Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Hoke, 2019 IL App (4th) 150544-B

Appellate Court 

Caption

ENBRIDGE PIPELINE (ILLINOIS), LLC, n/k/a Illinois Extension 

Pipeline Company, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDWARD HOKE; 

SONNA H. HOKE; NONRECORD CLAIMANTS; and UNKNOWN 

OWNERS, Defendants (Thomas J. Pliura, Appellant).–ENBRIDGE 

PIPELINE (ILLINOIS), LLC, n/k/a Illinois Extension Pipeline 

Company, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PMC FARMS, LLC; 

CHARLES MURPHY, Tenant; NONRECORD CLAIMANTS; and 

UNKNOWN OWNERS, Defendants (Thomas J. Pliura, Appellant).

District & No. Fourth District

Docket Nos. 4-15-0544, 4-15-0545 cons.

Filed January 28, 2019

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Witt County, Nos. 14-ED-3, 

14-ED-4; the Hon. William Hugh Finson, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Thomas J. Pliura, of LeRoy, appellant pro se.

Gerald A. Ambrose, of Sidley Austin LLP, of Chicago, and John M. 

Spesia and Jacob E. Gancarczyk, of Spesia & Ayers, of Joliet, for 

appellee.
- 2 - 

Panel JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Holder White and Justice Turner concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 In the summer of 2014, Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC, now known as the Illinois 

Extension Pipeline Company, LLC (IEPC), brought an easement condemnation action against 

(1) Edward Hoke and Sonna H. Hoke and (2) PMC Farms, LLC, and its tenant, Charles 

Murphy (collectively, landowners). See Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Hoke, 2017 IL 

App (4th) 150544, ¶ 2, 80 N.E.3d 807. Landowners subsequently filed traverse motions. Id. (A 

traverse motion is filed to oppose the condemnation of private property and challenges (1) the 

rebuttable presumption of public use and public necessity and (2) the presumption that the 

condemner negotiated in good-faith. See id. ¶ 134.) Ultimately, the trial court denied 

landowners’ traverse motions, and landowners appealed. Id. ¶ 2 

¶ 2 In July 2017, this court vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded the proceeding for the 

trial court to consider “only two matters on remand, which are landowners’ claims challenging 

(1) the rebuttable presumptions of public use and public necessity and (2) the [Illinois 

Commerce] Commission’s determination as to good-faith negotiations.” Id. ¶ 134. This court 

retained jurisdiction to review the trial court’s ruling on remand. Id. ¶ 146; Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b) 

(eff. Jan. 1, 1967). 

¶ 3 In January 2018, Thomas J. Pliura, the attorney representing landowners, filed a 

memorandum entitled “Evidence Landowners Seek To Present To Rebut The ‘Good-Faith 

Negotiation’ Presumption” (memorandum) in support of landowners’ traverse motions. In this 

memorandum, Pliura argued that, based on the totality of the circumstances, IEPC did not 

negotiate in good faith. One of the factors that Pliura cited was that IEPC gave landowners 

only a 10-day time frame in which to respond to the final offer. In May 2018, after conducting 

a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied landowners’ traverse motions.

¶ 4 Also in May 2018, IEPC filed a motion for sanctions against Pliura pursuant to Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). In July 2018, the trial court sanctioned Pliura, 

concluding that his memorandum “was not objectively reasonable and was filed solely to 

harass, to cause unnecessary delay, and/or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” 

¶ 5 Pliura appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sanction him, 

(2) IEPC’s motion for sanctions was procedurally insufficient, (3) the trial court was required 

to conduct an evidentiary hearing before imposing sanctions, and (4) the trial court abused its 

discretion by sanctioning him. We disagree with Pliura and conclude that (1) the trial court had 

jurisdiction, (2) Pliura forfeited his argument that the motion for sanctions was procedurally 

insufficient, (3) Pliura forfeited his argument regarding the need for an evidentiary hearing, 

and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning him. 

¶ 6 Also in this appeal, IEPC (1) suggests that this court should sanction Pliura pursuant to 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and (2) requests oral argument pursuant 

to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). We decline both IEPC’s suggestion 

and request. 
- 3 - 

¶ 7 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 8 A. The First Appeal 

¶ 9 In the summer of 2014, IEPC brought an easement condemnation action against 

landowners. See Hoke, 2017 IL App (4th) 150544, ¶ 28. Landowners subsequently filed 

traverse motions, arguing that IEPC’s condemnation suit should be dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 29-31. 

