U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

1 

77–566 PDF 

" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

112TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

S. PRT. 

2012

112–44 

CHINA’S IMPACT ON KOREAN 

PENINSULA UNIFICATION AND 

QUESTIONS FOR THE SENATE 

A MINORITY STAFF REPORT 

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 11, 2012 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

WILLIAM C. DANVERS, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v 

Background .............................................................................................................. 1 

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 

Questions for the Senate ......................................................................................... 2 

China’s Historic Claims Throughout Time ............................................................ 2 

The Recent Past ....................................................................................................... 3 

Today ........................................................................................................................ 4

Institutional Policy Coordination Between China and North Korea ................... 4 

The Move Toward Economic Integration-The Making of a 21st Century Tributary Province ........................................................................................................ 5 

Points of China-North Korea Commercial Intersection ........................................ 5 

A Magnet for China-North Korea’s Natural Resources-Mining and Rare Earth 

Materials ............................................................................................................... 8 

Unintended Consequences by and for North Korea .............................................. 9 

Is The Trend of North Korea Becoming a Chinese Protectorate and Economic 

Colony Irreversible? ............................................................................................. 10 

In Summary ............................................................................................................. 10 

Acknowledgements and Appreciation .................................................................... 11 

APPENDIXES

Appendix I.—Bibliography ...................................................................................... 17 

Appendix II.—Congressional Research Service Memorandum to Senator 

Lugar Regarding China’s Perspective on Historical Borders on the Korean 

Peninsula .............................................................................................................. 21 

Appendix III.—Korean Perspectives on Historical Change in the Borders between Korea and China: A Review and Comments on the Congressional 

Research Service Memorandum of March 9, 2012 ............................................ 33 

Appendix IV.—‘‘Reading Current & Future Commercial Tea Leaves: New 

Insights into DPRK Regime Dynamics’’ John S. Park, Ph.D., November 

27, 2012 ................................................................................................................. 69 

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC, December 11, 2012. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: When we consider the possible unification of 

the Korean Peninsula at some time in the future, the German 

model of unification often comes to mind. The purpose of the attached report is to alert Members that another outcome is possible.China’s historical claims to territory within the borders of the 

Korean Peninsula and the expanding investment by China within 

North Korea point to a situation where China may attempt to manage, if not oppose, the process of Korean Peninsula unification.The 

attached report includes extensive information regarding China’s 

trade and economic interaction with North Korea and the growing 

investment by Chinese companies inside North Korea. 

For historical perspective, Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

staff obtained information about Chinese claims that parts of the 

Korean Peninsula were historically part of China, and South Korean assessments about those claims. The Congressional Research 

Service (CRS) was asked to write about how China presents its historic claims to the Korean Peninsula so that Members would be 

alerted to this situation. The Northeast Asia History Foundation in 

Seoul greatly assisted by providing South Korea’s view of China’s 

historic claims. Neither the committee nor I take any position on 

the disputes over the history of the Korean Peninsula discussed in 

this report. 

Important questions are raised toward the beginning of the attached report for the Senate’s consideration regarding prospects for 

unification, the significance to the United States and our overall 

Korea policy. 

I would like to express appreciation to several scholars on North 

Korean affairs (referenced in the Appendix section) who assisted 

Keith Luse and other Committee staff in the development of this 

report, which may be a helpful future reference on Korean Peninsula unification. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

Ranking Member. 

(V)

(1) 

CHINA’S IMPACT ON KOREAN 

PENINSULA UNIFICATION AND 

QUESTIONS FOR THE SENATE 

‘‘Pyongyang today looks more like a tidy Chinese provincial city than the Spartan capital of the world’s last Stalinist state.’’ 1

BACKGROUND

For some time, China has been viewed by the West as the main 

intermediary with North Korea. The West has believed with some 

justification that because China serves as a lifeline and benevolent 

provider for the North, it would leverage that role to influence 

North Korea’s decision—making process in such matters as nuclear 

weapons development, nuclear tests, missile launches and other 

areas of international concern. 

In recent years, as official Washington has assessed denuclearization prospects in North Korea, it has viewed the China factor 

with varying degrees of hope, anticipation, and dismay. China’s 

willingness and desire to chair and manage the Six Party Talks 

process was accepted with optimism by many in the White House 

and the Congress. Reality has however begun to come to the forefront. The interests of China and the United States related to 

North Korea—regional stability vs. denuclearization—are not the 

same. In looking to the future, for similar reasons, China is a wild 

card on the subject of Korean Peninsula Unification—an eventuality that Chinese leaders may determine they cannot allow. 

INTRODUCTION

When Members of the U.S. Senate consider prospects for unification of the Korean Peninsula, they often reflect upon the demise of 

the East German government and the unification of East and West 

Germany, anticipating a similar outcome on the Korean Peninsula. 

However, another outcome is possible. 

China’s historical claims to territory within the borders of contemporary North Korea (and across parts of the entire Peninsula) 

and the expanding economic footprint of China in the North are 

among the factors creating a dynamic that leads away from eventual Peninsula unification. 

Whether the impetus for unification is the warming of relations 

between the North and the South, accompanied by accelerated commercial and other activities, or an abrupt seismic event within 

North Korea contributing to the demise of the present government, 

China could attempt to manage, and conceivably block the unification process. While working to safeguard its own commercial assets, and to assert its right to preserve the northern part of the peVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Jan 02, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\TOPIC REPORTS\MINORITY\KEITH\KOREA\
2 

ninsula within China’s sphere of influence, Beijing might seek to 

defend its actions as necessary to ensure regional stability. (Another important point to note is that increased economic cooperation between China and North Korea benefits China’s own development as well and enhances China’s access to North Korean natural 

resources for energy and other purposes.) 2

The possible presence of American military personnel north of 

the 38th Parallel does not conform to China’s definition of regional 

stability and is unacceptable to most Chinese officials. 

‘‘The conventional thinking in China is that it benefits 

from the maintenance of a divided peninsula and a fraternally allied socialist state on its border.’’ 3

As noted in the Interim Report of the University of Southern 

California (USC) Center for Strategic & International Studies 

(CSIS) regarding Challenges for Korean Unification Planning, 

‘‘There has been a traditional resistance to talking openly about 

unification scenarios. Policy-makers and scholars avoid the issue 

for fear of diplomatic fallout from China or the DPRK or because 

it operates in the realm of meaningless speculation and punditry. 

The absence of such discussion is a recipe for disaster.’’ 4 (emphasis 

added) 

The preparation of this report revealed a series of questions for 

Members. 

QUESTIONS FOR THE SENATE

• What are the foreign policy and national defense implications 

for the United States of an ongoing divided Korean Peninsula 

in comparison to a unified Peninsula? 

• What are the origins of resistance, and in some cases outright 

opposition to unification within South Korea? 

• Is China’s incremental economic integration with North Korea 

similar to its intent for relations with South Korea? 

• What is in the best interest of the United States—to pursue 

multilateral ‘‘Six Party Talks’’ with North Korea or engage in 

bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea, having separate and concurrent consultations with South Korea, 

Japan, China and Russia? Or is a ‘‘third way’’ preferable? 

CHINA’S HISTORIC CLAIMS THROUGHOUT TIME

‘‘ . . . disputes (between China and South Korea), have become intense and frequent over the past several years as 

China has increasingly asserted cultural hegemony, or 

Sinocentrism, commensurate with its ascendancy in the 

global economy and politics.’’ 5

To document China’s long-term interest in and claims on the Korean Peninsula, the Committee obtained South Korean and Chinese perspectives on the issue. 

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) was asked to provide 

information about Chinese claims that territory on the Korean Peninsula was historically part of China, with a focus on maps published in the People’s Republic of China depicting those claims. The 

3 

CRS memorandum, authored by Susan V. Lawrence, a CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs, discusses several works of state-supported 

Chinese scholarship on the subject, including maps depicting borders on the Peninsula at points in history between 475 B.C. and 

1982 A.D. The CRS memorandum is included in an appendix to 

this report. 

Yong Ho Kim, Director of the Office of Policy Planning of the 

Northeast Asia History Foundation in Seoul, was the point person 

for a team of Korean experts who provided analysis on behalf of the 

Republic of Korea regarding the Chinese perspective on this issue. 

The Foundation’s report is also included in an appendix to this report. 

China’s historic claims on the Peninsula raise the possibility of 

future Chinese intervention in the Korean unification process. 

THE RECENT PAST

The 1976 Area Handbook for North Korea prepared by Foreign 

Area Studies program of The American University provides an 

overview of China-North Korea relations following the Korean War. 

Excerpts included below provide important background: 

• During the last six decades, China and North Korea have experienced a generally amiable relationship deemed of mutual 

benefit. China’s intervention in the Korean War prevented the 

almost certain demise of North Korea as an independent state, 

and in the postwar years stationed troops inside North Korea 

until 1958. In 1961, North Korea and China signed a treaty of 

friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. 

• As North Korean-Soviet relations cooled, North Korea maintained an active relationship with China. In the early 1960’s, 

Kim Il-Sung supported China verbally during the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. ‘‘It was 

against this backdrop of comradeship that an old border dispute between the Chinese and Koreans over Mount Paektu 

(Paektu-san) was reportedly settled when the PRC Chief of 

State, Liu Shao-chi, visited Pyongyang in September 1963. At 

that time, the PRC apparently recognized North Korean sovereignty over much of the disputed 100-square-mile area involving Mount Paektu, a major concession to the Koreans.’’ 

• Following Premier Khrushchev’s ouster in 1964, the Soviet 

Union took a more conciliatory approach to North Korea which 

was immediately noticed by the Chinese. There were mild 

tremors in the relationship which became more publicly apparent e.g. in 1965 when the North Korean Embassy in Moscow 

reported that Peking had claimed the Mount Paektu area as 

‘‘compensation’’ for its military intervention and assistance 

during the Korean War; and in 1967 the Chinese Red Guards 

alleged that Kim Il-Sung had been arrested by his army following a coup. In 1969 North Korea-Chinese relations began to 

improve and in 1970 Premier Chou En-lai paid a state visit to 

North Korea where he heralded a new era of cordiality and 

mutual cooperation. 

• Warm relations between North Korea and China continued in 

the 1970’s with evidence that Pyongyang was taking an ‘‘evenVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Jan 02, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\TOPIC REPORTS\MINORITY\KEITH\KOREA\
4 

handed or independent posture toward Peking and Moscow.’’ 

During a nine-day visit to China in 1975, the two sides reaffirmed a ‘‘blood-sealed militant friendship.’’ 6

Disputes about the Korea-China borderline are historic and endless. Complicating analysis of research on borders is the fact that 

authoritative sources within China do not always agree.7 The attached analysis and documentation of China’s numerous historic 

claims on the Korean Peninsula may mean that many within Chinese leadership circles believe that areas of the Koreas (North and 

South), are in fact, part of China. 

Through the careful review of Chinese and Korean sources, analysts have documented China’s tenacious commitment to viewing 

parts of the Korean Peninsula as historically its own. Any future 

success at negotiations between North Korea and the United 

States, or with North Korea in a Six-Party or other multilateral 

context, is unlikely to change China’s perspective of its paternal 

role with North Korea. China is likely to resist direct or indirect 

challenges to its preferred status quo. 

TODAY

Chinese officials are prepared to take action as they deem necessary to preserve regional stability, (especially stability along the 

border with North Korea). Chinese officials earlier informed Senate 

Foreign Relations’ Committee staff that China reserved the right to 

place troops across the border inside North Korea to prevent hungry or impoverished North Koreans from fleeing into China. These 

plans have been described not as an invasion, but as a pre-emptive 

move that would be taken in consultation with North Korean authorities. In addition, China has contingency plan options to respond unilaterally to situations within North Korea which Chinese 

officials might deem as potentially destabilizing. 

INSTITUTIONAL POLICY COORDINATION

BETWEEN CHINA AND NORTH KOREA

There are multiple examples of increased policy coordination between China and North Korea at the institutional level. Examples 

include: 

• Strategic consultations between senior leaders. 

• Policy discussions and harmonization at the inter-party, intermilitary, inter-governmental and inter-ministerial levels and 

exchanges between provincial and local authorities (party, people’s committees, mass public organizations, civil groups, etc.) 

• Chinese advisory role and sharing of technical expertise at the 

sub-ministerial and sub-agency level, including regular exchanges and technical assistance at the vice-ministerial level 

(e.g. agriculture, electric power, light industry, banking, transportation, etc.) 

• Sharing of managerial control at mainstream North Korean 

enterprises with Chinese stakes.8

In addition, during 2011, China’s Ambassador in Pyongyan, Liu 

Hongcai, ‘‘had an extraordinarily active year, . . . both as a 

5 

facilitator of exchanges and as a support base for managing the 

comprehensive contacts between Chinese leaders and the full range 

of DPRK elites at the top ranks of leadership.’’ 9

But even more significant than the Ambassador’s public 

schedule is the reach of the embassy into the top echelons 

of North Korea’s elite leadership during visits by Chinese 

senior officials . . . as well as efforts by the embassy to follow-up with Kim Jong-il to schedule various special occasions following his visits to China.10

THE MOVE TOWARD ECONOMIC INTEGRATION—THE MAKING

OF A 21ST CENTURY TRIBUTARY PROVINCE

. . . keeping Pyongyang afloat is not only an immediate 

consideration, but also a long-term security hedge (for 

China).11

For over a decade, Chinese authorities ‘‘have attempted to put 

the economic relationship with North Korea on a market basis by 

reducing the amount of subsidies provided to North Korea from 

China’s central, provincial and local governments.’’ North Korean 

leaders rejected this approach preferring the subsidies over assuming political risks accompanying economic reform.12

The more recent China-launched investment and trade offensive 

directed at North Korea reflects an incremental economic integration with the North and is reminiscent of similar situations involving other sovereign states bordering China including Cambodia and 

Laos. However, North Korea represents a point of unique anxiety 

for Chinese officials’ who are determined to preserve what they call 

‘‘regional stability.’’ China’s active facilitation of closer economic 

ties with North Korea supports China’s economy while quietly establishing an extensive business and trade infrastructure within 

North Korea that China will be prepared to protect, if ever necessary. 

. . . a significant challenge for future North-South relations is the dominance of China in North Korea’s current 

external economic relations and the diversity and genuinely 

commercial motivations for the rapidly expanding trade 

and investment activities along the China border. These are 

indicators of a process of economic integration underway....The large ethnic Korean population on the Chinese 

side of the border also provides a fertile soil to nurture this 

process of gradual economic integration in the border 

areas.13

POINTS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA COMMERCIAL INTERSECTION

The October 2009 visit to North Korea by Chinese Premier Wen 

Jiabao was a benchmark event which leveraged Communist Party 

of China (CPC) ties with the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) ‘‘to 

deepen (the) bilateral commercial relationship for mutual benefit. 

Beijing shored up (the) stability of (the) Kim Jong-il regime and 

Pyongyang agreed to jointly develop DPRK natural resources—inVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Jan 02, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\TOPIC REPORTS\MINORITY\KEITH\KOREA\
6 

puts which will significantly aid sustainable economic development 

of (the) PRC’s three northeastern provinces.’’ 14

It is important to note that it is difficult to obtain accurate information regarding the status of North Korea’s economy or precise 

figures on the sources and amounts of Chinese investment in North 

Korea. 

There is more going on than meets the eye, both positively 

and negatively. It is very unusual for Chinese firms to complain publicly about their hosts, as Xiyang did, especially 

in sensitive situations. Most likely, this was the culmination of a number of fundamental problems. The North Koreans have shown no sign they understand what a commercial contract is. The notion of $7 billion in pending Chinese 

investment is thus difficult to accept. Moreover, some 

sources, notably in South Korea have a record of exaggeration when it comes to DPRK economic reporting. 

On the other hand, the scope of the land leases, infrastructure development (drop in the bucket though it is), and 

mining operations indicate that the UN figure for investment stock is too low. It should either be read as excluding 

non-monetary transactions or representing nominal prices 

far below those even in other poor economies. Trade figures 

are similarly too low.15

• In March of 2012, the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) 

published new foreign investment laws for the two special economic zones North Korea is promoting on the Chinese border— 

Rason as well as the Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Islands 

Zone.16 (Since 1993, North Korean laws governing the status 

of the special economic zones (SEZs) have been amended six 

times in an effort to improve incentives for foreign investors).17

A joint China-North Korea Committee oversees the development of the two special (SEZs). ‘‘SEZs are acceptable to the 

North Korean government because they are relatively easy to 

control.’’ 18

• Rason (the combined towns of Rajin and Sonbong) was established as an SEZ in 1991. While the North Koreans have tried 

to attract investment there with poor results in the past, a new 

push is now underway.19

• In 2011, China’s Shangdi Guanqun Investment Company 

signed a letter of intent with North Korea’s Investment and 

Development Group for an investment of $2 billion in the 

Rason Industrial Zone.20

• The road to the Chinese border from the Rason Economic Zone 

is now finished, cutting a 3-hour journey to under 50 minutes. 

The road has also improved connectivity between regions in 

the Special Economic Zone for local citizens.21

North Korea’s Joint-Venture & Investment Commission, designed 

by the North Korean government to attract foreign investment, 

signed an agreement in September with the Chinese Overseas Investment Federation to jointly launch the ‘‘Special Funds for North 

Korean Investments’’ project, supported by (US $480 million) from 

Chinese sources.22

7 

The lack of electricity is a major challenge to Chinese expansion 

along the border and within North Korea -a drag on investment in 

production factories. The lack of a credible plan for infrastructure 

investment in the Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Islands zone is a 

major obstacle as well.23

. . . integration of North Korea’s economy and China’s 

northeastern provinces, particularly the provinces of 

Liaoning and Jilin, ensure that Northeast China will pay 

a significant price should North Korea implode. Economic 

stability in these ‘‘rust belt’’ provinces, part of the struggling industrial region known informally in the West as 

Manchuria, is a key concern for Beijing.24

• The proportion of North Korea’s total foreign trade that is accounted for by China-North Korea trade increased to more 

than 60% in 2011.25

• Chinese visitors are one of North Korea’s key sources of foreign 

currency. Sixty thousand to seventy thousand Chinese tourists 

visited North Korea in 2011 compared to an estimated 40,000 

visitors from China in 2010.26

• China, along with Germany, France and South Korea are 

among the countries producing clothing in North Korea for export. Tens of thousands of North Koreans, many highly skilled, 

are employed by companies from these countries.27

• In August of 2012, a high level North Korean delegation visited China to develop consensus on renewed cooperation in key 

sectors of North Korea’s economy including emphasis on the 

development of economic zones along the China-North Korea 

border. 

Although unlikely to facilitate system-wide DPRK economic reform in the near-term, Beijing’s Sunshine Policy appears to be sufficient to bolster the stability of the new regime through the immediate benefits that the Kim Jong-un leadership can realize from 

preferential commercial arrangements with PRC partners. In practice, the Communist Party of China is bailing out the Workers’ 

Party of Korea via political and commercial arrangements.28

• Since earlier this year, China has issued over 40,000 work 

visas for North Koreans to work in three Northeast provinces: 

Jilin, Lianoning and Heilongjiang.29 (Some suggest that whether or not this number of visas has been issued, the number of 

North Koreans presently working in China may be fewer than 

40,000). 

• Press reports suggest that China and North Korea have reportedly agreed on a labor program under which China would take 

anywhere from 40,000 to 120,000 North Koreans to work in 

factories as industrial trainees and to work in the hospitality 

industry.30

(North Korea has also increased the number of workers at the 

Kaesong Industrial Complex which is managed by South Korean 

companies. Over 46,400 North Korean workers were at the industrial park in February, 2012, compared to 42,415 over a year ago. 

