UNMANNED 

AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

Measuring Progress 

and Addressing

Potential Privacy 

Concerns Would 

Facilitate Integration 

into the National 

Airspace System

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2012

GAO-12-981

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

On September 18, 2012 we updated this report to 

reflect an additional addressee.
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-981, a report to 

congressional requesters

September 2012

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

Measuring Progress and Addressing Potential 

Privacy Concerns Would Facilitate Integration into 

the National Airspace System

Why GAO Did This Study

UAS do not carry a pilot on board, but 

instead operate on pre-programmed 

routes and by following commands 

from pilot-operated ground stations. 

UAS can be small, generally 55 

pounds or less, or large. Current

domestic uses include law 

enforcement, forest fire monitoring, 

border security, weather research, and 

scientific data collection. However, 

current uses are limited. FAA 

authorizes UAS operations on a caseby-case basis after conducting a safety 

review. FAA and the other federal 

agencies that have a role or interest in 

UAS are working to provide routine 

access for UAS into the national 

airspace system. 

As requested, this report discusses 

(1) the status of obstacles identified in 

GAO’s 2008 report to integrate UAS 

into the national airspace system, 

(2) FAA’s progress in meeting its 

congressional requirements for UAS, 

and (3) emerging issues. GAO 

reviewed and analyzed documents and 

interviewed relevant government, 

academic, and private-sector entities, 

as well as UAS users and civil liberties 

organizations.

What GAO Recommends

FAA should incorporate regular 

monitoring of its efforts to assess 

progress toward fulfilling its statutory 

requirements. FAA, DHS, and DOJ 

should explore whether any actions are 

needed to guide the collection and use 

of UAS-acquired data. GAO provided a 

draft of this report to officials at DOT, 

DHS, DOJ, and three other agencies. 

DHS and DOJ concurred with the

recommendation; DOT officials agreed 

to consider the recommendations.

What GAO Found

Progress has been made, but additional work is needed to overcome many of the

obstacles to the safe integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that GAO 

identified in 2008. GAO reported in 2008 that UAS could not meet the aviation safety 

requirements developed for manned aircraft and that this posed several obstacles to 

safe and routine operation in the national airspace system. These obstacles still exist 

and include the inability for UAS to sense and avoid other aircraft and airborne 

objects in a manner similar to manned aircraft; vulnerabilities in the command and 

control of UAS operations; the lack of technological and operational standards 

needed to guide safe and consistent performance of UAS; and final regulations to 

accelerate the safe integration of UAS into the national airspace system. The Joint 

Planning and Development Office of the FAA has provided UAS stakeholders with a 

framework to collaborate and coordinate their UAS integration efforts.

Congress set forth specific requirements and deadlines in the FAA Modernization and 

Reform Act of 2012 for FAA to safely accelerate UAS integration. FAA, in 

coordination with stakeholders, has begun making progress toward completing those 

requirements, but has missed one deadline and could miss others. Many of the 

requirements entail significant work, including completing planning efforts and issuing 

a final rule for small UAS. Most of the requirements are to be achieved by December 

2015. While FAA has taken steps to meet them, it is uncertain when the national 

airspace system will be prepared to accommodate UAS given that these efforts are 

occurring simultaneously and without monitoring to assess the quality of progress 

over time toward the deadlines Congress established. Better monitoring can help 

FAA understand what has been achieved and what remains to be done and can also 

help keep Congress informed about this significant change to the aviation landscape. 

Concerns about national security, privacy, and the interference in Global PositioningSystem (GPS) signals have not been resolved and may influence acceptance of 

routine access for UAS in the national airspace system. The Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has the 

authority to regulate security of all modes of transportation, including non-military 

UAS. Working with FAA and other federal agencies, TSA implements security 

procedures, such as airspace restrictions like those limiting operations into and out of 

Ronald Reagan National Airport. In 2008, GAO recommended that TSA examine the 

security implications of non-military UAS. According to a TSA official, it recently 

reviewed its UAS related advisories and determined that they are still applicable. TSA 

has not provided information on its efforts to mitigate security implications of UAS, 

and GAO believes TSA should act on this recommendation. Stakeholder privacy 

concerns include the potential for increased amounts of government surveillance 

using technologies placed on UAS, the collection and use of such data, and potential 

violations of constitutional Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable 

search and seizures. Currently, no federal agency has specific statutory responsibility 

to regulate privacy matters relating to UAS for the entire federal government. Some 

stakeholders have suggested that DHS or the Department of Justice (DOJ) might be 

better positioned to address privacy issues since they generally stem from the 

operational uses of UAS for governmental surveillance and law enforcement 

purposes. Working proactively to address security and privacy concerns could help

prevent further delays in UAS integration. Finally, non-military UAS GPS signals are 

unencrypted, risking potential interruption of the command and control of UAS. 

View GAO-12-981. For more information, 

contact Gerald L.Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 

or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Letter 1 

Background 4

Status of Obstacles to Safe and Routine Integration of UAS into the 

National Airspace System 14

FAA Progress toward UAS Integration Requirements 23

Emerging Issues Related to UAS Integration Include Potential 

Security and Privacy Concerns and GPS Jamming and Spoofing 29

Conclusions 37

Recommendations 38

Agency Comments 38

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 41

Appendix II Federal Entities with Certificates of Waiver or Authorization Approved 

from January 1, 2012, to July 13, 2012 43

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 44

Tables

Table 1: Key Federal and Industry UAS Stakeholders and Their 

Roles 12

Table 2: Selected FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 

Requirements for UAS Integration 24

Figures

Figure 1: Conceptual Rendering of Unmanned Aircraft System 2

Figure 2: Examples of Current Uses for UAS and their Altitudes of 

Operation 6

Figure 3: Non-Federal Recipients of Certificates of Waiver or 

Authorization and Special Airworthiness Certificates in 

the Experimental Category and the Location, as of July 13, 

2012 8

Figure 4: Illustration of UAS Use for Hurricane Data Collection 10

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Abbreviations list: 

2012 Act FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 

ADS-B automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast

ASTM International formerly known as the American Society for Testing 

and Materials

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

COA Certificate of Waiver or Authorization

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOJ Department of Justice

DOT Department of Transportation

EUROCAE European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

GBSAA ground-based sense and avoid 

GPS Global Positioning-System

GSA General Services Administration 

JPDO Joint Planning Development Office 

MASPS minimum aviation system performance standards

MOPS minimum operational performance standards

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System

NPRM Notice of Proposed Rule Making

PIA privacy impact assessment

SC 203 Special Committee 203

RTCA formerly the Radio Technical Commission for

Aeronautics (now RTCA)

TSA Transportation Security Administration

UAS unmanned aircraft systems 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

September 14, 2012

Congressional Requesters 

Domestic use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is expected to 

increase as federal, state, and local public safety entities have obtained 

greater access to the national airspace system and the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) develops procedures to allow commercial UAS use. 

UAS aircraft do not carry a pilot onboard but instead operate on preprogrammed routes and by following commands from pilot-operated 

ground control stations. These aircraft are also referred to as “unmanned 

aerial vehicles,” “remotely piloted aircraft,” “unmanned aircraft,” or 

“drones.” The term “unmanned aircraft system” is used to recognize that 

UAS include not only the airframe and power plant, but also associated 

elements such as a ground control station and the communications links 

as shown in figure 1.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Figure 1: Conceptual Rendering of Unmanned Aircraft System

According to an industry forecast, the growth in the market for 

government and commercial UAS use could result in worldwide 

expenditures of as much as $89.1 billion ($28.5 billion for research and 

development and $60.6 billion for procurement) in aggregate over the 

next decade.1

 

1

Teal Group Corporation, World Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (Fairfax, VA: 2012).

While the U.S. military has been a catalyst for growth in the 

UAS market, the industry forecaster expects the civil UAS market to 

emerge first based on government use and a commercial nongovernmental market to emerge more slowly as the airspace access 

issues are being resolved. The growth in the market relies in part on 

regulations that will ensure the safe and routine integration of UAS into 

the national airspace system. Congress and other stakeholders have 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

expressed concerns that sufficient progress has not been made to allow 

for UAS to fly in the national airspace system in a manner similar to 

manned aircraft.2,3 In 2008, we reported that safe and routine UAS 

access to the national airspace system poses several obstacles.4 The 

FAA Modernization and Reform Act (the 2012 Act), enacted in February 

2012, brought greater focus to integrating UAS into the national airspace 

system, and FAA is working toward implementing the UAS-specific 

requirements set forth in that act.5 Concerns have been raised, by 

members of Congress and a civil liberties organization, about the 

potential implications of increased UAS use including potential privacy 

implications.

In this context, you asked us to assess

1. the status of obstacles to the safe and routine integration of UAS into 

the national airspace system that we identified in our 2008 report,

2. FAA’s progress in complying with the 2012 Act UAS requirements, 

and

3. emerging issues pertaining to UAS. 

This report focuses on issues related to non-military UAS and is based on 

our analysis of the efforts of FAA and other federal agencies to integrate 

UAS into the national airspace system as well as other emerging issues. 

To describe and assess the status of obstacles to safe integration that we 

previously identified in 2008, we reviewed documents provided by and 

interviewed officials of government, academic, and private-sector entities 

 

2

The Congressional Unmanned Systems Caucus, consisting of 60 members, was formed 

to educate members of Congress and the public on the strategic, tactical, and scientific 

value of unmanned systems; actively support further development and acquisition of more 

systems, and to more effectively engage the civilian aviation community on unmanned 

system use and safety.

3 The Congressional Research Service issued a report discussing the evolution of UAS 

and UAS related considerations for Congress. Congressional Research Service, Pilotless 

Drones: Background and Considerations for Congress Regarding Unmanned Aircraft 

Operations in the National Airspace System, R42718 (Washington, D.C.: September 

2012).

4

GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions Needed to Ensure Safety and 

Expand Their Potential Uses within the National Airspace System, GAO-08-511

(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2008).

5

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, §§ 332 – 334, 126 Stat. 

11 (2012).
 