Ultimately, the trial court denied landowners’ traverse motions. Id. ¶ 41. Landowners 

appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying them the ability to conduct discovery. Id. 

¶ 122. In July 2017, this court concluded that “landowners were entitled to present relevant 

evidence to rebut these specific presumptions and to refute the good-faith finding.” Id. ¶ 133. 

This court remanded the case back to the trial court to consider “only two matters on remand, 

which are landowners’ claims challenging (1) the rebuttable presumptions of public use and 

public necessity and (2) the [Illinois Commerce] Commission’s determination as to good-faith 

negotiations.” Id. ¶ 134. We further concluded that “[c]onsistent with the limited nature of a 

traverse motion as well as our limited remand, we direct the trial court to assume control of the 

discovery proceedings in the instant case.” Id. ¶ 136. This court retained jurisdiction to review 

the trial court’s ruling on remand. Id. ¶ 146; Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). 

¶ 10 B. Pliura’s Memorandum

¶ 11 In January 2018, Pliura filed his memorandum in support of the traverse motions in which 

he argued that, based on the totality of the circumstances, IEPC did not negotiate in good faith. 

One of these factors was “[t]he 10 day timeframe, from the date of the offers mailing, [IEPC] 

gave to the landowners to respond to the offers.” Another factor was the “failure by [IEPC] to 

base their offers to the landowners on an appraisal.”

¶ 12 In April 2018, IEPC filed a response to Pliura’s memorandum in which it argued that it had 

negotiated in good faith. In that response, IEPC also noted that it had previously informed 

landowners that it had based its final offer to landowners on a professional market analysis of 

current property values and provided landowners a “compensation worksheet” showing how it 

determined the final offer. IEPC also argued that it (1) was not required to provide more than 

10 days to accept the final offer and (2) Pliura’s memorandum was contrary to existing law and 

not supported by the evidence. 

¶ 13 In May 2018, the trial court conducted a traverse hearing. After hearing argument from 

both sides, the court concluded that landowners failed to rebut (1) the presumption of public 

use and public necessity and (2) the presumption that the condemnor negotiated in good faith. 

Accordingly, the trial court denied landowners’ traverse motions.

¶ 14 C. The Motion for Sanctions 

¶ 15 Also in May 2018, citing Pliura’s memorandum, IEPC filed a motion for sanctions 

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), in which IEPC asserted that 

(1) Pliura knowingly made legal arguments that are contrary to binding precedent and (2) there 

was no good-faith basis in fact to support Pliura’s arguments. Pliura filed a response in which 

he (1) rejected IEPC’s assertions and (2) alleged that IEPC had filed its motion for sanctions 

for an improper purpose. Later that month, the trial court conducted a hearing on IEPC’s 

motion for sanctions. After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court granted IEPC’s 

motion because it concluded that Pliura’s motion “raised issues that have no basis in law. Some 
- 4 - 

of the issues he raises have no basis in fact.” In June 2018, IEPC filed a “Verified Accounting 

of Fees and Expenses” and requested the trial court to order Pliura to pay $162,465 in attorney 

fees, as well as $56,246.25 in additional fines. 

¶ 16 D. The Trial Court’s Order

¶ 17 In July 2018, the trial court sanctioned Pliura in the amount of $61,516.10 and further 

ordered that Pliura could not bill his clients for this amount. The court concluded that Pliura’s 

memorandum “was not objectively reasonable and was filed solely to harass, to cause 

unnecessary delay, and/or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” The court explained 

that one of the reasons why it sanctioned Pliura was because his 10-day argument had been 

previously rejected in Enbridge Energy, Ltd. Partnership v. Fry, 2017 IL App (3d) 150765, 

¶ 48, 79 N.E.3d 246, and in Forest Preserve District v. First National Bank of Franklin Park, 

2011 IL 110759, ¶ 68, 961 N.E.2d 775. 

¶ 18 Later in July 2018, Pliura filed a motion to reconsider in which he argued that (1) the trial 

court did not have jurisdiction to sanction him and (2) IEPC’s Rule 137 motion for sanctions 

was procedurally insufficient. In August 2018, the parties tried to schedule a hearing on the 

motion to reconsider, but the trial court declined this request, concluding that it was without 

jurisdiction because the circuit clerk had already certified the record and returned it to the 

appellate court. 