South Korean companies have reportedly asked North Korea for an 

8 

additional 20,000 workers for the Kaesong Complex. North Korean 

workers at Kaesong, in China, in Mongolia and other countries provide millions of dollars of annual income for the North Korean government).31

• China has gained the rights to use North Korea’s port of 

Chongjin on the East China Sea. The agreement reportedly 

provides China with the rights to use two wharves at Chongjin 

for 30 years which are capable of processing 7 million tons of 

cargo on an annual basis.32

• Total accumulated FDI in North Korea reached $1.475 billion 

in 2010—according to the United Nations Conference on Trade 

and Development.33

• Nearly $7 billion of additional FDI ‘‘is in the works as Chinese 

infrastructure companies plan new ports, highways and power 

plants, according to Samsung Economic Research Institute in 

Seoul.’’ 34

• As of 2010, 138 Chinese companies were registered as doing 

business in North Korea.35

The North Korea-China trade and economic interaction is augmented by a network of state trading companies in North Korea 

with affiliations to the Worker’s Party of Korea, the Korean People’s Army and North Korea’s Cabinet. ‘‘While financial sanctions 

continue to dominate (the) U.S. approach to dealing with (the) 

DPRK, PRC companies have been deepening their interactions 

with (the) DPRK state trading companies operating in China.’’ 36

All of the indications about expanding Chinese investment in 

North Korea do not mask the enormous challenges to investors resulting from the lack of transparency and rule of law in North 

Korea. Actions by the North Korean government to revise investment law do not compensate for the challenges to investors posed 

by some North Korean officials or business people making their 

own rules and issuing new demands on an individual deal basis. 

There have been multiple reports in 2012 of Chinese partners pulling out of deals due to friction with their North Korean business 

partners or government officials. 

North Korea does not have a good reputation in honoring 

contracts, and surveys of Chinese investors and traders 

with North Korea have documented both the risks they face 

and mitigation strategies that have been adopted by those 

choosing to invest and trade.37

A MAGNET FOR CHINA—NORTH KOREA’S NATURAL RESOURCES— 

MINING AND RARE EARTH MATERIALS

North Korea has sizeable deposits of over 200 different minerals 

including coal, iron ore, magnesite, gold ore, zinc ore, copper ore, 

limestone, molybdenum and graphite. It is estimated that North 

Korea has up to 20 million tons of rare earth materials (rem) deposits.38

Using 2008 as the base year, one estimate projected the potential 

value for key mineral deposits in the North at over $6 trillion. Exports of rare metals to China in 2009 stood at $16 million.39 A 2012 

9 

report suggests that North Korea’s underground mineral resources 

amount to nearly $10 trillion.40

A November, 2011, North Korean science journal article identified the ‘‘main industrial rare earth materials in North Korea as 

monazite, bastnasite, cerium pyrochlore and britholite, while secondary minerals include fergusonite, gadolinite and cerite. The genetic-petrographic types of rem deposits are deposits related to 

laurvikites, placer deposits, apogranite deposits and pegmatite deposits. Laurvikites and placer deposits are large-scale deposits and 

main industrial genetic types that are widely distributed.’’ 41

As North Korea seeks outside assistance related to its mining 

projects China is an attractive partner for joint operations. ( North 

Korea’s main gold mine in Unsan County, North Pyongyang province, was originally opened by a United States company in 1896.) 42

Forty-one percent of the Chinese companies registered as doing 

business in North Korea in 2010 extract coal, iron, zinc, nickel, 

gold and other minerals.43

North Korea mining projects announced or underway include the 

following. 

• Beijing Bao Wian Hung Chang International Trading Ltd and 

North Korea reportedly signed a deal to develop three mines 

in North Korea—one gold and two iron-ore.44

• In 2007, the DPRK Ministry of Mining Industries and the 

Wanxiang Resources Limited Company of China established 

Hyesan-China Joint Venture Mineral Company. Copper ore 

production from the Hyesan Youth Mine goes to China. North 

Korean and Chinese workers completed a modernization 

project of the mine in September of 2011.45 The Hyesan Youth 

Mine reportedly has an annual capacity of 50 to 70,000 tons 

of copper concentrate that is expected to contain 20-30% copper 

with all of it to be sold to China.46 Also, China has reportedly 

invested $860 million in the mines under this joint venture 

and holds a 51% stake.47

• Four Chinese corporations acquired 50-year development 

rights to Musan Iron Mine according to the ROK’s ‘‘The Institute for Far Eastern Studies.’’ 48 120 tons of iron ore are reportedly exported to China annually from the Musan Mine 

which is believed to be the largest outdoor mine in Asia. 

• Chinese, South Korean and about 30 European companies 

have invested in copper and gold mines in North Korea, as well 

as factories producing medications and blue jeans, and even 

Internet Service.49

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES BY AND FOR NORTH KOREA

North Korean leaders’ steady refusal to give up their nuclear 

weapons program continually has diminished prospects for economic development assistance from international financial institutions, the United States and other countries. This economic estrangement, combined with South Korea’s policy of disengagement 

from North Korea50 has resulted in the growing economic and 

other assistance from China. 

10 

This scenario is not particularly discomforting to Chinese leaders 

who carefully managed the Six Party Talks process to maintain 

‘‘balance’’—preserving regional stability. Chinese leaders have 

adeptly cajoled or pressed North Korean leaders according to the 

situation at hand—in response to Beijing’s own ‘‘loss of face’’ when 

North Korea proceeded with a nuclear test, for instance, as a result 

of U.S. impatience with the North. 

As a former State Department official with long experience in 

Korea noted, ‘‘The day China decides to break with the DPRK and 

the moment the PRC decides that a reunified Korean Peninsula 

(under Seoul’s aegis) is more in its interest than a divided peninsula, that is when the process of Korea’s national unification will 

begin in earnest, and there will be little the DPRK can do to sustain itself as an independent entity. It is for that reason that the 

North has been extremely cautious in its ties with Beijing. . . . 

China is the DPRK’s lifeline and insurance policy, which for a nationalistic North Korea is something that necessarily sticks in the 

craw, but it is a fact of life.’’ 

IS THE TREND OF NORTH KOREA BECOMING A CHINESE

PROTECTORATE AND ECONOMIC COLONY IRREVERSIBLE? 

Some would suggest that the present trend is not necessarily irreversible, as there ‘‘is no love lost between Pyongyang and Beijing. 

The North Koreans are intensely nationalistic and do not want to 

become overly dependent on Beijing. And there are many in China 

who warn that North Korea is a strategic liability.’’ 51

In addition, it is important to note that North-South relations 

impact the degree to which North Korea engages (or needs to engage) China. Will a new government in the Republic of Korea seek 

closer relations with the North? 

However, these points do not counter the reality of China’s historic claims to the Korean Peninsula and that China views the 

North Korea as a ‘‘strategic buffer against a unified, pro-American 

Korea.’’ 52

IN SUMMARY

In the event the unification of the Peninsula does proceed in 

some manner, and/or there is a collapse of the North Korean government unification will be complicated. Depending on the circumstances that prompt a move toward unification, would consensus be achieved among key players (including China, the U.S. 

and South Korea), to focus on ‘‘securing stability on the Peninsula 

versus creating legitimacy?’’ 53

The findings of the USC-CSIS interim study on Korean Peninsula unification were that ‘‘for the Korean case, finding the balance 

between stability and legitimacy . . . becomes key. First-movers into 

a collapse of the DPRK may be trying to act in the name of efficiency, but will they necessarily be seen as legitimate? South Korea 

undeniably sees itself as the only legitimate party with the authority to act. But China is likely to focus legitimacy on a UN process 

that is protracted. China is therefore likely to focus on a longer 

time line for intervention and would only see a UN process as legitimate. This fits with the Chinese proclivity to be good at investVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Jan 02, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\TOPIC REPORTS\MINORITY\KEITH\KOREA\
11 

ing in the status quo rather than reacting to rapid change. The 

United States and the ROK, conversely, are better at responding 

to crises and trying to shape the outcome.’’ 54

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND APPRECIATION

Special thanks to those persons who assisted with the preparation of the report. They include Bradley O. Babson, SFRC colleague 

Jay Branegan, Victor Cha, Alexander Mansourov, Marcus Noland, 

John Park, Derek Scissors, and Scott Snyder. 

Also, deep appreciation is in order to Susan Lawrence at the 

Congressional Research Service and Yong Ho Kim of the Northeast 

Asia Foundation in Seoul. 

BRADLEY BABSON, Chair of the DPRK Economic Forum at the 

U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS 

JAY BRANEGAN, Senior Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee 

VICTOR CHA, Senior Advisor and Korea Chair, CSIS 

JOSEPH DETRANI, former Special Envoy for the Six Party Talks 

with North Korea 

BEN DOLVEN, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research 

Service 

NICOLE DUBE, Staff Assistant, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee 

DANIEL GESTAL, Intern, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

MR. JIMIN HA, Economic Researcher, Embassy of Korea, Washington, D.C. 

STEPHAN HAGGARD, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor, University of California, San Diego Graduate School of International 

Relations and Pacific Studies 

CHRIS HUDNUT, Intern, Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

FRANK JANNUZI, former East Asia Foreign Policy Adviser to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry 

PROFESSOR CHUNG JAE JEONG, former President of the Northeast 

Asian History Foundation. 

YONG HO KIM, Director of the Office of Policy Planning, Northeast Asian History Foundation 

KARIN LEE, Executive Director, National Committee on North 

Korea, Washington, D.C. 

JONGJOO LEE, Unification Attache, Embassy of the Republic of 

Korea, Washington, D.C. 

ALEXANDRE Y. MANSOUROV, PH.D., Visiting Scholar, U.S.-Korea 

Institute at SAIS, John Hopkins University 

MARK MANYIN, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service 

NICHOLAS MCCORMICK, Staff Assistant, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

MARCUS NOLAND, Deputy Director, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. 

12 

Open Source Center, Washington, D.C. 

HAN S. PARK, Director of The Center for the Study of Global 

Issues (Globis), University Professor of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia 

JOHN PARK, Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow, Security Studies Program, MIT 

EVANS REVERE, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution 

DEREK SCISSORS, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation 

SCOTT SNYDER, Senior Fellow for Korean Studies and Director, 

Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, Council on Foreign Relations 

HENNING SPECK, First Secretary, Political Affairs, Embassy of 

the Federal Republic of Germany, Washington, D.C. 

DAVID STRAUB, Associate Director, Korean Studies Program, The 

Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University 

SUE TERRY, Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University 

Weatherhead East Asian Institute 

ALEX UTSEY, Staff Assistant, Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

PROFESSOR DONALD S. ZAGORIA, Senior Vice President, National 

Committee on American Foreign Policy 

——————— 

NOTES: 

1 ‘‘The View from Pyongyang,’’ Charles K. Armstrong, The New York Times, August 15, 2012. 

2 ‘‘Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, A Report of the CSIS 

Freeman Chair in China Studies,’’ Bonnie S. Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, 

Principal Authors, and Stephen Haggard, Marcus Noland and Scott Snyder, 

Contributing Authors, November 2012. 

3 Avoiding the Apocalypse, Marcus Noland, Institute for International Economics, 

Washington, D.C. , June, 2000, p. 372. 

4 ‘‘Challenges for Korean Unification Planning, Justice, Markets, Health, Refugees and Civil-Military Transitions—An Interim Report of the USC-CSIS Joint 

Study, The Korea Project: Planning for the Long Term,’’ Victor Cha and David 

Kang, Principal Investigators, December, 2011. 

5 ‘‘Spats Mar 20 Years of China Ties,’’ The Korea Herald, August 8, 2012. 

6 Area Handbook for North Korea, Nena Vreeland, Rinn-Sup Shinn, Peter Just, 

Philip W. Moelle, Foreign American Studies of the American University, 1976, 

p. 206. 

7 ‘‘China’s Perspective on Historical Borders on the Korean Peninsula,’’ Congressional Research Service, Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs, March 

9, 2011. 

8 Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Ph.D., Visiting Scholar, U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, 

John Hopkins University. 

9 ‘‘Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, A Report of the CSIS 

Freeman Chair in China Studies,’’ Bonnie S. Glaser and Brittany Billinglsey, 

Principal Authors; Stephan Haggard, Marcus Noland and Scott Snyder, Contributing Authors, November 2012. 

10 Ibid. 

13 

11 Alliance Diversification & the Future of the U.S.-Korean Security Relationship, 

Charles M. Perry, Jacquelyn K. Davis, James L. Scoff and Toshi Yoshihara, The 

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., p. 137 

12 China’s Rise and the Two Koreas, Scott Snyder, Lynee Rienner, Publishers, London, 2009, p. 146 

13 ‘‘South-North Relations: Present Situation and Future Challenges and Opportunities,’’ Bradley O. Babson (A paper prepared for presentation at the IGE/ 

KEXIM/KDI/PIEE Conference on Unification and the Korean Economy, October 

22, 2012). 

14 ‘‘Reading Current & Future Commercial Tea Leaves: New Insights into DPRK 

Regime Dynamics,’’ presentation by John S. Park, Ph.D., Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow, Security Studies Program, MIT Associate, Managing the Atom 

Project, Harvard Kennedy School, November 27, 2012. 

15 Derek Scissors, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation. 

16 ‘‘Will North Korea’s Plans for Foreign Investment Make it a More Prosperous 

Nation?’’; Bradley O. Babson, 38 North, May 2, 2012. 

17 Ibid. 

18 ‘‘North Korea-China Special Economic Zones,’’ East Asia Forum, Andrei Landov, 

July 14, 2011. 

19 ‘‘Tending a Small Patch of Capitalism in North Korea,’’ The New York Times, 

Edward Wong, October 12, 2011. 

20 ‘‘Chinese Firm to Invest in North Korea,’’ Jay Solomon and Jeremy Page, The 

Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2011. 

21 ‘‘The Honeymoon Period is Over,’’ CHOSON EXCHANGE, Andray Abrahamian, 

August, 2012. 

22 ‘‘China Eyes Big Investment Opportunities in North Korea,’’ Economic Observer, Chen Young, November 6, 2012. 

23 Bradley Babson, Chair of the DPRK Economic Forum at the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS. 

24 ‘‘China’s Cheonan Dilemma,’’ Drew Thompson, Foreign Policy, June 7, 2010. 

25 ‘‘North Korean Economy: Can They ‘Open the Door to Being a Strong and Prosperous Great Power,’ ’’ Jin Meihua, Beijing Shijie Zhishi, June 16, 2012. 

26 ‘‘North Korean Minders Endure Chinese Invasion,’’ Asia Times Online, Yvonne 

Su, November 8, 2012. 

27 ‘‘Garment Production in North Korea,’’ 38 North, Paul Tija, August 30, 2012. 

28 John Park, Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow, Security Studies Program, MIT, 

email content to Keith Luse, August 17, 2012. 

29 ‘‘Garment Production in North Korea,’’ 38 North, Paul Tija, August 30, 2012. 

30 ‘‘145 North Korean Laborers Work at Garment Factory at China Border Town,’’ 

Kyodo News article as appeared in The Mainichi, July 31, 2012. Also, ‘‘120,000 

North Koreans to work in China,’’ China Daily Mail, August 2, 2012. 

31 ‘‘North Korea Keeps Sending More Workers to Kaesong Complex,’’ Chosun Ilbo, 

May 17, 2011. 

32 ‘‘China Gains Use of Another N. Korean Port,’’ Chosun Ilbo, September 11, 

2012. 

33 ‘‘North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?’’; Dexter Roberts, Bloomberg 

Businessweek, January 19, 2012. 

34 Ibid. 

35 ‘‘North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?,’’ Dexter Roberts, Bloomberg 

Businessweek, January 19, 2012. 

36 ‘‘Reading Current & Future Commercial Tea Leaves: New Insights into DPRK 

Regime Dynamics,’’ John S. Park, Ph.D., Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow, Security Studies Program, MIT Associate, Managing the Atom Project, Harvard 

Kennedy School, November 27, 2012. 

14 

37 ‘‘Will North Korea’s Plans for Foreign Investment Make it a More Prosperous 

Nation?’’; Bradley O. Babson, 38 North, May 2, 2012—‘‘Silent Partners: Chinese 

Joint Ventures in North Korea,’’ Drew Thompson, U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, 

February 2012; and Stephen Haggard, Jennifer Lee and Marcus Noland, ‘‘Integration in the Absence of Institutions: China-North Korea Border Exchange,’’ 

Working Paper 11-13, Peterson Institute for International Economics, August, 

2011. 

38 ‘‘Could North Korea Be the Next Rare Earth Powerhouse?’’; Rare Earth Investing News, Adam Currie, August 20, 2012. 

39 Ibid. 

40 ‘‘North Korea’s Mineral Resources Potentially Worth $9.7 Trillion,’’ The Korea 

Times, August 26, 2012. 

41 ‘‘Main Rare-Earth Element Mineral of Our Country and Its Metallogeny,’’ Kim 

Il-so’ng Chonghap Taehak Hakpo: Chayo’n Kwahak, Han Ryong-ryo’n and 

Ryang Mun-hyon, November 20, 2011. 

42 ‘‘North Korea’s Golden Path to Security,’’ Asia Times Online, Bertil Lintner, 

January 18, 2007. 

43 ‘‘North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?’’; Dexter Roberts, Bloomberg 

Businessweek, January 19, 2012. 

44 ‘‘North Korea, China Agree to Jointly Develop Three Mines in North Korea,’’ 

Yonhap, August 9, 2012; and ‘‘North Korea Deal to Allow Chinese Company to 

Develop 3 Mines,’’ ROK Daily, August 10, 2012. 

45 ‘‘Work on Border Bridge Source of Conflict Between PRC, DPRK,’’ ROK Online 

Daily, November 1, 2011, and ‘‘Modernization Project and Joint Venture Company Go Operational,’’ KCNA, September 19, 2011. 

46 ‘‘China-N.Korean JV starts production at Copper Mine,’’ Reuters, September 20, 

2011. 

47 ‘‘North Korea, China Agree to Jointly Develop Three Mines in North Korea,’’ 

Yonhap, August 9, 2012. 

48 ‘‘Increase in DPRK’s Mineral Resources Exports to China Expected Again this 

Year,’’ The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, February 24, 2011. 

49 ‘‘North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?,’’ Bloomberg Business Week, Dexter 

Roberts, January 19, 2012. 

50 ‘‘Changes in the North Korean Economy in the Next 5-10 Years,’’ Bradley O. 

Babson, October 18, 2012. 

51 Professor Donald S. Zagoria, Senior Vice President, National Committee on 

American Foreign Policy. 

52 Ibid. 

53 ‘‘Challenges for Korean Unification Planning, An Interim Report of the USCCSIS Joint Study, The Korea Project: Planning for the Long Term,’’ pp. 7,8, December 2011, Victor Cha and David Kang, Principal Investigators. 

54 Ibid. 

A P P E N D I X E S 

(17) 

APPENDIX I.—BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Alliance Diversification & the Future of the U.S.-Korean Security 

Relationship, Charles M. Perry, Jacquelyn K. Davis, James L. 

Schoff, and Toshi Yoshihara, The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.,221 pp. 

Area Handbook for North Korea, 1969, Rinn-Sup Shinn, Foreign 

Area Studies, The American University, U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 481 pp. 

Area Handbook for North Korea, 1976, Rinn-Sup Shinn, Nena 

Vreeland, Peter Just, Phillip W. Moeller, Foreign Area Studies, The 

American University, U.S. Government Printing Office, 394 pp. 

Avoiding the Apocalypse, Marcus Noland, Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., June, 2000. 

‘‘North Korean Economy: Can They Open the Door to Being a 

Strong and Prosperous Great Power′′, Jin Meihua, Beijing ′′Shijie 

Zhishi′′, June 16, 2012. 

‘‘Challenges for Korean Unification Planning, An Interim Report 

of the USC-CSIS Joint Study, The Korea Project: Planning for the 

Long Term′′, pp. 7 and 8, Victor Cha and David Kang, Principal Investigators. 

‘‘Changes in the North Korean Economy in the Next 5-10 Years′′, 

Bradley O. Babson, October 18, 2012. 

‘‘China Eyes Big Investment Opportunities in North Korea′′, ‘Economic Observer’, Chen Young, November 6, 2012. 

