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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

AND THE BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

ISP-IB-13-07 Office of Inspections January 2013

Inspection of 

the Broadcasting Board of Governors 

IMPORTANT NOTICE: This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Office of 

Inspector General. No secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or 

the Broadcasting Board of Governors, by them or by other agencies of organizations, without prior authorization by 

the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined by the Inspector General under the 

U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.
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PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

OF THE INSPECTION

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection 

and Evaluation, as issued in 2011 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and 

Efficiency, and the Inspector’s Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the 

U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). 

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and 

Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and 

the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service 

Act of 1980: 

• Policy Implementation: whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively 

achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and 

whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.

• Resource Management: whether resources are being used and managed with maximum 

efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts 

are properly conducted, maintained, and reported. 

• Management Controls: whether the administration of activities and operations meets the 

requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls 

have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of 

mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate 

steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken. 

METHODOLOGY

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated, 

reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and 

reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, 

individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review. 
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 United States Department of State

 and the Broadcasting Board of Governors 

 Office of Inspector General

PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the 

Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, 

as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared 

by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, 

accountability, and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors. 

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, 

post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant 

agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge 

available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for 

implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, 

and/or economical operations. 

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

 

Harold W. Geisel

Deputy Inspector General
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Table of Contents 

Key Judgments 1

Context 3

Executive Direction 5

Structure 5

Strategic Supervision versus Operational Management 5

Conflict of Interest: Broadcasting Board of Governors Board and Corporate Boards 7

Challenges of a Part-Time Board: Attendance and Vacancies 8

Internal Governance Issues 9

Meeting Management 9

Nondisclosure and Confidentiality 10

Board Dynamics 11

Board Relations with International Broadcasting Bureau Staff 12

Board Relations with Federal Broadcast Entities 13

Need for Legislative Change 15

Board Administrative Areas 16

Travel 16

Time and Attendance Review 17

Equal Employment Opportunity and Ethics 17

Representational Funds 18

List of Recommendations 19

List of Informal Recommendations 20

Principal Officials 21

Abbreviations 22

Appendix A: Organizational Chart 23
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Key Judgments

• U.S. Government broadcasting is characterized by journalism of the highest caliber and a 

widespread devotion to supporting democracy and freedom. This ongoing achievement is due 

to the commitment of the broadcast entities and professional staff.

• The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is also committed to the goals of U.S. 

international broadcasting but is failing in its mandated duties, including implementation of 

key aspects of its 5-year strategic plan. The Board’s dysfunction stems from a flawed 

legislative structure and acute internal dissension. 

• The Board is composed of nine part-time members, including eight private citizens who carry 

the title of Governor and the Secretary of State (ex officio). A part-time Board cannot 

effectively supervise all U.S. Government-supported, civilian international broadcasting. A 

chief executive officer (CEO) could coordinate the operational aspects of the broadcast 

entities and their support structure. 

• Although the legislation establishing the responsibilities of the Governors is clear regarding

the boundary between supervision and day-to-day management, individual Governors have

interpreted the law differently and determined their own fiduciary responsibilities, which has 

in turn impeded normal management functions. 

• Board dynamics are characterized by a degree of hostility that renders its deliberative process 

ineffectual. Board meetings are dominated by one member whose tactics and personal attacks 

on colleagues and staff have created an unprofessional and unproductive atmosphere.

• Chronic vacancies and absences of Board members threaten the quorum required for the 

Board to act, limit the diversity of perspectives brought to discussion, and put at risk the 

bipartisan nature of the Board. 

• The Board’s bylaws and self-adopted governance policies are inadequate to govern 

appropriately the conduct of Board business. 

• The system of having BBG Governors serve concurrently on the corporate board of the 

grantees creates the potential for—and, in some cases, actual—conflict of interest, as 

perceived by many and gives rise to a widespread perception of favoritism in Board 

decisions. 

• A comprehensive travel policy that relates Board travel to strategic objectives and followup 

actions should be implemented. 

All findings and recommendations in this report are based on conditions observed during the onsite review and the standards and policies then in effect. The report does not comment at length 

on areas where the OIG team did not identify problems that need to be corrected. The inspection 

took place in Washington, DC, between September 10 and November 19, 2012.(b) (5)
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(b) (5)
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Context 

The BBG is an independent Federal agency

1 that oversees all U.S. Governmentsupported, civilian international broadcasting. Its mission is to inform, engage, and connect 

people around the world in support of freedom and democracy. The BBG’s fundamental 

objective is to advance U.S. foreign policy by providing an example of free press and free media 

to countries where such freedom does not exist and to represent the United States, its people, and 

its policies. The “Broadcasting Board of Governors” also serves as the name of the governing 

body. The BBG Board is a nine-member, part-time, bipartisan body of eight private citizens 

appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, as well as the Secretary of State (ex 

officio), that serves as a collective head of agency. Of the nine Board members, only eight 

private citizens carry the title of Governor. 

The BBG oversees five organizations that represent varied legal and organizational 

frameworks (see appendix A). The Federal agency includes the International Broadcasting 

Bureau (IBB), which provides day-to-day administrative support and services, as well as two 

broadcast entities—the Voice of America (VOA) and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB). 

Three additional broadcast entities are private, nonprofit corporations: Radio Free Europe/Radio 

Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN). 

These organizations are BBG grantees, but Congress has given the Board supervisory authorities 

over them. 

