NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TEJBEER SINGH, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-70906 

Agency No. A215-666-767 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 6, 2021**

Pasadena, California

Before: KLEINFELD, NGUYEN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Tejbeer Singh, a native and citizen of India, challenges the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of his appeal of an immigration judge’s (IJ) 

denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

Convention Against Torture. He also challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 6 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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remand for consideration of eligibility for voluntary departure. We have 

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant the petition in part and deny it in 

part.

1. The government’s failure to include the time and place of proceedings in 

Singh’s putative Notice to Appear (NTA) did not deprive the IJ of jurisdiction over 

Singh’s removal proceedings. See Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 

2019). Therefore, we deny Singh’s petition to the extent he challenges the 

agency’s jurisdiction.

2. Singh sufficiently exhausted his challenge to the IJ’s adverse credibility 

determination because his BIA brief put the BIA on notice of this challenge. See 

Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2020). Yet the BIA failed to discuss any 

of the reasons underpinning the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. We 

therefore remand with instructions to consider whether, based upon the specific 

inconsistencies and implausibilities the IJ identified, the adverse credibility finding 

was clearly erroneous. See Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“[W]e do not review those parts of the IJ’s adverse credibility finding that the BIA 

did not identify as ‘most significant’ and did not otherwise mention.”).

3. Singh sufficiently raised his challenge to the IJ’s past persecution finding,

see Bare, 975 F.3d at 960, yet the BIA failed to address it. Because the BIA is 

“not free to ignore arguments raised by a petitioner,” we remand for the BIA to 
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consider Singh’s challenge to the IJ’s past persecution finding. Sagaydak v. 

Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). 

4. Under Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, Singh’s period of continuous physical 

presence for purposes of post-conclusion voluntary departure did not end when the 

government served the putative NTA or when the immigration court later mailed 

Singh a hearing notice. 3 F.4th 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[A] noncitizen builds 

up physical-presence time under § 1229c(b)(1)(A) from the moment he enters the 

United States until the moment he receives a single document that provides him 

with all the information Congress listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)—i.e., a § 1229(a) 

NTA.”) (emphasis added). We therefore remand the BIA’s denial of Singh’s 

motion to remand so that the BIA can reconsider Singh’s eligibility for voluntary 

departure under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(A). 

5. Singh argues that because the government failed to serve him with an NTA 

that complied with 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), his proceedings should be terminated. NizChavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021), which was decided after the BIA 

issued their decision in Singh’s case, may be relevant to this question. We 

therefore remand for the BIA to consider in the first instance what remedy, if any, 

is appropriate for the government’s failure to issue an NTA that complies with the 

statute. See INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (describing the 

ordinary remand rule). 
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PETITION GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.

1

 

1 The motion for a stay of removal [Dkt. No. 6] is granted. Singh’s removal 

is stayed pending a decision by the BIA. Each party shall bear its own costs.