GUANTÁNAMO BAY 

DETAINEES 

Facilities and Factors 

for Consideration If 

Detainees Were 

Brought to the 

United States 

Report to the Chairman, Select 

Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate 

November 2012 

GAO-13-31 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 
 United States Government Accountability Office 

Highlights of GAO-13-31, a report to the 

Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, 

U.S. Senate 

November 2012 

GUANTÁNAMO BAY DETAINEES 

Facilities and Factors for Consideration If Detainees 

Were Brought to the United States 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Since 2002, the United States has 

operated military detention facilities at 

its Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay, 

Cuba, to hold individuals detained 

during overseas counterterrorism 

operations. In 2009 the President 

directed the closure of these facilities 

within 1 year. Since then, a number of 

statutes have prohibited the transfer of 

Guantánamo Bay detainees to the 

United States. GAO was asked to 

review existing U.S. facilities and 

identify factors to be considered in the 

event that restrictions were lifted and 

Guantánamo Bay detainees were 

transferred to the United States. This 

report describes the (1) current 

Guantánamo Bay detention facilities 

and infrastructure, (2) DOD corrections 

facilities and factors to be considered if 

these facilities were used to hold the 

detainees, and (3) DOJ facilities holding 

individuals charged with or convicted of 

terrorism-related crimes, and factors to 

be considered if these facilities were 

used to hold the detainees. 

To conduct its work, GAO reviewed 

relevant laws and policies on detention 

operations; visited several facilities at 

Guantánamo Bay and DOD and DOJ 

sites in the United States selected for 

their range of housing configurations; 

and interviewed officials at both 

agencies. GAO’s review is descriptive 

and did not include an evaluation of 

whether specific U.S. facilities would 

be suitable for holding Guantánamo 

Bay detainees, nor did GAO address 

legal factors that are still being 

adjudicated. GAO is not making any 

recommendations in this report. In 

commenting on this report, DOJ stated 

that it has no plans to transfer 

detainees to the United States. This 

report is an unclassified version of a 

classified report issued in November 

2012. 

What GAO Found 

As of November 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) held 166 detainees in 

five separate facilities in conditions ranging from communal living to maximumsecurity segregated cells that limit detainee interaction. In addition, DOD 

maintains facilities and infrastructure dedicated to detention support operations. 

For example, DOD operates an extensive information-technology infrastructure, 

conducts operations to support the protection of military personnel, and performs 

other missions at Guantánamo Bay such as securing two courthouses used for 

military commissions. 

Within the United States, DOD operates six corrections facilities that are 

equipped to confine servicemembers for more than 1 year. On average, as of 

August 2012, these facilities were operating at about 48 percent capacity, but this 

varies across different facilities and housing units. GAO identified from interviews 

with DOD officials and analysis of detention operations documents several 

factors that would need to be considered in the event that the Guantánamo Bay 

detainees were transferred to one of DOD’s U.S. facilities. The following four 

factors, among others such as legal and cost considerations, would have to be 

considered: (1) ensuring compliance with international law and U.S. laws and 

policies; (2) ensuring the continued safety and security of DOD personnel and 

the detainees, as well as the general public; (3) collecting intelligence information 

from the detainees; and (4) maintaining current missions and services provided 

by the corrections facilities and associated installations. For example, DOD’s 

current ability to minimize risks to the public is attributable to Guantánamo Bay’s 

remote location and limited access, whereas DOD corrections facilities in the 

United States are generally located on active military installations in close 

proximity to the general public. Additionally, DOD officials indicated that locating 

detention operations on an active military installation could present risk to the 

installation’s core operations such as administrative and training operations. 

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through its Bureau of Prisons and Marshals 

Service, uses over 2,000 facilities to hold about 280,000 individuals charged with 

or convicted of federal crimes. Facilities range from low to high security and 

provide various conditions of confinement. GAO identified from interviews with 

DOJ officials and analysis of detention operations documents several factors that 

would need to be considered in the event that the Guantánamo Bay detainees 

were transferred to one of DOJ’s U.S. facilities. The following three factors, 

among others such as legal and cost considerations, would have to be 

considered: (1) formulation of policies and practices for housing the detainees; 

(2) ensuring the safety of facility personnel, the detainees, and the general 

public; and (3) identifying adequate space for housing the detainees and 

maintaining separation of detainees from the current inmate population. For 

example, according to DOJ officials, existing facilities would need to be modified 

or current inmates relocated because the Bureau of Prisons and Marshals 

Service would segregate Guantánamo Bay detainees from the inmate population 

for security purposes. Also, as of August 2012, system-wide Bureau of Prisons 

facilities were about 38 percent overcrowded, and holding Guantánamo Bay 

detainees could require triple bunking of inmates or expansion of facility capacity 

in order to maintain security for personnel, inmates, and detainees. 

View GAO-13-31. For more information, 

contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov or David C. Maurer at (202) 

512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Letter 1 

Background 4

Characteristics of the Current Guantánamo Bay Detention 

Facilities and Infrastructure 14

DOD Corrections Facilities in the United States and Factors to 

Consider If They Were to Hold Detainees 24

DOJ Corrections Facilities in the United States and Factors to 

Consider If They Were to Hold Detainees 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 48

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 51 

Appendix II Summary of Key Legislation Affecting the Potential to Transfer 

Guantánamo Bay Detainees to the United States 56 

Appendix III Noninteractive Timeline of Guantánamo Bay Detention Operations 57 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Justice 61 

Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 63

Tables 

Table 1: Detainee Detention and Prosecution Status as of 

November 2012 9

Table 2: Guantánamo Bay Detention Facilities as of November 2012 15

Table 3: Capacity of DOD Level II and III Corrections Facilities as 

of August 2012 29

Table 4: BOP Inmates with a History of or Connection to Terrorism 

by Facility Security Level as of August 2012 37

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Figures 

Figure 1: Location of U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba 6

Figure 2: Interactive Timeline of Guantánamo Bay Detention 

Operations 13

Figure 3: A Segregated Housing Unit in Camp 5 17

Figure 4: Example of a Camp 5 Cell and Detainee Comfort Items 18

Figure 5: Example of a Housing Unit in Camp 6 20

Figure 6: DOD Regional Corrections Facilities and U.S. Disciplinary 

Barracks 26

Figure 7: Sample General-Population Housing Unit, Naval 

Consolidated Brig Chesapeake, Virginia 27

Figure 8: Location of BOP Facilities in the United States 36

Figure 9: Step-Down Housing Unit, “Supermax,” U.S. 

Administrative Maximum Facility, Florence, Colorado 42

Figure 10: Outdoor Recreation Area, “Supermax,” U.S. 

Administrative Maximum Facility, Florence, Colorado 43

Figure 11: Communications Management Unit Cell, Terre Haute, 

Indiana 45

Abbreviations 

ADX U.S. Penitentiary Florence Administrative-Maximum 

AUMF Authorization for Use of Military Force 

BOP Bureau of Prisons 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOJ Department of Justice 

Marshals Service U.S. Marshals Service 

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

November 14, 2012 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein 

Chairman 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

Dear Madam Chairman, 

Since January 2002 the United States has operated military detention 

facilities at its Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to detain 

individuals captured during overseas counterterrorism operations. In 

January 2009, the President issued an Executive Order directing the 

closure of the Guantánamo Bay detention facilities within one year.1

Subsequently, in June 2009 the first in a series of appropriations and 

authorization measures limiting or prohibiting the use of appropriated funds 

to transfer Guantánamo Bay detainees to the United States was enacted.2

You requested that we review existing U.S. federal facilities and identify 

factors to be considered in the event that Guantánamo Bay detention 

facilities were closed and legal restrictions on transfer did not continue, and 

the 166 detainees currently held in these detention facilities were 

transferred to the United States.3

 Accordingly, this report describes (1) 

current Guantánamo Bay detention facilities and infrastructure; (2) 

Department of Defense (DOD) corrections facilities in the United States, 

and factors to be considered if they were used to hold Guantánamo Bay 

detainees; and (3) Department of Justice (DOJ) corrections facilities in the 

United States that hold individuals charged with or convicted of terrorismrelated crimes, and factors to be considered if they were used to hold 

Guantánamo Bay detainees.4

 We are also issuing a classified version of 

 

1

Exec. Order No. 13492, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained At the 

Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 

(Jan. 22, 2009). 

2

Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103 (2009). See app. II for descriptions of subsequent statutes. 

3

For purposes of this report, we use the word “detainees” to collectively refer to the 

individuals currently housed at Guantánamo Bay. As discussed later in the report, the 

status of these individuals varies. 

4

In providing information addressing these objectives, DOJ and DOD officials stated that 

the two agencies do not have plans to transfer any Guantánamo Bay detainees to their 

facilities in the United States and that such transfer is currently prohibited by law. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

this report in November 2012. That version includes an additional 

appendix, which provides a discussion of Guantánamo Bay facilities used 

for classified operations that would need to be considered if the detainees 

were transferred to facilities in the United States. 

The scope of our work was to provide a descriptive review of the 

detention facilities and infrastructure at Guantánamo Bay as well as 

existing corrections facilities in the United States. Hence, our review did 

not include an evaluation of whether specific U.S. facilities would be 

suitable for holding Guantánamo Bay detainees, nor did we address legal 

factors that are still being adjudicated such as detainee habeas corpus 

rights,5

 and right to counsel.6 In addition we are not making 

recommendations in this report. 

To describe the current Guantánamo Bay detention facilities and 

infrastructure, we visited the detention and support facilities at the U.S. 

Naval Station Guantánamo Bay. We also reviewed laws and policies 

related to DOD’s detention operations, an interagency report on detainees’ 

status, and DOD reports on conditions of detention at Guantánamo Bay. In 

addition, we discussed previous and current detention operations with 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, U.S. 

Southern Command, Joint Task Force-Guantánamo, American 

Correctional Association, and another related organization. 

To describe DOD corrections facilities in the United States and factors to 

consider if they were to hold Guantánamo Bay detainees, we reviewed 

DOD corrections policies and manuals and facility capacity data. We also 

reviewed analyses conducted in 2009 by DOD as part of its efforts to 

determine whether its facilities were equipped to conduct detention 

operations. Because analyses previously conducted by DOD to identify 

facilities in the United States were based on the assumption that all 

detention operations—including intelligence operations and military 

commission support—would remain the same, we maintained this 

assumption in our description of factors that might be considered in the 

event that Guantánamo Bay detainees were moved to DOD facilities in 

 

5

The constitutional privilege to seek a writ of habeas corpus allows a detained person to 

challenge the legality of his or her detention. In Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 

(2008), the Supreme Court found that the detainees at Guantánamo Bay have the habeas 

corpus privilege, and a number of habeas cases are ongoing in the federal courts. 

6

Litigation is ongoing regarding the extent of detainee access to counsel, and other issues. 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

the United States. We conducted site visits and interviewed officials at 

DOD corrections facilities, which are operated by the Army and the Navy. 

We selected three facilities that represent both services’ operating 

procedures and reflect a range of housing configurations, including both 

segregated and general-population housing units. There are three 

different types of corrections facilities operated by DOD: (1) Level I 

facilities, which are used for short-term (under 1-year) and pretrial 

confinement; (2) Level II facilities—consisting of five joint regional 

corrections facilities (two operated under the Army, and three under the 

Navy)—which are used for pretrial confinement and for inmates with 

sentences of 5 years or fewer; and (3) one Level III facility, which holds 

inmates with sentences exceeding 5 years and inmates sentenced to 

death. Because Level I facilities are not intended for long-term 

confinement, we limited the scope of our review to the Level II and Level 

III long-term incarceration facilities. In addition, we interviewed officials 

responsible for management of DOD corrections facilities, including 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Army 

Corrections Command, and Bureau of Naval Personnel. 