 The scope of U.S. Government broadcasting oversight has grown over time. The Board 

for International Broadcasting (BIB) was created in 1974 to fund and oversee RFE/RL. It was 

replaced with the BBG by the U.S. International Broadcasting Act of 1994. The 1994 Act 

consolidated all nonmilitary U.S. Government broadcasting under the supervision of the BBG, 

including the newly created IBB, which combined VOA, OCB, and the engineering and 

technical services needed to support them. Both the BBG and IBB were housed within the U.S. 

Information Agency (USIA). The BBG inherited oversight and grantmaking authority over 

RFE/RL and acquired those same authorities for RFA (created in 1996) and MBN (created in 

2003). The 1994 Act also established eight members to the Board (four Democrats and four 

Republicans), which are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The ninth, the 

Secretary of State, serves ex officio. With the exception of the Secretary of State, Board 

members are appointed for 3-year terms. However, when Board members are appointed to fill 

vacancies occurring prior to the expiration of a term, they serve the remainder of that term. By 

law, any Board member whose term has expired may serve until appointment of a successor.

The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, referred to hereafter as the 

1998 Act, merged USIA with the Department of State (Department) and transformed the BBG 

into an independent Federal entity. The 1998 Act also provided new coordinating authority to the 

IBB Director. The 1998 Act expressly separated the BBG from the Department to maintain a 

“firewall” to protect journalistic content from political interference. The 1998 Act also gave the 

 

1 Throughout this report, agency denotes the Federal entities of the BBG (Voice of America, International 

Broadcasting Bureau, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting), whereas the BBG and the Board denote the ninemember governing body.
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Board authority to “supervise” all broadcasting activities, modifying language from the U.S. 

International Broadcasting Act of 1994, which gave the Board power to “direct and supervise.” 

The U.S. Congressional Conference Report2 explained that removal of the word “direct” was 

meant to clarify that the Board is not responsible for day-to-day management, which the report 

called “incongruous with a part-time oversight board.” 

 Since its establishment, the BBG has guided this complex array of organizations through 

a progressively more challenging worldwide media environment. The BBG is one of the world’s 

largest newsgathering and reporting operations, with 50 news bureaus and offices worldwide. 

The five broadcast entities it supervises employ more than 3,500 journalists, producers, 

technicians, and support personnel full time in Washington, Miami, and Prague. It employs

approximately 1,500 freelancers around the world. BBG broadcasts reach an audience of 187 

million in 100 countries by radio, television, and Internet. In its FY 2013 budget, the BBG 

requested $720 million, a decrease of 4.2 percent from its FY 2012 budget ($750 million). 

 This inspection focused on the operations of the BBG Board, including its structure, 

conduct, and relationships with the entities that it oversees. The inspection did not review the 

internal operations of any of the BBG broadcast entities or the IBB. The Governors on the 

current Board were appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and took office in July 

2010. At the time of this inspection, two Governors had resigned and a third had submitted her 

resignation. Also, the President has nominated someone to fill the vacant position as Chairman of 

the Board. OIG previously conducted an inspection of the BBG in 2007. 

 

2 U.S. House Foreign Affairs and Restructuring Act of 1998 Conference Report (to accompany H.R. 1757). (H. R. 

Rep. No. 105-432).
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Executive Direction

 U.S. Government nonmilitary broadcasting is characterized by journalism of the highest 

caliber and a widespread, deep devotion to its mission of support for democracy and freedom. 

 

In questionnaires from and personal interviews with the current Board, IBB senior staff, 

the heads of the five broadcast entities, former Governors, staffs of congressional oversight 

committees, and an array of outside observers, the word most commonly used to describe the 

BBG was “dysfunctional.” Based on this evidence and a review of voluminous documentation 

and extensive personal interviews and observation, the inspection team agrees with this 

assessment. 

 This dysfunction is attributable largely to the Board’s structure, internal governance 

issues, and dynamics. This report describes in detail the impact of the dysfunction, including the 

Board’s failure to implement key aspects of the strategic plan, unclear lines of authority, and lack 

of setting priorities. 

Structure

 This Board is not the first in BBG history to be considered dysfunctional. A former 

Chairman of the BBG recently declared the Board system “structurally a mess.” The 1998 Act 

that established the Board is based on the assumption that a part-time bipartisan board can 

provide effective supervision of U.S. international broadcasting. That assumption has proved 

incorrect. Further, individual Governors have interpreted this legislation in different ways. 

 Another structural challenge for the Board lies in its relations with its three grantees: 

RFE/RL, RFA, and MBN. These broadcast entities are not Federal organizations but rather 

BBG-funded, nonprofit organizations that have their own corporate boards. Public Law 97-241 

of 1982 mandated that the RFE/RL corporate board and the BIB (BBG’s precursor) have 

identical memberships. RFA and MBN have adopted the RFE/RL model, although they are not 

legally required to do so. As such, all grantees are subject to supervision by the same eight 

Governors, each of whom performs both BBG and corporate roles. This dual functionality 

creates conflicts of interest and confusion regarding Governors’ roles and responsibilities. 

Strategic Supervision versus Operational Management 

 Under the 1998 Act, Governors are expected to supervise all U.S. international 

broadcasting activities. The management of the daily operations is the purview of the IBB 

Director and the presidents of the grantees. Over time, however, individual Governors have 

determined their own “fiduciary” responsibilities and acted accordingly. Inconsistent 

interpretation has lead to varying and unproductive levels of Governor involvement in day-today administration of the broadcast entities and has contributed to inefficiency and confusion 

over roles and responsibilities and has weakened the ability of IBB staff to manage the 

organization effectively. 
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Early in its tenure, the Board had a clear sense of its duties, as evidenced in a number of 

actions. It clarified lines of authority between the Board and the IBB Director and merged the 

BBG and IBB staffs under the leadership of the IBB Director. The Board also set up committees 

to leverage the expertise of Governors and make recommendations for the full Board’s 

consideration, adopted bylaws, and opened Board meetings to the public. It delegated many 

operational authorities to the IBB Director. During the Board’s second year, the Governors 

completed a comprehensive review of U.S. international broadcasting, resulting in a bold, 5-year 

strategic plan, “Impact Through Innovation and Integration.” The plan included a new mission 

statement and called for, among other things, the consolidation and streamlining of management

and the appointment of a CEO. The Board also explored converting VOA, OCB, and IBB from 

Federal agencies to private-sector, nonprofit organizations and also examined ways to minimize 

language service duplication. The Board took a substantial step toward implementing its strategic 

vision by deciding, in principle, to consolidate RFE, RFA, and MBN into a single organization. 

