IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JOHN T. DRIGGUS

, : : C.A. No.: K 23 C

- 0 1

- 01 5 JJC Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

: STATE FARM MUTUAL : AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE : COMPANY, :

:

: Defendant. :

Submitted: December 16 , 2023 Decided: January 8 , 2024

ORDER

On this 8 th day of January 2024, after considering Plaintiff John Driggus ’

motion for re argument
, and Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company’s opposition to that motion , it appears that:

1. Mr. Driggus sued State Farm for personal injury and property damage

that he alleges resulted from a January 2021 automobile accident

. 1 State Farm
insured both Mr. Driggus and the other driver for the accident under separate policies

of insurance. 2 In Mr. Driggus ’ complaint, he did not name the other driver as a

defendant even though he contended that the other driver’s negligence was the sole
proximate cause of his injuries and losses. 3 Under the circumstances , the most

1 D.I. 1.

2 D.I. 31.

3 D.I. 1.2

reasonable reading of his complaint suppor t ed a claim for only uninsured or

underinsured (hereafter “UM/UIM”) benefits from his own policy. 4

2. State Farm then moved to dismiss Mr. Driggus’ complaint for fai lure to

state a UM/UIM claim

. 5 Because the parties relied upon matters outside the
pleadings to support their positions , the Court elected to convert State Farm’s motion

to one for summary judgment

. 6 Accordingly , the Court provided the parties
additional time to supplement the summary judgment record

. 3. After considering the parties’ positions and their evidentiary
supplements, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm for three

reasons

. 7 First, the other driver , and not State Farm, w ould have been the proper party in interest for Mr. Driggus ’ claim for benefits from the other driver’s State
Farm policy

. 8 When Mr. Driggus declined to sue the other driver

, it became
impossible for him t o exhaust available coverage from th e other driver’s policy

. 9

Second, Mr. Driggus fai led to demonstrate that the other drive r had either (1) no

insurance

, or (2) that Mr. Driggus had exhausted the other driver’s insuranc e

. Accordingly, Mr. Driggus could not recover uninsured or underinsured benefits from
his own policy because he met nei ther prerequisite

. 10 Third and finally, the Court

observed that even if Mr. Driggus were to move to add the other driver as a

4 Id

. 5 D.I. 19.

6 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).

7 Driggus v. State Farm Mutual Auto

. Ins

. Co

. , 2023 WL 7599490 (Del. Super. Nov. 15, 2023).

8 Id. at * 4 ; s ee also Parker v. Breckin , 620 A.2d 229,232 (Del. 1993) (recognizing that in an automobile accident claim, the individual tortfeasor

, and not the insurance carrier

, is the proper party in interest).

9 18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(3) ( providing that an insurer is not required to pay UM/UIM benefits “until after the limits of liability under all bodily injury bonds and insurance policies available to the insured at the time of the accident have been exhausted by payment of settlement or judgments”)

. 10 Driggus , 2023 WL 7599490, at * 4 ; see also Dunlap v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co ., 878 A.2d 434, 439

- 40 (Del. 3005) (recognizing that an insurance carrier is not obligated to p ay its insured until after the insured exhaust s all available liability policies).3

defendant, the attempt would be futile because the two statute s of limitations that
apply to property damage and personal injury claims had expired

. 11

4. Presently, Mr. Driggus asks the Court to reconsider its decision granting
summary judgment. 12 In his motion, he emphasizes that State Farm separately

insured both parties involved in the accident. 13 Mr. Driggus does not request

reconsideration of the Court’s decision that UM/UIM benefits are unavailable to him

as a matter of law. Rather, he reiterates his belief that suing State Farm within two

years of the date of the accident complied with the statute s of limitations as to the

other driver. 14 On that basis , he maintains that he can recover compensation directly
from the other driver’s State Farm policy without suing him. 15

5. State Farm counters that Mr. Driggus neither alleged, nor provided

evidence, t hat he exhausted the alleged tortfeasor’s liability policy. 16 Further more , State Farm emphasizes that the two

- year statutes of limitation s for (1) bodily injury

and (2) property damage claims against the tortfeasor have expired. 17 F or that

reason , State Farm reiterates that Mr. Driggus’ failure to sue the proper party in

interest within two years of the accident make s it impossible to sue the other driver. 18

6. In a motion for reargument under Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e) , the

Court must examine whether it overlooked controlling precedent or legal principles,

11 Driggus , 2023 WL 7599490, at * 4 . Mr. Driggus did not attempt to amend his complaint to add the alleged tortfeasor as a party. In addition, Mr. Driggus did not contend, and the record did not independently demonstrate , that the individual tortfeasor had any knowledge that Mr. Driggus had filed suit , which could have triggered a relation back analysis under Superior Court Civil Rule 15(c)(3). Because of Mr. Driggus’ pro se status, however, the Court independently examined the question of whether he could remedy the infirmity through an amendment. The expiration of the statutes of limi tation would have made it futile to do so.

12 D.I. 31.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 D.I. 32.

17 Id.

18 Id.4

or whether it misapprehended the law or facts in a way that would have changed the
outcome of the challenged decision. 19 A motion for reargument is not a mechanism

to rehash a rguments already decided by the Court. 20

7. Here, Mr. Driggus merely reargues what he raised during the summary
judgment proceeding

. His motion focuses primarily on the fact that State Farm
separately insu red both he and the alleged tortfeasor. To that e nd, Mr. Driggus

maintains that he satisfied the statutes of limitations that applied to his claim s against

the individual tortfeasor when he sued State Farm

. 21

8. Mr. Driggus unfortunately misunderstands who is the proper party in

interest in an automobile negligence case

. Namely, the injured party must sue th e

other driver

– not the other driver’s insur ance company

– to successfully recover

third

- party liability benefits from the other driver’s policy

. 22 Mr. Driggus did not

which makes reco very from the other driver ’s liability policy impossible

. 9. Given Mr. Driggus’ inability to recover benefits from the other driver’s
policy, his only other potential recovery would be from his own UM/UIM policy

. To sustain such a claim, Mr. Driggus would have had to demonstrate that the other

driver had no available insurance coverage for the accident, or that he first exhausted
the other driver’s coverage through suit or settlement. 23 As the Court explained in
its summary judgment decision, he met neither prerequisite . As a result, s ummary judgment denying his claim to recover UM/UIM benefits remains appropriate.

10. In summary , Mr. Driggus raises no new arguments to justify

reconsideration of the Court’s decision

. T he Court cannot excuse mandatory

statutory and contractual requirement s that include d (1) the need for him to sue the

19 Petit v. Country Life Homes, Inc., 2005 WL 3194392, at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 29, 2005).

20 Id.

21 D.I. 31.

22 Breckin , 620 A.2d at 232

. 23 18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(3).5

proper party within the statutes of limitation s, (2) the need to comply with 18 Del.

C. § 3902(b)(3) ’s require ments, and (3) the need to satisfy the conditions of his
policy.

WHEREFORE

, for the reasons above, Mr. Driggus’ motion for reargument

must be DENIED

. IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jeffrey J Clark Resident Judge