To describe corrections facilities in the United States that hold individuals 

charged with or convicted of terrorism-related crimes or activities, and 

factors for consideration if Guantánamo Bay detainees were transferred 

to DOJ facilities in the United States, we reviewed laws and policies 

related to Bureau of Prisons (BOP) corrections operations, facility 

capacity data, and information related to the number and location of 

inmates under BOP custody who had a history of or connection to 

terrorism, including those charged with or convicted of terrorism-related 

crimes.7

 In addition, we reviewed U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals 

Service) policies related to facility capacity data and information related to 

the number and locations of inmates charged with terrorism-related 

 

7

BOP identified these inmates by including offenders who have been charged with or 

convicted of either a terrorism offense, such as receiving terrorist training, or an offense 

with a documented connection to terrorism, such as using the proceeds of criminal activity 

to support a terrorist group. In addition, regardless of the nature of the offense, BOP 

included inmates who are engaged in, or are under investigation for engaging in, 

radicalization and recruitment activities. BOP referred to this entire category of inmates as 

inmates with a history of or nexus (connection) to terrorism. 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

crimes in the custody of the Marshals Service.8 Also, we interviewed 

officials from BOP, the Marshals Service, the Office of the Deputy 

Attorney General, as well as other relevant DOJ component agencies, 

and we conducted site visits to four facilities selected to reflect diversity in 

types of housing units and security levels. While it is likely that conditions 

of confinement and related procedures for the detainees would change if 

they were moved into DOJ facilities, it is unclear what changes would 

occur. Thus, for the purposes of this report, when discussing factors for 

consideration if the detainees were moved to DOJ facilities, we assumed 

that most conditions and procedures would remain the same. Additionally, 

we interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland Security. 

According to Department of Homeland Security officials, its detention 

facilities are used to detain foreign nationals who are awaiting deportation 

from the United States, not detainees brought to the United States for 

law-of-war detention, pretrial detention, or postconviction incarceration; 

thus we subsequently removed the Department of Homeland Security 

from the scope of our work. For a full description of our scope and 

methodology, see appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to November 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress 

passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which 

authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force 

 

8

Among other missions, the Marshals Service is responsible for housing and transporting 

all federal prisoners from the time they enter federal custody until the time they are 

acquitted or convicted and delivered to their designated facility. While the Marshals 

Service does not classify individuals in their custody as having terrorism-related charges, 

they used other sources, including media reports and the nature of the pending charges, 

to identify individuals in their custody who might be considered to have such charges. 

Background 

Military Detention 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

against those ... [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 

terrorist attacks” against the United States.9

 Subsequently, many 

individuals detained during military operations in Afghanistan and 

elsewhere were transferred to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo 

Bay, Cuba—a site designated by the administration for long-term military 

detention operations under the authority of the AUMF and in accordance 

with international law. Approximately 1,800 servicemembers, civilian 

employees, and contractors support detention operations at Guantánamo 

Bay. An additional 4,200 individuals support other missions at 

Guantánamo Bay, including logistics and regional contingency 

operations, as it is the only U.S. naval station in the U.S. Southern 

Command area of responsibility.10 The Naval Station encompasses 45 

square miles on both sides of Guantánamo Bay, sharing a 17-mile border 

with Cuba. (See fig. 1.) 

 

9

Pub. L. No. 107-40 (2001). 

10U.S. Southern Command operates in Central America, the Caribbean, and South 

America and is one of the six geographic combatant commands included within DOD. 
 

Page 6 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Figure 1: Location of U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba 

According to DOD officials, the installation’s remote location enables 

DOD to limit aircraft flights and control maritime access points, and 

consequently provides an additional layer of security for the detention 

operations. DOD considers most of the individuals held in custody at 

Guantánamo Bay to be “unprivileged enemy belligerents” under U.S. and 

international law.11 Those detainees are afforded certain legal rights and 

protections under both international law and U.S. law. For example, 

 

11Section 948a of title 10, U.S. Code, defines an “unprivileged enemy belligerent” as “an 

individual (other than a privileged belligerent) who (A) has engaged in hostilities against 

the United States or its coalition partners; (B) has purposefully and materially supported 

hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; or (C) was a part of al Qaeda 

at the time of the alleged offense under this chapter.” 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Executive Order 13492 states that custody at Guantánamo Bay shall 

conform with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which, 

among other things, prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity” and “the 

passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 

judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the 

judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 

peoples.”12 In addition, various U.S. laws, including the Detainee 

Treatment Act13 and the Military Commissions Act,14 govern aspects of 

detainee treatment and trial. The President’s January 2009 order for the 

closure of Guantánamo Bay detention facilities directed the Secretary of 

Defense to undertake a review of the conditions of detention at 

Guantánamo Bay, and this review, known as the “Walsh Report,” 

reported that the conditions of confinement at Guantánamo Bay 

conformed with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.15

According to DOD, the purpose of military detention is to remove enemy 

armed forces from the battlefield, as opposed to criminal incarceration, 

which is a punitive measure for individuals convicted of violating domestic 

law. 

Under the authority of the AUMF, DOD has since January 2002 detained 

a total of 779 detainees at Guantánamo Bay. The detainee population 

peaked at approximately 680 in June 2003, and the last detainee to arrive 

was transferred to Guantánamo Bay in March 2008. The U.S. 

government, through an interagency task force, has ongoing efforts to 

transfer detainees from Guantánamo Bay to other countries and, since 

January 2002, has transferred more than 600 detainees, either to their 

 

12“Common Article 3” refers to Article 3 of each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 

(including, for example, the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 

August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316). In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), the 

Supreme Court held that Common Article 3 applies to the armed conflict between the 

United States and al Qaeda. 

13Two substantially similar versions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 were enacted, 

as title X of Pub. L. No. 109-148 (2005) and title XIV of Pub. L. No. 109-163 (2006). 

14The Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, was later amended by the 

Military Commissions Act of 2009, enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, div. A, title XVIII (2009) (codified at 10 

U.S.C. § 948a, et seq.). 

15DOD, Review of Department Compliance with President’s Executive Order on Detainee 

Conditions of Confinement (Washington, D.C.: February 2009). 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

home country or to a third country.16 In addition, in 2009, one detainee 

was transferred to the United States for trial and, in 2010, was convicted 

in a U.S. civilian court. He is currently serving a life sentence in a BOP 

facility in Florence, Colorado. 

As of November 2012, 166 detainees were being held in military 

detention at Guantánamo Bay. Also, as of November 2012, 3 of these 

detainees had been convicted of crimes by military commissions at 

Guantánamo Bay.17 Additionally, 7 detainees—including the 5 individuals 

accused of planning the September 11 attacks—have charges pending 

and face potential trial by military commissions.18 According to DOD 

officials, the U.S. government, through an interagency task force, is 

currently negotiating with other countries to transfer more than one-third 

of the remaining 156 detainees.19 Table 1 reflects the current detention 

and prosecution status of all detainees held at Guantánamo Bay as of 

November 2012. 

 

16One hundred twenty-one of the detainees who have left Guantánamo Bay have been 

sent to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to participate in programs to reeducate them and 

integrate them back into society. For additional information on Saudi Arabia’s rehabilitation 

program, see GAO, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering 

Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism 

Financing Efforts Needed, GAO-09-883 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2009). For a video 

of GAO interviews with a former Guantánamo Bay detainee, see 

http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-883. 

17As of November 2012, in addition to the three convicted detainees at Guantánamo Bay, 

four other detainees had been convicted by military commissions and subsequently 

transferred to other countries. In October 2012, one of the convicted detainees who had 

been transferred to another country had his conviction overturned by the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Of the three remaining at Guantánamo Bay, one has an 

appeal pending with the D.C. Circuit. 

18Six of those with charges pending have been referred to a commission for trial, while 

one has had charges sworn by prosecutors but has not yet been referred to a commission 

for trial. 

19These potential transfers are subject to legal limitations, including potential certification 

requirements and prohibitions on transfers to certain countries. See, for example, section 

1028 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81 

(2011). 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Table 1: Detainee Detention and Prosecution Status as of November 2012 

Status Description of status 

Number of 

detainees

Currently in Transfer 

Negotiations 

Detainees for whom the U.S. Department of State is in current or planned 

negotiations with the detainees’ home or third country for transfer. These 

detainees are not currently facing prosecution. 

56

Continued Detention under 

the AUMF 

Detainees who have been determined to require continued detention to 

protect against a significant threat to the security of the United States. These 

detainees are not currently facing prosecution. 

46

Conditional Detention Detainees from Yemen who will not be transferred until one of the following is 

satisfied (1) the security situation improves in Yemen, (2) appropriate 

rehabilitation programs become available, or (3) appropriate third-country 

resettlement options become available.a

 These detainees are not currently 

facing prosecution. 

30

Possible Prosecution Pending Detainees whose cases are under review in accordance with a joint DODDOJ protocol to determine if a case is feasible for prosecution and, if so, the 

appropriate forum and venue for that prosecution.b

24

Currently Facing Prosecution Detainees with military commission charges pending. 7

Convicted Detainees convicted through a military commission process at Guantánamo 

Bay. 

3

Total 166

Sources: DOD, DOJ, and Guantánamo Review Task Force. 

a

Not all detainees from Yemen are in Conditional Detention status. These conditions were specified in 

the final report of the Guantánamo Review Task Force, issued pursuant to Executive Order 13492. 

Guantánamo Review Task Force, Final Report (Jan. 22, 2010). They do not necessarily reflect 

subsequent legal restrictions on transfers, such as those described in footnote 19. Additionally, while 

all detainees facing conditional detention are from Yemen, they do not represent all detainees from 

Yemen currently held at Guantánamo Bay. 

b

DOD and DOJ, Determination of Guantánamo Cases referred for Prosecution (undated). 

Executive Order 13492, signed by the President on January 22, 2009, 

directed the closure of the detention facilities at Guantánamo Bay within a 

year and stated that any individuals who remained in detention at 

Guantánamo Bay at the time of the closure of its facilities “shall be 

returned to their home country, released, transferred to a third country, or 

transferred to another United States detention facility in a manner 

consistent with law and the national security and foreign policy interests 

of the United States.” Following the issuance of this Executive Order, an 

interagency working group including officials from DOD, DOJ, and the 

Department of Homeland Security began to identify existing facilities in 

the United States that could be used for continued military detention if the 

Roles of the Federal 

Agencies in Detention and 

Incarceration 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

decision was made to transfer detainees to the United States.20 Each of 

these departments operates confinement facilities in the United States, 

consistent with its missions and legal authorities. 

 DOD operates a system of corrections facilities in the United States 

that are used for pretrial detention and incarceration of members of 

the U.S. armed forces who are charged with or convicted of violations 

of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).21

 DOJ, through BOP, operates a system of corrections facilities in the 

United States that are used for pretrial detention and incarceration of 

individuals convicted of violating federal laws. BOP’s mission is to 

confine federal inmates in the controlled, safe, secure, humane, and 

cost-efficient environments of prisons and community-based facilities, 

and to provide work and other self-improvement opportunities to 

assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens. DOJ’s Marshals 

Service is the enforcement arm of the federal court system and its 

mission includes responsibility for the custody of pretrial federal 

inmates until they are acquitted or convicted, and delivered to the 

designated BOP facility. 

 The Department of Homeland Security operates a system of detention 

facilities to detain noncitizens who may be subject to removal from the 

United States under U.S. immigration laws. 