¶ 19 This appeal followed. 

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 21 Pliura appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sanction him, 

(2) IEPC’s motion for sanctions was procedurally insufficient, (3) the trial court was required 

to conduct an evidentiary hearing before imposing sanctions, and (4) the trial court abused its 

discretion by sanctioning him. We disagree with Pliura and conclude that (1) the trial court had 

jurisdiction, (2) Pliura forfeited his argument that the motion for sanctions was procedurally 

insufficient, (3) Pliura forfeited his argument regarding the need for an evidentiary hearing, 

and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning him. 

¶ 22 Also in this appeal, IEPC (1) suggests that this court should sanction Pliura pursuant to 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and (2) requests oral argument pursuant 

to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). We decline both IEPC’s suggestion 

and request. 

¶ 23 A. The Trial Court’s Jurisdiction

¶ 24 Pliura first argues that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to sanction 

him on remand. We disagree. 

¶ 25 1. The Applicable Law

¶ 26 Jurisdiction is commonly understood as consisting of two elements: personal jurisdiction 

and subject-matter jurisdiction. People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 12, 43 N.E.3d 932. 

Personal jurisdiction refers to the court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative process. 

Id. Subject-matter jurisdiction “refers to the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the 

general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.” Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota 
- 5 - 

Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334, 770 N.E.2d 177, 184 (2002). With the sole 

exception of the trial court’s power to review administrative actions, which is conferred by 

statute, the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred entirely by the Illinois 

Constitution, which provides that the trial court’s jurisdiction extends to all “justiciable matters 

except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. 

VI, § 9; Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 334. A matter is justiciable when it presents “a 

controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to 

hypothetical or moot.” Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 335. As long as a matter brought 

before the trial court is justiciable and does not fall within the original and exclusive 

jurisdiction of the supreme court, the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. In re Marriage 

of Armstrong, 2016 IL App (2d) 150815, ¶ 17, 68 N.E.3d 1039. Whether the trial court had 

jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. McCormick v. Robertson, 2014 IL App 

(4th) 140208, ¶ 15, 15 N.E.3d 968. 

¶ 27 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) provides as follows: 

“Every pleading, motion and other document of a party represented by an attorney shall 

be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall 

be stated. *** The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that 

he has read the pleading, motion or other document; that to the best of his knowledge, 

information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 

warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or 

reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as 

to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. *** 

If a pleading, motion, or other document is signed in violation of this rule, the court, 

upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a 

represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay 

to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the 

filing of the pleading, motion or other document, including a reasonable attorney fee.” 

¶ 28 The timely filing of a notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction from the trial court to the 

appellate court. General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 173, 950 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 

(2011). Once the notice of appeal is filed, the appellate court’s jurisdiction attaches 

immediately, and the cause of action is then beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court. Id. 

However, the trial court retains jurisdiction after the notice of appeal is filed to determine 

matters that are collateral or incidental to the judgment. Id. at 173-74. For example, “a trial 

court has jurisdiction over a motion for sanctions notwithstanding a previously filed notice of 

appeal.” Physicians Insurance Exchange v. Jennings, 316 Ill. App. 3d 443, 454, 736 N.E.2d 

179, 188 (2000); see also American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Bus, 212 Ill. App. 

3d 133, 137, 569 N.E.2d 1377, 1380 (1991) (“[T]he plaintiffs’ appeal from the summary 

judgment order did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction to consider the section 2-611 

motion [for sanctions].”).

¶ 29 Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), the appellate court may 

remand a matter to the trial court for a limited purpose while retaining jurisdiction of a case. 

People v. Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d 189, 195, 564 N.E.2d 784, 787 (1990). When a matter is 

remanded, the trial court can conduct only those proceedings which conform to the appellate 

court’s instructions. People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Firstar Illinois, 365 Ill. 
- 6 - 

App. 3d 936, 939, 851 N.E.2d 682, 685 (2006). Whether the trial court violated the appellate 

court’s instructions is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id.

¶ 30 The interpretation of supreme court rules are governed by the same principles that govern 

the interpretation of statutes. People v. Santiago, 236 Ill. 2d 417, 428, 925 N.E.2d 1122, 1128 

(2010). A court’s goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the drafters of the rule. 

