J

- A22036

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NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Q.R., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: H.R., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 229 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered December 1, 2017 i n the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at

No(s): CP

- 51

- DP

- 0003030

- 2017, FID: 51

- FN

- 376411

- 2009

BEFORE: BENDER, P .J.E., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS , P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E. : FILED NOVEMBER 20 , 201 8
Appellant H.R. (“Mother”) files this appeal from the O rder dated and

entered on December 1, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelph ia

County Family Court adjud icating dependent her t wo sons , Q.R., born in

December 2002, and L.R., born in October 2011 (collectively, the “Children”)

. 1

Specifically, Mother appeals the finding of abuse as to Q.R. related to two

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 In its Opinion filed on May 31, 2018, the trial court erroneously indicates that the instant appeal arises from its December 1, 2017, and December 29, 2017, Orders involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 5/31/18, at 1.J

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indicated reports from August 26, 2017

. 2 After review, we affirm the trial

court’s order

. The family came to the attention of the Department of Human Services
(DHS) on August 26, 2017 , following reports of Mother’s alleged physical

abuse of Q.R . N.T. at 9. DHS alleged that Mother had film ed Q.R.
masturbating with the inten t to publish such video on the I nternet. Id. at 10

- 11. As testified by DHS I ntake W orker, Yavonna Shields, there were additional
allegations of prior sexual abuse, untreated mental health issues, and harm
to family pets related to Q.R. 3 Id. at 11

- 13.
Notably, Q.R. had been hospitalized for mental health evaluations on

three occasions since March of 2017 and was at Fairmount Behavioral Health
at the time of the hearing. 4 Id. at 14, 25. Subsequent reports were received
which included allegations relating to the mental health of Mother ; lack of

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

2 While the court expressed approval of DHS’ ora l request for the indicated Child Protective Services (“CPS”) abuse re ports of August 26, 2017 , to be founded , Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 12/1/17, at 44

- 47, we observe that there was not a written order reflecting a finding of abuse pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303.

3 Ms. Shields testified to allegations of Mother “hitting and punching” Q.R. N.T. at 9

- 10. Ms. Shields further stated that, while Mother denied physical harm or discipline to Q.R., Mother confirmed filming Q.R. “dancing nude , but that she did not distribut e it.” N.T. at 17

- 18. Ms. Shields also noted that Mother a dmitted Q.R. had killed his brother’s turtle. Id. at 18.

4 Q.R. reportedly did not wish return to Mother’s care. Dependency Petition, 11/14/17, at ¶¶5 b, c, i.J

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medical care as to Q.R. and L.R. for an extended period of time ; physical
discipline of Q.R.; 5 lack of treatment for Q.R. for past injuries and sexual

abuse ; Q.R.’s desire to harm animals ; Mother’s lack of compliance with the
safety plan and refusal to accept in

- home services and supports ; absence of

a bond between Mother and Q.R. ; and the unkempt nature of the home. 6

Dependency Petition, 11/14/17, at ¶¶5 j, k.
DHS filed dependency petitions as to Q .R. and L.R. on November 14,
2017. An adjudicatory hearing pertaining to these petitions was held on

December 1, 2017. Mother was present and represented by Elizabeth Larin,

Esquire. Children , almost fifteen years old and s ix years old at the time,

alth ough not present, were represented by a Child Advocate, Brian Johnson,

Esquire. 7 DHS presented the testimony of DHS Intake worker, Yavonna

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

5 Ms. Shields observ ed scars on Q.R.’s right shoulder, left thigh, and right thigh , which Q.R. attributed to Mother ’s branding him with a fork as a result of hi s playing with fire . Mother also hit him with a metal broom and burn ed him w ith a curling iron . N.T. at 18

- 19.

6 On October 3, 2017 , DHS observed “that [Q.R.]’s bedroom lacks a bed, and is strewn with clothes and trash; that [Mother] and [L.R.]’s bedroom was unkempt and contained a full

- size bed on a broken metal frame and a deflated air matt ress; that the home was unkempt and strewn with trash and dirty laundry on the floors; and that there were also several bags of trash and dirty diapers in the home.” Id. at ¶5 l.

