26 August 2008

Operations in Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, and

Nuclear (CBRN) Environments

Joint Publication 3-11
PREFACE 

i 

1. Scope 

 This publication provides doctrine to assist commanders and staffs in planning, preparing 

for, conducting, and assessing operations in which their forces may encounter chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards. These principles apply across the 

range of military operations. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and 

training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their 

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC 

from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most 

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of 

these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed 

except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. 

If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service 

publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has 

provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a 

multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine 
Preface 

ii JP 3-11 

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the 

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine 

and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

 STANLEY A. MCCHRYSTAL 

 Lieutenant General, USA 

 Director, Joint Staff 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-11 

DATED 11 JULY 2000 

iii 

ï Introduces the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) construct 

ï Includes coverage of radiological threats and toxic industrial materials 

ï Provides figures that summarize CBRN threats and hazards 

ï Outlines operational elements of CBRN defense: sense, shield, sustain, and 

shape, which serve as a guide in conducting CBRN defensive planning and 

activities

ï Consolidates considerations for CBRN planning and operations into a single 

chapter 

ï Contains a chapter on sustainment that covers logistic support, personnel support, 

and health service support 

ï Removes discussion of military operations other than war 

ï Introduces the vulnerability assessment process 

ï Adds an appendix that discusses radiological hazard considerations 

ï Adds definitions for the terms ìbiological hazard,î ìchemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear environment,î ìchemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear hazard,î ìchemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection,î 

ìchemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear sense,î ìchemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear shape,î ìchemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

shield,î ìchemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear sustain,î ìchemical, 

biological, radiological, or nuclear incident,î ìchemical, biological, radiological or 

nuclear weapon,î ìchemical hazard,î ìclearance decontamination,î ìcollective 

protection,î ìcontamination avoidance,î ìionizing radiation,î ìpersonal protective 

equipment,î ìradiological exposure device,î and ìsplit-mission oriented protective 

postureî 

ï Modifies the definitions of the terms ìbiological warfare,î ìchemical agent,î 

ìchemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense,î ìcontamination,î 

ìcontamination control,î ìdetection,î ìimmediate decontamination,î 

ìincapacitating agent,î ìindividual protective equipment,î ìmission-oriented 

protective posture,î ìmission-oriented protective posture gear,î ìnuclear 

radiation,î ìoperational exposure guide,î ìpathogen,î ìprotection,î ìradiation 

dose,î ìradiation dose rate,î ìradiation exposure status,î ìradiological dispersal 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-11 

device,î ìriot control agent,î ìtoxic industrial biological,î ìtoxic industrial 

chemical,î ìtoxic industrial material,î and ìtoxinî

ï Removes the terms ìabsorbed dose,î ìaerosol,î ìavoidance,î ìbinary chemical 

munition,î ìbiological ammunition,î ìbiological defense,î ìbiological 

environment,î ìbiological operation,î ìbiological threat,î ìchemical 

ammunition,î ìchemical ammunition cargo,î ìchemical, biological, and 

radiological operation,î ìchemical contamination,î ìchemical defense,î ìchemical 

environment,î ìchemical operations,î ìcollective nuclear, biological, and chemical 

protection.î ìcontaminate,î ìfallout,î ìimprovised nuclear device,î ìindividual 

protection,î ìindustrial chemicals,î ìnuclear, biological, and chemical capable 

nation,î ìnuclear, biological, and chemical conditions,î ìnuclear, biological, and 

chemical defense,î ìnuclear, biological, and chemical environment,î ìnuclear 

defense,î ìsurvey,î ìtoxic chemical,î and ìtoxin agentî from Joint Publication 1-

02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

v 

 PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... ix 

CHAPTER I 

 THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT 

ï General ............................................................................................................................. I-1 

ï Strategic Environment ..................................................................................................... I-2 

ï Strategic Guidance ........................................................................................................... I-2 

ï Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats and Hazards ....................... I-4 

CHAPTER II 

 CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE 

 FRAMEWORK 

ï General ........................................................................................................................... II-1 

ï Principles of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense .................... II-1 

ï Operational Elements of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

 Defense ........................................................................................................................ II-2 

ï Considerations for Preparedness and Readiness ........................................................ II-13 

CHAPTER III 

 PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 

ï General .......................................................................................................................... III-1 

ï Planning Considerations ............................................................................................... III-6 

CHAPTER IV 

 SUSTAINMENT 

ï General .......................................................................................................................... IV-1 

ï Logistics ........................................................................................................................ IV-2 

ï Personnel Services ...................................................................................................... IV-16 

ï Health Service Support ............................................................................................... IV-17 

APPENDIX 

 A Threat Considerations ............................................................................................. A-1 

 B Chemical Hazard Considerations ........................................................................... B-1 

 C Biological Hazard Considerations .......................................................................... C-1 

 D Radiological Hazard Considerations ...................................................................... D-1 

 E Nuclear Hazard Considerations ............................................................................... E-1 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-11 

 F Treaty, Legal, and Policy Considerations ............................................................... F-1 

 G References ............................................................................................................... G-1 

 H Administrative Instructions .................................................................................... H-1 

GLOSSARY 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................................ GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions .................................................................................... GL-4 

FIGURE 

 I-1 General Characteristics of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

 Threats and Hazards ........................................................................................... I-4 

 I-2 Adversary Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Capability .......... I-5 

 I-3 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Hazards ................................ I-6 

 II-1 Operational Elements of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

 Defense ............................................................................................................. II-3 

 II-2 Ship/Land Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Mission- 

 Oriented Protective Posture Comparison ........................................................ II-7 

 III-1 Considerations for Combatant Command Strategic Planning ........................ III-2 

 III-2 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection Goals ............... III-7 

 III-3 Contaminated Materiel Retrograde Goals ..................................................... III-13 

 A-1 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threat Assessment 

 Framework ....................................................................................................... A-2 

 A-2 The Vulnerability Assessment Process ............................................................. A-3 

 A-3 Broad Objectives of Adversaries for Acquisition and Employment of 

 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons .......................... A-5 

 A-4 Emerging Global Adversary Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

 Nuclear Employment Profile ........................................................................... A-7 

 A-5 Regional Adversary Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

 Employment Profile ......................................................................................... A-8 

 A-6 Non-State Adversary Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

 Employment Profile ......................................................................................... A-9 

 B-1 Chemical Agent Effects ..................................................................................... B-2 

 B-2 Types of Chemical Agents ................................................................................ B-3 

 B-3 Industrial Chemical Site Minimum Downwind Hazard (Sample) ................... B-4 

 C-1 Pathogens, Viruses, and Toxins of Military Significance ................................ C-2 

 C-2 Examples of Biological Material Viability ....................................................... C-4 

 C-3 Weather Effects on Biological Agent Dissemination ....................................... C-5 

 D-1 Effects of Radiation Exposure ........................................................................... D-3 

 D-2 Radiation Exposure Status Categories .............................................................. D-7 

 D-3 Severity of Radiological Threat ......................................................................... D-9 

 D-4 Probability of Radiological Threat .................................................................. D-10 

 D-5 Level of Radiological Risk .............................................................................. D-11 

 D-6 Recommended Operational Exposure Guide Levels ...................................... D-12 

 E-1 Energy Distribution of Typical Nuclear Air Burst ............................................ E-2 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

vii

Describes the Security Environment for Employment or Threat of

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons

Discusses the CBRN Defense Framework

Provides Considerations for CBRN Planning and Operations

Describes Sustainment Considerations in a CBRN Environment

Overview

The US military must

train for and remain

prepared to conduct the

full range of military

operations throughout the

operational environment

undeterred by the threat

of chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear

(CBRN) weapons.

A variety of crisis and

conflict situations may

emerge in the

international security

environment to challenge

US interests.

The employment or threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and

nuclear (CBRN) weapons, including toxic industrial materials (TIMs)

pose serious challenges to US military operations worldwide. The

deadly, destructive, and disruptive effects of these weapons and

materials merit continuous consideration by the joint force commander

(JFC) and supporting commanders. The use of CBRN weapons

should provide no advantages to adversaries, only harsh

additional adverse consequences.

CBRN hazards include chemical, biological, radiological, and

nuclear elements created from accidental or deliberate releases,

TIMs (especially air and water poisons), chemical and biological

agents, biological pathogens, and radioactive material and those

hazards resulting from the employment of weapons of mass

destruction (WMD), or encountered by the Armed Forces of the

United States during the execution of military operations.

The worldwide availability of advanced military and commercial

technologies (including dual-use), combined with commonly available

transportation and delivery means, may allow adversaries opportunities

to develop and employ CBRN weapons without regard for national

or regional boundaries. Such situations could also expose US military

operations to CBRN threats and hazards.

Nation states and non-state actors alike may have incentives

to operate outside of international regulations/agreements,

especially when important interests are involved. Even if an

adversary does not intend to use a CBRN weapon, the potential

Strategic Environment
viii

Executive Summary

JP 3-11

Threats

Hazards

existence of CBRN threats and hazards in any operational area creates

potential risks.

Adversaries may be of the nation state or non-state actor

persuasion and could have local, regional, or global reach. A

number of adversaries have, or could rapidly acquire, biological

and chemical weapons, radiological or other toxic materials and,

in some cases, nuclear capabilities. They may also have or seek

to acquire clandestine or long-range delivery systems that can

reach beyond their geographic regions or to employ weapons in

defended US or allied regions by using innovative or unanticipated

delivery mechanisms.

Chemical agents are chemical substances which are intended

for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or

incapacitate humans or animals through their physiological effects.

Chemical agents are categorized according to their physiological

effects: choking, blister, blood, incapacitating, and nerve agents.

Biological agents are capable of spreading disease through

humans and agriculture and are microorganisms categorized as

either pathogens or toxins. Pathogens are microorganisms (e.g.,

bacteria, viruses, rickettsia) that directly attack human, plant, or

animal tissue and biological processes. Toxins are poisonous

substances that are produced naturally (by bacteria, plants, fungi,

snakes, insects, and other living organisms) but may also be

produced synthetically.

Radiological materials cause physiological damage through the

ionizing effects of neutron, gamma, beta, and/or alpha radiation.

Radiological hazards include any electromagnetic or particulate

radiation capable of producing ions so as to cause damage, injury,

or destruction.

A nuclear weapon refers to a complete assembly (i.e., implosion

type, gun type, or thermonuclear type), in its intended ultimate

configuration which, upon completion of the prescribed arming,

fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of producing the intended

nuclear reaction and energy release. Nuclear weapons effects

are qualitatively different from biological or chemical weapons.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats and Hazards
ix

Executive Summary

CBRN defense is based on three general principles that

specifically address the hazards created by CBRN incidents:

contamination avoidance of CBRN hazards; protection of

individuals, units, and equipment from unavoidable CBRN

hazards; and decontamination in order to restore operational

capability. Application of these principles helps to minimize

vulnerabilities, protect friendly forces, and maintain the force’s

operational tempo in order to achieve operation or campaign

objectives.

Preparedness — either to sustain readiness, prepare for

deployment, or to conduct major combat operations — for

conducting operations in a potential CBRN environment is integral

to any planning effort. Even when an adversary does not possess

CBRN weapons, easy global access to materials such as radiation

sources and toxic industrial chemicals represent significant

potential hazards to be considered during planning.

CBRN sense entails activities that provide CBRN threat and

hazard information and intelligence to support the common

operational picture. CBRN sense is intended to continually

provide critical information about potential or actual CBRN

hazards in a timely manner through early detection, identification,

and determination of the scope of hazards in all physical states

(air, water, land), as well as personnel, equipment, or facilities.

CBRN sense is also key to contamination avoidance.

CBRN shield consists of individual and collective protection

measures essential to mitigating the effects of CBRN hazards.

Protecting the force from CBRN hazards may include hardening

systems and facilities, preventing or reducing individual and

collective exposures, and applying medical prophylaxes.

Additional considerations also include designated nonmilitary

personnel as defined and designated by strategic and national

authorities.

CBRN sustain consists of the decontamination and medical activities

to restore combat power and continue operations. Mitigation includes

planning, initiating, and continuing operations despite threats from

CBRN materials through the conduct of contamination control, and

medical countermeasures that additionally enable the quick restoration

CBRN defense is based on

three general principles.

The operational elements

of CBRN defense are

sense, shield, sustain, and

shape.

Principles of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense

Operational Elements of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense
x

Executive Summary

JP 3-11

of operational capability; maintaining and recovering essential functions

and assets; and facilitating the return to pre-incident operational

capability as soon as possible.

CBRN shape is the command and control activity that integrates

the sense, shield, and sustain operational elements to characterize

CBRN hazards and threats and employ necessary capabilities to

counter their effects. This facilitates transformation of CBRN

information and capabilities into situational awareness, which is

essential for establishing viable active and passive defense

measures. This allows the JFC to make informed use of CBRN

information and defensive capabilities for future operations: to

plan, conduct, and integrate CBRN defense with other defenses;

to optimize the capability to operate in the CBRN environment;

and to minimize negative psychological effects.

An adversary’s CBRN capabilities or the existence of significant

quantities of TIM in the operational environment can have a

profound impact on US and multinational objectives, the concept

of operations, and supporting actions, and therefore must be taken

into account. Some CBRN considerations for planning are listed

below.

Establish priority intelligence requirements.

Take pre-incident actions to prevent adversary CBRN

weapons employment.

Plan offensive and active defense operations to prevent

or minimize CBRN attacks.

Plan actions to counter, mitigate, and manage the effects

of a CBRN incident, including disease containment

strategies.

Emphasize early warning and detection.

Take actions to prepare United States and indigenous

military forces.

Protect threatened civilians, infrastructures, and facilities

Detect and monitor acquisition and development of WMD.

The Armed Forces of the

United States must be

prepared to conduct

prompt, sustained, and

decisive military

operations in CBRN

environments.

Planning Considerations
xi

Executive Summary

Enablers for Operating in

CBRN Environments.

CBRN Defense Planning

Considerations.

Operations in CBRN

environments make

sustainment planning

more complex.

In considering the challenges to sustained combat operations in such

situations, six areas merit special emphasis: conducting joint

intelligence preparation of the operational environment; reducing

vulnerability to adversary CBRN use; preventing adversary

employment of CBRN capabilities; performing force protection;

conducting multinational operations; and synchronizing operations.

Information operations core, supporting, and related capabilities are

applied across these joint functions and independently.

The basic CBRN defense planning process remains the same

across the range of military operations and occurs within and

among all levels. Nevertheless, specific CBRN defense planning

considerations may vary considerably among strategic-,

operational-, and tactical-level operations due to differences

in missions, available resources, and the size of the operational

areas and area of interest. An adversary’s use of CBRN weapons

can quickly change the character of an operation or campaign.

The use or the threat of use of these weapons can cause largescale shifts in strategic and operational objectives, phases, and

courses of action. Planning at all levels should ensure the

integration of CBRN considerations into the overall planning and

decision-making processes. A key task for all commanders is the

establishment of protection against CBRN attacks in the

operational area and in other areas providing forces and sustaining

capabilities. These goals include prevention of adversarial use

of CBRN weapons, rapid and uninterrupted force preparation

and deployment, and comprehensive force protection.

Operational tempo, logistic operations, the health service

support system (HSS), personnel support system (PSS), and

reconstitution efforts may be profoundly affected by the

introduction of CBRN material. CBRN materials present

separate and distinct threats to personnel, units, equipment, and

operations. The ability to assess the potential effects of CBRN

hazards on the mission is a critical factor in deciding priorities

for CBRN protection and efficiently allocating resources.

Generally, operations will slow as tasks are performed by

personnel encumbered by protective equipment or exposed

to CBRN effects. Hazards may require abandonment or limited

use of contaminated areas, transfer of missions to uncontaminated

forces, or avoidance of planned terrain and routes. Additionally,

CBRN use or contamination resulting in a major disruption of

Sustainment
xii

Executive Summary

JP 3-11

normal personnel and materiel replacement processes in the theater

could severely hamper the component commanders’ capabilities for

force generation and sustainment.

Theater sustainment capabilities must be protected. CBRN

contamination at an essential port of embarkation or debarkation,

or other critical logistic facility can significantly affect campaign

plans and execution. Measures to prevent and mitigate the effects

of CBRN contamination must focus on maintaining support to

combat operations and rapidly restoring the degraded capabilities.

Protecting forces from the effects of a CBRN environment is

logistically taxing. Resupply requirements for protective

clothing, medical supplies (antidotes, antibiotics, and antivirals),

and sustainment supplies for quarantine/isolation facilities will

be time sensitive. Low density CBRN protective equipment may

require movement within the theater. Personnel and equipment

decontamination requires great amounts of water, and then creates

great amounts of contaminated water.

Providing PSS to assigned forces is a Service responsibility;

however, the geographic combatant commander (GCC) may

determine that centralizing some support functions (postal;

religious; legal; morale, welfare, and recreation; or other

appropriate services) within the area of responsibility would be

beneficial and may designate a single Service component to

provide or coordinate the support. These PSS functions may be

impacted in an area experiencing a CBRN incident. Some

services may be curtailed or stopped due to mission degradation

while others may require augmentation due to an increased

workload.

The GCC must consider and plan for all aspects of HSS

requirements, including the possibility of a CBRN incident.

Failure to plan for preventive medicine support as part of the

early entry force can cause mission failures due to disease and

nonbattle injuries. Planning for and maintaining a sound medical

surveillance program for all operations can maximize force

effectiveness by eliminating or reducing the effects of medical

threats, such as the existence of indigenous diseases and their

effect on the physiological and psychological health of military

forces. Sound preparation and thorough disease containment planning

will ensure the greatest range of options is available to respond to

CBRN events while balancing mission requirements with the risk to

personnel.

Logistics.

Personnel Services.

Health Service Support.
xiii

Executive Summary

This publication provides doctrine to assist commanders and staffs

in planning, preparing for, conducting, and assessing operations

in which their forces may encounter chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards.

CONCLUSION
xiv

Executive Summary

JP 3-11

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER I 

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT 

I-1 

ìThe greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of [a] secret and 

sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons.î 

President George W. Bush 

Remarks at the National Defense University 

11 February 2004 

1. General 

a. The employment or threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

(CBRN) weapons including toxic industrial materials (TIMs) pose serious challenges to US 

military operations worldwide. The deadly, destructive, and disruptive effects of these 

weapons and materials merit continuous consideration by the joint force commander (JFC) 

and supporting commanders. The US military must train for and remain prepared to 

conduct the full range of military operations throughout the operational environment 

undeterred by the threat of CBRN weapons. The use of CBRN weapons should provide no 

advantages to adversaries, only harsh additional adverse consequences. 

b. This publication focuses on maintaining the joint forceís ability to continue military 

operations in a CBRN environment by describing the CBRN environment in a strategic 

context, providing a CBRN defense framework, discussing planning and operational 

considerations, and highlighting the complexities of sustainment. It expands Joint 

Publication (JP) 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, discussion of CBRN 

passive defense actions, to include those plans and activities intended to mitigate or 

neutralize adverse effects on operations and personnel resulting from the use or threatened 

use of CBRN weapons and devices, and the release, or risk of release, of TIMs into the 

environment. Furthermore, this publication provides guidance to JFCs to assist in planning 

and conducting combat operations when an adversary is capable of employing CBRN 

weapons. Finally, this publication carefully considers how logistics, personnel services, and 

health service support are critical components of military operations in a CBRN 

environment.

c. Planning for joint forces operations in CBRN environments must include 

consideration of the threats and hazards posed by CBRN materials, and the operational 

limitations that employing CBRN defense may impose on joint operations. CBRN hazards 

include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear elements created from accidental or 

deliberate releases, TIMs (especially air and water poisons), chemical and biological agents, 

biological pathogens, and radioactive material and those hazards resulting from the 

employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or encountered by the Armed Forces 

of the United States during the execution of military operations. CBRN hazards could pose 

a hazard to individuals, equipment, animals, agricultural, and infrastructure and impact the 

overall operational environment and may impose limitations on joint operations. 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-11 

For additional information on CBRN passive defense in context with combating WMD, see 

JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

2. Strategic Environment 

a. A variety of crisis and conflict situations may emerge in the international security 

environment to challenge US interests. Such situations could encompass disputes and 

hostilities between and among nation states, coalitions of nation states, and non-state actors. 

These situations may threaten global or regional stability; the territory and populations of 

the United States, its allies, multinational partners, and other friendly states; democratic 

processes; economic progress; and a range of other US interests. 

b. The worldwide availability of advanced military and commercial technologies 

(including dual-use), combined with commonly available transportation and delivery 

means, may allow adversaries opportunities to develop and employ CBRN weapons 

without regard for national or regional boundaries. Such situations could also expose US 

military operations to CBRN threats and hazards.. 

c. Nation states and non-state actors alike may have incentives to operate outside 

of international regulations/agreements, especially when important interests are 

involved. In some cases, nation states may acquire CBRN weapons despite being 

signatories or parties to international agreements and treaties forbidding such actions. Nonstate actors normally do not consider themselves bound by such agreements and treaties. 

Additionally, adversaries not party to an ongoing conflict involving US forces or affecting 

US interests may, for their own purposes, attempt to hold US interests at risk at locations 

outside their own geographic regions, including within the United States. 

d. Even if an adversary does not intend to use a CBRN weapon, the potential existence 

of CBRN threats and hazards in any operational area creates potential risks. Commanders 

shall consider the implications of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRN release not only in 

the adversaryís geographic region, but also in other regions, including the United 

States. This responsibility extends to a comprehensive assessment of belligerent 

opportunists who are not directly engaged in an operational area, but have interests in 

threatening US interests. 

Appendix A, ìThreat Considerations,î provides information on categories of potential 

CBRN-capable adversaries, their objectives, capabilities, and employment concepts. 

3. Strategic Guidance 

a. US policies and strategies seek to prevent or limit the proliferation of CBRN 

capabilities through international agreements and treaties, multilateral initiatives, and 

unilateral actions. The Armed Forces of the United States support these policies and 

strategies within their respective roles and functions. The geographic combatant 

commander (GCC) is the vital link between those who determine national security policy 

and strategy and the military forces commanders that conduct operations within their area of 
The Strategic Context 

I-3 

responsibility (AOR). A GCC is responsible for a large geographical area requiring single 

responsibility for effective coordination of the operations within that area. Directives flow 

from the President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) through the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the GCC, who then plans and conducts the operations that achieve 

national, alliance, or coalition strategic objectives. 

b. Where proliferation or indigenous CBRN development has occurred, deterrence of 

an adversaryís employment of CBRN weapons is a principal US national objective. 

To support deterrence, commanders must ensure that their forces and supporting facilities 

are universally known to be able to operate effectively in CBRN environments. The US 

forces will need to survive, avoid, or mitigate the effects of CBRN employment in order to, 

fight and win in a potentially contaminated operational environment. The key to 

operational success may be the joint forceís ability to neutralize the adversaryís CBRN 

capabilities. Security cooperation activities by US forces can shape the operational 

environment to dissuade or deter CBRN use. US forces may be called upon to conduct 

operations to neutralize CBRN threats. The JFC incorporates passive defenses measures 

into operational planning and execution in order to survive, mitigate, or avoid the effects of 

CBRN hazards, and to fight, and win in a potentially contaminated operational 

environment. 

See JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, for more information on the 

various strategic measures that the US is prepared to simultaneously employ to eliminate 

an adversaryís ability to employ WMD. 

c. Situational awareness and assessment are critical to US forces ability to advance and 

defend US interests under both unpredictable and simultaneous occurring situations. 

CBRN risks assessments are integral parts of situational awareness and shall include CBRN 

use in the adversaryís geographic region as well as in the United States against civilian 

targets, military forces, and facilities supporting prospective military operations. The 

general characteristics of CBRN threats and hazards are outlined in Figure I-1. 

For detailed information on national security and military strategies applicable to CBRN 

see the following: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America; The 

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction; The National Defense Strategy 

of the United States of America; The National Military Strategy of the United States of 

America; The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism; and the National 

Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. See Department of Defense 

Instruction (DODI) 2000.18, Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines, for 

guidance on the establishment of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and highyield explosives preparedness program for emergency responders at all Department of 

Defense (DOD) installations. 

d. The GCC, Service components, and supporting organizations must develop theater 

strategies and plans that ensure force and facility sustainment and operation in CBRN 

environments while executing the national military strategy. Commanders of joint and 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-11 

multi-Service installations are also responsible for ensuring that the tactical execution of the 

principles of CBRN defense (as described in Chapter II, ìChemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Frameworkî) by all tenant units are integrated and 

coordinated to maximize operational capabilities in CBRN environments. 

4. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats and Hazards 

a. Threats. Adversaries may be of the nation state or non-state actor persuasion and 

could have local, regional, or global reach. A number of adversaries have, or could rapidly 

acquire, biological and chemical weapons, radiological or other toxic materials and, in some 

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,

RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR THREATS AND HAZARDS

CHARACTERISTICS

AREA AFFECTED

TIME TO DETECT

AND IDENTIFY

TIME FROM

EXPOSURE TO

ONSET OF

EFFECTS

MEDICAL

TREATMENT

ABILITY TO

DETECT

Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear

Relatively

Small

Seconds

Seconds to

Hours

Effective

Treatment

for Some

Chemicals,

Not Others

Potentially

Very Large

Minutes to

Days

Normally

Days Except

for Toxins

Effective

Prevention/

Treatment for

Some

Agents, Not

Others

Very Difficult

Relatively

Small

Minutes to

Hours

Varies with

Dose

Varies with

Dose

Variable

Based on

Type and

Severity of

Injury and/or

Dose

Impossible

without

Specialized

Instruments

Difficult

without

Specialized

Instruments

Large

Near Real

Time

Distinctive

Signature





Blast and

Heat =

Immediate

Radiation =

Varies with

Dosage

Figure I-1. General Characteristics of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Threats and Hazards
The Strategic Context 

I-5 

cases, nuclear capabilities. They may also have or seek to acquire clandestine or long-range 

delivery systems that can reach beyond their geographic regions or to employ weapons in 

defended US or allied regions by using innovative or unanticipated delivery mechanisms. 

Adversaries who might possess CBRN capabilities include global, regional, and nonstate adversaries (see Figure I-2).

Appendix A, ìThreat Considerations,î provides additional information on categories of 

CBRN-capable adversaries, their objectives, capabilities, and employment concepts. 

b. Hazards. Depending on the adversaryís specific objectives, widespread or limited 

methods may be used to create CBRN hazards. These hazards present both physical and 

psychological effects well beyond the immediate target area. The subsequent 

subparagraphs describe the characteristics and effects of CBRN hazards and selected toxic 

materials (see Figure I-3). 

(1) Chemical Agents. Chemical agents are chemical substances which are 

intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate humans or 

animals through their physiological effects. These agents exclude riot control agents 

(RCAs) when used for law enforcement purposes, herbicides, and substances generating 

smoke and flames. Chemical agents are categorized according to their physiological 

effects: choking, blister, blood, incapacitating, and nerve agents. An adversary may have to 

expend large quantities of chemical agents in order to cause mass casualties, or achieve area 

denial. 

Appendix B, ìChemical Hazard Considerations,î describes general chemical agent 

characteristics and their effects and identifies other potential toxic chemical hazards. 

ADVERSARY CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,

RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

GLOBAL

ADVERSARY

NON-STATE

ADVERSARY

REGIONAL

ADVERSARY

...could be a regional

power with an

advanced economy

and technology base

...likely to act without

regard for the

boundaries of

established state

authority

...could be a state

willing to threaten or

employ military force

to settle disputes

contrary to

international law

Figure I-2. Adversary Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Capability
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-11 

(2) Biological Agents. Biological agents are capable of spreading disease 

through humans and agriculture and are microorganisms categorized as either pathogens or 

toxins. Pathogens are microorganisms (e.g., bacteria or, viruses, rickettsia) that directly 

attack human, plant, or animal tissue and biological processes. Toxins are poisonous 

substances that are produced naturally (by bacteria, plants, fungi, snakes, insects, and other 

living organisms) but may also be produced synthetically. Biological agents pose a threat 

due to five factors: small doses of biological agents can produce lethal or incapacitating 

effects over an extensive area; detection in a timely manner; they are easy to conceal; they 

can be covertly deployed; and the variety of potential biological agents significantly 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, 

AND NUCLEAR HAZARDS

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

IND Improvised Nuclear Device

CBRN HAZARDS

CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL NUCLEAR

!

!

!

Chemical Weapons

Chemical Agents

Nontraditional 

Agents

!

!

!

Biological Weapons

Biological Agents

Nontraditional 

Agents

!

!

Radiological 

Dispersion Device

Radiological 

Exposure Device

!

!

Nuclear Weapons

IND

! Toxic Industrial 

Chemicals

! Toxic Industrial 

Biologicals

!

!

Toxic Industrial 

Radiologicals

Nuclear Power 

Reactors

WMD and Related Programs

Toxic Industrial Materials & Nuclear Power Reactors

Other Sources

Figure I-3. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Hazards
The Strategic Context 

I-7 

complicates effective preventative or protective treatment. These factors, combined with 

small employment signatures, delayed onset of symptoms, detection, identification, and 

verification difficulties, and agent persistence and communicability, can confer important 

advantages to adversaries who use biological agents. 

Appendix C, ìBiological Hazard Considerations,î provides additional information on the 

variety of potential agents and their effects. 

(3) Radiological Material. Radiological materials cause physiological damage 

through the ionizing effects of neutron, gamma, beta, and/or alpha radiation. These types of 

radiation are referred to as ionizing radiation and, for the purpose of this publication, the 

term radiation will mean ionizing radiation unless otherwise stated. Radiological materials 

can be found in a number of military and civilian environments, including nuclear power 

plants, hospitals, universities, and construction sites. Radiological hazards include any 

electromagnetic or particulate radiation capable of producing ions so as to cause damage, 

injury, or destruction. 

(a) Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are designed to scatter radioactive 

material to cause destruction, damage, area denial, or injury without producing a nuclear 

explosion. One design, popularly called a ìdirty bomb,î uses conventional explosives to 

disperse radioactive contamination. A dirty bomb typically generates its immediate 

casualties from the direct effects of the conventional explosion (i.e., blast injuries and 

trauma). However, one of the primary purposes of a dirty bomb is to frighten people by 

contaminating their environment with radioactive materials and threatening large numbers 

of people with exposure. The actual dose rate depends on the type and quantity of 

radioactive material spread over the area, and contributing factors such as weather and 

terrain. As an area denial weapon, an RDD can generate significant public fear and 

economic impact. In some cases, an area may not be habitable for nonmilitary personnel 

but military operations could continue in the area following appropriate risk management 

procedures such as strict exposure control guidelines. 

(b) A radiological exposure device (RED) is a radioactive source placed to 

cause injury, illness, or death. An undetected RED may increase the potential dose to the 

intended target. 

(c) Other sources of ionizing radiation include damaged or ruptured nuclear 

containers (e.g., Chernobyl), spent fuel rods, and medical radiological waste. 

1. By far the largest quantities of radioactive waste, in terms of both 

radioactivity and volume, are generated by the commercial nuclear power and military 

nuclear weapons production industries, and by nuclear fuel cycle activities to support these 

industries such as uranium mining and processing. 

2. Depleted uranium (DU) presents a residual radiation hazard and 

appropriate actions must be taken to protect against the hazard. If ingested or inhaled in 

large amounts, heavy metal properties of DU could have toxic effects on the kidney. This 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-11 

chemical toxic effect would be detected long before any negative health outcomes that may 

result from internalization of radiations associated with DU. 

Appendix D, ìRadiological Hazard Considerations,î provides additional information on 

operational considerations for other dispersed toxic radioactive materials. 

(4) Nuclear Weapons. A nuclear weapon refers to a complete assembly (i.e., 

implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear type), in its intended ultimate configuration 

which, upon completion of the prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of 

producing the intended nuclear reaction and energy release. With regard to the risk of 

proliferation and use by terrorists, the gun-type weapon is a relatively simple design and is a 

concern, as it does not require as much fine engineering or manufacturing as other methods. 

With enough highly enriched uranium, nations or groups with relatively low levels of 

technological sophistication could create an inefficient, though still quite powerful, nuclear 

weapon. Nuclear weapons effects are qualitatively different from biological or chemical 

weapons. A nuclear detonation produces its damaging effects through four primary ways: 

blast, thermal radiation, ionizing radiation, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The radiation 

effects of a nuclear explosion are divided into two categories: initial and residual. 

(a) Initial radiation effects are those effects generated within the first 

minute following the detonation and are almost entirely from the nuclear processes 

occurring at detonation. These effects are comprised of: 

1. Initial radiation (e.g., gamma, neutron, X-ray) generated by the 

nuclear explosion and dependent upon the yield itself, which may be very harmful to 

humans and other life forms within a few miles of the explosion. 

2. Thermal radiation, which will ignite flammable materials and cause 

significant burns to people in the direct line-of-sight of the burst. 

3. EMP, which may damage or destroy a variety of electronic 

equipment up to hundreds of miles away from the nuclear detonation. 

(b) Residual radiation is that radiation which is emitted later than one 

minute after detonation. Its effects are caused by radioactive fallout and neutron induced 

activity; it may encompass large areas, and serve as a persistent hazard to civilian and 

military personnel for extended periods of time. 

Appendix E, ìNuclear Hazard Considerations,î provides additional information on 

nuclear weapons effects. 

(5) Toxic Industrial Material. TIM is a generic term for toxic chemical, 

biological, or radioactive substances in solid, liquid, aerosolized, or gaseous form created 

for industrial, commercial, medical, military (nonweapon), or domestic purposes. 

Normally, such materials retained within their planned manufacturing, storage, and 

transport facilities do not pose a significant hazard. However, their intentional or accidental 
The Strategic Context 

I-9 

release may pose a significant hazard to joint forces. It could result in a toxic industrial 

hazard (i.e., the contamination or irradiation of personnel or the environment, area, or any 

particular object). Forces may be exposed to TIMs as a consequence of friendly action, 

adversary action, or accidents. A TIM hazard area refers to an area containing TIMs that 

have been released or have the potential for release into the environment with consequent 

impact on the conduct of military operations. 

(a) Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs). Industrial chemicals can pose 

significant toxic hazards and can damage the human body and equipment. Many industrial 

chemicals are corrosive, flammable, explosive, or combustible; these hazards may pose 

greater short-term challenges than the immediate toxic effects. Most TICs will be released 

as vapor or highly volatile liquid and can have both short-term and long-term health effects. 

The release of large volumes of hazardous industrial chemicals can also produce 

environmental damage. 

Appendix B, ìChemical Hazard Considerations,î describes general chemical agent 

characteristics and their effects and identifies other potential toxic chemical hazards. 

(b) Toxic Industrial Biologicals (TIBs). The release of TIB hazards can 

occur following an incident, an attack, or damage at a facility that handles, produces, stores, 

and/or recycles biological material. Those facilities include hospitals, medical installations, 

agricultural facilities, and facilities that recycle biological materials for the medical, 

pharmaceutical, or agricultural industries. 

Appendix C, ìBiological Hazard Considerations,î provides additional information on the 

variety of potential agents and their effects. 

(c) Toxic Industrial Radiologicals (TIRs). Possible sources of TIRs 

capable of producing radioactive hazards are: civil nuclear production, research, recycling, 

and storage facilities; nuclear waste containment sites; industrial and medical nuclear 

sources; nuclear materials and sources in transit; stolen or smuggled nuclear weapons grade 

material; medical and fossil fuel manufacturing and waste processing, and other industrial 

sources. The characteristics of radioactive hazards produced will depend on the type of 

radiation and the nuclide involved. The geographical hazard area can vary dramatically 

based on the source and manner of release. 

Appendix D, ìRadiological Hazard Considerations,î provides additional information on 

operational considerations for other dispersed toxic radioactive materials. 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-11 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER II 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND 

NUCLEAR DEFENSE FRAMEWORK 

II-1 

“Nation-states no longer have a monopoly over the catastrophic use of violence. 

Today, small teams or even single individuals can weaponize chemical, biological 

and even crude radiological or nuclear devices and use them to murder hundreds 

of thousands of people.” 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

February 6, 2006

1. General 

a. The capability to effectively respond to and defend against CBRN attacks, and 

sustain operations in CBRN environments, requires properly trained and equipped forces. 

US forces must be prepared to conduct and sustain operations in CBRN environments with 

minimal degradation. In order to sustain operations, US forces must assess the environment 

for CBRN hazards and prepare for CBRN defense when appropriate. CBRN defense is 

based on three general principles that specifically address the hazards created by CBRN 

incidents: contamination avoidance of CBRN hazards; protection of individuals, units, 

and equipment from unavoidable CBRN hazards; and decontamination in order to restore 

operational capability. Application of these principles helps to minimize vulnerabilities, 

protect friendly forces, and maintain the force’s operational tempo in order to achieve 

operation or campaign objectives. 

b. Preparedness — either to sustain readiness, prepare for deployment, or to conduct 

major combat operations — for conducting operations in a potential CBRN environment is 

integral to any planning effort. Even when an adversary does not possess CBRN weapons, 

easy global access to materials such as radiation sources and TICs represents significant 

potential hazards to be considered during planning. CBRN preparedness helps provide 

defense against attack and improves the capability to sustain operations in CBRN 

environments. Effective CBRN preparedness and operational readiness also deters 

adversary CBRN usage by contributing to the survivability of US forces. 

c. All elements in the Armed Forces of the United States are responsible for ensuring 

that their training for individuals and organizations meets the requirements of the combatant 

commands for operations in CBRN environments. 

2. Principles of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense 

a. Before employing passive defense measures, commanders must assess the 

operational environment. A thorough assessment of the risks associated with the CBRN 

hazards provides commanders the information necessary to determine the degree to which 

the three fundamental principles of contamination avoidance, protection, or 

decontamination are implemented. A CBRN assessment includes, but is not limited to, 

identifying, quantifying, and determining the properties of the agent or material in the 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-11 

operational area, determining the risks of the CBRN hazards, and their potential impact on 

operations. This requires the ability to recognize the presence or absence of CBRN hazards 

in the air, water, on land, and its potential impact on personnel, equipment, and facilities. 

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities enable forces to 

characterize the CBRN hazards. The fusion of these capabilities with information from 

other sources yields a common operational picture supporting decisions for specific 

contamination avoidance, protection, and decontamination actions. 

b. CBRN environments present major challenges to sustaining military operations in 

air, land, maritime, and space. Logistic operations and facilities are particularly vulnerable 

to CBRN attack to the degree that they rely on fixed sites (e.g., ports and airfields) or must 

remain in particular locations for extended periods of time. Working in CBRN

environments adds to the physical and psychological demands of military members. 

c. A detailed discussion of the operational elements of CBRN defense (shape, sense, 

shield, and sustain) follows with appropriate integration of the principles of CBRN defense. 

3. Operational Elements of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Defense 

a. Commanders at all echelons should initiate CBRN defense planning and integration 

into all phases of operations as early as possible. The following section outlines operational 

elements of CBRN defense: sense, shield, sustain, and shape, which serve as a guide in 

conducting CBRN defensive planning and activities (see Figure II-I). 

b. CBRN Sense. Early understanding and detection of CBRN hazards is a key to 

CBRN defense. CBRN sense entails activities that provide CBRN threat and hazard 

information and intelligence to support the common operational picture. CBRN sense is 

intended to continually provide critical information about potential or actual CBRN hazards 

in a timely manner through early detection, identification, and determination of the scope of 

hazards in all physical states (air, water, land), as well as personnel, equipment, or facilities. 

CBRN sense is also key to contamination avoidance. Successful contamination avoidance 

minimizes disruption to operations and organizations by eliminating unnecessary time in 

the various protective postures and minimizing decontamination requirements. CBRN 

sense provides decision makers with information useful for establishing requirements for 

other contamination avoidance measures such as isolating contaminated areas, establishing 

split-mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) concepts, sounding alarms, marking 

hazards, warning forces, restricting movement, and maneuvering away from the downwind 

hazard area. To support JFC decisions on contamination avoidance, specific tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTP) guide avoidance strategies, such as increased use of 

covers and shelters during CBRN employment windows, and providing key information for 

movement before, during, and after CBRN incidents. In planning for contamination 

avoidance, the JFC must include an assessment of the capabilities of available detection 

systems. Particular challenges include covert or unanticipated use of chemical, biological, 

or radiological agents and the capabilities and limitations of current remote and standoff 

detection systems. Sensing may include: 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Framework 

II-3 

(1) Determining the presence of any CBRN hazardous substances in the 

environment. 

(2) Identifying the storage locations of CBRN materials, weapons, or components 

in the operational area. 

(3) Developing environmental and climatology background data. 

OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,

RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE

SHIELD –The capability

to shield the force from

harm caused by CBRN

hazards by preventing

or reducing individual

and collective

exposures, applying

prophylaxis to prevent

or mitigate negative

physiological effects,

and protecting critical

equipment.

SUSTAIN – The ability to

conduct decontamination

and medical actions that

enable the quick

restoration of combat

power, maintain/recover

essential functions that

are free from the effects

of CBRN hazards, and

facilitate the return to preincident operational

capability as soon as

possible.

SENSE – The capability to continually provide the information

about the CBRN situation at a time and place by detecting,

identifying, and quantifying CBRN hazards in air, water, on land,

on personnel, equipment, or facilities. This capability includes

detecting, identifying, and quantifying those CBRN hazards in all

physical states (solid, liquid, gas).

SHAPE – Provides the ability to characterize the CBRN hazard to the force

commander - develop a clear understanding of the current and predicted

CBRN situation; collect, query, and assimilate info from sensors, intelligence,

medical, etc., in near real time to inform personnel, provide actual and

potential impacts of CBRN hazards; envision critical SENSE, SHIELD and

SUSTAIN end states (preparation for operations); visualize the sequence of

events that moves the force from its current state to those end states.

SHIELD

SUSTAIN

SHAPE

SENSE

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Figure II-1. Operational Elements of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-11 

(4) Identifying CBRN weapons employed in the operational area. 

(5) Identifying CBRN hazards as a result of CBRN incidents. 

(6) Detecting and identifying CBRN hazards in non-accessible areas. This may 

require participation from other than US forces and/or resources. 

(7) Obtaining samples collected by non-assigned organizations. 

(8) Verifying first use by proper sampling and identification of biological, 

chemical, or radiological agents. 

(9) Identifying naturally-occurring diseases endemic to the local area and 

developing baseline medical surveillance data for those diseases. 

For further information, on split-MOPP see Field Manual (FM) 3-11.34/Marine Corps 

Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-37.5/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

(NTTP) 3-11.23/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP(I)) 

3-2.33, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for Installation CBRN 

Defense. 

c. CBRN Shield

(1) CBRN shield consists of individual and collective protection measures 

essential to mitigating the effects of CBRN hazards. Protecting the force from CBRN 

hazards may include hardening systems and facilities, preventing or reducing individual and 

collective exposures, and applying medical prophylaxes. Additional considerations also 

include designated nonmilitary personnel as defined and designated by strategic and 

national authorities. Shielding may include: 

(a) Supplying or prepositioning protective consumable, expendable, and 

replacement CBRN equipment. 

(b) Employing protective measures to minimize the effects of CBRN 

incidents. 

(c) Integrating allied, coalition, and US protective measures and assets. 

(d) Establishing CBRN defense medical protection operations. 

(e) Protecting equipment and supplies. 

(f) Providing collective protection (COLPRO) for command and control 

(C2), medical operations, and work force rest and relief. 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Framework 

II-5 

(g) Implementing effective restriction of movement, to include social 

distancing, isolation, and quarantine as appropriate, to limit exposure following a CBRN 

attack or incident. 

(2) Protection. CBRN protection requires the planning, preparation, training, and 

execution of medical and physical defenses to negate the effects of CBRN hazards on 

personnel, materiel, and military working animals. As staffs analyze their mission 

requirements and conditions, the planning process will yield potential courses of action 

(COAs) required before, during, and after CBRN incidents. After commanders decide upon 

a COA, these actions should be clearly communicated and rehearsed from command to 

individual levels. CBRN protection conserves the force by providing individual and 

collective protection postures and capabilities. 

(a) Individual Protection

1. MOPP is a flexible system of protection against CBRN 

contamination. This posture requires personnel to wear only that protective clothing and 

equipment (MOPP gear) appropriate to the threat level and work rate imposed by the 

mission, temperature, and humidity. MOPP allows commanders to adjust their force’s 

protective posture (from as low as having individual protective equipment [IPE] readily 

available to as high as wearing the full personal protective ensemble) based on the threat of 

imminent attack or the CBRN hazards present, and then prosecute the mission with 

confidence. Mission performance of personnel will suffer from wearing protective 

equipment over time. Also, IPE effectiveness degrades over time. Therefore, MOPP 

analysis is critical for determining what should be worn, by whom, and for how long. 

MOPP analysis relies on accurate joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

environment (JIPOE) and CBRN hazard prediction, as well as a clear understanding of the 

force’s ability to quickly increase its CBRN protection. To facilitate adapting to varying 

mission demands across a combatant commander’s (CCDR’s) AOR, MOPP decisions 

should be delegated to the lowest level possible and retained at higher levels only in 

exceptional cases. The JFC has overall responsibility for providing guidance for levels of 

protection and ensuring timely warning of CBRN hazards. Commanders of installations are 

responsible for promulgating JFC guidance to all tenant units and coordinating with those 

units to maximize force protection (FP) and minimize the degradation of operations. Figure 

II-2 depicts ship/land CBRN MOPP comparison. Force components may require various 

MOPP configurations for unique situations, such as “MOPP ready” or “mask only” splitMOPP. Split-MOPP provides greater flexibility for fixed sites to respond to chemical 

threats in specific areas and continue operations within areas unaffected by the incident or 

at lower risk from the threat. Service publications address specific TTP for MOPP 

configurations and they should seek to standardize those configurations where possible. 

Installation commanders are responsible for ensuring unit plans include applicable MOPP 

configurations and ensuring all tenant units are prepared to implement and execute those 

configurations. 

2. Dependent upon characteristics such as color and type of material, 

ordinary clothing can provide extremely limited protection against the thermal effects of a 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-11 

nuclear detonation and mitigate the percutaneous threat associated with chemical agents in 

vapor form and aerosolized biological agents. It can also provide some basic protection 

against ionizing radiation particles (alpha and beta) from a nuclear detonation or a 

radiological incident. However, ordinary clothing should not be considered adequate 

protection against CBRN hazards. Additional protective measures are required, especially 

when exposure to biological, chemical, or radioactive hazards is direct, intensive, or 

prolonged. These measures include pretreatments, protective masks and clothing, radiation 

shielding and overgarments, antidotes, immunizations, and other medical treatments. 

Protective mask filters are designed to prevent ingestion or inhalation of certain aerosols 

and vapors of chemical and biological agents, and radiological particles. Wearing a 

correctly sized and maintained protective mask provides protection for the eyes and 

respiratory tract. IPE or personal protective equipment (PPE) provide protection from a 

wide range of chemical and biological agents and radiological particles. Additionally, 

overgarments can protect wearers from the effects of alpha particles and low energy beta 

particles. Likewise, individual equipment, vehicles, and supplies gain considerable 

protection from covers. These covers may be as simple as plastic sheathing, which should 

provide limited protection against large scale use of liquid agents, or CBRN protective 

covers which provide improved protection. Radiation shielding, such as lead or substantial 

thicknesses of concrete or certain plastics, is necessary to prevent exposure to high energy 

radiation including X-rays and gamma rays. 

3. The individual protective posture for response units may include 

DOD-approved commercial off-the-shelf protective ensemble or “nonstandard equipment 

sets” referred to as PPE. The PPE provides units with additional capabilities, such as the 

ability to detect a multitude of substances and chemicals that are immediately dangerous to 

life or health. CBRN consequence management forces utilize PPE which are divided in 

four categories (Level A, B, C, and D). 

For additional information on PPE see FM 3-11.21/Marine Corps Reference Publication 

(MCRP) 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/ AFTTP(I) 3-2.37, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures For Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management 

Operations. 

(b) COLPRO Postures. Sustaining operations in CBRN environments may 

require COLPRO equipment, which provides a toxic free area for conducting operations 

and performing life support functions such as rest, relief, and medical treatment without 

wearing IPE. IPE and warfighter performance while wearing IPE degrades over time, thus 

requiring COLPRO equipment. 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Framework 

II-7 

SHIP/LAND CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL,

AND NUCLEAR MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE

POSTURE COMPARISON

MOPP 0 MOPP 0

Ship

MOPP

Level

Land

MOPP

Level

 Inspect, size, fit, and issue

IPE to personnel

 Carry mask; IPE available

(within arms reach)

Description Description

Ship MOPP Land MOPP

MOPP 1 MOPP 1  IPE available (within arms

reach)

 Don protective suit

MOPP 2

MOPP 3

MOPP 4

MOPP 2

MOPP 3

MOPP 4









Carry mask, IPE available

Activate installed

detectors

Post detector paper

Set condition modified

ZEBRA (Ship Hatch

Closure/Secure Measures)









Don protective suit

Don protective boots

Set condition ZEBRA

Activate intermittent

countermeasure

washdown

(Ship Hatch Closure/

Secure Measures)











Don mask

Don protective gloves

Secure hood

Set condition CIRCLE

WILLIAM

Activate continuous

countermeasure

washdown

(Ship Hatch

Closure/Secure Measures)

 Don protective boots





Don protective mask

Secure hood (Joint

Service Lightweight

Integrated Suit

Technology)





Secure hood (Battle Dress

Overgarment only)

Don protective gloves

IPE Individual Protective Equipment

MOPP Mission-Oriented Protective Posture

Figure II-2. Ship/Land Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Comparison
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-11 

1. Besides protecting the joint force (including warfighters, contractors, 

and US Government civilians), DOD policy and the Geneva Conventions require protection 

for civilians, host nation (HN) personnel, adversary prisoners of war, and detainees. 

2. Contamination transfer into the toxic free area compromises the health 

and safety of all occupants and jeopardizes their ability to support the mission. Therefore, 

training must include procedures for toxic free area entry and exit to prevent contamination. 

3. In planning for the use of COLPRO, the staffs need to include an 

assessment of the capabilities of the available COLPRO systems. COLPRO systems should 

protect against most CBRN hazards; however, they do have limitations. Consult with 

subject matter experts to understand proper use. Logistic supportability is another challenge 

for COLPRO systems. Proper planning and coordination will be required to effectively use 

COLPRO. 

4. When COLPRO is not available, plans must be developed, exercised, 

and evaluated to move personnel to alternative toxic free areas that are well away from the 

contaminated areas. If evacuation is not possible, building occupants may be able to shelter 

in place to gain limited protection by closing all windows and doors, turning off ventilation 

systems, and moving to closed, inner rooms. If there is advance warning, occupants can 

increase protection by sealing windows, doors, and openings, but must recognize that the 

building or space may quickly become uninhabitable without cooling or ventilation. That is 

why, in at risk areas, an inventory of shelters must be conducted and filtering equipment 

must be in place for the anticipated number of people. Therefore, if possible, planners 

should include the provision of communication for the occupants of sealed areas to stay in 

touch with operations C2. 

(c) Threat-based Protection. When directed by the commander, or as a 

vulnerability reduction measure at installations or fixed sites, split-MOPP planners should 

provide the commander with flexible options to respond to threats in specific areas and 

continue operations within areas unaffected by the incident or at lower risk from the threat. 

d. CBRN Sustain

(1) CBRN sustain consists of the decontamination and medical activities to 

restore combat power and continue operations. Mitigation includes planning, initiating, and 

continuing operations despite threats from CBRN materials through the conduct of 

contamination control, and medical countermeasures that additionally enable the quick 

restoration of operational capability; maintaining and recovering essential functions and 

assets; and facilitating the return to pre-incident operational capability as soon as possible. 

Sustaining may include: 

(a) Integrating CBRN incident restoration operations. 

(b) Decontaminating significant areas or facilities. 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Framework 

II-9 

(c) Coordinating salvage and decontamination of materials. 

(d) Providing C2 of restoration operations. 

(e) Providing restoration country assistance teams. 

(f) Determining the disposition of contaminated equipment, facilities, and 

human remains. 

(g) Establishing reporting procedures for restoration requirements. 

(h) Providing operational guidance to contaminated forces. 

(i) Assessing the operational impact of restoration activities, to include 

assessing the linkage of restoration and the operational risk assessment. 

(j) Establishing appropriate mortuary processes. 

(k) Supporting restoration of special operations forces (SOF) operations. 

(l) Establishing contamination control. 

(2) Decontamination

(a) Decontamination efforts mitigate the effects of CBRN hazards to enhance 

JFC capabilities. Decontamination also supports the post-attack restoration of forces and 

operational capability. Decontamination is intended to minimize the time required to return 

personnel and mission-essential equipment to a mission capable state. Because 

decontamination may be labor intensive and assets are limited, commanders must prioritize 

requirements and decontaminate only what is necessary. Commanders may choose to defer 

decontamination of some items and, depending on agent type and weather conditions, opt to 

either defer use of equipment or allow natural weathering effects (temperature, wind, and 

sunlight) to reduce hazards. There are four levels of decontamination: immediate, 

operational, thorough, and clearance. The type of decontamination depends on the situation, 

mission, degree of contamination, time available, and decontamination assets available. The 

principles of decontamination are: 

1. Decontaminate as soon as possible. 

2. Decontaminate by priority. 

3. Decontaminate only what is necessary. 

4. Decontaminate as far forward as possible. 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-11 

(b) Contamination Control. Contamination control is a combination of 

standard force health protection measures, and CBRN contamination avoidance, protection 

and decontamination measures. This includes procedures for avoiding, reducing, removing, 

weathering, or neutralizing the hazards resulting from the contamination. Contamination 

control is applied in any operational environment where CBRN threats and hazards exist to 

support passive defense measures. Contamination control prevents secondary transfer of 

disease, chemical or radiological material, and/or agent reaerosolization. In a chemical 

environment, this involves TTPs that limit the further spread of chemical contamination 

(e.g., split-MOPP basing, contamination control areas, covering critical ground equipment, 

sheltering aircraft where possible, and developing an asset protection plan to prioritize 

ground equipment protection requirements). In a biological environment, this involves 

TTPs that limit the spread of contagious diseases (e.g., disease containment planning and 

restriction of movement). In a radiological environment, this involves TTPs that limit the 

further spread of radiological contamination. 

(c) Levels of Decontamination. There are four levels of decontamination: 

immediate, operational, thorough, and clearance. The type of decontamination depends on 

the situation, mission, degree of contamination, time available, and decontamination assets 

available. Decontamination also entails special considerations for patients, sensitive 

equipment, aircraft, ships, fixed sites, and the retrograde of equipment. Service publications 

provide detailed TTP for the technical aspects of decontamination. 

1. Immediate Decontamination. Immediate decontamination is a 

hazard reduction process to minimize casualties, save lives, and help to limit contamination 

exposure and spread. A contaminated individual carries out immediate decontamination, 

which may include: removal of contamination from the skin and eyes, personal wipedown 

(hood if worn, mask, gloves, individual equipment, etc.), and operator removal of surface 

contamination from frequently touched equipment surfaces. 

2. Operational Decontamination. Operation decontamination is a 

hazard reduction process that limits the spread and transfer of contamination, allows 

temporary relief from MOPP 4, and focuses on mission-essential techniques: MOPP gear 

exchange for personnel; decontamination of supply routes and operator wash down of 

mission-essential equipment. By supplementing the weathering process, the need for a 

thorough decontamination may be eliminated. 

3. Thorough Decontamination. Thorough decontamination is a hazard 

reduction process that reduces or eliminates the need for wearing of protective equipment 

and facilitates the relatively unconstrained use of previously contaminated resources. 

Thorough decontamination is supported by specialized decontamination units and 

personnel. There are three thorough decontamination techniques: detailed personnel 

decontamination, detailed equipment decontamination, and detailed aircraft 

decontamination. 

4. Clearance Decontamination. Clearance decontamination provides 

for the decontamination of equipment and personnel to a level that allows unrestricted 

transportation, maintenance, employment, and disposal. Reconstitution decontamination 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Framework 

II-11 

involves those actions required to bring contaminated items into full compliance with 

national work and occupational hazard standards after termination of conflict. It involves 

eliminating contamination to restore mission-critical resources to a condition that permits 

unrestricted use, handling, or operation, and release from military control. Reconstitution 

decontamination would be conducted after hostile actions have terminated, when the 

commander determines it is in the unit’s best interest, or when directed by higher authority. 

Clearance decontamination prepares organizations or individual units for return to their 

home garrisons. Decontamination at this level will probably be conducted at or near a 

shipyard, advanced base, or other industrial facility. Clearance decontamination involves 

factors such as suspending normal activities, withdrawing personnel, and having materials 

and facilities not normally present. During clearance decontamination, resource 

expenditures are documented. 

5. Additional Decontamination Considerations. Some situations 

require unique application of decontamination principles, procedures, and methods. These 

considerations should take into account command, control, communications, and planning 

capabilities required for decontamination of strategically significant areas/terrain or 

facilities, to include standing up/deactivating a task force, selecting and defining joint 

decontamination operations sites, and establishing the manning allocation of initial 

headquarters required by decontamination operations missions. 

a. Patient decontamination reduces the threat of contaminationrelated injury to health service support (HSS) personnel and patients. Patient 

decontamination will have to be accomplished as the operation and patient load allows. 

Under most CBRN circumstances delaying treatment or stabilization of the patient for 

decontamination should not put the patient at additional risk. Trained and qualified triage 

personnel should determine priority of treatment and decontamination. Aeromedical 

evacuation (AE) capabilities for contaminated and contagious casualties are very limited. 

The JFC should consult with US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to determine 

whether evacuation or treatment in place is appropriate. 

b. Sensitive equipment decontamination considers the delicate 

nature of certain types of equipment (e.g., avionics and/or electrical, electronic, and 

environmental systems); aircraft and vehicle interiors; associated cargo; and some weapon 

systems. Due to the corrosive properties of most decontamination solutions, sensitive 

equipment decontamination options are limited. Employ contamination avoidance 

measures (to include collective protection and standoff/point detection systems) to prevent 

or mitigate interior contamination of vehicles, aircraft, and ships. 

c. Aircraft pose unique decontamination challenges. Clearance 

decontamination is required to ensure the unrestricted use of air mobility and SOF aircraft 

for international flight operations. To achieve this level of cleanliness, specialized teams 

with more sensitive detection equipment may be required to validate that clearance 

standards have been achieved. Therefore, the JFC should limit the intentional exposure of 

air mobility aircraft to “critical” mission requirements. JFC plans must take into account 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-11 

these challenges in considering employment of aircraft to airlift contaminated cargo or 

passengers, or operate in contaminated areas. 

d. Sealift Decontamination. Clearance decontamination may be 

required to ensure the unrestricted use of Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships for 

strategic sealift. To achieve this level of cleanliness, specialized teams with more sensitive 

detection and decontamination equipment may be required. Therefore, the JFC should 

strive to limit the intentional CBRN exposure of MSC strategic sealift ships to only those 

missions considered critical. JFC plans must take into account these challenges in 

considering employment of MSC ships to transport contaminated cargo or passengers or to 

operate in contaminated areas. 

e. Fixed site decontamination techniques focus on fixed facilities 

and mission support areas, such as communications systems, C2 facilities, intelligence 

facilities, supply depots, aerial and sea ports, medical facilities, and maintenance sites. 

f. Cargo Decontamination. Cargo must be packaged safely in 

accordance with hazardous materials procedures or decontaminated prior to transport. To 

limit the spread of contamination and minimize risks to personnel, the JFC will limit the 

retrograde of contaminated or formerly contaminated cargo to “critical” items that are preidentified in JFC plans unless the cargo has been assessed to be safe or meets clearance 

standards. Additionally, destination and transit countries may deny overflight and landing 

clearances to aircraft carrying contaminated cargo. US Presidential approval may be 

required for these shipments. Postconflict redeployment of contaminated assets may 

require extensive decontamination measures (to include extended weathering) and the use 

of specialized teams and highly-sensitive detection and monitoring equipment. In place 

destruction/disposal of contaminated equipment may be necessary. 

g. Terrain Decontamination. Absorption of CBRN hazards by 

terrain surfaces may cause exposure at a later time. The decontamination of terrain allows 

personnel to increase stay time in an area and provides passage through an area. Large 

scale terrain decontamination requires extensive resources in terms of equipment, material, 

and time; and must therefore be limited to areas of critical importance. 

e. CBRN Shape. CBRN shape is the command and control activity that integrates the 

sense, shield, and sustain operational elements to characterize CBRN hazards and threats 

and employ necessary capabilities to counter their effects. This facilitates transformation of 

CBRN information and capabilities into situational awareness, which is essential for 

establishing viable active and passive defense measures. This allows the JFC to make 

informed use of CBRN information and defensive capabilities for future operations: to plan, 

conduct, and integrate CBRN defense with other defenses; to optimize the capability to 

operate in the CBRN environment; and, to minimize negative psychological effects. 

Shaping may include: 

(1) Providing CBRN situational awareness. 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Framework 

II-13 

(2) Establishing cooperative CBRN detection policies, procedures, and networks. 

(3) Identifying and coordinating links with operational area active systems with 

CBRN passive detectors. 

(4) Ensuring adequate joint force CBRN defenses. 

(5) Providing country assistance teams to support theater engagement plans. 

(6) Coordinating CBRN defense information systems and processes. 

(7) Providing CBRN defense plans and policies. 

(8) Coordinating CBRN defense operations. 

(9) Determining the resources required to respond to a CBRN incident. 

(10) Coordinating CBRN defense medical surveillance operations. 

(11) Collaborating with local medical and emergency response personnel to 

maximize effectiveness of transportation, triage, sheltering, and decontamination processes 

and resources. 

(12) Contributing to the development and implementation of the JFC’s 

communication strategy. 

(13) Providing warning and reporting. 

4. Considerations for Preparedness and Readiness 

a. Mission-essential functions are the specified or implied tasks required to be 

performed by, or derived from, statute or executive order, and those organizational activities 

that must be performed under all circumstances to achieve DOD component missions or 

responsibilities in a continuity threat or event. Failure to perform or sustain these functions 

would significantly impact DOD ability to provide vital services, or exercise authority, 

direction, and control. 

b. The fundamental elements needed for maintaining adequate preparedness are a clear 

understanding of the threats and operational requirements, both overseas and in the United 

States, as well as unity of effort. To support these requirements, commanders’ mission 

analyses identify specific, mission-essential tasks for individuals and organizations that 

facilitate operations in CBRN environments. The Armed Forces of the United States are 

also responsible for appropriate military support within the United States to counter 

adversary threats and employment of CBRN weapons directly against the United States. 

Such domestic military activity is subject to constitutional, statutory, and policy restrictions. 
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-11 

See JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, JP 3-28, Civil Support, and JP 3-41, Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management, 

for more information on countering threats to the United States and civil support for CBRN 

incidents. 

c. Peacetime preparedness for operations in CBRN environments includes measures 

taken by GCCs in theater operational areas. All commands must undertake vulnerability 

assessments and supporting actions, with appropriate emphasis on aerial and sea ports of 

embarkation and debarkation, local CBRN facilities and infrastructures, nonmilitary and 

foreign military support personnel, and deployed US forces and facilities, local, state, and 

federal support personnel. All commands are responsible for cooperative actions in 

peacetime with governments, armed forces of allies, and potential multinational partners to 

facilitate sustainment of operations in CBRN environments. GCCs develop joint missionessential task lists (JMETLs) in order to support the military strategy for every theater. 

JMETLs are a major input to planning, executing, and assessing joint training. Essential in 

these JMETLs is the inclusion of key tasks for establishment of effective defenses and 

counters to adversary CBRN attacks and other toxic material releases. 

d. US ambassadors and their country teams have primary responsibility for 

coordination with the host country government(s). JFCs and component commanders in 

operational areas must coordinate their actions with the country team to maintain peacetime 

preparedness and assure effective transition to operations. GCCs also have special 

responsibilities for US citizens and civilian assets in their AORs. These responsibilities 

may include noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) and other support to US citizens 

and interests as defined by current US policies. Planners should incorporate CBRN 

protection and/or decontamination into NEO plans. To assure adequate and timely 

international transportation support, affected combatant commands and US country teams 

may need to obtain HN clearances for flights from contaminated areas, continuously 

coordinating their planning with USTRANSCOM. 
CHAPTER III 

PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 

III-1 

ìOur Nation faces an increasing threat from the use of WMD [weapons of mass 

destruction] by hostile state and nonstate actors. The complexity of this threat 

also increases with the rapid advance of technologies used to develop and deliver 

WMD. We must posses the full range of operational capabilities to protect the 

United States, US military forces, and partners and allies from the threat or actual 

use of WMD.î 

General Peter Pace 

National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2006 

1. General 

a. Applicability. The Armed Forces of the United States must be prepared to conduct 

prompt, sustained, and decisive military operations in CBRN environments. An 

adversaryís CBRN capabilities or the existence of significant quantities of TIM in the 

operational environment can have a profound impact on US and multinational 

objectives, the concept of operations, and supporting actions, and therefore must be 

taken into account. The principles that follow assist the GCC and their subordinate JFCs 

in planning and executing effective military operations, and providing essential support to 

civilian authorities charged with mitigating and managing the consequences of an 

adversaryís use of CBRN weapons. Some CBRN considerations for planning are in Figure 

III-1. 

See JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, for more information on CBRN 

planning. 

b. Deterrence. A fundamental premise of US military planning is that adversaries are 

most likely to be deterred from provocative action when US forces are sufficiently and 

visibly organized, trained, and equipped to defeat that provocation and fear a credible threat 

of unacceptable response. Deterring adversary use of CBRN materials depends to a 

significant degree on effective preparedness and operational readiness to deny the 

adversary any meaningful strategic advantage. Credible plans, visibly effective 

education, training, and exercising capabilities, and a clearly communicated commitment to 

hold an adversary and its leadership at risk in response to CBRN use are also important 

elements of deterrence. The adversary should perceive US capabilities and determination 

with certainty while remaining uncertain about the precise nature and timing of US actions. 

Information operations (IO), in conjunction with its supporting and related capabilities, 

provides the GCC and subordinate JFCs with the principal means to influence a potential or 

actual adversary with the ultimate strategic objective of deterring them from taking actions 

that threaten US national interests. 

For a more detailed discussion of IO, see JP 3-13, Information Operations. 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-11 

c. Enablers for Operating in CBRN Environments. The principles of joint 

operations apply to situations in which adversaries possess CBRN capabilities. In 

considering the challenges to sustained combat operations in such situations, six areas 

merit special emphasis: conducting JIPOE; reducing vulnerability to adversary CBRN 

use; preventing adversary employment of CBRN capabilities; performing FP; conducting 

multinational operations; and synchronizing operations. IO core, supporting, and related 

capabilities are applied across these joint functions and independently. 

(1) Intelligence Support. The intelligence community and other joint staff 

members advise the GCC and subordinate JFCs of an adversaryís capability to employ 

CBRN weapons and under what conditions that adversary is most likely to do so. This 

advice includes an assessment of the adversaryís willingness and intent to employ these 

weapons as a part of JIPOE. JIPOE is a continuous process that identifies confirmed and 

potential adversary capabilities, plans, and actions. JIPOE should include an analysis of the 

CONSIDERATIONS FOR

COMBATANT COMMAND STRATEGIC PLANNING

















Establish priority intelligence requirements

Take pre-incident actions to prevent adversary chemical,

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons

employment

Plan offensive and active defense operations to prevent

or minimize CBRN attacks

Plan actions to counter, mitigate, and manage the effects

of a CBRN incident, including disease containment

strategies

Emphasize early warning and detection

Take actions to prepare United States and indigenous

military forces

Protect threatened civilians, infrastructures, and

facilities

Detect and monitor acquisition and development of

weapons of mass destruction

Figure III-1. Considerations for Combatant Command Strategic Planning
Planning and Operations 

III-3 

capabilities and limitations of adversary CBRN weapons and delivery systems; their 

command, control, and release procedures; and the indicators of intent to employ CBRN 

weapons. Further, it should include information from the joint force surgeon, normally 

prepared as a part of medical intelligence, that identifies medical and disease threats in the 

operational area. Additionally, the JIPOE process should assess the potential for sabotage 

of CBRN sources within the AOR, as well as industrial and commercial use TIM sources 

vulnerable to the adversary. GCCs and subordinate commanders should include treaty, 

legal, and policy considerations relating to CBRN in their JIPOE process. 

See Appendix F, ìTreaty, Legal, and Policy Considerations,î for additional information.

(2) Reducing Vulnerability to Adversary CBRN Capabilities. Vulnerabilities 

should be examined through continuous comprehensive assessments and integrated with 

risk management decisions that encompass the full range of potential targets subject to 

potential adversary CBRN attack. Commanders have multiple means to contain, mitigate, 

and manage the consequences of identified risks and control hazards in order to preserve 

combat power and minimize casualties. Such means include planning for branches and 

sequels in campaign plans, eliminating unique nodes, and assuring that multiple units 

are synchronizing operations to counter CBRN attacks. 

(a) When US, HN, or other civilian populations and infrastructures are at risk 

to CBRN attack, the JFC assists the appropriate military and civil authorities to protect 

against, mitigate, and manage the consequences of these risks. Of particular concern to the 

JFC in this regard are CBRN risks to civilian areas that may affect execution of the military 

campaign. 

(b) Assessment and vulnerability reduction must also address the dangers 

posed by TIMs, including radiological contamination and other environmental 

contamination from industrial operations within the JFCís operational area. Particular care 

must be taken in identifying the nature of such hazards, because in many cases standard 

military CBRN IPE will not provide the necessary protection. In some instances, avoiding 

the hazard may be the most effective or only COA. In all circumstances, the JFC should 

act to minimize immediate and long-term effects of toxic hazards, including low-level 

hazards, to health and mission objectives. 

See Chapter IV, ìSustainment,î for additional HSS information. 

(3) Preventing Adversary CBRN Weapons Employment. The JFC should not 

rely solely on efforts to reduce the forceís vulnerability to CBRN attacks. GCC and 

subordinate JFC plans should include every effort to prevent the adversary from 

successfully acquiring and delivering CBRN weapons, using the full extent of actions 

allowed by the rules of engagement (ROE). Rules on the use of force apply to civil 

support operations in lieu of ROE. These actions could include interdiction, close air 

support, strategic attack, offensive operations, counterair operations, WMD elimination, 

collateral damage planning and assessments, early and sustained operations to disrupt or 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-11 

destroy CBRN capabilities, and establishment of multi-layered defenses against CBRN 

weapons delivery. 

See JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats; JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction; JP 3-40, 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction; JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support; JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations; and Joint Handbook for WMD Elimination Operations. 

(4) Force Protection. Fundamentally, protecting the force consists of those 

actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against personnel, resources, facilities, 

and critical information. These actions conserve the forceís fighting potential so that it can 

be decisively applied. Offensive and defensive measures are coordinated and synchronized 

to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the 

adversary. In CBRN environments, the GCC and subordinate JFCs must take into account 

a number of unique considerations that have a significant effect on FP. These include but 

are not limited to training and leader development, IO, force health protection, and 

protective equipment. FP is an integral part of managing the impact of force entry in antiaccess and/or denied environments. Forces may be deployed by fixed/rotary-tilt-wing 

aircraft or by amphibious assault vehicles and landing crafts. CBRN protection must be 

provided throughout the entire operation: surveillance/reconnaissance through the actual 

assault; and, then resupply and refit. From the adversaryís position, contaminating 

landing/drop zones and beach landing areas with CBRN hazards is a combat multiplier. 

Plan and consider a mix of types of protective resources to balance operational 

requirements with optimal CBRN protection and sustainment. 

(a) Training and Leader Development. Rigorous and realistic individual 

and joint unit training across the force ensures effective emergency response, and readiness 

to fight and win should an adversary employ CBRN weapons. Training and leader 

development are responsibilities shared by combatant commands, Services, and a number 

of DOD agencies. Training, exercises, rehearsals, and professional military education 

and leader development programs should incorporate the principles for operations in 

CBRN environments and include realistic consideration of CBRN weapons effects, to 

include TIM, on peacetime and deployed contingency critical missions and on 

sustained operations. 

(b) Information Operations. IO provides a number of capabilities, which 

may reduce force vulnerability and deter adversarial use of CBRN weapons. Strategic 

communications can create international and internal pressures to convince an adversary not 

to acquire or use CBRN weapons. Computer network exploitation capabilities can make it 

difficult to employ complex weapons systems and could cause unwanted events on an 

adversaryís home territory. A combination of electronic warfare, computer network 

operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security (OPSEC), 

in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, 

or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making is vital to successful CBRN 

operations. In affecting an adversaryís intelligence and situational awareness, IO, including 

OPSEC, provide forces with a significant measure of protection by preventing an adversary 

from acquiring information necessary to successfully target forces and facilities. Deception, 
Planning and Operations 

III-5 

dispersion of forces, and effective use of terrain are examples of measures that complement 

OPSEC. 

(c) Force Health Protection. Medical protection of the force against CBRN 

threats involves integrated preventive, surveillance, and clinical programs. The GCC and 

subordinate JFCís plans should include preventive medicine (i.e., vaccination and 

prophylaxis), disease containment strategies (i.e., nonpharmaceutical interventions [NPI], 

restriction of movement), joint medical surveillance, CBRN casualty control (which may 

include casualty decontamination, mass casualty decontamination, and possibly 

management of contaminated remains [a logistics function]), medical evacuation, and 

provisions for readily available treatments and supplies to counter the physical effects of 

CBRN exposure. These plans should take into account the capabilities and requirements of 

host countries, multinational partners, governmental and nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), and essential civilian workers supporting US and multinational forces. 

(d) Protective Equipment. Sufficient equipment should be available to 

protect not only the uniformed force but also the essential supporting US and civilian work 

forces. Individual and unit training for proper sizing, use of, and care for individual 

equipment is required to take full advantage of its capabilities. IPE is the personal 

clothing and equipment provided to all military personnel. Protective equipment that meets 

civilian certifications as required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, is considered PPE.

(5) Multinational Operations 

(a) US military operations are routinely conducted with forces of other 

countries within the structure of an alliance or coalition. An adversary may employ 

CBRN weapons against non-US forces, especially those with little or no defense 

against these weapons, in an effort to weaken, divide, or destroy the multinational 

effort. In planning and conducting combat operations, the JFC must consider the 

capabilities and limitations of all available forces to maximize their contributions and 

minimize their vulnerabilities. Peacetime activities with multinational partners, particularly 

multinational and interagency training and planning exercises, provide means of preparing 

for multinational combat operations in CBRN environments. 

(b) Multinational operations in many cases will involve the use of HN 

sovereign airspace and territory, bases or civilian airports, facilities, and personnel 

(including other countriesí government and contracted civilian workers supporting US and 

multinational forces). For some contingencies, HN considerations are the subject of 

significant peacetime planning in which operational, legal, contractual, and personnel issues 

are addressed. Due to the complex and vital nature of coordinated action with HN 

authorities to defend against and mitigate the effects of CBRN attacks, advance planning is 

a high priority for the GCC and subordinate JFCs. GCCs and subordinate JFCs 

coordination of HN support activities will involve a number of DOD components as 

well as the US country team. 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-11 

DOD 4500.54-G, Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide, provides guidance on 

aircraft diplomatic and personnel clearance requirements for Department of Statedesignated special areas, combatant command AORs, and HNs around the world. 

(6) Synchronization of Operations. The objective in synchronizing operations 

is to maximize the combined effects of all friendly forces while degrading adversary 

capabilities. Synchronization entails the interrelated and time-phased execution of all 

aspects of combat operations, and is enhanced by situational awareness and adaptability. 

In CBRN environments, successful synchronization requires proper integration of and 

sequencing among ISR capabilities; passive defense measures; active defense operations; 

offensive operations; consequence management; and sustainment. The JFCís operation or 

campaign plan, C2 arrangements, and TTP should facilitate synchronization across all force 

functions and components. Installation commanders must also synchronize base-level 

operations among all tenant units to maintain readiness and continuity of operations in 

CBRN environments. 

2. Planning Considerations 

a. Supported and supporting combatant command contingency planning must take into 

account potential adversary CBRN weapons employment concepts in developing theater 

campaign plans as well as in planning for plausible but unforeseeable crises (see Figure 

III-1). In particular, campaign and supporting plans must include options for 

generating adequate and timely force capabilities (including FP) in the event of early 

adversary CBRN employment in the supported combatant command AOR or other 

supporting areas, including the United States. Combatant commands must establish 

priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), take pre-crisis actions to prevent adversary CBRN 

weapons employment, plan counterforce and active defense operations to prevent or 

minimize CBRN attacks, and plan actions to counter, mitigate, and manage the effects of a 

CBRN attack or incident. In conjunction with host countries, particular emphasis should be 

placed on early warning and detection; actions to prepare US and indigenous military 

forces; and protection of threatened civilian populations, essential infrastructures, and 

facilities. To preserve air mobility capability, these plans must emphasize contamination 

avoidance measures for mobility forces providing deployment, sustainment, and 

redeployment support to the JFC. Combatant commands should also develop and exercise 

plans to support host country actions to minimize and manage the effects of a CBRN attack, 

especially where the effects may constrain US military freedom of action. 

b. Plans and implementing actions to counter potential adversary CBRN 

developments during peacetime and early in crises are crucial. These plans and actions 

require aggressive and integrated joint, multinational, and interagency ISR activities to 

identify adversary CBRN employment concepts and doctrine, weapons developments, 

activities at suspected or known CBRN storage and production sites, and deployments of 

operational CBRN weapon systems. 

c. Public Diplomacy and Information. JFC planning should consider public 

diplomacy and information requirements when confronting the threat or use of CBRN 
Planning and Operations 

III-7 

weapons. Public interest in CBRN-related developments may be intense and may have an 

effect on US and multinational authoritiesí decision-making. Therefore, the JFC must be a 

source of timely, accurate information, with particular emphasis on the explanation of 

actions taken in response to CBRN threats or use. Establishing productive relationships 

with diplomatic channels and media organizations is an inherent element of JFC planning. 

d. Protection 

(1) Protection, including CBRN defense, consists of certain defensive measures 

that are required throughout each joint operation or campaign phase. Protection focuses on 

conserving the joint forceís fighting potential in three primary ways ó active defensive 

measures that protect the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and 

lines of communications from an adversaryís attack; passive defensive measures that make 

friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy; and emergency 

management and response to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to 

accidents, health threats, and natural disasters. Basic goals for operations and campaigns 

described in Figure III-2 include prevention of adversarial use of CBRN weapons, rapid and 

uninterrupted force preparation and deployment, comprehensive FP, and adherence to the 

law of war. 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND

NUCLEAR PROTECTION GOALS

These goals should be reflected in joint operation planning,

development of branches in campaign plans, redundant

assignments of mission-essential tasks to forces, and visible

exercises that assure peacetime preparedness and may

thereby deter potential adversaries:









Prevention of adversarial use of chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear agents either in the United

States or abroad

Rapid and uninterrupted force preparation and

deployment

Comprehensive force protection

Adherence to law of war including prohibitions against

illegal weapons and requirements to preserve evidence

of war crimes

Figure III-2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection Goals
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-11 

(2) Known threat of use and preparedness is imperative in a CBRN environment. 

The joint force can survive adversary use of CBRN weapons by anticipating their 

employment and understanding the potential hazards. Once these hazards are understood, 

commanders can protect their forces in a variety of ways, including training, OPSEC, using 

established reporting and notification procedures, dispersion of forces, use of IPE, and 

proper use of terrain for shielding against blast and radiation effects. Enhancement of 

CBRN defense capabilities reduces incentives for a first strike by an adversary with CBRN 

weapons. As directed, the JFCís protection function may also extends beyond FP to 

encompass protection of US noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of 

friendly nations; and other government agencies (OGAs), intergovernmental organizations 

(IGOs), and NGOs. JFCs should immediately inform HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, or 

NGOs in the operational area of adversary intentions to use CBRN weapons. These 

organizations do not have the same intelligence or decontamination capabilities as military 

units and need the maximum amount of time available to protect their personnel. 

(3) Protection capabilities apply domestically under civil support. The GCC 

when tasked by the SecDef can apply protection capabilities in support of homeland 

defense, civil support, and emergency preparedness. 

e. Public Affairs (PA). Well planned PA support should be incorporated in every 

phase of operations. PA planning, coordination, and execution within DOD and with OGAs 

enhances the credibility and coherence of information reaching the worldwide audience. 

Regardless of the type or scope of military operations, PA will facilitate making accurate 

and timely information available to the public. 

f. Threat and Capability Assessments

(1) Joint force intelligence staffs, in addition to assessing the full range of 

adversary CBRN capabilities, intent, CBRN hazards, and other threats, should also assess 

concepts of operations for delivery of CBRN weapons. Special attention should be given to 

identifying missile and covert or clandestine delivery concepts that would stress in-place 

US defenses ó especially prior to a major US force build-up. 

(2) Development of integrated operational concepts to counter the CBRN threat 

must be based on realistic assessments of available passive defense, active defense, and 

counterforce capabilities. Even with effective offensive and active defense capabilities, 

some adversary attacks may succeed, forcing reliance on passive defenses in order to 

survive and operate. If there are more serious shortfalls in counterforce and active defense 

assets, the burden on passive defenses will be correspondingly greater. 

(3) The primary purpose of CBRN defense planning is to support 

commandersí decision-making needs. CBRN defense planning is accomplished by: 

(a) Identifying, assessing, and estimating the adversaryís CBRN capabilities, 

intentions, and most likely COAs based on the situation. 
Planning and Operations 

III-9 

(b) Providing recommendations for commandersí guidance to help ensure 

that forces and facilities are prepared to operate in CBRN environments. 

(4) CBRN assessments support several critical facets of joint force planning and 

decision-making, including mission analysis, COA development, and the analysis and 

comparison of adversary and friendly COAs. Planning support to decision-making is both 

dynamic and continuous, thus CBRN vulnerability analyses must be completed early 

enough to be factored into the commandersí decision-making effort. Unit staff and CBRN 

personnel work together to ensure that all analyses are fully integrated into contingency and 

crisis action planning. They accomplish this by wargaming friendly versus adversary 

COAs and jointly developing products designed to assist the GCC, subordinate JFCs, 

Service components, and multinational partners in the decision-making processes. 

g. CBRN Defense Planning Considerations. The basic CBRN defense planning 

process remains the same across the range of military operations and occurs within and 

among all levels. Nevertheless, specific CBRN defense planning considerations may vary 

considerably among strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level operations due to differences 

in missions, available resources, and the size of the operational areas and areas of interest 

(AOIs). An adversaryís use of CBRN weapons can quickly change the character of an 

operation or campaign. The use or the threat of use of these weapons can cause large-scale 

shifts in strategic and operational objectives, phases, and COAs. Planning at all levels 

should ensure the integration of CBRN considerations into the overall planning and 

decision-making processes. A key task for all commanders is the establishment of 

protection against CBRN attacks in the operational area and in other areas providing forces 

and sustaining capabilities. These goals include prevention of adversarial use of CBRN 

weapons, rapid and uninterrupted force preparation and deployment, and comprehensive 

FP. This section will introduce strategic and operational level CBRN planning 

considerations. Tactical level CBRN planning considerations are covered within multiService and Service-specific doctrine. One of the key facets of planning for CBRN, given 

the large variety of potential agents, material, and weapons, is to limit those agents and 

weapons under consideration to those most likely to be employed during the time period 

being addressed. 

(1) Strategic-Level CBRN Defense Planning. Planning activities at the strategic 

level establish national and multinational military objectives, develop global plans or 

theater war plans to achieve these objectives, sequence initiatives, define limits, assess risks 

for the use of military and other instruments of national security policy, and provide 

military forces and other capabilities according to strategic plans. 

(a) The strategic-level operational environment is analyzed in terms of 

geographic regions, nations, strategic personality of leadership, and climate rather than local 

geography and weather. Other factors that impact the commandís CBRN planning include 

treaties; international law, custom, and practice; existing agreements/arrangements with 

HNs en route to and within the operational area; and the capability of adversary propaganda 

to influence US public support and world opinion. 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-11 

(b) Political, psychological, and economic characteristics of the operational 

environment assume increased importance for deterrence at the strategic level. They may, 

in fact, be the dominant factors influencing the adversaryís COAs. At this level, the 

analysis of the adversaryís strategic capabilities will concentrate on considerations such as 

psychology of political leadership, national will and morale, ability of the economy to 

sustain warfare, possible willingness to use CBRN weapons, and possible intervention by 

third-party countries and non-state actors. 

1. On the political scale, if a state has possessed CBRN weapons or been 

attacked with CBRN weapons during past crises, it becomes important to understand the 

effect of those weapons upon the region's politics and their effect on the decision to use or 

withhold such weapons. 

2. On the psychological scale, it is vital to understand the adversaryís 

motivations and values in order to be able to estimate the pressure it might feel to use, or 

withhold, CBRN weapons in a particular situation. 

3. On the economic scale, understanding the industrial and technological 

capabilities and interdependence of a nation or region can help estimate the type of CBRN 

weapons that may exist. 

(c) COA models at the strategic level consider the entire spectrum of 

resources available to the adversary and identify both military and nonmilitary methods of 

power projection and influence. 

(2) Operational-Level CBRN Defense Planning. The size and location of the 

operational environment at this level depends on the location of the adversaryís political 

and economic support structures, its military support units and force generation capabilities, 

potential third-nation or third-party involvement, logistics and economic infrastructure, 

political treaties, press coverage, and adversary propaganda. 

(a) At the operational level, analysis of the operational environment should 

concentrate on capabilities to support the movement of and logistic support to CBRN 

weapons (i.e., road, rail, air, and sea transportation networks); zones of entry into and 

through the operational area and AOI; the impact of large geographic features such as 

mountains, forests, deserts, and archipelagos on military operations; and the impact of 

seasonal climate on CBRN weapons effects. 

(b) When examining the adversaryís order of battle, the analysis of the 

adversary should include doctrine for C2, logistic support, release procedures for the use of 

CBRN weapons, agent delivery capability, special operations, and paramilitary forces. 

CBRN planning examines the adversaryís COAs in terms of operational objectives, largescale movements, lines of communications, and the phasing of operations. These estimates 

form the basis for operational planning by identifying, developing, and comparing friendly 

COAs and assessing the impact of a CBRN environment on each friendly COA. 
Planning and Operations 

III-11 

(c) CBRN planning by the staff helps to determine: 

1. The characteristics and decision-making patterns (i.e., weapons 

release procedures) of the adversaryís strategic leadership and field commanders. 

2. The adversaryís strategy, intention, or strategic concept of operation 

for use of CBRN weapons, which should include the adversaryís desired end state, 

perception of friendly vulnerabilities, and intentions regarding those vulnerabilities. 

3. The adversaryís ability to integrate offensive CBRN operations into 

the overall concept of operations. 

4. The composition, disposition, movement, strength, doctrine, tactics, 

training, and combat effectiveness of adversary forces with an offensive CBRN capability. 

5. The adversaryís principal strategic and operational objectives and 

lines of operations. 

6. The adversaryís CBRN weapons strategic and operational 

sustainment capabilities. 

7. The adversaryís ability to conduct IO. 

8. Use or access data from space systems to support its targeting process. 

9. The adversaryís CBRN weapons and weapons storage location 

vulnerabilities. 

10. The adversaryís capability to conduct asymmetric attacks against 

global critical support nodes. 

11. The adversaryís ability to conceal or obfuscate initial deployment of, 

or their responsibility regarding deployment of, CBRN weapons. 

12. The adversaryís relationship with possible allies and the ability to 

enlist their support. 

13. The adversaryís capability to operate advanced warfighting systems 

(e.g., smart weapons and sensors) in adverse meteorological and oceanographic conditions. 

14. Area studies, intelligence estimates, and/or economic studies that 

may indicate potential TIM hazards in the operational area. Use the JIPOE analysis to 

assess the existence and status of TIM hazard areas. 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 3-11 

15. The adversaryís capabilities for FP, civilian and infrastructure 

protection and, specifically, CBRN operations. 

h. Decontamination Actions. Established TTP for decontamination of military 

equipment and personnel will be followed. If decontamination of civilian personnel, 

equipment, or facilities is required, procedures will be established in coordination with HN 

authorities and IGO and NGO experts as appropriate. 

i. Retrograde of Contaminated Materiel from the Theater 

(1) In the early stages of post-conflict operations, returning US equipment to the 

continental United States (CONUS) or other locations will be a major activity as forces are 

withdrawn from the theater of operations. The GCC will establish the relative priority 

among the goals shown in Figure III-3 in view of the circumstances at hand, in particular 

operational timing and extent of contamination. For example, under emergency conditions, 

the attainment of US and multinational objectives may warrant increased risks and require a 

more robust protective posture to limit contamination hazards and mitigate their effects. In 

a nonemergency situation, those same risks may be unacceptable and more stringent 

contamination control measures may be required to support lower individual protection 

levels. 

(2) Essential actions begin at the operator level and continue to the organization 

ultimately receiving the shipped equipment. Two key roles are performed by the joint 

security coordinator (JSC) and the CBRN retrograde support element (RSE). 

Consistent with GCC guidance, and in coordination with Commander, USTRANSCOM, 

the JSC determines if mission requirements warrant the risk of emergency retrograde or if 

other COAs are acceptable. To assist with requirements for deliberate contaminated 

materiel retrograde, the JSC may organize a CBRN RSE to accomplish tasks from marking 

equipment to contamination monitoring. Redeployment planning should address 

requirements for consolidation points for equipment with residual CBRN contamination. 

Post conflict redeployment of military equipment, in most cases, occurs by sea.

(3) The safety of personnel is of foremost concern during the retrograde of 

equipment with potential, residual, or low-level CBRN contamination. Based on principles 

outlined in this paragraph, Services and other responsible military agencies must develop 

and implement specific, precautionary procedures for handling and transporting their 

equipment. Any equipment present in the attack or downwind hazard areas may possess 

residual contamination. Service manuals define CBRN contamination hazard areas. 

Specialized detectors may be required at specified sites in the joint security area (JSA) to 

monitor contamination. Given decontamination technology limitations, some equipment 

may require extensive weathering or, in some cases, destruction to meet safety objectives. 

Following thorough decontamination, residual contamination risks include potential vapor 

and contact hazards. These risks increase as contaminated equipment is consolidated and 

personnel work around this equipment for prolonged periods. Risks may also increase as 

equipment is disassembled for maintenance functions or containerized for shipment. 
Planning and Operations 

III-13 

(4) Methods to mitigate residual radioactive, persistent chemical, and 

biological hazards are primarily removal of these materials or, in some instances, 

allowing sufficient time for their decay or degradation.

(a) The time required for the natural decay of radioactive material is a 

function of the half-life of the isotope and cannot be altered. If the residual radiation cannot 

be removed, commanders must employ the principles of time, distance, and shielding. 

Minimize the time that personnel are exposed to the radiation source; maximize the distance 

between personnel and the radiation source; and place as much shielding material, such as 

walls or soil, between personnel and the radiation source as possible. If burying a 

contaminated source is necessary for personnel protection, ensure that doing so does not 

create other contamination hazards, such as irradiating ground water. 

(b) Biological agents generally decay within hours after dissemination or 

exposure to ultraviolet light (sunlight). For more robust biological agents, as well as 

CONTAMINATED MATERIEL RETROGRADE GOALS

MISSION:

PROTECTION:

CONTROL:

Support strategic and operational objectives

Protect the force and mission resources from

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards

Control contamination and previously contaminated

equipment for the remainder of its life cycle, including

its final destruction

Figure III-3. Contaminated Materiel Retrograde Goals
Chapter III 

III-14 JP 3-11 

persistent chemical agents, thorough decontamination and preparation of equipment to US 

Department of Agriculture import standards will eliminate most health threats; even so, 

continuing precautions, such as individual protection, are warranted. Because of the small 

particle size of many biological agents, some agent may adhere to internal equipment 

surfaces, creating a risk, primarily respiratory, to unwarned maintenance personnel touching 

facial areas after contact with these internal surfaces. 

(5) The nonemergency equipment retrograde concept assumes that post-conflict 

conditions allow time for thorough decontamination and weathering in the operational area 

before retrograde from the theater. Personnel assisting the JSC with detection, monitoring, 

and preparation of the equipment will require stringent personal protection and specialized 

detectors. These preparations may require continuous operations for weeks or months. As 

suspect equipment is consolidated for monitoring, decontamination, and weathering, 

security and buffer zones around the consolidation site provide additional contamination 

control measures to protect US and multinational forces as well as HN personnel. 

(6) Air quality control and related legal requirements are additional considerations 

requiring legal advice and review prior to equipment retrograde. Once in the US, 

precautionary measures continue throughout the remaining equipment life cycle, including 

DOD control requirements, pre-maintenance monitoring, and other periodic monitoring. 

j. Mitigation of Residual Hazards

(1) Identifying, assessing, and mitigating residual hazards in the theater of 

operations will be an important aspect of transition to conflict termination. US and 

multinational forces must be able to detect and evaluate hazardous areas in order to 

contain and mitigate contamination hazards. They must be capable of providing 

immediate lifesaving support and emergency disposal (or containment) of leaking, unstable, 

or otherwise dangerous toxic materials. 

(2) Joint force plans must also provide for the transfer of custody of contaminated 

materials and sites and associated monitoring tasks to the HN or follow-on forces or 

organizations. 

For further guidance on considerations for termination of operations, refer to JP 5-0, Joint 

Operation Planning, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 
CHAPTER IV 

SUSTAINMENT 

IV-1 

ìSustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to 

maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment. Key 

considerations include employment of logistic forces, facilities, environmental 

considerations, health service support, host-nation support, contracting, disposal 

operations, legal support, religious support, and financial management.î 

JP 3-0, Joint Operations

1. General 

a. The ability to sustain military combat operations with appropriate levels of logistics, 

personnel services, and HSS is critical to operational success. JFC plans supporting 

deployment; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); and 

sustainment must continually be reviewed. Operations in CBRN environments make 

sustainment planning more complex. 

b. The sustainment function encompasses a number of tasks including: 

(1) Coordinating the resupply of CBRN defense equipment. 

(2) Coordinating the supply of food, fuel, arms, munitions, and equipment. 

(3) Providing for maintenance of equipment. 

(4) Coordinating support for forces, including field services, personnel services 

support (PSS), HSS, mortuary affairs, religious support, legal services, financial 

management support, and medical readiness. 

(5) Building and maintaining sustainment bases. 

(6) Assessing, repairing, and maintaining infrastructure. 

(7) Acquiring, managing, and distributing funds. 

(8) Providing common-user logistic support. 

(9) Establishing and coordinating movement services. 

(10) Maintaining force health protection measures. 

(11) Decontaminating. 

c. Operational tempo, logistic operations, the HSS system, PSS, and reconstitution 

efforts may be profoundly affected by the introduction of CBRN material. CBRN materials 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-11 

present separate and distinct threats to personnel, units, equipment, and operations. The 

ability to assess the potential effects of CBRN hazards on the mission is a critical 

factor in deciding priorities for CBRN protection and efficiently allocating resources.

d. Generally, operations will slow as tasks are performed by personnel encumbered by 

protective equipment or exposed to CBRN effects. Hazards may require abandonment or 

limited use of contaminated areas, transfer of missions to uncontaminated forces, or 

avoidance of planned terrain and routes. Additionally, CBRN use or contamination 

resulting in a major disruption of normal personnel and materiel replacement processes in 

the theater could severely hamper the component commandersí capabilities for force 

generation and sustainment. Split-MOPP options could make available many forces that 

would otherwise have been unavailable due to unnecessary protective level constraints. 

Force reconstitution requirements may also dramatically increase over initial planning 

estimates. Even when sufficient protection has been afforded to individuals and units, 

continued operations in a CBRN environment could overburden reorganization and 

reconstitution systems, as well as the deployed medical treatment capabilities. 

e. Maintaining the physiological and psychological health of military forces is a basic 

requirement for combat effectiveness. A deliberate or inadvertent CBRN event in an 

operational area will affect both military and civilian populations. HSS considerations in 

CBRN environments, therefore, should include civilian public health service matters. The 

command surgeon is responsible for ensuring the integration of preventative health 

services matters (mass prophylaxis and treatment, ensuring a safe environment, 

restoration of a healthy population, etc.) into the command HSS plans and activities 

(to include providing medical care) in order to support mission accomplishment. 

2. Logistics 

a. Theater sustainment capabilities must be protected. CBRN contamination at an 

essential port of embarkation (POE) or port of debarkation (POD), or other critical logistic 

facility can significantly affect campaign plans and execution. Measures to prevent and 

mitigate the effects of CBRN contamination must focus on maintaining support to combat 

operations and rapidly restoring the degraded capabilities. Preventing and mitigating the 

effects of CBRN hazards on equipment and supplies includes the use of protective coatings 

and coverings. Under some circumstances it may be necessary to use alternate facilities. 

b. Protecting forces from the effects of a CBRN environment is logistically taxing. 

Resupply requirements for protective clothing, medical supplies (antidotes, antibiotics, and 

antivirals), and sustainment supplies for quarantine/isolation facilities will be time sensitive. 

Low density CBRN protective equipment may require movement within the theater. 

Personnel and equipment decontamination requires great amounts of water, and then creates 

great amounts of contaminated water. These and other resources needed for recovery from 

CBRN incidents can severely strain the theater logistic system and have unanticipated 

effects on combat operations. 

c. Overview and Assumptions 
Sustainment 

IV-3 

(1) Theater Maturity. US forces may be deployed to theaters that provide a 

wide range of infrastructure and support activities. 

(a) Mature theaters have forward-deployed forces with a significant amount 

of logistic infrastructure already in place. Quantities of pre-positioned supplies and 

equipment may be stored in environmentally controlled warehouses or covered shelters to 

reduce their vulnerability to contamination. Host-nation support (HNS) agreements may be 

in place and routinely exercised. 

(b) Immature theaters have few, if any, forward-deployed forces and only 

minimal logistic infrastructure. HNS agreements may not have been negotiated prior to the 

onset of hostilities. Pre-positioned supplies and equipment, if available, may be stored in 

the elements, thus the need for overhead cover. Other supplies and equipment may require 

storage at an intermediate staging base outside the theater until the theater logistic 

infrastructure matures to accept them. 

(2) Logistic Elements. Logistic elements operate throughout the operational 

environment. Logistic elements directly supporting engaged forces may be small, mobile 

units. Logistic elements providing area support may involve larger, more complex 

transportation and supply activities conducted at fixed or semi-fixed sites. 

(a) Mobile units seek to limit contamination by avoiding exposure to CBRN 

materials to the maximum extent possible. If contaminated, units identify clean areas, and 

on order move along pre-designated routes from contaminated areas. Units decontaminate 

equipment and exchange protective garments during the move to clean sites. 

(b) Units located at fixed locations, such as ports, airfields, and supply 

depots, may be required to continue operations from contaminated sites until they can 

relocate to clean areas or complete decontamination efforts. 

(3) Workforce Composition. In most circumstances, the logistic infrastructure 

in a theater operates with a substantial complement of nonmilitary personnel. In a 

typical theater, sustained logistic operations will rely heavily on military personnel, DOD 

civilians, HNS personnel, other nation support personnel, and contractor-provided logistic 

support personnel. During the early phases of deployment, the logistic infrastructure may 

rely on HNS personnel for port operations and transportation requirements. Workforce 

degradation due to CBRN contamination can severely hamper continued operations. 

d. Logistic Operations in Contaminated Environments. Logistic operations are 

particularly vulnerable to CBRN incidents. When assessing the likely nature and frequency 

of possible CBRN incidents on logistic facilities, the JFC should consider the number and 

type of available adversary delivery systems as well as the adversaryís ability to deliver an 

agent in quantities sufficient to significantly disrupt operations. Other factors to consider 

include: 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-11 

(1) Areas of Vulnerability. The areas of greatest vulnerability are large fixed 

sites (e.g., PODs), staging and marshalling areas, hubs and bases, assembly areas, and main 

supply routes (MSRs) adjacent to sites involved in early force build-up activities. 

(2) CBRN Logistic Readiness. Adequate logistic support, which must be 

maintained under all conditions, is vital to operations in CBRN environments. The key 

considerations are application of the joint logistic principles of sustainability, 

survivability, responsiveness, and flexibility to ensure adequate CBRN equipment 

stocks, interoperability, and training.

(a) Sustainability. Sustainability is the measure of the ability to maintain 

logistic support to all users throughout the theater for the duration of the operation. In 

CBRN environments, constant, long-term consumption of CBRN defense supplies requires 

careful planning, monitoring serviceability for items, such as overgarments, that have 

specific shelf lives (i.e., expiration dates), and anticipation of future requirements. 

(b) Survivability. Theater logistic sites and units present an adversary with 

important and often static high value targets for attack with CBRN weapons. Logistic 

planners must plan for both active and passive measures to minimize the risks of CBRN 

weapons incidents while satisfying the needs of the joint force for uninterrupted logistic 

support. 

(c) Responsiveness. The hazards and potential damage caused by CBRN 

incidents may require relocation of bases and HSS facilities, major redirection of supply 

flow, reallocation of transportation and engineering services, and short-notice transfer of 

replacement personnel or units from one part of the theater to another. Joint force plans 

should allow for surges in logistic requirements for CBRN defense consumables and 

equipment items to appropriate units. 

(d) Flexibility. Work/rest cycles must be activated and implemented to the 

maximum practical extent allowed. Maintaining logistic flexibility in CBRN environments 

requires that logistic units be capable of rapid alteration of work schedules. CBRN 

incidents can cause degradation of logistic operations due to operating in protective clothing 

and the requirement to handle and decontaminate supplies and equipment. Logistic 

planners will plan for deliberate and expedient covers and shelters to protect essential items 

from contamination. Commanders will prioritize and focus efforts on accomplishment of 

mission-essential tasks. 

For a complete discussion of all joint logistic principles see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

(e) CBRN Defense Equipment Stocks. Logistic support for CBRN 

readiness requires adequate supplies and transportation of chemical and biological defense 

equipment, as well as sustainment of supporting CBRN defense organizations responsible 

for carrying out reconnaissance, decontamination, and supporting tasks. 
Sustainment 

IV-5 

(f) Interoperability. In operations outside CONUS, the JFC will be working 

with HN and other forces. While each member organization of the multinational effort is 

responsible for its own CBRN defense, the ability to exploit logistic interoperability (e.g., in 

equipment and supplies) can contribute to the effectiveness of the collective force. 

(g) Training. Individual and unit survival skills and the ability to perform 

mission-oriented tasks while in protective clothing are vital to theater logistic activities. 

Mission-essential tasks will be identified in theater plans and unit standing operating 

procedures, and regular training will be conducted to establish individual and unit 

proficiency. 

(3) Communications Systems. Communications systems are integral to 

maintaining logistic support in CBRN environments. The JFC will ensure that 

communications systems supporting logistic operations are sufficiently self-reliant and 

robust to operate through CBRN incidents. Communications related vulnerability 

assessments will include: a review of plausible CBRN incidents; the CBRN warning and 

reporting system; high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) protection and other aspects 

of survivability and endurability; equipment redundancy; availability and proficiency in the 

use of protective clothing and equipment; proficiency of military and nonmilitary personnel 

in the performance of individual and unit tasks at various levels of MOPP; and the degree of 

reliance on, and compatibility of, HN equipment and support (e.g., utilities and transmission 

facilities). 

(4) CBRN Defense Planning Responsibilities. Theater-level logistic support is 

generally furnished from Service operated and other functional fixed sites throughout the 

JSA. Logistic CBRN defense operations in the JSA are based on Service and site 

requirements, but will be coordinated with the JSC and base cluster commanders (when 

designated). 

(a) The JSC is responsible for CBRN defense integration for the joint 

security area among the component commanders. Component commanders will 

incorporate CBRN plans, exercises, equipment considerations, individual decontamination 

measures, and preventive measures into their area and base cluster defense plans. They will 

also position CBRN defense personnel and assets to support current mission requirements 

and facilitate future operations, in accordance with JFC and area commander directives and 

priorities. 

JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, provides additional guidance on JSC and 

outlines a joint force and component commanderís roles and responsibilities. 

(b) The JFC must consider the adequacy of equipment and training of 

nonmilitary and non-US logistic personnel to survive and operate in CBRN environments. 

While it is a Service responsibility to train and equip the forces they provide to the joint 

force, the JFC is responsible for establishing the requirements based on the commandís 

assessment of the CBRN threats. If there are deficiencies in CBRN equipment and training, 

resources must be requested through Service and joint channels. 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-11 

e. Logistic Planning Considerations for Fixed Sites. Ports, airfields, and related 

fixed sites are choke points vulnerable to CBRN incidents. Combat forces are vulnerable to 

CBRN incidents during entry operations and during movement to areas of military 

operations. Fixed sites may be high-value targets for adversary CBRN incidents. Common 

fixed site defense measures can reduce their vulnerability. 

(1) Incident Warning and Reporting

(a) In order for individuals and units to take necessary self-protection 

measures, timely warning of CBRN incidents is required. The JFC has the responsibility, 

in coordination with the HN, to establish an effective and timely warning system and 

to exercise this system on a recurring basis. In a CBRN high threat environment, fixed 

site commanders should monitor CBRN warning systems, to include real-time integrated 

tactical warning and attack assessment missile warning systems (which include near-realtime notification of nuclear detonations) continuously and should be capable of passing 

warnings to personnel and units throughout their sites, to units in their downwind hazard 

areas, and receive warning from units upwind of their fixed site location. 

(b) Because of the variety of delivery methods for CBRN weapons and the 

limitations of detection capabilities, personnel and units may not receive warning before 

exposure occurs. Warning architectures should be designed to alert personnel 

promptly upon initial detection of an attack. Because personnel may be widely 

dispersed throughout the area, a site-wide alarm system, capable of being activated 

immediately upon receipt of warning, must be available, maintained, and exercised 

regularly. 

(2) Protective Postures

(a) Logistic planners must consider the vulnerability of HN and other 

civilian workers to incidents, and plan accordingly. The JFC is responsible for ensuring 

that mission-essential civilian workers receive appropriate equipment and training and are 

integrated into area CBRN defense plans. This may involve coordinating with HN 

representatives and the US country team. 

(b) Workers must be exercised in CBRN incident scenarios. Upon hearing an 

alarm, workers must be trained to immediately protect themselves by rapidly donning 

protective clothing and moving to the nearest overhead cover. Planners must ensure that 

overhead cover is available at appropriate locations throughout the area. 

(c) Typically, even during high volume sustainment operations, much of the 

materials handling equipment (MHE) at a facility is not in use. Commanders should protect 

idle MHE from exposure to CBRN hazards in the event of an incident. Housing and 

covering MHE with plastic, or otherwise protecting it from exposure, can ensure that it will 

be readily available to resume operations after the attack. 
Sustainment 

IV-7 

(3) Post-Attack Reconnaissance. Understanding the nature of possible 

contamination by CBRN agents is central to adopting an effective concept of operations 

that reduces the risk of casualties and cross-contamination and ensures a rapid resumption 

of operations after an incident. This requires coordinated reconnaissance, detection, and 

marking. Workers should be trained to conduct self-assessment activities to detect possible 

contamination in their work areas; however, a military unit trained and equipped to deal 

with CBRN contamination normally will be necessary to support these surveys. 

(4) Recovery from CBRN Incident. It may be required, when a base of support 

becomes contaminated, to decontaminate to continue sustainment operations. Depending 

upon the nature of the CBRN incident, extensive damage, mass casualties, and 

contaminated areas could result. During this phase, it is necessary to obtain additional 

information about the incident, and to develop and carry out a recovery plan. The incident 

commander or equivalent has primary responsibility to approve all recovery actions and 

will develop a recovery plan to be approved by the installation commander. Complex 

systems, made of various materials that absorb contaminates, may not be able to be 

decontaminated. These same materials may also not be transportable because of their 

inherent public health risk. 

(a) Conduct Appropriate Level of Area Decontamination. The following 

principles should be considered when conducting area decontamination. 

1. Begin with the most important items (mission and health essential) 

first. 

2. Decontaminate only what is necessary. 

3. Consider the mission, time, and the extent of contamination, 

protective equipment status, and the decontamination assets available. 

4. Do not move contaminated equipment, personnel, or remains away 

from the operational area if it is possible to bring decontamination assets (organic or 

supporting units) forward safely. This will keep the equipment on location, speed 

decontamination, and limit the spread of contamination to other areas. 

5. Additional decontamination options include: disposal, isolation, 

weathering, and neutralization of the hazard. 

(b) Restoration of the area is a long-range project, and is nonmilitary. 

(c) Assess and Repair the Installation Infrastructure. Assessment of the 

installationís infrastructure and assets after an attack is conducted by all functional areas. 

This includes all aircraft, facilities, vehicles, and equipment. 

1. Chemical and biological agents or covert radiological sources used in 

an attack usually would not cause much physical damage to the installation, only 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-11 

contamination. Relocation of such items may be necessary when persistent contamination 

is still present. 

2. Special circumstances are associated with contamination that tends to 

settle in basements and other low areas, rubble piles, and similar collections of debris, or 

into porous surfaces. This concentration could extend the lethality period of chemical and 

biological agents. 

3. A device producing a nuclear yield or a radiological dispersion device 

may also cause structural damage. The damage from a radiological dispersal device would 

be limited by the size of the conventional explosive while the extent of structural damage 

from a nuclear yield producing device could extend for miles. In either case, residual 

radiation may be a contamination hazard. If radioactive residue is found, coordinate 

disposal efforts with the authorities. 

(d) Assess Immediate and Long-Term Health Impacts. The type of attack 

and the means of delivery will determine whether immediate and/or long-term medical 

assistance is necessary. The ability to quickly and correctly assess the agent and provide 

appropriate medical care and supplies will have implications regarding the operational 

effectiveness of the installation, the medical facilities, and the populace after an attack. The 

impact can be immediate, long-term, or a combination of the two. 

1. Immediate Impact

a. Chemical Incidents. Casualties may appear immediately, or 

symptoms may be delayed. Medical personnel may encounter an immediate spike in 

casualties that will overload their capabilities. Depending on the agent, follow-on 

casualties may not appear immediately. However, if casualties are immediate, then 

requirements would be immediate and potentially require a large and readily accessible 

antidote supply. Procedures for obtaining these antidotes must be well established. 

b. Biological Incidents. If the type of pathogen is not quickly 

determined or medical treatment is not readily available, the potential for large numbers of 

casualties is increased. From the time of an incident to the incubation period, zero 

casualties would report to medical personnel for treatment. Depending on the agent used, a 

peak in casualties would take place within a few days (for anthrax) or up to two months (for 

brucellosis) and could quickly overload medical personnel and facilities. 

c. Radiological Incidents. Casualties are unlikely to appear 

immediately unless the incident is also associated with an explosion or other conventional 

casualty producing scenario. Radiation exposure symptoms will most likely be delayed and 

are dependent on the dose rate and total dose. Follow-on casualties may not have an 

immediate impact on operations. However, casualties with psychological effects may 

overwhelm medical facilities. 
Sustainment 

IV-9 

d. Nuclear Incidents. Casualties will appear immediately. There will be a combination of 

thermal, overpressure, traditional trauma, and radiation casualties requiring evacuation and 

treatment. Casualty estimation and planning for a nuclear scenario is available from North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2475-Allied 

Medical Publication (AMedP)-8, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), or the 

United States Army Nuclear and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency 

(USANCA). 

2. Long-Term Impact

a. Biological Incidents. Some biological agents (i.e., toxins) will 

be evident immediately after exposure, while the symptoms of other agents (i.e., anthrax) 

will take a while to present. Some biological agents have effective preventative 

medications, others respond to treatment after exposure, and still others do not respond to 

medical intervention, leaving only the option of supportive care. Commanders should be 

made aware of any medical intent to move biological casualties. Medical personnel should 

be aware that commanders must obtain approval for the movement of casualties with 

internationally quarantinable diseases through the appropriate coordinating agency 

(Department of Health and Human Services). 

b. Radiological and Nuclear Incidents. Radiation exposure can 

have delayed effects. Depending on the total dose, the effects may not manifest themselves 

for an extended period of time. Long term monitoring may be required for casualties not 

showing immediate symptoms or biological effects. 

(e) Conduct Follow Up Analysis

1. Work with investigation teams. Appropriate officials will investigate 

and identify the cause of the CBRN incident/attack and report findings. 

2. Compile inputs from all participating units. 

3. Periodically review the recovery plan and follow up on open action 

items. 

(5) Contamination Control

(a) A CBRN incident may contaminate essential operating areas. Local 

commanders, accordingly, must have available the capability to control the contamination, 

including the capability to decontaminate operating surfaces, MHE, aircraft, and 

exposed military cargo to the extent required to sustain operations. Large fixed sites 

(e.g., ports, airfields) with throughput capacity higher than required may allow split-MOPP 

processes and procedures implementation which would provide the flexibility to shift 

operations to uncontaminated locations on the installation. At smaller facilities operating at 

100% capacity, however, an incident could reduce throughput to a level below the JFC 

requirements. 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-11 

(b) Controlling contamination of equipment and operating surfaces at fixed 

sites is required to restore full operational capacity. The operational tempo and mission will 

determine the level of decontamination required. 

(6) Considerations for POEs and En Route Facilities

(a) POEs and en route fixed sites may be targeted in order to disrupt or 

inhibit US military deployments. Because these sites may be located in the US and other 

regions outside the threatened theater, they are subject to clandestine (including 

terrorist) attack. Commanders of POEs must take action to protect their facilities 

(including supporting staging areas as well as rail and road networks) against, and mitigate 

the effects of, CBRN incidents. 

(b) Intermediate logistic bases and infrastructure are also vulnerable to 

CBRN attack. For some large-scale operations, the en route structure is limited and may be 

a particularly valuable target. Commanders must protect and be prepared to deal with 

incidents at these facilities. 

(7) Considerations for Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs)

(a) While each APOD is unique, a few general considerations are important. 

When considering CBRN threats, the installationís overall size with respect to the mission, 

and its operational capacity and flexibility will affect the commanderís options for 

decontamination and avoidance. However, conducting successful attacks against APODs 

presents significant challenges to the adversary. If installation leadership and personnel are 

properly prepared to survive the attack and sustain operations, CBRN attacks may not cause 

significant long-term degradation of throughput capacity, unless the attack is nuclear, or 

involves a biological agent that remains undetected until it has spread through a significant 

portion of critical personnel and/or equipment. This is especially true at large APODs 

where critical assets and much of the storage areas and MHE could easily escape 

contamination. Operations in these cases may be limited more by the effects of the attacks 

on the local workforce and nearby civilian population. In most cases, it will be possible to 

continue operations at a contaminated APOD. While CBRN incidents may result in 

contamination of some operating surfaces, the size of the hazard area may be small 

compared to the size of the installation. The capability to shift operations to those areas and 

facilities on the installation that escaped contamination is key to sustaining throughput 

operations. This is the essence of split-MOPP. Proper preparation, response, recovery, and 

mitigation activities can significantly reduce the impact of CBRN incidents. Because it is 

unlikely that all of the operational areas of an APOD will be contaminated at any one time, 

it is particularly important that the commander know the location of hazard areas, 

requirements for working and parking areas, and the availability of runways and taxiways. 

APOD plans should include expedited offload procedures (e.g., engines running, no crew 

changes or refueling) within the CBRN threat area to minimize the number of aircraft and 

personnel exposed at any one time during ground operations. 
Sustainment 

IV-11 

(b) If necessary, contaminated aircraft must be decontaminated to the level 

required by GCC and HN before returning to the air mobility flow. The GCC is responsible 

for establishing control of contaminated aircraft in the AOR and at designated 

decontamination sites, and for procedures to address overflight requirements and 

destination base/country landing rights for previously contaminated aircraft. 

(c) In CBRN environments, there are limitations on the employment of 

aircraft. Some aircraft will not be able to land at or depart from contaminated areas 

regardless of an aerial portís CBRN preparedness. Of particular importance are the Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet, civilian, and other aircraft under contract to support military operations. 

Combatant command plans must provide for replacing these aircraft with other airlift assets 

or conducting transload operations from bases outside the immediate threat area. These 

replacement aircraft would have to operate from transload airbases to shuttle the affected 

cargo and passengers to the theater. If that is not feasible, alternate means (e.g., sea, rail, or 

wheeled transport) must be made available. 

(d) The availability of alternative aerial ports to accomplish the transload of 

personnel and materiel from intertheater to intratheater airlift can minimize potential 

deployment interruptions by adversary CBRN use. The supported CCDR, in coordination 

with the Commander, USTRANSCOM is responsible for designating transload aerial ports. 

All means of active and passive contamination avoidance measures will minimize the level 

of contamination and will prevent further cross contamination during operations. 

(8) Considerations for Seaports of Embarkation. JFC plans must take into 

account MSC ships exposed to contamination. Contaminated ships will require 

decontamination support and certification acceptable to civil authorities in order to load 

additional cargo at uncontaminated US or foreign commercial port facilities. 

(9) Considerations for Seaports of Debarkation (SPODs) 

(a) In large-scale operations, US equipment and materiel normally enter the 

theater on strategic sealift ships and offload at SPODs. The vital importance of these 

seaports to US power projection capability makes them an attractive target for CBRN 

incidents. However, conducting successful attacks against SPODs presents significant 

challenges to the adversary. If port managers and operators are properly prepared to survive 

the attack and sustain operations, CBRN attacks may not cause significant long-term 

degradation of military logistic throughput capacity. This is especially true at large ports 

where many piers, storage areas, and much of the MHE may escape contamination. 

Operations in these cases may be limited more by the effects of the attacks on the local 

workforce and nearby civilian population. 

(b) Though similarities concerning the impact of CBRN attack on SPOD and 

APOD operations exist, there are substantial differences. For example, assignment of 

overall responsibility for decontamination efforts is more complex. 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-11 

(c) Each port provides unique capabilities and has different vulnerabilities in 

CBRN environments, but contamination avoidance is an essential element of sustaining 

throughput operations. In normal circumstances, a port is but one node of a complex, 

theater-wide logistic network. Plans should include options for redirecting incoming ships 

when possible from contaminated ports to those that are uncontaminated. However, when 

alternate ports with adequate capacity and berths to handle large cargo ships are not 

available, it may be necessary to continue operations at contaminated ports. In considering 

alternate ports, planners must take into account the requirements for unit equipment to 

arrive in proximity to the marshalling areas for unit personnel, ammunition, and 

sustainment supplies in order to ensure a coherent RSOI for affected units. 

(d) In some cases, it will be possible to continue operations at a 

contaminated port. While CBRN incidents may result in contamination of some operating 

surfaces, the size of the contaminated area may be small compared to the size of the port. 

The capability to shift operations to those areas and facilities within the port that escaped 

contamination is key to sustaining throughput operations. Proper preparation can 

significantly reduce the impact of CBRN incidents on an SPOD. 

f. Logistic Planning Considerations for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward 

Movement, and Integration. The permanency of sites for RSOI of arriving forces can 

vary widely between theaters. Theaters with large forward-deployed forces rely on fixed 

sites for a wide variety of activities, such as pre-positioned stock maintenance and control, 

supply and maintenance, materiel and transportation management, and logistic 

communication systems. Theaters with limited forward presence normally rely more 

heavily on temporarily fixed sites (e.g., facilities that are transportable or mobile but, due to 

ongoing operational constraints, may not be rapidly moved). The CCDR will ensure that 

adequate detection, personnel protection, and decontamination assets are available to meet 

the threat and that alternative sites, along with rehearsed activation plans, are identified and 

prepared. Consideration of RSOI in CBRN environments encompasses a number of 

specific functional areas. 

(1) Reception Areas. APODs and SPODs may be attractive targets for CBRN 

attack. Logistic planners must assess the relative value of the convenience provided by 

establishing large centralized facilities, which are more easily targeted, and the enhanced 

security that results from a larger number of smaller, dispersed facilities that are more 

difficult to command and control but less vulnerable to CBRN attack. 

(2) While the anticipated threat will influence the staging area selection process, 

adequate facility and area space availability may be the determining considerations. 

Planning must consider equipment marshalling areas and rail yards (which may not be 

in close proximity of APOD and SPOD facility complexes); theater logistic hubs and 

bases (which may be fixed facilities in theaters with large forward-deployed forces); and 

assembly areas (where deploying units complete deployment recovery, equipment receipt, 

and processing, and prepare for movement to tactical assembly areas). 
Sustainment 

IV-13 

(3) Onward Movement. CBRN attack during the movement of forces and 

sustainment to tactical assembly areas or other operating areas must be considered by 

planners. Plans must consider the impact of delays in the arrival of forces, equipment, and 

sustainment or the vulnerability of MSRs to CBRN incidents that may vary widely among 

theaters. In theaters that rely on a few major MSRs and have limited alternative routes and 

off-road capability, CBRN attacks may have a greater impact on operations than in theaters 

with more extensive supply routes and where obstacles can more easily be traversed. 

(4) Integration. Consideration must be given to possible disruption to the 

integration of forces or the transfer of mission-ready forces and capabilities into the 

CCDRís force caused by a CBRN attack. 

g. External Support for US Military Operations

(1) In many operations, US military forces will receive significant logistic support 

from US and foreign nonmilitary personnel. In some theaters, foreign military sources will 

also augment nonmilitary support. These support personnel fall into the following 

categories: US Government civilians (to include non-DOD personnel), HN government 

civilians, HN military personnel (in direct support of US forces), third country nationals, 

other multinational partner military personnel, and contractors. Support and services that 

depend heavily on nonmilitary and foreign military personnel include, but are not limited 

to: transportation; stevedore and port operations; general engineering; personnel 

marshalling area operations (including supply of basic necessities); rail workers; emergency 

utility operations; selected maintenance activities; administrative activities (e.g., contracting 

specialists and local communications experts); and MSR security and control. Theater 

logistic support is provided through a wide array of Service, multinational, contract, 

and acquisition and cross-servicing agreements and will vary from theater to theater. 

(2) The three basic categories of external support for US military operations 

are wartime HNS, contingency contracts, and current contract agreements. These 

usually exist in conjunction with one another and collectively provide to the theater its full 

logistic capability. Contracts or agreements will clearly specify services to be provided 

during periods of crisis or war. 

(3) Logistic and area commanders should not expect unprotected or untrained 

individuals to continue to provide essential logistic services under the threat of CBRN 

incidents or during operations in CBRN environments. Massive worker absenteeism is 

possible, and a lack of adequate protective clothing and equipment could result in 

significant casualties should an incident occur. The area commander is responsible for 

ensuring that mission-essential personnel receive appropriate equipment and training, 

working in coordination with HN authorities and the US country team. CBRN protection 

includes individual and collective survival skills as well as operational training. Survival 

skills refer to the capability to take required, immediate action upon CBRN incident, to 

include masking, proper wear and care of protective clothing and equipment, personal 

decontamination, and buddy aid. Operational training refers to the ability to continue to 

perform essential functions under MOPP conditions and resume normal operations after an 
Chapter IV 

IV-14 JP 3-11 

incident. Essential functions and tasks include convoy driving, supply and equipment 

loading, refueling operations, and materiel decontamination. 

h. Handling of Contaminated Materiel and Equipment and Human Remains

(1) Materiel and Equipment

(a) The GCC is responsible for ensuring that all materiel and equipment 

exposed to CBRN contamination is decontaminated, if necessary, before it is returned to 

stock or retrograded from the theater. Joint doctrine and Service TTP are required to 

protect individuals against low-level CBRN hazard exposure, conserve valuable assets, 

identify requirements for the return of equipment and personnel to the United States, and 

maintain DOD life cycle control of previously contaminated equipment. In view of the 

limitations of decontamination technology in meeting all safety and health standards, some 

equipment may require extensive weathering to meet safety objectives. In some cases, 

equipment may be so grossly contaminated that reuse or repair is not practical and intheater destruction will be required. 

(b) The length of time that nuclear and biological contaminants pose a health 

hazard is determined by the nuclear and biological decay rates. The time required for the 

natural decay of radioactive material is a function of the half-life of the isotope and cannot 

be accelerated. If the residual radiation cannot be removed, commanders must employ the 

principles of time, distance, and shielding. Minimize the time that personnel are exposed to 

the radiation source; maximize the distance between personnel and the radiation source; and 

place as much shielding material, such as walls or soil, between personnel and the radiation 

source as possible. Biological agents generally decay to acceptable levels within hours after 

dissemination due to exposure to ultraviolet light (sunlight), relative humidity, wind speed, 

and temperature gradient. However, encapsulation or genetic engineering may protect 

agents from natural decay and increase their persistency. For more robust biological agents, 

thorough decontamination and preparation of equipment to US Department of Agriculture 

import standards will eliminate most health threats. 

(c) As a rule, contaminated materiel and equipment will be marked, 

segregated, and disposed of or decontaminated after the cessation of hostilities. Theater 

campaign plans and orders will provide guidance and procedures for retrograde of 

contaminated materiel and prioritize selected items that, due to their essential nature and 

short supply, require immediate retrograde, repair, and subsequent return to the theater. 

(d) Equipment retrograde and redeployment requires valuable lift assets that 

must be protected for future force flow/time-phased force and deployment data use. 

Therefore, only ìcriticalî retrograde cargo is moved from a contaminated to an 

uncontaminated airbase. Critical requirements are predesignated in theater war plans. The 

intent to retrograde residually contaminated equipment must be communicated through the 

CJCS due to potential foreign and domestic risks, and political/environmental sensitivities. 

GCCs are responsible for cargo processing to include packaging, technical escort, reception 

and staging, foreign and domestic interagency coordination and must comply with US laws; 
Sustainment 

IV-15 

applicable international laws, treaties, conventions, and agreements to which the United 

States is a party; and DOD and Service regulations and policies with consequence 

management the responsibility of the GCCs. 

More detailed treatment of retrograde of equipment and personnel is in Chapter III, 

ìPlanning and Operations.î 

(2) Human Remains

(a) A GCC has the responsibility to search, recover, tentatively identify, and 

evacuate US human remains from the AOR. To complete this task, the JFC establishes a 

mortuary affairs decontamination collection point (MADCP). The MADCP is an 

operational element under the oversight of the joint mortuary affairs office (JMAO), and is 

manned by specialized mortuary affairs and CBRN defense personnel. 

(b) In some circumstances (such as large scale CBRN casualties), the JFC 

may need to authorize alternative procedures for the disposition of human remains. If 

human remains cannot be decontaminated to a ìsafeî level, decontamination capabilities are 

not available, or for public health and safety, contaminated human remains may have to be 

temporarily interred or stored in a manner that contains the CBRN hazard and is properly 

marked to facilitate contamination avoidance. In instances of mass fatalities, the JFC, on 

advice of the JMAO, may authorize temporary interment. The JMAO will direct and 

control subsequent disinterments. Temporary interments will require dedicated 

transportation assets to avoid the spread of contamination, engineer support to prepare the 

site, and security personnel to prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the interment 

area. 

(c) In accordance with DOD policy, USTRANSCOM transports human 

remains that have been properly decontaminated and rendered safe for transport in 

accordance with the procedures established in JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint 

Operations. However, contaminated human remains should remain in place and not be 

transported until such time as the methods for returning contaminated human remains safely 

have been established by the SecDef. 

For joint doctrine for handling contaminated human remains, see JP 4-06, Mortuary 

Affairs in Joint Operations. 

3. Personnel Services 

 PSS requirements are coordinated and integrated throughout the operation, subject to 

the GCC approved guidance issued by the manpower and personnel directorate of a joint 

staff, with each Service retaining its own distinct culture, traditions, and requirements. 

Providing PSS to assigned forces is a Service responsibility; however, the GCC may 

determine that centralizing some support functions (postal; religious; legal; morale, welfare, 

and recreation; or other appropriate services) within the AOR would be beneficial and may 

designate a single Service component to provide or coordinate the support. These PSS 
Chapter IV 

IV-16 JP 3-11 

functions may be impacted in an area experiencing a CBRN incident. Some services may 

be curtailed or stopped due to mission degradation while others may require augmentation 

due to an increased workload. Support includes the following: 

a. Human resources functions (personnel management, casualty operations, casualty 

management, personnel accountability, and strength reporting). 

b. Postal operations and support. 

c. Religious support, in the form of religious support teams, provides for the spiritual 

care of military and authorized civilian casualties, as well as military first responders in a 

CBRN incident, by providing for religious worship, rites, sacraments, ordinances, 

ministrations, and visitation. Religious support teams also advise commanders on civil 

factors such as localized customs and humanitarian organizations. 

d. Financial management. 

e. Legal support. 

f. Quality of life issues (member and family well being). 

g. Morale, welfare, and recreation infrastructure and access.

For additional information, see JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations, JP 1-04, 

Legal Support to Military Operations, JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations, and 

JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations. 

4. Health Service Support 

a. To provide adequate HSS, definitive planning and coordination are required. 

The GCC must consider and plan for all aspects of HSS requirements, including the 

possibility of a CBRN incident. Failure to plan for preventive medicine (PVNTMED) 

support as part of the early entry force can cause mission failures due to disease and 

nonbattle injuries. Planning for and maintaining a sound medical surveillance program for 

all operations can maximize force effectiveness by eliminating or reducing the effects of 

medical threats, such as the existence of indigenous diseases and their effect on the 

physiological and psychological health of military forces. Sound preparation and thorough 

disease containment planning will ensure the greatest range of options is available to 

respond to CBRN events while balancing mission requirements with the risk to personnel. 

b. HSS supports all phases of operations, taking into account the unique characteristics 

and effects of the range of CBRN materials. While US policy and doctrine acknowledge 

that HSS is primarily a Service responsibility, the senior ranking medical person

(command surgeon, surgeon general, or public health emergency officer) is responsible for 

guiding and integrating all HSS capabilities available to the command to support the 

mission. HSS planning for post-CBRN incidents must include efforts to conserve available 
Sustainment 

IV-17 

HSS personnel for medical treatment. Although most definitive care is rendered outside the 

area of immediate combat (contaminated area) in a non-tactical environment in a mature 

theater, triage, patient decontamination, and initial resuscitative care may be necessary in 

the combat area (or contaminated area). HSS planners must ensure that units can locate 

clean areas in which to operate a medical treatment facility (MTF) or, if available, employ 

COLPRO shelter systems to provide life and limb care in combat areas. Commanders and 

medical leaders must also plan to prevent or reduce the numbers of stress-related cases in 

this environment. Pre-incident education and training programs will help reduce the stress 

of CBRN incidents and can be used to educate personnel on appropriate response actions 

(e.g., self-monitoring procedures, ROM, IPE wear). 

c. The GCC establishes the theaterís HSS requirements and uses directive authority to 

ensure the proper coordination of all HSS capabilities in the force (to include general HSS 

services, shelter, food, water, environmental and occupational health, medical surveillance, 

medical prophylaxis, medical pretreatments, immunizations, post-exposure therapeutics, 

antidotes, and fluids). 

Doctrine for HSS is in JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

d. CBRN Weapons Employment. Adversary use of CBRN weapons can cause large 

numbers of military and civilian casualties. Commanders and HSS planners must ensure 

that a process is in place to cope with and treat CBRN casualties. Additionally, the 

potential for accompanying widespread disruption and destruction will require special 

patient handling and challenge HSS capabilities and resources. Consequently, predeployment and employment intelligence collection, reporting, analyses, and risk 

assessments must be timely and accurate for PVNTMED protocols to be effectively 

implemented to support operations, while protecting the forcesí health. Timely and 

complete intelligence and risk assessments assist commanders to prevent casualties and 

prepare forces for immediate or long-term treatments, if required, prior to deployment and 

employment. 

e. Medical Intelligence

(1) Operations in CBRN environments place particular HSS demands on 

intelligence. Especially important are a clear and commonly shared assessment of 

adversary CBRN capabilities, CBRN use effects, and US, multinational, and HN HSS 

capabilities and limitations in countering adversary CBRN use. The Armed Forces Medical 

Intelligence Center (AFMIC) is responsible for intelligence products to support HSS 

aspects of JFC intelligence requirements. AFMIC can assist by producing epidemiological 

and environmental threat assessments associated with specific geographical locations. 

Threat assessments should include the identification of industrial sites in the theater 

that can produce toxic hazards. TIM could become a health hazard to deployed forces if 

these sites are accidentally or intentionally destroyed or damaged. Furthermore, TIM could 

be a source of environmental hazards to deployed forces even when the sites are not 

disturbed. 
Chapter IV 

IV-18 JP 3-11 

(2) In the theater, HSS activities supporting the continuous JIPOE process include 

investigations of disease and injury resulting from known or suspected chemical, biological, 

or radiological agents, and integration of HSS information from medical and nonmedical 

units. Effective preventive and curative HSS for the forces requires production of complete, 

timely, and accurate HSS intelligence products and their integration into overall theater 

intelligence assessments and estimates. Since an affect from a biological agent may first 

occur in the local population, it is important for HSS to maintain an awareness of local 

civilian disease trends and unique cases in order to quickly identify potential biological 

agent casualties. 

f. Other Information Resources. In addition to AFMIC, other specialized 

organizations provide expert information on medical aspects of CBRN threats, casualty 

prevention, CBRN agent sample and specimen collection, and medical care and 

management of casualties. These include DTRA, the Armed Forces Radiobiology 

Research Institute, the Naval Medical Research Center, the US Army Medical Research 

Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), the US Army Medical Research Institute of 

Chemical Defense, US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, 

USANCA, United States Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, Air Force Institute for 

Operational Health, the Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Command, as well as the US 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 

g. Medical Treatment Facilities. The success of MTFs in treating arriving 

casualties in CBRN environments depends on prior planning and adaptability. The 

GCC is responsible for directing and guiding planning and exercises to ensure adequate 

HSS, including the operations of MTFs. 

(1) CBRN materials are capable of producing mass casualties. In the hours 

immediately following a CBRN incident, MTFs can be overwhelmed with casualties that 

exceed their capacity. The GCC, supported by the command surgeon, establishes HSS 

priorities for treatment of mass casualties. MTF commanders are responsible for planning 

and training to cope with this situation in line with joint force plans and priorities. 

(2) Whenever possible, an MTF should be located such that it is maximally 

protected from a CBRN incident. No matter where the MTF is located, treatment providers 

must still have adequate IPE, particularly for certain chemical agents. Facilities must be 

prepared to track casualty flow and decontaminate as soon as possible once casualties are 

stabilized. 

(3) To facilitate operations in CBRN environments, MTFs employ COLPRO. 

COLPRO enables the MTF to continue operations in a contaminated environment, ensuring 

that contamination-free areas are available to treat decontaminated casualties. In a 

contaminated situation, casualties and staff are relocated to a contaminated free area as soon 

as possible, generally within 72 hours. MTFs are not usually moved into areas that are 

known to be contaminated. 
Sustainment 

IV-19 

(4) HSS operations at MTFs should avoid diversion of medical specialists to 

nonmedical tasks. Whenever possible, in line with joint force priorities and assets, 

augmentation will be made available to perform tasks such as decontamination, physical 

security, and maintenance of contamination-free areas and collective protective shelters. 

(5) The CCDR is responsible for providing MTFs with adequate logistic support 

in theater, including damage control, relocation, and resupply, in line with joint force 

priorities and assets. 

h. Preventive Medicine Principles 

(1) Demand for PVNTMED services increases commensurate with the 

CBRN threat. PVNTMED personnel and the command surgeon assist the JFC in 

determining the health risks associated with CBRN hazards; the safety of drinking water 

and food supplies; the appropriate time for using pretreatments, prophylaxis, and 

immunizations; and other PVNTMED measures. 

(2) PVNTMED personnel must remain aware of the potential medical threats in 

the local environment. They must establish and maintain a medical surveillance program 

that provides a database on actual medical threats in their commandís area; names and units 

of personnel exposed to the medical threats; and treatments provided to exposed personnel. 

The medical surveillance program must be established before the first personnel enter the 

theater, whenever possible, and be maintained and continued after the personnel depart. 

When possible, medical surveillance should be extended to include the local civilian 

population in order to quickly identify potential biological warfare (BW) casualties in the 

event that the civilian population is affected before the military population. 

(3) The damage caused by CBRN incidents will vary according to geographic and 

climatic conditions. Nevertheless, adherence to both the principles of PVNTMED and 

public health standards can mitigate the effects of CBRN incidents, particularly if these 

are implemented before an outbreak. 

(4) In the aftermath of a CBRN incident, HSS and public health service facilities 

may be strained beyond their capacities. Demands for medical support to both military and 

civilian populations could be intense. PVNTMED specialists must assist the JFC in 

establishing priorities and effectively using available HSS and public health service 

resources. To assure adequate support to the joint force, JFC directives concerning 

treatment of civilian populations must be clear and adhered to by the joint force HSS 

personnel and facilities. 

(5) Carelessness in emergency situations regarding food and water sanitation, 

general hygiene, and other common disease control measures can significantly contribute to 

secondary spread of disease. Enforcing satisfactory personal hygiene and field 

sanitation is a leadership responsibility. Washing with soap and water is the most 

effective, and often simplest, personal hygiene measure for controlling communicable 

diseases. All personnel must apply standard, individual hygiene and sanitation measures. 
Chapter IV 

IV-20 JP 3-11 

Strict procedures are required for waste treatment and sewage, including water surveillance 

and sanitation control measures. Generally, the best method of sanitizing water is 

purification or boiling. However, if the water will be used for human consumption and 

hygiene purposes, these are not effective against certain biological agents such as viruses, 

spores, toxins, or radioactive particles. The reverse osmosis water purification unit and the 

tactical water purification system can remove most CBRN agents, and provide a safe water 

supply for these uses. In all cases, the designated medical authorities must approve all 

water supplies before distribution and consumption. 

(6) Maintaining safe food and water supplies is vital in CBRN environments. 

Following an incident, all food except canned or similarly protected items should be 

thoroughly inspected for contamination. If the situation demands that suspect items be 

consumed, they should be decontaminated. Foods determined to be safe must be protected 

against secondary contamination. Protective measures must be practiced by those who 

transport, store, prepare, and serve food as well as by those who consume the food. In 

addition, commanders must consider applying control measures to prevent contamination of 

foodstuffs by insects, rodents, and other vectors. 

i. Preventive Measures. Effective HSS includes a combination of preventive and 

curative measures. Commanders must ensure that all the commandís personnel train to 

survive and accomplish their missions in CBRN environments. The commandís HSS 

activities must be able to effectively care for CBRN casualties while providing all other 

required health services. Commanders must ensure that personnel keep immunizations 

current (including full use of the Military Immunizations Tracking System), use available 

prophylaxis and pretreatments against suspect agents, and apply contamination avoidance 

procedures. Preventive measures in HSS planning for CBRN environments include, but are 

not limited to the following. 

(1) Development of the bodyís natural defenses through individual and unit health 

and fitness programs. 

(2) Integration of military PVNTMED and civilian public health service 

preventive capabilities, including hygiene and vaccination programs and disease 

containment strategies (i.e., restriction of movement, isolation, or quarantine), to the extent 

feasible and permissible by mission requirements. 

(3) Integration of HSS considerations into ISR activities to detect CBRN and 

other toxic agents and materials; provide early warning to maximize the effectiveness of 

PVNTMED and curative HSS. 

(4) Protection of medical supplies and equipment by using available overhead 

cover, chemical agent resistant coatings, or protective coverings. 

(5) Frequent testing of all food and water sources and supplies for CBRN 

contamination. 
Sustainment 

IV-21 

(6) Establishment and maintenance of a medical surveillance system to identify 

populations at risk, including eligible civilians, to anticipate, recognize, and assess 

hazardous exposures, to monitor health outcomes, and to employ new countermeasures. 

(7) FP measures extended to HSS organizations and facilities based on JFC 

priorities to ensure HSS availability in the event of CBRN incidents. 

(8) Integration of HSS units and facilities into joint force plans and activities to 

limit CBRN exposure and contamination following a CBRN incident, through application 

of CBRN defense principles. 

j. Casualty Decontamination and Triage

(1) Decontamination of casualties protects them from the detrimental effects of 

additional exposure and protects those who evacuate and treat them. The control and 

treatment of contaminated casualties will vary with the tactical situation and the specific 

contaminants. Although the primary responsibility for decontamination of casualties prior 

to transportation to MTFs rests with the unit, a medical unit must be prepared to receive 

contaminated casualties. Within the theater, decentralization of casualty decontamination is 

necessary. Casualties must not be forced to wait at central points for decontamination. All 

medical units should have readily available, and be proficient in the use of, the necessary 

decontamination equipment for self and patient decontamination. MTFs supporting 

operations in potential CBRN environments must establish appropriate procedures for 

casualty decontamination and triage. 

(2) Triage of contaminated casualties takes place with due regard to the type of 

CBRN agent that is known or likely to have caused the contamination. The triage officer 

takes account of the significant differences between and among CBRN hazards. When 

casualties arrive at the MTF, the triage officer will determine decontamination priorities 

based on the urgency of patient treatment needs. Patients with life- or limb-threatening 

conditions will receive emergency medical treatment before decontamination. 

k. Care and Management of CBRN Casualties

(1) Effective care and management by HSS organizations of casualties caused by 

CBRN materials requires planning to treat large numbers of individuals exposed to 

biological agents, toxins, chemical agents, and blast, heat, and radiation from nuclear 

weapons and/or radiological dispersal devices. Each element of the patient movement and 

treatment process requires careful evaluation to assure it best conserves and restores the 

commandís combat capability. Consideration of multinational partner and HN 

requirements and capabilities that affect the JFC mission and the ability of US HSS units to 

function effectively is especially important. 

(a) To conserve, restore, or maintain combat effectiveness, commanders and 

HSS personnel within the evacuation and treatment processes must continually evaluate 
Chapter IV 

IV-22 JP 3-11 

capabilities based on situational changes and make adjustments to conform to the GCCís 

and subordinate JFC priorities. 

(b) All patients must be checked for CBRN contamination and 

decontaminated, if required, prior to being admitted to MTFs to reduce the hazard to 

medical personnel and other patients and to prevent contamination of the MTF. 

(c) Treatment of life- or limb-threatening conditions must be accomplished in 

the patient decontamination area prior to and during decontamination. Medical personnel 

must support this mission, either by providing the actual patient decontamination function, 

or assisting with the patient decontamination process. 

(2) Units have primary responsibility for decontaminating their casualties as soon 

as possible and prior to moving them to MTFs. However, operational circumstances may 

prevent them from doing so. This has a serious impact on the commandís ability to 

maintain uncontaminated medical facilities. Decontamination and collective protection 

following CBRN incidents are essential if MTFs are in a contaminated area. The 

GCC, with advice from the command surgeon, must consider MTF needs when establishing 

priorities for allocating decontamination assets. 

(3) Demands for military medical support to neighboring civilian populations 

following a CBRN incident may be substantial, especially in areas with a concentration of 

very young, very old, and other individuals already suffering from underlying disease or 

other forms of weakening stress. In consultation with the command surgeon, the GCC must 

establish, at the beginning of the operation, the scope of care to be rendered to civilian 

populations. 

(4) In accordance with their missions, medical organizations assist with providing 

adequate shelter, establishing safe food and water sources, and ensuring that preventive 

measures and curative treatments are available. Adversary action and the potential need to 

deal with panic among the civilian population require physical security measures at 

facilities that permit uninterrupted medical treatment. The JFC may decide to assign the 

physical security mission to nonmedical units, if operational requirements and priorities 

permit. 

(5) Although the source and means of exposure to CBRN hazards affect incidence 

and the severity of injuries, basic principles of prevention and treatment do not change. For 

instance, in the event of a biological incident, rapid detection and accurate identification of 

the agent are important factors in providing operationally relevant information to the JFC 

and HSS units. This allows the command to mitigate effects on the force, facilitate 

adequate casualty management, and provide effective medical treatment. The first 

indication of a biological incident or covert radiological source may be the appearance 

of numerous casualties in which medical specialists are challenged to differentiate 

endemic disease occurrence from adversary attack.
Sustainment 

IV-23 

(6) In the case of a biological incident, casualties may not occur as they would 

during large-scale conventional bombardment or attack with most chemical agents against 

unprotected personnel. Moreover, the degree of agent exposure and personal resistance 

(natural or acquired) may delay illness. HSS units must anticipate increasing casualty loads 

beginning with relatively few initial casualties and escalating to a peak over successive 

hours or days. Since some biological agents are transmissible among humans, the 

prevention of disease transmission after the initial attack will be essential for military 

PVNTMED and civilian public health services organizations. 

(7) In the case of a contagious biological agent (e.g., plague) the installationís 

public health emergency officer (PHEO) in coordination with the medical commander, may 

recommend to the installation commander to institute a prophylaxis regimen and administer 

controls to isolate (isolation, quarantine, other emergency actions) categories of infected 

individuals in order to limit further spread of disease. When local capabilities are 

anticipated to be insufficient (e.g., deployed clinics, expeditionary medical support, combat 

support hospital), the combatant command surgeon recommends the redeployment of 

available in-theater assets to augment the local effort. 

(8) In the case of some chemical or radiological incidents, agent or radioactive 

material disseminated by explosion may not produce symptoms in casualties not injured by 

the blast effects until hours later. This is particularly true with mustard. A high index of 

suspicion for chemical (and radiological) material dissemination must be maintained by 

HSS facilities after a conventional attack. 

l. Patient Movement

(1) Externally contaminated patients and those infected with biological agents 

will not be transported without first being decontaminated or cleared for transport. 

Additionally, since AE provides transportation after initial casualty stabilization/treatment, 

patients should be decontaminated prior to entering the AE system. In the event patients 

cannot be decontaminated, the GCC, in conjunction with USTRANSCOM, will identify the 

requirement to move contaminated/contagious patients. The Commander, USTRANSCOM 

responsibilities include providing global patient movement, in coordination with geographic 

combatant commands, for the DOD through the Defense Transportation System. 

(2) Commanders operating in CBRN threat environments must consider the 

commitment of evacuation assets to contaminated areas. In planning for evacuation, the 

JFC considers the nature of the actual contamination hazard. Radiological contamination 

and radioactive fallout impose different operating conditions than persistent or 

nonpersistent chemical agents or lethal or nonlethal biological agents. When 

evacuation personnel are sent into a radiologically contaminated area, an operational 

exposure guide (OEG) must be established. Prolonged wearing of IPE under MOPP 

conditions, climate, workload, and fatigue combine to limit personnel effectiveness and 

consequently hamper casualty evacuation. Based on factors such as missions, priorities, 

and OEG, commanders decide which evacuation assets will be sent into the contaminated 
Chapter IV 

IV-24 JP 3-11 

area. As a general principle, to limit contamination of evacuation assets, if patients are 

stable enough, patients should be decontaminated before evacuation. 

m. Countermeasures and Response to CBRN Health Effects. Countermeasures 

and responses to the health effects of CBRN agents include immunizations, medical 

prophylaxis, medical treatments, antidotes, and disease containment measures such as 

ROM. These actions occur before exposure to high-risk, CBRN conditions (e.g., 

pretreatments and immunizations) as well as after exposure to CBRN agents (e.g., 

treatments and fluids). The timeliness and accuracy of intelligence including any warning 

can directly enhance the success of medical countermeasures and response. 

(1) Pre-Exposure. Commanders must ensure that all their personnel have up-todate immunizations, begin required pretreatments and prophylaxis, and/or use designated 

medical barrier materials as ordered before entering a potential CBRN hazardous area. 

(2) Post-Exposure. HSS personnel will assist commanders by ensuring that all 

exposed personnel continue prophylaxis, pretreatments, and the use of medical barrier 

materials, and to administer antidotes as required. Exposed personnel should seek medical 

assistance as soon as possible. HSS personnel will also advise commanders on the 

implementation and sustainment of ROM. 

(3) Psychological Impact. CBRN incidents will generate confusion, panic, and 

hysteria. Therefore, the use of combat and operational stress control teams is essential in 

preparing for and responding to CBRN incidents. Additionally, commanders should 

coordinate with PA in order to quickly and effectively communicate agent risk and response 

information to personnel in order to avoid confusion and hysteria. 

For information on domestic or foreign consequence management, see JP 3-41, Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management. 

For information on installation response to CBRN incident, see DODI 2000.18, Department 

of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield 

Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines. 
APPENDIX A 

THREAT CONSIDERATIONS 

A-1 

1. General 

a. This appendix identifies some of the factors required to assess the threat posed to 

friendly forces and operations by an adversaryís use of CBRN weapons and other toxic 

materials. The factors are generic in nature and should be replaced by current validated 

intelligence products as friendly plans are developed. An adversaryís ability and 

willingness to employ CBRN weapons can significantly influence friendly operations and 

every effort must be made to determine if an adversary possesses and can employ these 

weapons capabilities. 

b. Dealing with a CBRN threat requires detailed planning based on very specific 

intelligence about the adversaryís capabilities, opportunities, and intentions. When the 

possibility of a CBRN threat exists, commanders should establish CBRN specific PIRs. In 

developing these PIRs, there are a number of questions that need to be answered to produce 

an accurate CBRN threat assessment. These questions form the basis for a CBRN threat 

assessment and are summarized in Figure A-1. 

c. Adversaries have a wide range of potential CBRN options to employ against 

friendly forces and operations. What option an adversary is likely to employ depends on 

the adversaryís objectives and capabilities. There are basically three types of adversaries 

currently confronting US forces who possess, or can develop, a CBRN capability: 

(1) Emerging global adversaries. 

(2) Regional adversaries. 

(3) Non-state adversaries. 

d. There are a number of broad objectives that these adversaries may have in 

confronting US interests. Identifying and understanding these objectives will assist 

commanders in developing appropriate responses to deter potential employment. These 

adversary objectives include: 

(1) Defeating friendly forces. 

(2) Preventing defeat by friendly forces. 

(3) Disrupting friendly forcesí operations. 

(4) Deterring intervention. 

(5) Exerting regional leverage or intimidating other regional powers. 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-11 

(6) Survival and revenge. 

e. Adversaries are not constrained in their array of potential targets which can include 

military and civilian populations and infrastructure. As a result, in a potential CBRN 

environment, commanders must be prepared to deal with the impacts of the adversaryís use 

of those weapons on civilian targets. 

f. CBRN Vulnerability Assessments. CBRN vulnerability assessments are essential 

to FP planning (see Figure A-2). They provide the commander with a tool to determine the 

potential vulnerability of an installation, unit, activity, port, ship, residence, facility, or other 

site against CBRN threats and hazards. A CBRN vulnerability assessment identifies 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND

NUCLEAR THREAT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

WHO

WHERE

WHY

WHAT

WHEN

HOW

Type of Adversary Possessing CBRN

Types and Locations of Targets

Broad Objectives for Use of CBRN Weapons

Type of CBRN Use

Timing for Use in Crises and Conflicts

Concept for CBRN Employment

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Figure A-1. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threat Assessment Framework
Threat Conditions 

A-3 

functions or activities vulnerable to threats and requiring attention from C2 authorities to 

address improvement required to withstand, mitigate against, or deter the threat. 

(1) The CBRN vulnerability assessment will: 

(a) Indicate what the vulnerabilities are. 

(b) Determine the likelihood that CBRN threats or hazards will exploit a 

given vulnerability based on knowledge, technologies, resources, probability of detection, 

and the payoff. 

(c) Predict the potential impact to the operational area if the vulnerability is 

exploited. 

THE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Threat Assessment

(Threat & Hazard Based)

[Planning]

Vulnerability

Analysis

(Capability Based)

[Planning]

Vulnerability

Reduction

(Risk Based)

[Preparation]

Vulnerability

Assessment

Process

Figure A-2. The Vulnerability Assessment Process
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-11 

(2) CBRN vulnerability assessments require comparison of the threat with a unitís 

vulnerabilities to determine the efforts necessary to safely meet incident requirements. 

Vulnerability assessment also includes integration of commanderís guidance through a risk 

management process in order to prioritize vulnerability reduction measure implementation. 

(3) Given all the factors in the risk equation and the cost of implementing 

countermeasures, a determination may be made that the risk potential of a given 

vulnerability is not worth the cost of correcting or implementing a CBRN defensive 

countermeasure. 

FM 3-11.14/MCRP 3-37.1A/NTTP 3-11.28/AFTTP (I) 3-2.54, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Vulnerability 

Assessment discusses CBRN vulnerability assessments in more detail. 

2. Assessment Framework 

a. The framework for assessing the threat posed by an adversary possessing, or 

suspected of possessing, CBRN weapons contains six elements: who, why, when, where, 

what, and how. These elements are summarized in Figure A-1. 

b. This framework supports the CBRN threat assessment process and forms the basis 

for a tabular description of the threat profiles that follow. The framework provides an 

analytic tool for assessing the vulnerability of targets in general and in areas of interest to 

specific commands. 

3. Broad Objectives for Adversary Employment of Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons 

a. Figure A-3 summarizes the broad objectives that the three types of adversaries may 

entertain for employment of CBRN weapons against US forces operating unilaterally or in 

multinational coalitions. It also identifies the types of CBRN weapons that may be most 

appropriate for those broad objectives. While an adversary may use any weapon available 

in a conflict involving the United States, Figures A-4 through A-6 focus on the weapons 

that an adversary could consider most effective for achieving the stated objective. 

b. Adversaries may also develop and employ radiological weapons whose effects are 

achieved by dispersing toxic radioactive materials against desired targets. Moreover, other 

TIMs may be used deliberately or spread accidentally in ways that threaten US forces and 

interests. Adversary employment of radiological and other toxic materials may be most 

appropriate in seeking to disrupt US and coalition forces, deterring US intervention, or 

achieving regional leverage or intimidation. The variety of these toxic materials makes 

their detailed treatment in this appendix impractical. 
Threat Conditions 

A-5 

c. Global and regional adversaries may have the means and motivation to develop and 

employ nuclear and nonnuclear weapons for the purpose of generating an EMP. In some 

cases, EMP weapons could be detonated at high altitudes. 

4. Emerging Global Adversaries 

 An emerging global adversary could have a CBRN employment profile that seeks 

broad objectives as indicated in Figure A-4, and seeks to exploit US and coalition 

vulnerabilities. 

5. Regional Adversaries 

 A regional adversary could have a CBRN employment profile that seeks broad 

objectives as indicated in Figure A-5, and seeks to exploit US and coalition vulnerabilities. 

BROAD OBJECTIVES OF ADVERSARIES FOR

ACQUISITION AND EMPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL,

BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

WHY

WHO

Regional

Leverage,

Intimidation

Deter US

Intervention

Disrupt US

Multinational

Force

Prevent

Defeat by the

US

Defeat US,

Revenge,

Survival





Biological

Chemical





Nuclear

Chemical

 Biological





Biological

Chemical





Biological

Chemical





Biological

Chemical





Biological

Chemical





Biological

Chemical





Biological

Chemical





Biological

Chemical







Nuclear

Biological

Chemical







Nuclear

Biological

Chemical





Nuclear

Biological







Nuclear

Biological

Chemical







Nuclear

Biological

Chemical

Emerging

Global

Adversary

Regional

Adversary

Non-State

Adversary

Figure A-3. Broad Objectives of Adversaries for Acquisition and Employment of 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-11 

C2 Command and Control

EMP Electromagnetic Pulse

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

and Nuclear

SOF Special Operations Forces

WHY

Broad

Objective

Defeat US,

Revenge,

Survival





Mid-War;

Fearing Defeat

Late; Defeat

Imminent

 US and

Regional

Civilian

Infrastructure

and Population





Nuclear

Biological





Ballistic and

Cruise

Missiles

SOF

Prevent

Defeat by the

US

 Mid-War 





US and

Regional

Combat Units

C2

Logistics







Nuclear EMP

Biological

Chemical





Ballistic and

Cruise

Missiles

SOF

Deter US

Intervention

 Early 



Regional

Civilian

Infrastructure

Logistics





Nonlethal

Biological

Nonpersistent

Chemical







Aircraft

Ballistic and

Cruise

Missiles

SOF

Regional

Leverage,

Intimidation

 Early 



Regional

Civilian

Infrastructure

Population





Nonlethal

Biological

Nonpersistent

Chemical







Aircraft

Ballistic and

Cruise

Missiles

SOF

Disrupt US

Multinational

Force

 Early 





Regional

Combat Units

C2

Logistics







Nuclear EMP

Biological

Chemical







Aircraft

Ballistic and

Cruise

Missiles

SOF

WHEN WHERE WHAT HOW

Timing Targets Type CBRN

Use

Employment

Means

EMERGING GLOBAL ADVERSARY CHEMICAL,

BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

EMPLOYMENT PROFILE

Figure A-4. Emerging Global Adversary Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Employment Profile
Threat Conditions 

A-7 

WHY

Broad

Objective

WHEN WHERE WHAT HOW

Timing Targets Type CBRN

Use

Employment

Means

REGIONAL ADVERSARY CHEMICAL,

BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

EMPLOYMENT PROFILE

Defeat US,

Revenge,

Survival





Late; Fearing

Defeat

Post-Conflict;

for Revenge

 US and

Regional

Military and

Civilian

Infrastructure

and Population







Nuclear

Biological

Chemical









Artillery

Aircraft

Ballistic and

Cruise Missiles

SOF

Prevent

Defeat by the

US

 Mid-War 





US and

Regional

Combat Units

C2

Logistics







Nuclear

Biological

Chemical









Artillery

Aircraft

Ballistic and

Cruise Missiles

SOF

Deter US

Intervention

 Early 



Regional

Civilian

Infrastructure

Logistics





Biological

Chemical







Aircraft

Ballistic and

Cruise

Missiles

SOF

Regional

Leverage,

Intimidation

 Early 



Regional

Civilian

Infrastructure

Population





Nonlethal

Biological

Nonpersistent

Chemical







Aircraft

Ballistic and

Cruise

Missiles

SOF

Disrupt US

Multinational

Force

 Early 





Regional

Combat Units

C2

Logistics





Biological

Chemical







Aircraft

Ballistic and

Cruise

Missiles

SOF

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

SOF Special Operations Forces

C2 Command and Control

Figure A-5. Regional Adversary Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Employment Profile
Appendix A 

A-8 JP 3-11 

6. Non-state Adversaries 

 A non-state adversary could have a CBRN employment profile that seeks broad 

objectives as indicated in Figure A-6, and seeks to exploit US and coalition vulnerabilities. 

C2 Command and Control

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

SOF Special Operations Forces

WHY

Broad

Objective

Defeat US,

Revenge,

Survival





Late

Post-Conflict





Civilian

Infrastructure

Population







Nuclear

Biological

Chemical







Aircraft

Cruise

Missiles

SOF

Deter US

Intervention

 Early 



Civilian and

Military

Infrastructure

Population





Biological

Chemical







Aircraft

Cruise

Missiles

SOF

Regional

Leverage,

Intimidation

 Early 



Civilian

Infrastructure

Population





Nonlethal

Biological

Nonpersistent

Chemical







Aircraft

Cruise

Missiles

SOF

Disrupt US

Multinational

Force





Early

Mid-War







Civilian and

Military

Infrastructure

C2

Logistics





Biological

Chemical







Aircraft

Cruise

Missiles

SOF

WHEN WHERE WHAT HOW

Timing Targets Type CBRN

Use

Employment

Means

NON-STATE ADVERSARY CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,

RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT PROFILE

Figure A-6. Non-State Adversary Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Employment Profile
APPENDIX B 

CHEMICAL HAZARD CONSIDERATIONS 

B-1 

1. General 

 Exposure to toxic chemicals can significantly influence the operational tempo and 

sustainment of forces. This appendix presents a brief overview of chemical agents and 

TICs and their effects. The following definitions are important to understand this overview. 

a. Chemical Hazard. Any chemical manufactured, used, transported, or stored, 

which can cause death or other harm through toxic properties of those materials. This 

includes chemical agents and chemical weapons (prohibited under the Chemical Weapons 

Convention [CWC]) as well as TICs.

b. Chemical Agent. Any toxic chemical intended for use in military operations. 

c. Chemical Weapon. Together or separately: 

(1) A toxic chemical and its precursors, except when intended for a purpose not 

prohibited under the CWC. 

(2) A munition or device, specifically designed to cause death or other harm 

through toxic properties of those chemicals described in (1), above, which would be 

released as a result of the employment of such munition or device. 

(3) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the 

employment of munitions or devices described in (2), above. 

d. Toxic Industrial Chemical. Any chemical manufactured, used, transported, or 

stored by industrial, medical, or commercial processes. For example: pesticides, 

petrochemicals, fertilizers, corrosives, poisons, etc. 

2. Chemical Agents 

a. Chemical agents are classified according to physical state (solid, liquid, gas), 

physiological action (nerve, blood, blister, choking), and tactical use (immediate or delayed 

acting casualty agent). The terms ìpersistentî and ìnonpersistentî describe the time an 

agent stays in an area. Persistent chemical agents affect the contaminated area for more 

than 24 hours to several days or weeks. Conversely, a nonpersistent agent normally 

dissipates and/or loses its ability to cause casualties after considerably less time, but is 

usually a more lethal agent. The effects on personnel exposed to these hazards may be 

immediate or delayed. For units forced into high levels of protection, missions will take 

longer to perform. A summary of effects for persistent and nonpersistent chemical agents is 

shown in Figure B-1. 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-11 

b. Figure B-2 indicates individual symptoms and effects, rate of action, and how 

chemical agents are normally disseminated. 

c. Adversaries will seek to employ chemical agents under favorable weather 

conditions, if possible, to increase their effectiveness. Weather factors considered are wind, 

air stability, temperature, humidity, and precipitation. For example, the best weather for 

direct placement of an agent, especially a nonpersistent agent, on an occupied area is calm 

winds with a strong, stable temperature gradient. Low winds and stable or neutral 

conditions are most favorable for spreading an agent cloud evenly over a larger target area. 

Note: Non-state actors or terrorists may not need to wait for favorable weather 

conditions to employ chemical agents in order to create their desired effects (fear, 

terror, panic, etc.). 

d. Enemies may choose to deliver agents upwind of targets; in which case, stable or 

neutral conditions with low to medium winds of 5-13 kilometers per hour (kph) are the 

most favorable conditions. Marked turbulence, winds above 13 kph, moderate to heavy 

rain, or an air stability category of ìunstableî result in unfavorable conditions for chemical 

clouds. However, the adversary may be able to leverage these factors to effectively employ 

a persistent agent to contaminate water supplies, deny terrain, material, etc. 

e. Most weather conditions do not affect the quantity of munitions needed for 

effective, initial liquid contamination. 

CHEMICAL AGENT EFFECTS

PERSISTENCY Target of Choice Target Effect





Reduced Operations

Tempo or Mission

Degradation

Lethal or CasualtyProducing









Terrain

Materiel

Logistics

Command and Control

Facilities

Nonpersistent







Nerve

Blood

Choking





Immediate

Lethal

Persistent





Nerve

Blister

 Personnel

Figure B-1. Chemical Agent Effects
Chemical Hazard Considerations 

B-3 

3. Toxic Industrial Chemicals 

a. US forces frequently operate in environments in which TICs are present. A number 

of these chemicals could interfere in a significant manner across the range of military 

operations. Most TICs of immediate concern are released as vapors. These vapors exhibit 

Nerve

Blister

Blood and

Choking

Types

















Difficulty

Breathing

Sweating

Drooling

Nausea

Vomiting

Convulsions

Dimming of

Vision

Headache

(Symptoms

Usually Develop

Quickly)









Symptoms

Range from

Immediate to

Delayed

(Agent

Dependent)

Searing of

Eyes

Stinging of

Skin

Powerful

Irritation of

Eyes, Nose,

and Skin





Difficulty

Breathing

Coma





Incapacitates at

Low

Concentrations

Death at High

Concentrations







Blisters Skin

and Respiratory

Tract

Can Cause

Temporary

Blindness

Some Sting and

Form Welts on

the Skin

Interference with

Respiration at

Cellular Level or

by Interfereing

with Oxygen

Transport





Very Rapid by

Inhalation or

through the

Eyes

Slower

through the

Skin







Blisters from

Mustard May

Appear

Several Hours

After

Exposure

Lewisite

Causes

Blisters within

Minutes of

Exposure

Phosgene

Oxime Causes

Immediate,

Intense Pain

Rapid







Aerosol

Vapor

Liquid





Liquid

Particulate





Aerosol

Vapor

Symptoms Effects Rate of Action Release Form

TYPES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS

Figure B-2. Types of Chemical Agents
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-11 

the same dissemination characteristics as chemical agents noted above. The vapors tend to 

remain concentrated in natural low-lying areas such as valleys, ravines, or man-made 

underground structures downwind from the release point. High concentrations may remain 

in buildings, woods, or any area with low air circulation. Explosions may spread liquid 

hazards and vapors may condense to liquids in cold air. 

b. Figure B-3 identifies recommended isolation and protective action distances 

associated with accidental releases of some selected TICs. Isolation and protective action 

distances listed in the Emergency Response Guidebook do not apply to a terrorist or 

insurgent release of TICs. However, these distances may be multiplied by a factor of two to 

determine recommended isolation and protective action distances for a terrorist or insurgent 

INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL SITE MINIMUM

DOWNWIND HAZARD (SAMPLE)

* - Samples only. See ERG2004 for additional information and chemicals

CHEMICAL*

Ammonia

Chlorine

Nitric Acid

Phosgene

Sulfuric Acid

Hydrochloric

Acid

Petrochemicals

Phosphoric

Acid

ISOLATE

All

Directions

(Meters)

Protect Downwind

(Kilometers)

DAY

60

60

60

180

120

0.2

0.4

0.2

1.8

0.8

0.2

2.4

0.2

8.2

2.0

As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate

release in all directions for at least 50 meters for

liquids and at least 25 meters for solids

NIGHT

SMALL RELEASE

(< 55 Gallon Drum)

ISOLATE

All

Directions

(Meters)

Protect Downwind

(Kilometers)

DAY

120

480

120

1600

660

1.2

2.4

1.2

6.6

5

4.4

7.4

2.4

21+

13

NIGHT

LARGE RELEASE

(> 55 Gallons or Multiple

Small Releases)

Figure B-3. Industrial Chemical Site Minimum Downwind Hazard (Sample)
Chemical Hazard Considerations 

B-5 

TIC release. Release of TICs is most dangerous at night. The downwind hazard from a 

nighttime release is much longer than that for a daytime release. 

Note: Distances in Figure B-3 are worst case scenarios involving the instantaneous release 

of the entire contents of a package (e.g., as a result of terrorism, sabotage, or catastrophic 

accident). Figure B-3 distances were obtained by multiplying US Department of 

Transportation Emergency Response Guidebook by a factor of two. 

c. The most important action in case of an industrial chemical release is immediate 

evacuation from the hazardís path. The greatest risk from a large-scale toxic chemical 

release occurs when personnel are unable to escape the immediate area and are overcome 

by vapors or blast effects. Military respirators and protective clothing may provide 

only limited protection against TICs but can/should be used for immediate evacuation 

from the hazard area if more appropriate protective gear is not available. 

d. In planning for operations in areas that might include TICs, commanders at all 

levels should include consideration of these potential hazards as part of the JIPOE process. 

These hazards could occur from deliberate or accidental release from industrial sites as well 

as storage and transport containers. It is possible that enemies could use an improvised 

explosive device to disperse TICs. Particular emphasis should be placed on those TICs that 

produce acute effects when inhaled or that produce large amounts of toxic vapor when 

spilled in water. 

For detailed information on these and other TIC hazards, see National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Healthís, Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, and US Department 

of Transportationís, Emergency Response Guidebook. 
Appendix B 

B-6 JP 3-11 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX C 

BIOLOGICAL HAZARD CONSIDERATIONS 

C-1 

1. General 

 Militarily significant characteristics for biological aspects of operations include: a 

normally vulnerable target population; infectious or toxic agents with highly lethal or 

incapacitating properties; agent availability or adaptability for scaled-up production; agent 

stability; and agent suitability for mass dispersion. Limiting factors include biological 

properties (e.g., virulence), environmental factors (e.g., ultraviolet light causing rapid 

decay), and dissemination methods (e.g., wet versus dry aerosol). 

2. Technical Aspects 

a. Biological agents are categorized as either pathogens or toxins. Pathogens are 

microorganisms (bacteria and viruses) that directly attack human tissue and biological 

processes. Pathogens are further divided into noncontagious or contagious. When 

biological threats are contagious, planning needs to account for possible quarantines and 

evacuations. Toxins are nonliving poisonous substances that are produced naturally by 

living organisms (e.g., plants, animals, insects, bacteria, fungi) but may also be synthetically 

manufactured. A biological hazard is any pathogen or toxin that poses a threat to human 

or animal health. These hazards can originate from sources such as medical waste and 

biological samples. Advances in biotechnology, genetic engineering, and natural mutation 

may facilitate the development or emergence of potentially more deadly BW agents. Figure 

C-1 provides a synopsis of several potential biological agents and their range of effects. 

(1) The ability to modify microbial agents at a molecular level has existed since 

the 1960s, when new genetic engineering techniques were introduced, but the enterprise 

tended to be slow and unpredictable. With todayís techniques, infectious organisms can be 

modified to become more infectious, to evade current prophylaxis and treatment options, or 

to exhibit novel disease characteristics. The current level of sophistication for many 

biological agents is low, but there is enormous potential ó based on advances in modern 

molecular biology and drug delivery technology ó for making more sophisticated 

weapons. BW agents may emerge in two likely categories: man-made manipulations of 

classic BW agents and newly discovered or emerging infectious diseases. An example of a 

recent new pathogen (though not necessarily an ideal BW agent) is streptococcus 

pneumonia S23F, a naturally-occurring strain of pneumonia resistant to at least six of the 

more commonly used antibiotics. 

(2) The potential types of modified biological agents that could be produced 

through genetic engineering methodologies are listed below. Each of these techniques 

seeks to capitalize on the extreme lethality, virulence, or infectivity of BW agents and 

exploit this potential by developing methods to deliver agents more efficiently and to gain 

control of the agent on the battlefield. 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-11 

PATHOGENS, VIRUSES, AND TOXINS OF

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

DISEASE UNTREATED

MORTALITY (%) VACCINE INCUBATIONPERIOD

BACTERIA AND RICKETTSIA

VIRUSES

TOXINS

TRANSMISSIBILITY

(Human to Human)

ROUTES

OF

INFECTION

S: 5-20

R: 80-90

60

< 1

30-60

30

< 1

Up to 90

(Virus

Dependent)

60

30

< 1

Yes

No

IND

IND

Available

(Controlled

US Stock)

IND

No

IND: (Available

Only Under

FDA-Approved

Protocol)

No

No

No

1-4 Days

2-3 Days

2-10 Days

2-10 Days

10-12 Days

2-6 Days

3-21 Days

1-4 Days

Hours to Days

Hours to Days

—

No

High

No

No

High

Low

Moderate

No

No

No

S, R

V, R

V, R

D, V, R

R

R, V

DC, R, V

D, R

D, R

D, R

D, R, S

Anthrax (

)

Plague ( )

Q Fever (

)

Tularemia (

)

Bacillus

anthracis

Yersinia pestis

Cociella

burnetti

Francisella

tularensis

Smallpox (

)

Viral equine

encephalitis (e.g.,

Western, Eastern,

Venezuelan)

Viral hemorrhagic

fevers (Ebola, Marburg,

Lassa, Rift Valley,

Dengue, etc.)

Variola

major

Botulism (

)

Ricin (

)

Staphylococcal

Enterotoxin B

Trichothecene

Mycotoxins (T2)

Botulinum

neurotoxins

Ricinus

communis

D Digestive System

R Respiratory System

S Skin

DC Direct Contact

V Vector

IND Investigational New Drug

FDA Food and Drug Administration

10-60 Yes

(from skin

contact)

Figure C-1. Pathogens, Viruses, and Toxins of Military Significance 
Biological Hazard Considerations 

C-3 

(a) Benign microorganisms genetically altered to produce a toxin or 

bioregulator (naturally occurring organic compounds that regulate diverse cellular processes 

in multiple organ systems, such as heart rate). 

(b) Microorganisms resistant to antibiotics, standard vaccines, antivirals, and 

therapeutics. 

(c) Microorganisms with enhanced aerosol and environmental stability. 

(d) Immunologically altered microorganisms able to defeat standard 

identification, detection, and diagnostic methods. 

(e) Combinations of the above four types with improved delivery systems. 

b. TIBs. TIBs include infectious agents, as well as other biological hazards, and the 

risk can be direct through infection or indirect through damage to the environment. TIBs 

are often generated as infectious waste, such as sharps (e.g., needles, syringes, and lancets) 

or material contaminated by bodily fluids, and as biological samples (e.g., biopsies, diseases 

for research). 

3. Operational Considerations 

a. Dissemination. Biological agents may be dispersed or deposited as aerosols, liquid 

droplets, or dry powders. In general, agents dispersed as dry powder are more viable than 

those dispersed as wet aerosols. Biological agents can also be transmitted directly by 

arthropod vectors or by an infected individual. Infected arthropod vectors are useful for 

penetrating the skin. 

b. Persistency. The longevity of biological agents is greatly dependent on their 

viability (ability to cause disease). Examples of viability are shown in Figure C-2. 

c. Environmental Conditions. Environmental conditions may also affect the 

viability of biological material (see Figure C-3). These conditions include: solar 

(ultraviolet) radiation, relative humidity, wind speed, and temperature gradient. Ultraviolet 

light decreases the viability of most aerosol disseminated biological agents. However, 

encapsulation through man-made processes, natural sporulation, or arthropod vectors, may 

protect biological agents from the impacts of the environment and increase agent viability. 

d. Trigger Events. With current technology, it is possible that a BW attack will be 

completed before local commanders are aware that it has taken place. Commanders, 

through their PHEOs, must attempt to distinguish between an epidemic of natural origin, a 

BW attack, or the release of/exposure to TIBs. Trigger events can assist commanders and 

PHEOs by providing an indication that a BW event is likely to occur, may have occurred, or 

has occurred, and will prompt commanders to initiate response measures. There are four 

possible triggers signaling a biological event: intelligence triggers generally occur prior to 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-11 

an event; weapons and detector triggers indicate agent release and/or disease infection start 

times; and a sentinel casualty trigger identifies the onset of symptoms. 

(1) Intelligence warning trigger events occur when a commander receives 

convincing information (unanalyzed) or intelligence (analyzed information) indicating that 

a biological event (naturally occurring or intentional) is imminent. Information and 

intelligence from multiple sources (e.g., the general public, military intelligence, national 

EXAMPLES OF BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL VIABILITY

DISEASE

BACTERIA AND RICKETTSIA

VIRUSES

TOXINS

LIKELY

DISSEMINATION

METHOD

INFECTIVITY VIABILITY LETHALITY

Anthrax (

)

Plague (

)

Q Fever (

)

Tularemia (

)

Bacillus

anthracis

Yersinia

pestis

Cociella

burnetti

Francisella

tularensis

Smallpox (Variola

Major)

Viral equine

encephalitis (e.g.,

Western, Eastern,

Venezuelan)

Viral hemorrhagic

fevers (Ebola,

Marburg, Lassa, Rift

Valley, Dengue, etc.)

Botulism (

)

Ricin (

)

Staphylococcal

Enterotoxin B

Botulinum

neurotoxins

Ricinus

communis

Spores in Aerosol





Aerosol

Vectors





Aerosol

Sabotage (Food)





Aerosol

Sabotage





Aerosol

Sabotage

Aerosol

Aerosol

Aerosol

Aerosol

High

Very High

Very Low

Moderate

High

Low

High - Low

(Virus

Dependent)

High

Moderate

Low

Moderate

High

High

High

High

High

High

N/A

N/A

N/A

Spores Are Highly

Stable

Less Important

Because of High

Transmissibility

Stable

Not Very Stable

Stable

Relatively

Unstable

Relatively

Stable

Stable

Stable

Stable

Figure C-2. Examples of Biological Material Viability 
Biological Hazard Considerations 

C-5 

intelligence institutions in the host country) can provide advance warning of a biological 

event. 

(2) Weapons event trigger events refer to attacks by a weapon system(s), such as 

theater ballistic missile(s), artillery, or observed attacks employing other delivery means 

such as an aerosol sprayer device. Where intelligence has assessed a biological weapon 

capability, it is reasonable to initially react to weapons events as if they could contain 

biological agents. 

(3) Detector alarm trigger events refer to the discovery of a biological event via a 

positive result from a detection device, laboratory report from environmental samples, or a 

positive food/water sample indicating that a biological agent is present in the environment. 

WEATHER EFFECTS ON BIOLOGICAL AGENT

DISSEMINATION

Agent clouds travel

downwind for long

distances before they

spread laterally.

High humidity and

light rains generally

favor wet agent

dissemination.

Agent clouds tend to

dissipate quickly.

Agent clouds rise

rapidly and do not

travel downwind any

appreciable distance.

Cold temperatures

affect wet agent

dissemination.

Agent clouds tend to

dissipate uniformly and

remain cohesive as they

travel downwind.

Clouds lie low to the

ground and may not rise

high enough to cover

the tops of buildings

and/or other tall objects.

More agent required for

the same results as

under stable conditions.

Desired results may not

be achieved.

Agent clouds tend to

break up and become

diffused.

Little operational benefit

from off-target

dissemination.

FAVORABLE

MARGINAL

UNFAVORABLE

BIOLOGICAL

WARFARE AGENT

CLOUD

PERFORMANCE

OPERATIONAL

CONSIDERATIONS

WEATHER

CONDITION

Stable or Inversion

Conditions

Neutral Conditions

Unstable or Lapse

Conditions

Figure C-3. Weather Effects on Biological Agent Dissemination 
Appendix C 

C-6 JP 3-11 

Detectors are not a foolproof method of indicating the presence of biological agents due to 

the sensitivity limitations of the devices and the possibility of false negatives/positives. 

Positive results via detector may permit discovery of a biological event prior to the onset of 

symptoms. 

(4) A sentinel casualty trigger event refers to the medical communityís detection 

of a biological agent or infectious disease event by assessing trends in medical symptoms 

among personnel or diagnosis of an index case. Response actions based on a sentinel 

casualty may begin well into the disease progression cycle. 

e. Additional Attack Indicators. In addition to the Trigger Events listed above, the 

surrounding environment can also provide indication of a BW attack. Particular attention 

should be given to the following: 

(1) Increased numbers of sick or dead animals, often of different species. Some 

BW agents are capable of infecting/intoxicating a wide range of hosts. 

(2) Unusual entomological parameters. 

4. Biological Defense 

 The protection of operational personnel under BW threat is a multifaceted discipline. 

In striking contrast to protection against chemical, radiological, and nuclear weapons there 

exists the potential to minimize the effects of biological agents. The combined use of 

medical surveillance, identification, medical countermeasures, physical protection, and 

restriction of movement provides the basis of biological defense. 

a. Medical Surveillance. Human beings are a sensitive, and, in some cases, the only 

biodetector. Early clinical findings may be nonspecific or atypical of the natural disease. 

Medical personnel may be unable to differentiate natural disease from BW attacks. 

Considerable time may elapse following a BW attack before the extent of the exposure is 

known. To enable identification of a BW attack, ongoing, systematic collection and 

analysis of health data is essential. Following a BW attack, the disease pattern may have 

characteristics that differ from those of a naturally occurring epidemic: 

(1) In contrast to naturally-occurring epidemics (excluding food-borne outbreaks) 

in which disease incidence increases over a period of weeks or months, the epidemic curve 

for most large, artificially-induced outbreaks is compressed, peaking within a few hours or 

days. 

(2) In contrast to the peaks and troughs evident in most natural disease outbreaks, 

a steady and increasing stream of patients may be seen (comparable to that during a 

accidental food poisoning outbreak). 

(3) An understanding of disease ecology and epidemiology can be extremely 

useful in distinguishing natural outbreaks from those induced by BW attack. For example, 
Biological Hazard Considerations 

C-7 

diseases that are naturally vector-borne will have environmental parameters that predispose 

to naturally occurring outbreaks. Appearance of disease in the absence of these parameters 

would be highly suggestive of a BW attack. 

(4) The medical services must maintain routine disease surveillance; emergence 

of an atypical pattern mandates immediate notification of higher authority. The 

simultaneous appearance of outbreaks in different geographical locations should alert to the 

possibility of a BW attack. In addition, multiple biological agents may be used 

simultaneously in a BW attack, or chemical and biological agents may be combined in a 

single attack to complicate diagnosis. 

(5) A large number of casualties within a period of 48-72 hours (suggesting an 

attack with a microorganism), or within hours (suggesting an attack with a toxin). The 

epidemiology would be that of a massive single source. 

(6) A large number of clinical cases among exposed individuals. 

(7) An illness type highly unusual for the geographic area (e.g., Venezuelan 

equine encephalitis (VEE) in Europe). 

(8) An illness occurring in an unnatural epidemiological setting, where 

environmental parameters are not conducive to natural transmission (e.g., VEE in the 

absence of antecedent disease in horses or in the absence of vector mosquitoes). 

(9) An unusually high prevalence of respiratory involvement in diseases that 

when acquired in nature, generally cause a non-pulmonary syndrome ó the signature of 

aerosol exposure (e.g., inhalational anthrax). 

(10) Casualty distribution aligned with recent wind direction. 

(11) Lower attack rates among those working indoors, especially in areas with 

filtered air or closed ventilation systems, than in those exposed outdoors. The reverse is 

true when the attack is made by using ventilation systems in order to disseminate BW 

agents indoors. 

(12) Large numbers of rapidly fatal cases, with few recognizable signs and 

symptoms, resulting from exposure to multiple lethal doses near the dissemination source. 

b. Identification. Identification of BW agents is essential to determine appropriate 

operational and medical countermeasure responses that may be taken by the JFC and public 

health officials. 

(1) Presumptive or preliminary identification of the category of the BW agent, 

using laboratories in the operational area, will influence initial responses. The three BW 

agent categories can generally be described as: 
Appendix C 

C-8 JP 3-11 

(a) Communicable diseases, such as pneumonic plague, smallpox, influenza, 

and many others, that are able to be transmitted from person to person. 

(b) Noncommunicable diseases, such as anthrax, that can contaminate an 

area and infect personnel but are not able to be transmitted form person to person. 

(c) Noncommunicable BW agents, such as toxins and many other bacterial 

pathogens, that primarily only cause effects in directly exposed personnel. 

(2) Confirmatory identification through molecular diagnosis, using specialized 

laboratories, is necessary to confirm or alter initial operational and medical countermeasure 

responses. Procedures should be developed to obtain and transport environmental and 

human samples to these specialized laboratories. 

c. Medical Countermeasures

(1) Immunoprophylaxis

(a) Active Immunoprophylaxis. Vaccination is an important practical 

means of providing continuous protection against BW threats prior to, as well as during, 

hostile actions. Vaccines against a number of potential BW agents are available. Many of 

these vaccines were developed for the protection of laboratory workers or individuals 

working where the target diseases are endemic. 

1. In a biological agent attack the number of infectious or toxin units to 

which an individual is exposed may be greater than in the case of natural exposure. 

Exposure by inhalation may represent an unnatural route of infection with many biological 

agent. The efficiency of protection afforded by most vaccines is based on natural inoculum 

size and exposure. Vaccines, which are generally considered to be effective under natural 

circumstances, may not provide a similar degree of protection to individuals exposed to 

biological agent attack. 

2. An appropriate immunization policy is essential. Vaccines are 

biological agent specific and do not provide immediate protection. Not all vaccines can be 

administered simultaneously; therefore to prevent the logistic problems caused by in-theater 

vaccination, prior immunization is essential. 

3. If an in-theater vaccination program is required, the possibility of 

adverse reactions from vaccination and the concomitant degradation of operational 

efficiency must be taken into account. 

(b) Passive Immunoprophylaxis. For some biological agents, the only 

available medical countermeasures might be specific antiserum. Under certain conditions, 

passive immunoprophylaxis with immunoglobulin products might be considered. Use may 

be limited by lack of adequate sources and quantities of material, limited duration of 

protection, and the risk of serum sickness associated with antisera of animal origin. 
Biological Hazard Considerations 

C-9 

However, recent scientific advances in products for immunoprophylaxis (for example, 

human monoclonal antibodies, ìdespeciatedî equine or ovine antisera) are making this 

option technically more attractive. 

(2) Chemoprophylaxis

(a) Chemoprophylaxis using appropriate drugs (e.g., antibiotics, antivirals) 

may offer additional protection in the event of a BW incident. If an attack is felt to be 

imminent (i.e., intelligence trigger), or is known to have occurred (i.e., weapon event or a 

sentinel casualty), command-directed chemoprophylaxis would be appropriate for all 

personnel in the area. However, it is impractical and wasteful to place everyone located in a 

potential target area on prolonged, routine antimicrobial prophylaxis in the absence of such 

a threat condition. 

(b) For bacterial agents, antibiotics should be administered as soon as 

possible following exposure. Initiation of chemoprophylaxis during the incubation period is 

always worthwhile; however, the earlier the antibiotic is given the greater is the chance of 

preventing disease. In some cases (e.g., inhalational anthrax), post-exposure vaccination 

must be given in addition to antibiotics to personnel previously unvaccinated in order to 

prevent late onset of disease when antibiotics are withdrawn. 

(c) Consideration should be given to the possibility of the interaction 

between drugs in multi-drug regimens that address the multiple elements of force health 

protection. Medical personnel must ensure consistent observation of personnel receiving 

chemoprophylaxis in order to identify and treat harmful interactions or side effects. 

d. Physical Protection

(1) Individual Protective Equipment

(a) Respiratory Protection. Respiratory protection is essential in the 

presence of any BW inhalation hazard. Currently fielded respirators equipped with 

standard filter canisters will provide a high degree of protection against particles greater 

than 0.3 micrometers in size. Other forms of protection (e.g., self-contained breathing 

apparatus) are available and may be fielded to meet particular conditions. Low-grade 

masks (e.g., surgical masks) are not sufficient to protect against aerosol attacks. However, 

they may have some application for controlling the spread of contagious disease. 

(b) Dermal Protection. Intact skin provides an excellent barrier against 

biological agents however, any skin abrasions or exudative inflammation must be covered. 

In some instances it may be necessary to protect the mucous membranes of the eye. IPE 

clothing employed against CBRN agents will protect against skin contamination with 

biological agents, although standard uniform clothing affords a certain degree of protection 

against dermal exposure to the surfaces covered. 
Appendix C 

C-10 JP 3-11 

(c) Casualties. Casualties unable to continue wearing IPE in a biological 

agent contaminated area should be held and/or transported using containment measures to 

protect the patient against biological agent exposure. Contagious patients should be held 

and/or transported using a barrier system to prevent disease transmission. 

(2) Collective Protection

(a) A dedicated hardened or unhardened shelter equipped with an air 

filtration unit providing overpressure provides some protection from biological hazards, but 

does not provide 100% protection from all biological hazards. 

(b) COLPRO is the most effective method for protecting infected patients 

and the medical facility during the BW attack. However, following a BW attack, the 

environment within COLPRO may lead to cross-infection between casualties and staff. 

Therefore, it may be appropriate to care for patients whose illness is thought to be the result 

of a BW attack or those suspected of carrying a transmissible disease outside of the 

COLPRO facility. At a minimum, these patients will be cared for using barrier nursing 

techniques.

e. Restriction of Movement. Restriction of movement involves limiting the 

movement of people to prevent or reduce person-to-person transmission of contagious 

diseases. Restriction of movement may include social distancing, quarantine, or isolation. 

(1) Social distancing is a community-based strategy to increase the physical 

space between people to prevent person-to-person contamination (e.g., physical separation, 

cancellation of public events, closure of school and daycare facilities, and minimum 

manning policies). 

(2) Quarantine includes voluntary and mandatory restriction of movement 

placed upon individuals or groups reasonably believed to have been exposed to a CBRN 

agent. 

(3) Isolation is the separation of symptomatic individuals or groups from other 

personnel in order to prevent additional contamination. 
APPENDIX D 

RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD CONSIDERATIONS 

D-1 

1. General 

a. Background radiation is always present. It varies considerably throughout the world 

and can even vary within a small locality. It can complicate detection and quantification of 

man-made radiation, and hence the interpretation of radiation measurements for identifying 

and marking a potential hazard area. 

b. The potential for radiological hazards may also come from terrorist use of 

radiological materials. Radiological threats differ from chemical and biological threats in 

that radiation cannot be ìneutralizedî or ìsterilizedî and many radiological materials have 

half-lives measured in years. Radiation sickness is not contagious, but cross- contamination 

is possible. Respiratory protection will protect against the inhalation of airborne 

radiological contaminants. IPE reduces the amount of contaminants that can enter the lungs 

and the potential for skin burns from alpha and beta particles. 

c. The Services are responsible for enforcing precautions and establishing TTP for 

handling their conventional munitions that employ radioactive materials, such as DU, 

including enforcing exposure standards, that protect their personnel against external and 

inhalation and ingestion hazards. 

d. In the operational environment, many highly technical items of equipment have 

high-energy or radiological sources that may accidentally or deliberately become radiation 

hazards. For example, communications and surveillance sites may have known hazard 

areas around their equipment that result from high-energy transmissions. These 

transmissions can injure personnel, damage equipment, and cause electronics and avionics 

malfunctions. Additionally, medical treatment and diagnostic modalities use radiation 

sources which require precautions to avoid accidental or deliberate exposure. Lastly, 

dangerous levels of radiation can result from damaged industrial radiation hazard areas. 

Due to the downwind hazards such damage can produce, avoidance is the most effective 

individual and unit protective measure against industrial radiation hazards. 

e. Further, adversaries could disperse radioactive material using low-level radiation 

sources in a number of ways. Such dispersal could range from arming the warhead of a 

conventional missile with active material from a nuclear reactor, releasing low-level 

radioactive material intended for use in industry or medicine, disseminating material from a 

research or power-generating nuclear reactor, or depositing a radioactive source in a water 

supply. Dispersal of radioactive materials is an inexpensive threat that requires limited 

resources and technical knowledge for employment. 

f. Radiation exposure may result from dispersed radioactive material (in solid, liquid, 

gaseous, or vapor form) or it may result from discrete sources, such as a radioactive source 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-11 

concealed in a high traffic area. Any alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron source may present a 

potential radiation hazard. 

g. Radiation can cause both deterministic and nondeterministic health effects. Large 

doses in a short time period may cause a combination of deterministic effects termed ìacute 

radiation syndrome.î The higher the dose, the faster these effects occur, and the more 

severe the syndrome will be. All doses of radiation also have the potential to cause an 

increase in an individualís risk of cancer. Since this is only a potential effect from the 

exposure, it is considered nondeterministic. Occupational radiation protection programs 

and regulations are concerned with both deterministic and nondeterministic effects. Figure 

D-1 summarizes the overall effects of radiation exposure as a function of dose for healthy, 

young adults with no other injuries. The threshold for effects will be lower for personnel 

with combined injuries. 

2. General Principles 

a. The commanderís decision to expose personnel to ionizing radiation should be 

balanced between mission requirements and the overall risks. In combat, individuals may 

exceed safe levels of radiation exposure because of action by the enemy. The strategy is to 

be aware of the risks to the greatest extent possible and try to minimize them. To the extent 

that the demands of combat require exposure to radiation, the risk should be divided among 

combatants to keep exposure to the absolute minimum. 

b. Three basic principles of ionizing radiation protection form the foundation of 

managing the risks associated with ionizing radiation exposure: justification, optimization, 

and limitation. 

(1) Justification. No unnecessary exposure should be undertaken. 

(2) Optimization. The level of individual doses, the numbers of people exposed, 

and the likelihood of incurring exposures, should be kept as low as reasonably achievable. 

(3) Limitation. The dose to an individual shall be limited according to appropriate 

regulations. 

c. Possible radiation sources are: 

(1) Civil Nuclear Facilities. These facilities include those for power generation, 

research, nuclear fuel fabrication, and for the processing, storage, and disposal of nuclear 

waste. 

(2) Industrial and Medical. Wide-scale use of radioactive sources includes the 

testing of industrial products, medical treatment, calibration equipment, and the sterilization 

of food and equipment. 
Radiological Hazard Considerations 

D-3 

(3) Radiological Weapons. Any device, including weapon or equipment other 

than a nuclear explosive device, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by 

disseminating it to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced 

by the decay of such material. These weapons are sometimes also referred to as radiation 

weapons, RDDs, or REDs. 

(a) Radiological Dispersal Device. A device, other than a nuclear explosive 

device, designed to disseminate radioactive material in order to cause destruction, damage, 

or injury. 

EFFECTS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE

Probability of Death 

from Excess Cancer (40 

Years After Exposure)

(See Note 3)

Threshold 

Effects Within 1 

Day (See Notes 

1, 2)

Probability 

of Death 

Within 30 

Days

Probability of 

Nausea/ 

Vomiting 

Within 6 Hours

Percent Expected 

to Require 

Hospitalizations

Acute 

Dose 

centi-Gray 

(cGy)

Free-in-Air

1. The probability of death is without medical treatment and for healthy adults.

2. Burns and/or trauma in combination with radiation injury increases mortality. Personnel with such 

injuries combined with radiation doses exceeding 100 cGy will likely require prompt medical 

evaluation. Personnel with combined injuries with doses in excess of 600 cGy are unlikely to 

survive regardless of medical intervention. 

3. US citizens have approximately 41% chance of getting cancer over lifetime, averaging between 37% 

and 41% based upon race and ethnicity. 

NOTES:

8000 ! Disorientation ! Death

3000 Combat Ineffective 100% 100% 100% n/a

1000 Performance > 99% 10% 100% n/a

Degraded

410 ! > 50% 75%

!

!

Moderate 

Vomiting

Diarrhea

Fatigue

10-15%

! Lymphocyte < 25%

Count Drop

2-4%

Mild < 1% < 10% < 1%

-- Nausea

-- Vomiting

-- Headache

1-2%

None Expected < 1% < 1%

1 rad = 1 cGy 

100 rad = 1 Gy

Figure D-1. Effects of Radiation Exposure
Appendix D 

D-4 JP 3-11 

(b) Radiological Exposure Device. A radioactive source placed to cause 

injury or death, the placement of which may be covert in order to increase the potential 

dose. 

(4) Military Commodities. Military equipment may contain radioactive sources 

which, if breached, could present a radiation hazard. 

(5) Depleted Uranium. DU is a metal made from uranium hexafluoride, a 

byproduct of the uranium enrichment process. Although not a likely or significant hazard, 

DU is a low level radiation source and can be detected with military radiation, detection, 

indication, and computation (commonly called RADIAC) equipment. Extensive 

information and guidance on DU is available from the DU Library 

(http://fhp.osd.mil/du/index.jsp), the US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive 

Medicine (http://chppm-www.apgea.army.mil/), USANCA, the Surgeons General and the 

Force Health Protection office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs 

(http://www.deploymentlink.osd.mil/). 

3. Operational Considerations 

 It is DOD policy to reduce exposures to ionizing radiation associated with DOD 

operations to a level as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) consistent with operational 

risk management. Commanders should consider the risks of ionizing radiation exposure 

while balancing the requirements of completing military missions. Complying with the 

principle of ALARA should not introduce other (nonradioactive) risks above those 

associated with the risks from ionizing radiation exposure. 

a. The severity of the effect increases with dose for threshold effects and only happens 

at relatively high doses. However, the severity of the random effect, normally cancer, is not 

affected by the dose. For random effects, only the probability of the occurrence is 

associated directly with dose. There is currently no known threshold below which random 

effects do not occur; nor on the other hand, is there certainty that a random effect will occur 

even for higher doses. 

b. As part of the risk management process, applying radiation safety principles should 

not introduce a higher level or more severe risk to the unit or the mission. The highest risk 

of significant casualties will usually occur from the conventional weapons threat. 

Increasing conventional risk to achieve the goal of ALARA may result in an increased total 

risk with higher probability of mission failure. Complete risk management requires the 

following: 

(1) Information. The risk assessment begins with accurate information on the 

nature of all hazards present in the operational area, to include measurements, visual 

observations, and modeling. 
Radiological Hazard Considerations 

D-5 

(2) Justification. During operational decision-making, commanders should 

consider both threshold and random health consequences of radiation exposure, in addition 

to other health risks. Unnecessary risks to health should not be accepted. 

(3) Optimization. After a mission has been justified, the commander should 

optimize the plan to minimize the potential effects of all risks that are involved. 

Optimization can involve reducing the time in a radiation area, maintaining the maximum 

distance possible from radiation sources, and using shields between exposed personnel and 

radiation sources to keep radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable. 

Optimization also balances the reduction in operational effectiveness and increased time 

spent in contaminated regions with the protection from varying levels of MOPP or PPE. 

c. Commanders should ensure their personnel are informed of the potential health 

effects of radiation exposure and how to best protect themselves against the threshold and 

random effects of radiation. 

d. The dose contributed by ingestion or inhalation of radioactive material (known as 

internal dose), by partial body irradiations from gamma-rays, and by skin irradiations from 

beta-particles cannot be accurately measured in the field. However, such individual doses 

can be estimated for operational purposes. Depending upon the type of radioactive material 

and its dispersed form, the combined internal and external dose equivalent may be much 

larger than the external exposure recorded on a dosimeter. Consequently, respiratory and 

skin protection must be considered whenever the hazard analysis establishes a potential risk 

in which the internal exposure, or skin exposure, will cause the commanderís OEG to be 

exceeded. Implementation of respiratory and skin protection controls will be subject to 

common sense tests of being reasonably achievable and practical for the situation. 

4. Responsibilities 

a. Operational Commanders 

(1) Set the OEG. 

(2) Establish guidance for the use of radioprotectants. 

b. Staffs 

(1) Conduct radiological risk management. 

(2) Provide risk and mitigation recommendations to the commander. 

(3) Implement medical surveillance program. 

(4) Recommend guidance when to use radiotherapeutics. 

(5) Collect/archive cumulative dose information, this includes keeping and 

maintaining radiation exposure status (RES) records. RES is an estimate, indicated by the 
Appendix D 

D-6 JP 3-11 

categorization symbols R0 ñ R3 or RES-0 - RES-3 (see Figure D-2), which may be applied 

to a unit, subunit, or exceptionally, to an individual. It is based on total cumulative dose 

received from exposure to penetrating radiation. The total cumulative dose is determined 

by using a tactical dosimeter. If a dosimeter is not used, then the dose can be estimated 

based on radiation monitoring data and total exposure time. Special advisors should be 

consulted for acceptable, alternative methods of assessing these exposures. All individuals 

of the unit or sub-unit are assigned the same dose. If personnel are reassigned, the unit RES 

is determined by the average dose of the individuals assigned. All personnel who have 

received radiation exposure during operations should be evaluated by medical personnel, 

and appropriate entries documented in their individual medical record in accordance with 

multi-Service TTP and NATO STANAG 2473, Commanders Guide on Low Level 

Radiation (LLR) Exposure in Military Operations. Figure D-2 defines the RES categories 

as a function of dose receive by the unit and describes the precautions required for units in 

each of the RES categories. 

5. Operational Exposure Guidance 

a. The RES provides a convenient method of enabling exchange of information 

regarding radiation doses. Since RES is directly related to effects of tactical interest, it can 

be used for estimating the effectiveness of groups (or, in exceptional cases, of individuals) 

and is considered when planning missions to select units or individuals with appropriate 

capabilities or skills to ensure mission accomplishment that results in the lowest RES after 

the mission is completed. 

b. Assessing Radiation Hazards 

(1) Determining if hazards can be controlled depends on whether the radiological 

hazards are sufficiently characterized and appropriate controls are in place or can be in 

place, and sufficient resources exist to protect personnel to a level of risk comparable to 

occupational standards. Under such conditions commanders should apply the same 

standards of ionizing radiation protection as would apply to any routine practice involving 

ionizing radiation exposure and radioactive material as specified in DODI 6055.8, 

Occupational Radiation Protection Program. Military operations may require that dose 

limits specified in DODI 6055.8 be exceeded in emergency situations and during combat or 

wartime military operations. 

(2) A sufficiently characterized radiological hazard will normally include an 

evaluation of the environment by a radiation subject matter expert (SME) such as a health 

physicist or radiation specialist. Characterization normally includes identifying the 

radionuclide(s) (or ionizing radiation type and half-life of the source), quantifying the dose 

rate, and determining how the dose rate will change over time. Commanders should consult 

with available expertise and use available resources to characterize the environment to the 

best of their ability. Reachback and staff augmentation is available from several sources 

within each Service and the DTRA, Joint Task Force - Civil Support, and the Armed Forces 

Radiobiology Research Institute. 
Radiological Hazard Considerations 

D-7 

(3) In contrast, environments are uncontrolled when they are uncharacterized, 

and/or limited resources exist to reduce personnel exposure to ionizing radiation. Under 

such circumstances, commanders should apply operational risk management to protect 

personnel to the greatest extent possible. Requirements under these conditions include 

RADIATION EXPOSURE STATUS CATEGORIES

Recommended Actions

(Continue Actions from the Previous RES

Categories as RES Increases)

Radiation

Exposure

Status (RES)

Category

Total

Cumulative

Dose (See

Notes 1 & 2)

1. Radiation measurement in either centisievert (cSv) or millisievert (mSv) is preferred in all cases.

However, due to the fact that the military may only have the capability to measure centigray (cGy) or

milligray (mGy), the radiation guidance tables are presented in units of cGy for convenience. For

whole body gamma irradiation, 10 mGy = 1 cGy = 1 cSv = 10 mSv.

2. All doses should be kept as low as reasonably achievable. This will reduce individual soldier risk as

well as retain maximum operational flexibility for future employment of exposed soldiers.

3. Examples of priority tasks are those that contain the hazard, avert danger to persons or allow the

mission to continue without major revisions in the operational plan.

4. Examples of critical tasks are those that save lives or allow continued support that is deemed essential

by the operational commander to conduct the mission.

5. Although an upper bound for RES 1E is provided in the table, it is conceivable that doses to personnel

could exceed this amount. A low incidence of acute radiation sickness can be expected as whole body

doses start to exceed 75 cGy. Personnel exceeding the RES 1E limit should be considered for medical

evaluation and evacuation upon any signs or symptoms related to acute radiation sickness (e.g.,

nausea, vomiting, anorexia, fatigue).

NOTES:

R0

R1A

R1B

R1C

R1D

R1E

R2

R3

0 – 0.05 cGy

0.05 – 0.5 cGy

0.5 – 5 cGy

5 – 10 cGy

10 – 25 cGy

25 – 75 cGy

(see note 5)

75 – 125 cGy

(see note 5)

> 125 cGy

(see note 5)

 Routine monitoring for early warning of hazard





Record individual/unit dose readings

Initiate specific mission protocols or goals

 Initiate radiation survey and continue

monitoring







Update survey and continue monitoring

Continue dose control measures

Execute PRIORITY tasks only (see note 3)





Execute CRITICAL tasks only (see note 4)

Medical evaluation recommended upon

normally scheduled return to home station

 Monitor for acute radiation syndrome

symptoms

 Any further exposure exceeds moderate

operational risk

 All further exposure will exceed the

emergency operational risk

1 rad = 1 cGy

Figure D-2. Radiation Exposure Status Categories
Appendix D 

D-8 JP 3-11 

ensuring exposures are both justified and ALARA, as well as applying OEGs instead of 

dose limits. 

c. Determine the Radiological Hazard Risk 

(1) The first step in assessing the risk in a radiological environment is to 

determine the potential dose and dose rate from radiological sources that may be 

encountered during the mission. This will determine the severity of the radiological threat. 

Next, determine the likelihood to encounter this radiological threat. This will determine the 

probability. Figures D-3 and D-4 provide severity and probability definitions. 

(2) Once the severity and the probability of the hazard are determined, Figure D-5 

correlates the two to determine the level of risk associated with the hazard. 

d. Setting an OEG 

(1) The OEG is set for each platoon or equivalent unit and for each mission. The 

OEG should be based on the importance of the mission and the acceptable tolerance to 

ionizing radiation effects in comparison to other risks associated with the mission. During 

the risk management process a starting point could be to set the OEG at the ìlow end.î As 

an example, use Figure D-6 to determine OEG and assess the impact to the mission. If 

there is no foreseeable impact on the mission, then the low end OEG should be appropriate. 

If not, raise the guidance to the moderate level or high OEG and repeat the process. 

(2) The recommended levels for the exposure guidance given in Figure D-6 are 

low enough that the primary risk is limited to long-term health effects except for a critical 

mission with an ìExtremely Highî acceptable risk. This table is intended to guide 

commanders and their staffs in determining an appropriate OEG. However, based on the 

mission, operational commanders have the discretion to set any OEG determined to be 

appropriate (even an OEG greater than 125 centi-Gray per mission). 

(3) Critical missions are those missions that are essential to the overall success of 

a higher headquartersí operation, emergency lifesaving missions, or like missions. 

(4) Priority missions are those missions that avert danger to persons, prevent 

damage from spreading, or support the organizationís mission-essential task list. 

(5) Routine missions are all other missions that are not designated as priority or 

critical missions. 

(6) In all cases, if following the OEG introduces additional risks and/or hazards 

otherwise avoidable, a reassessment of the OEG is warranted. It is not reasonable to set the 

OEG so low that it introduces other more severe and/or unnecessary risks. For example, if 

the OEG is set so that a route is not usable because of fear of exceeding the OEG and other 

routes introduce the potential for unnecessary adversary engagement or other significant 

danger, then reassess the risks, the importance of the mission, and/or increase the OEG. 
Radiological Hazard Considerations 

D-9 

e. Commanders should establish an OEG for the following situations: 

(1) All missions with the potential for ionizing radiation exposure. 

(2) Units conducting radiological decontamination for personnel or equipment. 

(3) Units conducting immediate or operational decontamination. 

(a) Unlike chemical or biological agents, radiation will not be neutralized by 

decontamination. Decontamination will only move the hazard from one surface (bodies, 

SEVERITY OF RADIOLOGICAL THREAT

cGy centi-Gray cGy/hr centi-Gray per hour

1 rad = 1 cGy

MISSION IMPACT ASSOCIATED POTENTIAL

DOSE AND DOSE RATE LEVEL OF SEVERITY

CATASTROPHIC

CRITICAL

MARGINAL

NEGLIGIBLE

 Expected loss of ability

to accomplish mission







Expected significant

degradation of mission

capabilities in terms of

the required mission

standard

Inability to accomplish

all parts of the mission

Inability to accomplish

the mission to standard

if hazards occur during

the mission

 Expected degraded

mission capabilities in

terms of the required

mission standard;

Mission capability will be

reduced if hazards occur

during the mission

 Expected effect will have

little or no impact on

accomplishing the

mission





Total dose > 450 cGY

Encounter

source/environment with

dose rate > 200 cGy/hr





Total dose > 200 cGy

Encounter

source/environment with

dose rate > 10 cGy/hr





Total dose > 75 cGy

Encounter

source/environment with

dose rate > 0.5 cGy/hr





Total dose > 20 cGy

Encounter

source/environment with

dose rate > 0.01 cGy/hr

Figure D-3. Severity of Radiological Threat
Appendix D 

D-10 JP 3-11 

vehicles, etc.) to another (the ground). Removed contaminated clothing and waste water 

may themselves, under certain conditions, become radiation hazards. Waste water must be 

controlled to prevent further contamination. 

(b) Contaminated clothing and waste water should be treated as radioactive 

hazards. An appropriate OEG should be set for units conducting thorough decontamination 

operations (i.e., consider the decontamination operation a separate mission with its own 

OEG). 

(4) Radiological risk management applies to patient movement missions and 

healthcare providers; however, medical treatment or lifesaving measures take precedence 

over decontamination efforts. 

(a) Mission OEG should be established for medical missions; however, do 

not deny evacuation or treatment for a contaminated individual to avoid exceeding the OEG 

for evacuation crews and/or healthcare personnel. It is highly unlikely that a contaminated 

patient will create a significant radiation hazard for healthcare providers. In most cases, 

removing the outer layer of clothing will eliminate most of the radioactive contamination. 

PROBABILITY OF RADIOLOGICAL THREAT

IMPACT ON PERSONNEL PROBABILITY

OF EVENT

Frequent – 1 in 500

Likely – 1 in 1000

Occasional – 1 in 10,000

Seldom – 1 in 100,000

Unlikely

 Expected to occur several times or continuously

over the duration of a specific mission





Occurrence not impossible but can assume will

not occur during a mission

Occurs very rarely





Not expected to occur during a mission

Occurs rarely as isolated incidents





May occur as often as not during a specific mission

Occurs sporadically

 Expected to occur during a specific mission or at a

high rate but intermittently

Figure D-4. Probability of Radiological Threat
Radiological Hazard Considerations 

D-11 

(b) Treatment of radioactively contaminated casualties triaged as 

ìimmediateî should not be delayed for decontamination beyond removal of the outer layer 

of clothing. 

(5) Radiological risk management applies to all ground, air, and sea transportation 

missions. Risk to the transportation personnel, crew, and the mission requirements are 

factored into the decision process when setting the OEG. If transporting radioactive 

material, both the cargo and any other potential ionizing radiation exposure should be 

evaluated in the risk management process. For radioactively contaminated cargo, the 

decontamination requirement should be evaluated as part of the risk management process. 

Depending on the cargo and the mission, the OEG for the crew and transportation personnel 

may make decontamination unnecessary. Planning for intertheater transportation missions 

must consider the radiological control requirements at the destination. An intermediate 

intratheater stop may be required to conform to HN and international transportation 

requirements. 

f. Determining Decontamination Requirements 

(1) Immediate or operational decontamination should be completed so that the 

residual contamination will not result in exceeding the OEG. Once the mission is 

completed or before beginning a new mission, thorough decontamination may be necessary 

LEVEL OF RADIOLOGICAL RISK

SEVERITY

PROBABILITY

Catastrophic

Critical

Marginal

Negligible

FREQUENT LIKELY OCCASIONAL SELDOM UNLIKELY

Extremely

High

Extremely

High

Extremely

High

Moderate

Moderate Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Low Low

Low

High

High

High

High

High

Low

Low

Low

Low

Figure D-5. Level of Radiological Risk
Appendix D 

D-12 JP 3-11 

to avoid additional exposure and/or exceeding any new OEG and to keep exposure 

ALARA. 

(2) Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations parts 172 and 173, and Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission Reg. Guide 1.86 provides guidance during peacetime 

environments for movement, disposal, and release of radiologically contaminated 

equipment and buildings for unrestricted use. 

(3) Up to ten times background (2 microgray/hour) is considered an acceptable 

operating environment. 

6. Other Exposure Guidance 

a. Internal Dose: 

(1) Can be assessed for likelihood from nasal swabs (if done within one hour post 

exposure for certain isotopes). 

(2) Should be assessed via bioassay as soon as possible. 

b. Priority should be given to determining if there is an alpha or beta contamination 

issue. 

(1) Affects internal dose management. 

RECOMMENDED OPERATIONAL EXPOSURE GUIDE LEVELS

CRITICAL PRIORITY ROUTINE

ACCEPTABLE

RISK LEVEL

MISSION

IMPORTANCE

NOTE: All doses in cGy [rad]

Extremely High

High

Moderate

Low

125

75

25

5

75

25

5

0.5

25

5

0.5

0.5

Figure D-6. Recommended Operational Exposure Guide Levels 
Radiological Hazard Considerations 

D-13 

(2) Determines long term MOPP level guidance. 

c. Protection of Noncombatants and Dependents. 

(1) General criteria for implementing protective actions: 

(a) Threshold (i.e., acute) health effects should be avoided. 

(b) The risk of delayed effects should not exceed a level that is judged to be 

adequately protective of health in emergency situations. 

(c) Any reduction of risk to public health achievable at acceptable risk should 

be accomplished. 

(d) The risk from a protective action should not exceed the risk associated 

with the dose that is to be avoided. 

(2) Local commanders need to coordinate with local authorities, in accordance 

with status-of-forces agreements and locally published guidance to establish appropriate 

guidance for the protection of dependents and noncombatants. 

(3) For additional information on intervention levels for the protection of the 

public in domestic and foreign situations see: 

(a) The National Response Framework for domestic response guidance and 

information. 

(b) NATO STANAGs and International Atomic Energy Agency safety series 

documents for foreign operations. 
Appendix D 

D-14 JP 3-11 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX E 

NUCLEAR HAZARD CONSIDERATIONS 

E-1 

1. General 

 The international security environment encompasses threats from potential adversaries 

armed with nuclear weapons. This appendix summarizes common effects produced by 

nuclear weapons, high-energy radiation, and radiological materials to assist combatant and 

subordinate commanders to plan for and conduct operations in nuclear environments. The 

effects of radiation exposure described in Appendix D, ìRadiological Hazard 

Considerations,î also apply to the residual radiation including fallout from a nuclear 

explosion. 

2. Characteristics of Nuclear Weapons 

a. The nature and intensity of the effects of a nuclear detonation depend upon the 

characteristics of both the weapon and the target and the means of employment, especially 

the height of burst. The most significant characteristics of a nuclear weapon are its type and 

yield. 

b. Types of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear weapons release enormous amounts of 

energy liberated from the fission or fusion of atomic nuclei. Fission-based weapons utilize 

specific isotopes of massive elements, such as uranium or plutonium, as the fuel for the 

fission reactions. Fission-based weapons are often referred to as gun-type weapons. 

Because these weapons require a relatively lower level of technological sophistication, they 

are more likely to be developed or used by under developed nations or terrorist groups. 

Fusion-based weapons exploit the energy released when the nuclei of light elements, such 

as isotopes of hydrogen, combine to form more massive nuclei and are often referred to as 

hydrogen bombs or H-bombs. Fusion-based weapons require very high temperatures to 

enable fusion reactions and may also be referred to as thermonuclear weapons. Since 

fusion-based weapons require much greater technological sophistication and are more 

efficient, more technologically mature nations are likely to adopt this weapon type. 

c. Yield. The term yield is used to describe the amount of explosive energy released 

when a nuclear weapon is detonated. A nuclear weaponís yield is measured in units of tons 

of TNT (trinitrotoluene) that would produce an equivalent explosion. Fission-based 

weapons are capable of producing yields up to a few hundred kilotons (kTs). 

Thermonuclear weapons can produce yields in excess of 25 megatons.

3. Nuclear Weapons Effects 

a. The effects of a nuclear weapon are largely determined by the medium in which it is 

detonated. A nuclear weapon may be detonated in space, in the air at high or low altitude, 

on the surface, below the surface, or under water. Data in this appendix focuses on air 

bursts. 
Appendix E 

E-2 JP 3-11 

b. When detonated, a typical nuclear weapon will release its energy as blast, thermal 

radiation (including X-rays), nuclear radiation (alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and 

neurons), and electromagnetic pulse. (Figure E-1 depicts the relative proportions of the 

radiation products of a air burst nuclear explosion.) When the detonation occurs in the 

atmosphere, the primary radiation products interact with the surrounding air molecules and 

are absorbed by matter and scattered as they radiate from the point of detonation. The 

secondary radiation products, referred to as residual radiation or fallout, produce the 

preponderance of the radiation hazard and casualties beyond the immediate point of 

detonation. All of these interactions lead to the five significant effects of a nuclear weapon 

detonated in the air: blast, thermal radiation, ionizing radiation, EMP, and fallout. 

ENERGY DISTRIBUTION OF TYPICAL NUCLEAR AIR BURST

Blast

Thermal

Residual

Radiation

Initial Radiation

Electromagnetic

Pulse

50%

35%

10%

4%

1%

Figure E-1. Energy Distribution of Typical Nuclear Air Burst
Nuclear Hazard Considerations 

E-3 

For additional technical data, including nuclear weapon employment effects data, contact 

the USANCA. 

c. Blast. A low altitude nuclear air burst generates blast waves, high overpressures, 

and severe winds. These blast effects produce casualties and damage through crushing, 

bending, tumbling, and breaking. Many of the casualties will be injured from flying debris 

such as broken glass and rubble. Depending upon a weaponís yield and detonation 

location, the blast from a nuclear weapon is capable of destroying most of the infrastructure 

of a major city, including rendering roads impassable; disrupting water, sewer, gas, and 

phone lines; and destroying medical facilities. Commanders must anticipate these 

challenges when operating in a nuclear environment. 

d. Thermal Radiation. The effect of the enormous amount of heat and light released 

by a nuclear detonation, in certain circumstances, may be more damaging than the blast. 

The thermal radiation from a multi-megaton weapon can ignite wood, paper, rubber, 

plastics, and other materials many kilometers away from the detonation point. Because 

thermal radiation travels at the speed of light, flammable objects within the thermal range 

and line-of-sight of the blast will ignite immediately. These fires, simultaneously ignited 

over an area that may exceed 100 square kilometers, could create a firestorm that engulfs 

the entire area. Even a 10 kT weapon is capable of igniting flammable objects within 

several hundred meters of its detonation point. Additionally, thermal radiation will cause 

burns of various degrees to people in the line-of-sight of the explosion. Severe burn victims 

generally require intensive and sophisticated medical treatment, which may quickly 

overwhelm available medical support. Leaders must be aware of thermal radiation effects 

in order to operate in a nuclear environment. 

e. Ionizing Radiation. Initial radiation produced by a nuclear detonation (x-rays, 

gamma rays, and neutrons) ionizes material and therefore becomes a significant hazard to 

personnel and materiel. Acute radiation doses from initial or residual radiation can destroy 

human cells and lead to severe illness or death. Additionally, intense ionizing radiation can 

damage objects, including optical, mechanical, and electronic components by altering their 

physical properties. Gamma rays and neutrons have a long range in the air and are highly 

penetrating. Consequently, even people inside of buildings and behind opaque objects will 

receive some radiation dose. 

f. Potassium iodide may be used to protect the thyroid from radioactive iodine in the 

event of an accident or attack at a nuclear power plant, or other nuclear attack, especially 

where volatile radionuclides, which contain significant amounts of Iodine 131, are released 

into the environment. Radioiodine is a dangerous radionuclide because the body 

concentrates it in the thyroid gland. Potassium iodide cannot protect against other causes of 

radiation poisoning, nor provide protection against a dirty bomb unless it contains 

radioactive iodine. 

g. Electromagnetic Pulse. The interaction of gamma radiation with the atmosphere 

can cause a short pulse of electric and magnetic fields that may damage and interfere with 

the operation of electrical and electronic equipment and can cause widespread disruption. 
Appendix E 

E-4 JP 3-11 

The effects of EMP can extend to hundreds of kilometers depending on the height and yield 

of the nuclear burst. HEMP can generate significant disruptive field strengths over a 

continental-size area. The portion of the frequency spectrum most affected by EMP and 

HEMP is the communications band. 

h. Fallout. Fallout is the residual radiation product distributed into the atmosphere by 

a nuclear detonation. High-altitude bursts produce essentially no local fallout. For many 

weapon designs, low-altitude bursts in which the fireball does not touch the ground will 

very often produce little, in some cases negligible, amounts of fallout. All nuclear 

detonations close enough to the surface for the fireball to touch the ground produce very 

large amounts of radioactive debris that will be drawn up into the atmosphere and be 

deposited locally and dispersed downwind. Although the localized fallout will typically 

only be hazardous to human occupation for several weeks, some areas could remain 

hazardous for years. Radiological surveys will be needed to identify and characterize such 

areas. Localized fallout may severely limit military operations within a contaminated area. 

Civilian and military facilities and resources will most likely be overwhelmed by the 

requirements for fallout casualty decontamination, processing, and treatment. Additionally, 

decontamination, identification, and interment of remains are formidable challenges for 

commanders to overcome. 

4. Protective Actions 

a. Protective actions taken before an attack are most effective for individual 

survivability and unit effectiveness and may include clothing (one or two layers of loose, 

light colored clothing can reduce burns), terrain selection (use of reverse slopes), dispersion, 

and sheltering (use of depressions, culverts, caves, bunkers, and obstructions). Education 

and training of leaders, staffs, and individuals on nuclear weapons effects and the principles 

of operations in CBRN environments can significantly enhance operational effectiveness in 

the event of nuclear attack. 

b. Commanders operating in radiological and nuclear environments must minimize 

and control the exposure of their personnel to radiation. As described in Appendix D, 

ìRadiological Hazard Considerations,î an OEG must be established for all military 

operations. 

See Appendix D, ìRadiological Hazard Considerations,î for further information on setting 

the OEG, RES categories, military radiation exposure states, and risk criteria. 
APPENDIX F 

TREATY, LEGAL, AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 

F-1 

1. General 

 This appendix contains brief descriptions of treaty, legal, and policy strictures on 

proliferation, testing, possession, and employment of CBRN weapons. While the United 

States adheres to these strictures, a number of potential adversaries may not. Combatant 

and subordinate commanders will plan appropriate CBRN PIRs and include treaty, legal, 

and policy considerations relating to CBRN in their JIPOE process. Additionally, they will 

make periodic assessments of potential adversary CBRN capabilities including potential 

violations of international agreements to which the adversary may be party. 

2. Nuclear Weapons 

a. The employment of nuclear weapons by the United States is governed by the current 

Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy. The United States is party to treaties and 

international agreements that limit proliferation, testing, and possession of nuclear weapons. 

The affected commander must consult the Department of Stateís compilation titled Treaties 

in Force to confirm the signature, ratification, and entry into force of these instruments. 

The following paragraphs contain a brief description of some of the major treaties 

governing nuclear weapons. The list is not exhaustive and may not include additional 

protocols, amendments, implementing agreements, or policies related thereto. Affected 

commanders should consult with appropriate DOD SMEs for relevant interagency 

coordination and for the latest updates to applicable policies and agreements. 

b. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force on 5 

March 1970. It binds states/parties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The parties to 

the treaty agree not to transfer, assist, or encourage the manufacture of nuclear weapons or 

nuclear weapons technology. The United States ratified this treaty on 24 November 1969. 

On 4 June 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union issued the Joint Statement on NonProliferation, in which both reaffirmed their commitment to nonproliferation and, 

specifically, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 

c. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia

establishes limits on the number and type of strategic offensive forces. 

d. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 

Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty) entered into force on 10 October 1963. It limits 

states partiesí testing of nuclear devices. The United States ratified this treaty on 7 October 

1963.

e. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 

Strategic Offensive Reductions establishes limits on operationally-deployed strategic 

nuclear warheads. 
Appendix F 

F-2 JP 3-11 

f. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, which would preclude any nuclear 

weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, has not entered into force. While the 

United States signed this treaty on 24 September 1996, the Senate voted against ratification 

on 13 October 1999. The United States voluntarily observes a moratorium on nuclear 

weapon test explosions. 

g. There are several treaties seeking to prohibit the presence or use of nuclear weapons 

in defined geographic regions. Except for the Antarctic Treaty, which among its provisions 

prohibits any nuclear explosions or disposal of radioactive waste in Antarctica, the United 

States is not a party to any of them. The United States ratified the Antarctica Treaty on 18 

August 1960 and the treaty entered into force on 23 June 1961. With respect to these other 

treaties, while the United States is not a party to the treaties, the United States has signed 

and in one case ratified certain of their protocols. For instance, the United States has signed 

and ratified, subject to understandings and declarations, Additional Protocols I and II to the 

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty 

of Tlatelolco). The United States has signed but not ratified Protocols I and II to the African 

Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty, and the three protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear 

Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). 

h. The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 

Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor or in the Subsoil 

Thereof (Sea-Bed Treaty) entered into force on 18 May 1972. It precludes the placement of 

nuclear weapons and other weapons as well as structures, launching installations or any 

other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing, or using such weapons, on the 

seabed. The United States ratified this treaty on 26 April 1972. 

i. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials entered into force 

on 8 February 1987. It provides for certain levels of physical protection during 

international transport of nuclear materials and provides a framework for cooperation in the 

protection, recovery, and return of stolen nuclear material. The United States ratified the 

treaty on 4 September 1981. 

3. Biological and Chemical Weapons 

a. General. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics are principally responsible 

for implementing DOD policy and conducting appropriate interagency coordination for 

biological and chemical weapons matters. Affected commanders should continuously 

consult with applicable DOD biological and chemical weapons SMEs for updated policy 

guidance. 

b. Biological Weapons. Under the terms of the Convention on the Prohibition of 

Bacteriological and Toxic Weapons (also know as the Biological Weapons Convention 

[BWC]), (ratified by the US on 29 March 1975), parties undertake not to develop, produce, 

or acquire biological agents or toxins ìof types and in quantities that have no justification 
Treaty, Legal, and Policy Considerations 

F-3 

for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes,î as well as weapons and means of 

delivery. The BWC does not establish a specific verification regime. Prior to the BWC, 

restrictions on the use of biological and chemical weapons were established in the aftermath 

of World War I. 

(1) The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 

Poisonous, or other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, also known as the 

Geneva Protocol of 1925, prohibits chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare. Most 

parties interpret the protocol as a prohibition only of the first use of these agents in war. It 

did not ban the development, production, and stockpiling of these weapons. 

(a) In 1974, the US Senate gave advice and consent to ratification of this 

protocol subject to the reservation that the United States would not be bound by the 

provisions with respect to an adversary state or its allies who fail to respect the prohibitions 

of the protocol. 

(b) On 22 January 1975, the United States ratified the protocol subject to this 

reservation. The protocol entered into force for the United States on 10 April 1975. 

(c) The relevance of the Geneva Protocol is largely superseded by the more 

restrictive Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and 

Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction (also known as the Chemical Weapons 

Convention [CWC]), summarized below. 

(2) The Presidential Statement on Chemical and Biological Weapons, 25 

November 1969, renounced the use by the United States of lethal biological agents and 

weapons and confined biological research to defensive measures such as immunization and 

safety. It also reaffirmed the renunciation of first use of chemical weapons and extended 

the renunciation to first use of incapacitating chemicals. 

c. Chemical Weapons

(1) The CWC, which entered into force on 26 April 1997, bans the acquisition, 

development, production, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It prohibits the use of 

RCAs as a method of warfare. It provides for the destruction of all chemical weapons 

stocks and production facilities within 10 years after entry into force. It contains a vigorous 

challenge regime to ensure compliance. The United States ratified the CWC on 25 April 

1997. 

See Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, codified as Title 22, 

United States Code, Section 6701 and Executive Order 13128 of June 25, 1999. 

(2) Executive Order No. 11850, 8 April 1975, Renunciation of Certain Uses in 

War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, renounced first use of herbicides in 

war (except for specified defensive uses) and first use of RCAs in war except for defensive 

military modes to save lives. 
Appendix F 

F-4 JP 3-11 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX G 

REFERENCES 

G-1 

The development of JP 3-11 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. Strategic Guidance and Policy 

a. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-17/Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive (HSPD)-4, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

b. NSPD-33/HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century. 

c. HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents.

d. HSPD-8, National Preparedness. 

e. HSPD-18, Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction.

f. NSPD-46, National Policy for Combating Terrorism. 

g. National Response Framework. 

h. National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

i. National Security Strategy. 

j. National Defense Strategy of the USA. 

k. National Military Strategy. 

l. National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

m. Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council 60, Nuclear Weapons 

Employment Policy Guidance. 

n. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. 

2. Department of Defense Publications 

a. DOD Directive (DODD) 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism Program. 

b. DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities. 

c. DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. 
Appendix G 

G-2 JP 3-11 

d. DODD 3150.8, DOD Response to Radiological Accidents. 

e. DOD 4500.54-G, Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide.

f. DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief.

g. DODI 2000.18, Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines. 

h. DODI 2000.21, Foreign Consequence Management (FCM). 

i. DODI 6055.1, DOD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program. 

j. DODI 6055.8, Occupational Radiation Protection Program. 

k. DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health.

l. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, Medical Management of 

Radiological Casualties.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications 

a. CJCS Concept Plan 0500, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence 

Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or 

High-Yield Explosives Situation. 

b. CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 2030.01B, Chemical Weapons Convention Compliance 

Policy Guidance. 

c. CJCSI 2700.01B, International Military Agreements for Rationalization, 

Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States, Its Allies, and Other 

Friendly Nations. 

d. CJCSI 3110.16A, Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Operations. 

e. CJCSI 3125.01A, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management 

Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield 

Explosive Situation.

f. CJCSI 3214.01C, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management 

Operations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents. 

g. CJCSI 3431.01B, Joint Nuclear Accident and Incident Response Team. 

h. CJCSI 5120.02A, Joint Doctrine Development System. 
References 

G-3 

i. CJCS Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

(JOPES) Volume I: (Planning Policies and Procedures). 

j. CJCSM 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume 

II, Planning Formats.

4. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

b. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

c. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

d. JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations.

e. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

f. JP 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

g. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

h. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental 

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations. 

i. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

j. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

k. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. 

l. JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

m. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 

n. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

o. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

p. JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.

q. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives 

Consequence Management. 

r. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 
Appendix G 

G-4 JP 3-11 

s. JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

t. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations. 

u. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

v. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

5. Multi-Service Publications 

a. FM 3-05.105/NTTP 3-11.30/AFTTP(I) 3-2.35, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures (MTTP) for Special Operations Forces in Nuclear, Biological, and 

Chemical Environments, (FOUO). 

b. FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-11/AFTTP(I) 3-2.42,

MTTP for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations.

c. FM 3-11.3/MCRP 3-37.2A/NTTP 3-11.25/AFTTP(I) 3-2.56, MTTP for CBRN 

Contamination Avoidance. 

d. FM 3-11.4/MCWP 3-37.2/NWP 3-11.27/AFTTP(I) 3-2.46, MTTP for NBC 

Protection.

e. FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NWP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60, MTTP for CBRN 

Decontamination.

f. FM 3-11.9/MCRP 3-37.1B/Navy Tactical Reference Publication (NTRP) 3-

11.32/AFTTP (I) 3-2.55, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds. 

g. FM 3-11.14/MCRP 3-37.1A/NTTP 3-11.28/AFTTP 3-2.54, MTTP for NBC 

Vulnerability Assessment.

h. FM 3-11.19/MCWP 3-37.4/NTTP 3-11.29/AFTTP(I) 3-2.44, MTTP for NBC 

Reconnaissance.

i. FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP(I) 3-2.27, MTTP for CBRN 

Consequence Management Operations.

j. FM 3-11.34/MCWP 3-37.5/NTTP 3-11.23/AFTTP(I) 3-2.33, MTTP for Intallation 

CBRN Defense. 

k. FM 3-11.86/MCRP 3-37.1C/NTTP 3-11.31/AFTTP(I) 3-2.52, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Biological Surveillance. 
References 

G-5 

l. FM 4-02.283/MCRP 4-11.1B/NTRP 4-02.21/Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 

44-161(I), Treatment of Nuclear and Radiological Casualties. 

m. FM 8-284/MCRP 4-11.1C/NTRP 4-02.23/AFMAN (I) 44-156, Treatment of 

Biological Warfare Agent Casualties. 

n. FM 4-02.285/MCRP 4-11.1A/NTRP 4-02.22/AFTTP(I) 3-2.69, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and 

Conventional Military Chemical Injuries.

6. Army Publications 

a. US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine Tech Guide 244, 

The Medical NBC Battlebook. 

b. USAMRIID, Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook. 

c. US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, Medical Management of 

Chemical Casualties Handbook. 

d. FM 3-11.22, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures. 

e. FM 3-90.15, Sensitive Site Exploitation. 

f. FM 4-02.7, Health Service Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

Environment Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 

7. US Air Force Publications 

a. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.8, Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Operations. 

b. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (Em) 

Program Planning And Operations. 

c. AFI 10-2603, Emergency Health Powers On Air Force Installation. 

d. AFI 10-2604, Disease Containment Planning Guidance. 

e. AFMAN 10-100, Airmanís Manual. 

f. AFMAN 10-2502, Volume 1, AF Emergency Management Program Standards and 

Procedures; AFMAN 10-2502, Volume 2, Major Accident, Hazardous Material, and 

Natural Disaster Standards and Procedures; AFMAN 10-2502, Volume 3, Contingency/ 

Wartime Enemy Attack with Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield 
Appendix G 

G-6 JP 3-11 

Explosive (CBRNE) Weapons and Terrorist Use of CBRNE Materials Standards and 

Procedures. 

8. US Navy and Marine Corps Publications 

a. Naval Air 00-80T-121, Chemical and Biological Naval Air Training and Operating 

Procedures Standardization (NATOPS). 

b. NTTP 3-20.21, Surface Ship Survivability.

c. NTTP 3-20.31.470, Shipboard Biological Warfare/Chemical Warfare Defense and 

Countermeasures.

d. MCWP 3-37, Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) NBC Defense Operations. 

9. Multinational Documents and Publications 

a. Emergency Response Guidebook 2008. 

b. NATO STANAG 2909, Commanderís Guidance on Defensive Measures Against 

Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TIC). 

c. NATO AMedP-6(C) Volume 1, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC 

Defensive Operations (Nuclear). 

d. NATO AMedP-6(C) Volume 2, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC 

Defensive Operations (Biological).

e. NATO AMedP-6(C) Volume 3, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC 

Defensive Operations (Chemical). 

f. Allied Engineering Publication-7, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

(CBRN) Defense Factors in the Design, Testing, and Acceptance of Military Equipment, 

(Edition 5). 
APPENDIX H 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

H-1 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint 

Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments 

should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and 

appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for 

this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5). 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 3-11, 11 July 2000, Joint Doctrine for Operations in 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-FDQ 

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

 CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10// 

 Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting 

Center, Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans 

and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that 

directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. 

The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when 

changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 
Appendix H 

H-2 JP 3-11 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

_____________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________________________ 

5. Distribution of Publications 

 Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be 

in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the 

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication 

to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy 

(Defense AttachÈ Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 

Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. 
GLOSSARY 

PART I - ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

GL-1 

AE aeromedical evacuation 

AFI Air Force instruction 

AFMAN Air Force manual 

AFMIC Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center 

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction) 

ALARA as low as reasonably achievable 

AMedP Allied Medical Publication 

AOI area of interest 

AOR area of responsibility 

APOD aerial port of debarkation 

BW biological warfare 

BWC Biological Weapons Convention 

C2 command and control 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCDR combatant commander 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

COA course of action 

COLPRO collective protection 

CONUS continental United States 

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DODI Department of Defense instruction 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

DU depleted uranium 

EMP electromagnetic pulse 

FM field manual (Army) 

FP force protection 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

HEMP high-altitude electromagnetic pulse 

HN host nation 

HNS host-nation support 

HSPD homeland security Presidential directive 

HSS health service support 

IGO intergovernmental organization 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-11 

IO information operations 

IPE individual protective equipment 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JFC joint force commander 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

JMAO joint mortuary affairs office 

JMETL joint mission-essential task list 

JP joint publication 

JSA joint security area 

JSC joint security coordinator 

kph kilometers per hour 

kt kiloton 

MADCP mortuary affairs decontamination collection point 

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication 

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication 

MHE materials handling equipment 

MOPP mission-oriented protective posture 

MSC Military Sealift Command 

MSR main supply route 

MTF medical treatment facility 

MTTP multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NSPD national security Presidential directive 

NTRP Navy tactical reference publication 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NWP Naval warfare publication 

OEG operational exposure guide 

OGA other government agency 

OPSEC operations security 

PA public affairs 

PHEO public health emergency officer 

PIR priority intelligence requirement 

POD port of debarkation 

POE port of embarkation 

PPE personal protective equipment 

PSS personnel services support 

PVNTMED preventive medicine 
Glossary 

GL-3 

RCA riot control agent 

RDD radiological dispersal device 

RED radiological exposure device 

RES radiation exposure status 

ROE rules of engagement 

ROM restriction of movement 

RSE retrograde support element 

RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SME subject matter expert 

SOF special operations forces 

SPOD seaport of debarkation 

STANAG standardization agreement (NATO) 

TIB toxic industrial biological 

TIC toxic industrial chemical 

TIM toxic industrial material 

TIR toxic industrial radiological 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

USAMRIID United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 

 Diseases 

USANCA United States Army Nuclear and Combating Weapons of 

 Mass Destruction Agency 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

VEE Venezuelan equine encephalitis 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
GL-4 JP 3-11 

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for 

these terms and definitions. 

absorbed dose. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

acute radiation dose. Total ionizing radiation dose received at one time and over a period 

so short that biological recovery cannot occur. (1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11)

acute radiation syndrome. An acute illness caused by irradiation of the body by a high 

dose of penetrating radiation in a very short period of time. Also called ARS. (1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

aerosol. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

avoidance. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

binary chemical munition. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

biological agent. A microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals or 

causes the deterioration of materiel. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

biological ammunition. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

biological defense. None. ( Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

biological environment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

biological hazard. An organism, or substance derived from an organism, that poses a 

threat to human or animal health. This can include medical waste, samples of a 

microorganism, virus, or toxin (from a biological source) that can impact human 

health. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

biological operation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

biological threat. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

biological warfare. Employment of biological agents to produce casualties in personnel or 

animals, or damage to plants or materiel; or defense against such employment. (JP 1-

02; JP 3-11) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition 

and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-5 

biological weapon. An item of materiel which projects, disperses, or disseminates a 

biological agent including arthropod vectors. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

blister agent. A chemical agent which injures the eyes and lungs, and burns or blisters the 

skin. Also called vesicant agent. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

blood agent. A chemical compound, including the cyanide group, that affects bodily 

functions by preventing the normal utilization of oxygen by body tissues. (JP 1-02; JP 

3-11) 

centigray. A unit of absorbed dose of radiation (one centigray equals one rad). (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

chemical agent. A chemical substance which is intended for use in military operations to 

kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate mainly through its physiological effects. The term 

excludes riot control agents when used for law enforcement purposes, herbicides, 

smoke, and flames. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its definition modify 

the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

chemical ammunition. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

chemical ammunition cargo. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

chemical, biological, and radiological operation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 

1-02.)

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense. Measures taken to minimize or 

negate the vulnerabilities and/or effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, or 

nuclear incident. Also called CBRN defense. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This 

term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment. Conditions found in an 

area resulting from immediate or persisting effects of chemical, biological, 

radiological, or nuclear attacks or unintentional releases. Also called CBRN 

environment. (JP 1-02; JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard. Chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear elements that could cause an adverse affect through their 

accidental or deliberate release, dissemination, or impacts. Also called CBRN hazard. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection. Measures that are taken to 

keep chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards from having an 

adverse effect on personnel, equipment, or critical assets and facilities. Also called 

CBRN protection. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-11 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear sense. Activities that continually provide 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat and hazard information and 

intelligence in a timely manner to support the common operational picture. Also called 

CBRN sense. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear shape. The command and control activity 

that integrates the sense, shield, and sustain operational elements to characterize 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards and threats and employ 

necessary capabilities to counter their effects. Also called CBRN shape. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear shield. Individual and collective 

protection measures essential to mitigating the effects of chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear hazards. Also called CBRN shield. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear sustain. The decontamination and 

medical activities to restore combat power and continue operations. Also called CBRN 

sustain. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident. Any occurrence, resulting from 

the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and devices; the 

emergence of secondary hazards arising from counterforce targeting; or the release of 

toxic industrial materials into the environment, involving the emergence of chemical, 

biological, radiological and nuclear hazards. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved 

for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon. A fully engineered assembly 

designed for employment to cause the release of a chemical or biological agent or 

radiological material onto a chosen target or to generate a nuclear detonation. Also 

called CBRN weapon. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-

02.) 

chemical contamination. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

chemical defense. None. ( Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

chemical environment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

chemical hazard. Any chemical manufactured, used, transported, or stored which can 

cause death or other harm through toxic properties of those materials. This includes 

chemical agents and chemical weapons (prohibited under the Chemical Weapons 

Convention), as well as toxic industrial chemicals and toxic industrial materials. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-7 

chemical operation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

chemical warfare. All aspects of military operations involving the employment of lethal 

and incapacitating munitions/agents and the warning and protective measures 

associated with such offensive operations. Since riot control agents and herbicides are 

not considered to be chemical warfare agents, those two items will be referred to 

separately or under the broader term “chemical,” which will be used to include all 

types of chemical munitions/agents collectively. Also called CW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-11) 

chemical weapon. Together or separately, (a) a toxic chemical and its precursors, except 

when intended for a purpose not prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention; 

(b) a munition or device, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through 

toxic properties of those chemicals specified in (a), above, which would be released as 

a result of the employment of such munition or device; (c) any equipment specifically 

designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions or devices 

specified in (b), above. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

clearance decontamination. The final level of decontamination that provides the 

decontamination of equipment and personnel to a level that allows unrestricted 

transportation, maintenance, employment, and disposal. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

collective nuclear, biological, and chemical protection. None. (Approved for removal 

from JP 1-02.)

collective protection. The protection provided to a group of individuals which permits 

relaxation of individual chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection. Also 

called COLPRO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

contaminate. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

contaminated remains. Remains of personnel which have absorbed or upon which have 

been deposited radioactive material, or biological or chemical agents. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 4-06) 

contamination. 1. The deposit, absorption, or adsorption of radioactive material, or of 

biological or chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects. See also 

fallout; residual radiation. 2. Food and/or water made unfit for consumption by 

humans or animals because of the presence of environmental chemicals, radioactive 

elements, bacteria or organisms, the byproduct of the growth of bacteria or organisms, 

the decomposing material (to include the food substance itself), or waste in the food or 

water. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its definition modify the existing 

term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-11 

contamination avoidance. Individual and/or unit measures taken to reduce the effects of 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

contamination control. A combination of preparatory and responsive measures designed 

to limit the vulnerability of forces to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 

toxic industrial hazards and to avoid, contain, control exposure to, and, where possible, 

neutralize them. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

decontamination. The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, 

destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, 

or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-11) 

detection. 1. In tactical operations, the perception of an object of possible military interest 

but unconfirmed by recognition. 2. In surveillance, the determination and transmission 

by a surveillance system that an event has occurred. 3. In arms control, the first step in 

the process of ascertaining the occurrence of a violation of an arms control agreement. 

4. In chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments, the act of locating 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards by use of chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear detectors or monitoring and/or survey teams. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

fallout. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

half-life. The time required for the activity of a given radioactive species to decrease to half 

of its initial value due to radioactive decay. The half-life is a characteristic property of 

each radioactive species and is independent of its amount or condition. The effective 

half-life of a given isotope is the time in which the quantity in the body will decrease to 

half as a result of both radioactive decay and biological elimination. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

herbicide. A chemical compound that will kill or damage plants. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-11) 

immediate decontamination. Decontamination carried out by individuals immediately 

upon becoming contaminated to save lives, minimize casualties, and limit the spread of 

contamination. This may include decontamination of some personal clothing and/or 

equipment. Also called emergency decontamination. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are 

approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

improvised nuclear device. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-9 

incapacitating agent. A chemical agent, which produces temporary disabling conditions 

which (unlike those caused by riot control agents) can be physical or mental and persist 

for hours or days after exposure to the agent has ceased. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are 

approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

individual protection. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

individual protective equipment. In chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 

operations, the personal clothing and equipment required to protect an individual from 

chemical, biological, and radiological hazards and some nuclear hazards. Also called 

IPE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its definition modify the existing 

term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

industrial chemicals. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

initial radiation. The radiation, essentially neutrons and gamma rays, resulting from a 

nuclear burst and emitted from the fireball within one minute after burst. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

ionizing radiation. Particulate (alpha, beta, and neutron) and electromagnetic (X-ray and 

gamma) radiation of sufficient energy to displace electrons from atoms, producing 

ions. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

mission-oriented protective posture. A flexible system of protection against chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination. This posture requires personnel to 

wear only that protective clothing and equipment (mission-oriented protective posture 

gear) appropriate to the threat level, work rate imposed by the mission, temperature, 

and humidity. Also called MOPP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

mission-oriented protective posture gear. Military term for individual protective 

equipment including suit, boots, gloves, mask with hood, first aid treatments, and 

decontamination kits issued to military members. Also called MOPP gear. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

nerve agent. A potentially lethal chemical agent which interferes with the transmission of 

nerve impulses. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

nonpersistent agent. A chemical agent that when released dissipates and/or loses its 

ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15 minutes. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

nuclear, biological, and chemical-capable nation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 

1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-11 

nuclear, biological, and chemical conditions. None. (Approved for removal from JP 

1-02.) 

nuclear, biological, and chemical defense. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

nuclear, biological, and chemical environment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 

1-02.) 

nuclear defense. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

nuclear radiation. Particulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in 

various nuclear processes. The important nuclear radiations, from the weapon 

standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

nuclear weapon. A complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear 

type), in its intended ultimate configuration which, upon completion of the prescribed 

arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of producing the intended nuclear 

reaction and release of energy. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

operational decontamination. Decontamination carried out by an individual and/or a unit, 

restricted to specific parts of operationally essential equipment, materiel and/or 

working areas, in order to minimize contact and transfer hazards and to sustain 

operations. This may include decontamination of the individual beyond the scope of 

immediate decontamination, as well as decontamination of mission-essential spares 

and limited terrain decontamination. See also decontamination; immediate 

decontamination; thorough decontamination. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11)

operational exposure guide. The maximum amount of nuclear/external ionizing radiation 

that the commander considers a unit may be permitted to receive while performing a 

particular mission or missions. Also called OEG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This 

term and its definition modify the existing term “operation exposure guide” and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

overpressure. The pressure resulting from the blast wave of an explosion. It is referred to 

as “positive” when it exceeds atmospheric pressure and “negative” during the passage 

of the wave when resulting pressures are less than atmospheric pressure. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

pathogen. A disease producing microorganism that directly attacks human tissue and 

biological processes. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its definition 

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-11 

persistency. In biological or chemical warfare, the characteristic of an agent which pertains 

to the duration of its effectiveness under determined conditions after its dispersal. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

persistent agent. A chemical agent that, when released, remains able to cause casualties 

for more than 24 hours to several days or weeks. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

personal protective equipment. The equipment provided to shield or isolate a person 

from the chemical, physical, and thermal hazards that can be encountered at a 

hazardous materials incident. Personal protective equipment includes both personal 

protective clothing and respiratory protection. Also called PPE. See also individual 

protective equipment. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-

02.) 

precursor. Any chemical reactant which takes place at any stage in the production by 

whatever method of a toxic chemical. This includes any key component of a binary or 

multicomponent chemical system. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

protection. 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related 

military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and 

infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given 

operational area. 2. In space usage, active and passive defensive measures to ensure 

that United States and friendly space systems perform as designed by seeking to 

overcome an adversary’s attempts to negate them and to minimize damage if negation 

is attempted. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

radiation dose. The total amount of ionizing radiation absorbed by material or tissues. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

radiation dose rate. Measurement of radiation dose per unit of time. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-11) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are 

approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

radiation exposure status. Criteria to assist the commander in measuring unit exposure to 

radiation based on total past cumulative dose, normally expressed in centigray. Also 

called RES. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

radiological dispersal device. An improvised assembly or process, other than a nuclear 

explosive device, designed to disseminate radioactive material in order to cause 

destruction, damage, or injury. Also called RDD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This 

term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-12 JP 3-11 

radiological exposure device. A radioactive source placed to cause injury or death. Also 

called RED. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

residual radiation. Nuclear radiation caused by fallout, artificial dispersion of radioactive 

material, or irradiation which results from a nuclear explosion and persists longer than 

one minute after burst. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

riot control agent. Any chemical, not listed in a schedule of the Convention on the 

Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 

Weapons and on their Destruction which can produce rapidly in humans sensory 

irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following 

termination of exposure. Also called RCA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term 

and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

split-mission oriented protective posture. The concept of maintaining heightened 

protective posture only in those areas (or zones) that are contaminated, allowing 

personnel in uncontaminated areas to continue to operate in a reduced posture. Also 

called split-MOPP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

survey. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

thermal radiation. 1. The heat and light produced by a nuclear explosion. 2. 

Electromagnetic radiations emitted from a heat or light source as a consequence of its 

temperature; it consists essentially of ultraviolet, visible, and infrared radiations. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11)

thorough decontamination. Decontamination carried out by a unit, with or without 

external support, to reduce contamination on personnel, equipment, materiel, and/or 

working areas equal to natural background or to the lowest possible levels, to permit 

the partial or total removal of individual protective equipment and to maintain 

operations with minimum degradation. This may include terrain decontamination 

beyond the scope of operational decontamination. See also immediate 

decontamination; operational decontamination. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

toxic chemical. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

toxic industrial biological. Any biological material manufactured, used, transported, or 

stored by industrial, medical, or commercial processes which could pose an infectious 

or toxic threat. Also called TIB. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

toxic industrial chemical. A chemical developed or manufactured for use in industrial 

operations or research by industry, government, or academia. For example: pesticides, 

petrochemicals, fertilizers, corrosives, poisons, etc. These chemicals are not primarily 
Glossary 

GL-13 

manufactured for the specific purpose of producing human casualties or rendering 

equipment, facilities, or areas dangerous for human use. Hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen 

chloride, phosgene, and chloropicrin are industrial chemicals that also can be military 

chemical agents. Also called TIC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) (This term and its 

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

toxic industrial material. A generic term for toxic or radioactive substances in solid, 

liquid, aerosolized, or gaseous form that may be used, or stored for use, for industrial, 

commercial, medical, military, or domestic purposes. Toxic industrial material may be 

chemical, biological, or radioactive and described as toxic industrial chemical, toxic 

industrial biological, or toxic industrial radiological. Also called TIM. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-11) This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

toxic industrial radiological. Any radiological material manufactured, used, transported, 

or stored by industrial, medical, or commercial processes. For example: spent fuel 

rods, medical sources, etc. Also called TIR. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11) 

toxin. Poisonous substances that may be produced naturally (by bacteria, plants, fungi, 

snakes, insects, and other living organisms) or synthetically. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-11) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are 

approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

toxin agent. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

vesicant agent. See blister agent. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-11)
Glossary 

GL-14 JP 3-11 

Intentionally Blank 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATIONS

PLANS SYSTEM

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-11 Operations