RENDERED: AUGUST 22, 2024

TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2022-SC-0197-DG

JONATHAN HARDIN APPELLANT

ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS

V. NO. 2021-CA-0234

JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 19-CI-000858

LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY 

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT; AND 

LOUISVILLE METRO POLICE MERIT 

BOARD

APPELLEES

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER

AFFIRMING

Jonathan Hardin was terminated from his employment with the 

Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD) after the Chief of Police determined 

that he had committed four violations of police department Standard Operating 

Procedures (SOPs). Hardin appealed his termination to the Louisville Metro 

Police Merit Board (the Merit Board). The Merit Board concluded that Hardin 

had committed three of the four SOP violations that the Chief had found and

upheld Hardin’s termination. Hardin then appealed to the Jefferson Circuit 

Court, which affirmed the Merit Board’s decision. He then appealed to the 

Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Circuit Court. This Court granted 
2

Hardin’s Motion for Discretionary Review, and after a thorough review of the 

record and the law, we affirm the Court of Appeals. 

I. BACKGROUND

Hardin was employed by LMPD in 2015 and was assigned to serve as a 

school resource officer (SRO) at Frederick Law Olmsted Academy North, a 

school that staff members have described as “tough.” On January 22, 2015, 

Hardin was involved in an altercation with a 13-year-old student, Shavez 

Pearson, during which he struck Pearson in the face. He subsequently arrested 

Pearson, charging him with two public offenses, but failed to read Pearson his 

Miranda1 rights. On January 27, 2015, Hardin was involved in another 

altercation with a different student, Tywon Anderson, during which he wrapped 

his arms around Anderson so tightly that Anderson lost consciousness. Both 

incidents were captured on school surveillance video. 

Shortly after the second incident, both a Professional Standards Unit 

(PSU) investigation and a Public Integrity Unit (PIU) investigation were initiated. 

The PIU conducts criminal investigations of LMPD employees. The PSU 

conducts administrative/disciplinary investigations into possible internal policy 

violations by LMPD employees. During its investigation, the PIU conducted 

eleven witness interviews. The PIU also collected the school surveillance videos 

of the incidents. Once the bulk of the PIU investigation was completed, the PSU 

obtained copies of all of the items in the PIU file and incorporated those 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3

materials into the PSU investigative file, without conducting much independent 

investigation. The PSU did, however, interview Hardin. Hardin was ultimately 

charged with criminal offenses stemming from each of the incidents. 

On March 20, 2015, the Chief of Police terminated Hardin’s employment 

with LMPD. The Chief found that Hardin committed four violations of SOPs. 

The Chief found that Hardin committed two violations of SOP 9.1.4, entitled 

“Use of Physical Force,” for using more force than was reasonably necessary 

against both Pearson and Anderson. The Chief further found that Hardin 

committed one violation of SOP 10.7.2, entitled “Taking Juveniles into 

Custody,” for failing to advise Pearson of his Miranda rights when taking him 

into custody. Finally, the Chief found Hardin violated SOP 5.1.2, entitled 

“Obedience to Rules and Regulations,” for engaging in “conduct [that] led to 

[Hardin’s] arrest.”

Hardin appealed his termination to the Merit Board. The Merit Board 

reviews the Chief’s disciplinary actions and, in termination cases, holds a 

public, evidentiary hearing. At Hardin’s request, the Merit Board proceedings 

were abated until Hardin’s criminal charges were resolved. 

The criminal charges against Hardin related to the Pearson incident were 

eventually dismissed with prejudice. That criminal case was expunged in 

January 2016. In May 2018, Hardin went to trial on the criminal charges 

stemming from the Anderson incident, and a jury acquitted him of all charges. 

It does not appear that Hardin has obtained an expungement of that case. 

Hardin’s Merit Board hearing did not take place until after both the 
4

expungement and the acquittal, as previously mentioned. The hearing took 

place over four days during the months of August and October 2018. 

Prior to the Merit Board hearing, Hardin objected to the admission of 

materials related to the Pearson incident that had been taken from the PIU file, 

arguing that those materials had been expunged. He further objected to the 

admission of all transcribed witness statements if the witnesses were not called 

to testify during the hearing and made subject to cross-examination. Although 

the Merit Board did not explicitly rule on Hardin’s objection, it did not exclude 

the materials or witness statements, and thereby effectively overruled Hardin’s 

objections.

At the Merit Board hearing, LMPD did not call any of the witnesses who 

made statements to the PIU to testify. Instead, LMPD only called to testify

various employees of LMPD, including the investigating PSU officer, an 

investigating PIU officer, Hardin’s supervisor, and other supervisory officers. 

The school surveillance videos of the incidents were played multiple times. 

Hardin called three witnesses to testify on his behalf who had given statements 

to the PIU. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Merit Board found that Hardin 

committed three of the four SOP violations found by the Chief. The Merit Board 

found that he committed two violations of the use of force SOP and that he 

violated the SOP that required him to read Miranda rights to juveniles who are 

taken into custody. The Board, however, found that he did not commit the 

singular violation that resulted solely from the fact that he was charged 
5

criminally for the incidents, the “Obedience to Rules and Regulations” SOP,

“given the eventual exoneration and expungement of his criminal charges.” 

Ultimately, the Board upheld the Chief’s termination decision.

Hardin then appealed his termination to the Jefferson Circuit Court

pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 67C.323(3)(a) and KRS 

67C.326(2). To the circuit court, Hardin made three primary arguments. First, 

he argued that the Merit Board erroneously considered expunged materials 

related to the Pearson incident. Second, he argued that his statutory and due 

process rights were violated when the Merit Board considered transcribed 

witness statements, when those witnesses did not testify at the hearing and 

were not subject to confrontation and cross-examination. Finally, he argued 

that LMPD improperly relied on his arrest and criminal charges, absent a 

criminal conviction, as bases for his termination. The Jefferson Circuit Court 

affirmed the Merit Board’s order.

Hardin then appealed to the Court of Appeals, making the same 

arguments he made to the circuit court. The Court of Appeals also affirmed. 

