United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548 

Comptroller General

of the United States

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

The decision issued on the date below was subject to a 

GAO Protective Order. This redacted version has been 

approved for public release. 

Decision 

Matter of: Dayton T. Brown, Inc. 

File: B-402256 

Date: February 24, 2010 

Michael A. Gordon, Esq., and Fran Baskin, Esq., for the protester. 

Maj. Jonathan P. Widmann, Maj. Karen L. Douglas, Col. Thomas J. Hasty, III, and 

Steven R. Fuscher, Esq., Department of the Air Force, for the agency. 

Tania Calhoun, Esq., and Guy R. Pietrovito, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, 

GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision. 

DIGEST 

1. Protest that a solicitation’s planned evaluation of two potential task orders 

provides another firm with an unfair price advantage due to that firm’s prior work 

developing protocols required to perform the task orders is denied where the record 

shows that the other firm lost any competitive advantage it had when the protocols 

were released to all prospective offerors, and where the record shows that the 

magnitude and type of effort required by the task orders is significantly greater than 

that performed previously performed by the other firm. 

2. Protest that solicitation’s evaluation factors are defective and impermissibly 

restrict competition because the solicitation sets forth a broad scope of work but the 

agency plans to evaluate proposals based only on the solicitation’s task orders is 

denied where the record shows that the evaluation factors represent the key areas of 

importance to be considered during the evaluation, including both the task orders 

and the broader scope of work. 

DECISION 

Dayton T. Brown, Inc. (DTB), of Bohemia, Long Island, New York, protests the terms 

of request for proposals (RFP) No. FA7000-09-R-0059, issued by the Department of 

the Air Force, U.S. Air Force Academy, to obtain support for engineering tasks and 

research activities for aging structures initiated by the Academy’s Center for Aircraft 

Structural Life Extension (CAStLE) program. The protester essentially complains 

that another contractor would have an unfair competitive advantage under the RFP 

as drafted. 
We deny the protest. 

BACKGROUND 

CAStLE, located in the Academy’s Department of Engineering Mechanics, has a dual 

mission of supporting the education and training of cadets by bringing Air 

Force-relevant research and engineering activities into the classroom and by 

providing structural integrity tools and information to the Department of Defense, 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Federal Aviation 

Administration aerospace structure communities. Statement of Work (SOW) ¶ 1.1. 

CAStLE activities cover a variety of tasks that follow aircraft and other structures 

through their life-cycle from cradle to grave. These tasks span a wide range of 

structure-related topics, including basic development and characterization of 

materials, mechanical testing of structures, material corrosion susceptibility and 

mitigation, computer modeling and finite element analysis, flight data acquisition, 

structural teardown and analysis, and analysis of damaged, failed and/or aged 

structures. SOW ¶ 1.2. 

One of CAStLE’s ongoing projects is the KC-135 Teardown Analysis Program. This 

program involves the Air Force’s fleet of KC-135 tanker and transport aircraft, based 

on the Boeing 707 airframe, that date from the 1950s and 1960s. Since August 2008, 

the Air Force has obtained KC-135 teardown and analysis requirements via two task 

orders issued to Valdez International, Inc. under a previously competed contract for 

research support for various Academy departments. Under these task orders, Valdez 

developed procedures for KC-135 teardown and analysis and performed teardown 

and analysis of a KC-135 damaged during operations in the Arabian Peninsula. 

In the spring of 2009, CAStLE initiated this acquisition. Over the summer, the agency 

conducted market research; analyzed potential organizational conflict of interests 

(OCI), particularly with respect to the KC-135 teardown and analysis activities being 

performed by Valdez; conducted an industry day for potential offerors in order to 

answer questions and disseminate acquisition information; and posted on-line 

answers to industry questions, draft solicitation documents, and the procedures and 

related documents for the KC-135 teardown program delivered under Valdez’s 

existing task orders. 

On September 29, 2009, the Air Force issued the RFP, as a small business set-aside, 

for the award of an indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) contract with 

fixed-price, fixed-price level-of-effort, and reimbursable contract line items, for a 

base year and four option years. The RFP provided that the contract value would 

not exceed $90 million. The SOW outlined six major task sections--engineering; 

research, engineering, design analyses & development testing; full-scale testing; 

certification & force management development; force management execution; and 

general training/education/cadet learning environment and CAStLE support. The 

engineering task section includes structures teardown and non-destructive analysis. 

See SOW ¶ 2.2.2.1. 

Page 2 B-402256 
Offerors were asked to provide staff in specified labor categories to assist CAStLE 

faculty and students in performing a range of structural analysis and support 

activities. The SOW advised offerors that the contractor may be required to perform 

the CAStLE activities outlined above, as well as engineering, structures teardown, 

non-destructive analysis, design analysis and development testing, full scale testing, 

certification and force management development, force management execution, 

training/procedural support, and written reports/briefings. The SOW also advised 

that these types of activities may be required for a variety of structures. SOW ¶ 2.2.1. 

The RFP provided detailed proposal preparation instructions that, among other 

things, required offerors to submit technical, past performance, and price proposals. 

The technical proposal was required to address offerors’ approaches to performing 

the RFP’s “basic” SOW and the SOWs for three task orders (Nos. 0001, 0002, 0003). 

The task orders concern KC-135 teardown and analysis services that “represented 

the known, potentially awardable efforts at the immediate time.”1 See RFP § L.4.3.5; 

Contracting Officer’s (CO’s) Statement at 18. For their past performance proposals, 

offerors were required to submit information on six recent contracts they considered 

most relevant in demonstrating their ability to perform the proposed effort, a 

rationale supporting their assertions of relevance, and past performance 

questionnaires from their references. RFP §§ L.6.0., L.6.3. 

Offerors’ price proposals were required to provide labor rate matrices that contained 

fully loaded, composite labor rates for all of the labor titles listed in the RFP. 

Offerors were informed that these rates would apply to all fixed-price and fixedprice, level-of-effort labor hour task orders. RFP § L.5.3.1. Offerors’ task order price 

proposals were required to consist of fixed price labor hours by labor title for each 

task order, as well as fixed prices for travel, materials, transportation, and storage. 

Offerors were instructed that the task order labor rates must reflect the firms’ 

proposed fixed-price rates. RFP § L.5.3.2. 

The RFP stated that to assess technical acceptability the agency would evaluate 

technical proposals under two technical subfactors: technical performance and 

program management.2

 RFP § M.2.0. These subfactors would be used to assess 

offerors’ approaches to performing both the basic SOW and the RFP’s task orders. 

 

1

 Task Order (TO) No. 0001 provides for structural teardown and analysis of one 

aircraft, while TO No. 0002 provides for the concurrent structural teardown and 

analysis of two aircraft. TO No. 0003 provides for the non-concurrent structural 

teardown and analysis of two aircraft. 

2

 Proposals would be evaluated as acceptable, reasonably susceptible of being made 

acceptable, or unacceptable under these subfactors. RFP § M.2.5. 

Page 3 B-402256 
With respect to past performance, the RFP advised that the agency would use 

varying degrees of relevancy when assessing recent, relevant contracts. A “very 

relevant” rating would be given where a past performance effort involved 

“essentially the same magnitude of effort and programmatic and technical 

complexities this solicitation requires.” RFP § M.4.6. The solicitation identified 

various types of items the agency would consider in determining relevance, including 

items related to tasks described in the basic SOW and items concerning performance 

of teardown and failure analysis on the KC-135 or similar aircraft. RFP § M.6. Past 

performance would be assessed under the solicitation’s Performance Confidence 

Assessment Rating scheme as “substantial confidence,” “satisfactory confidence,” 

“limited confidence,” “no confidence,” or “unknown confidence.” RFP § M.4.4. 

Turning to price, the RFP stated that an offeror’s evaluated price would be 

calculated as the sum of the offeror’s proposed task order prices for TO Nos. 0001 

and 0002. RFP § M.3.1.2. Price proposals would be evaluated for reasonableness 

and to ensure balanced prices. 

Offerors were informed that the Air Force intended to award a contract without 

conducting discussions to the offeror whose proposal gave the agency the greatest 

confidence it would best meet the requirements specified in the SOWs and the 

contract. RFP § M.1.0. The RFP stated that award would be on the basis of a past 

performance/price tradeoff, under which past performance was to be significantly 

more important than cost or price. Technically acceptable offers would be ranked 

by price and then by past performance, and award would be made to the offeror with 

the lowest evaluated price which received a “substantial confidence” assessment 

under past performance.3

 The RFP provided that, if no technically acceptable offers 

received a “substantial confidence” rating, the source selection authority would 

assess technically acceptable offerors’ price and past performance ratings to make 

an integrated best value assessment. RFP § M.1.0. 

The agency received proposals from [DELETED] offerors by the November 18 

closing date.4

 DTB, which did not submit a proposal, filed this protest prior to the 

closing date. 

 

3

 “Substantial confidence” means that, based on the offeror’s performance record, 

the government has a high expectation that the offeror will successfully perform the 

required effort. RFP § M.4.4. 

4

 The agency states the proposals have been sealed pending resolution of the protest. 

Page 4 B-402256 
DISCUSSION 

DTB raises two distinct challenges here. First, it contends that Valdez has an unfair 

competitive advantage OCI. Second, DTB argues that the evaluation factors here 

unreasonably restrict the competition. 

Unfair Competitive Advantage 

The crux of DTB’s complaint is that the RFP provides Valdez with an unfair 

competitive advantage, and that this advantage will arise particularly in the area of 

pricing. Specifically, DTB contends that the performance of the RFP’s task orders 

will require the use of KC-135 teardown procedures, called “protocols,” which were 

developed by Valdez under its existing task orders.5

 DTB suggests that Valdez, by 

virtue of its development of the protocols, may have an unfair price advantage since 

only Valdez has “intimate” knowledge of the cost of using the protocols to perform 

the KC-135 teardown and analysis work. 

The Air Force explains that, when it initiated the KC-135 Teardown and Analysis 

Program, it knew that various contractors and other entities would be involved and 

wanted to prevent the compartmentalization of knowledge about these processes in 

one single person or organization/company. To this end, CAStLE focused on 

creating three items -- the protocols themselves, Teardown Analysis Program Subject 

Identification Documents (TAPSID), and a Teardown Data Management System. 

CO’s Statement at 8-9. The protocols and TAPSID were contract deliverables under 

Valdez’s existing task orders. 

Specifically, Valdez developed eight protocols. These protocols document the 

procedures and standards to be followed for each primary element of the teardown 

program, and represent best practices and lessons learned from prior teardown 

programs. The TAPSID is the data package for the program. CO’s Statement at 9; 

Agency Report (AR), Tabs 26 and 27 (the Protocols and TAPSID, respectively). After 

 

5

 DTB also suggests that Valdez may have an OCI under FAR § 9.505-2(b)(1), which 

requires, with certain specified exceptions, that a firm that prepares, or assists in 

preparing, a competitive solicitation’s work statement, or provides material “leading 

directly, predictably, and without delay” to such a work statement, may not be 

awarded a contract to supply the system or services covered by the work statement. 

In an October 2009 OCI Determination and Findings (D&F) documenting her analysis 

of potential OCIs, the contracting officer considered this issue and determined there 

was no OCI because the protocols were reviewed and modified by the government, 

and that any appearance of an OCI was mitigated by the release of the protocols to 

potential offerors. The record does not show that Valdez’s contribution to the 

protocols and other documents led “directly, predictably and without delay” to the 

statement of work, requiring the agency to exclude the firm from the competition. 

Page 5 B-402256 
the protocols were drafted, each protocol was reviewed and approved by the 

program’s oversight committee--comprised of experts from the Air Force and other 

government agencies--and the protocols were validated and modified by the 

government as required. AR, Tab 26, Protocol Documents, C/KC-135 Aircraft 

Teardown Plan and Objectives at 4 and Protocol 2, Teardown Section/Part 

Identification and Tracking, at iii. To neutralize the appearance of an OCI with 

respect to Valdez, the protocols and the TAPSID information were made available to 

potential offerors. CO’s Statement at 10; AR, Tab 14, D&F OCI, at 2-5. 

The Air Force contends that Valdez will not be afforded an unfair price advantage 

because of its knowledge and use of the protocols. Rather, the Air Force argues that 

the protocols are standardized documents that level the playing field for follow-on 

contracts, and that Valdez lost any competitive advantage it had when its knowledge 

of the process was documented in the protocols and provided to industry. We agree. 

Moreover, the Air Force explains, and we agree, that the work required by the RFP’s 

task orders is not, as DTB asserts, identical to that performed by Valdez. Instead, the 

magnitude of effort required by the RFP’s task orders is significantly greater than 

prior efforts, and will require considerably more nondestructive inspection and 

failure analysis tasks. In this regard, the prior effort involved some 250 sections of 

the airframe compared to up to 800 sections here, and sections with different types 

of damage. In addition, the contractor will be required to perform teardown and 

analysis activities on teardown sections not included under the existing contract, 

involving different airframes with differing structural complexities. CO’s Statement 

at 36-39. 

DTB’s assertion--that “possible” differences in the work is “irrelevant”--does not 

provide a sufficient basis for our Office to disagree with the agency’s position that 

Valdez is not afforded an unfair price advantage by virtue of its development and use 

of the protocols. Any unfair competitive advantage Valdez might have gained 

through its development of the protocols should be minimal given their general 

release to prospective offerors. See Foley Co., B-203408, Sept. 14, 1993, 93-2 CPD 

¶ 165 at 3 (bidder does not have an unfair competitive advantage where the bidder 

does not possess competitively useful information not available to other bidders). In 

addition, an agency is not required to compensate for every competitive advantage 

gleaned by a potential offeror’s prior performance of a particular requirement. For 

example, an incumbent contractor’s acquired technical expertise and functional 

knowledge of the costs related to a requirement’s complexity are not generally 

considered to constitute unfair advantages the procuring agency must eliminate. 

Snell Enters., Inc., B-290113, B-290113.2, June 10, 2002, 2002 CPD ¶ 115 at 7. 

Challenge to Evaluation Factors 

DTB next argues that the solicitation’s evaluation factors impermissibly restrict 

competition. The protester contends that the solicitation sets forth a broad scope of 

work, only one element of which concerns structural teardown and analysis. In 

Page 6 B-402256 
DTB’s view, the Air Force’s approach to evaluating proposals is based only on 

consideration of the solicitation’s KC-135 teardown and analysis task orders, which 

impermissibly favors the firm currently performing these activities, Valdez. 

Agency acquisition officials have broad discretion in selecting evaluation factors that 

will be used in an acquisition, and we will not object to the use of particular 

evaluation factors or an evaluation scheme so long as the factors used reasonably 

relate to the agency’s needs in choosing a contractor that will best serve the 

government’s interest. See FAR § 15.304(c); see also PPCSC/RAC BENNING JV 1, 

B-296239, July 19, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 137 at 5. Our review of the solicitation’s 

evaluation factors shows that they represent the key areas of importance to be 

considered during the evaluation and reasonably relate to the agency’s needs. 

DTB’s efforts to minimize the agency’s needs for structural teardown and analysis, 

and the scope of those needs, are belied by the record. Structures teardown and 

non-destructive analysis is among the work anticipated under one of the basic SOW’s 

six major task sections and not, as protester asserts, just one of 29 basic SOW tasks.6 

Moreover, as discussed below, the agency has shown that the work in the task 

orders encompasses numerous sub-tasks within all of these major task sections. In 

addition, the July 2009 acquisition strategy panel briefing indicates that the primary 

purpose of the acquisition is to advance scientific/technical knowledge and apply 

that knowledge to the extent necessary to achieve agency and national goals, and 

that “significant teardown activities [are] required to get to the primary purpose.” 

AR, Tab 22, Acquisition Strategy Panel Briefing, Slide 11. Finally, the contracting 

officer states that the RFP’s task orders comprise approximately 20-30 percent of the 

potential contract value and represent known, potentially awardable efforts at the 

immediate time. CO’s Statement at 18. 

Our review shows that DTB’s argument that the Air Force has elected to evaluate 

offers for the full scope of work based only on performance of the task orders is 

without basis. We address the technical, past performance, and price factors in turn. 

Technical proposals were to address an offeror’s proposed approaches to meeting 

the requirements of two subfactors, technical performance and program 

management. Offerors were also required to provide task order proposals and 

narratives in response to the RFP’s three task order SOWs. Technical proposals 

were to be evaluated on a pass/fail basis for technical acceptability. 

Under the technical performance subfactor, the RFP stated that the agency would 

evaluate the offeror’s proposed approach “to meeting the technical requirements of 

 

6

 DTB’s figure of 29 basic SOW tasks is derived from a mechanical count of each 

major task section in the SOW and each subtask within those task sections; such a 

mechanical count is not evidence of the relative significance of the SOW’s tasks. 

Page 7 B-402256 
the tear down and analysis in the Basic SOW and Task Orders 0001, 0002, and 0003 

SOWs” (emphasis added). RFP § M.2.1. The RFP set forth 9 “measures of merit” that 

would be used to ascertain when this subfactor was met. RFP § M.2.1.1. Taken 

together, these measures mirror the elements of the basic SOW. As a result, the RFP 

contemplates the evaluation of proposals for technical performance against the 

entire SOW and not just the task order SOWs. 

Under the program management technical subfactor, the RFP stated that the agency 

would evaluate the offeror’s approach and capabilities to establish and maintain the 

program management support “in relationship to the requirements identified in the 

Basic SOW and TOs 0001, 0002, and 0003 SOWs” (emphasis added). This evaluation 

was to include the offeror’s ability to manage staffing, schedule, and logistics, as well 

as teaming approach. RFP § M.2.2. The RFP sets forth 7 measures of merit the 

agency will use to ascertain when this subfactor is met. RFP § M.2.2.1. 

DTB is correct that several of these measures are associated with the task orders, 

but Section M’s instruction that the agency will evaluate the offerors’ approaches to 

both the basic SOW and the task order SOWs is buttressed by the language of these 

measures. The measures indicate the agency’s intention to use offerors’ approaches 

to the specific requirements of the task orders in order to assess how they will 

perform with respect to program management across the entire scope of work. 

For example, one measure is “[y]our plan for transporting and storing KC-135 

aircraft lots, teardown sections, and teardown parts for two complete KC-135 aircraft 

simultaneously, in accordance with the SOWs for TO [Nos.] 0001 and 0002, 

demonstrates a thorough process for accountability in not losing or damaging lots, 

sections and parts during transit or storage.” RFP § M.2.2.1.(a). By its terms, the 

RFP contemplates evaluating an offeror’s process for accountability across the 

scope of work by evaluating its specific approach to the task orders. Another 

measure is “Your approach for staffing in providing qualified personnel under [the 

task orders] demonstrates a complete and realistic plan to find, hire, and retain 

qualified personnel.” RFP § M.2.2.1.(b). Likewise, by its terms, the RFP 

contemplates evaluating an offeror’s staffing plan across the scope of work by 

evaluating its specific approach to staffing the task orders. While DTB objects that 

the RFP’s task orders do not involve the SOW’s other work elements, we find below 

that the agency has shown that the task orders involve a number of other work 

elements, and DTB has not persuaded us that its approach would differ if yet 

additional work elements were involved. 

Turning to past performance, the agency planned to use a Performance Confidence 

Assessment Rating to assess the government’s confidence in the offeror’s probability 

of successfully performing as proposed. More recent and relevant past performance 

would have a greater impact than less recent or relevant effort. The agency would 

use varying degrees of relevancy when assessing recent, relevant contracts; the 

highest rating, “very relevant,” was defined as “present/past performance effort 

Page 8 B-402256 
involved essentially the same magnitude of effort and programmatic and technical 

complexities this solicitation requires.” RFP § M.4.6. 

After the RFP was issued, several potential offerors expressed concern that aspects 

of the past performance evaluation terms were restrictive and favored Valdez. In 

response, the contracting officer amended the solicitation to, among other things, 

add a list of 14 items the government would consider in determining the relevancy of 

past performance. Among these were:7

• Performed a contract similar in order-of-magnitude to this 

acquisition (assuming the immediate execution of [the RFP’s task 

orders]. 

• Transported and stored lots, sections and parts of aircraft of 

similar size to the KC-135/Boeing 707, having 50 sections or more 

and resulting in approximately 5,000 parts or more. 

• Recruited, hired, and retained qualified personnel for 

teardown/analysis of aircraft similar to KC-135/Boeing 707, in a 

timely manner that enabled the offeror to successfully execute 

the effort within the schedule. 

• Recruited and hired qualified personnel for engineering effort 

similar in scope to KC-135 teardown/analysis, in a timely manner 

that enabled the offeror to successfully execute the effort within 

the schedule. 

• Scheduled and executed a teardown/analysis effort for aircraft of 

similar size to KC-135/Boeing 707, having 50 sections or more and 

resulting in approximately 5,000 parts or more. 

RFP § M.4.6. 

DTB argues that these items involve work tied to a teardown analysis of an aircraft 

similar to the KC-135 or Boeing 707, and that offerors without significant experience 

providing such analysis in this specific aircraft will be unable to achieve a 

“substantial confidence” rating. 

We do not agree. The solicitation’s definition of relevance is not tied to any 

particular type of work. A “very relevant” rating is reserved for an offeror whose 

past performance involved “essentially the same magnitude of effort and 

programmatic and technical complexities this solicitation requires.” RFP § M.4.6. 

We see no reason why, under the evaluation scheme, an offeror is precluded from 

receiving a “substantial confidence” rating, even without experience on the KC-135 

 

7

 The other nine items mirror various requirements of the basic SOW, undermining 

the protester’s argument that the evaluation scheme will not result in an assessment 

of an offeror’s ability to perform the requirements in the basic SOW. 

Page 9 B-402256 
or Boeing 707, provided it has otherwise relevant past performance. Even with 

respect to the agency’s consideration of items that refer to “similar aircraft” or 

aircraft of “similar size,” the agency’s needs are associated with an aircraft and other 

large-scale structures of a certain size and complexity. We have no basis to find the 

agency’s consideration of these items as gauges of relevance to be unreasonable. 

Turning to the price evaluation, offerors’ price proposals were required to provide 

labor rate matrices that contained fully loaded, composite labor rates for all of the 

labor titles listed in the RFP. Offerors were informed that these rates would apply to 

all fixed-price and fixed-price, level-of-effort labor hour task orders. RFP § L.5.3.1. 

Offerors’ task order price proposals were required to consist of fixed price labor 

hours by labor title for each task order, as well as fixed prices for travel, materials, 

transportation, and storage prices. Offerors were instructed that the task order labor 

rates must reflect the firms’ proposed fixed-price rates. RFP § L.5.3.2. 

All technically acceptable offers were to be ranked by their evaluated prices, which 

would be calculated as the sum of their proposed task order prices for TO Nos. 0001 

and 0002. RFP § M.3.1.2. Price proposals would also be evaluated for 

reasonableness and to ensure balanced prices. RFP §§ M.3.1.1., M.3.1.3. 

DTB argues that this evaluation method does not reasonably evaluate price because 

it is based solely on the KC-135 teardown and analysis efforts in two of the RFP’s 

task orders, which DTB asserts do not represent most of the tasks in the basic SOW. 

DTB also contends that the labor categories necessary to accomplish the task orders 

do not represent a reasonable sampling of the labor categories listed in the RFP--the 

firm estimates a maximum of six of what it contends are 31 labor categories in the 

RFP would be necessary. DTB also asserts that the task orders would use a large 

proportion of lower-skilled labor categories that do not correlate to the other work 

elements in the basic SOW that would require labor categories with more advanced 

skills and higher levels of education. 

Agencies must consider price or cost to the government in evaluating competitive 

proposals. 10 U.S.C. § 2305(a)(3)(ii) (2006). While it is up to the agency to decide 

upon some appropriate, reasonable method for proposal evaluation, an agency must 

use an evaluation method that provides a basis for a reasonable assessment of the 

cost of performance under the competing proposals. CW Gov’t Travel, Inc.-Recon.; 

CW Gov’t Travel, Inc., et al., B-295530.2 et al., July 25, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 139 at 4; 

Health Servs. Int’l, Inc.; Apex Envt’l, Inc., B-247433, B-247433.2, June 5, 1992, 92-1 

CPD ¶ 493 at 3-4. In the context of ID/IQ contracting, this is often difficult because 

of uncertainty regarding what ultimately will be procured. Agencies have developed 

a variety of methods or strategies to address this difficulty, including sample tasks. 

General Dynamics Info. Tech., B-299873, Sept. 19, 2007, 2007 CPD ¶ 154 at 10, citing

FC Bus. Sys., Inc., B-278730, Mar. 6, 1998, 98-2 CPD ¶ 9 at 3-5; Innovative Logistics 

Techniques, Inc., B-275786.2, Apr. 2, 1997, 97-1 CPD ¶ 144. Underlying each of these 

methods is the central objective of evaluating the relative cost of competing 

proposals in order to provide the agency’s SSA a meaningful understanding of the 

Page 10 B-402256 
cost or price implications of making award to one or another concern. 

We are not persuaded that the agency’s methodology here is objectionable. In our 

view, the Air Force has shown that the sample task orders to be used for the price 

evaluation reasonably represent the work that will be performed under the contract. 

The agency has provided a detailed explanation, in the form of a “correlation guide,” 

showing that the work in the task orders involves numerous sub-tasks that involve 

all six major task sections in the basic SOW. In response, DTB contends that the 

protocols do not fully support the agency’s explanation, and has provided its own 

analysis that supports its position. 

DTB’s position reflects its disagreement with the opinion of the agency’s engineers--

in this case, the Director and Technical Director of CAStLE. We will not substitute 

our judgment for the contracting agency’s technical judgment unless its conclusions 

are shown to be arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable. R&B Equip. Co., B-271194, 

May 22, 1996, 96-1 CPD ¶ 250 at 4. We have reviewed the record and conclude that 

DTB has not shown that the Air Force’s position is unreasonable. 

In our view, the language of the task order SOWs encompasses numerous tasks 

across the basic SOW, even if the descriptions of those tasks do not repeat the 

protocol instructions. Moreover, the solicitation provides that the protocols must be 

followed in performing the task orders, but does not prohibit an offeror from 

proposing to perform additional tasks that are within the scope of the task orders 

and set forth in the basic SOW. As the Air Force has explained, the magnitude of 

effort contemplated by these task orders is significantly greater than that previously 

performed by Valdez when it developed the protocols, and will require considerably 

more and different nondestructive inspection and failure analysis tasks. CO’s 

Statement at 36-39. DTB’s disagreement does not show that the agency’s technical 

judgment is unreasonable. See Pegasus Global Strategic Solutions, LLC, B-400422.3, 

Mar. 24, 2009, 2009 CPD ¶ 73 at 10. 

The Air Force also points out that the RFP does not list 31 labor categories but, 

rather, nine labor categories, most of which include varying levels depending upon 

experience and education, for a total of 31 labor titles. The Air Force has provided 

an analysis, broken down by task, supporting its estimate that the most likely labor 

mix for the task orders will use [DELETED] labor categories, and at least 

[DELETED] labor titles. 

DTB maintains that only six labor categories will be necessary to perform the task 

orders and that there is no need for personnel with higher levels to perform most of 

the work because it is generally not complex. However, DTB’s argument is driven 

largely by its view that the task orders do not involve an array of work across the 

SOW, a position which we have not found persuasive. The agency states that it 

provided varying levels within the labor categories to allow offerors the flexibility to 

determine their most optimum mix of categories and levels of labor. DTB’s 

Page 11 B-402256 
Page 12 B-402256 

disagreement with the agency’s estimate of the labor mix likely here has not 

persuaded us that it is unreasonable. 

The protest is denied. 

Lynn H. Gibson 

Acting General Counsel