‘‘China Gains Use of Another North Korean Port′′, ‘Chosun Ilbo’, 

September 11, 2012. 

‘‘China-North Korea Relations′′, Dick K. Nanto, Specialist in Industry and Trade; Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, 

′′Congressional Research Service′′, December 28, 2010. 

‘‘China-North Korean JV Starts Production at Copper Mine′′, 

‘Reuters’, September 20, 2011. 

‘‘China Offers North Korea security from any US Attack′′, Ching 

Cheong, The Straits Times Interactive, May 3, 2003. 

‘‘China’s Perspective on Historical Borders on the Korean Peninsula,’’ Congressional Research Service, Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs, March 9, 2011. 

China’s Rise and the Two Koreas, Scott Snyder, Lynne Rienner 

Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 2009. 

‘‘China’s North Korea Policy, Assessing Interests and Influences′′, 

Bates Gill, United States Institute of Peace Special Report, July, 

2011. 

‘‘Chinese Firm to Invest in North Korea′′, ‘The Wall Street Journal’, Jay Solomon and Jeremy Page, January 19, 2011. 

18 

‘‘Chinese Infrastructure and Natural Resources Investments in 

North Korea′′, Daniel Gearin, Research Fellow, U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Backgrounder, October 20, 2010. 

Cold War International History Project -BULLETIN-New Evidence on North Korea, Christian Friedrich Ostermann, Editor; 

Kathryn Weathersby, Co-Editor, Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars, Winter 2003-Spring 2004. 

‘‘Could North Korea Be the Next Rare Earth Powerhouse?′′, ‘Rare 

Earth Investing News’, Adam Currie, August 20, 2012. 

Do You Know About Korea? Foreign Languages Publishing 

House, Pyongyang, 1989. 

‘‘Garment Production in North Korea′′, ’38 North’, Paul Tija, August 30, 2012. 

‘‘Increase in DPRK’s Mineral Resources Exports to China Expected Again this Year′′, The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 

February 24, 2011. 

‘‘Integration in the Absence of Institutions: China-North Korea 

Border Exchange′′, Working Paper 11-13, Peterson Institute for 

International Economics, Stephen Haggard, Jennifer Lee and 

Marcus Noland, August, 2011. 

‘‘International Workshop on Foreign Relations of the Two Koreas 

during the Cold War Era′′, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 

Kyungnam University, May 11, 2006, Seoul. 

Korean Unification and the Neighboring Powers, KINU Unification Forum 2010, Choi Jinwook, Editor, NEULPUMPLUS, 2011. 

‘‘Main Rare Earth Element Minerals of our Country and its 

Metallogeny′′, ‘Kim Il-so’ng Chonghap Taehak Hapko: Chayo’n 

Kwahak’, Han Ryong-ryo’n and Ryang Mun-hyo’n, November 20, 

2011. 

‘‘Modernization Project and Joint Venture Company Go 

Operational′′, ‘KCNA’, September 19, 2011. 

‘‘North Korea, China Agree to Jointly Develop Three Mines in 

North Korea′′, ‘Yonhap’, August 9, 2012. 

‘‘North Korea - China Special Economic Zones′′, ‘East Asia 

Forum’, Andrei Lankov, July 14, 2011. 

‘‘North Korea Deal to Allow Chinese Company to Develop 3 

Mines′′, ‘ROK Daily’, August 10, 2012. 

North Korea International Documentation Project, The Woodrow 

Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.. 

‘‘North Korea Keeps Sending More Workers to Kaesong 

Complex′′, ‘Chosun Ilbo’, May 17, 2011. 

‘‘North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?′′, ‘Bloomberg 

Businessweek’, January 19, 2012. 

‘‘North Korean Economy: Can They ‘Open the Door to Being a 

Strong and Prosperous Great Power’′′, ‘Beijing Shijie Zhisi’, Jim 

Meihua, June 16, 2012. 

‘‘North Korean Minders Endure Chinese Invasion′′, ‘Asia Times 

Online’, Yvonne Su, November 8, 2012. 

19 

‘‘North Korea’s Golden Path to Security′′, ‘Asia Times Online’, 

Bertil Lintner, January 18, 2007. 

‘‘North Korea’s Growing Trade Dependency on China: Mixed 

Strategic Implications′′, Scott A. Snyder, ′′Asia Unbound′′, Council 

on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2012. 

‘‘North Korea’s Mineral Resources Potentially Worth $9.7 

Trillion′′, The Korea Times, August 26, 2012. 

‘‘Path Emergence on the Korean Peninsula: From Division to 

Unification′′, Ki-Joon Hong, ′′Pacific Focus, The Journal of International Studies′′, Inha University, 2012. 

‘‘Prospects from Korean Unification′′, Colonel, Australian Army 

David Coghlan, Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army 

War College, April, 2008. 

‘‘Reading Current & Future Commercial Tea Leaves: New Insights into DPRK Regime Dynamics′′, John S. Park, Ph.D., Harvard Kennedy School of Government, November 27, 2012. 

Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation, Jeffrey 

Knopf, Editor, Stanford Security Studies, 2012. 

‘‘Silent Partners, Chinese Joint Ventures in North Korea′′, U.S. 

- Korea Institute at SAIS, Drew Thompson, February, 2011, . 

‘‘South-North Relations: Present Situation and Future Challenges and Opportunities,’’ Bradley O. Babson, ‘‘A paper prepared 

for presentation at the IGE/KEXIM/KDI/PIEE Conference on Unification and the Korean Economy,’’ October 22, 2012. 

‘‘Spats Mar 20 Years of China Ties,’’ The Korea Herald, August 

8, 2012. 

‘‘Status and Future of the North Korean Minerals Sector,’’ Edward Yoon, Nautilus Institute, January 6, 2011. 

‘‘Tending a Small Patch of Capitalism in North Korea,’’ The New 

York Times, Edward Wong, October 12, 2011. 

‘‘The Honeymoon Period is Over,’’ A Short Report on Rason Special Economic Zone, Andray Abrahamian, CHOSUN EXCHANGE, 

August, 2012. 

The Impossible State, North Korea, Past and Future, Victor Cha, 

Harper Collins Publishers, 2012. 

The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, Yoichi Funabashi, The Brookings Institution, 2007. 

The United States and The Korean Problem, Documents 1943– 

1953, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Alexander Wiley, 

Chairman, 1953, AMS Press, New York. 

‘‘The View from Pyongyang,’’ The New York Times, Charles K. 

Armstrong, August 15, 2012. 

Triad Track-II Seminar on Peace Building and Reintegration of 

the Korean Peninsula, Center for the Study of Global Issues, 

School of Public and International Affairs, The University of Georgia, October 17-20, 2011. 

US-China Relations and Korean Unification, KINU Unification 

Forum 2011, Choi Jinwook, Korea Institute for National Unification, 2011. 

20 

‘‘USGS 2007 Minerals Yearbook for North Korea,’’ U.S. Geological Survey, December, 2009. 

U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, Council on Foreign 

Relations, Independent Task Force Report No. 64, Charles L. 

Pritchard and John H. Tilelli Jr., Hairs, Scott A. Snyder, Project 

Director, 2010, 85 pp. 

‘‘Will North Korean’s Plans for Foreign Investment Make it a 

More Prosperous Nation?’’, 38 North, Bradley O. Babson, May 2, 

2012. 

‘‘Work on Border Bridge Source of Conflict Between PRC, 

DPRK,’’ ROK Online Daily, November 1, 2011. 

(21) 

APPENDIX II.—CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

MEMORANDUM TO SENATOR LUGAR REGARDING CHINA’S PERSPECTIVE ON HISTORICAL BORDERS ON THE 

KOREAN PENINSULA 

March 9, 2012 

This memo responds to your request for information about areas 

of the present-day Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 

and Republic of Korea (ROK) that the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) considers to have once been parts of China. Per your request, the memo includes detailed discussion of Chinese maps 

showing those claims and also examines other state-supported PRC 

scholarship on this subject. CRS was asked only to summarize PRC 

state-supported scholarship, so this memo does not reflect scholarship by experts from the ROK, DPRK or other countries. 

This memo provides both Chinese and Korean names for ancient 

kingdoms and certain place names, with the Chinese listed first because of the memo’s focus on PRC claims. 

OVERVIEW

Since the early years of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 

Chinese government has devoted significant resources to research 

on China’s historic borders. In promoting such research, the Chinese government has appeared to be driven by several motivations: 

• The Chinese government sees the research as contributing to 

national unity and the ‘‘stability and development of China’s 

border areas.’’ With non-Han Chinese ethnic minorities occupying large swathes of territory within the borders of the PRC, 

the government appears to believe that research showing border areas as historically part of China can help solidify those 

areas’ sense of belonging to the PRC, and undermine any calls 

for such areas to break away from the PRC. 

• The Chinese government seeks to amass historic evidence to 

rebuff any claims by other nations to what the PRC considers 

to be its territory. For Chinese policymakers, memories remain 

fresh of Japan’s efforts to justify its invasion of China in the 

first half of the 20th century on the basis, in part, of claims 

to ancient kingdoms. China has commissioned historical research to defend all its sovereignty claims and has deployed 

historians to help make the historical case for its sovereignty 

over contested territory in such places as the South China Sea. 

• The government seeks to foster patriotism by highlighting 

what many in China see as the indignities that a weak China 

suffered in the 19th and 20th centuries at the hands of imperialist powers, and contrasting those humiliations with what 

the PRC portrays as its vigorous defense of Chinese territorial 

integrity and sovereignty. The indignities highlighted include 

22 

‘‘unequal treaties’’ that forced China to cede territory and acquiesce to foreign exploitation of Chinese resources. 

This memo presents PRC views about the history of the Chinese 

land border with North Korea. It does so by examining three significant works of state-sponsored PRC scholarship chronicling China’s historic borders. The first work of PRC scholarship examined 

is an eight-volume set of maps, published in the 1980s as The Historical Atlas of China. Thirty-nine maps from the Atlas, depicting 

areas of the Korean peninsula over the course of a millennium and 

a half, are discussed. The second work of PRC scholarship examined is a 67-page chapter on the Chinese-Korean border included 

in History of China’s Modern Borders, a two-volume study charting 

the history of China’s land and maritime borders. It was published 

in 2006. The third work examined is an essay in a 2003 volume, 

Research on China’s Northeast Borderland, published by the 

Northeast Project, a collaboration among the Chinese Academy of 

Social Sciences and the Communist Party Committees of three 

provinces. The essay, ‘‘Certain Issues in Gaogouli Research,’’ explores the political motivation for Chinese scholarship on an ancient kingdom known in Chinese as Gaogouli and in Korean as 

Koguryo. The Koguryo kingdom once straddled the present day 

Chinese-North Korean border. Chinese scholars associated with the 

Northeast Project consider the kingdom to have been Chinese; Koreans consider it to have been Korean. 

In summary, the first PRC work examined, The Historical Atlas 

of China, depicts Chinese territory as having once extended along 

the western half of the Korean peninsula all the way to the peninsula’s southern tip. It also presents as historically parts of China 

a number of ancient kingdoms that many Koreans consider to have 

been Korean. Such an approach has raised concerns among China’s 

neighbors that China may be seeking to rob them of their history. 

China’s historical claims have also raised fears among some of China’s neighbors that China may be seeking to lay the groundwork 

for possible future territorial claims on the Korean peninsula and 

elsewhere. China shares land borders with 14 countries. Listed by 

geographic location, they are North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, 

Myanmar, Bhutan, Nepal, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Russia. In addition, China 

claims maritime territory that is also claimed by one or more of 

eight governments: Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. 

The opening chapter of the second PRC work examined, the History of China’s Modern Borders, presents the view that the contours of the current Chinese-North Korean border were largely settled in the 15th century, during the Ming Dynasty, when Chinese 

and Korean rulers agreed that the Tumen/Tuman and Yalu/Amnok 

Rivers should form their border. It describes disagreement, however, between China and Korea over where the border lies in the 

short stretch of territory between the sources of the two rivers. The 

chapter also covers what the author describes as China’s uphill 

struggles in the late 19th century and early 20th century to persuade Korea, Japan, and Russia to accept and respect the Tumen/ 

Tuman River and Yalu/Amnok River borders. History of China’s 

Modern Borders suggests a strong current Chinese commitment to 

23 

the Tumen/Tuman and Yalu/Amnok River borders, but suggests 

some Chinese dissatisfaction about the status of the border with 

North Korea in the territory between the two rivers. 

The third PRC work examined, the essay in Research on China’s 

Northeast Borderland on the political motivations for China’s research on the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom, portrays China’s research as primarily defensive in nature, intended to fend off potential efforts by North Korea to claim territory in the present PRC. 

The author appears to undercut his argument that the research is 

defensive, however, when he urges Chinese scholars to document 

Chinese claims to other ancient kingdoms on the Korean Peninsula, too, including those kingdoms that occupied the southern end 

of the peninsula, far from the current Chinese-North Korean border. 

Complicating analysis of this state-supported research on China’s 

historical borders is the fact that authoritative sources do not always agree. While the essayist on the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom 

insists that the kingdom was always Chinese, for example, The 

Historical Atlas of China depicts the kingdom, in different periods, 

as having been under the jurisdiction of the central Chinese regime, having been a Chinese border minority-controlled territory, 

and having been an independent, non-Chinese kingdom. 

1. THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF CHINA (1982–1987) 

In 1954, just five years after the Communist Party took power 

in China, the official Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) launched 

a major project to update maps depicting Chinese territory over the 

centuries. The project ultimately lasted three decades and involved 

more than 100 scholars from a dozen institutions. In the project’s 

later years, sponsorship shifted from one official research institution, CAS, to another, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 

(CASS). The project culminated in the publication of an eight-volume atlas set, The Historical Atlas of China, the last volume of 

which was released in 1987. China’s premier modern cartographer, 

Tan Qixiang, served as the chief editor for all eight volumes, as 

well as for The Concise Historical Atlas of China, based on the 

eight volume set and published in 1991.1 The Historical Atlas of 

China and The Concise Historical Atlas of China, both published 

by the official Cartographic Publishing House, are considered the 

most authoritative maps of China’s historical borders yet produced 

in the People’s Republic of China. 

The scope of The Historical Atlas of China is considerably broader than the most ambitious previous effort to compile historical 

maps of China, undertaken by the celebrated Qing Dynasty cartographer Yang Shoujing. In a foreword to the first volume of The Historical Atlas of China, Chief Editor Tan notes that Yang’s maps, 

‘‘were limited to areas under the direct jurisdiction of central China 

regimes, and what they actually gave was an incomplete picture 

even of the central China regimes.’’ In contrast, Tan explains, the 

compilers of the PRC-era The Historical Atlas of China embarked 

on their work under the principle that, ‘‘our great motherland has 

been the joint creation by dozens of nationalities, of which all the 

national minorities constitute an inseparable part of China no matter what historical period they existed in and what form of regime 

24 

they established, independent or in vassalage to the existing central China regime. The scope and range our maps cover should include all their distribution areas and the territories of the regimes 

they founded.’’ 2

Much of the controversy that has attended Chinese scholarship 

on China’s historical borders stems from this decision to characterize as part of China all territory once occupied by ethnic minorities that are now part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 

even if those ethnic minorities’ kingdoms were once independent. 

Visually, The Historical Atlas of China distinguishes between the 

territory of ‘‘the central China administration’’ and areas occupied 

by ‘‘China’s border minorities’’ by depicting them in different colors. 

The compilers of The Historical Atlas of China make clear, however, that they consider both categories of territory to make up the 

contours of ‘‘China’’ in each historical period. 

The Historical Atlas of China’s Treatment of the Korean Peninsula 

Of the 304 maps in The Historical Atlas of China, several dozen 

include the Korean Peninsula. The maps show Chinese territory 

extending the furthest south on the peninsula in the Tang Dynasty 

(618–906). A map for 669 AD, after the Tang allied with the 

Xinluo/Silla Kingdom to defeat the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom, 

shows Tang territory extending along the west side of the peninsula to the peninsula’s far southern tip. (The Xinluo/Silla Kingdom 

is shown controlling the eastern side of the peninsula.) 

For many hundreds of years, the maps show Chinese territory 

covering all or part of the northern half of the peninsula, to between approximately 37 and 40 degrees north latitude. The maps 

indicate that today’s border between China and the DPRK, which 

follows the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, was largely established as the border between China and Korea by 1433, during 

the Ming Dynasty. 

A narrative of the territorial shifts over the centuries, as depicted by the maps in The Historical Atlas of China, follows below. 

The maps are discussed chronologically, from earliest history to 

most recent. CRS numbering is followed, in parentheses, by location of the maps in the Atlas. 

Maps 1 and 2 (Vol. I, Maps 31–32 and 41–42), from the Warring 

States Period (approx. B.C. 475–B.C. 221), show the course of a series of stone and earthen fortifications that later came to be considered part of the Great Wall of China. The maps show the fortifications extending well south of the Yalu/Amnok River into the current territory of the DPRK. 

Maps 3 and 4 (Vol. II, Maps 3–4 and 9–10) show the first borders 

of a central Chinese administration, the Qin Dynasty (B.C. 221– 

B.C. 206 BC). The maps show the fortifications extending still further south, to approximately 39 degrees north latitude (also known 

as the 39th parallel), stopping just short of today’s Pyongyang. The 

maps indicate that the Qin state encompassed the full area inside 

the fortifications. The Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is listed on the 

map as Chinese border minority territory, although the map does 

not mark its borders. 

Maps 5 and 6 (Vol. II, Maps 13–14 and 27–28), depicting the 

Western Han Dynasty (B.C. 206–A.D. 8), show the territory of the 

25 

central Western Han state extending down the full width of the peninsula to south of the 38th parallel, just north of today’s Seoul. 

The Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is depicted as part of the central 

Western Han state, with Map 6 showing the kingdom’s borders 

within the central Western Han state. In yellow shading, map 5 

shows much of today’s Northeast China, including the modern Chinese cities of Changchun, Harbin, and Yanji, as occupied by Chinese border minorities, outside of the borders of the central Chinese administration. 

Maps 7 and 8 (Vol. II, Maps 40–41 and 61–62), depicting the 

Eastern Han Dynasty (25–220), show the central Eastern Han 

state occupying the western part of the Korean peninsula to just 

south of the 38th parallel. The eastern boundary of the Eastern 

Han’s territory on the peninsula is depicted as being at roughly 127 

degrees east longitude. In these maps, the Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is again depicted as outside the borders of the central Chinese 

administration. The border between the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom and a more northerly kingdom, known in Chinese as Fuyu and 

in Korean as Puyo, is not marked, but both kingdoms are depicted 

as occupied by Chinese border minorities. 

In Maps 9 and 10 (Vol. III, Maps 3–4 and 13–14), which depict 

China’s borders in A.D. 262, during the Three Kingdoms Period, 

the Wei Kingdom’s territory is shown as extending across the full 

width of the Korean Peninsula down to below the 38th parallel. 

Gaogouli/Koguryo is depicted as Chinese border minority territory 

just outside the territory of the Wei Kingdom. As before, the border 

between the Gaogouli/Koguryo and Fuyu/ Puyo Kingdoms is not 

marked, but both kingdoms are depicted as the territory of Chinese 

border minorities. Maps 11 and 12 (Vol. III, Maps 33–34 and 41– 

42), show China’s borders 19 years later, in 281, and depict the 

borders on the Korean Peninsula as largely unchanged. 

Map 13 (Vol. IV, Map 3–4) shows China’s borders in the year 

382, during the turbulent Eastern Jin and 16 Kingdoms Period. 

The territory of the Former Qin rulers, shown in bright yellow, is 

depicted as extending only a little east of today’s Chinese border 

city of Dandong. The area controlled by Chinese border minorities 

is, however, shown in mustard yellow as extending down the peninsula to an east-west line that includes today’s Seoul. The Gaogouli/ 

Koguryo Kingdom is shown as part of this Chinese border minority 

territory. 

Maps 14 through 19 (Vol. IV, Maps 17–18, 19–20, 21–22, and 23– 

24, and Vol. V, Maps 3–4 and 19–20), showing China’s borders in 

449, 497, 546, 572, and 612, show a major retreat of Chinese control on the Korean Peninsula. In these maps, the Gaogouli/Koguryo 

Kingdom is depicted as being in control of much of the peninsula 

and, significantly, as being non-Chinese. Non-Chinese territory 

under Koguryo control is shown as extending as far north as the 

current Chinese city of Changchun. 

Map 20 (Vol. V, Map 32–33), depicting the situation in 669, during the Tang Dynasty, shows a dramatic territorial shift. After the 

Tang allied with the kingdom of Xinluo/Silla to defeat the Gaogouli/ 

Koguryo and Baiji/Paekche kingdoms, the map shows Tang territory extending all the way to the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula, with Xinluo/Silla-controlled territory on the east side of the 

26 

peninsula depicted as non-Chinese. This was the only time over the 

centuries that the maps show Chinese territory extending so far 

south on the peninsula. 

Maps 21 and 22 (Vol. V, Maps 34–35 and 50–51) show a very different situation just 72 years later, in 741. Here, the Tang Dynasty’s territory has shrunk back to north of what is now known in 

Chinese as the Datong Jiang, and in Korean as the Taedong River, 

leaving today’s Pyongyang in Chinese Tang Dynasty territory. The 

Korean peninsula south of that line is shown to be the non-Chinese 

territory of the Xinluo/Silla. 

Map 23 (Vol. V, Map 36–37), showing the situation in 820, depicts Tang territory on the peninsula as having receded further, to 

include only a small portion of the northwest side of the peninsula, 

including Pyongyang. The map shows the current Chinese cities of 

Dandong and Shenyang as being part of central Tang Dynasty territory, but shows today’s Chinese cities of Changchun and Yanji 

and areas north as being the territory of Chinese border minorities. 

Map 24 (Vol. V, Map 82–83) shows the situation in 943, during 

the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period. It depicts the Liao 

Dynasty, also known as the Khitan Empire after its ethnic-Khitan 

founders, as controlling a broad swath of territory north of the Korean Peninsula. The Liao’s border with Korea is depicted as being 

well south of the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, following 

a curved line whose northern tip is just below the 40th parallel. 

The peninsula south of that line is shown as non-Chinese Gaoli/ 

Koryo territory. 

Maps 25 through 29 (Vol. VI, Maps 3–4, 8–9, 42–43, 48–49, and 

44–45), covering the years 1111, 1142, 1189, and 1208, show the 

Korean peninsula as non-Chinese territory under Gaoli/ Koryo rule 

up to a line just north of the 40th parallel. 

Map 30 (Vol. VII, Map 3–4), depicting the situation in 1280, during the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty, shows the Chinese border further south, just north of Kaesong. 

Maps 31 and 32 (Vol. VII, Maps 5–6 and 13–14), showing the situation in 1330, still during the Yuan Dynasty, depict the border as 

having crept north again, to just above the 40th parallel on the 

west, though Yuan Dynasty territory is shown extending below the 

40th parallel on the east. 

Maps 33-38 (Vol. VII, Maps 40–41, 42–43, and Vol. VIII, Maps 

10–11, 3–4, 12–13, and 5–6), showing the years 1433, 1582, 1820, 

and 1908, depict Chinese territory as ending at the Yalu/Amnok 

and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, the rivers that form all but a small portion of the modern border between China and North Korea. 

Vol. VII, Map 1–2, the final map in the set, shows the territory 

of the People’s Republic of China as of 1982. 

CONTINUITY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

To probe whether The Historical Atlas of China represented a departure from claims made by the PRC’s predecessor regime, the Republic of China (ROC), CRS examined a set of four maps commissioned by the ROC’s Ministry of Education and printed in 1947 for 

use in Chinese classrooms.3 The maps provide a crude snapshot of 

the territory ascribed to various Chinese dynasties and show a significant degree of continuity between Chinese claims during the 

27 

PRC and ROC eras. The first map, depicting the territory of China’s Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD), shows the Han border extending to a line south of present-day Seoul. The second map, depicting the territory of the Chinese Tang Dynasty (618–907), shows 

Chinese control extending down the west side of the Korean Peninsula to the peninsula’s southern tip. The third map, showing the 

territory of the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368), depicts the Yuan border 

extending to a line south of Pyongyang and north of Kaesong. The 

final map, depicting the territory of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), 

shows the Chinese border with the DPRK largely as it is today. 

2. HISTORY OF CHINA’S MODERN BORDERS (2006) 

In 1983, as work on the Historical Atlas of China was winding 

down, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences established a new 

research center focused on study of China’s historical borders, the 

Research Center for Chinese Borderland History and Geography 

(Zhongguo Bianjiang Shi Di Yanjiu Zhongxin). The center’s Chinese-language website portrays the center’s goals as including ‘‘to 

inherit and carry forward the great heritage of China’s borderland 

history and geography and the patriotic tradition of the Chinese 

peoples,’’ and to ‘‘make contributions to the safeguarding of national unity and the stability and development of China’s border 

areas.’’ 4

According to the Research Center’s website, the center currently 

has 32 staff and is divided into several research sections, including 

sections focused on China’s northeast and northern borders, its 

northwestern borders, its southwestern and maritime borders, and 

‘‘theoretical’’ questions related to borders. The center has also established ‘‘work stations’’ in Yunnan Province (which borders Vietnam, Laos, and Burma), China’s northeast (which borders North 

Korea and Russia), Xinjiang (which borders Mongolia, Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and areas of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan and India), and Guangxi (which borders Vietnam). In addition, the center oversees an ‘‘Information Center on 

China’s History and Culture,’’ a ‘‘Research Center on Xinjiang’s Development,’’ and a ‘‘Research Base on Conditions along China’s 

Northeast Border.’’ 

In 2007, the Research Center produced a 1,228-page two-volume 

study charting the history of all China’s land and maritime borders, History of China’s Modern Borders. 5 It is in some ways the 

textual counterpart to The Historical Atlas of China. The study was 

originally launched as a high profile project for the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences during the 1986–1990 Seventh Five-Year 

Plan, and took two decades to complete.6 A top UK-based expert on 

the relationship between Chinese maps and national identity refers 

to it as a ‘‘standard-setting’’ work.7

In a preface, the chief editor of History of China’s Modern Borders, Lu Yiran, describes the study as being intended to ‘‘make people understand how China’s modern borders were formed, how the 

imperialist powers cut up and occupied China’s territory, how the 

corrupt Chinese [Qing Dynasty] government was forced to conclude 

and sign unequal treaties, and how the Chinese people struggled 

to safeguard the country’s territory and sovereignty.’’ Lu wrote that 

28 

a major goal for the book was ‘‘to sum up lessons from historical 

experiences.’’ 8

Treatment of the Chinese-Korean Border in History of China’s Modern Borders 

The opening chapter in History of China’s Modern Borders is a 

67-page exposition on the Chinese-Korean border, written by Yang 

Zhaoquan, a researcher with the Korean Studies Institute of the 

Jilin Province Academy of Social Sciences.9 The chapter begins in 

668, the year that the Chinese Tang Dynasty allied with the 

Xinluo/Silla Kingdom to defeat the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom. It 

describes how the Tang established administrative control over the 

area previously occupied by the Gaogouli/Koguryo, and made 

Pyongyang its local capital. After the alliance between the Tang 

and the Xinluo/Silla broke down, the chapter relates that the Tang 

was forced in 676 to move its local capital north. By 735, the Tang 

was forced to cede all territory south of the Datong/Taedong River 

to the Xinluo/Silla. The border moved north again some 200 years 

later, after the collapse of the Tang in 907 and the Xinluo/Silla in 

936. The chapter records the border as following its present course, 

along the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, as of 1440, during the Chinese Ming Dynasty. 

Yang nonetheless devotes considerable space to controversies 

over the border that arose in later centuries. In the 18th century, 

the Chinese and Korean governments found themselves at odds 

over the course of the border in the short stretch of territory between the starting points of the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen/Tuman 

Rivers, both of which originate in streams that flow from the 

Changbai Mountains. Yang writes that in 1712, the Qing Emperor 

Kangxi sent a local official to inspect the area in the company of 

a Korean official. They placed a boundary marker between the rivers, on a ridge near the peak of what China calls Xiao Bai Shan 

and Koreans call Mount Sobaek in the Changbai Mountains. Characters carved on the marker noted that the Yalu/Amnok River lay 

to the marker’s west and the Tumen/Tuman River to its east. Yang 

relates, however, that in 1885, when Chinese Qing Dynasty officials attempted to work with Korean officials to demarcate the border, teams sent to scout for the marker found it in a different spot. 

The Qing government charged that it had been intentionally moved 

in order to influence decisions about which of the streams that feed 

the Yalu/Amnok and the Tumen/Tuman Rivers should be considered their ‘‘true’’ headwater streams for boundary purposes. 

China’s position, according to Yang, was that the Tumen/Tuman 

River has three headwater streams, the Xidou Shui, Hongdan Shui, 

and Hongtu Shui, and that only the Hongdan Shui lies to the east 

of the original site of the 1712 marker, the direction in which the 

marker indicated that the Tumen River flowed. The Qing government thus believed that the Hongdan Shui should form the border. 

The Korean position, however, was that the Hong Tu Shan Shui, 

should be recognized as the headwater stream, and form the border. In 1887, the Qing government proposed what Yang describes 

as a compromise, suggesting that another stream, the Shiyi Shui, 

known in Korean as the Sogul, be deemed the headwater stream 

of the Tumen/Tuman River and form the boundary between the 

29 

two countries. In 1889, with no agreement on which stream should 

be deemed the headwater stream, the Qing Emperor Guangxu ordered the erection of ten boundary markers, starting at the Shiyi/ 

Sogul stream. Yang reports, however, that Koreans destroyed the 

boundary markers shortly after they were installed. The dispute 

went unresolved. 

Another dispute that erupted in the late 1800s centered on the 

question of whether the Tumen River should, in fact, be considered 

the boundary between China and Korea. The Korean side asserted 

that what it called the Tuman River was not the Tumen River that 

formed the border, opening the door to claims that territory north 

of the Tumen/Tuman River, including the ethnic Korean area 

around Yanji, was not in fact Chinese. Japan later adopted the 

same position. Yang chronicles Korean attempts to assert control 

over areas north of both the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, and Russian and then Japanese moves to abet those efforts. At 

the turn of the 20th century, Japan, Yang observes, was keen to 

gain control of Chinese Yanbian as a ‘‘back door’’ for its planned 

expansion into China. 

The chapter ends with discussion of a 1909 treaty between China 

and Japan. Japan had by then turned Korea into a protectorate, 

and was on the verge of annexing it. In the 1909 treaty, Japan ultimately recognized the Tumen/Tuman River as forming part of the 

border between China and Korea. It also specifically agreed that 

this part of the border ran from the 1712 border marker to the 

Shiyi/Sogul stream and along the stream to the Tumen/Tuman 

River. In exchange for that recognition, China granted Japan a 

broad array of rights in Chinese territory, including the right to 

open trading posts and establish consulates and sub-consulates. 

China also agreed to extend a railway to the Korean border, where 

it would link up with a railway on the Korean side. Yang notes 

that this agreement facilitated Japan’s later transport of troops to 

occupy northeast China. 

In documenting China’s struggles in the 19th and 20th century 

to secure agreement that the Tumen/Tuman and Yalu/Amnok Rivers form the border between China and Korea, Yang appears to signal a strong continuing Chinese commitment to those river borders. 

From Yang’s account, China’s position on the stretch of territory 

between the Tumen/Tuman and Yalu/Amnok Rivers may be less 

clear. The issue is significant not for strategic reasons, but because 

the area in question is in the Changbai/Choson’gul Mountains, 

which Chinese consider the mythical birthplace of the ancestors of 

the Manchu Emperors, and Koreans consider the birthplace of the 

Korean people. The official biography of North Korean leader Kim 

Jong Il lists him as having been born on Mt. Paektu, the tallest 

peak in the mountain range, although most scholars believe he was 

actually born in Russia. 

3. RESEARCH ON CHINA’S NORTHEAST BORDERLAND (2003) AND THE

ESSAY, ‘‘CERTAIN QUESTIONS IN GAOGOULI RESEARCH’’ 

One of the Research Center for Chinese Borderland History and 

Geography’s most controversial projects has been its ‘‘Northeast 

Borderland History and Current Situation Series Research 

Project,’’ launched in February 2002 and known in abbreviated 

30 

form as the ‘‘Northeast Project.’’ The project is a collaboration 

among the Research Center and the Communist Party committees 

of China’s three northeastern provinces, Jilin, Liaoning, and 

Heilongjiang. The center’s website portrays the project as a response to challenges presented by ‘‘some countries’ research institutions and scholars with ulterior motives engaging in ‘research’ on 

historical relations that distorts historical facts, and a few politicians with political purposes publicly promoting all sorts of fallacies, creating chaos.’’ Among the Northeast Project’s goals is to, 

‘‘further safeguard the stability of the Northeast border areas.’’ 10

Controversy has sprung from efforts by scholars associated with 

the project to claim the ancient kingdom of Gaogouli or Koguryo as 

Chinese, rather than Korean. Critics in South Korea, in particular, 

have castigated such efforts as a Chinese attempt to steal Korean 

history. Some critics have worried openly about whether the Chinese interest in the Gaogouli/Koguryo may presage a future Chinese attempt to make a history-based claim to territory on the Korean Peninsula. 

In 2003, the Northeast Project published Research on China’s 

Northeast Borderland, a collection of papers from a conference held 

a year earlier. The collection includes a revealing essay by a Chinese scholar presenting an explanation for the new scholarly interest in China in the Gaogouli/Koguryo, a kingdom that collapsed 

more than 1,300 years ago. In ‘‘Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research,’’ author Jiang Weidong of the Northeast Asia Research Institute at Changchun Normal University in China’s Jilin Province 

insists that the research is defensive in nature, intended to guard 

against territorial claims to parts of the present-day PRC primarily 

from China’s ostensible ally, North Korea. 11 Jiang writes that Chinese concerns about North Korean intentions toward Chinese territory have been longstanding, but that for many years, they took a 

back seat to the Chinese leadership’s insistence on the need to emphasize the friendship between the Chinese and North Korean peoples. The implication of his account is that the friendship has now 

frayed sufficiently to allow such concerns to be aired openly. 

Jiang makes no bones about his position that the Gaogouli/ 

Koguryo Kingdom was Chinese. It was ‘‘an ancient local regime of 

our country whose people were mainly ethnic Han migrants,’’ he 

writes. He adds, ‘‘Because of geography, their economy and culture 

could not keep pace with the interior. Gradually, they became 

indigenized and the central plains dynasties came to see them as 

Yi and Di tribes.’’ Jiang charges that Korean efforts to claim the 

kingdom as Korean are a legacy of imperial Japanese scholarship, 

which sought to develop pseudo-historical justifications for Japan’s 

invasion of China. Japan, Jiang says, worked hard to develop a 

theory that Japanese and Koreans were of shared ancestry, and 

then sought to claim for Korea the ancient kingdoms of Gaogouli/ 

Koguryo, Baiji/Paekche, and Bohai/Parhae in order to provide historical cover for Japanese expansion into northeast China. The 

Gaogouli/Koguryo and Bohai/Parhae kingdoms were particularly 

important because their territories extended well into areas of 

northeast China that Japan coveted. 

After Japan’s defeat in World War II, Jiang writes, North Korean 

scholars picked up the research into the ancient kingdoms. MeanVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Jan 02, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\TOPIC REPORTS\MINORITY\KEITH\KOREA\
31 

while, Chinese scholars hands were tied, he laments, because 

China and North Korea shared a special relationship as socialist 

allies, and any research that might ‘‘harm Chinese-Korean relations’’ was restricted, including research on ancient Korean history. 

Jiang reports that North Korea sent scholars to China after 1960 

to gather materials about the ancient kingdoms. He names one 

such North Korean scholar, Ri Jirin (known in China as Li Zhilin), 

who spent five years at Peking University, with the years unspecified. Jiang tells us that Ri’s Chinese advisor reported serious concerns about the direction of Ri’s work, but was ignored. Ri’s Chinese advisor warned his superiors that in researching the ancient 

kingdoms, Ri had come to see ancient Chinese rulers as having ‘‘invaded’’ Korean territories, Jiang tells us. Ri, the advisor reported, 

became focused on ‘‘recovering lost lands’’ from China. 

Jiang does not present any further information about North Korean scholarship, except to assert that North Korean scholars are 

particularly fixated on the Gaogouli/Koguryo. They see their country, Jiang claims, as the successor to a proud Koguryo regime that 

shared their capital, Pyongyang, boldly expanded its territory in 

the Wei and Jin Dynasties, and for a period stood as an equal to 

the Chinese Sui and Tang Dynasties. Jiang quotes Ri’s Peking University advisor as warning that while North Korean scholars’ desire to ‘‘recover lost lands’’ might not now amount to anything, if 

such positions are not countered, North Koreans might in future 

generations ‘‘use this excuse to grab territory.’’ Jiang reports approvingly that China’s government has come to recognize the dangers of allowing Japanese and Korean scholarship on the ancient 

kingdoms to go unchallenged, and has lifted taboos on Chinese 

scholarship on the ancient kingdoms. 

In an exhortation that may alarm China’s neighbors, especially 

South Koreans, Jiang concludes by urging his academic colleagues 

not to neglect research on the ancient Baiji/Paekche Kingdom, 

which once occupied the southwestern part of the Korean Peninsula. ‘‘We must not abandon it because its territory is not in our 

possession today,’’ Jiang writes. Jiang also urges his colleagues to 

study the Xinluo/Silla Kingdom, saying, ‘‘We cannot, because it is 

the predecessor of a Korean nation today, overlook the fact that it 

was subordinate to us in the Sui, Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing [Dynasties].’’ 

——————— 

NOTES: 

1 The Historical Atlas of China (Zhongguo lishi ditu ji), ed. Tan Qixiang, vols. 1– 

8, Cartographic Publishing House (Ditu chubanshe), 1982–1987. A Concise Historical Atlas of China (Jianming zhongguo lishi ditu), ed. Tan Qixiang, Cartographic Publishing House (Ditu chubanshe), 1991. Information about the 

project that produced the atlas is drawn from Tan Qixiang’s forewords to Volumes 1 and 8. 

2 Tan Qixiang, ‘‘Forward,’’ in The Historical Atlas of China, Vol. 1 (Cartographic 

Publishing House, 1982), p. 3. The forward is published in both Chinese and 

English. The quote here is from the English-language version. 

3 Lu Dianyang, ed., Maps of the Territory of the Han and Tang at their Height 

(HanTang shengshi jiangyu tu) and Maps of the Yuan and Qing at their Height 

(Yuan Qing shengshi jiangyu tu), commissioned by the Ministry of Education 

(Republic of China), Yaguang xingdi xueshe chubanshe, 1947. Chiang Kai-shek’s 

Republic of China was in power in mainland China until 1949, when it fled to 

32 

Taiwan, leaving Mao Zedong’s Communists to proclaim the People’s Republic of 

China on the mainland. 

4 ‘‘A Brief Introduction to the Research Center for Chinese Borderland History 

and Geography,’’ accessed at http://bjzs.cass.cn/news/129888.htm. 

5 History of China’s Borders (Zhongguo jindai bianjie shi), ed. Lu Yiran (Sichuan 

People’s Publishing House, 2007). 

6 Lu Yiran, ‘‘Preface,’’ in History of China’s Borders (Zhongguo jindai bianjie shi), 

vol. 1 (Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 2007), p. 7. 

7 William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford University Press, 

2010), p. 114. 

8 Lu Yiran, ‘‘Preface,’’ in History of China’s Borders (Zhongguo jindai bianjie shi), 

vol. 1 (Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 2007), p. 5. 

9 Yang Zhaoquan, ‘‘The Chinese-Korean Border,’’ in History of China’s Borders 

(Zhongguo jindai bianjie shi), vol. 1 (Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 2007), 

pp. 3–70. 

10 ‘‘A Brief Introduction to the Northeast Project (Dongbei gongcheng jianjie),’’ 

accessed at http://bjzx.cass.cn. 

11 Jiang Weidong, ‘‘Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research (Gaogouli yanjiu de 

ruogan wenti),’’ in Research on China’s Northeast Borderland (Zhongguo 

dongbei bianjiang yanjiu), ed. Ma Dazheng, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press 

(Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe), August 2003, p. 149–161. 

(33) 

APPENDIX III.—KOREAN PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORICAL CHANGE IN THE BORDERS BETWEEN KOREA 

AND CHINA: A REVIEW AND COMMENTS ON THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MEMORANDUM OF 

MARCH 9, 2012 

EXPLANATION OF THE FORMAT OF THE REVIEW AND COMMENTS

This text treats historical border issues between Korea and 

China from ancient times to the early twentieth century. The historical sources used for research in this topic were written in Chinese characters, and typically in Chinese grammar. However, place 

names had different pronunciations, and thus different names, in 

the Chinese and Korean languages. Presenting those pronunciations in English thus has posed important problems of representation. The explanations below will introduce how these issues have 

been resolved for this text. 

Korean words have been romanized using the McCuneReischauer System. The government of the Republic of Korea uses 

a different system (Revised Romanization), but for this text the 

Northeast Asian History Foundation has chosen to use the system 

preferred by many scholars writing in English. Chinese words have 

been romanized through the Pinyin system. 

For the names of rivers and mountains in the border area between today’s Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China, the following pattern has been used. The 

Korean name is provided first and then followed by the Chinese 

name in parentheses. For example, the river called Amnok in Korean and Yalu in Chinese is written as ‘‘Amnok (Yalu) River.’’ The 

mountain called Paektu in Korean and Changbai in Chinese is 

written as ‘‘Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai).’’ Foreign-language terms in 

parentheses are preceded with ‘‘C.’’ or with ‘‘K.’’ so to identify the 

language (Chinese or Korean) and are italicized. 

At the end of this text is an Appendix. Here are found three sections, a collection of maps compiled by the Northeast Asian History 

Foundation that is called ‘‘Borders between Korea and China in 

Historical Maps of Korea,’’ a list of Korean reign periods and their 

dates, and a glossary of terms that appear in this text. 

34 

INTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW AND COMMENTS

The Northeast Asian History Foundation, which has prepared 

‘‘South Korean Perspectives on Historical Change in the Borders 

between Korea and China: A Review and Comments on the Congressional Research Service Memorandum of March 9, 2012,’’ is the 

representative South Korean research institute for research in the 

histories of Northeast Asian countries and peoples. It has launched 

various academic projects to move beyond history issues between 

Korea and China or between Korea and Japan, and endeavors to 

construct stronger relationships of amicability and cooperation between and among these countries. 

The Review and Comments has been prepared for the following 

purposes. 

First, the Northeast Asian HIstory Foundation agrees with the 

critical view of the CRS Memorandum of March 9, 2012, that the 

way in which the government of the People’s Republic of China 

(hereafter as ‘‘PRC’’) understands the historical borders between 

Korea and China by relying solely upon Chinese historical maps 

and scholarship can result in incomplete research. 

Second, we present the standard view in academic circles in the 

Republic of Korea on the historical borders between Korea and 

China by utilizing primary resources and research from such academic fields as history, archaeology, anthropology, and geography. 

Third, in so doing we have prepared the Review and Comments 

to develop a fact-based understanding of how the borders between 

Korea and China have changed over time and how they have been 

represented in maps. 

OUTLINE OF THE REVIEW AND COMMENTS REGARDING

THE CRS MEMORANDUM

1. The Historical Atlas of China 

The CRS Memorandum concentrated on three texts recently published in the PRC in Chinese and one report issued by the United 

States Department of State which treat China’s historical borders. 

These four texts are The Historical Atlas of China (C. Zhongguo 

lishi ditu ji, 1982-1987; hereafter as ‘‘the Atlas’’), History of China’s 

Modern Borders, vol. 1 (C. Zhongguo jindai bianjieshi, 2007), Research on China’s Northeast Borderland (Zhongguo dongbei 

bianjiang yanjiu, 2003), and the Department of State’s International Boundary Study (1962). More specifically, the CRS Memorandum concentrated on one chapter from each of the latter two 

Chinese-language books. From History of China’s Modern Borders 

was used Yang Zhaoquan’s chapter entitled ‘‘Zhongguo yu 

Chaoxian de bianjie’’ (The Chinese-Korean Border). And from Research on China’s Northeast Borderland was used Jiang Weidong’s 

‘‘Gaogouli yanjiu de luogan wenti’’ (Certain Questions on Gaogouli 

Research). The sections of these four texts that focused on historical borders with Korea will be treated separately. Presented below 

are brief introductions to these texts and the issues that they raise. 

35 

The Atlas is a collection of historical maps published in an atlas 

format in the PRC, and is the atlas that has been most widely used 

in that country. The most important problem in this work is in the 

inclusion of areas that belonged to neighboring countries and peoples in the past. This problem stems from the three China-centered 

interpretations outlined below. 

First, the Atlas depicts in a sweeping manner the borders of Chinese countries by the standard of their greatest territorial size as 

achieved through war. This means that all of the histories of the 

peoples who lived in the territory that is now contemporary China 

are China’s history. Such an approach may lead readers of the 

Atlas to misconstrue the territory of neighboring countries or peoples under the occupation or influence of a Chinese country as 

being a fixed territory. 

Second, in the Atlas, the process of determining borders follows 

the military activities of Chinese governments to the neglect of 

such aspects of history as the lives of local people and the exercise 

of dominance. Most of the military engagements of Chinese governments with countries in the Korean Peninsula and in Manchuria 

resulted in short-term military occupations. Nevertheless, the Atlas 

demarcates the occupied areas of those countries as the territory of 

the Chinese countries. As a result, those areas are marked as if 

they had been directly controlled for a long period of time by Chinese governments. Also important is that the counties and prefectures that Chinese governments established in the northern part of 

the Korean Peninsula and in Manchuria were frontier counties and 

prefectures, and thus differed from those administrative units in 

China. The occupied lands were controlled in strategic areas whose 

defense was protected by fortresses, and along traffic routes that 

connected those areas. The Atlas errs in considering the frontier 

counties and prefectures, which were far from direct Chinese rule, 

as having been administered through the same type of direct control as were those in China. 

Third, the Atlas merges non-Han Chinese peoples, which were 

ethnically, historically, and culturally different from Chinese, and 

their territories into the current boundary of the PRC under the 

principle of the ‘‘unified multi-ethnic country’’ (C. tongyi de 

duominzu guojia). For example, the Jurchens, who resided in areas 

between Liao (916–1125) of Kara Khitan ethnicity and Koryoˇ (918– 

1392), were a third force that did not belong to either country but 

still were included in a Chinese country’s territory in these Chinese 

maps. 

2. Chapter One of History of China’s Modern Borders 

The CRS Memorandum introduces the debate over the borders 

that followed the Amnok (C. Yalu) River, Mt. Paektu (Mt. 

Changbai; C. Changbai-shan), and the Tuman (C. Tumen) River 

based upon Yang Zhaoquan’s ‘‘The Chinese-Korean Border,’’ which 

is chapter one in History of China’s Modern Borders, and focuses 

on China’s effort to secure the border. Seen from South Korean 

scholarship, this chapter has three important problems. 

36 

First, by describing the establishment of the Amnok (Yalu) RiverTuman (Tumen) River formed through the expansion of territory 

under Ming China’s rule in the fifteenth century, the chapter 

passes over the fact that the domain of Ming China (1368-1644) 

was limited in this region to the southern part of the Liaodong 

River and to the western downstream area of the Amnok River. 

Second, without referencing historical sources, this chapter describes the original location of the Mt. Paektu boundary marker 

erected in 1712 as being on Mt. Sobaek. And it states that the determination of the border between Chosoˇn and Qing China as being 

along the Mt. Sobaek-Soˇgoˇl River (Mt. Xiaobai-Shiyi Stream; C. 

Xiaobai-shan, Shiyishui) resulted from the border conference held 

between the two countries in 1887. This claim overlooks the fact 

that the border between Chosoˇn and Qing China had already been 

decided as following the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. 

Changbai)-Tuman (Tumen) River in 1712. 

Third, by highlighting the efforts of China in defending the 

Tuman (Tumen) River border in the negotiations held between 

Qing China and Japan from 1905 to 1907, this chapter discounts 

the fact that the Kando (C. Jiandao) Agreement between Qing 

China and Japan in 1909 excluded Korea, which should have been 

a participant because this issue treated the border between Korea 

and Qing China. 

3. ‘‘Certain Questions in Gaogouli Research,’’ in Research on China’s Northeast Borderland 

The Chinese scholar Jiang Weidong argues in his chapter ‘‘Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research’’ in Research on China’s 

Northeast Borderland that Koguryoˇ (C. Gaogouli) was ‘‘an ancient 

local regime of our country whose people were mainly ethnic Han 

migrants.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 9.) 

However, Yemaek tribes established Koguryoˇ (?–668). Differing 

from the Mo people who were active in northern China, these 

tribes came from a non-Han Chinese Dongyi people living in the 

Liaodong Peninsula and the northern and central areas of the Korean Peninsula. PRC scholarship believes the Mo or the Gaoyi people that appear in ancient Chinese sources to be the ethnic origin 

of Koguryoˇ. However, there is from 1,500 years to 2,000 years between the historical activities of the Mo and Gaoyi peoples and the 

establishment of Koguryoˇ. 

Further, there is little archaeological evidence through which the 

Mo and Gaoyi peoples may be linked to Koguryoˇ. As Koguryoˇ expanded, some Han Chinese people became Koguryoˇ people, but 

their numbers are thought to have been small compared to the 

Koguryoˇ population. 

That is, Koguryoˇ was a different country from the contemporary 

Han Chinese countries. The ancient Chinese records, too, relate 

distinctions between Koguryoˇ and these Chinese governments. In 

the ‘‘Records of the Dongyi People’’ in the Book of Wei (C. Dongyi 

zhuan, in Wei shu), which was included in the History of the Three 

Kingdoms (C. Sanguo zhi), one of the Chinese dynastic histories, 

are entries regarding Puyoˇ (C. Fuyu), Koguryoˇ, Ye, Eastern Okchoˇ, 

Mahan, Chinhan, Pyoˇnhan, and Wa (ancient Japan). 

37 

The ‘‘Records of the Dongyi People’’ describes the Dongyi as peoples having histories that differed from those of Wei China (220- 

265), Shu China (221-263), and Wu China (229-280). This pattern 

in the historiography on the historical governments in Manchuria 

and in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula continued into 

later historical records in traditional China. Further, the ‘‘Records 

of the Dongyi People’’ recorded the heaven-worship ceremonies of 

the Puyoˇ, Koguryoˇ, Ye, and Mahan peoples. Those descriptions 

show that these peoples sought to communicate directly with heaven and endeavored to introduce a means of receiving divine legitimacy. In other words, these four governments each formed a polity 

that was neither a vassal state nor a satellite regime of Chinese 

governments. 

4. The United States Department of State International Boundary 

Study 

Noting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter as 

‘‘DPRK’’)-PRC boundary treaty in 1962 and the DPRK-PRC border 

protocol in 1964, the CRS Memorandum notes the unresolved sovereignty over some sand islets. The 1962 treaty was of great significance in that it not only succeeded to the boundary conference 

held between Chosoˇn and Qing China in the 1880s, but also finalized the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-Tuman 

(Tumen) River border between the DPRK and the PRC in the form 

of a modern treaty. The sovereignty of 451 islands and islets (264 

to the DPRK, 187 to the PRC) along the Amnok (Yalu) River and 

the Tuman (Tumen) River was determined as recorded in the List 

of Sovereignty of Islands and Islets attached to the 1964 protocol. 

5. Outline of Korean Historical Maps Accompanying the Review and 

Comments 

Regarding the dispute over historical borders between Korea and 

China in the modern period, a problem that emerges in the PRC 

scholarship is the inclusion of historical areas with unclear borders 

or buffer zones that were not clearly determined in terms of sovereignty. 

The Northeast Asian History Foundation has for several years 

compiled historical maps of Northeast Asia, including East Asia 

and Central Asia, in order to reflect research in other countries and 

to provide more accurate and impartial historical maps of the region. For this Review and Comments the Foundation has prepared 

a set of twelve historical maps. These twelve maps show historical 

borders between Korea and China over the past 2,000 years. They 

are intended to assist in clarifying issues of interpretation introduced above and discussed in further detail below. Readers of this 

Review and Comments are encouraged to consult these maps, as 

they read the Review and Comments. This set of maps, entitled 

‘‘Borders between Korea and China in Historical Maps of Korea,’’ 

may be found in the Appendix. The maps are divided into four 

groups according to the standard periodization of Korean history. 

This periodization, too, may be found in the Appendix. These four 

groups are introduced in the following paragraphs. 

38 

Maps 1, 2, 3, and 4 mark the territories and borders of Old 

Chosoˇn (K. Kojosoˇn) and the Four Han Chinese Commanderies (K. 

Hansagun). The earliest chapter of Korean history started with the 

foundation of Old Chosoˇn, which controlled the northwestern part 

of the Korean Peninsula and the northern part of the Liaodong Peninsula. This country was destroyed by Han China in 108 BCE. 

Han China then established four commanderies in this large area. 

These administrative units, which differed from the county-prefecture system for local administration in Han China, were used for 

temporary purposes. The extent of Han China’s territorial control 

was limited to the main fortresses and the traffic routes connecting 

these military facilities. In 82 BCE, or about twenty-five years 

after the establishment of these commanderies, two of them were 

closed, and the Hyoˇndo Commandery (C. Xuantu-jun) was later 

pushed back into the Liaodong area. In 313 CE, the Nangnang 

Commandery (C. Lelang-jun) was destroyed by Koguryoˇ. And in 

314, a new commandery, the Taebang Commandery (C. Taifangjun), which was not established by Han China, was driven out by 

Paekche (?–660). 

Maps 5, 6, and 7 cover the periods of Koguryoˇ, the unification of 

the Three Kingdoms, and Parhae (698–926). The western border of 

Koguryoˇ during the reign of King Kwanggaet’o (r. 391–412) was the 

Liao River, and it remained there until the collapse of Koguryoˇ in 

668. The allied forces of Tang China (618–960) and Silla (?–935) destroyed Paekche in 660 and Koguryoˇ in 668. Tang China established the Uˇ ngjin Commandery (C. Xiongjin dudufu) in the former 

territory of Paekche and the Andong Commandery (C. Andong 

duhufu) in the former territory of Koguryoˇ for military purposes. 

As the Andong Commandery was moved to the Liaodong Peninsula 

in 676, the influence of Tang China withered in the former 

Koguryoˇ territory east of the Liaodong area. In 698, Parhae (C. 

Bohai) was established under the leadership of the former Koguryoˇ

people in the former territory of Koguryoˇ. Parhae followed Koguryoˇ

as an independent state. During the reign of King Soˇn (r. 818–830), 

Parhae achieved its largest size, facing Tang China along the Liao 

River and the Khitans north of the Liao River. 

Maps 8, 9, and 10 chart the borders between Korea and China 

during the Koryoˇ period (918–1392) in Korean history. In its first 

years, Koryoˇ established a local administration system in which the 

northern frontier was settled along the southern shore of the 

Taedong River (C. Datong-jiang) and Woˇnsan Bay. In the early 

eleventh century, the mouth of the Amnok River became the border 

between Koryoˇ and the Khitans. One century later, the military expedition of Yun Kwan (d. 1111) led Koryoˇ to achieve tighter control 

over the Jurchens in the Mt. Paektu and upper Tuman River areas. 

During the Mongol Intervention of 1259 to 1356, the area north of 

Ch’oˇllyoˇng was left under the direct control of the Mongols. These 

areas were later restored to Koryoˇ during the reign of King 

Kongmin (r. 1351–1374). 

Maps 11 and 12 depict the borders between Korea and Ming 

China and between Korea and Qing China during the Chosoˇn period (1392–1910). In its first decades the Chosoˇn government expanded its northern frontier to the Amnok (Yalu) River in the 

northwest and to the coast of Hamgyoˇng Province in the northeast. 

39 

In the fifteenth century, the border extended along the full lengths 

of the Amnok (Yalu) River and the Tuman (Tumen) River. In 1712, 

with the placement of the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) boundary 

marker, the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)- 

Tuman (Tumen) River border was confirmed. The border treaty between the DPRK and the PRC in 1962 and the border protocol between these same two governments in 1964 reaffirmed the Amnok 

(Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-Tuman (Tumen) River border, and this remains the boundary between the DPRK and the 

PRC today. 

REVIEW AND COMMENTS ON TEXTS PUBLISHED

IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The three texts introduced above that were published in the People’s Republic of China are discussed in the sections that follow. 

Each section includes direct quotations from the CRS Memorandum that are then followed by analysis and discussion. These 

comments, analysis, and discussion are not critical of the CRS 

Memorandum. Rather, they focus upon the information and interpretations provided in the Chinese texts. 

1. The Historical Atlas of China 

‘‘Much of the controversy that has attended Chinese scholarship 

on China’s historical borders stems from this decision to characterize as part of China all territory once occupied by ethnic minorities that are now part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 

even if those ethnic minorities’ kingdoms were once independent. 

Visually, The Historical Atlas of China distinguishes between the 

territory of ‘the central China government’ and areas occupied by 

‘China’s border minorities’ by depicting them in different colors. 

The compilers of The Historical Atlas of China make clear, however, that they consider both categories of territory to make up the 

contours of ‘China’ in each historical period.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 

3–4.) 

The Atlas’s treatment of both the ‘‘central Chinese administration’’ region and the areas where ‘‘China’s border minorities’’ lived 

as Chinese territory in each historical period may be questioned. 

For example, the Jurchens, situated between Liao and Koryoˇ, did 

not belong to either Liao or Koryoˇ. However, the Atlas includes the 

Jurchens in PRC territory. Since the 1980s, scholarship in the PRC 

has merged the history of foreign countries, such as Koguryoˇ, into 

the history of China through the theory of the unified multi-ethnic 

country. As a result, areas that once were considered to be part of 

foreign histories have come to be incorporated into the history of 

China. Thus, the Atlas does not always reflect historical processes. 

‘‘Maps 1 and 2, from the Warring States Period (approx. B.C. 

475–B.C. 221), show the course of a series of stone and earthen fortifications that later came to be considered part of the Great Wall 

of China. The maps show the fortifications extending well south of 

the Yalu River into the current territory of the DPRK.’’ (CRS 

Memorandum, 4.) 

40 

A key element in understanding the extent of the Great Wall is 

the location of the Taeryoˇng River Long Wall (C. Daning-jiang 

changcheng). Contrary to claims in PRC scholarship, this military 

fortification was not constructed by Chinese dynasties, but rather 

by Old Chosoˇn or by Koguryoˇ in the northern half of the Korean 

Peninsula for defense against contemporary Chinese dynasties such 

as Yan, Qin, and Han. Objects appear infrequently in excavations 

there, but those items provide evidence of interactions between 

Korea and China in ancient times. It thus may be suggested that 

the argument that the Great Wall extended into the northwestern 

Korean Peninsula and that that area became part of Chinese territory in ancient times seems to lack empirical foundation. 

The assertion in PRC scholarship that the Great Wall was extended into the northwestern area of the Korean Peninsula in the 

Warring States Period (475 BCE–221 BCE) is predicated upon two 

facts. The first is that the Taeryoˇng River Long Wall was part of 

the Great Wall. The second is that some excavated objects, which 

were made in Yan or in styles common in Yan, are occasionally 

found in the northwestern Korean Peninsula. 

However, scholarship published in the Republic of Korea believes 

that the Taeryoˇng River Long Wall was constructed during the Old 

Chosoˇn period or the Koguryoˇ period, and that the wall was used 

even during the Koryoˇ period. Further, considering its location, this 

wall was designed to block enemies from the west to the east. The 

Yan, who resided northwest of the wall, cannot have been the people that constructed this impediment. Consequently, it is inaccurate to argue that this long wall was contructed by the Yan, that 

it was part of the Great Wall, and that the northwestern area of 

the Korean Peninsula was part of Yan territory. 

‘‘Maps 3 and 4 show the first borders of a central Chinese administration, Qin China (B.C. 221–B.C. 206). The maps show the fortifications extending still further south, to approximately 39 degrees north latitude (also known as the 39th parallel), stopping just 

short of today’s Pyongyang. The maps indicate that the Qin state 

encompassed the full area inside the fortification. The Gaogouli/ 

Koguryo Kingdom is identified on the map as Chinese border minority territory, although the map does not mark its borders.’’ (CRS 

Memorandum, 4.) 

The statement that the Great Wall was extended to P’yoˇngyang 

during the Qin period is not accurate. This statement found in PRC 

scholarship is based upon unreliable documents. Historically, the 

northwestern part of the Korean Peninsula belonged to Old Chosoˇn 

in the early third century BCE. (See the commentary on maps 1 

and 2 in ‘‘Borders beween Korea and China in Historical Maps of 

Korea’’ below.) Given the information in two Chinese texts, Treatise on the Xiongnu (C. Xiongnu liezhuan) and Biography of Meng 

Tian (C. Meng Tian liezhuan), which are included in Records of the 

Grand Historian (C. Shiji) by Sima Qian (circa 145 or 135 BCE– 

86 BCE), the area east of the Great Wall is believed to have been 

in today’s Liaoyang, in Liaoning Province. 

41 

Sources from later Chinese dynasties, however, sometimes wrote 

Jieshi instead of Liaodong, Nangnang instead of Jieshi, Koguryoˇ instead of Nangnang, and P’yoˇngyang instead of Koguryoˇ. The inconsistent use of these place names in Chinese sources weakens the 

argument in PRC scholarship that the eastern end of the Great 

Wall reached P’yoˇngyang. Further, it should also be noted that 

‘‘Jieshi’’ was a common place name in ancient China, and may be 

seen in various locations in ancient Chinese sources. As a result, 

it is not accurate to describe Qin’s borders as extending to 39 degrees north latitude and near to P’yoˇngyang. 

‘‘Maps 5 and 6, depicting the Western Han Dynasty (B.C. 206– 

A.D. 8), show the territory of the central Western Han state extending down the full width of the peninsula to south of the 38th 

parallel, just north of today’s Seoul. The Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom 

is depicted as part of the central Western Han state, with Map 6 

showing the kingdom’s borders within the central Western Han 

state. In yellow shading, map 5 shows much of today’s Northeast 

China, including the modern Chinese cities of Changchun, Harbin, 

and Yanji, as occupied by Chinese border minorities, and outside 

of the borders of the central Chinese administration.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 4.) 

It is believed that the southernmost area of the four Han 

commanderies was in the Korean Peninsula, in the area of the 

Chaeryoˇng River, Hwanghae Province (north of Mt. Myoˇrak), and 

in northern Kangwoˇn Province. The area south of the four Han 

commanderies was beyond the control of China. In general, little 

has been clarified regarding the relationship between early 

Koguryoˇ and Han China’s county-prefecture administration, and 

scholars have not reached any definite conclusions. However, it is 

important to note that, as in the case of Hyoˇndo Commandery relocation in 75 BCE, the retreat of Han China’s county-prefecture administration back to China coincided with the growth of Koguryoˇ. 

The Atlas map which shows Koguryoˇ in the territory of Western 

Han (202 BCE–9 CE) would thus seem to be out of historical context. And, such historical peoples as the Okchoˇand the Suksin (C. 

Sushen) lived in the Changchun, Harbin, and Yanji areas of the 

present-day PRC and were independent people that differed from 

Han China in ethnicity and in culture. 

The four Han commanderies, which were established after the 

collapse of Old Chosoˇn, did not last. The Chinboˇn (C. Zhenfan) 

Commandery and the Imtun (C. Lintun) Commandery were closed 

in 82 BCE. The remaining prefectures attached to these two 

commanderies were incorporated into the Nangnang Commandery 

and the Hyoˇndo Commandery. The influence of these county-prefecture areas was limited to the surrounding areas, and their administration tended to be loose and indirect. Therefore, Han China’s 

territory cannot be marked as extending to the south of 38 degrees 

north latitude. Specifically, Han China’s influence could only cover 

the area between the Taedong River and the Chaeryoˇng River, and 

part of the Hamhoˇng Plain in the northwestern Korean Peninsula. 

Other areas should be described as the lands of indigenous peoples 

from the time of ancient Korea. 

42 

To be discussed next are maps depicting the first three centuries 

of the Common Era. 

‘‘Maps 7 and 8, depicting the Eastern Han Dynasty (25–220), 

show the central Eastern Han state occupying the western part of 

the Korean peninsula to just south [of] the 38th parallel. The eastern boundary of the Eastern Han’s territory on the peninsula is depicted as being at roughly 127 degrees east longitude. In these 

maps, the Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is again depicted as outside 

the borders of the central Chinese administration. The border between the Koguryo Kingdom and a more northerly kingdom, known 

in Chinese as Fuyu and in Korean as Buyeo or Puyoˇ, is not 

marked, but both kingdoms are depicted as occupied by Chinese 

border minorities.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 4–5.) 

During the Eastern Han period (25–220), the Nangnang 

Commandery could not extend southward to the Han River area. 

The growth of indigenous forces such as Koguryoˇ accelerated the 

retreat of Han China’s county-prefecture administration back to 

China. (The second relocation of Hyoˇndo Commandery and the reduction of the area controlled by Nangnang Commandery were also 

caused by the expansion of Koguryoˇ.) The description in the Atlas 

of Koguryoˇ, Puyoˇ, Uˇ mnu, and Okchoˇ as border areas of Eastern 

Han points to an arbitrary interpretation based on the theory of 

the unified multi-ethnic country. This interpretation conflicts with 

historical facts, however. Koguryoˇ, Puyoˇ, and Okchoˇ emerged from 

the Yemaek people and became part of the origins of the Korean 

people. Therefore, these peoples and countries are to be expressed 

as belonging to the realm of Korean history. 

The borders of China in the second half of the third century appear next. ‘‘In maps 9 and 10, which depict China’s borders in A.D. 

262, during the Three Kingdoms Period, Wei Kingdom’s territory is 

shown as extending across the full width of the Korean Peninsula 

down to south of the 38th parallel. Gaogouli/Koguryo is depicted as 

Chinese border minority territory just outside the territory of the 

Wei Kingdom. As before, the border between Gaogouli/Koguryo and 

Fuyu/Buyeo Kingdoms is not marked, but both kingdoms are depicted as the territory of Chinese bordere minorities.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 5.) 

The Atlas exaggerates the dominance of Wei in occupying the 

northern half of the Korean Peninsula. It is true that Wei occupied 

the Nangnang Commandery and Taebang Commandery areas, but 

these two commanderies each administered only six prefectures. 

Considering this, Wei’s administration could not reach the middle 

of the Korean Peninsula. Thus the borders shown south of 38 degrees north latitude are inaccurate. Revision is also required of the 

depiction of the Ye area in the northeastern Korean Peninsula. The 

area is drawn as having been thoroughly controlled by the 

Nangnang Commandery when, in fact, the governance of the 

Nangnang Commandery centered mostly on the Pullae area. Further, the Uˇ mnu people, who were of Suksin ethnicity, cannot be 

placed into the history of the Han Chinese dynasties. 

‘‘In Maps 11 and 12, showing China’s borders nineteen years 

later, in 281, the borders on the Korean Peninsula are shown as 

largely unchanged.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 5.) 

43 

Long belonging to Koguryoˇ, the northeastern Korean Peninsula 

should be depicted as territory of the Korean governments that followed Koguryoˇ. ‘‘Map 13 shows China’s borders in the year 382, during the turbulent Eastern Jin and 16 Kingdoms Period. The territory of the 

Former Qin rulers, shown in bright yellow, is depicted as extending 

only a little east of today’s Chinese border city of Dandong. The 

area controlled by Chinese border minorities is, however, shown in 

mustard yellow as extending down the peninsula to an east-west 

line that includes today’s Seoul. The Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is 

shown as part of this Chinese border minority territory.’’ (CRS 

Memorandum, 5.) 

Countries such as Koguryoˇ, Puyoˇ, Okchoˇ, and Yemaek were important agents in Korean history. And the Khitan, Kumoxi, 

Rouran, and Didouyu belonged to neither traditional Korean history nor traditional Chinese history. The Atlas, however, places 

them in PRC territory or it ahistorically identifies them retrospectively as China’s border minorities (as is seen in other maps in the 

Atlas, as well). 

‘‘Maps 14 through 19, showing China’s borders in 449, 497, 546, 

572, and 612, show a major retreat of Chinese control on the Korean Peninsula. In these maps, the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is 

depicted as being in control of much of the peninsula and, significantly, as being non-Chinese. Non-Chinese territory under Koguryo 

control is shown as extending as far north as the current Chinese 

city of Changchun.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 5.) 

Given that Koguryoˇ continuously expanded its territory toward 

the northeast, as shown by its expedition against Eastern Puyoˇ (?– 

410) and its control over the Malgals (C. Mohe) during the reign 

of King Kwanggaet’o, Koguryoˇ’s northeastern borders at that time 

should be corrected as in Map 5, ‘‘Koguryoˇ Territory Following the 

Reign of King Changsu (circa 450),’’ compiled by the Northeast 

Asian History Foundation. 

‘‘Map 20, depicting the situation in 669, during the Tang Dynasty, shows a dramatic territorial shift. After the Tang allied with 

the kingdom of Xinluo/Silla to defeat Gaogouli/Koguryo and Baiji/ 

Paekje kingdoms, the map shows Tang territory extending all the 

way to the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula, with Xinluo/Sillacontrolled territory on the east side of the peninsula depicted as 

non-Chinese. This was the only time over the centuries that the 

maps show Chinese territory extending so far south on the peninsula.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 5.) 

After the war in the Korean peninsula that ended in 668, Tang 

China failed to integrate the former territories of Paekche and 

Koguryoˇ into its own territory. It succeeded only in destroying 

these two dynasties and temporarily establishing administrative 

districts. Although Tang China’s occupation of the Paekche and 

Koguryoˇ capitals and the stationing of troops in those capitals cannot be regarded as territorial acquisition, Map 20 in the Atlas depicts the former land of these two countries as Chinese territory. 

The Atlas greatly exaggerates Tang China’s boundaries. 

The Uˇ ngjin Commandery was established after the fall of 

Paekche in 660, but it does not appear in historical sources after 

665. In this same period, a Silla province called Soburi appeared 

44 

in former Paekche territory. Given this historical context, the 

Uˇ ngjin Commandery may be characterized as a headquarters for 

Tang Chinese troops during the war in the Korean Peninsula in 

the 660s. The Atlas inaccurately depicts a temporary occupation as 

complete control over the southwestern Korean Peninsula. While 

Tang destroyed Paekche in alliance with Silla and established the 

Uˇ ngjin Commandery, Silla’s army was also stationed in former 

Paekche territory. Thus it cannot be said that Tang China occupied 

all of the former Paekche territory. Describing the Uˇ ngjin 

Commandery as Tang Chinese territory should be reconsidered. As 

a result of the war between Silla and Tang fought from 668 to 676, 

Silla occupied areas south of the Taedong River to the Woˇnsan Bay 

in the Korean Peninsula. The depiction of the areas south of the 

Taedong River as Tang China territory in Map 20 thus is not accurate. 

After the fall of Koguryoˇ in 668, Tang China established the 

Andong Commandery in P’yoˇngyang to govern the surrounding 

areas in a temporary form of administrative district. However, numerous attacks from military units organized by the former 

Koguryoˇ army, and the Silla army compelled Tang China to relocate the Andong Commandery to Xincheng, in Liaoning Province, 

in 670 and then to Liaodong Fortress, in Liaoning Province, in 676. 

In 741, Tang China’s territory stopped west of the Liao River, 

and thus did not reach the Taedong River in the present-day 

DPRK. Parhae was east of the Liao River. This period is depicted 

in Map 21 of the Atlas. However, Map 21 does not include Parhae 

(698–926), a country which is part of Korean history. The period 

depicted in this map of Parhae’s history is that of the reign of King 

Mun (r. 737–793), the country’s third king. Most of the former 

Koguryoˇ territory had been recovered during the reign of his predecessor, King Mu (r. 719–737). Thus, Tang China did not control any 

territory on the Korean Peninsula from the 670s on. 

Although scholars in the PRC identify Parhae as an ethnic minority state under Tang China, the following facts show that as a 

successor to Koguryoˇ, Parhae was an independent state not subjugated by Tang China. First, Parhae called its ruler Great King, 

the Reverent, and Imperial Highness. Parhae also had its own 

reign names and posthumous epithets (or, temple names) for its 

rulers. Second, Parhae people were permitted to sit for the Tang 

government’s special examination conducted only for foreigners. 

Third, Parhae placed the neighboring Malgals in a hierarchical relationship and had its own imperial government. Fourth, in official 

letters sent to the court of Japan at that time, the king of Parhae 

referred to himself as the ‘‘King of Koryoˇ’’ or as the ‘‘heavenly descendant,’’ thus repeating the tradition of Puyoˇ. Fifth, Parhae was 

a sovereign state that conducted independent diplomatic relations 

with neighboring countries, including Japan and Silla, as well as 

with Tang China. 

‘‘Map 23, showing the situation in 820, depicts Tang territory on 

the peninsula as having receded further, to include only a small 

portion of the northwest side of the peninsula, including 

Pyongyang. The map shows the current Chinese cities of Dandong 

and Shenyang as being part of central Tang Dynasty territory, but 

shows today’s Chinese cities of Changchun and Yanji and areas 

45 

north as being the territory of Chinese border minorities.’’ (CRS 

Memorandum, 5.) 

Around 820, the area extending from P’yoˇngyang to the western 

coast of the Korean Peninsula and to the Liaodong Peninsula was 

under the control of Parhae, and not Tang China. The northeastern 

Korean Peninsula, Liaoning Province, Jilin Province, and 

Heilongjiang Province in the present-day PRC, and the Primorsky 

region of present-day Russia were also part of Parhae territory. 

‘‘Map 24 shows the situation in 943, during the Five Dynasties 

and Ten Kingdoms Period. It depicts the Liao Dynasty, also known 

as the Khitan Empire after its ethnic-Khitan founders, as controlling a broad swath of territory north of the Korean Peninsula. The 

Liao’s border with Korea is depicted as being well south of the Yalu 

and Tumen Rivers, following a curved line whose northern tip is 

just below the 40th parallel. The peninsula south of that line is 

shown as non-Chinese, Gaoli/Koryo territory.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 

5.) 

After 933, Koryoˇ territory was shaped by the lower reaches of the 

Amnok River and the Long Wall, which was in the Korean Peninsula. An important problem in setting the territory of Korea and 

China during the Koryoˇ and early Chosoˇn periods in the Atlas is 

the absence of a buffer zone or a neuteral zone. In the early Koryoˇ

period, there were two groups of Jurchens living between Koryoˇ

and Liao (916–1125). The first group resided near Liao. The second 

group lived near the Koryoˇ border and submitted to Koryoˇ authority. If the first group were to belong to Liao, the second group must 

be included in Koryoˇ territory. From the 1020s to the 1110s, Koryoˇ

significantly extended its influence to north of the Long Wall. During this period, Koryoˇ ended the long state of hostilities with Liao 

and prepared a new stage of warfare with Qin (1115–1234), which 

was founded by Jurchens and had destroyed Liao. 

‘‘Maps 31 and 32, showing the situation in 1330, during the Yuan 

Dynasty, depict the border as having crept north again, to just 

above the 40th parallel to the west, though Yuan territory is shown 

extending below the 40th parallel to the east.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 

6.) 

In 1356, during the reign of King Kongmin, Koryoˇ reclaimed the 

Ssangsoˇng Commandery (C. Shuangcheng zongguanfu), which had 

earlier been incorporated into a frontier district of Yuan China. 

Koryoˇ’s territory now reached the Amnok (Yalu) River and the 

Tuman (Tumen) River. 

‘‘Maps 33–38, showing the years 1433, 1582, 1820, and 1908, depict Chinese territory as ending at the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, the 

rivers that formed all but a small portion of the modern border between China and North Korea.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 6.) 

In the early Chosoˇn period, during the reign of King Sejong (r. 

1418–1450), specifically in the 1430s, Chosoˇn conquered Jurchen 

and established four counties in the upstream area of the Amnok 

(Yalu) River and six garrisons in the downstream area of the 

Tuman (Tumen) River, setting the two rivers as the country’s 

northern borders. During this period, Ming China’s control over the 

area north of the Great Wall was limited to the southern region of 

Liaodong and the western area of the downstream region of the 

Amnok (Yalu) River. The Jurchens conquered the whole of mainVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Jan 02, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\TOPIC REPORTS\MINORITY\KEITH\KOREA\
46 

land China and established the Qing government in 1644, and the 

Amnok (Yalu) River and the Tuman (Tumen) River became settled 

as the border between Chosoˇn and Qing China in the mid-seventeenth century. 

Regarding text from ‘‘Continuity with the Republic of China’’ in 

the CRS Memorandum: 

‘‘Map B, depicting the territory of the Chinese Tang Dynasty 

(618–907), shows Chinese control extending down the west side of 

the Korean Peninsula to the peninsula’s southern tip.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 6.) 

Before its collapse in 668, Koguryoˇ held the eastern part of 

Liaodong River and the northern part of Korean Peninsula as its 

territory. Later, these regions were taken over by Parhae (698– 

926). Tang China established the Uˇ ngjin Commandery after Silla 

and Tang together destroyed Paekche. However, Tang’s military occupation in the former Paekche territory was temporary because 

Silla also stationed troops there. Regarding the former territory of 

Paekche in its entirety as Tang China’s territory thus is not accurate. 

‘‘Map C, showing the territory of Yuan China (1271–1368), depicts the Yuan border as extending to a line south of Pyongyang 

and north of Kaesong.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 6.) 

The Tongnyoˇng Commandery (C. Dongning-fu), which was constructed by Yuan, was taken back by Koryoˇ in 1290. Koryoˇ also 

used force to restore the Ssangsoˇng Commandery in 1356. Lacking 

information about this history provided in this Review and Comments, this map may misrepresent the areas as belonging entirely 

to Yuan China at that time. 

2. Chapter One of History of China’s Modern Borders 

In this section, the second of the three texts published in the 

People’s Republic of China, History of China’s Modern Borders, in 

particular, chapter one, ‘‘The Chinese-Korean Border,’’ will be discussed. 

In the first half of the fifteenth century, Chosoˇn established its 

northern borders along the Amnok (Yalu) and Tuman (Tumen) rivers after defeating Jurchen communities in that area. On the other 

hand, Ming China’s control was limited only to the southern area 

of the Liaodong Peninsula and the area west of the downstream 

part of the Amnok (Yalu) River. Chapter One of History of China’s 

Modern Borders describes from the perspective of China’s territorial expansion the formation of the Amnok (Yalu) River-Tuman 

(Tumen) River border between Ming China and Chosoˇn in the early 

fifteenth century. PRC scholarship notes that the control of the 

Ming government’s Nuergan Regional Military Commission (C. 

Nuergan dusi) which administered the Left Jianzhou Commandery 

(C. Jianzhou zuowei) reached the region north of the Amnok and 

Tuman rivers. However, as Ming China’s control did not extend 

into Jurchen areas after the early fifteenth century, the view that 

Ming China and Chosoˇn then made these two rivers the border between their countries is inaccurate. According to Korean sources, 

during the reign of King Kongmin, the Koryoˇ government established counties and prefectures for local administration and defense 

structures in the Amnok (Yalu) River area so that it controlled terVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Jan 02, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\TOPIC REPORTS\MINORITY\KEITH\KOREA\
47 

ritory south of the Amnok (Yalu) River. Later, during the reign of 

King Sejong in the first half of the fifteenth century, the Chosoˇn 

government defeated Jurchen communities and then established 

four counties in the Amnok (Yalu) River’s upstream area and six 

military garrisons in the downstream area of the Tuman (Tumen) 

River. In this way the Chosoˇn government extended its administrative control to the Amnok (Yalu) River and Tuman (Tumen) River 

areas. 

From the CRS Memorandum, item 1: ‘‘In 1712 . . . [t]hey placed 

a boundary marker between the rivers, on a ridge near the peak 

of what China calls Xiao Bai Shan in the Changbai Mountains, 

known in Korean as the Choson’gul or Jangbaek. Characters 

carved on the marker noted that the Yalu River lay to the marker’s 

west and the Tumen River to its east. Yang relates, however, that 

in 1885, when Chinese Qing Dynasty officials attempted to work 

with Korean officials to demarcate theborder, teams sent to scout 

for the marker found it in a different spot. The Qing government 

charged that it had been intentionally moved in order to influence 

decisions about which of the streams that feed the Yalu and the 

Tumen Rivers should be considered their ‘true’ headwater streams 

for boundary purposes.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 7–8.) 

PRC scholarship introduced the ‘‘move of the Mt. Paektu boundary marker’’ explanation according to which the marker was originally placed at the watershed of Mt. Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai) but was 

later moved by Koreans to the southern foot of Mt. Paektu (Mt. 

Changbai). However, extant documents and historical maps concerning the erection of the boundary marker show that this explanation lacks supporting evidence. The ‘‘Mt. Paektu Boundary 

Marker Map’’ (K. Paektu-san choˇnggyebi to, 1712), held by the 

Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies at Seoul National University, in the Republic of Korea, clearly portrays the boundary marker as a headwater marker (K. kangwoˇnbi) at the southern foot of 

Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai). Kim Chinam (1654–1718) accompanied 

the Escort Commissioner Pak Kwoˇn (1658–1715) in his capacity as 

First Chinese-language Translator (K. Susoˇk t’ongyoˇkkwan) at the 

time of the marker’s placement. Kim Chinam left a detailed account in his Records of the Northern Expedition (K. Pukchoˇng rok). 

This text related the negotiation process between the Chinese representative Mukedeng and the Korean representative Pak Kwoˇn. 

Hong Set’ae (1653-1725) left Writings on Mt. Paektu (K. Paektusan ki). In this travelogue based on information from Kim 

Kyoˇngmun (dates unknown), who climbed Mt. Paektu (Mt. 

Changbai) together with Mukedeng, Hong described the situation 

in which the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) boundary marker was 

erected. These documents describe clearly and concretely the process by which the boundary marker was erected. It thus is certain 

that the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) boundary marker was located 

at the southern foot of Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai). 

The Korean historical map below, which was compiled in 1712, 

shows the boundary marker on Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) erected 

earlier that year. In this map, the boundary marker is clearly depicted as a headwater marker. Meanwhile, Mt. Sobaek (Mt. 

Xiaobai), drawn as a separate peak to the southwest of the marker, 

is next to Taegak Peak and Yoˇnji Peak. 

48 

MAP 1: MT. PAEKTU BOUNDARY MARKER MAP (K. PAEKTU-SAN

CHOˇ NGGYEBI TO), HELD AT THE KYUJANGGAK INSTITUTE FOR KOREAN STUDIES, SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

From the CRS Memorandum, item 2: ‘‘China’s position, according 

to Yang, was that the Tumen River has three headwater streams, 

the Xidou Shui, Hongdan Shui, and Hontu Shui, and that only the 

Hongdan Shui lies to the east of the original site of the 1712 marker, the direction in which the marker indicated that the Tumen 

River flowed. The Qing government thus believed that the 

Hongdan Shui should form the border. The Korean position, however, was that the Hong Tu Shan Shui, should be recognized as the 

headwater stream, and form the border. In 1887, the Qing government proposed what Yang describes as a compromise, suggesting 

that another stream, the Shiyishui, known in Korean as the Sogul, 

be deemed the headwater stream of the Tumen River and form the 

boundary between the two countries. In 1889, with no agreement 

on which stream should be deemed the headwater stream, the Qing 

Emperor Guangxu ordered the erection of ten boundary markers, 

starting at the Shiyishui stream. Yang reports, however, that Koreans destroyed the boundary markers shortly after they were installed. The dispute went unresolved.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 8.) 

PRC scholarship avers that Qing China erected ten border markers from Mt. Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai) to the Soˇgoˇl Stream (Shiyi 

Stream) soon after the 1887 Chosoˇn-Qing China Border Conference 

in order to prove the agreement of the two countries on the Mt. 

Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai)-Soˇgoˇl Stream (Shiyi Stream) border. However, 

no official records from Qing China prove that these ten markers 

were erected. There is one record which indicates that a border-deVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Jan 02, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\TOPIC REPORTS\MINORITY\KEITH\KOREA\ Kor1.eps
49 

marcation committee member petitioned the General of Jilin for 

placing ten border markers from Mt. Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai) to the 

Musan area. Wu Luzhen (1880–1911), who was in charge of negotiations with Japan over Kando (Jiandao), conducted extensive research on border-related documents. His Yanji Border Issue Report 

(C. Yanji bianwu baogao) in 1908 states that the markers were prepared but not erected because Qing China and Chosoˇn failed to 

reach agreement. There is no record of discussion of the placement 

of ten border markers in Korean documents, either. Qing China requested that another border conference be held in 1888. These 

three facts also support the view that ten boundary markers were 

not erected. 

From the CRS Memorandum, item 3: ‘‘The Chapter ends with 

discussion of the 1909 treaty between China and Japan. Japan had 

by then Korea into a protectorate, and was on the verge of annexing it. In the 1909 treaty, Japan ultimately recognized the Tumen 

River as forming part of the border between China and Korea. It 

also specifically agreed that this part of the border extended from 

the 1712 marker to the Shiyishui stream and along the stream to 

the Tumen River.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 8.) 

PRC scholarship contends that the Tuman (Tumen) River border 

was determined in the Kando (Jiandao) Agreement of 1909. However, the Kando (Jiandao) Agreement is null and void on the 

grounds that it was concluded by Japan, which intended to occupy 

Manchuria, and without agreement from Chosoˇn, the very government with the authority to discuss such a border issue. In relation 

to this, another difficult point in this Chinese argument stems from 

the exclusion of Chosoˇn from involvement in this border issue. 

Moreover, Chosoˇn raised the question of the Tuman (Tumen) River 

border in order to solve the issue of immigrants moving to the 

north of the Tuman River, whereas Japan raised the question by 

opening the Kando (Jiandao) Police Substation at Longjing (K. 

Yongjoˇng) in 1907 for the purpose of invading Manchuria. However, this agreement was signed without the participation of the 

Korean government during the negotiations and based upon the 

1905 Protectorate Treaty, which had forcibly deprived Chosoˇn of its 

diplomatic rights. 

From the CRS Memorandum, item 4: ‘‘In documenting China’s 

struggles in the 19th and 20th century to secure agreement that 

the Tumen and Yalu Rivers form the border between China and 

Korea, Yang appears to signal a strong, continuing Chinese commitment to those river borders. From Yang’s account, China’s position on the stretch of territory between the Tumen and Yalu Rivers 

may be less clear. The issue is significant not for strategic reasons, 

but because the area in question is in the Changbai/Choson’gul 

Mountains, which Chinese consider the mythical birthplace of the 

ancestors of the Manchu Emperors and which Koreans consider the 

birthplace of the Korean people.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 8-9.) 

Although the Amnok (Yalu) and Tuman (Tumen) rivers formed 

the border between Chosoˇn and Qing China from the seventeenth 

century, the drawing of the border at the headwater stream of the 

Tuman (Tumen) River had not been finalized. In 1712, Qing clarified the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-Tuman 

(Tumen) River border by erecting the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) 

50 

boundary marker at the watershed running from the foot of Mt. 

Paektu (Mt. Changbai). During the Chosoˇn-Qing China border conference in the 1880s and during the negotiations over the Kando 

(Jiandao) issue from 1907 to 1909, the Tuman (Tumen) River border was at the core of the controversy. Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) 

itself was not brought into the dispute. Insofar as the starting 

point of the border discussion was the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) 

boundary marker, it can be said that Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) 

has been the border between Korea and China since that time. 

3. ‘‘Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research,’’ in Research on China’s Northeast Borderland 

In this section, too, direct quotations from the CRS Memorandum 

are followed by comment and discussion. 

From the CRS Memorandum, item 5: ‘‘In 2003, the Northeast 

Project published Research on China’s Northeast Borderland, a collection of papers from a conference held a year earlier. The collection includes a revealing essay presenting a Chinese explanation 

for the new scholarly interest in the Gaogouli/Koguryo, a kingdom 

that collapsed more than 1,300 years ago. In ‘‘Certain Questions on 

Gaogouli Research,’’ author Jiang Weidong of the Northeast Asia 

Research Institute at Changchun Normal University, in China’s 

Jilin Province, insists that the research is defensive in nature, intended to guard against territorial claims to parts ofthe presentday PRC primarily from China’s ostensible ally, North Korea. Jiang 

writes that Chinese concerns about North Korean intentions toward Chinese territory have been longstanding, but for many 

years, they took a back seat to the Chinese leadership’s insistence 

on the need to emphasize the friendship between the Chinese and 

North Korean peoples. The implication of his account is that the 

friendship has now frayed sufficiently to allow such concerns to be 

aired openly.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 9.) 

Research by scholars in the PRC on the northeast region in the 

modern period began with Jin Yufu’s Dongbei tongshi (A History 

of the Chinese Northeast, 1943), which was published before the 

founding of the PRC, and did not originate in concerns about the 

DPRK, the PRC’s ally. Jin believed that territory is historically 

formed, thus expanding or diminishing over time. However, as PRC 

scholars promoted the theory of the unified multi-ethnic country in 

part so to revise the history of Koguryoˇ, but inaccurately marked 

the current territory of the PRC as if it had been the territory of 

China in the past. However, no historical sources support this argument. This argument of scholars in the PRC may be a good example of how China has reduced and expanded the borders for political needs, but this interpretation ultimately is not accurate history. 

From the CRS Memorandum, item 6: ‘‘Jiang charges that Korean 

efforts to claim the kingdom as Korean are a legacy of imperial 

Japanese scholarship, which sought to develop pseudo-historical 

justifications for Japan’s invasion of China. Japan, Jiang states, 

worked hard to develop a theory that Japanese and Koreans were 

of shared ancestry, and then sought to claim for Korea the ancient 

kingdoms of Gaogouli/Koguryo, Baiji/Paekje, and Bohai/Balhae in 

order to provide historical cover for Japanese expansion into northVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Jan 02, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\TOPIC REPORTS\MINORITY\KEITH\KOREA\
51 

east China. The Gaogouli/Koguryo and Bohai/Balhae kingdoms 

were particularly important because their territories extended well 

into areas of northeast China that Japan coveted.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 9–10.) 

In the 1930s and 1940s, Japanese historians studied Koguryoˇ

history through the Manchuria-Chosoˇn view of northeast Asian history (J. Mansen shikan). This approach, which separated the history of Manchuria from those of the Chinese dynasties, juxtaposed 

Manchuria, Korea, and Japan in the same historical framework, 

which had been introduced for the ideological purposes of Japanese 

imperialism, and rationalized the occupation of Manchuria. Jin 

Yufu caught such intentions of Japanese scholarship and wrote, 

‘‘Koguryoˇ was a local polity of ancient China,’’ in order to stress 

that Manchuria and Chinese governments originally were a single 

historical community in the past. He also argued that the basic 

premise of research on Koguryoˇ history should be predicated upon 

the exclusion of any political perspectives from the countries of 

China and Japan. Jin also wrote that Koguryoˇ history should be 

seen only through historical facts. 

Regarding the history of Koguryoˇ, scholars in the Republic of 

Korea are agreed that a) the growth and development proceeses in 

Koguryoˇ emerged from the struggles with the local administration 

of Han China and from the withdrawal of Chinese administration 

from the Koguryoˇ area; b) Koguryoˇ, as an independent state, had 

its own reign names and royal succession system; c) Koguryoˇ established tributary relationships with both the Southern and Northern 

dynasties in China based upon its own interests; d) Koguryoˇ created a unique culture by incorporating Chinese and Central Asian 

cultures into its traditional culture; e) Koguryoˇ had a Koguryoˇ-centered world view that differed from those of contemporary Chinese 

governments; and f) the war between Koguryoˇ and Tang China in 

the 660s was not a civil war but rather a war between two countries. Academics in the PRC had acknowledged these facts regarding Koguryoˇ’s history until the launch of the PRC government’s 

Northeast Project in 2002. 

Having a history can occur only when later generations recognize 

that history as theirs, record that history, and have a clear sense 

of succession to that history. Considering this, attention must be 

paid to the fact that official records of traditional Chinese history 

have described Koguryoˇ as a predecessor of Koryoˇ since the History 

of Song (C. Songshi) was completed in the fourteenth century. As 

seen clearly in the Korean texts History of the Three Kingdoms (K. 

Samguk sagi) completed by Kim Pusik (1075–1151) in 1145 and 

Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms (K. Samguk yusa) by Iryoˇn 

(1206–1289) in 1281, too, Korean historians in premodern times 

also depicted Koguryoˇ as a central part of their history together 

with Paekche and Silla. The Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms 

presents the mythical leader Tangun of Old Chosoˇn as the founder 

of the Korean people, and Chumong, the founder of Koguryoˇ, as the 

son of Tangun. That is, Korean historians in the Koryoˇ period understood that their history flowed from Old Chosoˇn to Koguryoˇ, and 

then to Koryoˇ. That history subsequently continued from Koryoˇ to 

Chosoˇn, a kingdom that was founded in 1392. This perception of 

historical succession is clearly reflected in the English names of the 

52 

two Koreas, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. (The name ‘‘Korea’’ came from ‘‘Koryoˇ.’’) 

From the CRS Memorandum, item 7: ‘‘Jiang reports that North 

Korea sent scholars to China after 1960 to gather materials about 

the ancient kingdoms. He names one such North Korean scholar, 

Ri Ji-rin (known in China as Li Zhilin), who spent five years at 

Beijing University, with the years unspecified. Jiang tells us that 

Ri’s Chinese advisor reported serious concerns about the direction 

of Ri’s work, but was ignored. Ri’s Chinese advisor warned his superiors that in researching the ancient kingdoms, Ri had come to 

see ancient Chinese rulers as having ‘invaded’ Korean territories, 

Jiang tells us. Ri, the advisor reported, became focused on ‘recovering lost lands’ from China.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 10.) 

Based upon differences in the bronze relics and graves discovered 

in the Liaodong area from those found in the central plains of 

China, Ri Jirin argued that the center of Old Chosoˇn was in the 

Liaodong region. (See Map 1, ‘‘The Territory of Old Chosoˇn.’’) He 

believed that Old Chosoˇn territory extended across Liaodong and 

the northwestern Korean Peninsula, and at its peak reached the 

Daling River, which is west of the Liao River. However, Ri’s book, 

Kojosoˇn yoˇngu (Studies in Old Chosoˇn History), which was published in 1963, does not urge the recovery of the ancient territory 

of Old Chosoˇn in the Liaodong region. Nevertheless, Ri’s adviser at 

Beijing University and Jiang Weidong understood his argument as 

being for the purpose of territorial recovery. Their views, however, 

were assumptions that applied a Chinese perspective to Ri’s research. 

From the CRS Memorandum, item 8: ‘‘Jiang does not present any 

further information about North Korean scholarship, except to assert that North Korean scholars are particularly fixated on the 

Gaogouli/Koguryo. They see their country, Jiang claims, as the successor to a proud Koguryo regime that shared their capital, 

Pyongyang, boldly expanded its territory in the Wei and Jin Dynasties, and for a period stood as an equal to the Chinese Sui and 

Tang Dynasties. Jiang quotes Ri’s Peking University advisor as 

warning that while North Korean scholars’ desire to ‘recover lost 

lands’ might not now amount to anything, if such positions are not 

countered, North Koreans might in future generations ‘use this excuse to grab territory.’ Jiang reports approvingly that China’s government has come to recognize the dangers of allowing Japanese 

and Korean scholarship on the ancient kingdoms to go unchallenged, and has lifted taboos on Chinese scholarship on the ancient 

kingdoms.’’ (CRS Memorandum, 10.) 

The PRC’s assertion that scholars in the Republic of Korea and 

the DPRK are studying Koguryoˇ history in order to justify the future recovery of lost territory reveals a Chinese perspective in 

which the PRC government would in the future absorb the history 

of that area into Chinese territory. It would appear that scholars 

in the PRC seem to have considered an example from Japan, which 

developed the theory of the Imna Nihon-fu in order to rationalize 

a historical claim to territory in the Korean Peninsula. However, 

the basic perspective in the historical scholarship conducted by 

scholars in the Republic of Korea is that historical research should 

exclude political purposes and move forward based upon facts. 

53 

From the CRS Memorandum, item 9: ‘‘In an exhortation that 

may alarm China’s neighbors, especially South Koreans, Jiang concludes by urging his academic colleagues not to neglect research on 

the ancient Baiji/Paekje Kingdom, which once occupied the southwestern part of the Korean Peninsula. ‘We must not abandon it because its territory is not in our possession today,’ Jiang writes. 

Jiang also urges his colleagues to study the Xinluo/Silla Kingdom, 

saying, ‘We cannot, because it is the predecessor of a Korean nation 

today, overlook the fact that it was subordinate to us in the Sui, 

Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing [Dynasties].’ ’’ (CRS Memorandum, 10.) 

Jiang Weidong believed that Paekche and Silla, like Koguryoˇ, were subordinate to Chinese dynasties because these two southern 

Korean kingdoms had tributary relationships with Chinese governments. However, scholars in the Republic of Korea believe that the 

tribute system in pre-modern East Asia was an international order 

for diplomatic relations and one form of trade. Viewing the international order and diplomatic relations between China and neighboring countries in pre-modern East Asia through the logic of subordination and dominance in the imperialist age does not correspond with historical facts. 

The CRS Memorandum makes the excellent point that Jiang contradicted his own argument regarding the defensive nature of the 

historical scholarship in the PRC when he urged his colleagues not 

to neglect research on several ancient kingdoms in the Korean Peninsula, including the kingdoms which had once ruled the southernmost part of the Korean Peninsula, far from the current border 

shared by the DPRK and the PRC. 

CONCLUSION

The Review and Comments has offered a Korean perspective on 

the historical borders between Korea and China. As shown above, 

this analysis sometimes matches and sometimes differs from those 

presented in the PRC. The Northeast Asian History Foundation believes that ongoing open dialogue among Korean and Chinese 

scholars will enhance discussion and contribute to future research 

on border issues in history, and enable countries in Northeast Asia 

to continue moving forward toward peace and cooperation. 

54 

BORDERS BETWEEN KOREA AND CHINA IN 

HISTORICAL MAPS OF KOREA 

MAP 1: THE TERRITORY OF OLD CHOSOˇ N

Map 1 shows the territory of Old Chosoˇn, the earliest government in Korean history. It is believed that Old Chosoˇn controlled 

a considerable area of the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria 

(present-day Northeast China) in ancient times. It developed a polity which differed from and was independent of the Chinese dynasties at that time. As early as the third century BCE, its territory 

is believed to have concentrated in the northwestern part of the 

Korean Peninsula and the northern part of the Liaodong Peninsula. 

55 

MAP 2: THE CLASH BETWEEN OLD CHOSOˇ N AND CHINA (196 BCE) 

Map 2 depicts Qin China’s borders before the collapse of Old 

Chosoˇn in 108 BCE. P’aesu, generally considered to be the presentday Amnok River, formed the border between Old Chosoˇn and Han 

China. 

56 

MAP 3: THE TERRITORY OF THE HAN COMMANDERIES AT THE TIME

OF THE COLLAPSE OF OLD CHOSOˇ N (108 BCE) 

Map 3 shows the territory of the Four Han Commanderies after 

Old Chosoˇn’s conquest by Han China in 108 BCE. These 

commanderies, including the Nangnang Commandery, were established in the former territory of Old Chosoˇn. Most of the Han Chinese commanderies were pushed into the Liaodong Peninsula by 

resistance from local residents, and, as in the case of the Nangnang 

Commandery, cultural and political attitudes of the Chinese were 

assimilated into local areas. 

57 

MAP 4: THE TERRITORIAL DECREASE OF THE HAN COMMANDERIES

AND THE GROWTH OF KOGURYOˇ (CA. 106 CE) 

Map 4 presents the situation in 106 CE when the Hyoˇndo 

Commandery (C. Xuantu Commandery) was pushed into the 

Liaodong Peninsula while Koguryoˇ controlled Manchuria and both 

sides of the Amnok (C. Yalu) River. In the eastern coastal area, 

Okchoˇ and Eastern Ye (K. Dongye) emerged near Koguryoˇ. 

58 

MAP 5: KOGURYOˇ TERRITORY FROM THE REIGN OF

KING CHANGSU (R. 413–491) 

Map 5 shows the border with China at the time of Koguryoˇ’s 

greatest expanse. Koguryoˇ restored the territory of Old Chosoˇn by 

expelling the Nangnang (C. Lelang) Commandery in 313 and the 

Taebang (C. Daifang) Commandery in 314. During the reign of 

King Kwanggaet’o (r. 391–412), Koguryoˇ’s western border reached 

the Liao River. Later, Koguryoˇ conquered Puyoˇ (C. Fuyu) in the 

Nongan (C. Nongan) area and constructed the Puyoˇ fortress. Its 

northernmost border was thus established. Koguryoˇ maintained 

this border until defeated in war in 668. 

59 

MAP 6: THE TERRITORIES OF SILLA AND TANG CHINA AFTER THE

RELOCATION OF THE ANDONG COMMANDERY (CA. 676) 

Map 6 shows the period when the Andong Commandery moved 

to the Liaodong Peninsula and the influence of Tang China had 

completely waned. The Silla-Tang China forces defeated Paekche in 

660 and Koguryoˇ in 668. Tang China established the oˇngjin (C. 

Xiongnu) Commandery in the former territory of Paekche and the 

Andong (C. Andong) Commandery in the former territory of 

Koguryoˇ. However, Tang China’s control over these two areas was 

for the stationing of troops. Paekche and Koguryoˇ people fought 

against the Tang troops, and even Silla started to gradually control 

area formerly held by Tang China. Later, Silla established Soburi 

Province in the former Paekche territory in 671 in order to push 

out the oˇngjin Commandery. The Andong Commandery relocated to 

the Liaodong Peninsula in 676. This situation forced Tang China 

to wield a limited control over the Liaodong Peninsula. Subsequently, the Korean Peninsula was governed by two countries, Silla 

and Parhae. 

60 

MAP 7: THE BORDER BETWEEN PARHAE AND TANG CHINA

Map 7 shows the border between Parhae and Tang China in 698, 

the year Parhae was founded by former Koguryoˇ people in the 

former territory of Koguryoˇ, particularly in Manchuria. Part of Korean history, this country’s territory also included area in the 

LiaodongPeninsula. As an independent state, Parhae inherited history and culture from Koguryoˇ. During the reign of King Soˇn (r. 

818–830), Parhae achieved its greatest expansion, facing Tang 

China along the Liao River and the Khitans west of the Liao River. 

61 

MAP 8: THE NORTHERN BORDER IN THE EARLY KORYOˇ

PERIOD, 940–1044 

Map 8 traces territorial changes in the early Koryoˇ period. Line 

I shows that in its early decades Koryoˇ established local administration in the northern frontier area along the Taedong River and 

Woˇnsan Bay. Line II shows the Koryoˇ-Khitan border around 1044. 

By this time, Koryoˇ had secured the downstream area of the 

Amnok River, particularly the six garrison settlements east of the 

Amnok River, through warfare and negotiations with the Khitans. 

Line III highlights Koryoˇ’s indirect control over the Jurchens after 

the border settlement with the Khitans. 

62 

MAP 9: THE BORDER AND AREA UNDER THE INDIRECT CONTROL OF

KORYOˇ IN THE LATE ELEVENTH CENTURY

Map 9 illustrates the borders of Koryoˇ and the areas to the 

northeast that were under Koryoˇ’s indirect control in the late eleventh century. The black line marks the border and the red line 

marks the area where Koryoˇ exercised indirect control over the 

Jurchens. In 1073, Koryoˇ established fifteen garrison settlements 

up to the present-day Kyoˇngsoˇng area of northern Hamgyoˇng Province, where resided Jurchen tribes that were either politically loyal 

to the Koryoˇ court or generally submissive to Koryoˇ authority. 

63 

MAP 10: THE NORTHERN BORDER OF KORYOˇ DURING THE

MONGOL INTERVENTION OF 1259–1356 

Map 10 represents the northern frontier of Koryoˇ during the 

Mongol Intervention of 1259–1356. Koryoˇ concluded a truce with 

the Mongols after a war that lasted thirty years. The areas north 

of Ch’oˇllyoˇng, centering on the Ssangsoˇng Commandery, were left 

under the direct control of the Mongols. Later, the region was restored through the military activities of King Kongmin (r. 1351– 

1374) in 1356. 

64 

MAP 11: THE LAND BORDER OF CHOSOˇ N, 1392 

Map 11 shows the border of Chosoˇn (1392–1910) in its first 

years. Subsequently, Chosoˇn expanded its northern frontier to the 

Amnok (Yalu) River in the northwest and to the coast of northern 

Hamgyoˇng Province in the northeast. Meanwhile, in the fifteenth 

century, Ming China exerted direct influence over part of the 

Liaodong Peninsula. The border between Chosoˇn and Ming China 

was formed along the downstream area of the Amnok (Yalu) River 

at that time. The Jurchens in contemporary Manchuria were largely independent of both Chosoˇn and Ming China. 

65 

MAP 12: THE AMNOK RIVER-TUMAN RIVER BORDER BETWEEN

CHOSOˇ N AND MING CHINA IN THE EARLY CHOSOˇ N PERIOD

Map 12 shows the Amnok (Yalu) River-Tuman (Tumen) River 

border between Chosoˇn and Ming China in the early Chosoˇn period. During the reign of King Sejong (r. 1418–1450), Chosoˇn built 

six garrisons after defeating several Jurchen communities in the 

Tuman (Tumen) River area and established four counties in the upstream area of the Amnok (Yalu) River, thus setting the two rivers 

as its northern border. During this period, Ming China’s control 

over the area north of the Great Wall was limited to part of the 

Liaodong Peninsula. And, as shown in the map, Ming China shared 

its western border with Chosoˇn in the downstream area of the 

Amnok (Yalu) River. 

66 

GLOSSARY 

KOREAN TERMS: 

Place Names and General Terms: 

1905 Protectorate Treaty 

Amnok River C. Yalu River 

Andong Commandery C. Andong duhufu 

Ch’oˇllyoˇng 

Chaeryoˇng River 

Chinboˇn Commandery C. Zhenfan-jun 

Chinhan 

Chosoˇn 1392–1910 

Eastern Okchoˇ

Eastern Puyoˇ

Four Han Chinese Commanderies K. Hansagun 

four counties 

Hamgyoˇng Province 

Hamhuˇng Plain 

Hwanghae Province 

Hyoˇndo Commandery C. Xuantu-jun 

Imtun Commandery C. Lintun-jun 

Kando (C. Jiandao) Agreement 

kangwoˇn marker headwater marker 

Kangwoˇn Province 

Koguryoˇ (C. Gaogouli) ?-668 

Koryoˇ , 918–1392 

Mahan 

Malgals C. Mohe 

Map of Mount Paektu Boundary Marker 

Mt. Myoˇrak 

Mt. Paektu C. Changbai-shan, 

Mt. Paektu boundary marker 

Mt. Sobaek C. Mt. Xiaobai 

Musan 

Nangnang Commandery C. Lelang-jun 

Okchoˇ

Old Chosoˇn (K. Kojosoˇn) 

P’yoˇngyang 

Paekche C. Baiji, ?-660 

Parhae C. Bohai, 698–926 

Puyoˇ C. Fuyu 

Pyoˇnhan 

Records of the Northern Expedition K. Pukchoˇng rok 

History of the Three Kingdoms K. Samguk sagi 

Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms K. Samguk yusa 

Silla C. Xinluo –935 

six garrisons 

Soˇguˇl River C. Shiyi Stream 

Ssangsoˇng Commandery C. Shuangcheng zongguanfu 

Susoˇk t’ongyoˇkkwan First Chinese-language Translator 

Suksin C. Sushen 

Taebang Commandery C. Taifang-jun 

Taedong River C. Datong-jiang 

67 

Taegak Peak 

Taeryoˇng River Long Wall C. Daning-jiang changcheng 

Tongnyoˇng Commandery C. Dongning-fu 

Tuman River C. Tumen River 

Uˇ mnu 

Uˇ ngjin Commandery C. Xiongjin dudufu 

Woˇnsan Bay 

Writings on Mt. Paektu K. Paektu-san ki 

Ye 

Yemaek 

Yoˇnji Peak 

Personal Names: 

Hong Set’ae 1653–1725 

Iryoˇn 1206–1289 

Kim Chinam 1654–1718 

Kim Kyoˇngmun dates unknown 

Kim Pusik 1075–1151 

King Changsu, of Koguryoˇ r. 413–491 

King Kongmin, of Koryoˇ r. 1351–1374 

King Kwanggaet’o, of Koguryoˇ r. 391–412 

King Mu, of Parhae r. 719–737 

King Mun, of Parhae r. 737–793 

King Sejong, of Chosoˇn r. 1418–1450 

King Soˇn, of Parhae r. 818–830 

Pak Kwˇ n 1658–1715 

Ri Jirin 

Yun Kwan d. 1111 

Chinese Terms: 

Biography of Meng Tian C. Mengtian liezhuan 

Book of Wei C. Wei shu 

Dongyi ‘‘eastern barbarians’’ 

Eastern Han China 

Gaoyi people 

General of Jilin 

Heilongjiang Province 

History of Song C. Songshi 

History of the Three Kingdoms C. Sanguo zhi 

Jiandao K. Kando 

Jieshi 

Jilin Province 

Left Jianzhou Commandery C. Jianzhou zuowei 

Liaodong River 

Liaoning Province 

Liaoyang 

Longjing K. Yongjoˇng, 

Ming China 1368–1644 

Mo people 

Nuergan Regional Military Commission C. Nuergan dusi 

Pullae 

Qin China 221 BCE–206 BCE 

Jin China 1115–1234 

Qing China 1644–1910 

68 

Records of the Grand Historian C. Shiji 

Shu China , 221–263 

Tang China 618–960 

Treatise on the Xiongnu C. Xiongnu liezhuan 

‘‘unified multi-ethnic country’’ C. tongyi de duominzu guojia, 

Wei China 220–265 

Western Han China BCE 206–CE 8 

Wu China 229–280 

Yan China 

Yanji Border Issue Report C. Yanji bianwu baogao 

Personal Names: 

Jin Yufu 1887–1962 

Sima Qian circa 145 BCE or 135 BCE–86 BCE 

Mukedeng 1664–1735 

Jiang Weidong 

Wu Luzhen 1880–1911 

Yang Zhaoquan 

Other Terms: 

Didouyu 

Jurchens 

Kara Khitan 

Kumoxi 

Liao 916-1125 

Manchuria-Chosoˇn View of Northeast Asian History J. Mansenshi kan 

Primorsky region 

Rouran 

Theory of the Imna Nihon-fu 

Wa 

Periodization of Korean History 

Old Chosoˇn (K. Kojosoˇn) ?–BCE 108 

Paekche ?–660 

The Three KingdomsKoguryoˇ ?–668 

Silla ?–935 

Parhae 698–926 

Koryoˇ 918–1392 

Chosoˇn 1392–1910 

(69) 

APPENDIX IV.—‘‘READING CURRENT & FUTURE COMMERCIAL TEA LEAVES: NEW INSIGHTS INTO DPRK REGIME DYNAMICS’’ JOHN S. PARK, PH.D., NOVEMBER 27, 

2012 

70 

Page 1 

Page 2 


AGENDA 

Communist Party of China + Workers' Party of Korea 

Beijing's Sunshine Policy with 

Chinese Characteristics - A Game Changer? 

Reading the Commercial Tea Leaves - Implications 

I. CHINA TAILORS ITS FOREIGN POUCY PRINCIPLES TO NE ASIA 

Cenrrality of Xlaokang In PRC's Foreign Policy Principles 

.,. 

;(raokang Core Foc". o'these Pnnerpl .. s 

olMr countries 

., 

1. Non·proIlfwlltlon In ABle " 

2. 1'6;,ce'ul settlement through dialogue 

3. 1'6;,ce & BIBb/llty on the Penlnsule 

• . NHdto 

The 2 Prlm8ry Principles & lI.e . 

Sentences ;are intended to further 

)llao/<llOg goals by fostering the 

development of Ihe following enential 

I.elo,..: 

• Astable extern3l envi,onment 10' 

focusing on Internal economic 

development 

• Extensive & deep retations with U.S. 

as a pillar lor PRe economic 

Although the "Four Sentences H comprise Beijing's long-term approach to the 

Korean Peninsula & remain unaltered, the means for achieving these objeCflves 

have changed - Beijing has become more proactive & entrepreneurial In behavior 

.,. 
71 

Page 3 

Page 4 


I. CHINA'S PARALLEL TRACK WITH NORTH KOREA 

Fostering Sustainable Stability in the Northeast Asia Security Environment 

Means A 

Bolstering 

DPRK regime 

stability wlth 

PRC political 

capital 

I Means B 

Promoting 

DPRK resource 

development 

for multlal 

benefit 

Stabilizing North Korea Is a fundamental external element to working 

towards PRC's sustainable economic development goals 

We shouldn't be surprised by this separate, parallel Sino-DPRK track. PRC, 

like all countries, Is seeking to further Its national interests 

.,. 

I. A UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP: 

Communist Party of China (CPC) - Wor/lel"$' Parry of Korea (WPK) Ties 

Key Events 

• China and North Korea 

establish dlplomaflc relations 

• China Intervenes in the Korean 

W" 

• China and South Korea 

establish diplomatic relations 

as part of Seoul's Nordpolitik 

• Vice Premier Wu Yi attends 

60'" annivel"$ary celebrations 

in Pyongyang of founding of 

the WPK. Wu is accompanied 

by Commerce Minister 80 Xilal 

Significance 

• CPC & WPK comprise main 

channel of Inleractlon 

• Chinese People's Volunteer 

Army turns the fide, which 

leads to a stalemate 

• DPRK denounces PRC for 

"betrayal". Bilateral relations 

grow cold for much of 1990s 

• Wu states that PRC is willing 

to help develop DPRK natural 

resources & infrastructure. 

Musan Iron ore mine deal is 

concluded 

... 
72 

Page 5 

Page 6 


I. A UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP: 

CPC - WPK Ties 

Key Events 

• Premier Wen Jiabao attends 

60'" anniversary of founding of 

bilateral relations. Unique 

delegation accompanies him 

• KIm Jong·if & Jang Song·taek 

meet with current (Hu, Wen) & 

future (Xi, Li) CPC leaders in 

Beijing 

• Kim Jong-i/ & Hu Jinfao meet 

in Changchun, Jilin Province 

• Kim Jong-il tours China 's 

economic development zones 

& meets with Hu Jlntao 

Significance 

• PRC delegarion presents a 

·'comprehenslve 

relationship," Visit is 

culmination of efforts to 

restore CPC-WPK ties 

• Meeting occurs during height 

of post·Cheonan sinking 

period. Acceleration of 

DPRK leadership succession 

• Unfinished business from 

May visit is completed by 

Kim & Hu, ·'Rising generation 

of Party" '" Kim Jong-eun 

• Kim Jong-fl seeks food aid; 

also po! & econ support for 

succession of Kim Jong-£1un 

.,. 

I. PREMIER WEN'S DELEGATION DEEPENED THIS 

STRATEGIC COMMERCIAL BOND 

Premier Wen's October 2009 delegation leveraged CPC-WPK ties to deepen 

bilateral commercial relationship for mutual benefit. Beijing shored up 

stability of Kim Jong-il regime & Pyongyang agreed to jointly develop DPRK 

natural resources - inputs which will significantly aid sustainable economic 

development of PRC's three northeastern provinces 

.,. 
73 

Page 7 

Page 8 


I. CONFLICT PREVENTION & STABILIZATION: 

PRC's ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT OF OPRK 

Internal Economic Development 

PRe leadership's goal of 

US$3,000Icaplta by 2020 has been 

attained ahead of schedule 

A core criterion of sustainable 

development Is a stable el(ternal 

environment on its borders 

PRe concemed that sudden 

collapse of DPRK regime (from 

escalation Of implosion) would 

result In regional instability 

Sino-DPRK trade & Investment have 

strong synergIes - PRe Inputs 

drive chronically underdeveloped 

DPRK mineral resources sector 

No Lmkage with Denucleaflzatlon 

PRC econ dev engagement of DPRK 

occurring on a track separate from 

denuclearizaUon process 

Increasing access to subsistence 

food & inputs are primary ways for 

PRC to maintain OPRK stability 

Vice Premier Wu Vi signed major 

trade deal with North Korea on 60"' 

anniversary of KWP In Pyongyang 

(10/10/05) - re-affirmed on 

President Hu Jlntao's visit (10130/05) 

Premier Wen's 10/2009 visit 

launched important tour1sm , 

education, econ development" deals 

I. THE ORGANISM - UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA, INC 

North Korea, INC 

Through North Korea, INC - a network of state trading 

companies (STCs) affiliated to KWP, KPA, and Cabinet -

regime derives funds to maintain loyalty of elites and to 

provide a mechanism through which different groups can 

generate funds for operating budgets 

While DPRK remains an opaque country, we now have 

greater access to unique defectors with following 

characteristics - prior experience working in OPRK state 

trading companies 

In post-Kim Jong-jj period, new collective leadership will 

have to generate RMB on a recurrIng basis to stay in power. 

p::: R - C (Profit::: Revenues - Costs) 

.,. 

.,. 
74 

Page 9 

Page 10 


-_. 

SOURCE: Inr....,. ... s willi DPRK d. r.crors 

II. BEIJING'S SUNSHINE POLICY WITH CHlNESE CHARACTERISTICS 

What are the PRe Charactenstlcs7 

Beijing's SP much brighter Ihan 

Seoul's earlier version - entire 

border region & minerai resources 

It increasingly radiates on PRe 

mainland - KPA firms very active 

Massive Investment of politIcal 

capital by CPC Into WPK lor 

institution-building 

No direct linkage between Joint eeon 

dey projects and Short-term OPRK 

denuclearizatlon activities 

No forllseeable time limit - PRe 

leadership won't be voted oul 

What are the Key SIde Effects? 

ROK: loomIng debate between 

conservatives and progressives all 

"Who Lost North Ko eil1~ 

.u....s.,: DPRK is Increasingly complex 

3'" party Issue in evolving Sino-U.S. 

relations. Pressuring PRe to rein In 

its OPRK ally has not worked 

.B!!!!.!l!.: Seeking to catch up to 

Beijing's Sunshine Policy 

QeBK: Beijing's SP similar to 

bailout package. What strings are 

attached to this package? How will 

the post·transltion OPRK leadership 

deal with these strings? 

.,. 

.... 
75 

Page 11 

Page 12 

76 

Page 13 

Page 14 

77 

Page 15 

Page 16 

78 

Page 17 

Page 18 

Æ