7 Notably, Attorney Johnson ’s office, the Defender’s Association Child Advocacy Unit, was appointed by the trial court on November 15, 2017, as counsel and guardian ad litem to represent the Children. Such appointment was to represent the Children’s interests in connection with proceedings related to abuse, dependency, termination of parental rights, ad option and/or custody. Order Appointing Counsel, 11/15/17.J

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Shields , for purposes of the adjudication. Prior to the completion of Ms.
Shields’ testimony , Mother agreed to an a djudication of dependency and

commitment. 8 , 9 N.T. at 20. The parties stipulated that had Ms. Shields
continued to testify she would have testified to the facts set forth in the
dependency petitions. There was not a stipulation, however, as to the verac ity

of such facts. Id. at 21. Thereafter, the trial court additionally approved DHS’

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

While this appeal was pending, this Court extended the requirements of In re Adoption of L.B.M. , 639 Pa. 428, 432, 161 A.3d 172, 174 (2017), and its progeny to dependency actions generally. Se e L.B.M. , supra (the issue decided was whether 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a), which mandates the appointment of counsel for children involved in contested involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings, is satisfied by the appointment of a GAL provided th at the GAL is an attorney.); see also In re T.S. , ___ Pa. ____, 192 A.3d 1080 (2018) (holding that the trial court did not err in allowing the children’s GAL to act as their sole representative during the termination proceeding because, at two and three ye ars old, they were incapable of expressing their preferred outcome.); In re J’K.M. , 191 A.3d 907 (Pa.Super. 2018) (reversing order denying appointment of a separate counsel for dependency proceedings where there was a conflict between the child ’ s best inte rests and legal interests). Instantly, upon our review, we discern no conflict between Q.R.’s preference and his best interests. However , the preference of L.R. who was six years old at the time of the proceeding in quest ion is unknown, and t he certified record does not suggest his preference. If the trial court determines there is a conflict between his preference and his best interests, L.R. must have separate legal counsel to advocate for those disparate interests in future proceedings.

8 Attorney Johnson supported the adjudication and commitment of the Children. Specifically, in response to inquiry from the trial court, he replied, “I am in agreement with the stipulations as to [the Children’s] full commits. And the recommendations for the children then for mom. . . .” N.T. at 49.

9 Mother does not challenge the adjudication of dependency on appeal.J

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oral request for two indicated CPS abuse reports as to Q.R. from August 26,

2017 , to be founded. 10 Id. at 44

- 47. The certified record , however, does not
contain a written order reflecting a finding of abuse pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 6303. Such a finding is not reflected in the court’s December 1, 2017 , order
memorializing adjudication and disposition. Order of Adjudication and

Disposition

– Ch ild Dependent, 12/1/17. Of relevance, t he following exchange

occurred on the record:

MS. HARRISON : Your Honor, had previously inquired about the status of the report. So I don’t know if the [c] ourt wants that on the record before mom leaves.

THE COURT : Yes. What’s the status of the reports of DHS investigation for August 26 th

. MS. HARRISON : Before she leaves.

THE COURT : Counsel’s here.

MS. HARRISON : Okay.

THE COURT : She needs to start making her phone call.

MS. HARRISON : Your Honor, the CPS Repor t from 8/26/17 in regard to the hitting, that report is indicated. The additional CPS Report with respect to the other issues discussed with the [c] ourt will also be indicated.
In addition, there were a number of reports that came in. There is a valid G PS from 10/2/2017, which is referenced in the

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

10 The court additionally found that Mother’s adult daughter, N.R., and N.R.’s infant daughter, N.M., also resided in Mother’s household a nd then held Mother in custody until N.R. surrendered N.M. to DHS. Id

. at 28

- 44. Mother appeals this issue separately at Superior Court Nos. 230 & 232 EDA 2018. N.R. and N.M. were not a subject of the instant dependency proceedings and appeal.J

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petition. And there is still pending CPS Report from 11/22 and that matter will still be pending, Your Honor.

THE COURT : So as it stands right now within the last say, like, four months I have two indicated r eports.

MS. HARRISON : Two indicated and

--
MS. SHIELDS : Three indicated, two from 8/26, one from 10/2 and a valid GPS from 10/3. And there’s a pending CPS.

THE COURT : Okay. Thank you.

MS. HARRISON : And we would ask for the indicated reports to be founded based on the stipulation and the testimony if the [c] ourt would grant.

MS. LARIN : What are you asking?

MS. HARRISON : That the findings

--
THE COURT : That the indicated reports

--
MS. LARIN : Your Honor, I don’t even have the

--
THE COURT :
-- be marked founded based on the stipulation.
Ms. Larin, I’ll hear from you.

MS. LARIN : I mean, my only objection is that I haven’t actually seen those reports. But if it’s based on the stipulation of what’s in the petition and if you’re saying what’ s in the petition is what you’re asking to be founded.

MS. HARRISON : Yes. Yes, correct.

MS. LARIN : That would

-- I did not stipulate to the veracity of those, Your Honor.

MS. HARRISON : The [c] ourt can make a credibility determination of the testimo ny, which was on the two CPS Reports that was presented at the very least.

THE COURT : Well, actually, when we were on the record before counsel indicated that they would stipulate to the adjudication, Ms. Shields had already testified to the August 26, 2 017, CPS Report.J

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- MS. LARIN : Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT : And I think that that dealt with the physical abuse or the alleged physical abuse of [Q.R.] by [Mother].

MS. HARRISON : And the videotaping.

THE COURT : And the videotaping.

MS. HARRISON : Whic h is the same day. It’s a separate report.

THE COURT : And it’s a separate report. So those are the two reports that did come in. And so, based on that I believe that I can make the finding.

MS. HARRISON : Thank you.

THE COURT : In terms of the Octob er 2 nd report, and I think the October 2 nd report had to do with

– I don’t know that I got full testimony on the October 2 nd report.

MS. HARRISON : I’m fine with the two founded reports, Your Honor. That’s sufficient.

THE COURT : Okay. That’s fine. So that’s what I feel comfortable with doing.

. . . N.T. at 44

- 47

. On December 29, 2017 , Mother, through counsel, filed a timely notice
of appeal as well as a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b) . The trial court filed its Rule
1925(a) O pinion on May 31, 2018. 11

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for this Court’s review:

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

11 The trial court filed a single opinion addressing the instant appeal involving the court’s finding of abuse and Mother’s separate challenge to her incarceration

.J

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1. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by finding child abuse after [Mother] had already been involuntarily removed from the [c] ourtroom, so that she was unable to present any evidence in her own defense, in violation of her rights to due process?

2. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by finding child a buse when [Mother] had not been provided notice that the Philadelphia Department of Human Services intended to pursue a finding of child abuse against her, and where the Philadelphia Department of Human Services did not indicate that they were requesting a finding of child abuse at the outset of the Adjudicatory hearing?
3. To the extent the trial court based a finding of child abuse on counsel’s stipulation at the Adjudicatory hearing, did the trial court commit an error of law, abuse of discretion, and v iolate [Mother] ’s right to due process?

4. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of discretion when it based its finding of child abuse on uncorroborated hearsay statements, in violation of 23 Pa.C.S. [A.] §6381(b), the Juvenile Act, the Pen nsylvania Rules of Evidence, and [Mother] ’s right to due process?

5. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by finding child abuse where the Philadelphia Department of Human Services failed to prove by clear and convincing evid ence that the child was abused, as defined by 23 Pa.C.S. [A.] §6303?

Mother’s Brief at 7

- 8

. Our standard of review for dependency cases is as follows:

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact a nd credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.

In re R.J.T. , 6 08 Pa. 9, 26

- 27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010) (citations omitted);

see also In the Interest of L.Z. , 631 Pa. 343, 111 A.3d 1164 ( 2015). “TheJ

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trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is

likewise free to make all credibili ty determinations and resolve conflicts in the

evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G. , 855 A.2d 68, 73

- 74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation s
omitted)

. [T]o adjudicate a child dependent, a trial court must determine, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child:

is wi thout proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or control may be b ased upon evidence of conduct by the parent, guardian or other custodian that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk.

42 Pa.C.S. A. § 6302 (1) . “Clear and convincing” evidence has been defined as testimony that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of facts to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.R.S. , 696 A.2d 840, 843 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citation omitted).

In accordance with the overarching purpose of the Juvenile Act “[t]o preserve the unity of the family wherever possible,” see 42 Pa.C.S. A. § 6301(b)(1), “a child will only be declared dependent when he is presently without proper parental care and when suc h care is not immediately available.” In re R.T. , [ ] 592 A.2d 55, 57 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citation omitted). This Court has defined “proper parental care” as “that care which (1) is geared to the particularized needs of the child and (2) at a minimum, is l ikely to prevent serious injury to the child.” In re C.R.S., supra at 845 (citation omitted).

In re A.B. , 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa. Super. 2013).J

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-

Under the current version of the CPSL, effective June 12, 2018 , 12 child

abuse is now defined as follows:

(b.1) Chi ld abuse.

-- The term “child abuse” shall mean intentionally, knowingly or recklessly doing any of the following:

(1) Causing bodily injur y to a child through any recent

act or failure to act.

(2) Fabricating, feigning or intentionally exaggerating

or inducing a medical symptom or disease which results in a potentially harmful medical evaluation or treatment to the child through any recent act.

(3) Causing or substantially contributing to serious

ment al injury to a child through any act or failure to act or a series of such acts or failures to act.

(4) Causing sexual abuse or exploitation of a child

through any act or failure to act.

(5) Creating a reasonable likelihood of bodily injury to

a child through any recent act or failure to act.

(6) Creating a likelihood of sexual abuse or

exploitation of a child through any recent act or failure to act.

(7) Causing serious physical neglect of a c hild.

(8) Engaging in any of the following recent acts:

(i) Kicking, biting, throwing, burning, stabbing or cutting a child in a manner that endangers the child.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

12 The definition of child abuse remained the same as the prior version of the CPSL , effective October 28, 2016 , to February 20, 2018, in effect on August 26, 2017. Further, only S ubsection s (b.1)(8)(vii)(D) and (b.1)(10) , which are not relevant instantly, were not included in the version of the CPSL, effective July 1, 2015 , to October 27, 2016, i n effect prior to that.J

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- (ii) Unreasonably restraining or confining a child, based on consideration of the method, lo cation or the duration of the restraint or confinement.

(iii) Forcefully shaking a child under one year of age.

(iv) Forcefully slapping or otherwise striking a child under one year of age.

(v) Interfering with the breathing of a child.

(vi) Causing a child to be present at a location while a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. [A.] § 7508.2 (relating to operation of methamphetamine laboratory) is occurring, provided that the violation is being investigated by law enforcement.

(vii) Leaving a chil d unsupervised with an individual, other than the child ’ s parent, who the actor knows or reasonably should have known:

(A) Is required to register as a Tier II or Tier III sexual offender under 42 Pa.C.S. [A.] Ch. 97 Subch. H (relating to registration of

sexu al offenders), 11 where the victim of the sexual offense was under 18 years of age when the crime was committed.

(B) Has been determined to be a sexually violent predator under 42 Pa.C.S. [A.] § 9799.24 (relating to assessments) or any of its predecessors.

(C) Has been determined to be a sexually violent delinquent child as defined in 42 Pa.C.S. [A.] § 9799.12 (relating to definitions).

(D) Has been determined to be a sexually violent predator under 42 Pa.C.S. [A.] § 9799.58 (relating to assessments) or has to regist er for life under 42 Pa.C.S. [A.] § 9799.55(b) (relating to registration).J

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- (9) Causing the death of the child through any act or failure

to act.

(10) Engaging a child in a severe form of trafficking in persons

or sex trafficking, as those terms are defined under section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (114 Stat. 1466, 22 U.S.C. § 7102).

23 Pa.C.S. A. § 6303(b.1) (footnote omitted)

. Bodily injury is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or
substantial pain.” 23 Pa.C.S. A. § 6303(a). Serious mental injury is defined

as “[a] psychological condition, as diagnosed by a physician or licensed
psychologist, including the refusal of ap propriate treatment, that: (1) renders
a child chronically and severely anxious, agitated, depre ssed, socially
withdrawn, psychotic or in reasonable fear that the child’s life or safety is

threatened; or (2) seriously interferes with a child’s ability to accomplish age

appropriate developmental and social tasks.” Id. Further, serious physical
negl ect is defined as follows:

Any of the following when committed by a perpetrator that endangers a child’s life or health, threatens a child ’ s well

- being, causes bodily injury or impairs a child’s health, development or functioning:

(1) A repeated, prolonged o r egregious failure to

supervise a child in a manner that is appropriate considering the child’s developmental age and abilities.

(2) The failure to provide a child with adequate

essentials of life, including food, shelter or medical

care.J

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Id

. Lastly, sexu al abuse or exploitation is defined, in part, as “(1) [t] he
employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child
to engage in or assist another individual to engage in sexually explicit conduct,

which includes, but is not limited to, the following: . . . (iv) [a] ctual or
simulated sexual activity for the purpose of producing visual depiction,
including photographing, videotaping, computer depicting or filming. . . .” Id.

In In the Interest of J.R.W. , 631 A.2d 1019, 1024 (Pa. Super. 199 3),
we explained that, pursuant to the doctrine of incorporation, the Juvenile Act’s

definition of dependent child subsumed the definition of child abuse outlined
in the CPSL. Thus, we stated the two laws “must be applied together in the

resolution of chi ld abuse complaints.” Id

. at 1023. We reasoned :
The Legislature intended a detailed and specific definition of abuse to leave no doubt as to the capacity of the trial court, which in this case can only be the Juvenile Court, to make a finding and determi nation that a child has been abused. In its capacity as a trial judge, the Juvenile Court judge will look and must look to the above definition of child abuse in a case referred by the child protective service agency to the Court under petition for review of dependency when child abuse has been alleged.

Id

. In addition to establishing the pertinent definition of child abuse, the

court in In the Interest of J.R.W. also stressed that the juvenile court’s

determination of whether child abuse occurred must be supported by clear

and convincing evidence. Id

. [T]he clear and convincing evidence necessary to find dependency, has been imposed by the Legislature as the standard which the Juvenile Court must apply in deciding abuse cases. . . .J

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There is no conflict, constitutional or otherwise, with the clear and convincing evidence standard imposed by the Act to establish child abuse.

Id

. ; s ee also In re L.Z. , __ Pa. __, 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (2015).

Moreover, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6381 provides, in pa rt:
(d) Prima facie evidence of abuse.

-- Evidence that a child has suffered child abuse of such a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the parent or other person responsible for the welfare of the child shall be prima facie evidence of child abuse by the parent or other person responsible for the welfare of the child.

As to the August 26, 2017 , reports of abuse, t he trial court stated:

In the present case, the social worker testified based on he r investigation following a Child Protective Services report, Q.R. showed her scars on his body he attributed to the physical abuse of his Mother. Furthermore, the social worker testified Mother confirmed she videotaped Q.R. engaged in sexual acts on her telephone. Furthermore, Mother admitted she was aware [of] Q.R. harming family pets. The social worker testified Mother stated allegations of her hitting Q.R. were false.
Counsel for the Department of Human Services requested the indicated Child Protect ed Services report of August 26, 2017 alleging physical abuse of Q.R. and videotaping of Q.R. be marked, “founded.” Counsel for Mother stipulated to the petition of the Department of Human Services and adjudication of Q.R. and L.R. The [c] ourt’s ruling a nd determinations were based on the testimony of the social worker.

The [c] ourt reasoned concern of the allegations of physical and sexual abuse perpetrated on Q.R. by Mother. The [c] ourt marked the indicated Child Protective Services report of August 26, 2017 as founded based on the testimony and the stipulations.

T rial Court Opinion, 5/31/18, at 4

- 5 (citations to N.T. omitted)

. M other argues
that the trial court entered a finding of abuse without notice and in violationJ

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of due process, and on the basis improperly admitted evidence. Mother’s Brief

at 19

- 59.

In the case sub judice , wh en adjudicating Q.R. dependent the trial court

did not make a finding of abuse pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303. Althou gh

such is arguably apparent from the court’s on
- the

- record findings, N.T

. at 44

-
47, the trial court did not include such a finding in its written adjudication , or

otherwise

. 13 Order of Adjudication and Disposition

– Child Dependent,

12/1/17. Hence, an appeal of this issue is not viable. See Pa.R.A.P. 341 ( an
appeal may be taken from an order entered as a final order).

Further, t o the extent Mother argues before this Court that her right to

due process was violated due to lack of notice or the fact that the issue was

addressed after she was removed from the courtroom , Mother failed to raise

this claim first with the trial court and, instead, presents it for the first time

on appeal

. Additionally, counsel did not timely challenge that a finding of

abuse was addressed after Mother had been removed from the co urtroom and,

therefore, outside the presence of Mother. C ounsel , who was present and

remained in the courtroom after Mother was removed therefrom, placed an

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

13 While it is not indicated on the cover sheet of the petition that the petition alleges child abuse pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303 , it certainly is arguable from the allegations set forth therein pertaining to the purported physic al abuse and discipline of Q.R., the filming of Q.R., the failure to comply with the recommended mental health treatment, and the failure to provide appropriate medical care. Dependency Petition, 11/14/17, at ¶¶5b, c, j, k.J

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objection on the record related to the CPS reports of August 26, 2017,

involving the alleged abuse of Q.R. by Mother and indicated she had not seen

the reports. N.T. at 46; however, counsel did not raise a lack of notice or

failure to raise the issue of abuse in the petition

. Thus, Mother has waived

these claims on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing for waiver of issues

not first raised in lower court); Fillmore v. Hill , 665 A.2d 514, 515

- 16

(Pa. Super. 1995), appeal denied , 544 Pa. 609, 674 A.2d 1073 (1996) (stating:

“[ I]n order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a

timely and specific objection at the appropriate stage of the proceedings

before the trial court. Failure to timely object to a basic and fundamental

error, such as an erroneous jury instruction, will result in waiver of that issue.

On appeal, th e Superior Court will not consider a claim which was not called

to the trial court’s attention at a time when any error committed could have

been corrected.” ) (citations omitted).

F or the foregoing reasons, Mother’s claims fail , and the trial court’s

O rd er adjudicating Children dependent is affirmed.

Order affirmed.

P.J.E. Bender joins the memorandum.

Judge Nichols concurs in the result.J

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/20/18