These decisions represented positive steps. 

 However, in the face of criticism from within and outside the organization, the Governors 

have not implemented these decisions, with two Governors in particular backsliding on their 

prior commitments. Instead, the Board has allowed itself to be distracted by operational issues 

best handled at lower management levels and has consistently undermined the IBB Director in 

the execution of his duties. By allowing its focus to slip from issues of strategic importance, the 

Board fails to exploit fully its collective talents and does not meet its legislative obligation to 

provide oversight of and strategic guidance to the broadcast entities. 

 A prescription for improving the situation lies in the Board’s own 5-year strategic plan, 

which sets forth as “imperative” that the Board attend to strategy, budget, and outreach and 

create a full-time CEO to manage the agency’s day-to-day affairs. At the September Board 

meeting, the Governors tasked the IBB staff to provide information about the challenges of 

creating and implementing a CEO position. At the October Board meeting, the IBB briefed the 

Governors on the requested information, but the Board has not moved forward on this issue. The 

inspection team endorses the CEO concept, as did many individuals interviewed. The CEO 

would have clear authority over the IBB and the two Federal broadcast entities but does not 

address what authority the CEO would have over the three grantee organizations. The Board 

would retain its obligation to safeguard the editorial independence of the broadcast entities.

 The concept of a CEO with clearly delineated authorities and responsibilities, 

complemented by a part-time, Presidentially appointed board of directors focused on strategic 

issues, has worked well with entities like the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the 

Corporation for Public Broadcasting. A CEO would allow the Board to put the necessary focus 

on these strategic concerns and keep out of day-to-day management. Whether the CEO for U.S. 

international broadcasting might be appointed by the Board or nominated by the President and 

confirmed by the Senate has been the subject of much Board deliberation. The inspection team 

takes no position on this issue. 

Recommendation 1: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should implement a chief executive 

officer position as outlined in its 2012–2016 Strategic Plan, “Impact Through Innovation and 

Integration.” (Action: BBG)
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Conflict of Interest: Broadcasting Board of Governors Board and Corporate Boards 

 Governors’ duties as members of the BBG Board are by nature different and sometimes

at odds with their duties as members of the corporate boards of RFE/RL, RFA, and MBN. The 

statutory role of the Board is to oversee, assess, and evaluate the quality and effectiveness of 

broadcasts in the context of broad U.S. foreign policy objectives and to facilitate efficient 

management of public funds. Governors are subject to Federal guidelines from the Office of 

Government Ethics, conflict-of-interest rules, and the Government in the Sunshine Act. While 

serving on the boards of the three nonprofits, Governors have the fiduciary responsibility of 

obedience, loyalty, and care. They are governed by the grantee’s articles of incorporation, the 

U.S. International Broadcasting Act of 1994, and laws for the state in which the grantee was 

incorporated. Most of the individuals who the inspection team interviewed said that these dual 

responsibilities create a conflict of interest, as Governors serving on the corporate boards of the 

grantees would have to be prepared to vote against the grantee leadership on matters that were 

not in the BBG’s overall interest. For example, the OIG team documented a case in which a 

Governor, sitting on the RFA corporate board as its vice chairman, advocated for the grantee 

against the Board’s governance committee on which he also sits. 

 

The intended purpose of having BBG Governors serve as heads of corporate boards of 

the grantees was to create opportunities for more substantive involvement by individual 

Governors in grantees’ activities and to provide a way to take advantage of an individual 

Governor’s regional or other expertise. An unintended consequence, however, is a clear 

perception among the Federal entities that this dual functionality has led to advocacy and 

favoritism on behalf of the grantees—especially in RFA—giving them an advantage in budget 

and policy decisions of the Board. This belief was expressed to the inspection team in numerous 

interviews and is especially acute in the largest of the BBG broadcast entities, VOA. This 

perception is further enhanced with the current Board because a few of the Governors actually 

make the time to take active roles on the three grantee boards. 

 One example that emerged in numerous interviews and correspondence illustrates the 

problem. The Board decided that all five broadcast entities should adopt a new content 

management system called Pangea. The goals were to save money and allow all entities to share 

content. RFA was on the study committee that included representatives from various BBG 

entities. The committee submitted its findings to the Board, which voted to adopt Pangea. 

Despite the Board’s decision, RFA refused to adopt this content system. This action was an 

obvious challenge to Board authority. At present, all broadcast entities except RFA participate in 

the program, and the broadly held perception—expressed repeatedly to the OIG team—is that

RFA can flout collective decisions of the Board because it can rely on strong support from the 

chairman and vice chairman of its corporate board. 

 The inspection team was told about another conflict of interest. Having the Governors 

serve on the corporate boards of RFE/RL, RFA, and MBN in effect allows the Board to grant 

money to itself and to take a more prominent role in the programmatic activity of the grantee 

organizations than foreseen in legislation. The Governors, by law, do not have to serve on the 

corporate boards of RFA and MBN. This dual function causes constant confusion over which 

board is actually making decisions or providing oversight. Any remedy for the current 
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arrangement with the RFE/RL board would require legislative change and is addressed in a 

recommendation in the Need for Legislative Change section of this report. 

Recommendation 2: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should remove Governors from the 

corporate boards of Radio Free Asia and Middle East Broadcasting Networks and establish a 

new mechanism for selecting corporate board members. (Action: BBG)

Challenges of a Part-Time Board: Attendance and Vacancies

A part-time Board faces significant challenges in operating as a collective agency head. 

The demands of regular Board meetings, committee meetings, and corporate board meetings 

have proved overwhelming, especially for Governors who live outside the DC metropolitan area, 

hold full-time jobs, and engage in other professional activities. Meetings and venues for the 

coming year are put on a calendar at the start of each fiscal year, but last-minute schedule 

conflicts forced the cancellation of the July 2012 meeting and nearly derailed the June, August, 

and October 2012 meetings for lack of a quorum. Scheduling conflicts prevented some 

Governors from attending the June and August meetings, and they participated via digital video 

conference or telephone. Although overall performance records indicate that Board members 

have an average attendance rate of 84 percent, these statistics are misleading. A review of 

meeting minutes and observation of the June and September Board meetings revealed that 

several Governors arrived late, left early, and periodically absented themselves without 

explanation. One Governor has attended only 12 of the Board’s 20 meetings to date and has 

participated in recent Board meetings only by telephone. 

 A generally accepted obligation for being an effective Board member is to prepare for 

and attend Board meetings. However, the BBG does not have an attendance policy and does not 

censure or sanction Board members who do not attend Board meetings. Absent Governors 

impede the Board from achieving or maintaining a quorum and, consequently, its ability to 

address issues requiring action. 

Recommendation 3: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should establish a policy on 

meeting attendance that includes sanctions for noncompliance. (Action: BBG)

Chronic vacancies have further hampered the Board’s ability to meet its obligations. The 

Board has been fully staffed for only 7 of its 17 years of existence, and the current Governors are 

serving under expired terms. All eight members of the current Board were nominated in 

November 2009 and confirmed in July 2010. They replaced the four Governors remaining from 

the previous Board, who had been appointed in 2002. The legislation called for staggering 

Governors’ terms of office for the purpose of maintaining institutional stability and memory. 

However, replacing Board members in a regular and timely fashion has been hampered by White 

House delays in nominating candidates and Senate delays in confirming them. For example, 

three members of the current Board resigned in 2012, and only one replacement had been 

nominated as of November 1. Chronic vacancies deprive the BBG of the diversity of 

perspectives envisioned by legislation and put at risk the intended political balance among Board 

members. 
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Internal Governance Issues

 Since taking office in July 2010, the Board has adopted bylaws and policies to govern the 

conduct of BBG business. However, these policies are self-imposed and depend upon the 

willingness of individual Governors to abide by them. Based on observation, review of meeting 

records, and interviews with meeting participants and stakeholders, it is clear that the Board’s 

self-governance policies are inadequate to ensure the appropriate, effective, and efficient conduct 

of business. Good governance requires more than bylaws and policies; it requires consistent 

practices that reinforce those policies and a system of accountability to ensure adherence.

 The Board has adopted a practice of trying to reach consensus on major issues in lieu of 

the statutorily mandated majority vote as stated in its bylaws. The inspection team has been told 

that this practice stems from the fact that minority votes become the inspiration for blog output 

and lobbying with congressional oversight committees. The reluctance of the Board to 

acknowledge dissension publicly, even when the dissenting view is held by a single Governor, 

creates paralysis in Board decisions. This reluctance has been reflected in the Board’s failure to 

implement its strategic plan described previously. Although the Board adopted the plan 

unanimously, Governors have gone on record as questioning or backpedaling on specific 

elements of the plan. 

 The Board fails to stand by its own decisions. One example is in the preparation of the 

FY 2014 budget. The Board’s internal deadline to approve the budget was July 2012, but that 

month’s meeting was canceled because of lack of a quorum. The Board held an emergency 

meeting by telephone in August 2012 and unanimously approved the budget. However, entity 

heads subsequently appealed to a number of the Governors to modify their decisions. The 

Governors decided to revisit the budget at their September meeting, 3 days after the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) deadline for budget submission. The Board ultimately provided 

the final budget to OMB a week late. This is the third year in a row that the Board has failed to 

submit its budget on time—one of its clearly delineated legislative responsibilities. It is the view 

of the inspection team that this particular issue could have been avoided if the Board had 

exercised better self-governance.

Meeting Management

Board meetings are disorganized, do not follow planned schedules, and at times include 

more agenda items than can be addressed in the time allotted, usually one long working day. 

Without a clear demarcation between oversight and management responsibilities, the number of 

issues that can attract the Board’s attention is limitless. Untouched agenda items are shunted 

from one meeting to the next, or are dealt with in committees, leading to charges of 

decisionmaking in the dark. 

 The Board’s September 2012 meeting, which the inspection team attended and is 

available in recorded version on the BBG Web site, provides a vivid example of a Board unable 

to conduct business. An overambitious agenda included 17 items, only 5 of which the Board 

discussed. 
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 Procedural and ceremonial issues take up valuable meeting time that could be used to 

address substantive issues. As an example, the March 2012 meeting agenda included 19 items. 

