Correc ted 12/14/12 F OR P UB LIC AT ION 

### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f - Appellee ,

v. RA U L Z AMOR ANO -P O N CE ,

Defendant - Appellant

. No. 11-10462 D.C. No. 4:11-CR-01244- CKJ -JC G-1 OPI NI ON
Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Arizona Mark W. Be nnett, District J udg e, Presiding

Argued and Submitted Se pte mbe r 1 4, 20 12 –Sa

n F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia Filed Nove mber 6, 2012 Be fore : Arthur L . Alarc ón, Susan P. Graber , and Mars ha S. B e rzo n, Cir c uit

Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e Gr aberU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Z AMOR ANO -P O N CE 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no par t of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y *

Crim inal L aw Affir ming a sentenc e for

illega l ree ntry

afte r remova l, the p an e l h e ld th at a p r io r c o nv ic ti o n f o r “ r a p e o f a c h ild in the third degree ,” in violation of Revi s ed Code of Washing ton section 9A.44.079, cate g orica lly qualifies as “ statutory

rape ,” which is a “ crime of violence” for the purpose of a sente ncing enhanc ement under

U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)( 1)(A) (ii).

CO UN SEL Andre a L

. Matheson, Matheson L aw Firm, P.C., T u cs on, Arizon a , f

or De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. Robert L . Miskell, Assist ant United States Attorney , Tucson, Arizona, for Plaintiff-A

ppellee.

OP IN ION GRABE R, Circuit J udg e: Def endant Raul Z amora

no-Ponce appea ls the sentence imposed after

he plea ded guilty to illega l ree ntry afte r remova l, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The question bef ore us is whether a p ri o r conviction for “ rape of a c hild in theU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Z AMOR ANO -P O N CE 3 third degree ,” in vi o l at i on of Revised Code of Washington section 9A.44.079, qua lifies as a “ crime of violence” for the purpose of the sentenc ing enhanc ement under U.S.S .G. § 2L 1.2(b)( 1)(A) (ii). Reviewingde novo, U n ite d S ta tes v. Espinoza-Morales , 621 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2010), we answe r “yes” a

nd, there fore , aff

irm the sentenc e. In 2003, Def

endant pleade d guilty in state court to “r ape of a child in the third degree ,” in violation of Revised Code of Washington se ction 9A.44.079. The state court sente nced him to a 12 -m onth t e rm

of imp ri so nme nt. Af

te r s e rv ingjus t over ha lf of the se ntence , Def endant was rele ased f

rom prison and re mov e d f

ro m th e Un ite d St ate s. In 2011, the United States B order Patrol appre hended Def endant a nd sever al others a fewmiles from the United States-Mexico border, ne ar L ukeville, Arizona. The group a dmi tte d to be ingMe xica

n c iti zen s w ith out do c ume ntatio n to e sta bli shthe le g a lity

of the ir pr e se nc e in t

he Un ite d St ate s. A fede ral g rand jury indicted Def endant f or re entry afte r re mov a l, i n viol atio n of 8 U.S. C. § 13 26 . H e ple a de d guil ty purs ua nt t o a writt e n p le a

a g re e me nt. The main issue at sentencing was whether the cour t should apply

a 16-le vel enha

nceme nt for a pri o r “crime of violence,” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)( 1)(A) (ii). The Presentenc e Investig ation Report and the gove rnment re c omm e nd e d th at th e c ourt a pp ly the e nh anc e me nt b e c a

us e Def en dant’s prior c onviction under Revised Code of Was hin g ton

se c tio n 9 A. 44 .0 79 qu a lif ie s c ate g or ic a ll y

a s a “crime of violence .” S pecif ically , the g overnme nt argued that s ec tion 9A.44.079 falls square ly within the ge neric fede ral definition of “statutory

rape .” De fenda

nt objected to theU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Z AMOR ANO -P O N CE 4