Hardin then sought discretionary review from this Court. After initially abating 

his case, we granted his motion for discretionary review.

II. ANALYSIS

To this Court, Hardin asserts the same arguments that he made to both 

the circuit court and the Court of Appeals. First, he argues that the Merit 

Board erred in failing to exclude expunged materials. Second, he argues that 

the Merit Board erred in considering sworn, transcribed statements of 
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witnesses who were not called to testify at the hearing and, therefore, were not 

subject to cross-examination. Finally, he argues that his termination was 

improperly based in part on his arrest and criminal charges instead of on a 

conviction. We review each allegation in turn. 

A. Standard of Review

“[J]udicial review of administrative action is concerned with the question 

of arbitrariness.” Am. Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson Cty. Plan. & 

Zoning Comm’n, 379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (Ky. 1964). The Circuit Court uses a 

“modified de novo” standard of review when reviewing actions of the Merit 

Board. Crouch v. Jefferson Cnty., Ky. Police Merit Bd., 773 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Ky. 

1988). It “allows the reviewing court to invade the mental processes of the 

Board to determine whether its action is not arbitrary. To determine 

arbitrariness, the appellate court may review the record, the briefs, and any 

other evidence or testimony which would be relevant to that specific, limited 

issue.” Id. In reviewing for arbitrariness, the reviewing court must determine

whether the questioned exercise of authority might be infirm because the 

action exceeded the Board’s granted powers, the proceeding lacked procedural 

due process, or the Board’s decision lacked substantial evidentiary support.

Am. Beauty Homes Corp., 379 S.W.2d at 456. Importantly, “[t]he appeal is not 

the proper forum to retry the merits.” Crouch, 773 S.W.2d at 464.

In the case before us, all of the issues presented are questions of law. 

Thus, despite the above-described general standard of review, we review the 
7

issues before us de novo. Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d 644, 647 

(Ky. 2017).

B. Use of Expunged Materials

Hardin argues that the Merit Board erroneously failed to exclude 

expunged materials from its consideration. As previously discussed, the 

criminal charges related to the Pearson incident were expunged pursuant to a 

Jefferson Circuit Court order entered on January 19, 2016. That order stated, 

The above-named offense(s) is/are expunged from the court 

records. On entry of this order, the proceedings shall be deemed 

never to have occurred; the court shall reply to any inquiry that no 

record exists; and Defendant shall not have to disclose the fact of 

the record or any matter relating to it on an application for 

employment, credit, or other purpose. 

(Bold in original). Regarding police and other agencies outside of the court 

system, the order stated,

The Kentucky State Police and other following agencies

[including LMPD], with custody of records relating to the arrest, 

charge or other matters arising out of the arrest or charge, shall 

expunge the record, including but not limited to: arrest records, 

fingerprints, photographs, index references, or other documentary 

or electronic data, and shall certify to the Court on this form 

within sixty (60) days of the entry of this order that the required 

expunging action has been completed[.]

(Bold in original). The order was entered on a form provided by the 

Administrative Office of the Courts, and its language closely tracks the 
8

language of the expungement statutes. KRS 431.0762, the expungement 

statute relevant to Hardin’s circumstances, states in part,

An order of expungement pursuant to this section shall expunge all 

criminal records in the custody of the court and any criminal records 

in the custody of any other agency or official, including law 

enforcement records, but no order of expungement pursuant to this 

section shall expunge records in the custody of the Department for 

Community Based Services. The court shall order the expunging on 

a form provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts. Every 

agency, with records relating to the arrest, charge, or other matters 

arising out of the arrest or charge, that is ordered to expunge 

records, shall certify to the court within sixty (60) days of the entry 

of the expungement order, that the required expunging action has 

been completed. All orders enforcing the expungement procedure 

shall also be expunged.

KRS 431.076(4). That same statute goes on to state,

After the expungement, the proceedings in the matter shall be 

deemed never to have occurred. The court and other agencies shall 

delete or remove the records from their computer systems so that 

any official state-performed background check will indicate that the 

records do not exist. The court and other agencies shall reply to any 

inquiry that no record exists on the matter. The person whose record 

is expunged shall not have to disclose the fact of the record or any 

matter relating thereto on an application for employment, credit, or 

other type of application.

KRS 431.076(6). Notably, KRS 431.079(3) defines “expungement” as “the 

removal or deletion of records by the court and other agencies which prevents 

the matter from appearing on official state-performed background checks.” 

Stated simply, Hardin argues that because the entirety of LMPD’s PIU file 

was subject to the expungement order, anything in the PSU file that came from 

2 KRS 431.076 has been amended multiple times since Hardin’s expungement 

order was entered. However, all of the amendments to the relevant subsections of the 

statute apply retroactively. KRS 431.076(8). 
9

the PIU file should also have been expunged and therefore excluded from the 

Merit Board’s consideration.3 Hardin asserts that pursuant to KRS 431.076, 

the records to be expunged include “law enforcement records.” He further 

contends that the PIU investigatory file was a criminal law enforcement record, 

and that all PIU records had to be expunged, including those PIU records 

placed in the PSU file. The Louisville/Jefferson County Metropolitan 

Government (Metro Government) and the Merit Board, on the other hand, 

argue that the expungement statutes do not apply to LMPD’s PSU file, as it is 

an internal employment record.

To determine what materials should have been excluded from the Merit 

Board’s consideration due to the expungement order, we must determine the 

breadth of the application of our Commonwealth’s expungement statutes. “The 

cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the intention of the legislature 

should be ascertained and given effect.” MPM Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Morton, 289 

S.W.3d 193, 197 (Ky. 2009). “We derive that intent, if at all possible, from the 

language the General Assembly chose, either as defined by the General 

Assembly or as generally understood in the context of the matter under 

consideration.” Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 

2011) (citing Osborne v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 645 (Ky. 2006)). “Only if 

3 Hardin relies heavily on McNabb v. Ky. Educ. Pro. Standards Bd., No. 2013-

CA-000601-MR, 2015 WL 5096007 (Ky. App. Aug. 28, 2015). However, McNabb is an 

unpublished Court of Appeals decision and holds no weight with this Court. 

Regardless, McNabb is distinguishable because McNabb’s teaching certificate was 

revoked based solely on a felony conviction which was eventually reversed and 

expunged, whereas Hardin’s termination was not based solely on allegedly expunged 

materials. Id. at *3.
10

the statute is ambiguous or otherwise frustrates a plain reading, do we resort 

to extrinsic aids such as the statute’s legislative history; the canons of 

construction; or, especially in the case of model or uniform statutes, 

interpretations by other courts.” Id. 

In construing a statute, we must “presume that the General Assembly 

intended for the statute to be construed as a whole, for all of its parts to have 

meaning, and for it to harmonize with related statutes.” Id. Finally, “[a] wellestablished rule of statutory construction is that the courts will consider the 

purpose which the statute is intended to accomplish—the reason and spirit of 

the statute—the mischief intended to be remedied.” City of Louisville v. Helman, 

253 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Ky. 1952).

In this case, much of the language contained in KRS 431.076 is broad. 

The statute requires that “records relating to the arrest, charge, or other 

matters arising out of the arrest or charge” must be expunged. KRS 

431.076(4) (emphasis added). The statute further provides that “[a]fter the 

expungement, the proceedings in the matter shall be deemed never to have 

occurred.” KRS 431.076(6) (emphasis added). However, KRS 431.076 also 

includes language that appears to more clearly demonstrate the intent of the 

legislature in drafting the statute. The statute states that the records must be 

“delete[d] or remove[d] . . . so that any official state-performed background 

check will indicate that the records do not exist.” Id. (emphasis added). 

This language, which is repeated in the specific definition of “expungement” 

provided by the legislature, clarifies the effect that the expungement is 
11

intended to have. See KRS 431.079(3) (“For purposes of . . . KRS . . . 431.076 . 

. ., ‘expungement’ means the removal or deletion of records by the court and 

other agencies which prevents the matter from appearing on official stateperformed background checks.”). Accordingly, the plain language of KRS 

431.076 shows the legislature’s intent that expungement is meant to “prevent[] 

the matter from appearing on official state-performed background checks” so 

that “[t]he person whose record is expunged shall not have to disclose” any 

information related to the record.

After closely analyzing the expungement statute, we agree with Metro 

Government and the Merit Board that LMPD’s PSU file is an internal 

employment file to which the expungement statute does not apply. Although 

the PSU file is in the possession of an agency subject to the expungement 

order, it is not itself a “criminal record” or a “law enforcement record” of the 

type contemplated by the legislature in drafting the expungement statutes. See

KRS 431.076(4). The PSU file is, for all practical purposes, a personnel file, 

similar to one that would be maintained by the human resources department 

of any other employer. Because of this very nature, material that is contained 

within LMPD’s PSU file will never “appear[] on official state-performed 

background checks” regardless of the source of that material. KRS 431.079(3).

Accordingly, because information contained in the PSU file is neither a criminal 

record nor would it appear on a state-performed background check, we 

conclude that it is not subject to the expungement order. Therefore, the Merit 
12

Board did not err in considering the information in the PSU file that was 

obtained from the PIU file.

C. Due Process Right to Cross-Examine

Hardin next argues that the Merit Board’s consideration of sworn, 

transcribed witness statements of individuals who were not called to testify at 

the hearing and, therefore, were not subject to cross-examination, violated his 

Due Process rights. He asserts that these rights can be found both in the 

statutes that govern the Merit Board as well as in the Kentucky and United 

States Constitutions.

1. Statutory Due Process Rights

Hardin argues that KRS 67C.325 and 67C.326(1)(h) provide him with 

procedural and administrative due process rights to cross-examine witnesses 

against him such that the admission of transcriptions of these witnesses’ prior 

statements was improper. The Merit Board and Metro Government, on the 

other hand, assert that the admission of sworn statements is contemplated, 

and even explicitly permitted, by the relevant statutes. 

KRS 67C.325 states in full,

Procedural due process shall be afforded to any police officer 

brought before the board. The officer shall be given a prompt hearing 

by the board, have an opportunity to confront his or her 

accusers, and have the privilege of presenting the board with 

evidence. The board shall have the power to issue subpoenas 

attested in the name of its chairman, to compel the attendance of 

witnesses, to compel the production of documents and other 

documentary evidence, and so far as practicable, conduct the 

hearing within the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon a 

showing of proper need, the board shall issue subpoenas to 

compel the attendance of witnesses, or to compel the production 
13

of documents and other documentary evidence for the benefits of 

the officer or the chief at the request of the officer or the chief.

(Emphasis added). Hardin asserts that the “opportunity to confront his or her 

accusers” language of KRS 67C.325 is modeled after the language of the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and thus provides analogous 

rights. However, the Sixth Amendment provides criminal defendants with the 

“right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. 

amend. VI. This language is markedly different from that contained in KRS 

67C.325. 

KRS 67C.325 makes no mention of a “right” (other than in its title), and 

instead, merely provides a police officer with an “opportunity to confront his or 

her accusers.” The word “opportunity” is crucial in this analysis, as the 

remainder of that statutory section sets out how that opportunity to confront is 

to be provided: “[T]he board shall issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of 

witnesses . . . at the request of the officer.” KRS 67C.325. Thus, police officers 

brought before the Merit Board are provided the opportunity to confront their 

accusers by requesting a subpoena be issued which compels the accuser’s 

attendance at the hearing and then confronting the accuser through direct or 

cross-examination. Nothing more is required by KRS 67C.325. To interpret 

KRS 67C.325 in any other way would apparently result in more procedural due 

process rights for officers employed by LMPD than for officers employed by 

many other agencies within the Commonwealth.4

4 The Police Officers’ Bill of Rights, KRS 15.520, which applies to many of our 

Commonwealth’s police officers, does not include similar “opportunity to confront” 
14

We are mindful that we must “presume that the General Assembly 

intended for the statute to be construed as a whole, for all of its parts to have 

meaning, and for it to harmonize with related statutes.” Shawnee Telecom Res., 

Inc., 354 S.W.3d at 551. The above interpretation of KRS 67C.325 is further 

supported by the language contained in a related statute, KRS 67C.326(1)(h).