People v. Tousignant, 2014 IL 115329, ¶ 8, 5 N.E.3d 176. The most reliable indicator of that 

intent is the language of the rule, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Rules 

must be construed to avoid absurd results. In re C.P., 2018 IL App (4th) 180310, ¶ 18. The 

interpretation of a supreme court rule is a question of law reviewed de novo. People v. 

Brindley, 2017 IL App (5th) 160189, ¶ 15, 82 N.E.3d 856. 

¶ 31 2. This Case

¶ 32 On landowners’ first appeal, this court gave the following instructions for remand:

“Based on the aforementioned discussion of the proper scope of a traverse hearing, 

the trial court should consider only two matters on remand, which are landowners’ 

claims challenging (1) the rebuttable presumptions of public use and public necessity 

and (2) the Commission’s determination as to good-faith negotiations, as generally set 

forth in *** landowners’ July 2014 traverse motion.” Hoke, 2017 IL App (4th) 150544, 

¶ 134.

¶ 33 Based on this court’s remand instructions, Pliura argues that the trial court did not have 

subject-matter jurisdiction to impose sanctions. See id. Instead, he argues the trial court could 

rule only on “landowners’ claims challenging (1) the rebuttable presumptions of public use 

and public necessity and (2) the Commission’s determination as to good-faith negotiations.” 

Id. This jurisdictional argument has no merit. Jennings, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 454 (“[A] trial court 

has jurisdiction over a motion for sanctions notwithstanding a previously filed notice of 

appeal.”). 

¶ 34 We also emphatically reject this argument because Rule 137 always applies to all matters 

properly before the trial court. Upon our remand in this case, the trial court had authority to 

rule on certain designated landowners’ claims and to receive pleadings from the parties 

regarding those claims. As with every pleading, motion, or other document filed in the trial 

court, the pleadings the parties filed in the trial court in this case upon remand needed to 

comply with all the requirements of Rule 137. 

¶ 35 Our remand instructions did not alter the trial court’s authority to sanction Pliura. Rule 137 

applies to any document signed by counsel and submitted to the trial court. We emphasize that 

although we limited the scope of remand pursuant to Rule 615(b), that limitation did not affect 

the trial court’s inherent authority under Rule 137. To conclude otherwise would strip the trial 

court of its authority to prevent the filing of frivolous pleadings, motions, or 

documents—which would be an absurd result. Accordingly, we reject Pliura’s argument. 

¶ 36 B. Procedural Requirements 

¶ 37 Next, Pliura argues that IEPC’s motion for sanctions was procedurally insufficient because 

it failed to comply with the pleading requirements in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 

(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-603 (West 2016)). Pliura claims that IEPC’s alleged failure to comply 

with the Code made it “virtually impossible for [him] to respond to each allegation or claim. It 
- 7 - 

[made] it nearly impossible to do anything other than generally deny the conclusory 

allegations.” We conclude that this argument is both forfeited and without merit.

¶ 38 Forfeiture applies when an issue is not raised in a timely manner. Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore 

Drive Condominium Ass’n, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 26, 988 N.E.2d 75. Issues not raised before the 

trial court are deemed forfeited and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. In re Ronald 

J., 2017 IL App (4th) 160855, ¶ 22, 74 N.E.3d 1178. Likewise, an argument made for the first 

time in a motion to reconsider is forfeited on appeal. People v. Ross, 2017 IL App (4th) 

170121, ¶ 32, 92 N.E.3d 999; Vantage Hospitality Group, Inc. v. Q Ill Development, LLC, 

2016 IL App (4th) 160271, ¶¶ 46-47, 71 N.E.3d 1. 

¶ 39 After IEPC filed its motion for sanctions, Pliura filed a 17-page response, but in that 

response, Pliura never argued that IEPC’s motion failed to comply with the Code. Instead, 

Pliura raised this issue for the first time in his motion to reconsider. Accordingly, this issue is 

forfeited. See Vantage Hospitality Group, Inc., 2016 IL App (4th) 160271, ¶ 47.

¶ 40 Alternatively, the law is clear that a motion for sanctions under Rule 137 is not a pleading. 

In In re Marriage of Nesbitt, 377 Ill. App. 3d 649, 660, 879 N.E.2d 445, 455 (2007), the First 

District concluded that “Sections 2-619 and 2-615 of the Code apply only to pleadings. 735 

ILCS 5/2-619, 2-615 (West 2004); [citations]. A motion for Rule 137 sanctions is not a 

pleading and, thus, is not capable of being stricken under either section.” Accordingly, we 

deem Pliura’s argument as additionally without merit. 

¶ 41 C. Evidentiary Hearing 

¶ 42 Pliura filed a supplemental brief in this court in which he argued that the trial court erred by 

sanctioning him under Rule 137 because it did not conduct an evidentiary hearing. We 

conclude that this argument is forfeited. 

¶ 43 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) governs the contents of an appellate 

brief. Rule 341(h)(7) requires that an argument “contain the contentions of the appellant and 

the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Id. 

“The failure to provide proper citations to the record is a violation of Rule 341(h)(7), the 

consequence of which is the forfeiture of the argument.” Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 

2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 12, 969 N.E.2d 930. “Mere contentions, without argument or 

citation to authority, do not merit consideration on appeal.” Id. 

¶ 44 Pliura’s supplemental brief lacks adequate citation to the record. Further, based on the 

record in this case, it appears that Pliura did not object to the proceedings or request that an 

evidentiary hearing be conducted. This court “will not search the record for purposes of finding 

error *** when an appellant has made no good-faith effort to comply with the supreme court 

rules governing the contents of briefs.” In re Estate of Parker, 2011 IL App (1st) 102871, ¶ 47, 

957 N.E.2d 454. Accordingly, this argument is forfeited. 

¶ 45 D. The Trial Court’s Sanctions

¶ 46 Last, Pliura argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sanctioning him pursuant to 

Rule 137. We disagree. 
- 8 - 

¶ 47 1. The Applicable Law on Rule 137 Sanctions

¶ 48 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) authorizes the trial court to impose 

sanctions against a party or its attorney when a motion or pleading is “not well grounded in 

fact, not supported by existing law, or lacks a good-faith basis for modification, reversal, or 

extension of the law, or is interposed for any improper purpose.” Whitmer v. Munson, 335 Ill. 

App. 3d 501, 513-14, 781 N.E.2d 618, 628 (2002). The attorney’s conduct must be judged by 

an objective standard. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Ivicic, 2015 IL App (2d) 140970, 

¶ 24, 46 N.E.3d 395. Because Rule 137 is penal in nature, it must be strictly construed. Id. “The 

purpose of Rule 137 is to prevent the filing of false and frivolous lawsuits.” Yunker v. Farmers 

Automobile Management Corp., 404 Ill. App. 3d 816, 824, 935 N.E.2d 630, 637 (2010). “The 

rule is not intended to penalize litigants and their attorneys because they were zealous but 

unsuccessful in pursuing an action.” Id. 

¶ 49 The appellate court will reverse the trial court’s imposition of Rule 137 sanctions only if 

the trial court abused its discretion. Mohica v. Cvejin, 2013 IL App (1st) 111695, ¶ 47, 990 

N.E.2d 720. “[W]e utilize this deferential standard, in part, because the conduct at issue 

occurred before the trial judge, who is then in the best position to determine whether the 

conduct warranted penal sanctions ***.” Id. ¶ 78 (Gordon, J., specially concurring). A trial 

court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person would agree with its decision. Lake 

Environmental, Inc. v. Arnold, 2015 IL 118110, ¶ 16, 39 N.E.3d 992. A reviewing court may 

affirm the trial court’s imposition of sanctions for any reason provided in the record. Id.

Further, “a litigant cannot expect to avoid all sanctions under Rule 137 merely because the 

pleading was not entirely frivolous.” Walsh v. Capital Engineering & Manufacturing Co., 312 

Ill. App. 3d 910, 919, 728 N.E.2d 575, 582 (2000). 

¶ 50 2. The Applicable Law on Negotiations in Good Faith

¶ 51 In Forest Preserve District, 2011 IL 110759, ¶ 68, the Illinois Supreme Court wrote the 

following regarding good-faith negotiations: 

“Defendants make two additional arguments related to good faith. They argue that 

the District’s lack of good faith is shown by its failure to attach an appraisal to its offer 

letters and by setting a limit of 10 days for negotiations. *** No Illinois court has ever 

held that including ‘the basis for computing’ the amount of compensation means that 

the condemning authority must actually tender its own appraisal to the landowner. *** 

Similarly, we conclude that a condemning body is not legally constrained to provide 

more than 10 days for negotiations in order to satisfy the good-faith requirement.”

¶ 52 In Fry, 2017 IL App (3d) 150765, ¶¶ 48-50, an appeal in which Pliura was the attorney of 

record, the Third District concluded as follows: 

“Evidence that an offer was made by the condemning authority based upon the advice 

of an experienced appraisal consultant is generally sufficient to establish a good-faith 

attempt to agree. Forest Preserve District v. First National Bank of Franklin Park, 

2011 IL 110759, ¶ 63. To satisfy the good-faith negotiation prerequisite, however, the 

condemning authority is not required to tender its own appraisals to the landowner. Id.

¶ 68. In addition, the condemning authority is not required to provide more than 10 

days for negotiations in order to satisfy the good-faith requirement. Id. 

 ***
- 9 - 

 *** As noted above, and contrary to the landowners’ assertion here, Enbridge was 

not required to tender its land market survey to the landowners during negotiations to 

satisfy the good-faith requirement. See Forest Preserve District, 2011 IL 110759, ¶ 68. 

Under the circumstances of the present case, the trial court did not err in the manner in 

which it conducted the proceedings on the traverse motion, in finding that Enbridge 

had made a good faith offer of just compensation, or in ultimately denying the traverse 

motion.” 

¶ 53 3. This Case

¶ 54 Before the trial court in this case, Pliura argued that, based on the totality of the 

circumstances, IEPC did not negotiate in good faith. One of the factors which Pliura cited was 

“[t]he 10 day timeframe [sic], from the date of the offers mailing, Enbridge gave to the 

landowners to respond to the offers.” However, the Illinois Supreme Court had already 

concluded that “a condemning body is not legally constrained to provide more than 10 days for 

negotiations in order to satisfy the good-faith requirement.” Forest Preserve District, 2011 IL 

110759, ¶ 68. Likewise, in a case where Pliura was the attorney of record, the Third District 

concluded that “the condemning authority is not required to provide more than 10 days for 

negotiations in order to satisfy the good-faith requirement.” Fry, 2017 IL App (3d) 150765, 

¶ 48. Both of these decisions were cited by the trial court in its decision to impose sanctions 

against Pliura under Rule 137. Based upon the above-quoted language from those cases, we 

conclude that the trial court’s sanction was not an abuse of discretion. 

¶ 55 On appeal, Pliura contends that “[t]he point of emphasis here is NOT that landowners were 

given only ten days to respond, but instead that [IEPC] failed to inform the landowners how it 

determined fair market value.” This assertion is contradicted by the record. In previous written 

exchanges between IEPC and landowners, as well as in argument before the Illinois 

Commerce Commission (at which Pliura appeared and represented landowners), IEPC 

explained that it based its offers on a land market study. Furthermore, in its final offer to 

landowners, IEPC included a “compensation worksheet” showing how it determined the final 

offer. 

¶ 56 E. Rule 375 Sanctions 

¶ 57 IEPC suggests that we sua sponte sanction Pliura pursuant to Rule 375(b). (We note that 

IEPC in this appeal has not formally requested this court to impose sanctions under Rule 

375(b) but merely—and indirectly—suggests that action.) We decline to do so. 

¶ 58 Rule 375(b) empowers a reviewing court to sanction an attorney sua sponte if it determines 

that an appeal is frivolous or not taken in good faith. Garlick v. Bloomingdale Township, 2018 

IL App (2d) 171013, ¶ 59. An appeal is frivolous when (1) it is not reasonably well-grounded 

in fact; (2) it is not warranted by existing law; (3) it is not a good-faith argument for the 

extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; or (4) a reasonable attorney would not 

have brought the appeal. Goldberg v. Michael, 328 Ill. App. 3d 593, 600, 766 N.E.2d 246, 252 

(2002). An appeal is not taken in good faith when the primary purpose of the appeal is to delay, 

harass, or cause needless expense. Id. at 600-01. This is an objective test. Bloomingdale 

Township, 2018 IL App (2d) 171013, ¶ 59. 

¶ 59 If a reviewing court initiates the sanction proceedings (which the posture of this case would 

require this court to do, given that IEPC only suggests but does not request that action), the 
- 10 - 

reviewing court shall require the attorney “to show cause why such a sanction should not be 

imposed before imposing the sanction.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 

1994). When a sanction is imposed, the reviewing court will set forth the reasons and basis for 

the sanction in its opinion or in a separate written order. Id. However, the imposition of Rule 

375(b) sanctions “is left entirely to the discretion of the reviewing court.” Parkway Bank & 

Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶ 87, 2 N.E.3d 1052. 

