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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS

ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFORMATION POLICY,

CENSUS, AND NATIONAL ARCHIVES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 30, 2009

Serial No. 111–70

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.oversight.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

JACKIE SPEIER, California

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

——— ———

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois

——— ———

RON STROMAN, Staff Director

MICHAEL MCCARTHY, Deputy Staff Director

CARLA HULTBERG, Chief Clerk

LARRY BRADY, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFORMATION POLICY, CENSUS, AND NATIONAL ARCHIVES

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

DIANE E. WATSON, California

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

DARRYL PIGGEE, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on July 30, 2009 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Thomas, Adrienne C., Acting Archivist of the United States, National

Archives and Records Administration, accompanied by Gary M. Stern,

General Counsel, the National Archives and Records Administration,

and Sharon Thibodeau, Deputy Assistant Archivist for Records Services; and Paul Brachfeld, Inspector General, National Archives and

Records Administration ................................................................................ 6

Brachfeld, Paul .......................................................................................... 18

Thomas, Adrienne C. ................................................................................. 6

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Brachfeld, Paul, Inspector General, National Archives and Records Administration, prepared statement of ........................................................... 21

Clay, Hon. Wm. Lacy, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Missouri, prepared statement of .................................................................. 3

McHenry, Hon. Patrick T., a Representative in Congress from the State

of North Carolina, prepared statement of ................................................... 29

Thomas, Adrienne C., Acting Archivist of the United States, National

Archives and Records Administration, prepared statement of ................. 9

(1)

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS

ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFORMATION POLICY, CENSUS, AND

NATIONAL ARCHIVES,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Wm. Lacy Clay (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Clay, McHenry, and Norton.

Staff present: Darryl Piggee, staff director/counsel; Frank Davis,

professional staff member; Jean Gosa, clerk; Charisma Williams,

staff assistant; Charles Phillips, minority chief counsel for policy;

Adam Fromm, minority chief clerk and Member liaison; Howard

Denis, minority senior counsel; and Chapin Fay and Jonathan

Skladany, minority counsels.

Mr. CLAY. The Information Policy, Census, and National Archives Subcommittee will now come to order.

Good afternoon and welcome to today’s hearing entitled, ‘‘National Archives and Records Administration Organizational Issues.’’

Without objection, the Chair and ranking member will have 5

minutes to make opening statements, followed by opening statements not to exceed 3 minutes by any other Member who seeks recognition.

Without objection, Members and witnesses may have 5 legislative days to submit a written statement or extraneous materials for

the record.

The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the loss of an external hard drive containing data from the Executive Office of the

Clinton administration. We will hear from the Acting Archivist,

Adrienne Thomas, and the NARA Inspector General, Paul

Brachfeld, and we hope to get real insight into how the security

breach occurred and what steps have been taken, and what steps

should be taken to tighten security at NARA facilities.

The missing hard drive, which is a backup copy, contained the

entire computer files of 113 White House employees. Their entire

computer files were downloaded and stored on a hard drive and

later transferred to the backup hard drive that is now missing.

Classified documents and personally identifiable information of

former Clinton administration staff and visitors to the White House

are now exposed.

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Before we continue with this hearing, let us be very clear that

the subcommittee has no intention of interfering or impeding the

investigations currently being conducted by the NARA Inspector

General, the Secret Service, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

We urge everyone’s cooperation with these investigations and I

thank all of our witnesses for appearing today and look forward to

their testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Wm. Lacy Clay follows:]

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Mr. CLAY. Now, we are on a tight schedule today, so what I am

going to do is, normally we would yield to the ranking member,

who is not here yet. When he gets here, he will be allowed an opening statement, but I will swear the witnesses in. I will introduce

you and swear you in, and hopefully by the end a minority Member

will be here.

Let me first introduce the panel. We will hear first from Ms.

Adrienne Thomas, Acting Archivist of the U.S. National Archives

and Records Administration. Ms. Thomas is currently the Acting

Archivist of the United States. Prior to her appointment as Acting

Archivist in December 2008, Ms. Thomas served as the Deputy Archivist of the United States.

Ms. Thomas has been with the National Archives for 38 years,

beginning as an Archivist Trainee in the Office of Presidential Libraries, and subsequently holding a number of policy and administrative roles.

Ms. Thomas will be accompanied by Mr. Gary M. Stern, General

Counsel for the National Archives and Records Administration.

Welcome to both of you.

Our next witness will be Mr. Paul Brachfeld, Inspector General,

National Archives and Records Administration. Mr. Brachfeld

serves as the IG of NARA and as the IG for NARA, he oversees

the conduct and execution of all audits, investigations and inspection for the agency, in compliance with provisions of the Inspector

General Act of 1978 as amended.

Mr. Brachfeld’s entire career has been devoted to investigative

activities since graduating from the University of Maryland College

Park in 1979. Go Terps. And today, he brings 10 years of experience as the NARA Inspector General and 30 years of exceptional

service to the U.S. Government. Currently at NARA, Mr.

Brachfeld’s tenure has included the recovery of hundreds of stolen

archival holdings and related successful prosecutions of identified

subjects. And we look forward to his testimony.

I want to welcome all of you to our hearing today, and it is the

policy of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee to

swear in all witnesses before they testify.

Would all of you please stand and raise your right hands?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. CLAY. You may be seated. Thank you.

Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative, and each of you will have 5 minutes to make opening statements. Your complete written testimony will be included in the

hearing record. The yellow light will indicate that it is time to sum

up. The red light will indicate that your time has expired.

Ms. Thomas, you may begin your opening statement.

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STATEMENTS OF ADRIENNE C. THOMAS, ACTING ARCHIVIST

OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND

RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY GARY M.