When the two statutes are read together, it becomes even clearer that the 

legislature intended for sworn, transcribed witness statements to be considered 

by the Board even if those witnesses were not called to testify at the hearing. 

KRS 67C.326(1)(h) sets forth the “minimum” “administrative due process 

rights” provided to police officers in proceedings in front of the Merit Board. 

KRS 67C.326(1)(h)2 explicitly permits the Merit Board to consider “any sworn 

statements or affidavits” and requires those statements to “be furnished to the 

police officer no less than seventy-two (72) hours prior to the time of the 

hearing.” If the General Assembly had intended to permit the Merit Board to 

consider sworn statements and affidavits only if the witness was called to 

testify, it would have said so. We are not permitted to add words to a statute, 

and “a legislature making no exceptions to the positive terms of a statute is 

presumed to have intended to make none.” Lee v. Ky. Dept. of Corr., 610 

S.W.3d 254, 262 (Ky. 2020) (quoting Bailey v. Reeves, 662 S.W.2d 832, 834 

(Ky. 1984)).

language. However, KRS 78.460, which provides procedural due process rights to 

county police officers, does include similar language.
15

KRS 67C.326(1)(h) further provides that the accused police officer “may 

cross-examine all witnesses called by the charging party.” KRS 67C.326(1)(h)7. 

This right is specifically and explicitly contingent upon the witness being, in 

fact, “called by the charging party.” Id. Hardin asserts that the LMPD’s 

presentation of a sworn, transcribed witness statement is tantamount to the 

LMPD calling that witness to testify at the hearing, which in turn, triggers his 

right to cross-examine the witness. We find no support for this contention in 

either the plain language of the statute or in our Court’s precedent, and it 

appears to be directly contrary to KRS 67C.326(1)(h)2, which, as just 

discussed, allows for consideration of sworn statements and affidavits.

Like KRS 67C.325, KRS 67C.326(1)(h) also provides an accused police 

officer the right to request a subpoena to require the attendance of witnesses at 

the hearing. KRS 67C.326(1)(h)6. In order for a police officer to avail himself of 

the “opportunity” to confront his accuser, he may need to subpoena the 

witness, call him or her to testify, and then cross-examine him or her. Further, 

police officers are explicitly provided the right to cross-examine witnesses 

called by the LMPD. KRS 67C.326(1)(h)7. We find nothing in the language of 

KRS 67C.325 or 67C.326 which provides Hardin any greater right to crossexamine. Accordingly, the Merit Board did not violate Hardin’s statutory Due 

Process rights in considering sworn, transcribed witness statements even 

though those witnesses did not testify at the hearing and were not subject to 

cross-examination.
16

2. Constitutional Due Process Rights

Hardin next argues that even if the statutes do not prohibit the Merit 

Board from considering sworn, transcribed statements of witnesses who were 

not called to testify at the hearing and therefore were not subject to crossexamination, both the Kentucky and United States constitutions do. He argues 

that his constitutional procedural Due Process rights under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section Two of 

the Kentucky Constitution may be greater than those provided by the statutes 

and were violated when the Merit Board considered sworn, transcribed 

statements of witnesses who were not subject to cross-examination. He further 

argues that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause jurisprudence should 

inform our Due Process analysis. He does not, however, engage in a meaningful 

way with the Mathews v. Eldridge factors which, as described below, the United 

States Supreme Court has stated determine the contours of procedural Due 

Process protections. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

“[T]he Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights—life, 

liberty, and property—cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally 

adequate procedures.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 

(1985). The property rights protected by the Due Process Clause include the 

right to continued employment in a merit system like that established for 

LMPD. See id. at 539, 543.

“The essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an 

opportunity to respond.” Dep’t of Revenue, Fin. & Admin. Cabinet v. Wade, 379 
17

S.W.3d 134, 138 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546). The hearing 

at which the individual can respond “must be ‘at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.’” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (quoting 

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). However, “due process is 

flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation 

demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). “[W]hat may be 

required under [the Due Process] Clause in dealing with one set of interests 

which it protects may not be required in dealing with another set of interests.” 

Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155 (1974). Notably, it does not always 

require Sixth Amendment-like confrontation, as Hardin suggests. To hold 

otherwise would elevate the rights provided at a civil administrative hearing to 

those provided at a criminal trial where the defendant’s very liberty, or even 

life, is at stake.

Although our Court can interpret “the Constitution of Kentucky in a 

manner which differs from the interpretation of parallel federal constitutional 

rights by the Supreme Court of the United States[,]” when we do so, it is 

typically “because of Kentucky constitutional text, the Debates of the 

Constitutional Convention, history, tradition, and relevant precedent.” 

Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 77–78 (Ky. 1995). When it comes to 

the Due Process Clause, this Court has adopted the three-factor test found in 

the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 

319. Trans. Cabinet v. Cassity, 912 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Ky. 1995). 
18

In Mathews, the United States Supreme Court was tasked with 

determining how much procedural process was due to a Social Security 

disability benefit recipient prior to the termination of those benefit payments. 

424 U.S. at 323. In order to do so, the Court stated that 

identification of the specific dictates of due process generally 

requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private 

interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk 

of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 

used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 

procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, 

including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 

burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 

would entail.

Id. at 335. Since then, the Mathews test has become the controlling test for

determining how much procedural due process is required under any given set 

of circumstances, and we are ever mindful that “[t]he matter comes down to the 

question of the procedure’s integrity and fundamental fairness.” Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971). Because this Court has not yet decided how 

much procedural process is constitutionally due a police officer before the 

Merit Board, we must undertake the Mathews analysis today. 

a. Private Interest

The first factor to be considered in the Mathews test is “the private 

interest that will be affected by the official action[.]” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

In this case, the private interest at stake is the retention of merit employment. 

