IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 3, 2019

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON 

COUNTY EX REL. STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DELINQUENT TAXPAYERS 

AS SHOWN ON THE 2011 REAL PROPERTY TAX RECORDS OF THE 

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON 

COUNTY, TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 13-299-III Ellen H. Lyle, Chancellor

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No. M2018-00357-COA-R3-CV

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This case involves a dispute regarding a trial court’s assessment of interest on a parcel of 

real property subject to a redemption action. The trial court required the redeeming party 

to pay interest to the tax sale purchasers for the time that elapsed during the redemption 

proceedings. The redeeming party appealed the trial court’s application of interest to any 

period after the redeeming party had filed its notice of redemption. Following our 

thorough review of this issue, we agree that assessment of interest beyond the date of the 

filing of redemption notice was improper. We therefore reverse the trial court’s 

assessment of interest and modify the trial court’s judgment accordingly.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed in Part as Modified, Reversed in Part; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN 

STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., joined.

Charles Walker, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, REO Holdings, LLC.1

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

On March 8, 2013, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson 

County, Tennessee (“Metro”) filed a complaint in the Davidson County Chancery Court 

(“trial court”) against delinquent taxpayers as shown on the 2011 real property tax 

 

1 The appellees in this action did not file a brief.

07/24/2019
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records. As pertinent herein, Metro averred that the estate and heirs of Jessie Mills owed 

Metro outstanding taxes for a parcel of real property located at 1026 N. 7th Street in

Nashville (“the Property”). On April 18, 2013, William Mills, a purported heir of Jessie 

Mills, filed an answer contesting Metro’s allegation that 2011 real property taxes were 

overdue and asserting that a good faith effort had been made to work with Metro to pay 

the taxes on the Property. 

On October 25, 2013, Metro moved for judgment on the pleadings. In its motion, 

Metro alleged that no adequate defense to the delinquent tax action had been asserted in 

the answer and requested that the trial court award Metro the real property taxes owed, as 

well as interest, attorney’s fees, and court costs. The trial court conducted a hearing 

concerning the motion on November 22, 2013, and subsequently entered an order on 

December 2, 2013, granting Metro’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial 

court awarded to Metro real property taxes due on the Property for the years 2008 

through 2011 and granted Metro authority to collect those taxes through public auction of 

the Property if the judgment remained unpaid. Following the clerk and master’s 

provision of notice of a delinquent tax sale, on January 22, 2014, the Property was sold at 

public auction to Emily Girvin and Michael Beyer for $29,000.00. The trial court entered 

a “Final Decree Confirming Sale” on February 28, 2014. 

On February 24, 2015, Evans Realty Management LLC filed a “Notice of 

Redemption Process” in the trial court and tendered payment for the Property. Also on 

February 24, 2015, REO Holdings, LLC, (“REO”) filed a “Notice of Redemption 

Process” in the trial court and tendered payment for the Property.2 The tax sale 

purchasers subsequently filed a claim for the cost of lawn care and payment of the 2014 

real property taxes on the Property. The trial court set a hearing for May 28, 2015, 

concerning the claims and objections filed, to determine whether Evans Realty 

Management LLC or REO should be allowed to redeem the Property.

Following the filing of various pleadings by the parties, the trial court entered an 

order on December 11, 2015, transferring the matter from Chancellor Carol L. McCoy, 

who had recused herself, to Chancellor Ellen H. Lyle for further proceedings. 

Subsequently, on March 9, 2016, the trial court entered an order staying the matter due to

the institution of bankruptcy proceedings by REO. Following a remand from the 

bankruptcy court, the trial court set the matter for hearing to determine whether the 

Property could properly be redeemed by either Evans Realty Management LLC or REO.