According to DOD attorneys, DOD, under the AUMF, has legal authority 

to maintain custody of the detainees currently at Guantánamo Bay. A 

DOJ official from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General stated that 

DOJ would likely need additional authorities to detain law-of-war 

detainees for continued detention at BOP facilities, but indicated that he 

was unaware of any analysis of the issue because DOJ is not evaluating 

transferring detainees to the United States in light of transfer restrictions. 

With respect to the three detainees who have been convicted of crimes 

by military commissions, the Military Commissions Act provides that, 

“[u]nder such regulations as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe, a 

 

20These efforts ceased after restrictions, beginning in June 2009, were imposed on the 

transfer of detainees to the United States. 

21The UCMJ is a collection of statutes that govern the military justice system, and is 

codified in Title 10 of the United States Code. UCMJ includes punitive articles that define 

specific offenses similar to those found in civilian criminal law (e.g., murder, rape, wrongful 

use of controlled substances, larceny, and drunk driving) as well as other offenses that 

specifically affect good order and discipline in the military (e.g., absence without leave, 

disrespect toward superior commissioned officer, or dereliction of duty). 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

sentence of confinement adjudged by a military commission...may be 

carried into execution by confinement ...in any penal or correctional 

institution under the control of the United States.”22 However, while this 

statute indicates that the three convicted detainees serving sentences at 

Guantánamo Bay could potentially be confined in DOJ or other U.S. 

controlled facilities, BOP officials said that BOP would need additional 

statutory authority in the federal criminal code to take custody of 

individuals convicted by military commission, like the authority it currently 

has to confine persons convicted by courts-martial.23 In addition to the 

above-mentioned legal authorities, since the signing of Executive Order 

13492 in January 2009, a number of statutes have limited or prohibited 

the use of federal funds to transfer or assist in the transfer of 

Guantánamo Bay detainees to U.S. facilities. See appendix II for a 

summary of key statutes. Prior to the enactment of these statutes, in June 

2009, one Guantánamo Bay detainee was formally charged with crimes 

by DOJ and subsequently transferred to the United States. This detainee 

was transferred by DOD into the custody of the Marshals Service to stand 

trial in the United States. In November 2010 he was convicted by a 

federal court, and is currently serving a life sentence in a BOP facility in 

Colorado. 

Over time, DOD’s detention facilities at Guantánamo Bay have evolved 

as the department has constructed new facilities and closed older ones in 

response to changes in the size of the detainee population. The original 

facilities—known as Camp X-Ray—were open for 92 days (in 2002). They 

were preexisting migrant-detention facilities comprised of chain-link 

enclosures on concrete slabs. Subsequent facilities, called Camps 1, 2, 3, 

and 4, were built in response to increases in the detainee population and 

the need to segregate different groups of detainees; for example, 

individuals who were compliant with facility rules were separated from 

 

2210 U.S.C. § 949u. 

2318 U.S.C. § 4083 (“Persons convicted of offenses against the United States or by 

courts-martial punishable by imprisonment for more than one year may be confined in any 

United States penitentiary.”). BOP officials noted that under this statute and article 58 of 

the UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 858), which provides that “a sentence of confinement adjudged by 

a court-martial or other military tribunal ... may be carried into execution by confinement 

... in any penal or correctional institution under the control of the United States ... .”, as 

well as a memorandum of understanding with DOD, BOP houses convicted military 

uniformed service personnel, who have been formally discharged from their respective 

service. 

History of Detention 

Facilities and Standards of 

Confinement at 

Guantánamo Bay 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

those who were noncompliant. These early facilities were generally 

covered, open-air, single-cell structures with steel mesh walls. DOD 

subsequently constructed the indoor, climate-controlled facilities that are 

currently in use. As shown under the Facilities tab in figure 2, a total of 10 

different detention facilities have been used to hold Guantánamo Bay 

detainees (see app. III for the noninteractive version of this figure). Of 

these, 5 are currently in use: Camp Echo, Camp Iguana, and Camps 5, 6, 

and 7. 

 
Page 13 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees

Figure 2: Timeline of Guantánamo Bay Detention Operations

Source: DOD, DOJ, and GAO analysis of select executive and legislative actions.

Facilities

Detainees

Key executive

actions

Key

legislation

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Interactivity instructions: Click on the event type to view more information. See appendix III for the non-interactive, printer-friendly version. 

January 22, 2009:

Executive Order 13492

February 2009: Report

on conditions of

confinement at

Guantánamo Bay 

issued

January 22, 2010:

Guantánamo Review 

Task Force Report

December 2001: Selection 

of Guantánamo Bay as a 

detention site

November 2001:

Start of military detention overseas

March 7, 2011: Executive 

Order 13567

June 2003: Guantánamo 

Bay reaches peak population, 

approximately 680

March 2008: Last

detainee transferred to 

Guantánamo Bay

September 2012:

Population of 166

June 2009:

One detainee transferred 

to Department of Justice 

for prosecution

January 2002: Detainees begin 

arriving at Guantánamo Bay

January 2009:

Population of 242

April 2002:

Camp 1 opens

October 2002:

Camps 2 and 3 open

April 2004:

Camp 5 opens

October 2004:

Camp Echo opens

December

2006: Camp

6 opens

January 2011:

Camp 4 closes for repair

January 2002:

Camp X-Ray opens

February

2003: Camp 

4 opens

August 2008:

Camp Iguana opens

March 2010:

Camps 2 and

3 close

February 2011:

Camp 1 closes

April 2002: Camp 

X-Ray closes

September 2006:

Camp 7 opens

December 16, 2009:

Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2010

October 28, 2009:

National Defense

Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2010/Military 

Commissions Act of 2009

June 24, 2009:

Supplemental

Appropriations Act, 2009

January 7, 2011: Ike Skelton 

National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2011

December 31, 2011:

National Defense 

Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2012

September 18, 2001:

Authorization for the

Use of Military Force

October 17, 2006:

Military Commissions 

Act of 2006

December 30, 2005:

Detainee Treatment

Act of 2005

April 15, 2011: Department of 

Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011

December 23, 2011:

Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2012

November 18, 2011:

Consolidated and Further 

Continuing Appropriations 

Act, 2012
 

Page 14 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

In September 2006, DOD revised DOD Directive 2310.01E, its policy 

regarding standards for detainee treatment.24 The standards outlined in 

the directive ensure that military detainees are treated humanely and in 

conformity with “the laws of the United States, the law[s] of war, including 

the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and all applicable policies, directives, 

or other issuances ....” According to DOD officials, as long as 

Guantánamo Bay detainees maintain their legal status as military 

detainees held under the authority of AUMF and remain in DOD custody, 

DOD’s detention directive and all related laws and standards would 

continue to be applicable to the Guantánamo Bay detainees if they were 

transferred to the United States. 

DOD currently conducts extensive detention operations at Guantánamo 

Bay, operating multiple facilities that hold detainees and support other 

detainee-related missions, such as medical services. In addition, DOD 

maintains facilities and infrastructure dedicated to detention support 

operations.25 For example, DOD operates an extensive informationtechnology infrastructure to support force protection and other missions, 

and maintains and secures legal facilities. 

As of November 2012, DOD held 166 detainees in five detention facilities 

on its Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. According to DOD 

officials, all facilities currently in use were designed on the basis of 

facilities in the United States that meet American Correctional Association 

 

24Department of Defense Directive 2310.01E, Department of Defense Detainee Program

(Sept. 5, 2006). This directive states that all detainees, regardless of status, will at a 

minimum receive treatment consistent with Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions 

of 1949. This includes prohibitions on violence, taking of hostages, humiliating or 

degrading treatment, and the sentencing and carrying out of executions without a court 

judgment; provision of care for the wounded and sick; and provision of services by an 

impartial humanitarian organization, such as the International Committee of the Red 

Cross. 

25A discussion of facilities used for classified operations can be found in the classified 

version of this report. 

Characteristics of the 

Current Guantánamo 

Bay Detention 

Facilities and 

Infrastructure 

Overview of Current 

Detention Facilities at 

Guantánamo Bay 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

standards.26 The facilities differ in configuration and detainee population, 

and DOD generally places detainees in facilities according to a detainee’s 

compliance with facility rules.27 See table 2 for a description of each 

detention facility. DOD also provides medical, dental, and behavioral 

health services in some of the detention facilities and in separate 

dedicated facilities. 

Table 2: Guantánamo Bay Detention Facilities as of November 2012 

 Facility name Description of facility 

Nonsegregated 

population

Segregated 

population

Camp 5 Four housing units containing singleoccupancy cells for noncompliant 

detainees and prisoners. 

One shared housing unit. 

1-20 10-30

Camp 6 Eight shared housing units. 110-130 0

Camp 7 Segregated single-cell facility, used 

for high-value detainees. 

0 10-20 

Camp Echo Single-occupant structures, with 

shared recreation area. 

5-10 0

Camp Iguana Communal structures shared by 

detainees who have been 

designated for release. 

1-5 0

Source: GAO representation of DOD data. 

Note: Populations of Camps 5, 6, Echo, and Iguana are presented as ranges because specific 

numbers of detainees in these camps can change over time as detainees are released or moved 

between facilities. The specific number of detainees in Camp 7 can be found in the classified version 

of this report. 

 

26The American Correctional Association’s Commission on Accreditation provides all 

accreditations for BOP institutions. The American Correctional Association’s standards 

provide guidance to all correctional organizations on correctional issues such as 

programming, officer staffing, and officer safety, as well as physical standards such as 

inmate housing, environmental conditions, and exercise and recreation areas. However, 

the Guantánamo Bay detention facilities themselves have not been evaluated or 

accredited by the American Correctional Association. 

27An exception to this practice is the small group of detainees deemed to be “high-value,” 

who are housed separately from each other and from the other facilities at Guantánamo 

Bay regardless of compliance with facility rules. 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Camp 5 is the second-most populous detention facility at Guantánamo 

Bay—approximately one-fourth of detainees reside there at any given 

time. It is a maximum-security facility consisting of 100 indoor climatecontrolled cells divided among four individual cell blocks, each with two 

tiers, and 24 open-air cells. Most of the cell blocks in Camp 5 are 

operated as segregated housing. One block currently serves as shared 

housing. DOD holds three types of detainees in Camp 5: 

(1) Most of the detainees in Camp 5 are held in segregated cells on a 

temporary basis to encourage compliance with facility rules. Once these 

detainees have begun complying with facility rules, they are transferred to 

one of the other camps having more shared living spaces. 

(2) One cell block of Camp 5 houses compliant detainees with similar 

lifestyle habits in shared housing. DOD finished converting this block to 

shared housing in May 2012 in order to decrease the number of 

detainees in another facility. Detainees in the shared housing block can 

access each other’s cells and recreate together, but are separated from 

the other groups of detainees in Camp 5. 

(3) Detainees who have been convicted by military commission at 

Guantánamo Bay and are serving their sentences there are also held in 

Camp 5. These convicted individuals are confined to a cell block tier 

segregated from all other detainees. 

Camp 5 
 

Page 17 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Figure 3: A Segregated Housing Unit in Camp 5 

In addition to housing units, Camp 5 contains one media room on each 

tier—consisting of a television for use by one detainee at a time—and 

three outdoor recreation areas. These secured outdoor recreation areas 

have exercise equipment but are not large enough for detainees to play 

games such as soccer. They are designed such that no more than two 

detainees can be present in the same area at a given time, though 

detainees may speak with those in adjacent recreation areas. All 

detainees assigned to segregated housing units in Camp 5 have access 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

to at least 2 hours of recreation per day with one other detainee; those 

who have begun complying with facility rules have access to at least 4 

hours of recreation per day. All detainees in Camp 5 also have access to 

books and magazines, and compliant detainees may obtain a greater 

number of books as well as additional clothing choices. Detainees in the 

shared housing unit are provided other privileges as well, such as the 

ability to move freely within the tier. Camp 5 also contains a medical 

treatment room and a dental chair. 