¶ 60 Although we believe that a case could be made that Pliura’s arguments are frivolous within 

the meaning of Rule 375(b), we have concluded in the exercise of our discretion not to pursue 

this matter. This pipeline litigation has gone on long enough. Requiring Pliura to file a motion 

to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed will only further delay the outcome of this 

case. Further, affirming the trial court’s imposition of sanctions should serve as a sufficient 

deterrent both for Pliura and the profession. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer 

Discipline, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 675, 696-97 (2003). Accordingly, in the exercise of our 

discretion, this court declines to pursue possible sanctions against Pliura under Rule 375(b). 

¶ 61 F. Oral Argument 

¶ 62 Last, IEPC has requested oral argument pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) 

(eff. July 1, 2018). We decline this request. 

¶ 63 1. The Applicable Law

¶ 64 Oral argument often serves a useful function in the adjudication of appeals because it 

“provides the litigant with a better opportunity to inform the judges of the litigant’s position” 

because “cold, printed words convey little in regard to the sense of urgency under which a 

party may be operating.” Myron H. Bright, The Power of the Spoken Word: In Defense of Oral 

Argument, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 35, 37 (1986). Furthermore, oral argument may develop “a new 

issue overlooked or not adequately briefed” and “provides an important forum for an 

interchange of ideas between counsel and the judges, and between the judges themselves.” 

Stanley Mosk, In Defense of Oral Argument, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 25, 27 (1999). 

¶ 65 Based on these policy concerns and the decline in the number of oral arguments, the 

Illinois Supreme Court recently modified Rule 352(a). The prior version of the rule stated that 

the appellate court “may dispose of any case without oral argument if no substantial question is 

presented, but this power should be exercised sparingly.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 352(a) (eff. July 1, 

2017). However, following a May 2018 amendment, Rule 352(a) now reads as follows: 

“After the briefs have been filed, the [appellate] court may dispose of any case 

without oral argument if no substantial question is presented, but this power shall be 

exercised sparingly and only upon the entry of a written order stating with specificity 

why such power is being exercised in the affected case. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 

oral argument shall be held in any case in which at least one member of the panel 

assigned to the case requests it.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 352(a) (eff. July 1, 

2018).

¶ 66 When interpreting a supreme court rule, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the 

intention of the drafters. Tousignant, 2014 IL 115329, ¶ 8. The plain language of the rule is the 

most reliable indicator of that intent. Id. The interpretation of a supreme court rule is a question 

of law reviewed de novo. Brindley, 2017 IL App (5th) 160189, ¶ 15. 
- 11 - 

¶ 67 Rule 352(a) does not define “substantial question” or give further guidance on when to 

deny oral argument. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). However, the Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure provide that a reviewing court may deny oral argument if (1) the appeal is 

frivolous, (2) the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively decided, or (3) the court 

would not be significantly aided by oral argument because the facts and legal arguments are 

adequately presented in the briefs and the record. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). We find these 

factors to be highly persuasive when determining whether a “substantial question” is present 

under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a). 

¶ 68 2. This Case

¶ 69 We note that the Fourth District Appellate Court has always been very receptive to requests 

for oral argument and rarely declines them. Further, Rule 352(a) requires that we “sparingly” 

deny requests for oral argument. Ill. S. Ct. R. 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). However, under the 

unique facts of this case, we decline the request for oral argument. See id.

¶ 70 First, many issues Pliura raised on appeal are meritless and do not warrant oral argument. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(A). Second, the law governing the primary issue in this 

case—whether the trial court abused its discretion when sanctioning Pliura—is straightforward 

and settled. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(B). Last, although the overall procedural history of 

this case is complex, this court would not benefit from oral argument because the facts and 

legal arguments of this case are adequately presented in the briefs and the record. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a)(2)(C). Because this case does not present a substantial question, oral argument 

would unnecessarily delay this case and increase the costs of litigation. Thus, we find this case 

appropriate for the sparing exercise of our power to dispose of a case without oral argument. 

¶ 71 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 72 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We thank the trial court for its 

well-reasoned written order, which we found quite helpful. 

¶ 73 Affirmed.