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i 

74–473 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–132] 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE 

EAST: THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE 

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 19, 2012 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, April 19, 2012, Recent Developments in the Middle East: The 

Security Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic ................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, April 19, 2012 ........................................................................................ 31 

THURSDAY, APRIL 19, 2012 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE SECURITY 

SITUATION IN THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ...................... 5 

Panetta, Hon. Leon E., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense ....... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Dempsey, GEN Martin E. ................................................................................ 42 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 35 

Panetta, Hon. Leon E. ...................................................................................... 39 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Attachment To Accompany Letter from International Assessment and 

Strategy Center ............................................................................................. 53 

Letter from International Assessment and Strategy Center to Mr. Turner 51 

Letter from Mr. Turner to Secretary Clinton (Department of State) and 

General Clapper (ODNI) .............................................................................. 49 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 61 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 61 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 62 

(1) 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE 

SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, April 19, 2012. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. I was just informed that first votes could happen between 10:10 and 10:25. The 

Secretary has a hard close time at 12:30, so we are going to be as 

expeditious as we possibly can here. 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services 

Committee meets today to receive testimony on the security situation in Syria from the Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Leon 

Panetta, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 

Martin Dempsey. Gentlemen, thank you for your distinguished 

service to our Nation and thank you for being here today. 

The Syrian conflict is now in its second year and the situation 

remains both uncertain and dire. As we convene, a tenuous 

ceasefire is in place. It comes on the heels of horrifying violence at 

the hands of the Assad [President Bashar al-Assad] regime, yet 

even though Assad has committed the ceasefire, reports indicate 

that he continues to inflict violence on the Syrian people. President 

Assad’s fierce crackdown has been ruthless, including flagrant 

human rights violations, extra judicial killings, use of force against 

non-combatant civilians, including children, and interference with 

the provision of medical aid and humanitarian assistance. To date, 

the United Nations estimates the death toll from the crisis at 

9,000, while other estimates put the death toll as high as 12,000. 

Just over a year ago, in the midst of the Arab Spring, the Syrian 

people peacefully took to the streets calling for the opportunity to 

elect their leadership through a free and fair democratic process. 

This desire for freedom and justice from an oppressive regime embodies the essence of what is driving the opposition, and is one that 

we can relate to and should support. The President has stated that 

the violence in Syria must end and that Assad must go. But it remains completely unclear how the President will accomplish these 

goals. 

In addition to the humanitarian concerns that I believe we all 

share, I am very concerned about the implications for regional con-
2 

flict. As recently as April 10th, Assad-backed military units shot 

across the border into Syrian refugee camps in Turkey, killing five 

individuals. Additionally, violence has spilled into Lebanon and 

Iraq could begin to behave erratically as it considers the prospect 

of a Sunni-controlled government succeeding the Assad regime and 

its western border or alliances forming between Syria’s Sunni population and Iraq’s own Sunni population. 

Moreover, the situation presents a strategic opportunity to deal 

a blow to known supporters of terrorism in the region as Iran continues to back the Assad government and groups such as Hezbollah 

have enjoyed support and residence in Syria. On the other hand, 

there is much we do not know about the opposition. Syria also 

maintains robust air defenses that limit military options. 

Therefore I am not recommending U.S. military intervention, 

particularly in light of our grave budget situation unless the national security threat was clear and present. Nevertheless, these 

reflections lead me to wonder what the United States can do to 

stem the violence and hasten President Assad from power. We also 

need to understand what we are doing to insure the security of one 

of the world’s largest stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. 

To paraphrase General Petraeus, how does this all end? I look forward to your insights into the security situation and our way forward in Syria. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time, let 

me just say that I agree completely with the chairman’s opening 

remarks. The Assad regime has made a clear and awful choice to 

simply kill as many of its own people as he can to maintain power. 

It is an international outrage that should be condemned by all nations. I applaud both the Department of Defense and the Secretary 

of State and our U.N. [United Nations] representative for their 

work to call attention to this outrage and try to build international 

support to stop it. I think we need greater support in nations like 

Russia and China should rise to the challenge and work with us 

to find a solution to this problem and they clearly have not done 

enough. 

I also agree with the chairman, the fact that I don’t see a military option for us in this area for a wide variety of reasons, I have 

a longer statement which I will submit for the record that explains 

that, but we should look at every possible option for how we can 

stop this. I also agree that it has profound impacts for a region that 

was already unstable in many ways. 

So I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses today to 

hear what our best options are going forward to try to contain this 

and to give this committee a full briefing on where the situation 

is at, and where they see it going as difficult as that prediction 

might be. I thank the chairman and I thank both of our witnesses 
3 

for their leadership of our country and for being before us today, 

and with that, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Secretary Panetta. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary PANETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative 

Smith, Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to be able to discuss what is obviously a very tense and fluid situation in Syria. 

Widespread demands for political change in Syria started more 

than a year ago, emerging out of the Arab Spring that was impacting on other countries, and it obviously then hit Syria as well. But 

rather than trying to meet the legitimate demands of the people, 

the regime of Bashar al-Assad turned instead to violence against 

its own people. That violence has been brutal and it has been devastating. It has put the Syrian people in a desperate and difficult 

situation. It has outraged the conscience of all good people, and it 

has threatened stability in a very important part of the world. 

The United States has made clear that the Assad regime has lost 

its legitimacy, and that this crisis has no effective solution without 

Assad’s departure. As the President has stated, Assad must go. Recent days are testing whether the Assad regime will live up to all 

of its responsibilities to the Syrian people and to the international 

community. Restoring calm to the cities and towns across Syria is 

just one test for Assad in the days ahead. Assad is responsible for 

fully abiding by the transition plan that has been outlined by the 

Joint [U.N.–Arab League] Special Envoy, Kofi Annan. 

He also faces deep skepticism about his motives, a skepticism 

based on a long train of Assad’s deceitful actions to date, including 

broken promises to his own people and to the international community. The United States is committed to holding the Syrian regime 

to its obligations. We are leading an international effort to help 

stop the violence and support a peaceful, political transition in 

Syria. Even as we speak, Secretary of State Clinton is meeting 

with our international partners in Paris to determine what additional steps should be taken to make that happen. We know 

achieving that end is a tough task. From every angle, the situation 

in Syria is enormously complex. There is no silver bullet. I wish 

there was, but there isn’t. 

At the same time the situation is of grave consequence to the 

Syrian people. There are many others who are affected by what 

happens in Syria as well, including Syria’s neighbors, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and all nations with a vital interest in 

the Middle East. 

Meanwhile, it is fair to say that Iran is Syria’s only ally in the 

region. No other country stands to lose more than Iran from the 

eventual fall of the Assad regime, which is why Iran is supporting 

the regime with material, financial, and technical assistance. We 

also know that the complex problems in Syria cannot all be solved 

through the unilateral actions of the United States, or for that matter, any other country. They demand a coordinated, international 
4 

response that is uniquely tailored to the situation we are confronting in Syria. 

There are, however, certain principles that have guided the Administration’s response to unrest across the Middle East. These 

basic principles have shaped our responses in Tunisia, in Egypt, in 

Libya, and now in Syria. 

First, we oppose the use of violence and repression by regimes 

against their own people. Second, we support the exercise of universal human rights. And third, we support political and economic 

reforms that can meet the legitimate aspirations of ordinary people 

throughout the region. Our policy in Syria is very clear: We support a political and democratic transition that fulfills the Syrian 

people’s greatest aspirations. To support that objective, the United 

States is leading international efforts along five tracks. 

First, we are supporting efforts to maintain international pressure and advance transition, political transition in Syria. We join 

with our partners in the U.N. Security Council including now Russia and China in calling for the urgent comprehensive and immediate implementation of all aspects of the Annan plan. 

Second, we are further isolating the Assad regime, we are encouraging other countries to join the United States, the European 

Union, and the Arab League in imposing strong sanctions against 

it. These sanctions are putting Assad under greater pressure than 

ever before. We are undermining the financial lifelines of the regime; three United States executive orders have targeted senior 

leadership, Commercial and the Central Bank of Syria. The result 

is that 30 percent of the regime’s lost revenues have occurred as 

a result of those sanctions. The U.S. and the EU [European Union] 

have imposed a strong oil embargo, the exchange rate has depreciated by more than 50 percent and their GDP [Gross Domestic 

Product] has been in a serious decline, approaching almost a minus 

8 percent in 2011 and more now. 

Third, we are strengthening and unifying the nonviolent political 

opposition in Syria. The United States is in the process of providing 

direct nonlethal support, including communications and medical 

equipment to the civilian lead opposition. We are taking these actions in concert with similar steps taken by the friends of Syria 

and other international partners to assist the opposition. 

Fourth, we are providing emergency humanitarian assistance to 

the Syrian people. With the total commitment so far in excess of 

$25 million, food rations, medical supplies, water, and other relief 

supplies have been provided. 

And lastly, we are reviewing and planning for a range of additional measures that may be necessary to protect the Syrian people. By acting along these lines, we are increasing pressure on the 

Assad regime every day. Make no mistake, one way or another, 

this regime will ultimately meet its end. There are legitimate questions about what steps are necessary to achieve this end, with some 

arguing for an approach similar to the one we took in Libya. The 

fact is that our recent experience in Libya is helping to inform the 

approach that the United States is taking towards Syria. First, our 

efforts are strengthened, strengthened by multilateral international 

consensus, that is extremely important to our ability to keep maximum pressure on the Assad regime. 
5 

Second, we should maintain clear regional support from the Arab 

world itself. Nations of the Arab world are outraged at the regime 

and what they are doing to the Syrian people. 

Third, we should offer substantial U.S. contributions where we 

can bring unique resources to bear. 

Fourth, we should have a clear legal basis for our approach 

there. And that clearly involves close consultations with Congress. 

And fifth and finally, our approach must keep all options on the 

table, all options on the table. While recognizing the limitations of 

military force, we must be prepared to take whatever action is required. But let me also say that the situation in Syria is different 

from the one in Libya, in some very important ways; this is not 

Libya. In Libya, there was widespread international support in the 

Arab world and elsewhere in a clear Security Council authorization 

for military intervention. And NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] was authorized to act on that. No such consensus currently exists regarding Syria. 

The opposition is also not as well organized and does not control 

territory is what we saw in Libya. There are almost 100 different 

groups. On the one hand that indicates that this is an insurgency 

that is broad based, but on the other hand, it makes it difficult to 

determine who to help if they cannot come together and organize 

as a single opposition force. 

We must also be mindful, as Secretary Clinton has noted, of the 

possibility that outside military intervention will make a volatile 

situation even worse and place even more innocent civilians at risk. 

The United States has made clear that we are on the side of the 

Syrian people and they must know that the international community has not underestimated either their suffering or their impatience. The Defense Department, as we always do, is reviewing and 

is continuing to review plans for a variety of possible scenarios 

should the President determine that further steps are necessary. In 

the meantime, our only clear path is to keep moving diplomatically 

through the international community in a resolute and deliberate 

manner to find a way to return Syria to the Syrian people. If we 

remain dedicated to that effort I think we ultimately can prevail. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Panetta can be found in 

the Appendix on page 39.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

General Dempsey. 

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman 

Smith and other distinguished Members of this committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and discuss the 

evolving situation in Syria. The situation is tragic for the people of 

Syria and for the region. Real democratic reforms should have been 

the Assad regime’s response to last year’s peaceful protest. Instead, 

the regime responded with brutality. Syria’s internal convulsions 

are having consequences for a region already in turmoil. Refugees 

are fleeing, spillover into neighboring countries is an increasing 

concern, and of course, we also need to be alert to opportunistic ex-
6 

tremists who may seek to exploit the situation, as well as the need 

to be especially alert to the fate of Syria’s chemical and biological 

weapons, they need to stay exactly where they are. 

With other conscientious nations, the United States is applying 

diplomatic and economic pressure on the regime to compel Assad 

and his accomplices to stop the killing their own. 

Our military’s role to this point has been limited to sharing information with our partners, our regional partners, but should we be 

called on to help secure U.S. interests in other ways, we will be 

ready. We maintain an agile regional and global posture. We have 

solid military relationships with every country on Syria’s border. 

Should we be called, our responsibility is clear—provide the Secretary of Defense and the President with options, and these options 

will be judged in terms of their suitability, their feasibility, and 

their acceptability. 

We have a further responsibility to articulate risk and the potential implications to our other global commitments. In closing, I 

want to assure you and the Nation that America’s Armed Forces 

are ready to answer the call, wherever that takes us. I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Dempsey can be found in the 

Appendix on page 42.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We—the vote has been 

called. We are 5 minutes into the vote. I will ask questions and get 

as much done as we can before, and we will break. Those of you 

who desire to leave earlier to get over there to vote, I would encourage you, I think there are three votes, to return as quickly as we 

can so we can keep this moving forward. 

Mr. Secretary, according to media reports this morning, the 

French President stated that action should be taken to establish 

humanitarian corridors. What are your views on this option? Have 

you been aware of that? 

Secretary PANETTA. Mr. Chairman, we have looked at a variety 

of options as to what could be done, including the possibility of developing humanitarian corridors. And again, we are prepared to do 

whatever the international community ultimately agrees ought to 

be done. But clearly, we have made plans along those lines. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Dempsey, you stated that Syria’s chemical and biological weapons need to stay exactly where they are. 

What can be done and what is being done to ensure that Syria’s 

chemical and biological stockpiles are secured? 

General DEMPSEY. At this point, Chairman, we are, as I mentioned in my statement, sharing information and intelligence with 

our regional partners. And in the aggregate, we feel like we have 

a good understanding of the disposition, the current disposition of 

Syria’s chemical and biological weapons. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ranking Member Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess one of my concerns is, it’s been said for a long time since the uprising has started 

that Mr. Assad’s days are numbered, and he can’t long last, but I 

have been worried about that ever since I was in Israel last summer and had some conversations about that. What is the path for 

that happening? Because as I said in my opening remarks, the 

Assad regime has sort of decided they don’t care what the inter-
7 

national community thinks. They are going to kill as many people 

as they need to kill to stay in power. Regrettably they are getting 

at least some sort of tacit support from important nations like Russia and China, and much more direct support from Iran and that 

makes them clearly different than Qadhafi and Libya. Qadhafi had 

no friends anywhere, he couldn’t get that assistance. 

With that support, what are the mechanisms that we—the levers 

we need to pull to make sure the Assad regime, in fact, goes, or 

might that support not be enough to let them stay as violently as 

they need to? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think the concerns that you have indicated, 

Congressman, are the concerns that we all share, that part of the 

problem here is that Assad still seems to maintain the loyalty of 

the military even though there have been significant defections, 

that the military still seems loyal and they continue to strike back 

at the Libyan people, even as this effort to try to achieve a 

ceasefire and try to reduce violence there, we still see continuing 

artillery barrages violating the whole effort. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could focus on—what hope is there to get Russia 

and China to change their stance and actually be more aggressive 

about pressuring the Assad regime? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think the fact that—obviously, that was a 

concern when they initially voted against the Security [Council] 

Resolution that would have taken action here, but they have come 

around, they have supported the resolution that was adopted, supporting Annan and his effort to try to achieve a ceasefire, and diplomatic pressure is being brought on both Russia and China, particularly Russia has had a longstanding relationship in that part 

of the world with Syria, to bring pressure on them to exercise 

whatever influence they can to try to ensure that they abide by the 

Annan plan. 

So there is some progress being made on that front. The additional steps that are important is that the international community 

continues to be very unified in taking action against that regime. 

There are additional sanctions that can be applied. We applied 

some very significant sanctions, they are having—they are putting 

great pressure on the regime itself. That pressure needs to continue. 

The third thing that I would indicate is that this is a broadbased insurgency, and I think it is fair to say that the Intelligence 

Community feels that because it is a broad-based insurgency, yes, 

he can strike back, and yes, he can try to continue to hold on, but 

ultimately his days are numbered and ultimately he will be taken 

down. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I 

have. 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess now until we are able 

to return after the votes. Thank you very much. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, in your oral testimony, 

you noted that the Administration has publicly committed to sending communications equipment to Syrian opposition groups and hu-
8 

manitarian organizations. I am aware of American companies that 

can provide the necessary hardware to the Syrian opposition 

groups and humanitarian efforts. What steps is the Administration 

taking to ensure the allocated funding and potential future allocations are dedicated to the procurement of U.S.-manufactured equipment? What steps are being taken to ensure American-made technologies are being reviewed and properly vetted? 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, I think I will yield to General 

Dempsey on this as well. 

Secretary PANETTA. But my sense is that most of the communications gear that we are talking about is made in this country, and 

that is primarily the communications gear that we would be transferring to the opposition leaders. 

General DEMPSEY. I have nothing further to add to that, Congressman. That program is being supervised by the Department of 

State. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The State Department, other than the Office of 

Political Military Affairs, is typically not charged with providing 

communications equipment to besieged areas. And it is my understanding that the political and military affairs personnel at stake 

are not actively involved in determining the nature of what equipment should be distributed to Syria. Seeing as how the Department 

of Defense would have more precedent in such a role, what interagency coordination is occurring between the Department of State 

and Department of Defense? 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, there is ongoing coordination 

with the Department of Defense, or with the Department of State, 

on this issue. We do have a liaison that is there and working with 

them, but let me give you a more in-depth report as to what the 

level of that relationship is like. But there is—there is a military 

liaison that is working with the State Department on this issue. 

General DEMPSEY. I have nothing to add, Congressman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both 

gentlemen, for being here once again and for your service to our 

country. As you know, Russia has not been very cooperative in 

moving the U.N. closer to authorizing some form of action in Syria. 

And I know a lot of us have been disappointed in trying to move 

something. Some Members have suggested that we use some sort 

of pressure on Russia to help convince them to be more helpful. For 

example, we could fence Cooperative Threat Reduction funds. Do 

you believe that is a good idea? Why or why not? 

Secretary PANETTA. You know, at this stage, obviously the State 

Department is the one that is taking the lead in dealing with Russia, so I am not going to kind of prejudge what the State should 

or should not use as leverage with Russia. At this point, I would 

have to say that Russia has been cooperative with regards to enacting support for Annan’s effort at a ceasefire. They seem to be working with the international community in trying to advance that 

ceasefire and getting it in place. 

The most important leverage, frankly, for Russia, is to try to 

make sure that they understand that, in fact, their interests are 
9 

served by taking these steps, because once Assad goes, the interests that they have in Syria are going to go away unless they participate with the international community. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. General. 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Congresswoman. Just if I could 

broaden the aperture a bit and point out the places where we are 

cooperating with Russia in a very positive way. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. I am not suggesting that I am one of those 

but do I hear from my colleagues we should—— 

General DEMPSEY. Sure, yeah. And I guess my point would be we 

have to understand it in the context of the entire relationship, not 

this particular issue in isolation because we have terrific cooperation with them on the northern distribution network out of Afghanistan, counterterror, counterpiracy, counternarcotics. So I think we 

have to understand the entire thing in context and deal with them 

as we would other nations with whom we have a variety of relationships. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Gentlemen, some have said that if we would just, 

and I quote this very loosely, ‘‘handle Syria,’’ that that would help 

us in what is brewing with respect to Iran, that one of the effects 

of military is that, of course, Assad has one of the largest army 

ground troops in the area and that that sort of buttresses Iran’s, 

you know, some have called it bullying in the area. What do you 

say to that? That somehow Syria—that if we would get involved in 

Syria and we could help the people there move on to a more democratic or different type of government, that it would help us to 

bring the threat of Iran down in the neighborhood? 

Secretary PANETTA. There is absolutely no question that if the 

Assad regime comes down that the one country in that part of the 

world that is even going to be further isolated is Iran. And Iran 

knows that and that is the reason they continue to provide some 

assistance to Assad is because they know that their interests are 

in maintaining the Assad regime, not in seeing it go down. 

General DEMPSEY. The other thing I think I would add, Congresswoman, is the fall of the Assad regime would be a serious 

blow to Iran, and I think General Jim Mattis has testified before 

this body to that effect. But saying that it is the key would be analogous to saying you are going to solve a Rubik’s cube puzzle by lining up one side and neglecting the other three. This is a very complex region of the world and there are no, as the Secretary said in 

his opening comments, there are no silver bullets out there. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Secretary, are there any circumstances under 

which the United States would get involved militarily? For example, what if Turkey invoked Article 5 of our NATO charter? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think it is clear that the only way that the 

United States would get involved militarily is if there is a consensus in the international community to try to do something along 

those lines and then obviously ensure that the international community is able to get the authorities required in order to make that 

happen. The one area with regards to Article 5 in Turkey, Article 

5 has only been enacted once after 9/11, as I recall. But they would 

have to make clear that what is happening there really does truly 

represent a direct threat to Turkey. And I think at this point that 

is probably a stretch. 
10 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the 

time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and Mr. Secretary, General Dempsey, thank you for being here today. And Mr. 

Secretary, if the situation changes, and you believe that use of 

force in Syria becomes necessary, will this Administration seek authorization from Congress before taking action? 

Secretary PANETTA. We will—we will clearly work with Congress 

if it comes to the issue of the use of force. This Administration 

wants to work within the War Powers provision to ensure that we 

work together, and not separately. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Secretary, as a former Member of Congress, I 

have the biggest concern, and this has not pointed at this Administration, it could be at any administration that they seem to want 

to take the authority to decide whether or not they need to go into 

a country that is not been a threat, they might have evil dictators, 

they might have problems in those countries. But I have been very 

concerned. I actually went to the Federal courts with Dennis 

Kucinich and two other Republicans and two other Democrats. We 

went to the courts because of the decision and how it was made— 

I realize you were not there at the time—about Libya. I continue, 

and the American people seem to agree, that we in Congress have 

not exerted our Constitutional responsibilities when it comes to 

war. And I hope that if there is a decision including Iran as well 

as Syria, if the decision is made to commit American forces, that 

the President would feel an obligation to the American people, not 

to Congress necessarily, but the American people to explain and 

justify why we would take that kind of action. 

And again, I am talking about a situation where we are not 

being attacked, we just see things happening in other countries 

that we don’t approve of. And I would hope, and I think you did 

give me this answer, but if you would reaffirm that if we have to 

use military force and as we are going to initiate that force, was 

it going to be our initiation that causes that force that the President, any President would come to Congress and the American people and justify the need to attack. 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, as you understand, this President as other presidents will operate pursuant to the Constitution. 

The Constitution makes clear that the Commander in Chief should 

act when the vital interests of this country are in jeopardy. And I 

believe this President believes that if that, in fact, is the case he 

would do that in partnership with Congress in terms of taking any 

action. 

Mr. JONES. Well, I will make another statement and then I will 

work toward a closing, Mr. Chairman. I remember my good friend, 

Randy Forbes from Virginia, asked Secretary Gates when we went 

in and it seemed like the Administration if they called the leadership of the House and Senate, it must have been one call each 

House, each Senate. And Mr. Forbes asked Mr. Gates if the Libyans fired missiles in New York City, would that be an act of war? 

And I will have to say, because my friend from Virginia is a very 

articulate and a very intelligent gentleman, that he never got a 

straight answer. 
11 

So I hope that you will prevail upon the Administration not to 

take those kind of actions as they did in Libya, whether it was justified or not. We won’t get into that debate, but in my opinion that 

was really kind of a snub of Congress and the responsibility of Congress based on the Constitution. 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, what I can assure you of is as 

long as I am Secretary, we won’t take any action without proper 

legal authority. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. And with that, 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my 39 seconds. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you Mr. 

Secretary and Chairman, your service is both an inspiration to us 

and a blessing to our country. We thank you very much for it. 

I want to congratulate the Administration on your success with 

Russia and China, moving them to a very different place on this 

issue as compared to where they were just a few weeks ago. And 

Mr. Secretary, I think that the data you gave us about the exchange rate for the Syrian currency and the GDP are a reflection 

of the effectiveness of that coalition. But you also note that we do 

not yet have the level of consensus in the Arab world that existed 

for the Libyan problem. What do you see as the principle obstacles 

to achieving that kind of consensus with respect to Syrian regime? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think the Arab world is struggling with the 

same issues that the whole international community is struggling 

with which is, in order to take additional actions, what in fact does 

make sense? You know, who is the opposition? How can we best assist the opposition? How do we best provide the kind of help that 

the Syrian people need in order to overcome the situation? What 

kind of pressures would best be placed on Assad in order to force 

that regime downward? 

All of those same difficult complex issues that the whole international community is dealing with, the Arab community is confronting as well. In Libya, that all came together; in Syria, it is still 

a difficult challenge to try to put those pieces together. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you suppose, this is a hypothesis, that the cohering factor in the Libyan situation was a sense that Qadhafi had 

completely lost the support of his own people, and no one wanted 

to be associated with a regime that was illegitimate in that sense? 

Do you think that Assad has simply not reached that point with 

his own people yet or is there some other factor that is diverting 

us from that consensus? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think it is the factors that I pointed out in 

my testimony make this different from Libya. The fact that number 

1, he does still enjoy, as I said, the loyalty of a good chunk of the 

Army and the military, and that makes it more challenging in 

terms of trying to undermine the regime. Secondly the opposition 

is dispersed, there are a lot of groups there that represent the opposition. In Libya, there were some different tribal groups that 

made up the opposition, they were holding territory. We knew who 

they were, we could define what the opposition was that needed assistance. This is much more difficult, there aren’t geographic areas 

that are being held by the opposition, it is much more of an insurgency kind of opposition. 
12 

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Secretary, if I may, taking off on that, you 

mentioned the phrase ‘‘vital national interest’’ a few minutes ago. 

Do you agree with the proposition that it is a vital national interest 

to the United States to discourage regimes which could serve as an 

incubator for asymmetric warfare against the United States? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think that would, you know, obviously have 

to be debated on the issue of does it directly impact our vital interest? I guess an argument could be made along those lines. I would 

think in this case, it is really important for the international community. If we are going to continue to work with the international 

community, if we are going to be a partner with them in deciding 

what additional actions ought to be taking place, that it ought to 

be within the international context that decisions for action ought 

to be taken. 

Mr. ANDREWS. How would you characterize the public record of 

the relationship between Syria and Hezbollah? 

Secretary PANETTA. The public record, and more importantly, the 

intelligence record that we have is that there is always been a close 

relationship between Syria and Hezbollah, and that Hezbollah has 

always had some level of protection. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you agree with the proposition that the weaker 

Hezbollah is, the better the United States is? 

Secretary PANETTA. Hezbollah, in our book, is a terrorist organization, they have spread terror not only in that region, but elsewhere, and anything—anything done to weaken a terrorist group 

is in our interest. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman, I yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank 

you for being here and General Dempsey, we thank you for your 

service, you are both good men, you have served your country well, 

and we just are honored that you would be here and share your 

thoughts with us here today. We know you have a tremendous 

challenge, and the risk to the country out there is huge today. And 

when we talk about vital national interest, probably there is no 

greater vital national interest that we have than the rule of law. 

So sometimes we have to just ferret that out and see what that is. 

And as I understand what you have indicated to this committee, 

Mr. Secretary, and correct me if I am wrong, you believe that before we would take military action against Syria, that it would be 

a requirement to have a consensus of permission with the international community before that would happen. Is that a fair statement, and if not, would you tell me what the proper—— 

Secretary PANETTA. I think that is a fair statement. 

Mr. FORBES. If that is fair, then I would like to come back to the 

question Mr. Jones asked, just so we know, I know you would 

never do anything that you didn’t think was legally proper, and 

you said that the Administration would have proper legal authority 

before they would take any military action. So my question is what 

is proper legal authority? And I come back to, as Mr. Jones pointed 

out with the War Powers Act, it is unlikely we would have a declaration of war, but that would be one of the things. Certainly we 

know if there was a national attack, that would be one of them. 
13 

And then the second thing, of course, the joint—the War Powers 

Act would be specific statutory authorization. Do you feel that it 

would be a requirement to have proper legal authority that if you 

did not have a declaration of war or an attack on the United 

States, that you would have to have specific statutory authority, in 

other words the permission of Congress, before you take military 

action against Syria? 

Secretary PANETTA. We would not take action without proper 

legal authority. 

Mr. FORBES. And I understand, and in all due respect, I don’t 

want to put you in interrogation, but we are trying to find out what 

exactly proper legal authority is, because that is what we have to 

act under. And we don’t have the President here to chat with him 

or have a cup of coffee with him, and ask him, you are the closest 

we get. And so we ask it from your understanding and as Secretary 

of Defense, what is proper legal authority? Would that require specific statutory authorization from the United States Congress if we 

had not had a declaration of war or an attack upon the United 

States? 

Secretary PANETTA. Well, again let me put it on the this basis, 

this Administration intends to operate pursuant to the War Powers 

Act, and whatever the War Powers Act would require in order for 

us to engage, we would abide by. 

Mr. FORBES. Again, Mr. Secretary, thank you for putting up with 

me as I just try to stumble through this and understand it. But as 

I read the War Powers Act, it has those three requirements, are 

there any other requirements that you are familiar with that I am 

leaving out or not reading? 

Secretary PANETTA. No. 

Mr. FORBES. If that is the case, then again, I just come back to 

if there is no declaration of war, no attack upon the United States, 

and if we are going to comply with the War Powers Act, would that 

require specific statutory authority by Congress before we took 

military action? 

Secretary PANETTA. Again, under the Constitution, as I indicated, the Commander in Chief has the authority to take action, 

that involves the vital interest of this country, but then pursuant 

to the War Powers Act, we would have to take steps to get congressional approval. That is the process that we would follow. 

Mr. FORBES. You would have to take steps to get that approval, 

but would the approval be required before you would take military 

action against Syria? 

Secretary PANETTA. As I understand the Constitution and the 

power of the President, that the President could, in fact, deploy 

forces if he had to under—if our vital interest were at stake, but 

that ultimately then under the War Powers Act, we would have to 

come here for your support. 

Mr. FORBES. So would you get the support of Congress after you 

began military op—— 

Secretary PANETTA. In that particular situation, yes. 

Mr. FORBES. And then just one last thing and make sure I am 

stating this correctly, it is your position that the Administration’s 

position would be that we would have to get a consensus of permission from the international community before we would act, but 
14 

that we wouldn’t have to get specific statutory authority from Congress before we would act? 

Secretary PANETTA. Well, I think in that situation, if the international action is taken pursuant to a Security Council resolution, 

or under our treaty obligations with regards to NATO that obviously we would participate with the international community. But 

then ultimately, the Congress of the United States, pursuant to its 

powers of the purse, would be able to determine whether or not 

that action is appropriate or not. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary and General Dempsey, we certainly appreciate 

your being here and all of your dedicated service. 

I wanted to ask you more about the opposition groups. I think 

you have been quite clear that it is a diverse group and probably 

hard to read them in many ways. Are there several issues where 

you see them fragmenting or coalescing and particularly as it 

would relate to trying to broker any kind of agreement with the 

Assad regime short of eliminating it? 

Secretary PANETTA. As I have indicated, there are a number of 

groups that are involved in the opposition. It has not always been 

easy to get those groups to be able to coalesce. There are some outside Syrian groups that are making an effort to do that. 

There has been better progress by other countries that have tried 

to, one way or another, provide assistance to try to urge those 

groups to coalesce, and there has been a little more progress on 

that front, but it is still a difficult challenge. 

General DEMPSEY. What I would add, Congresswoman, is—and 

it kind of threads back to an earlier question—why does it seem 

so difficult to get the countries in the region to coalesce around a 

single unifying idea here, I think it is because they are extraordinarily cautious about what comes next. To thread these two 

themes together, a different regime or a different governance model 

in Syria will affect the relationship of Ankara, Damascus, Cairo, 

Riyadh, Tehran, Baghdad. It will. Now, that is not to predict some 

negative outcome, but it will change. I think what they are circling 

around here is can they get a little clearer idea of what might happen on the other end of this. So these two thoughts are linked, I 

think. 

Mrs. DAVIS. In thinking as well about some of the efforts that we 

have undergone there in terms of humanitarian missions, how are 

we protecting those, if at all? What is happening in that arena? 

And to what extent do we think it is going to have a positive effect 

or helping to mobilize others and/or bring the opposition groups together in any way? What effect does it have? 

Secretary PANETTA. The humanitarian assistance, obviously, the 

State Department is directing most of that assistance, but it is 

going through programs like the World Food Program. There is 

about $10.5 million that is being dispersed in food rations. The 

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees is providing medical services 

and supplies, food and water, blankets, hygiene kits, and heaters 

at about $8.5 million. And the International Committee on the Red 

Cross is providing relief supplies under their authorities at about 
15 

$3 million. And there are some NGOs [Non-governmental Organizations] that are providing some additional assistance as well. 

Most of that—I think it is fair to say, Congresswoman, that a lot 

of it is probably being done in the refugee areas where a lot of the 

refugees have gathered; and we have an extensive number of refugees both on the Turkish and Jordanian borders that have located 

there. 

Mrs. DAVIS. So less so in cities, less so in areas where it needs 

to be protected—— 

Secretary PANETTA. I think that is correct. 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. As it is going to the population. 

Is there any perception through those efforts that we are there 

to help the people of Syria? That we have ongoing efforts? 

Secretary PANETTA. Yes, I think it has been made clear that we 

are trying to do whatever we can to provide that help. We are making efforts to try to do some outreach into Syria itself, to try to assist those who have been harmed and try to see what we can do 

to provide assistance there as well. It is a much more difficult challenge. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Chairman Dempsey, thank you for your service. 

I appreciate it as a veteran and also a very grateful parent of a son 

serving in the military. 

In the context of the instability that you are reviewing, I’m very 

concerned about the sequestration of the defense budget, which 

would be a reduction of 8–12 percent beginning next January. You 

both have correctly warned of the hollowing out of the military, but 

people are still confused because they have heard and seen a $100 

billion cut, a $487 billion cut, and now a pending $600 billion cut. 

It is just total confusion. 

What message do you have to the American people? What do you 

want them to know about the effect of sequestration, Mr. Secretary 

and General? 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, I tried to make clear time and 

time and time again that sequestration and the cuts involved in sequestration would be a disaster for the Defense Department and 

would truly hollow out our force and weaken our national defense. 

We are already cutting close to half a trillion dollars pursuant 

to the Budget Control Act. We have made those proposals. They 

are part of our budget. We are doing that over 10 years. And that 

has been difficult. It has been a difficult challenge to try to do it 

pursuant to a strategy and do it in a way that protects our national 

defense. 

Sequester, which is a whole other set of cuts that are out there 

that are supposed to take effect in January, represent a $500–600 

billion across-the-board meat ax approach to the budget that would 

impact every area of the defense budget, regardless of policy, regardless of strategy, and blindly strike at every area of the defense 

budget. 
16 

So for that reason, obviously, we have urged the Congress, we 

have urged whoever we can to work together to make sure that 

doesn’t happen. 

General DEMPSEY. I would add, Congressman, in terms of what 

message to the American people, so I think, first and foremost, that 

the military is not oblivious to the economic ills of the Nation and 

have done our best to contribute as part of the equation of national 

power, which includes economic, diplomatic, and military power. 

All three have to be in balance. Therefore, we have stepped up to 

the plate and done our best to make better use of our resources. 

Secondly, we adjusted our strategy after the lessons of 10 years 

of war and our projection on what the Nation would need in 2020, 

and we mapped the ’13–’17 budget to it, absorbing the $487 billion 

cut. And that if we have to absorb more cuts, we have got to go 

back to the drawing board and adjust our strategy. 

What I’m saying to you today is that the strategy that we would 

have to adjust to would in my view not meet the needs of the Nation in 2020 because the world is not getting any more stable. It 

is getting increasingly unstable, for all of the reasons we are talking about here today. 

So, I think we’ve done as much as we can do, given what I know 

about the future we are about to confront. 

Mr. WILSON. I particularly appreciate your pointing out this is 

not a peace dividend. The world is so dangerous, and so thank you 

for emphasizing that. 

Additionally, General, I am very concerned about the National 

Guard. This year, the Administration has been proposing a reduction in 100,000 personnel in the ground forces in the Army and the 

Marines. But, fortunately, in a way for the Guard, that is Active 

Duty. But I see a threat to the Guard. If there was sequestration, 

a concern I have, or reduction in the size of our Army Guard, that 

has already had an impact on the Air Guard, which I think is not 

good, but the cuts, how large will these be? A 50,000 reduction? A 

100,000 reduction? What could our governors, our TAGs [The Adjutant Generals], the National Guard families see coming their way? 

General DEMPSEY. Our job as the Joint Chiefs is to keep the force 

in balance and have enough of it ready to go tonight and a different 

amount of it ready to go in 30 days, 6 months, or a year. And that 

is how we balance the force against requirements. 

The reason the Army—and I was the Chief at the time—didn’t 

take any of this reduction out of the Guard is because we had 

grown the Active Force over the past 10 years by about 65,000. We 

had not grown the Guard. We had about 8,000. So when we absorbed the cuts, we didn’t take many of those cuts off of the Guard 

because we hadn’t grown the Guard. We wanted the Guard to be 

about the size it was. 

If you are asking me would a further reduction in our budget authority result in an effect on the Army National Guard, yes. I can’t 

tell you today how deeply, because it would depend on the depth 

of the cut. If we have to make more cuts and if our responsibility 

remains keeping the force in balance, it will affect both Active 

Guard and Reserve. 
17 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much for you concern. I just see 

cuts of dramatic effect affecting American families and our security. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your answers on the 

sequestration. I think this is one of the most difficult issues facing 

our defense. And we understand that defense has to be on the 

table, and we have been there. These cuts that we are going 

through right now are enormous. And the fact that defense accounts for 20 percent of the budget and we have taken 50 percent 

of the savings out of defense is something that cannot be overlooked. 

What we really need to understand is we cannot solve our Nation’s financial difficulties on the backs of the military. And the 

thing that we really need to keep in mind is if we eliminated the 

whole discretionary budget, defense, all discretionary spending, we 

would still be running a half-trillion-dollar deficit. So what we really need to do is to fix the mandatory spending side of the budget. 

Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, 

for being here today and your service. 

We have talked about the differences between Syria and Libya. 

We have talked about trying to identify the different influences of 

the different folks within Syria and how tough it is to predict an 

outcome and where this might go. 

So I’m going to put you a little bit on the spot, Mr. Secretary. 

We have seen sometimes democracy, when you give people the 

choice, they don’t always choose necessarily what we would like for 

them to choose. So democracy can be unpredictable, as we are seeing in some of the results of Arab Spring heading in different directions as it plays itself out. 

Scenarios for Syria, as you indicated, it is not a matter of if but 

when this regime falls. What do we anticipate, maybe best-case, 

worst-case outcome being? What kind of government, what kind of 

relationships within Syria? What would be some of the things we 

could look for? 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, at some point you probably 

ought to sit down with our intelligence analysts to discuss some of 

those possible options. 

I will give you some sense. This can happen in a good way, and 

it can happen in a bad way. If the Assad regime—if we can do this 

pursuant to the Annan ceasefire and the reforms that he is suggesting and it is done in a politically careful way in terms of implementing the reforms that have to be done and you can have Assad 

move out and try to develop, you know, a government that would 

be able to take its place, that would be subject to, hopefully, a vote 

of the people and implement the kind of democratic reforms that 

ultimately the people deserve, that would be the best way for it to 

play out. And it could be done in a way that recognizes that there 

are divided populations in Syria but that all of them would be 

brought into that kind of government. That would be the best way 

for this to move forward. 

The worst way is that suddenly it comes down. Various tribes, 

the various segments of that population that are there begin to assert themselves and you have the beginnings of some kind of civil 
18 

war that takes place within there to try to assert who should take 

charge. And that would probably be the worst development. 

Somewhere in between, hopefully, you can get some of the reforms that need to take place. But, you know, it could take us in 

a better direction. So there is a range of possibilities that are there. 

But I think the bottom line is that anything that takes the Assad 

regime down is a step in the right direction right now. 

What the international community has to assure is that, if that 

happens, it happens in the context of legitimate reforms that keep 

that country together and that serve the Syrian people. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

General Dempsey, you mentioned that the relationship between 

the government and the military is strong right now. Is there a 

basis for that relationship being strong in terms of maybe just the 

Generals saying we are going to stay with whoever we think is 

going to come out on top? Is there a situation, scenario, where that 

might change and the military might withdraw some of that support and make some other things possible? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I think there are conditions. I would like 

to think that the military leaders in Syria would recognize that 

using the kind of violence they are using against their own citizens 

is a fool’s errand and that at some point that will jeopardize them 

as an institution. 

By the way, that could be one of the reasons they are beginning 

to hold on tighter now, is that they have used this violence and if 

now they return to garrison and allow a referendum to occur, 

change government, I think they will feel themselves to be at great 

risk. 

I was going to say what we need to do, but this is best solved 

by the regional actors with our support because, you know, there 

is a scenario where, at the end of this, those that are arrayed 

around Assad become the oppressed and, as the Secretary described it, we end up in a situation that is a prolonged civil war. 

So, yes, I think there is reason to believe that the military could 

come to understand that they are on a path to their own destruction as an institution. But I think that case has to be made by regional players, less so by us. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Chairman Dempsey, I want to thank you for your 

strong statements this week on the issues of addressing sexual assault in the military. I think your leadership is well needed, and 

I appreciate your strong statements and your strong action. 

We had a meeting yesterday with General Amos. We understand, 

General Dempsey, he is certainly echoing your strong commitment. 

We appreciate the efforts of both of you. It makes a big difference 

to the men and women who are serving. 

General, you just said that the world is becoming increasing unstable. And, Mr. Secretary, you have recently said every day we are 

within an inch of war. I think as we look to the issue of Syria we 

know that Russia and China have blocked two United Nations Security Council resolutions with respect to Syria, and certainly I 
19 

think that takes us to an issue of, when we look to the world and 

instability, of a question with regard to Russia and China. 

With regard to Russia, we have seen public reports that they 

continue to arm the Syrian military, have sent Russian advisors to 

Syria, and have deployed naval forces off the Syrian coast. My first 

question is, Mr. Secretary, how would you say that Russia is supporting Syria’s military today? 

Secondly, I want to switch to China, which unavoidably takes us 

to the issue of North Korea. North Korea’s recent ballistic missile 

launch failed. Many people sighed with relief, but I think that is 

probably misplaced relief in that we know that North Korea continues its quest for missile technology and most recently, in the observance of the 100th anniversary of the birth of the founder of the 

dictatorship, brought forward their new road-mobile missile. Secretary Gates previously indicated that North Korea is becoming a 

direct threat to the United States. 

I recently wrote to Secretary Clinton and General Clapper—and 

I ask that my letter be made a part of the record—over my concern 

of what appears to be China’s support for the new North Korean 

missile that was unveiled. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

pages 49–57.] 

Mr. TURNER. Specifically, a transporter erector launcher system 

for the new missile that appears to be of Chinese origin. 

So my second question then is, Mr. Secretary, can you tell me 

your concerns over China supporting North Korea’s missiles, and 

is North Korea a direct threat to the United States? Is that something that we are witnessing and have to be concerned with China 

and their involvement? 

Secretary PANETTA. Look, there is no question that North Korea’s 

capabilities with regards to ICBMs [inter-continental ballistic missiles] and their developing nuclear capability represent a threat to 

the United States. For that reason, we take North Korea and their 

provocative actions very seriously. 

Regardless of the success or failure of that effort at the launch— 

and it was a huge failure—the fact is it was a provocation. Taking 

that step was condemned and should have been condemned, and 

our hope is that they don’t take any additional provocative actions. 

The history is that they usually turn somewhere else to try to do 

something provocative. We hope they don’t do that. 

We are prepared from the Defense Department’s point of view to 

deal with any contingency. But there is growing concern about the 

mobile capabilities that were on display in the parade recently in 

North Korea. I have to tell you, we need, frankly, to get better intelligence as to exactly what those capabilities are, exactly what is 

real and what is not real here in order to determine exactly what 

that threat represents. 

But I think the bottom line is, if they in fact have a mobile capability to be able to have ICBMs deployed in that manner, that that 

increases the threat coming from North Korea. 

Mr. TURNER. Before the time is expired, the concern then is China’s involvement with North Korea being able to make these ad-
20 

vances, support for the systems, and then, of course, Russia’s involvement with Syria? 

Secretary PANETTA. We have made very clear to China that 

China has a responsibility here to make sure that North Korea, if 

they want to improve the situation with their people, if they want 

to become a part of the international family, if they in fact want 

to deal with the terrible issues that are confronting North Korea, 

there is a way to do that. And China ought to be urging them to 

engage in those kinds of diplomatic negotiations. We thought we 

were making some progress, and suddenly we are back at provocation. 

Mr. TURNER. The concern, obviously, is that, beyond just diplomacy, if the equipment itself has trade and technology exchanges. 

Secretary PANETTA. I am sure there has been some help coming 

from China. I don’t know the exact extent of it. I think we would 

have to deal with it in another context in terms of the sensitivity 

of that information. But clearly there has been assistance along 

those lines. 

With regards to Russia, Russia has a long history of having provided military assistance and economic assistance to Syria. The 

good news is that Russia is now working with us to try to get a 

ceasefire and hopefully put that in place. They are, I think, at least 

working with the international community right now. But the reality is that Russia could have a much more significant impact on 

Syria and on Assad if they were willing to assert that. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General. 

Let me ask, Secretary Panetta, violence has not abated. The initiatives by U.N. Special Envoy Annan have been undertaken, but 

when do we determine that they are not successful and move on 

to plan B? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think that is what Secretary Clinton is 

dealing with in Paris as we speak, which is to look at that situation, to determine what the next steps are with regards to the 

Annan initiative. 

I think there is an effort to try to, obviously, deploy monitors 

that can go in and determine whether or not those violations are 

taking place. There is also consideration of perhaps a peacekeeper 

initiative to try to back up the Annan initiative with peacekeepers. 

What the final decisions are, are going to rest with the international community. 

Ms. SPEIER. In terms of arms flowing to Syria from Iran, do we 

have credible estimates on what is flowing from Iran into Syria? 

Secretary PANETTA. I think, to discuss that in depth, we really 

ought to do it in the context of an intelligence briefing. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. 

General Dempsey, I’m concerned about the report that NATO’s 

assessment of the Libya air campaign found that there were numerous problems with cooperation when it came to sharing target 

information and sharing analytical capabilities. How are we incorporating the lessons learned from Libya into our current actions in 

Syria? 
21 

General DEMPSEY. I actually was encouraged that the lessons 

learned were credible and transparent, because I was a bit afraid 

that there was going to be this euphoria about Libya as a template 

for future actions that would have taken us down a path that probably would be ill-advised. 

So I am alert to that. I’m actually going to Brussels next week 

to meet with my NATO CHODs [Chiefs of Defense]. One of the 

agenda items is, in fact, Operation Unified Protection. 

What we have got to do is we have got to be candid with each 

other—I can assure you I will be—about what they can reasonably 

expect us to provide, what they need to provide in terms of ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance], the analysis fusion of 

intelligence and operations, and investments that they need to 

make in order to close some gaps that heretofore they relied almost 

exclusively on us to provide. So I actually see this as a positive 

thing. 

Ms. SPEIER. General, what do you think are the greatest risks if 

the United States intervenes? 

General DEMPSEY. In Syria? 

Ms. SPEIER. Yes. 

General DEMPSEY. First of all, on occasion I have been portrayed 

as saying this would just be too hard, so let’s not do it. I want to 

assure you that is not the case. If asked to do something, we absolutely have the capability. 

But in terms of my concerns and how they would translate into 

military advice, I would have to be very clear about the military 

objectives that I was being asked to achieve, and I would have to 

be clear about how those military objectives were contributing to 

some outcome that we would all understand and probably agree 

upon. 

So what is the outcome? If it is just stopping the violence, that 

is one outcome. If it is changing the regime, that is another outcome. But the point is I can build from that outcome. I can build 

military options. 

My other responsibility is to balance the risk to the mission. 

What would be the cost of doing this in lives and equipment? And 

the risk to the force? Because it is a zero sum game. We are deployed all over the world. If I am asked to do something in Syria, 

if the Secretary turns to me and says, I need this option developed, 

then my responsibility is to assure that I understand the military 

objective, I build an option that will deliver it, and that I articulate 

the risk, not just to the mission we are talking about but to our 

global responsibilities. And it is all an integrated part of my advice. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, thank you for joining 

us and thank you for your service to our Nation. 

Secretary Panetta, I will begin with you. I want to follow up on 

your scenarios of looking at U.S. engagement in Syria. You spoke 

about engaging the international community, looking at NATO 

partners, and making a decision about that particular engagement. 
22 

Do you envision a scenario where the U.S. would act unilaterally? 

And do you also look at a situation where, in any scenario, would 

the U.S. look at a broader combat perspective on that? In other 

words, will we have boots on the ground moving into a peacekeeping operation in that scenario? So I want to get your perspective on that. 

Secretary PANETTA. At this point in time, Congressman, the decision is that we will not have any boots on the ground and that we 

will not act unilaterally in that part of the world. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I just wanted to make sure that we were looking 

at those particular scenarios. 

General Dempsey, to get your perspective, we see what is happening in Syria. We also see the Arab Spring. That has unfolded 

in the Middle East over the last 18 months. As you look at that 

scenario, are you concerned about the continual expansion of the 

effort by Assad in Syria maybe moving to other areas in the Middle 

East—Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq? What is your perspective on what 

potentially this holds if this effort in Syria continues? 

General DEMPSEY. Again, speaking as the principal military advisor to this body and the President’s SecDef [Secretary of Defense] 

and National Security Advisor, I don’t see the Assad model spreading. I think quite the opposite. I think the model is that previously 

suppressed populations, seeing what is happening around them, 

are beginning to rebel against the traditional strongmen, who in 

many cases have been from the minority side of the demographic 

equation. 

That is why I agree with the Secretary that change in Syria is 

inevitable. I don’t know how long it will take for it to occur, but 

it will occur. I have concerns about that. Because I think long term 

we are all eager to see these populations that have long not been 

reaping the benefits of the resources in their country, have been 

suppressed politically, and in some cases have been suppressed 

even in terms of their religious freedoms and certainly women’s 

rights. 

I think that long term this will become a stabilizing influence. 

But I think getting from here to there is going to be a wild ride. 

So I think we are in for 10–15 years of instability in a region that 

has already been characterized by instability. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask you, too, on this line, General Allen 

was here testifying before us last month talking about operations 

in Afghanistan. I want to get, both Secretary Panetta and General 

Dempsey, your perspectives. 

His comments were this. He said that he saw the use of U.S. 

power there extending past 2013. I want to get your perspective on 

that and understand, do you agree with General Allen? Are you 

looking to him as far as his guidance, his thought about how we 

utilize our current forces there, as we are drawing down? What is 

necessary past 2013? 

Because I think all of these parts of what happens not only in 

the Middle East but also there in Afghanistan and obviously our 

efforts there in Iraq are all intertwined, so I want to get your perspectives on that. 

Secretary PANETTA. Congressman, you bet we are listening to 

General Allen. He is the best. He has exercised tremendous leader-
23 

ship out there and tremendous dedication and, more importantly, 

he has put together a very good plan for the future with regards 

to Afghanistan. 

As I have pointed out, 2011 was a turning point. We have seen 

the Taliban weaken. They have not organized an effort to regain 

any area that they have lost. They have engaged in these sporadic 

hits. And we expect that they will continue. They are resilient. But 

they have been weakened. 

More importantly, the Afghan people themselves have rejected 

them. 

More importantly than that, the Afghan Army is beginning to operate on its own. These events that took place in Kabul over the 

weekend told us, told General Allen, that the Afghan Army, the Afghan police, are in fact becoming an effective force to achieve security in Afghanistan. 

And more importantly, the transitions are working. We have two 

tranches of transitions that have occurred. Fifty percent of the population is now under Afghan security and control. The third 

tranche, which is to take place this year, will put 75 percent of the 

people under Afghan security and control. 

So the plan and the strategy that General Allen has developed, 

and that NATO supports, is to proceed with that plan to take us 

through 2013 and be able to complete the final transitions and 

then draw down to the end of 2014. And then, beyond that, to have 

an enduring presence there that represents a continuing effort to 

provide support to the Afghans on counterterrorism, on training, 

advice and assist and other areas. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thanks for being here. 

General Dempsey, earlier, before votes, you were answering 

questions about chemical and biological weapons in Syria, and I 

don’t want to recharacterize your comments so I will say what I 

thought I heard, and then you can recharacterize more accurately. 

Did you say that you thought we had sufficient transparency into 

the security and location of the Syrian chemical and biological 

weapons caches? 

General DEMPSEY. I did. To recharacterize it, I believe we have 

sufficient intelligence on their facilities related to chemical and biological weapons in consultation with our close allies in the region. 

Mr. LARSEN. The second part of that question is kind of the ‘‘so 

what’’ question. So what if we do? Does that mean that we are in 

a position to do something about it if the circumstance arises where 

we need to do something about it, and are we willing to do that, 

and who makes that call? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, let me start where you began, which is 

the ‘‘so what’’ of it. As we watch these facilities and monitor—if you 

are talking about what are our vital national interests in that particular country, it seems to me that the proliferation or the potential proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, that is to say 

weapons of mass destruction, would be right at the top of the list. 

Mr. LARSEN. I would agree with that. In terms of the discussions 

we are having today about Syria and the resistance and the vio-
24 

lence in Syria, if Syria was going to use—if we thought Syria was 

going to use these chemical and biological weapons, what do we do? 

General DEMPSEY. Again, because of the classification of this setting, let me just assure you that we have planning that is updated 

constantly on actions we could take in the event that those weapons—and, by the way, the planning is being done with our allies 

in the region. 

Secretary PANETTA. I just wanted to assure you on that last point 

that we have made plans to try to deal with any contingency involving those areas. Because we think that does represent the most 

serious concern with regards to our security. 

Mr. LARSEN. I understand the classification here, and hearing 

that assurance is important. We can explore this later in a different venue. 

Secretary Panetta, I want to change the focus a little bit. Folks 

have been asking about Afghanistan and China and Russia. I want 

to ask about the story I read this morning about Yemen. Because 

about 2 years ago, the current CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] 

director was sitting about where you are sitting as a CENTCOM 

[Central Command] telling us that we did understand there is a 

difference between a civil war and what is a counterterrorism national security interest that the U.S. is trying to be supportive of 

in Yemen. A lot has changed since then obviously with the Arab 

Spring, but I don’t know that a lot has changed in terms of the 

U.S. staying out of a civil war versus the U.S. continuing to pursue 

a counterterrorism strategy in Yemen. 

The story this morning about joint strikes, whether it is true or 

not—let’s assume that it is just a story and we are reading it—that 

the CIA is looking at changing their strategy on how they conduct 

joint strikes and where they go, causes me to question whether or 

not—is the CIA tail-wagging the DOD [Department of Defense] dog 

or the State Department dog on this issue? I will just put it out 

to you. We need to have that answer, and you can’t leave the dais 

until you answer that. 

Secretary PANETTA. Thank you. 

First of all, with regards to the story in the paper, I think those 

involved classified operations, and I guess I would urge you to try 

to get what is behind that based on that kind of classified briefing. 

With regards to the larger issue—and I understand the implications of what you are asking—from DOD’s perspective, and I think 

it is, frankly, true for Intelligence, our target there represents 

those terrorists—those Al Qaeda terrorists that involve a threat to 

this country. And there are very specific targets. This is not broad 

based. We are not becoming part of any kind of civil war disputes 

in that country. We are very precise and very targeted and will remain pursuant to those kinds of operations. 

Mr. LARSEN. That is great from a DOD perspective. I guess we 

need a little clearer idea about the Administration’s perspective, if 

they are changing their view about Yemen or not over the last couple of years. 

Secretary PANETTA. Again, without going into specific details 

here, the position of the administration is that our interest in 

Yemen is the same interest we had in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] and we have in Somalia, which is to go after 
25 

those terrorists—those al Qaeda terrorists who are involved in 

planning attacks on this country. No more, no less. 

General DEMPSEY. If I may add, that is on what we are doing 

kinetically. But I also want to point out that we are working very 

closely with the military in Yemen, notably their special forces, to 

increase their capabilities as a building-partner-capacity endeavor. 

So I think it is important not to see this as we are only doing one 

thing and not the other. We are actually trying to round it off. 

Mr. LARSEN. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Roby. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you again for 

you guys being here today. 

Just real briefly, over the next 3 months, can you just explain to 

us how you see the opposition? Do you see it fragmenting or do you 

see it coalescing? How do you see this playing out over the course 

of the next 3 months? 

Secretary PANETTA. In Syria? 

Mrs. ROBY. Yes. Sorry. Back to the topic. 

Secretary PANETTA. If I could give you a firm answer as to what 

we saw happening, I probably wouldn’t be in this job. I would be 

somewhere else. 

It is a tough thing to try to look at the elements at play here 

and try to determine just exactly how this will play out. Obviously, 

Intelligence has provided its perspective on this. 

I think the best thing that we can see is that, as a result of this 

broad-based insurgency, as a result of the international community’s unified approach to dealing with Syria and applying the 

sanctions, applying the pressures, and continuing to indicate that 

Assad must step down, as a result of what the U.N. is doing now 

in implementing a ceasefire where you now have the support of 

Russia and China, there is a whole series of efforts here that I 

think are putting incredible pressure on the Assad regime to do the 

right thing. This may continue to play out. Assad will continue 

probably to resist these efforts, but I think it is just a matter of 

time before he is brought down. 

General DEMPSEY. I have nothing to add, Congresswoman. 

Mrs. ROBY. I guess, playing off of that, the Department of Defense’s assumptions around this, how have our plans evolved specifically over the last year since we have seen the Syrian revolution 

commence? 

Secretary PANETTA. What we do and what General Dempsey does 

with the service chiefs is to develop all of the plans necessary for 

any contingency. And whatever the President ultimately decides, 

we will be prepared to implement. 

General DEMPSEY. Just to kind of give you the view of the region 

writ large, we are a NATO partner with Turkey. We have a very 

strong relationship with Jordan. Obviously, Israel. We are still 

200–300 military strong in Iraq. And of course Iraq has a piece of 

this as well on their western border. 

We have been meeting with leaders throughout the region. The 

Secretary met with President Barzani from the Kurdish region, 

and they have a huge interest. There are Kurd populations in 

northeastern Syria, in eastern Turkey, in western Iran, and in 
26 

northern Iraq. And these issues are all intertwined. So, right now, 

we are in the business of sharing intelligence, sharing information, 

building partner capacity where we can, and having the credible 

thread of military capability to undergird our diplomatic and economic efforts. 

Mrs. ROBY. I guess what I would just add to that is, based on 

comments that have been made from my colleagues in their previous questioning as it related to what happened in Libya and 

maybe the concerns regarding the War Powers Act and how we 

proceeded in that action that, of all of the conflicts that we have 

dealt with over the past years, that the one lesson learned is end 

game and that there needs to be a clear defining of the mission on 

behalf of our troops, our military families, and also Americans. So 

it is my hope, and echoing the sentiments of my colleagues, that 

as we move through this, as you continue to share information with 

us, as we act in our congressional oversight role, that there will be 

clear lines of communication on behalf of our military families and 

the American people. 

Secretary PANETTA. I appreciate that concern. I want to assure 

you that I think General Dempsey and I are unified with regards 

to not proceeding with any military action unless there is a clear 

objective, unless we know what it is going to take to achieve that 

objective, how long is it going to take, and ultimately do we have 

a legal authority to in fact accomplish what we are being asked to 

accomplish. And that would involve very close consultations with 

Congress. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you both so much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank both of you for being here. 

General Dempsey, it looks like it is a real possibility that a postAssad government might potentially be dominated by the Muslim 

Brotherhood, as seems to be coming to pass in Egypt. What do you 

think the major likely impacts will be on the security of Israel and 

other U.S. interests in the region if that occurs? 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah, I wouldn’t personally predict it would 

be Muslim Brotherhood. But what we do know for a fact, just demographically, is that 70 percent of the Syrian population is of the 

Sunni confessional of Islam. And, therefore, you would have a pretty dramatic shift from a minority government and a majority out 

of power to the majority in power. 

I think there will be some combination of conservative Islamic 

party’s secular—Syria has quite a tradition of secularism that I 

wouldn’t discount. And among the minority, the Kurds, the Druze, 

and the Christians, who have been supported by the Assad party, 

but I think they could be persuaded to become part of the government. And that’s the point, I think, is that in terms of looking toward helping identify the opposition but then also holding them accountable before we support them, to committing themselves to a 

representative, shared government at the end of this thing so that 

we don’t end up creating the conditions for a civil war. 
27 

Mr. FRANKS. I think that sounds good. I guess my concern is, of 

course, you know, in Egypt, Egypt was a fairly moderate government as far as the Arab world goes. And with their elections, they 

brought in about 40 percent Muslim Brotherhood, in their parliamentary elections about 20-some plus Salifis, and that is a fairly 

frightening coalition. 

I suppose the question then should be asked: What are we doing 

and what more can we do to ensure that Syrian Kurds, Christians, 

any of the Jewish population, and other minorities there are fully 

protected and will have meaningful roles in building at least a religiously and ethnically tolerant democratic Syria, should the Assad 

regime be eventually overthrown? 

We tried to do that in Iraq. Many of us were quite concerned 

about religious freedom there. That was not achieved, and there is 

a terrible purging, especially of the Christian population in Iraq 

now. It is a frightening thing, I think, to a lot of us. What can we 

do to try to prevent that dynamic from occurring in Syria in a postAssad regime? 

I direct that to either of you. 

Secretary PANETTA. The things you have pointed out are truly legitimate concerns. You know, I guess the response is that if we can 

build democratic institutions into these countries, and to some extent we even see it—we see it in Iraq. We are beginning to see it 

in Egypt. We certainly see it in Libya. Which is that once you build 

some of these institutions where parties have to participate in governing and they have to look at how they can build coalitions and 

try to meet their responsibilities to the people, that, whether you 

like it or not, it does have some kind of moderating impact. 

Even in Egypt, where I understand your concerns, the fact is 

that the Brotherhood, there are various segments of the Brotherhood. Some are now trying to understand that they are going to 

have a bigger responsibility there. They are going to have to exercise leadership with regards to every aspect of governing there. 

And in Iraq, every time it looks like it is headed in one direction, 

the fact is that the Kurds and others that are part of that government continue to bring pressure on the president to try to stay in 

the right path. It doesn’t always work as crisply as we would like, 

but the fact is it does impact on that. We are seeing some of that 

in Libya. 

There are a lot of forces. As a result of the Arab Spring, we have 

unleashed a lot of forces here. But one thing I don’t think we ought 

to lose sight of is that, as a result of all of this, we can direct and 

help direct those countries in a better direction than where they 

were. We have to stick to that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Secretary, if I could try to squeeze in one last— 

because you’re on the right track here. I guess I’m hoping that we 

might be able to involve some of the religious and ethnic minorities, at least in northern Syria. Because it seems to me if we do 

that ahead of time, we have a chance of ameliorating the issue. 

And, of course, we should probably be pretty thankful to Israel 

for taking out the nuclear plant at this point, if the Muslim Brotherhood does gain control of Syria. 

Any thoughts you may have? 

Secretary PANETTA. No, I agree with what you just said. 
28 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Franks. 

It is very fitting as we conclude with Congressman Chris Gibson 

of New York, who himself is a distinguished veteran of service in 

the Mideast and in Central Asia. Congressman Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the strong 

leadership in the Department of Defense of both distinguished careers of the gentlemen with us today. 

I will talk about Syria in a second, but while I have the Secretary, I am very curious to hear his feedback. So I am recently 

back from Fort Bragg, visiting with one of the subordinate commands of the Special Operations Command. In previous work with 

General Clapper and the Intelligence Community—and let me say 

up front that it is remarkable the level of teamwork that is going 

on out there, but yet I feel that we are lacking in terms of systemic 

codification of some of the very encouraging developments over the 

past decade. 

I am still hearing that it is not very often but it can happen that 

the Intelligence Community may be working a line of operation, 

Special Operations Command may be working a line of operation, 

and figuratively they will bump into each other. I know there are 

efforts to bring stronger collaboration in terms of information-sharing, but, given your recent history and work, I would be very curious to know now in your current capacity what your thoughts are 

in terms of reform to bring a closer collaboration between the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense? 

Secretary PANETTA. I would yield to General Dempsey on this as 

well, but from my own experience as director of the CIA and now 

as Secretary of Defense, at least in the history that I have been in 

this town, I don’t think there is a better relationship between the 

intelligence and the military operations, special operations forces, 

than there is today. They are truly working together. 

Whether those operations are taking place in Pakistan, Afghanistan, in Yemen, in Somalia, other parts of the world, they are unified in the approach. They are working off of strong intelligence resources that are being shared. The operations that are developing, 

whether they are done on a covert basis or an overt basis, are basically worked out in the operations centers that have developed in 

each of those areas. There is very close coordination. There isn’t a 

target that is taken on that doesn’t involve the participation of both 

the intelligence and military operations, and they are doing it very 

effectively. 

I do think that we need to learn the lessons. I think you are right 

that we need to put in place probably the kind of lessons learned 

so that we can make sure that the kind of cooperation that is going 

on now is one that continues. That is probably my biggest concern, 

is that it is working well now. We are facing Al Qaeda and we are 

facing terrorism together. But as we are able to achieve some success there, there may be a danger that both of these may go off and 

try to do their own thing. That is what we have to pay attention 

to. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. I would only add that the sort of gamechanging lessons learned over the last 10 years are the integration 

of ISR, SOF [Special Operations Forces], and cyber, by the way. So 
29 

I think where you are seeing us move with our new strategy is we 

call it a global networked approach to warfare. Global and 

networked are the operative words. 

Think of it this way: Most of our adversaries, in fact even state 

actors, are not confronting us directly. They are confronting us 

through networks of surrogates and proxies and asymmetrically. So 

to defeat a network, we have to be a network. 

It gets right at what you said, Congressman. We have to find 

ways to network our capabilities internal to the interagency of government—DHS [Department of Homeland Security], FBI [Federal 

Bureau of Investigation], DOD, CIA, and all of those—as well then 

with our international partners in ways that we haven’t had to do 

before. But we are on it. We are working it. 

Mr. GIBSON. I concur with the assessment. And, of course, as we 

go forward, we don’t want to overcodify to the point that we stifle 

initiative. But I am also concerned and I think I hear the same 

thing that much of this is based on relationships. It is forged in the 

crucible. And to the extent that we can codify that, that it wouldn’t 

come to an end in the event that two individuals, very strong 

willed, may not get along, we still need this to work. So much to 

do. 

Just one specific question—I see my time is getting short here. 

But with regard to the unrest in Syria, have there been any adverse implications, ramifications in Anbar and in Nineveh Province? 

General DEMPSEY. No, not coming from Syria in. One of the biggest tribes in the Arab world, and you probably know this having 

served there, but it runs from northern Saudi Arabia through western Iraq and up into Syria, and there is assistance being provided 

on the basis of tribal relationships flowing into Syria. It is another 

one of the complications I mentioned. But we haven’t seen any kind 

of backwash coming back the other way. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you very much. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Gibson. 

As we conclude, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. 

Thank you for your service. 

Chairman Dempsey, thank you again for your service and your 

commitment to our troops, military families, and veterans. 

We shall be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 19, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 19, 2012 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 19, 2012 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 19, 2012 

(61) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. As you know, Russia has not been cooperative in moving the UN 

closer to authorizing some form of action in Syria. Some members have suggested 

that we use some sort of pressure on Russia to help convince them to be more helpful. For example, we could fence Cooperative Threat Reduction funds. Do you believe 

that this is a good idea? Why or why not? 

Secretary PANETTA. Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, such as the Department’s Nunn-Lugar program, typically deal with weapons of mass destruction issues 

on which the U.S. and Russia have cooperated successfully. These programs are important to both governments and the international community writ-large. 

The U.S. continues to engage with Moscow at the highest levels on Syria in an 

effort to persuade them that continued support of the Assad regime, including 

through weapons transfers, is not in their long-term strategic interests. We believe 

that continued engagement with Russia—rather than threatening decades-old programs that benefit both sides—offers the best chance of impacting Russian calculations on this issue. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Secretary Panetta, to the greatest extent that you can, given the 

unclassified environment of this hearing, please share with us your views on the 

stability of the ‘‘cessation of violence’’ and the most likely end-game scenarios in 

Syria. 

Secretary PANETTA. The U.S. Government policy is to hasten the fall of the Asad 

regime and push forward with a stable and democratic transition. 

As UN/Arab League Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan recently reported, the Asad 

regime has, so far, failed to comply with key obligations. The Asad regime’s forces 

have not pulled back from population centers, and a heavy military presence still 

poses a significant threat to the Syrian people. It remains to be seen if the Asad 

regime will maintain its pledge to permit peaceful demonstrations, open access for 

humanitarian aid and journalists, and begin a political transition. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Recent news articles have reported that Turkey is seriously considering the creation of an exclusion zone inside Syrian borders. Can you provide 

an assessment of the feasibility and likelihood of such an undertaking, as well as 

the effect that it would have on the security situation? How would such an action 

affect our NATO treaty responsibilities? 

Secretary PANETTA. Turkey is rightly concerned about the brutality of the Asad 

regime, the resulting in-flow of Syrian refugees into Turkey, and incidents of violence along and across the Turkey-Syria border. As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has stated that the Alliance is closely monitoring the situation along the 

Turkish-Syrian border. 

As the international community works to find a way to end the violence in Syria, 

the United States is conducting planning for a range of scenarios, including how to 

support partners and Allies that border Syria. Turkish officials have also said that 

they have their own planning for a possible exclusion or buffer zone. Turkey has 

a modern force and would likely be capable of establishing and maintaining an exclusion zone inside Syrian borders, whether opposed or unopposed. However, since 

Turkey has not formally approached the United States or NATO to discuss the details of its planning, it is difficult to assess the feasibility or likelihood of a Turkish 

exclusion zone inside Syria. 

As a NATO member, Turkey has the right to assess that the violence along its 

border with Syria warrants consultations with Allies under Article 4, which stipulates that Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty may consult whenever, in the opinion 

of any Ally, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of an Ally 

is threatened. If Turkey were to approach Allies under Article 4 with concerns about 

its border, the United States and all Allies are obliged to determine if the Turkish 

situation warrants an Alliance response to restore and maintain security in the region—an obligation I take seriously. 
62 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. Secretary Panetta, how should Congress measure whether the Annan 

plan is working in Syria? What options are on the table moving forward? 

Secretary PANETTA. As UN/Arab League Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan recently 

reported, the Asad regime has, so far, failed to comply with key obligations. The 

Asad regime’s forces have not pulled back from population centers, and a heavy 

military presence still poses a significant threat to the Syrian people. It remains to 

be seen if the Asad regime will maintain its pledge to permit peaceful demonstrations, open access for humanitarian aid and journalists, and begin a political transition. 

We continue to work with our international partners to come to a political solution that ends the violence in Syria and prepares the groundwork for a stable transition in which Asad leaves. 

However, we are also attuned to efforts by the Asad regime to forestall international action by making additional empty promises or taking half steps. We therefore maintain close contact with our allies and partners regarding potential cooperative measures that could be taken to support the UN monitoring mission in Syria. 

Ms. SPEIER. Secretary Panetta, some argue that the perceived absence of international support is making the armed opposition more jihadist in nature. In your 

opinion, is there any validity to this concern? 

Secretary PANETTA. Based on what is known, extremist elements—and foreign 

fighters in particular—still appear to have a relatively small role in relation to the 

armed Syrian opposition. The United States will continue to monitor extremist 

groups closely and work with allies and partners to disrupt flows of terrorist financing and foreign fighters. 

Ms. SPEIER. General Dempsey, in its quarterly report to Congress, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction stated that Iraq cannot defend its air space 

if Iran violates it to provide arms to Syria. Recognizing that this is an unclassified 

forum, to what degree can Syria’s other neighbors prevent arms flows to support the 

regime through Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon? 

General DEMPSEY. Internal politics, a lack of resources, and an expansive border 

make it difficult for Jordan and Lebanon to effectively secure their territories. 

Amman is dealing with an influx of Syrian refugees and Beirut is divided along proand anti-Syrian lines. However, both countries have increased border security 

through the continued deployment of troops and equipment, as Amman and Beirut 

fear weapons smuggling and movement of fighters would increase the potential for 

violence to spill across the border. Turkey has numerous means to prevent arms 

shipments into Syria, including routine customs enforcement procedures, diplomatic 

and economic pressure, and military options. Turkish military and Jandarma forces 

frequently patrol mountainous and desert terrain along Turkey’s borders, making 

such routes unreliable for smuggling large shipments and heavy weapons. Turkey 

has not closed its border or ceased trading with Syria, however, and the large volume of traffic originating from and transiting Turkey prevents Ankara from inspecting all trucks, aircraft, and ships bound for Syria. 

Ms. SPEIER. General Dempsey, former U.S. envoy to Bosnia Daniel Serwer recently argued that the presence of observers is tamping down the violence, but that 

there are insufficient numbers of observers on the ground. In your assessment, how 

many observers would be necessary to meaningfully decrease the violence? To end 

it? 

General DEMPSEY. It is difficult to determine the number of observers necessary 

to decrease violence or make it end. UN observers provide a monitoring function 

that does not involve direct intervention to stop violence. We support UNSCR 2043 

that mandates 300 UN Military Observers (unarmed) on the ground in Syria. These 

observers will provide substantial distributed monitoring capacity. We believe this 

force will be in place by the end of May and it will take some time to assess the 

effect their presence is having both on Regime and Opposition actions. 

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