Figure 4: Example of a Camp 5 Cell and Detainee Comfort Items 

Note: All detainees receive basic comfort supplies, such as soap, toothpaste, clothing, and religious 

items. Compliant detainees receive additional clothing and footwear choices and other incentives. 
 

Page 19 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Camp 6 is the most-populous detention facility at Guantánamo Bay—

about two-thirds of detainees are held there. It is a medium-security 

detention camp designed after the layout of a U.S. county jail, and it 

consists of eight indoor climate-controlled, two-story housing units that 

each contain 22 individual cells and one large common area. Within each 

housing unit, two cells are reserved for use as a shared pantry and 

library. DOD generally assigns detainees to specific housing units 

according to cultural and lifestyle preferences. For example, detainees of 

the same nationality or detainees who have similar television-viewing 

preferences may share a housing unit. 

Camp 6 
 

Page 20 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Figure 5: Example of a Housing Unit in Camp 6 

Detainees in Camp 6 are allowed access to one adjacent housing unit as 

well as their own unit. Adjacent housing units are connected by a 

secured, shared outdoor recreation yard with exercise equipment and an 

area for the detainees to play sports such as basketball or soccer. Except 

for DOD inspection times, during which detainees are confined to their 

cells, detainees can move freely for 20 hours per day in the recreation 

yard and the adjacent housing unit; they are confined to their assigned 

housing unit the remaining 4 hours per day. Camp 6 also includes 
 

Page 21 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

medical and dental treatment rooms and staff to provide routine medical 

care and medication dispensation. 

DOD operates three additional facilities to house certain small groups of 

detainees: Camp 7, Camp Echo, and Camp Iguana. Camp 7 holds “highvalue” detainees, such as those accused of planning the September 11 

attacks. These individuals are held in climate-controlled segregated 

housing units that limit their ability to communicate with each other. 

Detainees in Camp 7 have access to up to 4 hours of recreation per day in 

secured recreation areas containing exercise equipment; two detainees 

may have outdoor recreation at the same time in separate but adjacent 

recreation areas. In addition, Camp 7 contains a medical treatment room 

and a dental chair. The other two facilities—Camp Echo and Camp 

Iguana—house compliant detainees in shared settings. Detainees whose 

personal security would be at risk if they were housed in Camp 6 are 

assigned to Camp Echo, and detainees who have been designated for 

release from Guantánamo Bay are assigned to Camp Iguana.28 These 

camps are isolated from each other and from the other camps. Camp Echo 

consists of 10 wooden hut-like structures, with each detainee’s housing unit 

containing a sleeping cell and a personal living area. Detainees assigned to 

Camp Echo may recreate together up to 20 hours per day. DOD uses 

unoccupied structures at the Camp Echo facility to support other detentionrelated operations, such as detainee-attorney meetings. Camp Iguana is a 

communal space that consists of multiple wooden hut-like structures within 

a secured fenced area. The detainees can move freely within the fenced 

area at all times, and they use the structures for a variety of purposes, 

including sleeping, cooking, laundry, and recreation. Although detainees in 

Camps Echo and Iguana are afforded more privileges than other 

detainees, they must continue to comply with facility rules or they may be 

temporarily placed in Camp 5 to encourage compliance. 

In addition to detention facilities, DOD operates several facilities that 

provide medical, dental, and behavioral health care to detainees. In 

addition to medical treatment rooms at Camps 5, 6, and 7, DOD operates 

a hospital dedicated to detainee care. The detainee hospital is primarily 

an in-patient facility with secured cells, but it does provide some 

outpatient care such as radiology, surgery, dental, and other medical 

 

28As of November 2012, DOD has designated three detainees for release, but the 

detainees have so far refused offers from third countries willing to receive them. 

Camp 7, Camp Echo, and Camp 

Iguana 

Medical, Dental, and Behavioral 

Health Facilities 
 

Page 22 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

services. If necessary, the detainee hospital can leverage the resources 

of the Naval Station hospital, which is located elsewhere on the base. For 

example, medical staff can perform minor surgery at the detainee 

hospital, but major surgery is performed at the Naval Station hospital. In 

addition, DOD will bring specialists to Guantánamo Bay to treat detainees 

if required. Camps 6 and 7 also have dental facilities. Furthermore, DOD 

operates a 12-bed behavioral health unit in a separate facility, which 

provides care to detainees with mental health issues. Overall, there are 

about 100 people who provide medical, dental, or behavioral health care 

to the detainees, including specialized medical linguists. 

In addition to the facilities it uses to house and provide services to 

detainees, DOD maintains facilities and infrastructure dedicated to 

detention support operations. These operations include (1) physical 

security and protection for detainees and U.S. military personnel, (2) 

intelligence collection and analysis, (3) maintenance and security of military 

commission courtrooms and other legal support. In addition, DOD provides 

administrative offices, housing, dining, medical, and other necessary 

support facilities for the approximately 1,800 detention-operations staff 

members at Guantánamo Bay. On average, the cost to operate 

Guantánamo Bay detention facilities and support operations is about $114 

million per year, not including the cost of military personnel or 

approximately 120 contract linguist staff.29 Some of this funding is 

dedicated to fixed costs, such as the information-technology infrastructure, 

and would not change proportionately to changes in detainee population. 

Several facilities at Guantánamo Bay are used to support DOD’s 

operations to maintain physical security and protection of the detainees and 

U.S. military personnel. For example, in one facility, DOD screens and 

translates—in up to 13 languages—approximately 400 pieces of incoming 

and outgoing detainee mail each month; according to officials, this figure 

can increase to more than 1,000 when officials from the International 

Committee of the Red Cross visit. All operations at Guantánamo Bay utilize 

an extensive information-technology infrastructure, comprising several 

networks, over 2,000 computers, and 190 servers. For example, electronic 

records of all detention camp activities are stored in a computer database. 

 

29This figure reflects the fiscal years 2008 through 2012 budget data for operation of the 

five detention facilities currently in use; intelligence and security programs; and the 

support provided to Naval Station Guantánamo Bay for hosting detention operations. 

Detention Support 

Operations 

Maintaining Physical Security 

and Protection of Detainees 

and U.S. Military Personnel 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Moreover, DOD policy requires the preservation of all evidence, 

documents, and recorded information of every detainee now or ever held at 

Guantánamo Bay.30 Therefore, DOD maintains facilities to store and 

preserve a variety of information including (1) all electronic data collected, 

(2) physical evidence obtained at the time of a detainee’s capture, and (3) 

records of contraband or makeshift weapons seized over the course of 

detention operations. 

DOD also operates some facilities at Guantánamo Bay exclusively for the 

collection of intelligence—through voluntary interviews of detainees—and 

analysis of this information by linguistic and technical support staff.31

According to DOD, it collects this intelligence to provide support to military 

commissions, Periodic Review Boards,32 the intelligence community, and 

law-enforcement agencies. According to a 2009 DOD report, given the 

length of time that most detainees have spent at Guantánamo Bay, the 

primary focus of the voluntary detainee interviews is to gather information 

to help ensure the safety and security of the detention facilities and 

personnel. 

DOD maintains and secures two courthouses and several office facilities 

used in the military-commission process at Guantánamo Bay. In 2008, 

DOD completed construction of a courtroom complex designed 

specifically to hold commissions for the five detainees accused of 

organizing the September 11 attacks. It includes five detainee holding 

cells and nine areas, including the courtroom and office spaces, in which 

highly classified information may be discussed. Because the facility was 

 

30Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice 5761, Preservation of Detainee Records

(Feb. 29, 2008). 

31DOD is required by law to record all detainee interviews. National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1080, 123 Stat. 2190, 2479-81 (2009). 

32In March 2011, the President directed DOD to coordinate a process of periodic review of 

continued law-of-war detention for detainees. Exec. Order 13567, Periodic Review of 

Individuals Detained at Guantánamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for 

Use of Military Force, 76 Fed. Reg. 13277 (Mar. 7, 2011). Section 1023 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81 (2011), directed DOD 

to issue procedures for the review boards, and DOD did so in May 2012. Directive-Type 

Memorandum 12-005, Implementing Guidelines for Periodic Review of Detainees Held at 

Guantánamo Bay per Executive Order 13567 (May 9, 2012). According to DOD officials, 

an interagency task force has begun reviewing detainee files. Review boards will 

ultimately conduct hearings—at which detainees may participate—and make 

determinations about whether DOD should continue to detain that individual. 

Intelligence Collection and 

Analysis 

Military Commissions and 

Other Legal Support 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

designed to allow the discussion of highly classified information, DOD 

must secure it 24 hours per day. In addition, DOD operates a separate 

facility that it converted into a courtroom in 2005. This facility utilizes 

some of the same technology as the other courtroom but is smaller and is 

cleared for discussion of classified information at a lower level. The facility 

includes a holding cell for detainees and rooms for detainees to meet with 

legal counsel. DOD utilizes advanced videoconferencing and courtreporting technology in both courtrooms and it can broadcast proceedings 

to an observation area adjacent to the larger courtroom, the media facility 

at Guantánamo Bay, and remote viewing locations in the United States. 

In addition to the courtrooms, there are several administrative facilities 

dedicated to legal services and upcoming detainee Periodic Review 

Boards. One facility will enable the use of secure video teleconferencing 

during upcoming detainee reviews, and the intelligence collection and 

analysis staff will provide support to assessments of the potential threat 

posed by each detainee. In addition, DOD maintains a legal office staffed 

with approximately 10 attorneys to facilitate detainee-attorney meetings, 

of which there were 132 between November 2011 and April 2012. This 

office also contributes support to the military commission process. 

DOD operates six facilities in the continental United States for confining 

servicemembers for more than 1 year. Each facility utilizes both generalpopulation and segregated housing units and is equipped to manage 

inmates at all security levels. On average, as of August 2012, these six 

facilities were 48 percent occupied. In the event that the Guantánamo 

Bay detainees were transferred to one of these facilities, and all detention 

operations were to remain the same as they were at Guantánamo Bay, 

we identified from interviews with DOD officials and analysis of detention 

operations documents several factors that would need to be considered, 

such as ensuring compliance with international law and U.S. laws and 

policies, and ensuring the safety and security of detainees, DOD 

personnel, as well as the general public, before the facilities could be 

used for this purpose.33

 

33A discussion of Guantánamo Bay facilities used for classified operations and related 

factors that would need to be considered if the detainees were transferred to facilities in 

the United States can be found in the classified version of this report. 

DOD Corrections 

Facilities in the 

United States and 

Factors to Consider If 

They Were to Hold 

Detainees 
 

Page 25 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

DOD operates a system of corrections facilities in the continental United 

States that it uses to confine members of the uniformed services charged 

with or convicted of violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 

(UCMJ). Six of these facilities, operated by the Army and the Navy, are 

equipped to confine individuals for more than 1 year.34 Five of the six are 

joint regional correctional facilities—two Army-operated regional 

correctional facilities and three Naval consolidated brigs—that are used 

for pre- and posttrial confinement for inmates with sentences of 5 years or 

fewer. The sixth is the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, a facility operated by the Army, which holds inmates with 

sentences exceeding 5 years as well as inmates sentenced to death. Five 

of these six DOD corrections facilities are accredited by the American 

Correctional Association, which reaccredits facilities every 3 years to 

ensure they meet specific national standards related to facility 

administration and management, physical plant and institutional 

operations, institutional services, and inmate programs.35 In fiscal year 

2011, the cost to operate these facilities ranged from approximately $1.6 

million to $14 million.36 See figure 6 for the names and locations of the six 

facilities. 