STERN, GENERAL COUNSEL, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND

RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, AND SHARON THIBODEAU,

DEPUTY ASSISTANT ARCHIVIST FOR RECORDS SERVICES;

AND PAUL BRACHFELD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL

ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

STATEMENT OF ADRIENNE C. THOMAS

Ms. THOMAS. Thank you, Chairman Clay and members of the

subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss a recent security incident that is a serious breach of the trust placed in the

National Archives to protect our Nation’s records.

NARA learned in late March that an external computer hard

drive containing copies of Clinton Administrative Executive Office

of the President records was missing from the electronic records

processing room. As the Acting Archivist, and as someone who has

devoted my entire 39-year career to the National Archives, I am

deeply angered that a NARA employee or contractor may have intentionally removed this item.

With me today are NARA’s General Counsel and Senior Agency

Official for Privacy, Gary Stern, and Sharon Thibodeau, Deputy Assistant Archivist for Records Services.

The loss of the hard drive occurred while NARA was conducting

preservation processing of electronic media received from the Executive Office of the President [EOP], at the end of the Clinton administration. Tapes containing snapshots of the contents of the

working drives of EOP employees were copied by a contractor to

new media to prevent deterioration.

On September 18, 2008, two My Book hard drives created by the

contractor were delivered to NARA. The hard drives were labeled

master No. 2 and backup No. 2. The two hard drives were taken

to suite 5300 at the National Archives in College Park and placed

on a shelf in the unclassified electronic records processing room

within the suite. At the time, approximately 85 NARA employees

and contractors had badges that opened the three doors to the office area of the suite. Individuals with badge access to suite 5300

also had access to the electronic records processing room for unclassified records.

On October 30th, the work of verifying the records on the hard

drive was assigned to an information technology specialist. Work

was performed only on the master No. 2 hard drive, not the backup

No. 2, which would later be missing.

On February 5, 2009, the IT specialist placed the master No. 2

hard drive into its original manufacturer’s box and noted that the

backup No. 2 hard drive was in a similar adjacent box. The two

boxes remained on a shelf in the processing room and no additional

work was done on the hard drive until March 24, 2009, when the

IT specialist discovered that the box that had contained backup No.

2 hard drive was empty. The master No. 2 hard drive was still in

its box.

An immediate division-wide search was initiated. On April 2,

2009, the Inspector General, General Counsel and I were informed

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of the loss. While the Office of the Inspector General continues its

investigation, there are currently no facts to determine whether the

drive was stolen or misplaced and no suspect has been identified.

NARA has offered a reward of up to $50,000 for information that

leads to the recovery of the missing hard drive.

NARA staff reviewed the master No. 2 hard drive and discovered

that it contained numerous files containing personal names and Social Security numbers. In addition, NARA also found a small number of files that contained markings indicating they may contain

classified information. While information from the EOP provided at

the time of transfer indicated that the hard drives did not contain

classified data, we believe EOP employees must have accidentally

or improperly stored some classified information on their unclassified computers.

We are compiling a list of those individuals who may have had

their personal information compromised and a credit monitoring

contractor is notifying these individuals as they are identified. To

date, approximately 15,750 notification letters have been mailed.

NARA is offering each individual 1 year of free credit monitoring

services and fraud protection. To date, 796 individuals have signed

up for the credit monitoring services. Because of the extremely

large volume of data on the drive, over 8.7 million individual files,

we do not yet know the total number of individuals whose privacy

has been affected.

NARA has taken steps to improve internal security in our Electronic Records Division. First, we have added separate bad access

controls to the doors opening the processing rooms in suite 5300.

There are now only entrances to the processing room and only individuals with badges programmed to open these doors may enter the

processing room. All others must sign the log and be accompanied

by an authorized person while in the room.

Second, we conducted an audit of all electronic media containing

personally identifiable information and moved it to a separate

locked block of shelving within a locked stack area accessible only

to authorized employees.

Finally, all NARA staff are required to complete training on how

to handle sensitive information, including the new security procedures.

The Office of Records Services is also conducting unannounced

inspections of all records branches and divisions on a periodic

basis, and supervisors are required to do periodic walk-through inspections during the day.

When the investigation of this incident by NARA’s Office of Inspector General and Secret Service is completed, I can assure you

that we will act on the results with swift and appropriate disciplinary actions if it is determined that any NARA employees were responsible for removing the hard drive or failed to adhere to proper

records handling procedures.

The National Archives is a public trust and the 3,000 women and

men who work at NARA’s 44 facilities across the country take their

job and that trust very seriously. Every day, our staff performs

work that is vital to our democracy by preserving and safeguarding

the more than 9 billion records that make up the National Archives

of the United States.

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At the same time, we must balance safeguarding the records

with providing the people of this country access to those records.

As with any endeavor that relies on the work of human beings, our

work, despite our best efforts and intentions, is subject to error.

However, the loss of even one record or breach, even one individual’s personal information is unacceptable. And I assure you that

NARA will continue to improve our security procedures and ensure

that all staff is inculcated with the importance of following these

procedures.

Given the seriousness with which we take this loss, I am thankful for the opportunity to testify and I will try to answer any questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Thomas follows:]

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Mr. CLAY. Thank you so much, Ms. Thomas.

Mr. Brachfeld, you are up next.

STATEMENT OF PAUL BRACHFELD

Mr. BRACHFELD. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I thank you for offering me the opportunity to testify today. I

have been called before the subcommittee to provide testimony on

the circumstances surrounding an external computer hard drive

missing from the National Archives and Records Administration

which contained a vast amount of material from the Clinton administration, including Presidential Record Act [PRA], material.

The Presidential Record Act of 1978 governs the official records

of the President and Vice President created or received after January 20, 1981. The PRA changed the legal ownership of the official

records of the President from private to public and established a

new statutory structure under which Presidents must manage their

records.

I trust that in reaction to the loss of a hard drive, new policies,

procedures and processes will be defined and implemented at

NARA, and certainly my office will evaluate these actions, provide

guidance and appropriate independent and skilled oversight.

However, our focus now is on the criminal investigation of the

disappearance of the hard drive capable of holding two terabytes of

our government’s information, and which my forensic investigator

informs me was essentially filled with data.

At the outset, I must say I am not able to talk about all aspects

of the investigation at this time. This is an ongoing criminal investigation which may have elements affecting national security.

Therefore, I know that the Chair and members of this distinguished committee would not wish me to provide any information

that could potentially damage the investigation’s integrity or potential success.

Currently, we are working with the assistance of the U.S. Secret

Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to more precisely

identify the content of the hard drive. However, an initial cursory

review identified that thousands of examples of personally identifiable information [P.I.] data, reside on the hard drive. We reported

this to NARA management officials and they have hired a contractor to further analyze this P.I. aspect and provide breach notification per OMB requirements.

I should also note that at my request, the Special Agent in

charge of the Secret Service Washington Field Office generously

made their 24/7 hotline operation available to us in order to support the investigation and potential recovery of the missing drive.

In response to our suggestion, NARA has established a reward

of up to $50,000 for information leading to the successful recovery

of the missing hard drive. No productive leads have resulted to

date from this action.

The subcommittee has asked about the security in place at

NARA at the time the hard drive went missing and after the hard

drive went missing. The direct answer is that the controls in place

were inadequate and what controls were in there were readily bypassed and obviously compromised on an ongoing and dynamic

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basis. Quite simply, this was an accident waiting to happen and

now it has.

As a direct result of these failures in controls, my office’s capacity

to investigate this incident has been severely compromised. The

loss went unnoticed potentially for months. Conservatively speaking, at least 150 people had access to the area, and even rudimentary access controls such as badge or sign-in logs were not

maintained or could be readily bypassed.

While the drive was kept in an area ostensibly secured by a proximity card-reading lock, in practice this system failed. People could

simply piggyback by going through the door when other persons

opened it, and even worse, doors which should have been secured

were propped open for ventilation purposes.

It was also reported to my investigators that the processing area

in which the hard drive went missing was used as a conduit or

shortcut to the rest rooms. Therefore, it can be argued that the security for this area was no greater than the general security for the

building as a whole.

The loss of this hard drive holding PRA materials is not the only

concern I have in this investigation. Many in the pool of potential

subjects of this criminal investigation have access to the processing

area where this drive disappeared, as well as more traditional storage or stack areas. Therefore, I cannot say with any confidence

that data stored in these areas was not compromised. This includes

the records of the 9/11 Commission, the Warren Commission, as

well as large quantities of other national security holdings.

In a benign case where proper controls were in place and a subject hard drive was lost or ruinously disposed of, one might take

comfort that other data was not compromised. The facts dictate

that I am afforded no such comfort. If the drive was deliberately

removed, the person or persons could have just as readily removed

other holdings or copied information onto other mediums.

I am also deeply concerned about how NARA generally treated

the category of Presidential data like that which was on the missing hard drive. Specifically, when the data was copied from original

Executive Office of the President [EOP] computer tapes to modern

hard drives, the copying was done by contractors offsite without

any security requirements. NARA had a fixed price delivery order

for the duplication of 1,428 such EOP computer tapes to external

hard drives to include the missing hard drive.

A small business was provided complete custody and control over

the housing content of the EOP material. Amazingly, this contractor was one in a series of like contracts in which NARA was silent

in addressing any security requirements for the tapes or the information which they held. In fact, the contractor made absolutely no

mention of the sensitivity of these records, nor included a nondisclosure agreement.

When handling and processing groups of PRA material, I would

think it essential to institute appropriate measures for security

over transport and processing of these records offsite by contractors. However, no such measures were identified. In this specific

case, the tapes were sent offsite to a small storefront operation in

New Jersey. The existing security at this location was rudimentary

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and clearly inadequate to protect and limit inappropriate access to

PRA material.

In a June 18, 2009 letter, Senator Charles E. Grassley asked the

Acting Archivist of the United States: ‘‘Do you recognize NARA is

a national security agency?’’ She stated, ‘‘No. NARA is not a national security agency by any shared means of that term within the

executive branch for which we are aware. NARA does not make nor

does it implement national security policy. NARA’s only relationship to national security is our responsibility for ensuring that

those security classified records that come into our custody from

other agencies are stored, protected and handled following the

rules for which all agencies that handle classified records must adhere.’’

I would submit that NARA has in this and other recent cases

breached that relationship. While by some technical standards,

NARA may not meet the traditional definition of a formal national

security agency, the information and records we hold are vital to

our Nation’s security.

What I will say specific to the loss of this hard drive is that the

American people deserve better security and accountability than

NARA has provided them. I can assure you that through our audits

and investigations, management consultations and briefings, we

will work to help NARA strengthen its internal control and security mechanism.

While some corrective measures have, and I trust more will be

taken, it is analogous to closing the barn door after the horse has

left. The event has passed and damage done, the extent to which

I cannot quantify for you today.

I thank you for the opportunity to testify and am available to

take questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brachfeld follows:]

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Mr. CLAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Brachfeld.

We have been joined by two additional Members. I will yield to

Mr. McHenry for his opening statement.

Mr. MCHENRY. I thank the chairman.

Ms. Thomas, thank you for agreeing to join us today, this time,

for the hearing.

The topic today is, of course, the National Archives and Records

Administration organizational issues, but I think that is sort of diminishing the import of this. And organizational issues I think is

putting it lightly, the scope or the magnitude of the problem that

we are facing.

The National Archives is an agency with an extremely important

function. It serves as the keeper of our Nation’s valuable records,

preserves government and historical records that include copies of

acts of Congress, Presidential proclamations and Federal regulations. While the Archives maintains public access to some documents, other records contain highly sensitive data.

Mr. Brachfeld, thank you for touching on the national security

component in your testimony.

And these must be secured to ensure our national security and

shield personally identifiable information as well. The effectiveness

of the Archives as protector of the records under its control is key

to preserving our history and maintaining accountability in our

government.

The Archives conducts truly invaluable work, very important

work, obviously, yet they are an agency that the public doesn’t

often hear much about. Unfortunately, they have been getting quite

a lot of press lately, all of which or most of which seems to be negative. In May, the National Archives Inspector General, Mr.

Brachfeld, notified Congress that an external hard drive containing

national security information had gone missing from the agency’s

College Park facility sometime between October 2008 and March

2009, when its absence was first noticed.

That drive contained one terabyte of information, and what we

have come to know is that Clinton presidency records, the equivalent of which are millions of books full of information, as Mr.

Brachfeld has previously put it. The missing data, including more

than 100,000 Social Security numbers, the personal contact information of Presidential administration officials, the entire computer

files of 113 former White House employees, Secret Service and

White House operating procedures, and other highly sensitive information.

Disturbingly, the missing hard drive was stored in an easily

identifiable package, as Ms. Thomas testified to today, in a workspace that the Archives has already admitted was unsecured, unattended, and accessible to personnel without clearance. Even now,

it is still not known whether the hard drive was misplaced, lost or

stolen, or even when it actually went missing.

It is my hope that the National Archives management would immediately react to what has been called a catastrophic loss by

tightening security and accessibility at their College Park facility,

particularly in the area which the hard drive was removed.

However, when a bipartisan group of Oversight Committee staff

visited the campus on July 17th, they observed many of the same

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deficiencies in security measures and left with the impression that

a motivated criminal would be able to remove sensitive material

with little to no resistance.

Now, this is a bipartisan assessment. There wasn’t much of an

effort on the part of National Archives staff to even make it appear

that substantive changes had been made to secure the location. To

be fair, the pattern of material mismanagement of the National Archives precedes Ms. Thomas by quite a few years. We are still remembering Clinton administration official National Security Adviser Sandy Berger caught walking out of the Archives with his

pants stuffed, or actually rather socks, stuffed full with classified

uninventoried documents.

There are many more alarming cases of negligence at the Archives, yet none as egregious as the disappearance of the hard

drive. These include the disappearance of $6 million worth of taxpayer-funded equipment over the periods of 2002 to 2006, the disposal of countless original records from the Bureau of Indian Affairs with the Archives trash, and the disappearance of 55,000

pages of CIA and other Federal agency records right off the shelf

in 2006.

There is a prevalent culture of carelessness at the National Archives and it must be replaced with meticulous accounting for all

materials, paper and electronic, and stringent security measures

that restrict access of unauthorized employees to areas where confidential data is kept.

On Tuesday, President Obama announced he had selected his

nominee as Archivist to replace Ms. Thomas, David Ferriero. Quite

frankly, I believe this announcement couldn’t come soon enough.

Mr. Ferriero has certainly had a lot of experience managing mass

quantities of paper and electronic documents and other information

in his tenure as director of Research Libraries at the New York

Public Library, and I look forward to hearing about his qualifications and his plans for the National Archives at his Senate confirmation hearing, whenever the Senate really gets around to doing

their job.

And I thank the witnesses for appearing here today, and look forward to the testimony and explanation of how the hard drive full

of sensitive information was lost or stolen.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Patrick T. McHenry follows:]

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Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. McHenry.

We will now go into the questioning stage of this hearing, and

I will start it off with Ms. Norton for 5 minutes.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I see why you called this hearing. It is a virtually mandatory

hearing in light of the circumstances and the buildup of the security issues.

Let me make sure what we are talking about, because as I

looked at the testimony, I think it is Mr. Brachfeld’s testimony, I

tore it out, which says the hard drive contained examples of personally identifiable information.

You know, the word secure information has been thrown around

in the last several years so loosely. I am trying to understand what

was on the hard drive. What does it mean by personally identifiable information?

Mr. BRACHFELD. Is that question directed at me, ma’am?

Ms. NORTON. Yes, Mr. Brachfeld, that is fine.

Mr. BRACHFELD. There is a technical definition for PII. For purposes of this hearing, what I will define is that OMB defines PII

material to include Social Security numbers and like material that

could be used to damage a person’s security, banking, for identity

theft, along those lines. It could be names, addresses, associates,

that kind of information.

As this information was a compilation from the Clinton administration, it was a compilation, it has information that was resided

on individual computers, and thus there is information that meets

that definition that resided on the hard drive that is missing.

So again, it was a compilation of material.

Ms. NORTON. Have all of the parties whose information was compromised been so informed?

Mr. BRACHFELD. I will yield to the Acting Archivist.

Ms. THOMAS. We are in the process of identifying the individuals

that need to be notified of the breach.

Ms. NORTON. When did the breach occur?

Ms. THOMAS. I am sorry?

Ms. NORTON. When did the breach occur? When was it noted?

Ms. THOMAS. At the end of March, actually on April 2nd it was

reported to me, to Mr. Brachfeld, and to Mr. Stern that the hard

drive had been lost.

Ms. NORTON. Considering the nature of information and that this

is the month of almost August, are you saying that most of these

parties have not been so notified?

Ms. THOMAS. We don’t at this point know how many people’s

names and Social Security numbers are on the hard drive.

Ms. NORTON. Why do you not know that information?

Ms. THOMAS. There are 8.7 million individual files on this hard

drive, and we have a contractor at this time trying to extract all

of the data that they can to come up with the lists to go

through——

Ms. NORTON. Is that contractor, like this one, off the premises?

This is another contracting out matter where people who apparently should not have been handling secure information were doing

so. Now, where is this contractor located and why couldn’t this be

done on the premises so the hard drive would not have had, why

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did the hard drive have to leave the premises, I suppose is my

question.

Mr. Brachfeld.

Mr. BRACHFELD. Let me answer your last question. The process

of copying the information from White House tapes or what were

White House EOP employees’ tapes to the hard drive was done offsite and that is what I testified regarding. That was done offsite

up in New Jersey, and that is where I have raised significant security issues.

The second part of your interest, which is on now attempting to

mine and identify those individuals whose PII may have been compromised, that is under a separate contract which is being administered by the Archives.

The reason it is taking so exceptionally long is this is probably,

as far as I know through my 30-year career, this is probably the

greatest challenge in trying to identify——

Ms. NORTON. You are having to reconstruct essentially what was

on the hard drive with nothing to go on?

Mr. BRACHFELD. What my investigators are trying to do and are

now yielding the PII element to the contractor, what we are attempting to do is to use the latest forensic investigative software

available. This is not normal data that sits in one standard language or one standard format.

If you think about every record that you have ever captured over

your career in different languages and different spread sheets and

different formats, all being compressed into one entity. That is

what has happened. It is not readily mineable and definable as one

would think.

Ms. NORTON. So nobody’s been notified as of now?

Mr. BRACHFELD. I yield.

Ms. THOMAS. We have sent I believe it is 15,000, somewhere between 15,000 and 16,000 letters have gone out to notify people of

the breach of their information.

Ms. NORTON. Do you have any idea how long it will take before

all of the parties have been notified? What kind of harm could be

done in the meantime?

Ms. THOMAS. I think it is going to take several months. I think

one of the things that this has made perfectly clear to us, it is very

difficult to get the information off the hard drive. There are many

different——

Ms. NORTON. So you think that in terms of a nefarious act, someone trying to use the data, that would not be very easy to do?

Ms. THOMAS. Given that we have a contractor that was suggested to us by the National Security Agency as somebody that

they had worked with, who they thought was the best in the field

to try and do this, I do indeed believe that it is going to be difficult

for anybody to extract this information from the hard drive.

Ms. NORTON. Well, Mr. Brachfeld, you said a criminal investigation is going on. Is there any possibility other than this being stolen that you would regard as a credible possibility? I mean, could

it have been mislaid? If it had been mislaid, where would that have

been, since there were only two places it should be, either the Archives or with the contractor?

35

Mr. BRACHFELD. I cannot dismiss any aspect as to whether or not

it is missing, somebody took it for purposes of benign intent, just

to use it for their own medium, or the worst case scenario, that it

was taken for more nefarious purposes. That is a potential.

I also want to state that people with the correct technologies and

tools can mine this data. We have a contractor now that is trying

to, my investigation is focusing on how it happened and what the

impact of the loss is, and if we can find the subject.

I am also looking at what classified material resided on that

hard drive and other sensitive information. I am no longer involved

in looking at the PII content. That has now been yielded to the contractor working for the National Archives.

What I can say is, again, people with the capacity to read this

data, the tools, can do it. My investigators, my forensic auditor

could in fact pull up PII information fairly readily. Now, to find the

tremendous quantity to issue PII letters, as the agency is doing,

that is another subject. But certainly, somebody with, if they had

that intent, and if in fact it really is out there and somebody is

using it for that purpose, certainly they could pull P.I. information

off of that drive.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask to the extent that

there is a discovery of criminal use of this information that the

chairman of this subcommittee be informed immediately? I don’t

know what people could do to protect themselves, but I think the

worse thing to happen in a circumstance like this is not to even

know that out there in the stratosphere and perhaps in the hands

of thieves is all your personal information.

And if it is discovered, it seems to me at such point it is discovered, if you are at 20,000 of 8 million or whatever, it seems to me

that this committee should be informed at that point.

Mr. CLAY. Oh, for certain that will be made part of this official

hearing record.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you for the question.

Mr. McHenry, are you ready?

Mr. MCHENRY. Yes.

Ms. Thomas, how long have you been Acting Archivist?

Ms. THOMAS. Since mid-December 2008.

Mr. MCHENRY. Since mid-December.

Mr. Chairman, I am not familiar with most administration officials testifying with counsel at the desk. It seems to me a bit telling about the situation we are in, about how sensitive this is. But

you know, Ms. Thomas, I know this predates you. I mean, this

doesn’t necessarily simply fall at your feet. So I mean, how long

have you been with the Archives?

Ms. THOMAS. Thirty-nine years.

Mr. MCHENRY. Thirty-nine years, full career. So you know, there

have been studies on job satisfaction within the Federal Government. And I think it was American University’s Best Places to

Work in the Federal Government 2009, American University’s Institute for the Study of Public Policy. Are you familiar with the

study?

Ms. THOMAS. Yes.

36

Mr. MCHENRY. Yes. It was telling to me, based on our Oversight

Committee, to see where National Archives and Records Administration ranks. It is extraordinarily low in terms of job satisfaction

within the Federal Government. It is actually, I think the second

to last of all the institutions they studied.

Do you think there is a linkage between job satisfaction—well actually, let’s start here. What do you attribute the low job satisfaction assessment to?

Ms. THOMAS. Well, we did some further analysis of what the different rankings were in the different parts of the National Archives. And the truth of the matter is that most of the very low

rankings came from our regional facilities. And we have, for example, in our Federal Records Centers, which are fairly low paid occupations, they are not exactly intellectually stimulating.

It is people moving boxes in and out and so forth. There is not

a whole lot of promotion potential within the Records Center system, and a great deal of the very low scores in terms of job satisfaction came from those regional activities.

If you look at the National Archives in the Washington area, we

rank at at least the same average as most other agencies or a little

higher. So the regional scores basically bring the agency score

down to the level that is reported in that study.

Mr. MCHENRY. OK. OK. Do you think that there is any linkages

between dissatisfaction and disappearance of records or theft of

records?

Ms. THOMAS. I think there could be, but the averages for the people who are working with archival records are much higher and

they are not low. The Records Center records, of course, are agency

records, temporary records, not archival records. So the incidents

that have occurred over the past several decades have occurred in

archival records.

Mr. MCHENRY. OK.

Ms. THOMAS. So I am not sure that the linkage is there.

Mr. MCHENRY. In terms of your testimony, you said that this

drive with one terabyte of information was kept in its original

package. Is that true?

Ms. THOMAS. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. MCHENRY. OK. Is that standard procedure within your division of government to put these objects back in their original box?

Ms. THOMAS. In most cases, information——

Mr. MCHENRY. If you don’t have a policy, then that is fine, then

if you will just state that.

Ms. THOMAS. I don’t know. I can provide that for the record. I

don’t know the answer.

Mr. MCHENRY. Yes, if you could, that would be good.

Ms. THOMAS. Sure.

Mr. MCHENRY. It seems somewhat bizarre to me to have such

important information, and this is not really judging the information. You know, but having it lost to history is a major concern and

being able to piece this back together on what the——

Ms. THOMAS. Well, the information is not lost because this was

a backup tape. It is a copy.

Mr. MCHENRY. OK. Where was the original kept? Wasn’t it all

in the same desk?

37

Ms. THOMAS. The originals are the tapes that were delivered

from the EOP at the end of the Clinton administration. Those

tapes were backed up onto these hard drives, one of which was a

master hard drive and one which is a copy hard drive.

Mr. MCHENRY. And they were next to each other?

Ms. THOMAS. Yes, but the tapes were stored in the locked staff

area, the original records.

Mr. MCHENRY. OK. Is there a procedure for having a master, the

original and the backup, the two drives, is there a process to keep

them separate? If you have the backup and the main drive, right?

Same information, is there any policy you have within the Archives

to keep them in separate locations?

Ms. THOMAS. Not while they are being processed, and that is

what was happening at the time that the hard drives were there.

Mr. MCHENRY. Is it not true that the reason why we don’t know

if it is October or March is because they have been sitting on someone’s desk the whole time and they were not being processed? They

were left out untouched.

Ms. THOMAS. I think it is unclear how long they were left untouched.

Mr. MCHENRY. OK, which tells me you don’t have any policies

or procedures on how this works.

Mr. Brachfeld, are there policies and procedures on paper within

the Archives about how to handle two copies of the same data?

Mr. BRACHFELD. I will answer your question by getting specific

in this matter. In this case, I should note that drives that were not

used new were maintained in a locked area. Whereas the drives

that were in process and therefore holding the kind of data and

quality of data we talked about today were left in an unlocked, exposed area, put back in the original box.

So to me, it seemed curious and bothersome, troublesome that

clean tapes are locked up for security, but tapes that have documentation were left in an open area.

As far as policy and procedures, I guess more specifically, that

is what we are investigating. Right now, my focus is investigating

a potentially criminal act. We have time and we will look at audit

issues. We will look at new internal controls. I can simply say, as

I said in my testimony, it would seem that internal controls were

not the focus in this area.

Mr. MCHENRY. Well, thank you for your testimony. My time is

up, but it seems to me that the basic Archives procedure was the

equivalent of putting your car keys and your backup car key on the

same key chain. It seemed that it was very basic procedure that

was not instituted, nor was there a culture of following those procedures to ensure that you have two pieces of data—right?—kept separately, both secure so that therefore you have in this new technology age that we have, with diminishing documents from the

early 1990’s as that technology is getting older, that you would actually have those policies and procedures.

So, you know, to the larger issue here is making sure this doesn’t

happen again for any administration or any document.

And with that, I yield back.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. McHenry.

38

It begs the question of the backup system, that there be a foolproof backup system. Let me ask both witnesses, do you know anything about hundreds of thousands of veterans’ PII that has been

compromised when the National Archives sent unencrypted hard

drives to a vendor in return for replacement of hard drives? And

if you do, what has been done to inform veterans that their information has been compromised? Either one.

Mr. BRACHFELD. I will answer that by saying we are in the process, as I stated in my last semiannual report, of conducting an investigation specific to that matter. At this time, I do not have information to the extent that I could respond fully to that question.

We do believe an event occurred. The question is, what is the nature of the event and what are the implications? We are currently

investigating that matter.

There have also been other issues related to and have been reported in a management letter, related to St. Louis and the military veterans records in terms of other PII policy and procedures

that have been violated that also potentially compromises veterans’

information. And again, that is an issue which I cannot discuss in

a public forum because should that information be made available

publicly, it could be damaging.

So I respectfully cannot—I don’t think you would want me to discuss this in this public forum.

Mr. CLAY. OK. Well, I will go to my next witness, and ask Ms.

Thomas, can you shed any light on it? Are you aware of it?

Ms. THOMAS. I am unfamiliar with an incident relating to veterans’ records and a hard drive and missing records. I just don’t have

any information on that.

Mr. CLAY. OK. All right. Ms. Thomas, in June 2006, the Information Security Oversight Office inspected the information security

controls of NARA’s Washington National Records Center. ISOO

found that due to inadequate records management, hundreds of

boxes of classified materials could not be readily located.

It is my understanding that since the ISOO inspection, NARA

has taken steps to improve security at the Washington National

Records Center. What is the status of those missing boxes and

what has NARA done to improve the management of classified and

other materials at the Washington National Records Center?

Ms. THOMAS. There are two vaults at the Washington National

Records Center. One contains top secret SCI and R.D. material,

and the second vault contains secret and confidential information.

The Washington National Records Center has almost four million

cubic feet of records. Of those, 333,000 are classified, either at the

top secret SCI or secret or confidential.

The controls, the ISOO made recommendations, 22 different recommendations for how to improve security at the Washington National Records Center. At this stage, I believe all of them have been

implemented. An Information Security Program Manager has been

hired. A Vault Manager has been hired. Resources have been

thrown into the Records Center to do a complete inventory of both

vaults.

They started on the top secret and the SCI one. And they completed that inventory. Initially, they found 1,400 boxes that were

not where they were supposed to be. They then did a complete

39

check and got that number down to, I believe, 125 boxes of material that is not apparently on the shelves at the Washington National Records Center.

These records are owned by the agencies. They are not NARA

records. They are not archival records. They are often called back

by the agencies. And often what has happened in the past is that

an agency calls back records and they either keep them, because

they are their records and they have that right, and/or they will

send them back some months or years later in another accession

so that the number changes in terms of how you identify the

records, and they get shelved as a new accession, and they contain

boxes from the old accession.

So there certainly was a record keeping issue that needed to be

straightened out so we could keep better control over what went

back to the agency, whether they were permanently withdrawn and

kept in the agency, or whether or not they were returned to the

Washington National Records Center.

We are now, for the 125 boxes that are still not accounted for,

we have contacted six different agencies whose records these are

and asked them if they could check and find out if perhaps they

have a record of whether or not they borrowed back these records.

I believe there was something from the Energy Department just in

the past few weeks that said, oh yes, they have 15 of the boxes that

they have been able to account for.

So we are still working the process to find out where the records

are, and a similar inventory of the secret and confidential vault is

underway. And we will go through the same process of completing

the inventory, determining to the best we can where the records

are, and whether or not they have been loaned back to the agencies

or permanently withdrawn by the agencies.

Mr. CLAY. OK. And thank you for your response.

Mr. McHenry’s second round of questioning.

Mr. MCHENRY. Certainly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now, you found out about this security breach, or the disappearance of the drive April 2nd, you said. Is that correct?

Ms. THOMAS. Yes. That is when I was informed.

Mr. MCHENRY. OK.

Ms. THOMAS. All three of us were informed. Gary is here because

he is the Privacy Officer for the agency and has responsibility for

PII.

Mr. MCHENRY. So what have you done to address this so it

doesn’t happen again?

Ms. THOMAS. The Office of Record Services for Washington did

a complete review of procedures, and has implemented much more

stringent procedures to make sure that it doesn’t happen again.

Some of them I went through in my testimony, and they are in

more detail in my longer testimony that is submitted for the

record.

Mr. MCHENRY. Yes.

Ms. THOMAS. They have put card readers on doors where before

you could go into the office area and then go into the processing

area. The card reader on the office door would, in essence, get you

into the office area and into the processing office. Now, the processVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:24 Oct 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\58132.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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ing space has another layer of security, and so you have different

card reader access for those doors.

They are doing spot inspections. The supervisors and managers

are going through the space to make sure that the procedures that

we put in place are being adhered to.

We intend to do more training for people so that they truly get

the message that this is a basic part of their job is protecting the

records that they are working with. And that is a balancing act between providing access for research purposes and securing the

items, but securing the items is a critical, critical part of their job.

Mr. MCHENRY. Certainly. Now, are you familiar with the Inspector General’s audits from between October 2007 and March 2008?

Are you familiar with the audits that the Inspector General’s office

issued?

Ms. THOMAS. Well, I see the audits, yes.

Mr. MCHENRY. OK. Because at that point, it was pointed out in

that audit that the Archives was, ‘‘not accounting for artifacts in

a timely manner.’’ That was one. And two, among other things, artifacts were ‘‘not maintained in appropriate space.’’

So the audit there expressed some of the same failings that resulted in the disappearance of this data. Did you have any actions

you took off that audit from——

Ms. THOMAS. Well, I think that audit referred to the museum

items, the artifacts in Presidential libraries.

Mr. MCHENRY. Yes.

Ms. THOMAS. And Presidential libraries had started an inventory

process. It was at various stages in the different libraries. We indeed poured more resources into completing the inventories, and

they are underway. Some of them have been completed. Some of

the problems that existed in the older libraries will not exist for the

Bush Library or any library going forward because there will be a

computer system that tracks every artifact as it arrives in the

White House, and then that system is provided to us so that we

will have a complete list to start out with.

The record keeping in the White House Gift Office wasn’t as complete in the past, and it was not consistent, if I can give you an

example. A tea set, is that one item or is that a teapot and four

cups? And is there a tray? Is that seven items? You know, there

was no consistency in how they dealt with it.

Mr. MCHENRY. But within one division of the Archives, when you

have issues like, you know, not having information secured in appropriate space, does that raise questions for the overall system?

Do you look at overall systems within the Archives? Or is that just

one division and therefore isn’t applicable to anywhere else?

Ms. THOMAS. For the issue with the hard drive, we are going to

undertake a complete review. The Office of Records Services in

Washington has already started.

Mr. MCHENRY. I thought you said they have already done that.

Ms. THOMAS. I am sorry?

Mr. MCHENRY. I thought you said, in my last question, that they

had already done a complete review.

Ms. THOMAS. They did it for the Electronic Records Division.

They are branching out to all of their records holding units and,

as you said, looking at it more holistically across the agency, as opVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:24 Oct 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\58132.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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posed to just in one division. So we are looking at all security procedures and whether or not they are sufficient, whether they need

to be improved.

We certainly have decided that we need to improve our training

and that we need training at a lot of different levels. For example,

I am proposing that we will train every employee that comes to the

National Archives as part of their orientation, whether they are a

budget analyst or whatever, to make them understand what the

mission of the agency is and that everybody has a responsibility to

make sure that records are protected.

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you. Thank you. Very good answer. Thank

you.

Mr. CLAY. Ms. Thomas, regarding the notices that were sent out

to the 16,000, roughly, people, were there any problems with the

notices? I have received reports that recipients of those notices

thought that they were scams.

Ms. THOMAS. We did have some questions come in. We had a hotline set up for any questions that anybody did have. And we also

had an email box where they could contact us. And yes, the most

frequently asked question that came to us was: Is this a scam? Is

this somebody who is, you know, Prince so and so from somewhere

who is, you know, trying to get hold of my personal information

and drain my bank account or something?

So we have answered those questions.

Gary, if you have anything to add to that?

Mr. CLAY. Mr. Stern.

Mr. STERN. I can try. Yes.

The letters were sent out by our contractor providing the credit

monitoring services as well. And so while it is on NARA letterhead,

it was put in an envelop that looks more like the kind of envelope

you get from, you know, a bank or something else.

Mr. CLAY. A solicitation?

Mr. STERN. Exactly. So I think some people thought, weren’t

sure, is this really from the National Archives or is this just some

company just trying to, you know, solicit my business. And so we

assured those people that it really was from us. We referred them

to our Web site and we put up an updated notice to say we have

sent these letters out and they are legitimate, and we are informing you of this potential breach and offering this service.

So there was some confusion that we just hadn’t occurred to us

that would result by sending out the letters in that format.

Mr. CLAY. I see.

Any recommendations, Mr. Brachfeld?

Mr. BRACHFELD. Specific to that question?

Mr. CLAY. Yes.

Mr. BRACHFELD. I am pretty much apart from that process.

Again, my duty is to do the investigations. We reviewed the language in the breach notification letter just as a courtesy and the

language in the breach notification seemed to be appropriate.

As far as the contractor, the mailing, that is completely outside

of my domain.

Mr. CLAY. So there was really two mailings. Did you re-mail the

notices or no?

42

Ms. THOMAS. No, no, no. But there was an email box set up and

in the letter that notified people of the breach, they were provided

with the email address. They were provided with a hotline number

that they could call. And they were notified that they could look at

our Web site for further information, so that if they had any questions about the breach notification, they could contact us in several

different ways.

Mr. CLAY. Ms. Thomas, regarding the copying of Executive Office

computer tapes onto this hard drive, why were security requirements not built into the contract documents with your vendor?

Ms. THOMAS. Well, the contractor that did the work on the latest

batch of copying, because there were five different contracts, I believe, for various stages of copying of this material, was a GSA

schedule contract with the routine, I will say routine, because they

were, clauses about protection of government information, government products that were provided to the contractor.

In hindsight, our people should have included some additional security requirement clauses in the contract and that will certainly

be a part of any contract going forward.

Mr. CLAY. OK.

Mr. Brachfeld, any comment on that?

Mr. BRACHFELD. I have pretty much all the documentation related to this contract and what is clearly missing is any, any mention

of security as even a consideration within the body of any of the

solicitation.

The company that received the tapes did not even respond in

terms of their having any security arrangements in place. Again,

there was no clause for nondisclosure of information, as should be

customary in such a contractual relationship, contractual document.

Basically, it just shouldn’t have happened, and I think the Archives will learn from that.

Mr. CLAY. This sounds pretty sloppy as far as how we handle

sensitive information.

Mr. BRACHFELD. We visited the site and it is not the contractor’s

fault, per se, because the contractor was doing a duplication service. They were honoring the terms of the contract. But if you went

to the contractor site, as my agents did, along with other law enforcement you would have seen a basic storefront operation with

security clearly not the focus. You would see that the tapes were

kept in a room where doors were propped open also.

I have actually images of this and it will be in my investigative

report when it is finalized, or I could present them to you subsequent to this hearing. It was not the environment that one would

expect you would keep something of even minimal importance,

much less the quality and quantity of data that we have discussed

today.

Mr. CLAY. You can certainly share whatever information you can

with this subcommittee, so that we can get a clear picture of it.

Mr. BRACHFELD. I will do that.

Mr. CLAY. I will stop there and let Mr. McHenry have the last

question.

Mr. MCHENRY. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for having this hearing. I think it is important that we get the right policies and proceVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:24 Oct 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\58132.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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dures in place. And this is not necessarily an adversarial thing, I

am just perplexed at how something so basic could disappear. You

know, these hard drives in my experience aren’t cheap to get anyway. They are not cheap objects to have lying around, much less

with no information, much less with sensitive information on it.

And so it seems to me that even so much as actually taking that

hard drive, instead of leaving it out, putting it in a locked desk

drawer would have been a world apart from what happened, or as

near as we can tell, happened with the minimal amount of information that is actually known right now.

And as the IG still has the investigation going on, and I would

love to have any information as you produce it that you are able

to share with us, we would certainly appreciate it.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing and thank you

for your leadership.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, too, Mr. McHenry.

Since there are no further questions, that concludes this hearing.

The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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