The trial court conducted a hearing on February 6, 2018. On February 7, 2018, the 

trial court entered an order concluding that REO had rightly sought redemption as a 

 

2 REO subsequently filed documentation to demonstrate that it was a creditor of William Mills. Evans 

Realty Management LLC apparently claimed an interest in the Property derived from another purported 

heir, Liam Mills.
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creditor of William Mills. Thereafter, on February 16, 2018, the trial court entered a 

supplemental order wherein the court directed REO to pay Ms. Girvin and Mr. Beyer the 

additional amount of $8,633.70, representing interest at a rate of ten percent per annum 

on the purchase price of the Property ($29,000.00), for the time period of February 24, 

2015, through February 15, 2018. On February 27, 2018, William Mills filed a notice of 

appeal from the trial court’s February 7, 2018 order. REO filed a notice of appeal 

concerning the trial court’s February 16, 2018 order on March 5, 2018. On March 12, 

2018, the trial court entered an order directing that REO pay the $8,633.70 interest 

amount contained in the February 16, 2018 supplemental order directly to Ms. Girvin and 

Mr. Beyer. 

On June 19, 2018, this Court entered an order determining that the appeals filed by 

both William Mills and REO were untimely because the trial court had yet to issue a 

final, appealable judgment. As this Court explained:

The February 7, 2018 order contemplates further proceedings in the trial 

court including additional filings by attorney Franklin Brabson and an 

evidentiary hearing to quiet title. It appears an evidentiary hearing was set 

for May 15, 2018, but the record contains no order from that hearing. In 

addition, on May 8, 2018, Deborah Mills Butler, Darryl Keith Mills, and 

Faith Raynett Mills filed a petition to set aside the trial court’s prior orders.

The trial court must resolve all these matters before any appeal can proceed.

It is, therefore, ordered that, within ninety (90) days following the 

entry of this order, the parties shall either obtain a final judgment from the 

trial court and cause the same to be transmitted to this court in a certified 

supplemental record, or else show cause why the appeal should not be 

dismissed. The briefing schedule provided by Tenn. R. App. P. 29 shall run 

from the date the supplemental record is filed. 

The trial court entered a final order on August 14, 2018, reaffirming its earlier 

ruling that REO held a valid lien on the Property as a creditor of William Mills. The 

court further determined that the Property was owned by the four heirs of Jessie Mills, 

except that William Mills’s interest had been extinguished by REO’s lien. The court thus

determined that REO held a one-fourth ownership interest in the Property. The court 

ordered that REO was entitled to recover its expenses related to the Property in the 

amount of $52,964.43, to be divided equally among the three remaining heirs. The court 

further ordered that if such amounts had not been paid by the heirs on September 7, 2018, 

REO could file a motion for the Property to be sold.

On August 30, 2018, REO filed a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Tennessee 

Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04. In the motion, REO asked that the trial court require Ms. 

Girvin and Mr. Beyer to return the $8,633.70 in interest that REO had paid them, as REO 
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had been ordered to do by the court’s March 12, 2018 interlocutory order. REO asserted 

that pursuant to a recent opinion of this Court, Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty. 

v. Delinquent Taxpayers as Shown on 2011 Real Prop. Tax Record, No. M2018-00026-

COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 3532079, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018), no statutory 

authority existed that required REO to pay interest on the purchase price of the Property 

past the date that REO had filed for redemption and tendered payment.

Following various filings, on October 1, 2018, the trial court entered an order 

denying REO’s motion to alter or amend as untimely. In its order, the trial court 

disagreed with REO’s characterization of the March 12, 2018 order as “interlocutory” 

and concluded that it was a final order. The court explained that the March 12, 2018

order “left nothing else for the trial court to do on payment to the tax sale purchaser[s], 

Ms. Girvin and Mr. Beyer.” The trial court further observed that, “[a]ll claims between 

all parties regarding the tax sale were resolved and the redemption had been entirely 

disposed of” upon the trial court’s issuance of the March 12, 2018 order. Noting that 

REO’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion was filed long after expiration of 

the thirty-day window following entry of the March 18, 2018 order, the trial court 

concluded that REO’s motion was untimely and that the court could not alter or amend

the order. REO timely appealed. 

II. Issue Presented

REO presents the following issue for our review, which we have restated slightly:

Whether the trial court erred by requiring REO to pay interest on the 

Property’s purchase price to Ms. Girvin and Mr. Beyer for the time period 

following REO’s filing for redemption of the Property and tendering of 

payment. 

III. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s findings of fact following a bench trial de novo with a 

presumption of correctness unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See 

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Nashville Ford Tractor, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 194 S.W.3d 

415, 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de 

novo with no presumption of correctness. Hughes v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & 

Davidson Cty., 340 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tenn. 2011).

As our Supreme Court has explained concerning principles of statutory 

interpretation:

When dealing with statutory interpretation, well-defined precepts apply. 

Our primary objective is to carry out legislative intent without broadening 

or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope. Houghton v. Aramark 
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Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002). In construing 

legislative enactments, we presume that every word in a statute has 

meaning and purpose and should be given full effect if the obvious 

intention of the General Assembly is not violated by so doing. In re 

C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005). When a statute is clear, we 

apply the plain meaning without complicating the task. Eastman Chem. 

Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). Our obligation is 

simply to enforce the written language. Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., 

Inc., 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006). It is only when a statute is 

ambiguous that we may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history 

of the legislation, or other sources. Parks v. Tenn. Mun. League Risk 

Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1998). Further, the language of a 

statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, but “should be construed, if 

practicable, so that its component parts are consistent and reasonable.” 

Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968). Any 

interpretation of the statute that “would render one section of the act 

repugnant to another” should be avoided. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. City of 

Chattanooga, 172 Tenn. 505, 114 S.W.2d 441, 444 (1937). We also must 

presume that the General Assembly was aware of any prior enactments at 

the time the legislation passed. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 

(Tenn. 1995).

In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613-14 (Tenn. 2009).

IV. Assessment of Interest

REO asserts that the trial court erred in requiring REO to pay interest on the

purchase price of the Property for a period subsequent to REO’s filing of its notice of 

redemption and tendering of payment. Because the redemption statute was amended 

effective July 1, 2014, as a preliminary matter, this Court must determine which version 

of the redemption statute applies to the case at bar. This Court has elucidated that 

statutory provisions concerning redemption in effect at the time the property was sold at a 

tax auction shall govern the right of redemption for the property. See Delinquent 

Taxpayers as Shown on 2011 Real Prop. Tax Records of Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & 

Davidson Cty. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., No. M2015-02450-COAR3-CV, 2018 WL 3530842, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2018). As this Court therein 

stated, “[t]he right of redemption and the procedure by which it is exercised are created 

by statute and originate on the date of the tax sale.” Id. Therefore, in considering REO’s 

argument, this Court must apply the version of the applicable statute in effect at the time 

of the tax sale of the Property on January 22, 2014. 
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Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 67-5-2702, -2703, and -2704, as in effect on the 

date of the tax sale, govern this redemption action. Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-

2702 (2013) states that a party

entitled to redeem property may do so by paying the moneys to the clerk as 

required by § 67-5-2703 within one (1) year from the date of entry of the 

order of confirmation of sale, as evidenced by the records in the office of 

the clerk of the court responsible for the sale.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-2703 (2013) also provides that a redeeming party

shall pay to the clerk of the court who sold the property the amount paid for 

the delinquent taxes, interest and penalties, court costs and any court 

ordered charges, and interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum 

computed from the date of the sale on the entire purchase price paid at the 

sale.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-2704 (2013) states in pertinent part:

(a) Within ten (10) days of receipt of the money required for redemption as 

set forth in § 67-5-2703 and, if required, the statement setting forth the 

basis under which a person is entitled to redeem the property, the clerk shall 

send a notice to the purchaser of the property at the tax sale. This notice 

shall state that money to redeem the property has been tendered, the date of 

the tender, and that the purchaser shall have thirty (30) days from the date 

of the tender to file a motion requesting additional amounts to be paid to 

compensate the purchaser for any other lawful charges or moneys, 

including property taxes due or delinquent on the property, expended to 

preserve the value of the property or to otherwise protest the redemption. If 

the court finds that the purchaser has paid additional moneys, including 

property taxes due or delinquent on the property, for lawful charges in 

order to preserve the value of the property, the court shall order the person 

requesting to redeem the property to pay such additional sums to the clerk 

of court. “Lawful charges” as used in this subsection (a) include, but are 

not limited to, reasonable payments made for maintenance and insurance. 