Page 4 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

involved with UAS issues. To assess FAA’s progress in meeting its 

statutory requirements for UAS integration, we reviewed relevant portions 

of the 2012 Act and obtained documents and conducted interviews with 

the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration Office at FAA. We also 

identified criteria for assessments from GAO’s Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government. We spoke with officials from the 

FAA’s Joint Planning Development Office (JPDO) to understand UAS 

coordination efforts across the federal government and other 

stakeholders. To identify emerging issues related to UAS, we reviewed 

documents provided by and interviewed officials from federal, state, and 

local entities that use UAS as well as representatives from the Electronic 

Frontier Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union regarding 

UAS security and privacy concerns. We also examined pertinent legal 

requirements to which federal agencies must adhere when collecting and 

using personal information.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to September 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains more 

detailed information on our objectives, scope, and methodology.

The national airspace system encompasses an average of more than 

100,000 aviation flights per day, including commercial air carriers, general 

aviation,6 and military aircraft. There are approximately 18,000 

commercial aircraft and 230,000 active general aviation aircraft in the 

United States. Most commercial aircraft operate at altitudes between 

18,000 and 60,000 feet,7

 

6

According to the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, general aviation is all 

aviation other than military and commercial airlines that is not available to the general 

public for transport. General aviation includes nonscheduled aircraft operations such as air 

medical-ambulance, corporate aviation, and privately owned aircraft. 

while general aviation aircraft can operate at 

various altitudes, depending on the type of aircraft. For example, the 

7

Altitudes 18,000 and 60,000 feet are reported as mean sea level, which is the average 

height of the surface of the sea for all stages of the tide; used as a reference for 

elevations.

Background 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

majority of single engine aircraft generally operate at altitudes below 

10,000 feet, while multi-engine jet aircraft operate at altitudes up to 

50,000 feet. UAS also fly at all levels of airspace, generally based on their 

size. UAS are typically described in terms of weight, endurance, purpose 

of use, and altitude of operation. For the purposes of this report, we use 

the broad categories of “large” and “small” UAS. “Small” UAS typically 

weigh less than 55 pounds, fly below 400 feet above ground level, can 

stay airborne for several hours, and can be used for reconnaissance, 

inspection, and surveillance.8

 

8

According to an industry association, small UAS are expected to comprise the majority of 

UAS that will operate in the national airspace system.

However, some small UAS can have longer 

endurance and can operate beyond line-of-sight capability. “Large” UAS, 

depending on their size and mission, generally fly at altitudes up to or 

greater than 60,000 feet, some can remain airborne for multiple days, and 

are generally used for the purposes of surveillance, data gathering, and 

communications relay. Figure 2 provides examples of UAS and the 

altitudes at which they operate. Below 18,000 feet, there is a wide variety 

of types of aircraft, including those taking off and landing, and levels of 

activity at different altitudes which impacts the integration of UAS into the 

national airspace system. This variety of flight activity will require 

coordination with various state and federal agencies, e.g., law 

enforcement, agricultural, environmental, and emergency response. The 

activity in this airspace is projected to experience significant growth in 

small independent UAS utilization because of the potential economic 

benefits for the users of UAS.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Figure 2: Examples of Current Uses for UAS and their Altitudes of Operation

Note: As a technical reference for elevations, altitudes of 18,000 and 60,000 feet are mean sea level

and 400 feet is above ground level. 

Note: Both NASA and DOD operate at additional flight levels other than those depicted.

Currently, FAA authorizes military and non-military (academic institutions; 

federal, state, and local governments including law enforcement entities; 

and private sector entities) UAS operations on a limited basis after 

conducting a case-by-case safety review. Only federal, state, and local 

government agencies can apply for and be granted a Certificate of Waiver

or Authorization (COA); private sector entities (civil operators) may apply 

for special airworthiness certificates in the experimental category that 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

allows them to operate UAS.9

 

9

COAs and special airworthiness certifications in the experimental category represent 

exceptions to the usual aircraft certification process. FAA examines the facts and 

circumstances of a proposed UAS to ensure that the prospective pilot has acceptably 

mitigated the safety risks.

Between January 1, 2012, and July 13, 

2012, FAA issued 342 COAs to 106 federal, state, and local government 

entities across the United States, including law enforcement entities as 

well as academic institutions. Over the same time period, FAA issued 8 

special airworthiness certifications for experimental use to 4 UAS 

manufacturers. Presently, under COA or special airworthiness 

certification, UAS operations are permitted for specific time frames 

(generally 12 to 24 months), locations, and operations and thus the COA 

holder may fly multiple times under a specific COA. However, it is not 

uncommon for an entity to receive multiple COAs for various missions 

and locations. See figure 3 for the locations of COA’s and special 

airworthiness certificates in the experimental category as of July 13, 

2012. See appendix II for the list of federal entities with COAs.
 

Page 8 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Figure 3: Non-Federal Recipients of Certificates of Waiver or Authorization and Special Airworthiness Certificates in the 

Experimental Category and the Location, as of July 13, 2012

Several federal agencies use UAS to fulfill their mission, including the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense 

(DOD), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and 

the Department of Justice (DOJ). According to DHS officials, Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) owns and uses nine UAS that it operates for 

its own border security missions as well as for missions in conjunction 
 

Page 9 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

with other agencies, and would like to expand its fleet of UAS.10 DOD has 

successfully used UAS for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and 

combat missions,11 and the United States military services expect to 

conduct more UAS training flights across the contiguous United States, 

as combat operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere decrease.12

 

10The DHS Inspector General reviewed CBP’s actions to establish its UAS program, the 

purpose of which is to provide reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and acquisition 

capabilities across all CBP areas of responsibility. The Inspector General assessed 

whether CBP has established an adequate operation plan to define, prioritize, and 

execute its unmanned aircraft mission. The Inspector General’s May 2012 report found 

that CBP had not achieved its scheduled or desired level of flight hours for its UAS. The 

report estimated that CBP used its UAS less than 40 percent of the time it would have 

expected. The report made four recommendations intended to improve CBP’s planning of 

its UAS program to address its level of operation, program funding, and resource 

requirements along with stakeholder needs. Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspector General, CBP’s Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Nation’s Border 

Security, OIG-12-85 (Washington, DC: May 30, 2012).

While 

many of DOD’s UAS operations currently take place outside of the United 

States, the military services require access to the national airspace 

system to conduct UAS training. DOD has also assisted DHS in border 

security missions, including two missions since 2006 where the National 

Guard provided support in four southwestern Border States. NASA uses 

UAS primarily for research purposes, such as a large UAS (Predator B) 

for wildfire mapping and investigations as well as the collection of 

hurricane data (see fig. 4). Entities within DOJ have used UAS to fulfill its 

law enforcement missions. 

11GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Comprehensive Planning and a Results-Oriented 

Training Strategy Are Needed to Support Growing Inventories, GAO-10-331 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 26, 2010).

12House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Performance Audit of the 

Department of Defense Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (Washington, DC: 

Apr. 2012).
 

Page 10 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Figure 4: Illustration of UAS Use for Hurricane Data Collection

Although current domestic uses of UAS are limited to include activities 

such as law enforcement, search and rescue, forensic photography, 

monitoring or fighting forest fires, border security, weather research, and 

scientific data collection, UAS also have a wide range of other potential 

uses. These include commercial uses such as pipeline, utility, and farm 

fence inspections; vehicular traffic monitoring; real-estate and 

construction-site photography; relaying telecommunication signals; fishery 

protection and monitoring; and crop dusting. FAA’s goal is to eventually 

permit, to the greatest extent possible, routine UAS operations in the 

national airspace system while ensuring safety. As the list of potential 

uses for UAS grows, so do the concerns about how they might affect 

existing military and non-military aviation as well as concerns about how 

they might be used.
 

Page 11 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

According to an industry forecast, the market for government and 

commercial use of UAS is expected to grow, with small UAS having the 

greatest growth potential.13 As previously stated, this forecast states that 

the worldwide expenditures on UAS and related research could be 

potentially as much as $89.1 billion in aggregate over the next decade. 

The associated worldwide research and development for production is 

estimated to be $28.5 billion of the $89.1 billion.14

Domestically, state and local law enforcement entities represent the 

greatest potential users of small UAS in the near term because they can 

offer a simple and cost effective solution for airborne law enforcement 

activities. For example, federal officials and one airborne law enforcement 

official said that a small UAS costing between $30,000 and $50,000 is 

more likely to be purchased by state and local law enforcement entities 

because the cost is nearly equivalent to that of a patrol car and much less 

than a manned aircraft. According to an industry trade group, local law 

enforcement can potentially choose from about 146 different types of 

small UAS being manufactured by about 69 different companies in the 

U.S. 

The United States 

could account for 62 percent of this research and development 

investment. A 2008 forecast noted that while civil and commercial UAS

markets will eventually emerge, a likely scenario would be for a UASleasing industry to emerge first to serve the needs of businesses that do 

not want to invest in UAS ownership.

In addition to FAA, many federal and private sector entities have roles in 

the effort to integrate UAS into the national airspace system. For 

example, DHS’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 

authority to regulate the security of all transportation modes to ensure that 

appropriate safeguards are in place. According to TSA, its aviation 

security efforts include addressing risks, threats, and vulnerabilities 

related to non-military UAS. Table 1 provides an overview of key federal 

and industry UAS stakeholders’ roles in the integration effort.

 

13Teal Group Corporation, World Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (Fairfax, VA: 2012).

14The other portion of the estimate, $60.6 billion, is for the procurement of UAS.
 

Page 12 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Table 1: Key Federal and Industry UAS Stakeholders and Their Roles

Key stakeholders UAS integration role

Federal entity FAA FAA’s UAS Integration Office is responsible for ensuring that 

UAS operate safely in the national airspace system.

DOD DOD provides FAA with UAS operational and safety data, as well 

as research and development support. 

NASA NASA provides research and development and testing on UAS 

integration efforts. 

JPDO FAA’s JPDO provides a framework for UAS stakeholders to 

collaborate and coordinate on their UAS integration efforts.

DHS DHS’s CBP has provided flight demonstrations to FAA’s Next 

Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) Office.

GSA The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for 

tracking the federal government’s UAS inventory. Federal 

agencies that own or lease UAS report their UAS inventory, cost 

and utilization data to GSA.

DOJ DOJ’s National Institute of Justice is responsible, in part, for 

addressing the technology needs—including UAS—of local, 

state, and tribal law enforcement agencies.

UAS Executive Committee The UAS Executive Committee is composed of senior executives 

from federal agencies including FAA, DOD, NASA, and DHS and 

is responsible for

a

UAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee

identifying solutions to the range of technical, 

procedural, and policy concerns arising from UAS integration. 

The UAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee was chartered in 2011 

to provide a mechanism for industry and academic stakeholders 

as well as other federal, state, and local government entities to 

provide recommendations and standards to FAA on issues 

related to UAS integration. 

b

Standards making bodies RTCA SC-203 RTCA is a private, not-for-profit organization consisting of 

industry experts. SC 203 is responsible for developing 

consensus-based recommendations and standards regarding 

UAS communications, navigation, surveillance, and air traffic 

management system issues.

c

ASTM International Committee F38 ASTM International Committee F38 is a private organization 

consisting of industry experts that is responsible for developing 

standards and consensus based recommendations for small UAS 

integration into the national airspace system and worldwide.

d

Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.

a

The UAS Executive Committee was formed as a result of the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009)). Section 935 of 2010 NDAA 

states that “The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation shall, after consultation 

with the Secretary of Homeland Security, jointly develop a plan for providing expanded access to the 

national airspace system for unmanned aircraft systems of the Department of Defense” and requires 

the Executive Committee members to provide Congress with, among other things, a communication 

plan, specific milestones for expanded access to the national airspace system, and report on their 

efforts.

b

FAA also chartered a small UAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee in 2008, which made 

recommendations for the standards and regulations for the operation of small UAS in the national 

airspace system.
 

Page 13 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

c

RTCA, formerly the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, serves as a federal advisory 

committee, and its recommendations are the basis for a number of FAA’s policy, program, and 

regulatory decisions.

d

FAA has also historically partnered with a range of industry, federal 

research entities, universities, and international organizations for research 

on UAS. These types of research and development agreements are 

categorized as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers,

ASTM International, formerly known as the American Society for Testing and Materials, works to 

deliver the test methods, specifications, guides, and practices that support industries and 

governments worldwide.

15

Cooperative Research and Development Agreements,16 and International 

Agreements.17

In 2008, we reported that federal actions were needed to ensure safety 

and expand the potential uses of UAS within the national airspace 

system.

These agreements typically require the agency, 

organization, or company to perform types of research and provide FAA 

with the data in exchange for funding. For example, FAA established an 

agreement with the European Union to initiate, coordinate, and prioritize 

the activities necessary for supporting the development of provisions 

required for the evolution of UAS to full recognition as a legitimate 

category-of-airspace user. 

18

 

15FAA’s Federally Funded Research and Development Centers are located at MITRE, 

MIT’s Lincoln Lab, and the Air Force Research Lab. 

We stated that Congress should consider creating an 

overarching body within FAA to address obstacles for routine access. 

While such a body has not been created, as discussed in this report, FAA 

is combining its UAS safety and air traffic staff under one executive, and 

JPDO has provided UAS stakeholders with a framework to collaborate 

and coordinate their UAS integration efforts. FAA implemented our 

recommendations that it (1) finalize and issue a UAS program plan to 

16FAA has Cooperative Research and Development Agreements with academic 

institutions such as New Mexico State University, Rutgers University, Auburn University, 

University of North Dakota, Stanford University, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Colorado 

University, Wichita State University, and Embry Riddle University. FAA also has 

Cooperative Research and Development Agreements with General Atomics, AAI 

Corporation, GE Aviation Systems LLC, Boeing Inc, and Georgia Tech Research 

Corporation.

17FAA’s international agreements include the Netherlands, the German Aerospace Center, 

and the European Union.

18 GAO-08-511 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

address the future of UAS and (2) analyze the data FAA collects on UAS 

operations under its COAs and establish a process to analyze DOD’s

data on its UAS research, development, and operations. In addition, to 

ensure that appropriate UAS security controls are in place when civil-use 

UAS have routine access to the national airspace system, we 

recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the TSA 

Administrator to examine the security implications of future, non-military 

UAS operations in the national airspace system and take any actions 

deemed appropriate. As discussed later in this report, TSA has taken 

some steps but we have not yet closed this recommendation.

In 2008, we reported that UAS could not meet the aviation safety 

requirements developed for manned aircraft and that UAS posed several 

obstacles to operating safely and routinely in the national airspace 

system. FAA and others have continued their efforts to address these 

obstacles, but many still remain, including 

1. the inability for UAS to detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft and 

airborne objects in a manner similar to “see and avoid” by a pilot in a 

manned aircraft; 

2. vulnerabilities in the command and control of UAS operations; 

3. the limited human factors engineering incorporated into UAS 

technologies; 

4. unreliable UAS performance; 

5. the lack of technological and operational standards needed to guide 

the safe and consistent performance of UAS; 

6. the lack of final regulations to guide the safe integration of UAS into 

the national airspace system; and 

7. the transition to NextGen.19

To date, no suitable technology has been deployed that would provide 

UAS with the capability to sense and avoid other aircraft and airborne 

objects and to comply completely with FAA regulatory requirements of the 

 

19NextGen is a new satellite-based air traffic management system that will replace the 

current radar-based system

Status of Obstacles to 

Safe and Routine 

Integration of UAS 

into the National 

Airspace System

Sense and Avoid 

Technologies
 

Page 15 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

national airspace system.20 However, research and development efforts 

by FAA, DOD, NASA, and MITRE21, among others, suggests that 

potential solutions to the sense and avoid obstacle may be available in 

the near term. With no pilot to scan the sky, most UAS do not have an onboard capability to directly “see” other aircraft. Consequently, UAS must 

possess the capability to sense and avoid an object using on-board 

equipment, or within the line-of-sight of a human on the ground or in a 

chase aircraft,22 or by other means, such as ground-based sense and 

avoid (GBSAA).23

 

20 The FAA regulations include 14 C.F.R § 91.111, “Operating near other aircraft,” with 

reference to “create a collision hazard,” and 14 C.F.R. § 91.113, “Right-of-way rules.”

Many UAS, particularly smaller models, will likely 

operate at altitudes below 18,000 feet, sharing airspace with other aircraft 

or flight objects. Sensing and avoiding other vehicles or objects through 

the use of technology represents a particular challenge for small UAS 

because aircraft, obstructions, or flight objects at low altitude often do not 

transmit an electronic signal to identify themselves, and even if they did, 

many small UAS do not have equipment to detect such signals and may 

be too small to carry such equipment. Since 2008, FAA and other federal 

agencies have managed several research activities to support meeting 

the sense and avoid requirements. DOD officials told us that the 

Department of the Army is working on a GBSAA system that will detect 

other airborne objects and allow the pilot to direct the UAS to maneuver 

to a safe location. The Army has successfully tested one GBSAA system, 

but this system may not be useable on all types of UAS. Another potential 

system to address this obstacle is an airborne sense and avoid system, 

which could equip UAS with the same Global Positioning System (GPS)-

based transponder system that will be used in FAA’s NextGen air-trafficmanagement system and with which some manned aircraft are starting to 

be equipped. UAS could also be equipped with other systems comprised 

of sensors for detecting airborne aircraft or other objects, computer 

software to track and potentially resolve collision threats and displays to 

21MITRE is a public interest company that works in partnership with the federal 

government applying systems engineering and advanced technology to address issues of 

national importance. 

22A chase aircraft is a manned aircraft that is used to follow a UAS and serves as the seeand-avoid function for total flight safety. The pilot of the chase aircraft monitors for 

conflicting aircraft and is in constant radio contact with the pilot in command of the UAS 

who is on the ground.

23GBSAA is an air surveillance radar that provides positional information via a display of 

traffic information to the UAS flight crew.
 

Page 16 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

provide maneuvering advice and/or information to the pilot. In 2012, 

NASA researchers at Dryden Flight Research Center successfully tested 

an automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) transponder 

system on its Ikhana UAS. 24 25 An airborne sense and avoid system 

could include ADS-B, along with other sensors such as optical / infrared 

cameras and radar. However, not all aircraft will be required to be 

equipped with ADS-B. Until technical solutions for UAS to sense and 

avoid are tested and validated, both small and large UAS will continue to 

mitigate the “see and avoid” obstacle by operating within line-of-sight, 

using a chase aircraft, or operating in segregated airspace.

Similar to what we reported in 2008, ensuring uninterrupted command 

and control for both small and large UAS remains a key obstacle for safe 

and routine integration into the national airspace system. Since UAS fly 

based on pre-programmed flight paths and by commands from a pilotoperated ground control station, the ability to maintain the integrity of 

command and control signals are critically important to ensure that the 

UAS operates as expected and as intended. 

FAA and MITRE have been researching solutions to lost link, but the 

standardization of lost link procedures, for both small and large UAS, has 

not been finalized. In a “lost link” scenario, the command and control link 

between the UAS and the ground control station is broken because of

either environmental or technological issues, which could lead to loss of 

control of the UAS. To address this type of situation, UAS generally have 

pre-programmed maneuvers that may direct the UAS to first hover or 

circle in the airspace for a certain period of time to reestablish its radio 

link. If the link is not reestablished, then the UAS will return to “home” or 

the location from which it was launched, or execute an unintentional flight 

termination at its current location. It is important that air traffic controllers 

know where and how all aircraft are operating so they can ensure the 

 

24ADS-B transponder system uses GPS signals along with aircraft avionics to transmit the 

aircraft’s location to ground receivers. The ground receivers then transmit that information 

to controller screens and cockpit displays on aircraft equipped with automatic dependent 

surveillance-broadcast transponder system avionics. 25Ikhana is a large UAS that NASA has used for a number of research activities, such as 

monitoring and tracking wildfires and expects to use for an arctic mission to assess the 

surface sea ice next year. 

Command and Control 

Communications 

“Lost Link” Scenarios
 

Page 17 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

safe separation of aircraft in their airspace.26

Progress has been made in obtaining additional dedicated radiofrequency spectrum for UAS operations, but additional dedicated 

spectrum, including satellite spectrum, is still needed to ensure secure 

and continuous communications for both small and large UAS operations. 

In 2008, we reported that the lack of protected radio-frequency spectrum 

for UAS operations heightens the possibility that an pilot could lose 

command and control of a UAS. Unlike manned aircraft—which use 

dedicated, protected radio frequencies—UAS currently use unprotected 

radio spectrum and, like any other wireless technology, remain vulnerable 

to unintentional or intentional interference. This remains a key security 

and safety vulnerability because, in contrast to a manned aircraft in which 

the pilot has direct physical control of the aircraft, interruption of radio 

transmissions can sever the UAS’s only means of control. At the 2011 

World Radio Conference, additional aviation protected spectrum was 

allocated for line of sight control of for both public and civil UAS 

operations. 

Currently, according to FAA, 

each COA has a specific lost link procedure unique to that particular 

operation and air traffic controllers should have a copy for reference at all 

times. Until procedures for a lost link scenario have been standardized 

across all types of UAS, air traffic controllers must rely on the lost link 

procedures established in each COA to know what a particular UAS will 

do in such a scenario. 

UAS stakeholders are working to develop and validate hardware and 

standards for communications operating in allocated spectrum. 

Specifically, according to NASA, it is developing, in conjunction with 

Rockwell Collins, a radio for control and a non-payload communications 

data link that would provide secure communications. In addition, FAA’s 

UAS Research Management Plan identified 13 activities designed to 

mitigate command, control, and communication obstacles. One effort 

focused on characterizing the capacity and performance impact of UAS 

operations on air-traffic-control communications systems. In addition, a 

demonstration led by Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in 2010 

 

26Air traffic controllers monitor and coordinate the movement of air traffic. They 

communicate with pilots of aircraft, including UAS, but do not directly control the 

operations of aircraft.

Dedicated Radio-Frequency 

Spectrum
 

Page 18 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

simulated a national airspace communications system27 to demonstrate 

the process and ability of a UAS pilot to establish alternate voice 

communications with air traffic control if the primary radio 

communications link were lost. NASA is also performing additional 

command and control research. As part of its 5-year UAS Integration in 

the National Airspace System Project, NASA is working to develop and 

verify a communications system prototype to support the allocation of 

spectrum for safe UAS operations.

UAS stakeholders have been developing solutions to human factor issues

for both small and large UAS. According to FAA, human factors are 

defined as a broad field that examines the interaction between people, 

machines, and the environment for the purpose of improving performance 

and reducing errors. Human factors are important for UAS operations as 

the pilot and aircraft are not collocated. The separation of pilot and aircraft 

creates a number of issues, including loss of sensory cues valuable for 

flight control, delays in control and communications loops, and difficulty in 

scanning the visual environment surrounding the unmanned aircraft. In 

2008, we reported that UAS developers had not fully incorporated human 

factors engineering in their products. Such engineering incorporates what 

is known about people, their abilities, characteristics, and limitations into 

the design of the equipment they use, the environments in which they 

function, and the jobs they perform. Several human factors issues have 

not yet been resolved. Specifically, how pilots or air traffic controllers 

respond to the lag in communication of information from the UAS, the skill 

set and medical qualifications required for UAS pilots,

 

27A National Airspace System Voice System is a new flexible networkable voice 

communications system with flexible networking capabilities that will be required for future 

air traffic operations, as envisioned by NextGen. The National Airspace System Voice 

System is the key voice communication component for NextGen, as many of the 

seventeen different switches currently used in the national airspace are already 

experiencing severe obsolescence issues.

and UAS pilottraining requirements. As part of NASA’s UAS Integration in the National 

Airspace System Project, NASA is working to develop human factor 

guidelines for ground control stations. NASA plans to share the results 

with RTCA SC-203 to inform the recommended guidelines. In addition, 

the U.S. Army is working to develop universal ground control stations, 

which would allow UAS pilots to fly different types of UAS without having 

to be trained on multiple configurations of a ground control station.

Human Factors
 

Page 19 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

FAA and NASA are taking steps to ensure the reliability of both small and 

large UAS by developing a certification process specific to UAS. 

Currently, FAA has a process and regulations in place for certifying any 

new aircraft type and allowing it access to the national airspace system. 

UAS stakeholders we interviewed stated that this process is costly and

manpower intensive, and does not assure certification. One manufacturer 

that tried certifying a UAS through this process noted that it took one year 

and cost $1 million to permit a single airframe to have access to the 

national airspace system. According to FAA, another manufacturer 

recently started this process. FAA’s Research and Development office is 

working to identify the substantive differences in how to meet the 

certification standards for manned and unmanned aircraft. According to 

its Research Management Plan, the office has six activities under way 

that support the development of UAS-specific certification and 

airworthiness standards. One such activity brought subject matter experts 

together to examine how the varied requirements of certification28 relate 

to operations of UAS in the national airspace system. A 2007 study 

examined the relevant federal regulations, statutes, orders, and policies 

applicable to UAS operating in the national airspace. It found that 30 

percent of the certification regulations would apply to UAS, 16 percent 

would not apply, and it was unclear whether the remaining 54 percent 

would apply.

Standards-making bodies are working to develop safety, reliability, and 

performance standards for UAS. The complexities of the issues to be 

addressed and the lack of operational and safety data have hindered the 

standards development process. Minimum aviation system performance 

standards (MASPS) and minimum operational performance standards 

(MOPS) are needed in the areas of: operational and navigational 

performance; command and control communications; and sense and 

avoid capabilities. RTCA, a standards-making body chartered by FAA, 

established a federal advisory committee called the Special Committee 

203 (or SC 203), to establish MASPS and MOPS for FAA to use in 

developing UAS regulations. Individuals from academia and the private 

sector serve on the committee, along with FAA, NASA, and DOD officials.

According to an RTCA official, both DOD and NASA are sharing the 

 

28Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 C.F.R.) part 91, titled “General Operating and 

Flight Rules.”

Reliability

Standards 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

results of their UAS flight experience and research and development 

efforts to assist RTCA in the standards development process. In addition, 

an international voluntary consensus standards-making body known as 

ASTM International Committee F38 on UAS, is working with FAA to 

develop standards to support the integration of small UAS into the 

national airspace system. An official from RTCA suggested that the 

standards-making process might be accelerated if RTCA SC 203 could 

start by producing an initial set of standards for a specific UAS with a 

clearly defined mission. RTCA SC 203 could then utilize those initial 

standards, along with the subsequent safety and performance data from 

those operations, to develop additional standards for increasingly 

complex UAS functions and missions.

While FAA officials stated that the agency’s efforts to develop standards 

have been slowed by the lack of operational data, FAA has not utilized

the operational data it does possess. In 2008, we recommended that FAA 

expedite efforts to ensure that UAS have routine access to the national 

airspace system by analyzing the data FAA collects on UAS operations 

as part of its COA process and establish a process to analyze DOD data 

on its UAS research, development, and operations.29 Safety and 

operational data can directly support the development of UAS technology. 

For example, in the development and validation of UAS technology, 

GBSAA for example, the FAA requires data to demonstrate that 

cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft can be consistently indentified at 

all operational altitudes and ranges, and the proposed system can 

effectively avoid a potential collision. To date, FAA has not utilized the 

operational data available to the agency as part of the COA process for 

the development of standards. According to a DOD official, it started 

providing, FAA with 7 years of operational and safety data in September 

2011.

30

 

29

However, according to FAA officials, the agency has been unable 

to use the data to support its standards development because the data

was not in a usable format. As of June 2012, FAA was still defining the 

data fields it needed and how the data will be used to support the 

development of performance or certification standards and the regulatory 

process for UAS. FAA officials have since communicated their data 

requirements to DOD and also provided us with a list of general data 

GAO-08-511. 

30 In June 2011, FAA and DOD signed a memorandum of agreement that specified the 

data that would be provided.
 

Page 21 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

requirements. Furthermore, FAA officials also noted that the agency 

currently has a contract with MITRE to address these data challenges in 

fiscal year 2013.

According to FAA, its draft Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) that 

would define and govern how small UAS would potentially operate in the 

national airspace system will be issued at the end of 2012. Concerns 

relating to the process and potential timeline for publishing the final small 

UAS rule will be discussed later in this report. FAA regulations govern the 

routine operation of most aircraft in the national airspace system.31

However, these regulations do not contain provisions that explicitly 

address issues relating to UAS. As we highlighted in our 2008 report, 

existing regulations may need to be modified to address the unique 

characteristics of UAS to prevent “undue harm to manned aircraft.”

Today, UAS continue to operate as exceptions to the regulatory 

framework rather than being governed by it. Without specific and 

permanent regulations for safe operation of UAS, federal stakeholders, 

including DOD, continue to face challenges and limitations on their UAS 

operations. The lack of final regulations could hinder the acceleration of 

safe and routine integration of UAS into the national airspace system. In 

addition, as we stated earlier, the market for government and commercial 

use of UAS is expected to grow with small UAS having the greatest 

potential and a market forecast indicates that the United States could 

account for 62 percent of the world’s research and development 

investment for UAS technology over the coming decade. 

As FAA and others continue to address the challenges to UAS 

integration, they must do so with the expected changes to the operations 

of the national airspace system as a result of NextGen in mind. As UAS 

operations are expected to proliferate, it is important that they are able to 

safely operate in the NextGen environment. Both FAA’s NextGen 

Integration Office and JPDO are working to coordinate UAS and NextGen 

research and development. NextGen is a new satellite-based air traffic 

management system that will replace the current radar-based system for 

a variety of aircraft types, including UAS. NextGen is expected to 

enhance the safety and capacity of the air transport system and will 

provide a number of operational, technical, economic, and environmental 

 

31Title 14 of Code of Federal Regulations. 

Regulations 

Transition to NextGen
 

Page 22 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

opportunities and challenges for all national airspace system users. 

NextGen will use technological advancements to identify the location of 

aircraft as they travel in the national airspace system and develop 

efficient flight paths. The transition to NextGen and the integration of UAS 

into the national airspace system entail many of the same technological 

issues. We have previously reported on research gaps,

32 and the 

Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General recently 

reported that significant research and development issues remain 

unresolved, including developing cross-agency requirements, standards, 

procedures, and avionics for introducing UAS into the NextGen 

environment, among others.33

In addition, the NextGen Integration Office recently published its NextGen 

Implementation Plan. The Implementation Plan identified a number of 

NextGen-related efforts that could benefit UAS integration. For example, 

in July 2011, FAA achieved initial operating capability with ADS-B 

transponder-system data integrated into the air traffic control’s

automations system at the New York Terminal Radar Approach Control 

facility. As we stated earlier in this report, developing and testing ADS-B 

transponder-system technology may be a key aspect of an airborne 

sense and avoid system, which will allow for pilots of UAS to see and 

avoid other aircraft. Furthermore, the Office of Management and Budget 

recently tasked the NextGen partner agencies to develop a strategic, 

multiagency, NextGen UAS road map with assistance from the JPDO.

According to a JPDO official, UAS and 

NextGen stakeholders should focus on critical and cross-cutting long-term 

research and development issues. These include UAS technologies, 

human factors, ground-control stations, communications, and sense and 

avoid, all associated with UAS flying with manned aircraft in a future 

NextGen airspace. 

34

 

32GAO, Transportation: Integration of Current Implementation Efforts with Long-term 

Planning for the Next Generation Air Transportation System,

This road map would identify the most critical technology issues involved 

in establishing a plan for UAS operations as a part of NextGen. 

GAO-11-132R (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 22, 2010).

33Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Timely Actions Needed to 

Advance the Next Generation Air Transportation System, Report Number AV-2010-068 

(Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2010). 

34The NextGen partner agencies include the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, 

Defense, and Homeland Security, FAA, NASA, White House Office of Science and 

Technology Policy, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 
 

Page 23 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Coordinating UAS integration and NextGen implementation efforts could 

lead to opportunities to cost-share demonstrations, eliminate duplicate 

investments and efforts, and accelerate the FAA’s use of data and 

requirements to develop standards and regulations.

Similar to FAA’s NextGen efforts, other countries are also looking to 

modernize their air traffic control systems and develop standards for UAS. 

FAA has worked with the international community and Europe in 

particular on harmonization of their systems to ensure that airplanes can 

seamlessly fly and transfer between different air traffic control systems. 

As other countries work toward integrating UAS in their respective 

airspaces, similar harmonization efforts will be critical to developing 

standards and operational procedures that could enable UAS to 

seamlessly cross international borders and U.S. manufacturers to sell 

their products in the global marketplace. International bodies and 

individual countries face challenges similar to those that the United States 

faces in integrating UAS into their respective airspaces and have similar 

efforts underway to develop UAS standards. The European Organization 

for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) working group 73 is developing 

standards for large UAS (above 150 kilograms) that would be adopted by 

the European Union as a whole; and working group 93 is developing 

standards for small UAS (under 150 kilograms) that would be approved 

on a country-by-country basis. Both EUROCAE working groups are 

coordinating with RTCA SC 203 and ASTM F38 to try to ensure 

harmonized standards. In addition, as of April 2012, the International Civil 

Aviation Organization amended its International Standards, Rules of the 

Air to identify high level requirements related to UAS while noting that 

certification and licensing standards have not yet been developed. 

Concerned with the pace of progress of UAS integration, Congress set 

forth specific requirements and deadlines for FAA to safely accelerate 

UAS integration in the 2012 Act. FAA—with its federal and other 

stakeholders—has begun making progress toward completing those 

requirements, but has missed one deadline and could miss others. Many 

of the requirements will require significant work on the part of FAA and its 

stakeholders to complete. This work involves developing detailed steps 

for achieving safe and routine access to the national airspace system, 

including defining the characteristics of safe integration, identifying 

needed research and development to achieve integration, and identifying 

the information needed to issue regulations, among other tasks. By 

meeting these requirements, FAA will be better positioned not only to 

address the obstacles cited earlier, but to achieve UAS integration. 

FAA Progress toward 

UAS Integration 

Requirements 
 

Page 24 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

The requirements in the 2012 Act include streamlining the existing COA 

process for public safety entities, developing test ranges for developing 

and validating UAS technologies and potential standards to completing 

planning efforts and issuing a final rule for small UAS. Most of the 

requirements must be achieved between May 2012 and December 2015 

(see table 2), and FAA is working to identify the actions and resources 

needed to meet those requirements. The 2012 Act sets an aggressive 

time frame for FAA to integrate UAS into the national airspace system. In 

our 2008 report, we recommended that FAA expedite efforts to ensure 

that UAS have routine access to the national airspace system by 

finalizing and issuing a program plan to address future issues. In 2010, 

FAA implemented our recommendation by issuing a 2-page road map 

highlighting steps towards UAS integration, which included the goal of 

UAS having routine access to the national airspace system after 2020.

Table 2: Selected FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 Requirements for UAS Integration

Approximate 

deadline FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 requirement a Status of action 

05/14/2012 Enter into agreements with appropriate government agencies to simplify the process for 

issuing COAs or waivers for public UAS. 

In process

08/12/2012 Establish a program to integrate UAS into the national airspace system at 6 test ranges. 

This program is to terminate 5 years after date of enactment. 

In process

08/12/2012 Develop an Arctic UAS operation plan and initiate a process to work with relevant federal 

agencies and national and international communities to designate permanent areas in the 

Arctic where small unmanned aircraft may operate 24 hours per day for research and 

commercial purposes.

In process

08/12/2012 Determine whether certain UAS can fly safely in the national airspace system before the 

completion of the Act’s requirements for a comprehensive plan and rulemaking to safely 

accelerate the integration of civil UAS into the national airspace system or the Act’s 

requirement for issuance of guidance regarding the operation of public UAS including 

operating a UAS with a COA or waiver.

In process

11/10/2012 Expedite the issuance of a COA for public safety entities. Completed

11/10/2012 Develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate integration of civil UAS into national 

airspace system.

In process

11/10/2012 Issue guidance regarding operation of civil UAS to expedite COA process; provide 

collaborative process with public agencies to allow an incremental expansion of access 

into the national airspace system as technology matures and the necessary safety 

analysis and data become available and until standards are completed and technology 

issues are resolved; facilitate capability of public entities to develop and use test ranges; 

provide guidance on public entities’ responsibility for operation.

In process

02/14/2013 Approve and make publically available a 5-year road map for the introduction of civil UAS 

into national airspace system, to be updated annually.

In process

02/14/2013 Submit to Congress a copy of the comprehensive plan. In process

02/12/2013 Make operational at least one project at a test range. None to date
 

Page 25 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Approximate 

deadline FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 requirement a Status of action 

08/14/2014 Publish in the Federal Register the Final Rule on small UAS. In process

08/14/2014 Publish in the Federal Register a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to implement 

recommendations of the comprehensive plan. 

None to date

08/14/2014 Publish in the Federal Register an update to the Administration’s policy statement on UAS 

in Docket No. FAA-2006-25714.

None to date

09/30/2015 Achieve safe integration of civil UAS into the national airspace system. In process

12/14/2015 Publish in the Federal Register a Final Rule to implement the recommendations of the 

comprehensive plan.

None to date

12/31/2015 Develop and implement operational and certification requirements for public UAS in 

national airspace system.

In process

02/14/2017 Report to Congress on the test ranges. None to date

Source: GAO analysis of FAA Modernization and Reform Act as well as FAA progress.

a

Some of these deadlines are approximate. For example, while the 2012 Act requires that a program 

to integrate UAS at 6 test ranges is to be established no later than 08/12/2012, such test ranges 

could conceivably be established prior to that date. The date such a program is actually established 

triggers a deadline for an additional requirement.

FAA has several efforts under way to satisfy its statutory requirements for 

safe integration of UAS. These include four broad categories of 

requirements, including: (1) developing plans for the integration of UAS 

into the national airspace system; (2) changes to the COA process; (3) 

efforts to develop UAS test ranges; and (4) developing, revising, or 

finalizing regulations and policies related to UAS.

• Comprehensive plan and road map. FAA, with the assistance of 

JPDO, is developing several planning documents required by the 

2012 Act, including a 5-year roadmap and comprehensive plan to 

outline the steps toward safe integration. The road map, which FAA 

must complete and make publicly available by February 2013, is 

intended to help facilitate UAS integration into the national airspace 

system. Given its unique role in managing partnerships among federal 

agencies for NextGen, JPDO is leading the development of a 

comprehensive plan for UAS on behalf of FAA. As required by law, 

this plan shall contain, among other elements, recommendations on 

the small UAS rulemaking, a phased-in approach to and timeline for 

the integration of civil UAS into the national airspace system, and the 

establishment of a process to develop certification, flight standards, 

and air traffic requirements at UAS test ranges. To assist in the 

development of the comprehensive plan, FAA is developing a 

Concept of Operations to guide efficient federal resources planning for 

UAS integration. To date, FAA has not developed measures for 

assessing the various efforts to achieve safe integration by 
 

Page 26 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

September 2015. The 2012 Act specifies content for a more 

comprehensive plan than what was laid out in the 2-page road map, 

but it does not set forth any expectation for monitoring to assess the 

quality of progress over time toward meeting the range of activities to 

be outlined in the plan. Our Standards for Internal Control in the 

Federal Government provide the overall framework for establishing 

and maintaining internal control and for identifying and addressing 

major performance and management challenges and areas at 

greatest risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.35 One of 

those standards is monitoring, which is an internal control designed to 

assess the quality of performance over time. This internal control 

should generally be designed to assure that ongoing monitoring 

occurs in the course of normal operations and that it is performed 

continually and is ingrained in the agency’s operations. In light of the 

time frames and complicated tasks ahead, the absence of regular 

monitoring precludes the agency and Congress from assessing 

progress toward completion of the 2012 Act requirements. 

• Changes to the COA process. FAA has changed the existing COA 

process in response to the 2012 Act, including taking steps to 

expedite COAs for public safety entities and finalizing agreements 

with government agencies to expedite the COA or waiver process for 

UAS. First, FAA extended the length of UAS authorization from a 12-

month period to a 24-month period so that those entities receiving 

COAs do not have to reapply as frequently. Second, FAA worked with 

DOJ’s National Institute of Justice to develop a process through a 

memorandum of understanding to meet the operational requirements 

of law enforcement entities, which are expected to be early adopters 

of small UAS. According to FAA, two law enforcement entities 

currently use small UAS on a consistent basis for their missions and 

operations. Officials from both FAA and DOJ have reached 

agreement on a draft version of the memorandum of understanding 

establishing this process; the memorandum of understanding is still 

under legal review. The process would allow law enforcement entities 

to receive a COA for training and performance evaluation. When the 

entity has shown proficiency in operating its UAS, it would then 

receive an operational COA allowing it to operate small UAS for a 

range of missions. While this process adds an additional step for 

 

35GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
 

Page 27 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

entities applying to operate a UAS, once an entity receives the 

operational COA, it has more latitude for where and when it can 

operate its UAS. According to FAA data, as of July 2012, 12 state and 

local law enforcement entities have a COA. An official at the DOJ said 

that approximately 100 law enforcement entities have expressed 

interest in using UAS for some of their missions. According to law 

enforcement officials with whom we spoke, small UAS are ideal for 

certain types of law enforcement activities. Officials anticipate that 

small UAS could provide support for tactical teams, post-event crime 

scene analysis, and critical infrastructure photography. Officials do not 

anticipate using small UAS for routine patrols or missions that would 

require flights over extended distances or time periods.

• Test ranges. FAA has taken steps to develop, but has not yet 

established, a program to integrate UAS at six test ranges, as 

required by the 2012 Act. FAA must establish six test ranges, and as 

part of these ranges, FAA must safely designate airspace for 

integrated manned and unmanned flight operations, develop 

certification standards and air traffic requirements for UAS, ensure the 

program is coordinated with NextGen, and verify the safety of UAS 

and related navigation procedures before integrating them into the 

national airspace system. FAA expects data obtained from these test 

ranges will contribute to the continued development of standards for 

the safe and routine integration of UAS. In March 2012, FAA issued a 

Request for Comments in the Federal Register and subsequently 

received 227 comments from congressional members, state and local 

governments, industry firms, academic and other entities, and 

individuals. The comments addressed questions such as what 

certification requirements should be set for aircraft as part of the test 

ranges, who should manage the airspace and what restrictions should 

be placed on those using the test ranges, and where test ranges 

should be located. For example, FAA has proposed outsourcing the 

management of the test ranges; however, some commenters 

preferred FAA or another public entity to maintain oversight 

responsibility. Some commenters also said that test ranges should be 

selected based on locations with existing facilities and infrastructure, 

given the absence of any funding available for the set-up, 

management, or oversight of the test ranges. FAA officials told us 

they are still working to meet all of the specified requirements for the 

test ranges and had expected to issue a Request for Proposals in July 

2012. However, because of privacy concerns regarding the collection 

and use of UAS-acquired data expressed by commenters, the internal 

review process was delayed, and FAA officials do not know when they 

will issue the Request for Proposals. The 2012 Act requires the FAA 
 

Page 28 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

to have at least one project at a test range operational 180 days after 

the date the project is established.

• Rulemaking. While FAA has efforts under way supporting a 

rulemaking for small UAS, as required by the 2012 Act, it is uncertain 

whether FAA will be able to meet the established deadline. The 

agency’s rulemaking efforts for UAS date back more than 5 years, 

when it established the small UAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee in 

2008. In August 2011, FAA provided the Secretary of Transportation 

with its draft NPRM for the first time. Since then, the Office of the 

Secretary has provided several rounds of comments to FAA to further 

refine the NPRM. FAA expected to publish the NPRM in late 2011, but 

FAA officials told us in August 2012 that the Office of the Secretary of 

Transportation was still reviewing the draft and that FAA does not 

expect to publish it in the Federal Register before the end of the 

year.36

While FAA has made some progress to meet the requirements from the 

2012 Act to date, those requirements that remain will require significant 

work from the agency to meet the established deadlines. FAA has 

reorganized to provide more focus on its UAS integration efforts; 

however, because the reorganization has not yet been fully implemented, 

it remains unclear whether it will provide the support needed to complete 

the work. FAA’s UAS efforts rely on expertise and resources from several 

offices within FAA, such as the Aviation Safety Organization, the Air 

Traffic Organization, the Research and Development Integration Office, 

JPDO, and the NextGen Office. FAA has reorganized its office that 

oversees UAS activities several times over the past few years, but had 

not previously assigned a single and visible leader to this effort. We have 

previously reported the need for stable leadership at FAA for major 

aviation efforts.

FAA is required by the 2012 Act to publish a final rule 

governing small UAS in the Federal Register by August 2014. 

37

 

36In general, after OMB reviews a proposed rule, the proposed rule is issued and the 

public provides comments generally within a 60-day period. This is followed by the 

agency’s preparation and OMB’s review of the final rule, concluding with the agency 

publishing the final rule in the Federal Register.

More recently, FAA has taken steps to provide the 

organizational leadership needed to facilitate progress to safely 

37GAO, Joint Planning and Development Office: Progress and Key Issues in Planning the 

Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System, GAO-07-693T (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 29, 2007).
 

Page 29 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

accelerate UAS integration into the national airspace system. In March 

2012, FAA assigned an Executive Manager for its newly created UAS 

Integration Office, which is expected to combine UAS-related activities 

from the agency’s Air Traffic Organization and Aviation Safety 

Organization. However, as of July 2012, the UAS Integration Office had 

not yet been finalized within FAA and no employees had been officially 

assigned to the UAS Integration Office. FAA officials told us that they 

expect approximately 50 federal employees and contractors eventually 

will be assigned to the office; however, the officials are still evaluating the 

number of personnel needed.38

While FAA has taken steps to meet the requirements set forth in the 2012

Act, it is uncertain when the national airspace system will be prepared to 

accommodate UAS. FAA’s efforts and activities are occurring 

simultaneously and without monitoring to assess the quality of progress 

over time toward the deadlines Congress established as well as the 

activities to occur over the next 5 years, as outlined in FAA’s road map.

Although not new, concerns about national security, privacy issues, and 

GPS jamming and spoofing related to UAS have not been resolved and 

may influence the acceptance of routine access for UAS in the current 

national airspace system or the forthcoming transition to NextGen. 

In 2008, we reported that TSA had not examined the security implications 

of routine UAS access in the national airspace system, an assessment 

that remains unchanged. Within DHS, TSA has authority to regulate 

security of all transportation modes to ensure that appropriate security 

safeguards are in place. According to TSA, its aviation security efforts 

 

38Presently, the Air Traffic Organization and the Flight Standards Organization are 

developing a Service Level Agreement (SLA) that will define the reporting protocols for Air 

Traffic Organization employees who would be reporting to the Aviation Safety 

Organization, which structurally houses the UAS Integration Office.

Emerging Issues 

Related to UAS 

Integration Include 

Potential Security and 

Privacy Concerns and 

GPS Jamming and 

Spoofing 

Security of Domestic UAS 

Use
 

Page 30 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

include addressing risks, threats, and vulnerabilities related to nonmilitary UAS. Working with FAA and other federal agencies, TSA 

implements security procedures, such as allowing some flights into 

restricted airspace (e.g., allowing certain operations into and out of 

Ronald Reagan National Airport).39

In 2008, we recommended that TSA examine the security implications of 

future, non-military UAS operations in the national airspace system and 

take any actions deemed appropriate. At the time, TSA indicated that it 

used a risk management approach to identify and address security 

threats, but had not completed a UAS risk assessment. In response to 

our recommendation, DHS referenced the 2007 National Strategy for 

Aviation Security, which requires regular reviews of national aviation 

security programs as a whole to identify conflicting procedures, changes 

to threats, vulnerabilities, and resulting consequences, and coordinate 

mitigation measures but does not specifically address UAS. Since 2008, 

TSA has identified and documented the potential threat posed by UAS 

and remote controlled aircraft on several occasions. In its 2004 advisory, 

TSA noted the potential for UAS to carry explosives or biological weapons 

and advised individuals to report any suspicious activities to local law 

enforcement and the TSA General Aviation Hotline.

TSA also coordinates and provides 

notice about threats to transportation in addition to carrying out other 

security-related responsibilities. 

40

 

39After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the FAA maintained flight restrictions over 

certain cities and sensitive sites, including Washington D.C., Ronald Reagan National 

Airport. While commercial aircraft operators with full TSA security programs were 

permitted to resume at Ronald Reagan National Airport, commercial operators without full 

programs and general aviation operators were largely prohibited from operating into and 

out of the airport. In order to fly into these restricted airspace areas, certain aircraft 

operators must seek a waiver from TSA, which provides an analysis of the security 

aspects of requests for waivers. 

According to a TSA 

official, it recently reviewed its UAS related advisories and determined 

that they are still applicable. However, TSA has not provided information 

on specific steps it has taken to mitigate the potential threats, but believes 

its current practices are sufficient to address UAS security. A recent 

incident in which a man pled guilty to plotting to use a large remotecontrolled model aircraft filled with plastic explosives to attack the 

40Department of Homeland Security, TSA Advisory: Security Information Regarding 

Remote Controlled Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Washington, DC: Nov. 22, 

2004).
 

Page 31 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Pentagon and U.S. Capitol highlights the potential for UAS being used as 

weapons.

Security remains a significant issue that could be exacerbated with an 

increase in the number of UAS. TSA’s practices might be sufficient in the 

current UAS environment of limited operations taking place under closely 

controlled conditions, but these controlled conditions will change as FAA 

and others continue to work toward allowing routine UAS operations in 

the national airspace system. Without an assessment of TSA’s current 

security practices, TSA is not equipped to know whether any changes to 

its practices are needed. As a partner agency of JPDO, DHS—and 

specifically TSA—have an opportunity to shape the security requirements 

for UAS from the outset. For example, TSA has not yet taken steps to 

develop security requirements for UAS ground control stations, which are 

the UAS equivalent of cockpits. 

Another emerging issue is the operation of model aircraft—aircraft flown 

for hobby or recreation. Congress defined the term “model aircraft” in the 

2012 Act as an unmanned aircraft that is capable of sustained flight in the 

atmosphere, flown within visual line of sight of the person operating the 

aircraft, and flown for hobby or recreational purposes. Model aircraft and 

small UAS—the latter for which FAA is currently developing rules—may 

essentially be the same aircraft with the critical difference being that the 

operator of the model aircraft is a hobbyist and the small UAS is being 

operated for an authorized purpose such as a search and rescue mission. 

According to FAA officials, model aircraft, which are subject to special 

statutory conditions outlined in the 2012 Act, can be larger and faster and 

fly at higher altitudes than UAS that are expected to operate under the 

proposed rule for small UAS. FAA provided guidance on voluntary safety 

standards to model aircraft operators in 1981 in its Advisory Circular 91-

57. A model aircraft association has also published voluntary guidance 

documents for its members.41

 

41FAA’s Advisory Circular 91-57 sets out model aircraft operating standards that 

encourage voluntary compliance with specified safety standards for model aircraft 

operators. 

Voluntary guidance, however, is not 

enforceable and, according to FAA officials, does not address the 

increased size and performance capability of model aircraft. Owners of 

model aircraft do not require a COA to operate their aircraft. Pursuant to 

the 2012 Act, FAA is prohibited from developing any rule or regulation for 
 

Page 32 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

model aircraft that fly under a specified set of conditions.42

We continue to believe that our 2008 recommendation—that TSA 

examine the security implications of future, non-military UAS operations in 

the national airspace system and take any actions deemed appropriate—

remains relevant and that TSA should take steps to implement the 

recommendation.

Regardless of

the statutory prohibition against promulgating a rule or regulation for 

model aircraft, FAA maintains the authority to take enforcement action 

against the operator of a model aircraft who endangers the safety of the 

national airspace system or persons and property on the ground. For 

example, in April 2012, FAA took such action against a person who 

operated a small remote controlled model aircraft on the campus of the 

University of Virginia in close proximity of pedestrians. FAA fined the 

operator $10,000, citing public safety concerns based on video footage of 

the aircraft flying close to pedestrians, cyclists, and property.

Recently, members of Congress, a civil liberties organization, and others 

expressed concern that the potential increased use of small UAS for 

surveillance and other purposes in the national airspace system has 

potential privacy implications. Concerns include the potential for 

increased amounts of government surveillance using technologies placed 

on UAS, the collection and use of such data, and potential violations of 

constitutional Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable 

search and seizure.43

 

42This prohibition on FAA model aircraft rules or regulations only applies where the aircraft 

is: (1) flown strictly for hobby or recreational use; (2) operated in accordance with a 

community-based set of safety guidelines and within the programming of a nationwide 

community-based organization; (3) limited to not more than 55 pounds (unless otherwise 

certified through a design, construction, inspection, flight test, and operational safety 

program administered by a community-based organization); (4) operated in a manner that 

does not interfere with and gives way to any manned aircraft; and (5) when flown within 5 

miles of an airport, operated under prior notice to the airport operator and the air traffic 

control tower.

Additionally, a June 2012 poll conducted by 

Monmouth University reported that 42 percent of those sampled were 

very concerned about their own privacy if U.S. law enforcement started 

43 The Congressional Research Service has issued a report assessing the use of UAS 

under the Fourth Amendment. Congressional Research Service, Drones in Domestic 

Surveillance Operations: Fourth Amendment Implications and Legislative Responses, 

R42701 (Washington, D.C.: September 2012).

Privacy Concerns over the 

Collection and Use of UASAcquired Data
 

Page 33 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

using UAS with high tech cameras, while 15 percent said they were not at 

all concerned. However, the poll reported that of those sampled, 80

percent said they supported the use of UAS for search and rescue 

missions while 67 percent said they oppose the use of UAS to issue 

speeding tickets.

44 While the 2012 Act contains provisions designed to 

accelerate the safe integration of UAS into the national airspace system, 

proposed legislation in the 112th session of Congress seeks to limit or 

serve as a check on government use of UAS by, for example, limiting the 

ability of the federal government to use UAS to gather information 

pertaining to criminal conduct without a warrant.45

Many stakeholders we interviewed projected how past Supreme Court 

cases that address privacy issues related to government surveillance 

might apply to UAS. While the Supreme Court has not addressed privacy 

issues related to governmental UAS surveillance, the Court has, however, 

upheld several instances involving government aerial surveillance from 

manned aircraft.

 

46 Several other Supreme Court governmental 

surveillance cases, while not aerial surveillance cases, specifically relate 

to technology (one involving a GPS tracking device and the other a 

thermal imaging device) and have included some general discussion of 

the interplay between evolving technology and privacy.47

 

44The Monmouth University Polling Institute reported that it conducted the poll on June 4 

to 6, 2012 with a national random sample of 1,708 adults age 18 and older, including 607 

via live interview on a landline telephone, 675 via interactive voice response on a landline, 

and 426 via live interview on a cell phone. Monmouth University Poll, “U.S. Supports 

Some Domestic Drone Use, But Public Registers Concern About Own Privacy” (June 12, 

2012). 

In the 2012 GPS 

case, for example, one Justice observed, in part, that with respect to 

privacy expectations, “technology can change those expectations” and 

that “dramatic technological changes may lead to periods in which 

popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant

changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide increased 

convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may 

45Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012, S. 3287, 112th Cong. 

(2012) and Farmer’s Privacy Act of 2012, H.R. 5961, 112th Cong. (2012).

46See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Dow Chemical Co. v. United 

States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986): and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 

47See, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 

(2012). 
 

Page 34 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

find the tradeoff worthwhile.”48

At the individual agency level, there are multiple federal laws designed to 

provide protections for personal information collected and used by federal 

agencies. As we have previously reported,

These manned aircraft and advanced 

surveillance technology cases may present some issues similar to those 

that may be raised as governmental use of UAS becomes more 

widespread.

49 privacy protections for 

personal information collected or used by federal agencies is governed 

primarily by two laws: the Privacy Act of 197450 and the privacy provisions 

of the E-Government Act of 2002.51

 

48United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). In Kyllo, a 

justice stated, in part, that “it would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy 

secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the 

advance of technology. For example, the technology enabling human flight has exposed 

to public view (and hence, we have said, to official observation) uncovered portions of the 

house and its curtilage that once were private.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 

(2001)

The Privacy Act, as amended, places 

limitations on agencies’ collection, disclosure, and use of personal 

information maintained in systems of records. The E-Government Act of 

2002 was passed, among other reasons, to enhance the protection for 

personal information in government information systems or information 

collections by requiring that agencies conduct privacy impact 

assessments (PIA). PIAs are analyses of how personal information is 

collected, stored, shared, and managed in a federal system. In addition, a 

number of federal agencies including the Department of Transportation 

(DOT), DHS, and DOJ, are statutorily required to establish a privacy 

office and/or Chief Privacy Officers to assess their agency programs, 

including proposed programs, systems, technologies, or rule-makings for 

privacy risks. DHS reports that its associated privacy office also provides 

policy and programmatic oversight across the agency. DHS was the first 

federal agency to be statutorily required to establish a privacy officer. 

With respect to the individual agencies, both DOT’s and DHS’s privacy 

officers responsibilities include “assuring that the use of technologies 

49See, GAO, Privacy: OPM Should Better Monitor Implementation of Privacy-Related 

Policies and Procedures for Background Investigations GAO-10-849 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sep. 7, 2010). 

50Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974).

51Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002).
 

Page 35 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, 

collection, and disclosure” of personal information.

We recently testified that while laws and guidance set minimum 

requirements for agencies, they may not protect personal information in 

all circumstances in which it is collected and used throughout the 

government and may not fully adhere to key privacy principles.52 We have 

previously suggested that Congress consider amending applicable 

privacy laws to address identified issues in three major areas: applying 

privacy protections consistently to all federal collection and use of 

personal information, ensuring that use of personally identifiable 

information is limited to a stated purpose, and establishing effective 

mechanisms for informing the public about privacy protections. We have 

also made numerous recommendations to agencies over the last several 

years to address weaknesses in policies and procedures related to 

privacy and to strengthen their information security programs.53 In 

addition, at a July 2012 testimony before the Senate Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs committee, a law professor testified that the 

Congress should create a Chief Privacy Officer to coordinate privacy 

policy across federal agencies.54

Currently, no single federal agency has been statutorily designated with 

specific responsibility to regulate privacy matters relating to UAS for the 

entire federal government. UAS stakeholders with whom we spoke 

disagreed as to whether the regulation of UAS privacy-related issues 

should be centralized within one federal agency and, if centralized, which 

agency would be best positioned to handle such a responsibility. 

Representatives from a civil liberties organization told us that since FAA 

 

52Federal agency collection or use of personal information is governed primarily by two 

laws: the Privacy Act of 1974 and the privacy provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002. 

The Privacy Act places limitations on agencies’ collection, disclosure, and use of personal 

information maintained in systems of records. The E-Government Act of 2002 was 

passed, among other reasons, to enhance the protection for personal information in 

government information systems or information collections by requiring that agencies 

conduct PIAs. PIAs are analyses of how personal information is collected, stored, shared, 

and managed in a federal system.

53GAO-12-961T 

54Statement of Peter Swire, “State of Federal Privacy and Data Security Law: Lagging 

Behind the Times?,” Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the 

Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia, July 31, 2012. 
 

Page 36 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

has responsibility to regulate the national airspace system, it could be 

positioned to handle responsibility for incorporating rules that govern UAS 

use and data collection. However, FAA officials and others have 

suggested that regulating privacy issues in connection with equipment 

carried on UAS, such as surveillance sensors that do not affect safety, is

outside FAA’s mission, which is primarily focused on aviation safety. DHS 

or DOJ might be better positioned to address UAS privacy issues since 

they generally stem from the operational uses of UAS for surveillance and 

law enforcement purposes. While is it not clear what entity should be 

responsible for addressing privacy concerns across the federal 

government, many stakeholders believe that there should be federal 

regulations for the types of allowable uses of UAS to specifically protect 

the privacy of individuals as well as rules for the conditions and types of 

data that UAS can collect. As government use of UAS is expected to 

increase with FAA’s development of standards and rules to allow routine 

access to the national airspace system, the safety of personal information 

collected by federal agencies using UAS is an emerging issue and the 

government can take a number of steps to potentially address some of 

these privacy issues. Some stakeholders have suggested that FAA has 

the opportunity and responsibility to incorporate such privacy issues into 

the small UAS NPRM that is currently under development and in future 

rulemaking procedures. In addition, stakeholders we interviewed stated 

that developing guidelines for technology use on UAS ahead of 

widespread adoption by law enforcement entities could preclude abuses 

of the technology that could lead to a negative public perception of UAS 

and possibly affect their acceptance and use. 

The jamming of the GPS signal being transmitted to the UAS could also 

interrupt the command and control of UAS operations. In a GPS jamming 

scenario, the UAS could potentially lose its ability to determine its 

location, altitude, and the direction in which it is traveling. Low cost 

devices that jam GPS signals are prevalent. According to one industry 

expert, GPS jamming would become a larger problem if GPS is the only 

method for navigating a UAS. This problem can be mitigated by having a 

second or redundant navigation system onboard the UAS that is not 

reliant on GPS, which is the case with larger UAS typically operated by 

DOD and DHS. In addition, a number of federal UAS stakeholders we 

interviewed stated that GPS jamming is not an issue for the larger, 

military-type UAS, as they have redundant inertial navigation systems on 

the aircraft. A stakeholder noted that GPS jamming can be mitigated for 

small UAS by encrypting its communications, but the costs and weight 

associated with encryption may make it infeasible. 

GPS Jamming and 

Spoofing 
 

Page 37 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

GPS spoofing has also been identified as an emerging issue. Encrypting 

civil GPS signals could make it more difficult to “spoof” or counterfeit a 

GPS signal that could interfere with the navigation of a UAS. Non-military 

GPS signals, unlike military GPS signals, are not encrypted and 

transparency and predictability make them vulnerable to being 

counterfeited, or spoofed. In a GPS-spoofing scenario, the GPS signal 

going from the ground control station to the UAS is first counterfeited and 

then overpowered. Once the authentic (original) GPS signal is 

overpowered, the UAS is under the control of the “spoofer.” This type of 

scenario was recently demonstrated by researchers at the University of 

Texas at Austin at the behest of DHS. During the demonstration at the 

White Sands Missile Range, researchers spoofed one element of the 

unencrypted GPS signal of a fairly sophisticated small UAS (minihelicopter) and induced it to plummet toward the desert floor. The 

research team found that it was straightforward to mount an intermediatelevel spoofing attack, such as controlling the altitude of the UAS, but 

difficult and expensive to mount a more sophisticated attack. The 

research team recommended that spoof-resistant navigation systems be 

required on UAS exceeding 18 pounds.55 

By establishing statutory requirements for FAA, Congress highlighted the 

importance of accelerating the safe integration of UAS into the national 

airspace system. However, FAA faces the daunting task of ensuring that 

all of the various efforts within its own agency, as well as across agencies 

and other entities, will align and converge in a timely fashion. The pace of 

progress toward UAS integration that occurred prior to the 2012 Act and 

questions about the agency’s ability to meet deadline requirements raise 

concerns about when UAS integration in the national airspace system will 

be achieved. Incorporating regular monitoring will help to assess progress 

toward goals identified in the comprehensive plan and 5-year road map 

that can help FAA understand what has been achieved and what remains 

to be done. Monitoring can also help keep Congress informed about this 

significant change to the domestic aviation landscape.

 

55The presentation “Assessing the Civil GPS Spoofing Threat” by Todd Humphreys, 

Jahshan Bhatti, Brent Ledvina, Mark Psiaki, Brady O’Hanlon, Paul Kintner, and Paul 

Montgomery sought to assess the spoofing threat of a small civil UAS. The team built a 

civilian GPS spoofer and tested some countermeasures. They concluded that GPS 

spoofing is a threat to communications security and civil spoofing has not been the focus 

of research in open literature.

Conclusions 
 

Page 38 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Concerns regarding the potential security and privacy implications of UAS 

are growing. As the number of UAS operating in the national airspace 

system increases, questions about how the security of the national 

airspace system will be protected and how data captured by UAS will be 

used by governmental or commercial entities will continue to arise. 

Federal agencies have not yet stepped forward to proactively address

these issues. This lack of activity may result from agency officials’ belief 

that they do not have direct authority to regulate privacy issues for UAS or 

the current level of UAS activity in the national airspace system. 

However, not working to proactively address security and privacy 

concerns could lead to further delays in the integration of UAS into the 

national airspace system. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA 

Administrator to incorporate, in FAA’s comprehensive plan (to be 

completed in November 2012) and the 5-year road map for UAS 

integration (to be completed in February 2013), mechanisms that allow for 

regular monitoring to assess progress toward safe and routine access of 

UAS into the national airspace system.

We recommend that the Secretaries of Transportation and Homeland 

Security and the Attorney General initiate discussions, prior to the 

integration of UAS into the national airspace system, to explore whether 

any actions should be taken to guide the collection and use of UASacquired data. 

We provided a draft of this report to officials at Commerce, DHS, DOD, 

DOJ, DOT, and NASA. DHS and DOJ concurred with our 

recommendation. DOT officials agreed to consider our recommendations. 

DHS, DOJ, DOD and DOT provided comments that were technical or 

clarifying in nature, which were incorporated into the report as 

appropriate. NASA and Commerce had no comments on the draft report. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, Secretary 

of the Department of Homeland Security, Secretary of the Department of 

Commerce, Secretary of the Department of Defense, the Attorney 

General, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on 

GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Recommendations 

Agency Comments 
 

Page 39 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix III.

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.

Director

Physical Infrastructure Issues
 

Page 40 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV

Chairman 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison

Ranking Member

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation

United States Senate 

The Honorable John L. Mica

Chairman 

The Honorable Nick J. Rahall II

Ranking Member

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Thomas E. Petri

Chairman

The Honorable Jerry F. Costello

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Aviation

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul

Chairman

Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 41 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

This report describes (1) the status of obstacles we identified in our 

previous report to the safe and routine integration of UAS into the national 

airspace system, (2) FAA’s progress in complying with FAA 

Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 requirements, and (3) emerging 

issues pertaining to UAS.

To describe and assess the status of obstacles to safe integration that we 

previously identified, we reviewed documents provided by and 

interviewed officials of government, academic, and private-sector entities 

involved with UAS issues. We reviewed relevant GAO reports and 

interviewed internal stakeholders working on related engagements. We 

also interviewed officials at federal agencies, including the FAA’s 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration and Research and Development 

Offices, DOD, NASA, Department of Commerce’s International Trade 

Administration, DHS, and the Department of Justice. We interviewed 

representatives from related federal advisory groups including FAA’s 

JPDO, RTCA Special Committee 203, the Interagency Taskforce on 

Unmanned Systems, and the DOD’s Air Force Research Lab as well as 

independent standards setting organizations RTCA and ASTM F38. 

Additionally, we interviewed representatives from universities with centers 

of research on UAS technology and issues, including the University of 

North Dakota and New Mexico State University, as well as a 

representative from the Mesa County, Colorado Sherriff’s Office. We 

interviewed private sector representatives from MITRE, Rockwell Collins, 

and Raytheon. We interviewed representatives from the Association for 

Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, Aircraft Owners and Pilots 

Association, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, and the 

Airborne Law Enforcement Association. To obtain information on current 

civil UAS use, we obtained information from the FAA on the certificates of 

authority and special airworthiness certificates issued from January 2012 

to July 2012.

To assess FAA’s progress in meeting its reauthorization requirements 

and to understand UAS coordination efforts across and federal 

government and private stakeholder, we reviewed relevant portions of the 

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 and the Federal Register. We 

identified criteria for assessments from GAO’s Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government. We also reviewed documents

provided by and conducted interviews with FAA’s Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems Integration Office and JPDO. Additionally, we participated in 

several public webinars that addressed privacy concerns over nonmilitary UAS use and FAA’s request for comment on the UAS test range 

program.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 42 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

To assess issues regarding privacy concerns over the use of UAS 

acquired data, we reviewed documents provided by and interviewed UAS 

federal, state, and local stakeholders as well as representatives from the 

Electronic Frontier Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union. To 

obtain information about UAS security considerations, we reviewed 

documents from the Academy of Model Aeronautics and the Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center and spoke with officials from FAA, DHS, 

and the Association for Unmanned Vehicles Systems International. We 

also examined legal requirements to which federal agencies should 

adhere when collecting and using personal information.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 through 

September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Page 43 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Federal Entities with Approved COAs

Number of Groups within Federal 

Entities with COAs Number of approved COAs

DARPA 1 3 

Department of State 1 1 

Department of Homeland Security 2 17

DOD – U.S. Special Operations Command 1 32

DOD – Navy-USMC 12 18

DOD – U.S. Air Force 16 56

DOD – U.S. Army 33 54

Department of Energy – National Laboratories 2 6 

Department of Justice – Federal Bureau of 

Investigation 1 3 

Department of Interior 1 7 

NASA 5 

Total Federal Entities with approved COAs 

between January 1, 2012 and July 13, 2012

30

75 227

Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.

Note: Federal agencies have COAs in multiple locations across the U.S. 

Appendix II: Federal Entities with Certificates 

of Waiver or Authorization Approved from 

January 1, 2012, to July 13, 2012
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 44 GAO-12-981 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

Individuals making key contributions to this report include Maria 

Edelstein, Assistant Director; Amy Abramowitz; Gary Bianchi; Cristina 

Chaplain; Erin Cohen; Elizabeth Curda; John de Ferrari; Colin Fallon; 

Rebecca Gambler; Geoffrey Hamilton; David Hooper; Daniel Hoy; Joe 

Kirschbaum; Patricia Lentini; Brian Lepore; SaraAnn Moessbauer; Faye 

Morrison; Brian Mullins; Madhav Panwar; David Plocher; and Tina Won 

Sherman.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(540233)
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