Of these, seven were procedural or ceremonial; for example, adoption of meeting minutes and 

resolutions honoring award winners, service anniversaries, and individual contributions to the 

organization. The inspection team was told the Board had at one point agreed not to include 

ceremonial items on meeting agendas, but these items continue to appear. Other March agenda 

items included routine reports from entity heads and IBB staff that did not provoke Board 

discussion or require Board action. These issues could have been provided to the Governors prior 

to the meeting for review. Any items requiring action could be bundled together in a “consent 

agenda” and voted on, as a package, without discussion. A consent agenda would enable the 

Board to differentiate between routine matters not needing explanation and more complex issues 

requiring examination. 

Recommendation 4: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should adopt the use of a consent 

agenda to address routine matters in all Board meetings. (Action: BBG)

 The Board’s bylaws outline specific responsibilities and authorities of the Board 

Chairman but do not include explicit authority to maintain order at meetings, enforce the Board’s 

agreed-to code of conduct, and keep the meeting focused on issues that are the clear purview of 

the Board. 

Informal Recommendation 1: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should amend its 

bylaws to grant the Chairman explicit authority over the conduct and content of Board 

meetings.

Nondisclosure and Confidentiality

 Confidentiality is critical to establishing and maintaining an atmosphere of frank and 

deliberate discussion. Its absence can sow mistrust among Board members and jeopardize the 

Board’s effectiveness. However, breaches of confidentiality often arise when there are dissenting 

opinions. To be effective, the Board should speak with one voice—dissenting opinions should be 

captured in official meeting records and not aired publicly through the press or other outlets. 

As a collective agency head, the Board has an even greater responsibility to speak with 

one voice in representing the views of the agency. Nine members of a collective agency head 

publicly articulating inconsistent and/or divergent positions would reduce confidence in agency 

decisionmaking and harm its effectiveness. But few rules govern the Governors’ public 

statements—to employees, Congress, or the press. Allegations of leaks and inappropriate 

information sharing are rampant within the BBG and the broadcast entities. These leaks

negatively affect the free exchange of ideas during closed Board meetings and create external 

pressures on the Governors’ deliberative process. 

 The Board sought to address this problem by unanimously adopting a policy in June 2012 

that prohibits the disclosure of “deliberative” information. However, this nondisclosure policy 

has been the subject of extensive Board debate over the course of several meetings and has even 

resulted in congressional inquiry. During the September 2012 Board meeting, a Governor who 
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actively participated in drafting the policy rescinded his approval. Although this single dissenting 

vote does not repeal the policy, it does raise questions as to this particular Governor’s 

commitment to the concept of confidentiality and nondisclosure and the Board’s ability to 

enforce its own guidelines. The policy, like others that govern the Board, lacks a mechanism for 

censuring or sanctioning Governors who violate it. The importance of such a mechanism was 

underscored in a recent Governance Committee meeting when the Governor who reversed his 

position on the policy repeatedly inquired about the consequences of violating the policy. 

 Board meetings are conducted in accordance with the Government in the Sunshine Act (5 

U.S.C. 552 b.). The Board’s nondisclosure policy clearly states that the policy does not affect the 

BBG’s requirements to comply with the Sunshine Act and will be implemented in a manner 

consistent with its provisions. However, the inspection team found the policy inconsistent with

the Sunshine Act in that the language of the policy does not reference specific exemptions 

provided in the Sunshine Act. The “deliberative process” that is referred to in the nondisclosure 

policy is language more consistent with Freedom of Information Act exemptions and not with 

Sunshine Act exemptions. A simple notation of applicable Sunshine Act exemption(s) would 

bring the policy in line. The most broadly and consistently applicable exemption is c(9)(B), 

which allows the agency an exemption to the Act if the agency “...properly determines that such 

portion or portions of its meeting or the disclosure of such information is likely to... significantly 

frustrate the implementation of a proposed agency action....” 

Recommendation 5: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should update and implement its 

nondisclosure policy to reference relevant exemptions from the Government in the Sunshine Act 

and to include sanctions for noncompliance. (Action: BBG)

Board Dynamics

The Governors bring an array of experience and achievement to their service to U.S. 

international broadcasting. They have rich backgrounds in politics, media, communications, and 

foreign affairs. They began their tenure by identifying shortcomings with Board operations, 

agency structure, and coordination among the elements of U.S. international broadcasting and by 

adopting a strategic plan that lays out how to resolve these issues. Unfortunately, internal Board 

dynamics have largely derailed their efforts to implement the plan. 

Board dynamics are characterized by a degree of hostility that renders its deliberative 

process ineffectual. During the course of the inspection, the majority of individuals interviewed 

firmly expressed the view that the Board’s current paralysis was the fault of a single Governor 

and that the reputations of other Board members should not be damaged because of his tactics.

The inspection team’s observations and interactions with the aforementioned Governor support 

this view.

 The inspection team observed the behavior of the Governor in question in Board 

meetings and reviewed extensive communications between him and his Board colleagues and 

IBB senior staff. In meetings, he habitually disrupts the flow of discussion with points of order, 

complains of being uninformed about matters that were part of documentation presented before 
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the meeting to all Governors, and accuses senior staff of hampering him from carrying out his 

fiduciary duties by keeping important information from him. 

 This Governor frequently refers to his years of experience as mayor of a city as his 

compass for carrying out his fiduciary duties on the Board. He uses his knowledge of 

parliamentary procedure to impede free Board discussion. He visits widely throughout the 

agency, offering to bypass IBB management to assure Board attention to employee concerns. 

Many accuse him of using outside media to support his views and attack colleagues and staff 

who disagree. 

These may be familiar practices in municipal government politics but have side-tracked 

positive collective action by the Board. Moreover, his insulting and intimidating manner, as 

witnessed by the inspectors, to IBB and grantee staff creates tension and hampers productive 

exchange. He styles himself “the loyal opposition,” a role that seems out of place on a bipartisan 

Board acting as a collective agency head.

 To his credit, this Governor has been diligent in Board meeting attendance and has raised 

important issues. For example, he brought to the Board’s attention the fact that flu shots were 

being offered to direct-hire employees but not to contractors. But his interventions force Board 

attention onto relatively minor issues or management decisions with which he disagrees. On 

balance, his behavior has been a barrier to the Board’s ability to provide strategic guidance for 

U.S. international broadcasting. 

 

The former Board Chairman placed emphasis on developing consensus for Board 

decisions. By all accounts, he expended considerable effort in this pursuit. The presiding 

Governor has continued in this general vein. However, consensus decisions are not necessary 

because by statute, Board decisions must be reached by majority vote. To the extent that other 

Governors have allowed the tactics of one Governor to hamstring the Board, they bear some 

responsibility for its being dysfunctional.

Board Relations with International Broadcasting Bureau Staff

The role of IBB staff is to facilitate the work of the Board and to prepare briefing 

materials and Board meeting agendas, offer legal and financial advice, make travel 

arrangements, and provide strategic planning information. In addition, the staff has other nonBoard obligations. A majority of the Governors are pleased with the staff’s work and dedication. 

The inspection team found that the IBB senior staff is composed of seasoned professionals with a 

commitment to the mission. A review of Board briefing documents and email correspondence 

showed that the staff works long and often irregular hours to support the Board. 

 

An assessment of the relations between the Board and IBB staff must begin with the IBB 

Director, appointed by the President and approved by the Senate, who has broad responsibilities, 

including management of VOA and OCB on paper. The Board delegated the Director a wide 

range of authorities in 2011 but promptly overrode his initiative to introduce a single content 

management system (Pangea) for all broadcast entities. The Board allowed one grantee, RFA,
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not to take part in this initiative. This action led to the IBB Director’s authorities being 

undermined in the eyes of the broadcast entities and his own staff. 

 The relationship between the IBB staff and the Board is good with the exception of one 

particular Governor mentioned in the previous section. For example, at the September 2012 

Board meeting, the inspection team observed this Governor showing unprofessional behavior 

and hostility toward the IBB staff. The inspection team reviewed email correspondence showing 

that such behavior is normal for this Governor. 

 At the November 2011 meeting, the Board agreed that all requests for information from 

the staff should go through the IBB Director. This directive has not been followed. The 

inspection team reviewed the volume and nature of requests made directly to the staff for 

information from the same Governor cited previously. He asserts that he has the right to request 

from the staff anything he deems necessary to fulfill his fiduciary responsibilities as he sees 

them. The inspection team found that much of the information he requested was only marginally 

relevant to Board strategic concerns, or was information already distributed to Governors. 

The efforts of IBB staff to prepare briefing materials for Board meetings are often in 

vain. Last-minute cancelations of Board meetings provide an example of wasted staff time. 

Another is the failure of a few Governors to read their briefing materials thoroughly, leading to 

their raising questions to IBB staff that were already answered in the briefing materials. 

The inspection team noted that the aforementioned Governor has produced a pervasive 

atmosphere of hostility, lack of trust, and disrespect within the IBB senior staff. However, it 

would be unfair to ascribe these unfortunate behaviors and actions to the Board as a whole. 

Indeed, mutual admiration and respect between senior staff members and several Governors 

exists. Unfortunately, these Governors have not imposed discipline on their colleague. 

Board Relations with Federal Broadcast Entities

 The Board’s relationships with the two Federal entities, VOA and OCB, are complicated 

by the competition for resources and the desire of each entity for the greatest measure of 

management control. The view from both VOA and OCB reveals a Board that is inconsistent in 

the way it handles funding issues and that lacks transparency in its decisionmaking process. The 

OIG team heard complaints that Board meetings take place purportedly to arrive at decisions on 

broadcast issues when, in fact, decisions have already been reached. 

 

 In response to this perception, the Board designated Governors to establish closer liaison 

with the VOA and OCB. From the OIG team’s observation of two Board meetings, however, it 

does not appear that the Board has achieved this goal. An example of coordination was the effort 

by VOA to shift funding from shortwave broadcasting to China to more effective digital 

platforms. The inspection team agrees that this sensitive issue should have been discussed 

thoroughly by the Board, with an expectation that the Board would help prepare Congress for 

what might look at first glance like an abandonment of the Chinese audience. Instead, individual 

Board members used negative congressional response to the proposed change to claim ignorance 

of the matter and launch criticism of VOA leadership.
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 The OIG team noted the absence of BBG direction to VOA and OCB regarding meeting

the demands of changing world media. Also lacking is any discussion of overall U.S. 

Government policy priorities in relation to the world media. Without Board direction, issues are

played out in congressional committees and in public media, including very active blogs. In the 

view of the inspection team, a Board of part-time government employees, regardless of their

dedication to public service, cannot successfully achieve these requirements. 
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Need for Legislative Change 

 The structural issues discussed in this report will require changes in the law for 

improvement to be effective and longstanding. The recommendation to create a CEO position, as 

well as several other recommendations in this report, provide temporary solutions but do not 

address the fundamental structural issues that plague the Board. For example, the appointment of 

a CEO would not relieve the tendency of the Board to delve into operational issues or ensure that 

the Board would respect the authorities vested in the CEO. 

 At the January 2012 meeting, the Board authorized a working group to develop a 

proposal for legislative change to the U.S. International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (as amended). 