In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, the United States Supreme 

Court explained, “[T]he significance of the private interest in retaining 

employment cannot be gainsaid. We have frequently recognized the severity of 
19

depriving a person of the means of livelihood.” 470 U.S. at 543. That Court 

went on to note that “[w]hile a fired worker may find employment elsewhere, 

doing so will take some time and is likely to be burdened by the questionable 

circumstances under which he left his previous job.” Id.

So, while the private interest in retaining employment is high, it is, 

perhaps, not as high as the private interest at stake in other situations. For 

example, the United States Supreme Court noted that the private interest in 

retaining welfare benefits is higher than that in retaining employment because 

“termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over [welfare] eligibility 

may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he 

waits.” Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264. The private interest here is also less 

significant than the private interest in the retention of Social Security disability 

benefit payments because in the case of the loss of disability benefits, “there is 

little possibility that the terminated recipient will be able to find even 

temporary employment to ameliorate the interim loss.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 

341. 

In cases such as the one before us, the private interest in retaining 

employment is lessened by the fact that the terminated employee has the 

physical ability to obtain at least temporary employment in order to mitigate 

some of the hardship imposed by the loss of his merit employment. 

b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation and Probable Value of Additional Safeguards

The second factor to be considered under the Mathews test is “the risk of 

an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
20

the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards[.]”

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Here, the additional procedural safeguard that 

Hardin seeks is live testimony and cross-examination of a witness whose 

statement the LMPD seeks to admit against an officer. 

Courts have long acknowledged the “value of cross-examination in 

exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth” in a fact-finding endeavor. 

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965). Further, “[d]ismissals for cause will 

often involve factual disputes.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543. In fact, the United 

States Supreme Court has stated that “[p]articularly where credibility and 

veracity are at issue, as they must be in any [public assistance benefits] 

termination proceedings, written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis 

for decision.” Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269. That Court went on to say that “[i]n 

almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due 

process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse 

witnesses.” Id. Notably, however, the Supreme Court used the term 

“opportunity” as opposed to the term “right,” and the facts of Goldberg are

highly distinguishable from the facts before us today. In Goldberg, the New 

York City Department of Social Services procedures at issue failed to provide 

the opportunity for any “personal appearance of the [benefits] recipient before 

the reviewing official, for oral presentation of evidence, [or] for confrontation 

and cross-examination of adverse witnesses” prior to termination of public 

assistance benefits. Id. at 259. In our case, however, as is described below, 

hearings before the Merit Board include personal appearance by the officer, 
21

representation by counsel, presentation of live testimony and documents, oral 

argument, and cross-examination of witnesses called by LMPD.

We contrast Goldberg with Richardson v. Perales. 402 U.S. 389 (1971), in 

which the United States Supreme Court reached a different result. In 

Richardson, the Court had to determine “whether physicians’ written reports of 

medical examinations they have made of a disability claimant may constitute 

‘substantial evidence’ supportive of a finding of nondisability . . . when the 

claimant objects to the admissibility of those reports and when the only live 

testimony is presented by his side and is contrary to the reports.” 402 U.S. at 

390. Although the Court relied heavily on the “underlying reliability and 

probative value” of the medical reports, its ultimate holding was as follows:

We conclude that a written report by a licensed physician who has 

examined the claimant and who sets forth in his report his medical 

findings in his area of competence may be received as evidence in a 

disability hearing and, despite its hearsay character and an absence 

of cross-examination, and despite the presence of opposing direct 

medical testimony and testimony by the claimant himself, may 

constitute substantial evidence supportive of a finding by the 

hearing examiner adverse to the claimant, when the claimant has 

not exercised his right to subpoena the reporting physician and 

thereby provide himself with the opportunity for cross-examination 

of the physician.

Id. at 402 (emphasis added). The Court noted that “the claimant complains of 

the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the reporting physicians, [but] he did 

not take advantage of the opportunity afforded him under [the relevant 

regulation] to request subpoenas for the physicians.” Id. at 404 (emphasis 

added). It went on to say, “[A]s a consequence [the claimant] is to be precluded 

from now complaining that he was denied the rights of confrontation and 
22

cross-examination.” Id. at 405. Accordingly, despite the value of crossexamination in truth-finding, live testimony and cross-examination at a 

hearing is not always a prerequisite to admission of witness statements. 

Hardin’s hearing in front of the Merit Board is distinguishable from most, 

if not all, of the United States Supreme Court cases cited thus far in this 

Opinion in one important way. The hearing that occurs in front of the Merit 

Board is a post-termination hearing, meaning that the police officer whose 

matter the Merit Board is considering has already been terminated from his 

employment. The hearing before the Merit Board is the last chance for factfinding, which is different from the cited cases that analyze pre-action hearings 

under statutory schemes which require a full hearing post-action. See, e.g., 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532. Thus, accurate fact-finding by the Merit Board is 

even more important.

That being said, however, the General Assembly has already provided 

officers with extensive procedural safeguards in matters before the Merit Board. 

Prior to an officer ever being terminated or going before the Merit Board, KRS 

67C.321(1) requires the Chief of Police to “furnish the officer concerned with a 

written statement of the reasons why the described action is being taken.” The 

officer is then “allowed a period of ten (10) days within which the officer may 

file a written answer to the charges and the reasons which caused her or his 

suspension, removal, or reduction.” Id. If the Chief proceeds with the 

termination, the officer is then permitted an appeal to the Merit Board, which 
23

“shall be heard by the full board. The board shall give notice and hold a public 

hearing.” KRS 67C.323(1).

As previously discussed, KRS 67C.325 provides officers brought before 

the Merit Board certain procedural due process. Under that statute, “[t]he 

officer shall be given a prompt hearing by the board, have an opportunity to 

confront his or her accusers, and have the privilege of presenting the board 

with evidence.” KRS 67C.325. Further, at the request of the officer, “the board 

shall issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses, or to compel the 

production of documents and other documentary evidence for the benefits of 

the officer[.]” Id.

As previously discussed, KRS 67C.326 provides officers with certain 

“administrative due process rights.” It prohibits “threats, promises, or 

coercions” from being “used at any time against any police officer while he or 

she is a suspect in a criminal or departmental matter.” KRS 67C.326(1)(b). It 

further mandates that 

[a]ny charge involving violation of any consolidated local government 

rule or regulation shall be made in writing with sufficient specificity 

so as to fully inform the police officer of the nature and 

circumstances of the alleged violation in order that he may be able 

to properly defend himself. The charge shall be served on the police 

officer in writing[.]

Id. at (1)(e). Finally, KRS 67C.326(1)(h) provides a long list of administrative 

due process rights that “shall be the minimum rights afforded any police officer 

charged.”5 The officer “shall be given at least seventy-two (72) hours’ notice of 

5 The General Assembly has amended KRS 67C.326, effective January 1, 2025, 

in a way that is seemingly beneficial for officers. For example, officers must be given 
24

any hearing[.]” Id. at (1)(h)1. He must be provided with “[c]opies of any sworn 

statements or affidavits to be considered by the hearing authority and any 

exculpatory statements or affidavits . . . no less than seventy-two (72) hours 

prior to the time of any hearing[.]” Id. at (1)(h)2.6 The Supreme Court has 

recognized that a “safeguard against mistake is the policy of allowing the 

disability recipient’s representative full access to all information relied upon by 

the state agency.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 345–46. This access is granted in 

Merit Board proceedings. 

Additionally, if the disciplinary action was taken based on a complaint 

made by an individual, the Merit Board can only consider charges made by 

that individual if the individual appears at the hearing. KRS 67C.326(1)(h)4. 

Further, “[t]he accused police officer shall have the right and opportunity to 

obtain and have counsel present, and to be represented by counsel[.]” Id. at 

(1)(h)5.

Regarding subpoenas, the General Assembly has provided an accused 

police officer with the following rights:

The appointing authority, legislative body, or other body as 

designated by the Kentucky Revised Statutes shall subpoena and 

require the attendance of witnesses and the production by them of 

books, papers, records, and other documentary evidence at the 

request of the accused police officer . . . . If any person fails or 

refuses to appear under the subpoena, or to testify, or to attend, or 

twelve days’ notice of a hearing and must be provided with any statements and 

affidavits to be considered by the Merit Board at least twelve days before the hearing. 

KY LEGIS 181 § 10 (2024), 2024 Kentucky Laws Ch. 181 (HB 388). This expanded 

time frame provides a greater opportunity to effect due process.

6 Merit Board hearing procedures require all documents to be provided to the 

other side at least ten days before the hearing. 
25

produce the books, papers, records, or other documentary evidence 

lawfully required, the appointing authority, legislative body, or other 

body as designated by the Kentucky Revised Statutes may report to 

the Circuit Court or any judge thereof the failure or refusal, and 

apply for a rule. The Circuit Court, or any judge thereof, may on the 

application compel obedience by proceedings for contempt as in the 

case of disobedience of the requirements of a subpoena issued from 

the court[.]

Id. at (1)(h)6. The police officer must also “be allowed to have presented, 

witnesses and any documentary evidence the police officer wishes to provide to 

the hearing authority, and may cross-examine all witnesses called by the 

charging party[.]” Id. at (1)(h)7. Finally, action taken by the Merit Board is then 

appealable to the circuit court, and the judgment of the circuit court can be 

appealed to the Court of Appeals. KRS 67C.323(3); KRS 67C.326(2), (3).

In weighing the second Mathews factor, we conclude that there is at least 

some risk of an erroneous deprivation of an officer’s right to employment by 

allowing admission of sworn statements of witnesses who are not called to 

testify at the hearing and therefore are not subject to cross-examination. We 

further conclude that said risk would be somewhat mitigated by requiring 

those witnesses to appear in person and be subject to cross-examination before 

admitting their prior statements. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. However, we 

also conclude that the right to cross-examine would likely have minimal value 

in accurate fact-finding because of the significant procedural safeguards 

already granted officers by the General Assembly, including notice of the 

hearing, right to counsel, access to the information relied upon by LMPD, and 

the right to subpoena witnesses. See id.
26

c. Government’s Interest

The final Mathews factor that we must consider is “the Government’s 

interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 

burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 

entail.” Id. The United States Supreme Court also described this factor as “the 

public interest,” which includes “the administrative burden and other societal 

costs[.]” Id. at 347. 

Metro Government asserts three primary interests to be considered 

under this factor: (1) maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline, (2) 

expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees, and (3) avoidance of 

administrative burdens. These are all legitimate interests to be considered, 

although some weigh more heavily than others. 

The maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline is an important 

interest to consider. However, Metro Government does not explain how 

employee efficiency will be impacted by requiring the live testimony, subject to 

cross-examination, of witnesses before their prior statements will be considered 

by the Merit Board, aside from the general increased administrative burdens 

that would result. Further, the importance of maintaining appropriate 

discipline among police officers cannot be overstated; however, because Merit 

Board hearings take place only after termination,7 there is no risk that an 

7 The General Assembly has amended KRS Chapter 67C, effective January 1, 

2025, to require Merit Board hearings to take place prior to any disciplinary action 

being taken under certain circumstances. KY LEGIS 181 § 10 (2024), 2024 Kentucky 
27

undisciplined employee will remain on the police force while awaiting his 

hearing and chance to cross-examine those witnesses whose statements have 

been submitted to the Merit Board. 

While the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees is also a 

legitimate factor to consider, it weighs very little in this case. Certainly, the 

quick removal of an unsatisfactory police officer, whose duty it is to uphold and 

enforce laws, is vital. However, additional process at the Merit Board stage 

would do nothing to stand in the way of that expeditious removal. As previously 

stated, the Merit Board hearing does not occur until after the police officer is 

terminated and, therefore, does not impede a quick termination. Further, 

because the hearing takes place post-termination of employment, there would 

be no additional cost imposed on the state in terms of the officer’s salary while 

awaiting a hearing, as there would be in the case of an officer suspended with 

pay pending his Merit Board hearing. 

Finally, Metro Government asserts a governmental interest in the 

avoidance of administrative burdens. This is a real and significant interest that 

the United States Supreme Court has stated “must be weighed.” Id. at 348 

(“[T]he Government’s interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving 

scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed.”). 

The additional requirement that LMPD call to testify every witness the PIU or 

PSU interviewed so that they can be cross-examined would greatly increase the 

Laws Ch. 181 (HB 388). We make no holding regarding the weighing of the Mathews

factors under the newly enacted legislation.
28

length of the Merit Board hearing. In the case at bar, for example, the hearing 

lasted four days even without LMPD calling those witnesses. It likely would 

have lasted several more if LMPD was forced to call an additional seven 

witnesses. That additional administrative cost and delay would result is 

obvious. 

Aside from the interests Metro Government asserts, there are other 

public interests that must be considered. Society has an interest in assuring 

that Merit Board actions are correct and just. The cross-examination 

requirement for which Hardin advocates is one way in which that interest could 

be supported. Relatedly, society, LMPD, and the officer all share an “interest in 

avoiding disruption and erroneous decisions[.]” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544. 

Finally, “[a] governmental employer has an interest in keeping citizens usefully 

employed rather than taking the possibly erroneous and counterproductive 

step of forcing its employees onto the welfare rolls.” Id. This interest is further 

shared by the public at large. 

d. Weighing of the Mathews Factors

In summary, there are significant interests to both the individual and the 

public that are at stake in deciding how much process is due a terminated 

police officer in front of the Merit Board. However, “[a]t some point the benefit 

of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative 

action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, 

may be outweighed by the cost.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348. Such is the 

weighing in the case at bar. The police officer’s interests are high and so are the 
29

public’s interests. However, as previously explained, given the significant 

safeguards already provided by the General Assembly to officers in matters 

before the Merit Board, the risk of error is relatively low. Likewise, there is little

probable value in increasing the safeguards in front of the Merit Board by 

requiring live testimony by witnesses with cross-examination prior to the 

admission of the witness’s prior statement. Accordingly, we conclude that 

Hardin’s Due Process rights were not violated when the Merit Board considered 

sworn, transcribed witness statements even though those witnesses were not 

called to testify at Hardin’s hearing and therefore were not subject to crossexamination. 

D. Reliance on Arrest and Criminal Charges

Finally, Hardin argues that basing his termination on his arrest and 

criminal charges, absent a conviction, was inherently arbitrary. He asserts that 

non-final criminal charges can never be the basis of the termination of a meritprotected employee. Metro Government, on the other hand, argues that the 

Chief’s termination of Hardin’s employment was not based solely on the nonfinal criminal charges but instead was based on the facts underlying the 

incidents. It further argues that because the Merit Board did not uphold the 

Chief’s finding of a violation of SOP based on the criminal charges, the issue is 

moot. 

Regarding the Chief’s finding that Hardin violated the SOP governing 

“Obedience to Rules and Regulations,” the Chief’s pre-termination notice letter 

to Hardin stated as follows:
30

You violated Standard Operating Procedure 5.1.2 Obedience to 

Rules and Regulations when your conduct led to your arrest on 

February 3, 2015. You were arrested for Assault 4th Degree, Official 

Misconduct 1st Degree (2 counts), False Swearing, Assault 1st

Degree, and Wanton Endangerment 1st Degree. The above charges 

were brought against you regarding your interactions with two 

juveniles on two different occasions, January 22, 2015 and January 

27, 2015 at Frederick Law Olmsted Academy North. The events 

leading to your arrest were captured on the school surveillance 

cameras. There is probable cause for your arrest for your actions 

concerning the above juveniles. 

SOP 5.1.2, in turn, states,

Members of the LMPD shall not commit any act that constitutes a 

violation of any of the laws and ordinances applicable in their 

current respective location.

Members shall also obey all rules, orders, policies and procedures 

of the department. Members who violate any of the above may be 

dismissed or be subject to other punishment as directed for such a 

violation.

All members shall abide by the Standards of Ethical Conduct, 

located in the Louisville Metro Government Personnel Policies 

(Section 1.5). . . .

Finally, KRS 67C.321(1) says that “[a]ny officer may be removed, suspended for 

a period not to exceed thirty (30) days, laid-off, or reduced in grade by the chief 

for any cause which promotes the efficiency of the services . . ..” (emphasis 

added). 

None of the above quoted sources provide guidance as to the amount of 

evidentiary proof that the Chief must have in order to find a violation of an 

SOP. If we were to hold that the Chief could not terminate an employee for a 

violation of SOP 5.1.2 based on a violation of a law until that employee was 

formally convicted of the underlying offense, we would, in essence, be holding 

the Chief to a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. Practically 
31

speaking, a holding such as that requested by Hardin would also serve to 

prevent the Chief from finding a violation of this SOP for violation of a law until 

after a conviction, which, as is exemplified by this case, can take years. We 

refuse to require the Chief to either find a violation beyond a reasonable doubt 

or wait until a criminal conviction is final to find a violation. Probable cause 

that an employee has violated a law is sufficient to sustain a finding by the 

Chief of a violation of SOP 5.1.2.

We are further persuaded that the Chief’s termination of Hardin and the 

Merit Board’s subsequent upholding of that termination were not arbitrary 

because they were not based solely on Hardin’s arrest and criminal charges.8

There were other independent bases for his termination. In fact, a violation of 

SOP 5.1.2 was only one of four SOP violations found by the Chief, and the 

Merit Board, in fact, found no violation of this SOP “given the eventual 

exoneration and expungement of [Hardin’s] criminal charges.” Nevertheless, the 

Merit Board, after a hearing and deliberation, upheld the Chief’s termination 

decision, and this was not arbitrary.

Accordingly, we hold that Hardin’s termination was not arbitrary merely 

because the Chief found that he violated SOP 5.1.2 due to his arrest and 

criminal charges. 

8 This is the determinative distinguishing factor between the facts of Hardin’s 

case and the facts of the Court of Appeals opinions, Commonwealth, Transp. Cabinet v. 

Woodall, 735 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. App. 1987), and Vaden v. Louisville Civil Service Bd., 

701 S.W.2d 150 (Ky. App. 1985), on which he heavily relies.
32

III. CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of 

Appeals.

VanMeter, C.J.; Conley, Keller, Lambert, Nickell and Thompson, JJ., 

sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Lambert and Nickell, JJ., concur. Conley and 

Thompson, JJ., concur in result only by separate opinion. Bisig, J., not sitting. 

CONLEY, J., CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY: For the reasons expressed 

in my concurring opinion in the contemporaneously rendered decision of 

Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro. Gov. v. Dezmon Moore, -- S.W.3d – (Ky. 2024), I 

conclude that LMPD violated the expungement statute by considering materials 

that ought to have been destroyed pursuant to that statute and a lawful court 

order. I also conclude Hardin had a Due Process right to confront the witnesses 

against him in person pursuant to the 14th Amendment of the federal 

constitution; Section 2 of the Kentucky constitution; and our holding in Kaelin 

v. City of Louisville, 643 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Ky. 1982). But I find the errors 

harmless because the videos of the incidents were recorded by the school; and 

were not, at that point, a criminal record or record “relating to the arrest, 

charge, or other matters arising out of the arrest or charge[.]” KRS 431.976(4). 

Therefore, the Merit Board would have had these videos as evidence, in spite of 

the expungement order in one of Hardin’s cases. As such, there was 

substantial evidence supporting the Merit Board’s decision.

THOMPSON, J., CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY: While I agree that the 

majority is correct in its result, my reasoning differs from the majority opinion 
33

in certain respects. I agree with the majority opinion that the Chief of Police for 

the Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD) had the authority to terminate 

Hardin. This action was reasonable based on his improper conduct while he 

was engaged in his duties as an officer. Hardin argues that the Merits Board 

relied on his expunged criminal conviction in upholding his termination, but 

there is no evidence to support his supposition. Therefore, I agree that the 

Merits Board could properly uphold Hardin’s termination on other grounds 

after the expungement of his conviction on one charge and acquittal on another 

charge.

I wish to clarify how the expungement process is supposed to take place 

when it comes to different governmental organizations. Unlike the 

Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), which will simply expunge all 

criminal records upon receiving notice of an order of expungement, the LMPD 

did not have to sift through all of its internal records to locate all references to 

Hardin’s criminal charges. Instead, its obligation was to redact its internal 

records before they were disclosed to outside third parties, such as in response 

to a Freedom of Information Act request. 

The LMPD also needed to redact any references to that type of 

information contained in the Professional Standards Unit (PSU) file provided for 

the Merits Board’s review of Hardin’s termination. To the extent that the Merits 

Board received “records relating to” Hardin’s “arrest charge, or other matters 

arising out of the arrest or charge” including his conviction, KRS 431.076(4),

prior to the LMPD receiving notice of the order of expungement, it could not 
34

rely on those records or put them into evidence to support its decision because, 

by operation of law, those events never occurred. 

I disagree with Hardin that KRS 431.076(4) required all the PIU materials 

collected during the criminal investigation, including witness statements, had 

to be destroyed and not considered. An order of expungement erases the 

criminal process in its entirety, but what it cannot do is eradicate underlying 

facts and materials which could be used in support of a criminal proceeding, 

such as witness statements, videos, and investigatory records (although 

portions of such records may need to be redacted to remove references to the 

criminal process). Hardin’s underlying conduct and the investigation of that 

conduct (which led to his criminal charge, prosecution and ultimate conviction) 

is not expunged; essentially, it is as if a potential crime was investigated, but

never resulted in an arrest, an indictment or an ultimate resolution. 

SOP 5.1.2 prohibits members of the LMPD from committing “any act that 

constitutes a violation of any of the laws and ordinances applicable in their 

current respective location[,]” requires them to “obey all rules, orders, policies 

and procedures of the department[,]” and to “abide by the Standards of Ethical 

Conduct[.]” The conduct underlying even an expunged or an acquitted charge 

could potentially still constitute a violation of SOP 5.1.2. Additionally, an 

acquittal (if it has not been expunged either through an order of expungement 

or automatically through operation of law, see KRS 431.076(1)(a)-(b)) means 

that a charge cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not mean a 

disciplinary charge based on that same conduct cannot be established by a 
35

preponderance of the evidence. However, because the Merits Board ultimately 

found that there was no violation of SOP 5.1.2, I am not convinced that 

Hardin’s expunged charge (despite his claims to the contrary) was actually 

considered by the Merits Board in its determination to uphold his termination. 

Hardin has not established that the other three charges which formed a 

basis for the Merits Board to uphold his termination were used as a pretext to 

terminate him based on his expunged charge. Each of these grounds was 

supported by the conduct which formed the basis for his charges. Accordingly, 

the Merits Board’s decision to uphold the Chief’s termination was not arbitrary.

I also concur with the majority’s determination that Hardin’s due process 

rights were not violated when the LMPD did not call the witnesses to testify 

whose statements were submitted into evidence. I, however, write separately 

because I do not agree that much the well-written majority’s analysis on this 

issue was necessary. 

Having determined that the LMPD did not need to expunge witness 

statements from the PSU file, Hardin cannot argue that his right to cross 

examine witnesses was violated where it was previously disclosed to him that 

twelve witness statements would be placed into evidence and he could have 

subpoenaed all twelve under KRS 67C.325 but only chose to subpoena three. 

No one denied Hardin the ability to confront or cross-examine witnesses. 

Accordingly, there was no error. I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision. 
36

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

David Lindsay Leightty

Priddy, Cutler, Leightty & Meade, PLLC

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY 

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT:

Mitchel Terence Denham

McBrayer, PLLC

Derek Miles

DBL Law

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, LOUISVILLE METRO POLICE MERIT BOARD:

Mark Wesley Dobbins

Joanne Lynch

Tilford Dobbins Schmidt PLLC

Kathleen M. Winchell Schoen