T h e re le v a n t ap p lica tio n no te sta te s: 1

“ C r i me of

vi ol ence” m ean s an y of t he f ol l owi ng of

f ens es und er f ed eral , s t at e, or l o cal l aw: M urder, m ansl aught er, ki d nap p i ng, a ggravat ed a ss aul t , forci b l e sex of f enses (i ncl ud i ng wh er e con s en t t o t h e c on du ct i s n ot g i v en or i s n ot l eg al l y v al i d, su c h a s w h e re c o n se n t to the c o n d u c t is in v o lun ta ry, in c o m p e te n t, o r c o e rc e d ), s t at ut or y r ape , se x u a l a b u se o f a m ino r, ro b b e ry, a rs o n , e x to rtio n , e x to rtio n a te e x te n sio n o f cr e d it, bur gl ar y of

a dwel l i ng , or any ot her of f ens e u nder f

eder al , s t at e, or l oca l l aw t h at h as a s a n e l eme n t t h e u s e, a t t empt ed u s e, or t hreat ened us e o f

phys i cal f

o rce agai nst t he p ers o n of ano t her.
U

. S.S. G

. § 2 L1

. 2 cm t

. n. 1 (B )( i i i ) ( em p hasi s ad d ed ). enhanc ement, arguing, a mong other thing s, that section 9A .4 4. 07 9 is br oa de r t

ha n th e fe deral de fi nit ion

be c a us e it does not requir e a me ns rea of “know ingly .” The dist rict cour

t concluded that violation of section 9A.44.079 qualifies c ategor ically as a c rime of violenc e. Acc ording ly , the cour

t applied the 16-le vel enha nceme nt and se nte nc e d D e fe nd ant t o 3 3 mo nth s’ imp ri so nme nt. He tim e ly appea led. “Section 2L 1.2(b)( 1 )(A)(ii) of the U .S. Sentencing Guideline s p r o v id e s f o r a s ixt e en-le vel sentenc ing enhanc ement upon conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, where an a li e nil le g a ll y

r e e n te r e d

th e U n it e d

St ate s a f te r h av ing been pr eviously

deporte d subsequent to a c onviction for a felony ‘crime of violence .’” United States v. Gom ez-M endez , 486 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 2007). Relying on the application notes to the Guidelines, we have pr eviously conclude d that statutory rape is a “crime of violence.” Id . at 60 1– 02 ; United 1 States v. Rodriguez-G uzman , 506 F.3d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 20 0 7 )

. T h e qu e s ti o nh e r e , th e n , is wh e th e r D e f e n d ant’sU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Z AMOR ANO -P O N CE 5 conviction under Revised Code of Washington se ction 9A.44.079 constitutes “statutory rape ” and is, ther efor e, a “crime of violence ” that subjec ts him t o the sentenc ing e nh anc e me nt. Se c tio n 9 A. 44 .0 79 state s: A person is guilty of rape of a child in th e thi rd de g re e whe n the pe rs on

ha s se xua l inte rc ours e wi th another who is at least four

teen year s old but less than six tee nye ar s o ld

an d n o t m ar r ie d to th e p e r

p e tr ator and the pe rpetra

tor is at least for

ty -eight months ol der tha n th e vic tim

. “To de termine whe ther a

conviction constitutes ‘statutory rape ’ and the ref

ore a ‘cr i m e of violence ,’ we employ the fa mil iar c ate g or ic a l a

pp ro a c h th e Sup re me Court c ra ft e d in Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575 (1990).” Go mezMende z , 486 F.3d at 602. Under the categ orica l approa ch, we do not look to the specific conduct t h at was the ba sis of a def endant’ s state convic tions. Instead, we consider the statutory def inition of the crime. A state ’s def inition of [ the crime] must be compare d with the g eneric def inition of that cr ime to determine if the defe ndant’s conviction i s a crime of violence pur suant to the Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s. Rodriguez-Guzman , 5 06 F .3 d at 74 3–44 (a lte ra tio n in orig inal) (int ern al quot ation marks omitted). “In case s involving nontra ditional of fense s, as her e, we must determine whether the full sco p e o f conduc t proscribe d by [R evised Code of Washing ton section 9A.4 4

. 0 79] falls withi n the ‘ordinar y , contempora

ry , and common meaning ’ of the ter mU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Z AMOR ANO -P O N CE 6

W e reco gni ze t ha t th e p a nel i n Rodr iguez - G uz m an que st i o ned t he 2 G om ez - M endez pa nel ’ s cat ego ri zat i o n of st at ut o ry rape as a “ n o nt r adi t i onal of

f ens e. ” See Rodr iguez - G uz m an , 50 6 F.3d at 74 5 n. 5

. T he cat ego ri zat i o n of st at ut o ry rape as a t radit i o nal co m m o n law o f f ense o r a nont r adi t i onal of

f ens e makes no di f

f er enc e her e becau s e i t do es not af f ect t he f ed eral generi c d ef

i ni t i o n of st at ut o ry rape und er G om ez - M endez and Rodr iguez - G uz m an . S e e id

. ‘statutory rape .’” Gomez-

Mende z , 48 6 F .3 d at 60 2 ( fo otn ote 2 omitted). We ha ve previously provided a g eneric fede ral de finition for “ statutory

rape ” in the con t ex t of “c rime[s] of violence ” under U .S. S .G. § 2L 1.2. In Gomez- Mende z , we he ld that “[t] he ter m ‘statutory

rape ’ is ordinarily , contempora rily , and commonly

understood to mean the unlawful sexual intercour s e with a minor unde r the a g e of c onsent specif ied by state statut e .” 48 6 F .3 d at 60 3. Sho rt ly the re a ft e r, we he ld that “the ter

m ‘minor’ in the conte x t of a s t atutory rape law means a perso n u n der sixteen year s of ag e.” Ro dr igu ezGuzman , 506 F.3d a t 745. Accor dingly , under Ro dr igu ezGuzman , th e g e ne ri c fe de ra l de fi nit ion of “ statut or y ra pe ” is unlawful sexual intercour se with a pe rson under the ag e of 16. T h e g e n e r ic f

e d e r a l d e f in it io nma

y a ls o in c lu d e a

fouryear -ag e-diff

ere nce e lement. Un ite d S tates v . G onza le

zAp ar ic io , 663 F.3d 419, 431 ( 9th Cir. 2 011). We nee d not resolve the latter issue here , howeve r, bec ause Revise d Code of Washington se ction 9A.44.079 contains a four -year -ag ediffer ence element a

nd, thus, would not cover more conduct tha n th e fe de ra l de fi nit ion

e venif the fe de ra l de fi nit ion

a lso require d a four -year

ag e diffe renc e. Section 9A.44.079 quali fi es categ orica lly as “statutory rape ” under Rodriguez-Gome z ’ g en eric fede ral de finition ofU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Z AMOR ANO -P O N CE 7 thatc r i m e b e c a

u s e th e f e d e r a l d e f

i n i t i o nc o v e r s th e “ f

u ll sc op e of the cond uc t” tha t th e Was hin g ton

statut e pr oh ibi ts. Gomez- Mende z , 4 86 F .3 d at 60 2. B oth pr oh ibi t e ng a g ingin unlawful sexual intercour se with a pe rson under the age of 16, wher e ther e is at lea st a four- year ag e diffe renc e betwe en the per petrator and the vic tim, and the fede ral de fi n i tion contains no additional re quirement that is abse nt from sec tion 9A.44.079. Def endant r elies on E

s tra d a -E s p in oz a v
. M

u k asey , 546 F.3d 1147 ( 9th Cir. 2008) (en ba nc), to a rgue t h at the fede ral g eneric definition of “statutory rape ” includes a

mens rea element of

“knowing ly .” De fenda nt’s relianc e on Es tra da -E

sp inoza is mispl ace d. That ca se def i n ed the ter

m “sexual abuse of

a minor” for the purpose of considering wh e th e r a p r i o r c o nv i c t i o nc o n s t i tut e d

an“ a g g r av at e d

f e l o ny” under the Immigration and National ity Act. Id . at 1150. No thing in Es tra da -E

sp inoza purports to requir e that “statutory rape ,” within the meaning of the commentar y to the Gu ide lin e s, c onta in a

me ns re a e le me nt. No r d oe s th e c a se overr ule or undermine Gomez-

Mende z or Rodriguez-Guzman in any other way . In fac t, w e have rec og nized previously that Es tra da -E

sp inoza “neve r discussed or even cited to our prior ‘statutory rape ’ dec isions in Gomez- Mende z and Ro dr igu e

zGuzman .” Go nz ale

z- Ap ar ic io , 6 63 F .3 d at 43 2. No r d id Un ite d Sta te

s v . M e din a- Vi lla , 567 F.3d 507 ( 9th Cir. 2009), chang e the definition of “statutory rape ” withi n the meaning of the Guide lines. Rather, a s releva n t h er e, itheld only

that a state- court c onviction for lewd a nd lascivious acts on a child under 14 year s old is st ill “sex ual abuse of a minor” for sentenc ing pur

poses af ter Es tra da -E

sp inoza . Me din a- Vi lla , 567 F.3d at 509.U NI TED S T A T ES V
. Z AMOR ANO -P O N CE 8 In summary , Def

endant’ s conviction under Revised Code of Wa s h in g to n s e c ti o n 9 A

. 4 4

. 0 7 9 qu a li f ie s c ate g o r ic a ll y

as
“ statut or y ra pe ,” wh ic h is a

“ c ri me of vio le nc e ” that su bje c ts him to a sentencingenhanc ement under U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2. AF F IRMED.