The inspection team endorses this initiative and urges the Board to pursue it vigorously. The 

central goal would be to establish guidelines for Board self-governance, including enhanced 

authorities for the Board Chairman and accountability for the actions of Governors. The initiative

would also include the legislative establishment of a head of agency reporting to the Board, 

changes in the corporate board membership of RFE/RL, and a restatement of the Board’s duty to 

provide strategic direction, safeguard journalistic integrity, and approve the agency’s budget. 

Recommendation 6: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should coordinate with the Office 

of Management and Budget and the Congressional Oversight Committees to formally propose 

and implement new legislation for U.S. international broadcasting that includes enhancing

authority for the Board Chairman in Board governance, focusing the Board on its strategic 

oversight and direction roles, changing the membership of the corporate board for Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, prohibiting Governors from sitting on the corporate boards of Radio Free 

Asia and Middle East Broadcasting Networks, and implementing a mechanism for censure or 

removal of Governors for actions harmful to the ability of the Board to perform its duties. 

(Action: BBG)
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Board Administrative Areas

 The IBB staff provides all administrative support to the Board. This inspection did not 

focus on examining IBB administrative processes and procedures in detail but rather on broad 

areas in which the Governors have a responsibility to comply with Federal administrative 

regulations. These areas are travel, time and attendance procedures, Equal Employment 

Opportunity (EEO) and ethics, and representational funds. 

Travel 

 The Board spent approximately $210,000 in travel from July 1, 2010, to August 31, 2012. 

This amount includes the travel vouchers of two Governors who resigned. The inspection team 

reviewed travel vouchers only from 2011 to 2012 because very little travel took place in 2010. 

The review revealed that some of the Governors purchase their own low-fare airline tickets in 

advance, which in the majority of cases is cheaper than using the U.S. Government contract fare. 

Other Governors purchased higher fare airline tickets or different class tickets (i.e., business or 

first class) but asked for reimbursement only for the Government contract fare. The travel 

vouchers were supported with proper receipts. 

 At the July 14, 2011, Board meeting, the then Chairman called upon several Governors to 

give trip reports, explaining that the BBG is a Federal agency with an international mission, and 

it is important for the Governors to travel from time to time to the “front lines” to meet the 

people who are touched directly by the BBG’s mission. He added that the Governors have been 

very careful about travel and only make important trips with real purposes. He noted that several 

Governors had taken important trips and invited those Governors to report briefly on their trips. 

While the Chairman was in place, he allowed each Governor one international trip per year, 

subject to his approval. 

After the departure of the Chairman, briefings on official travel became less frequent and 

international trips have not been authorized by the presiding Governor. A valid purpose of travel

is to meet the employees who carry out the mission. However, without a comprehensive policy 

that stipulates not only the frequency of travel but also how official trips need to support specific 

strategic goals and objectives of the agency and have a quantifiable impact, the Board is unable 

to determine the effectiveness of the trips. 

The OIG team’s sample review revealed that the travel vouchers of one Governor, who is 

retired and has more time to devote to BBG work, stand out from those of the other Governors. 

He visited the same two Asian countries in 2011 and 2012. From January to August 2012, he 

made as many trips as all the other Governors combined, at a total cost of approximately 

$24,000; half of this amount he spent on travel other than to Board/committee meetings. 

The BBG Board would benefit by defining in writing specific requirements for official 

trips (domestic and international), including reporting and discussing outcomes and followup 

actions of these trips and travel processes, such as authorization and approval of travel (i.e., by 

either the Board or the Chairman). A good travel policy needs to include the use of business class 
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and processes for obtaining visas and country clearances before official travel. In doing so, the 

Board would make more effective use of its travel funds and have a policy that is consistent with 

Federal travel regulations. 

Recommendation 7: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should implement a written 

comprehensive travel policy that sets clear guidelines on all facets of official travel (domestic 

and international), including the authorization and approval process, processes for visas and 

country clearances, a clear statement of objectives and strategic goals in the travel authorization, 

a report on impact, and followup actions. (Action: BBG)

 

Time and Attendance Review

A review of Board time and attendance records showed that they are complete. The 

Governors self-certify the hours they work on BBG matters. Every pay period, the timekeeper 

sends the timesheet form to all the Governors via email. All Governors comply with this 

requirement with the exception of one Governor. The review of time and attendance records for 

this particular Governor revealed frequent late submission of timesheets, normally 4 weeks after 

the pay period submission deadline. Not adhering to the timely submission of timesheets may 

raise questions about the validity of the hours the Governor claims on the time and attendance 

forms. 

The review also revealed that another Governor has not claimed on time and attendance 

forms hours worked on BBG matters, specifically, time spent at some meetings. Any U.S. 

Government employee, despite his or her part- or full-time status, may not provide service free 

of charge.

Informal Recommendation 2: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should submit 

accurate time and attendance forms by the established deadline and claim all hours 

worked on Board-related matters.

Equal Employment Opportunity and Ethics

 At the time of the inspection, the BBG Board updated the agency’s EEO statement. 

Under the leadership of the current Board, the EEO statement has been updated annually and 

implemented and distributed to all BBG personnel. 

 The Governors are subject to General Principles of Ethical Conduct, United States Code, 

Title 18-Criminal Laws and Code of Federal Regulations, Title 5, Part 2635-Administrative 

Code. The Governors have submitted the required public financial disclosure reports (Standard 

Form 278) and confidential financial disclosure reports (OGE Form 450). The Governors are 

considered special government employees. This means that a Governor is employed for no more 

than 130 days in a 365-day period from the time of his or her appointment. The number of days 

that a Governor works could have significant implications on a number of ethical restrictions and 

disclosures. 
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In reviewing ethics documentation, the OIG team discovered that one particular Governor 

had exceeded the 130-day limit in 2011 and came close to doing the same in 2012. Although he 

did not lose his special government employee status by serving more than 130 days, he 

jeopardized BBG’s ability to make subsequent special government employee designations in 

good faith. 

 During the course of the inspection, a 1-hour ethics briefing was scheduled for the 

Governors during a Board meeting. However, because of the Governors’ schedule conflicts, the 

Board dropped the training from the agenda and did not reschedule it. Although the annual ethics 

briefing can be met by providing the Governors with a written summary of ethics rules, this 

method may not be sufficient. The inspectors observed that Governors often fail to read in 

advance briefing materials that IBB staff prepares for Board meetings, providing no guarantee 

that Governors would read the written summary of ethics rules. An in-person ethics briefing for 

the Governors would allow them to ask questions and acquire a better understanding of the 

complex combination of criminal statutes, administrative regulations, and Executive Orders as 

well as their proper application to specific situations. 

Informal Recommendation 3: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should schedule a 

1-hour, in-person briefing on Federal ethics rules and require all Board Governors to 

attend. 

Representational Funds

The inspection team reviewed the BBG Board’s 2010–2012 representational vouchers, 

totaling $13,800. All were supported with the proper justification and authorizations. 
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List of Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should implement a chief 

executive officer position as outlined in its 2012–2016 Strategic Plan, “Impact Through 

Innovation and Integration.” (Action: BBG)

Recommendation 2: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should remove Governors from 

the corporate boards of Radio Free Asia and Middle East Broadcasting Networks and establish a 

new mechanism for selecting corporate board members. (Action: BBG)

Recommendation 3: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should establish a policy on 

meeting attendance that includes sanctions for noncompliance. (Action: BBG)

Recommendation 4: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should adopt the use of a consent 

agenda to address routine matters in all Board meetings. (Action: BBG)

Recommendation 5: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should update and implement its 

nondisclosure policy to reference relevant exemptions from the Government in the Sunshine Act 

and to include sanctions for noncompliance. (Action: BBG)

Recommendation 6: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should coordinate with the Office 

of Management and Budget and the Congressional Oversight Committees to formally propose 

and implement new legislation for U.S. international broadcasting that includes enhancing 

authority for the Board Chairman in Board governance, focusing the Board on its strategic 

oversight and direction roles, changing the membership of the corporate board for Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, prohibiting Governors from sitting on the corporate boards of Radio Free 

Asia and Middle East Broadcasting Networks, and implementing a mechanism for censure or 

removal of Governors for actions harmful to the ability of the Board to perform its duties. 

(Action: BBG)

Recommendation 7: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should implement a written 

comprehensive travel policy that sets clear guidelines on all facets of official travel (domestic 

and international), including the authorization and approval process, processes for visas and 

country clearances, a clear statement of objectives and strategic goals in the travel authorization, 

a report on impact, and followup actions. (Action: BBG)
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List of Informal Recommendations 

 Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by 

organizations outside the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau. Informal 

recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent 

OIG inspection or on-site compliance review will assess the mission’s progress in implementing 

the informal recommendations.

Informal Recommendation 1: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should amend its bylaws 

to grant the Chairman explicit authority over the conduct and content of Board meetings.

Informal Recommendation 2: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should submit accurate 

time and attendance forms by the established deadline and claim all hours worked on Boardrelated matters.

Informal Recommendation 3: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should schedule a 1-

hour, in-person briefing on Federal ethics rules and require all Board Governors to attend.
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Principal Officials

Board of Governors

All Governors, with the exception of Secretary Clinton, were appointed on July 2, 2010. 

• Walter Isaacson, Chairman (resigned January 27, 2012) 

• Victor H. Ashe

• Hillary Rodham Clinton (ex officio), delegated authority to Under Secretary for Public 

Diplomacy and Public Affairs Tara Sonenshine 

• Michael Lynton, presiding Governor 

• Susan McCue 

• Michael P. Meehan

• Dennis Mulhaupt 

• Dana Perino (resigned December 31, 2012) 

• S. Enders Wimbush (resigned May 23, 2012) 
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Abbreviations 

BBG Broadcasting Board of Governors 

BIB Board for International Broadcasting 

CEO Chief executive officer 

Department U.S. Department of State 

EEO Equal Employment Opportunity 

IBB International Broadcasting Bureau 

MBN Middle East Broadcasting Networks 

OCB Office of Cuba Broadcasting 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

RFA Radio Free Asia 

RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 

USIA U.S. Information Agency 

VOA Voice of America 
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Appendix A: Organizational Chart

Under the BBG are the five broadcast entities VOA, RFE/RL, RFA, OCB, and MBN (shown on the 

left), and the administrative support agency IBB (shown on the right). Under IBB are the following: 

Office of Human Resources; Office of Contracts; Office of Security; Office of Civil Rights; Office of 

Policy; Office of Performance Review; Office of Chief Financial Officer; Office of the General 

Counsel; Office of Strategy and Development; Office of Communication and External Affairs; Office 

of Digital and Design Innovation; and Office of Technology, Services, and Innovation. Under the 

Office of Technology, Services, and Innovation are the following: Chief Information Officer, Office 

of Engineering & Transmission, Office of Information Technology, and Resources Management.
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FRAUD, WASTE, ABUSE,

OR MISMANAGEMENT

OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

HURTS EVERYONE.

CONTACT THE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

HOTLINE

TO REPORT ILLEGAL

OR WASTEFUL ACTIVITIES:

202-647-3320

800-409-9926

oighotline@state.gov

oig.state.gov

Office of Inspector General

U.S. Department of State

P.O. Box 9778

Arlington, VA 22219