In addition, the court shall direct the person entitled to redeem to pay a 

reasonable fee to the clerk and master or delinquent tax attorney for the 

preparation of the notices, motions, and orders required to give effect to the 

request to redeem the property. After any additional sums have been paid 

to the clerk, the court shall order that the redemption has been properly 

made, and the clerk shall disburse the purchase price with interest at a rate 

of ten percent (10%) per annum computed from the date of the tax sale to 

the purchaser. If the court finds that no additional sums are owing in order 
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to redeem, or upon expiration of the thirty-day period for the purchaser to 

file a motion to protest the redemption or to request additional moneys, the 

court shall order that redemption has been properly made, and the clerk 

shall disburse the purchase price, plus interest at a rate of ten percent (10%) 

per annum computed from the date of the sale, and any other moneys so 

ordered by the court to the purchaser. 

REO contends that the trial court erred in requiring it to pay interest on the 

Property for any period following REO’s filing for redemption and tender of payment. 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-2703 expressly requires that as part of the monies 

required to be paid to the clerk for redemption of property, interest be included as 

“computed from the date of the [tax] sale on the entire purchase price paid at the sale.” 

The statute, however, provides no specific termination date for the computation of such 

interest. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2703. This Court has resolved that ambiguity by 

looking to Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-2702, which expressly provides that all 

such monies be paid to the clerk within one year from the date of entry of the order 

finalizing the tax sale. See Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 2018 WL 

3532079, at *3. This Court specifically explained that “[b]ecause the redeeming party 

must pay its funds, including interest on the amount paid at the tax sale within one year, 

there is no authority in the statute for a longer period of interest.” Id. at *3. This Court 

went on to state that if “the legislature [had] intended the redeeming party to pay interest 

while redemption was proceeding, it could have expressly done so.” Id. 

A related statutory provision, Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-2704 (2013),

provides the process for disbursement of funds to the tax sale purchaser following a 

redeeming party’s tender of payment to the clerk of court. This statutory section requires 

that the clerk of court provide notice of tender to the tax sale purchasers, who are then 

entitled to respond with a request for additional compensation for “lawful charges” and 

expenditures made to preserve the value of a property following the tax sale. See Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 67-5-2704. Where tax sale purchasers request additional compensation, a 

trial court can choose to order a party seeking redemption to compensate the tax sale 

purchaser for any additional expenses that the tax sale purchaser made to preserve the

property’s value. Id. Although a trial court may assess a redeeming party for the value 

of a tax sale purchaser’s “lawful charges” related to preserving the value of a property, 

section 67-5-2704 does not grant a trial court the right to increase the period during 

which interest may accrue on the property. See Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson 

Cty., 2018 WL 3532079, at *3.

In the case at bar, the trial court entered a decree finalizing the tax sale of the 

Property on February 28, 2014. REO filed for redemption, concomitantly tendering

payment of the amount due, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-2703, on 

February 24, 2015. The trial court ultimately entered an order on March 12, 2018, 

wherein it required REO to pay to the tax sale purchasers ten percent interest on the 
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purchase price of the Property for a period beginning on February 24, 2015, and ending 

on February 15, 2018. We determine that this directive from the trial court was

inconsistent with Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-2704. As this Court has previously 

explained, a redeeming party such as REO has no obligation to compensate tax sale 

purchasers for interest accruing during the pendency of redemption proceedings. See 

Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 2018 WL 3532079, at *3. REO, by statute, 

only owed interest to Ms. Girvin and Mr. Beyer for a period beginning on the date on 

which the tax sale was confirmed by the trial court, February 28, 2014, and ending on the 

date when REO filed for redemption and tendered payment, February 24, 2015. We 

therefore determine that the trial court erred in its assessment of interest on the Property 

beyond February 24, 2015.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment 

concerning interest owed to the tax sale purchasers. We modify the judgment to award 

interest only until February 24, 2015. This case is remanded for reassessment of the 

amount of interest owed consistent with this Opinion. The remainder of the trial court’s 

judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are assessed one-half to the appellant, REO 

Holdings, LLC, and one-half to the appellees, Emily Girvin and Michael Beyer. 

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THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE