DIVINE

PROVIDENCE ROVIDENCE
DIVINE

PROVIDENCE ROVIDENCE

The 2011 Flood in

the Mississippi River

and Tributaries Project

by

Charles A. Camillo

Foreword by George C. Grugett

Executive Vice-President

Mississippi Valley Flood Control Association

Postscript by T. Stephen Gambrell

Executive Director

Mississippi River Commission

Mississippi River Commission

Vicksburg, Mississippi

2012
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Camillo, Charles A.

Divine providence : the 2011 fl ood in the Mississippi River and Tributaries 

Project / by Charles A. Camillo ; with foreword by George C. Grugett and 

postscript by T. Stephen Gambrell.

 p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Flood control—Mississippi River Valley—History—21st century. 

2. Floods—Mississippi River Valley—History—21st century. 3. Mississippi 

River Valley—Environmental conditions. 4. Mississippi River and Tributaries 

Project (U.S.)—History. 5. Flood control—Mississippi River Valley—History. 

6. Mississippi River—Navigation—History. I. United States. Mississippi River 

Commission. II. Title.

TC425.M6C36 2012

363.34’930977090512--dc23

 2012006073
DIVINE

PROVIDENCE ROVIDENCE

Contents

Foreword

George C. Grugett, Executive Vice-President,

Mississippi Valley Flood Control Association

page v

Preface

page vii

Prologue

The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project

page 1

Chapter One

General Jadwin’s Floodway:

Historical Background of the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway

page 21

Chapter Two

Trouble at the Confl uence:

The 2011 Activation of the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway

page 59

Chapter Three

Fergie Fixes the River:

Improving the Flood-Carrying Capacity of the River

page 125
iv

Divine Providence

Chapter Four

The River Wants Out:

The 2011 Flood in the Heart of the MR&T Project

page 163

Chapter Five

Through the Spout to the Gulf:

The 2011 Flood in the New Orleans District

page 217

Postscript

T. Stephen Gambrell,

Executive Director, Mississippi River Commission

page 275

Select Bibliography

page 283

Notes

page 289
v

Foreword

In my many years of experience on the magnifi cent lower Mississippi River I have read many articles, books, and periodicals concerning the Mississippi River and Tributaries Project. I am certain that the 

major change I have discerned through all this reading is that, for some 

reason that I have never really examined, modern-day historians such 

as Charles Camillo have found the secret of making their writings of 

historical events a lot more “readable” than those experts of years past. 

I am certain that the readers of this account of the Great Flood of 2011 

will agree with that personal assessment.

Mr. Camillo was there on the spot, if you will, during those periods 

of anguish when the Mississippi River Commission made the diffi cult 

decisions that allowed this fl ood of record to fl ow to the Gulf of Mexico 

without the loss of a single life and with not one acre of land fl ooded 

that was not supposed to be fl ooded. Those gut-wrenching moments 

are captured in this book in such a manner that you do not have to be a 

water resources engineer to feel the tension and the need for the correct 

decision to be made at the proper time.

What happened during the Great Flood of 2011 did not happen 

because of some overnight miracle. It happened because of the foresight of the people that formed a triad more than 80 years ago. The triad 

consisted of the United States Congress, the United States Army Corps 

of Engineers, and last, but certainly not least, the local people who had 

organized themselves in 1922 into what is now the Mississippi Valley 

Flood Control Association. Working together to solve the problems created by uncontrolled fl ooding of the Mississippi River and its tributaries, the triad successfully secured passage of the Flood Control Act of 
vi

Divine Providence

May 15, 1928 that created, among other things, the Mississippi River 

and Tributaries Project. The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project 

is a comprehensive project that not only provides fl ood control but also 

a permanent and reliable navigation channel. In addition, the project 

plays a large role in the protection and restoration of man’s natural 

environment. It turns the third largest watershed on the planet into the 

greatest river basin in the world, not because of its size but because of 

its greatness, greatness because of the benefi ts derived from the entire 

watershed. These benefi ts are possible because the mighty river from 

Cape Girardeau, Missouri, to the Gulf of Mexico has been controlled. 

It is now a huge asset to the entire Nation and one that belongs to the 

people because the people made it possible. It could well be called the 

People’s River.

No one in his right mind looks forward with any degree of pleasure 

to experiencing a major record-setting fl ood because they are always 

a devastating and damaging event; but when a great fl ood has been 

experienced and passed in record time to the Gulf, then it has at least 

two benefi cial results. One, it gives us confi dence that what man has 

designed and constructed has been well done and two, it discloses where 

the weaknesses are in the system, even the one that worked so well. 

If we are smart, we will learn and make the necessary corrections, 

improvements and repairs before the next fl ood occurs as it surely will.

This book will be of great assistance to those who read it and learn. I 

hope you use it wisely and for the good of the people of this great Nation.

George C. Grugett

Executive Vice President

Mississippi Valley Flood Control Association

January 29, 2012
vii

Preface

As the historian for the Mississippi River Commission and the Mississippi River and Tributaries project, I face the dilemma of leaving 

behind a record of current events for future generations. Oddly, it is 

easier for me to document the activities and accomplishments of the 

commission and the project from one hundred years ago than fi ve or 

ten years ago. This is because very few paper records exist nowadays. 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Mississippi River Commission generate voluminous amounts of memoranda, studies, correspondence, and briefi ngs, but most can only be found in an electronic format. 

It was against this backdrop that I endeavored to produce this study.

I do not view the pages that follow as a historical study, although I 

do incorporate historical material to provide context for key elements 

of the story. Instead, the narrative is more representative of an eyewitness account of a historic event. During several presentations and 

speaking engagements that I delivered after the fl ood, my audiences 

seemed to want the answer to three basic questions. The fi rst involved 

the decision-making processes at the three fl oodways placed into operation in 2011. The second involved the history of the Birds Point-New 

Madrid fl oodway. The third involved the absence of a fl oodway to 

relieve pressure between the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway and 

the Old River control complex. This study attempts to addresses those 

questions.

The chapters that chronicle the 2011 fl ood rely heavily on my own 

notes – a diary of sorts – interviews conducted after the event with key 

players that I identifi ed during my coverage of the fl ood, daily situation 

reports from the district offi ces, daily emergency management briefi ngs 
viii

Divine Providence

that tracked changing conditions, and electronic correspondence. To that 

end, one of the purposes of this study is to leave behind a transparent 

record of the 2011 fl ood so that future historians will have a central 

repository to work from. Yet, there is one caveat. The fl ood roughly 

spanned a three-week period and impacted the entire Mississippi River 

and Tributaries project system. Naturally, I could not be in all places at 

once, so coverage is limited to the three fl oodways and the fl ood fi ght 

in the Vicksburg Engineer District. Heroic fl ood fi ghts took place along 

both banks of the Mississippi River from Cape Girardeau, Missouri, 

to the Gulf of Mexico and the Atchafalaya River from Simmesport 

to Morgan City. The absence of a detailed discussion at any specifi c 

location is in no way intended to trivialize those desperate efforts to 

convey the fl ood.

The chapters that provide historical context rely heavily on my 

personal collection of primary source material accumulated over the 

past decade in the form of correspondence, technical papers, reports, 

and Engineering News-Record articles. For those interested in learning 

more about the history of the Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, 

I strongly recommend Designing the Bayous: The Control of Water in 

the Atchafalaya Basin, 1800-1995, by Martin Reuss and Upon Their 

Shoulders: A history of the Mississippi River Commission through the 

advent of the Modern Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, by 

Charles Camillo and Matthew Pearcy. For those interested in comparing what could have been during the historic 2011 fl ood to what happened in the valley during the 1927 fl ood prior to the establishment of 

the Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, I recommend Rising Tide: 

The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How It Changed America, by 

John Barry.

I am grateful to serve as a historian in the United States Army. The 

military as a whole appreciates the fi eld of historical study for what 

it really is: a tool to strengthen the understanding of the past so that 

improvements can be made for our future. The uniformed and civilian 
ix

Preface

leadership of the Army live by that creed, as evidenced by their reliance on after-action reports and lessons-learned studies. During the 

2011 fl ood, the Mississippi River Commission and leaders from the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers’ district offi ces in the lower valley granted 

me full access to meetings, operations, personal discussions, and documentation so I could produce an account of events to strengthen their 

decision-making processes. This unfettered access provided the unique 

opportunity to note facial expressions, body language, verbal exchanges, 

tone of voice, and sense of urgency that otherwise would have gone 

undocumented. These elements bring the story to life. Most professional historians – at least historians of river engineering in the Mississippi Valley – can only dream of incorporating such features when 

constructing a narrative.

This behind-the-scenes narrative is edgy at times, yet there was no 

attempt by the Mississippi River Commission or the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers to sanitize the story during the review and approval process. 

That is a testament to the integrity of both agencies. Some reviewers 

disagreed with my interpretation of certain events or the conclusions I 

developed from the evidence at hand. As Mark Twain once opined, “The 

very ink with which all history is written is merely fl uid prejudice.” As 

a historian, I am very cognizant of that fact. As much as I might try to 

suppress my own infl uences and biases, they are certain to be refl ected 

in the pages that follow. For this reason, it must be noted that the views 

and conclusions expressed in this study are mine; they do not necessarily 

represent those of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Mississippi 

River Commission, the Army, or the United States.

I accumulated many debts throughout the preparation of this book. 

My supervisor, Stephen Gambrell, provided generous understanding and 

support from concept to completion. Pam Vedros and Edie Whittington 

selfl essly took on many of my routine responsibilities as I concentrated 

on research and writing. The staff at the Louis Latzer Memorial Public 

Library in Highland, Illinois, graciously provided a comfortable and 
x

Divine Providence

quiet space from which to work – an environment free from visitors, 

email, and telephones. I am also indebted to my colleague Damon 

Manders, who, had it not been for his untimely deployment to Afghanistan with the Alabama National Guard, most likely would have been 

co-author of this study. Prior to his deployment, Mr. Manders prepared 

much of the background material in chapters one and three. Without 

the aforementioned support, I would not have accomplished my goal 

within the tight self-prescribed deadline.

Even though I am a historian for the world’s premier engineering 

organization, I must admit that I only know enough about engineering to be dangerous. I relied heavily on the expertise and input from 

several engineers and professionals. Charles Shadie and Bill Frederick 

of the Mississippi River Commission and Mississippi Valley Division, 

Deborah Lee of the Great Lakes and Ohio River Division, David Busse, 

Russell Errett, Elizabeth Behrens, and Jacob Prebianca of the St. Louis 

Engineer District, David Berretta and Jon Wilson of the Memphis Engineer District, Robert Simrall, Lanny Barfi eld, and Kent Parrish of the 

Vicksburg Engineer District, and William Veatch of the New Orleans 

Engineer District all generously withstood my constant requests for 

clarifi cation, analysis and information. I truly appreciate their knowledge, professionalism, and patience.

Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, Col. Vernie Reichling, Col. Jeffrey Eckstein, Col. Edward Fleming, Charles Shadie, Stephen Gambrell, David 

Busse, Deborah Lee, Russell Davis, James Lloyd, Robert Simrall, Lanny 

Barfi eld, John Lonnquest, Douglas Wilson, and Matthew Pearcy, representing either the Mississippi River Commission or the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, graciously reviewed and commented on parts or all of the 

manuscript, as did external reviewers George Grugett, Lester Goodin, 

Kevin Pritchett, Peter Nimrod, Robert Rash, and Robert Thompson. 

Col. Fleming, Stephen Gambrell, Deborah Lee, David Busse, Walter 

Baumy, Jon Wilson, Col. Thatch Shepard, and Captain Todd Mainwaring provided crucial access to emails and electronic documents that 
xi

Preface

otherwise would not have been incorporated into the manuscript. I am 

grateful to several Corps of Engineers’ photographers — Alfred Dulaney, 

Brooks Hubbard, Oscar Reihsmann, and others — that captured the 

many images used in this manuscript. My colleague Brian Rentfro 

edited the manuscript. Brian Everitt designed the reference maps and 

Colleen Cummins redesigned several graphics used in the manuscript. 

Their combined efforts greatly improved the fi nal product.

I also extend my gratitude to Marilyn Holt for the layout and graphic 

design of the book and Pat Caldwell for designing the cover. Their talents are unmatched.

This study is dedicated to everyone who has ever played a role in 

the development of the Mississippi River and Tributaries project — 

from the visionaries who conceptualized it, the engineers who modifi ed 

and improved it, the congressional members who secured funding, the 

levee districts who maintain its features, the Mississippi Valley Flood 

Control Association who champions it, and the great people who call 

the valley home.

Charles A. Camillo

Historian, Mississippi River Commission

January 25, 2012

Prologue

The Mississippi River 

and Tributaries Project

Should Divine Providence ever send a fl ood of the maximum 

predicted by meteorological and fl ood experts as a remote probability but not beyond the bounds of ultimate possibility, the 

fl oodways provided in the plan are still normally adequate for 

its passage without having its predicted heights exceed those 

of the strengthened levees.

Maj. Gen. Edgar Jadwin

December 1, 1927
2

Divine Providence

MR&T Project Features
3

DURING THE OVERNIGHT HOURS OF MAY 1-2, 2011, a powerful 

thunderstorm hammered the tri-state area fl anking the confl uence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. The storm, the 

last of a series of successive violent storms that had dropped massive 

amounts of rain over the preceding two weeks, was the most severe 

yet. From mid-April through early May, rainfall amounts exceeding at 

least half of the yearly average precipitation fell over large swaths of 

seven states in the mid Mississippi Valley. The heavy rains transformed 

the normally-scenic Mississippi River, made legendary by the quaint 

and entertaining stories of Samuel Clemens, into a swollen, angry and 

indomitable torrent.

As Americans across the nation stirred to the celebratory news that 

U.S. armed forces had killed Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind 

several terrorist acts against the nation, Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, the 

president of the Mississippi River Commission, sat alone in his command post on the motor vessel MISSISSIPPI, which sat moored in the 

Mississippi River one mile south of the bridge that connected Cairo, 

Illinois, from what was at the time to most of the general public a little 

known spot on the map called Birds Point, Missouri. Walsh was in 

anything but a cheerful mood as he mulled over his decision to activate 

the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway – the fi rst of three fl oodways 

he ultimately ordered into operation to manage the massive fl ood. He 

was gravely concerned. Driving rain pelted the windows of his lonely 

stateroom as he pored over river forecasts and situation reports from 

fl ood fi ght teams desperately trying to hold the fl ood control system 

that protected millions of people and their homes. Brilliant bolts of 

lightning lit up the night sky, followed by powerful thunderclaps that 

shook the vessel. Walsh was confi dent the system would hold, but he 

knew the storm that night would turn what had been a severe fl ood into 

a historic fl ood. This is the big one, he thought to himself, the fl ood 

we’ve always feared!1
4

Divine Providence

The burgeoning fl ood around Walsh represented, perhaps, the act of 

“Divine Providence” that Maj. Gen. Edgar Jadwin, the Chief of Engineers during the Great Flood of 1927, had prophesized 84 years earlier 

when he promoted his concept of making room for the river through 

the incorporation of fl oodways into the general plan for fl ood control in 

the lower Mississippi Valley. Whether an act of divine direction or not, 

by all indicators the fl ood was a monster. Before it was over, the fl ood 

shattered previous gage records from Cairo to Caruthersville, Missouri, 

and from Vicksburg, Mississippi, to Red River Landing, Louisiana. 

According to the offi cial measurements taken by the U.S. Geological 

Survey, the fl ood also established new peak fl ood discharge records 

from Cairo to Baton Rouge, Louisiana.2

As the massive fl ood unfolded, the Mississippi River Commission, 

the Corps of Engineers, levee districts, and residents of the lower Mississippi Valley put their faith in the readiness of the fl ood control system 

that had protected the valley since 1928 – the Mississippi River and 

Tributaries (MR&T) project. The project is a comprehensive fl ood control and navigation system that sits at the foot of the Mississippi River 

drainage basin. The basin drains roughly forty-one percent of the fortyeight contiguous United States. Runoff from all or parts of thirty-one 

states and two Canadian provinces drains into the MR&T project footprint on its way to the Gulf of Mexico. In that way, the MR&T resembles 

the spout of a large funnel. What began in 1928 as a simplistic plan fi rst 

championed by Maj. Gen. Jadwin to relieve pressure on the levee system 

by providing room for fl oods to expand through designated fl oodways 

has since been transformed into a truly comprehensive project through 

dozens of complex modifi cations during its 84-year life span.

The MR&T project is an anachronism. While today the Corps of 

Engineers uses terms such as fl ood damage reduction or fl ood risk management to describe its fl ood protection projects, the MR&T system 

remains as what can only be called a fl ood control system. The MR&T 

employs a variety of engineering techniques to control Jadwin’s fl ood 
5

Prologue

of “Divine Providence.” The engineering features include an extensive 

levee system to prevent disastrous overfl ows on developed alluvial lands; 

fl oodways to safely divert excess fl ows past critical reaches; backwater areas to store surplus fl oodwaters and reduce pressure on the levee 

system; channel improvements to increase the fl ood-carrying capacity 

of the river; channel stabilization features to protect the integrity of the 

levee system and to ensure proper alignment and depth of the navigation 

channel; and tributary basin improvements, to include levees, headwater reservoirs, and pumping stations, to maximize the benefi ts realized 

along the main channel by expanding fl ood protection coverage and 

improving drainage into adjacent areas within the alluvial valley. Since 

its initiation, the MR&T program has brought an unprecedented degree 

of fl ood protection to the approximate 4 million people living in the 

35,000 square-mile project area within the lower Mississippi Valley. 

The nation has contributed roughly $14 billion toward the planning, 

construction, operation, and maintenance of the project. It has proven 

to be a wise investment that has prevented more than $478 billion in 

fl ood damages – a $34 return for every dollar invested.3

The administration of the project also refl ects its throw-back status. 

The project is prosecuted by the Mississippi River Commission, a sevenmember governing body established by Congress in 1879 to heal a growing schism between the Army’s engineers and the civilian engineering 

community by combining their talents to transform the Mississippi River 

into a reliable commercial artery, while protecting adjacent towns and 

fertile agricultural lands from destructive fl oods. Three general offi cers, 

three civilian members (two of whom must be civil engineers), and one 

admiral from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

comprise the seven members of the commission. The President of the 

United States appoints each member with the advice and consent of the 

United States Senate. Upon its establishment, the commission quickly 

assumed the role of an active federal agent capable of transcending the 

regional issues that had previously hampered the development of a more 
6

Divine Providence

effective river improvement system. The commission’s biannual inspection trips, held since the 1880s, promote face-to-face interaction while 

nurturing a connection between a government entity and the people it 

serves that is unmatched anywhere in the nation, possibly the world.

The Project Design Flood

The long and storied success of the MR&T fl ood control program 

can be traced to a change in policy following the 1927 fl ood. Prior to 

that tragic fl ood event, the Mississippi River Commission and levee 

districts attempted to control fl oods on the lower Mississippi by building 

levees high enough to withstand the last great fl ood of record. Since the 

inception of the MR&T project in 1928, however, the comprehensive 

fl ood control system controls a “project design fl ood,” or the maximum 

probable fl ood.

The U.S. Weather Bureau (now the National Weather Service) 

developed the current project design fl ood in 1954 after the Senate 

Committee on Public Works requested a thorough examination of all 

components of the MR&T project. The fl ood represented the worst thing 

the bureau could conjure based on actual storms that had occurred in 

the past. The Weather Bureau study incorporated previously unavailable data regarding the sequence, severity, and distribution of past major 

storms and investigated thirty-fi ve different hypothetical combinations 

of actual storms that produced signifi cant amounts of precipitation and 

runoff. The Weather Bureau arranged the historical storms sequentially 

to mimic frontal movements and atmospheric situations consistent with 

those occurring naturally to determine the most likely pattern capable of 

producing the greatest amount of runoff on the lower Mississippi River. 

This included the consideration of storm transpositions, storm intensity adjustments, seasonal variations, and storm mechanics. In simpler 

terms, the Weather Bureau developed the project design storm series 

from various combinations of storms and resultant fl oods—referred to 
7

Prologue

as hypo fl oods—that had a reasonable probability of occurring from a 

meteorological viewpoint. Preferring to err on the side of caution, the 

bureau tweaked the storms to make them as severe as possible. The 

studies revealed that Hypo-Flood 58A had the most probable chance of 

producing the greatest discharge on the lower Mississippi River from 

Cairo, Illinois, to the Gulf of Mexico.

Three severe storms comprised Hypo-Flood 58A. The fi rst storm 

is the January 6-24, 1937 storm that struck the Ohio and lower Mississippi River basins and produced the record-setting fl ood of that year. 

To be conservative, the Weather Bureau increased the runoff from the 

1937 storm by ten percent. Three days later the January 3-16, 1950 

storm that caused widespread fl ooding falls over the same general area 

as the 1937 storm. The 1950 storm is followed three days later by the 

February 14-18, 1938 storm, with its center transposed 90 miles to the 

north and the rainfall pattern rotated by twenty degrees to maximize its 
8

Divine Providence

coverage over all the tributary basins on the lower Mississippi River. 

To convert Hypo-Flood 58A into the project design fl ood, the Mississippi River Commission assisted the Weather Bureau in developing 

fl ood fl ows that would occur from the three storms and routed the fl ows 

through the tributary systems under three conditions: unregulated by 

reservoirs; regulated by reservoirs that existed in 1950; and regulated 

by existing reservoirs, plus those proposed to be constructed in the near 

future (1960 timeframe). The fl ood fl ows were then routed down the 

Mississippi River to determine the peak discharges at key locations. 

The Mississippi River Commission selected the 58A fl ood with nearfuture reservoirs condition, referred to as 58A-EN (existing or near 

completion), as the basis for the project fl ood fl ows and adopted it as 

the project design fl ood in 1956.4

The project design fl ood refl ects the worst that the Weather Bureau 

could dream up. Even regulated by reservoirs, the fl ood is about twentyfi ve percent greater than the devastating 1927 fl ood. The peak discharges for the project design fl ood in cubic feet per second (cfs) are: 

Cairo 2,360,000; Arkansas City 2,890,000; and Latitude of Red River 

Landing 3,030,000. Following the 1973 fl ood, the Mississippi River 

Commission reviewed the adequacy of the project design fl ood. The 

review concluded that the thorough approach used in 1955 was based 

on sound technology that was still reliable by current standards. The 

project design fl ood peak discharges remained unchanged.

Conveying the Project Design Flood5

To fully appreciate the performance of the MR&T project during 

the 2011 fl ood, it is important to understand how the system operates. 

Levees are the backbone of the MR&T project fl ood control plan. The 

levees protect the vast expanse of the developed alluvial valley from 

periodic overfl ows of the Mississippi River. The mainline levee system 

begins at Cape Girardeau, Missouri, and continues to Venice, Louisiana, 
9

Prologue

approximately ten miles above the Head of Passes near the Gulf of 

Mexico. The MR&T levee system includes 3,727 miles of authorized 

embankments and fl oodwalls. Of this number, nearly 2,216 miles are 

mainline levees along the Mississippi River. Backwater, tributary, and 

fl oodway levees comprise the remaining levees. The grade and section 

of the present levee system dwarfs by comparison those of the levee 

system overwhelmed during the 1927 fl ood. In addition to higher and 

wider levees, the MR&T levee system design incorporates technological 

breakthroughs from the science of soil mechanics that take into account 

the type, condition, and moisture content of material used in the construction of the levees.

The integrity of the current levee system is bolstered by advancements in the design, construction, installation, and maintenance of seepage 

control measures, to include landside berms, drainage trenches, drainage 

blankets, and relief wells. More than 1,000 miles of articulated concrete 

mattress revetment protect the levee system from erosion and assure 

reliability of the navigation channel. In an effort to further guarantee 

the soundness of the system, levee districts and other local sponsors 

implement strict annual levee maintenance programs with their own 

labor and funds. Activities include mowing, clearing brush and trees, 

fi lling holes, restoring rain-washed areas, clearing drainage ditches, correcting drainage problems, and spraying chemicals to control noxious 

and unwanted growth. Personnel from the Corps of Engineers’ district 

offi ces ensure that maintenance requirements are met through annual 

inspections that identify any defi ciencies and weak spots in the levee 

system so that immediate corrective actions can be taken. The addition 

of fi fteen-foot wide, all-weather access roadways on top of the levee 

system aid federal personnel and local levee districts during the inspection process and during fl ood-fi ghting operations.

To maximize protection from fl oods, current levee grades provide for 

freeboard – the distance between the project design fl ood fl owline and 

the top of the levee. The presently-authorized freeboard is a minimum 
10

Divine Providence

MR&T Project Design Flood 

Discharge in 1,000 cfs 

MisSiSSippi 

150 

Missouri I 

100 - • 

St. Louis Ohio 

240 Cairo 

I 

Birds Point-New Madrid -... 2,250 

Floodway 550 I 

White 

1,810 • '490 Paducah 

I 

Tennessee 

2,410 . Memphis 

Arkansas I - 400 540 

Atchafalaya Old 

Floodway 620 

250 [/ I 2,100 • Red River Ldg __ Lake Pontchartrain 

680 600 I ~ Archara/oyo 1500 Morganza 500 ~ 250 

Way Lake 0 tIer I Floodway I • New 

~ • MO:9an Orleans 

440 <..J I City 

OU Ch;ca local 

Red lOa 

150 '\ 100 

West --- I 

2,890 • Greenville 

I Yazoo 

- 25 

2.710 

I 

2,720 

I • Natchez 

Bonnet Corre Spillway 

GULF 

1,060 OF 

1,250 MEXICO 
11

Prologue

of three feet above the project design fl ood on the Mississippi River 

levees below Cairo, Illinois, and two feet on the Atchafalaya basin 

fl oodway levees. Levee grades between Cape Girardeau and Cairo 

and along the south banks of the Arkansas and Red rivers provide for 

a three-foot minimum freeboard over the maximum tributary fl ood 

meeting the maximum fl ood of record on the Mississippi River, with 

provisions to ensure that the same fl ood meeting the project design fl ood 

will not overtop the levee. In the vicinity of New Orleans, Louisiana, 

the authorized freeboard exceeds fi ve feet because of the increased 

danger to the urban areas from wave wash and storm surges common 

along coastal areas.

When fl ood stages begin to approach project design fl ood dimensions, 

additional project features activate to control and convey potentiallydamaging fl oodwaters to relieve stress on the levee system. The fi rst key 

location on the fl ood control system is in the vicinity of Cairo. When 

the river reaches critical stages on the Cairo gage, the Birds Point-New 

Madrid fl oodway goes into operation to prevent the project fl ood from 

exceeding the design elevation of the levees and fl oodways at and near 

Cairo, the levees along the west bank above Birds Point, and the east 

bank levee adjacent to the fl oodway. The fl oodway varies in width from 

about three to ten miles and has a length of nearly thirty-six miles. The 

fl oodway diverts up to 550,000 cfs from the Mississippi River during 

the project design fl ood and provides up to seven feet of stage lowering in the vicinity of Cairo, with smaller reductions above Cairo and 

through the fl oodway reach. The fl oodway has special fuseplug levees 

at its upper and lower end. The fl oodway is activated when sections of 

the frontline levee naturally overtop or when artifi cially crevassed by 

the Memphis Engineer District. The fl oodway requires timely operation to insure its design effect during a fl ood approaching the project 

fl ood magnitude. For this reason, the plan of operation involves the 

placing and detonation of explosives at the required crevasse locations. 

The president of the Mississippi River Commission, with advice from 
12

Divine Providence

the members of the commission, directs the operation of all fl oodways 

within the MR&T project after consultation with the chief of engineers.

There are two major reservoirs—Kentucky and Barkley lakes—

on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers that are not features of the 

MR&T project, but are authorized through the 1944 Flood Control Act 

to reduce fl ood stages on the Mississippi River in the vicinity of and 

downriver from Cairo. Because of the close proximity of the reservoirs 

to the confl uence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, regulation of the 

reservoirs has a major predictable impact on the operation of the Birds 

Point-New Madrid fl oodway. During the development of the project 

design fl ood, the Weather Bureau accounted for the impacts of these 

reservoirs. The 1944 Flood Control Act directs the Tennessee Valley 

Authority to regulate the release of water from the Tennessee River 

into the Ohio River in accordance with instructions from the Corps of 

Engineers. Objectives developed by the Great Lakes and Ohio River 

Division for the Kentucky-Barkley reservoir outfl ows have priorities to 

safeguard the Mississippi River levee system, to reduce the frequency 

of use of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway and to reduce the frequency and magnitude of fl ooding of lands along the lower Ohio and 

Mississippi rivers which are unprotected by levees. When fl oods threaten 

the fl ood control features along the upper reaches of the MR&T project, the Mississippi River Commission president and the Great Lakes 

and Ohio River Division commander—a position that also serves as a 

member of the Mississippi River Commission—work together to regulate releases from Barkley and Kentucky lakes with the concurrence of 

the general manager of the Tennessee Valley Authority to accomplish 

these objectives.

Between the lower end of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway 

and the Old River control complex, the system relies on levees to confi ne the project design fl ood. A combination of fl ood control reservoirs 

in the Arkansas-White basin and a comprehensive channel rectifi cation program supplement the levee system in confi ning fl oods. The 
13

Prologue

channel rectifi cation program greatly improved the carrying capacity 

of the main channel and lowered the project fl ood fl ow line through 

the use of cutoffs (severing large bends from the river) and corrective 

dredging. Between 1932 and 1942, the Mississippi River Commission 

executed fi fteen artifi cial cutoffs that, along with one natural cutoff, 

chute enlargements, and other corrective dredging techniques reduced 

the length of the river by nearly 170 miles and achieved stage reductions in the project fl ood fl ow line by up to twelve feet.

The levee system between Memphis and Old River is supplemented 

by four backwater areas located at the mouths of the St. Francis, White, 

Yazoo, and Red rivers. Signifi cant portions of the upper sections of 

these backwater areas receive protection from overfl ows of the Mississippi River afforded by the mainline levees. The lower portions of 

these areas serve as natural storage during larger fl oods approaching 

the project fl ood design. The backwater levees overtop at a time suffi cient to reduce project fl ood peak stages along the main stem of the 

Mississippi River. When fl ood stages on the Mississippi River or its 

tributaries subside, fl oodwaters from within the backwater areas drain 

through fl oodgates and pumps, with the exception of the Yazoo backwater area, which does not have a pump station despite congressional 

authorization for one since 1941.

From the Red River backwater to the Gulf of Mexico, including the 

Atchafalaya basin, the MR&T project represents an elaborate plumbing system designed to orchestrate the diversion and control of fl ood 

waters. The fi rst key component of that system is the Old River control 

complex at the head of the Atchafalaya River basin. Construction of the 

complex began in 1954 to prevent the Atchafalaya from capturing the 

Mississippi River. The complex is designed to maintain the 1950 fl ow 

distribution between the Mississippi River and the Atchafalaya River 

of seventy percent to thirty percent, respectively.

Approximately thirty miles downstream from Old River, the MR&T 

fl ood control plan provides for a major diversion of fl oodwaters from 
14

Divine Providence

the Mississippi River to the Atchafalaya basin through the Morganza 

fl oodway. Governed by a 3,900-foot long and a 125-bay intake structure, the fl oodway can divert up to 600,000 cfs from the Mississippi River during the project design fl ood when the Mississippi River 

fl ows below Morganza are projected to exceed 1,500,000 cfs. The West 

Atchafalaya fl oodway extends along the west side of the Atchafalaya 

River. The fl oodway contains an eight-mile long fuseplug section of 

levee at its head. When the fuseplug section crevasses or when the west 

bank Atchafalaya River levee overtops, the fl oodway can divert up to 

250,000 cfs. The West Atchafalaya fl oodway would be the last feature of 

the fl ood control system to be used under the project design fl ood. The 

Atchafalaya River, the Morganza fl oodway, and the West Atchafalaya 

fl oodway converge at the lower end of the Atchafalaya River levees 

to form the Atchafalaya basin fl oodway. This fl oodway is designed to 

carry 1,500,000 cfs or nearly one-half of the project fl ood discharge 

of 3,000,000 cfs at the latitude of Red River Landing, including fl ows 

through the Old River control structures. Levees confi ne fl ows to a point 

below the latitude of Morgan City, Louisiana, whereby 1,200,000 cfs 

is conveyed to the Gulf of Mexico by the Atchafalaya River and the 

remaining 300,000 cfs is passed to the Gulf through the Wax Lake Outlet.

The fl ood control system provides protection against the remaining 

1,500,000 cfs in the Mississippi River below the Morganza fl oodway 

through the Bonnet Carré spillway, located approximately thirty miles 

above New Orleans, Louisiana. The 7,200-foot long spillway structure 

is governed by 350 intake bays and connects to a six-mile long fl oodway that empties into Lake Pontchartrain. The fl oodway is designed to 

divert up to 250,000 cfs from the Mississippi River, thereby insuring 

a peak discharge fl ow under project fl ood conditions at New Orleans 

not to exceed 1,250,00 cfs.
15

Prologue

Comparing Systems

No one can deny the severity of the 2011 fl ood, but some have 

argued the Great Flood of 1927 that devastated the lower Mississippi 

Valley was a much larger fl ood than the 2011 event; that the stages and 

discharges would have been greater in 1927 than actually measured had 

the federal levee not sustained seventeen major crevasses and allowed 

the fl oodwater to spread out. That may or may not be true. On the other 

hand, it can also be argued that stages and discharges in 2011 would have 

been greater than occurred had it not been for the three fl oodways placed 

into operation and the many dozens of post-1927 reservoirs constructed 

in the Missouri, Ohio and Arkansas/White basins that impounded massive amounts of water during the winter and early spring, as well as for 

the major dredging program executed in the 1930s and 1940s that drastically shortened the river and increased the fl ood carrying capacity of 

the channel. As a result, the only way to provide a relative comparison 

of the two benchmark fl oods from the standpoint of hydraulics with the 

different protection systems employed would be to approximate fl ows 

and stages of the 1927 fl ood under 2011 project conditions or vice versa. 

In either case, this is a diffi cult task to accomplish. It is fairly simple, 

though, to compare the performance of the fl ood control systems in 

place during the two precedent-setting fl oods.

For nearly fi ve decades prior to 1927, the Mississippi River Commission completed and then improved the general levee system begun 

by the states in the mid-nineteenth century. The commission coordinated local efforts, set standards and specifi cations for levee construction, and allotted funds to cash-strapped levee districts throughout the 

lower valley. The commission believed the levees not only provided 

adequate protection from fl ooding, but would also promote scouring of 

the riverbed and provide a deeper navigation channel. For this reason, 

the commission rejected alternative methods of fl ood control, such as 

diversions, fl oodways, spillways, cutoffs and reservoirs. Critics derided 
16

Divine Providence

the commission’s approach as the “levees only” policy. As one fl ood 

after another overpowered the levee system, the commission responded 

by building the levees higher. The policy eventually left the lower Mississippi Valley shattered after the Great Flood of 1927, as the massive 

fl ood completely overwhelmed the outmatched levee system. Crevasses 

caused by the deluge numbered between 120 and 225, with seventeen 

of those being major crevasses on federal levees. The remainder of 

the breaks – ranging in size from half a mile wide to a mere trickle – 

occurred in state or local levees. The unshackled fl oodwaters inundated 

16.8 million acres in 170 counties in seven states – a swath roughly 50 

to 150 miles wide running from Cairo to Baton Rouge on the east bank 

and Cape Girardeau to the coast on the west bank. The vast majority of 

the properties in the fl ooded regions were a total loss. Those buildings 

that remained standing quickly rotted from exposure. Estimates are that 

nearly one million people lived in the region, only slightly less than 

one percent of the total U.S. population at the time. This means one of 

roughly every 100 to 120 persons in the country lived through or was 

impacted by the fl ood.6

Statistics demonstrate the far-reaching impact of the 1927 fl ood. 

Estimates of the death count range from 150 to 500. Some sources 

suggest a total number as high as 1,000 including indirect deaths such 

as from starvation. Many more were left homeless. Roughly 162,000 

homes were unlivable, and 41,000 buildings were destroyed. The fl ood 

turned approximately 700,000 people into refugees; about 600,000 

received aid from the Red Cross or other organizations. Seventy counties from seven states received some fl ood damage; nineteen of them 

were more than 70 percent inundated. The fl ood destroyed some two 

million acres of farmland valued at $102.5 million. At maximum market 

value, the amount of land not used or ruined reached nearly $2 million. 

This does not include the value of the more than 1.2 million poultry 

and 271,000 livestock that died in the fl ood, including 26,000 cattle and 

127,000 pigs. In Louisiana, the fl oods decimated the 6.2 million muskrat 
17

Prologue

population that formed a large part of Cajun income. It took years to 

restore these populations. In addition, damages to public infrastructure 

– roads, telephone poles, bridges and railroads – totaled $10 million. 

Estimates of the total value of losses reached up to $1 billion, during 

an era when the federal budget rarely exceeded $3 billion.7

Equally disconcerting for the average citizen were the dramatic 

changes to the landscape imposed by the fl ood, which lingered long 

after it receded. When waters poured through crevasses, they left behind 

grooves and channels. In several locations, blue holes – large lakes 

of clear water a hundred feet deep – remained where fl oodwaters dug 

out holes when dumping through the levees. Such lakes now mark the 

spot of crevasses all along the river. Many landmarks had changed or 

disappeared beneath the silt left behind by the waters. Sandbars four 

and fi ve feet high grew up many miles from a crevasse. Silt and sand 

covered roads, fi rst fl oors of buildings, and acres of farmland, which 

required digging out to reach the fertile valley soil. It took several years 

for many farms to return to pre-fl ood profi tability. Public facilities, if not 

buried, were eroded or destroyed. Bridges washed out, roadways were 

full of holes and gaps, and railroads twisted, appearing as picket fences. 

Debris – driftwood and destroyed homes – piled up in many locations, 

and most buildings had water marks on them. Large gaps existed in 

the levees, which in some cases had eroded until little more than small 

bumps remained. Even after fl oodwaters receded, lands normally prone 

to fl ooding remained underwater. Ditches turned to creeks, and creeks 

to wide rivers. Much of the Atchafalaya Basin returned to swampland. 

The impression it left in the minds of its victims lingered for decades.8

Following the Great Flood of 1927, the nation galvanized its support to prevent another similar tragedy from happening again. Congress 

authorized the Jadwin plan and then modifi ed it dozens of times to produce the comprehensive MR&T project. Unlike the levees-only system 

during the 1927 fl ood, the comprehensive MR&T system functioned as 

designed during the 2011 fl ood. Not a single life was lost as a result of 
18

Divine Providence

Comparison of overflowed areas during the 1927 and 2011 floods.

W i! ESTIMATED MAXIMUM INUNDATION EXTENTS 

-

_ _ __ 0-

c:3 ___ _ 

\ 

\ 

-

_ 

--------- ... - .--_. ----- -_._----- -

_._--

_ ... ----~ ..... _ ... ............... - -_ -

----~- .... - .. _----.. -
19

Prologue

the fl ood. Water lapped at the top of fl oodwalls and levees the length 

of the river, exerting unprecedented levels of pressure on the backbone 

of the protection system, but the levees withstood the record stages 

and pressure due in large part to the operation of three fl oodways and 

the storage capacity provided by non-MR&T reservoirs in the Ohio 

and Arkansas-White basins. Flood fi ght teams, composed of federal, 

state, and local resources that battled unusually frigid temperatures, 

high winds, and stinging rain, also assisted the levees in holding back 

the onslaught of the river. With the levee system not experiencing any 

crevasses, only 6.3 million acres fl ooded within the 22.4-million acre 

project footprint. In other words, sixty-two percent of the property inundated during the 1927 fl ood escaped overfl ow in 2011. Nearly all of the 

land that fl ooded during the 2011 fl ood was located between the levees 

or other unprotected areas, or within the designated fl oodways and 

backwater areas. Approximately 950,000 households, along with major 

industrial, commercial, and retail facilities that stood in harm’s way 

escaped the fl ood undamaged. Most of the estimated 35,000 households 

damaged by the fl ood were located in unprotected areas or within the 

designated fl oodways. MR&T project features also prevented $7.3 billion in crop losses. All told, the MR&T project prevented $110.6 billion 

in damages, not including potential losses from interrupted business 

activities and related impacts.9

The pages that follow endeavor to provide a transparent depiction 

of the 2011 fl ood within the MR&T footprint and, in the process, give 

evidence to the realities just described, while providing necessary historical context for greater understanding of key features of the project. 

It is the story of prudent foresight, heroic actions, agonizing decisions, 

and extreme personal sacrifi ce.

Chapter One

General Jadwin’s 

Floodway:

Historical Background 

of the Birds PointNew Madrid Floodway

I do not think that my people have ever been in favor of that 

plan for they do not want to see southeast Missouri made the 

dumping ground to protect Cairo, Illinois, much as we love 

Cairo. That is all the Jadwin plan does. Indeed, it is doubtful 

it accomplishes that objective.

Dewey Short

U.S. Representative from Missouri

1930
22

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30-Day Rain Totals 

(April 5 - May 5, 2011) 
23

DURING JANUARY AND FEBRUARY OF 2011, a prolonged and active 

cold weather pattern hit the Midwest, dropping signifi cant 

snowfall across the Upper Mississippi River Valley and southward along the Ohio River Valley. By mid-February a larger and deeperthan-normal snowpack covered large sections of the drainage basin 

above the Cairo gage, situated at the confl uence of the Mississippi and 

Ohio rivers. As the late winter thaw set in across the region, widespread 

heavy rains dropped up to 300 percent above normal amounts in most 

areas along the Ohio and middle Mississippi. The rivers, which were 

below fl ood stage, began to swell. In late February the rivers climbed 

even higher, as unseasonably warm temperatures rapidly melted the 

remaining Ohio Valley snowpack in less than 48 hours, releasing up to 

four additional inches of water as runoff. The melted snow and weeks 

of excessive rains caused widespread, but minor, fl ooding along the 

Ohio and middle Mississippi rivers. At the Cairo gage, the river reached 

43 feet on February 28, just three feet above fl ood stage, but it had 

jumped 25 feet in the ten days since February 18. The wet pattern was 

not over, though. Heavy and repeated rains continued to pound the 

Ohio Valley. By mid-March, the Cairo gage exceeded 50 feet, eventually climbing to more than 13 feet above fl ood stage on March 18. Then, 

much to the relief of fl ood-stricken areas along the middle and upper 

portions of the Ohio River, the active storm track shifted northward into 

the upper Mississippi River basin. The heavy rains and warmer temperatures had the same effect on the snowpack and rivers across Wisconsin, 

Minnesota, and Iowa. By early April a signifi cant fl ood wave developed 

on the upper Mississippi River, with an anticipated arrival date of late 

April at Cairo. The Ohio River had crested and dropped below fl ood 

stage at Cairo in early April, but the heavy rains returned and reversed 

the descent. The Cairo gage jumped back above fl ood stage on April 10. 

It did not permanently drop below that point again until early July.10

On April 20, the Cairo gage stood at just below 49 feet. It had risen 

almost a foot in 24 hours. The offi cial National Weather Service called 
24

Divine Providence

for a rise to 52 feet by April 30, but contingency forecasts, which represent worst case scenarios, indicated a possible rise to 58 feet on the 

gage. How high the river would get was a matter of timing, or unusual 

timing in this instance. The early warm temperatures and sustained rains 

in the upper Midwest led to an earlier-than-normal snowmelt crest on 

the Mississippi River. The arrival of that crest was expected to coincide 

with the arrival of the second crest pulsing down the Ohio River. If both 

crests arrived at the same time, the confl uence area and the lower Mississippi River would face a deluge. If it rained on top of that, the resultant 

fl ooding would be worse – much worse. The National Weather Service, 

indeed, was keeping a close eye on an area of high pressure to the east 

and a trough over the Central and Western United States. That pattern 

created favorable conditions for a frontal system to become stationary 

over the Arkansas and Ohio valleys. If warm and moist air from the 

Gulf of Mexico streamed northward along the western periphery of the 

high pressure system and collided with the cooler air to the north of 

the front, forecasters expected heavy precipitation. With each passing 

moment, the likelihood of persistent rains arriving at the same time as 

both crests on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers became more of a reality.11

On the morning of April 21, Bill Frederick, the staff meteorologist at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi Valley Division 

(MVD) delivered his daily weather report. The National Weather Service expected the frontal system to become stationary over the Ohio, 

middle Mississippi, and Arkansas valleys, bringing daily rounds of 

intense rainfall totaling up to eight inches over the entire area through 

April 27. The National Weather Service still anticipated the Cairo gage 

to reach 52 feet on April 30, but the forecast did not include the heaviest rains expected for the ensuing fi ve days. They would release an 

updated forecast, to include the anticipated fi ve-day rainfall totals, later 

in the afternoon during the Lower Ohio-Mississippi River Coordination 

Teleconference – a daily call among representatives from the National 

Weather Service river forecaster centers and Corps of Engineers water 
25

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

control offi ces from the Great Lakes and Ohio River Division (LRD), 

MVD, and the MVD district offi ces.12

During the afternoon coordination call, the National Weather Service 

divulged its contingency forecast. Incorporating expected rainfall over 

the ensuing fi ve days, the contingency forecast showed a possible crest 

of 61.1 feet on the Cairo gage late on May 3 or early on May 4. Isolated 

models called for 62.3 feet on the gage. Anyone on the call remotely 

familiar with the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway immediately took 

notice of those numbers. According to the 1986 fl oodway operations 

plan, the forecast would necessitate the activation of the fl oodway for 

the fi rst time in 74 years. An action that many on that coordination call 

never thought would happen in their lifetimes – blowing up the Birds 

Point-New Madrid levee – had just become a strong possibility.

Bott leneck at the Confluence

Authorized in the aftermath of the 1927 fl ood and constructed during 

the early 1930s, the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway represented 

Maj. Gen. Edgar Jadwin’s solution to the decades-long fl ood problem at 

the confl uence of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. The confl uence area 

had plagued the Mississippi River Commission’s fl ood control efforts 

since the late nineteenth century. Historically during larger fl oods, the 

Mississippi River found room to expand through a natural outlet or 

diversion through a low gap in the bank below Cape Girardeau, Missouri. 

Depending on the magnitude of the fl ood, up to 300,000 cfs escaped the 

main channel through the gap and coursed through the St. Francis basin 

before returning to the Mississippi River near Helena, Arkansas. While 

the diversion of fl oodwaters proved devastating to low-lying lands in 

both the upper and lower St. Francis basins in Missouri and Arkansas, 

it helped to keep fl ood stages somewhat in check on the east bank of the 

river at Cairo, Columbus and Hickman, Kentucky, and Tiptonville, Tennessee, and the slightly elevated lands along the west bank in Missouri. 
26

Divine Providence

The diversion, though, clashed with the commission’s levees-only policy, 

which rested on the premise of confi ning fl oodwaters between the levee 

system with the aim of increasing the scouring energy of the river so 

that it would erode or dig the riverbed deeper to lower fl ood heights 

and provide adequate depths for navigation.13

At the twilight of the nineteenth century, the federal levee system 

on the west bank extended in a continuous line from just below New 

Madrid, Missouri, to Pecan Point below Osceola, Arkansas. From New 

Madrid northward to Commerce, Missouri, individual landowners had 

constructed smaller, detached levees that merely connected various 

ridges of higher ground to protect against minor seasonal fl ooding. 

Between 1899 and 1907, the commission assisted local levee districts 

in Missouri with constructing a federal levee between Birds Point and 

Dorena. Because the commission’s jurisdiction at that time was limited 

to the area below the confl uence, the levee districts completed the levee 

line between Commerce and Birds Point with their own resources. In 

1909, the levee eventually sealed off the river’s access to the natural 

diversion into the St. Francis basin and denied the river the necessary 

room to expand. Across the river, Cairo had long enjoyed levee protection since the 1830s. Further to the south in the Reelfoot basin, the town 

of Hickman did not have a protective levee. Hickman sat on slightly 

elevated ground on the bank of the river, but the levee construction on 

the west bank dictated countermeasures on the east bank. In 1902, the 

commission began assisting the state in constructing a levee from the 

Hickman bluffs down to the state line with Tennessee, where it connected with the existing levee that extended southward for fi ve miles 

to Slough Landing.14

The levees on both banks were built close to the low-water channel, which created narrow constrictions during high water events. The 

constrictions impeded the fl ow of fl oodwaters and caused the fl oods 

to stack up and place tremendous pressure on the system of levees and 

fl oodwalls extending from above the confl uence to several miles below. 
27

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

With the natural diversion near Cape Girardeau walled off by a levee, 

there was nowhere for the water to escape. Eventually the river would 

fi nd the room to expand. Where it would fi nd the room remained an 

unanswered question that haunted landowners along both banks, particularly those living in Cairo. While the city of Cairo has recently fallen 

on hard times due to labor and racial strife, it represented the crown 

jewel of the area in the early part of the twentieth century. Home to 

approximately 16,000 people, Cairo was a bustling commercial center 

in the heartland of America. Cairo had it all – lavish antebellum homes, 

a quaint garden district, a prosperous downtown lined with shops that 

offered the latest goods, thriving night clubs, a booming “red-light” district, and navigation, rail, and highway connections. Cairo’s geographic 

location, which made it the ideal river hub, was precisely the root of the 

problem. The city sat on a massive, low-lying, sand pit. The Mississippi 

and Ohio rivers fl anked the town on three sides, which explains why 

Cairo was the fi rst leveed city on the Mississippi River north of New 

Orleans. During fl oods, the intense pressure on the underbelly of the 

town caused massive sinkholes and underseepage. That same pressure 

also threatened the massive fl oodwalls and levees protecting it, particularly at the neck of the peninsula, where the rivers ran closest to each 

other and the pressure was at its greatest.15

During the fl ood of 1912, the fi rst major fl ood since the commission and levee districts had completed construction of the confl uence 

area levees, the river established a new record height of 53.9 feet on 

the Cairo gage that shattered the existing fl ood record set in 1883 by 

an astonishing two feet. The U.S. Weather Bureau anticipated an even 

higher crest at Cairo, but the river overtopped and crevassed the east 

bank levee just downriver from Hickman, sending fl oodwaters coursing 

through the entire 304 square-mile area behind the newly-constructed 

levee. In 1913, the river again established a new record stage on the 

Cairo gage, surpassing the stage of the previous year by nearly one 

foot before fl oodwaters crevassed the levee near Birds Point at four 
28

Divine Providence

locations and caused 29 small breaks on the west bank levee opposite 

Columbus and Hickman. The crevasses allowed the river to spread 

out and spared the east bank levee from crevassing a second time. The 

crevasses also lowered the crest at Cairo by a little more than three feet. 

Prior to the crevasse, the river was forecast to reach 58 feet, but as the 

river expanded into the fl oodplain in Missouri, the Cairo gage crested 

at 54.8 feet. During the 1927 fl ood, the river established a new record 

stage on the Cairo gage for the third time in 15 years when it reached 

a height of 56.5 feet. Once again the river threatened the levee system 

in the confl uence area until a crevasse at Dorena, just north of New 

Madrid, reduced stages at the Cairo and Hickman gages by two feet in 

less than 24 hours.16

As evidenced by the fl oods of 1912, 1913, and 1927, the constrictions and closure of the diversion threatened the levee system along the 

entire reach. In May 1927, while the Great Flood was still ravaging the 

Mississippi Valley, Maj. Gen. Edgar Jadwin instructed the Mississippi 

River Commission to develop an alternative to the levees-only policy. 

By September, the commission submitted a report to address the fl ood 

problem on the lower Mississippi River. The commission’s plan, with an 

estimated cost of a then staggering $882 million, recommended higher 

and stronger levees supplemented by several fl oodways – leveed pathways to divert excess fl ows – to make room for the river during larger 

and more severe fl ood events. All of the proposed fl oodways were to be 

located below the mouth of the Arkansas River. From Cape Girardeau 

to the Arkansas River, the commission plan represented a continuation of the levees-only policy. To protect Cairo and the levee system 

along the entire reach, the commission studied a number of alternatives 

to include elevating the town of Cairo above the fl oodplain and constructing diversion channels to siphon off excess fl ows from the main 

channel. Elevating Cairo to the prescribed height, according to some 

estimates, would take at least 57 million cubic yards of earth. Elevating the city also necessitated replacing the sewer system, 23 miles of 
29

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

A flooded store in Hickman, Kentucky, during the 1912 flood. (Library of Congress)

Flood fi ghting at Fulton County during the 1927 flood. (National Archives)
30

Divine Providence

street, 40 miles of sidewalks, and nearly 4,000 homes and businesses at 

a cost of $30 million. The Commission also investigated fi ve diversion 

routes coinciding with the historic natural diversion prior to its closure 

by the levee system. The diversions were intended to accommodate up 

to 300,000 cfs from the main channel and redirect the water through 

the St. Francis basin to the White River basin, but the commission 

discovered that the cheapest routes to construct would cost at least 

$220 million. Instead, the commission proposed levee setbacks at the 

constriction points on the river where high water tended to pile up and 

threaten the levee system. The commission also proposed raising the 

level of protection at Cairo to 70.4 feet on the Cairo gage.17

Jadwin, though, rejected the report largely because of exorbitant 

costs and instructed the commission to rework the plan. He had previously held conversations with Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis and 

President Calvin Coolidge emphasizing the importance of keeping costs 

manageable, and believed lower cost 

solutions were possible if the commission reduced levee heights and eliminated the $91 million it had budgeted 

for damages and rights-of-way costs to 

local interests. Col. Charles L. Potter, 

the commission’s experienced president, argued with Jadwin over the 

issue of damages in the fl oodways. 

He did not believe that spillways and 

fl oodways could be put across people’s 

land without their being compensated 

for it, and he desired to include a “full

estimate” of costs. On November 28, 

Potter forwarded the revised report 

to Jadwin. The revised plan did not 

Maj. Gen Edgar Jadwin, Chief of Engineers, 

1926-1929. (Offi ce of History, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers)
31

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

substantially change the engineering features recommended in the original report, particularly with respect to Cairo and the confl uence area, 

but it did reduce the estimated cost to $774 million, including $91 million in damages for the planned fl oodways below the Arkansas River. 

Potter knew that the changes would not satisfy Jadwin. In a response to 

a request from Sen. Joseph E. Ransdell of Louisiana for data to defend 

the commission in upcoming congressional hearings, Potter noted that 

“you will probably fi nd arrayed against you some powers from whom 

you might not expect opposition.”18

The Mississippi River Commission of 1926-1927. Front row, from left to right: Charles West, Col. Charles 

Pott er, and John Stipes. Back row: Col. George Hoff man, Col. Charles Kutz, Edward Flad, Capt. Robert Faris, 

and Capt. Willis Teale.
32

Divine Providence

Potter was correct in his prediction. Maj. Gen. Jadwin was not 

pleased with the revised report and did not submit it to Congress. A 

week later, he submitted his own plan to Secretary Davis on December 1, 1927, who forwarded it through President Coolidge to Congress 

on December 8. The Jadwin plan, which carried an estimated price tag 

of only $296 million – a number that was well-received by the fi scal 

conservatism of the Coolidge administration – differed from the commission plan in a number of ways. One of the more noticeable engineering differences involved Cairo and the confl uence area. In addressing 

the channel constrictions and the Cairo dilemma, Jadwin argued that 

the levees protecting the town already towered 20 feet above parts of 

the city. The commission’s plan would take those levees 10 to 12 feet 

higher than that. He advised that “levees are now about as high as they 

should be” and the city “should not be subject to the jeopardy of levees 

higher than they are now.” Jadwin insisted on the need to provide room 

for the river to expand, especially at the confl uence area. Instead of 

higher levees and individual levee realignments, Jadwin called for an 

overbank fl oodway on the west bank of the river to be created by the 

construction of a new levee about 5 to 10 miles west of the existing 

levee. The new levee – called the setback levee – would extend from 

Birds Point to St. John’s Bayou just east of New Madrid and would 

form the west boundary of the new fl oodway. Jadwin’s plan kept the 

existing levee in place, but lowered it by three to fi ve feet to allow the 

river to escape into the wide 130,000-acre fl oodway between the new 

and old levees when river stages exceeded 55 feet on the Cairo gage. 

The lowered sections – called fuseplugs – would cause the main levee, 

or frontline levee, to naturally crevasse. Jadwin insisted that the fl oodway would only operate at a frequency of about once every ten years. 

He also maintained that the lands within the fl oodway would remain 

“capable of cultivation” during all fl oods with the exception of larger, 

but less frequent, fl oods. By Jadwin’s estimation, the additional room 

for the river provided by the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway would 
33

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

lower stages at the Cairo gage by as much as six feet during extreme 

fl oods, with other areas along the reach achieving smaller reductions.19

Critics lost little time in assailing elements of Jadwin’s plan. The 

incorporation of fl oodways into the general plan represented a necessary, but stark, about-face from the previous levees-only policy. The 

overpowering of the levee system during the disastrous 1927 fl ood 

had forced that change, but even in the wake of the fl ood’s widespread 

devastation, a controversy emerged over the reality of implementing 

the fl oodway concept. Highborn and arrogant, but nationally popular, 

Jadwin was unfazed by the criticism. He boasted, “Neither the plan 

nor any feature of it has yet been punctured by criticism, nor can it 

be, because, previous to its submission, it was subjected to every vital 

engineering test.” Jadwin, though, had not accounted for the upcoming 

test of public opinion. Residents and landowners within the fl oodways 

were ill-prepared for the reality of fl oodways – a reality that assured their 

lands would be sacrifi ced to reduce fl ood damages elsewhere. Under 

the Jadwin plan, the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway was designed 

to do just that – protect the levee system protecting Cairo and land 

elsewhere in Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, and even Missouri. Critics 

of the fl oodway desperately needed an alternative to the confl uence 

fl ood problem.20

The Mississippi River Commission had posited an alternative, but 

Jadwin had suppressed their report. Word soon reached Congress, though, 

that a viable alternative plan existed. Slighted that Jadwin had simply 

by-passed them, both houses of Congress requested an offi cial copy. 

At the request of the Senate Commerce Committee and introduced by 

Sen. Thaddeus H. Caraway of Arkansas, the Senate offi cially requested 

a copy in January 1928. Senate Resolution 90 ordered the Secretary of 

War to “furnish to the Senate said preliminary estimates, or suggestions 

and recommendations, if any, of both the Chief of Engineers of the Army 

and the Mississippi River Commission touching fl ood control.” Davis 

responded on January 12 by sending the report “with many caveats.” 
34

Divine Providence

During hearings before the House Flood Control Committee, Jadwin, 

when asked about the plan, complained, “We have not forwarded their 

report to you offi cially. That report came in the back door.” A week 

later, Rep. Frank Reid of Illinois, the chairman of the committee, asked 

Potter to forward the report through the Secretary of War to Congress. 

“They said that this report got in at the back door. We will get it in at the 

front door.” On Potter’s objection that it would be “very unmilitary” to 

bypass the chief of engineers, Reid agreed to sending it through Jadwin, 

to which Potter responded, “I do not think that I will remain president 

of the Mississippi River Commission long after I do that.” Reid insisted, 

and Potter sent a letter to Jadwin explaining the directive of the committee to forward the report and quoting the Mississippi River Commission 

Act of 1879: “It shall be the duty of said commission ... to submit to 

the Secretary of War a full and detailed report of their proceedings and 

actions, and of such plans, with estimates of the cost thereof ... to be 

by him transmitted to Congress.”21

During congressional hearings on the Jadwin plan, critics of the proposed Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway desperately latched onto the 

commission’s plan as a favorable substitution. Opposition to Jadwin’s 

fl oodway came from two distinct angles – one political and the other 

engineering. From the political side, Missouri’s congressional delegation attempted to seize on the sympathy factor. Discounting claims 

that the fl oodway provided protection to the entire reach, including the 

Missouri levees between Commerce and Birds Point and the Reelfoot 

basin in Kentucky and Tennessee; Missouri politicians argued that the 

fl oodway represented an unfair burden on southeast Missouri solely to 

protect Cairo – one city in another state. Rep. James Fulbright, a native 

of Millersville in nearby Cape Girardeau County, blasted the fl oodway, 

calling it “a tragedy to southeast Missouri” that would provide “no 

benefi t to any part of the State.” Rep. William Nelson, a former farmer, 

demanded further study to fi nd a more suitable solution.22
35

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

Col. Potter and Lucius Berthe, a consulting engineer for the three 

Missouri levee districts comprising the upper St. Francis basin, led the 

attack from the engineering side. Potter indicated the fl oodway would 

not provide any relief to stages on the Cairo gage and went so far as to 

say that it was not “feasible from an engineering standpoint.” Berthe 

conceded that the fl oodway would lower stages on the Cairo gage and 

along the levees protecting the Reelfoot and St. Francis basins, but not 

to the level promised by Jadwin. Citing the crevasses along the proposed fuseplug levee during the fl oods of 1912 and 1913, Berthe contended that the overbank fl oodway experiment had already been tried 

by nature. On both occasions, the crevasses lowered the crest at Cairo 

by three feet, not six, according to Berthe. He further pointed out that 

the Dorena crevasse during the 1927 fl ood only lowered the crest by 

two feet. Berthe argued that the overbank fl oodway would not be as 

successful in keeping stages down as the former natural diversion. The 

former diversion rerouted fl oodwaters; the proposed fl oodway did not. 

It kept the excess fl ow in the river. “If we took down all of our levees,” 

Berthe informed the House committee, “I ... wouldn’t guarantee your 

getting a fi ve foot reduction at Cairo.”23

The main engineering criticism of the plan, though, was its incorporation of fuseplug levees at the entrances to the fl oodways. One 

prominent railroad engineer had never heard of them, and many others, 

including Col. Potter and current and former members of the commission argued that fuseplugs provided less reliability and control over the 

amount of water sent into a fl oodway than a controlled structure. James 

Kemper, a nationally-renowned civil engineer, denounced the use of 

fuseplugs levees as unpredictable and dangerous. Berthe concurred 

with that sentiment, insinuating that the fuseplug would not trigger as 

expected. He hinted that dynamite might be necessary “to open it up.” 

George Schoenberger, the chief state engineer for Louisiana, argued 

that the kinetic energy from the water released through the crevasse of 
36

Divine Providence

a fuseplug would destroy private property and insisted that lands within 

the fl oodways should be purchased by the government.24

Not that everyone opposed the fl oodway or at least some form of 

relief through the state of Missouri. For example, Rep. Edward Denison of Illinois blamed the dire situation at Cairo on the closure of 

the natural diversion through Missouri and the creation of bottlenecks 

through levee construction. “Cairo is now absolutely prone and is in a 

position where she can not do anything more for herself,” he told the 

House Flood Control Committee. He suggested that the government 

should not only establish the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway, but 

should purchase the land outright as compensation to the landowners. 

To counter the sentiment that Missouri interests were being sacrifi ced 

for the benefi t of another state, Rep. William Gregory of Kentucky 

argued that Hickman and the rest of Fulton County did not suffer from 

fl oods until the state of Missouri constructed levees on the west side 

of the river. Gregory argued that more than 6,000 people in western 

Kentucky faced destruction from fl oods “not by the act of God ... and 

not by any mistake on the part of Kentucky,” but because of Missouri’s 

lack of consideration for its neighbors. Kentucky’s senators also blamed 

levee construction in Missouri for pushing more water into their state, 

however, they were quick to defl ect the blame from the state of Missouri by pointing out that the Mississippi River Commission had built 

the levees. Sen. William Sackett argued that if the river were allowed 

to overfl ow into Missouri as it did before the levees were constructed, 

it would provide “a great safety valve to protect the town of Hickman.” 

Sen. Alben Barkley insisted that any permanent solution to the problem 

“must contemplate a widening of the area between the levees.” To support these arguments, engineers from the Fulton County and Reelfoot 

levee districts provided scientifi c testimony showing that the levees 

on the Missouri side of the river had caused fl ood stages to increase in 

Kentucky and Tennessee with each passing fl ood and pointed to how 
37

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

the crevasses on the west bank of the river in 1913 and 1927 had saved 

their levees from collapse.25

By the conclusion of the congressional hearings in February 1928, 

the federal legislature remained divided on how to protect the lower 

Mississippi Valley from fl oods, not just at the confl uence area, but 

along the entire alluvial valley. A large block in both houses endorsed 

the comprehensive and budget-friendly plan advanced by the Corps of 

Engineers. Others, championed by Chairman Reid, favored the lessintrusive commission plan that offered fewer and smaller fl oodways 

controlled by gated structures and provided more generous compensation for the use of private land to be incorporated into the fl ood control 

plan. With competing bills advanced in both houses and with time running out on the fi rst session of the 70th Congress, federal legislators, 

operating under the constant threat of a presidential veto, crafted a series 

of compromises to appease those legislators holding up passage of the 

bill. Passed by both houses of Congress on May 8 and signed into law 

by Coolidge on May 15, the Flood Control Act of 1928 received great 

acclaim by members from both parties as a nonpartisan effort to provide 

relief to the fl ood victims.26

The new law was a pioneering legislative act, if for no other reason 

than its authorization of what eventually evolved into the MR&T project 

in the form of the Jadwin plan. Hailed by Reid as the “greatest piece of 

constructive legislation ever enacted,” the 1928 Flood Control Act more 

accurately refl ected compromise legislation that resulted in ambiguities and internal contradictions. Section one of the act clearly approved 

the engineering aspects of the Jadwin plan, but it also established a 

special engineering board to help select the best features from among 

the Corps of Engineers and commission plans. The Birds Point-New 

Madrid fl oodway represented one of the few engineering differences 

between the plans to be considered by the board. The fate of the proposed fl oodway, as well as that of the residents and landowners within 

it, hung in the balance.
38

Divine Providence

Establishment of the Floodway

To critics of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway, the adoption of 

Maj. Gen. Jadwin’s plan was to be tempered by the creation of the special engineering board, whose job was to evaluate, reconcile, and choose 

the best options presented by both plans submitted to Congress in 1927. 

The chief of engineers, the president of the Mississippi River Commission, and a civilian engineer nominated by Coolidge would comprise 

the board. The board would consider the engineering differences in the 

plans and make recommendations to Coolidge, whose decision would 

“be followed in carrying out the project.” Congressional supporters of 

the commission plan anticipated major revisions to the project, but the 

special engineering board would not drive those changes. Within days 

of the passage of the act, Coolidge nominated retired Col. Carleton W. 

Sturdevant as the third member of the special board. Sturdevant was a 

prominent railroad and canal engineer who had gotten his start working 

for the Mississippi River Commission, most recently as superintendent 

of dredging from 1897 to 1902. He was, therefore, familiar with the 

Mississippi River problem, albeit primarily from a dredging perspective. The primary mark against him was that he had a close relationship 

with Jadwin, having served under him in the 15th Engineers in France 

during World War I and consulted on the St. Lawrence Waterway from 

1925 to 1927. Although members of the Senate Commerce Committee expressed concern that having a third member of the board under 

personal obligation to Jadwin might defeat the purpose of the board, 

Sturdevant made a good impression and convinced them that he would 

keep an open mind and be an independent arbiter of the two plans. As 

a result, the Senate confi rmed his nomination before the end of May 

1928. Still, Sen. Harry Hawes and others believed Sturdevant “was 

appointed at the request of Jadwin, and ... nobody else” and that little 

good would come of it.27
39

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

Floodway opponents, though, had great faith that Mississippi River 

Commission president and recently-promoted Brig. Gen. Charles Potter 

would stand up to Maj. Gen. Jadwin and fi ght to replace the Bird’s PointNew Madrid fl oodway with a plan for higher levees. At a minimum, they 

would settle for a gated or controlled spillway instead of the fuseplug 

levees envisioned by Jadwin. Potter was evidently looking forward to 

the board and had been gathering data. In a letter dated June 8, 1928, 

Berthe stated he had heard from news reports that the board was to 

start conducting hearings within weeks. Surprised at the rumor, Potter 

immediately forwarded the note to Jadwin and wrote that “a lot of study 

is necessary before we can expect local interests to present their side of 

the case, especially where many technical questions are involved.” He 

still believed he would be participating in the board.28

On June 10, after Congress had recessed for the summer, Jadwin 

named Col. Thomas H. Jackson to replace Potter as the Western Division Engineer, and Coolidge appointed him as commission president 

pending Senate approval. The move came as a shock to those depending 

on Potter’s infl uence on the board. Jackson had gained a reputation for 

considerable expertise with fl oodways while working on the Sacramento 

River and later as a member of the California Debris Commission, and 

he had even suggested in 1913 that fl oodways could solve Mississippi 

fl ood problems. But he had no experience with the Mississippi River, 

and he also had close connections to Jadwin, having worked with him 

during World War I. No doubt Jadwin chose him both for his experience 

and loyalty and hoped to avoid further delay or confl ict over implementing his plan. Potter took the news gracefully. He spent his last day in 

offi ce preparing memoranda outlining problems with the gage at Cairo 

and supporting his view that the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway was 

unnecessary. He then retired. Two months later, he was dead, “hastened 

on his last journey by the shock resulting from his summary dismissal,” 

according to Berthe.29
40

Divine Providence

The special engineering board made only a single trip downriver 

to hold hearings. Participants complained of not being given adequate 

notice to prepare. In New Madrid, confl ict over the lack of notice 

curtailed debate over the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. Jadwin 

declined a continuance, forcing Berthe to submit a report via mail for 

the fi ve Missouri levee districts opposing the fl oodway. The merits of 

the arguments would not be heard in person.30 On August 8, 1928 – a 

mere 60 days after it had been organized – the special board delivered 

its report. In short, the report summarized, “the adopted project is, all 

things considered, the best comprehensive plan that can be formulated,” 

and it recommended against further studies of the comprehensive commission plan. On August 13, Coolidge approved the recommendations 

of the board, other than acquiring rights-of-way for lands required for 

building the spillways and fl oodways, which he wished to consider. 

Four months later, the president approved the purchasing of property 

and fl owage rights – a one-time indemnity paid to landowners for the 

right to fl ood their land during the operation of the Birds Point-New 

Madrid fl oodway – but stipulated that the fuseplug levee could not be 

degraded by the necessary three to fi ve feet until at least fi fty percent 

of the fl owage easements had been secured. Coolidge also authorized 

the purchase of a strip of land adjacent to the fuseplug section at a price 

capped at two times the 1928 assessed value of the land.31

Criticism of the board and its fi ndings started almost immediately. 

Nearly everyone was taken aback at the time it spent coming to its 

conclusions. “There is perhaps no record in the world of so highly 

controversial a question, involving the peace and happiness of so many 

people and the expenditure of such a great sum of money being disposed of with such speed as this,” Kemper concluded. The Engineering 

News-Record editorialized that “the board complied with the letter but 

disregarded the spirit of its mandate,” which was “to inform itself fully 

and obtain such data as might be needed for determining upon the best 

plan.” Another point of contention was that Jadwin and his protégés 
41

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

comprised the board, which one member of congress referred to as the 

“Jadwin, Jadwin, and Jadwin Board.”32

Although the special engineering board made no major surveys to 

support its work, the Corps of Engineers completed several surveys and 

studies to determine details of the plan. To answer critics who believed 

the fl oodway would not lower fl ood heights at Cairo, Maj. Donald Connolly of the Memphis Engineer District completed a new study in May 

1928 that found it would lower fl ood stages by three to four feet. This 

confi rmed studies by consultant E.C. Williamson submitted in late 1927 

that the best plan was to lower the fl ood heights through the use of a 

fl oodway rather than raising the city or its levees. More problematic 

were fi ndings revealed by surveys that the setback levee would cross 

several drainage ditches and cause local fl ooding. A study by consultant 

T.T. Knappen completed July 31, 1929, provided three plans to reroute 

drainage ditches to St. John’s Bayou or place culverts in the Mississippi 

River or setback levee costing between $557,000 and $731,000. The 

fi nal option selected was a modifi cation of the drainage ditch plan.33

Despite calls from the American Engineering Council, who argued 

that “it would be a grave mistake” to begin construction of fl oodways 

“until the engineering practicability and economic feasibility are studied 

by a non-partisan and competent Board of Engineers,” the Memphis 

Engineer District made progress at the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. On receiving presidential approval, Jadwin ordered construction 

of levees not impacting drainage canals on December 15, 1928, and 

obtaining fl owage rights and levee rights-of-way through condemnation. Current market value for land was $50 to $150 per acre depending on location. By December 1928, the district had started receiving 

commitments on sale of rights-of-way. In June 1929, the government 

initiated condemnation proceedings. However, there were already litigants claiming that the government was forcing sale without appropriate 

compensation. Judge Charles Davis of St. Louis denied one request for 

injunction on May 22, 1929. Only a few weeks later, in Kirk vs. Good, 
42

Divine Providence

George W. Kirk sought an injunction and sued the government on the 

grounds that it was taking his land without due process for less than its 

value, and that he could not borrow money on the land or sell it. Davis 

again denied the injunction and dismissed the suit on July 11. Condemnation proceedings had not been initiated on Kirk’s land, and any 

losses of income were, according to Judge Davis, “mere consequential 

damages” to construction of levees. If damages were to be realized 

through the operation of the fl oodway, Judge Davis determined that the 

landowner had “complete and adequate remedy” for compensation under 

the provisions of the1928 Flood Control Act. In response to government 

condemnation suits, one group of landowners argued that offers were 

$12 million to $15 million less than market value and that fl owage rights 

should be purchased simultaneously to avoid impacts to land value. At 

least one organization – the Mississippi County Levee District – had 

been making this argument since November 1928. Even as it proceeded 

with condemnations, the Memphis district was receiving bids for construction. By June 1929, it had received all bids, and with resolution 

of the Kirk suit construction began on the setback levee on October 21, 

1929. This work was completed by the end of October 1932.34

The only remaining work involved degrading the fuseplug levee 

to a height corresponding to 55 feet on the Cairo gage. By 1932, the Memphis Engineer District had come to agreement with 288 of the landowners over fl owage rights. The remainder of the 660 condemnation suits 

remained tied up in court. By 1936, the district had obtained 77 percent 

of fl owage rights, surpassing the mandated 50 percent necessary to 

degrade the fuseplug levee. However, during deliberation of condemnation proceedings for fl owage rights in the U.S. District Court of Eastern 

Missouri in Cape Girardeau, Judge Charles B. Faris ruled he would seek 

an injunction if the Memphis district attempted to lower the fuseplug 

levees before obtaining all of the fl owage rights in the fl oodway.35 The 

acquisition of fl owage easements and land rights had proved diffi cult 

and time consuming. It was not until January 1942, fourteen years after 
43

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

the passage of the 1928 Flood Control Act, that the federal government 

completed the acquisition of fl owage rights on the necessary acres within 

the fl oodway – a fi gure that did not include acreage in the backwater 

area. The cost of fl owage easements totaled $2,385,546 at an average 

price of $22.34 per acre.36

First Activation - 1937 Flood

As the Memphis district actively pursued fl owage rights, the Great 

Flood of 1937 along the Ohio and Mississippi valleys provided the fi rst 

signifi cant test of the MR&T fl ood control project and its protection 

of the confl uence area. During a three-week period in January, steady 

rain fell over the entire Ohio River basin and the confl uence region, 

with some locations receiving in excess of 15 inches of precipitation. 

The Ohio Valley had already been saturated by heavy precipitation in 

December that, because of abnormally warm temperatures, fell in the 

form of rain rather than snow. The additional intense January rains 

immediately turned into runoff, swelling the Ohio, Tennessee, and 

Cumberland rivers.37 On January 15, the Memphis Engineer District 

mobilized for a fl ood fi ght as the massive crest moved down the Ohio 

River toward the confl uence. With rain continuing to pound the Ohio 

Valley, Brig. Gen. Harley Ferguson, the Mississippi River Commission 

president, approved the request by Col. Eugene Reybold, the Memphis 

district commander, to authorize an evacuation of the 3,000 inhabitants 

residing in the fl oodway. On January 21, the river reached 51.6 feet on 

the Cairo gage – up more than1.5 feet from 24 hours earlier. Radio stations began broadcasting the evacuation notice while district personnel 

travelled through the fl oodway distributing handbills with the news. On 

January 23, the Cairo gage surpassed 56 feet – one foot higher than 

the height at which the fuseplug levee at the head of the fl oodway was 

intended to overtop and crevasse. The fuseplug levee, though, had not 
44

Divine Providence

been cut down to a height corresponding to 55 feet on the Cairo gage 

because of Judge Faris’s order.38

The Weather Bureau anticipated that stages would reach 61 feet on 

the Cairo gage within a week, but the fl ood had not yet crested at Pittsburgh at the origin of the Ohio River. Rain continued to fall, making 

it diffi cult to accurately predict the ultimate stage on the Cairo gage. 

Nonetheless, Reybold instructed district fl ood fi ghters to prepare the 

levee system between Cairo to Memphis for a possible stage of 62 feet 

on the Cairo gage. With the help of a 15,000-man workforce, composed 

mainly of Civilian Conservation Corps, Works Progress Administration, 

and inmate laborers, the fl ood fi ght teams strengthened and topped the 

levees throughout the confl uence area. While the majority of Cairo’s 

citizens fl ed to higher ground, laborers constructed wooden bulkheads 

or “mudboxes” on the tops of the levees and fl oodwalls protecting the 

low-lying city from complete inundation. After completing the wooden 

bulkheads and bracing them in place, workers lugged sacks of clay 

brought to site on railcars to the top of the structure and dumped the 

contents in the box. They then used wooden tampers to hand-tamp the 

clay into place. Upon completion, the bulkheads effectively raised the 

level of protection to 63.3 feet on the Cairo gage. A similar frantic battle 

against the river took place at Hickman, where the failure of the levee 

would fl ood eastern Kentucky and Tennessee all the way down to the 

Obion River. Engineers also feared the failure of the levee might lead 

to a permanent change in course of the river.39

While the fl ood fi ght continued in the confl uence area, Reybold 

dispatched Maj. R.D. Burdick to the fl oodway to evaluate the situation. 

When Burdick arrived, he joined two senior engineers working for the 

Mississippi River Commission, Charles Schweitzer and George Clemens, 

and Dan Fordice, a surveyman from the district, in making his assessment. The engineers found the river already spilling over the frontline 

levee at several locations. They were concerned. They knew the rate of 

overtopping was not enough to hold the stage below 60 feet on the Cairo 
45

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

gage. The levee needed to be crevassed artifi cially. Burdick instructed 

Fordice’s survey crew to use picks and shovels to cut a trench across 

the crown of the levee to encourage fl ow and scour suffi cient to create 

a complete break, but the attempt failed to achieve the desired results. 

Just as Lucius Berthe had predicted in 1928, Burdick reached the conclusion that dynamite was necessary to crevasse the levee. The failure of 

the manmade cuts, though, proved to be a fortunate circumstance when 

the crews discovered several locals had ignored the evacuation order 

and were trying to raise the level of protection along the frontline levee. 

Reminiscent of the 1927 fl ood, some of the stragglers were armed and 

Workers raise the level of protection at the Cairo floodwall during the 1937 flood. 

(Farm Security Administration - Offi ce of War Information Photograph Collection, Library of Congress)
46

Divine Providence

threatened to prevent the opening of the fl oodway by force, prompting 

Missouri Governor Lloyd C. Stark to summon the Missouri National 

Guard to protect workers attempting to open the fl oodway.

In the early morning hours of January 25, the Cairo gage read 

58.2 feet. Burdick and his team braved the frigid temperatures and 

began preparations to crevasse the sleet-covered levee with dynamite. 

With stinging rain and sleet whipping across the region, they spent the 

morning digging and drilling three rows of three holes through the 

frozen levee to a depth of eight feet at two locations about 350 feet apart. 

The crews placed approximately 1,000 pounds of dynamite in each hole 

at both locations. At approximately 1100 hours, with the Cairo gage 

reading 58.4 feet, the charge was blown, creating a 70-foot wide gap 

in the levee. The swollen river rushed through the opening. Airplanes 

fl ying over the fl oodway began dropping metal canisters containing 

hand-written U.S. Army fi eld messages that alerted fl oodway residents 

of the impending danger. “Levee has broken. Get out at once.” the 

messages warned. About 90 minutes later, the crew opened a second 

gap measuring 50 feet. More water gushed into the fl oodway. Burdick 

observed active erosion and caving at both openings and anticipated 

that they would grow to form one large crevasse. They crews repeated 

the process and opened two additional gaps in the levee by nightfall. 

By 2300 hours, the river was still climbing, having reached 58.7 feet 

on the Cairo gage. Burdick realized that the crevasses were not enlarging as quickly as he originally anticipated. By his estimation, the crevasses were only discharging roughly 30,000 cfs into the fl oodway. 

Using an additional 17,000 pounds of dynamite, Burdick and his team 

created fi ve more crevasses in the levee on January 26. By 2000 hours, 

the Cairo gage had dropped four-tenths of a foot to 58.3 feet, despite 

rising stages upriver from the gage. By January 27, the crevasses had 

an aggregate length of 1,000 feet that passed an estimated 150,000 cfs 

into the fl oodway, with additional infl ows coming through the natural 

crevasses and overtopping.40
47

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

The activation of the fl oodway caused only a minor drop in actual 

stages at the Cairo gage, but the fl ood crest had not yet reached the confl uence area and the river resumed its ascent. The Ohio River crested 

10 feet above the previous record stages at Cincinnati on January 26 and 

Evansville on January 27. It took another week for the crest to reach 

the Cairo gage, where the river reached 59.51 feet on February 3. By 

that time, the length of the crevasses had grown to 9,200 feet. Despite 

the fl awed activation process, Burdick concluded that the fl oodway, 

which passed approximately one-fourth of the entire fl ood discharge 

at Cairo at the height of the fl ood, had reduced the February 3 crest at 

Cairo by 3.5 feet – a signifi cant reduction considering that the fl oodwalls and levees, with the emergency bulkheads in place, only protected 

to a height slightly above 63 feet. The operation of the fl oodway also 

Army Field Message dropped by plane into the Birds Point-New Madrid 

floodway during the 1937 flood. (Photo by Kevin Pritchett )

Inset: Activation of the Birds Point-New Madrid floodway, 1937.
48

Divine Providence

delayed the crest long enough for the town of Hickman to construct 

bulkheads by placing earth-fi lled bulkheads on top of the fl oodwall and 

levees protecting the city. More importantly, the use of the fl oodway 

reduced the stress on the entire levee system in the confl uence area. Following the fl ood, the Memphis Engineer District closed all crevasses 

in the frontline levee, with the exception of those at the very bottom of 

the fl oodway, with an interim levee by May 1, 1937. According to the 

Annual Report of the Mississippi River Commission, the interim levee 

held back the spring rise on the Mississippi River and the farmers in 

the fl oodway enjoyed excellent crops during the 1937 growing season. 

By the 1938 fl ood season, the frontline levee had been restored to its 

pre-fl ood height.41

The 1937 fl ood shattered stage records on every major gage from 

Huntington, West Virginia, to Cairo on the Ohio River and from the 

confl uence to Helena, Arkansas, on the Mississippi River. At the Cairo 

gage, it surpassed the 1927 record stage by more than three feet; at New 

Madrid it topped the old 1913 mark by more than three feet; at Memphis 

the 1913 record by more than 6.5 feet; and at Helena the 1927 height 

by nearly 3.5 feet. Even though the improved mainline levees along 

that reach held fi rm, communities like Cairo, Hickman, and Tiptonville 

had to raise the level of protection to prevent the levees and fl oodwalls 

from overtopping. Longtime critics of the fl oodway, such as Berthe, 

questioned the adequacy of the operation. Citing the four-tenths of a 

foot drop on the Cairo gage, they scoffed at Burdick’s estimation that 

the fl oodway lowered stages at Cairo by 3.5 feet. To many, the smaller 

immediate reduction proved Berthe’s contention from the congressional 

fl ood control committee hearings in 1928 that the fl oodway would not 

provide the six-foot stage reductions envisioned by Maj. Gen. Jadwin. 

Berthe also questioned the adequacy of the project design fl ood. The 

project fl ood to which the MR&T project was designed to protect against 

allowed for a maximum discharge at Cairo of 2.25 million cfs to 2.4 million cfs, with additional levee heights to spare. The 1937 fl ood registered 
49

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

a peak discharge just a shade over two million cfs, yet several towns 

barely escaped disaster with the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway in 

operation.42

Before the fl ood crest had cleared the Mississippi River, the House 

Committee on Flood Control sent a request to Maj. Gen. Edward 

Markham, the chief of engineers, to submit revised comprehensive plans 

for the Mississippi and Ohio valleys. The operation of the fl oodway 

had left an indelible impression on Markham. He had received reports 

detailing the damages in the fl oodway and had seen pictures of homes 

being washed away by the torrent unleashed through the fl oodway. “I 

am now of the opinion that no plan is satisfactory which is based upon 

deliberately turning fl oodwaters upon the homes and property of people,” 

he lamented, “even though the right to do so may have been paid for in 

advance.” Markham conceded that the existing project fl ood dimensions 

at the Cairo gage were insuffi cient and suggested that the maximum 

The Birds Point-New Madrid floodway in operation during the 1937 flood.
50

Divine Providence

probable fl ood could reach as high as 2.6 million cfs. To keep the rate 

of discharge manageable at the confl uence area, he recommended the 

construction of additional reservoirs in the Ohio Valley.43

Increasing the Level of Protection

Over the next two decades, the Corps of Engineers and the Mississippi River Commission initiated projects and modifi cations to reduce 

the likelihood of activating the fl oodway, while maintaining it as an 

essential safety feature in the event of a fl ood approaching project fl ood 

dimensions. Whether or not it was a direct result of Markham’s plea, 

Congress authorized the construction of Kentucky Dam across the Tennessee River the following year and later authorized the Barkley Dam 

across the Cumberland River. Though not features of the MR&T project, 

the 1944 Flood Control Act authorized the Corps of Engineers to operate the dams to reduce fl ood stages to safeguard the levee system on 

the Mississippi River in the vicinity of and downriver from Cairo and 

to reduce the frequency of operation of the Birds-Point New Madrid 

fl oodway.44

The fl oodway came perilously close to operation during the 1945 and 

1950 fl oods, with the Memphis Engineer District mobilizing resources 

to activate, but in both instances stages remained below the trigger 

point. After 1950 the Mississippi River did not experience any signifi -

cant fl oods for more than two decades, however, backwater fl ooding 

resulting from minor high water events entering the fl oodway through 

the 1,500-foot outfl ow gap continued to plague more than 80,000 acres 

in the lower portion of the fl oodway. The commission sought to provide partial protection for the backwater area by recommending a new 

levee to project grade extending across the 1,500-foot gap and providing for the construction of a gravity drainage structure. Under the plan, 

32,000 acres of low land near the control structure would be utilized as 

a sump area. The plan also required local interests to furnish all lands, 
51

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

easements, rights-of-way, and fl owage rights. In 1959, the St. John 

Levee and Drainage District began acquiring the necessary easements 

within the backwater area, but landowners in the vicinity of the gap, 

where property fell within the proposed ponding area, resisted overtures 

to provide easements. They preferred the construction of a pumping 

plant in conjunction with the authorized gravity drainage structure. 

Because of the lack of cooperation, the levee district was unable to 

acquire the necessary easements, forcing the acquisition program into 

dormancy and preventing the work from proceeding. While the lower 

portion of the fl oodway continued to experience signifi cant backwater 

fl ooding, the inability to close the gap and construct the drainage structure posed no threat to fl oodway operations.45

Much had changed within the fl oodway since it was fi rst operated 

during the 1937 fl ood. In the 1930s, wooded areas comprised approximately fi fty percent of the lands within the fl oodway. By the 1950s, that 

same area had been transformed into some of the richest cropland in the 

nation, with nearly 98 percent of the fl oodway invested with agricultural production. As part of that transformation, the Mississippi River 

Commission estimated that nearly 10,000 people lived in several communities, complete with homes, churches, commercial establishments, 

and supporting infrastructure. The stakes were much higher. A second 

operation of the fl oodway would unleash more extensive damage than 

was experienced in 1937. In 1959 the commission advanced a plan to 

raise the frontline levee to a grade corresponding to 62 feet on the Cairo 

gage to provide additional protection made possible by the enlargement 

of the mainline levees in the vicinity of Cairo. The commission plan 

also contained provisions to raise the fuseplug sections to a grade corresponding to 60 feet on the Cairo gage. The levee improvements, along 

with existing and planned reservoirs in the Ohio basin, would enhance 

the level of protection within the fl oodway by reducing the expected 

frequency of its operation from once every 17 years with Kentucky 

and Barkley lakes in operation to once every 80 years. The 1965 Flood 
52

Divine Providence

Control Act authorized these recommendations. The act also stipulated 

that, while the fl oodway would not be placed into operation by overtopping until a fl ood stage of 60 feet was predicted, the commission 

maintained the right to create artifi cial crevasses in the fuseplug levee 

or elsewhere when stages reached 58 feet on the Cairo gage and a stage 

higher than 60 feet was predicted.46

Following the passage of the 1965 Act, the Mississippi River Commission further modifi ed the plan for operating the fl oodway. The new 

plan raised the fuseplug sections to a height corresponding to 60.5 feet 

on the Cairo gage, raised the frontline levee to 62.5 feet, and raised the 

setback levee to a height of 65.5 feet. The plan called for the operation 

of the fl oodway only through explosives detonation at the upper fuseplug section when stages reached 58 feet at Cairo with a forecast of 

stages to exceed 60 feet. These changes necessitated a round of modifi ed easement acquisition covering 80,982 acres of land, of which more 

than 76,000 acres were already embraced under the original easements 

obtained between 1928 and 1942. Between 1968 and 1974, the federal 

government acquired the necessary modifi ed fl owage easements at 

prices ranging from $1 to $100 per tract. The easements conformed to 

the new plan of operation and reserved for the federal government the 

right to operate the fl oodway by artifi cial crevassing. The easement 

also reserved to the owners the right to compensation if operation of 

the fl oodway resulted in “excessive deposits of sand and gravel” upon 

the land.47

After a 23-year hiatus from severe high water, the Mississippi Valley 

experienced a severe fl ood in 1973. Unlike the major fl oods of 1937 

and 1950, the bulk of the fl oodwaters during the 1973 fl ood emanated 

from the upper Mississippi River, not the Ohio basin. The fuseplug 

sections at the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway had not yet been 

fully raised to the 60.5 feet on the Cairo gage as called for under the 

modifi ed operations plan. Col. John Parish, the Memphis Engineer District commander, closely watched river forecasts. By March 22, river 
53

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

forecasters announced that they did not expect the river to climb above 

55 feet on the Cairo gage. The Memphis district and local levee boards 

were heavily engaged in fl ood fi ght activities at the Commerce to Birds 

Point levee, Cairo, and the Reelfoot/Obion sector. After surveying the 

situation, Parish was confi dent that fl ood stages would not necessitate 

the activation of the fl oodway. “Our levees are in no danger of failing,” 

he informed local newspapers in the confl uence area.

Parish approached Maj. Gen. Charles Noble, the president of the 

Mississippi River Commission, with the recommendation to fl ood fi ght 

at the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway as a precautionary measure 

to prevent overtopping of the fuseplug levee. “We want to be prepared 

for a 60-foot river. We do not expect it.” Noble gave his consent. In late 

March, a crew consisting of 42 laborers and fi fteen bulldozers, under the 

leadership of Jim Patridge of the Memphis district, raised eleven miles 

of the fuseplug levee by two feet – a height equivalent to 60 feet on 

the Cairo gage. Battling rain, wind, and mud, Patridge’s crews pushed 

35,000 cubic yards of material from the landside of the levee to the 

levee crown in less than 48 hours. Throughout the emergency operation, Parish continued to warn fl oodway residents that the effort was 

a precautionary measure. “If stages hit 58 feet, we must evacuate the 

fl oodway,” Parish told local newspapers. He also intended to activate the 

fl oodway if the forecast changed and pushed stages higher than 60 feet 

on the Cairo gage. The warnings, though, did little to damper the happy 

mood of fl oodway residents. For the fi rst time since Maj. Gen. Jadwin 

had conceived the fl oodway concept, they were being allowed to fl ood 

fi ght to save their property. The emergency action, though, created a 

false sense of optimism that perhaps such actions would be common 

in the future. That optimism would not last long.48

After the fl oods of 1973, 1975, and 1979, the Mississippi River 

Commission once again revised the fl oodway operations plan after 

concluding that activation would be more safe and effective if artifi -

cial crevasses, including the use of explosives, were not limited to the 
54

Divine Providence

upper fuseplug section. The new plan of operation included artifi cial 

crevasses at four locations along the frontline levee: two at the upper 

fuseplug section, one at the lower fuseplug section, and one in the 

frontline levee opposite Hickman, Kentucky. To assure the artifi cial 

crevasses came at the precise time to protect against fl oods approaching 

the project design fl ood dimensions, the plan incorporated the use of 

explosives if necessary. The Memphis Engineer District, though, soon 

realized that it did not possess suffi cient property rights to enable personnel to access the levee to place explosive materials as prescribed in 

the modifi ed plan. The original and modifi ed easements obtained under 

the authority of the 1928 and 1965 fl ood control acts covered only those 

lands between the landside toe of the frontline levee and the riverside 

toe of the setback levee. The easements did not extend to lands upon 

which the frontline levee rested. On July 20, 1981, Colonel W.H. Reno, 

the district commander, requested that the St. John Levee and Drainage District and Levee District No. 3 of Mississippi County, Missouri, 

grant rights of entry for district personnel to access the levee in order 

to artifi cially crevasse it with explosives in the event river conditions 

warranted operation of the fl oodway. Both sponsors refused.

In 1983 another fl ood struck the Mississippi Valley. The National 

Weather Service forecast fl ood stages to reach 60 feet on the Cairo 

gage, prompting the commission to make contingency plans for the 

operation of the fl oodway. The federal government instituted eminent 

domain proceedings seeking immediate possession of the necessary 

easements to allow Memphis district personnel to access the frontline 

levee and put the plan of operation into effect if conditions warranted. 

In response, several landowners joined with Levee District No. 3 in 

fi ling a lawsuit with the Federal District Court in Cape Girardeau seeking a temporary injunction to prevent the operation of the fl oodway. 

On May 10, Judge Kenneth Wangelin issued a permanent injunction 

against the plan to operate the fl oodway with four artifi cial crevasses. 

In making his decision, Judge Wangelin ruled that the 1965 Act did 
55

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

not provide congressional approval to artifi cially crevasse the frontline 

levees, to include the fuseplug sections, and that no substantial evidence 

existed to suggest that it was necessary to make artifi cial crevasses to 

ensure operation of the fl oodway. Judge Wangelin also ordered that if 

his injunction was reversed by appeal, the federal government must 

deposit $10.4 million dollars with the court for “just compensation” if 

the commission activated the fl oodway. The predicted fl ood stages never 

materialized during the 1983 fl ood due in part to the reduction in stages 

provided by Kentucky and Barkley lakes, but the district court’s injunction remained intact. The federal government appealed the case to the 

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 15, 1984, the appellate court 

reversed the district court’s decision by fi nding the plan to operate the 

fl oodway was not “arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.” The 

court also questioned Judge Wangelin’s authority to review the case at 

all by fi nding the decision to operate the fl oodway “is one committed to 

agency discretion by law...and is unreviewable.” Last the court ruled 

that the district court had erred in instructing the federal government 

to deposit the $10.4 million as compensation.49

In the aftermath of the 1983 fl ood, the commission tweaked the 

fl oodway operational plan in an effort to reduce preparatory actions 

and to delay the operation of the fl oodway until later in the project 

design fl ood curve. The intent of the modifi ed plan, known as the 1986 

operations plan, was to allow natural overtopping along more than 

eight miles of the upper fuseplug section before artifi cially crevassing 

the levee. To this end, the plan included raising 2.5 miles of the upper 

fuseplug section and 1.5 miles of the lower fuseplug, and imbedding 

the raised sections with polyethylene pipe that could be fi lled with 

blasting agent in less than a day. The additional height in the levee was 

necessary to provide a dry platform for crews to pump the explosives 

through access wells into the buried lines. The explosives could also 

be removed safely in the event that river stages did not necessitate the 

operation of the fl oodway. The timetable for the new operational plan 
56

Divine Providence

The Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway under the 1986 operations plan.

, -. BIRDS POINT NEW MADRID FLOODWAY I~,,, " .nOM"" " 

® 
57

Chapter One – General Jadwin’s Floodway

was based on the river elevations projected in the design hydrograph 

for fl oods approaching the project design fl ood. When stages reached 

56 feet on the Cairo gage, a tow with the necessary equipment would 

depart the Ensley Engineer Yard. Preparation of the infl ow crevasse 

would begin when stages reached 59 feet and would be completed by 

the time the river reached 60 feet. Artifi cial crevassing of the levee 

would commence upon the command of the commission president prior 

to river stages reaching 61 feet on the Cairo gage with additional stage 

increases forecast. Despite the changes, the federal government reserved 

the right to activate the fl oodway, if necessary, when stages reached or 

exceeded 58 feet on the Cairo gage and the levee system showed any 

signs of severe stress.50

Residents within the fl oodway, though, pushed for its outright 

abandonment. In 1987, Rep. William Emerson of Missouri prodded 

the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation to pass a 

resolution directing the commission to determine feasible alternatives 

to operating the fl oodway. This resulted in a 1990 reconnaissance by 

the Memphis Engineer District that investigated several alternatives 

to include purchasing the land within the fl oodway at a cost of more 

than $200 million and leasing it back to farmers at the their own risk; 

constructing permanent auxiliary channels in the fl oodway to confi ne 

fl oodwaters diverted into the area, rather than allow them to overfl ow 

the entire fl oodway; realigning and setting back the frontline levee at 

fi ve locations to provide a wider fl oodplain; executing a cutoff at Bessie 

Bend to increase the slope and lower fl ood stages upstream of the bend 

throughout the fl oodway reach; and a plan of natural overtopping of the 

frontline levee. The study concluded that several of the alternatives were 

feasible from an engineering viewpoint, but were not justifi ed economically. The study further concluded that the plan of natural overtopping 

of the frontline levee without artifi cial crevasses would serve as an 

alternative to the 1986 plan of operation and would provide a higher 

level of protection for the lands within the fl oodway. This alternative 
58

Divine Providence

required raising the upper fuseplug section to a height corresponding 

to 64.5 feet on the Cairo gage, while leaving the elevation of the lower 

fuseplug section and the remainder of the frontline levee unchanged. 

Under this proposed alternative, though, hydraulic models indicated 

an increase of fl ood stages on the Cairo and Hickman of 3.7 feet and 

2.2 feet, respectively.51

The reconnaissance study served as the basis for engineering review 

of the potential impacts of the natural overtopping plan along both banks 

of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. Published in 1991 by the Memphis 

district, in coordination with the Louisville district, the engineering 

review determined that the implementation of the modifi ed plan required 

improvements to existing levees and fl oodwalls and alterations to existing pumping stations and culverts throughout the confl uence area in both 

districts at a cost of $140 million – $100 million in the Memphis district 

and $40 million in the Louisville district. In April 1992, the Mississippi 

River Commission endorsed the modifi ed plan and requested that the 

district furnish copies to local and congressional interests because the 

implementation of the plan would require congressional authorization. 

Congress, however, never took action.52

General Jadwin’s fl oodway remained the authorized solution to the 

dilemma at the confl uence. The fl oodway had been modifi ed several 

times between 1937 and 1986. Through those modifi cations, the Mississippi River Commission through the Memphis Engineer District 

had raised the fuseplug sections of the frontline levee from a height 

equivalent to 55 feet on the Cairo gage to 60.5 feet. Each modifi cation 

not only raised the level of protection, but also reduced the likelihood 

of activation. Yet, the fl oodway remained as a viable safety valve to 

reduce pressure on the system in the event of a massive fl ood. In 2011, 

as the snowmelt crests on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers converged on 

the confl uence area and the National Weather Service intently watched 

a developing storm pattern that threatened additional intense rains, the 

1986 operations plan remained in effect and set in law.
Chapter Two

Trouble at the 

Confluence:

The 2011 Activation 

of the Birds PointNew Madrid Floodway

The operation of the fl oodway is the safest method due to 

the non-hazardous ingredients, which are not classifi ed as 

a high explosive even when mixed; the fastest, because the 

explosive is stored at a Corps facility and can easily be transported, mixed, and pumped into pre-emplaced pipes; and the 

most reliable method that has been successfully fi eld tested 

in various environmental conditions.

James W. Lloyd and Jack H. Hurdle

The Military Engineer, July 1988
60

Divine Providence

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61

ON APRIL 22, 2011, MILUS WALLACE stood outside his lovely brick 

ranch home and looked over his sprawling 2,300-acre farm 

situated in the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. He quietly 

and proudly took in the serenity offered by the little slice of paradise 

that he and his wife, Wanda, had carved out of the landscape during their 

35-year marriage. On that Good Friday morning on April 22, Wallace 

intended to go fi shing to restock his supplies for his famous fi sh fries, 

where anyone and everyone was welcome to stop by the Wallace home 

and enjoy good food and even better company. As he stood surveying his 

land, the backwater fl ooding entering the fl oodway from the 1,500-foot 

gap near New Madrid concerned him. The backwater threatened to cover 

the roads leading from his home to New Madrid. He needed to move 

nearly 17,000 bushels of beans before the roads closed. But that was 

the extent of his worries. The backwater would not fl ood his property. 

Wallace had lived in the fl oodway his entire life. His parents had also 

lived in the fl oodway, having endured the 1937 operation. His mother 

gave birth to one of his siblings in a tent on the levee in the aftermath 

of the great fl ood of that year. Wallace understood the risks associated 

with living and farming in the fl oodway. With each high water event, 

he always knew in the back of his mind that there was a chance that 

the Mississippi River Commission and the Corps of Engineers would 

blow the levee. The fl oodway was designed to save lives and property. 

Wallace respected that. At the same time, a part of him did not think 

that they would ever actually activate it.53

The Rain Begins

The April 21, 2011, contingency forecast for 61.1 feet on the Cairo 

gage late on May 3 or early on May 4 certainly alarmed water control 

managers at MVD and LRD. The specter of activating the Birds PointNew Madrid fl oodway remained only a remote possibility. The forecast, 

after all, merely represented a worst-case scenario – but it captured the 
62

Divine Providence

undivided attention of the Mississippi River Commission and the Memphis Engineer District. Up to that point, the fl ood had been a routine late 

winter/early spring fl ood. The new forecast and the threat of additional 

rain represented the fi rst real indication of big trouble. Charles Shadie 

and Deborah Lee, the chiefs of water management at MVD and LRD, 

respectively, and David Berretta, the long time chief of hydraulics at 

the Memphis Engineer District, immediately held a second conference 

call to discuss potential stage scenarios at the Cairo gage, impacts to 

the fl oodway, and possible options to store water in the massive fl ood 

control reservoirs upriver of the confl uence area.

They also alerted their respective commanders of the contingency 

forecast. Shadie contacted Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, the Mississippi 

River Commission president and MVD commander since February 2008. 

A native of Brooklyn, New York, Walsh possessed an impressive resume 

based heavily on civil works experience with the Corps of Engineers. 

He had served as the commander of the Sacramento Engineer District, 

the South Atlantic Division, and the Gulf Region Division in Iraq. He 

had also served stints as the executive director for civil works and chief 

Maj. Gen. John W. 

Peabody (left) and 

Maj. Gen Michael J. 

Walsh during the 

2011 flood.
63

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

of staff at the Corps of Engineers’ headquarters in Washington, D.C. As 

president of the Mississippi River Commission, it would be Walsh’s 

decision as to if and when to operate the fl oodway. Berretta notifi ed 

Col. Vernie Reichling, Jr., the Memphis Engineer District commander 

since July 2010. Reichling, a combat engineer who led his platoon in 

the initial assault into Panama during Operation Just Cause and participated in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Enduring Freedom, 

was relatively new to the Corps of Engineers’ civil works mission. He 

would be Walsh’s point man on the ground responsible for preparing the 

fl oodway for operation if conditions warranted. Lee notifi ed Maj. Gen. 

John Peabody, the LRD commander and member of the Mississippi 

River Commission since August 2008. A native of northern Ohio and 

a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Peabody had 

spent most of his career as a combat engineer and had been one of the 

fi rst men in during the invasion of Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

As LRD commander, he oversaw the fi rst line of defense against fl oods 

represented by the Corps of Engineers’ fl ood control reservoirs in the 

Ohio basin. Peabody would be called upon to store water in those reservoirs in an attempt to lower fl ood stages along the confl uence area and 

try to prevent the activation of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway.

Under Section 7 of the 1944 Flood Control Act, Peabody was in 

direct command of the Cumberland River system in the Nashville Engineer District, including Barkley Lake, and the Tennessee Valley Authority’s reservoir system, including Kentucky Lake. As Peabody’s agent, 

Lee directed releases from Kentucky and Barkley dams. At that point, 

the entire reservoir system in LRD was in overall good shape in terms 

of storage utilization. The Cumberland system, though, represented the 

only viable tool to protect the confl uence area. Lee’s immediate plan 

called for the release of water from behind Kentucky and Barkley dams 

to clear storage space for the rains expected over the weekend. The 

main problem confronting LRD water control managers involved the 

Wolf Creek, Center Hill, Dale Hollow, and J. Percy Priest dams on the 
64

Reservoirs in the Ohio basin.

LRD Water Management 

Reservoir and Lake Status 

Utilizing >25% Flood Control Storage: 37 proj

Utilizing >50% Flood Control Storage: 17 proj

Utilizing> 100 % Flood Control Storage: 4 pro

Rl,k Reduction M.uu,," 

Pool ( I ...... : 630.00' 

Today: 6S7.2'/'tudy 

Gradu allnrru •• to lulllufbine 

capa<lty by f riday (5/71 
65

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

Cumberland River system upriver from Kentucky and Barkley lakes. 

The Wolf Creek and Center Hill dams were undergoing critical dam 

safety repairs to protect the integrity of the structures. They held restrictive ratings on the Dam Safety Action Classifi cation (DSAC) ranking 

system, which meant that dam safety offi cers feared failure of the dams 

was a real possibility if the necessary repairs were not completed. As 

such, the pool elevations in the reservoirs behind those dams had been 

lowered substantially to prevent seepage failure. To keep pool elevations 

below restricted levels, the dams were releasing maximum discharges. 

If the anticipated rain over the next week fell behind those dams, LRD 

faced a diffi cult decision – continue maximum discharges which would 

take away valuable fl ood storage capacity at Kentucky and Barkley 

lakes, or hold back water behind the dams with the restrictive ratings.54

On April 22, one to three inches of rain fell over most of the middle 

Mississippi basin below St. Louis and along the Ohio River. Some areas 

received fi ve inches or more of heavy localized precipitation. LRD 

water control managers increased the discharges through the Kentucky 

and Barkley dams to clear additional storage space to accommodate 

runoff from additional storms in the forecast. On April 23, three to fi ve 

additional inches of rain fell between Caruthersville and Chester. Southeastern Missouri got the worst of it – 3.2 inches fell in Cape Girardeau, 

3.2 inches in Popular Bluff, 4.7 inches in Greenville, and 3.8 inches 

in Fisk – but the rain also hammered the southern portions of Illinois, 

Indiana, and Ohio, as well as northwest Kentucky and western Tennessee. Cairo’s two-day rainfall total reached 3.5 inches.55

Deborah Lee pressed the National Weather Service to publish its 

contingency forecast. That forecast typically served only federal audiences for informational purposes because the forecast relied heavily on 

precipitation as far away as fi ve days into the future. Conditions often 

changed, causing adjustments to the forecasts. The weather service normally did not publish its contingency forecasts out of concern of causing 

an overreaction among the public. The agency considered the forecasts 
66

Divine Providence

far too unreliable. The service’s various models predicted a broad array 

of expectations at the Cairo gage ranging from 51.3 feet to 62.3 feet, 

which refl ected on the uncertainty of how much rain it expected to fall 

and where it would fall over the ensuing fi ve days. Lee expressed her 

concern about the timing of the rainfall. It was Easter weekend. People 

would be distracted by family festivities. She wanted to get the information out to the public so that they and emergency response agencies 

could accelerate their preparedness if, indeed, the worst-case scenario 

materialized. The National Weather Service relented and began publishing a qualifying statement with its forecasts indicating that, taking 

future rainfall into consideration, river stages could potentially rise two 

to three feet higher than forecasted in some areas.56

At 0600 hours on Easter morning, April 24, the Cairo gage stood 

at 52.5 feet. The river had risen nearly 1.5 feet in 24 hours, one-half 

foot higher than the offi cial National Weather Service forecast from the 

afternoon before. The steady downpour over the preceding two days had 

dropped more rain than anticipated. Still it kept raining. Three inches 

of rain fell at New Madrid. Another 2.3 inches fell at Cairo. Four more 

inches dropped at Paducah. That afternoon, the weather service revised 

its projected crest at Cairo to 60 feet on May 3, but warned that the rain 

was far from over. Another three to eight inches was anticipated over the 

middle Mississippi and the Arkansas, Ohio, and Tennessee valleys. In 

LRD, the torrential rains were fi lling up the reservoir system. Systemwide fl ood storage utilization stood at 15 percent. Nineteen reservoirs 

already topped 25 percent of their authorized fl ood control storage; 

seven of those reservoirs reached greater than 50 percent. Col. Keith 

Landry, commander of the Louisville Engineer District, reported that six 

of the eleven fl ood control lakes in his area of operations approached 

record pool elevations. The situation pressed Maj. Gen. Peabody into 

issuing “over-arching guidance” to the senior leaders on his staff and 

to his district commanders. Stating the ongoing fl ood had “the potential 

to reach epic proportions,” Peabody directed that fl ood duty missions 
67

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

take the top priority over all actions at LRD and its district offi ces. “We 

must do every single thing we possibly can do – no matter how small 

or seemingly insignifi cant – to reduce the projected maximum crest at 

Cairo,” he wrote. Peabody wanted his staff to consider all alternatives, 

including those outside of the division’s normal operating procedures, 

“It is essential that we pull out the stops to fi ght the peak river crest for 

this event.”57

By the morning of April 25, the Cairo gage reached 54.5 feet. The 

confl uence area was a mess as a result of the deluge of the past week. 

Cairo was almost an island, with only a narrow strip of slightly elevated land containing Illinois Route 3 providing access to and from the 

city. Further to the south on the east side of the river, seepwater and 

impounded rain covered much of Fulton County, Kentucky, and Lake 

County, Tennessee. Standing water covered the fl at farmland in the fourstate area and inundated low-lying state and county roads with several 

inches of water. Creeks and drainage ditches overfl owed their banks. 

Because the Mississippi River stages were so high, the interior drainage 

had nowhere to go, unless it was pumped through or over the levees. 

At St. John’s Bayou on the west side of the river, the fl oodgates were 

closed in late February, which caused the bayou to back up and fl ood 

low-lying lands in East Prairie and Sikeston. Water began to encroach 

upon Interstate 55, the major north-south thoroughfare in the Mississippi 

Valley. Levee conditions across the confl uence area degraded. Small 

boils exploded everywhere across the region, particularly in the Cairo 

and Fulton County sectors where relief wells had not been installed.58

Underseepage and sand boils represent major concerns during fl oods. 

When river levels rise, the additional weight of the water creates pressure that tries to fi nd an escape route through the foundation of the 

levee system. As the underseepage makes its way to the surface on the 

landside of the levee, it boils up through the ground – hence the term 

boil. Excessive pressure causes the underseepage to drag or pipe soil 

particles from the foundation along with it – hence the term sand boil. 
68

Divine Providence

Left unchecked, sand boils create voids under the levee, which can 

lead to an eventual collapse of the levee. The Corps of Engineers uses 

relief wells and seepage berms to dissipate the pressure to the point that 

the underseepage will not erode the levee foundation. In levees where 

relief wells have not been installed, the Corps of Engineers fi ghts boils 

by building rings, usually with sandbags, around the sand boils. As the 

rings fi ll with water, the weight of the water inside the ring dissipates 

the pressure and prevents the piping of foundation material.

On April 25, the National Weather Service expected another 

eight inches of rain over much of the area during the next three days. The 

pressure on the levee system would continue to mount. The Memphis 

Illustration depicting the potential danger of a sand boil.

Inset: A dreaded sand boil piping sediment.
69

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

Engineer District had moved into Phase II operations – the highest level 

possible – across the entire confl uence area the day before. Flood fi ght 

teams, coordinating with local levee districts, patrolled levees and fl oodwalls on a 24-hour basis, intently searching for any sign of weakness 

threatening the integrity of the levee system. At 0630 hours on April 25, 

Col. Reichling, following the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway operations plan, ordered crews in Memphis to commence loading the barges 

with the explosives and necessary equipment. Crews loaded two pump 

barges each with 192 barrels of aluminum powder, six 2,500 gallon 

tanks of liquid blasting agent, two mix-pump units, and two forklifts. 

They also loaded two dozers and two backhoes on an equipment barge. 

The process took 12 hours to complete. In the meantime, it kept raining. Southeast Missouri and the Ohio Valley received another pounding. 

Nearly six inches of rain fell on Poplar Bluff and two inches at New 

Madrid. Cairo received another inch and a half; Paducah received more 

than two inches. Hopkinsville, Kentucky, received nearly 3.5 inches.59

The continued intense rains and rising river stages forced Peabody’s 

hand on April 25. Going into the fl ood, he faced the diffi cult decision 

with regard to storing water behind the restricted dams on the DSAC 

ranking system – particularly the Wolf Creek and Center Hill dams – 

in order to conserve storage space at Kentucky and Barkley lakes and 

keep fl ood stages at the confl uence in check. He had to reduce the outfl ows from Kentucky and Barkley, but that action, along with maximum 

releases coming in from the Cumberland system, would rapidly diminish 

his available storage. He knew that he did not stand a chance at preventing activation of the fl oodway without that extra storage. After intensive 

study and exhaustive analysis of the dam safety issue, Peabody took 

decisive action to initiate reductions from Kentucky and Barkley dams, 

while reducing to nearly zero the discharges from the restricted dams 

at Wolf Creek, Center Hill, Dale Hollow, and J. Percy Priest and other 

dams on the Cumberland system to reduce the amount of water fl owing 

into Kentucky and Barkley lakes. This would have the effect of driving 
70

Divine Providence

up water levels behind the restricted dams well above acceptable norms, 

but the LRD engineers expressed confi dence that the dams would hold 

if the higher pool elevations lasted only a few weeks.60

On April 26, the Cairo gage reached 56.5 feet, up more than two feet 

from the previous morning. The National Weather Service projected a 

new crest of 61 feet on the gage for May 3. Weather forecasts for the 

day called for up to two more inches of rain over the affl icted areas. 

Conditions at Cairo and Fulton County continued to degrade. At Hickman the fl oodwall had cracks that seeped water. Flood fi ghters stuffed 

sandbags around the stop logs in the fl oodwall to prevent additional 

leakage. The Dyer County Little Levee board in Tennessee, facing an 

eventual overtopping of their levee, voted to create an artifi cial breach 

at the south end of the levee to allow fl oodwater to slowly back into 

the area, rather than face the torrent and scour from overtopping at the 

north end. At Lake County, a fl ood fi ght team discovered that a milelong segment of the levee was two feet below the designed height and 

began making plans to raise the low spots. At Dutchtown, Missouri, the 

Memphis district worked with local offi cials to raise a portion of the 

Hubble Creek levee to protect the town from fl ooding. At Caruthersville, 

city offi cials contemplated raising the height of the fl oodwall protecting 

the city. Over at Lake Wappapello at the head of the St. Francis basin, 

the rain of the past week had been the most severe. Lake levels had 

risen more than 40 feet in a matter of four days. Corps of Engineers 

offi cials warned that the lake was near full and would soon go to emergency spillway operations. The only shred of good news involved the 

Commerce to Birds Point levee, where patrols reported no problems.61

The Commerce to Birds Point levee is, as David Berretta described, 

“the most critical levee” in the Mississippi Valley. A break in the levee, 

located at the head of the alluvial valley, would inundate more than 

two million acres in the Missouri bootheel and most of the St. Francis 

basin in northeast Arkansas. Some estimates put the number of acres 

potentially fl ooded at more than three million. Following the 1927 fl ood, 
71

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

Areas protected by the Birds Point-New Madrid floodway.

Shawnee 

NF 

Poplar 

d'~I~u~ff~ __ --"""~' 

Million Acres 

Protected by 

Floodway 

Forr 

o 

I I I Levee Centerline 

c=J Levee Protected Area 

Birds Point- New Madrid 

Floodway 
72

Divine Providence

Missouri congressman William Nelson described the levee as the “roof” 

of the fl ood control system on the west bank of the MR&T project. 

Nelson’s roof needed to be leak proof. The Commerce to Birds Point 

levee had served as the source of major scares during past fl ood events. 

During the severe 1973 fl ood, a 1,500-foot section on the riverside of 

the levee caved into the river. The caving extended to the top of the 

levee, which caused intense fears it would fail. Personnel from the Memphis Engineer District addressed the problem by placing 18,000 tons 

of riprap stone – carried to the site on barges – to prevent additional 

caving and to shore up the levee. The aggressive response saved the 

levee from failure. Twenty years later during the 1993 fl ood, the levee 

again provided an anxious moment. The private Len Small levee on 

the opposite bank of the river typically overtopped or failed during 

larger fl oods, which lowered river stages and reduced pressure on the 

Commerce to Birds Point levee. The owners of the Len Small levee, 

though, had strengthened their levee during the 1980s. During the 1993 

fl ood, the levee held against a stage under which it normally failed. The 

river remained confi ned and it climbed to within a few feet of the top 

of the Commerce to Birds Point levee. Sand boils developed, which 

fl ood fi ght teams attacked with sandbag rings until the underseepage 

stabilized. Beginning in 1995, with strong support and encouragement 

from U.S. Congressman William Emerson and the Mississippi River 

Commission, the Memphis Engineer District raised and strengthened 

the Commerce to Birds Point levee and installed relief wells. But as 

the 2011 fl ood developed, the district kept a close eye on the levee.62

On April 26, Maj. Gen. Walsh ordered the movement of the fl eet 

carrying the explosives and equipment from the Ensley Engineer Yard at 

Memphis to the harbor at Hickman, Kentucky. A driving rain pounded 

the Memphis area with nearly four more inches of rain as the fl eet prepared to ship out. Walsh also ordered the land-based crews to deploy 

to the fl oodway and begin preparations for possible activation. James 

Lloyd, one of the developers of the Birds Point-New Madrid operations 
73

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

plan, gathered the fl oodway task force in the auditorium at the Ensley 

Engineer Yard to do one last systems check. They could not leave anything behind. “If we don’t have it with us, we will have to work without 

it,” Lloyd warned. He also ensured that every single person – the boat 

captains, the survey men, the hose handlers, and so on – knew their 

roles. He expressed the importance of focusing on the mission at hand. 

More importantly, he cautioned them to expect the unexpected. “If we 

have to do this,” Lloyd warned, “fate will probably dictate that we will 

have to do this at night and in the rain.”63

With intense rains hammering much of the confl uence area and Ohio 

Valley with two inches of rain on April 26, total rainfall accumulations 

continued to climb higher, as did river levels on the Cairo gage. By 

the morning of April 27, the river had climbed more than a foot higher 

than the previous morning. Bill Frederick’s morning weather report 

called for another widespread and severe weather event that carried a 

high risk of strong tornadoes, large hail, and damaging winds over the 

Tennessee Valley. The National Weather Service anticipated another 

one to three inches of rain between Cape Girardeau and Arkansas City, 

with the heaviest rains falling along the Cumberland and Tennessee 

watersheds. The report, however, contained some good news. As the 

storm front moved through the region, it would bring an end to the torrential rains of the past week. Clear skies were in the forecast for the 

next two days.64

The Cairo gage stood at 57.9 feet, but the offi cial projected crest 

dropped from 61 feet on May 3 to 60.5 feet on May 1. Maj. Gen. Peabody’s decisive move to reduce outfl ows from the restricted dams in 

the Cumberland system to conserve storage at Kentucky and Barkley 

lakes was paying off. While the local population’s concern grew over 

the possible use of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway, the performance of the LRD reservoirs and the anticipated respite from rains for 

the next few days created a sense of unspoken and guarded optimism 

among Corps of Engineers and Mississippi River Commission offi cials 
74

Divine Providence

that the fl oodway might not be needed. That afternoon, Maj. Gen. Walsh 

and two civilian members of the commission, Sam E. Angel and R.D. 

James, conducted an aerial assessment of the four-state area impacted 

by the deluge of the past week. Water was everywhere, sometimes as 

far as their eyes could see. The situation remained serious, to be sure, 

but if Peabody could continue to work his magic and the rain held off, 

the commissioners believed the fl ood might be manageable.65

Following the aerial tour, Walsh, Angel, and James travelled to 

East Prairie, Missouri, to attend a town-hall style meeting organized 

by Rep. Jo Ann Emerson. Her congressional district encompassed the 

fl oodway, and she intended to help her constituents. Earlier in the day, 

Emerson along with Missouri’s two U.S. senators, Claire McCaskill 

and Roy Blunt, sent a letter to President Barrack Obama urging him to 

consider alternatives to using the fl oodway. In the cramped Creative 

School Zone building in East Prairie, she took her fi ght to a new level. 

With approximately 75 deeply-concerned citizens packed around her, 

Emerson pulled out a photocopied page from the Mississippi River 

Commission history book, Upon Their Shoulders, and read a quote 

from Maj. Gen. Edward Markham, the chief of engineers at the time the 

fl oodway was last activated in 1937. “I am now of the opinion,” Emerson read aloud from the page before her, “that no plan is satisfactory 

which is based upon deliberately turning fl oodwaters upon the homes 

and property of people even though the right to do so may have been 

paid for in advance.” The crowd cheered. “We’re going to do everything 

possible to prevent the Corps from operating the fl oodway,” Emerson 

told them. They cheered again. She then informed the audience that she 

arranged the meeting to help combat rumors about the possible operation 

of the fl oodway—rumors that were leading to panic across the region. 

She hoped that Walsh could help calm the situation by answering their 

questions. She turned the fl oor over to Walsh.66

Maj. Gen. Walsh faced the large audience huddled around him in 

a semi-circle. They were angry and they were right on top of him. If 
75

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

Above: Aerial view of flooding in the confluence area.

Below: Members of the Mississippi River Commission and staff conduct an aerial assessment of the 

extensive flooding at the confluence area on April 27, 2011.
76

Divine Providence

Emerson intended for the close proximity of the crowd and the cramped, 

stuffy quarters to make Walsh uncomfortable, her plan worked initially. His face reddened. His voice wavered when he started to speak, 

but he quickly recovered. “I recognize all of your livelihoods will be 

impacted,” Walsh explained, “but when it gets to 61 feet, these levees 

have never been under this kind of pressure before.” For the better part 

of the next hour, Walsh and Reichling answered pointed questions and 

anxious concerns presented by the highly-intense audience. How much 

notice will we have? Will the setback levee hold? Why won’t you let the 

fl oodway naturally overtop? When you will give the order? Why are 

you willing to destroy my livelihood? Reichling gave his assurances 

that the setback levee was up to standard. He also bravely explained to 

the hostile crowd that the fl oodway protected more than just Cairo – it 

protected the entire system along that reach, especially the critical Commerce to Birds Point levee that protected many in attendance. Walsh 

emphasized that no decision had yet been made and that operating the 

fl oodway remained a last resort, but he sternly added, “At the end of 

the day, I am going to do my duty.”67

The April 27 public meeting at East Prairie, Missouri. (Photo by Kevin Pritchett )
77

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

Later that afternoon, Walsh and the commission’s senior leaders 

went to the frontline levee at Birds Point, where Reichling’s task force 

prepared the fl oodway for activation. The frontline levee contained 

two fuseplugs sections that would allow the Mississippi River into the 

fl oodway. The upper fuseplug, located at the northern tip of the project area, served as the main introduction point for fl oodwaters. The 

infl ow site was eleven miles long, with nine miles of that length built 

to a height corresponding to 60.5 feet on the Cairo gage. The lower 

elevation allowed gradual overtopping in the event of a massive fl ood. 

The Corps of Engineers, though, constructed sections of the fuseplug 

to a height of 62.5 feet on the Cairo gage – the same height as the 

rest of the frontline levee. The higher elevation sections on the fuseplug housed nearly two miles of buried polyethylene pipe connected 

at 1,000-foot intervals by access wells buried in the levee. Under the 

operations plan, crews would pump liquid explosives into the buried 

lines through the access wells. At the lower end of the fl oodway sat 

two infl ow/outfl ow areas equipped with more access wells and buried 

lines. These sections allowed the fl oodwaters to enter the fl oodway, but 

they were also designed to evacuate the fl oodwaters when river levels 

eventually subsided.68

Working under security provided by the Mississippi County Sheriff 

Department to address any potential confrontation with landowners, 

the survey crews, equipped with maps, global positioning satellites, 

and magnetometers, travelled the length of the frontline levee marking 

and locating the 46 buried access wells with wooden stakes and orange 

tape. The ground crews followed behind. Using the backhoes brought 

to the levee on the equipment barge, the ground crews uncovered the 

wells. Workers then used shovels to clear the wells of any loose dirt 

and gravel. Once this was accomplished, they installed fi ttings on the 

pipes to accommodate the hoses from the pump barges, if necessary. 

With Walsh and his staff on the levee, Reichling, Lloyd, Russell Davis 

– Reichling’s operations chief – and Bartley Durst, the explosives team 
78

Divine Providence

leader from the Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC), 

detailed the processes the task force would employ to prepare the access 

wells, charge the lines, and, ultimately, detonate the explosives to artifi cially crevasse the levee. While on the levee someone – most likely 

either Davis or Durst – indicated to Walsh that fi lling the lines with 

explosives did not commit him as Mississippi River Commission president to operating the fl oodway. In other words, the action of charging the 

lines did not signal a point of no return as it was possible to neutralize 

the explosive slurry and pump the mixture from the lines. Lloyd, the 

subject matter expert, pulled Walsh aside, though, and explained that 

while it was possible to clear the lines, he knew “from hands-on experience” that it was a very complicated process that took weeks, if not 

A briefi ng on the levee. From left: Col. Thatch Shepard, James Lloyd, David Sills, Bartley Durst, Edward Belk, 

and Richard Lockwood brief Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh (squatt ing) and Col. Vernie Reichling (with back to 

camera) on the potential operation of the floodway.
79

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

months, to accomplish. If the crews 

pumped the slurry in and Walsh 

did not give the activation order, 

the district would have to arrange 

security until the explosives were 

removed. People would not be able 

to return to their homes until then. 

To complicate matters, the district 

could not clear the lines until after 

the fl ood season ended because 

all available materials required 

for activation were already on site. 

There was not a reserve stash of explosives at the Ensley Engineer Yard 

in Memphis. Lloyd then delivered a stern recommendation to hold off 

on the pumping operations until Walsh was certain he would give the 

order to activate. “Sir, you don’t want to pump it [the explosive slurry] 

in, if you aren’t going to detonate,” Lloyd cautioned. Reichling concurred with the assessment. Lloyd’s advice would resonate with Walsh 

through the entire fl ood fi ght.69

The April 27 frontal system that brought an end to the rains that 

pounded the area for the past week did so with a deadly vengeance. The 

National Weather Service reported that 160 tornadoes, 292 damaging 

wind events, and 178 large hail reports had left 178 dead in one day. 

Perhaps the most notorious killer was the massive tornado that ripped a 

132-mile path through Mississippi and Alabama and virtually wiped the 

town of Heckleburg, Alabama, from existence. The rain, though, was 

over for the time being. Since April 20, at least six inches of rain had 

fallen over a huge section of Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Mississippi. That was just the minimum amount, 

most areas received a foot or more, with Springdale, Arkansas, recording the most at 19.7 inches. By the morning of April 28, the Cairo gage 

Memphis Engineer District work crews 

unearth the access wells at the Birds PointNew Madrid floodway fuseplug levee.
80

Divine Providence

reached 58.7 feet. The river had climbed nearly another foot, testing 

the levee system like never before.70

Pressure on the System

At LRD, the total system storage reached 23 percent on April 28. 

Col. Landry reported to Peabody that three reservoirs in the Louisville 

Engineer District – Rough River, Monroe, and Patoka – were approaching emergency spillway operations. The lakes had almost reached their 

design limitations. Other than that, the LRD and TVA reservoir systems were in good shape considering the circumstances. Because of 

Peabody’s April 25 order to conserve storage space, Kentucky and 

Barkley lakes still maintained close to 80 percent of their available 

fl ood storage. Peabody’s aim was to hold the Cairo gage steady long 

enough for Walsh to give the order to load the pipes. At 0700 hours, 

he instructed Deborah Lee to operate the Kentucky and Barkley pools 

to an elevation of 374.5 feet – four and one-half feet above the record 

pool elevation – with the goal of managing stages at Cairo. The full 

375 feet as called for in the fl ood control manual could not be used; the 

cofferdam protecting the new Kentucky Lock construction would be 

overtopped at 375 feet with the potential for undermining and loss of 

control of Kentucky Lake. Even leaving only one-half foot of freeboard 

was risky; a wind aligned with the lake’s axis could push the water 1.5 

to 2 feet higher. Lake Barkley’s control gates also were not engineered 

to sustain overtopping and long-recognized vibration issues with them 

precluded surcharging operations (raising the gates to get higher pool 

elevations above 375 feet).

Deborah Lee knew they were walking a very tight line between 

maximizing an effective operation and potentially losing control of 

Kentucky and Barkley lakes with devastating consequences for the 

nation. If the cofferdam project overtopped, the Barkley hydropower 

unit would be destroyed. If that happened, LRD would likely lose the 
81

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

ability to control fl oodwater for up to a year. Peabody, though, had 

seen Lee in action as she masterfully manipulated water levels in the 

system. He had total confi dence in her ability. He also directed further 

increases of storage on the Cumberland system reservoirs in a manner 

consistent with any DSAC concerns. He then sent an email to Walsh 

recommending that the task force load the slurry at the fl oodway as 

soon as possible, as LRD expected the river to rise above 60 feet in the 

next 24 to 48 hours.71

Walsh received Peabody’s recommendation during a decision briefing by Col. Reichling. He did not respond immediately. During that 

briefi ng, Reichling informed Walsh that his engineers were highly concerned about the integrity of the levee system at Fulton County. The 

number of sand boils developing along the levee represented a marked 

increase over previous high water events. If the river continued to climb 

as forecasted, his engineers on the ground were not confi dent they could 

hold for an extended period of time. Engineers from the Cairo sector 

also reported an increased number of sand boils, but, to date, no large 

high-energy boils had been discovered. The situation at the Commerce 

to Birds Point levee, the Caruthersville fl oodwall, and Lake County 

remained stable. Reichling informed Walsh that, while the operations 

plan allowed for activation of the fl oodway at 58 feet on the Cairo gage 

if the levee system could not handle the pressure, the integrity issues at 

Fulton County and Cairo did not warrant activation. Instead Reichling 

favored waiting. The task force needed roughly 24 hours in advance of 

the Cairo gage reaching 60 feet to prepare the fl oodway for operation. 

Based on input from his water control offi ce, his assessment was that 

the gage would not break 60 feet for at least another 48 hours. Reichling recommended that Walsh hold the barges at Hickman harbor for 

the time being.72

Walsh notifi ed Peabody of his decision to hold the barges. Peabody 

responded that he had been making his decisions to hold the stage at 

Cairo to “facilitate the placement of slurry” at the request of MVD. The 
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Divine Providence

Memphis Engineer District had earlier sent a plea for LRD to hold the 

Cairo gage at 59 feet so that the task force could prepare the fl oodway. 

Meeting that request, according to Peabody, had “unnecessarily used 

up storage” at Kentucky and Barkley lakes. He went on to add that he 

did not have legal authority to manage those reservoirs for the purpose 

of preparing the fl oodway. He could only operate them to keep the 

maximum crest at Cairo below 61 feet. In other words, Peabody told 

Walsh that as LRD commander he had done all that he could – probably 

more than he should have – to buy Walsh time to prepare the fl oodway 

for activation. He could do nothing more to facilitate that action below 

61 feet on the Cairo gage. Walsh was on his own if he did not get the 

pipes loaded by that stage. “We were holding back everything we could 

to give General Walsh time to load the pipes,” Lee later recalled. “We 

knew we were reaching the breaking point,” she continued, “but he 

wasn’t making the decision” to commence loading.73

Cairo was just starting to reach the breaking point. On the evening 

of April 28, Thomas Morgan, an engineer from the Memphis district 

assigned to the Cairo sector fl ood fi ght team, gave Col. Reichling and 

Malcolm Gay, a reporter with the New York Times, a tour of the Cairo 

area. Morgan attempted to explain to the reporter the immense pressure the river exerted on the fl oodwall and surrounding levee system. 

Almost as an afterthought, he took Reichling and Gay to an abandoned 

piezometer located a few hundred feet from the fl oodwall at one of the 

narrowest points at the neck of the peninsula. The piezometer was well 

known to veteran area fl ood fi ghters. When river stages climbed and 

increased pressure in the aquifer, the piezometer spouted water several 

feet into the air, which perfectly illustrated the point Morgan wanted to 

make. As he explained the pressure on the system, he noticed a small 

sand boil near the base of the piezometer. The throat or opening of the 

boil was only about nine inches in diameter, but it was growing right 

before Morgan’s eyes. Another small boil developed a few inches away 

from the fi rst. Within moments they joined to together to former a larger 
83

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

boil. Then it happened again. Morgan knew the boil was a serious problem. It was precisely the type of high-energy boil that Reichling had 

reported the absence of during his briefi ng earlier in the morning. He 

called Mike Watson and Chip Newman, two fellow Memphis district 

fl ood fi ghters, and apprised them of his observations.74

Newman arrived at the scene just after 1900 hours. By then the 

boil had grown to two feet in diameter. Newman took one look at the 

high-energy boil and recognized that the traditional treatment of building a sandbag ring around it to equalize the pressure would not suffi ce. He had another plan in mind, though. Newman called Jeff Denny, 

the Alexander County Engineer, and representatives from the Bunge 

Corporation and the nearby water treatment plant. Newman suggested 

they construct a ring berm around the sand boil using a nearby stockpile of fl yash cinder owned by Bunge. The representatives from Bunge 

agreed. As the night’s mission progressed under a bank of emergency 

work lights, the team’s resources grew to include dozers, backhoes, 

loaders, excavators, dump trucks and approximately 40 people, including Edward Dean and James Nabakowski from the Memphis Engineer 

District. By 0100 hours, the crew constructed a 50-foot diameter ring 

berm to a height of 6.5 feet. The sand boil, however, continued to pipe 

sediment at an alarming rate. The river was too high and exerted too 

much pressure. The berm needed to go higher.75

Newman was dejected. Fatigue had set in. His mind began to race. 

He had never seen the river this high before or a boil this large. His 

thoughts turned to the people of Cairo. If he could not get the boil under 

control, the fl oodwall would probably fail. He prayed to God that his 

efforts would be successful. So many lives were at stake. At 0130 hours, 

Newman met with the Cairo mayor, Judson Childs, and police chief, 

Gary Hankins. The discussion quickly turned to the possibility of a 

mandatory evacuation, but Childs resisted for the time being. Their 

discussion took place in the middle of the night, so there would be no 

way to spread the word other than by door-to-door. They agreed to meet 
84

Divine Providence

Above: R.D. James, left, and Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh discuss the mega boil with Chip Newman as rain 

continues to pound Cairo..

Below: The flyash cinder ring berm at the Cairo mega boil.
85

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

again later in the morning. If the work crew could not get the sand boil 

under control by then, Newman would give Mayor Childs an engineering assessment with regard to evacuation. Newman went back to work. 

The crew raised the berm another two feet. At 0400 hours, though, the 

boil took on more energy and began piping material again at an accelerated rate. The crew had hoped to build the berm wider for additional 

stability, but the boil’s increase in energy forced them to abandon the 

notion. They continued building higher without the benefi t of a wider 

base. By 0630, the berm stood 10 feet high. The boil’s energy fi nally 

began to dissipate.76

The crew had the boil under control, but as seasoned fl ood fi ghters, they realized the pressure would try to fi nd a new outlet. Newman 

instructed the crew to search the adjacent fl ooded fi eld for additional 

boils. They discovered another high-energy boil directly behind the 

NAPA auto parts store. Acting quickly, Illinois National Guardsmen 

fi lled sandbags in the parking lot of the NAPA store, carried the bags on 

fl at bottom boats through two feet of water, and constructed a fi ve-foot 

high berm around the boil. Once the second boil stabilized, the crew 

built an access road so they could haul in rock to reinforce the sandbag 

ring. Morgan later found a third mega boil on 27th Street, approximately 500 feet from the fl oodwall. The boil was smaller than the fi rst 

two, requiring a four-foot high sandbag ring. All three high-energy 

boils stabilized for the time being. The river was still forecasted to go 

higher. The pressure on the levees and fl oodwall would increase along 

with river stages. The fi ght was not over. Mayor Childs recognized as 

much and issued a voluntary evacuation of the city.77

While crews fought the high-energy mega boils at Cairo, conditions 

at Fulton County continued to degrade. The levee in Fulton County 

represented a traditional trouble spot during fl oods along the lower Mississippi River, due mostly to uncontrolled underseepage. The number 

and size of sand boils appearing in that sector worsened with each high 

water event. If the levee failed at Fulton County, the river would fl ood 
86

Divine Providence

western Kentucky and western Tennessee all the way down to the Obion 

River. The Memphis Engineer District had designed a plan to solve 

the problem through the extensive application of relief wells, but local 

landowners resisted granting the necessary rights-of-way to allow the 

improvements to proceed.78 By the time the week-long downpour ended 

on April 27, the Fulton County area was a sloppy mess. Darian Chasteen, the Memphis district’s man in charge of the fl ood fi ght at Fulton 

County, found it diffi cult to address the signifi cant number of sand 

boils developing in the area. On April 28, the Fulton County Detention 

Center sent roughly two dozen inmates to assist Chasteen, the Fulton 

County Levee Board, and the Kentucky National Guard in the fl ood 

fi ght. To help combat the mud, David Weatherly, the president of the 

levee board, secured three Hydratreks – tracked vehicles capable of navigating through the quagmire while hauling 1,000 pounds of sandbags. 

With the added resources, the fl ood fi ght team successfully gained control of several severe sand boils at 

the toe of the levee by constructing 

Sand boil rings near the toe of the levee surround a home in Fulton County.

Inset: Darian Chasteen stands next to a sand boil ring in muddy Fulton County, Tennessee.
87

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

fi ve-foot high sandbag rings to equalize the pressure. While Chasteen 

appreciated the inmates, referring to them as “lifesavers,” he realized 

that he could not continue to treat the sand boils on an individual basis. 

More materialized and the crews, no matter how valiantly they tried, 

could not keep pace with their development.79

Chasteen, Nicholas Bidlack, a geotechnical engineer, Jack Ratliff, 

the area commander from the Dyersburg offi ce, and Thomas Minyard, 

the Memphis district’s chief of engineering and construction, met to 

discuss the situation. They knew the National Weather Service expected 

the river to rise at least another two feet. To a man they had reservations 

that the levee could withstand that kind of intense pressure for any prolonged period. They devised a plan to construct a berm perpendicular 

to the levee and extending approximately 1,500 feet to higher ground. 

They could pump additional water into the area enclosed by the berm, 

thereby creating a water blanket over the entire area to counteract the 

pressure from the river. If the fl ood fi ght team could not fi ght the sand 

boils individually, then they would create one, large sand boil ring over 

the entire area. It was a plan of last resort. It was also a plan that would 

take time to complete.80

While the fl ood fi ght continued at Cairo and Fulton County, residents and landowners in the fl oodway continued their evacuations. On 

April 25, Mississippi County Sheriff Keith Moore declared a state of 

emergency in the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. Two days later, 

he and New Madrid County Sheriff Terry Stevens ordered all 230 residents in the fl oodway to evacuate. Missouri Governor Jay Nixon, who 

staunchly opposed the activation of the fl oodway, but respected the 

need for law and order, sent more than 700 national guardsmen to the 

area to assist with the evacuation and establish checkpoints to secure 

the homes and property once the people left. With water high on the 

riverside of the levee some 25 to 30 feet above them, people like Milus 

and Wanda Wallace, Mark and Rebecca Dugan, Larry and Cathy Allred, 

McIvan Jones, and hundreds of others packed their belongings, their 
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Divine Providence

treasures and heirlooms, and whatever they could move from their 

homes. As national media outlets covered Great Britain’s royal wedding, fl oodway residents boarded up windows and tried to seal their 

homes with little attention other than from the local media. Farmers 

moved what equipment they could and tried to secure the rest. They 

also rounded up livestock and other animals and either sold them or 

whisked them away to nearby farms outside the fl oodway. Deer and 

turkey, too, seemed to sense the danger as they fl ocked to high ground 

on the levee. Utility crews removed electrical boxes. More ominously, 

crews from the U.S. Geological Survey placed sensors to measure the 

discharge if activation became necessary. Tension mounted across the 

fl oodway. Everyone just watched and waited. Aside from the river stabilizing and dropping, there was one last hope. If the river would not 

cooperate, perhaps the courts would.81

The previous Monday, the State of Missouri fi led suit in the Eastern District Court of Missouri seeking a temporary restraining order 

to prevent activation the fl oodway. Missouri Attorney General Chris 

Koster sought the injunction on the grounds that operating the fl oodway 

violated the state’s Clean Water Act and that alternative fl ood control 

methods, other than operating the fl oodway, could alleviate the fl ooding in the region. On April 27, after reviewing written affi davits, U.S. 

District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., announced his intention to 

hold an evidentiary hearing the following day. During fi ve hours of 

testimony at the U.S. Courthouse in Cape Girardeau, Koster and his 

assistant, John McManus, attempted to prove that the activation of the 

fl oodway would contaminate bodies of water under the jurisdiction 

of the State of Missouri. Farmer Milus Wallace, a long-time owner of 

2,300 acres in the fl oodway, testifi ed that he used many forms of herbicides and fertilizer as part of his farming operations and stored those 

chemicals on property, as did other farmers in the fl oodway. Davis 

Minton, the deputy director for operations for the Missouri Department 

of Natural Resources, claimed that numerous petroleum storage tanks, 
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Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

farm chemical storage buildings, and liquid propane gas tanks dotted the 

fl oodway. Some of the tanks in the backwater area and other locations 

were cut off by interior fl ooding and could not be removed or cleared. 

Minton contended that the torrent of water released into the fl oodway 

through activation of the fuseplugs would wash away the storage tanks 

and contaminate surrounding bodies of water in the fl oodway. Knowing 

that the federal government was immune from suit under the federal 

Clean Water Act for activities related to the maintenance of navigation, 

Koster and his team attempted to divorce the navigation and fl ood control features of the MR&T project by arguing that it was the intent of 

Congress to do so.82

The legal team representing the federal government consisted of 

Nicholas Llewellen, of the U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce in St. Louis, and 

Department of Justice attorneys Ed Passarelli and Ty Blair. Relying on 

the expert testimony of Memphis district employees David Berretta, 

James Lloyd, and Robert Learned, the defense successfully demonstrated that the MR&T project was a comprehensive project that encompassed both fl ood control and navigation improvements. Berretta, in 

particular, testifi ed that operating the fl oodway would pose less harm 

to navigation than if the fl oodway was not used because an unintended 

levee failure elsewhere in the system might lead to a shift in the course 

of the river that would disrupt navigation and harm commerce.83 Limbaugh adjourned the hearing without issuing a ruling from the bench, 

choosing instead to weigh the information before him. The next day he 

fi nally rendered a decision. He denied the temporary restraining order. 

Koster appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

The motion was denied. Undeterred, he appealed to the U.S. Supreme 

Court, but once again the State’s request was denied. The path to fl oodway activation had been cleared if conditions warranted.84

By Saturday, April 30, landowners completed their mandatory 

evacuation of the fl oodway. The situation at Cairo and Fulton County 

appeared to stabilize after receiving aggressive fl ood fi ghting measures. 
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Divine Providence

Conditions at those two trouble spots remained threatening, but the past 

few days of dry weather had helped, as had Peabody’s reservoir directives. While the Cairo gage reached 59 feet for only the second time in 

history, the rate of rise had slowed considerably, due in large part to the 

diligent efforts by the LRD water control team to store water behind 

the Kentucky and Barkley dams. Throughout the day, though, any lingering hopes that the worst of the fl ood had passed began to crumble.

In the early morning hours, Bill Frederick released his latest daily 

weather report. For several days those reports warned of another round 

of rain slated to begin on April 30, but the slim possibilities remained 

that the expected weather system would shift to the north or south or 

even potentially dissipate. Unfortunately, none of these scenarios materialized. Frederick reported that the National Weather Service expected 

a frontal system to become stationary along the Arkansas and Ohio valleys later in the evening, bringing another round of intense rains – up 

to 7.5 inches – lasting through the afternoon of May 2. The area was 

already completely saturated. Most locations within a 50 miles radius 

of the confl uence area had been pounded with at least ten inches of rain 

between April 20 and April 27. Some locations in southeast Missouri, 

northern Arkansas, southern Illinois, and western Kentucky and Tennessee received anywhere from 12 to 16 inches of rainfall during that same 

period. Any new precipitation could not be absorbed; the rain would 

immediately turn into runoff and cause the rivers to swell even higher.85

Despite the expected rainfall, the National Weather Service did not 

raise the projected crest for the Cairo gage. They continued to call for 

a crest of 60.5 feet, but moved the crest date from May 1 back to May 

3. Peabody, though, had a problem. The LRD reservoirs were fi lling 

up. He needed to increase releases from Kentucky and Barkley dams 

immediately to retain storage if the forecasted rainfall fell behind the 

reservoir system. At Kentucky Dam, the pool elevation climbed to 

within feet of overtopping the cofferdam at the new lock under construction. He could not afford to lose that project. Peabody ordered the 
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Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

increase of releases to stabilize the pools and conserve storage. By the 

next morning – May 1 – Kentucky and Barkley dams were releasing 

nearly 2.5 times the amount of water from the previous day into the 

Ohio River.86

At 1030 hours on April 30, Col Reichling provided another decision 

brief over the telephone to Maj. Gen. Walsh. At the time, Walsh and 

Peabody were in a small offi ce in the Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky 

International Airport preparing for a fl yover of the fl ood-stricken region 

in Peabody’s area of operations. Reichling informed the commission 

president that the Cairo sector fl ood fi ght team had discovered a third 

large high-energy boil the previous day. While his engineers did not 

believe the fl oodwall was in imminent danger of failing, they advised 

Mayor Childs to start a mandatory evacuation. Furthermore, fl ood fi ght 

teams at Fulton County discovered more sands boils. “Sir, my engineers 

are concerned about the levee system performance at Cairo and Fulton 

County at these current stages!” Reichling reported before recommending that Walsh authorize the move to H minus 21 in the operational 

timeline. H minus 21 equated to breaking up the tows and positioning 

the barges on the frontline levee at Birds Point, but stopped short of 

mixing and pumping the explosive slurry into the buried lines in the 

levee. Reichling knew he was running out of time. Walsh knew such 

an action would create a stir with the public, the press, and the politicians. He wasn’t ready to act yet. He still believed that activating the 

fl oodway might not be necessary and he still recalled Lloyd’s advice. 

Instead of approving the recommendation, he modifi ed it by ordering 

the motor vessel MISSISSIPPI and the barges to move from Hickman, 

where they had been staged since April 27, to Wickliffe, Kentucky, some 

three hours closer in the operational timeline to Birds Point.87

Following the briefi ng, Walsh, Peabody and their staffs conducted 

an aerial tour of the Ohio basin. High pool elevations and backwater 

fl ooding at the reservoirs along the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers 

were evident from the air, as were the dire conditions at Evansville, 
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Divine Providence

Smithland and Paducah, not to mention Cairo, which remained a virtual 

island. The amount of water was staggering. It was everywhere. Deborah 

Lee could not mask her deep concern over what she saw. She and the 

others on the fl ight found it diffi cult to discern where the normal channels of the Ohio and Mississippi ended and the surrounding low-lying 

fl oodplains started. “I knew I was sitting on a ticking time bomb,” she 

later remarked. When she fi rst arrived at LRD in July 2001, George 

McKee, the long-time hydrologist who taught Lee how to manage fl ood 

operations, told her, “If we ever hit 13 percent [of total system storage capacity], build an ark!” On April 30, that percentage approached 

30 percent.”88

Upon arrival at the Sikeston Memorial Municipal Airport, Walsh and 

Peabody met up with fellow commissioner R.D. James and began the 

20-minute drive to Cairo to inspect the mega boil that had developed 

near the fl oodwall. When they arrived, they found a throng of reporters, cameramen, and photographers crowded across the access road to 

Thomas Morgan (left), Maj. Gen. Walsh, and Capt. Todd Mainwaring at the Cairo mega boil.
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Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

the boil, partially blocking their view. As they made their way past the 

crowd they were stunned by what they saw. It was the largest sand boil 

ring any of them had ever seen. For that matter it was the largest that 

even the most seasoned and experienced fl ood fi ghters had ever seen. 

“My God,” Col. George “Thatch” Shepard, the commission secretary, 

exclaimed, “That’s not a sand boil; that’s more like a swimming pool!” 

The commissioners and accompanying staff made their way to the massive ring, where Chip Newman and Tom Morgan were busy raising the 

ring berm and shoring it up with rock. Newman and Morgan detailed 

the dramatic effort they and their crews had accomplished to prevent 

the failure of the fl oodwall. Walsh, Peabody and Reichling huddled 

with Mayor Childs. He was considering a mandatory evacuation. They 

turned to the press and began answering their questions. As they did, 

the National Weather Service released a new contingency forecast of 

61.5 feet for the Cairo gage on May 4. That height would be nearly 

2.5 feet higher than the gage reading that morning.89

Walsh and fellow commissioners, Angel, James, and Smith, returned 

to the levee at Birds Point. Water reached high on the riverside of the 

levee. Three feet of freeboard – the distance between the top of the river 

and the top of the levee – still remained where the access wells were 

located, but only one foot remained at the fuseplug sections where the 

levee was constructed to an equivalent height of 60.5 feet on the Cairo 

gage. Members from the fl oodway task force once again described the 

processes for fi lling and charging the lines. Lloyd reiterated his recommendation to Walsh to load the pipes only if he intended to activate 

the fl oodway.90

Following the briefi ng, Walsh, Peabody, James, Reichling, and various staff members climbed into a van bound for the Sikeston airport. 

They learned that Childs issued a mandatory evacuation for Cairo. The 

commissioners held serious discussions about precipitation forecasts, 

river stages, and operations. They knew the tide was turning again. 

What was already a major fl ood was about to become a monster fl ood, 
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Divine Providence

perhaps even the project design fl ood. The discussion turned to Peabody. 

Could he hold back more water? He told the commissioners that he was 

doing all that he could. Four reservoirs were already at or near spillway operations. LRD was nearing record pool elevations at numerous 

reservoirs across the Cumberland, Tennessee, and lower Ohio basins. 

The reservoirs backed up water everywhere in Kentucky, Indiana, and 

Tennessee. He would continue to hold as much as he could for as long 

as he could, but he could not lose the cofferdam at Kentucky Lake.

After dropping off the commissioners, Reichling, Lloyd, and Julie 

Ziino, Reichling’s forward operating executive assistant, sat in the van 

outside the airport and refl ected on the day’s developments. It had not 

started raining yet, but they were deeply concerned. They knew Peabody could not hold back much more water. He had to release it. When 

he did, the river would go up quickly. At that point a realization swept 

over Lloyd. He turned to Reichling and said, “We’re going to operate.” 

Reichling looked him back in the eyes and replied, “You’re right.” In 

that brief instant, Reichling, Lloyd, Ziino, and the entire fl oodway task 

force transitioned from preparation to execution mode. A few hours 

later, the rain started to fall. At 0200 hours on May 1, the river on the 

Cairo gage surged past 59.5 feet. The river had never before reached 

that high on the gage and it continued to climb.91

The Decision

At 1000 hours on Sunday, May 1, Maj. Gen. Walsh, Sam Angel, 

and R.D. James arrived at Cape Girardeau Regional Airport to hear 

Col. Reichling’s latest decision brief. Reichling did not waste time 

getting straight to the point, “Sir, we have moved from an ‘if’ to a 

‘when’ situation.” With this in mind, he recommended three immediate actions. First, he requested permission to move to H minus 3 in the 

operational timeline, which meant moving the barges into position at 

the frontline levee and loading the pipes with explosive agents. Second, 
95

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

he recommended contacting the county sheriff to give him 24 hours to 

begin the fi nal sweep of the fl oodway. He also wanted permission to 

advise the U.S. Coast Guard of the decision to move to H minus 3 so 

they could issue a notice to mariners. Reichling clarifi ed that he was 

not asking for permission to activate the fl oodway, but he explained 

that for the safety of the workers, they needed to begin loading immediately. The safety plan called for crews to be off the levee by the time 

the Cairo gage reached 60.5 feet, which according to his forecasters 

would happen sometime between 0300 hours and 0400 hours on May 2. 

They were running out of time. The fl oodway task force needed to move 

immediately.92

Walsh, though, was not ready to load the pipes. Looking at the 

current and anticipated stages and realizing how long it would take to 

complete preparations for fl oodway activation, he still thought he had 

more time. He understood the safety risks and adverse conditions the 

crews would face, but he wanted to balance that with the risk of loading prematurely. Lloyd’s advice to Walsh on the levee not to load the 

explosives unless he planned to detonate had made an impact on the 

commission president’s thought processes. Walsh was still not convinced that fl oodway activation would ultimately be necessary. Instead 

of approving Reichling’s recommendation, Walsh ordered the tows to 

move from Wickliffe to the levee at Birds Point. He asked to be briefed 

again at 1500 hours.93

Col. Reichling appeared shocked, perhaps even angry, that Walsh 

denied his recommendation. His jaws clenched; his face reddened. He 

may have come to his realization the previous night, but his superior 

offi cer had not. Reichling quickly recovered, though, and acknowledged the order. He still had a major fl ood fi ght on his hands. His team 

needed leadership.94 At Fulton County, Darian Chasteen remained deeply 

concerned about the integrity of the levee. Construction of the water 

berm had commenced at 0500 hours. The contractor, James Coffey, was 

making good progress under the circumstances, but the standing water 
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Divine Providence

and deep mud proved to be tough obstacles. A driving rain pounded 

the area – another three inches fell in the county that day. The river 

exerted unprecedented pressure. New sand boils exploded into existence. 

The levee was coming apart. Chasteen knew it would not hold much 

longer. He desperately needed to know if and when Walsh would give 

the order to operate the fl oodway. Chasteen needed to ease the pressure 

on the levee through activation of the fl oodway or he needed the water 

berm to counteract the pressure – perhaps he needed both. He and the 

team were losing the fi ght.95 A little farther north at Cairo, the heavy 

rains had caused a new problem. Chip Newman and his crew raised 

the berm around the massive mega boil to a height of almost 13 feet to 

combat the increased pressure from the rising river. That was not the 

main concern, though. The heavy rains had saturated the fl yash berm. 

The berm turned to mush. It began to fail. Newman and his crew set 

to work immediately in the cold driving rain to cover the berm with 

plastic and reinforce it with rock. The city of Cairo could not afford to 

lose the berm.96

Back at Birds Point, the fl oodway task force crews assembled prior 

to 0700 hours in anticipation of receiving the order to load the explosives 

sometime after the 1000 hours decision brief. They were eager to get to 

work. Not that they wanted to activate the fl oodway – no one did – but 

they knew what lay ahead. Davis and Lloyd had prepared them mentally 

to handle the diffi cult assignment under less than ideal circumstances. 

Like Col. Reichling, they knew they were running out of time. They 

were on the levee. They saw the river creeping higher and higher into 

their work space. Davis described the workers as “attack dogs on short 

leashes.” They were ready to go. After receiving instruction to stand 

down, Davis and Lloyd set out to keep them focused. “We were trying 

to keep their heads in the game, trying to keep them from wandering 

off,” Lloyd later recalled. Having already come to the realization that 

activation was fait accompli in his own mind, Lloyd knew that Walsh 
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Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

eventually would reach the same conclusion. The crews had to be ready 

to go when he did.97

At around 1500 hours, Col. Reichling, the civilian members of the 

commission, and assorted members of the division, district, and commission staffs waited patiently in the airport conference room for Maj. Gen. 

Walsh. It was raining hard again. A thick sense of tension permeated 

the room. What will Walsh do? The question entered everyone’s mind. 

They had to wait for the answer. Walsh was in a nearby room engaged 

in a telephone conversation with Robert Fitzgerald, chief of engineering 

at the division offi ce. Fitzgerald provided Walsh with his engineering 

assessment of the levee system in the confl uence area. The river had 

never before reached its current stage. Likewise, the pressure on the 

levee system had never been this great. Fitzgerald voiced his opinion 

that the commission and the Corps of Engineers could manage the fl ows 

under existing conditions, but the system was beginning to unravel. It 

was the last advice Walsh received prior to the decision brief.98

Walsh entered the conference room for the briefi ng and took his 

place at the table next to Col. Reichling. Bill Frederick, calling in from 

the commission’s emergency operations center in Vicksburg, led things 

off. Those sitting at the table leaned in slightly closer to the speaker 

phone to hear Frederick’s thin voice over the driving rain that pelted the 

windows of the airport conference room. His report did not contain a 

shred of good news. The latest weather forecasts called for an additional 

three to fi ve inches of rainfall over the Ohio basin over the next 24 hours, 

with the heaviest rains coming after dark. With the Cairo gage reading 

59.9 feet and rising at 1400 hours, Frederick informed Walsh that the 

river would move above 60 feet within the next few hours and would 

break 60.5 feet late in the morning of May 2. The National Weather 

Service expected the river to remain above 60 feet for nine days and 

above 61 feet for 5 days, with a forecasted crest of 61.8 feet on May 4. 

Frederick then tossed in a wild card for Maj. Gen. Walsh to consider, 

“The National Weather Service is concerned that heavy localized rainfall 
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Divine Providence

will cause stages to spike even quicker than forecasted.”99 That caution 

would later prove prescient.

David Berretta and Tom Minyard phoned in their reports. Berretta 

went fi rst, giving a quick snapshot of the reservoir operations in LRD. 

His report contained more bad news. Kentucky and Barkley lakes had 

reached record pool elevations and continued to climb. On the morning 

of April 27, those lakes utilized only 21 percent of their fl ood storage. 

On May 1 they were at 74 percent and 70 percent, respectively. Half of 

the fl ood storage pools fi lled with water in just four days.100 Deborah Lee 

and the LRD water control team had done a masterful job of skillfully 

managing the reservoir system along the Cumberland and Tennessee 

rivers and they continued to try to match releases from Kentucky and 

Barkley dams with the amount of water fl owing into the reservoirs. The 

reservoirs that fed into Kentucky and Barkley lakes, though, were fi lling 

at a rapid pace.101 LRD could not hold back much longer. They would 

need to release water soon. Minyard followed with his own engineering 

analysis. The entire levee system in the Cairo to Caruthersville reach 

remained under tremendous stress. Newman and his crew had kept the 

existing boils at Cairo stabilized. No new high energy boils developed, 

but a signifi cant number of sand boils materialized at Fulton County. 

Conditions at Lake County and Caruthersville continued to degrade.102

The levee system was holding, but it faced unprecedented pressure with 

each passing hour and would have to continue to handle that pressure 

for at least another nine days, maybe longer.

The mood in the room can only be described as sobering. Rain 

continued to lash at the conference room window; the rumblings of 

thunder to the west hinted that more severe weather was on the way. 

Russell Davis spoke next. As the chief of operations for the Memphis 

Engineer District, he was Col. Reichling’s man on the ground. It was his 

responsibility to prepare the fl oodway for activation once Walsh delivered the order. He got straight to the point, “Sir, bottom line up front: 

we need to move to H minus three.” Davis recommended breaking up 
99

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

the tows, positioning the equipment and vessels at the frontline levee, 

fi lling the buried pipes with explosives, rigging them for detonation, 

and then going into a holding pattern awaiting command to activate 

the fl oodway if necessary. It would take roughly 18 hours to make the 

preparations. He then articulated his overriding concern – the safety 

of the work crews. Less than two feet of distance stood between river 

levels and the top of the levee at some locations where work needed to 

be done, and the river continued to rise at an alarming rate. Darkness, 

additional pounding rain, and the possibility of lightning concerned him. 

Davis ended his report, “Sir, we need to get the work done as quickly 

as possible for the safety of our crews.”103

Col. Reichling closed the briefi ng with a passionate plea, ‘Sir, conditions are continuing to degrade. You can hear the rain outside lashing 

against this building. The river is rising fast. We need to prep now!” 

Reichling explained that under the operations plan, preparations to activate the fl oodway should have been completed by the time the Cairo 

gage hit 60 feet and “we are there right now.” With the river rising at 

a rapid clip, his crews would eventually run out of levee to work with. 

The 1500 hours decision brief on May 1, 2011, at the Cape Girardeau Regional Airport. Seated at the table 

from left to right are Sam Angel, R.D. James, Stephen Gambrell, Col. Vernie Reichling, Maj. Gen. Michael 

Walsh, Edward Belk, and Richard Lockwood. Dennis Norris is seated against the window between Reichling 

and Walsh.
100

Divine Providence

Reichling warned that even if everything went according to plan, his 

crews would be cutting it close. “We run the risk of not being able to 

put this ‘safety valve’ to use if we need to operate later,” Reichling 

emphasized as he ended the briefi ng.104

All eyes in the room turned toward Maj. Gen. Walsh. He calmly 

removed his reading glasses, placed one of the arm pieces in the corner 

of his mouth, and leaned back slightly in his chair. He was deep in 

thought, weighing and processing all of the information just presented 

to him. Col. Reichling, Walsh’s man on the ground, wanted to move now, 

but Lloyd, the subject matter expert on the operations plan, advised him 

not to load the pipes unless he intended to blow the levee. Walsh still 

remained uncertain that he would eventually give that order. Fitzgerald, 

his engineering chief back in Vicksburg, indicated it might be possible 

to manage the fl ow if conditions did not worsen, but Minyard’s systems 

analysis pointed to rapidly deteriorating conditions. Maj. Gen. Peabody 

was holding back as much water as possible, but Frederick warned of 

localized rain possibly causing a spike in river levels regardless of the 

LRD reservoirs. Davis cited concerns about crew safety – one loss of 

life would render the operation a failure. Perhaps most confl icting was 

the fact that across the table sat R.D. James. As a landowner in the 

fl oodway, James personifi ed every single person who lived or owned 

property in the fl oodway and he symbolically brought each and every 

one of them into that conference on that cold and rainy day. That oftenrepeated quote from Maj. Gen. Markham after the 1937 activation of 

the fl oodway suddenly fl ashed through Walsh’s mind. I am now of the 

opinion that no plan is satisfactory which is based upon deliberately 

turning fl oodwaters upon the homes and property of people even though 

the right to do so may have been paid for in advance. The quote weighed 

heavily on Walsh. His decision would impact lives.105

Walsh sat back at attention, looked across the table, and asked the 

two members of the Mississippi River Commission present if they had 
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Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

anything to add. R.D. James looked forlorn. His normally broad shoulders slumped forward; both forearms resting on the conference table as 

he stared at the pen that he slowly twisted in his hands. He looked like 

he had something to say. He and his family had a fi nancial stake in the 

decision being made, though, so he recuesed himself from the discussion. 

He only offered his support to Walsh’s decision – whichever way that 

decision went. Walsh then turned to Sam Angel. A 32-year member of 

the commission, Angel knew what the decision needed to be – everyone in the room did. He looked at Walsh, shrugged his shoulders and 

nodded his head in deference to as if to say, This is a tough decision, 

General, but it is your decision to make.

Walsh still did not announce his intentions. He turned to two of his 

trusted advisors, Edward Belk and Dennis Norris. Belk, a 24-year veteran of the Corps of Engineers, served as the chief of programs for the 

division offi ce. More importantly he had cut his teeth in the Memphis 

Engineer District, serving as the chief of project development, executive assistant to the district commander, and the deputy district engineer 

for project management. He knew the Memphis Engineer District. He 

knew its projects. He knew the people it served. “Sir, with the forecast 

facing us, our window to prep is getting smaller,” Belk calmly advised, 

“H minus three and hold is where we need to be.” Norris, the commission’s respected chief of operations, spoke next. He began his career 

with the Corps of Engineers in 1980 and spent 30 of those years in the 

operations sector. He was a river man; someone who got things done. 

When he spoke, his words carried weight. If Belk knew the Memphis 

district, then Norris knew operations like no other. “Sir,” Norris calmly 

stated in his reassuring southern drawl, “in ops things never go as 

planned. Recommend we go to H minus three.” His words would prove 

prophetic in a few hours.106

Walsh nodded in recognition. “In six days the Cairo gage has gone 

up six feet,” he announced. “Go to H minus three and give me a progress report every two hours.” He had made the decision to move.107
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Divine Providence

Activation

At Birds Point Davis relayed Walsh’s approval to deploy the barges 

to the infl ow crevasse site and commence pumping operations. The plan 

was for the tender GOODWIN and one pump barge to begin fi lling the 

lines at the lower end and work their way upriver. The motor vessel 

STRONG and the second pump barge would start at the upper end and 

work their way downriver. As the vessels moved into position on the 

frontline levee, Davis, Lloyd, Durst and other task force leaders met to 

discuss the impact of weather conditions on the operation. The primary 

concern was lightning. Even though the explosives components were 

extremely stable and not yet primed, Durst advised against commencing pumping operations until the threat of lightning had cleared. Davis 

and Lloyd concurred. The task force would wait out the storm before 

commencing work. If Walsh had his own timeline in mind throughout 

the entire decision-making process, he had not accounted for lightning. 

No one had, not even Lloyd, one of the developers of the operations 

plan. “Working at night didn’t bother us. Rain didn’t bother us,” Lloyd 

recalled, “but when those thunderstorms popped up, we had to shut 

down.”108 Dennis Norris was correct; things were not going as planned. 

Davis notifi ed Walsh of the delay just prior to the general’s press conference with Governor Nixon. The river climbed passed 60 feet on the 

Cairo gage and approached 60.5 feet.

At 1930 hours, Davis informed Walsh that the crews remained in a 

holding pattern awaiting a break in the weather. After completing the 

press conference with Governor Nixon, Walsh established his command 

post on the motor vessel MISSISSIPPI, which was moored in the river 

channel approximately one mile south of the Birds Point-Cairo bridge. 

Walsh, Angel, James and the commission staff boarded the MUDDY 

WATERS, a small survey boat, and made the long trip to the MISSISSIPPI in the driving rain. As he boarded the vessel, Walsh received 

a note from J. Lawrence Barnett, lead counsel at the division offi ce, 
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Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

informing him that the Supreme Court denied the state’s request for an 

injunction. The fl oodway survived the legal challenges, but if the task 

force could not prepare it for activation, the point was moot. High winds 

continued to rock the MISSISSIPPI. Walsh listened to the rain lashing 

against the windows and decks. These were the heaviest rains yet, but 

he remained confi dent, adamantly so, that the system could manage 

the fl ows without the use of the fl oodway. A mile away at Birds Point, 

Davis shut down the operation. The National Weather Service did not 

foresee an end to the severe weather until after 0100 hours at the earliest. The crews were mentally exhausted having experienced so many 

varying degrees of highs and lows throughout the day. They needed 

rest. At 2200 hours, he ordered them back to quarterboats for a few 

hours of dry downtime. As the rain and lighting picked up in intensity 

and the river broke new stage records by the hour, everyone involved 

in the operation wondered if this last storm would be the event that 

would break the back of the operations plan and the MR&T project.109

At 0400 hours on May 2, Frederick informed Walsh that the area 

continued to receive higher than expected localized rainfall. The previous day, three inches of rain fell over Cairo and Paducah. More than that 

fell over Fulton County, where the fl ood fi ght team continued to build 

the water berm to stabilize the severe underseepage that threatened the 

levee. The Cairo gage was only three inches shy of 61 feet. The National 

Weather Service’s latest forecast, issued at 0230 hours, still projected 

a crest of 61.5 feet on May 4, but the river continued climbing faster 

than predicted. The persistent and heavy localized rains hammered 

areas not protected by the LRD reservoirs. Frederick indicated that the 

forecast center would begin additional model runs in the next few hours. 

He promised to keep the general posted on any development. For the 

fi rst time Walsh’s confi dence that the system could manage the fl ows 

started to erode. Four hours later, it completely evaporated. The National 

Weather Service informed Frederick that the latest models projected a 

crest of 63.5 feet on the Cairo gage on May 5. Upon hearing the news, 
104

Divine Providence

a recent memory popped into Frederick’s mind – a memory of the time 

he stood face-to-face with Walsh’s predecessor, Brig. Gen. Robert Crear, 

on August 29, 2005, and informed him that the storm surge from Hurricane Katrina would probably overwhelm the levees at New Orleans. 

He could still visualize the long, silent and awkward stare on Crear’s 

face and the slow nod of his head in acknowledgement of the news. 

Frederick shook off the memory and notifi ed Walsh of the forecast.110

At 0800 hours, Maj. Gen. Walsh held a teleconference with all of 

his district commanders and his crisis management team. Just prior to 

the call, Maj. Gen. Peabody reported that conditions on the Ohio River 

were deteriorating. He confi rmed the sentiment shared by Frederick a 

few hours earlier. The heavy rains fell outside of the storage capabilities 

of the LRD reservoirs. The mayor of Smithland, Kentucky, ordered a 

mandatory evacuation. As Walsh took his seat at the conference table 

on the motor vessel MISSISSIPPI, Frederick delivered another blow. 

The National Weather Service anticipated another one to four inches of 

rain to fall over the next 24 hours. The heavy rains of the previous night 

had not only hit the confl uence area and the Ohio Valley, but they had 

R.D. James buries his face in his hands after hearing the updated forecast crest of 63 feet at the Cairo gage 

during the 0800 hours briefi ng on May 2, 2011, in the second floor conference room on the MISSISSIPPI.
105

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

also pounded the Arkansas Valley. The fl ood was moving south and it 

was growing. The weather service expected the lower Mississippi River 

at Arkansas City to rise by two to four feet. Col. Thomas O’Hara, commander of the St. Louis Engineer District, reported Lake Wappapello 

overtopped a rock berm constructed across the emergency spillway at 

0200 hours. O’Hara expected the pool to rise another fi ve feet before 

cresting, which would result in excess of 25,000 cfs being released into 

the St. Francis River and additional fl ooding downstream.

Col. Reichling spoke next. Normally possessing a reserved demeanor, 

Reichling was anything but that on this day. He talked rapidly, which lent 

a sense of urgency to his report. He notifi ed Walsh that the task force 

commenced pumping operations at 0500 hours. The crews discovered 

medium-sized sand boils along the frontline levee. They also reported 

water fl owing over the fuseplug section of the levee; the fl oodway was 

going into passive operation. Conditions continued to deteriorate across 

the region. The mega boil at Cairo grew and began piping sediment 

again. Sinkholes appeared below the elevated railroad tracks on the north 

end of the town. His engineers questioned the integrity of the fl oodwall. 

Signifi cant underseepage continued to plague Fulton County. Failure of 

the levee was not imminent, but the number and size of the new boils 

presented a major concern. Chasteen and his crew continued to construct 

the water berm, but it would take at least another day to complete it. 

Because of the situation at Lake Wappapello, Reichling reported that 

his engineers were concerned about the potential for levee overtopping 

in the upper St. Francis basin. At the lower end of that basin, the W.G. 

Huxtable pumping plant at the St. Francis backwater area operated at 

full capacity. Flood fi ght teams were also concerned about rising river 

levels on the Commerce to Birds Point levee. The levee faced additional 

pressure because the Len Small private levee had held thus far. The 

freeboard levels at the Tiptonville levee and the fl oodwalls at Hickman 

and Caruthersville were slowly disappearing. “The system is holding,” 

Reichling ended his report, “but it is showing considerable strain.”111
106

Divine Providence

At the fl oodway, crews had assembled in the early morning hours at 

the infl ow crevasse and commenced pumping operations. Rain continued to fall, but the lightning shifted to the west and the north, clearing 

the way for work to begin. The task force lost nearly a full day’s work 

due to the lightning. Lloyd was on the levee to monitor the operation; 

Davis and Reichling remained at their command post to provide top 

cover. The GOODWIN crew, at fi rst, worked deliberately. It took more 

than an hour to fi ll the fi rst line. The only prior experience the crews 

had involved test operations conducted on 400-foot sections in dry and 

sunny conditions. The May 2 operation was not an exercise – it was the 

real thing. The crews braved cold temperatures and stinging rain made 

worse by blustery winds. Their work space on the barges, where they 

mixed the liquid blasting agent with aluminum powder, was limited and 

Passive activation of the floodway. The Mississippi River overtops the lower sections of the Birds Point-New 

Madrid floodway fuseplug levee early on May 2, 2011.
107

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

surrounded by a rising river on three sides. The gangplanks were small 

and the levees were muddy. Footing everywhere was slippery. Clouds of 

aluminum powder dust fl oated about and coated everything. The crews 

dragged heavy hoses across the soggy levee and connected them to the 

pipe fi ttings in the wells. One thousand feet away, a crew member stood 

prepared to signal when the line was full. Each 1,000-foot segment had 

three lines to be fi lled. The explosive slurry was a thick mixture so it took 

considerable pressure to move it through the pipes. When the line was 

full and crews attempted to remove the hose, the back pressure caused 

the hose to whip around for a few seconds, spilling the slurry. A member 

from the ERDC explosives team moved in immediately once the line 

was full and placed the blasting cap and detonation cord in place. As 

they progressed down the line and became more comfortable with the 

operation, they reduced the fi ll time to 60 minutes.112

The Goodwin and pump barge at the Birds Point-New Madrid floodway. Note the cloud of aluminum 

powder dust.
108

Divine Providence

At the upper end of the infl ow crevasse site, though, the STRONG

crew and its pump barge encountered their fi rst problem. The frontline 

levee in their area of operations took on a horseshoe shape. This was 

a direct result of the 1937 operation of the fl oodway, which caused a 

massive scour hole. When the Memphis district rebuilt the levee, they 

rebuilt a section around the scour hole, creating the large bend. The 

bend was part of the levee to be crevassed; it contained access wells that 

needed to be fi lled. The problem was not the bend; the problem was a 

spur levee – a levee projecting from the frontline to direct erosive river 

currents away from the frontline levee – that blocked the entrance to the 

bend. The STRONG had a seven-foot draft and could not navigate over 

the spur levee to push the pumping barges into place. To alleviate this 

problem, the task force used the WARD, which could safely navigate 

Members of the floodway task force provide the Mississippi River Commission with an operational update.
109

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

over the spur because it only had a fi ve-foot draft. As the STRONG and

WARD burned up valuable time jockeying the pump barge into position around the bend, one of the mix pump units began to break down, 

causing the operation to slow even more considerably.113

After a brief visit to observe operations along the frontline levee, 

Walsh and R.D. James met with Reichling and Davis. Davis informed 

Walsh that the crews would complete pumping operations in 12 hours. 

It was 1030 hours, so by Davis’s timeline, the fl oodway would be ready 

for activation by 2230 hours. Walsh, though, wanted a plan to get the 

job done in eight hours. He intended to operate the fl oodway; however, 

he was not prepared to make his decision offi cial. He would wait to 

inform governors Nixon and Quinn of his intentions until after the 

new timeline had developed. Reichling reminded Walsh that the river 

already exceeded 61 feet on the Cairo gage. They were already past the 

trigger point for activation in the operations plan. Reichling voiced his 

Members of the floodway task force prepare the explosive slurry mix.
110

Divine Providence

primary concern – preparing the outfl ow channels at the lower end of 

the fl oodway. Reichling was confi dent the task force would complete 

the preparation at the infl ow site, but he expressed concerned about 

having enough time to prepare the two outfl ow channels at the lower 

end of the fl oodway. According to the operations plan, preparations 

at all three sites were to be complete in advance of the gage reaching 

60 feet. If Walsh unleashed up to 550,000 cfs into the fl oodway with 

the lower outfl ow areas remaining closed, he risked overtopping the 

set back levee at New Madrid. Walsh reiterated his demand. He would 

not make his decision offi cial until he received a new and shortened 

timeline.114

After the meeting Walsh, James, and Stephen Gambrell, the commission’s executive director, climbed into James’s white Denali and set out 

from Birds Point for a visual inspection of the situation at Cairo and to 

meet with Governor Quinn, who was scheduled to hold a press conference. As they headed out of Missouri on Interstate 57, they observed the 

result of the persistent rains of the past 10 days, particularly the deluge 

that hammered the area the previous night. Water was everywhere. It 

covered low-lying fi elds for as far they could see. The water went right 

up to the elevated highway. The ditches separating the north and southbound lanes were fl ooded. Conditions were worse once they crossed into 

Illinois. Sheets of water fl owed across Route 3, the main road leading 

to and from Cairo. At the entrance to the city, two police cars blocked 

the tunnel through the massive levee and railroad embankment. James 

stopped the truck. A police offi cer checked their credentials and then 

waved them through. As they travelled down Sycamore Street, they 

noticed the town looked deserted. Everything was saturated. A thin layer 

of water covered the paved street and sidewalks. As he turned left on 

40th Street – the road leading to the mega boil – James noticed Mayor 

Childs trying to fl ag down his vehicle. James pulled over and rolled 

down the window. Childs, soaked from the steady downpour falling on 
111

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

the city, leaned his head in the window. “General,’ he said, as water ran 

from his ball cap onto Walsh’s lap, “we are ready for your decision!”115

After a brief inspection of the mega boil, where Chip Newman, Tom 

Morgan, and the fl ood fi ght team were raising the ring berm to match 

the rising river and the pressure it exerted, Walsh, James, and members 

of the commission staff climbed to the top of the fl oodwall in a steady 

downpour. As they reached the top, the view before them was unbelievable. The fl oodwall that usually towered above them when they made 

periodic visits to the city during their high and low water inspection trips 

barely stuck out of the water by a few feet. At that moment, the Cairo 

gage read 61.1 feet; nearly 2.5 feet lower than the projected crest. The 

river looked angry, violent. Chocolate colored waves crashed against 

the fl oodwall. James turned to Walsh and shouted through the howling 

wind, “General, there is nowhere for this water to go.” Walsh shook 

his head as if to acknowledge the comment and register his disbelief at 

what he was seeing. “Can you imagine what this river is going to look 

like at sixty-three?” James yelled. Walsh shook his head again.116 If he 

could help it, the river would never reach 63 feet on the gage, but that 

depended on the fl oodway task force fulfi lling its mission.

Back at Birds Point, as Lloyd monitored the pumping operations, 

he realized that the task force was running through the supply of liquid 

blasting agent at a rate not consistent with the amount of pipes that had 

been fi lled. If this continued, there would not be enough explosives to 

fi ll the lines at the infl ow/outfl ow sites at the lower end of the fl oodway. 

Lloyd began conferring with crew leaders to determine the cause of the 

problem. Col. Reichling heard Lloyd’s discussion with the crew leaders over the radio. He asked for Lloyd to come to the command post to 

give him an update. Lloyd told Reichling, “Sir, we’ve got issues. We 

need to make a change.” He explained the operation was using up too 

much of the liquid blasting agent. He was not certain whether this was 

due to waste or the product was getting lost in the lines, but his bottom 

line was “right now we don’t have enough liquid to get the job done.” 
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Divine Providence

The task force needed to conserve enough liquid to prepare the lower 

infl ow/outfl ow crevasse site; the other middle infl ow/outfl ow site was 

not important. Lloyd explained that the middle infl ow/outfl ow site was 

designed for use with the 1,500-ft gap at the bottom of the levee closed 

as part of the St. John’s Bayou-New Madrid fl oodway pumps project. 

The project had been delayed, so the gap remained open. To conserve 

liquid, Lloyd recommended abandoning the uppermost access wells at 

the bend. Doing so would reduce the length of the crevasse site from 

the planned 11,000 linear feet to 9,000 linear feet, thereby reducing the 

amount of fl ow into the fl oodway, but he believed the crevasse would 

draw off enough water to get the desired reduction in stages across the 

system. Lloyd’s plan involved allowing the GOODWIN crew to continue 

working up the line because they were making decent progress. Lloyd, 

though, wanted the STRONG to cease operation once it had completed 

fi lling the wells at the horseshoe section and proceed downriver to 

Jim Lloyd discusses options with Russell Davis (left) and Col. Vernie Reichling at Reichling’s command post.
113

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

commence operations at the lower infl ow/outfl ow crevasse site. Reichling conferred with Berretta, who validated Lloyd’s conclusions. The 

plan fi t Walsh’s directive to Davis to complete the preparations in eight 

hours. “Go. Make it happen!” Reichling told Lloyd.117

At 1515 hours, the STRONG departed for the lower infl ow/outfl ow 

crevasse site. Lloyd resumed monitoring the GOODWIN crew. The 

Cairo gage read 61.3 feet. As he looked at the clock and watched the 

river rise, he realized that the operation was taking too much time. 

Before long, there would not be much levee to work with. The crews 

had been concerned about spillage and waste, but Lloyd was more 

concerned about speeding up the process. He instructed the crews to 

run the equipment at a higher rate. He needed to reduce the fi ll time 

from 60 minutes to 20 minutes.118 At the command post, Davis briefed 

Walsh on the shift in the operation. Davis explained that Reichling had 

approved dividing the crews and sent the STRONG downriver to commence preparations at the lower infl ow/outfl ow site. He then articulated the limitations of the plan. The plan meant the task force had to 

Russell Davis explains the 

task force’s accelerated plan 

with Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh 

as Col. Thatch Shepard and 

Col. Vernie Reichling look on.
114

Divine Providence

sacrifi ce any redundancies. If one of the GOODWIN’s pumps went out 

of commission for any reason, they had no back-up measures to institute. They would have to proceed with a single pump. He also informed 

Walsh the plan necessitated giving up a section of the fuseplug. Model 

tests confi rmed an acceptable reduction in stages, despite the smaller 

crevasse. Last, he informed Walsh about the shortage of liquid blasting 

agent. The task force faced the prospect of running through its supply 

before it could prepare the middle infl ow/outfl ow site for operation.119

After the briefi ng, two additional civilian members of the commission, Sam Angel and William Clifford Smith, joined Walsh and James 

at Reichling’s command post. Tension grew in the cramped command 

post. Reports from the fi eld detailing the immense stress and pressure 

on the fl ood control system fl owed in on a continual basis. Walsh was 

being overwhelmed by email messages that begged him to activate the 

fl oodway immediately and an equal amount pleading for him not to. 

Rain and wind continued to lash against the command post as a constant 

reminder of the rough weather outside. Even during the intermittent 

dry spells, the television cycled the Doppler radar depicting a narrow 

band of storms centered over the confl uence area and the Ohio River. 

“It just keeps raining,” a dejected Stephen Gambrell complained as he 

watched the radar, “it just keeps raining!” Then Frederick delivered 

more bad news. The National Weather Service released its forecast for 

the entire lower Mississippi River. The service predicted record stages 

at Greenville, Vicksburg, Natchez, and Red River Landing over the next 

three weeks. At approximately 1630 hours, Walsh initiated the offi cial 

notifi cation process. He called Governor Nixon and informed him that 

he would have to operate the fl oodway sometime between 1900 hours 

and 2400 hours. Nixon was gracious in his response and thanked Walsh 

for keeping him informed. Walsh and Gambrell made additional calls 

to other congressional members from the tri-state area. Walsh sent a 

note to Maj. Gen. Peabody asking him to inform the governors of Kentucky and Indiana. Peabody responded that both supported his decision. 
115

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

Next, he called Governor Quinn. Walsh then informed the media of his 

decision to operate.120

By 1900 hours, Lloyd and his crew completed the pumping operations. They had fi lled 27,000 linear feet of lines with approximately 

115 tons of explosives. It would take the ERDC crews approximately 

three hours to charge the lines and establish a blasting site approximately 

5,000 feet from the fuseplug. The river stymied their efforts. Water 

encroached up the gravel road surface and threatened to inundate two 

wells, forcing the ERDC team to build sandbag rings to keep the water 

out prior to detonation. In the meantime, national guardsmen completed 

their fi nal sweep of the fl oodway. At 2030 hours, Reichling informed 

Walsh that the fl oodway was 45 minutes from being operational.121

The tension in the command post thickened – minutes seemed like 

hours. R.D. James knew the time for activation was imminent. Try as 

he might, he could not displace thoughts of what the operation of the 

fl oodway would mean to his friends and neighbors. He also worried 

about the ultimate fate of his own farm. He stared at the fl ood and quietly “prayed for the safety of all involved and for all affected.” While 

everyone in the command post was tired, James looked completely 

fatigued. The past week had taken its toll on the 30-year veteran of 

the commission. As a member of the commission, he was well-known 

through the entire confl uence area. Both Walsh and Reichling relied 

on him as a liaison with elected offi cials from Missouri and local levee 

districts. Not only was he a local, who owned land in the fl oodway, 

but he was also a native of Hickman on the Kentucky side of the river. 

Throughout the week, parties from both sides of the river besieged him 

with questions and concerns. Floodway landowners begged him for 

constant updates. City leaders from New Madrid asked for his advice 

on the possibility of issuing an evacuation order. Acquaintances and 

offi cials in Fulton County pleaded with him to provide insight into 

Walsh’s thought processes. Missourians everywhere wanted to know 

if the Commerce levee would hold. Perhaps nothing weighed on his 
116

Divine Providence

mind more than the date – May 2 – which was his beloved daughter’s 

birthday. Virginia Elizabeth James had passed away in 1996. She was 

only nineteen years old. A wide range of emotions danced through his 

conscience as his mind raced from topic to topic. Finally, James broke 

the silence in the command post by asking Gambrell to lead everyone 

present in a prayer. Gambrell obliged:

We remember God’s Word ... I John 1:9 “If we confess our sins, 

He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us 

from all unrighteousness.” Father, in a time like this when we 

don’t know what to pray we ask for You to intercede for us and 

for all the people who will be helped and harmed by the results 

of the actions we take. We acknowledge that You are the only 

one who can forgive sin, restore hope and truly help. In Jesus 

strong name we pray, Amen.122

From the blasting site, Lloyd notifi ed Reichling, “Ready to operate 

on your order.”

 Reichling entered the command post, “Sir, I am requesting permission to blow the levee. The ERDC team leader is ready to go hot.”

“Approved,” Walsh replied. He said nothing else.

Reichling notifi ed Lloyd that Walsh and the commissioners were 

on their way to the blasting site, “As soon as they get there, you are 

green light to go.”123

At 2200 hours, the river reached 61.7 feet on the Cairo gage. As 

the members of the Mississippi River Commission travelled to the 

frontline levee, fl oodway residents and landowners coped in their own 

ways. Some, including Milus Wallace, stood nervously on the setback 

levee to witness the operation, sickened as they pondered the fate of 

the homes and property. Others anxiously watched news coverage on 

television sets in their hotels or at the homes of family and friends. For 

some, the emotional stress was too great – they could not bear to watch 

in person or on the television.124
117

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

At Birds Point, it was pitch black outside with the exception of the 

glow from the city lights at Wickliffe, Kentucky, which created a perfect 

backdrop that illuminated the crevasse site. The fl oodway was eerily 

silent. Ponded rain and seepwater extended like fi ngers across the fi elds. 

A light mist fell. Suddenly, Durst called out, “T minus three minutes!” 

The tension mounted. No one said a word. Another minute ticked off 

the clock until Durst broke the silence, “T minus two minutes!” Another 

minute later, he called out again, “Radio silence!” This alerted everyone 

that only 60 seconds remained prior to detonation. After what seemed 

an eternity, but was only less than a minute, he signaled to Walsh to 

begin the countdown.

“Fire in the hole! Fire in the hole! Fire in the hole!” Walsh bellowed, 

with Angel, James, and Smith echoing in unison. “Five. Four. Three.”

The Mississippi River Commission on the frontline levee at Birds Point just moments before the activation of 

the floodway.
118

Divine Providence

“Wait!” Durst interrupted. Norris was correct; operations still were 

not going as planned. The episode provided a brief moment of humor to 

an otherwise long and ominous day. “Okay, start over,” Durst declared 

as he fi nished tinkering with his equipment.

Walsh and the commissioners resumed counting, “Five. Four. Three. 

Two. One.”

An impressive fi reball illuminated the fl oodway, then another, and 

another, and so on down the fuseplug. The frontline levee trembled 

slightly from the violent explosion. A pressure wave from the blast 

followed a few seconds later. The force of the wave blew out windows 

in a house in nearby Wyatt. As far away as Cape Girardeau, people 

reported hearing the explosion. A thick cloud of smoke billowed up and 

slowly drifted across the fl oodway, masking the view of the crevasse 

site. As the smoke eventually cleared, the commissioners did not see any 

Fireballs light up the night sky as the Birds Point-New Madrid floodway is placed into operation. (Photo by 

Oscar Reihsmann)
119

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

water rushing through the fl oodway, but heard a roar from the crevasse. 

An hour later, Frederick reported the Cairo gage read 61.3. The river, 

which had been climbing at an alarming rate, had dropped six inches. 

By 0600 hours the next morning it had dropped more than one foot.125

At the 0800 hours commander’s briefi ng on May 3, Frederick 

reported that the rain had fi nally ended. Since April 20, all locations 

from Chester in the north, to Arkansas City in south, and extending 

from Little Rock in the west to Cincinnati in the east, received at least 

eight inches of rain. The vast majority of that region received more 

than 12 inches and several large areas received more than 20 inches. 

An incredible amount of rain had fallen – totals exceeded the normal 

rainfall for that two-week period by 600 to 1,000 percent – and it fell 

just as the snowmelt crest on the Mississippi River and the fl ood crest on 

the Ohio River arrived at the confl uence. Lt. Col. Hamilton, Col. Reichling’s deputy, informed Walsh that the fl oodway operation achieved the 

desired effects. Chip Newman and his crew had the Cairo sand boils 

under control. Conditions at Fulton County stabilized even though the 

water berm remained incomplete. The river came within two feet of the 

top of the Commerce to Birds Point levee at some locations, but already 

stages were dropping. Peabody sent word that the National Weather Service, taking the fl oodway activation into account in their calculations, 

lowered the crest at Smithland by three feet. The fl oodway, thus far, 

was operating as designed and reducing the pressure on the system.126

The fl oodway operation, though, was not complete. At 1100 hours, 

Walsh briefed Angel, James and Smith on the progress at the lower 

infl ow/outfl ow site. The vessels encountered severe winds, rains, and 

lightning while travelling from Birds Point to the lower end of the fl oodway, which delayed their arrival times. The crews successfully fi lled two 

of the six wells, but found the remaining four wells fi lled with rainwater. They pumped the water from the wells and successfully fi lled three 

before running out of liquid blasting agent. The crew could not prepare 

the middle infl ow/outfl ow site. Even though his hydraulics experts 
120

Divine Providence

had advised him that the lower infl ow/outfl ow was suffi cient to drain 

the fl oodway, Walsh wanted to stick to the operations plan. He gave 

Reichling 12 hours to procure additional explosives. At 1240 hours, the 

task force activated the lower infl ow/outfl ow site, with the Mississippi 

River Commission standing on the levee at New Madrid, approximately 

1.5 miles away. The daylight provided a much different perspective than 

the previous night. As the 56 tons of explosives detonated, a cloud of 

black dirt from the levee fl ew high into the air, followed by a billowing cloud of white smoke. It took several seconds for the fi ve distinct 

sounds waves to reach the commission. A large crowd on the levee 

cheered their approval, giving the commissioners a “thumbs up” sign. 

Two days later, the task force opened the middle infl ow/outfl ow site 

using an alternate explosive agent. The alternate explosives used were 

not as effective as the original explosives. The levee only partially crevassed – not anywhere near the optimum design level.127

Water roars through the upper inflow crevasse at the frontline levee the day after activation.
121

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

Above: Activation of the lower inflow/outflow crevasse site on May 3, 2011.

Below: Aerial view of the upper crevasse site after activation of the floodway.
122

Divine Providence

It took nearly three days for the fl oodway to fi ll with fl ood water. 

Each day, fl oodway residents and farmers travelled through the area 

on boats to examine their property. Water stood high in their homes 

and on their lands – too high to determine the extent of their losses. 

It took weeks for the water levels to recede as the river did not cease 

fl owing into the fl oodway through the crevasse sites until June 8. Their 

sacrifi ce had been great. The Food and Agricultural Research Policy 

Institute estimated the crop losses alone at $85 million, with the broader 

economic impact exceeding $156 million. The fi gures did not account 

for damages to public and private infrastructure. Some lost everything; 

but their sacrifi ce saved so many elsewhere in the confl uence area.128

In its May 2 forecast, the National Weather Service projected the 

river to crest at 63.5 feet on the Cairo gage on May 5. At 0700 hours 

on May 5, the Cairo gage read 59.6 feet – nearly four feet lower than 

originally anticipated. The maximum discharge into the fl oodway measured approximately 400,000 cfs, nearly 150,000 cfs below the projected 
123

Chapter Two – Trouble at the Confluence

maximum project fl ood design capacity. The peak discharge at Cairo 

reached 2.1 million cfs – only 89 percent of the project design fl ood 

fl ow of 2.36 million cfs. Also, the task force only crevassed a portion 

of the levee, which accounted for some of the difference. The successful activation of the fl oodway rested on the shoulders of the task force. 

The crews on the ground braved severe weather and a dangerous work 

environment, while continually changing plans on the fl y. “They did 

everything that was asked of them on short notice and without complaint,” Davis later recalled. LRD had done its part as well in preventing 

a system collapse. April 2011 had been the wettest April in the Ohio 

Valley in the past 117 years. Peabody’s informed and decisive move 

to store water behind the restricted dams on the Cumberland system 

created nearly fi ve feet of storage at Kentucky and Barkley lakes. By 

May 5, ten reservoirs in LRD had reached record pool elevations. Eight 

of those were in the Louisville Engineer District – eight of eleven reservoirs in the district set new records. Four of those went beyond full 

capacity. Total system storage in LRD reached 38.9 percent, shattering 

the old record of 35 percent. Without that storage capacity, the river 

would have reached 65.5 feet on the Cairo gage and overtopped the 

critical Commerce to Birds Point levee and other levees and fl oodwalls 

in the confl uence area. Peabody and his water control managers had 

done all that they could. “This wasn’t a man-made disaster,” Peabody 

later recalled, “It was a God-made scenario.”129

In other words, it was Divine Providence.

Chapter 3

Fergie Fixes 

the River:

Improving the FloodCarrying Capacity 

of the River

Whatever credit is due for a courageous effort to lower fl ood 

heights on the confi ned waters of the Mississippi is due to 

Maj. Gen. Harley B. Ferguson. There are many who project 

an idea where danger is involved but there are few with the 

courage to give it effect and to assume the responsibility.

Maj. General Lytle Brown

Former Chief of Engineers

1948
126

Divine Providence

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127

MAY 10, 2011 WAS A BEAUTIFUL DAY in Vicksburg, Mississippi. 

The normally sleepy town was alive with excitement. A cool 

breeze out of the north carrying the sweet fragrance of honeysuckle ushered in noticeably mild temperatures and low humidity for 

that time of year, which the Purple Martins undoubtedly enjoyed as 

they whistled and chirped their delight. Along Washington Street – the 

brick-paved thoroughfare lined with quaint shops and colorful crepe 

myrtles – throngs of onlookers dodged the unusually high numbers 

of cars, pick-up trucks, and recreation vehicles as they nonchalantly 

strolled toward the best unobstructed view of the river creeping higher 

and higher up the wonderfully-decorated fl oodwall. Festive jazz music 

rang out from the speakers outside each storefront along Washington 

Street. The carnival-like atmosphere was reminiscent of the celebrations during the golden age of the steamboat era, when the sound of 

the calliope awakened townsfolk from their mundane and isolated lives, 

drawing them to the riverfront to learn the latest gossip or to be fi rst in 

line to see the new goods for sale.

That beautiful May day in Vicksburg, not a single park bench 

remained empty. Outside the historic Biedenharn Candy Manufacturing Company, one aged reveler commented to his entourage that he had 

never seen the water that high. The others nodded in agreement. Yet, 

the fl ood crest was still days away and the water would rise another 

four feet on the fl oodwall. Similar scenes, no doubt, played out in other 

river towns – Memphis, Greenville, Natchez – but away from the cities 

the mood was anything but celebratory. Engineers, levee boards, and 

fl ood fi ghters along the levee system from Memphis to Natchez were 

engaged in the fi ghts of their lives. River stages attained levels never 

before experienced at most locations along the reach, exerting unprecedented pressure on the system. Yet, unlike the northern and southern 

sections of the MR&T project, the middle section was not equipped 

with fl oodways to divert excess fl ow and relieve pressure on the levee 

systems – though that had not always been the case.130
128

Divine Providence

The Boeuf Floodway

The 1927 fl ood demonstrated the futility of the levees-only policy 

between the Arkansas River and Old River. The severely swollen Mississippi and Arkansas rivers placed incredible pressure on the overmatched 

levee system. The rivers wanted out of their confi ned spaces. The fi rst 

major crevasse of a levee considered commission grade occurred at 

Mound Landing north of Greenville on April 21, 1927. At the time of 

the crevasse, the Arkansas City gage had reached 60 feet – 2.55 feet 

above record. An eddy had been eroding the levee for several days 

and, with water fl owing over the levee at several locations, Greenville 

residents valiantly worked to reinforce it. Despite the heroic effort, 

fl oodwaters eventually blew out the banquette, taking several persons 

with them. The crevasse eventually widened to nearly half a mile as 

nearly 500,000 cfs crashed violently into the Mississippi delta. The 

uncontrolled torrent broke through a back levee protecting Greenville, 

Greenville, Miss., after the Mound Landing levee crevasse.
129

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

fl ooding the city to a depth of six feet on April 24. Several counties, 

including Bolivar, Tallahatchie, Sunfl ower, and Humphreys, saw greater 

than 75 percent losses. More than 50,000 evacuated. On the same day 

that the levee crevassed at Mound Landing, levees on the Arkansas River 

failed at Pendleton and Medford. At Pendleton, water overtopped the 

levee, washing away sandbags faster than crews could replace them. Just 

a short distance downriver at Medford, crews fl ed after the Pendleton 

levee failed out of fear of being isolated. A week later, another Arkansas 

River levee that was below grade washed away after being weakened 

by overtopping. On May 1, Mississippi River levees along a 16-mile 

stretch just south of Natchez crevassed after overtopping at Glasscock, 

Brabston and two locations near Bougere, Mississippi. On May 3, with 

fl oodwaters from Mound Landing returning to the Mississippi River via 

the Yazoo River and increasing stages considerably, another crevasse 

occurred at Cabin Teele in Louisiana across and slightly upriver from 

Vicksburg. The crevasse inundated most of the Tensas basin between 

Macon Ridge and the Mississippi River.131

Floodwaters inundate Tallulah, La., after the Cabin Teele levee crevasse.
130

Divine Providence

The series of crevasses represented the defi ning moment of the 1927 

fl ood in the region and prompted Maj. Gen. Edgar Jadwin to incorporate a fl oodway on the west bank of the river to prevent a repeat of a 

similar tragedy. The Corps of Engineers had considered a fl oodway 

through the Boeuf and Tensas basins in southeast Arkansas and northeast Louisiana since the mid nineteenth century. Charles Ellet, Jr., and 

Capt. Andrew Humphreys completed thorough investigations for the 

Corps of Engineers that made provisions for a west bank fl oodway to 

accommodate excess fl ow from the river at extremely high stages. Their 

recommendations, however, never came to fruition as the levees-only 

policy became dogma. Jadwin intended to reverse that course. Under 

the original Jadwin plan, the project called for higher and stronger 

levees on both sides of the river from the mouth of the Arkansas River 

to Old River. The levees were to be constructed to the higher 1928 

grade as the fi rst line of defense against fl oods. The only exception was 

a 30-mile stretch of levee extending from Cypress Creek to a point in 

Arkansas nearly fi ve miles west of Greenville. The project called for 

this segment of levee to remain at its existing height in order to function as a fuseplug entrance into a 1.32 million-acre fl oodway, known 

as the Boeuf fl oodway.132

Historically, Cypress Creek had served as a natural diversion or 

outlet that allowed the Mississippi to expand and disperse overfl ows 

through the Boeuf and Tensas basins. In 1921, the Tensas Basin and 

Southeast Arkansas levee districts, with the consent of the Mississippi 

River Commission, extended the mainline levees across the outlet, 

thereby denying the Mississippi access to its historic fl oodplain. Through 

his fl ood control plan, Jadwin envisioned restoring the Boeuf diversion 

to redirect Mississippi River fl ows in excess of 1,950,000 cfs in the 

vicinity of Arkansas City to keep river stages at or below 62.5 feet on 

the Arkansas City gage. Jadwin estimated the fuseplug trigger point 

to be at a height equivalent to 60.5 feet on the Arkansas City gage. 

This height represented a 10-foot increase over the historical point of 
131

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

Map depicting the guide levees that were to defi ne the Boeuf floodway.

--

<, •• •• , ' ~ ~ ---","- ~- , ~ " 

" 

~ 

I 

" 
132

Divine Providence

overfl ow prior to the closure of the Cypress Creek gap. Under project 

fl ood conditions, the 9.5-mile wide fl oodway, fl anked by 80 miles of 

protection levee on the west and 100 miles on the east, would divert 

900,000 cfs through the Boeuf basin to the Red River backwater area 

in Louisiana and eventually to the Gulf of Mexico via the Atchafalaya 

basin.133

Similar to the stiff resistance to the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway mounted by residents and elected offi cials from southeast Missouri, residents and landowners in the Boeuf and Tensas basins bitterly 

opposed Jadwin’s inclusion of the Boeuf fl oodway in the general fl ood 

control plan for the lower Mississippi Valley. But unlike the situation 

at the confl uence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, the Mississippi 

River Commission had also proposed a fl oodway in the Boeuf basin. 

The commission’s fl oodway was smaller than Jadwin’s, with a capacity 

to divert only 600,000 cfs from the Mississippi River, and less intrusive by avoiding the inclusion of higher value properties. It was also 

more palatable to those impacted because it was to be governed by a 

concrete weir or a gated structure instead of Jadwin’s dreaded fuseplug 

levee concept.134

The most signifi cant difference between the Jadwin and the commission plans involved payments for damages after use of the fl oodway. 

Jadwin believed that all land within the fl oodway was naturally subject 

to fl ooding and thus the Corps of Engineers was not liable for damages 

if it let nature take its course. The commission argued that the current 

system already protected much of the land – particularly along Cypress 

Creek – and that it was illegal to take land and not pay in some way for 

its use. Adding to the problem was that the Jadwin plan fl ooded more 

land more often – only about two thirds of property in the valley would 

receive complete protection with the others receiving various levels 

depending on their location in the fl oodways and backwater areas. By 

protecting fewer areas and not paying for damages, Jadwin reduced 

the costs considerably. Local businessmen and landowners, meanwhile, 
133

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

argued that forced purchase of fl owage rights and local condemnation 

devalued property and made it impossible to sell. Railway operators 

in particular believed they should receive compensation for moving 

their lines. The only way to ensure fair market value was for the federal 

government to purchase the land at an earlier cost.135

On May 15, President Calvin Coolidge signed the 1928 Flood Control Act into law. The new law provided for a special board to consider 

the differences between the Jadwin and commission plans. Boeuf fl oodway residents and their allies hoped the board would clarify a stark 

contradiction found in section four of the 1928 act. Section four authorized the federal government to purchase fl owage rights for “additional 

destructive waters” resulting from “diversions from the main channel 

of the Mississippi River,” but the last-minute insertion of “additional” 

left it unclear whether all lands in the fl oodways were included. Jadwin 

had announced his attention to purchase fl owage rights at the Birds 

Point-New Madrid and Bonnet Carré, but not the Boeuf and Atchafalaya 

fl oodways. It was a question that would plague the Boeuf fl oodway for 

years to come.136

After the special engineering board refused to touch the compensation issue and endorsed the engineering features of the Jadwin plan, 

President Calvin Coolidge instructed Jadwin to proceed with the implementation of his fl ood control plan, but specifi cally delayed any decision 

pertaining to the acquisition of land rights for constructing the fl oodways. 

Shortly after the 1928 elections, which boosted Herbert Hoover to the 

presidency, the lame-duck Coolidge approved the site for the Bonnet 

Carré spillway and authorized Jadwin to purchase the necessary land 

and fl owage rights for that element of the plan. Three weeks later he 

did the same for the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. Lastly, in two 

separate orders in January 1929, Coolidge authorized the acquisition 

of rights-of-way and construction of the protection levees within the 

Boeuf and Atchafalaya fl oodways. Provisions for the purchase of fl owage rights in the Boeuf and Atchafalaya fl oodways were conspicuously 
134

Divine Providence

absent in the fi nal two communiqués. The Corps of Engineers had 

determined that landowners in the Boeuf and Atchafalaya fl oodways 

would not be subjected to additional destructive waters. There was to 

be no compensation paid to landowners.137

More than 50,000 people resided within the Boeuf fl oodway in the 

late 1920s. Some landowners quickly settled on prices to sell rights-ofway for levees or agreed to damage waivers for their mostly undeveloped land. Others refused to accede to threats of condemnation largely 

because of a recent spike in property values generated by the success of 

gas and oil wells in the region. Many argued that the Jadwin plan constituted a reopening of the Cypress Creek gap. For that, they believed 

the federal government owed compensation. No matter what the reason 

for their refusal, they quickly found allies among leading engineers. 

When Louisiana State Engineer George Schoenberger wrote Sen. Joseph 

Ransdell opposing the fi ndings of the special board in August 1928, he 

explained that fuseplug levees would create great velocity in the fi rst 

few miles and then fl ood the fl oodways to a depth of about 20 feet, 

greatly damaging property. “If water must be diverted down the Boeuf 

Basin ... then the land within the fl oodway area should be bought by 

the government at a fair price and dedicated to fl oodway purposes.” In 

his book published November 1928, James Kemper observed that the 

special board had proposed providing $6 an acre for easements – the cost 

to plant the land – but that many would lose homes, fencing, livestock, 

and food. “It makes one fear that an autocracy is growing that will soon 

be necessary to curb,” he wrote. In the spring of 1929, the American 

Engineering Council’s Flood Control Committee – Baxter Brown, John 

Freeman, Arthur Morgan, and Gardner Williams – noted that “suffi cient 

study ... of fl ood control on the Mississippi River has not been made” 

because “the intent of Congress and the best interest of the nation were 

defeated by the constitution and action” of the special board. “It would 

be a grave mistake to permit the letting of contracts” on the fl oodways “until the engineering practicability and economic feasibility are 
135

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

adequately studied by a non-partisan and competent board of engineers.” 

The secretary of the council forwarded the report to President Hoover 

on May 20, 1929.138

From the start, congressional members from the lower Mississippi 

Valley region had advocated a truly comprehensive fl ood control plan 

supported by large federal expenditures. As it became apparent that the 

fl ood control act was fl awed in its application of compensation and that 

the federal government did not intend to purchase property or fl owage 

rights in the Boeuf and Atchafalaya fl oodways, pressure mounted from 

their constituents to delay and change the project. Many found hope 

in the new president. Coolidge and Jadwin may have been the main 

architects of the project, but it would be implemented by the Mississippi 

River Commission under Hoover’s watch. Although his administration 

represented a continuation of the previous one as far as party affi liation 

and fi scal conservatism, Hoover, unlike his seemingly unsympathetic 

predecessor, was actively involved in the 1927 fl ood fi ght, winning the 

respect of many southerners.

On May 9, 1929, a congressional delegation representing the lower 

Mississippi Valley led primarily by Southern Democrats petitioned 

Hoover to suspend work on the project pending a presidential and congressional interpretation and review of the 1928 Flood Control Act. The 

delegation stressed that Congress’ intent under section four of the act 

was “to assure compensation for fl owage rights over land embraced 

within all spillways and fl oodways and for damage where injury is 

done to property.” They argued that section one placed the responsibility of approval or rejection of particular elements of the plan squarely 

on the shoulders of the president. Furthermore, the delegation insisted 

that Coolidge issued his instructions to Jadwin to proceed with the 

acquisition of rights-of-way for levees, but not fl owage rights, without 

having before him “a full and complete report” on the commission and 

the Jadwin plans. Therefore, Coolidge did not have the opportunity “to 

pass upon the question of compensation for fl owage rights under both 
136

Divine Providence

plans in the Boeuf and Atchafalaya Basins.” With this in mind, the delegation suggested that if Hoover did not reach the same interpretation, 

he then should call for a temporary cessation of work on the project 

to allow Congress to revisit and clarify the issue through a legislative 

amendment. 139

Hoover sent the brief, along with a supplemental support statement, 

to Secretary of War James W. Good. On May 27, Good forwarded the 

documents to Attorney General William D. Mitchell asking for his 

opinion as to whether the adopted project was subject to change at the 

behest of the president or was it fi xed by law. He also asked Mitchell 

if the existing law required the federal government to purchase fl owage rights in the Atchafalaya and Boeuf fl oodways. The attorney general published his offi cial decision a little more than three weeks later. 

Mitchell expressed his view that the law did not authorize the purchase 

of fl owage in the Boeuf and Atchafalaya basins. The project was fi xed 

by law and could only be changed by Congress. As to Good’s inquiry 

into the legality involved in purchasing fl owage rights in the Atchafalaya and Boeuf fl oodways, Mitchell responded, “I must fully decline 

to express an opinion on your question,” citing existing litigation in 

federal court.140

Mitchell’s reference to existing litigation centered on a number of 

lawsuits brought before the federal courts. Having failed the test of 

public opinion, the Jadwin Plan now faced several legal tests. The most 

prominent suit commenced on June 15, 1929, two days before bids for 

the construction of protection levees within the Boeuf fl oodway were 

to be received. On this date, R. Foster Kincaid, an owner of 160 acres 

toward the lower end of the proposed Boeuf fl oodway, fi led a lawsuit 

in the Federal Court of Western Louisiana against the United States, 

the secretary of war, the Corps of Engineers, and the members of the 

Mississippi River Commission in an effort to halt the receiving of bids 

and the awarding of contracts for construction of the guide levees that 

would defi ne the fl oodway boundaries and confi ne fl oodwaters entering 
137

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

through the fuseplug entrance. The suit alleged that the planned fl oodway through the Boeuf basin subjected Kincaid’s land to additional 

destructive fl oods. His lawyers argued that Kincaid’s land was valued 

at $9,000, but the federal government, by advertising and receiving bids 

for construction of the protection levees, had “cast a cloud upon” the 

title of the land, thereby impairing Kincaid’s ability to sell or to borrow 

money against it. As such, the proposal to initiate work in the basin 

without condemnation proceedings was tantamount to the taking of his 

land “without due process of law and without just compensation.”141

A similar application for an injunction to stop the awarding of contracts in the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway – Kirk v. Good – had 

been denied in late May by Judge Charles B. Davis of the Federal Court 

in Missouri. Jadwin desired another decision along those lines. As R.N. 

Duffy and Maj. Paul S. Reinecke prepared to testify for the Mississippi River Commission in the preliminary hearing of the Kincaid case, 

Jadwin worked to coordinate on the message for future legal action. First 

he did not focus on the fact that some of these lands might fl ood, which 

federal lawyers admitted, but instead he stressed that no “additional” 

fl oodwaters would enter the fl oodway from the Mississippi by way of 

operating the fl oodway. Second, he contended that because the overall 

plan lowered fl ood stages on the Mississippi, less water would enter the 

fl oodway from the main channel. Last, he argued that building levees 

to protect property adjoining the fl oodways in no way prevented local 

interests from protecting their citizens by building their own levees as 

they had in the past. When Duffy seemed not to grasp this in an internal 

memo, afraid that “such errors might lose the Government cases in the 

Mississippi Valley,” Jadwin requested Reinecke go over the legal position with Duffy or else “keep him out of Louisiana and either handle 

the case yourself or get someone who can. Your other work is of small 

importance compared to this.”142

Despite this preparation, the Kincaid case went against the government from the beginning. Unlike the Kirk case, where the plaintiff 
138

Divine Providence

could fi nd remedy in condemnation proceedings, Judge Benjamin C. 

Dawkins of the Western Louisiana District Court ruled that the Kincaid 

case had merit to proceed to trial and agreed to a temporary injunction. 

This had impact, not just on construction, but on purchase of the levee 

rights-of-way. In an ongoing condemnation case, United States v. Stubbs, 

Dawkins ruled the government could not take immediate possession of 

the property of Col. Frank P. Stubbs and others in the Monroe circle in 

Louisiana without putting up the maximum value of the property until 

the Kincaid case was resolved. In response, Good instructed the attorney 

general, “After decision has been rendered in the injunction suit and 

when it has been decided to resume work on these levees, the matter 

can be taken up and the question of depositing funds in the registry 

of the court then determined.” The only other condemnation ongoing, 

against the Jewell Realty and Chicot Trust companies, which had fi led 

numerous interventions claiming damages for $3 million, was also put 

on hold, essentially shutting down all progress on the fl oodway until 

resolution of the case.143

The Kincaid case went to trial October 15, 1929. Testifying for 

Kincaid were well-known opponents of the Jadwin plan: James Kemper, 

Lucius Berthe, and Harry Jacobs, the new Louisiana State Engineer; for 

the government, commission members Brig. Gen. Thomas Jackson and 

Col. Earnest Graves, as well as Capt. John P. Dean. As expected, the 

trial hinged on the interpretation of “additional” fl oodwaters. On this, 

opinions varied, as there were a number of ways of defi ning additional. 

One was the frequency of the Arkansas City gage reaching 60.5 feet to 

trigger use of the fl oodway, which Kemper placed at one in four years, 

Dean one in 13, and Graves perhaps even more infrequent, compared 

to fl ooding every two to three years previously. Jacobs testifi ed that the 

Cypress Creek levee had protected Kincaid’s land until the current project, but Dean stated that “The waters pass naturally as they always have 

passed down through the natural Boeuf basin.” Kemper argued additionally that when fl oods came, they would be violent because of crevassing 
139

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

the fuseplug levee, a statement Graves confi rmed. A second defi nition 

involved the amount of discharge. Mississippi River Commission fi gures used by Kemper showed the fl oodway would pass 350,000 cfs 

more through the basin than experienced in 1927. Although Graves 

disputed the reliability of these fi gures, Jackson admitted there would 

be an increase in discharge of at least 150,000 cfs. A third defi nition was 

the depth of fl oodwaters. Kincaid’s land previously fl ooded frequently, 

but Jacobs argued that construction of guide levees 16 feet higher than 

his property showed intent to fl ood his land to this depth. Although 

Dean initially argued that the levees were to protect “adjoining lands” 

and that fl ood heights would be no higher than in 1927, under “rigid 

cross-examination” he admitted that, in fact, water would rise four feet 

higher on his property than in 1927. In his ruling issued December 13, 

Judge Dawkins reasoned that although fl ooding might be infrequent, it 

would damage property. “It will not be assumed that Congress intended 

to violate the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution by taking private 

property for public purposes without just compensation,” so the act 

required obtaining property through purchase or condemnation. On 

February 10, 1930, he upheld the injunction to prevent construction of 

the guide levees until purchase of fl owage rights.144

Jubilation sprang forth across the Boeuf and Atchafalaya fl oodways. 

An editorial in the Engineering News-Record called Dawkins’ ruling, “a 

common sense decision.” Long opposed to many aspects of the Jadwin 

Plan, in particular to the issue of compensation for fl oodway residents, 

the editors admonished Jadwin, Coolidge, and the Army engineers 

testifying in the case:

The outcome is surprising only in view of the fact that a former 

Chief of Engineers deliberately planned to utilize the land for 

a fl ood control channel without compensation, that a former 

President issued an order to this very end, and that the government witness at the trial in Monroe strained their integrity to 
140

Divine Providence

show that destructive fl ooding would not occur, until after cross 

examination they admitted the contrary.”145

The impacts of the decision extended beyond the immediate issue 

of just compensation for those living within the Boeuf fl oodway. Back 

in September of 1929, after Judge Dawkins ruled that the case had 

merit, Hoover announced that he would delay new work on the Boeuf 

and Atchafalaya fl oodways if “the Senators and Representatives of the 

interested states are willing to assume the responsibility by making 

the request” since “there has been a great deal of division of opinion” 

requiring resolution. After receiving formal requests from at least six 

of the congressmen, he approved cessation of work on the Boeuf and 

Atchafalaya fl oodways. Although his order left the Jadwin plan otherwise intact, the delay “opened a way for reconsideration of portions 

of the diversion plans for Mississippi fl ood control,” the Engineering 

News-Record editorialized.146

With construction of the Boeuf fl oodway guide levees stalled, however, the fl ood control system protecting the middle section of the project contained an ominous and threatening weak spot. While Jadwin 

envisioned excess fl oodwaters escaping through the natural diversion 

in the Boeuf basins, with no guide levees to confi ne the overfl ow, a 

large fl ood would unleash a torrent of uncontrolled water down the 

Boeuf and Tensas basins, sowing havoc and devastation. Yet, Jadwin 

was gone, having retired in October 1929, just prior to Judge Dawkins’ 

ruling. The new chief of engineers, Maj. Gen. Lytle Brown, possessed 

more political savvy and fl exibility than his confrontational and obstinate predecessor. Brown particularly generated great excitement among 

lower valley interests when he hinted that changes to the Jadwin plan 

might be in order by describing the plan as a “piece of emergency work” 

developed hastily to protect the citizens of the lower valley as quickly as 

possible. Moreover, Brown, recognizing that “very little effort has been 

made by those responsible for the work toward inquiry as to how the 
141

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

general plans might be changed,” 

encouraged a reevaluation of the 

existing fl ood-control plan. While 

Brown understood that a widespread hostility toward altering the 

Jadwin plan existed among many 

within the Corps of Engineers and 

certain blocs within Congress—

hostility which discouraged inquiries into potential modifi cations of 

the plan—he was taken aback that 

no suggestion from a responsible 

authority had been made proposing the elimination or modifi cation 

of contested elements of the project. Brown promptly issued a challenge to the engineer community to 

explore and develop new answers to the fl ood-control question. It was 

in this context that a new plan emerged—the use of man-made cutoffs 

and channel rectifi cation to lower fl ood stages.147

More Water at Lower Stages

The Mississippi River is an alluvial stream that creates bends or 

loops as it meanders through the valley. Bends reduce the slope or velocity of the river. As a result, the river typically pools in the bends during 

fl oods, causing fl oodwaters to pile up above the bend. Left unchecked by 

bank revetment, the bends lengthen as they develop until only a narrow 

neck of land separates the upstream bend from the downstream bend. 

A cutoff occurs when a new channel is carved – whether naturally or 

artifi cially – across the neck, eventually divorcing the old bend from the 

river and transforming it into an oxbow lake. Since the 1850s, engineers 

Maj. Gen. Lytle Brown, Chief of Engineers, 

1929-1933. (Offi ce of History, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers)
142

Divine Providence

dabbled with the concept of artifi cial cutoffs to prevent fl oodwaters 

from stacking up and to speed fl oodwaters through the system.

While the merits of cutoffs as a method of fl ood control had been 

discussed in engineering circles since the mid nineteenth century, the 

renewed push came from William Elam, an engineer with the Mississippi Levee Board. Elam had been studying cutoffs since 1913, when 

he witnessed the Albemarle Chute Cutoff—a gradual widening of a 

narrow side channel between Willow Point and Newman Towhead about 

30 miles north of Vicksburg that had the same effect of cutting a new 

main channel. The old main channel started to cave in 1910, and the 

commission tried to revet the banks, but within three years abandoned 

it. Because the new channel funneled the current against the east bank, 

the commission started to build a levee in expectation of a cave-in per 

the old theories, but found it unnecessary. “It was enough to create doubt 

about old theories,” Elam wrote. Over the next 15 years, he developed 

his fi ndings of cutoffs. After the Flood of 1927, Elam wrote articles 

for the Engineering News-Record and the Proceedings of the American 

Society of Civil Engineers that laid out a plan that comprised revetment, 

levees, sandbar removal, and cutoffs to fl atten the slope of the river 

and reduce fl ood stages. Altogether, he identifi ed 35 cutoffs – most 

prominently at the Greenville Bends – that would lower fl ood stages 

between Arkansas City and Vicksburg by an estimated 10 to 20 feet.148

By the time Elam prepared the articles, the 1928 act had already 

incorporated Jadwin’s position that cutoffs were “too uncertain and 

threatening to warrant adoption” and that “it is advisable to adhere 

to the present policy of preserving the river generally in its present 

form.”149 The Mississippi River Commission, too, opposed cutoffs, 

having adopted a policy to prevent natural cutoffs in 1880 out of fear 

of harming the regimen of the river. Yet Elam’s articles and the attention 

they garnered appeared to have at least one effect. When a cutoff started 

to develop at Yucatan Point in 1929, Jadwin approved letting it proceed, 

apparently with the intent of proving its ill effects. For some years, the 
143

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

commission was aware of the possibility of a cutoff at Yucatan Point, 

where the Big Black River traversed the neck of the point and emptied 

into the Mississippi River at the lower bend. The bank was caving on 

both sides of the bend, gradually narrowing the distance between the 

Big Black River and the Mississippi River on the upper bend. In August 

and September 1928, the commission placed revetment to prevent the 

Mississippi from breaking into the Big Black, but by order of Jadwin did 

no more work to prevent the cutoff. During the winter months of 1929 

and 1930, fl oodwaters from the Mississippi overwhelmed the ridge and 

broke through to the Big Black, effectively cutting off Yucatan Point. At 

that point, at the request of Brown, engineers began taking gage readings and discharge measurements, and Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Jackson 

ordered establishment of cross-section surveys to observe the cutoff’s 

development. The ensuing cutoff developed slowly and afforded the 

commission its fi rst opportunity in more than a generation to study the 

progress of a cutoff and to make detailed observations on the impacts to 

the river. As the cutoff developed over many months, the commission 

observed no immediate or violent changes to the regimen of the river. 

In August 1930, engineers reported depth measurements in excess of 

18 feet.150

With initial data from the Yucatan Cutoff already starting to disprove 

the long-held belief that cutoffs harmed the regimen of the river, Elam 

submitted his ideas for the improvement of both the Mississippi and 

Atchafalaya rivers through cutoffs to Maj. Gen. Brown in March 1930 

while attending the Mississippi River Commission’s high-water inspection tour of the Mississippi River. Impressed with the concept as a 

method to perhaps avoid building the Boeuf fl oodway, Brown studied 

Elam’s ideas carefully. He later met Elam in Greenville, Mississippi, 

and continued to correspond with him about cutoffs throughout the 

year. In the meantime, in November 1930, Col. Harley Ferguson, a 

member of the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, submitted 
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Divine Providence

Map depicting the progression of the natural cutoff at Yucatan Point, 1929-1931.

, .,' . - , 

SCALE \ 

===l\ "; 

YUCATAN BE ND IN 1929 

- -.'.- . 

,..-

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( 

< 

< 

< 

< 

( 

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( 

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( 

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145

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

a detailed plan infl uenced by Elam’s fi ndings and the observations from 

the Yucatan cutoff.151

One of the most prominent Army engineers before World War II, 

having earned a reputation by raising the USS MAINE in Havana Harbor, 

Ferguson was the South Atlantic Division commander. He had been 

studying Mississippi fl ooding since at least 1928, when he requested 

that Capt. Lewis A. Pick provide him with data and maps. By October 

1930, when he pulled in his engineer in charge of surveys, Gerard H. 

Matthes, to aid him in drafting the plan, Ferguson had already conceptualized a proposal of fl ood stage reductions through cutoffs, corrective dredging, and stabilization of the new channel through revetment. 

Submitted to the Board of Engineers on November 22, 1930, the plan 

outlined the issue: “The fl ood problem above the Arkansas is solved 

by levees. The problem below Old River is solved by the Atchafalaya 

fl oodway and the Bonnet Carré spillway.” The critical stretch was from 

the Arkansas to the Red River, where fl ood heights proved unmanageable by other means. His plan argued for increasing the carrying capacity of this stretch through targeted cutoffs, closing secondary channels, 

checking bank erosion using revetment, deepening the channel, and 

restricting crossovers where the river channel crosses from one side 

of a bend to another. These activities would allow the river to further 

dredge its own channel. As Ferguson noted, the kinetic energy of the 

river “is equivalent to more than 50 dredges.” Essential to controlling 

the river and improving drainage in that reach were removal of the clay 

ridge near Natchez, Mississippi, deepening Old River, and improving 

the Atchafalaya River. “The river itself is the main dredge,” Ferguson 

wrote, “The channel from Natchez to Old River is the pipeline.”152

While Ferguson’s channel rectifi cation program proposed various 

bank revetment and dredging operations, the cutoffs represented the 

most revolutionary part of his plan. “There can be no possible harm in 

reducing the river to the length which it had in 1880,” he wrote. Among 

the cutoffs he proposed were at Gaillardo Lake (Glasscock), Giles Bend, 
146

Divine Providence

Grand Gulf (Diamond Point), and 

the Greenville Bends. He would 

generally work from south to 

north, improving the reach from 

Natchez to Old River and then 

from Greenville to Vicksburg. At 

the same time, it was the combination of correction and cutoffs that 

defi ned his unique approach. His 

method was to enlarge the riverbed through “corrective dredging” 

to improve slope and navigation, 

and place revetment and dikes 

to stabilize the river above and 

below a proposed cut. He cautiously added, “it will be necessary to have several dredges on hand” to ensure navigation. He even 

recommended the type of dredges and revetment required. Based on 

these improvements, he predicted lowering fl ood heights by at least 

three to seven feet for $50 million within three years. Finally, he argued, 

“the amount by which the fl ood capacity of the main river channel can 

eventually be increased can be determined only by proceeding with the 

work and measuring the effects.” In other words, Ferguson argued that 

the only real way to prove the stage lowering effects of cutoffs was to 

proceed with his experimental program.153

On reading the plan in December 1930, Pick noted “you will 

meet a lot of opposition to your plan. This, of course, is not based 

on anything except the old school of thought.” Indeed, the plan met 

almost immediate opposition, starting with Board of Engineers for 

Rivers and Harbors member and former Mississippi River Commission member Col. Edward Schulz. At a hearing of the board to consider 

Ferguson’s plan on January 5, 1931, Schulz tried to convince the board 

Col. Harley B. Ferguson
147

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

mathematically that cutoffs would not lower the riverbed and that its 

benefi ts would dwindle to zero above the cut. Despite Schulz’s efforts, 

on February 5, 1931, the majority of the board approved Ferguson’s 

plan. Many Mississippi River Commission employees, too, opposed the 

plan because of its long stance against cutoffs. Jackson, the commission 

president, made clear his own views in an article that January. While 

not denying cutoffs could improve discharge, he noted their dangers 

and high costs. Jackson concluded, “In fl ood-control plans of the past, 

the cutoff has played an unimportant role, and there is little prospect 

of it playing a more important one in the future.”154

Not surprisingly, Ferguson’s plan impressed Maj. Gen. Brown. The 

bold and innovative approach represented the exact type of exploration 

he had challenged the Corps of Engineers to produce upon replacing 

Maj. Gen. Jadwin as chief of engineers. On February 28, 1931, Brown 

submitted a plan to modify the MR&T project to Congress. The plan 

included the recommendation for the Board of Engineers to initiate a 

program of “experimental work, including channel rectifi cation and 

stabilization, dredging, and bank protection.” Only a year later, after 

receiving permission from Congress to pursue further investigations into 

cutoffs in January 1932, Brown assigned a board of review that included 

Ferguson, Spalding, Dean Anson Marston of Iowa State College, and 

Lt. John P. Dean. The board assembled in Memphis on March 9 and 

proceeded downriver on the INSPECTOR, including a trip to the Atchafalaya River. It made another trip in May to Cairo and the St. Francis 

and Tensas basins. Although the ostensible goal of this board was review 

of the fl oodways as well as increases in discharge in the river, it spent 

considerable time discussing cutoffs during its early months. Among 

others, the board interviewed Jackson for suggestions concerning the 

Jadwin plan, but he made no statements showing favoritism to cutoffs 

and suggested that he only desisted from preventing the Yucatan Cutoff 

after revetment had failed.155
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Divine Providence

It should come as no surprise that, given Jackson’s disagreement 

with cutoff plans and Ferguson’s interest in implementing them, Brown 

would allow Jackson to retire in May 1932 and nominate Ferguson as 

the new president of the Mississippi River Commission. Ferguson was 

widely considered the most talented offi cer in the Corps of Engineers. 

According to one version of the story, Brown called Ferguson to his 

offi ce to tell him of the assignment. They sat smoking pipes until Ferguson fi nally asked his superior offi cer, “Do you want me to write a book 

or fi x a river?” Brown, inhaled the smoke from his pipe then exhaled 

slowly before replying, “Fergie, you get the hell out of here and go fi x 

that river.” From that moment, Ferguson let nothing stand in his way. 

Raised in the North Carolina-Tennessee backcountry, Ferguson had a 

way of explaining his plan that appealed to the public. “The Mississippi wants out. Let it out. Don’t try to bridle it and make it stay inside 

roundabout, twisting, inadequate channels.... Put it to work. Keep it 

from damaging its banks and make it carry the load in its bed.”156

When Ferguson arrived in Vicksburg on June 15, 1932, he initially 

found most of his staff biased against his plan. Therefore, his fi rst act 

was to convince and instruct them in a series of memoranda outlining 

his views in pithy comments. “A cut-off reduces the distance, hence 

the resistance to fl ow, between two points,” he wrote in June. “River 

engineering is fundamentally a question of energy,” he added. “Clay 

will stand a very swift current. Sand will not. The banks are composed 

of alternate layers of sand and clay, or gumbo,” he explained in a discussion of revetment in July. “The correct location of revetment is to put it 

along a line pointing downstream where we wish the river to go for the 

next fi ve miles.” He wrote in October on effective dredging, “For any 

particular depth in a river there is a range of velocities which will not 

cause scour or deposit.” In November, “If we enlarge the section above 

the outlet until its capacity is equivalent to that below ... the river will 

be stable.” In December, “If we can increase the power of transportation in the lower reaches or decrease the erosion in the upper reaches, 
149

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

we will accomplish our purpose.”At the same time, he ordered studies 

of a range of topics and frequently made suggestions borrowed from 

others, such as using Navy torpedo nets to close secondary channels, 

experimenting with board revetment, or deciding where to place dredged 

material. In June, he ordered George Clemens to coordinate revetment 

experiments at the Waterways Experiment Station and the Memphis 

Engineer District. He also requested studies of additional proposed 

cutoff locations at the Waterways Experiment Station. He then began 

an extensive regimen of data collection; personally planned dredging 

work for 1932 based on available funding, and on June 17 and July 5 

held conferences to develop plans for where to correct the channel or 

place revetment and how to proceed with his plan.157

The fi rst cutoff in Ferguson’s program was at Diamond Point below 

Vicksburg. The technique used, as with all of the cuts, was to add revetment and improve the alignment and slope of the river above and below 

Gerard Matt hes, left, and Brig. Gen. Harley Ferguson, with arms crossed, inspect operations at the Diamond 

Point cutoff .
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Divine Providence

the cut through dredging and then make a pilot channel from either side 

using dragline machines and cutterhead dredges instead of allowing 

the river to carve its own channel. This avoided the fl ooding below the 

cut that previously resulted from cutoffs. Ferguson left the old bends 

open to allow “valley storage,” or natural reservoirs to temporarily 

store overfl ow from the new channel during high water. He also took 

great care to select the location of the cutoffs. He tried to choose stable 

stretches of river from which to extend the cut, with mild curvature, 

no islands or chutes, and no excessive bank erosion or silting so as to 

avoid any impediments to navigation. He avoided cuts across narrow 

necks where instability already existed, did not attempt to straighten 

the river unduly and risk excessive bank caving, and in general tried 

to plan cuts in close proximity from south to north to allow the cuts 

to carry eroded material from a new cut. The commission initiated the 

cutoff at Diamond Point on January 8, 1933, dramatically dynamiting the narrow ridge separating the pilot channels for a total cost of 

$500,000. The New Orleans States later contrasted this with the fi rst 

shot of the Battle of Lexington. Instead of the shot heard around the 

world, “Nobody even noticed much the shot that should have echoed 

up and down the Mississippi Valley.” Ferguson started work on planned 

cutoffs at Glasscock Point and Giles Bend near Natchez in March and 

May 1933, with preparation begun for several others.158

By the 1935 high-water season, Ferguson had made substantial 

progress implementing his program. Seven artifi cial cutoffs were in 

operation at Diamond Point, Glasscock Point, Giles Bend, Leland Neck, 

Worthington Point, Willow Point, and Marshall Point. Along with the 

natural cutoff at Yucatan Point cutoff, Ferguson’s effort had shortened 

the river by 70 miles. The corrective dredging in the reaches between 

the cutoffs had also signifi cantly widened and improved the alignment 

of the channel, which allowed the kinetic energy of the river to scour its 

bed deeper. While none of the cutoffs had fully developed by the 1935 

high-water season, they, along with the corrective dredging measures, 
151

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

produced substantial results during a fl ood that spring. The fl ood was 

lengthy in duration, but only moderate in height. At the Arkansas City 

gage, the peak fl ow surpassed that of the 1932 fl ood, but the crest of 

the 1935 fl ood was nearly two feet lower – the river carried more water 

at a lower stage. Ferguson’s plan was working.159

Dividends of Channel Rectifi cation

Buttressed by that initial success, the Mississippi River Commission 

proposed several sweeping modifi cations to the Jadwin plan. The most 

intriguing modifi cation involved the Boeuf fl oodway. The commission 

proposed eliminating the 1.32 million-acre fl oodway from the plan and 

replacing it with a smaller 820,000-acre fl oodway through the Tensas 

basin. The proposed replacement, known as the Eudora fl oodway, was 

farther south and east. Under the commission’s new plan, the Eudora 

fl oodway would extend fi ve miles west of the Mississippi River and then 

southward from Eudora, Arkansas, along the eastern edge of Macon 

Ridge to the Red River backwater area. The fl oodway was capable of 

diverting up to 700,000 cfs from the Mississippi River. Along with the 

increased channel capacity created by Ferguson’s program, the fl oodway 

provided the necessary overfl ow relief under project fl ood conditions. 

Being nearly 800 square miles smaller than the Boeuf fl oodway, it also 

eliminated the prospect of future inundation to hundreds of thousands 

of acres of fertile, valuable, and taxable farmlands. To the delight of 

longtime critics of the Boeuf fl oodway, the commission also recommended eliminating the use of a fuseplug levee as contemplated under 

the Jadwin plan. Instead the commission intended to construct control 

works—either gated spillways or concrete weirs—that would commence operation at a stage corresponding to 51 feet on the Vicksburg 

gage. The commission believed that the substitution of control works 

for the fuseplug levee allowed for the fl exibility to open the fl oodway 

only when high and prolonged fl ood stages warranted operation, thereby 
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Divine Providence

An earthen plug is all that separates the dredged pilot channels.

Dynamite removes the plug and opens the cutoff .

Anatomy of a Cutoff
153

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

Fifteen minutes after opening.

One hour after opening, erosion of the plug has spread.
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improving fl owage conditions and regulating the extent and duration 

of diversion.160

The commission also sought to address the nagging issue of compensation by exploiting the generosity of New Deal Democrats, but 

recognized that an impediment still existed in the Corps of Engineers. 

That agency still maintained the position that the fl oodways were natural 

outlets for overfl ows, therefore, the federal government held no obligation to compensate landowners. To remedy the situation, the commission asked the Corps of Engineers to revise its real estate policy by 

advising the secretary of war to enter into an agreement with the states 

of Arkansas and Louisiana to hasten the acquisition process. Under the 

agreement, the states or other local authorities would acquire and transfer land rights to the federal government. The secretary of war would, 

in turn, reimburse the states at a cost not to exceed 1.5 times the total 

1934 assessed value of the land rights acquired. Maj. Gen. Edward 

Markham, Brown’s successor as chief of engineers, concurred with the 

commission’s proposal, but slightly modifi ed the recommendation by 

insisting on 1935 assessed values.161

The commission’s proposed modifi cations, which also included substantial improvements in the Atchafalaya basin, were warmly received 

by many longtime critics of the Jadwin plan. In commenting on the 

changes in the Atchafalaya basin, James Kemper, an outspoken opponent 

of the Jadwin Plan and long-time critic of the Mississippi River Commission, remarked, “For the fi rst time I appear to approve and support 

. . . the main engineering features of this new project.” Harry Jacobs, 

another vocal opponent of the Jadwin Plan and the former chief engineer with the Louisiana Board of State Engineers, gave a similar ringing 

endorsement by calling the commission plan a “splendid recommendation” and asked Congress to authorize the modifi cations, posthaste. The 

Board of State Engineers shared its former chief engineers’ sentiments. 

In a letter to House Flood Control Committee Chairman Riley Wilson, 

the board concluded that the plan came “as near being a perfect plan, 
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Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

consistent with justifi able outlay of funds, as it is possible to conceive. 

The Board of Mississippi Levee Board and the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta 

Levee Board also endorsed the modifi cations.162

One obstacle remained. Support for the commission plan ended 

at the Boeuf and Tensas basins. The success of Ferguson’s program 

sparked a movement to eliminate any fl oodway in southeast Arkansas 

and northeast Louisiana. That movement had actually gained momentum 

the year before when the commission completed a study that examined 

a system of reservoirs in the Arkansas and White basins with a combined storage capacity of 15 million acre-feet. The study concluded that 

the 26 reservoirs, if built, would lower fl ood stages between Arkansas 

City and Old River by as much as fi ve feet. Residents in the Boeuf and 

Tensas basins latched onto the fi nding and the results of Ferguson’s 

program and launched a campaign insinuating that they were being 

forced to take on water to protect Mississippi interests across the river. 

In their view, this was a severe inequity worthy of remediation. Their 

proposed solution was to abandon the fl oodway in favor of levees of 

equal height on both sides of the river to give everyone an equal chance 

to life and property.163

Across the river, Mississippi delta interests, led by Mississippi Congressman Will Whittington, opposed the complete abandonment of 

a west bank fl oodway. Citing the historic fl oods of 1897, 1913, and 

1927, they claimed that the equal protection theory was impractical. 

The Tensas and Boeuf basins were natural outlets; the Yazoo basin was 

not. When the historic fl oods crevassed the levees protecting the Yazoo 

basin, the water coursed southward through the Mississippi delta and 

reentered the Mississippi River near Vicksburg, eventually causing the 

levees on the Louisiana side of the river to break as the fl oodwaters 

sought a natural outlet, as had been the case following the Mound Landing crevasse in 1927. The fuseplug levee on the western bank assured, 

in a very certain way, where dispersion would take place; to abandon 
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it and replace it with levees would remove this uncertainty and render 

the entire stretch of the river between the Arkansas River and Old River 

vulnerable to levee crevasses and overfl ow at points nearly impossible 

to predict. Furthermore, confi nement meant higher fl ood elevations in 

the Yazoo backwater area. Appreciably sympathetic to the plight of 

their neighbors on the west side of the river, Mississippians exercised 

great care to not alienate them by reiterating their full support for just 

compensation, controlled spillways, a narrower fl oodway and, perhaps 

eventually, the incorporation of tributary reservoirs.164

For his part, Maj. Gen. Markham recognized the near impossibility of gaining a consensus between the two camps. While appearing 

before the House Flood Control Committee to answer questions on 

the proposed modifi cations, Markham remarked, “As you talk with 

Tom, Dick, or Harry, each has his own opinions and will stick to it very 

tenaciously.” Markham wanted to fi nd a more equitable solution to the 

fl oodway dilemma, but he was certain that dispersion, not confi nement, 

was the answer. The channel rectifi cation program was paying dividends 

in terms of increasing the carrying capacity of the main channel, yet he 

simply could not consent to any plan calling for the abandonment of a 

west bank fl oodway. He believed that the Eudora fl oodway concept was 

as reasonable and generous a solution as conceivably possible from both 

the engineering and economical view points, much more so in light of 

the provision for a controlled spillway at the head of the fl oodway.165

Ferguson’s testimony somewhat echoed that of Markham. He began 

by explaining that measurements taken during the recent high water 

event of 1935 showed a signifi cant increase in the ability of the main 

channel to carry more water at lower stages between Arkansas City 

and Vicksburg. He indicated, however, that the carrying capacity of the 

river did not reach the point where dispersion was no longer necessary. 

The channel rectifi cation program was designed to confi ne fl oodwaters 

and secure as rapid a discharge as possible, but would permit dispersion when absolutely necessary to prevent catastrophe. During a heated 
157

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

exchange with committee member John L. McClellan, in which the 

Arkansas congressman prodded Ferguson with a salvo of questions 

as to whether or not the purpose of the Eudora fl oodway was to divert 

fl oodwaters to protect the Mississippi delta, the commission president 

fi red back, “It permits the diversion of waters where of necessity they 

must go.” He continued, “You have a physical situation that outranks 

the laws of Congress and all the opinions of engineers.”166

After nearly a year of political haggling, congressional delegations 

from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi fi nally brokered a compromise. On June 15, 1936, Congress passed the Overton Act, which, along 

with other system-wide improvements, approved the elimination of the 

Boeuf fl oodway from the project upon the completion of the Eudora 

fl oodway. The Overton Act prohibited the construction of the guide 

levees for the new fl oodway until after the federal government acquired 

at least 75 percent of the required fl owage easements. The new law had 

solved the fl oodway dilemma – at least on the surface. By the end of 

1936, roughly 30 percent of the requisite number had been secured. As 

a new year dawned, the intended fuseplug levee for the Boeuf fl oodway 

remained at a height that stood lower than surrounding levees. No guide 

levees had been constructed. If a major fl ood developed and breached the 

fuseplug levee, there would be no way to confi ne the overfl ow, leaving a 

large portion of southeast Arkansas and northeast Louisiana vulnerable 

to uncontrolled fl ooding. Just such an event occurred in January 1937 

when a staggering amount of rain began falling over the Ohio Valley. 

It was the onset of the Great Flood of 1937.167

As the 1937 fl ood swept down the Ohio Valley, residents on the 

Boeuf and Tensas basins anxiously watched as the swollen river shattered old stage records from Huntington, West Virginia, to Cairo. That 

anxiety turned to gripping fear after the Mississippi River Commission 

activated the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. As the fl ood crest 

rolled past the confl uence and down the Mississippi River, it established new stage records at each passing gage – Hickman, New Madrid, 
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Divine Providence

Tiptonville, Caruthersville, Osceola, Memphis, and Helena. News outlets predicted new records fl ows – as much as 25 percent greater than 

any fl ows experienced before. Rumors began to spread that the Boeuf 

fl oodway would overtop and fail, unleashing an unstoppable wall of 

water through the basin. Local landowners began patrolling the fuseplug levee and threatened armed resistance to any attempt to activate 

the fl oodway through artifi cial means.168

Fortunately, the dreaded predictions below Helena never materialized. Throughout the stretch of the river between the Arkansas River and 

Old River, Ferguson’s channel rectifi cation program had dramatically 

increased the carrying capacity of the river. Floodwaters did not seriously challenge the fuseplug levee at the Boeuf fl oodway. The cutoffs 

and chute enlargement operations that had performed so admirably in 

lowering fl ood stages during the 1935 high-water season had more fully 

developed in the two years since that event. By 1937, Ferguson had also 

executed four additional cutoffs – Tarpley Neck and Ashbrook Neck in 

the Greenville Bends, Rodney Bend, and Sarah Island. These cutoffs 

brought the total number of artifi cial cutoffs to eleven. Along with the 

natural Yucatan cutoff, they shortened the river by 100 miles. The performance of Ferguson’s program during the 1937 fl ood demonstrated 

the unmistakable signs of improvement, even with variances in the size 

and parameters of fl oods. During the 1929 fl ood, the Arkansas City gage 

had reached 58.7 feet when discharge was 1.78 million cfs. At that same 

discharge during the 1937 fl ood, the gage read 47.2 feet – a reduction 

of 11.5 feet. At 53.7 feet, the discharge was 1.4 million cfs in 1929 and 

2.1 million cfs in 1937, an increase in carrying capacity of more than 

700,000 cfs or nearly 50 percent. Just below the Greenville Bends, the 

peak discharge of the 1937 fl ood was 20 percent greater than that of 

the 1929 fl ood, but the peak crest was one foot lower. Vicksburg saw 

an increase in capacity of 317,000 cfs (18 percent greater than 1929) 

for a reduction in stages of 5.2 feet.169
159

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

In the aftermath of the Great Flood of 1937, Maj. Gen. Markham, 

shaken by the experience of operating the Birds Point-New Madrid 

fl oodway, recommended an $82 million plan calling for thirteen reservoirs in the Arkansas-White basin, in addition to the six reservoirs 

already authorized through the 1936 fl ood control act. His advocacy of 

the reservoir plan, which would reduce the fl ood discharge on the Mississippi River below Arkansas City by 200,000 cfs was tied to his desire 

to eventually eliminate or at least reduce the probability of operating 

the Boeuf/Eudora fl oodway. Ferguson, for his part, remained confi dent 

in the value of his program, but he would not commit to abandoning 

the fl oodway until that program had fully developed. Until it did, he 

warned that it was necessary to keep the fl oodway as an insurance policy 

to protect the integrity of the mainline levees.170

Ferguson executed one fi nal cutoff at Caulk Neck on May 13, 1937, 

before retiring two years later. In 1941, the Mississippi River Commission, while maintaining the Boeuf and Eudora fl oodway concepts were 

feasible and sound from an engineering standpoint, but impractical 

because of intense local opposition, conceded that it was possible to 

eliminate the Boeuf/Eudora fl oodway from the MR&T project. Citing 

the success of Ferguson’s program and the storage capacity of newlyauthorized reservoirs in the Arkansas-White basin, the commission 

suggested that if those improvements had been in place in 1928, more 

serious consideration would have been given to confi ning the project 

fl ood with higher levees below the Arkansas River. Through the 1941 

Flood Control Act, Congress eliminated the Boeuf and Eudora fl oodways from the MR&T project. The law also mandated that the mainline 

levee on the east bank of the river south the Coahoma-Bolivar county 

line have a two-foot height superiority over the levees on the west bank. 

In other words, the law authorized the levee on the east bank to have 

three feet of freeboard above the project fl ood fl owline, but limited 

the west bank levee to only one foot of freeboard. Because the higher 

levees on both sides of the river would confi ne fl oodwaters and cause 
160

Mississippi River cutoff s, 1929-1942.

c.u ... 

COO" 

.. " .. 0 

O • . ..... 

CUTO •• 
161

Chapter Three – Fergie Fixes the River

higher fl ood stages in the Yazoo backwater area, the law authorized 

extensive improvements to alleviate backwater fl ooding in the lower 

Yazoo basin.171

Ferguson’s replacement as commission president, Brig. Gen. Max 

Tyler, carried out three additional cutoffs between the Arkansas River 

and Memphis at Jackson, Sunfl ower, and Hardin. By 1942, there were 

16 cutoffs in operation. These reduced the length of the Mississippi 

River between Memphis and Baton Rouge by 151.9 miles. Corrective 

dredging, chute enlargements, and other improvements — carried out 

in addition to the cutoffs — brought the total reduction in length to 

170 miles. The channel realignment program not only lowered fl ood 

stages, it also improved transportation costs. Prior to the cutoffs, the 

average time for a towboat and barges to travel from Baton Rouge to 

Helena took 125 hours. By 1938, with the cutoff program only 75 percent complete, that same trip took an average of 105 hours – a savings 

of nearly one full day. In 1944, the commission reported, “The river 

now has the best alignment, the best navigation channel, and the greatest fl ood-carrying capacity it has ever had.” The navigation industry 

and levee board engineers heartily agreed.172

The problems of maintaining the stage reductions achieved through 

channel realignment, protecting the integrity of the levee system from 

a meandering river, and providing an adequate channel for safe and 

reliable navigation were inseparable. To retain the stage reductions 

and to prevent the river from regaining its former length, the commission launched a massive channel stabilization program consisting of a 

large-scale bank revetment program, channel contraction works, and 

dredging. As Charles Senour, the chief engineer for the commission 

explained, the channel stabilization program “is the necessary sequel to 

the fl ood control and navigation improvements hitherto accomplished, 

which it is designed to supplement and protect.”173

From the beginning, Maj. Gen. Brown’s stated intent was to try 

to eliminate or reduce the proposed Boeuf fl oodway, which residents 
162

Divine Providence

opposed and whose cost had increased by millions of dollars because of 

court rulings that the Corps of Engineers had to pay for fl owage rights. 

Ferguson’s cutoff plan had cut across the grain of accepted engineering 

theory. Despite opposition from leading engineers, Brown had courageously adopted it out of necessity to solve the problems in building 

the fl oodway. Yet it was Ferguson who earned near universal acclaim, 

not just for proposing and implementing cutoffs, but for continuing the 

program until he saw real results. “The remarkable feature of the Ferguson plan is its boldness,” Gerard Matthes wrote to a reporter in 1937. “A 

foot or two of stage lowering would have satisfi ed many engineers. Not 

so General Ferguson.” He did not quit until there was a stage reductions 

of 12 feet at Arkansas City and seven feet at Vicksburg. Later cutoffs 

implemented by Tyler improved the carrying-capacity of the river as far 

upstream as Memphis, where the commission estimated up to two feet 

of stage reduction had been achieved. The Ferguson plan thus not only 

affected a profound change in Mississippi River policy but a change 

in engineering practice as well. The only question that remained was 

whether the improvements in the river resulting from the cutoffs were 

sustainable through the channel stabilization program.174

As the 2011 fl ood crest slowly worked its way down the Mississippi River, engineers from Memphis to Natchez asked themselves that 

same question. With no fl oodways to relieve the pressure on the levee 

system, the fl ood-carrying capacity of the channel would be the fi rst 

line of defense.
Chapter 4

The River 

Wants Out:

The 2011 Flood 

in the Heart of 

the MR&T Project

Is there that problem out there that you just don’t see? That’s 

what haunts a geotechnical engineer during fl oods. What is 

out there that I am missing? What is out there that I cannot 

see? Everything we fear is taking place under the surface of 

the levee. That’s what keeps us up at night.

Chuck Mendrop

Chief of Geotechnical Engineering

Vicksburg Engineer District

2011
164

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165

ON APRIL 22, SEVERAL STAFF MEMBERS FROM the Vicksburg Engineer 

District gathered in a conference room in the district headquarters building to participate in the Lower Ohio-Mississippi 

River coordination teleconference. The teleconference represented a 

daily gathering of forecasters from the National Weather Service and 

Corps of Engineers water control managers. The main focus of the 

day’s teleconference centered on the Mississippi River and Ohio River 

fl ood crests building toward the Cairo gage. Although the major Mississippi River gages in the Vicksburg district at Arkansas City, Greenville, 

Vicksburg, and Natchez remained anywhere from three to fi ve feet below 

fl ood stage, there was a strong hint of trouble in the air. The engineers 

present in the conference room had been alerted to the contingency 

forecast for the Cairo gage in excess of 61 feet issued the previous day 

by the National Weather Service, but they knew that it only represented 

a worst-case scenario. The offi cial forecast was nine feet lower. Still, 

the threat of additional rain over the Arkansas and Ohio valleys created 

an ominous feeling in the conference room. The water at Cairo would 

eventually work its way down the valley and combine with the added 

fl ows of the Arkansas and White rivers before coursing through the heart 

of the MR&T project in the Vicksburg Engineer District. The amount 

of water the district needed to accommodate depended on the amount 

and location of additional precipitation. Finally, the Lower Mississippi 

River Forecasting Center broke the news. Based on anticipated rainfall 

fi ve days into future, the National Weather Service anticipated a crest 

of 59 feet on the Greenville gage on May 11 and a crest of 53.5 feet on 

the Vicksburg gage on May 13.175

Everyone in the conference room was stunned – it was as if a major 

fl ood had just materialized out of nowhere. Amid the gasps and confusion, Robert Simrall, the chief of water control at the Vicksburg district, 

glanced at Wayland Hill, the 35-year veteran river forecaster who had 

spent his entire career studying the dynamics of the river, and blew out a 

long whistle as he leaned back in his chair and placed his hands behind 
166

Divine Providence

his head. Fifty-three and a half feet! The number bounced around his 

mind as he tried to place the fi gure into context with the stages produced 

by previous major fl oods. That stage, if it materialized, would surpass 

the stages of the devastating fl oods of 1937 and 1973 – the two major 

benchmark fl oods of the MR&T era. That stage would be the highest 

stage and produce the greatest amount of pressure on the MR&T system 

since its establishment in 1928. A gage reading of 53.5 feet would register as the second highest stage ever recorded, behind only the Great 

Flood of 1927. The other engineers in the room had similar thoughts. 

Collectively they snapped back to attention. The crest was still three 

weeks away. They still had time to prepare.176

The Weak Link

The forecast shocked Kent Parrish as well. As the district’s senior 

project manager for the Mississippi River levee system, his immediate 

concern was what he considered the weakest link in the entire system – 

the mainline levee at Buck Chute. The levee at Buck Chute, near Eagle 

Lake, Mississippi, represented a signifi cant threat to the safety of the 

lower Mississippi delta. The levee was a traditional problem area in 

terms of underseepage and sand boils, even during periods of low fl ood 

stages. If the levee failed, the delta would see fl ooding not experienced 

since 1927. The Vicksburg district addressed the problem by installing 

relief wells in 1999 and 2007. In early 2010, the Mississippi Levee 

Board identifi ed several sand boils – which had likely formed during 

the 2008 fl ood, but had gone undetected – about 2,000 feet upriver 

from the newly-installed improvements. During the 2010 high water 

season, the board detected several massive sinkholes at the toe of the 

levee. Upon closer inspection, the 10 to15-foot wide and six to eightfoot deep holes turned out to be the result of sand boils. The fact that 

the boils fi rst appeared when the river was less than a foot above bank 

full alerted the levee board of the signifi cance of the problem. Peter 
167

Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

Nimrod, the chief engineer for the levee board, notifi ed the Vicksburg 

district and the Mississippi River Commission of the critical nature of 

the problem. Following the 2010 high water, the district took soil borings and performed cone penetrometer tests in the area to determine 

the ability of the soil to withstand pressure. Based on the fi ndings, the 

district designed plans to remediate the problem with a 1,500-foot long 

and 200-foot wide landside seepage berm to add extra weight and cross 

section to the levee with the intent of dissipating pressure on the levee 

during fl ood events. The design also included the installation of 25 relief 

wells. The district intended to fi nalize plans and specifi cations and to 

begin advertising the contract for construction in May 2011. They never 

got the chance. The fl ood of 2011 struck before they could take action.177

The early fl ood pulse in March 2011 forced the Mississippi Levee 

Board to take temporary measures. After consulting with geotechnical 

engineers from the Vicksburg district, the board fi lled the holes with 

sand and placed engineering fabric over the sand. The levee board also 

constructed a low earthen dike around the area, which was allowed to fi ll 

with seepwater, to counteract the pressure from the minor fl ood stages 

experienced. Upon hearing the updated forecast for the Vicksburg gage 

on April 22, Kent Parrish and other district offi cials knew that the critical situation at Buck Chute required immediate and aggressive action. 

The existing temporary remediation measures at Buck Chute did not 

stand a chance against the onslaught of pressure at a stage of 53.5 feet. 

Representatives from the district’s geotechnical, hydraulics, operations, 

and project management offi ces immediately analyzed various options 

to address the problem. In the meantime, Chuck Mendrop, the chief of 

geotechnical engineering at the Vicksburg district, and his staff developed an interim plan to construct a thick earthen berm over the levee 

board’s makeshift fi lter.

As the district team established a more detailed plan, Parrish immediately called Jimmy Coldiron, a supervisory mechanical engineer from 

the district’s river operations branch, and notifi ed him of the dire nature 
168

Divine Providence

of the problem at Buck Chute. Coldiron dispatched his assistant, Bobby 

Stokes, to the site to coordinate with the district’s geotechnical engineers 

and to assess what resources and assets were needed to get the job done. 

Stokes immediately observed that the site was a mess. It was heavily 

wooded. A tornado the year before had toppled many of the trees, creating a tangled mess that needed to be cleared. Below the trees and logs 

stood one to two feet of seepwater impounded by the remnants of the 

levee board’s small water berm. The conditions on the ground did not 

particularly disturb Stokes – his guys could clear the area without any 

problems – but he needed clay to build the berm. The job necessitated 

a lot of it. The district crews could not just take the clay to build the 

dike from anywhere. Taking it from the landside of the levee was not 

an option. Doing so would threaten the integrity of the levee. Taking it 

from a nearby farm was not an option without compensating the landowner. Hauling the clay from a distant location would use up valuable 

time. The Mississippi Levee Board, though, had already identifi ed an 

A view of the Buck Chute area prior to clearing operations. Note the elevation marked on the tree.
169

Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

adequate borrow pit less than a mile from the site. But the borrow pit 

was on the river side of the levee. The good news was that the river was 

still fi ve feet below fl ood stage. The bad news was that the river was 

coming up fast and would engulf the borrow pit in a matter of days.178

Coldiron and Stokes immediately began securing the necessary 

resources. The equipment and personnel they needed were scattered 

throughout the district on various high-priority projects. Speaking of 

the operation at Buck Chute, Parrish told Coldiron, “This is the new top 

priority. Everything else can wait.” Within hours, Coldiron had lined 

up seven dozers, four trackhoes, a dozen dump trucks and excavators, 

and a bank of emergency lights for the nightshift operations. He also 

assembled two, twelve-man crews, pulling crew members from dredges, 

the mat-sinking unit, and other projects. By Saturday, April 23, the hiredlabor crew and equipment were at Buck Chute clearing debris from the 

area and racing against the river to relocate 20,000 cubic yards of fi ll 

from the riverside borrow pit. It was Easter weekend, but that was the 

farthest thing from their minds. They had a job to do. The safety of the 

lower Mississippi delta depended upon their success.179

By the morning of April 25, the Mississippi River on the Vicksburg gage reached 39.2 feet, still nearly four feet below fl ood stage, 

but it had climbed by more than a foot since April 22. Over the weekend, the district’s multi-discipline team continued to analyze options 

to combat the Buck Chute problem. Coldiron’s hired-labor crew had 

already commenced constructing the dike around the entire two-acre 

area, but Mendrop’s geotechnical team was not overly confi dent that 

an earthen berm alone would provide enough of a safety factor. The 

geotechnical engineers determined that because the levee did not fail 

during the 2008 fl ood, a similar head differential – the difference in 

height between the water level on the outside of the levee and the land 

on the protected side of the levee – would suffi ciently prevent the 

underseepage from undermining the levee. With a predicted stage of 

53.5 feet on the Vicksburg gage, that meant they needed to raise the 
170

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171

Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

berm on the protected side of the levee to an elevation equal to 87 feet 

– an elevation approximately ten feet higher than the natural ground. 

Mendrop approached Ron Goldman’s hydraulic engineers and asked 

if it was possible to create a blanket of water over the earthen berm to 

provide extra weight. Goldman’s crew indicated it would be no problem. To make it a reality, Coldiron’s hired labor crew would continue 

constructing the earthen dike around the Buck Chute, fi ll the dike with 

a three-foot layer of sand, and cover the sand with a two-foot thick clay 

cap. In the meantime, the water control offi ce would open the gates 

at the Muddy Bayou control structure and allow Steele Bayou to back 

into and raise the elevation of Eagle Lake, which, in turn, would fl ood 

and blanket the earthen berm with several feet of water until it reached 

an elevation of 87 feet, perhaps even higher if conditions warranted.180

The plan faced a few obstacles. First, the job required sand for the 

core of the Buck Chute berm. The Vicksburg Engineer District had 

an available stockpile across the river in Delta, Louisiana, at a local 

mat casting fi eld. The sand, which was to be used to make articulated 

concrete mattress for bank revetment purposes, had been stockpiled on 

the riverside of the levee. The rising river would soon engulf the mat 

casting fi eld and the sand stockpile along with it. The district quickly 

awarded an emergency contract to remove and relocate the sand to Buck 

Chute. Within hours, dozens of trucks began hauling sand, day and 

night, from Delta and stockpiled it near the construction site at Buck 

Chute. To speed the hauling operation, Warren County Sheriff Martin 

Pace coordinated with law enforcement agencies in Louisiana to allow 

the trucks to bypass the weigh station on Interstate 20 in Louisiana.

Changing the fl ow of water at the Muddy Bayou control structure 

also represented an obstacle. The structure was built to prevent agricultural runoff from Steele Bayou from entering Eagle Lake. During 

dry periods, the control structure prevented the lake from draining into 

Steele Bayou. Raising the elevation of Eagle Lake represented a reversal in the intended purpose of the control structure. Any such reversal 
172

Divine Providence

required a deviation from the water control plan for the Muddy Bayou 

control structure. Maj. Gen. Walsh, the president of the Mississippi 

River Commission, would need to approve the deviation, and he would 

not grant it automatically, given the potential impacts to more than 

800 residents and their property along Eagle Lake. Those potential 

damages originally gave the district reason to pause, but the inundation maps depicting a levee failure at Buck Chute quickly wiped away 

the hesitation. According to the inundation map, a breach would cover 

nearly all of Issaquena and Sharkey counties with anywhere from fi ve 

to twenty feet of water. Higher elevated lands at Mayersville, Onward, 

Rolling Fork, and Cary might only see a few inches to fi ve feet of water, 

but the lower lying lands in the southern parts of the counties, as well 

as those in northern Warren County and western Yazoo County could 

possibly experience depths in excess of 20 feet. The devastation from 

a possible breach extended all the way into southern Washington and 

Humphreys counties. The potential damages were too great. The levee 

had to hold. The district team determined that the proposed plan was 

the appropriate safety measure to ensure the levee, in fact, held.181

As Coldiron’s crews continued constructing the dike, the district’s 

water control team began coordinating the deviation request for the 

Muddy Bayou water control plan with the watershed management team 

at the Mississippi Valley Division headquarters across town, as well 

as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Mississippi and Louisiana 

departments of wildlife, the Warren County Board of Supervisors, the 

Madison Parish president, and state and local entities. It took several 

days to get everything in order. Finally, on April 27, the district formally sent the deviation request to Maj. Gen. Walsh. Charles Shadie, 

the chief of water management at the division offi ce, relayed Walsh’s 

desire for input from residents of Eagle Lake before approving the 

deviation. At the district offi ce, Goldman took this to mean that Walsh 

was not inclined to approve the deviation.
173

Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

The following day, Goldman, Mendrop, and Parrish accompanied 

Col. Jeffrey Eckstein, commander of the Vicksburg Engineer District, 

to meet with Walsh. Eckstein took command of the district in December 

2009, but this would be his fi rst major fl ood fi ght. Parrish had taken him 

to Buck Chute over Easter weekend to observe, fi rsthand, the criticality 

of the problem. The visit convinced Eckstein that the levee represented 

an imminent threat to the lower Mississippi delta. He was prepared to 

present his case to Walsh. At the meeting, Walsh asked pointed questions. 

The water control plan was established for a reason; deviating from the 

plan could leave the Corps of Engineers open to criticism. He wanted 

assurances that there were no other options available. As Walsh spoke, 

Goldman thought to himself, He is going to turn us down. Goldman 

understood that deviations should not be made lightly, but to him the 

Buck Chute dilemma represented an instance where a deviation was 

absolutely necessary. Eckstein and his staff provided pointed answers to 

Walsh’s direct questions. They informed the commission president that 

the levee at Buck Chute was the weakest link in the levee system. In 

their estimation, it would not withstand the pressure exerted by the river 

without the added counter pressure that the water berm would provide. 

If the levee failed, approximately 3,000 homes and 1,450 square-miles 

of land – nearly seven times the amount of land in the Birds Point-New 

Madrid fl oodway – faced inundation. They needed to act quickly. They 

had made a compelling case. Walsh concurred and signed the deviation 

approval letter before they left his offi ce.182

On the morning of April 28, the Mississippi River surged past 41 feet 

on the Vicksburg gage and completely engulfed the riverside borrow pit 

that Coldiron’s crew had been using to secure earth for the Buck Chute 

dike. The river had come up fast, but his crew loaded and hauled dirt 

24 hours a day as they raced the rising tide to get as much material out 

of the pit before the river overtook it. Nimrod, who stopped by to check 

on their progress, was amazed by their effort and dedication. These guys 
174

Divine Providence

are fearless, he thought to himself as he watched the loading operations with the river nipping at the margins of the pit. The crews had 

constructed an elevated, but narrow, access road constructed of timber 

mats so they could squeeze every possible yard of dirt from the pit. As 

the river climbed higher, the crew raised the road higher. Absolutely 

fearless! Having won the race against the river, Coldiron’s crew had no 

time to relax, though. Another race would soon commence. This time 

they would be racing against the rising water from Eagle Lake on the 

other side of the levee.183

The following day, Col. Eckstein and 

Peter Nimrod held a public meeting at 

Eagle Lake to explain the need and consequences of raising the elevation of the 

lake. Approximately 500 people crammed 

into and around the Eagle Lake Fire Station. 

Most in attendance were not as concerned 

with raising the water level of Eagle Lake 

as they were with the potential failure of 

Hired-labor crews construct the earthen berm around Buck Chute, while continuing to clear the area.

Peter Nimrod and Jimmy Coldiron at 

Buck Chute.
175

Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

the Buck Chute levee. Rumors had run rampant through several local 

communities. The levee is going to fail! The Corps is doing everything it 

can, but failure is imminent! People were scared. They needed answers. 

Eckstein and Nimrod attempted to calm their fears. Eckstein explained 

the emergency action that the district and levee board had undertaken. 

“If we don’t do anything,” he explained, “we will have a 32-foot head 

differential” between the stage on the riverside of the levee and the 

natural ground. “We aren’t confi dent with that.” Eckstein explained 

that his geotechnical engineers wanted to raise the level of the lake 

to reduce that head differential to 19 feet “to take away the threat of 

imminent failure.” Still, he wanted everyone to know that the action 

did not alleviate all risk of failure. He urged the crowd to make prudent 

measures to protect their own lives and property.184

The hired-labor crew begins placing the clay cap over the sand fi ll as water from Eagle Lake climbs higher 

against the earthen berm.
176

Divine Providence

At 0700 hours on April 30, the Vicksburg district opened the gates 

at the Muddy Bayou control structure. Five days earlier on April 25, the 

district had closed the gates that allowed Steele Bayou to drain into the 

Yazoo River to prevent the Yazoo from backing into the bayou. With no 

outlet to allow the escape of interior drainage, Steele Bayou reached the 

elevation of 88.6 feet on April 30, but was expected to rise to 94 feet 

with additional normal rainfall. Opening the gates at Muddy Bayou 

allowed water from Steele Bayou to overfl ow into Eagle Lake until the 

two water levels reached equilibrium. To prevent the scour and erosion 

to lands on the Eagle Lake side of the control structure, the district only 

partially opened the gates. The slow release of water also served another 

purpose. It gave Coldiron’s crew time to complete the dike. The crew 

had completed the base, but it had yet to reach the fi nal height. Nonetheless, it was of suffi cient height to allow the sand fi lling operation to 

begin. The dike, sand fi ll, and clay cap needed to be complete before 

the lake overfl owed and covered the area. The hydraulic engineers 

provided Coldiron with a sheet of paper depicting the anticipated lake 

elevation for each day of construction. They expected the lake to reach 

an elevation of 80 feet by May 2 and then rise roughly 1.5 feet per day 

thereafter until it reached its fi nal elevation around 87 feet. Coldiron’s 

crew fought to stay ahead of the rising lake. By the time the water from 

Eagle Lake reached the dike, it was about 75 percent complete, but the 

base was above the water line. They still had a dry working space to 

complete the operation. The weather continued to cooperate as well, at 

least in the lower Yazoo basin, where it had not rained since April 25. 

The same could not be said for the Arkansas and Ohio valleys to the 

north. Another round of heavy and persistent rains moved into that area 

on April 30 and lingered for several days, just as the fl ood crests from 

the upper Mississippi and Ohio rivers converged at the confl uence.185
177

Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

Yazoo Backwater Levee

On May 2, the major fl ood bearing down on the Vicksburg Engineer 

District was about to become worse. During the Lower-Ohio Mississippi 

River coordination teleconference that day, the National Weather Service 

formally delivered its revised forecast for the Cairo gage. “Sixty-three 

feet,” Robert Simrall said aloud in amazement. Henry Dulaney, the 

relatively new chief of engineering and construction at the Vicksburg 

district became alarmed by Simrall’s reaction. The obscure number on 

a distant gage did not register with Dulaney – who had a background 

in design and technical services – as it had with Simrall and the other 

members of the water control team present. He looked at Simrall and 

asked, “What does 63 mean?” Simrall replied, “It means our whole 

world is fi xing to change!”186

As the teleconference continued, the magnitude of the fl ood in the 

midsection of the MR&T project began to crystallize. The heavy rains 

had not only worsened fl ood conditions at the confl uence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, but they also wreaked additional havoc in the 

already swollen Arkansas and White basins. Three of the fi ve major 

reservoirs comprising the White river system – Beaver, Table Rock, 

and Norfolk lakes – went to emergency spillway operations. The two 

other major reservoirs – Greer’s Ferry Lake and Bull Shoals Lake –did 

not require spillway discharges, but experienced extremely high pool 

elevations, nonetheless. The Arkansas River also experienced signifi cant 

fl ooding. The rain fell where the eleven major fl ood control reservoirs 

in the Arkansas system could not be of use, but the Southwest Division 

deviated from its water control plans and reduced discharges from the 

dams to reduce fl ows downstream. By May 6, water control managers 

from the Southwest Division anticipated the combined fl ows entering 

the Mississippi River from the Arkansas and White rivers to approach 
178

Divine Providence

500,000 cfs, just days before the crest rolling down the Mississippi River 

arrived. All of this translated into a stunning forecast for the major gages 

in the Vicksburg Engineer District: Arkansas City 53.5 feet, Greenville 

64.5 feet, Vicksburg 57.5 feet, and Natchez 64 feet – a range of 14.5 feet 

to 16.5 feet above fl ood stage on each gage.187

While the mainline levees in the system stood high enough to hold 

back the river without overtopping – with the exception of signifi cant 

low spots spanning nearly 3,000 feet near Vidalia, Louisiana – the levees 

would soon be facing a level of pressure never before experienced. At 

Greenville, the predicted crest stage would fall about one foot shy of 

the record stage reached in 1927, but it would break the 1973 stage 

by more than six feet. At Vicksburg, the new forecasted stage would 

top them all – more than one foot higher than 1927, more than four 

feet higher than 1937, and more than six feet higher than 1973. The 

thought of a fl ood six feet greater than 1973 fl ood stages at Greenville 

Flooding in the Yazoo backwater area during the 1973 flood.
179

Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

and Vicksburg sent a shiver of fear through most of the people living 

in the Mississippi delta. Those people could not relate to the fl oods of 

1927 and 1937 because the events had taken place 84 years and 74 years 

ago, respectively. The same could not be said of the 1973 fl ood. The 

majority of delta residents 40 years of age or older vividly recalled 

the devastation of that fl ood, when nearly one million square-miles of 

land were inundated in the Yazoo basin alone. While areas in Arkansas and Louisiana, particularly those in the Ouachita basin, suffered 

extreme hardships during the 1973 fl ood, approximately 45 percent of 

the land fl ooded during the event was in Mississippi. The Yazoo basin, 

particularly the area known as the Yazoo backwater area, served as the 

epicenter of devastation in Mississippi.188

Backwater areas are the necessary result of gaps left in the Mississippi River levee system at the mouths of major tributaries that empty 

into the river. Prior to the construction of the levee system, the backwater 

areas were no different than most lands comprising the alluvial valley. 

They fl ooded when the Mississippi River overfl owed its natural alluvial 

banks or backed into the tributary streams. As the levee system gradually extended upriver, the confi nement of Mississippi River fl oodwaters 

protected lands upriver from the backwater areas from overbank fl ows, 

but fl oods continued to back up through the gaps and around the lower 

end of the levees, inundating the low-lying areas behind the levees. As 

originally authorized in 1928, the MR&T project did not contemplate 

protection of the major backwater areas in the lower Mississippi valley 

at the mouths of the St. Francis, White, Yazoo, and Red rivers. Historically, the Mississippi River Commission recognized the importance of 

maintaining the natural storage capacities of the backwater areas as a 

benefi t for fl ood control. The low-lying lands stored vast quantities of 

fl oodwaters, thereby lowering fl ood stages on the river by reducing the 

peak fl ows downstream of the backwater areas. After the initial success 

of Maj. Gen. Harley Ferguson’s channel realignment and rectifi cation 

program carried out in the 1930s, which improved the ability of the 
180

Divine Providence

river to carry more water at lower stages, calls for improving conditions 

in the backwater areas gained momentum. The call was particularly 

strong in the Yazoo basin, where several reservoirs and other improvements had been authorized through the 1936 Overton Act to provide 

protection from headwater fl oods emanating from the hill country in the 

upper part of the basin. All that remained for the basin to maximize the 

benefi ts achieved through the enhanced mainline levees, the improved 

carrying capacity of the Mississippi River channel, and the protection 

from headwater fl ooding was protection from backwater fl ooding at 

the lower end of the basin.

While maintaining the position that the backwater area could never 

be fully redeemed from fl ooding, the Mississippi River Commission 

eventually conceded that the Yazoo basin could receive substantial protection from fl oods, provided the improvements did not hamper the natural reservoir effect the area provided during larger fl oods approaching 

project design fl ood elevations. The 1941 Flood Control Act authorized 

a plan developed by the Mississippi River Commission to provide for a 

level protection – corresponding to a height of 56.5 feet on the Vicksburg 

gage – for roughly 634,000 acres in the Yazoo backwater. The commission’s plan involved the construction of a backwater levee extending 

from the existing Mississippi River mainline levee along the west bank 

of the Yazoo River to Yazoo City, where the levee would connect with 

the levee authorized under the 1936 Overton Act to control headwater 

fl oods. Recognizing that the backwater levee would impound runoff 

from the tributaries that traversed the backwater area and emptied into 

the Yazoo River, the commission recommended constructing a drainage 

structure at the Little Sunfl ower River and a combination of structures 

and pumping plants at the mouths of the Big Sunfl ower River, Deer 

Creek, and Steele Bayou to evacuate impounded water. When stages 

on the Mississippi and Yazoo rivers were too high to allow for gravity drainage, the plan made provisions for pumping stations at three 
181

Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

 locations with a total discharge capacity of 14,000 cfs – Big Sunfl ower 

River (11,000 cfs), Deer Creek (700 cfs) and Steele Bayou (2,300 cfs).189

Following a comprehensive review of the MR&T project in 1959, 

the Mississippi River Commission recommended changes to the plan 

after noting that channel improvements in the Mississippi River and 

reservoirs and associated works in the upper basin had reduced the frequency and duration of fl ooding in the backwater area. The plan called 

for replacing the previously-authorized pumping stations at the Big 

Sunfl ower River, Deer Creek, and Steele Bayou with improved gravity drainage structures and a 20-mile long and 200-foot wide channel 

connecting the Sunfl ower River and Steel Bayou ponding areas to the 

outlets at the Little Sunfl ower and Steele Bayou fl oodgates. The 1965 

Flood Control Act authorized the proposed modifi cations and construction of the project quickened. In 1969 the Steele Bayou drainage structure, designed to discharge 19,000 cfs from the ponding area into the 

Yazoo River, was completed. In 1975, the drainage structure at Little 

Sunfl ower River capable of discharging 8,000 cfs was completed.190

In between the dates of completion for the two drainage structures, 

the 1973 fl ood struck the lower Mississippi Valley. The backwater levee 

had yet to be constructed, leaving the lower end of the Yazoo basin 

exposed. In early April 1973, the swollen Yazoo River overtopped a 

natural ridge along Deer Creek and began fi lling the Steele Bayou 

ponding area. A week later, the river and backwater levels equalized 

at an elevation of 99 feet, creating a lake 60 miles long and 40 miles 

wide. But the water levels continued to rise, cresting another two and 

a half feet higher on May 15. The backwater continued to creep farther 

north into the Yazoo basin until more than 1,000 square miles lay under 

water. It took several more weeks for the water to drain out. Thousands 

of people, many of them farmers, returned to fi nd their homes and 

property destroyed.191

The May 2, 2011, forecast of 57.5 feet on the Vicksburg gage certainly caught the attention of the district’s water control engineers. Most 
182

Divine Providence

engineering analyses and model tests dating back to the 1950s indicated 

that the Yazoo backwater levee would overtop as designed when the 

Mississippi River approached a range of 56.2 to 56.6 feet on the Vicksburg gage. The information on channel conditions used in development 

of the studies, though, was several decades old. The 2008 fl ood afforded 

the Vicksburg Engineer District the opportunity to gather fresh information. The river reached 57.3 feet on the Greenville gage and 51 feet on 

the Vicksburg gage in 2008. Both stages were less than one foot lower 

than stages experienced on both gages during the 1973 fl ood. Ronald 

Goldman, the district’s chief of hydraulic engineering, used the fl ood 

as an opportunity to gain more knowledge of the river. As the peak fl ow 

moved downstream through the district, contract crews in a survey boat 

measured the depth of the centerline of the channel, while additional 

crew members at the exact latitude on the levees on both sides of the 

river plotted the exact high water mark. They repeated the process every 

half mile. Hydraulic engineers used the data to develop a modern or 

updated profi le of the river in terms of its slope and the relationship 

between stage and discharge. From this profi le, the Vicksburg district 

developed a new baseline to more accurately determine how the river 

would respond under existing channel conditions. The 2008 profi le confi rmed what previous studies had shown – the Yazoo backwater levee 

would overtop when the river reached 56.3 feet on the Vicksburg gage. 

With an anticipated crest stage of 57.5 feet on the Vicksburg gage, the 

backwater levee would overtop by more than one foot.192

At the Mississippi Levee Board offi ce, Peter Nimrod could not 

believe what his ears were hearing. “What? No way!” Kent Parrish 

had called to inform him that the Vicksburg district’s hydraulic engineers expected the 28-mile backwater levee to overtop by more than a 

foot for at least ten days. The overtopping itself did not concern him. 

It would certainly create some hardship in the lower Yazoo basin, but 

he believed that the levee board could manage the additional water. 

Nonetheless, he would press the Vicksburg district to fl ood fi ght at the 
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backwater levee; to raise the levee with sandbags and HESCO bastions – large containers fi lled with sand. No, the overtopping was not 

Nimrod’s main concern. The prospect of losing the backwater levee 

entirely, though, terrifi ed him.

Ten days! Nimrod thought to himself. Ten days! The hydraulic engineers at the Vicksburg district expected more than a foot of water to fl ow 

over the top of the 28-mile long backwater levee for ten days. It was 

disconcerting enough for him to know that the water on the river side 

of the levee would be approximately 17 feet higher than the ground on 

the landside. The highest differential the levee had ever experienced in 

the past was a little more than nine feet in 2008. The immense pressure 

on the levee from the head differential alone was extremely worrisome, 

but the added powerful and constant force of more than a foot of water 

eroding the crown, the landside slope, and the toe of the levee for ten 

consecutive days frightened Nimrod. The backwater levee was a fi ne 

and well-constructed levee, but under those conditions, ten days represented a lifetime. Nimrod started doing the calculations in head. If 

the levee failed, the south Mississippi delta faced a catastrophe. Water 

levels in the backwater area would be six feet higher than those experienced during the 1973 fl ood. Rolling Fork and Mayersville, both of 

which stayed high and dry during the 1973 fl ood, would be inundated. 

Nimrod pictured a map of the backwater levee in his mind. Twenty 

eight miles of levee overtopping for ten days! The levee had to hold.193

On May 3, Goldman, Simrall, and Wayland Hill began poring over 

profi les and data in more detail. Residents in the backwater area were 

about to catch their fi rst break. The 2008 profi le that Goldman had commissioned showed a steeper slope in the Yazoo River than originally 

thought – as much as a half a foot steeper. Using information collected 

during the 2008 fl ood, the district’s hydraulic engineers determined 

that if the river reached 57.5 feet on the Vicksburg gage, the backwater levee would only overtop along a four-mile stretch extending from 

the junction of the Mississippi River mainline levee and the Yazoo 
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backwater levee up to the vicinity of the Steele Bayou control structure. 

Attempting to prevent a breach along 28 miles of levee in a short period 

of time seemed nearly impossible; doing the same along a four-mile 

segment was doable. Armed with this information, the district team 

decided to examine the impacts that temporarily raising the backwater 

levee would have on the Mississippi River levees. Nimrod was ecstatic 

upon hearing the news.194

At Buck Chute, Coldiron’s crew continued to push toward completing the emergency berm. By May 3, the three-foot sand layer inside the 

dike was complete and the process of capping it with a two-foot layer 

of clay had commenced, with an estimated completion date of May 7. 

All that remained was for Eagle Lake to rise to the prescribed height. 

The four-foot increase in the Mississippi River forecast meant that the 

water berm needed to go higher than an elevation of 87 feet, but Robert 

Simrall, who prepared the deviation request, wisely incorporated some 

leeway for the district to maneuver in the event that the forecast crest 

increased. While the original plan called for providing an elevation 

of 87 feet, Simrall worded the request to allow for raising Eagle Lake 

The clay cap nears completion at Buck Chute as water from Eagle Lake continues to rise.
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up to an elevation of 90 feet. The geotechnical engineers confi rmed 

that the elevation of 90 feet provided enough of a safety factor. There 

would be no need to secure an additional deviation request unless the 

National Weather Service raised the forecast. The concern at Buck Chute, 

in terms of completing the emergency measures to protect the levee, 

was getting enough water on top of the earthen berm. When the plan 

was originally conceived over Easter weekend and the gates closed 

on April 25, Steele Bayou stood at 87 feet. Water control managers 

expected the bayou to reach an elevation of 94 feet with normal rainfall, 

but Steele Bayou remained stable at 89.9 feet. The only way to raise 

the elevation of Eagle Lake was for additional precipitation to fall and 

drain into Steele Bayou. In another example of the unique nature of the 

2011 fl ood, the Vicksburg district and local levee boards were fi ghting 

a fl ood in the middle of a drought – the deluge they prepared for had 

emanated primarily from above the confl uence of the Mississippi and 

Ohio rivers. It had not rained in the Yazoo basin since April 25, other 

than trace amounts. It would not rain again until after the gates were 

reopened on June 18 – a period of 55 days.195

During the morning commander’s briefi ng on May 4, Col. Eckstein 

informed Maj. Gen. Walsh that Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour 

was gearing up a task force to assist in the fl ood fi ght. Eckstein knew 

that the state and the Mississippi Levee Board were prepared to formally 

ask the district to raise the backwater levee or armor the backside slope 

along the four-mile stretch from Steele Bayou to the mainline levee on 

the Mississippi River. Walsh stiffened in his chair as he heard Eckstein’s 

report, wincing at the thought of a fl ood fi ght at the backwater area. 

Walsh recognized the severity of the problem at the backwater levee, 

but he faced a tough dilemma. The Yazoo backwater area was meant 

to overtop to relieve pressure on the system. Only 34 hours earlier, he 

had directed the operation of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway 

to protect the integrity of the system in the confl uence area, despite 

intense political and local pressure to fl ood fi ght along the fuseplug levee 
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instead. Now he was being asked to fl ood fi ght. His initial thought was 

that he simply could not approve the request. Walsh still remained on 

the motor vessel MISSISSIPPI in the confl uence area while overseeing 

the operation of the lower infl ow/outfl ow crevasses at the fl oodway. He 

had been there since May 1, so he did not have a good feel for system 

conditions in the Vicksburg region. He wanted more information. “We 

didn’t fl ood fi ght at Birds Point,” Walsh told Eckstein, “so we need to 

study the impacts of fl ood fi ghting on the system.” He asked Eckstein 

to talk to him offl ine after the briefi ng.196

At 0945 hours, Eckstein called Walsh as instructed. The engineering 

and operations staffs from the commission and the district were on the 

line as well to discuss the possibility of fl ood fi ghting. Confusion over 

the authorized height of the backwater levee ensued. The l941 Flood 

Control Act that authorized improvements in the Yazoo backwater area 

required the Mississippi Levee Board to provide assurances that it would 

not raise the backwater levee above limitations established by the Chief 

of Engineers. The Chief of Engineers, at the recommendation of the 

Mississippi River Commission, established the limitation at a height 

equivalent to 56.5 feet on the Vicksburg gage (elevation 107) as long 

as the backwater levee improvements did not confi ne fl oodwaters and 

push river levels to within fi ve feet from the top of the mainline Mississippi River levees. The confusion over the issue came from subsequent 

authorizations stemming from the 1973 levee enlargements. The enlargement of the mainline levees authorized the enlargement of the Yazoo 

backwater levee by almost six feet. Some engineers from the district 

believed this justifi ed temporarily raising the backwater levee during the 

fl ood. Others argued that raising the backwater levee was contingent on 

the completion of the mainline levees and other improvements, which 

had yet to be fully constructed. To make matters worse, sections of the 

backwater levee were defi cient – a foot lower than authorized. Those 

areas needed to be raised to prevent premature overtopping.
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Walsh digested the information presented to him. There were still too 

many unknowns. He was concerned that the district staff in Vicksburg 

might be caving to pressure from friends and associates back home. 

The backwater area essentially represented the district’s back yard. He 

asked Eckstein to prepare and deliver a decision briefi ng later in the 

evening. “There will be pressure to the contrary,” Walsh told Eckstein, 

“but we need to operate as a system. The integrity of the mainline levee 

is of paramount importance.”197

Eckstein’s engineers quickly determined that they were not authorized to fl ood fi ght along the backwater levee, even though protecting 

the levee from overtopping would raise fl ood heights along the mainline 

levees by only a fraction of an inch. They had to draw the line somewhere. Nimrod took the news generally well. The 2011 fl ood, thus far, 

had proved to be a battle of inches. He understood the situation – raising the backwater would place additional strain on the mainline levee 

system, particularly the low spot being raised with a HESCO bastion 

by the Fifth Louisiana Levee District near Vidalia. Nimrod, though, 

reminded the Vicksburg district that the backwater levee was designed 

to overtop, not fail. He pressed the district to authorize the armoring of 

the levee to prevent a breach if overtopping occurred. Nimrod also had 

a dilemma of his own. The anticipated fl ood crest was still two weeks 

away, but the levee board’s resources were already stretched to the limit. 

The board maintained 212 miles of levees, 37 miles of which were 

defi cient in height or section. Levee board crews were busily shoring 

up those areas. Crews were also preparing the levees for the ensuing 

fl ood fi ght by mowing the levees crowns, checking relief wells, and 

repainting station markers. Other crews were already ringing boils and 

sandbagging roads and infrastructure. Armoring the backwater levee, if 

approved, was beyond the board’s capability. He knew he needed the 

Vicksburg district’s help. That afternoon, he sent an offi cial request to 

Col. Eckstein asking the district to assume leadership of any fl ood fi ght 

or emergency actions on the backwater levee west of Highway 61.198
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As Eckstein’s staff continued to prepare the decision briefi ng to be 

given to Walsh later that night, Simrall and Parrish set out to provide 

desperately-needed information to residents of the lower Mississippi 

delta. Word of the forecast left those residents understandably shaken. 

The memories of the devastation caused by the 1973 fl ood remained 

fresh in their minds. Now, the National Weather Service predicted stages 

six feet higher than 1973. The Vicksburg district exacerbated the problem by informing people in Vicksburg that if they experienced fl ooding 

in 1973, they would be fl ooded again. The message was intended for 

unprotected areas south of the Yazoo River, not the Yazoo backwater 

area, because the backwater levee had been constructed after the 1973 

fl ood. Rumors began fl ying across the region. News of the forecast came 

on the heels of the nationally-televised Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway operation. Genuine concern grew that the commission intended to 

blow the backwater levee to reduce pressure on the system.199

As their car got to within a mile of the meeting location at the 

National Guard Armory in Rolling Fork, Simrall and Parrish noticed 

cars lined up on both sides of the road for as far as they could see. More 

than 1,500 people waited for their arrival. As the two district employees pushed their way through the burgeoning crowd, Simrall thought 

The public meeting at Rolling Fork, Miss.
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

to himself, they’re fi xing to hang us. He could feel the tension. As the 

meeting began, though, his fear quickly dissipated. The crowd was not 

angry; it was scared. No one pointed fi ngers. They simply wanted to 

know what was going to happen. Simrall and Parrish, along with Nimrod, 

spelled out the possibilities. They wanted the audience to clearly understand the risks they faced. The district expected the backwater levee to 

overtop by as much as a foot of water for ten days, which would fl ood 

approximately 450 square miles. They also warned the audience that the 

levee might not survive the onslaught. If the torrent of water breached 

the levee, the water would engulf approximately 1,900 square miles 

– including Rolling Fork, Mayersville, and other towns not fl ooded in 

1973. To help prevent that scenario, the district was seeking approval to 

armor the landside slope of the levee. Much like the Buck Chute meeting at Eagle Lake, they instructed their audience to prepare and make 

plans for evacuation. They also put to rest the rumor that the commission intended to blow the backwater levee.200

A similar situation played out at Yazoo City. City leaders planned 

on holding the meeting at the county courthouse, but the crowd quickly 

outgrew the capacity of the meeting space. They moved the meeting 

to the library. Again, the crowd grew beyond available space. Finally, 

they settled on the First Baptist Church, which could accommodate 

up to 700 people. It rapidly fi lled to near capacity. Simrall and Parrish found the Yazoo City crowd possessed a similar temperament as 

the Rolling Fork audience. Again, no one cast blame; they just desperately wanted to know more about what the two district employees 

thought would happen. But Simrall and Parrish could only posit the 

possibilities. The rest depended on the decision to be made that night 

by Maj. Gen Walsh.201

At 2100 hours on May 4, Walsh and the three civilian members of 

the commission – Sam Angel, R.D. James, and Clifford Smith – gathered in the second fl oor conference room on the motor vessel MISSISSIPPI to hear Eckstein’s brief on the Yazoo backwater area. Eckstein 
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delivered the briefi ng by telephone, but the slides he used projected 

onto a large screen that the commissioners could view from the conference table. Eckstein explained the intent behind the backwater area 

and how its operation related to the Vicksburg gage. He showed two 

inundation maps, one depicting areas impacted by overtopping and 

the other depicting areas overfl owed with a levee failure. If the levee 

overtopped, approximately 286,000 acres faced inundation; if the levee 

failed the number grew to 1.2 million acres. Eckstein explained that 

more than 3,000 people would be impacted by a levee failure. He then 

went directly to the point of the briefi ng, “Sir, I request permission to 

raise low spots to elevation 107 and to armor the landside of the levee 

to protect against erosion.”202

Walsh only momentarily pondered the request before glancing 

around the room at Angel, James, and Smith, who all nodded their 

concurrence. “Recommendation approved,” Walsh replied.203

Eckstein’s engineers in Vicksburg had already begun researching 

the best way to armor the levee. They devised a plan to install a thick 

landfi ll liner over the landside slope of the levee. The liner, which was 

40 millimeters thick, had proven more durable than regular polyethylene plastic sheeting. Eckstein approved the plan. In the meantime, ten 

members from Coldiron’s crew moved from the Buck Chute operation 

to the Yazoo backwater levee to begin raising the low spots and fi lling cattle gaps on the backwater levee. They also began constructing a 

2,000-foot long makeshift HESCO bastion fl oodwall along the junction 

of the Mississippi river levee and the backwater levee to prevent any 

damage to the mainline levee.

The district offi ce soon encountered a problem. The supplier of the 

liner – GSE Lining Technology – could not install the product. To make 

matters worse, the liner came in rolls that needed to be overlapped. To 

be effective, the seams along the overlapped areas needed to be sealed 

with a special tool that acted as a large iron and melted or welded the 

two pieces together. The American Environmental Group (AEG), an 
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

Ohio-based contractor, possessed the necessary equipment and expertise 

to install the liner and seal the seams, but it would be diffi cult to reposition the necessary heavy equipment to move and lift the liner rolls to 

the backwater levee in a short amount of time. A local contractor would 

need to provide the equipment and infrastructure. Fordice Construction 

– a Vicksburg-based contractor – secured the contract. Dan Fordice, the 

company’s vice president, told Henry Dulaney, the district’s engineering 

and construction chief, that “My grandfather fought the ’37 fl ood and 

my dad fought the ’73 fl ood. This one is ours to deal with.” The fl ood 

fi ght, as with most fl ood fi ghts, was personal.204

Armoring the backwater levee necessitated several moving parts 

working together as a team. Each contractor had to know his or her particular part of the mission and work with the other contractors to accomplish the critical task. On May 7, GSE Lining Technology delivered the 

Armoring the Yazoo backwater levee.
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liner to the site. Fordice Construction dug a one-foot wide and two-foot 

deep trench along the landside crown of the levee. With AEG providing technical guidance on the installation process, Fordice positioned 

the liner rolls above the trench. Crews then moved down the landside 

slope of the levee and unrolled the liner until they reached and covered 

the toe of the levee.

 Next, the liner was pinned into place at the crown of the levee 

before the trench was backfi lled with dirt and gravel. At that point, 

AEG began welding the seams together. The contractors repeated the 

process until the landside slope of the four-mile levee segment was covered. By May 11 – four days after the operation began – the contractors 

completed the armoring process just as the river approached 54 feet on 

the Vicksburg gage. Everyone in the lower delta simply watched and 

waited as the river continued its rapid ascent.205

Water from Eagle Lake creates a water berm over the earthen berm at Buck Chute. Note the outline of the 

earthen berm under the water.
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

The Pig in the Python

As water levels at Eagle Lake continued to cover the clay-capped 

berm at Buck Chute and the armoring of the Yazoo backwater levee 

raced toward completion, the Mississippi River, on May 8, topped 

60 feet on the Greenville gage for the fi rst time since the 1927 fl ood. 

The following day the river surged past 52 feet on the Vicksburg gage – 

the highest gage reading since the 1927 fl ood. Both stages represented 

the highest the river had ever climbed against the MR&T levee system 

– and the crest was more than a week away. Mississippi Governor Haley 

Barbour, as only he could, described the rapidly-swelling fl ood pulse 

bulging through the system as a pig moving through a python.206 As the 

river crept higher, pressure on the system mounted.

To the north in the Memphis Engineer District, Col. Vernie Reichling 

reported on May 9 that the river crested on the Memphis gage nearly 

one foot shy of the 1937 record, despite a discharge that exceeded the 

previous record fl ow by nine percent – a shade more than 200,000 cfs. 

In the St. Francis Levee District of Arkansas, Robert Rash, the captivating chief engineer of the levee district, possessed a cocksure attitude, 

despite the immense pressure on the system. The 160 miles of mainline 

levees in the St. Francis levee district, equipped with hundreds of relief 

wells, seepage berms, slope fl attening, and fl yash injections, represented 

arguably the fi nest in the MR&T system. At the fl ood crest, his levees 

maintained up to ten feet of freeboard above the swollen river. When 

a local offi cial approached him about concerns that the district was not 

properly protected, Rash replied, “I don’t care if you’re comfortable 

or not. I’m telling you, this is what we do. The levees won’t breach!” 

To Rash, the 2011 fl ood defi ned the improved state of the levee system. 

When Rash was fi rst hired by the levee district in 2001, Tommy Patterson, a fi fty-year employee with the levee district, took him to Blue 

Lake, Arkansas. When they arrived, Patterson used his foot to draw a 

circle in the dirt. He told Rash, “This is the fi rst place we see seepage 
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in our district when the river reaches 34 feet on the Memphis gage.” 

Rash doubted the information, but the following year underseepage 

occurred at that exact spot when the Memphis gage reached 33.8 feet 

– Patterson’s assessment had been right on target. After the 2002 high 

water, the Memphis Engineer District installed 88 relief wells at Blue 

Lake. During the 2011 fl ood, the levee did not experience underseepage until the Memphis gage reached 44 feet. The relief wells and other 

levee improvements provided the St. Francis levee district with a tenfoot head start in its fl ood fi ght effort.207

On the east bank of the river, where the Memphis district’s jurisdiction extended to the approximate latitude of Clarksdale, Mississippi, 

the levees remained under intense stress from the pressure exerted by 

the high stages. By May 11, the crest, for all intents and purposes, had 

passed through Reichling’s area of operations, but he expected the river 

to remain at dangerously-high stages for a week or more before slowly 

and steadily dropping off. The most pressing problem was near Rena 

Lara, Mississippi, where Kelly Greenwood and the Yazoo-Mississippi 

Levee Board combated underseepage and multiple sand boils with a 

large water berm.208

The mainline levees in the Vicksburg Engineer District in Arkansas, 

Louisiana, and Mississippi had been plagued by underseepage of varying degrees for days. The Vicksburg district used aircraft with forward 

looking infrared technology to identify colder river water fl owing from 

sand boils, which gave fl ood fi ghters an early warning and adequate time 

to address the problems. In Arkansas, the Southeast Arkansas Levee 

District and the state assembled what amounted to a well-equipped, 

small army to combat the fl ood. Flood fi ght teams consisting of National 

Guard soldiers, inmate laborers, hired laborers, and levee district members worked around the clock to address sand boils at historically active 

areas near Rohwer, Dewey, Leland Chute, Otter Bayou, and Willow 

Lake with sandbag rings or water berms. The most serious trouble spot 

in Arkansas was at Lake Chicot. As Early as May 2, Eric Woerner, the 
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

district’s deputy sector commander in southeast Arkansas, reported 

ten large boils and numerous smaller boils – called pin boils – near the 

Greenville bridge, approximately 500 feet from the toe of the levee. 

The area had not been considered a traditional seepage problem area, 

but the extent of sediment deposits – several hundred cubic yards of 

material – discovered by levee inspectors indicated that the sand boils 

had formed during previous high water events without being detected. 

With that being the case, the levee was already in a weakened state prior 

to the fl ood. Crews tried to ring the individual boils, but – much like 

the Darian Chasteen’s heroic effort at Fulton County – they could not 

keep pace with the development of new boils. The weakened state of 

the levee and the rapidly growing number of developing boils necessitated the construction of a water berm.209

To the south, the Fifth Louisiana Levee District also worked around 

the clock to protect the integrity of the 260 miles of Mississippi River 

levees under its jurisdiction. As early as April 25, the Vicksburg district 

held a coordination call with Reynold Minsky, the levee district president, and James Shivers, the superintendant, to make certain they understood the scope and magnitude of the fl ood coursing through the system 

and to ensure they had the necessary resources to combat it. Minsky, 

White sand boil rings near the toe of the levee at the Greenville bridge in Arkansas.
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Divine Providence

The river climbs high against the levee and towers above the protected town of Greenville, Miss.

The river encroaches upon the gravel road at the crown of the armored Yazoo backwater levee. Note the 

trapped interior drainage to the right of the levee.
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

Shivers, and the levee district, though, were already prepared. Corps of 

Engineers offi cials considered them experienced, master fl ood fi ghters 

for a reason. Because of the small tax base in their district, Minsky and 

Shivers were accustomed to doing more with less. The Fifth Louisiana 

Levee District had highly-detailed and closely-coordinated standing 

orders for their fl ood fi ght teams to follow during fl ood events to get 

out ahead of the problems and treat them in advance. They knew the hot 

spots and they knew how to address them. Having fought a signifi cant 

fl ood only three years prior also helped. During the 2008 fl ood fi ght, the 

levee district utilized nearly 300,000 sandbags to construct rings and 

berms at many traditional problem areas – Henderson, Ice Box Hole, 

Milliken Bend, Mound, Davis Landing, Lake Bruin, Kemp Bend, and 

Lake St. John. Many of those sandbags remained in place. The various 

berms and rings needed to be repaired and solidifi ed, but the levee district already had a head start. That head start and the advanced forecast 

Arkansas City, Ark., during the 2011 flood.
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from the National Weather Service were all that Minsky, Shivers, and 

their boys needed. In many cases, Corps of Engineers levee inspectors, 

who responded to reports of sand boils, arrived to fi nd the boils already 

ringed and stabilized. The Fifth Louisiana Levee District was ready 

and confi dent. A week before the crest, Minsky told Maj. Gen. Walsh, 

“We’re in good shape, General. We can pass this fl ood.”210

On the Mississippi side of the river, the fl ood fi ght took on a little 

different fl avor. The 2008 fl ood had highlighted numerous trouble spots 

in Arkansas and Louisiana. The levee districts in those states used that 

experience to their advantage in preparing for the 2011 fl ood upon them. 

The Mississippi Levee Board did as well, particularly at Buck Chute, 

but the 2008 fl ood had not highlighted as many problem areas as it had 

across the river. This was a refl ection of the fi ne condition of the levees 

managed by the Mississippi Levee Board, which had begun an extensive levee enlargement and relief well program during the 1990s. The 

2011 fl ood, though, was a much larger fl ood. The pressure exerted by 

the river surged past the 2008 thresholds, causing new problem areas 

to rise to the forefront.211

By early May, with the river reaching stages not experienced since 

1927, potential problem areas exploded into existence throughout the 

Mississippi delta. The Mississippi Levee Board preferred close consultation with the Vicksburg district fl ood fi ghters before taking action. 

Bradley Martin, an experienced geotechnical engineer from the Vicksburg district, spent a few days in the Greenville area at Peter Nimrod’s 

request inspecting boils and other potential trouble areas. By late afternoon on May 9, he had not discovered anything out of the ordinary. 

Nimrod asked Martin to accompany Bobby Thompson, the levee board’s 

assistant engineer, to check on one last reported boil near Francis, Mississippi. The area, located at the northern end of Bolivar County, just 

upriver from the mouth of the Arkansas River, traditionally experienced 

signifi cant underseepage during fl ood events, but the inspectors noted 

at least one particularly massive boil. Martin agreed to survey the area. 
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

At 1730 hours, he phoned Nimrod, “We’ve got a serious problem!” 

Martin had never seen a sand boil this large before, and it was located 

at the toe of the levee berm. It was a high-energy boil. Water gushed 

powerfully through the basketball-sized throat, spewing sediment that 

had eroded from beneath the surface. “We can’t leave this until morning,” he warned Nimrod. It would not take long for the sand boil, if left 

unchecked, to possibly undermine the levee.212

Nimrod arrived about an hour later and quickly surveyed the area. 

Underseepage had completely saturated the ground. As he traversed the 

site, Nimrod felt like he was walking across a waterbed. He had never 

before witnessed such complete and thorough saturation. He grabbed a 

nearby willow tree with both hands and shook it forcefully. The waterlogged earth rolled back and forth in rhythm with every push and tug. 

Martin and the levee board crew immediately began building a small, 

fi ve-foot high, C-shaped sandbag berm around the boil, with each end 

of the berm tying into the toe of the levee. After several hours of backbreaking work, they fi nally gained control of the boil – at least so they 

thought. At approximately 2200 hours, as the ring fi lled with seepwater, a second boil suddenly developed a few feet from the original boil. 

The second boil undermined the berm, causing it to collapse. Martin, 

Nimrod, Thompson and the crew were back at square one; only now 

they had two large boils to contend with.

Nimrod and Martin conferred. They agreed that sandbagging alone 

would not remedy the problem. Additional measures were needed. As 

the crew immediately began constructing an extension to the sandbag berm to envelop both boils, Martin called Chuck Mendrop and 

informed him that a sandbag berm would not be able to produce enough 

 counter-pressure to completely check the boil. Martin recommended that 

Mendrop send a hired-labor crew to construct a 75-foot wide, 200-foot 

long dike around the massive boil – and several smaller boils that had 

since developed – to serve as a water berm. In the meantime, Nimrod 

knew the crew needed assistance, so he contacted Mack Grimmett, the 
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Divine Providence

A sand boil spews sediment-laden waters at Francis, Miss.

From left to right: Robert Thompson, Chuck Mendrop, and Lanny Barfi eld discuss the flood fi ght at 

Francis, Miss.
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

Bolivar County Sheriff. Grimmett secured volunteer inmate laborers 

from the Mississippi Department of Corrections to assist the operation. With the added manpower, the crew completed the extension by 

0530 hours the next morning. The fl ood fi ghters rested on the levee and 

anxiously watched the water levels rise inside the berm. The rate of 

sediment transport was beginning to decelerate. All of a sudden, they 

heard another abrupt “whoosh.” A section of the berm had collapsed 

again. The berm was too high. It did not withstand the weight of the 

water. They needed to build the berm wider to provide additional stability. They were back at square one again.

The weary fl ood fi ghters laid on the levee, trying to harness enough 

energy to tackle the boil for a third time. They were exhausted – both 

physically and mentally. Throughout the night and early morning hours, 

they had fi lled, carried, and stacked sandbags. The hired-labor crew 

would arrive soon. The fl ood fi ght team desperately needed the break. 

As they rested on the levee, they engaged in small talk. Thompson puffed 

on a cigarette and stated nonchalantly, “We really need some giant super 

sacks” or sandbags to plug the gap in the berm. Martin sat up. He felt 

a sudden bolt of energy. Thompson was correct – that is exactly what 

they needed. The small sandbags they used would not stay in place, but 

a giant sandbag would easily plug the breach. He pulled out his cellular phone and called an acquaintance – an agricultural seed supplier 

in nearby Cleveland, Mississippi. The seed supplier had hundreds of 

large super sacks in stock only a short thirty-minute drive from Francis. 

Nimrod dispatched an employee to retrieve the bags.

Mendrop and Lanny Barfi eld, one of Mendrop’s section chiefs in 

the geotechnical engineering branch, arrived at Francis shortly thereafter. Laborers began constructing the water berm dike on the periphery. 

The three geotechnical engineers examined the boil. It was still piping 

a considerable amount of material. They knew it would take days for 

the crews to complete the dike and get enough water over the area to 

counteract the pressure. The high-energy boil demanded immediate 
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attention. Shoring up the berm with the “super sacks” would help in 

the short term. Barfi eld and Martin discussed a possible experiment – 

creating a fi lter over the sand boil. During a 2010 fl ood fi ght operation 

near Vidalia, Louisiana, Martin had dropped gravel in a boil to act as 

a fi lter that allowed the boil to continue to fl ow and relieve pressure. 

The gravel also trapped the sediment and checked further erosion of 

the subsurface foundation. Barfi eld and Martin approached Mendrop 

and asked if they could try it again. Mendrop looked at the ominous 

boil and replied, “I’ll try anything.”

The hired-labor crew hurriedly moved earth around the boil-plagued 

area. At the same time, Barfi eld, Martin and the levee board crew 

improved the sandbag berm. After two of the super sacks were fi lled 

with sand, a trackhoe lifted each bag from the levee and lowered them 

into place to plug the breach. To seal the remaining leaks, the fl ood fi ghters stuffed smaller sandbags around the “super sacks.” Once the berm 

was stabilized and sealed, they poured large quantities of sand into the 

Bradley Martin, left, gives a “thumbs up” to the trackhoe operator as inmates guide a “super sack” into place.
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

boil before dumping several loads of number 57 stone – a coarse gravel 

aggregate ranging from a half inch to 1.5 inches in size – on top of and 

around the boil. Martin had not slept for nearly 36 hours, so Mendrop 

drove him back to Vicksburg, leaving Barfi eld behind to oversee the 

operation. By the following day, the murky water contained by the sandbag berm began to lose its turbidity. The boil was running clear. The 

fi lter experiment worked. A few days later, the hired labor crew completed the earthen water berm, which provided a higher safety factor.213

As fl ood fi ghters addressed the Francis boil at the north end of the 

delta, Col. Eckstein escorted Maj. Gen. Walsh and the civilian members 

of the Mississippi River Commission – Sam Angel, R.D. James, and 

Clifford Smith – on a helicopter fl yover of the Vicksburg region on May 

10. The extent of fl ooding looked severe. Water stood high against the 

levees on both banks of the river. From the air, it appeared that the river 

had reached the tops of the levees, but in reality there was plenty of 

freeboard available—which was fortunate. The Vicksburg gage read just 

inches shy of 53 feet, but the river was expected to rise at least another 

The completed water berm at Francis, Miss. Note the additional sand boil rings in the foreground and the river 

stage in the background.
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4.5 feet. Sam Angel elbowed R.D. James and said, “The fl ooding here 

is different.” Indeed, it was different, compared to the conditions the 

commission had just witnessed over the past few weeks at the confl uence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. Violent storms had dropped 

up to nearly two feet of rain in some parts of southeastern Missouri, 

southern Illinois and western Kentucky and Tennessee. Standing water 

was everywhere in the confl uence area. Overfl owing creeks, bayous, and 

ditches had nowhere to drain because of the high river stages, causing 

them to back up and spread out across the surrounding terrain. But this 

was not the case in the heart of the MR&T project.

The commission observed the MR&T system working as designed. 

The river may have stood high against the levees, but the land and 

infrastructure on the protected sides of the levee remained dry. Wheat, 

corn, beans, and cotton fl ourished in the fl at, low-lying farmlands below. 

Smith mentioned the irony of irrigation pivots slowly spinning across 

several farms, “Look at that – a drought in the middle of a fl ood!” Cars 

and trucks sped east and west along Interstate 20, seemingly oblivious 

to the high river stages pressing against the levee. In the heart of the 

MR&T, the fl ood – at least thus far – remained confi ned between the 

levees, with the exception of backwater fl ooding along the Yazoo River 

and Steele Bayou. Still they noticed the rooftops of several homes jutting from the water on the Mississippi side of the river. From the helicopter, they looked like stepping stones across a shallow pond. Those 

homes had been built on the riverside of the levee. Many stood above 

the 100-year fl ood elevation, but the MR&T levees towered above that 

elevation for a reason. The river was high and it was expected to rise at 

least another 4.5 feet. The pig had not yet fully reached the Vicksburg 

portion of the python.214

At the northern end of the Vicksburg district, with Francis water 

berm complete and the sand boil under control, Barfi eld set out to 

return to Vicksburg on May 12. As he drove south, his phone rang. 

It was Mendrop asking for him to meet up with Bobby Thompson to 
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

check on a reported boil near Winterville, Mississippi, just a few miles 

north of Greenville. Barfi eld met Thompson and they drove to the site 

together. Thompson wanted Barfi eld’s advice on whether or not the boil 

needed immediate attention or if it could wait until the morning. With 

each passing day, as the river climbed higher and exerted more pressure, numerous boils exploded everywhere across the region, further 

thinning the stretched resources of levee districts.

As they drove along the levee, Barfi eld detected water violently 

erupting from the ground in a clump of trees near the toe of the levee 

berm. He looked at Thompson, “Oh, no! This is not good!” He climbed 

from the car and rushed to examine the boil. Like the Francis boil, the 

18-inch throat piped heavy sediment-laden water. “We’ve got to do 

something and we have to do it now!” he told Thompson. “This can’t 

wait!” As Thompson hurriedly phoned in a request for men and material, 

Barfi eld inspected a ditch next to the sand boil for freshly-deposited silt. 

By his fi eld estimation, the boil had eroded more than 100 cubic yards 

Lanny Barfi eld checks the high-energy boil at Winterville, Miss.
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of subsurface material. He had never seen a boil develop to the point of 

a levee failure other than on training videos. He wanted to keep it that 

way. The heavy sediment load erupting from the boil and the amount 

of silt already deposited in the ditch worried him. No matter how badly 

he wanted to, Barfi eld could not possibly know what was happening 

beneath the surface. He checked with the landowner, who told him that 

the sand boil was not there the day before. It was a high-energy boil. 

It had virtually exploded into existence out of nowhere and quickly 

moved a large quantity of material – 100 cubic yards of material. As he 

rechecked the freshly-deposited sediment, Barfi eld thought to himself, 

Where did it come from? Just beneath the surface? Was it piping vertically? Was it piping horizontally under the landside seepage berm? 

Was the boil working toward the levee? To make matters worse, the 

boil continued to grow before his eyes.

The sand boil sat at an extremely critical location under the Mississippi Levee Board’s jurisdiction. It was nearer the upper end of the 

district, slightly north of two of the larger population centers in the 

Mississippi delta – Greenville, with a population of nearly 35,000, and 

Leland, with a population of approximately 5,500. Unlike a possible 

levee breach at Buck Chute or the Yazoo backwater levee at the lower 

end of the district, where fl oodwaters would slowly back up through the 

delta, a levee break at the upper end of the levee district would unleash 

a torrent of water that would rush southward and engulf the delta much 

like the devastating crevasse at Mound Landing during the 1927 fl ood. 

Perhaps more threatening, a levee break at Winterville would inundate 

Greenville in less than six hours; Leland in twelve hours. More than 

40,000 people would need to be evacuated in less than one-half of a 

day, most of them sooner than that. For this reason, Governor Barbour’s 

task force had quietly staged buses in the area to quickly evacuate large 

quantities of people on short notice. Having gained valuable emergency 

management experience during Hurricane Katrina, the DeepwaterHorizon oil spill, and several nasty tornados, Barbour knew how to 
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

prepare for a disaster. The state was ready to act, but it would not need 

to if Barfi eld and Thompson could get the boil under control.

Once the necessary resources arrived, Barfi eld, Thompson and the 

fl ood fi ght team – mainly composed of inmate labor – formed a human 

conveyor belt, passing sandbags from the levee through the knee-deep 

water in the ditch to construct a sandbag and plywood dike to trap the 

seepage and create a water berm. Fresh off of the successful experiment at Francis, Barfi eld also decided to create a fi lter over the boil. 

The deep water and the clump of large trees partially blocked access 

to the site, but the team used a trackhoe to reach between the trees and 

across the water berm to dump the sand and number 57 stone on the 

boil. The experiment went smoother than the initial test at Francis the 

day before. Within a matter of hours, the fi lter was complete. Barfi eld 

checked the ditch for newly-developed boils and found none. Clear 

water began cascading from the gravel mound. The high-energy boil 

had been checked.215

Ups and Downs

The high-energy sand boils at Francis, Winterville, and other locations were indicative of the enormous pressure exerted by the extremely 

swollen river on the levee system. Across all ten of the Vicksburg 

Levee workers and inmates address the high energy boil at Winterville.
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district’s fl ood fi ght sectors covering Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana, levee inspectors responded to more than 300 sand boil incidents. 

Reported incidents most often involved clusters of boils, rather than 

single or isolated boils, so the number of boils that actually developed 

dwarfed the number of incidents reported. The system was springing 

leaks everywhere, but it was holding together. “The river wants out,” 

Col. Eckstein told a group of reporters in trying to explain the signifi -

cant number of boils in the area, “We want that, too. We just want to 

control it so it doesn’t move material and undermine the levee.” That 

much was true, but treating and controlling a sand boil could only be 

accomplished if the problem was identifi ed. As the river continued to 

rise and the pressure on the system continued to mount, undetected 

activity below the surface of the levees threatened to materialize at a 

moment’s notice. Geotechnical engineers, levee board members, and 

fl ood fi ghters throughout the region asked themselves the same questions that Chuck Mendrop asked himself back at the Vicksburg Engineer 

District, What is out there that I am missing? What is out there that I 

cannot see?216

On May 12, the Mississippi River reached 63.5 feet on the Greenville gage and 54.5 feet on the Vicksburg gage. The river was also 

climbing fast at the Natchez gage, having reached 58 feet, more than 

ten feet above fl ood stage. By 0800 hours the following day, the river 

stormed past 64 feet on the Greenville gage. The crest, which had yet to 

reach the Arkansas City gage further upriver, was still at least four days 

away. Everyone expected the river to continue to rise. At 1400 hours, 

the gage stood at 64.13 feet, but the gage reading an hour later depicted 

a drop in river levels by three-hundredths. The reading at 1600 hours 

showed another drop. By 1800 hours, the river had dropped back below 

64 feet on the gage. The 2000 hours gage reading recorded yet another 

drop, down a tenth of a foot from two hours earlier. Walter Mattingly, 

working in the Vicksburg district’s emergency operation center, called 

Ron Goldman at home and told him, “The stage is falling at Greenville.” 
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

Those words hit Goldman like a bombshell. He was scared and understandably so. A sudden drop in a river gage prior to the arrival of the 

crest could only mean the gage had malfunctioned or, worse, a levee had 

fi nally succumbed to the relentless pressure of the river. He immediately 

returned to the district offi ce to determine the cause of the problem. 

Mattingly also contacted Paul Keene at the district’s Greenwood area 

offi ce. Keene began organizing the sector commanders on both sides of 

the river to inspect the levees to determine if a breach had taken place.217

Keene, in turn, notifi ed the Mississippi Levee Board. Upon hearing 

the news, Thompson decided to call Nimrod, who was at his Greenville 

home stealing a few hours to get some much needed sleep. Nimrod 

had left his cellular phone in the kitchen and did not hear it ringing. 

Thompson hung up and called Nimrod’s house phone. When Nimrod 

answered Thompson informed him of the news, “Peter, something’s 

wrong! The gage just dropped!” The sudden rush of adrenaline immediately sapped the fog of weariness from the chief engineer of the levee 

board. Thompson passed on the Vicksburg district’s belief that either 

the gage had malfunctioned or a levee had breached. Within minutes, 

the Greenwood area offi ce notifi ed Nimrod that the gage was working 

properly and that water marks on a nearby sign post also depicted a drop 

in river levels. By 2100 hours, the gage reading had dropped another 

tenth of a foot, which confi rmed water was leaving the system somewhere. Nimrod began calling members of his crews. They had spent the 

day riding the levees with personnel from the Greenwood area offi ce 

and would have noticed any problems. None reported noticing anything 

substantial. Nimrod pondered his next step. The gage had checked out. 

It was working properly. His levees checked out. No breaks were found. 

Perhaps a levee crevassed on the other side of the river. The clock was 

nearing midnight. The river had dropped six inches over the previous 

nine hours. Nimrod called Sam Angel, a member of the Mississippi 

River Commission who lived across the river in Lake Village, Arkansas. 

“Mr. Angel, did the levee break on your side?” he asked. Angel, who 
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Divine Providence

had been asleep when his telephone rang, considered the question an 

odd one. “Not that I know of,” he replied. Nimrod explained the situation. Angel indicated that he would check with levee district offi cials 

in Arkansas, but he soon discovered that no break had been reported.218

By 0300 hours the following morning – May 14 – the river stopped 

falling on the Greenville gage and resumed its ascent. Within hours, the 

water control managers at the district offi ce had determined the culprit. 

On May 12, the river overtopped an abandoned MR&T levee at Wilson 

Point, near Lake Providence, Louisiana. The Mississippi River Commission had constructed a new mainline levee further to the west, but the 

abandoned levee remained intact, providing substantial protection for 

approximately 12,000 acres of prime farmland. In the early afternoon 

of May 13, the abandoned levee –with close to a foot of water violently 

pouring over its crown and landside slope – crevassed, allowing the river 

to fi ll the 12,000-acre bowl between the levees. The incident proved to 

be a false alarm in terms of a possible catastrophic break in the levee 

system, but it served notice of the destructive dynamics involved in 

the overtopping of a levee. The Wilson Point levee had crevassed with 

a foot of water pouring over the levee after only one day. Residents in 

the Mississippi delta took notice of that. All eyes nervously turned to 

the newly-armored Yazoo backwater levee, which was expected to be 

overtopped by more than a foot of water for ten long days. Admittedly, 

the Wilson Point levee was not an MR&T levee, and it had not been 

armored as the backwater levee had, but it was originally constructed 

to MR&T specifi cations. Residents continued to watch and pray as the 

river inched higher and higher against the backwater levee.219

Their prayers were soon answered. At the onset of the 2011 fl ood, 

Ron Goldman wanted to gather more data on the river. He instructed 

Michael Warren to establish a temporary gage near a small spur levee 

that jutted out toward the channel from the mainline levee at its junction with the backwater levee. The 2008 profi le had established a high 

water mark on the upstream side of the spur levee. Data obtained from 
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

that 2008 high water mark had led to the discovery of the greater slope 

along the Yazoo River and the determination that only the lower four 

miles of the backwater faced overtopping when the Vicksburg gage 

would reach 57.5 feet. Upon arriving at the levee, Warren witnessed 

the fl urry of activity where the hired-labor crew busily prepared the 

HESCO bastion fl oodwall on the backwater levee. Attempting to stay 

out of the way, Warren established the gage on the downstream side of 

the spur levee, only a few hundred feet away from the location of the 

2008 high water mark.

The new gage started collecting data on May 8, the day after the 

Vicksburg gage surged past 50 feet and the day after the backwater levee 

armoring project commenced. Within a few days, the district’s hydraulic 

engineers noticed something odd. The new gage depicted a one-foot 

drop in the slope of the river from the upstream and downstream sides 

of the spur levee. The development piqued Goldman’s curiosity. The 

normal fall in the river averaged one-half foot per mile, yet the gage 

depicted a one-foot slope spanning a distance of only a few hundred feet. 

Goldman went to inspect the gage personally. He could hear water rushing along the spur levee. Goldman surmised that the water was hitting 

the spur and piling up. If the same thing happened in 2008, it probably 

caused an artifi cially high reading on the temporary gage upstream of 

the spur. If that was the case, the backwater levee might not overtop 

until the Vicksburg gage reached 57 feet or higher. That prospect excited 

Goldman, but he remained uncertain. The situation was too unique, too 

odd. The possibility remained that the differential could equalize and 

therefore dissipate as the river continued to rise. He wanted to see how 

the river responded before reaching a concrete conclusion. By May 14, 

Goldman was convinced that the one-foot differential would not change. 

He went to see Col. Eckstein. In the colonel’s offi ce, Goldman drew 

a schematic of what was transpiring on a large piece of butcher board 

paper. Eckstein fl ashed a broad smile. It was becoming more and more 

evident that the backwater levee would not overtop.220
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On May 15, the worst of the fl ood was nearly upon the entire Vicksburg district. The river climbed back above 64 feet on the Greenville 

gage. On the Vicksburg gage, the river surpassed the 1927 high water 

mark of 56.2 feet. During the morning commander’s briefi ng, Walsh 

asked Eckstein for an update on the Yazoo backwater levee. Eckstein 

reported that the river was about a foot from the gravel road on the crown 

of the levee. “It’s going to be close if it overtops at all,” he informed the 

commission president. Eckstein closed his report by informing Walsh 

that fl ood conditions in the Vicksburg Engineer District had reached a 

steady state – at least for the time being. Conditions seemed not only to 

be holding steady, but improving slightly, with no new boils reported in 

the Vicksburg district over the preceding 24 hours. Still, Dennis Norris, 

Walsh’s chief of operations, reminded everyone to stay vigilant, “the 

unprecedented boils and seepage we are experiencing may translate 

into levee slides after the river falls off.”221

Robert Thompson intently watches the development of a sand boil.
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

On May 16, the Mississippi River crested on the Arkansas City 

gage, but the steady-state of conditions came to a crashing end. A levee 

inspector discovered a cluster of boils in the levee toe near Albemarle, 

Mississippi, just a short distance north of Buck Chute. Chuck Mendrop dispatched Lanny Barfi eld to take a look at the boils, but Peter 

Nimrod and a levee board crew arrived at the scene fi rst. They immediately discovered the boils were the least of their problems. They had 

a levee slide to contend with. A slide may occur when a portion of the 

levee face becomes saturated and shifts or slides down the slope of the 

levee, typically when the river recedes. Most slides that occur along 

the Mississippi River levee system in the region are, for the most part, 

unrelated to high water events, with most slides caused by various wetting and drying cycles that weaken the soil. Slides typically occur on 

the riverside of the levee, where the levee slopes are steeper. The slide 

at Albemarle was on the landside slope of the levee, less than 50 feet 

downriver from the boils.

The water gushing from the face of the levee terrifi ed Nimrod. The 

Albemarle levee had yet to be enlarged, so it was not equipped with a 

landside seepage berm or relief wells. The ongoing levee enlargement 

program had advanced and stopped approximately 2,000 feet upriver. 

While the levee was constructed to a substantial height and width, it 

was not as strong as the levees located a few thousand feet to the north. 

Nimrod was worried. The levee was completely saturated. The river 

was nearing its crest, and it placed tremendous pressure against the 

weakened levee. He called Barfi eld, who was in transit to the site, and 

notifi ed him of the slide. Barfi eld arrived minutes later. He examined 

the boils fi rst. They were good-sized boils that piped a considerable 

amount of sediment. Compared to the boils at Francis and Winterville, 

though, the boils were noticeably less aggressive, leading Barfi eld to 

conclude that the inspectors had discovered the boils early in the developmental stage. Barfi eld studied the slide next. He tried to determine 

if the water fl owing from the face of the levee was underseepage or 
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Divine Providence

seepage through levee. The origin of the seepage mattered to Barfi eld. 

He hoped it was underseepage. Seepage through the face was more 

disconcerting because it would be easier for the newly-formed cavity 

to creep back toward the levee face and cause a failure, than to crawl 

under the levee. Barfi eld concluded that it was probably underseepage 

fl owing from the levee, but he was not certain. He called Mendrop and 

apprised him of the situation.222

Mendrop and two of his senior geotechnical engineers – Noah 

Vroman and Brad Arcement – dropped what they were doing and drove 

to Albemarle to assist Barfi eld. Together, the engineers determined 

that the levee had been constructed in an abandoned river channel. 

The existence of sand boils and clay deposits near the toe of the levee, 

along with the presence of what appeared to be iron in the seepwater, 

led them to conclude that the slide was the result of underseepage and 

the uplift pressures associated with it. Mendrop decided to get the boils 

under control fi rst, before addressing the slide. He shared Barfi eld’s 

view that the boils, while severe, were not as problematic as the boils 

at Francis and Winterville. The boils and slide did not overly concern 

him at that moment, but he knew the situation could deteriorate rapidly. 

If they were not able to get the problem under control, he knew they 

could possibly lose the levee and unleash fl ooding far worse than what 

had been predicted if the levee at Buck Chute failed. Mendrop called 

Jimmy Coldiron. Within hours, Coldiron’s hired-labor crew was on the 

scene building a rock dike at the landside toe of the levee. The dike was 

to be fi lled with sand to stabilize the levee.223

On May 17, as Coldiron’s crew constructed the rock dike at Albemarle, the Mississippi River crested at 64.2 feet on the Greenville gage, 

approximately one foot lower than the 1927 high water mark. Two 

days later, it crested at 57.1 feet on the Vicksburg gage, which broke 

the old record mark set in 1927 by almost a foot. The river climbed to 

the gravel road on the crown of the Yazoo backwater levee but stopped 

four inches shy from overtopping it. The fl ood, though, was far from 
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Chapter Four – The River Wants Out

over. After fi rst reaching 60 feet on the Greenville gage on May 7, the 

river remained above that mark for a staggering 19 days before fi nally 

dropping below it on May 26. At the Vicksburg gage, the river remained 

above 51.6 feet – the high water mark of the devastating 1973 fl ood – 

until June 4. The river had fi rst topped that mark on May 9 and remained 

there for 26 days.

The Vicksburg and Memphis districts, along with the levee boards 

in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi had faced several harrowing 

moments, but the MR&T system held the fl ood in check despite facing 

unprecedented pressure. The river wanted out and the MR&T system 

provided room through managed seepage. The project had advanced a 

long way since the 1973 fl ood. The 2011 fl ood set stage records from 

Cairo to Caruthersville and from Vicksburg to Natchez by one to two 

feet, but from Memphis to Greenville the fl ood crested from one to 

six feet below the records established in 1937 at Memphis and 1927 

Col. Jeff rey Eckstein discusses the Yazoo backwater armoring operation at a press conference on the levee.
216

Divine Providence

in Greenville. Yet at the same time, the fl ood established new record 

fl ows from Cairo to Baton Rouge. The fl ood exceeded previous record 

fl ows at Helena by 8 percent; Arkansas City by 6 percent; Vicksburg 

by 11 percent; and Natchez by 9.5 percent. The improved capacity of 

the river to carry more water at lower stages – resulting from Ferguson’s channel realignment and rectifi cation program and the subsequent 

channel stabilization measures to maintain the stage-lowering benefi ts 

achieved – was primarily responsible for the reach between Memphis 

and Greenville not setting new stage records in 2011 and for keeping 

stages more manageable along the entire reach between Memphis and 

Natchez. The improved carrying-capacity also proved pivotal in preventing the Yazoo backwater levee from overtopping and preventing 

similar damages as those experienced during the 1973 fl ood.
Chapter 5 Through the Spout to the Gulf:

The 2011 Flood in the 

New Orleans District

Can you imagine what this river would look like without engineering controls? It would resemble a Third World country – 

no power, no water intakes, no sewer, no navigation, no farms. 

The entire lower valley would be destroyed and useless.

Stephen Gambrell

Executive Director

Mississippi River Commission

May 14, 2011
218

Helena Uvingston Tangipahoa , SI. Tammany Pearl River Ii?i':iI 

I!::YJ 

us Army Cor

of EngoInee. s

05

-
219

ON THE MORNING OF MAY 2, THE Mississippi River Commission 

and its staff gathered in the second fl ood conference room 

on the motor vessel MISSISSIPPI for the daily 0800 hours 

briefi ng. Only four hours earlier, Bill Frederick, the staff meteorologist at the division offi ce, had informed Maj. Gen. Walsh, the president 

of the commission, of the new forecast for 63 feet at the Cairo gage. 

Everyone in the tension-fi lled conference room knew what that meant. 

They could not mask the concern on their faces, nor their exhaustion. 

The violent thunderstorm that rocked the vessel the previous night had 

not been conducive for sleeping. They all realized the persistent rains 

made activation of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway unavoidable. 

As the commission members and staff waited for the conference call 

to begin, the normally-gregarious group said little, which refl ected on 

the gravity of the situation.

Edward Belk, the MVD chief of programs, surveyed the room as the 

district commanders phoned in the situational reports for their areas of 

operations. He could sense the fatigue – both mental and physical – of 

the group before him. He knew they were running on the adrenaline 

created by the crisis unfolding at the confl uence of the Mississippi and 

Ohio rivers. That concerned him. While still at least fourteen hours away, 

the activation of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway was, for the 

most part, fait accompli. It was going to happen. Nothing could stop it 

from operating if Col. Reichling’s task force could load the pipes with 

explosives in time. The tension-packed series of events from the past 

week were rapidly building toward a crescendo – the ultimate activation 

of the fl oodway. The natural reaction after the operation, Belk knew, 

would be for the tired and weary decision-makers and fl ood fi ghters to 

let down their guards as if the worst of the fl ood was behind them. But 

it was not behind them. The fl ood was just beginning. Activating the 

fl oodway would only serve as the opening salvo of a larger battle. With 

this in mind, Belk calmly and astutely warned the participants on the 
220

Divine Providence

conference call, “As the fl ood moves downstream, we need to reload 

and re-cock, and be ready for the next challenge.”224

The Need for Engineering Control

The ammunition in Belk’s “reload and re-cock” analogy referred to 

the engineering controls in the lower end of the MR&T project. If the 

Mississippi drainage basin represents a gigantic funnel stretching across 

41 percent of the United States, and the lower Mississippi represents 

the spout, then the MR&T project below Natchez represents the tip of 

the spout. Under project design fl ood conditions, the tip must convey a 

fl ow of three million cfs – a massive amount of water roughly 12.5 times 

greater than the amount of water that passes over Niagara Falls each 

second. To control that discharge, the developers of the MR&T project devised what amounts to an elaborate plumbing system, with two 

entrance points – the Mississippi River fl owing past Natchez and the 

Red River; three transfer points – the Old River control complex, the 

Morganza fl oodway, and the West Atchafalaya fl oodway; and four exit 

points – the Bonnet Carré spillway into Lake Pontchartrain, the Wax 

Lake outlet into Atchafalaya Bay, and the mouths of the Mississippi and 

Atchafalaya rivers into the Gulf of Mexico. The goal of the system is to 

divert fl ows a little at a time so that the Mississippi River discharge will 

not exceed the manageable rates of 1.25 million cfs past New Orleans 

and 1.5 million cfs past Baton Rouge, while insuring a distribution of 

thirty percent of the combined waters and sediment of the Mississippi 

and Red rivers at the latitude of Red River Landing are passed through 

to the Atchafalaya basin.

Since the early nineteenth century, engineers had been debating 

the merits of creating expansion room for the river as a way to supplement the rapidly-extending line of levees. George Graham, the U.S. 

General Land Offi ce Commissioner, fi rst proposed a fl oodway through 

the Atchafalaya basin in 1828. In 1852, Charles Ellet, Jr., a prominent 
221

Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

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222

Divine Providence

civil engineer working under a commission from the secretary of war, 

proposed a system of outlets through the Atchafalaya River, Bayou 

Plaquemine, Bayou Lafourche, and Lake Borgne. A month later, the 

State of Louisiana published a plan developed by Samuel Ricker that 

mostly mirrored Ellet’s proposal, but expanded it by calling for manmade outlets at Morganza and Red River Landing. A decade later, Army 

engineers Capt. Andrew Humphreys and Lt. Henry Abbot published 

the Delta Survey, which advocated using, but not enlarging, the natural 

outlets through bayous Plaquemines and Lafourche. More importantly, 

Humphreys and Abbot urged complete resistance to the growing temptation of divorcing the Atchafalaya River from the Mississippi River, 

as such an action would deprive the Mississippi fl oodwaters of a vital 

diversion route.225

Instead of heeding these recommendations, the Mississippi River 

Commission recommended upon its establishment the completion of 

the levee line begun by local levee districts and the closure of most 

outlets, with the exception of the Atchafalaya River. Levees – at least 

conceptually – promised protection from the river; while fl oodways, 

outlets, and spillways meant surrendering land to the river. The commission’s policy rested on the theory that closing off the outlets would 

increase the velocity of the river and scour the riverbed deeper, perhaps 

to the point that levees would no longer be needed to confi ne fl oods. 

By the dawn of the twentieth century, though, the commission began to 

ease on its stance against dispersion. Following the 1912 fl ood, which 

set a record stage of 21 feet near New Orleans on the Carrollton gage, 

Louisiana interests began pushing for the construction of emergency 

spillways to relieve pressure on the levee system during fl oods. The 

commission relented and studied the feasibility of constructing a spillway. The commission investigated six sites: Bonnet Carré, Kenner, 

and Lake Borgne on the east bank of the river; Willow Bend, Waggaman, and Jesuit’s Bend on the west bank. Coming as no surprise to 

spillway advocates in New Orleans, the report concluded that a fl ood 
223

Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

stage exceeding 21 feet on the Carrollton gage, indeed, threatened the 

security of the region’s commercial and business interests. The report 

suggested as a solution the construction of a 6,000-foot long spillway 

capable of diverting 230,000 cfs from the main channel, but—citing 

fears of interrupting the continuity of the existing levee line and the 

threat of backwater fl ooding to New Orleans—surmised that a suitable 

location for a spillway could not be found.226

The call for spillways again jumped to the forefront during the 

1922 fl ood, when the river established a new record on the Carrollton 

gage at 21.3 feet before the levee crevassed at Poydras, approximately 

12 miles downriver from New Orleans. Although more than four feet 

separated the fl ood crest from the crown of the levee protecting the 

city, New Orleans residents believed that the Poydras crevasse lowered 

fl ood heights to the point of sparing them from calamity. In short order, 

several plans emanated from the civilian engineering community. John 

Klorer, the New Orleans city engineer, revitalized Ellet’s 1852 plan for 

an artifi cial outlet from the Mississippi into Lake Borgne. John Freeman, 

the principal advocate for establishing a national hydraulic laboratory, 

set forth his own plan to draw fl ows out of the Mississippi above New 

Orleans through the enlargement of the Atchafalaya.227

In 1924, the Louisiana state legislature authorized the Orleans Levee 

District to design a spillway below New Orleans to protect the integrity of the levees lining the city front. On January 26, 1925, the levee 

district submitted a plan to lower eleven miles of levees at Pointe-a-laHache, approximately 50 miles downriver from New Orleans, to serve 

as a spillway. The Louisiana Board of State Engineers reviewed the 

plan and soon fragmented over differences of opinions on the subject. 

One faction believed that the spillway would reduce fl ood heights by 

as much as two feet. Another faction, while still advocating the necessity of spillways, believed Pointe-a-la-Hache was too far downriver to 

have any impact. Both factions did agree, however, that construction 

and implementation of the spillway would provide “an opportunity to 
224

Divine Providence

procure valuable data for future reference.” That statement refl ected a 

matter of considerable importance. New Orleans interests hoped the 

data gathered through the spillway experiment would ultimately lead 

to a more systematic employment of spillways to protect southern Louisiana. This hope manifested itself through the efforts of Louisiana 

Congressman Riley J. Wilson, who was busily preparing a bill seeking 

authorization of a federal survey to determine the feasibility and cost of 

controlling Mississippi River fl oods between Old River and the Head 

of Passes through controlled spillways.228

The Louisiana Board of State Engineers approved the plan on February 10, two weeks prior to the next session of the Mississippi River 

Commission. On February 25, Gervis Lombard, the assistant state engineer for the board, and Marcel Garsaud, chief engineer for the Orleans 

Levee District, appeared before the commission to plead their case. 

Lombard took the lead, explaining that the proposed spillway would 

benefi t the levee system near New Orleans and that all parties impacted 

by the plan agreed to the necessity of its construction. Colonel Potter, 

the commission president, refl ecting on the irony of the people near 

Pointe-a-la-Hache agreeing to lower their own levee to benefi t people 

upstream, commented, “It is not very long ago that levees were guarded 

with shot guns down in that country.” Lombard answered, “In times 

of stress people do lose their heads.” On February 26, the commission 

passed a resolution endorsing the state’s plan to modify the 11-mile 

stretch of the levee. The State of Louisiana completed the Pointe-a-laHache spillway in 1926 at a cost of nearly $500,000. Shortly after its 

completion, President Calvin Coolidge signed Congressman Wilson’s 

bill authorizing the Corps of Engineers to study the feasibility and costs 

of controlling Mississippi River fl oods south of Old River by means 

of spillways and levees. The Corps of Engineers, in turn, established 

a spillway board to survey plans to keep fl ood stages in New Orleans 

below 20 feet and at Simmesport on the Atchafalaya River below 48 feet. 

As the spillway board commenced its investigation in the fall of 1926, 
225

Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

heavy rains drenched a large portion of the Mississippi drainage basin. 

The rains continued into the winter and spring of 1927, sending one fl ood 

crest after another through the lower Mississippi Valley. The spillway 

board’s fi nal analysis would come too late.229

As the 1927 fl ood developed and placed tremendous pressure against 

the levees in south Louisiana, fear of a levee crevasse reached panic 

levels, particularly after word spread of the crevasses at Laconia Circle 

and Whitehall in Arkansas and at Dorena, Missouri. On April 19, New 

Orleans Mayor Arthur J. O’Keefe and Garsaud met privately with the 

Mississippi River Commission in St. Louis to inquire about the steps 

to create an artifi cial cut in the levees to lower fl ood levels if it became 

necessary. Among the requirements outlined were getting permission 

from the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War as required by 

Section 14 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and the assumption 

of all costs and responsibility by the local government. Two days later 

the Mound Landing levee crevassed, inundating the entire Mississippi 

delta and further spiking panic levels in New Orleans. On April 25, with 

gage readings exceeding 21 feet, Garsaud, publisher President James W. 

Thompson, Sen. Joseph Ransdell, Rep. James O’Connor, and other 

Louisiana powerbrokers urged permission to breach the levee. The 

Mississippi River Commission quickly passed a resolution that “to 

avoid the loss of life and property” it “is advisable to create a break” if 

Louisiana Gov. Oramel Simpson provided a formal statement requesting it and assumed responsibility for damages. The commission would 

then get permission from Maj. Gen. Jadwin, the Chief of Engineers. 

Only fi ve hours later, Governor Simpson sent a telegram with his and 

Mayor O’Keefe’s concurrence to cut the levee near the site of the 1922 

Poydras crevasse. The following night, Jadwin and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover conferred with the commission. Jadwin sent 

telegrams to Simpson and to Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis, who 

telegrammed Simpson, that they “interpose no objection” to the state’s 

plan to dynamite the levee.230
226

Divine Providence

Three days later, on April 29, after the evacuation of residents of 

St. Bernard Parish, George C. Schoenberger, chief of the Louisiana 

board of state engineers, oversaw the execution of the proposed cut 

with the national guard standing by to prevent interference. The actual 

site selected was at Caernarvon, Louisiana, about 13 miles below New 

Orleans. As reporter George W. Healy, Jr., observed, “The fi rst blast, on 

Friday, April 29, was a fl op, literally and fi guratively. Soil blown out 

of the levee went straight up in the air and then fl opped down into the 

The Caernarvon levee in late April 1927. (Library of Congress)

Workers prepare the Caernarvon levee crevasse site. (Library of Congress)
227

Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

holes in the levee’s crown whence it had been blown.” Only a trickle 

of water was getting through the hole. Several attempts to dynamite 

the levee followed, expanding it to about 800 feet on May 1, but Roger 

McWhorter of the New Orleans Levee District noted, the “batture is 

scouring more slowly than expected.... This levee was built of ideal 

material and is one of the best in the state.” Only after a diver placed 

additional charges under the batture on May 3 did the levee fi nally 

collapse, opening up a 2,600-foot gap. The Carrollton gage showed an 

immediate decline. No one had taken measurements during the 1922 

crevasse at Poydras, so the Caernarvon cut was the fi rst opportunity to 

prove the effect of spillways on the city. According to Klorer, “Ocular 

demonstration has convinced most of those not committed to spillways 

that relief of this kind is essential.” The Corps of Engineers spillway 

board agreed. Its fi nal report, which the board submitted to Jadwin on 

November 12, 1927, recommended the construction of fl oodways at 

Bonnet Carré and on both banks of the Atchafalaya River. The report 

concluded that “it is by this means only that the safety of the city and 

port of New Orleans can be positively and unqualifi edly assured.”231

After the Caernarvon levee crevasse. (Library of Congress)
228

Divine Providence

Less than a month later, Jadwin submitted his formal plan to the 

project design fl ood in Louisiana with a combination of levees and 

fl oodways. The dynamiting of the levee at Caernarvon had blasted the 

levees-only policy out of existence. The end result transformed the 

lower Mississippi River and the Atchafalaya basin into some of the 

most engineering-controlled waterways on the planet.

One Flood, Three Floodways

By midday on May 2, 2011, Edward Belk’s call for vigilance proved 

insightful. The second round of storms that began hammering the White 

and Ohio valleys late on the night of April 30 had quickly transformed 

the fl ood into a game-changing event, not just at the Birds Point-New 

Madrid fl oodway, but the entire MR&T system – particularly along 

the lower reaches of the project in the New Orleans Engineer District. 

Based on that additional rainfall, the Lower Mississippi River Forecast 

Center predicted record stages at Natchez, Red River Landing, and 

Baton Rouge. Estimates for the peak discharge expected at Red River 

Landing exceeded 1.8 million cfs. During the 84-year lifespan of the 

MR&T project, the peak discharge at Red River Landing had never 

reached 1.5 million cfs – the key rate of fl ow and trigger point in the 

elaborate plumbing system designed to convey the project design fl ood 

below the Old River control structures. The river had come close to 

reaching that magic number on several occasions, exceeding 1.4 million cfs during the fl oods of 1937, 1950, 1973, 1979, 1983, 1997, and 

2008, but in each instance the discharge stayed below 1.5 million. But 

in 2011, the New Orleans district faced the possibility of exceeding 

that discharge by nearly twenty percent. As the forecast became public, 

Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal tried to calm any fears, “We are going 

to do everything we can to prepare for the worst-case scenario, while 

we are still hoping for the best case.”232
229

Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

On the morning of May 3, Col. Edward 

Fleming, commander of the New Orleans 

Engineer District, informed Walsh that he 

intended to make a formal recommendation 

to open the Bonnet Carré spillway later in 

the day. Depending on the outcome of an 

ongoing engineering analysis by his staff, 

Fleming hinted that he would request to 

open the structure on either May 6 or May 9. 

He also informed Walsh that the National 

Weather Service and his own water control managers anticipated the river would 

quickly surpass the trigger point (1.5 million cfs at Red River Landing) to activate 

the Morganza fl oodway, perhaps as early as 

Col. Edward Fleming, New Orleans Engineer District Commander.

Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal and 

Col. Edward Fleming discuss flood 

readiness.
230

Divine Providence

May 11. Fleming’s announcement that the Morganza fl oodway was in 

play stunned the commission staff, which only hours before had witnessed the activation of the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. Walsh 

noticed the inquisitive looks – raised brows and darting eyes – on the 

faces of those sitting around the conference table on the MISSISSIPPI. 

Grasping for a talking-point to take to the press, Walsh, who had ordered 

the operation of the Bonnet Carré spillway during the 2008 fl ood, asked 

his staff if he would be the fi rst commission president to operate the 

structure twice. “It’s bigger than that, sir,” one staff member replied, 

“This will be the fi rst time we’ve activated three fl oodways during the 

same fl ood.”233

The statement testifi ed to the historic nature of the 2011 fl ood. The 

commission had opened the Bonnet Carré to limit fl ows past New 

Orleans on nine occasions since its completion in 1932 or about once 

every nine years. Opening the structure had become fairly commonplace, 

but three fl oodways was an entirely different story. Prior to 2011, the 

commission had placed multiple fl oodways into operation during the 

same fl ood on only two occasions. During the 1937 fl ood, the commission activated the Bonnet Carré and Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodways. 

The Morganza fl oodway, though, had not been completed, although river 

discharges would not have necessitated its use. During the 1973 fl ood, 

the commission opened the Bonnet Carré and Morganza structures. 

The discharge rate of the river did not reach the trigger point to place 

the Morganza fl oodway into operation, but Maj. Gen. Charles Noble, 

the commission president, ordered its activation to relieve pressure on 

the low sill component of the Old River control structures after scour 

threatened the integrity of the structure. Now in May 2011, the commission faced the prospect of activating three fl oodways simultaneously. 

Walsh and the others in the room understood the message. It was time 

to reload and re-cock.

On the afternoon of May 3, Fleming sent a memorandum to Walsh 

that requested permission to open the Bonnet Carré spillway. Walter 
231

Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

Baumy, Fleming’s chief of engineering at the district offi ce, authored 

the district’s recommendation, which Fleming attached to his offi cial 

request. The district had anticipated the possibility of opening the 

Bonnet Carré spillway as early as April 25. The new forecast on May 2 

transformed the possibility into a necessity.234 Historically, opening 

the structure had proven less controversial than operating the other 

fl oodways in the MR&T system because the federal government had 

purchased the property behind the spillway, rather than merely paying 

for the right to fl ood it. That land was all federal property; no homes 

or farms stood to be inundated. The most controversial aspect of opening the spillway involved the introduction of a large amount of fresh 

water into the brackish water of Lake Pontchartrain, which could impact 

oyster populations and related industries. Many oyster grounds in the 

lake had reported damage during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and 

were only beginning to recover.

Citing the National Weather Service forecast of 1.8 million cfs at 

Red River Landing, Baumy stressed that the fl ood bearing down on 

the New Orleans Engineer District “would rank as the largest since 

measurements began in 1930.” He pointed out that from a historical 

standpoint the approval to open the spillway had been granted when the 

discharge at Red River Landing reached 1.3 million cfs combined with 

a rising hydrograph. The weather service and the district’s water control managers expected this to occur on May 10. Baumy also expressed 

concerns about freeboard defi ciencies in the levees and fl oodwalls at 

Avondale, Carrollton, Holy Cross, and the Industrial Harbor Navigation Canal, as well as seepage concerns along the levees at Jefferson 

Heights, Algiers, Chalmette, Lake Borgne, and other known problem 

areas. Baumy noted that the authorized water control manual governing the operation of the structure was clear. The Bonnet Carré spillway 

was to be opened when the Mississippi River discharge below Baton 

Rouge reached 1.25 million cfs on a rising hydrograph or to preserve a 

desired freeboard on defi cient levees in the New Orleans area. Opening 
232

Divine Providence

the Bonnet Carré spillway would keep stages lower and reduce pressure and the resulting seepage along the system. In anticipation of fl ows 

in excess of 1.25 million cfs below Bonnet Carré on May 10, Baumy 

recommended that Fleming request “approval to have the fl exibility to 

initiate operation” of the Bonnet Carré spillway as early as May 9, “as 

the rate of rise may necessitate gate openings in a suffi cient manner to 

limit fl ows” on May 10.235

Walsh acknowledged receipt of the Bonnet Carré spillway request 

and informed Fleming that the commission had it under advisement. 

In the meantime, he wanted Fleming to prepare an informational briefing on the Morganza fl oodway, which had not been opened since 1973. 

At 2030 hours on May 4, Col. Fleming provided a brief detailing the 

layout, trigger points, and processes of the Morganza fl oodway. Once 

the preliminaries were covered, he set forth his operational concept for 

activating the fl oodway. Fleming’s timeline called for Walsh’s approval 

of the operational plan on May 5 and the issuance of a public notice of 

intent to operate Morganza on May 6. The notice of intent would initiate the fl oodway evacuation phase. Fleming explained that the National 

Weather Service anticipated a discharge of 1.8 million cfs at Red River 

Landing, which meant that the Morganza fl oodway would siphon off 

roughly 300,000 cfs from the Mississippi River and divert it to the 

Atchafalaya basin. The 300,000 cfs represented roughly one-half of 

the 600,000 cfs design capacity of the fl oodway under project design 

fl ood conditions.

Although the National Weather Service did not expect the discharge 

at Red River Landing to reach the trigger point of 1.5 million cfs until 

May 13, Fleming planned for a slow opening of the Morganza structure 

on May 10, when the anticipated discharge would reach 1.3 million cfs. 

The slow release procedure amounted to partially opening the gates to 

allow a gradual introduction of fl oodwaters under minimum velocities. Fleming’s staff believed the slow release was necessary from the 

environmental viewpoint in that it would allow wildlife, particularly 
233

Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

the endangered Louisiana Black Bear, time to seek refuge before the 

heaviest fl ows inundated the fl oodway. The black bear had been listed 

as a threatened and endangered species in 1992 and the fl oodway designated as its critical habitat in 2009.

A gradual opening would also serve notice that the commission was 

serious about its intent to operate the fl oodway and force people to get 

out of harm’s way. The commission had not activated the spillway in 

38 years, and even then it only did so because of the problem with the 

wing wall at the Old River low sill structure. Like Milus Wallace at 

the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway, some residents that would be 

impacted by the Morganza fl oodway did not think the commission would 

activate they fl oodway. They had been lulled into complacency. With an 

assumed fl ow of 272,000 cfs through the fl oodway and 760,000 cfs fl owing through the Atchafalaya River, Fleming’s inundation map showed 

much of the fl oodway and the lower Atchafalaya basin covered with 

anywhere from ten to twenty feet of water, which would impact a population approaching 10,000 people and nearly 6,000 homes. These fi gures 

included people and homes protected by ring levees at Simmesport, 

Krotz Springs, and Melville, but did not account for potential impacts 

from backwater fl ooding. The local citizens needed to know that the 

commission was serious about sticking to the plan.236

Fleming expected a decision from Walsh, but the commission president offered none. Walsh intended to stick to the trigger of 1.5 million cfs laid out in the offi cial Morganza water control plan and the 2011 

MVD operation plan. Similar to the situation at the Yazoo backwater 

levee, when the Vicksburg Engineer District fi rst advocated fl ood fi ghting, Walsh did not feel comfortable that he had enough information 

to announce his intention. Because there were so many variables and 

unknowns that had not been fully vetted with the commission and its 

staff, he desired more information on the impacts to the backwater area 

at the lower end of the Atchafalaya basin. That area represented a very 

sensitive situation. Much of it was not in the fl oodway, but opening 
234

Divine Providence

the Morganza spillway would put additional pressure on Morgan City 

and more water in surrounding areas. Fleming’s inundation map did 

not depict those impacts. Walsh also had questions about evacuation 

plans. Although Fleming assured his commanding offi cer that the district 

staff would be meeting the following day with Governor Jindal, parish 

presidents, levee boards, and other stakeholders – all of whom knew 

the trigger points – Walsh was not yet sold. He wanted everything on 

the table handled properly and deliberately.237

The following morning, May 5, the commission voted unanimously 

to give Fleming the authority to open the Bonnet Carré spillway “in 

accordance with the approved Water Control Manual,” but Walsh did 

not open the discussion on the request to open the Morganza spillway. 

On May 6, Fleming sent a memorandum to Walsh offi cially requesting approval to activate the Morganza fl oodway. He attached another 

detailed engineering justifi cation developed by Baumy, his engineering 

chief. In his analysis, Baumy mentioned that the river had reached a 

stage of 15 feet on the Carrollton gage and 37 feet on the Baton Rouge 

gage. If the discharge at Red River Landing reached 1.8 million cfs as 

expected, the National Weather Service anticipated crest stages at Carrollton and Baton Rouge to reach 19.5 and 47.5 feet, respectively, without the Morganza fl oodway in operation. The higher stages, according 

to Baumy, would place unprecedented pressure on the levee system and 

required major fl ood fi ght efforts along more than 200 miles of levees 

that protected large population centers and numerous chemical plants 

and refi neries between Baton Rouge and Bonnet Carré. Of particular 

concern were Duncan Point, where the district had placed nearly 12,000 

sandbags to serve as a seepage berm; a three-mile segment of levee at 

Manchac Bend, which would overtop by up to two feet of water; and the 

Baton Rouge front. Baumy also noted that the Morganza structure itself 

faced overtopping. The resulting scour “could potentially jeopardize the 

stability of the structure,” and place more stress on the Old River control 

structures. Even if fl ood fi ghting efforts proved successful throughout 
235

Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

the reach of the Mississippi below Morganza, Baumy warned that the 

increased velocity in the channel posed another level of unacceptable 

risk by increasing the probability of errant barges or vessels damaging 

or breaching the levee system. All of these potential threats could be 

alleviated, though. With the fl oodway in operation, the predicted crests 

would only reach 17 feet on the Carrollton gage and 43.5 feet on the 

Baton Rouge gage and river velocities would remain manageable.238

After formally submitting the written request, Fleming verbally 

delivered a second decision briefi ng to Walsh and the commission. To 

avoid any confusion, Fleming stated at the onset that the purpose of the 

briefi ng was to secure the commission president’s approval to operate 

the fl oodway. Fleming’s new operational timeline called for the fl oodway evacuation to commence immediately and for Walsh to approve 

the operation by the following day – May 7. Fleming still intended to 

begin with a slow release, but he pushed the date back from his original 

proposal of May 10 to May 11. River forecasters expected the Mississippi River discharge at Red River Landing to approach 1.4 million cfs 

on May 11. Fleming’s timeline, as it had originally on May 4, still called 

for the structure to be fully operational by May 14. To support his argument for the slow opening, the district commander emphasized that the 

Flood of 1973 Post-Flood Report prepared by the district recommended 

a gradual introduction of fl oodwaters to limit velocities to one foot per 

24 hours to “provide terrestrial wildlife an opportunity to vacate the 

fl oodway with a minimum of distress.” It was one of the lessons learned 

from the one and only operation of the fl oodway. The slow release also 

addressed a crucial engineering concern in that it would help to alleviate 

scour on the downstream side of the structure. This was an important 

consideration and another key lesson learned from the 1973 activation 

of the fl oodway. During the 1973 operation, massive scour holes developed below the stilling basin causing extensive damage. Left unchecked, 

the scour could work its way back toward the gates and undermine the 

structure. Scour was such a concern that the district placed more than 
236

Divine Providence

a dozen scour indicators below the stilling basin. The indicators, eight 

inch by eight inch wooded fl oats anchored to metal disks, were buried to 

a depth of fi ve feet. In the event that releases through the gates scoured 

the land on the backside of the structure and uncovered the indicators, 

the fl oats would surface and alert the district of the problem.239

The inundation map Fleming used in the briefi ng was the same as the 

one he used on May 4, at least in respect to the Atchafalaya basin fl oodway guide levees. According to the new map, which used roughly the 

same assumptions as the previous map – 300,000 cfs fl owing through the 

Morganza spillway and 760,000 cfs down the Atchafalaya River – the 

Morganza fl oodway and much of the Atchafalaya basin fl oodway below 

Interstate 10 would be inundated with anywhere from ten to twenty feet 

of water. Sections toward the lower end of the West Atchafalaya fl oodway in the vicinity of Melville and Krotz Springs could expect anywhere 

from a few inches to ten feet of water. The Pointe Coupee loop and the 

northern portions of the West Atchafalaya fl oodway would remain dry, 

as would the towns of Simmesport, Melville, and Krotz Springs, whose 

combined populations of 2,800 received protection from ring levees. 

By Fleming’s estimation, operating the fl oodway would impact nearly 

2,500 people and nearly 2,000 homes, with the highest concentrations 

of people being found along State Highway 105 between Melville and 

Krotz Springs (600 residents), along the West Atchafalaya Levee Road 

south of Krotz Springs (350 residents), and in the Butte La Rose area, 

east of Henderson (475 residents).

Fleming also sought to address concerns about impacts to the backwater area presented by Walsh during the May 4 briefi ng. The inundation 

map indicated that large sections of Iberville, Assumption, and Terrebonne parishes to the east of the eastern basin levee would be inundated 

by up to fi ve feet of backwater fl ooding from the combined fl ows of the 

Atchafalaya River and the Morganza fl oodway. Fleming informed Walsh 

that fl ooding would impact up to 22,500 people and nearly 11,000 homes 

in the backwater areas, including Amelia and Stephenville near Morgan 
237

Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

City in St. Mary Parish; communities in Terrebonne Parish between 

Houma and Morgan City, including Humphreys, Gibson, and Donner; 

Pierre Part and Belle River in Assumption Parish; and communities 

along Bayou Sorrel and Grand River in Iberville Parish.240

The potential impacts to the large numbers of people and property 

in the backwater area left an impression on Walsh. Although they were 

not in the fl oodway, he knew that the fl ood would impact them and 

that they would need to seek legal remedies for their losses. After the 

briefi ng, Walsh sent a note to Maj. Gen. Bo Temple, the deputy chief 

of engineers, informing him of the backwater situation and asking the 

Corps headquarters “to seek authority and funding to set up a claims 

process that would include paying for impacts.” Temple responded by 

suggesting a review of alternate scenarios to compare the impacts of 

operating the fl oodway against potential impacts to the MR&T system 

below Morganza. “The less impact we have in either case, the better,” 

Temple wrote to Walsh, “realizing there’ll be impacts no matter what 

we do.” Walsh, in turn, instructed Charles Shadie, his chief of water 

management, to work with the New Orleans Engineer District to develop 

an assessment of various scenarios.241

Only three basic scenarios existed. The fi rst was to stick to the 

approved water control plans and divert 300,000 cfs through the Morganza fl oodway, while passing 1.5 million cfs through the system 

between Baton Rouge and the Bonnet Carré spillway. The second 

involved not operating the fl oodway and attempting to pass 1.8 million cfs – a discharge roughly twenty percent greater than the project 

design fl ood – past Baton Rouge, while fl ood fi ghting along 200 miles 

of levees along the vital corridor. The third was to avoid operating the 

fl oodway and compensate by pushing an additional 300,000 cfs through 

the Old River control structures to maintain a project design fl ood 

discharge past Baton Rouge. The fi rst two scenarios had already been 

addressed in Baumy’s engineering justifi cation attached to Fleming’s 

May 6 written request to open the Morganza fl oodway. As for the Old 
238

" I 

OUTFLOW CHANNEL 

AIVER 
239

Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

River control scenario, Baumy had already commenced developing an 

assessment the previous day. It was a tricky situation.

Congress authorized the Old River control structures in 1954, after 

Mississippi River Commission studies revealed a “defi nite” possibility that the Mississippi River might change course and divert its fl ow 

through the Old River link to the Atchafalaya River, thereby causing 

greater fl ooding in the Atchafalaya basin and the abandonment of the 

existing Mississippi River channel below Old River, which would have 

created extreme economic hardship to ports, the navigation industry, 

and industrial facilities between Baton Rouge and New Orleans.

The original structures consisted of a closure dam across Old River, 

a gated low sill structure to regulate the daily fl ow of water at all stages 

from the Mississippi River into the Red-Atchafalaya system, a massive 

overbank structure to pass excess fl ows during fl oods, and a navigation 

lock to maintain the waterborne commerce link between the Mississippi, Red, and Atchafalaya rivers. A hydropower plant and an auxiliary 

structure – designed to reduce stress on the low sill structure after it 

was damaged during the 1973 fl ood – were added to the control complex in 1986 and 1990, respectively. Because the Atchafalaya River 

was a distributary of the Mississippi River, it received a continuous 

fl ow of water and sediment from the Mississippi via the Old River link. 

To maintain that existing relationship, the law required the Corps of 

Engineers to regulate the structures so that 70 percent of the combined 

fl ows and sediment of the Red and Mississippi rivers would continue 

down the Mississippi River, while thirty percent of combined Red and 

Mississippi River fl ows and sediment would be conveyed through the 

Atchafalaya River.242

The Old River area is a very dynamic place, with a long history 

of attack from the river. For that reason, Baumy’s assessment of the 

scenario refl ected a harsh reality. If the goal was to not activate the 

Morganza fl oodway, but still maintain project design fl ood fl ows past 

Baton Rouge, he contended that a total fl ow of 920,000 cfs needed to be 
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conveyed through the Old River control structures. The project design 

fl ood called for 620,000 cfs to pass through the structures, so the scenario necessitated a fi fty percent increase. To distribute the increased 

fl ows under this scenario, Baumy intended to pass 350,000 cfs through 

the low sill structure, 350,000 cfs through the auxiliary structure, and 

220,000 cfs through the overbank structure. The potential for increased 

velocity and scour was the main concern. The control structure had 

passed 620,000 cfs during the 1973 fl ood. The increased velocity caused 

numerous bank failures and severe erosion to levee setback. In 2009, the 

New Orleans Engineer District fully opened the gates at the auxiliary 

structure to fl ush sediment. The surge of water fl anked the revetment 

on both banks of the infl ow channel and caused bank failures near the 

upper guide levee and the south entrance channel. Baumy also surmised 

that the additional water would overtop the levees on the east bank of 

the Atchafalaya River and reduce the freeboard on the west bank levees 

to less than one foot at their intersection with the Melville and Krotz 

Springs ring levees.243

More problematic were the low sill and overbank structures. In 1964 

and 1965, the district closed the gates after barges had broken free from 

their upstream fl eeting areas and crashed into the low sill structure on 

separate occasions. The reopening of the gates resulted in extensive 

scouring in the outfl ow channel. Less than a decade later, the 1973 fl ood 

severely damaged the low sill structure. The high-velocity fl ow through 

the structure scoured a 50-foot-deep hole in front of and partially under 

the structure. It was this scour that resulted in the infamous collapse of 

the wing wall and the subsequent activation of the Morganza fl oodway. 

Had the scour holes in the infl ow and outfl ow channels connected, the 

entire low sill structure may have collapsed. The low sill structure had 

since been repaired, but it had sustained permanent damage, which 

resulted in restricting the head differential from the Mississippi River 

side of the structure to the downstream side of the structure from 37 feet, 

as originally designed, to 22 feet. It was this restriction that necessitated 
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

the construction of the auxiliary structure. Baumy touted the soundness 

of the low sill structure, but cautioned, “excessive velocities can cause 

damage in unanticipated ways...the potential for scour and undermining, undetectable during the event, could result in signifi cant damage 

or failure.”244

The overbank structure also posed two problems – Baumy addressed 

one in his analysis. When the structure was fi rst used during the 1973 

fl ood, severe scour occurred near the south guide levee that connected 

the overbank exit channel to the low sill structure outfl ow channel. The 

New Orleans Engineer District addressed the problem by installing a 

120-acre gabion fi eld over the scour area. During the 1983 fl ood, though, 

a massive scour hole developed in the gabion fi eld. The added capacity 

to convey water through the auxiliary structure had alleviated the need 

to open the overbank structure during larger fl oods in 1997 and 2008. 

As the 2011 fl ood developed, the district had no intention of using the 

overbank structure in an effort to avoid new scour to the gabion fi eld. 

Therein lay the second problem. The overbank structure had limitations. It needed to be operated before the head differential between the 

riverside and landside of the structure reached thirteen feet. As Baumy 

developed the scenario, the river rapidly approached that level. Use of 

Water seeps through the overbank structure at the Old River Control Complex on May 4, 2011.
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the overbank structure required a quick trigger. The river would exceed 

the thirteen-foot head limitation by the afternoon of May 11.245

When you gonna do it?

By May 8, the Mississippi River reached 40 feet on the Baton Rouge 

gage, fi ve feet above fl ood stage. The river had risen seven feet in 

seven days. At the Carrollton gage near New Orleans, the river reached 

16 feet. Pressure mounted on the levee system, but it held fi rm. For 

fl ood fi ghting purposes, the New Orleans Engineer District divided the 

reach of the river below Baton Rouge into sectors. The Pontchartrain, 

Orleans-Jefferson, and Lake Borgne sectors comprised the 183 miles 

of levee on the east bank. The Pontchartrain sector covered 98 miles 

of levees between Baton Rouge and the Bonnet Carré spillway. The 

Orleans-Jefferson sector encompassed 37 miles of levees from Bonnet 

Carré to the Orleans-St. Bernard Parish line. The Lake Borgne sector 

started at the same county line and covered 48 miles of levees extending down to Bohemia. On the west bank, the Lower West Mississippi 

sector covered 92 miles of levee between the Morganza spillway and 

Donaldsonville. The Lafourche sector encompassed the 90 miles of 

levee between Donaldsonville and the Algiers Canal. The Lower Coast 

sector covered the 77 miles of levee extending between the canal and 

Venice. Stuart Waits served as the area engineer for the east bank sectors, 

as well as the Lafourche and Lower Coast sectors, and Ted Eilts as the 

area engineer for the West Lower Mississippi sector and all sectors in 

the Atchafalaya basin and on the Mississippi River above Morganza.246

The river regularly climbs above 11 feet on the Carrollton gage, the 

trigger point for phase I fl ood fi ght activities. In fact the New Orleans 

district had been in phase I since early March. Phase I activities equate 

to inspecting every mile of levee in the system, two to three times a 

week. Phase II – daily inspections and 24-hour operations – commences 

when the Carrollton gage exceeds 15 feet. Going into the 2011 fl ood, the 
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

New Orleans district was well prepared. The 2008 fl ood had helped the 

district and levee boards indentify potential problem areas. That fl ood 

had crested at 43.1 feet on the Baton Rouge gage and 16.8 feet on the 

Carrollton gage, therefore, the 2008 high water had placed similar pressure loads on the system and exposed problematic underseepage areas, 

sand boils, and other related issues. As the river climbed higher in May 

2011, exerting its force and weight against the levees as it sought an 

escape route under the structures, fl ood fi ghters knew exactly where 

to look for potential weak spots identifi ed during the 2008 fl ood fi ght.

The ongoing dry spell in the region also assisted in the identifi cation of problem areas. Unlike previous major fl oods, like 1973 and 

2008, persistent localized rainfall did not accompany the 2011 high 

water. The 2011 fl ood emanated entirely from above. Normally during 

fl oods, ditches, low spots, and surrounding fi elds are covered with 

impounded rain, making it diffi cult for fl ood fi ghters to determine the 

difference between seepage and runoff. While the drought conditions 

had a downside, namely causing shrinkage and cracks in the levees, the 

dry conditions made the identifi cation of underseepage easier for weary 

levee inspectors. As Waits noted, “it had been so dry for so long, that 

any landside water we saw was seepage.” According to Waits, the dry 

conditions also allowed fl ood fi ghters “to identify a lot of areas that we 

wouldn’t have noticed before.”247

Despite these good fortunes, not all was well within the system. 

There were several areas of intense concern, particularly with regard to 

underseepage. Chief among them was the levee at Duncan Point, just 

south of Baton Rouge. The levee had been plagued with severe underseepage since the 1973 fl ood. It was a known trouble spot. Following 

the development of several sand boils during the 2008 fl ood, the New 

Orleans district constructed a stability berm to address the problem, 

but as the river placed pressure on the levee during the 2011 event, the 

underseepage migrated to the north of the berm on the landside toe of 

the levee. This prompted the Pontchartrain levee district to construct 
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an extension to the berm using in excess of 12,000 sandbags. Aside 

from underseepage, another cause for heightened anxiety among the 

levee districts involved barges. Several levee districts complained that 

barges were pushing and mooring too far up on the levees. They were 

concerned that the barges might bump or push against the levees and 

threaten the integrity of the all-too-important structures. The levee districts found some comfort in the fact that the district had formed a Rapid 

Response Team, which had developed a number of “what if” scenarios 

and accompanying plans to address a catastrophic levee failure, but that 

comfort only went so far. The only thing that would ease their fears was 

the activation of the Morganza fl oodway.248 The Morganza fl oodway was 

really at the heart of the issue. Walsh had not authorized its opening or 

even hinted that he would, despite two very public requests by Fleming. 

Flood stages of 44 feet and 17 feet at the Baton Rouge and Carrollton 

gages, respectively, would certainly test the system from Baton Rouge 

The levee along the corridor between Baton Rouge and New Orleans holds back the river.
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

on down the river, but the system had already passed that test in 2008. 

Without the Morganza fl oodway in operation, though, the predicted 

stages on those same gages would reach 47.5 feet and 19.5 feet. That 

represented an entirely different test – one that the levee districts, the 

state, and the public wanted to avoid.

Governor Jindal and the levee districts simply wanted predictability. 

The fact that the commission and the district were analyzing alternatives 

to operating the fl oodway created a strong sense of uncertainty. From 

the state’s perspective, they had the resources they needed to get into 

place. They needed to evacuate the fi rst fl oors of hospitals, open shelters, 

pre-position food and water, and prepare for evacuations. They had to 

consider high population centers, schools, and infrastructure. They had 

to allocate fl ood fi ghting resources. Where would the national guard 

and inmate laborers be needed most to fi ll sandbags? All depended on 

whether or not Walsh intended to operate the Morganza fl oodway and 

when. If he intended to activate the spillway, those resources would be 

needed in the Atchafalaya basin. If he intended to pass the water past 

Baton Rouge and through the system, the resources needed to be staged 

farther to the east. The same went for the Mississippi River levee districts. They desperately wanted Fleming’s staff to provide a little foresight. They needed to know how high to raise their levees during the 

fl ood fi ght. Defi ciencies in levee heights under project design fl ood fl ows 

certainly existed but not along the entire reach below Baton Rouge. The 

defi ciencies were manageable, but raising 300 or more miles of levees 

was no simple task. The effort would use up resources – resources that 

could be devoted to other purposes, such as levee inspections. If Walsh 

intended to use the fl oodway, the levee districts could reallocate those 

resources.249

The private sector was feeling the heat, too. The emergency preparedness manager the Waterford nuclear power station in St. Charles 

Parish – one of two nuclear plants in the state – sent a message to 

Michael Stack, the New Orleans district’s emergency management 
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chief, asking for the district’s intention with respect to operating the 

Morganza fl oodway. He was worried that the plant would be forced 

to initiate a shutdown if the Morganza fl oodway was not placed into 

operation. Citing concerns about the station’s intake structure and the 

stability of the power grid, he noted that the plant’s leadership faced 

several decisions about moving assets and equipment to provide protective measures. He was not trying to infl uence the decision one way or 

the other. Rather, he simply asked whether or not the district anticipated 

opening the structure before river stages would force the plant to shut 

down. The plant’s emergency preparedness manager may not have been 

pressuring the district for a decision, but Steve Wilson, the president 

of the Pontchartrain levee district, did. “Folks, this is a nuclear power 

plant,” he wrote to the district, “You think we might want to consider 

Morganza? Please.”250

Forecasted stages between Baton Rouge and New Orleans also led to 

concern for the Coast Guard, which acted as the manager of commercial 

transportation, a mission that included overseeing maritime safety. The 

The Mississippi River levee between Baton Rouge and New Orleans.
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

Coast Guard notifi ed the Corps of Engineers that if the predicted stages 

materialized, it would close the river to navigation. The threshold for 

closure would only be reached if the Mississippi River Commission did 

not activate the fl oodway. The notifi cation was not a threat or an attempt 

to infl uence a decision – the Coast Guard respected that it was Walsh’s 

call – but their potential action was a reality necessitated by the river 

forecasts. The navigation industry, recognizing that nearly 500 million 

tons of water commerce moved through the Mississippi River system 

annually, began placing pressure on the district to operate the fl oodway. 

“I can’t tell you how many times the navigation folks said, ‘Hey, Corps, 

pull the trigger, baby,’” Christopher Accardo, the New Orleans district’s 

chief of operations, later recalled. All Col. Fleming and New Orleans 

district staff could do was relay the concerns to Maj. Gen. Walsh and 

the Mississippi River Commission. Fleming would oversee the execution of the project, but it was Walsh’s decision as to if and when the 

structure would be operated.251

As pressure on the system mounted, so did the public pressure on 

Col. Fleming and his staff. By this point in the overall system-wide 

fl ood fi ght, Walsh’s modus operandi with respect to the fl oodways took 

on a hint of brinksmanship. Making room for the river by dispersing 

excess fl ows through the fl oodways made perfect engineering sense on 

paper, but actually making the decision to intentionally fl ood people’s 

homes, property, and business interests, though unavoidable, was no 

easy task. Whether intentional or not, Wash’s deliberate decision processes created the impression that he was willing to push the system 

to the limit and avoid using the fl oodways. One theory is that Walsh 

wanted to build a regional consensus on the necessity of operating 

fl oodways. He wanted to create anxiety among the public who stood 

to benefi t from the operation of the fl oodways. He wanted them to 

experience the same level of tension as those living in the fl oodways. 

He wanted them and their elected offi cials to put pressure on him, as 

the commission president, to operate.252 Such had been the case at the 
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Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway, where Walsh’s deliberate process 

created a high level of discomfort. By the time he gave the order to 

activate at Birds Point-New Madrid, he had received several notes from 

offi cials from Illinois, Kentucky and Tennessee – even from Missouri 

offi cials from outside the fl oodway – pleading for him, even demanding 

for him, to blow the levee. The same was beginning to happen at the 

Morganza fl oodway. Population centers, levee districts, the navigation 

industry, the power industry, the Coast Guard, and the governor were 

anxious. Their level of discomfort grew with each passing day, as did 

their acknowledgement that the fl oodways were vital parts of the system 

for a very important reason.

On the morning of May 9, Maj. Gen. Walsh, along with fellow commissioners Sam Angel and Clifford Smith, travelled to the Bonnet Carré 

spillway to oversee the opening of the structure. The Mississippi River 

roared past the structure at rate of 1.24 million cfs. This resulted in a 

reading of 16.5 feet at the Carrollton gage. Farther upstream, the discharge rate at Red River Landing reached 1.32 million cfs. Higher fl ows 

Aerial view of the Bonnet Carré floodway just moments after the spillway was opened.
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

and higher stages were on the way, 

necessitating the opening of Bonnet 

Carré. River water seeped through the 

needles at the structure, partially inundating the fl oodway on the protected 

side of the structure. A large crowd of 

people were in attendance, which created a festival-like atmosphere. That 

atmosphere would continue for days, 

as more than 40,000 visitors would 

ultimately travel to the spillway to 

witness the diversion. At 0900 hours, 

Fleming gave the order to open the fi rst 

set of needles to allow the swollen and pressure-packed river to relieve 

its pressure and crash into the fl oodway. Crews continued raising needles 

until the river fl owed through 28 bays at a rate of 26,000 cfs. The onrushing water quickly formed small channels that began wending through 

the fl oodway toward Lake Pontchartrain, approximately seven miles 

to the north. Within fi ve days, crews had opened 300 of the 350 bays, 

allowing so much water to escape the river that the discharge through 

the spillway actually exceeded its design capacity of 250,000 cfs.253

Later in the afternoon, Fleming presented the three scenarios that 

Walsh had requested with respect to the Morganza fl oodway. Going 

into the briefi ng, Fleming was confi dent that his commanding offi cer 

would grant permission to operate the Morganza fl oodway now that 

the opening of the Bonnet Carré spillway was out of the way. He knew 

it was unrealistic to try to pass more than 1.5 million cfs past Baton 

Rouge. Furthermore, the previous day Walsh had instructed Fleming 

to develop “a sequence of activities to open Morganza into discrete 

actions” and put those action into a timeline of H-hours, similar to the 

operational plan Col. Reichling had developed for the Birds Point-New 

Madrid fl oodway activation. Fleming responded that there were not any 

Raising the needles at the Bonnet Carré 

spillway.
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discreet actions at Morganza fl oodway. The process was entirely different from the process used by Col. Reichling and the Memphis Engineer 

District. The operational plan for the Missouri fl oodway contained a 

series of decision points that telegraphed the ultimate outcome. There 

was a separate decision to load and move the barges, to locate and 

uncover the access wells, to pump the explosives into the pipes, and to 

activate the fl oodway. At Morganza there was only one action – open it 

or do not open it. Still, the request signaled to Fleming that Walsh was 

moving closer to making a decision. Governor Jindal shared Fleming’s 

confi dence. Aware that the district commander was prepared to brief 

Walsh, Jindal expressed optimism to the media that “Walsh will make 

a decision today.”254

During the briefi ng, Fleming informed Walsh of the many levees, 

freeboard, and seepage concerns that he had in the system and communicated the issues involving the navigation industry and the nuclear 

power plant. He also presented the three scenarios. After emphasizing 

Walter Baumy, left, explains the three scenarios to Sam Angel and Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh.
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

that the second and third scenarios (attempting to pass more than 1.5 million cfs past Baton Rouge and deviating through the Old River control 

structures) posed too great a risk to the system, Fleming recommended 

opening the Morganza spillway. Walsh concurred with Fleming’s recommendation. Sticking to his practice of brinksmanship, though, he did 

not grant permission to open the spillway; rather, he confi rmed that he 

would operate the fl oodway according to the operations plan “when I 

make the decision concerning the use of the Morganza Floodway.” This 

at least confi rmed that the commission would not try to pass a discharge 

greater than 1.5 million cfs past Baton Rouge or deviate through the 

Old River control structures.255

The decision relieved some of the anxiety demonstrated by the 

levee districts along the Mississippi River below Baton Rouge, but 

for Col. Fleming and the district staff, the questions from the public 

merely went from “are you going to do it?” to “when are you going to 

do it?” As Fleming later recalled, “When you gonna do it? When you 

gonna do it? When you gonna do it? That’s all anyone wanted to know. 

When you gonna do it?” Even Maj. Gen. Temple asked Walsh, “When 

do you estimate you’ll make the Morganza decision?” The governor’s 

offi ce wanted to know the same thing. They needed to issue a mandatory 

evacuation, but they also needed to know when to make the declaration. 

The governor’s offi ce and local offi cials encouraged a voluntary evacuation, but any progress proved slow. Instead of moving their belongings, 

many fl oodways residents were sandbagging and building temporary 

levees to protect their homes.256

We Have Serious Issues

By the morning of May 10, Fleming realized that he had an additional specter with which to contend. The New Orleans district had completed the construction of the Morganza spillway by the time Congress 

authorized the Old River control structures in 1954. The operational 
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plan for the fl oodway rested on the assumption that a Mississippi River 

discharge of 1.5 million cfs at Tarbert Landing – located about 4 miles 

upriver from Red River Landing – would equate to a stage no higher 

than 56 feet at the Morganza spillway. With the top of the gates reaching 

an elevation of 60 feet, the structure possessed four feet of freeboard 

above the maximum expected stage of the river – at least conceptually. 

The 1973 fl ood, as it had at so many MR&T project features, exposed a 

problem. Rating curves developed after the fl ood indicated a “progressive deterioration of the discharge capacity” for the reach of the river 

between the Old River control structures and the Morganza spillway, 

possibly due to the changes in the dynamics of the river created by the 

control structures. In other words, higher stages than expected for a 

given fl ow had materialized. The phenomenon occurred again during 

subsequent fl oods. In 1983, the discharge at Tarbert Landing peaked at 

1.47 million cfs, but the stage at the structure reached 58.1 feet, more 

than two feet higher than expected. Further changes to the dynamics 

of the river were created by the construction of the auxiliary structure 

and hydropower plant at Old River in 1986 and 1990, respectively. In 

2008, the Tarbert Landing discharge measured 1.46 million cfs and 

the river crested at 57.6 feet in the spillway. The New Orleans district 

water control managers noticed the same anomaly in 2011. When the 

discharge at Tarbert Landing reached 1,335,000 cfs in 1973, the estimated corresponding stage at the spillway was 52 feet. In 2008, when 

the discharge reached that same rate of fl ow, the stage at the spillway 

reached 54 feet, an increase of nearly two feet. By May 9, 2011, the 

discharge at Tarbert Landing reached 1,335,000 cfs. The stage at the 

Morganza spillway was 55 feet. The discharge trigger for operating the 

fl oodway was not correlating to the proper stage. The phenomenon did 

not catch the district off guard, but it was becoming clear to Fleming 

that, based on the rate of rise, there was a strong probability that the 

river would overtop the gates at the Morganza spillway.257
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

The potential overtopping of 

the gates presented several problems. From an operational standpoint, overtopping threatened the 

ability to open the gates. The spillway is a 3,906-foot-long structure 

with 125 gated openings, each a 

little more than 28 feet wide and 

separated by three-foot-wide piers. 

Each opening contains steel vertical lift gates. Upper and lower 

leafs comprise each gate. Each leaf 

is equipped with rollers that allow 

the gates to slide up and down in 

the slots between the piers. The 

structure has two gantry cranes 

that move along the structure and 

raise the gates. The gantry cranes 

lift the gates to allow water to 

pass through the structure. Each 

gate leaf has two lifting eyes. The 

gantry cranes lower lifting beams 

equipped with pins into the slots. 

The pins attach to the lifting eyes 

and the gantry crane raises the gates. 

Aligning the pins into lifting eyes 

requires visual assistance and confi rmation. The concern with overtopping was two-fold. First, head 

pressure higher than the design limit 

of 56 feet increased the possibility 

of the roller gates locking up, which, 

Water spills over the gates at the Morganza spillway.
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Divine Providence

in turn, could stress or possibly damage the gantry cranes. The facility 

possessed a back-up crane, but its operation depended on the use of 

slings that had to be manually connected to the gates. Such an operation 

would be impossible with water cascading over the gates. The second 

concern was that overtopping would inhibit the crew’s ability to visually align the pins with the lifting eyes.258

Not being able to operate the structure was a concern in terms of 

maintaining the project design fl ood discharge and safeguarding the 

levees below Baton Rouge, but higher head stages and overtopping 

threatened the integrity of the structure itself. Geotechnical and structural engineers from the district were somewhat concerned that the pressure from the extremely high stages might actually move or uplift the 

structure. The probability was low, but the concern warranted surveys 

and observation. The more pressing concern centered on the curtain 

walls at both ends of the spillway. The curtain walls extended from the 

gated sections of the spillway to the abutments on either end. The walls 

were constructed to the same elevation as the gates. The areas immediately below the curtain walls did not have scour protection. If the walls 

overtopped, the resultant scour threatened to undermine the structure. 

The district contemplated sandbagging the curtain walls to add height, 

but concerns for the safety of the individuals who would have to work 

on the narrow wall – with little margin of error separating them from 

the rising river – forced the abandonment of the idea. Little could be 

done, other than to open the spillway to relieve stages.

During the May 11 daily briefi ng, Charles Shadie reported that the 

National Weather Service had adjusted the forecast fl ows at Red River 

Landing downward from 1,800,000 cfs to 1,626,000 cfs. For several 

days, the water control managers at the New Orleans district and MVD 

believed the forecast was too high and coordinated their suspicions with 

the offi cial forecasters. They suspected that the raw models used by the 

weather service were interpreting the higher stages in the tributaries as 

infl ow into the system, rather than the Mississippi River backing into 
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

the tributaries, which was actually the case. The downward revision 

simply confi rmed the age-old axiom that forecasts always get better 

closer to the event. The downgrade was both good news and bad news 

for Fleming. It was good news from the standpoint that it meant less 

water that needed to be diverted from the Mississippi River into the 

Morganza fl oodway. On the other hand, he knew that forecast might 

infl uence Walsh to reconsider his May 9 decision to operate according 

to the operations plan when the river discharge reached the 1.5 million 

cfs trigger point at Red River Landing.

Fleming went into immediate damage control mode when it was 

his turn to speak during the briefi ng. He pointed out that the river had 

climbed two feet in two days at the Morganza structure. By the morning of May 11, the river exceeded 57 feet – one foot higher than the 

assumed design stage for operating the spillway. The river was within 

three feet of overtopping the spillway gates and the south guide levee. 

He relayed his newest concern to Walsh, “If we overtop, we will have 

great diffi culty moving the gates when the time comes.” He also relayed 

his concerns about the curtain wall, which he warned “cannot tolerate 

overtopping.” He then almost pleaded with Walsh not to change direction by arguing, “I understand the forecast fl ow change at Red River 

Landing, but nothing we have heard changes our recommendation to 

operate the fl oodway.” Sensing that “there will be further affects as the 

fl ows hit backwaters and trees and friction points in the river,” Walsh 

instructed Fleming to “Hold the line as you are.” In the meantime, he 

wanted Fleming’s staff to run the three scenarios presented to him on 

May 9 against the new predicted discharge numbers.

To Fleming, the tasking to run the scenarios only amounted to homework. He saw the river racing toward the trigger point. In the early 

morning hours of Friday, May 13, he sent a note to Walsh, seeking his 

permission to inform Jindal at the governor’s daily briefi ng that “we 

will open Morganza within 36 hours as long as the fl ow at Red River 

hit 1.5M [1.5 million cfs].” Based on the forecasts, the river would 
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Divine Providence

reach the trigger point on the afternoon of May 14. Fleming knew 

he was pressuring his commanding offi cer, but he had a good reason. 

The evacuation was still progressing slowly. The governor’s unifi ed 

command group would be at the briefi ng and they could notify people 

quickly that the fl oodway would be activated. Fleming was concerned 

that if they waited until later in the day, state offi cials would experience 

diffi culties in getting the word out. He also requested permission to tell 

his staff, so that they could stop working on other scenarios and focus 

entirely on the fl oodway operations. The request drew a strong rebuke 

from Walsh, “The decision has not been made.” Walsh instructed Fleming to “Tell [Governor Jindal] as always at 1.5 [million cfs] on the gage 

we will operate . . . work all scenarios until a decision is reached.”259

A little more than an hour later during the daily commanders briefing, Fleming announced that he expected the Bonnet Carré spillway to 

reach its design capacity discharge of 250,000 cfs sometime during the 

course of the day; the discharge fl owing past New Orleans had reached 

the project design fl ood dimension of 1,250,000 cfs. The stage at Morganza had reached 58.6 feet, less than 1.5 feet from overtopping the 

gates. “We are ready to operate,” Fleming told Walsh. He also informed 

Walsh that once the district received the order, the district would notify 

the Louisiana National Guard, the state police and individual mayors and 

“they will go door-to-door in the communities to insure the fl oodway 

is clear.” At 1500 hours that same day, Walsh sent an offi cial order in 

writing that directed Fleming to “be prepared to operate the fl oodway 

within 24 hours,” upon Walsh’s order to execute and in accordance with 

the approved operational plan.260

The approved operational plan specifi ed a trigger point of a 

1,500,000 cfs discharge at Red River Landing. Because the Morganza 

spillway was designed under the assumption that the gates would open 

prior to river stages reaching 56 feet at the structure, all tables, graphs, 

and data in the water control manual ended at that stage. Rating curves 

and various equations used by the district’s hydraulic engineers to 
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

extrapolate stages, therefore, were not as precise as needed. This posed 

an incredible challenge for the district. Baumy had sent personnel to 

the Morganza spillway and Old River control structures to monitor the 

situation and check gages around the clock. At 2200 hours on May 13, 

Nancy Powell, the district’s chief of hydraulics, was at her home checking the gages from her phone, when she noticed a sizeable uptick in the 

river stages at Morganza. She checked the most current reading against 

previous readings. The river was climbing at a rapid pace. At that rate, 

Powell knew the gates at the spillway would overtop sometime during 

the night. She called Baumy and advised him of her assessment. Not 

knowing whether or not Walsh intended to open the spillway, Baumy 

instructed the gate operators at the Old River auxiliary structure to 

divert more water from the Mississippi River to keep the gates from 

overtopping. The gate change increased the total discharge through the 

Old River control structures to 672,000 cfs, more than 50,000 cfs above 

the project design fl ood discharge. The gate change had prevented the 

The Low Sill Structure at the Old River Control Complex on May 14, 2011.
258

Divine Providence

river from overtopping the gates at Morganza, but it also siphoned off 

some of the discharge at Red River Landing.261

On the morning of May 14, the Mississippi River Commission and 

its staff assembled in the conference room on the MISSISSIPPI, which 

was moored at Baton Rouge, for the daily 0800 hours conference call. 

It was a few minutes prior to the meeting, so all were present but Walsh, 

who was in his stateroom reviewing situational reports from his district 

commanders. As was usual, individual paper copies of the slides for the 

morning presentation sat on the conference table in front of each chair. 

Upon taking their places the commission members and staff examined 

the briefi ng and intently fl ipped to the page that contained the operational timeline for the Morganza fl oodway. The timeline was a chart that 

mapped out the previous, current, and forecasted daily high discharges 

at Red River Landing, along with key decision points. Almost everyone 

anticipated that the May 14 forecast would depict at least 1,500,000 cfs 

at Red River Landing. To a person, they were shocked to see the forecast at 1,480,000 cfs.262

On paper, 20,000 cfs seems like a huge difference, but in reality it 

is not when it pertains to predicting the discharge of a river as big, fast, 

and deep as the Mississippi River. Various phenomena such as reverse 

fl ow, vertical fl ow, underwater sand dunes, and anti-dunes constantly 

form and disappear. Furthermore, when predicting the fl ow of the river, 

forecasters do not have an infi nitely fi ne ruler. They can only measure with a certain degree of accuracy, with the typical margin of error 

being from fi ve to ten percent. William Veatch, a hydrologist for the 

New Orleans district, described the difference between 1,480,000 cfs 

and 1,500,000 cfs as almost a “philosophical question – you’re almost 

asking what minute did you measure it.” Philosophical question or not, 

that 20,000 cfs might impact Walsh’s decision. One commission staff 

member walked up to Stephen Gambrell, the executive director for the 

commission, and tapped his fi nger on the May 14 discharge entry on 
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

Gambrell’s copy of the timeline and whispered, “Does this mean he 

won’t pull the trigger?”263

Col. Fleming and the district staff were asking themselves that very 

same question: Does this mean he won’t pull the trigger? To Fleming, 

it was a moot point. It did not matter what the fl ow was. The gates 

were about to overtop. Walsh needed to approve opening the structure. 

Fleming was convinced that Walsh would give the order. “There was no 

other way we could go. It was a slam-dunk,” he later recalled. He had 

been confi dent that he would secure approval after his initial request 

on May 4, and again on May 6 and May 9, though. Fleming was confi dent, but not overly so. In fact, Walsh still had not reached a decision 

in his own mind, even as the commission departed the MISSISSIPPI at 

Baton Rouge and drove to the Morganza spillway. Walsh did not want 

to operate the structure prematurely. While he was certainly leaning 

toward opening the gates, he intended to stick to the operational trigger point of 1.5 million cfs at Red River Landing as spelled out in the 

approved water control manual.264

When the commission arrived at the Morganza spillway, they immediately went out on the structure to gain a more thorough perspective 

on the gates and their relationship to the height of the river. Going 

in, Walsh was convinced that the crews would be able to connect the 

pins to the lifting eyes and raise the gates even if the gates were under 

water. His trip to the structure convinced him otherwise. Water lapped 

at the top of the gates and spilled over when wave after wave crashed 

against the structure. Walsh turned to Russell Beauvais, the operations 

manager for the Morganza spillway and Old River control structures, 

and asked him, “Will you be able to lift the gates?” Beauvais, a burly 

Cajun, answered in his thick accent, “Yes, sir. It shouldn’t be an issue, 

as long as we don’t overtop.” The district had taken a precautionary 

measure to insure that they would at least be able to open the fi rst two 

gates on the structure. Fearing that they might lose the ability to hook 

the lifting mechanisms into the gates as water spilled over the top, the 
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Divine Providence

crews had already made the necessary connections. Lifting the fi rst two 

gates would not pose a problem; lifting the remaining gates necessary 

to keep pace with the rising river was another story.265

Moments later, Maj. Gen. Walsh and the three civilian members of 

the commission, Sam Angel, R.D. James, and Clifford Smith gathered 

in the cramped main offi ce at the spillway for another decision briefi ng. 

Col. Fleming, Christopher Accardo, Michael Stack, Thomas Holden, and 

Beauvais represented the district in person, while Baumy and Powell 

phoned in from the district offi ce in New Orleans. Fleming set the stage 

by informing the commission that the river had set a new record stage 

of 62 feet at the Red River Landing gage. The river was higher than it 

had ever been and it was heading toward the Morganza structure, which 

already had reached the stage of 59.4 feet. Fleming expressed concern 

that the system was unraveling, “as you just saw, water is spilling over 

the gates.” Furthermore, the district had lost its battle to save the south 

Col. Edward Fleming, left, delivers his fi nal decision brief to the Mississippi River Commission.
261

Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

guide levee. For days, the district had been sandbagging the levee to 

keep it from overtopping and crevassing. The levee did not protect 

property – it merely served the purpose of guiding water toward the 

structure – but it tied into the spillway and the adjacent mainline levee 

that protected the town of Morganza. The river was now overtopping 

and eroding the levee, which generated concern that the crevasse would 

work its way toward the structure and the mainline levee. “Operating 

the spillway will take the head pressure off that levee,” Fleming advised.

Baumy followed with an update on river conditions. The latest 

National Weather Service forecast only called for the Mississippi River 

discharge to reach 1,430,000 cfs at Red River Landing later in the day, 

approximately 70,000 cfs below the trigger point for opening the gates. 

The district water control staff projected the discharge would not reach 

1.5 million cfs until the following day – May 15. “We have serious 

concerns about gate openings, particularly at night,” Baumy warned. 

He stated fl atly that there were only two possible actions to address the 

freeboard problem at the structure and to relieve pressure on the guide 

levee, “open the gates now or deviate through Old River.”

Fleming interjected, “Sir, the National Weather Service forecast 

does not change my recommendation. We have serious issues at this 

structure!”

Perhaps sensing that Walsh was bothered by the forecast, Thomas 

Holden, the Deputy District Engineer for Project Management, entered 

the conversation. Holden had served as the secretary for the commission 

from 2001 to 2002, so he knew how the commission and the MR&T 

project operated. Holden stated bluntly, “General, this is not an ‘if” but 

a ‘when’ scenario.” He went on to add, “If we don’t operate today, we 

will have to deviate through Old River. We simply cannot go another 

day without doing something. We simply can’t!”

Fleming interjected again, “Sir, I request permission to open one 

gate at 1500 hours. Then we’ll let the river dictate how we proceed.”
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Divine Providence

Sitting erect at the small offi ce desk in the center of the room, Walsh 

nodded to acknowledge he understood the seriousness of the situation. 

He jotted a few notes in his green fi eld notebook and then looked at the 

civilian members of the commission that sat crowded around him on 

the opposite side of the desk. “Members?” Walsh asked, signaling that 

he wanted their input. Angel, James, and Smith each concurred with 

Fleming’s recommendation. He looked at Fleming, “Approved!” He 

then called Governor Jindal to notify him of the decision. The governor 

informed Walsh that the fl oodway was clear.266

Outside the offi ce, Holden had the demeanor of a person who had 

just survived a car crash or near-death experience and was left to ponder 

the “what ifs.” Holden and Walsh had served together as army majors 

in the 92nd engineer regiment, so he had a history with the commission 

president. He knew Walsh’s command style – never let anyone know 

what you are thinking. As Holden walked hurriedly past a throng of 

reporters, trying to burn off the adrenaline that had accumulated in his 

system, he slowly shook his head and huffed, “I thought he was going 

say no. I REALLY thought he was going to say no.”267

The commission made the half-mile trek to the middle of the spillway to get another overview on the gate lifting process. It was actually a pleasant day weather-wise, with the mild temperatures and low 

humidity ushered in by the cool, stiff breeze out of the north. The sun 

shone brightly, with only a few isolated clouds present. A large crowd of 

reporters gathered at the south end of the structure, but unlike the opening of the Bonnet Carré spillway, the Morganza operation was closed to 

the public. Still there was a buzz in the air – literally – as several state 

police and news helicopters fl uttered across the peaceful blue sky. The 

view from the structure allowed a glimpse of two worlds. On one side 

of the structure stood a 23-foot wall of water. The angry river itched to 

be freed from its shackles, looking for room to expand and relieve its 

own pressure. Wind-driven waves slammed against the structure. Violent 

eddies swirled near the structure like vultures circling prey. The water 
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

Aerial views of the Morganza floodway shortly after activation.
264

Divine Providence

was literally at the top of the gates. On the other side of the structure 

rested a serene and tranquil timbered landscape that seemed oblivious 

to the threat just a few hundred feet to the east.268

At 1500 hours, Col. Fleming made the long walk from the south 

end of the structure to the middle, where the commission awaited his 

arrival and the opening of the gates. He appeared confi dent and relaxed. 

A thin smile stretched across his face as if a large weight – not to mention the enormous pressure of the system in his area of operations – had 

been lifted off of his shoulders. Without hesitation, he gave the signal 

to open the fi rst gate. The entire structure vibrated from the sudden and 

loud surge of water as the gantry crane lifted the gate. The violent torrent of water unleashed its energy into and across the shallow stilling 

basin below before beginning its slow crawl across the dry land and 

disappearing into the timber.269

The Atchafalaya Basin

The activation of the Morganza fl oodway had immediate results on 

the MR&T protection system on the Mississippi River. By May 15, the 

district had opened nine bays at the spillway which siphoned off roughly 

100,000 cfs per second from the Mississippi River. At the 0800 hours 

daily briefi ng on May 15, Shadie announced that the system was controlling the fl ood as designed. Because of the diversion at Morganza, 

the National Weather Service lowered the projected crests at Baton 

Rouge and New Orleans by 2.5 feet. The weather service expected 

the river to fl atten out and crest at 17 feet at the Carrollton gage that 

day and for the river to crest at 45 feet on the Baton Rouge gage by 

May 16. With the lower forecasts would come less stress and pressure 

on the levee system than originally anticipated. Stuart Waits, the area 

engineer for the levees below Baton Rouge, reported that most seepage problems and freeboard concerns dissipated after the opening of 

the spillway. Unfortunately, the transfer of water from the Mississippi 
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

River had the opposite effect on the Atchafalaya basin. The additional 

water, expected to reach upwards of 175,00 cfs, would put more stress 

on the Atchafalaya basin levees and the unprotected communities in the 

backwater area. At Butte La Rose, a small community on the river near 

Interstate 10, the National Weather Service expected the Atchafalaya 

River to reach 27 feet on May 24, just inches shy of the record stage set 

in 1973. The projected stage was only 2 feet above fl ood stage, but that 

represented a signifi cant river elevation for the low-lying town that had 

no fl ood protection system. At that stage, some areas could expect more 

than ten feet of water. For Morgan City, at the bottom of the basin, the 

weather service expected the crest to reach 11 feet, a half a foot higher 

than the 1973 record stage. During that fl ood, the fl oodwall protected 

the city to a stage of 11 feet, but it had since been raised to 22 feet. Still, 

Mayor Tim Matte expressed concern that the improved fl oodwall had 

never been tested by the amount of pressure expected.270

An example of “flood proofi ng” in the Atchafalaya basin.
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Divine Providence

In the days leading up to the opening of the Morganza fl oodway, the 

New Orleans Engineer District held public meetings at most communities that would be impacted by the introduction of additional water in 

the Atchafalaya basin – Butte La Rose, Morgan City, Berwick, Pierre 

Part, Stephenville, to name but a few. Fleming suspected that the meetings would be very intense, maybe even hostile, but he felt it a personal 

obligation to provide the best information at his disposal, whether good 

or bad. “It is not easy telling folks that they are going to fl ood, but you 

have to let them vent,” he later recalled. Based on the inundation maps 

developed by the district, Fleming or his surrogates – Lt. Col. Mark 

Jernigan, Holden, Accardo and Eilts – informed the public that they 

could expect to see the same amount of water, if not more, than experienced during the 1973 fl ood. At meeting after meeting, Fleming heard 

loud gasps emanating from the audiences, and for good reason. The 

1973 fl ood produced “extensive fl ooding to depths seldom experienced,” 

according to the post-fl ood report of that year. More than 1,226 square 

miles of land had been inundated in the Atchafalaya basin, resulting in 

an estimated $37 million in damages.271

Fleming and his representatives had to contend with the “us versus 

them” mentality, with the “us” representing Atchafalaya basin residents 

and the “them” representing the cities of New Orleans and Baton Rouge. 

The issue fi rst gained traction as far back as May 3, when Fleming 

announced that operating the Morganza fl oodway was on the table. That 

statement drew a rebuke from a Morgan City councilman, “If there’s 

a choice between Morgan City and New Orleans, we know who the 

choice is going to be.” To Fleming, it was not an either/or choice. The 

system was designed around the fl oodway to keep the fl ows manageable 

at and below Baton Rouge. Operating the system did not preclude fl ood 

fi ghting at Morgan City and other locations. “We will not fl ood Morgan 

City to save New Orleans,” Fleming argued, “We will run the system 

how it is designed to run and we will fl ood fi ght where we can.”272
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

The New Orleans Engineer District, the state, parishes, and levee 

districts were well-prepared for the fi ght. During the 2008 fl ood, a 

single area engineer had responsibility for the 650 miles of levees in 

the Atchafalaya basin and along the west bank Mississippi River levees 

extending from the lower end of the Fifth Louisiana levee district and 

Donaldsonville. It was a large area for one person to administer the 

resources necessary for a fl ood fi ght. During the after-action review 

process, the district decided to split that responsibility between two 

area commanders – one for the Atchafalaya sectors and one for the 

Mississippi sectors. The change afforded the opportunity for the area 

commanders to focus on a smaller area and more precisely manage their 

assets and resources. The two area commanders – Kinney Siffert with 

the Mississippi River sectors and Kinney Benoit with the Atchafalaya 

basin sectors – would now report to Ted Eilts, the Lafayette area engineer. The 2008 after action review also convinced the district to realign 

the trigger points for fl ood fi ght activities. Prior to 2011, the district 

based all fl ood fi ght movements off of stages on the Carrollton gage. 

When the gage reached 11 feet, the entire district mobilized for Phase I 

actions. When the gage reached 15 feet, the entire district transitioned 

to Phase II. The 2008 fl ood fi ght demonstrated that incorporating trigger points at the Simmesport and Morgan City gages provided greater 

local control over the necessary assets and resources in the Atchafalaya 

basin than a central trigger at the lower end of the Mississippi River.273

The 2008 fl ood, like it had in the Mississippi delta and the Mississippi River below Baton Rouge, also provided a strong test of the levee 

system in the Atchafalaya basin, exposing numerous potential trouble 

spots. With the experiences gained in that fl ood and the data contained in 

the 1973 post-fl ood report, levee inspectors and levee district personnel, 

for the most part, knew where to look for problem areas. The drought 

conditions also aided their efforts in identifying underseepage, just as 

it had in the Mississippi River sectors. While the fl ood was aided by 

past experience and dry conditions, the engineers at the district offi ce 
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Divine Providence

still had concerns about I-walls in the Atchafalaya basin. The Corps of 

Engineers had learned much about I-walls during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and issued new guidance about pressure loads, but that 

guidance had only recently been fi nalized, so the improvements had not 

been implemented in the basin. In preparing for the high river stages 

building the Atchafalaya system, the district conducted load tests by 

simulating the pressure anticipated under the forecasted stages to determine if any of the I-walls needed reinforcing in advance of the fl ood.274

To back up his earlier promise to fl ood fi ght in the backwater area, 

Fleming established a command post in Morgan City to coordinate 

the delivery of HESCO bastions, sandbags, and other resources, while 

helping levee districts address gaps in the system. He wanted a strong 

presence in the backwater area to send a clear message that someone 

was there to look out for south Louisianans and that the district did 

not operate the spillway and then walk away. Fleming’s actions, along 

with Mayor Matte’s leadership, and proactive planning by local levee 

The Atchafalaya River climbs against the floodwall at Morgan City.
269

Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

districts, imparted a strong level of confi dence to local residents that the 

fl ood was manageable. For these reasons, Walsh and the commission 

travelled to the backwater area to meet with parish presidents and the 

levee districts. On May 15, the commission drove from Baton Rouge 

to Morgan City, travelling alongside the west bank Mississippi River 

levees between Port Allen and Donaldsonville. The levees towered 

above the surrounding terrain. Although the commission members could 

not see the river, it was obvious that the water level on the opposite 

side of the levee was several feet higher than the farms, homes, businesses, industry, and infrastructure on the protected side of the levees. 

The scene served as a clear validation of the vision of the designers of 

the MR&T project.275

Clifford Smith, a thirteen-year veteran member of the Mississippi 

River Commission with more than 55 years of engineering experience, 

was clearly exhausted after nearly two weeks of non-stop meetings, 

Cliff ord Smith explains the flow of water in the Atchafalaya basin to Capt. Todd Mainwaring in Col. Fleming’s 

command post at Morgan City.
270

Divine Providence

briefi ngs, and site visits, but the drive through the bayous rejuvenated 

him. Smith, a native of Houma, Louisiana, was in his element. He 

seemed to know the complete history of every city, body of water, business, and nook and cranny in south Louisiana. Long ago, that ability 

had earned him the loving moniker “Uncle Clifford” from his fellow 

commissioner, R.D. James. As the commission travelled past a farming 

operation, Smith noticed a tractor kicking up dust in a parched fi eld 

adjacent to the road. He put his arm around Sam Angel and directed 

his attention to the wind-driven dust cloud, “This north wind is exactly 

what we need!” The north winds kept the moist air from the gulf in 

check. “It’s so dry in the Morganza that the ground and the wind are 

going to soak all the water up.”

During its visit to south Louisiana, the commission held face-toface meetings with various leaders to assess the situation on the ground 

and to answer their concerns. They met with state representatives and 

local elected offi cials, the mayors of Morgan City and Berwick, the 

parish presidents of St. Mary, St. Martin, and Terrebonne parishes, 

Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, Morgan City Mayor Tim Matt e, and Cliff ord Smith at Amelia, Louisiana.
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Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

representatives from the Chitimacha Nation, the navigation industry, 

and levee districts. Despite its decision to operate the Morganza fl oodway, the commission was well-received at each meeting. Because of 

its annual inspection trips through the Atchafalaya basin and the many 

engagements that accompanied those trips, the commission had developed strong bonds with many partners in the basin. The commission 

was not a faceless governmental bureaucracy. Those people knew the 

commission personally. They understood its mission. They respected the 

commission for having their boots on the ground in the affected areas.276

Perhaps the most compelling part of the trip involved an emergency 

operation at Bayou Chene, where a joint effort by the New Orleans 

district, the state, and the newly-formed St. Mary Parish levee district 

aimed to seal off the bayou from the Atchafalaya River. The current from 

Bayou Chene generally fl ows in a southerly direction before entering 

the Atchafalaya River south of Morgan City. When stages in the Atchafalaya River rise higher than the stage in the bayou, the river actually 

surges into Bayou Chene, forcing the current to reverse its fl ow and 

Aerial view of the operations at Bayou Chene.
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Divine Providence

threaten backwater communities, such as Amelia, with inundation. The 

St. Mary Parish levee district devised the operation, which consisted 

of sinking a massive 500-foot-long submersible oceangoing barge in 

the center of the channel, fl anked by smaller barges sunk on both ends. 

Once the barges were in place, crews drove 70-foot-long, interlocking 

sheet pile on the Atchafalaya River side of the barges, with the sunken 

vessels providing added weight and reinforcement. The sheetpile dam 

extended across the channel and tied into higher elevations on both 

banks. The tie-ins, in turn, were reinforced with 17,000 tons of rock. As 

Bill Hildago, the levee district president explained to the commission, 

the goal of the $6 million operation was to create a makeshift dam to 

block the reverse fl ow from the Atchafalaya and force the excess water 

to sheet fl ow into lower elevation marshes away from communities and 

investments. Clifford Smith smiled as he looked over the operation, 

“This is Cajun ingenuity at its fi nest!”277

The Mississippi River Commission and staff view the Bayou Chene operation.
273

Chapter Five – Through the Spout to the Gulf

On May 19, the Mississippi River crested on the Vicksburg and 

Natchez gages. With the river having already crested on the Baton 

Rouge and Carrollton gages because of the engineering controls at Old 

River, Morganza, and Bonnet Carré, the only major gage where the 

Mississippi had not crested was at Red River Landing, but even it was 

only inches shy of cresting. Intense pressure on the Mississippi River 

levee system would remain until river levels subsided, but exhausted 

fl ood fi ghters could at least see the light at the end of the tunnel. In the 

Atchafalaya basin, though, the crest was still another ten to eleven days 

away. By May 19, the Morganza spillway had 17 bays open, contributing approximately 180,000 cfs into the basin. The Butte La Rose gage 

reached 21 feet; six feet shy of the expected crest elevation. The Morgan 

City gage exceeded 8 feet; three feet shy of the expected crest.278

On May 21, Atchafalaya residents caught their fi rst break. The 

National Weather Service adjusted the forecast crest for Butte La Rose 

downward from 27 feet to 24.5 feet, roughly three feet higher than the 

stage of 21.3 feet reached on the gage that day. Clifford Smith’s observation had proven correct. Dry conditions in the Morganza fl oodway 

allowed the parched land to absorb more water than expected. Dry 

ditches and culverts, half-empty ponds and lakes, and dry stream beds all 

held more water – realities that computer models had no way of predicting. During his many trips through the Atchafalaya basin, Col. Fleming, 

noting the irony of massive sandbag rings and temporary levees built to 

keep water out of homes while sprinkler systems watered lawns within 

the rings, had drawn the same hopeful conclusion as Smith. Four days 

later, the weather service lowered the Butte La Rose by another foot. 

On May 27, the river crested on the Butte La Rose gage at 23.2 feet. 

The lower crest at Butte La Rose translated into lower stages at Morgan 

City. On May 30, the river crested on the Morgan City gage at a stage 

of 10.2 feet – approximately eleven inches below the original crest. 
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Divine Providence

Finally, during the daily briefi ng on the morning of June 1, Col. Fleming reported to Maj. Gen. Walsh, “Sir, it is safe to report that the crest 

has completely passed through the MR&T system.”279

If the intense rainfall and snowmelt that caused the massive fl ood to 

build at the confl uence of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers was, indeed, 

“Divine Providence,” then the extreme drought in Louisiana that helped 

to absorb the Morganza fl oodway waters and made life easier and less 

of an impact on residents was a sign of His grace – a rainbow, in a sense, 

across the south Louisiana parishes parched by the sun.
Postscript

There are a lot of trade-offs you make, but the idea that the 

untouched, natural way of life is the correct way of life is only 

for people who have never lived with nature. Nature is wonderful, but try living in a fl ood. Try living with droughts. Not 

so wonderful. That is how nature comes. She doesn’t come 

packaged with cows in green fi elds.

John Briscoe

Gordon McKay Professor of the 

Practice of Environmental Engineering

and Environmental Health

Harvard University

277

THE NATION HAS LONG RECOGNIZED THE VALUE OF the lower Mississippi Valley. Nineteenth century capitalists coined it the “Alluvial Empire” for its untapped potential, fertile lands, and 

abundant natural resources. Frequent and devastating Mississippi fl oods 

were the main impediments to the realization of that potential. Following the Great Flood of 1927, the nation united behind a bold vision to 

prevent another similar tragedy from happening again. The Mississippi 

River and Tributaries system that controlled the 2011 fl ood is the result 

of that vision. The MR&T system has prevented roughly one-half trillion dollars in damages since its inception. The estimated value of the 

total benefi ts to the nation is many times greater if consideration is 

given to the fact that not all can be calculated and captured in bland, 

one-size-fi ts-all formulas. Despite the overall success of the MR&T 

project, we have yet to realize the vast benefi ts of the Alluvial Empire, 

the additional under-developed resources of America’s Great Watershed. 

The high-value economic engine in the heart of the country has been 

long overlooked or undervalued by many as a true difference maker in 

national and global competition.

A benchmark. The fl ood will be remembered by most for the 

activation of three fl oodways, but the 2011 event set several records. 

More than a dozen fl ood control reservoirs in the Ohio, Arkansas-White, 

and St. Francis basins established new pool elevation records as water 

control managers desperately tried to store water to keep downstream 

stages at manageable levels. Several of those reservoirs went beyond 

full capacity. As the fl ood wave consolidated at the confl uence and 

rolled down the lower Mississippi River, it established new gage records 

through much of the system. The fl ood also established new peak fl ood 

discharge records from Cairo, Illinois, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The 

event was also lengthy. It was not until June 1 that the Mississippi River 

Commission declared the fl ood crest had passed through the MR&T 

system, but the Mississippi River remained above fl ood stage at the Red 
278

Divine Providence

River Landing gage until June 26, and the Atchafalaya River stayed 

above fl ood stage on the Morgan City gage until July 26 – nearly four 

months after the Cairo gage reached fl ood stage on April 3rd.

Diversions. Engineered structures in the system diverted more than 

1,573,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) to provide a level of protection 

and predictability for the nation’s corridor of commerce. The U.S. Geological Survey recorded peak fl ows of 186,000 cfs at Morganza Floodway, 316,000 cfs at Bonnet Carré Spillway, 400,000 cfs at the Birds 

Point-New Madrid fl oodway, and 671,000 cfs at the Old River Control 

Structures. This level of control brings to mind something that John 

Briscoe, a McKay professor of the practice of environmental engineering and professor of the practice of environmental health at Harvard 

University said:

There are a lot of trade-offs you make, but the idea that the 

untouched, natural way of life is the correct way of life is only 

for people who have never lived with nature. Nature is wonderful, but try living in a fl ood. Try living with droughts. Not so 

wonderful. That is how nature comes. She doesn’t come packaged with cows in green fi elds.

Room for the River. The MR&T system is designed to pass a larger 

fl ood. It has room to handle more water. The 2011 fl ood, while recordsetting in many areas, remained below project design fl ood levels. At 

the Cairo gage, the 2011 fl ood reached 89 percent of the project design 

fl ood; at the Arkansas City and Red River Landing gages, the fl ood 

reached 79 percent and 78 percent, respectively, of the project design 

fl ood. This equates to another 360,000 cfs at the Cairo gage, 597,000 cfs 

at the Arkansas City gage, and 459,000 cfs at the Red River Landing 

gage. Additional room for larger fl oods can be accommodated by the 

river’s use of fl oodways and backwater areas. At peak discharges, the 

three fl oodways placed into operation had the design capacity to divert 
279

Postscript

a combined total of approximately 1.4 million cfs from the Mississippi River. During 2011, the combined maximum discharge barely 

exceeded 900,000 cfs, or 65 percent of the maximum design capacity. 

Adding in the unused West Atchafalaya Floodway and its 250,000 cfs 

maximum design discharge, the total percentage drops to 55 percent. 

Put another way, the four fl oodways possess the capacity to divert an 

additional 750,000 cfs over what was diverted in 2011. Likewise, the 

total acreage in the massive backwater areas numbers 1,652,000 acres, 

but only 20 percent (335,000 acres) were used during the 2011 fl ood. 

That leaves a little more than 2,000 square miles of land available to 

store water up to 20 feet deep.

Local people have a voice. One of the things that made the MR&T 

project successful in the fl ood of 2011 was the long-term, regular dialogue and input from the local people. The comprehensive MR&T 

project is so unique because it captures all the decisions from regular 

systematic local input and dialogue with the federal government and 

the many interests and partners convened over the past 133 years (since 

1879). The thoughts, ideas, changes, additions, and improvements are 

captured in the form of the current project as it exists today.

State of the system. The engineers have assessed damages to the 

system with the tools available, but the extent of the damage can only 

be determined by the next fl ood event. The fl ood tested the system and 

the system worked – that much we know. We do not know the potential 

damages that cannot be seen clearly on the system – a system comprised 

of thousands of miles of earthen and concrete structures and channel. 

By the end of May, teams of engineers and inspectors started damage 

assessments as the fl ood water receded, compiling a list based on specifi c criteria to determine priorities. By the time the Mississippi River 

Commission met in August 2011, a senior engineer team had reviewed, 

developed, and negotiated a priority list of 93 critical repair needs totaling $800 million. The commission deliberated during the Low-Water 
280

Divine Providence

Inspection trip and the commission president forwarded the list to the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to help receive emergency funds related 

to life safety impacts for immediate work. Due to the leadership of the 

Mississippi Valley Flood Control Association, the voice of the local 

citizens, and the action of congress, a bill passed at the end of December 2011 to cover the initial cost of infrastructure damages. It will take 

another billion dollars to restore the system. The nation has no option 

other than to reset, restore, and continue to improve the system based on 

regular dialogue with citizens and other interests so that future generations will be able to live, work, and produce in a sustainable, reliable, 

and productive living environment. The people’s MR&T project is the 

foundation of the success of this great productive valley.

Much to learn! As engineers, our deliberate processes rooted in 

science, engineering, and logic are a part of our training and responsibilities. But, we do not have all the answers — it takes local on the 

ground knowledge, diverse resources and relationships, and understanding along with the ever present questions ... “what’s the federal interest” and “what’s the public value.” Our successful, highly productive 

agrarian, maritime nation continues to benefi t from the infrastructure 

investments of the past, yet the long-term sustainable approach for the 

nation’s economy and man’s environment is yet to be fully realized. 

Our decisions and investments over the next couple of decades will 

determine the success of our nation’s next 200 years.

A common occurrence and local sentiment that the Commission 

experienced from the pre-fl ood days and throughout the fl ood fi ght 

among many of the people and stakeholders in the valley refl ected a 

thoughtful sincere expression of dependence on the Divine that was 

expressed in conversations with the Creator about the resources that 

we, the locals and the government, get to help manage.
281

Postscript

The Mississippi River Commission and the strong partners in the 

valley continue to keep an ear to the past, a hand on the present, and a 

clear voice for our nation’s bright and productive future.

Many of the nation’s leaders agree on the need for a thoughtful, 

regular, and structured water infrastructure investment based on the 

nation’s priorities for economic and social development. This will help 

relieve the burden of imminent system failure and the subsequent ridiculous amount of resources wasted on recovery and rebuilding brought 

about by a shutdown of an economy generating part of the fabric of our 

infrastructure. While that need, indeed, sounds simple, we have yet to 

see it addressed. We still have an embarrassingly poor report card from 

science and engineering on the state of the nation’s water infrastructure 

and investment. A strong future requires the dedication of the world’s 

best minds and untiring, focused effort of wisely-blended practitioners 

and academics. The art of which we speak will serve watersheds around 

the globe for generations.

Listening, Inspecting, Partnering and Engineering!

T. Stephen Gambrell

Executive Director

Mississippi River Commission

February 1, 2012

Select

Bibliography

Mississippi River Commission

Executive Offi ce

Annual Reports of the Mississippi River Commission, 1928-2010.

Proceedings of the Mississippi River Commission, 1928-2011.

2011 Flood Files. These fi les include offi cial decision briefi ngs, white 

papers, technical papers, deviation requests, and memoranda 

authorizing operation of MR&T project features.

Emergency Management Offi ce

Memphis District, MVM Flood April 2011: Situational Reports

Vicksburg District, MVK Spring Flood 2: Situational Reports

New Orleans District, Spring 2011 High Water: Situational Reports

Mississippi Valley Division, Operation Watershed Commander’s 

Brief 0800. These are PowerPoint presentations containing daily 

weather information, river stages, river stage/discharge forecasts, 

inundation maps, etc., from April 30 to June 16, 2011.
284

Divine Providence

History Offi ce

Camillo, Charles. 2011 Flood Notes (April 21-June 1, 2011).

Birds Point-New Madrid Files

Boeuf Floodway Files

Cutoffs Files

Engineering News-Record Articles File

Jadwin Plan Files

1927 Flood Files

1937 Flood Files

1973 Flood Files

1983 Flood Files

Congressional Sources

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Flood Control in the Mississippi Valley, 70th Cong., 1st sess., December 8, 1927. H. Doc 

90.

_______. Committee on Flood Control. Special Report of the Mississippi River Commission on Revision of Plans for Improvement of 

Navigation and Flood Control of the Mississippi River Commission, 70th Cong., 1st sess., November 28, 1927. Com. Doc.1.

_______. Committee on Flood Control. Hearings, Control of the 

Destructive Flood Waters of the United States, 70th Cong., 

1st sess., 7 vols., November 7, 1927 – February 1, 1928.

_______. Flood Control in the Mississippi Valley: Report Submitted 

by Hon. Frank R. Reid, 70th Cong., 1st sess., 1928, Report no. 

1072.

_______. Committee on Flood Control, Flood Control: Report of 

the Mississippi River Flood Control Board to the President, 70th 

Cong., 2nd sess., August 8, 1928. Com. Doc. 28.

_______. Committee on Flood Control, Opinion of the Attorney 

General in Regard to certain Provisions of the Mississippi Flood 

Control Act of May15, 1928, 71st Cong., 1st sess., July 19, 1929. 

Com. Doc. 1.
285

Select Bibliography

_______. Committee on Flood Control. Hearings, Flood Control on 

the Mississippi River, 5 vols, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., 1930.

_______. Committee on Flood Control, Hearings, Flood Control on 

the Mississippi River, 71st Cong., 3rd sess., 1931.

_______. Control of Floods in the Alluvial Valley of the Lower Mississippi River, 71st Cong., 3rd sess., 3 vols., February 28, 1931. 

H. Doc. 798.

_______. Committee on Flood Control, Hearings, Flood Control on 

the Mississippi River, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., 1932.

_______. Committee on Flood Control, Hearings, Progress and 

Present Status of Flood Control on the Mississippi River and Its 

Tributaries, 73rd Cong., 1st sess., 1933.

_______. Committee on Flood Control, Hearings, Flood Control on 

the Mississippi River, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1934.

_______. Committee on Flood Control, Hearings, Flood Control 

in the Mississippi Valley, 74th Cong., 1st sess., (on H.R. 6833), 

April 1-13, 1935.

_______. Committee on Flood Control, Hearings, Flood Control in 

the Mississippi Valley, 74th Cong., 1st sess., (Supplemental Hearing), May 3 and 6, 1935.

_______. Committee on Flood Control, Flood-Control Works in the 

Alluvial Valley of the Mississippi River, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 

February 12, 1935. Com. Doc. 1.

_______. Committee on Flood Control, A report on the thirteen reservoirs in the Arkansas River Basin and the thirteen reservoirs in 

the White River Basin in response to a resolution of the Committee on Flood Control of the House of Representatives dated April 

24, 1935, 74th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 1935. Com. Doc. 1.

_______.Committee on Flood Control, Comprehensive Flood-Control Plan for the Ohio and Lower Mississippi Rivers, 75th Cong., 

1st sess., April 28, 1937, Com. Doc. 1.

_______. Committee on Flood Control, Hearings, Comprehensive 

Flood Control Plans, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., March 30 to April 19, 

1938.
286

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_______. Flood Control on the Lower Mississippi River, 77th Cong., 

1st sess., August 14, 1941. H. Doc. 359.

_______. Mississippi River between Cairo, Illinois, and Baton 

Rouge, Louisiana, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., March 22, 1943. 

H. Doc. 509.

_______. Mississippi River and Tributaries with Respect to Old River 

Control, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., July 9, 1954. H. Doc. 478.

_______. Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, 88th Cong., 2nd 

sess., 6 vols., May 11, 1964. H. Doc. 308.

Secondary Sources

Barry, John M. Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and 

How It Changed America. New York City: Touchstone Edition, 

1998.

Camillo, Charles and Matthew Pearcy. Upon Their Shoulders: A 

history of the Mississippi River Commission from its inception 

through the advent of the modern Mississippi River and Tributaries Project. Vicksburg: Mississippi River Commission, 2004.

Clay, Floyd M. A Century on the Mississippi: A History of the Memphis District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1876-1976. U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, Memphis: Memphis District, 1976.

Cowdrey, Albert, E. Land’s End: A History of the New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Its Lifelong Battle with 

the Lower Mississippi and Other Rivers Wending Their Way to 

the Sea. New Orleans: New Orleans District, 1977.

Daniel, Pete. Deep’n as it Come: The 1927 Mississippi River Flood. 

Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1996.

Elam, William E. Speeding Floods to the Sea or The Evolution of 

Flood Control Engineering on the Mississippi River. New York: 

The Hobson Book Press, 1946.

Elliott, D.O. The Improvement of the Lower Mississippi River for 

Flood Control and Navigation. 3 vols. Vicksburg: U.S. Waterways Experiment Station, 1932.
287

Select Bibliography

Ferguson, Harley B. History of the Improvement of the Lower Mississippi River for Flood Control and Navigation, 1932-1939. Vicksburg: Mississippi River Commission, 1940.

Frank, Arthur Dewitt. The Development of the Federal Program of 

Flood Control on the Mississippi River. New York: Columbia 

University Press, 1966.

Kemper, James P. Floods in the Alluvial Valley of the Mississippi: A 

National Calamity, What Should Be Done About It. New Orleans: 

National Flood Commission, 1928.

_______. Rebellious River. Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1949.

Kemp, Emory. “Stemming the Tide: Design and Operation of the 

Bonnet Carré Spillway and Floodway,” Essays in Public Works 

History. December 1990, No. 17.

Mills, Gary B. Of Rivers and Men: The Story of the Vicksburg District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Vicksburg: Vicksburg District, 1978.

Moore, Norman R. Improvement of the Lower Mississippi River and 

Its Tributaries, 1931-1972. Vicksburg: Mississippi River Commission, 1972.

Morgan, Herbert. Through Shifting Currents: A History of the Memphis District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1982-1998. Memphis: Memphis District, 1999.

Nimrod, Peter. 2011 Flood Report: A Success Story. Greenville: Mississippi Levee Board, 2011.

Reuss, Martin. Designing the Bayous: The Control of Water in the 

Atchafalaya Basin, 1800-1995. Alexandria, Virginia: U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, 1998.

Interviews

Christopher Accardo (6 December 2011)

Lanny Barfi ed (9 November 2011)

Walter Baumy (10 December 2011)

Russell Beauvais (12 December 2011)
288

Divine Providence

David Berretta (23 June 2011)

Darian Chasteen (23 June 2011)

Jimmy Coldiron (9 November 2011)

Russell Davis (23 June 2011)

Col. Jeffrey Eckstein (8 November 2011)

Ted Eilts (7 December 2011)

Col. Edward Fleming (7 December 2011)

Ronald Goldman (8 November 2011)

Thomas Holden (7 December 2011)

James Lloyd (23 June 2011)

Bradley Martin (28 November 2011)

Chuck Mendrop (8 November 2011)

Thomas Minyard (23 June 2011)

Thomas Morgan (23 June 2011)

Chip Newman (23 June 2011)

Peter Nimrod (10 November 2011)

Kent Parrish (8 November 2011)

Nancy Powell (6 December 2011)

Robert Simrall (8 December 2011)

Bobby Stokes (9 November 2011)

William Veatch (6 December 2011)

Stuart Waits (6 December 2011)

Milus Wallace (11 November 2011)

Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh (24 August 2011)

Eric Woerner (16 November 2011)
289

Notes

Prologue

1 Charles Camillo, 2011 MR&T Flood Notes, (Hereafter cited as Flood Notes); 

Interview with Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, by Charles Camillo, August 24, 2011.

2 Email, Charles Shadie to David Berretta, et al., January 2, 2012, Subject: 2011 

Flood – Peak Flows; Mississippi River Commission, 2011 MR&T Flood Report, 

pp. 21.

3 Ibid., pp. 2.

4 House of Representatives, Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, House 

Document No. 308 (88th Cong., 2d Sess.) Vo1.2, Annex C.

5 This section is a revised version of an earlier information paper, “The Mississippi River & Tributaries Project: Controlling the Project Flood,” written by 

Charles Camillo for the Mississippi River Commission in 2007.

6 Pete Daniel, Deep’n As It Come: The 1927 Mississippi River Flood (Fayetteville, Ar.: University of Arkansas Press, 1996): pp. 8; Arthur D. Frank, The 

Development of the Federal Program of Flood Control on the Mississippi River

(NY: AMS, 1968): 187-194; Charles Camillo and Matthew Pearcy, Upon Their 

Shoulders: A history of the Mississippi River Commission from its inception 

through the advent of the modern Mississippi River and Tributaries Project

(Mississippi River Commission, 2004) 139-144; John Barry, Rising Tide: The 

Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How It Changed America (New York: 

Touchstone, 1998) pp. 285-286.

7 Frank, Development of Flood Control, pp. 187-200; Daniel, Deep’n As It Come, 

pp. 8, 87-97; Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, 139-144; Barry, 

Rising Tide, pp. 285-286; “Congress and Mississippi Flood Control,” Congressional Digest (Feb.): 41. On death counts, compare Daniel, pp. 126-133 and 

Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, Vol. 2: The Cabinet and the 

Presidency, 1920-1933 (NY: Macmillan, 1952): 125; Letter, Capt. William E. 

Teal to R.F., Feb. 29, 1928.

8 Daniel, Deep’n As It Come pp. 177-209; W.W. DeBerard, “Today in the Mississippi Flood Area, I. Land and People of the Upper Basin,” Engineering 
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News-Record 99:21, Nov. 24, 1927; “II. Closing Mound Landing Crevasse,” 

Engineering News-Record 99:22, Dec. 1, 1927, 870-872.

9 Larry Kilgo, “MRT FDO Breakout of 3 Districts,” January 9, 2012. This source 

is actually a spreadsheet compiled by Corps economists.

Chapter One

10 Great Lakes and Ohio River Division, After Action Report: 2011 Spring Floods, 

DRAFT document dated September 9, 2011.

11 Ibid. Email, Deborah Lee to MG John W. Peabody, et. al., April 20, 2011, Subject: LRD has initiated lower Ohio-Mississippi River teleconferences.

12 Email, Bill J. Frederick to Undisclosed Recipients, April 21, 2011, Subject: 

4-21-11nws.ppt; Email, Charles Shadie to MG Michael Walsh, April 21, 2011, 

Subject: Cairo Forecast. Gage versus gauge - river engineers in the United 

States tend to use the variant spelling of “gage.”

13 Mississippi River Commission, Annual Report, 1917, pp. 3531-3536; Camillo 

and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, 57-66.

14 Mississippi River Commission, Annual Report, 1917, pp. 3531-3536.

15 W.W. De Berard, “Today in the Mississippi Flood Area: The Cairo Problem 

and Its Proposed Solution,” Engineering News-Record, February 23, 1928, pp. 

311-316.

16 W.W. De Berard, “Today in the Mississippi Flood Area: The Cairo Problem and 

Its Proposed Solution,” Engineering News-Record, February 23, 1928, 311-316; 

Mississippi River Commission, Special Report of the Mississippi River Commission on Revision of Plans for Improvement of Navigation and Flood Control 

of the Mississippi River, (St. Louis: Mississippi River Commission, Sept. 28, 

1927): 60-137; House of Representatives, Committee on Flood Control, Hearings, Control of Destructive Flood Water of the United States, 70th Cong., 1st 

Sess., 1927-1928, Vol. 6, 4199-4213, Berthe testimony,(Hereafter cited House 

Flood Control Hearings, 1927-1928); D.O. Elliott, The Improvement of the 

Lower Mississippi River for Flood Control and Navigation (Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, MS 1932), pp. 199-200, Plate XXVIII (b)-XXVIII 

(C).

17 Mississippi River Commission, Special Report of the Mississippi River Commission, September 1928, pp. 73-74; W.W. De Berard, “Today in the Mississippi Flood Area: The Cairo Problem and Its Proposed Solution,” Engineering 

News-Record, February 23, 1928, 311-316.

18 Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, 150-156; Letter, Potter to Commission, Possible Changes, emphasis in original; Letter, Jadwin to Potter, Special 

Report on Flood Control and Navigation, Nov. 18, 1927; Letter, Jadwin to 

Schulz, Nov. 18, 1927; Memorandum by Edward Flad, Suggested Alterations 

of the Special Report, Nov. 23, 1927; Memorandum, from Potter to Members, 

Mississippi River Commission, Nov. 21, 1927; Potter to Chief, Special Report 
291

Notes

dated November 29, 1927, Nov. 29, 1927; letter, Ransdell to Potter, Nov. 24, 

1927; quotes from letter, Potter to Ransdell, Dec. 1, 1927.

19 House of Representatives, Flood Control in the Mississippi Valley, House Document 90 (70th Cong., 1st Sess.), 6, 29. (Hereafter cited as House Document 

90.)

20 Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, 154, 177.

21 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record (Jan. 4, 1928): 925; House Flood Control 

Hearings, 1927-1928, Vol. 4, 2102-2111, Vol. 5, 3564-3567; quotes from Vol. 5, 

3582, and Vol. 6, 4539; Memorandum, Potter to Chief of Engineers, Mississippi River Commission, Special Report – November 28, 1927, Feb. 15, 1928; 

Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, pp. 154-14.

22 Frank R. Reid, Flood Control in the Mississippi Valley, H.R. Report 1072, 

pp. 51-70, 101-109, 116-117; U.S. Congress, Hearings Before the Committee on 

Flood Control, House of Representatives, on Flood Control on the Mississippi 

River, 1930, Vol. 1 (71st Cong., 2nd Sess.): 8.

23 House Flood Control Hearings, 1928, 2116 (Potter Testimony), 4199-4213 

(Berthe Testimony).

24 Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, p. 179-180; Reid, Flood Control in 

the Mississippi Valley, H.R. Report 1072, pp. 51-70, 101-109, 116-117; House 

Flood Control Hearings, 1927-1928, 2116, 3004.

25 House Flood Control Hearings, 1927-1928, 941-942 (Sackett Testimony), 949-

954 (Barkley Testimony), 1075-1081 (Stone Testimony), 1082-1093 (Donaldson Testimony), 2928 (Gregory Testimony), 3272-3278 (Denison Testimony).

26 Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, 157-165.

27 “Sturtevant Named as Third Member of the Flood-Control Board” and “Washington Notes,” Engineering News-Record 100:21 (May 24, 1928): 826-829; 

“Appointment of Sturtevant to Mississippi Board Confi rmed,” Engineering 

News-Record 100:22 (May 31, 1928): 874; Jackson and Graves Nomination 

Hearings, p. 2.

28 Memorandum, Mississippi River Commission to Chief of Engineers, Hearings of Special Flood Control Board, June 9, 1928. Potter received his promotion effective May 15, 1928, on the passage of the act as a result of section 8; 

Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, 164-167.

29 Letter, Potter to Whittington, June 12, 1928; Potter, Memorandum for Board 

of Three, Tensas Basin Floodway, June 15, 1928; Memorandum for Board of 

Three, [Cairo Gage], June 15, 1928; Memorandum for Board of Three, Argument against higher levees, June 15, 1928; “Potter Superseded as Head of 

Mississippi River Commission,” Engineering News-Record 100:24 (June 14, 

1928): 947; “Gen. Thomas H. Jackson New Head of Mississippi River Commission,” Engineering News-Record 100:25 (June 21, 1928); Transactions of 

the American Society for Civil Engineers, 94 (1930): 1600-1601 (Hereafter 

cited as Transactions of the ASCE); Martin Reuss, Designing the Bayous: The 
292

Divine Providence

Control of Water in the Atchafalaya Basin, 1800-1995 (College Station: Texas 

A&M University Press, 2004). pp. 121-123; Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their 

Shoulders, pp. 166-167; Berthe quoted in James P. Kemper, Floods in the Alluvial Valley: A National Calamity, What Should be Done About It (New Orleans: 

National Flood Commission, 1928), p. 173; Jackson and Graves Nomination 

Hearings, pp. 23; Kemper, Floods in the Valley, pp. 165, 169-179, 198-233; 

James P. Kemper, Rebellious River, (Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc, 1949) pp. 

163-167; Jackson to R.C. Donaldson, Jul. 14, 1928.

30 Kemper, Floods in the Valley, pp. 165, 169-179, 198-233; Kemper, Rebellious 

River, pp. 163-167; Jackson to R.C. Donaldson, Jul. 14, 1928. The copy of the 

Berthe letter in Kemper dated Jul. 13 references the death of Potter on Aug. 6, 

so Berthe or Kemper edited it for publication.

31 “Report of Board” (Wash., D.C.: GPO, 1928): quotes pp. 2, 7, 9; Jackson to district engineers, Report of the Mississippi Flood Control Board, Aug. 25, 1928; 

“Jadwin Flood-Control Plan Approved by Special Engineer Board,” Engineering News-Record (Aug. 23, 1928): 283-286; Reuss, Designing the Bayous, pp. 

124-127; Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, p. 167; U.S. Congress, 

Opinion of the Attorney General in Regard to Certain Provisions of the Mississippi Flood Control Act of May 15, 1928, Flood Con. Comm. Doc. 2 (71st 

Cong., 1st Sess.): 10-12.

32 Kemper, Floods in the Valley, p. 180; “Letter but Not Spirit” and “The Mississippi Decision,” Engineering News-Record (Sept. 6, 1928): 337; Jackson and 

Graves Nomination Hearings, pp. 3, 22-26, quote on 23; Letter, Schoenberger 

to Ransdell, Aug. 28, 1928; Capt. Lewis A Pick to Col. Harley B. Ferguson, Jun. 

15, 1928; House Flood Control Hearings, 1930, p. 1816.

33 Mississippi River Commission, Annual Report, 1929-1930, pp. 1968, 2073; 

Connolly to Chief of Eng., Levee setback – Cairo to New Madrid, May 19, 

1928; Williamson, Estimate for Raising the City of Cairo, Sept. 26, 1927; Wilby 

to Chief of Eng., Engineering Report on proposed Bird’s Point-New Madrid 

fl oodway, Dec. 4, 1928, and indorsements; Knappen to Memphis District Eng., 

Drainage Report on Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway, Jul. 31, 1929; Wilby to 

Chief of Eng., Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway, Plans for drainage intercepted by back levee, Aug. 13, 1929, and indorsements; De Berard, “The First 

of the Mississippi Floodways,” Engineering News-Record (May 23, 1929): 

816-822.

34 The quote from the American Engineering Council is taken from L.T. Berthe, 

Old Man River Speaks: The Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway, May 1937, 

pp. 6; Mississippi River Commission, Annual Report, 1929-1930, pp. 1968, 

2073-4; Chief of Eng. to Pres., MRC, Levee from Birds Point to New Madrid, 

Dec. 15, 1928; Letter, MS County Levee District to MRC, Nov. 17, 1928; 

DeBerard, “First of Floodways”; “Injunction to Stop New Madrid Spillway 

Refused,” Engineering News-Record (May 30, 1929): 883; “Start to Condemn 

Land for New Madrid Spillway,” Engineering News-Record (Jun. 13, 1929): 
293

Notes

969; “Another Injunction Sought to Halt Floodway Construction,” Engineering News-Record (June 20, 1929): 1009; “New Madrid Landowners Ask Higher 

Compensation,” Engineering News-Record (Jul. 4, 1929): 33; Kirk vs. Good, 

13 F. Supp. 1020, 349 (Mo. Dist. Ct. 1929); Mississippi River Commission, 

Annual Report, 1933.

35 Mississippi River Commission, Annual Report, 1931-1935, pp. 2096-2097; 

1986-1988; 1294-1295; 1504-1506; 1705-1707;Acting Sec. of War to AG, May 

15, 1930; Maj. Elliott to Memphis DE, New Madrid Floodway fuse plug levee 

profi les, Jun. 13, 1931; Lt. Col. E. Reybold to Pres. MRC, Crevasse closures, 

Lower Fuse Plug Levee, Upper St. Francis Levee District, May 9, 1936, and 

indorsements; “Important Flood Control Unit on Mississippi Nears Completion,” Engineering News-Record (Oct. 27, 1932): 514; “Special River Problems 

Studied by Models.”

36 Mississippi River Commission, Annual Report, 1931-1935, pp. 2096-2097; 

1986-1988; 1294-1295; 1504-1506; 1705-1707;Acting Sec. of War to AG, May 

15, 1930; Maj. Elliott to Memphis DE, New Madrid Floodway fuse plug levee 

profi les, Jun. 13, 1931; Lt. Col. E. Reybold to Pres. MRC, Crevasse closures, 

Lower Fuse Plug Levee, Upper St. Francis Levee District, May 9, 1936, and 

indorsements; “Important Flood Control Unit on Mississippi Nears Completion,” Engineering News-Record (Oct. 27, 1932): 514; Statistical information 

on fl owage easements can be found at Mississippi River Commission, Annual 

Report, 1942, p. 1957. During subsequent litigation in Matthews v United 

States, the court found that lands falling within the backwater limits at the lower 

end of the fl oodway did not warrant compensation for fl owage easements.

37 Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, pp. 230-233.

38 Ibid; Maj. R.D. Burdick, Report on Placing the Birds Point-New Madrid 

Floodway into Operation, n.d.; Floyd M. Clay, A Century on the Mississippi: A 

History of the Memphis District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, pp. 145-149; 

Mississippi River Commission, Annual Report, 1937, pp. 1674-1679.

39 Maj. R.D. Burdick, Report on Placing the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway 

into Operation; W.W. DeBerard, “Conditions in Flood Beleagured Cairo,” 

Engineering News-Record, February 4, 1937, pp. 153-155; H.W. Richardson, 

“Mississippi Flood Fighting Begins,” Engineering News-Record, February 4, 

1937, pp 151-153.

40 Maj. R.D. Burdick, Report on Placing the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway 

into Operation, n.d.

41 Ibid, H.W. Richardson, “Superfl ood Devastates Lower Ohio and Now Threatens 

Mississippi Levee System,” Engineering News-Record, February 4, 1937, pp 

151-152; Mississippi River Commission, Annual Report, 1937, pp. 1739-1740.

42 Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, pp.233-235; “Permanent Flood 

Safety,” Engineering News-Record, April 14, 1938, pp. 531; Berthe, Old Man 

River Speaks, pp. 6.
294

Divine Providence

43 House Committee on Flood Control, Comprehensive Flood Control Plan For 

Ohio and Lower Mississippi Rivers, Committee Document No. 1 (75th Cong., 

1st Sess.) April 28, 1937.

44 Ibid; Lower Ohio and Middle Mississippi Rivers Flood Management; Camillo 

and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, 233-237. The additional reservoirs are a reference to the reservoirs already authorized in the 1936 Flood Control Act.

45 Clay, A Century on the Mississippi, pp. 181, 198; United States Senate, 

St. John’s Bayou and New Madrid Floodway, Missouri, Senate Document No. 

95-87 (87th Cong., 2d Sess.); Memorandum for Records, Harris T. Vandergriff 

to President, Mississippi River Commission, “Letter Supplement No. 3 to Real 

Estate Design Memorandum, Flowage Easements, Birds Point-New Madrid 

Floodway, Missouri”, June 26, 1998. The 1986 Water and Resources Development Act authorized the St. John’s Bayou-New Madrid Floodway project 

as a related, but separate, project to the 1954 authorization to close the 1,500-

foot gap in the frontline levee and construction of the gravity drainage structure. Authorized improvements under the 1986 act included the widening and 

straightening of approximately 144 miles of three separate channels to speed the 

evacuation of water within the St. John’s Bayou basin and the lower portion of 

the New Madrid fl oodway. The act also authorized the construction of a 1,000 

cfs pumping station for the St. John’s Bayou area and a 1,500 cfs pumping 

station for the New Madrid fl oodway area to evacuate impounded fl oodwaters 

during periods of high stages on the Mississippi River. In 2004, however, the 

Environmental Defense Fund and the National Wildlife Federation fi led a lawsuit to prevent the construction of the project features authorized by the 1954 

and 1986 acts. In September 2007, Judge James Robertson of the U.S. District 

Court issued an injunction preventing further work. Robertson also ordered the 

dismantling of work already completed. In the summer of 2008, the Department of Justice, after reviewing the court’s ruling, determined that it would not 

appeal the decision.

46 U.S. House of Representatives, Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, 

House Document No. 308 (88th Cong., 2d Sess.) pp 10-11, 33, 57-58, 148; 

Legal Analysis RE: Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway, n.d.; J. Frank Randall, 

Attorneys Opinion: Authority for Continued Acquisition of Modifi ed Easements, Birds Point New Madrid Floodway, Missouri, n.d.; Preparing To Operate 

the Floodway Under The 1965 Act, n.d.

47 Legal Analysis RE: Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway, n.d.; J. Frank Randall, 

Attorneys Opinion: Authority for Continued Acquisition of Modifi ed Easements, Birds Point New Madrid Floodway, Missouri, n.d.

48 Memphis District, Post Flood Report: Mississippi River and Tributaries System 

Flooding, 1973, October 1972, pp 13-19; “Engineers Raise Levee in Emergency Operation,” The Enterprise Courier, March 29, 1973; “Work Crews Add 

Two Feet to Fuse Plug Levee System,” Cairo Evening Citizen, March 26, 1973.
295

Notes

49 Memphis District, Post Flood Report: May-June 1983, September 16, 1983. 

This document contains a series of newspaper articles that trace the fl ood and 

the ensuing litigation; United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 

Story v Marsh, Case No. 83-1643, April 13, 1984; Herbert Morgan, Jr., Through 

Shifting Currents: A History of the Memphis District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1982-1998, pp. 20-27.

50 Ibid., 20-27; Memphis District, Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway Operations 

Plan, January 1986; James W. Lloyd and Jack H. Hurdle, “TEXS Blows the 

Plug: A Tactical Explosive Adapted for Flood Control,” The Military Engineer, 

July 1988, pp. 428-431; Memphis District, Analysis of Potential Modifi cation to 

the Plan of Operation for the Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway, May 1985.

51 Herb Morgan, Through Shifting Currents, 20-27; Memphis District, Reconnaissance Report: Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway, Mississippi County, Missouri, March 1990.

52 Morgan, Through Shifting Currents, 20-27; Memphis District, Birds Point-New 

Madrid Floodway, Mississippi County, Missouri, Memphis District, Engineering Review Report: Modifi ed Plan of Operation, Vol. 1, Nov. 1991.

Chapter Two

53 Interview with Milus Wallace, by Charles Camillo, November 11, 2011.

54 Email, Deborah Lee to MG John W. Peabody, et. al., April 21, 2011, Subject: 

lower Ohio-Mississippi River fl ood outlook. Center Hill and Wolf Creek were 

both DSAC 1 dams. The DSAC 1 classifi cation is the highest and most critical 

designation. Dale Hollow and J.P. Priest are DSAC 2 dams.

55 Precipitation data pulled from numerous sources.

56 Interview with Deborah Lee by Charles Camillo, August 9, 2011; Email, Deborah Lee to MG John W. Peabody, et. al., April 21, 2011, Subject: Lower OhioMississippi River fl ood outlook.

57 Email, MG John W. Peabody to Richard Hancock, et. al, April 24, Subject: 

Afternoon Water Management Update – 24 April 2011; Email, Richard Hancock to MG John W. Peabody, et. al., April 24, Subject: Afternoon Water Management Update – 24 April 2011; Email, Robert Moyer to DLL-CERD, Subject: 

Afternoon Water Management Update – 24 April 2011.

58 Camillo, Flood Notes, April 25; Ibid., April 27; Memphis District, MVM Flood 

April 2011: Situation Report No. 4; Memphis District, MVM Flood April 2011: 

Situation Report No. 5.

59 Camillo, Flood Notes, April 25; Ibid., April 27; Memphis District, MVM Flood 

April 2011: Situation Report No. 4; Memphis District, MVM Flood April 2011: 

Situation Report No. 5.

60 Interview with Deborah Lee by Charles Camillo, August 9, 2011. LRD 

Timeline, n.d.; Reid, Flood Control in the Mississippi Valley, House Report 

No. 1072, pp. 293. The reduction of outfl ows from the dams on the Cumberland 
296

Divine Providence

system was initiated on April 25 and carried out in steps through April 27. 

April 28 represented the fi rst day that the daily average outfl ow equaled zero. 

It is important to note that Peabody had been the LRD commander for three 

years prior to the 2011 fl ood. He had spent considerable time and energy on the 

dam safety issue, especially with regard to the Wolf Creek Dam. His decision to 

store water behind the high-risk dams was well-informed and calculated based 

on years of experience and in-depth analysis.

61 Email, Bill Frederick to Undisclosed Recipients, April 26, 2011, Subject: 4-26-

11nws.ppt; Memphis District, MVM; Flood April 2011: Situation Report No. 5; 

Memphis District, MVM Flood April 2011: Situation Report No. 6.

62 Interview with David Berretta, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011; Clay, A Century on the Mississippi: A History of the Memphis District, 255-256; Memphis 

District, Post Flood Report: Mississippi River and Tributaries System Flooding, 1973, October 1973, pp iv, 3; Lester Goodin, “Securing the C/BP Mainline 

Levee,” November 1997.

63 Interview with James Lloyd, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011; Memphis District, MVM Flood April 2011: Situation Report No. 9.

64 Email, Bill J. Frederick to Undisclosed Recipients, April 27, 2011, Subject: 

4-27-11nws.ppt.

65 Camillo, Flood Notes, April 27, 0756; Ibid., 1140.

66 Ibid.,1500; Letter from Claire McCaskill, Roy Blunt, and Jo Ann Emerson to 

President Barrack Obama, dated 27 April, 2011. Camillo and Pearcy, Upon 

Their Shoulders, p 236; M.D. Kittle, “Residents voice concerns about fl oodway,” Southeast Missourian, April 28, 2011.

67 Ibid., Walsh quote taken from article in the Southeast Missourian; M.D. Kittle, 

“Corps explains process, impact of breaching Birds Point levee,” Southeast 

Missourian, April 28, 2011. Camillo, Flood Notes, April 27, 1500; Interview 

with Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, by Charles Camillo, October 19, 2011.

68 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Memphis District, Birds Point – New Madrid 

Floodway Operation Plan, January 1986.

69 Ibid., Interview with James Lloyd, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011; Interview with Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, by Charles Camillo, August 24, 2011; 

Camillo, Flood Notes, April 27, 1530.

70 Email, Bill Frederick to Undisclosed Recipients, April 27, 2011, Subject: 4-27-

11nws.ppt.

71 Email, COL Keith Landry to MG John W. Peabody, April 27, 2011, Subject: 

Wednesday, April 27, 2011.; Email, MG John W. Peabody to Deborah Lee, 

April 28, 2011, Subject: CG Guidance; Email, MG John W. Peabody to MG 

Michael Walsh, April 28, 2011, Subject: KY-Barkley.

72 Memphis District, Birds Point-New Madrid Floodway, Plan of Operation, dated 

April 25, 2011. This document was a decision brief delivered by Reichling to 
297

Notes

Walsh on April 28. Apparently, Memphis District personnel did not change the 

date on the cover slide from a previous briefi ng.

73 Email, MG Michael Walsh to LTG Robert Van Antwerp, et. al., April 28, 2011, 

Subject: Recommendation from District Commander Regarding Operation of 

the Floodway; Email from MG John W. Peabody to MG Michael Walsh, April 

28, Subject: Recommendation from District Commander Regarding Operation 

of the Floodway; Interview with Deborah Lee, by Charles Camillo, August 9, 

2011.

74 Interview with Thomas Morgan, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011.

75 Interview with Chip Newman, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011.

76 Ibid., Memphis District, MVM Flood April 2011: Situation Report No. 9.

77 Interview with Thomas Morgan, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011; Memphis 

District, MVM Flood April 2011: Situation Report No. 9.

78 Interview with Thomas Minyard, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011; Interview 

with Darian Chasteen, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011.

79 Interview with Darian Chasteen, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011; Memphis 

District, MVM Flood April 2011: Situation Report No. 11.

80 Ibid.

81 Camillo, Flood Notes, April 29, 0900-1500.

82 U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Southeast Division State of 

Missouri v United States Army Corps of Engineers, Case No 1:11CV00067 

SNJL, April 29, 2011.

83 Ibid.

84 Camillo, Flood Notes, April 29, 0838, Ibid., April 29, 1600; Ibid., April 30, 

2100; Ibid., May 1, 2100.

85 Email, Bill J. Frederick to Undisclosed Recipients, April 30, 2011, Subject: 

4-30-11 nws.ppt; MVM Flood April 2011: Situation Report No. 10; Precipitation data pulled from numerous sources; Mississippi River Commission, 2011 

MR&T Flood Report, 6.

86 Interview with James Lloyd, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011. Email, Robert 

Moyer to DLL-CELRD, April 30, 2011, Subject: Morning Water Management 

Update; Email, Robert Moyer to DLL-CELRD, May 1, 2011, Subject: Morning 

Water Management Update.

87 Camillo, Flood Notes, April 30, 1030; Ibid., 1130; Memphis District, Floodway 

Decision Brief, April 30, 2011.

88 Interview with Deborah Lee, by Charles Camillo, August 9, 2011. Email, 

Deborah Lee to Charles Camillo, September 9, 2011, Subject: clarifi cation on a 

quote; Camillo, Flood Notes, April 29, 2011.

89 Camillo, Flood Notes, April 30, 1300.

90 Ibid., 1545.
298

Divine Providence

91 Memphis District, MVM Flood April 2011: Situation Report No. 10; Interview 

with James Lloyd, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011.

92 Memphis District, Floodway Decision Brief, May 1, 2011; Camillo, Flood 

Notes, May 1, 1000.

93 Interview with Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, by Charles Camillo, August 24, 2011; 

Camillo, Flood Notes, May 1, 1000.

94 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 1, 1000.

95 Interview with Darian Chasteen, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011; Darian 

Chasteen, “Timeline for Fulton County Water Berm Construction,” June 23, 

2011.

96 Interview with Chip Newman, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011.

97 Interview with James Lloyd, by Charles Camillo, June 23; Camillo, Flood 

Notes, May 2.

98 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 1, 1440; Interview with Dennis Norris, by Charles 

Camillo, August 16, 2011; Interview with Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, by Charles 

Camillo, August 24, 2011.

99 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 1, 1513.

100 Maj. Gen. John W. Peabody, Great Lakes and Ohio River Division: 2011 Flood 

Overview. This is a presentation delivered by Maj. Gen. Peabody at the public 

meeting in New Madrid on August 15, 2011, during the Mississippi River Commission Low Water Inspection.

101 Ibid., 1513

102 Ibid., 1513

103 Ibid., 1513

104 Ibid., 1513

105 Interview with Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, by Charles Camillo, August 24, 2011.

106 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 1, 1513.

107 Ibid., 1513.

108 Interview with James Lloyd, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011; Email, Russell 

Davis to MG Michael Walsh, May 1, 2011, Subject: BPNM update 1730 hrs, 1 

May.

109 Email, Russell Davis to MG Michael Walsh, May 1, 2011, Subject: BPNM 

update 1930 hrs, 1 May; Email, Larry Barnett to MG Michael Walsh, May 1, 

2011, Subject: SCT denies Missouri’s request!; Email, Russell Davis to MG 

Michael Walsh, May 1, 2011, Subject: BPNM update 2130 hrs, 1 May Interview with Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, by Charles Camillo, August 24, 2011.

110 Email, Bill Frederick to Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, May 2, 2011, Subject: 

Cairo Update; Interview with Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, by Charles Camillo, 

August 24, 2011; Email, Bill Frederick to Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, May 2, 
299

Notes

2011, Subject: Cairo model; Interview with Bill Frederick, by Charles Camillo, 

August 24, 2011.

111 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 2, 0742-1030; MVM Flood April 2011: Situation 

Report No. 11.

112 Interview with James Lloyd, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011; Camillo, Flood 

Notes, 0920.

113 Interview with James Lloyd, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011; Email, Jon 

Wilson to Charles Camillo, July 7, 2011, Subject: Specifi c questions – MVM 

fl ood history.

114 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 2, 1030.

115 Ibid., 1140.

116 Ibid., 1140.

117 Interview with James Lloyd, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011.

118 Interview with James Lloyd, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011; Email, Jon 

Wilson to Charles Camillo, July 7, 2011, Subject: Specifi c questions – MVM 

fl ood history.

119 Camillo, Flood Notes, 1315.

120 Ibid., May, 1100.

121 Interview with James Lloyd, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011; Email, Jon 

Wilson to Charles Camillo, July 7, 2011, Subject: Specifi c questions – MVM 

fl ood history; Camillo, Flood Notes, May 2, 2040.

122 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 2, 2040; Mississippi River Commission, 2011 

MR&T Flood Report, 10; Interview with James Lloyd, by Charles Camillo, 

June 23, 2011; Email, Jon Wilson to Charles Camillo, July 7, 2011, Subject: 

Specifi c questions – MVM fl ood history.

123 Interview with James Lloyd, by Charles Camillo, June 23, 2011 (This is the 

source for the exchange between Lloyd and Reichling); Camillo, Flood Notes, 

May 2, 2030-2125.

124 Interview with Milus Wallace, by Charles Camillo, November 11, 2011. 

 Stephen Deere, “Farmers in Missouri fl oodway race to salvage growing 

season,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 24, 2011; Mary Delach Leonard, “Back 

to the spillway: In Dorena, Mo., the breach of the Birds Point levee swept away 

what time had speared,” St. Louis Beacon, July 7, 2011; Joseph Barrett, “After 

the Flood, Farmers Try to Dig In,” The Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2011.

125 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 2, 2200-2330; Ibid, May 3, 0230-0630.

126 Ibid., May 3, 0650-0800; Ibid., May 5, 0800.

127 Ibid., May 3, 0800-1120; Ibid., May 3, 1230; Ibid., May 5, 1435.

128 Stephen Deere, “Farmers in Missouri fl oodway race to salvage growing 

season,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 24, 2011; Mary Delach Leonard, “Back 

to the spillway: In Dorena, Mo., the breach of the Birds Point levee swept away 
300

Divine Providence

what time had speared, “ St. Louis Beacon, July 7, 2011; Joseph Barrett, ‘After 

the Flood, Farmers Try to Dig In,” The Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2011.

129 Camillo, Flood Notes, May, 1635; Camillo, Low Water Inspection Notes.

Chapter Three

130 Camillo, Flood Notes.

131 “Mississippi Record Flood Crest Passes Memphis,” Engineer News-Record, 

p. 703-5; Mississippi River Commission, Special Report of the Mississippi 

River Commission on Revision of Plans for Improvement of Navigation and 

Flood Control of the Mississippi River, September 28, 1927, App. A, pp. 125-7; 

“Mississippi Record Flood Crest Passing Vicksburg,” Engineering NewsRecord 98:18 (May 5, 1927): 741-745; “Mississippi Foods Now Threaten 

Southern Louisiana,” Engineering News-Record 98:19 (May 12, 1927): 789-

791; “Failure of Levees in Atchafalaya Basin Spread Mississippi Flood,” 

Engineering News-Record 98:20 (May 19, 1927): 829-831; “Levee Failure at 

McCrea Flood region Between Atchafalaya and Mississippi Rivers,” Engineering News-Record 98:21 (May 26, 1927)

132 House Document 90, 70th Cong., 1st sess., Senate Executive Document No. 49, 

32nd Cong., 1st sess., 1852; Andrew A. Humphreys And Henry L Abbot, Report 

Upon The Physics and Hydraulics Of The Mississippi River; Upon The Protection Of The Alluvial Region Against Overfl ow; Upon The Deepening Of The 

Mouths; Based Upon Surveys And Investigations Made Under the Acts Of Congress Directing The Topographical And Hydrographical Survey Of The Delta 

Of The Mississippi River, With Such Investigations As Might Lead To Determine 

The Most Practical Plan For Securing It From Inundation, And The Best Mode 

of Deepening The Channels At The Mouths Of The River, Professional Papers of 

the Corps of Topographical Engineers, U.S. Army, No. 13 (Washington, D.C.: 

GPO, 1876).

133 “Boeuf Floodway for Mississippi Flood Control,” Engineering News-Record, 

September 5, 1929, 379-383; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Flood Control, Control of Floods in the Alluvial Valley of the Lower 

Mississippi River (71st Cong., 3rd sess.) March 3, 1931, House Document No. 

798, p. 2, (Hereafter cited as House Document #798); “Today in the Mississippi 

Flood Area: The Cypress Creek Diversion Down the Boeuf River,” Engineering 

News-Record, March 29, 1928, 512-516.

134 Mississippi River Commission, Special Report of the Mississippi River Commission on Revision of Plans for Improvement of Navigation and Flood Control 

of the Mississippi River, September 28, 1927, pp 86-91.

135 Wooten, “Washington Notes,” Jan. 26, 1928, p. 169; Jadwin quote from House 

Document 90, p. 9; Mississippi River Commission, Special Report, pp. syllabus, 73, 81-90; Frank, pp. 234-236; Reuss, Designing the Bayous, p. 118; 

Reid, Flood Control in the Mississippi Valley, H.R. Report 1072, pp. 11-16, 70, 

110-114.
301

Notes

136 U.S. Congress, An act for the control of fl oods on the Mississippi River and its 

tributaries, and for other purposes, PL 70-391 (70th Cong., 1st Sess.); “Provisions for Flood Control Under New Law,” Engineering News-Record 100:21 

(May 24, 1928): 824-825; Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, 179.

137 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Flood Control, Opinion of the Attorney General in Regard to Certain Provisions of the Mississippi 

Flood Control Act of May 15, 1928, 71st Cong., 1st sess., July 19, 1929, Committee Document #2, 10-12. (Hereafter cited as Committee Document #2).

138 Letter, Schoenberger to Ransdell, Aug. 28, 1928; L. Wallace, Eng. Council, to 

Hoover, May 20, 1928; Kemper, Floods in the Alluvial Valley, p. 184; Camillo 

and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, pp. 178-180.

139 Committee Document #2, 1-6. The brief was signed by Representatives Riley 

J. Wilson (D-LA), William J. Driver (D-AR), Jere Cooper (D-TN), William V. 

Gregory (D-KY)Dewey Short (R-MO), Hubert D. Stephens (D-MS), Thaddeus H. Caraway (D-AR), Will M. Whittington (D-MS) and Senators Frederick 

M. Sackett (R-KY), Joseph E. Ransdell (D-LA), Harry B. Hawes (D-MO) and 

Kenneth D. McKellar (D-TN).

140 Ibid., 13-16.

141 Kincaid v. United States, 35 F.(2d) 235, See also Reuss, Designing the Bayous, 

130-133.

142 Letter, Jadwin to Reinecke, Jul 15, 1929; Letter, Jadwin to Duffy, Jul. 17, 1929.

143 “Boeuf Floodway Suit to Go to Trial,” Engineering News-Record (Aug. 15, 

1929): 272; “Judge Rules for Landowners in Flood-Control Project,” Engineering News-Record (Oct. 17, 1929): 631; U.S. vs. Col. Frank P. Stubbs, et. al., No. 

1809 (W. La. Dist. Ct., 1929); Good to AG, Nov. 12, 1929; Charles F. Cole to 

AG, Nov. 7, 1929; Reuss, Designing the Bayous, pp. 130-131.

144 “Confl icting Testimony Given in Floodway Suit,” Engineering News-Record

(Oct. 24): 668-9; “Flood-Control Work in Boeuf Basin Is Enjoined by Court,” 

Engineering News-Record (Dec. 19, 1929): 983-4; Decree and Order of Injunction No. 335, 35 F. 2d (W. La. Dist. Ct., 1930); Reuss, Designing the Bayous, 

pp. 131-133; Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, pp. 182-183.

145 Kincaid v. United States, 35 F.(2d) 235; “Flood-Control Work in Boeuf basin is 

Enjoined by Court,” Engineering News-Record, December 29, 1929, 983-984; 

“A Far Reaching Decision,” Engineering News-Record, December 19, 1929, 

951.

146 AG Opinion, pp. 13-16; Letters to Hoover from Wilson, Tilman Parks, Pearl 

Oldfi eld, Otis Wingo, Whittington, and Caraway, Sept. 20-21, 1929; Telegram, 

Hoover to W.J. Driver, Sept. 20, 1929; “Engineering Features of Flood-Control 

Plan Not Subject to Change by President,” Engineering News-Record (Aug. 1, 

1929): 186-7; Wooton, “Hoover Willing to Hold Up Doubtful Flood-Control 

Work,” Engineering News-Record (Sept. 12, 1929): 432; quote from “The 
302

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President Acts on Mississippi Flood Control,” Engineering News-Record (Sept. 

19, 1929): 441; Reuss, Designing the Bayous, p. 130.

147 Norman R. Moore, Improvement of the Lower Mississippi River and Tributaries, 1931-1972, (Vicksburg: Mississippi River Commission, 1973), pp. 

149-150; “Flood Control Being Tested on the Mississippi,” Engineering NewsRecord, February 11, 1937, 222-225.; House Flood Control Hearings, 1930, V: 

1283; Lytle Brown, “Mississippi Flood Control,” Engineering News-Record, 

February 6, 1930 230-231; Lytle, Brown, “Discussion on Cutoffs,” Transactions of the ASCE, 113 (1948): 22, (Discussion of Gerard H. Matthes, “Paper 

No. 2329, Mississippi River Cutoffs, With Discussion by Messrs. W. E. Elam, 

C. L. Hall, H. D. Vogel, Harry N. Pharr, Lytle Brown, Anson Marston, E. J. 

Williams, Jr., and Eugene A. Graves, and Gerard Matthes,” Transactions of the 

ASCE, 113 (1948): 1-39.) Hereafter cited as Transactions of the ASCE, 1948. 

In the ENR article, Brown indicated that any modifi cations to the plan would 

secure dependable, affordable and timely protection based on a possible combination of levees, fl oodways and reservoirs.

148 W.E. Elam, Speeding Floods to the Sea or The Evolution of Flood Control 

Engineering on the Mississippi River, (New York: The Hobson Book Press, 

1946), pp. 45-54, “Flood Control Through Slope Correction,” and “Flood 

Control with Special Reference to the Mississippi River” reprinted in Speeding 

Floods, pp. 119-160; Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, pp. 187-188.

149 Jadwin, Mississippi River Commission, and Elam quoted in Elam, Speeding 

Floods, pp. 54-61, 137-145. The commission also rejected a cutoff plan, which 

“has recently been brought up,” probably by Todd. These pronouncements 

came despite progress made when the Navigation Board suggested studying the 

use of dredging for fl ood control by lowering the slope, for example through 

cutoffs. Because of the reigning opinion, Elam believed there was no chance of 

infl uencing the investigation of the Special Board then ongoing, but felt ethically bound to provide advanced notice of his articles. He convinced James S. 

Allen, chief engineer of the Mississippi Levee Board, to present the articles 

during his statement to the Special Board. After the hearing, Jadwin asked how 

many years Elam had worked on the river. “I remarked that I had been on the 

river for more than twenty years and that in my fi rst few years I knew more 

about the river than at the time I wrote those papers,” Elam wrote, perhaps 

playing off the Mark Twain adage that he was surprised how much his father 

had learned in seven years. Jadwin said he planned on appointing a board to 

consider the matter, though no such board ever came into being, and the Special 

Board went on to condemn cutoffs as heartily as the Jadwin plan. A few months 

later, Elam published his articles to the praise of Williams and Coleman and 

general approval of Col. Charles Townsend, former commission president.

150 Elam, Speeding Floods, p. 61; Memo for the President, MRC, Yucatan Bend 

Cut-Off, Jun. 10, 1932; D. Persons, Memo, Yucatan Bend Cut-off, Shift of 

Navigation to, Jan. 22, 1934; Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, 

pp. 188-189. Discharge through the cutoff increased from 10 percent in 1930, to 
303

Notes

40 percent by January 1932, to 58 percent by mid-April with a peak of 850,000 

cubic feet per second. Observations showed gradual enlargement of the channel with a rapid change in the “controlling” section from January to April 1932. 

Cross-sections showed great variability in slope, with very little change above 

and a slight increase immediately below the cut, but seemed to indicate that 

very little change or even a slight decrease further downstream. A comparison 

of readings from 1930 to 1932 showed lowering of stages above and a slight 

increase below, with no change fi ve or six miles upstream or downstream. 

Based on what were the best observations of a cutoff to that time, it appeared 

that changes to stages were very slight and localized to the vicinity of the 

cutoff, and that there were no major impacts to navigation. By September 9, 

1932, the U.S. Lighthouse Willow reported navigation was established on the 

cutoff and that around Yucatan Bend discontinued.

151 “Mature Consideration Urged for Changes in Flood-Control Plans,” and “Straitening Channel Proposed as Mississippi Flood Solution,” Engineering NewsRecord (Oct. 23, 1930): 665-666 and 700-701.

152 Letter, Pick to Ferguson, Jun. 15, 1928; Ferguson, Memo for Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors on Control of Mississippi River Floods, Nov. 22, 

1930; Matthes, Transactions of the ASCE, 1948, pp. 28-30; Camillo and Pearcy, 

Upon Their Shoulders, pp. 189-193.

153 Ferguson, Memorandum on Control of Mississippi River Floods; Matthes, 

Transactions of the ASCE, 1948, pp. 28-30; Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their 

Shoulders, pp. 189-193.

154 Pick to Ferguson, Dec. 10, 1930; Matthes, Transactions of the ASCE, 1948, 

pp. 30-31; Jackson, “Flood Control,” pp. 107-108.

155 Elam, pp. 84-91, Ferguson quote on 91; Control of Floods in the Alluvial Valley 

of the Lower Mississippi River, pp. 13-14; OCE Special Orders No. 16, Mar. 1, 

1932; Matthes, Transactions of the ASCE, 1948, pp. 22-35.

156 Ferguson to U.S. TAG, Consideration for appointment, Mar. 14, 1929; Thompson quote from J.B. Tiffany, ed., History of the Waterways Experiment Station. (Vicksburg: Waterways Experiment Station, 1968): IV-2; Meigs O. Frost, 

“River Control by New Principles Is Devised,” New Orleans States (Sun., Jul. 

9, 1933): 1; Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, pp. 203-205.

157 Ferguson, Cut-Offs, Jun. 3, 1932; Use of Gravel, Jun. 18, 1932; Revetment, Jul. 

2, 1932; Closing Secondary Channels, Jul. 2, 1932; Revetments, Jul. 9, 1932; 

Dredging, Jul. 12, 1932; Effective Dredging, Oct. 31, 1932; Outlets, Nov. 4, 

1932; General, Dec. 7, 1932; Dredging, Dec. 7, 1932; Memo, Results of Conference of July 5, 1932 re Revetment and Channel Adjustments in Vicksburg 

District, Jul. 7, 1932; Matthes, Transactions of the ASCE, 1948, pp. 29-30.

158 Matthes, Transactions of the ASCE, 1948, pp 3-15, 28-30, 33; quote from Frost, 

“River Control,” p. 1; “Dredging of Cut-Off in Mississippi River Begun,” Engineering News-Record (Oct. 13, 1932): 451; Schweizer, Diamond Point Cutoff, 

Jan. 9, 1933; Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, pp. 107-210.
304

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159 Mississippi River Commission, Annual Report, 1935, 1645; House Flood 

Control Hearings, April 1-13, 1935, 76; Clemens, “Straightening the Father 

of Waters,” Engineering News-Record, February 20, 1936, 276; U.S. Waterways Experiment Station, “Studies of Existing Cut-Offs and Atchafalaya River 

Improvements,” Technical Memorandum No. 92-7, dated October 5, 1937; See 

also U.S. Waterways Experiment Station, “Experiment to Determine the Effects 

of Proposed Dredged Cut-Offs in the Mississippi River,” April 15, 1932; U.S. 

Waterways Experiment Station, “Experiment to Determine the Effects of a 

Cut-Off at Tarpley Neck”; U.S. Waterways Experiment Station, “Experiment to 

Determine the Effects of Various Cutoffs in the Greenville Bends”; U.S. Waterways Experiment Station, “Experiment to Determine the Superfl ood Flowline 

of the Mississippi River in the Vicinity of Slough Landing Neck.”

160 Committee Document #1, 1935, 21-23; House Flood Control Hearings, April 

1 to 13, 1935, 3, 13. The commission did not recommend modifi cations to the 

project above the Arkansas River despite the commission’s early resistance to 

the Birds Point-New Madrid fl oodway. By the time of the report the commission considered the fl oodway a fait accompli.

161 Ibid.; William Willingham, Civil Works, 1933-1941: From Depression to War, 

44-46; Reuss, Designing the Bayous, 181-185.

162 House Flood Control Hearings, April 1-13, 1935. Jacobs’ testimony can be 

found on pages 258-267; Kemper’s on page 774. Statements from the Board of 

Mississippi Levee Commissioners and the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta levee board 

can be found on pages 217-219. The latter from the Louisiana Board of State 

Engineers is quoted in Reuss, Designing the Bayous, 181.

163 House Document #359, 15; House Flood Control Hearings, 73rd Cong., 

2nd sess., on H.R. 8146 and H.R. 8048, February 27, 1934.

164 House Flood Control Hearings, February 27, 1934, 18-21; ibid., April 1-13, 

1935, 818-829 (Whittington statement).

165 House Flood Control Hearings, April 1-13, 1935, 3-8. (Markham testimony).

166 Ibid., 75-78, 85-96. (Ferguson testimony).

167 Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, pp 226-232.

168 Ibid, 233-234; “Superfl ood Devastates Lower Ohio and Threatens Mississippi 

Levee System,” Engineering News-Record, February 4, 1937, 151; “Mississippi 

Flood Fighting Begins,” Engineering News-Record, February 4, 1937, 205.

169 Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, 234; Matthes to Mr. Meigs O. 

Frost, Mar. 6, 1937; Ferguson, Increasing the Flood Carrying Capactiy of the 

Mississippi River from White River to Cairo, Oct. 30, 1937.

170 House Committee on Flood Control, Comprehensive Flood Control Plan For 

Ohio and Lower Mississippi Rivers, Committee Document No. 1 (75th Cong., 

1st Sess.) April 28, 1937; House Flood Control Hearings, April 6, 1937.

171 House Document No. 359.
305

Notes

172 Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, 214; House of Representatives, 

Mississippi River between Cairo, Ill., and Baton Rouge, La., House Document 

No. 509, (78th Cong., 2nd Sess.), March 22, 1944.

173 House Document No. 509; Charles Senour, “New Project for Stabilizing and 

Deepening Lower Mississippi River,” Transactions of the ASCE, Vol. 112, 

1947, pp 277-300.

174 Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, 208; Quote from Matthes, Memo 

for Mr. Meigs O. Frost; Moore, Improvement of the Lower Mississippi River 

and Tributaries, 43-47.

Chapter Four

175 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 2, 1625, Interview with Robert Simrall, by Charles 

Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011; Interview with Kent Parrish, by Charles Camillo, 

Nov. 8, 2011. All gage information for this entire chapter was obtained from 

www.rivergages.com.

176 Interview with Robert Simrall, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

177 Peter Nimrod, 2011 Flood Report: A Success Story, (Mississippi Levee Board) 

June 30, 2011; Interview with Kent Parrish, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011; 

Interview with Chuck Mendrop, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011; Interview 

with Lanny Barfi eld, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 9, 2011; Interview with Peter 

Nimrod, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 10, 2011.

178 Interview with Jimmy Coldiron, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 9, 2011; Interview 

with Robert Stokes, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 9, 2011; Interview with Kent Parrish, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

179 Interview with Jimmy Coldiron, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 9, 2011; Interview 

with Kent Parrish, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011; Interview with Lanny 

Barfi eld, by Charles Camillo, Nov.9, 2011.

180 Robert Simrall, Memorandum to CEMVD-PD-W, Subject: Approval for a 

major deviation from the approved Water Control Plan at Muddy Bayou Control Structure is requested, April 27, 2011; Interview with Chuck Mendrop, 

by Charles Camillo, Nov 8. 2011; Interview with Lanny Barfi eld, by Charles 

Camillo, Nov. 9, 2011.

181 Robert Simrall, Memorandum to CEMVD-PD-W, Subject: Approval for 

a major deviation from the approved Water Control Plan at Muddy Bayou 

Control Structure is requested, April 27, 2011; Interview with Robert Simrall, 

by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011; Interview with Ron Goldman, by Charles 

Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

182 Ibid., Interview with Col. Jeffrey Eckstein, by Charles Camillo, Nov.8, 2011; 

Interview with Kent Parrish, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011; Interview with 

Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, by Charles Camillo, Aug. 24, 2011, Robert Simrall, Memorandum to CEMVD-PD-W, Subject: Approval for a major deviation 

from the approved Water Control Plan at Muddy Bayou Control Structure is 
306

Divine Providence

requested, April 27, 2011; formal approval was granted in a memorandum for 

Maj. Gen, Michael Walsh to commander, Vicksburg District, Subject: Approval 

for a major deviation from the approved Water Control Plan at the Muddy 

Bayou Control Structure, dated April 28, 2011.

183 Interview with Peter Nimrod, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 10, 2011; Interview 

with Jimmy Coldiron, by Charles Camillo, May 9, 2011.

184 “Eagle Lake to rise ‘up on its banks,” The Vicksburg Post, April 30, 2011; MVK 

Spring Flood 2, Situation Report No. 4; Interview with Col. Jeffrey Eckstein, by 

Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

185 Vicksburg District, MVK Spring Flood 2, Situation Report No. 5; Interview 

with Jimmy Coldiron, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 9, 2011.

186 Interview with Robert Simrall, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

187 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 2, 1625, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Little Rock 

District, After Action Flood Report, Spring 2011 Event, September 2011, 1-8, 

Email, Ron Bell to Charles Shadie, et. al., November 19, 2011, Subject: Question on Ark/White.

188 Vicksburg District, Post Flood Report: Flood of 1973, 1973, pp. 3-4, 7-8, A-8, 

A-11; MVK Spring Flood 2, Situation Report No. 8; Interview with Col. Jeffrey 

Eckstein, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

189 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Flood Control on the Lower 

Mississippi River, 77th Cong., 1st sess., House Document No. 359, pp. 3-4, 

37-41; Camillo and Pearcy, Upon Their Shoulders, 243-244.

190 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Mississippi River and 

Tributaries Project, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 21 May 1964, House Document No. 

308, 1964, Vol. 1; Moore, Improvement of the Lower Mississippi, pp. 160-161. 

Charles Camillo, “Mississippi River and Tributaries Project: Backwater Areas,” 

April, 2008 . The Steele Bayou structure has a design capacity of 19,000 cfs, 

but the structure has passed up 50,000 cfs during certain fl ood events.

191 Vicksburg District, Post Flood Report: Flood of 1973, 1973, pp. 3-4, 7-8, A-8, 

A-11.

192 Interview with Ron Goldman, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

193 Interview with Peter Nimrod, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 10, 2011; Peter Nimrod, 

2011 Flood Report: A Success Story, June 30, 2011.

194 Interview with Ron Goldman, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011; Interview with 

Peter Nimrod, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 10, 2011.

195 MVK Spring Flood 2, Situation Report No. 8; MVK Spring Flood 2, Situation Report No. 9; Robert Simrall, Memorandum to CEMVD-PD-W, Subject: 

Approval for a major deviation from the approved Water Control Plan at Muddy 

Bayou Control Structure is requested, April 27, 2011; Peter Nimrod, 2011 Flood 

Report: A Success Story, June 30, 2011.
307

Notes

196 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 4, 0800; Interview with Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, 

by Charles Camillo, August 24, 2011.

197 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 4, 0945; Col. Jeffrey Eckstein, “CG Brief, Yazoo 

Backwater,” May 4, 2011.

198 Peter Nimrod, 2011 Flood Report: A Success Story, June 30, 2011; Interview 

with Peter Nimrod, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 10, 2011; Letter from Peter 

Nimrod to Col. Jeffrey Eckstein, re: Request for Corps to assume leadership of 

YBW Levee Flood Fight Operations, dated May 4, 2011.

199 Interview with Kent Parrish, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011; Interview with 

Col. Jeffrey Eckstein, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

200 Peter Nimrod, 2011 Flood Report: A Success Story, June 30, 2011; Interview 

with Robert Simrall, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011; Interview with Kent 

Parrish, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

201 Interview with Robert Simrall, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

202 Col. Jeffrey Eckstein, “CG Brief, Yazoo Backwater,” May 4, 2011; Camillo, 

Flood Notes, May 4, 2100.

203 Ibid.; Formal approval was granted in a memorandum from Maj. Gen. Michael 

Walsh to Col. Jeffrey Eckstein, Subject: Yazoo Backwater Levee (MR&T), 

dated May 4, 2011.

204 Interview with Col. Jeffrey Eckstein, Nov. 8, 2011; Email, Lamar Jenkins to 

Charles Camillo, Nov. 23, 2011, Subject: YBW Armoring Project.

205 MVK Spring Flood 2, Situation Report Nos. 13-16.

206 Campbell Robertson, “In Mississippi Delta, All Eyes on Swelling River,” The 

New York Times, May 6.

207 Camillo, Flood Notes, May, 4, 1500; Ibid., May 9, 0800.

208 Ibid., May 10, 0800; Ibid., May 11, 0800; Ibid., May 15, 0800.

209 Vicksburg District, “ Problem areas noted on West Bank MRL Arkansas and 

Louisiana during Spring 2011 Ms. River Flood Fight II (April - May 2011), 

.n.d.; Interview with Bradley Martin, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 28, 2011; Interview with Eric Woerner, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 16, 2011. Information for the 

paragraph was also pulled from multiple SITREP reports spanning from May 4 

to May 23.

210 Vicksburg District, “ Problem areas noted on West Bank MRL Arkansas and 

Louisiana during Spring 2011 Ms. River Flood Fight II (April - May 2011), 

.n.d.; Interview with Kent Parrish, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011. Information for the paragraph was also pulled from multiple SITREP reports spanning 

from May 4 to May 23.

211 Interview with Bradley Martin, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 28, 2011; Interview 

with Kent Parrish, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.
308

Divine Providence

212 Interview with Bradley Martin, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 28, 2011; Vicksburg 

District, MVK Spring Flood 2, Situation Reports No. 15, No. 16 and No. 17.

213 The depiction of the fl ood fi ght at Francis was compiled from the following 

interviews: Interview with Bradley Martin, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 28, 2011; 

Interview with Peter Nimrod, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 10, 2011; Interview 

with Lanny Barfi eld, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 9, 2011; Interview with Chuck 

Mendrop, by Charles Camillo, Nov 8, 2011.

214 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 10, 1030.

215 The depiction of the fl ood fi ght at Winterville was compiled from the following 

interviews: Interview with Lanny Barfi eld, Nov. 9, 2011; Interview with Peter 

Nimrod, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 10, 2011; Interview with Chuck Mendrop, 

by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

216 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 13, 1400; Interview with Chuck Mendrop, by 

Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011;

217 Interview with Ron Goldman, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

218 Proceedings of the Mississippi River Commission, 386th Session, Testimony 

of Peter Nimrod before the Mississippi River Commission, Lake Providence, 

Louisiana, August 17, 2011. ( The discussion between Nimrod and Angel is 

contained in the audiotapes of the Lake Providence hearing; Interview with 

Peter Nimrod, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 10, 2011.

219 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 14, 0800.

220 Interview with Ron Goldman, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

221 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 15, 0800.

222 Ibid., May 17, 0800; Interview with Peter Nimrod, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 

10, 2011; Interview with Lanny Barfi eld, by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011.

223 MVK Spring Flood 2, Situation Report No. 22. Interview with Chuck Mendrop, 

by Charles Camillo, Nov. 8, 2011, MVK Spring Flood 2, Situation Report Nos. 

23-26.

Chapter Five

224 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 2, 0800; Interview with Edward Belk, by Charles 

Camillo, May 4, 2011.

225 Reuss, Designing the Bayous, 37-52. Reuss’s study is unmatched in its research 

and discussion of the history of the development of engineering controls on the 

Atchafalaya and lower Mississippi Rivers.

226 Major Clarke S. Smith, “Report on Spillways, Vicinity of New Orleans, LA,” 

dated October 8, 1914; Elliott, Improvement of the Lower Mississippi River, II: 

317; Reuss, Designing the Bayous, 98; Kemper, Floods in the Valley of the Mississippi, 37.
309

Notes

227 Reuss, Designing the Bayous, 97-99; John Klorer, “The Flood Problem of 

the Lower Mississippi River,” Transactions of the ASCE, LXXXVIII (1924): 

1007-1014.

228 Report of the Board of State Engineers of the State of Louisiana, 1924-1926, 

84-85.

229 Ibid., Proceedings of the Mississippi River Commission, 1925, 1922-1925, session 167 (February 25-26, 1925), Reuss, Designing the Bayous, 101. Wilson’s 

bill was authorized as Public Law 69-134 on April 17, 1926.

230 Roger McWhorter, “Breaching the Levee Below New Orleans,” Engineering 

News-Record 98:18 (May 5, 1927): 742-5; Proceedings of the Mississippi River 

Commission, April 19-29, 1927: 4355, 4367-4369; Flood Control Hearings, 

1927-1928: 2066-2075. For more on the negotiations that took place among city 

leaders, St. Bernard Parish leaders, and the governor’s offi ce, see Barry, Rising 

Tide pp. 213-258.

231 Daniel, Deep’n as it Come, pp. 69-73; Roger McWhorter, Breaching the Levee 

Below New Orleans,” Engineering News-Record 98:18 (May 5, 1927): 745; 

Shaw, “Spillway Gives Relief at New Orleans,” Engineering News-Record 

98:22 (June 2, 1927): 912; Cowdrey, Land’s End, 36-7; Frank, Development of 

the Federal Program for Flood Control, pp. 218-219; Klorer quoted in W.W. 

DeBarard, “Today in the Mississippi Flood Area: IV. What New Orleans Thinks 

of Flood Protection,” Engineering News-Record 99:25 (Dec. 22, 1927): 1004; 

Spillways on the Lower Mississippi River, House Document 95 (70th Cong., 1st 

Sess.): 1-10, quote on 22; Kemper, Rebellious River, pp. 116-118.

232 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 2, 1625; Ibid., May 3, 0746; Mississippi Valley 

Division, Water Control Manual, Morganza Floodway, April 1984, Revised 

February 2000, pp. 2-5; Jindal and Minsky quotes taken from “Deep South 

braces for rising Mississippi River,” The Messenger-Online. May 3.

233 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 3, 0800.

234 Memorandum from Col. Edward R. Fleming to President, Mississippi River 

Commission, Subject: Bonnet Carré Spillway Operation, May 3, 2011; New 

Orleans District, Spring 2011 High Water: Situation Report No. 40; Emory 

Kemp, “Stemming the Tide: Design and Operation of the Bonnet Carré Spillway and Floodway,” Essays in Public Works History, December 1990, No. 17. 

Kemp’s essay on the Bonnet Carré spillway is an excellent starting point for 

those interested in a more detailed history of the structure.

235 Memorandum from Walter Baumy to Commander, New Orleans District, Subject: Operation of Bonnet Carré Spillway, May 3, 2011.

236 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 4, 2030; New Orleans District, Morganza Spillway 

Briefi ng, May 4, 2011; Water Control Manual, Morganza Floodway, pp. 1-14; 

Interview with Christopher Accardo, by Charles Camillo, December 6, 2011.

237 Interview with Col. Edward Fleming, by Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011; 

Interview with Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, by Charles Camillo, August 24, 2011.
310

Divine Providence

238 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 5, 0930; Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Michael 

Walsh to Col. Edward Fleming, Subject: Bonnet Carré Spillway Operation, 

May 5, 2011; Memorandum from Col. Edward Fleming to President, Mississippi River Commission, Subject: Morganza Control Structure and Floodway 

Operation, May 6, 2011 (This document contains Baumy engineering assessment as an attachment); Interview with Walter Baumy, by Charles Camillo, 

December 10, 2011.

239 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 6; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2011 Flood 

Response, Decision Brief to the President of the MRC, May 6, 2011 (This document is a PowerPoint presentation containing Fleming’s Briefi ng to Walsh on 

the Morganza operation).

240 Ibid.

241 Email, MG Michael Walsh to MG William Grisoli, et al., May 7, 2011, Subject: 

Morganza Floodway Execution; Email, MG Bo Temple to MG Michael Walsh, 

May 7, 2011, Subject: Morganza Floodway Execution.

242 House of Representatives, Mississippi River and Tributaries with respect to Old 

River Control, House Document No. 478 ( 83r Cong., 2d Sess.) July 26, 1954, 

pp.14-21; Reuss, Designing the Bayous, 209-238, 243-247; Ben Fatheree, The 

First 75 Years: History of Hydraulic Engineering at the Waterways Experiment 

Station, (ERDC 2004), 99-102; 177-179.

243 Walter Baumy, White Paper: Mock Scenarios for Passing the 2011 Mississippi 

River Flood, May 7, 2011.

244 Ibid., Reuss, Designing the Bayous, 242-245.

245 Baumy, White Paper: Mock Scenarios for Passing the 2011 Mississippi River 

Flood, May 7, 2011; New Orleans District, Flood of 1974: Post Flood Report, 

37-38; New Orleans District, Flood of 1983: Post Flood Report; 29-31; Interview with Walter Baumy, by Charles Camillo, December 9, 2011; Interview 

with Russell Beauvais, by Charles Camillo, December 12, 2011. Email, William 

Veatch to Charles Camillo, January 11, 2011, Subject: Overbank Structure.

246 Interview with Stuart Waits, by Charles Camillo, Dec. 6, 2011; Interview with 

Ted Eilts, by Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011; Flood of 1973: Post Flood 

Report, 65-80. Various SITREP reports were used to defi ne the sectors.

247 Interview with Stuart Waits, by Charles Camillo, December 6, 2011; Interview 

with Ted Eilts, by Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011.

248 New Orleans District, Spring 2011 High Water: Situation Report No. 48; Interview with Stuart Waits, by Charles Camillo, December 6, 2011; Interview with 

Christopher Accardo, by Charles Camillo, December 6, 2011.

249 Interview with Col. Edward Fleming, by Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011.

250 Email, Gregory Fey to Michael Stack, May 9, 2011, Subject: Morganza Spillway Opening – Request for Information; Email, Steven Wilson to Christopher 
311

Notes

Accardo, et al., May 9, 2011, Subject: Morganza Spillway Opening – Request 

for Information.

251 Interview with Christopher Accardo, by Charles Camillo, December 6, 2011; 

Interview with Col. Edward Fleming, by Charles Camillo, December 9, 2010.

252 This is entirely the opinion of the author. Maj. Gen. Walsh maintains that his 

motivation was to be slow, deliberate, and transparent to ensure the district and 

MRC were not being reactive, unnerved or uncoordinated.

253 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 9, 0900; Ibid., May 16, 0800;

254 Email, MG Michael Walsh to COL Edward Fleming, May 9, 2011, Subject: 

Pls break down the; Interview with Col. Edward Fleming, by Charles Camillo, 

December 7, 2011; “US Army Corps Decision to Open Morganza Spillway 

Could Come Today,” KATC-TV Online, May 9 (Jindal quote).

255 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 11, 0800; Interview with Col. Edward Fleming, by 

Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011;

256 Ibid.; Email, MG Bo Temple, to MG Michael Walsh, et al., May 9, 2011; Subject: Morganza Floodway Operation.

257 Water Control Plan, Morganza Floodway, pp 2-7; Interview with Will Veatch, 

by Charles Camillo, December 6, 2011; Email, William Veatch to Charles 

Camillo, December 9, 2011, Subject: Stage-Discharge at Morganza; Interview 

with Walter Baumy, by Charles Camillo, December 9, 2011; Flood of 1983: 

Post Flood Report, 37. Prior to 1963 and the completion of the Old River control structures, the discharge at Red River Landing was used rather than Tarbert 

Landing.

258 Water Control Manual, Morganza Floodway, 1-7; Walter Baumy, White Paper: 

Morganza Control Structure, Operational Assessment – Overtopping Situation, 

May 13, 2011; Interview with Russell Beauvais, by Charles Camillo, December 

12, 2011.

259 Interview with Col. Edward Fleming, by Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011; 

Email, COL Edward Fleming to MG Michael Walsh, May 13, 2011, Subject: 

Morganza; Email, MG Michael Walsh to COL Edward Fleming, May 13, 2011, 

Subject: Morganza.

260 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 13, 0800; Ibid., 1500; Operation Watershed: Emergency Management Briefi ng, 0800, May 10, Ibid., May 31, 2011 (These PowerPoint briefi ngs contains information about stages and discharges).

261 Interview with Nancy Powell, by Charles Camillo, December 6, 2011; Interview with Will Veatch, by Charles Camillo, December 6; Interview with Col. 

Edward Fleming by Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011; Interview with Walter 

Baumy, by Charles Camillo, December 10, 2011; Memorandum from Maj. Gen. 

Walsh to Commander, New Orleans District, Subject: Morganza Floodway 

Operation, May 13, 2011, 1500 hours.

262 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 14, 0800.
312

Divine Providence

263 Interview with Will Veatch, by Charles Camillo, December 6, 2011; Camillo, 

Flood Notes, May 14, 0800.

264 Interview with Col. Edward Fleming, by Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011.

265 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 14, 1200; Interview with Maj. Gen. Michael Walsh, 

by Charles Camillo, August 24, 2011; Interview with Russell Beauvais, December 12, 2011; Interview with Walter Baumy, by Charles Camillo, December 10, 

2011.

266 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 14, 1215. All quotes and descriptions from the decision meeting at the Morganza structure were taking from personal notes.

267 Ibid., 1245.

268 Ibid., 1430.

269 Ibid., 1500.

270 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 15, 0800; Ibid., May 15, 1245; Interview with 

Stuart Waits, by Charles Camillo

271 Flood of 1973: Post Flood Report, 126-132; Interview with Col. Edward 

Fleming, by Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011; Interview with Christopher 

Accardo, by Charles Camillo, December 6, 2011; Interview with Ted Eilts, by 

Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011.

272 Interview with Col. Edward Fleming, by Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011; 

Claire Taylor, “Rising tide may bring fl oods to Morgan City,” Lafayette Daily 

Advertiser – Online, May 4, 2011, (Councilman quote).

273 Interview with Ted Eilts, by Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011.

274 Ibid., Interview with Walter Baumy, by Charles Camillo, December 10, 2011.

275 Interview with Col. Edward Fleming, by Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011; 

Camillo, Flood Notes, May 15, 1245.

276 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 15 (complete entry); Interview with Col. Edward 

Fleming, by Charles Camillo, December 7, 2011; Camillo, Flood Notes, May 

15, 1245.

277 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 15, 1330.

278 Camillo, Flood Notes, May 19, 0800; Operation Watershed: Emergency Management Briefi ng, 0800, May 31, 2011.

279 Ibid., Camillo Flood Notes, May 21, 0800; Ibid., May 25, 0800; Ibid., June 1, 

0800.