Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC18-150

____________

SHAWN ROGERS,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

September 5, 2019

PER CURIAM.

Shawn Rogers appeals his conviction and death sentence for the first-degree 

murder of Ricky Dean Martin. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. 

Const. For the reasons we explain, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 30, 2012, Shawn Rogers was an inmate at the Santa Rosa 

Correctional Institution, serving a life sentence for a 2002 conviction for robbery 

with a firearm and a concurrent fifteen-year sentence for aggravated battery with a 

firearm arising out of the same incident. That afternoon, Rogers was moved into 

cell D1-117, where he would become cellmates with another inmate, Ricky Dean
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Martin. Prior to the move, both Rogers and Martin were asked if they had a 

problem with the move, and they both indicated that they did not. At 7 p.m. that 

evening, a routine security check was conducted by corrections staff. Officer 

Beaudry conducted the check of cell D1-117. At that time, Beaudry saw both 

Rogers and Martin, Rogers asked Beaudry for the time, and neither inmate 

indicated that he was having a problem with the other.

At approximately 7:10 p.m., Officer Givens noticed that many inmates on 

the wing were being loud and carrying on more than normal. Givens began to 

walk around to try to determine which inmates were making noise. When Givens 

arrived at cell D1-117, Rogers was standing at the door and said to Givens, “Hey 

man. He’s cutting himself. Y’all need to get in here and stop him.” Rogers was 

referring to Martin and complaining that Martin was harming himself. Through 

the window in the cell door, Givens observed Martin lying on the ground with a 

prayer rug covering his head and most of his body down to his waist. Martin 

appeared to be lying on his back with his hands behind his back, his elbows 

slightly protruding from under the rug, and oriented with his feet closest to the 

door. Givens directed Martin to show his hands and stop cutting himself, but 

Martin did not respond. Givens could see blood on the floor around Martin and on 

the walls beside him.
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Based on his training and in an attempt to stop Martin from cutting himself, 

Givens deployed pepper spray at Martin’s exposed elbow through the handcuffing 

portal in the cell door. In reaction to the spray, Martin rolled onto his side, and 

Givens could see then that his hands were tied behind his back with white strips of 

cloth, which were made from a torn bedsheet. Givens then called for assistance,

and Rogers, who was cooperative and appeared to be uninjured, was removed from 

the cell and secured in a shower area, where another inmate observed him drop a 

small object into the shower drain.

Once officers entered cell D1-117 and removed the prayer rug from Martin, 

they observed Martin with a string tied around his neck, hands tied behind his 

back, feet tied together, pants pulled down, and a pair of boxers over his head. 

There were bloody handprints on one of the cell walls near his body. Once the 

boxers were removed from Martin’s head, it became apparent that he had severe 

facial injuries. Martin was unresponsive, and his breathing was becoming 

increasingly labored, so he was transported to the prison’s on-site emergency 

room.

At the on-site emergency room, Martin had a seizure, and a registered nurse 

determined that he appeared to have severe brain damage. Martin was gurgling 

blood in his mouth and was turned on his side to have the blood suctioned out of 

his mouth. When Martin was turned on his side, matter or bodily fluids came out 
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of his ear, and the nurse observed that part of one ear was missing. Because of the 

severity of his injuries, Martin was transported from the prison to a local hospital 

for further treatment.

Martin was admitted to the hospital with extensive head injuries, diagnosed 

with an intracranial hemorrhage, and given a poor prognosis. Martin had no 

neurological response and was placed on a ventilator due to respiratory failure. 

Over the next few days, Martin’s respiratory condition continued to deteriorate, 

and he developed pneumonia. Nine days after the attack, Martin was declared 

brain dead and taken off life support. He was pronounced dead at 11:36 a.m. on 

April 8, 2012.

Rogers was subsequently charged in Martin’s death with first-degree murder 

and kidnapping to terrorize or inflict bodily harm. The State provided notice that it 

intended to seek the death penalty. Rogers demanded a speedy trial and elected to 

represent himself throughout the guilt phase and for a portion of the penalty phase

before electing to be represented by counsel instead.

During the guilt phase, the medical examiner, Dr. Minyard, testified that an 

autopsy revealed the cause of Martin’s death to be blunt impact to his head and the 

manner of death to be homicide. Martin had several external injuries to his face 

and scalp, caused by blunt force trauma, and wounds made by a sharp weapon on 

his chest and left upper extremity. Martin’s brain was severely injured, with 
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subdural hemorrhaging apparent. Dr. Minyard opined that it was possible that 

Martin’s injuries could have been sustained in less than five minutes. 

Rogers chose to testify during the guilt phase and gave his version of the 

events surrounding the murder. Rogers claimed that when he was transferred into 

Martin’s cell, it was filthy. Rogers started cleaning the cell and “talking shit” to 

Martin, calling him “a dirty-ass cracker” and “filthy motherfucker,” and “cussing 

him out” “real aggressively.” Rogers finished cleaning and got on the top bunk to 

listen to the radio. When Rogers looked down, he noticed that Martin was cutting 

himself with some type of razor or sharp, metal object. Rogers believed that 

Martin felt he needed to get moved out of the cell away from Rogers and was 

likely cutting in an attempt to get transferred to the medical wing. Rogers jumped 

down from the top bunk and said to Martin, “What the fuck’s wrong with you, 

man? You’re acting like a little bitch.” Rogers told Martin that if he did not stop 

cutting himself, Rogers was going to put his foot in Martin’s ass. Martin kept 

saying, “Oh, I got to get up out of here.” At that time, Rogers put a shirt over the 

window in the cell door. According to Rogers, this is done when inmates want to 

fight without getting in trouble. Martin then started yelling and making a lot of 

noise. Rogers threw a combination of three or four punches at Martin, and when 

Martin fell down, Rogers started kicking him in the face. Rogers stomped Martin’s 

head into the concrete six or seven times. Martin was screaming and yelling like 
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he was in pain during the attack. Rogers said that Martin kept trying to get up and 

that is how the bloody handprints got on the cell wall. When Martin tried to get 

up, Rogers knocked him back down and continued to kick him. Rogers described 

a portion of the attack as follows:

I kicked him in the face and said, [t]his is for Trayvon Martin, 

motherfucker. I kicked him in the face again and said, [t]his is for 

Trayvon Martin, motherfucker. I kicked him a third time and said, 

[t]his is for Trayvon Martin, you pussy-ass fuck boy. I kicked him in 

the face a fourth time and said, [t]his is for Martin Luther King. I 

kicked him in the face a fifth time and said, [t]his is for Emmett Till 

and all the other black people you crackers done killed.

Rogers said Martin never came at Rogers or had a chance to try to throw a 

punch at him. Martin was just sitting there when Rogers started beating him and 

he was helpless to every blow and punch and kick that Rogers delivered. When 

Rogers realized that Martin was not going to stop trying to get up, he tore up a 

bedsheet and used the strips of cloth to tie Martin up. Rogers also put cloth in 

Martin’s mouth and “tied his mouth up so he couldn’t scream no more.” When 

asked if Martin was still moving and trying to get up while Rogers was tearing the 

bedsheets, Rogers responded, “Yea. Like – I don’t know. I guess like – kind of 

like when you step on a roach, man. They still be alive, but they still be moving.” 

Rogers described the end of the attack:

By then, he was beat up bad and breathing hard, and I asked all 

the brothers on the wing, Who wants me to kill this pussy-ass cracker? 

A lot of them said, Yeah. But my lil’ homie Y.O., Steve Young, said, 

Big Brother, don’t kill that cracker just put him on the door. I said, 
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Bro, God going to bless you, Y.O., because I was going to kill this 

fuck boy on the strength -- I said, Blue Flame Midnight Crip Gang. 

Then Mr. Martin’s gang brothers started cussing me out and 

threatening me about what they going to do. Now, I never raped Mr. 

Martin or slapped him on his ass, but I pretended I did and made the 

slapping sounds to make his brother -- his gang brothers mad.[1]

 And I 

covered him up with a prayer rug and pulled his pants down to make 

his gang brothers think that it was real.

Rogers went on to tell the jury:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if you’re asking yourself if I 

beat Mr. Martin up about the murder of Trayvon Martin, my honest 

answer is, you’re goddamn right I did, but there was also other 

factors. When I first met Mr. Martin and looked him in his eyes, I 

knew all for real what he was all about. He was a straight bitch, a 

snitch, and an undercover racist. That’s the vibe he gave off. I’m 

from Brooklyn, New York[,] and been in the streets my whole life, so 

my instincts are good when it comes to reading people. 

And the more I got to learn about Mr. Martin, my suspicions 

had been confirmed. Mr. Martin is everything I despised in life: A 

snitch, a coward, and a straight fuck boy. I got no love for [the] dude 

or no sympathy. I don’t feel bad about it. I don’t feel no remorse. 

I’m not losing any sleep over the death of Ricky Martin and neither is 

anybody else.

. . . .

Convicts know how to do time, inmates don’t. Ricky Martin 

was an inmate, a cry baby, a cutter, not even man enough to stand up 

in his pants for what he claimed he believed in. He would rather tell 

the police if he got a problem and check-in with protective custody. I 

would never have no sympathy for no buster like that.

. . . .

And I believe in the Midnight Crip Gang to the fullest. I’ve 

been A-1 since day one, from Spofford Juvenile Detention Center in 

 

1. Rogers had testified previously—and that testimony was admitted at 

trial—that after Martin was tied up, Rogers pulled down Martin’s pants and 

spanked him so everyone could hear, while yelling out, “This is some sweet 

cracker ass,” with the intent of humiliating Martin.
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New York, to Rikers Island, to Florida State [P]rison. I’m a Midnight 

Crip, and I would be less of a man to get in front of the jury -- in front 

of y’all in this situation and pretend that it’s anything different while 

there’s brothers in the streets dying and catching life sentences 

everyday about this blue flag.

When my mom was smoking crack and my pops was nowhere 

to be found, it was the Crip Gang that took me in. They been my 

family when I had no family. When I was doing time and didn’t have 

nothing, Crip made sure I had a care package. Some people believe in 

religion and that’s great, but I believe in my gang. And I’m willing to 

die about that, I’m willing to live about that, and I’m down for 

whatever. That’s what you call true blue.

I said all this because I firmly believe that if you stand for 

something, you stand firm in your convictions regardless of the 

consequences. The bottom line is I’m responsible for the death of 

Ricky Martin. I accept that responsibility, but I also want it noted the 

negligence, stupidity, and incompetence of the Florida Department of 

Corrections.

I’m not going to change the way I do my time, and you can ask 

anybody that knows me, I’ve been the same way my whole life. I 

don’t change up. I don’t flip-flop. You will always know where I 

stand and what I’m about because I’ve been thoroughly consistent all 

these years. Loyalty is all I know.

. . . .

Society is not made for people like me. Society is full of fake 

people, fake friendships, fake relationships, fake, but with me, what 

you see is what you get. There’s nothing fake or phony about me. 

I’m O.G. Jigga Man, Midnight Crip Gang, 103 Eastside Trey’z up, 

and that’s why I can get on this witness stand and look you, ladies and 

gentlemen, in the face, of the Jury, and tell you that I could care less 

about Ricky Martin, and I meant everything I said.

The jury found Rogers guilty as charged of first-degree premeditated murder 

or felony murder and kidnapping to terrorize or inflict bodily harm.

At the penalty phase, the State presented records of Rogers’ prior felony 

convictions as well as his own admissions regarding those convictions, which were 
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made during a prior proceeding. When Rogers was a minor, he was convicted as 

an adult for armed robbery with a firearm of an individual at a train platform. 

Rogers was also convicted in 2002 of robbery with a firearm and aggravated 

battery with a firearm for robbing a cab driver, whom he struck with the firearm 

and knocked out a tooth. The State also presented additional testimony from the 

medical examiner, Dr. Minyard, regarding the injuries Martin suffered.

In mitigation, Rogers presented evidence in the form of testimony from eight 

inmates regarding their interactions with Rogers. The inmates described Rogers as 

“a humble soul,” peaceful, “a straight-up dude” with “a good heart,” a good friend 

who gives advice, encourages them to become educated, to work out, to eat 

healthy, and lends items to individuals who need them. The inmates considered 

Rogers a good friend and mentor.

Rogers also presented testimony from a number of experts: Dr. Marvin 

Dunn, a community psychologist; Dr. Mark Rubino, a neurologist; Dr. Joseph Wu, 

a physician who specializes in neuropsychiatric imaging assessments of brain 

injury; and Dr. Julie Harper, a licensed psychologist. Several of the experts 

testified regarding Rogers’ difficult childhood. Rogers was born in New York City 

and brought home from the hospital to a housing project. His mother was a drug 

addict and psychiatrically unstable; he never knew his father. When Rogers was 

two years old, his mother surrendered him to foster care. From that point, Rogers 
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was placed in various foster homes and group homes, lived off and on with his 

maternal grandmother, and sometimes was placed back with his own mother. 

When Rogers was fourteen, he was placed in an inpatient psychiatric care facility. 

An assessment done at that time indicated that he could be impulsive and 

distractible with consequent poor judgment, which is consistent with attention 

deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). He was also diagnosed with conduct 

disorder at that facility. He has also been diagnosed with major depressive 

disorder, anxiety disorder, and antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). After being 

released from the psychiatric facility, Rogers became involved with the department 

of juvenile justice, into whose custody he kept returning. Before the age of twenty, 

Rogers had several periods of incarceration in the New York Department of 

Corrections.

The experts also testified that Rogers has impulse control problems that are 

explained by his upbringing and head injuries suffered as a child. Dr. Rubino 

reviewed a CAT scan of Rogers’ brain and opined that Rogers had at least one 

indication of traumatic brain injury in his frontal temporal region, a right frontal 

hygroma, and that portions of Rogers’ brain, including the frontal lobe, had 

atrophied. Dr. Rubino said that when a person has an injury to his frontal temporal 

region, that person can have impulse control problems and loss of judgment and 

appreciation of consequences. Dr. Wu reviewed a PET scan of Rogers’ brain, in 
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which he observed damage to the orbitofrontal areas of the brain, which are 

important for the regulation of aggressive impulses.

In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Greg Prichard, a forensic psychologist. Dr. 

Prichard diagnosed Rogers with ASPD. Dr. Prichard said that individuals with 

ASPD often have abnormal brain scans. Dr. Prichard testified that Rogers was in 

an adult prison in New York from the age of seventeen to twenty-one for attempted 

robbery and within a year of his release, Rogers hit a taxi cab driver in the mouth 

with a gun during another robbery and received a life sentence for that crime in 

Florida at age twenty-two in 2002. That same year, Rogers tied up his cellmate 

and beat him up. In 2005, Rogers again tied up a cellmate and beat him because 

Rogers said the man “disrespected” him. Rogers told Dr. Prichard that he felt like 

he beat that cellmate worse than Martin. In 2009, Rogers stabbed another inmate 

in the head with a knife and kneed another inmate in the face. As evidence of 

Rogers’ ability to plan and premeditate, Dr. Prichard referred to a letter written by 

Rogers to a predecessor judge in which Rogers admitted that he had decided to kill 

the next white man he came across. He pointed out that in Rogers’ letter to the 

predecessor judge, Rogers said that he intended to kill Martin in the cell that night 

and only stopped because another inmate begged him. Rogers bragged in the letter 

that he is a “ruthless, cold-blooded, cutthroat, gangsta [sic], blood killer, and killer 

of any and everything that go [sic] against the Crips gang.” Rogers also stated that 
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he knows he is a sociopath and that he has no remorse, regard, or regret for 

anything he has done in his life.

During the charge conference, the defense made no objections to the 

aggravating factors, the final jury instructions, or the verdict form. After the 

instructions were read to the jury, the judge asked if the parties had any objections 

to the instructions as read, and both parties stated that they did not. 

The jury was instructed that it must “unanimously determine whether the 

aggravating factors alleged by the State have been proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” The jury was instructed to consider the following aggravating factors: (1) 

that Rogers was previously convicted of a felony and under sentence of 

imprisonment at the time he committed the murder; (2) that Rogers was previously 

convicted of felonies involving the use or threat of violence to another person, 

specifically robbery with a firearm, aggravated battery with a firearm, and 

attempted robbery; (3) that the murder was committed while Rogers was engaged 

in the commission of a kidnapping; (4) that the murder was especially heinous, 

atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (5) that the murder was committed in a cold, 

calculated, and premeditated (CCP) manner without any pretense of moral or legal 

justification. Ultimately, the jury found unanimously that all five aggravating 

factors were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court also found that all 

five aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and assigned significant 
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weight to aggravator three—the murder was committed while Rogers was engaged 

in the commission of a kidnapping—and great weight to the other four aggravators.

The jury was also instructed to consider whether Rogers had established by 

the greater weight of the evidence the existence of any of the proposed sixty-eight 

mitigating circumstances. The proposed mitigating circumstances follow with the 

relevant findings made by the jury and the trial court and any weight assigned by 

the trial court detailed parenthetically: (1) the capital felony was committed while 

Rogers was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (not 

found by the jury or court); (2) the capacity of Rogers to appreciate the criminality 

of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 

substantially impaired (not found by the jury or court); (3) the age of Rogers at the 

time of the crime (not found by the jury or court); (4) Rogers suffers from major 

depression (not found by the jury; found by the court, very little weight); (5) 

Rogers has a history of multiple head injuries starting as a child (found to exist by 

jury vote of 10-2; moderate weight); (6) Rogers was born to a crack-addicted 

mother (not found by the jury or court); (7) Rogers does not know the identity of 

his father (not found by the jury; found by the court, no weight); (8) Rogers 

endured maternal abandonment (found by jury vote of 12-0; some weight); (9) 

Rogers endured paternal abandonment (not found by the jury; found by the court, 

little weight); (10) Rogers’ mother is mentally ill (not found by the jury; found by 
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the court, very little weight); (11) Rogers’ mother attempted suicide by jumping off 

a building with Rogers (not found by the jury; found by the court, little weight); 

(12) Rogers was emotionally abused and rejected by his mother (found by jury 

vote of 12-0; some weight); (13) Rogers was rejected by his maternal grandmother 

(not found by the jury or court); (14) Rogers was born into a dysfunctional family 

(found by jury vote of 12-0; some weight); (15) Rogers was separated from his 

biological brother, Christopher, as a toddler (found by jury vote of 9-3; some 

weight); (16) Rogers was separated from his biological brother, Kevin, who was 

born cocaine positive and removed at birth (not found by the jury; found by the 

court, very little weight); (17) Rogers was separated from his biological brother, 

Sherrod, who was born cocaine positive and removed at birth (not found by the 

jury; found by the court, very little weight); (18) Rogers was exposed to drugs at 

an early age by his mother, who made him inject her with drugs (not found by the 

jury; found by the court, some weight); (19) the death of Rogers’ maternal 

grandmother was traumatic for him (not found by the jury or court); (20) Rogers 

never received grief counseling after the loss of his grandmother (not found by the 

jury or court); (21) Rogers has never been shown love or affection (not found by 

the jury or court); (22) Rogers loves his mother in spite of the maltreatment and 

neglect by her (not found by the jury; found by the court, very little weight); (23) 

Rogers loves his brother, Christopher (not found by the jury; found by the court, 
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very little weight); (24) Rogers has empathy for his mother (not found by the jury;

found by the court, little weight); (25) Rogers has encouraged his brother to do 

well (not found by the jury; found by the court, very little weight); (26) Rogers has 

counseled his brother on the importance of his education (not found by the jury;

found by the court, very little weight); (27) Rogers will continue to be a source of 

emotional support to his brother (not found by the jury or court); (28) Rogers lived 

on the streets when he was homeless (found by jury vote of 12-0; some weight); 

(29) Rogers grew up in poverty during developmental years (found by jury vote of 

10-2; some weight); (30) Rogers spent his early years in the Marcy Projects in 

Brooklyn (found by jury vote of 5-7; some weight); (31) Rogers moved to multiple 

foster homes (found by jury vote of 8-4; some weight); (32) the psychological 

impact of being placed in foster care (found by jury vote of 9-3; some weight); (33) 

Rogers experienced inadequate nutrition as a child (not found by the jury or court); 

(34) Rogers attended at least eight schools by the age of thirteen (found by jury 

vote of 1-11; very little weight); (35) Rogers witnessed multiple violent acts in his 

neighborhood (found by jury vote of 10-2; some weight); (36) Rogers was sent to a 

children’s group home, The Children’s Village (not found by the jury; found by the 

court, very little weight); (37) Rogers was moved to another group home, Edwin 

Gould Academy (not found by the jury; found by the court, very little weight); (38) 

Rogers was admitted to a children’s psychiatric hospital at the age of fourteen
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(found by jury vote of 12-0; moderate weight); (39) Rogers did not have a stable 

childhood (found by jury vote of 12-0; some weight); (40) Rogers was exposed to 

racial tension and discrimination in his life (found by jury vote of 11-1; some 

weight); (41) Rogers suffers from brain damage (found by jury vote of 1-11; some 

weight); (42) Rogers suffers from neurological deficits (found by jury vote of 1-11;

some weight); (43) Rogers was exposed to acts of violence while in high-security 

juvenile detention facilities (found by jury vote of 12-0; some weight); (44) Rogers 

sustained head trauma at age fourteen, when he was hit in the head with a metal 

pipe or metal chair or both, which resulted in metal fragments being left in his 

skull while in a juvenile detention facility (found by jury vote of 10-2; some 

weight); (45) Rogers sustained head trauma and loss of consciousness when he was 

hit by a car at the approximate age of eight or nine (not found by the jury or court); 

(46) Rogers seeks to improve his knowledge base by reading articles and news (not 

found by the jury; found by the court, very little weight); (47) Rogers has spent 

years in solitary confinement (found by jury vote of 5-7; little weight); (48) Rogers 

cared for homeless boys on the streets (not found by the jury or court); (49) Rogers 

has mentored other inmates (not found by the jury; found by the court, very little 

weight); (50) Rogers has shared food and hygiene products as well as paper, 

envelopes, and stamps with other inmates (not found by the jury; found by the 

court, very little weight); (51) Rogers encouraged the relationship between his 
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girlfriend, Chloe Johnson, and her mother (not found by the jury; found by the 

court, very little weight); (52) Rogers suffers from attachment issues (not found by 

the jury or court); (53) Rogers suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder (not found 

by the jury; found by the court, little weight); (54) Rogers has frontal lobe damage 

(not found by jury; found by court, some weight); (55) Rogers has signs of a 

presumptive diagnosis of chronic traumatic encephalopathy (not found by the jury;

found by the court, some weight); (56) Rogers has suffered concussions (not found 

by the jury or court); (57) Rogers has neocortex damage (not found by the jury;

found by the court, some weight); (58) Rogers has suffered a subdural hematoma 

as evidenced by a right frontal hygroma (found by jury vote of 2-10; some weight); 

(59) there is a disparity in Rogers’ neuropsychological test, which is found in brain 

injury and consistent with Rogers’ imaging studies (found by jury vote of 10-2;

some weight); (60) Rogers is unable to calibrate or modulate his responses as a 

result of frontal lobe damage (not found by the jury or court); (61) Rogers is unable 

to conform his behavior due to a significantly compromised neocortex (not found 

by the jury or court); (62) Rogers suffers brain atrophy (found by jury vote of 2-10;

moderate weight); (63) Rogers’ judgment and decision-making are impaired (not 

found by jury or court); (64) Rogers has a lack of impulse control (not found by the 

jury or court); (65) Rogers cannot appreciate the consequences of his actions (not 

found by the jury or court); (66) Rogers suffers from racial hypersensitivity (not 
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found by the jury; found by the court, very little weight); (67) Rogers endured 

institutional failures (found by jury vote of 12-0; some weight); and (68) Rogers 

was diagnosed with ADHD (not found by the jury; found by the court, little 

weight).

The jury was also specifically instructed as follows:

[I]f your verdict is that the defendant should be sentenced to death, 

your finding that each aggravating factor exists must be unanimous, 

your finding that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose death 

must be unanimous, and your finding that the aggravating factors 

found to exist outweigh the established mitigating circumstances must 

be unanimous, and your decision . . . to impose a sentence of death 

must be unanimous. 

The jury unanimously found that the aggravating factors were sufficient to 

warrant a death sentence and that those factors outweighed the mitigating 

circumstances. The jury ultimately and unanimously concluded that Rogers should 

be sentenced to death.

Rogers subsequently waived his right to present additional evidence 

regarding mitigating circumstances at the Spencer2 hearing, and the court 

appointed special counsel for that purpose. Dr. Jethro Toomer, a clinical and 

forensic psychologist, testified on Rogers’ behalf at the Spencer hearing. Dr. 

Toomer testified that he did not “find any evidence of sociopathy or any diagnostic 

entities suggestive of antisocial personality disorder” and described Rogers’ 

 

2. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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condition as “toxic stress syndrome,” which “basically is a result of persistent 

exposure to traumatic and debilitating situations and environment.”

At sentencing, the trial court made its own findings with respect to the 

aggravation and mitigation, finding that all five aggravators were proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt and that forty-nine mitigating circumstances were established. It 

assigned the weight to each aggravator and mitigator as detailed above, see supra 

pp. 12-18, and ultimately sentenced Rogers to death.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the jury instructions during the penalty phase

Rogers first argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that 

it must determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the aggravating factors were 

sufficient to justify the death penalty and whether those factors outweighed the 

mitigating circumstances. Rogers concedes that he failed to request these 

instructions or object to the instructions as read to the jury but claims that the trial 

court’s failure to instruct on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for proof 

constitutes fundamental error. This argument is without merit.

In Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 53 (Fla. 2016), this Court held that “before 

a sentence of death may be considered by the trial court in Florida, the jury must 

find the existence of the aggravating factors proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 

that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose death, and that the aggravating 
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factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances.” But Hurst did not require that the 

determinations at issue here—that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose 

death and that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances—be 

made beyond a reasonable doubt. And when we amended Florida Standard 

Criminal Jury Instruction 7.11—Final Instructions in Penalty Proceedings—

Capital Cases—last year in order to conform with the requirements of Hurst v. 

Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, we fully considered the 

arguments made that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof should apply 

to the jury’s determinations of sufficiency of the aggravation and weighing of the 

aggravation and mitigation but ultimately declined to include a standard of proof 

for these determinations. See In re Standard Criminal Jury Instructions in Capital 

Cases, 244 So. 3d 172, 191-92 (Fla. 2018); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim) 7.11 (2018). 

Even more recently, we explained in Foster v. State, 258 So. 3d 1248, 1252 (Fla. 

2018),

the Hurst penalty phase findings are not elements of the capital felony 

of first-degree murder. Rather, they are findings required of a jury: 

(1) before the court can impose the death penalty for first-degree 

murder, and (2) only after a conviction or adjudication of guilt for 

first-degree murder has occurred.

To the extent that in Perry v. State, 210 So. 3d 630, 633 (Fla. 2016), we 

suggested that Hurst v. State held that the sufficiency and weight of the 

aggravating factors and the final recommendation of death are elements that must 
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be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, we mischaracterized Hurst v. 

State, which did not require that these determinations be made beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Since Perry, in In re Standard Criminal Jury Instructions in Capital Cases

and Foster, we have implicitly receded from its mischaracterization of Hurst v. 

State. We now do so explicitly. Thus, these determinations are not subject to the 

beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, and the trial court did not err in 

instructing the jury.

B. Admission of Rogers’ letters to the predecessor judge and state attorney

Rogers asserts that the trial court erred in admitting in their entirety during 

the guilt phase letters written by Rogers to a predecessor judge and the elected 

state attorney, which included his reflections on race, politics, and his own 

character and predispositions. Rogers claims that it was error to admit the letters in 

their entirety because portions of each were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. 

Because Rogers did not object to admission of the letters, we review this claim 

only for fundamental error, which we have “defined as error that ‘reaches down 

into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not 

have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.’ ” Brooks v. State,

762 So. 2d 879, 899 (Fla. 2000) (quoting McDonald v. State, 743 So. 2d 501, 505 

(Fla. 1999)).
- 22 -

There are four specific portions of the letters that Rogers claims were 

admitted in error. In those portions, Rogers discusses being a black revolutionary, 

a member of the Crips, and a ruthless, cold-blooded, cutthroat gangster, how he 

feels it is necessary to seek vengeance when white people kill black people, his 

lack of remorse for the murder, that he has a tendency to be very violent with little 

or no provocation, that he sees his problem with violence “getting worse as the 

years go by” and that “[a]ll I think about every day is who I can hurt and who I can 

kill. . . . Next time it may be corrections staff,” and states that this should be an 

easy case for the prosecution because he did kill Ricky Martin. Most of the 

statements to which Rogers objects were relevant, not outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice, and cumulative to his guilt phase testimony, and their admission 

certainly does not rise to the level of fundamental error. The statements that 

Rogers sees his problem with violence “getting worse as the years go by” and that 

“[a]ll I think about every day is who I can hurt and who I can kill. . . . Next time it 

may be corrections staff” were irrelevant, and if Rogers had objected to them, the 

trial court likely would have sustained the objection. But Rogers did not object 

and these two statements in the context of the entire trial do not rise to the level of 

fundamental error.

Rogers also asserts that admission of the letters during the guilt phase 

amounted to a denial of due process and fundamental error in the penalty phase. 
- 23 -

Rogers claims that by inflaming the jury’s emotions, Rogers’ reflections on race, 

politics, and his own character in the challenged portions of the letters precluded 

the jury from fairly judging the existence of the aggravating factors. This 

argument is unavailing. Because the challenged portions of the letters regarding 

Rogers’ reflections on race and his own character were essentially cumulative to 

his own testimony during the guilt phase, there is no reasonable possibility that the 

admission of the letters in their entirety affected the jury’s death recommendation. 

Even without the letters, the jury still would have heard from Rogers’ own mouth 

that he uses racist terms, considers himself a brutal gangster who would do 

anything, even die, for his gang, that he has no intention of changing the way he 

acts in prison—which is fairly interpreted to mean that he will continue to attack 

people if he feels he should do so—and that he has no remorse for the murder. 

And the only challenged statement that may be considered a reflection on politics

(“It’s 2013 and we have the 1st African-American president in this country[,] who 

is disrespected on a regular basis by his so-called colleagues in the political arena 

based on the color of his skin.”) was not prejudicial to Rogers.

Thus, we conclude that the admission of Rogers’ letters did not amount to 

fundamental error with respect to either phase of the trial. Rogers is not entitled to 

relief on this claim.
- 24 -

C. Application of the CCP aggravator

Rogers claims that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the CCP 

aggravator and that the jury’s and trial court’s findings of the CCP aggravator are 

not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The record does not support this 

claim.

Rogers did not object to the jury being instructed on CCP. During the 

charge conference, he agreed with the proposed instruction, and after the jury was 

instructed, Rogers had no objection to the instructions as read. Because Rogers 

failed to object to the instruction, he did not properly preserve this claim for 

appellate review. Even if we were to consider this claim on its merits, we would 

conclude that Rogers is not entitled to relief because there was credible and 

competent evidence to support the CCP instruction and thus, the trial court did not 

err in giving the instruction.

Regarding the finding of CCP, “[t]he standard of review this Court applies to 

a claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support an aggravating 

circumstance is that of competent, substantial evidence.” Guardado v. State, 965 

So. 2d 108, 115 (Fla. 2007). “When reviewing a trial court’s finding of an 

aggravator, ‘it is not this Court’s function to reweigh the evidence to determine 

whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 

doubt—that is the trial court’s job.’ ” Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 608 
- 25 -

(Fla. 2009) (quoting Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997)). We

“review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of law 

for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether competent[,] substantial 

evidence supports its finding.” Id. (quoting Willacy, 696 So. 2d at 695).

In order to establish the CCP aggravator, the evidence must 

show: (1) “the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and 

not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage 

(cold)”; (2) “the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to 

commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated)”; (3) “the 

defendant exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated)”; (4) 

“the defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.”

Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 195 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Franklin v. State, 965 

So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 2007)); see § 921.141(6)(i), Fla. Stat. (2017).

Here, there was competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the 

finding of the aggravator. Dr. Prichard testified that the killing was not an act 

prompted by “emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage,” and that the fact that 

Rogers stopped beating Martin in order to tie him up and to converse with other 

inmates demonstrates that there was a certain amount of restraint regarding the 

crime. According to Dr. Prichard, Rogers did not act wholly on impulsivity or just 

“lose control.” Dr. Prichard also opined that the homicide of Martin was not 

committed while Rogers was under the influence of an extreme mental or 

emotional disturbance. Dr. Prichard said that the murder was calculated, 

premeditated, and not based on any mental illness. In Dr. Prichard’s opinion, at 
- 26 -

the time of the crime, Rogers had the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 

conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Further, by 

Rogers’ own admissions, he planned for roughly a month to kill a white man in 

retaliation for the shooting of Trayvon Martin and he intended “to kill [Ricky 

Martin] in the cell that night.” Rogers also told Martin during the attack, that the 

purpose of the attack was revenge for white people killing Trayvon Martin and 

other black people. Finally, Rogers admitted that Martin did not provoke him or 

resist the attack in any way and that he killed Martin for “no good reason.” See 

Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 867 (Fla. 2009) (“CCP may be established by . . . 

‘lack of resistance or provocation . . . .’ ” (quoting Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 

270, 277 (Fla. 1988))). Thus, there is competent, substantial evidence in the record 

to support the finding of the CCP aggravator.

Even if Rogers had preserved his objection to the CCP instruction, and we 

determined that the CCP instruction was given or the findings were made in error, 

Rogers would still not be entitled to relief since any error would be deemed 

harmless. The trial court specifically stated in the sentencing order that “even if 

the CCP factor were not proven and was accorded no weight, the Court’s 

sentencing decision would remain the same. The combined weight [of] the other 

four aggravating circumstances, without considering CCP whatsoever, far 

outweigh the mitigating circumstances presented.” Thus, even if the application of
- 27 -

the CCP aggravator were erroneous, any such error would be found to be harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt because there is no reasonable possibility that trial court 

would have imposed a life sentence had it not found this aggravator applicable. 

See Calhoun v. State, 138 So. 3d 350, 362 (Fla. 2013) (holding that any error in 

finding an impermissible aggravator is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if there 

is no reasonable possibility that the evidence presented in mitigation is sufficient to 

outweigh the remaining aggravators).

D. Analysis of the prior violent felony aggravator

Rogers claims that in the process of analyzing the prior violent felony 

aggravator, the trial court improperly focused on Rogers’ “illegal use of violence 

against other people” but that Rogers was not actually convicted of a violent crime 

as a result of his use of “illegal violence against other people.” Rogers is mistaken.

In analyzing this aggravator, the trial court wrote:

It is uncontroverted that the Defendant was previously 

convicted of three felonies involving the use or threat of violence to 

another person. § 921.141(6)(b). In 1997, the Defendant was 

convicted of attempted robbery in the first degree and sentenced to 27 

to 54 months in prison in New York County case number 906-97. 

The conviction arose from an incident during which the Defendant 

used a gun to rob a man on a train platform.

In addition, as previously mentioned, the Defendant was 

previously convicted of robbery with a firearm and aggravated battery 

with a deadly weapon in Volusia County, Florida. During the 

criminal episode in Volusia County, the Defendant robbed a cab 

driver and used the gun to strike the driver in the mouth. When the 

Defendant battered the driver, he knocked out one of the driver’s 

teeth.
- 28 -

In a letter to Judge Goodman dated March 31, 2013, the 

Defendant stated “I have a tendency to be very violent with little or no 

provocation. A problem I see that is only getting worse as the years 

go by.” These undisputed facts demonstrate that the Defendant has 

used illegal violence against other people. The Defendant’s pattern of 

criminal conduct has escalated to the point where the Defendant 

himself has testified he murdered a cellmate because, in part, of the 

victim’s “vibe.”

This aggravating factor is given great weight.

Contrary to Rogers’ assertion, the trial court clearly did not conclude that the 

prior violent felony aggravator was proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on 

conduct that did not result in criminal convictions. The illegal use of violence 

against other people on which the trial court focused was Rogers’ prior conviction 

for attempted robbery in 1997, during which Rogers used a gun, and his 2002 

convictions for robbery with a firearm and aggravated battery with a deadly 

weapon. Although the trial court included a quotation from a letter Rogers wrote 

in which he stated that his tendency to be very violent with little or no provocation 

is getting worse, the trial court did not refer to any speculative future violence or 

any violence that did not result in a criminal conviction when analyzing this 

aggravator. Thus, this claim is without merit.

E. Sufficiency of the sentencing order

Rogers asserts that the trial court failed to thoughtfully and comprehensively 

analyze any of the proposed mitigating circumstances in accordance with our 

decision in Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419-20 (Fla. 1990), receded from on 
- 29 -

other grounds by Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1055 (Fla. 2000), failed to 

expressly and specifically articulate why the established mitigating circumstances 

were given relatively limited weight, and instead summarily disposed of all sixtyeight mitigating circumstances.

In Campbell, we articulated the requirements regarding the manner in which 

a trial court must weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in its written 

sentencing order. We have summarized the requirements for a capital sentencing 

order under Campbell and its progeny as follows:

A trial judge must

(1) expressly evaluate in his or her written order 

each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant 

to determine whether it is supported by the evidence and 

whether, in the case of nonstatutory factors, it is truly of a 

mitigating nature; (2) assign a weight to each aggravating 

factor and mitigating factor properly established; (3) 

weigh the established aggravating circumstances against 

the established mitigating circumstances; and (4) provide 

a detailed explanation of the result of the weighing 

process.

Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 547-48 (Fla. 2009). “[T]he determination of 

mitigating and aggravating circumstances and the respective weight assigned to 

each [are] within the trial court’s discretion . . . .” Griffin v. State, 820 So. 2d 906, 

913 (Fla. 2002).

Contrary to Rogers’ argument, the sentencing order here does expressly 

evaluate each proposed mitigator (including finding twenty-five mitigators that 
- 30 -

were not found by the jury). It also decides whether the nonstatutory mitigators 

were truly mitigating, assigns a weight to each aggravator and mitigator properly 

established, and weighs the aggravators against the mitigators.

In Oyola v. State, 99 So. 3d 431, 447 (Fla. 2012), we stated that “the 

sentencing order violated the requirements articulated in Campbell” because the 

trial court “merely gave a brief summary of its findings with regard to the 

mitigators, and did not expressly and specifically articulate why the evidence

presented . . . warranted the allocation of slight weight to the nonstatutory 

mitigation evidence presented.” Our decision in Campbell, however, did not 

impose a requirement that a trial court expressly and specifically articulate why the 

evidence presented warranted only the allocation of a certain weight to a mitigating 

circumstance. Because Oyola mischaracterizes our decision in Campbell, we now 

recede from Oyola to the extent that it employed a requirement that a trial court 

expressly articulate why the evidence presented warranted the allocation of a 

certain weight to a mitigating circumstance.

Rogers also raises the complaint that the trial court twice referred to 

incorrect mitigating circumstances in its analysis. This is true. When intending to 

analyze proposed mitigating circumstance 19, that the death of Rogers’ maternal 

grandmother was traumatic for him, the trial court instead considered whether 

Rogers had ever been shown love or affection. And when intending to analyze 
- 31 -

proposed mitigating circumstance 52, whether Rogers had established that he 

suffers from attachment issues, it appears that the trial court actually analyzed 

whether Rogers had cared for homeless boys on the streets. Neither the jury nor 

the court found that either mitigating circumstance 19 or 52 was established.

The decision whether a mitigating circumstance has been established is 

within the trial court’s discretion and reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Ault v. 

State, 53 So. 3d 175, 187 (Fla. 2010); Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747, 755 (Fla. 

1996). “[A] trial court’s findings on mitigation are . . . subject to review for 

harmless error, and this Court will not overturn a capital appellant’s sentence if it 

determines that an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ault, 53 So. 3d 

at 187.

We find no abuse of discretion with the trial court failing to find that 

proposed mitigating circumstance 19 was established. Although there was 

evidence presented that Rogers grieved the loss of his grandmother and that he did 

not properly grieve that loss, there was no evidence that the loss was “traumatic” to 

him. As to proposed mitigating circumstance 52, there was unrebutted evidence 

presented by both Dr. Dunn and Dr. Harper that Rogers suffers from attachment 

issues. And the trial court did not make any finding that Dr. Dunn’s or Dr. 

Harper’s testimony was not credible. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did

abuse its discretion in failing to find that proposed mitigating circumstance 52 was 
- 32 -

established by the greater weight of the evidence. But this error was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt because there is no reasonable possibility that the trial 

court would have imposed a life sentence based on Rogers’ attachment issues, 

given the five weighty aggravating circumstances present here. See Orme, 25 So. 

3d at 544 (concluding that trial court’s failure to consider remorse as a mitigating 

circumstance was harmless in light of the three aggravators—HAC, commission 

during a sexual battery, and pecuniary gain—and relatively weak mitigation). 

Rogers is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim.

F. Sufficiency of the evidence

Although Rogers does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 

sustain his conviction for first-degree murder, this Court independently reviews the 

record in death penalty cases to determine whether competent, substantial evidence 

supports the conviction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5) (“On direct appeal in death 

penalty cases, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence or proportionality is an 

issue presented for review, the court shall review these issues and, if necessary, 

remand for the appropriate relief.”). “In determining the sufficiency of the 

evidence, the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 

732, 738 (Fla. 2001). Our duty on appeal is “to review the record in the light most 
- 33 -

favorable to the prevailing theory and to sustain that theory if it is supported by 

competent[,] substantial evidence.” Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla. 

1996). “A general guilty verdict rendered by a jury instructed on both first-degree 

murder alternatives may be upheld on appeal where the evidence is sufficient to 

establish either felony murder or premeditation.” Crain v. State, 894 So. 2d 59, 73 

(Fla. 2004).

To establish first-degree premeditated murder, the State was required to 

prove the following elements: (1) Ricky Martin is dead; (2) the death was caused 

by the criminal act of Rogers; and (3) there was a premeditated killing of Ricky 

Martin. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.2.

3

 Martin’s medical records, the testimony 

of a nurse practitioner from the hospital where he was treated and died, and 

testimony from the medical examiner were sufficient to prove that Ricky Martin is 

dead. Rogers admitted that he punched Martin in the face several times without 

provocation, that he stomped his head into the concrete floor, that he kicked him in 

the face several times, that he tied Martin up when Martin tried to get up off the 

 

3. Alternatively, to prove first-degree felony murder, the State was required 

to prove the following three elements: (1) Ricky Martin is dead; (2) while engaged 

in the commission of kidnapping, Rogers caused the death of Ricky Martin, or 

while engaged in the attempt to commit kidnapping, the death occurred as a 

consequence of and while Rogers was engaged in the kidnapping of Ricky Martin; 

and (3) Rogers was the person who actually killed Ricky Martin. See Fla. Std. Jury 

Instr. (Crim.) 7.3. We also conclude that there was competent, substantial 

evidence presented to sustain a conviction under the felony murder theory. 
- 34 -

floor, and that he “killed Ricky Martin” and is “responsible for the death of Ricky 

Martin.” These admissions are sufficient to prove that Martin’s death was caused 

by the criminal act of Rogers. Finally, Rogers admitted in the unchallenged 

portions of the letter to the predecessor judge that his “intentions were to kill 

[Ricky Martin] in the cell that night,” and that after hearing about the shooting of 

Trayvon Martin, he “decided that [he] was going to kill the next white man that 

came across [his] path.” These unchallenged statements are sufficient to prove that 

the killing of Ricky Martin was premeditated. Together, these facts provide 

competent, substantial evidence to sustain a conviction of first-degree premeditated 

murder.

G. Proportionality

Finally, Rogers argues that his death sentence is disproportionate because his 

case is not among the least mitigated first-degree murder cases. Given the 

relatively weak mitigation in this case, we reject this argument.

To ensure uniformity of sentencing in death penalty proceedings, this Court 

considers the totality of circumstances and compares each case with other capital 

cases. We do not simply compare the number of aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances. Taylor v. State, 937 So. 2d 590, 600 (Fla. 2006). “Further, in a 

proportionality analysis, this Court will accept the weight assigned by the trial 

court to the aggravating and mitigating factors.” Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 
- 35 -

46 (Fla. 2009). “In performing a proportionality review, a reviewing court must

never lose sight of the fact that the death penalty has long been reserved for only 

the most aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree murders.” Urbin v. State, 

714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998).

Here, the trial court found that five aggravating factors—including prior 

violent felony, CCP, and HAC—were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Three of 

the five aggravators found in this case are among the weightiest aggravators in 

Florida’s statutory scheme. Hodges v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 542 (Fla. 2010) (prior 

violent felony and HAC); Wade v. State, 41 So. 3d 857, 879 (Fla. 2010) (HAC and 

CCP), receded from on other grounds by McCloud v. State, 208 So. 3d 668, 687 

(Fla. 2016). Neither the trial court nor the jury found that any statutory mitigating 

circumstances were established, but the trial court did find that forty-nine 

nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were established. And although the trial 

court found forty-nine mitigating circumstances, proportionality review is “not a 

mere numbers game.” Rigterink v. State, 66 So. 3d 866, 899 (Fla. 2011). Many of 

the mitigating circumstances in this case were repetitive and cumulative. For 

example, eleven of the circumstances were related to Rogers’ family dysfunction, 

eleven of the circumstances related to Rogers’ difficult childhood, seven of the 

circumstances related to his head and brain injuries, and five of the circumstances 

related to the love and care he has for his family members.
- 36 -

We have found the death sentence proportionate in cases with similar 

aggravation and mitigation. In White v. State, 817 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2002), White 

and a codefendant severely beat the victim and then stabbed her to death. The 

death sentence was found to be proportionate where the trial court found four 

aggravators: (1) prior violent felony; (2) while engaged in the commission of a 

kidnapping; (3) committed to disrupt or hinder the enforcement of laws; and (4) 

HAC. 817 So. 2d at 803 n.2. In mitigation, the trial court found the statutory 

mitigator that White was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional 

disturbance and nonstatutory mitigators similar to those in the instant case, 

including poor family background, parental neglect, organic brain damage and 

neurological deficiencies. Id. at 803 n.3. The court also found more significant 

mitigation than in Rogers’ case, including: an extensive history of alcohol and 

substance abuse from an early age; marginal intelligence or a low IQ; and that 

White was intoxicated and had diminished capacity at the time of the crime, was a 

willing worker and a good employee, lacked future dangerousness, had the 

potential to be rehabilitated, had a good prison record, and had contributed to the 

community. Id.

In Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 666-67 (Fla. 2004), Globe strangled a 

fellow inmate to death. The trial court found four aggravators: under sentence of 

imprisonment, prior violent felony, HAC, and CCP. 877 So. 2d at 668 n.3. The 
- 37 -

court found no statutory mitigating circumstances and eleven nonstatutory 

mitigators:

(1) Globe’s abusive relationship with his parents—given little weight; 

(2) Globe was a good friend to other inmates—given slight weight; 

(3) Globe met the criteria for antisocial personality disorder—given 

slight weight; (4) Globe gave confessions and made statements about 

committing the murder—given slight weight; (5) Globe’s history of 

substance abuse—given slight weight; (6) charitable deeds done by 

Globe for a fellow inmate—given slight weight; (7) Globe’s mother’s 

love for him—given slight weight; (8) Globe’s appropriate conduct 

throughout the trial—given little weight; (9) Globe was helpful to 

others—given slight weight; (10) Globe’s capacity to form 

relationships—given slight weight; and (11) Globe did not have a 

positive role model as a child, was berated, and as a teenager was 

unwanted—given slight weight.

Id. at 668 & n.4.

The facts and aggravation and mitigation in Globe are very similar to the 

instant case. Here, the additional aggravation of the murder being committed 

while Rogers was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping was present. And 

while the mitigation is similar, Rogers also has evidence of head and brain injuries 

that were found to be mitigating.

We have also upheld death sentences in cases with less aggravation and 

more compelling mitigation. E.g., Abdool v. State, 53 So. 3d 208, 215 (Fla. 2010) 

(concluding that the death penalty was proportionate where there were two 

aggravating factors, four statutory mitigating circumstances (age of nineteen at the 
- 38 -

time of the crime, no significant history of criminal activity, and both statutory 

mental health mitigators), and forty-eight nonstatutory mitigating circumstances).

In light of the presence of three of the weightiest aggravating circumstances 

and the relatively weak mitigation in this case, we conclude that Rogers’ death 

sentence is proportionate as compared with other capital cases.

III. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed Rogers’ claims as well as the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence of death.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, LAGOA, LUCK, and MUÑIZ, JJ., 

concur.

LABARGA, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LABARGA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the decision of the majority to affirm the judgment and 

sentence of death. I write separately to emphasize two points and dissent as to one 

other. First, although the majority correctly notes that Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 

40, 53 (Fla. 2016), stated “before a sentence of death may be considered by the 

trial court in Florida, the jury must find the existence of the aggravating factors 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating factors are sufficient to 

impose death, and that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 
- 39 -

circumstances,” we also held that these findings must be unanimous. See id. at 57. 

We further held that the jury recommendation must be unanimous for a trial court 

to impose a sentence of death. Id.

4

 As the majority notes, the trial court here 

complied with Hurst and instructed the jury as to the unanimity requirement with 

respect to each finding and the recommendation.

On this same topic, however, I must voice my disagreement with the 

decision of the majority to refer to certain findings mandated by Hurst as 

“determinations.” This terminology is contrary to the language used in Hurst. See 

202 So. 3d at 44 (“In capital cases in Florida, the[] specific findings required to be 

made by the jury include the existence of each aggravating factor that has been 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the finding that the aggravating factors are 

sufficient, and the finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 

circumstances.” (emphasis added)); id. at 59 (“[W]e conclude that under the 

commandments of Hurst v. Florida, Florida’s state constitutional right to trial by 

jury, and our Florida jurisprudence, the penalty phase jury must be unanimous in 

 

4. This holding has been repeated many times, including in the decision 

where we amended the capital jury instructions to comply with Hurst. See In re 

Std. Jury Instrs. in Capital Cases, 244 So. 3d 172, 173 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Hurst, 

202 So. 3d at 54); see also Patrick v. State, 246 So. 3d 253, 264 (Fla. 2018)

(quoting Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 57); Gregory v. State, 224 So. 3d 719, 737-38 (Fla. 

2017) (quoting Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 54).
- 40 -

making the critical findings and recommendation that are necessary before a 

sentence of death may be considered by the judge or imposed.” (emphasis added)).

In deciding what were the “critical findings” to be made by the jury as a 

matter of Florida law, we looked to the language of Florida’s sentencing statutes in 

effect at that time. First, we quoted section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (2012), 

which provided:

(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be 

punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence 

according to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 results in findings by 

the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such 

person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible 

for parole.

Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 52. We then quoted section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2012), 

which provided:

(1) SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS ON ISSUE OF 

PENALTY.—Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant 

of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing 

proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to 

death or life imprisonment as authorized by s. 775.082 . . . .

(2) ADVISORY SENTENCE BY THE JURY.—After hearing 

all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory 

sentence to the court, based upon the following matters:

(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as 

enumerated in subsection (5);

(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which 

outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and

(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should 

be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.

(3) FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF SENTENCE OF DEATH.—

Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the 

court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
- 41 -

shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if the court 

imposes a sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing its findings 

upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts:

(a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as 

enumerated in subsection (5), and

(b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to 

outweigh the aggravating circumstances.

Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 52 (some emphasis added) (some alterations in original). 

Although Florida’s sentencing statutes have changed since the issuance of 

Hurst, the title of section 921.141(2), Florida Statutes (2018), is “Findings and 

recommended sentence by the jury,” and that subsection lists precisely what we 

held in Hurst to be the “critical findings” that must be found unanimously by a jury 

before a sentence of death may be recommended:

(2) Findings and recommended sentence by the jury.—This 

subsection applies only if the defendant has not waived his or her right 

to a sentencing proceeding by a jury.

(a) After hearing all of the evidence presented regarding 

aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances, the jury shall 

deliberate and determine if the state has proven, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, the existence of at least one aggravating factor set forth in 

subsection (6).

(b) The jury shall return findings identifying each aggravating 

factor found to exist. A finding that an aggravating factor exists must 

be unanimous. If the jury:

1. Does not unanimously find at least one aggravating factor, 

the defendant is ineligible for a sentence of death.

2. Unanimously finds at least one aggravating factor, the 

defendant is eligible for a sentence of death and the jury shall 

make a recommendation to the court as to whether the 

defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole or to death. The recommendation shall be 

based on a weighing of all of the following:

a. Whether sufficient aggravating factors exist.
- 42 -

b. Whether aggravating factors exist which outweigh the 

mitigating circumstances found to exist.

c. Based on the considerations in sub-subparagraphs a. 

and b., whether the defendant should be sentenced to life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole or to 

death.

(c) If a unanimous jury determines that the defendant should be 

sentenced to death, the jury’s recommendation to the court shall be a 

sentence of death. If a unanimous jury does not determine that the 

defendant should be sentenced to death, the jury’s recommendation to 

the court shall be a sentence of life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole.

§ 921.141, Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis added). A finding does not suddenly cease 

to be a finding simply because the statute has been reworded to remove certain 

references to “findings” and add the word “determine.”

Finally, although I concur with the decision of the majority to recede in part 

from Oyola, the importance of compliance with Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 

(Fla. 1990), with respect to sentencing orders cannot be overemphasized. This is 

because “the ultimate penalty of death cannot be remedied if erroneously 

imposed,” Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300, 319 (Fla. 1997), and this Court must be 

able to conduct a meaningful review of an order that sentences a defendant to 

death. See Ferrell v. State, 653 So. 2d 367, 371 (Fla. 1995). As we explained over 

two decades ago:

[T]rial courts have the undelegable duty and solemn obligation to not 

only consider any and all mitigating evidence, but also to “expressly 

evaluate in [their] written order[s] each mitigating circumstance 

proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by the 

evidence.” Campbell, 571 So. 2d at 419; Ferrell v. State, 653 So. 2d 
- 43 -

367, 371 (Fla. 1995) (reaffirming Campbell and establishing 

enumerated requirements for treatment of mitigating evidence).

This bedrock requirement cannot be met by treating mitigating

evidence as an academic exercise which may be summarily addressed 

and disposed of.

Walker, 707 So. 2d at 319 (some alterations in original).

The more detailed the sentencing order, the greater this Court’s ability to 

perform its critical task of determining whether a trial court’s “final decision in the 

weighing process [is] supported by ‘sufficient competent evidence in the record.’ ” 

Campbell, 571 So. 2d 420 (quoting Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327, 1331 

(Fla. 1981)). While Campbell delineates the minimum requirements for a 

sentencing order to be sufficient, nothing precludes trial courts from providing 

detailed analyses beyond the requirements of Campbell with respect to the finding 

and weighing of aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances, thereby greatly 

aiding in this Court’s meaningful review in death penalty cases.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Santa Rosa County,

John F. Simon, Jr., Judge - Case No. 572017CF000804CFAXMX

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Richard M. Bracey, III, Assistant Public 

Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellant

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Jennifer A. Donahue, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee