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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED March 16, 2017

v No. 331089 Oakland Circuit Court CRYSTAL FAYLA HENSLEY, LC No. 2014-249251-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M ARKEY , P.J., and W ILDER and S WARTZLE , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Defendant is charged with one c ount of delivery/manufacture of 5 to 45 kilograms (20 to 200 plants) of marijuana, contrary to MCL 333.7401(2)(d)( ii ), and with one count of delivery/manufacture of marijuana, contrary to MCL 333.7401(2)( d)( iii ). Defendant moved to suppress statements she made to the police during the police se arch of her premises and, after conducting a two-day Walker 1 hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion. We grante d leave to appeal 2 and now affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At the Walker hearing, Sergeant Craig White of the Madison Heights Police De partment, testified that on August 1, 2013, while working as a plain clot hes detective assigned to the Oakland County Narcotics Enforcement Team [OCNET], he and a fiv e-person police team executed a search warrant on a home owned by defendant’s husban d. All team members were armed and because they were working undercover, wore masks. Th ey went to the front door intending to knock, but a person inside opened the door for the m. 3 The team then conducted a

1 People v Walker (On Rehearing) , 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).

2 People v Hensley , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 2 3, 2016 (Docket No. 331089).

3 Sergeant White had been informed that there was a marijuana gro wing operation in the home and recognized that it could be legal, but said he did not have access to information concerning-2- sweep of the home to secure the premises, finding seven to eigh t people, including two adults, teenagers, and defendant’s 12- and 9-year-old daughters. The o ccupants were brought to the living room and some of them were handcuffed but they were not held at gunpoint. One officer stayed with the occupants in the living room while the rest con ducted a search. A locked game room that contained marijuana was found along with a locked “gr ow room” in the basement that had marijuana plants. The police forced open the doors to gainaccess.
Sergeant White obtained the ce llular telephone number of defen dant’s husband, Joseph Hensley, and called him at work, informing him that his home wa s being searched and that he should return home. Hensley, i n turn, called de fendant, inform ed her about the search, and urged her to return home. Defendant arrived about 45 minutes after t he search had started, after the marijuana had been discovered. Sergeant White recalled that he met with defendant on the front lawn and informed her that he had a search warrant for the home to search for narcotics, and that they had discovered marijuana. He was no longer wearing his ma sk. Sergeant White specifically told defendant she was not under arrest. He never told her, however, that she was free to leave, never gave her the Miranda 4 warnings, never asked if she had any prior police contacts, and never asked if she had a learning disability or i f she was dyslexic. 5 Sergeant White testified that while they were t alking, defendant appeared to c omprehend the quest ions he did ask and gave detailed answers.

Sergeant White asked defendant if she had valid medical mariju ana paperwork. According to Sergeant White, defendant responded that the marij uana grow operation belonged to her husband, and he had the paperwork for it. Defendant and Sergeant White then walked to the bedroom to obtain some medical marijuana paperwork that she said was there. Sergeant White testified that defendant pr oduced some medical marijuana paperwork and her own medical marijuana patient card, but defendant claimed that there was a masked police officer in the bedroom and that the medical marijuana paperwork was already sp read out on the bed. Defendant then told Sergeant White that she did not know the lo cation of the key and combination for the locks on the grow room, but she called Hens ley and obtained that information and then gave it to White. Sergeant White asked de fendant if she helped with the marijuana cultivation or watered the plants, and she responded that she had helped by trimming the plants. She was then escorted to the living room and detai ned with the other occupants; she was not handcuffed but was never to ld she was free to leave.

Sometime later, Sergeant White came back and asked defendant t o give him a written statement concerning the verbal statements she had made to him. Defendant claimed that

whether it was a legal operation; he explained that because thi s might have been a legal marijuana operation, he sought to ga in consensual entry rather than breaking in the door.

4 Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

5 Defendant never volunteered tha t she had these disabilities, a nd no evidence was ever presented to suggest that she suffered from any physical or cognitive dis ability. Defendant, who was 35 years old at the time, had dropped out of the 10th grade and ha d held various jobs involving manual labor. She claimed that she was not a good speller and had problems writing. She stated that her only other contact wit h police was one time when she w as stopped for speeding.-3- Sergeant White took her to the b edroom and, with another office r present, told her she could be arrested and charged and that he wanted her to write a statemen t; she did not believe she had any choice. In the statement she said: “I, Crystal Hensley, am a patient and my husband, Joe, is a patient and a care giver to two patients. Grow [sic] in the ba sement belongs to him. I sometimes help with the trimming.” Serg eant White did not read defendant the Miranda warnings at any time, and specifically did not do so before interviewing defend ant or asking her to write a statement. Defendant testified that the police told her what t o write, but she acknowledged that the words in the statement were not the ones she testified that the police told her to write, and she further agreed that the statement was true. Sergeant White est imated that he spoke with defendant for a tot al of about 15 minutes.

The trial court ruled that, considering the totality of the fa cts, the prosecution had established that defendant was not in custody and that her stat ements were voluntary. 6

II. CUSTODY

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in holding that her statements were admissible, contending that she wa s subjected to custodial inte rrogation without b enefit of the Miranda warnings and without waiving the rights enumerated in those wa rnings. We disagree.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress in the trial court and a Walker hearing was conducted, so this issue has been preserved for appellate revie w. People v McCrady , 244 Mich App 27, 29; 624 NW2d 761 (2000). “This Cour t reviews de novo t he trial court’s ultimate ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress.” People v Smart , 304 Mich App 244, 247; 850 NW2d 579 (2014), quoting People v Brown , 279 Mich App 116, 127; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). “The trial court’s findings of fact at a s uppression hearing are reviewed for clear error.” Smart , 304 Mich App at 247.

It is well-established that a person who is in custody must be given specific warnings regarding the person’s constitutional rights to remain silent a nd to counsel before being subjected to police interrogation or its functional equivalent. Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966); People v Elliott , 494 Mich 292, 301; 833 NW2d 284 (2013). It is also well-established “that Miranda warnings need be given only in situations involving a custodial interrogation.” People v Anderson , 209 Mich App 527,532; 531 NW2d 780 (1995). As this Court summarized in People v Zahn , 234 Mich App 438, 449; 594 NW2d 120 (1999):

6 The trial court also considered testimony by Joseph Hensley co ncerning his interactions with the police after he arrived at th e home, and concluded that he was not in custody and that his statements were voluntary. After answering some questions conc erning the grow operation and admitting that he was probably over the amount of cultivated ma rijuana he was allowed to possess, Joseph Hensley was given Miranda warnings and the interview continued. The trial court ruled that Joseph Hensley was not in custody and his stat ements were voluntary. We are not called upon in this appeal by defendant to determine if the trial court’s rulings with regard to her husband were correct.-4- The term “custodial interrogation” means “ ‘questioning initiat ed by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of [her] freedom of m ovement in any significant way.’ ” People v Hill

, 429 Mich 382, 387; 415 NW2d 193 (1987), quoting Miranda

, supra at 444. To determine whether a defendant was in custody at the time of the interrogation, we look at the totality of the circumstances, with the key questio n being whether the accused reasonably could have believed that [s]he was not free to leave. People v Roark , 214 Mich App 421, 423; 543 NW2d 23 (1995). The determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interroga tion rather than the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating offic ers or the person being questioned. Stansbury v California , 511 US 318, 323; 114 S Ct 1526; 128 L Ed 2d 293 (1994).

In determining whether an individual has been subjected to poli ce custody, a court must consider the totality of the circumstan ces surrounding the interrogation , but “the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of mo vement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v Beheler , 463 US 1121, 1125; 103 S Ct 3517; 77 L Ed 2d 1275 (1983), quoting Oregon v Mathiason , 429 US 492; 97 S Ct 711; 50 L Ed 2d 714 (1977). See also People v Roberts , 292 Mich App 492, 505; 808 NW2d 290 (2011) (“Whether an individual is effectively ‘in c ustody’ is based on the totality of the circumstances.”)

In Mathiason , the defendant was asked to meet with police for an interview. He voluntarily went to the police station. On review of the trial court’s decision not to suppress the defendant’s statement, the Oregon Supreme Court determined that the defendant was in custody and his statement should be suppressed. The United States Supr eme Court reversed and stated:

In the present case, however, there is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where res pondent’s freedom to depart wa s restricted in any way. He came voluntarily to the police station, where he was i mmediately informed that he was not under arrest. At the close of a 1⁄2-hou r interview respondent did in fact leave the police station without hindran ce. It is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in custody “or otherwise dep rived of his freedom of action in a ny significant way.”

Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even i n the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the ques tioning took place in a “coercive environment.” Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virt ue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ul timately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are no t required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questi oning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedomas to render him “in custody. ” It was that sort of-5- coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited. [429 US at 495.]

The totality of the circumstances in this case are: (1) defen dant was informed by her husband that the police were at their home executing a search w arrant and she should return there; (2) defendant voluntarily drove to her home; (3) she saw police officers at her home; (4) she met Sergeant White who told her the police were executing a search warrant; (5) Sergeant White informed defendant she wa s not under arrest; (6) pursuant to the legal search of the home, the police had discovered marijuana; (7) Sergeant White was awa re that defendant’s husband was purportedly a medical marijuana caregiver and that he and d efendant were possibly medical marijuana patients; (8) defendant informed Sergeant White that she was a medical marijuana patient; (9) all of the police at the scene were armed, but non e of them drew or pointed their weapons at defendant; (10) some of the officers wore masks, butto conceal their identities—it was clear that all of them were police officers; (11) during hi s discussions with defendant, Sergeant White’s face was unmasked; (12) defendant was not hand cuffed at any time; (13) defendant was asked if she had paperwork to verify the legal st atus of the marijuana operation; (14) accompanied by Sergeant White, and possibly another office r, defendant went to her bedroom to obtain the paperwork; (15) on the way to the bedroom , defendant was able to observe that the occupants of t he house, including her children , had been rounded up and detained in the living room; ( 16) with the exception of defenda nt’s two young daughters, the remaining occupants were all handcuffed; 7 (17) according to Sergeant White, defendant produced some paperwork and her medical marijuana patient card, but the paperwork dealt with the application for a medical marijuana license or patient card and did not answer the question whether the operation in the home was legal; (18) defendant cla imed that the paperwork was already spread out on the bed but she did not explain what that paperwork consisted of and, given her claimed lack of involvement in her husband’s marijuan a business, she would not necessarily have been equipped to make that assessment; (19) Se rgeant White asked defendant for the key to the marijuana grow room and the combination to t he combination lock for that room and, after calling her husband to get that information, sh e gave it to the police; (20) defendant claimed that White asked if she was involved with her husband’s grow operation and whether she watered the plants, and that she explained that it was her husband’s and she generally had nothing to do with it but had helped by trimming the plants on at least one occasion; (22) Sergeant White later asked defendant if she woul d make a written statement setting out what she had told h im and she agreed to do so; (23) defendant claimed that White told her she could be charged and arrested and ordered her to write a statement; (24) defendant further claimed that she wrote what the police officer told her to write, but she subsequently agreed that the words were hers and they were true; (25) defend ant was 35 years old, had a tenth grade education, and there is no indication that she had troubl e understanding Sergeant White and she did not indicate to him (or to the trial court) that sh e had any cognitive issues that would

7 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the police may handcuff occupants in a residence while a search is being conducted to protect the safe ty of investigating officers. Muehler v Mena , 544 US 93, 99-100; 125 S Ct 1465; 161 L Ed 2d 299 (2005).-6- have prevented her from understanding what was happening or wha t he was saying to her; (26) Sergeant White never told defendant she was free to leave; (27) Sergeant White’s interaction with defendant lasted about 10 to 15 minutes and after it was c ompleted, defendant was brought to the living room and was requir ed to stay with the other occupants, but she was not handcuffed; (28) defendant was not arrested that day; and (29) the search t ook about two hours and after it was concluded, the police left.

The police questioning in this case occurred in defendant’s ho me. “[I]nterrogation in a suspect’s home is usually viewed as noncustodial.” People v Coomer , 245 Mich App 206, 220; 627 NW2d 612 (2001), quoting Mayes (After Remand) , 202 Mich App 181, 196; 508 NW2d 161 (1993) (Corrigan, P.J., concurri ng). Defendant knew that the p olice were at her home executing a search warrant when she voluntarily went there. When she fir st encountered the police, she was told she was not under arrest. Her interaction with the po lice was relatively short (10 to 15 minutes), as was the overall time the police were present in he r house (approximate ly two hours). As the Supreme Court observed in Michigan v Summers , 452 US 692, 701; 101 S Ct 2587; 69 L Ed 2d 340 (1981), it may be assumed that most citizens would ch oose to remain at their residence to observe the poli ce while they conduct a search.

Defendant was detained during th e course of the search, but sh e was not handcuffed. In People v Jones , 301 Mich App 566, 580; 837 NW2d 7 (2013), the defendant was a sked by the police to remain with her children in the rear seat of a police cruiser following a traffic stop. Marijuana was then found in the defendant’s car along with some medical marijuana caregiver and patient paperwork for the defendant and others. The police questioned the defendant at the scene and while she was being transported to the police station , but she “was released without being charged after the questioning was completed.” 301 Mich A pp at 569-570. This Court found that the defendant was not in custody.

In this case, the brief detent ion and questioning occurred indefendant’s home. Similar
to Jones , the questioning involved the police trying to determine if de fendant could legally possess the marijuana that had been discovered (where there was some evidence that it may have been possessed in accordance with the Medical Marijuana Act), a nd defendant’s children were in relatively close proximity. In contrast to Jones , defendant was never take n to the police station.

Additional factors suggest tha t defendant was not in custody. Defendant was permitted to call her husband on her cell phone. Because there were other f amily members present in her home, she was not isolated and deprived of any source of suppor t; that is, while the experience may have been stressful, defendant was not forced to undergo it alone in an interview room in a police station. Although she was detained by the police, the d etention was associated with the execution of a valid search warrant. There is no indication th at the police embarked on the search as a means of questioning defendant (or her husband). I nstead, the minimal questioning that the police did conduct was related to the object of the se arch: investigating the marijuana that was discovered at the house pursuant to a valid search. T he limited questioning was directed at determining whether defendant had proper paperwork that woul d establish that the marijuana growing operation was legal and that the amount of marijuana wa s permitted by the number of authorized medical marijuana patients.-7- The police are permitted to ask general on-the-scene questions to investigate the facts surrounding a crime without implicating Miranda

. People v Hill , 429 Mich at 398. Quoting language from the Miranda decision, our Supreme Court reasoned:

It can be argued that police officers should inform every pers on of whom they ask a question that the question need not be answered. Ho wever, whether this would have a socially beneficial effect is doubtful, and t his approach was specifically, and wit h good reason, rejected in Miranda :
General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-find ing process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of respon sible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they m ay have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compell ing atmosphere inherent in the pro cess of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present. [384 US 477-478.]

Once it is recognized that it is proper for members of society to voluntarily answer appropriate questions of law enforcement officers, it is difficult to conceive why a line should be drawn which might encourage silen ce simply because the person being questioned is the focus of a police in vestigation. It is desirable that such an individua l also speak frankly and volunt arily to the police. However, he must never be put in a position where he feels that he must speak even though he prefers not to do so. Thus, we protect prime su spects through the reading of the Miranda warning, as we do any other individual, when he is in a situation in which he may perceive that he must speak against h is will, i.e., during custodial interrogation. The purpose of the Miranda rule is to redress the disadvantage inherent in a cust odial setting, not to create a c onfrontational atmosphere in the more neutral noncustodial environment. [429 Mich at 398- 399.]

Defendant emphasizes that she “did not go to her home for the specific purpose of police interrogation and she did not hav e a conversation with the poli ce prior to her arrival agreeing to be subject to custodial interrogation upon her arrival.” She e mphasizes that she was detained for 11⁄2 to 2 hours, was surrounded by armed police officers (five of whom had masks on), that her movement was restricted, that she was not given Miranda warnings, that she was never told she was free to leave, that she was never told she did not have to talk with the police, and that she was twice interrogated in her bedroom – isolated from her famil y, and was “paraded” past her handcuffed family on the way to the bedroom. Defendant also em phasizes that she was terrified and thought she was under arre st and was going to jail.

Defendant overstates her situation. As noted, she was told by her husband that the police were at their home executing a se arch warrant. Thus, when she voluntarily returned to her home, she could not have been surprised to find police there. The po lice officer she primarily interacted with, Sergeant White , was not masked, and he informe d her at their ini tial meeting that she was not under arrest ; defendant was never handcuffed or told she was under arrest.-8- Defendant was escorted by or accompanied the police to her bedr oom because that is where she informed them that the medica l marijuana paperwork was located . On the way to the bedroom from the front door, she passed by her family members in the li ving room because in order to get to the bedroom from the entrance to the home, it was necessary to pass by the living room ; defendant was not “paraded” by her handcuffed family members to intimidate her. Defendant admits that she was allowed to call her husband but she complai ns on appeal that she was not “continuously on the telephone.” There is, however, no indicat ion that she ever asked the police if she could remain on the tel ephone with her husband and that they refused such a request.

Defendant argues that the cited caselaw deals with Fourth Amen dment issues rather than the Fifth Amendment issues presented in this case. Defendant m isperceives the application of these cases. Because the police were properly permitted to det ain the home’s occupants (including defendant) while they conducted their authorized sea rch, it cannot be said that they “staged” the setting to intimidate defendant and coerce her int o talking with them. Had defendant said nothing at all, she and her family would still h ave been detained because of the ongoing search. The purpose of the detention was not to coerce defendant into agreeing to talk with the police. Indeed, the po lice did not know whether defen dant was at home when they executed the search warrant, and could not know whether she wou ld arrive home while the search was underway. The police were present for the purpose o f conducting a search for contraband, not to question suspec ts. Defendant emphasizes tha t her family was detained by armed police officers, suggesting that this scenario was intent ionally created to intimidate her into talking. The detention was consistent with proper police procedure, however, and the detention of family members occurred before defendant arrived, defendant never saw any drawn weapons, and defendant was specifi cally told when she arrived t hat she was not under arrest.

Defendant claims that the tri al court failed to “specifically apply Miranda ” in its decision. This is simply not correct. The trial court noted that the iss ue was whether the police were required to give defendant her Miranda rights before conducting a cu stodial interrogation: “The question really is whether or not Mr. and Mrs. Hensley were in custody.” The court then discussed what the caselaw said with respect to when a suspect is in custody. The court quoted a passage from Rhode Island v Innis , 446 US 291; 100 S Ct 1682; 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1980), that specifically referenced Miranda . The court cited several more cases dealing with how a court is to determine whether a person is in custody. The court was als o clearly aware that defendant was not given Miranda warnings while her husband was given the warnings: “Neither o f the defendants were [sic] given their constitutional rights until M r. Hensley mentioned that he might be over [the statutory limit] and at which point, Sergeant Whit e did Mirandize Mr. Hensley. . . .” These statements make it clear that the court was aware of the issue it was tasked with deciding.

Factual findings are sufficient as long as it appears that the trial court was aware of the issues in the case and correctly applied the law. People v Armstrong

, 175 Mich App 181, 185; 437 NW2d 343 (1989). The court need not make specific findings of fact regarding each element of the crime. People v Wardlaw

, 190 Mich App 318, 320-321; 475 NW2d 387 (1991); People v Vaughn , 186 Mich App 376, 384; 465 NW2d 365 (1990). A court’s failure to find t he facts does not require remand where it is manifest that the court was aware of the factual issue, that it resolved the issue, and that further explication would not facilitate review.-9- People v Jackson , 390 Mich 621, 627 n 3; 212 NW2d 918 (1973). [ People v Legg , 197 Mich App 131, 134-135; 494 NW2d 797 (1992).]

Defendant also claims that the trial court failed to “place on the record during its oral ruling crucial testimony of [defe ndant] and [Sergeant] White.” The “crucial testimony,” according to defendant, was (1) that defendant testified that s he was not given the Miranda warnings; (2) that defendant tes tified she was detained; (3) th at Sergeant White testified that he did not give defendant the Miranda warnings; and (4) that Sergeant White specifically stated that defendant was detained. As alr eady indicated, however, the tri al court summarized that neither defendant nor her husband were given Miranda warnings until Hensley stated that he was probably over the limit, at which point he was given the warnings. This summary by the court was sufficient to indicate that it was aware that defendant was never given the warnings. Moreover, there is no dispute that defendant was not given the warnings. And the issue of whether defendant was given the warnings is a secondary issue; the primary issue is whether defendant was in custody , because it is only the fact of custody that gives rise to the requirement that the police give a defendant the Miranda warnings. The court determined that defendant was not in custody and the police were therefore not required to gi ve her the warnings. There was no dispute that defendant was detained until the search was comple ted.

Courts of this state have repeatedly held that the mere fact o f detention, without more, is not enough to conclude that a defendant was “in custody” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. See City of Grand Rapids v Impens , 414 Mich 667, 675; 327 NW2d 278 (1982); People v Steele

, 292 Mich App 308, 317-319; 806 NW2d 753 (2011); Mayes , 202 Mich App at 196-197; People v Edwards ; 158 Mich App 561, 563; 405 NW2d 200 (1987). Officers, however , cross the threshold from allowable detentio n to custody when they create a coercive or threatening environment in which a potential defendant does not feel free t o refuse to answer questions or otherwise end the police encounter. See Impens , 414 Mich at 675; Mayes , 202 Mich App at 196- 197.

In Summers , 452 US at 705, the United States Supreme Court discussed “the limited authority [police officers have] to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” The Court stated:

The detention of one of the residents while the premises were s earched, though admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty, was surely l ess intrusive than the search itself. Indeed, we may safely assume that most citizens – unless they intend flight to avoid arrest – would elect to remain in order to observe the search of their possessions. Furthermo re, the type of detention impos ed here is not likely to be exploited by the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, because the information the officers seek normally will be obtained through the search and not through the detention. Moreover, be cause the detention in this case was in respondent’s own residence, it co uld add only minimally to the public stigma associated with the search itsel f and would involve neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a c ompelled visit to the police station. In sharp c ontrast to the custodial interro gation in Dunaway [ v-10- New York , 442 US 200; 99 S Ct 2248; 60 L Ed 2d 824 (1979)], the detenti on of this respondent was “substantial ly less intrusive” than an arre st.

In assessing the justification for the detention of an occupan t of premises being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant, both the law enforcement interest and the nature of the “articulable facts” supporting the detention are relevant. Most obvi ous is the legitimate law enf orcement interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is f ound. Less obvious, but sometimes of greater importan ce, is the interest in minimiz ing the risk of harm to the officers. Finally, the or derly completion of the search may be facilitated if the occupants of the premises are present. [452 US at 701-703. ]

The Supreme Court further observed that: “[T]he detention repr esents only an incremental intrusion on personal liberty when the search of a home has bee n authorized by a valid warrant. The existence of a search warrant, however, also provides an ob jective justification for the detention.” Id . at 703.

In this case, officers validly detained the occupants of the h ome to protect the safety of the those executing the search warrant. Defendant voluntarily arrived at the home and assisted officers in the search. Unlike many of the other occupants, sh e was not handcuffed or restrained in any manner. No one pointed a weapon at her or threatened he r in any manner. Her detention follows only from an officer’s direction to her to stay in the living room while others completed the search. No one asked questions of her while she was detain ed but rather requested her presence in another room of the house. We therefore conclude t hat defendant’s detention was not subject to the type of coe rcion necessary to implicate Miranda

. Finally, we reiterate that the issue of whether a defendant is in custody requires application of a reasonable pers on standard rather than a subje ctive standard. Roberts , 292 Mich App at 504. Defendant focuses on her testimony that she was te rrified and fearful that she was going to be arrested, but that does not establish that she was in custody. The question is whether a reasonable person in her situation would feel that she was incustody. Where defendant was told she was not under arrest, was not placed in handcuffs, was never physically touched or restrained, was allowed to cal l her husband, was only briefly d etained, and the detention was incidental to the valid search o f the premises, we conclude tha t the trial court correctly concluded that defendant was not in cust ody. Therefore, the police were not required to advise defendant of the Miranda warnings before they questioned her.

III. VOLUNTARINESS

Defendant also contends that her statements to the police were not voluntary. This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s determination regarding the vol untariness of a defendant’s
statement. People v Ryan , 295 Mich App 388, 396; 819 NW2d 55 (2012). “Deference is giv en, however, to the trial court’s asse ssment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded to the evidence. The trial court’s factual findings a re subject to reversal only if they are clearly erroneous, meaning that the Court is left with a firm a nd definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id . (internal citation omitted). The test to be applied “is whet her, considering the totality of a ll the surrounding circumstances, the [statement] is ‘the product of an-11- essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,’ or whe ther the accused’s ‘will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically im paired . . . .’” People v Cipriano

, 431 Mich 315, 333-334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988), quoting Culombe v Connecticut , 367 US 568, 602; 81 S Ct 1860; 6 L Ed 2d 1037 (1961). We find no error in the trial court’s determination.

When determining whether a defendant’s statement is voluntaril y made, our Supreme Court has found it useful to appl y a non-exclusive list of fact ors, including:

the age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligen ce level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolo nged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an un necessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused w as deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was phys ically abused; and whether the suspect was t hreatened with abuse.

The absence or presence of any one of these factors is not nec essarily conclusive on the issue of voluntariness. The ultimate test of admissibility is whether the totality of the ci rcumstances surrounding the makin g of the [statement] indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made. [ Cipriano , 431 Mich at 334; internal citations omitted.]

The trial court cited Cipriano , and endeavored to make an assessment of the relevant facts as developed by the testimony at the hearing. The court noted that defendant (1) was an adult; (2) she did not have a high school diploma; (3) she did not manifest any disability in terms of verbal or written communicatio n; (4) she appeared to be of a t least average intelligence; (5) she had no previous experience w ith the police; (6) there was n o prolonged questi oning by police because while the entire searchlasted only about two hours, th e questioning itself occupied only about 5 to 15 minutes; (7) defendant was not advised of her con stitutional rights; (8) she was not injured, intoxicated, drugged, or in ill health; (8) she was no t deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; (9) she was not physic ally abused or touched; (9) de fendant claimed that Sergeant White threatened to charge her; (10) defendant was told she was not under arrest, she was not placed under arrest during the time the police were at her home , and she was not arrested that day; (11) she was not handcuffed; (12) she voluntarily went to her home knowing that the police were executing a search warrant; (13) no guns were pointed at t he occupants; and (14) the encounter between defendant and the police occurred at her home . The court also noted several other facts during the course o f its summary of the testimony o f the witnesses: (15) there were armed police officers present at the house, some of whom were w earing masks (although Sergeant White was not), but the y were clearly identified as po lice officers and two of them were uniformed officers; (16) Sergeant White did not raise his voice or yell at defendant; and (17) she was allowed to call her husband.

We further observe that the police did not engage in persisten t, intense questioning over an extended period of time in an effort to sap defendant’s will power. The initial questioning occurred immediately after defendant arrived at her home, and w as directed at securing medical-12- marijuana paperwork and the key to a padlock and the combinatio n for a combination lock. The subsequent questioning occurred after defendant had been detain ed approximately 40 minutes, but it consisted only of the request that she make a written st atement of what sh e had already told the police. 8 On the contrary, Sergeant White’s questioning was very limite d and appears to have been directed at determining whet her defendant had evidence dem onstrating that she and her husband possessed the marijuana legally. The court found that both Sergeant White and defendant had indicated that at their initial encounter, White asked if defendant had medical marijuana paperwork, and they proceeded to the bedroom so she c ould show him the paperwork that she had. 9 As Sergeant White testified, and as the trial court noted, th e police are unable to verify the status of medical marijuana users. Had defendant be en able to show Sergeant White paperwork indicating that the amo unt of marijuana discovered inthe home was under the amount authorized by the Medical Marijuana Act, it is likely that no c harges would have subsequently been filed.

Defendant appears to particularly concentrate on the giving of the written statement, presumably because defendant claims that before she was asked t o provide a written statement, Sergeant White told her that she could face criminal charges. Yet, because the written statement only recorded what she had alread y verbally told White, and bec ause she acknowledged that the words were her own and that theywere true, this Court conclude s that the written statement was also voluntarily made.

Considering the relevant factors, this Court concludes that th e trial court correctly determined that defendant’s sta tements to the police were volun tary.

Affirmed.

/s/ Jane E. Markey /s/ Kurtis T. Wilder /s/ Brock A. Swartzle

8 While there was a dispute concerning whether defendant was thr eatened with criminal charges before she made the written statement, the statement itself did not relate any new information; it was merely a written statement of what defendant had already di sclosed to the police, and she admitted it was true.

9 The trial court noted the discrepancy between Sergeant White’s testimony that defendant provided the paperwork and defend ant’s claim that the paperwork was spread out on the bed when she entered the bedroom. The trial court found that this discrepancy did not make “a big difference” and this Court agrees. There was already a police officer in the bedroom when defendant and Sergeant White entered. It is possible that whil e Sergeant White was meeting with defendant, the other officer c ame across the paperwork as he searched the bedroom. Even if the paperwork had already been found, Sergeant White may not ha ve known that it been discovered.