 

34The facilities are operated by the Army and the Navy, but individuals from any branch of 

the military can be confined in any facility. DOD also operates facilities that it uses 

primarily for inmates with sentences of less than 1 year. For the purposes of our review, 

we did not consider these facilities in our scope. 

35At the time of our review, the Naval Consolidated Brig in Chesapeake, Virginia, which 

opened in August 2011 and had not yet been accredited, was in the accreditation process. 

36This figure includes facility operations and civilian personnel costs for fiscal year 2011 

for the Northwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, Naval Consolidated Brig Miramar, 

Naval Consolidated Brig Charleston, the Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, and 

U.S. Disciplinary Barracks. Because Naval Consolidated Brig Chesapeake was opened in 

2011, historic cost data were not available at the time of this review. 

DOD Corrections Facilities 

in the United States 
 

Page 26 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Figure 6: DOD Regional Corrections Facilities and U.S. Disciplinary Barracks 

Each of these facilities comprises both general-population and 

segregated housing units. Most inmates are housed in general-population 

housing units. These units are similar in design to the shared housing 

units in Camp 6 at Guantánamo Bay; they generally include an open 

space with shared tables, chairs, televisions, telephones, and showers, 

as well as individual cells containing single or double bunked beds, a 

toilet, and a sink. Each DOD facility has multiple general-population 

housing units, and while capacity of these units varies, typically generalpopulation units can be configured to hold up to 80 inmates; Navy officials 

indicated that when possible they prefer to maintain capacity at 40 

inmates. Depending on the facilities’ operating procedures and individual 

inmates’ compliance with facility rules, the amount of time inmates in 

general-population housing units are required to spend in their cells 

varies, as does their access to the shared living space. See figure 7 for a 

photographic example of a general-population housing unit. 
 

Page 27 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Figure 7: Sample General-Population Housing Unit, Naval Consolidated Brig 

Chesapeake, Virginia 

Unlike general-population housing units, segregated housing units 

prevent inmate interaction, and they do not have a shared living space. 

Inmates in segregated units are individually bunked and confined to their 

cells for the majority of their time. Similar to the segregated housing units 

in Camp 5 at Guantánamo Bay, these cells are used primarily as a 

temporary administrative or disciplinary measure for inmates who are 

noncompliant with facility rules, who may be a danger to themselves or 

others, or who may be at risk of harm from other inmates. Segregated 

housing units can also be used as long-term housing for inmates who 

have been classified as needing maximum security. 

These six DOD facilities are required to manage inmates at all security 

levels. When sentenced to a facility, inmates are assessed and assigned 
 

Page 28 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

a security custody classification.37 These classifications range from 

individuals who require limited supervision and maintain jobs outside of 

the facility to the most-maximum-security inmates who present the 

highest risk of violence. An inmate’s security classification is the basis 

upon which he or she is assigned to a housing unit—for example, 

medium-custody inmates are housed with other medium-custody inmates. 

DOD policy allows for an inmate classification to be reviewed and for 

inmates to be reclassified, if appropriate; thus housing-unit security 

designations can change over time. An inmate’s classification can also 

change as needed based on compliance with facility rules. These six 

facilities have the ability to secure inmates requiring additional controls 

such as protective custody or restricted communications; for example, the 

Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility at Ft. Leavenworth has eight 

specialized soundproof cells within its segregated housing unit that can 

be used for individuals charged with high-profile crimes in order to limit 

their communications with other inmates. 

These six facilities also have space and infrastructure dedicated to facility 

support operations and inmate programs, including administrative offices 

and staff rooms; rooms used to facilitate legal and general visits; and onsite medical, dental, and behavioral health facilities, although inmates 

requiring advanced care are transported to separate military or civilian 

medical facilities. In addition, these facilities include classrooms for 

educational, treatment, and other group programs; space for religious 

services; dining areas; shops for work programs (for example, wood and 

textile shops); and indoor and outdoor recreation spaces. An inmate’s 

freedom of movement around a facility is also based on his or her security 

custody classification; for example, inmates requiring minimum security 

may move throughout the facility unescorted on an as-needed basis, 

whereas inmates classified as needing maximum security require 

restraints and two escorts when moving throughout a facility. 

 

37Army standards require that this classification be based on several factors including, at a 

minimum, the individual prisoner’s offense, attitude, aptitude, intelligence, personality, 

adaptation to incarceration, record of performance prior to incarceration, and potential for 

further military service. 
 

Page 29 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

On the basis of our interviews with DOD officials and analyses of 

detention operation documents, we identified several factors that would 

have to be considered in the event that the Guantánamo Bay detainees 

were transferred to existing DOD facilities within the United States. 

According to DOD’s 2009 plan and DOD officials we interviewed, if 

detainees were transferred to DOD facilities in the United States, DOD 

would plan on providing all of the same detention and support operations 

in U.S. facilities that are currently maintained at Guantánamo Bay. While 

there is available capacity to house the 166 Guantánamo Bay detainees 

across the six DOD facilities included in our scope if detention operations 

remained the same (see table 3), the following four factors, among others 

such as legal and cost considerations, would also have to be considered: 

(1) ensuring compliance with international law and U.S. laws and policies; 

(2) ensuring the continued safety and security of DOD personnel and the 

detainees, as well as the general public; (3) conducting intelligence 

operations; and (4) maintaining current missions and services provided by 

the corrections facilities and associated installations. 

Table 3: Capacity of DOD Level II and III Corrections Facilities as of August 2012 

Maximum 

capacity

Current 

inmates 

Available 

capacity

Percent 

occupied

Naval Consolidated Brig Chesapeake, VAa 395 78 317 20%

Naval Consolidated Brig Charleston, SC 439 102 337 23

Naval Consolidated Brig Miramar, CA 599 310 289 52

Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, Ft. Leavenworth, KS 512 215 297 42

Northwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, Joint Base LewisMcChord, WA 219 123 96 56

United States Disciplinary Barracks, Ft. Leavenworth, KSb 515 449 66 87

Total 2,679 1,277 1,402 48%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a

The Naval Consolidated Brig in Chesapeake, Virginia, opened in July 2011 as a result of the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission process. While it was built as a Level II facility, 

at the time of our review it was being used as a Level I facility. Level I facilities are for inmates serving 

sentences up to 1 year, while Level II facilities are for inmates serving sentences of 5 years or fewer. 

b

In 1994, the Army entered into a memorandum of agreement with the BOP to provide space in BOP 

facilities for 500 UCMJ inmates. According to DOD officials, as of April 2012 there were about 300 

UCMJ inmates being held in BOP facilities. 

Factors to Consider If the 

Guantánamo Bay 

Detainees Were to Be Held 

in DOD Corrections 

Facilities in the United 

States 
 

Page 30 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

First, U.S. law prohibits the confinement of members of the armed forces 

in “immediate association” with foreign nationals.38 To comply with this 

law, DOD would need to relocate UCMJ inmates if detainees were to be 

moved to existing facilities. Since this provision in the law does not define 

“immediate association,” UCMJ inmates could potentially be relocated 

among multiple facilities, or within a specific facility, according to DOD 

officials. Additionally, according to DOD officials, for operational and 

policy reasons DOD prohibits the commingling of unprivileged enemy 

belligerents with those convicted of crimes, as seen in its holding of three 

detainees under AUMF authority in the United States. For example, DOD 

held one former Guantánamo Bay detainee at the former Naval Brig 

Norfolk—which is now closed—and subsequently transferred him to 

Naval Consolidated Brig Charleston. DOD officials told us that although 

this individual was a U.S. citizen, because he was taken into custody 

under AUMF authority he was therefore segregated from all UCMJ 

inmates until his transfer to another country.39 According to officials, DOD 

did not relocate inmates to another facility, but instead segregated this 

detainee from all UCMJ inmates at all times. DOD would also have to 

ensure that it maintained separation of detainees and UCMJ inmates 

while still conforming to international and U.S. standards for access to 

medical care and recreation. According to DOD officials, provision of onsite medical care for detainees might present a challenge. All DOD 

corrections facilities provide medical services on site, although, they are 

limited in what they are equipped to provide. As a result, UCMJ inmates 

requiring more-complex medical treatments are transported to clinics or 

hospitals, but that might be challenging were Guantánamo Bay detainees 

to be treated in this way in the United States. 

While UCMJ inmates have in the past been colocated in the same 

facilities with a few AUMF detainees, the current configuration of these six 

facilities may not easily accommodate the 166 currently held at 

 

3810 U.S.C. § 812. “No member of the armed forces may be placed in confinement in 

immediate association with enemy prisoners or other foreign nationals not members of the 

armed forces.” All of the Guantánamo Bay detainees are foreign nationals. 

39This individual was born in the United States, and subsequent to his detention he gave 

up his citizenship and was transferred to Saudi Arabia. In addition to the former 

Guantánamo Bay detainee, DOD held two other individuals in its U.S. facilities under 

AUMF authority. Neither of these individuals was ever detained at Guantánamo Bay, and 

according to DOD officials, in both cases they were fully segregated from UCMJ inmates 

until they were charged with federal crimes and transferred to DOJ custody. 
 

Page 31 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Guantánamo Bay. In particular this is because DOD’s policies for 

separating different categories of inmates and detainees may present 

capacity limitations. DOD policies require that within the same facility 

UCMJ inmates of different gender and security custody classifications 

maintain separate hygiene and sleeping areas, including additional 

segregation for those inmates requiring additional controls.40 DOD’s 

Guantánamo Bay standard operating procedures also call for segregating 

different categories of detainees from each other. According to DOD, the 

practice of segregating different categories of Guantánamo Bay detainees 

from each other would also be maintained if detainees were transferred to 

DOD facilities in the United States. Currently at Guantánamo Bay the 

following three categories of detainees are confined separately from one 

another, and from all other detainees: (1) detainees designated for 

release, (2) “high-value” detainees, and (3) detainees who have been 

convicted by military commissions. 

Second, according to DOD officials, if detainees were moved to its U.S. 

facilities, DOD would need to continue to ensure the safety and security 

of DOD personnel and the detainees, as well as ensure the safety and 

security of the general public located in close proximity to these facilities. 

According to DOD, maintaining the safety and security of its personnel 

and the detainees is a key mission area at Guantánamo Bay. For 

example, as we observed during our visit to Guantánamo Bay, DOD 

takes several precautions to safeguard its personnel’s identities from the 

detainees in an effort to prevent any harm from coming to personnel or 

their families, and to minimize any attempt by the detainees to 

compromise DOD’s detention operations. In DOD corrections facilities, 

however, personnel and inmates typically interact regularly throughout the 

course of the day. Additionally, in order to conform with international law 

and DOD policies, detainees are to be treated humanely and protected 

from public curiosity (for example, pictures of detainees’ faces are not 

disseminated publicly). According to DOD’s 2009 analysis, four of the six 

facilities in our review—the two Ft. Leavenworth facilities and the Miramar 

and Charleston brigs—are in public view and this could present a 

disadvantage. For example, the general public might be able to view 

detainees utilizing the outdoor recreation areas, or detainee privacy and 

 

40Housing for all female inmates in the DOD prison system is located in the Naval 

Consolidated Brig in Chesapeake, Virginia—which houses females with sentences not 

exceeding 5 years—and the Naval Consolidated Brig in Miramar, California—which 

houses females with sentences over 5 years. 
 

Page 32 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

personnel anonymity may be compromised when transporting detainees 

off-site for medical care. 

Moving the detainees to DOD’s U.S. facilities would also necessitate the 

development of operations to ensure the safety of the general public. 

According to DOD officials, the physical location of the detainees could 

become a target for individuals and groups intent on harming the 

detainees, or harming the U.S. military personnel involved in detention 

operations—which could result in unintended harm to the general public. 

DOD’s current ability to minimize risks to the public is attributable to 

Guantánamo Bay’s remote location and limited access, whereas DOD’s 

corrections facilities in the United States are generally located on active 

military installations in close proximity to the general public. Further, 

because the only access to Naval Station Guantánamo Bay is by military 

approved flights (including both military flights and commercial flights 

contracted by DOD) or ships, all visitors are cleared in advance of their 

arrival. If detainees were colocated with UCMJ inmates, according to 

DOD corrections officials, DOD may not be able to maintain similar 

control over facility access, specifically because UCMJ inmates are 

permitted visits from family and friends, and access to U.S. military 

installations is not as restricted as access to the installation at 

Guantánamo Bay. DOD may also need to consider increased risk when 

transporting detainees outside of the facility. 

Third, if DOD were to continue to conduct intelligence operations similar 

to those conducted at Guantánamo Bay, according to DOD officials, this 

could require facilities and infrastructure that may not be readily available 

at existing U.S. DOD facilities. For example, DOD would require secure 

facilities equipped with recording equipment for conducting detainee 

interviews, as well as secure workspaces for intelligence personnel, 

documents, and equipment. According to DOD officials, its intelligence 

costs might increase if the detainees were moved from Guantánamo Bay 

to the United States. That is because most intelligence information 

collected at Guantánamo Bay from the detainees is used to ensure the 

protection of U.S. military personnel, and relocating the detainees to a 

U.S. facility, with more exposure than Guantánamo Bay, may increase 

the need for greater protective measures resulting in additional costs to 

implement such measures. 

Fourth, inmates at U.S. DOD facilities provide services to DOD, and these 

and other operations performed on the installation would be affected by 

moving Guantánamo Bay detainees to an existing DOD facility. According 

to DOD, if DOD were to move all UCMJ inmates from a facility it might 
 

Page 33 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

also have to relocate work programs such as graphic arts, woodworking, 

as well as textile repair and embroidery for all Army uniforms and related 

gear. According to DOD, in fiscal year 2011 provision of these services by 

inmates at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks resulted in almost $15 million in 

offset savings. Additionally, according to DOD, locating detention 

operations on an active military installation could present risk to the 

installation’s enduring base operations such as administrative and training 

operations. For example, Ft. Leavenworth is home to the Joint Center for 

International Security Force Assistance, and it hosts international officials. 

According to DOD officials, the objection of several foreign nations to the 

Guantánamo Bay detention operations could affect these international 

exchanges. 

DOJ, through BOP and the Marshals Service, uses over 2,000 federal, 

state, local, and private facilities to hold about 280,000 individuals 

charged with or convicted of violating federal laws.41 Under current U.S. 

law, DOJ does not consider itself to have authority to maintain custody of 

DOD detainees under the AUMF. According to DOJ officials, DOJ does 

not have plans to transfer any Guantánamo Bay detainees to its facilities 

in the United States, and such transfer is prohibited by law. BOP and 

Marshals Service officials also stated that, although no active 

consideration has been given to the unique issues that would arise in 

connection with transferring Guantánamo Bay detainees to the United 

States, on the basis of their experience they could safely and securely 

house and transport the detainees if requested to do so and if given the 

necessary resources, planning lead time, and authorities. However, 

several factors would need to be considered, such as maintaining 

separation of detainees from the current inmate population; ensuring the 

safety and security of facility personnel and the detainees; and 

 

41In fiscal year 2012, BOP had a budget of about $6.6 billion for salaries and expenses 

and a staff of about 36,700, which includes administrative, program, and support staff 

responsible for all of BOP’s activities nationwide. In fiscal year 2012, the Marshals Service 

had a budget of $1.2 billion and a staff of about 5,500 employees, including U.S. 

marshals, deputy U.S. marshals, criminal investigators, detention enforcement officers, 

and administrative staff. 

DOJ Corrections 

Facilities in the 

United States and 

Factors to Consider If 

They Were to Hold 

Detainees 
 

Page 34 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

formulating new policies and practices for housing the detainees in DOJ 

facilities in the United States.42

BOP has 117 corrections facilities in the United States, where as of July 

2012 it held over 177,000 federal inmates.43 Many of these facilities 

consist of both general-population and segregated housing units. BOP 

confines inmates at all security levels—including those inmates convicted 

of federal crimes related to terrorism or who otherwise have a history of or 

connection to terrorism.44 BOP holds inmates in facilities that range from 

minimum to high security, some of which are called administrative 

facilities and have special purposes (e.g., the detention of pretrial 

offenders, or the treatment of inmates with serious or chronic medical 

problems).45 Currently, BOP has only one high-security maximum-custody 

facility—its Administrative-Maximum (ADX) facility in Florence, 

Colorado—to contain the most dangerous, violent, or escape-prone 

inmates. BOP facility security levels are based on the extent of physical 

security and supervision provided in the facility. BOP reports that, in fiscal 

year 2011, system-wide on average, the per inmate costs to house 

inmates ranges from $73.57 per day in a low-security prison to $94.87 per 

day at a high-security prison. The Marshals Service is responsible for the 

custody of about 63,000 individuals, who are held across 22 BOP 

 

42A discussion of facilities used for classified operations and related factors that would 

need to be considered if the detainees were transferred to facilities in the United States 

can be found in the classified version of this report. 

43One of these facilities is located in Puerto Rico. As of July 2012, BOP also held about 

40,800, or about 19 percent, of federal prisoners, in 15 privately managed low- and 

minimum-security level prisons, in 185 residential reentry centers (also known as halfway 

houses), and in home detention. According to DOJ, inmates with a history of or connection 

to terrorism have been referred to residential reentry centers. However, as of July 2012, 

BOP did not hold inmates with a history of or connection to terrorism in minimum security 

facilities. 

44There are a range of federal statutes that DOJ uses to prosecute terrorism-related 

offenses, some of which specifically address terrorist activities, such as terrorist attacks 

against mass transportation systems or receiving military-type training from a foreign 

terrorist organization, and others that address general criminal activities that could be in 

support of either a terrorist organization or other criminal networks, such as money 

laundering, immigration fraud, or drug trafficking. 

45BOP also has seven stand-alone minimum-security facilities. However, BOP does not 

hold individuals charged with or convicted of terrorist-related crimes or activities in 

minimum-security facilities. 

DOJ Corrections Facilities 

in the United States 
 

Page 35 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

facilities, and in about 1,800 state, local, and private facilities.46 According 

to Marshals Service officials, the security levels of the BOP, state, local, 

and private facilities it uses vary from low security to high security and 

administrative facilities. In addition, a facility’s age, configuration, and 

capacity may determine the housing units the facility is able to provide. 

For example, some facilities provide dormitory-style housing while others 

may provide segregated housing units. 

As of August 2012, BOP and the Marshals Service had custody of at least 

377 inmates charged with or convicted of crimes related to terrorism, or 

who otherwise had a history of or connection to terrorism. BOP had 373 

of these inmates housed in 98 of its facilities, and the Marshals Service 

had the remaining 4 inmates housed in 3 different facilities—2 inmates 

were in a BOP facility, 1 was in a privately contracted detention facility, 

and 1 was in a county facility.47 See figure 8 for the locations of all BOP 

facilities, including the 98 facilities holding individuals with a history of or 

connection to terrorism; and see table 4 for the number of BOP inmates 

with a history of or connection to terrorism by facility security level. 

 

 

46Generally, the Marshals Service holds more than 80 percent of its inmates in state, 

local, and private facilities. The remaining 20 percent are held in 22 BOP facilities that 

have allocated bed space for the Marshals Service. Through Intergovernmental Service 

Agreements, the Marshals Service contracts with approximately 1,800 state and local 

governments for the provision of suitable quarters and the safekeeping, care, and 

subsistence of the prisoners in Marshals Service custody. 

47BOP identified these inmates by including offenders who have been charged with or 

convicted of either a terrorism offense, such as receiving terrorist training, or an offense 

with a documented connection to terrorism, such as using the proceeds of criminal activity 

to support a terrorist group. In addition, regardless of the nature of the offense, BOP 

included inmates who are engaged in, or are under investigation for engaging in, 

radicalization and recruitment activities. The Marshals Service does not classify 

individuals in their custody as having terrorism-related charges. Instead, they used other 

sources, including media reports and the nature of the pending charges, to identify 

individuals in their custody who might be considered to have such charges. 
 

Page 36 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Figure 8: Location of BOP Facilities in the United States 

Note: This map excludes BOP minimum-security facilities. 
 

Page 37 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Table 4: BOP Inmates with a History of or Connection to Terrorism by Facility 

Security Level as of August 2012 

BOP facility security level 

Number of individuals 

with a history of or 

connection to terrorisma

Number of facilities that 

hold individuals with a 

history of or connection to 

terrorism

Minimum 0 0

Low 70 28

Medium 123 38

High 42 16

Administrativeb 138 16

Total 373 98

Source: GAO analysis of BOP data. 

a

BOP identified these inmates by including offenders who have been charged with or convicted of 

either a terrorism offense, such as receiving terrorist training, or an offense with a documented 

connection to terrorism, such as using the proceeds of criminal activity to support a terrorist group. In 

addition, regardless of the nature of the offense, BOP included inmates who are engaged in, or are 

under investigation for engaging in, radicalization and recruitment activities. 

b

Administrative facilities are institutions with different security levels, including maximum security. 

They also have special purposes, such as the detention of pretrial offenders, or the treatment of 

inmates with serious or chronic medical problems. 

According to DOJ officials, although BOP and the Marshals Service have 

the correctional expertise to safely and securely house detainees with a 

history of or nexus to terrorism, DOJ has not made preparations for 

housing Guantánamo Bay detainees, nor does it have plans to do so. 

BOP has security policies that govern where inmates, including those with 

a history of or connection to terrorism, are sent for their terms of 

incarceration. While the Marshals Service does not assign specific 

security levels to individual inmates, Marshals Service officials told us 

they consider all inmates under their custody as “high-risk” for the 

DOJ Security Classification 

Policies 
 

Page 38 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

purposes of prisoner handling and transportation.48 According to BOP, the 

first step to determine which security level is appropriate for the inmate is 

“scoring” the inmate. This is done by taking into consideration information 

about the inmate from several sources, including the sentencing court, 

the Marshals Service, and other federal agencies. BOP also considers 

other factors such as the inmate’s membership in a specific disruptive 

group, the inmate’s history of violence, and inmate programming. On the 

basis of this information, BOP assigns a score to each inmate. Generally, 

an inmate who receives a higher classification score will be placed in a 

higher-security facility. In addition to scoring, BOP also considers other 

factors such as the inmate’s medical needs, the level of overcrowding at a 

facility, and whether an inmate may need to be separated from others, 

before assigning the inmate to a facility. 

The Marshals Service generally defers to the facility holding the inmate to 

conduct a risk assessment on the basis of information provided to facility 

officials by the Marshals Service and other law-enforcement agencies, the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office, and courts to determine the inmate’s appropriate 

custody classification level. The Marshals Service can also recommend 

that high-profile inmates, such as some recognized as terrorists, be held 

in isolation. While in Marshals Service custody, the one Guantánamo Bay 

detainee who was transferred to the United States in 2009 was placed in 

a segregated housing unit in a BOP facility in New York City. In another 

case, involving a terrorist suspect associated with the September 11 

attacks, the Marshals Service made a special agreement with the local 

facility where the suspect was being held to provide increased security. 

For example, Marshals Service officials stated that they arranged for 24/7 

monitoring of this individual, a private cell, and an additional cell for use 

by his legal team to conduct meetings.49

 

48According to Marshals Service officials, the Marshals Service assigns inmates under its 

custody to a facility on a case-by-case basis, primarily based on the facility’s proximity to 

where the individual is indicted, the security measures the facility can provide, the quality 

of facility management, the availability of in-facility medical care, and available capacity. 

When possible, the Marshals Service prefers to use BOP facilities because they do not 

charge for bed space and, because the facilities are DOJ facilities, the Marshals Service 

has greater control over the detention of the inmate as compared with state or local 

facilities. 

49According to Marshals Service officials, the Marshals Service must pay for these and 

other supplemental security measures such as additional car escorts and staff to and from 

the trial location for high-profile inmates in its custody. 
 

Page 39 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

DOJ may also apply additional security procedures for an individual on 

the basis of security concerns that are not reflected in the classification 

process; these exceptions are called special administrative measures. 

Special administrative measures, which must be authorized by the 

Attorney General, primarily limit an inmate’s communications with other 

inmates and the outside world (e.g., separation from other inmates, 

limited telephone privileges, and visitation rights).50 These measures may 

affect the BOP facility or housing unit where the inmate is placed. The 

Attorney General may authorize special administrative measures when 

there is the presence of substantial risk that an inmate’s communications 

or contact with others could result in death or serious bodily injury to 

persons, or substantial damage to property. Generally, pretrial inmates 

subject to the provisions for special administrative measures would be 

held at facilities that are located within the Judicial District in which they 

have proceedings. Postconviction inmates subject to the provisions for 

special administrative measures would generally be held at ADX due to 

the requirements of the order that dictates specific controls on their 

housing and communications. 

Conditions of confinement for inmates in BOP facilities can vary on the 

basis of the facility’s security level, inmate behavior, and other factors. 

BOP policies state that all facilities, security level notwithstanding, must 

provide the same basic conditions of confinement, such as clean housing 

units; nutritionally adequate meals that meet dietary requirements (such 

as vegetarian or religious diet); access to educational, occupational, and 

leisure time programming; access to work opportunities; and basic 

medical and mental health care.51 All BOP facilities are to provide inmates 

with access to a chaplain and basic religious items according to their 

religious beliefs. Most inmates in general-population housing units, 

regardless of security level, are allowed outside of their cells 

approximately 16 to 17 hours per day. Generally during this time, inmates 

may move freely within the housing unit and may move to other areas of 

 

5028 C.F.R. § 501.3. Special administrative measures may be imposed for a period of up 

to 120 days, or, with the approval of the Attorney General, up to 1 year and may be 

renewed. The BOP Director may renew special restrictions within the special 

administrative measures if the Attorney General or a federal law-enforcement or 

intelligence agency provides written notification of continued substantial risk related to the 

inmate’s communications or contacts with other persons. 

51BOP detention centers and metropolitan corrections centers are not required to offer the 

full range of programming activities to inmates. 

DOJ Conditions of 

Confinement 
 

Page 40 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

the facility (such as the dining or work areas) through controlled or 

supervised movements throughout the day. In low-security facilities, 

inmates live in dormitories and are not confined to a cell. Typically, 

general-population inmates at all security levels consume their meals in a 

common dining area, such as a dining hall. Inmates in general-population 

units also have mail, visitation, and telephone privileges that are subject 

to monitoring.52 In addition, BOP requires all its facilities to be accredited 

by the American Correctional Association. 

BOP also operates specialized housing units that allow it to separate 

inmates from the general population. This specialized housing includes its 

ADX facility, its Communications Management Units, as well as other 

units.53 For example, BOP’s most-dangerous inmates are placed in ADX 

because they are perceived as a risk to the institutional security of other 

corrections facilities. Some of the 373 terrorism-related individuals in BOP 

facilities are confined in cells alone approximately 23 hours a day at ADX. 

According to BOP officials, as of February 2012, ADX held 41 of the 373 

BOP inmates charged with or convicted of federal crimes related to 

terrorism. ADX has multiple housing units that provide a range of 

conditions of confinement on the basis of the inmate’s security needs, 

including the following: 

 Control Unit: The control unit is ADX’s most-restrictive unit and 

houses BOP’s most-disruptive inmates, who are allowed 7 hours of 

out-of-cell recreation in individual recreation areas per week. Control 

unit inmates are also allowed one 15-minute phone call and up to five 

noncontact visits per month. 

 Special Security Unit: Generally inmates that have special 

administrative measures are held in the Special Security Unit. These 

inmates are subject to restrictive conditions specific to their special 

administrative measures that can include limited physical contact with 

other inmates; as well as limited communications, visitation, and 

phone calls. In addition, all inmate telephone calls and visits are 

contemporaneously recorded and monitored by the Federal Bureau of 

 

52According to BOP, all inmate telephone calls are recorded and randomly monitored, 

except for attorney-inmate telephone calls. Inmates may have limited physical contact with 

visitors, which may be restricted by facility staff to prevent the introduction of contraband 

and ensure the orderly operation of the facility. 

53For the purposes of this report, we limited our scope to the ADX facility and 

Communications Management Units. 
 

Page 41 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Investigation, and written social correspondence is monitored by the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation as well. Special Security Unit inmates 

are allowed a minimum of two 15-minute phone calls and up to five 

visits per month. 

 General-Population and Step-Down Units: According to BOP officials, 

the majority of inmates at ADX are held either in general-population 

units or in the step-down unit. The step-down unit is a four-phase 

program in which inmates may progress from more-restrictive to lessrestrictive phases over a minimum of 36 months on the basis of good 

conduct. For example, inmates in the step-down unit may interact with 

other inmates during their recreation hours and receive more 

telephone time as they progress through the phases. Both generalpopulation and step-down unit inmates are allowed a minimum of two 

15-minute phone calls and up to five visits per month. 

According to BOP officials, all inmates at ADX are generally kept 

segregated from each other; they consume all their meals inside their 

cells, except for those in phases three and four of the step-down unit, in 

which inmates may share their meals with a small group of other inmates. 

Like all BOP facilities, ADX can provide a religiously observant diet. A fulltime chaplain provides for inmates’ religious needs, but BOP officials 

explained that group prayers are not allowed at ADX. BOP provides most 

educational, religious, and recreational programs to ADX inmates in their 

cells through staff visits or by closed circuit television or radios located 

inside the inmates’ cells. See figures 9 and 10 for examples of a 

segregated housing unit and recreation areas. 
 

Page 42 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Figure 9: Step-Down Housing Unit, “Supermax,” U.S. Administrative Maximum Facility, Florence, Colorado 
 

Page 43 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Figure 10: Outdoor Recreation Area, “Supermax,” U.S. Administrative Maximum 

Facility, Florence, Colorado 

In addition to ADX, some individuals with a history of or connection to 

terrorism are held in Communications Management Units, which are 

administrative units located within two medium-security BOP facilities, 

where they are allowed to interact with the other inmates in the unit for up 

to 15 hours a day.54 As of February 2012, of the 373 inmates with a 

history of or connection to terrorism, 44 were held in these units. In 2006 

and 2008, BOP established these units to confine inmates who require 

increased monitoring of all communications between inmates and with 

persons outside the prison.55 Communications Management Units require 

100 percent live monitoring of inmates’ telephone calls and social visits, 

 

54According to BOP policy, inmates in the Communications Management Unit at the Terre 

Haute Federal Correctional Institution (Terre Haute, Indiana) are ordinarily housed in 

double-bunk cells. Inmates in the Communications Management Unit at Marion U.S. 

Penitentiary (Marion, Illinois) are ordinarily housed in single-bunk cells. 

55In 2006, BOP established the Terre Haute Communications Management Unit, and in 

2008, the Marion Communications Management Unit. 
 

Page 44 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

and review of all incoming and outgoing social mail.56 Inmates are allowed 

two 15-minute telephone calls per week and 8 hours of visiting time per 

month, although no physical contact is allowed during visits. All telephone 

calls and social visits are live monitored and recorded, and they must 

occur in English only, unless the call is previously scheduled for and 

conducted through simultaneous translation monitoring. Other than 

increased communications monitoring, BOP officials stated that 

conditions of confinement in these units are the same as conditions of 

confinement for inmates in other medium-security general-population 

housing units, including access to medical and mental health services; 

meals meeting inmate dietary requirements served in a common dining 

area; access to recreation in a common area daily up to 15 hours per day; 

religious service opportunities; and access to leisure and law library 

services, table games, television in the common areas, and some aerobic 

exercise equipment. See figure 11 for a photographic example of a 

Communications Management Unit cell. 

 

56Legal and special mail (e.g., attorney, federal courts) can be sealed and delivered to unit 

management. 
 

Page 45 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Figure 11: Communications Management Unit Cell, Terre Haute, Indiana 

Marshals Service policy requires that the facilities it uses to detain 

inmates meet minimum conditions of confinement, including 24-hour staff 

supervision; three adequate meals per day; availability of adequate 

emergency medical coverage 24 hours a day; adequate security, 
 

Page 46 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

sanitation, and hygiene services; and access to prescription drugs. In 

addition, Marshals Service policy states Marshals should seek to develop 

intergovernmental agreements with facilities that can provide special 

prisoner services, such as mental health care. 

As previously stated, DOJ does not consider itself to have authority to 

maintain custody of DOD detainees under the AUMF and has no plans to 

house Guantánamo Bay detainees at its U.S. facilities; and BOP and the 

Marshals Service would need additional statutory authority to take 

custody of Guantánamo Bay detainees. If prohibitions against transferring 

the Guantánamo Bay detainees to the United States were eliminated, and 

BOP and the Marshals Service were authorized to conduct military 

detention under the AUMF in U.S. facilities, our interviews with DOJ 

officials and analysis of detention-operation documentation identified 

several factors—among others such as funding, personnel resources, 

and planning time—that would need to be considered. These factors 

include (1) formulation of policies and practices for housing the detainees; 

(2) ensuring the safety of facility personnel, the detainees, and the 

general public; (3) identifying adequate space for housing the detainees 

and maintaining separation of detainees from the current inmate 

population. 

First, according to DOJ officials, new operational policies and practices 

would need to be formulated for housing the detainees in BOP facilities in 

the United States or in other types of facilities used by the Marshals 

Service for detention purposes. BOP and the Marshals Service 

established existing policies and practices pursuant to federal criminal 

statutes specifically authorizing them to take custody of individuals 

charged with or convicted of violating a federal law.57 In addition, BOP 

follows American Correctional Association standards for care and 

treatment of inmates convicted or charged under U.S. law. According to 

DOJ officials, these existing policies and practices would not be sufficient 

if DOJ received new authority to conduct law-of-war detention. New 

policies and practices that would be needed include standards governing 

 

57See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(i), 3621(a)-(b), 4001, 4042(a)(2), 4068. Pursuant to statute, DOJ 

also has authority to take custody of certain persons convicted by courts-martial, offenders 

in the District of Columbia, and state offenders pursuant to a contract for reimbursement. 

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4083, 5003; Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 

11201(a)-(b), 111 Stat. 251, 734. 

Factors to Consider If the 

Guantánamo Bay 

Detainees Were to Be Held 

in DOJ Corrections 

Facilities in the United 

States 
 

Page 47 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

(1) the holding of detainees who have not been charged with or convicted 

of violating U.S. law, (2) where and how each category of detainee would 

be housed, (3) religious and cultural accommodations, (4) visitation by the 

International Committee of the Red Cross, and (5) intelligence gathering 

and use. 

Second, according to BOP and Marshals Service officials, additional 

procedures and infrastructure would be required governing where and 

how each category of detainee would be held, including their 

accommodations. According to Marshals Service officials, they may have 

to adopt additional measures to transport detainees to and from BOP 

facilities, which could have implications on detainee and public safety. For 

example, Marshals Service officials explained that when it had a highprofile prisoner associated with the September 11 attacks in its custody, it 

used extra security vehicles and additional staff to help ensure safety and 

security during transport. 

Third, according to BOP officials, given its current facility capacity rates, 

finding capacity in its facilities for the Guantánamo Bay detainee 

population may present challenges. Overall, according to BOP, as of 

August 2012, its facilities system wide were 38 percent overcrowded, and 

crowding is a relatively higher concern at facilities with higher security 

levels, where, according to BOP officials, Guantánamo Bay detainees 

would likely be held. Despite current overcrowding, BOP officials said that 

if they had custody of the detainees, with adequate resources, they could 

accommodate the detainees.58

Finally, BOP officials we interviewed said that if they were to add 166 

detainees to their facilities, keeping them completely separated from the 

existing inmate population would have an effect on BOP’s operations in 

the facility or facilities where the detainees were placed. For example, if 

BOP needed to confine detainees to single cells, existing inmates would 

have to be moved to create space for the detainees, which could require 

that BOP triple bunk some of the current inmate population. According to 

 

58BOP expects to activate four newly constructed prisons by 2014, adding about 5,568 

beds. In addition, BOP is budgeting for additional contracted bed space—1,000 beds in 

2013 and 1,500 the next year, but the addition of these contracted beds is subject to 

future appropriations. For additional information on BOP capacity, see: GAO, Bureau of 

Prisons: Growing Inmate Crowding Negatively Affects Inmates, Staff, and Infrastructure, 

GAO-12-743 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012). 
 

Page 48 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

BOP officials, increasing the number of inmates per cell can affect BOP’s 

ability to ensure the safety and security of its personnel, inmates, and 

institutions. Another challenge BOP would face in maintaining separation 

of detainees and inmates would be in the provision of inmate-provided 

services including food preparation, commissary operations, and laundry, 

educational, and religious services. According to BOP officials, if 

detainees were to have access to these services, BOP would require 

additional personnel to ensure separation between the detainees and the 

inmates. For example, while most general–population inmates go to a 

shared dining hall for their meals—which can be served and prepared by 

other inmates—to avoid interaction with inmates, detainees would likely 

not be able to eat meals in shared dining halls, or in dining facilities where 

other inmates work. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, DOJ, and the Department of 

Homeland Security for comment. The Department of Homeland Security 

declined to provide comments, and DOD provided technical comments 

that were incorporated as appropriate. DOJ provided technical comments 

as well as a letter making additional written comments, which are 

reproduced in appendix IV and were incorporated as appropriate. 

In its letter, DOJ stated that, generally speaking, BOP and the Marshals 

Service have the correctional expertise to safely and securely house 

detainees with a nexus to terrorism. However, DOJ reiterated that current 

law prohibits the transfer of detainees to the United States; DOJ has not 

made preparations for housing Guantánamo Bay detainees, and does not 

have plans to do so. DOJ also stated that, given these factors, any 

discussion of housing detainees in the United States is hypothetical and 

raises legal, policy, and resource issues that descriptions of current 

policies and practices contained in this report cannot fully address. We 

agree that given the legal restrictions on transferring detainees to the 

United States and DOJ’s stated policy that it does not plan to transfer 

detainees to the United States, our assessment of factors to be 

considered if DOD or DOJ facilities were used to hold detainees is 

hypothetical. Our report provides a descriptive discussion of several 

factors that would need to be considered should the current legal 

restrictions be discontinued and detainees were transferred to the United 

States, but does not purport to provide a comprehensive list of all factors. 

Our report also clearly states the current legal restrictions and policy 

decisions against transferring detainees to the United States, and makes 

no recommendations on the legal and policy issues surrounding 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
 

Page 49 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Guantánamo Bay detainees and whether they should be transferred to 

the United States. 

DOJ also recommended that we delete Table 4 showing the number of 

BOP inmates with a history of or connection to terrorism by facility 

security level. We believe the table accurately demonstrates a point DOJ 

makes in its comment letter; namely that BOP and the Marshals Service 

have the correctional expertise to safely and securely house detainees 

with a history of or connection to terrorism. In response to DOJ’s 

comment, we added language clarifying that, while DOJ has this 

expertise, DOJ has not made preparations or plans to house 

Guantánamo detainees. 

 
 

Page 50 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. we will send copies to appropriate congressional committees, 

the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of 

Homeland Security. In addition, the report will be available at no charge 

on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or LeporeB@gao.gov, or David C. 

Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix V. 

Sincerely yours, 

Brian J. Lepore 

Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management Team 

David C. Maurer 

Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Team 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 51 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

The scope of our work was to provide a descriptive review of the detention 

facilities and infrastructure at Guantánamo Bay, existing military and civilian 

corrections facilities in the United States, and an overview of factors that 

might need to be considered if Guantánamo Bay detainees were moved to 

facilities in the United States. Hence, our review did not include an 

evaluation of whether specific U.S. facilities would be suitable for holding 

Guantánamo Bay detainees. Our description of what factors would need to 

be considered does not include legal issues related to the Guantánamo 

Bay detainees that are currently being adjudicated, such as habeas corpus, 

and right to counsel. We limited our review to corrections facilities in the 

United States operated by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and federal, state, local, and private facilities used 

by the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service). Additionally, we 

interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland Security who told us 

that its detention facilities are used to detain foreign nationals who are 

awaiting deportation from the United States, not detainees brought to the 

United States for law-of-war detention, pretrial detention, or postconviction 

incarceration. Thus we subsequently removed the Department of 

Homeland Security from the scope of our work. 

To describe the history and current status of Guantánamo Bay detention 

operations, facilities, and infrastructure, we reviewed relevant 

international law and U.S. laws and policies relating to DOD’s detention 

operations, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 

1949 and relevant sections of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. We also 

reviewed executive orders pertaining to Guantánamo Bay detention 

operations, an interagency report on detainees’ status, and DOD reports 

on conditions of detention at Guantánamo Bay. We conducted a site visit 

to the detention and support facilities at the U.S. Naval Station 

Guantánamo Bay, where we interviewed officials and observed 

operations at Camps 5, 6, Echo, and Iguana, and toured former camps. 

Members of the team also received a detailed briefing on Camp 7 and 

reviewed photographs of the facility. We met with officials and toured the 

detention-support facilities including the courtroom complex, mediasupport facility, detainee hospital, behavioral health center, kitchen 

facility, intelligence operations–support facilities, information-technology 

facilities, visitor lodging, and staff housing. We also met with officials 

responsible for providing legal and International Committee of the Red 

Cross support. In addition, we interviewed officials from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, U.S. Southern Command, Joint Task 

Force-Guantánamo, Congressional Research Service, and American 

Correctional Association. In order to determine the average cost to 

operate Guantánamo Bay detention facilities and support operations, we 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 52 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

obtained data from U.S. Southern Command on funding that the U.S. 

Army and U.S. Southern Command provide for detention operations at 

Guantánamo Bay. We met with officials to clarify funding sources and 

totals, as well as the cost categories not included in these data, and 

analyzed the data to determine average funding among fiscal years 2008 

through 2012. We conducted a data-reliability analysis of these data by 

asking detailed questions of U.S. Southern Command regarding the 

origins and means of collection of these data, and determined that the 

data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To describe DOD corrections facilities in the United States and factors to 

consider in the event that they were to hold Guantánamo Bay detainees, 

we focused the scope of our review on DOD’s Level II and Level III 

facilities. DOD has two Level II regional corrections facilities and three 

Level II consolidated brigs used for pretrial confinement and for inmates 

with sentences ranging from 1 to 5 years, and one Level III facility used 

for inmates with sentences from 5 years to life, and inmates sentenced to 

death. We excluded DOD’s Level I facilities, because they are not 

intended for confinement of individuals for more than 1 year. We reviewed 

relevant laws such as the Detainee Treatment Act, the Military 

Commissions Act, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice; and DOD 

documents that govern its corrections operations and facilities, such as 

DOD directives on the administration of military corrections facilities and 

Army and Navy corrections manuals and regulations. In order to 

determine overall capacity levels in DOD Level II and Level III corrections 

facilities, we obtained and analyzed facility capacity data from the Army 

and the Navy. We conducted a data-reliability analysis of these data by 

obtaining information from DOD officials on how the data are collected 

and used, and what internal controls the data are subject to. We 

determined that they were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. In 

addition, we conducted site visits to the Naval Consolidated Brig 

Chesapeake, Virginia (Level II); the Midwest Joint Regional Correctional 

Facility, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas (Level II); and the United States 

Disciplinary Barracks, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas (Level III). We 

interviewed officials and observed operations at these facilities. We 

selected these facilities because they represent both Level II and Level III 

facility operations; both Army and Navy operating procedures; and 

because they reflect a range of housing configurations—including both 

segregated and general-population housing units. In addition, we 

interviewed officials responsible for the management of DOD corrections 

facilities, including officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Joint Staff, Army Corrections Command, and Bureau of Naval Personnel. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 53 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

To identify factors for consideration if the Guantánamo Bay detainees 

were transferred to DOD facilities in the United States, we reviewed 

analyses from 2009 conducted by DOD to determine whether its facilities 

were equipped to conduct Guantánamo Bay detainee operations. We 

also interviewed an official that worked on these analyses to identify what 

factors and facilities may have changed since 2009. Because these 

analyses were based on the assumption that all detention operations—

including intelligence operations and military commission support—would 

remain the same, we maintained this assumption in our description of 

factors requiring consideration in the event that Guantánamo Bay 

detainees were moved to DOD facilities in the United States. Therefore, 

using this assumption as our framework, we identified challenges DOD 

might face in conforming to all relevant U.S. laws and policies, 

international laws, as well as DOD corrections policies and operating 

procedures if Guantánamo Bay detainees were transferred to DOD 

facilities. We also identified operational challenges that DOD might face in 

moving its detention operations as they currently exist to the United 

States. Factors we describe in this section provide a summary of several 

key issues DOD may need to consider, and is not intended to be an allinclusive list. Additionally, we are issuing a classified version of this 

report. That version includes an additional appendix that provides a 

discussion of Guantánamo Bay facilities used for classified operations 

that would need to be considered if the detainees were transferred to 

facilities in the United States. 

To describe Department of Justice (DOJ) corrections facilities in the 

United States we reviewed relevant laws and policies, such as federal 

laws and regulations governing detention pending trial in federal court, 

imprisonment of federal offenders, and BOP management and 

operations; BOP and Marshals Service policies, such as the BOP policies 

on inmate classification and management and a Marshals Service 

directive on prisoner detention and housing. We also interviewed officials 

from BOP, the Marshals Service, and the Office of the Deputy Attorney 

General. We conducted site visits to and interviewed officials at four BOP 

facilities including: U.S. Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas; U.S. 

Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania; Federal Correctional Complex, 

Florence, Colorado; and Federal Correctional Complex, Allenwood, 

Pennsylvania. We selected these facilities because they provide 

examples of various types of housing units and security levels, including 

segregated and general-population housing units. In order to determine 

overall capacity levels in DOJ facilities, we obtained and analyzed facility 

capacity data from BOP and the Marshals Service. To assess the 

reliability of the BOP and Marshals Service data on facility capacity, we 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 54 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

reviewed agency documentation, received a demonstration of BOP’s 

facility database, and interviewed BOP and Marshals Service officials. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To describe the number and locations of inmates in BOP and Marshals 

Service custody charged with or convicted of terrorism-related crimes, we 

obtained inmate data from both agencies. Both BOP and the Marshals 

Service determined the criteria for inmates identified as charged with or 

convicted of terrorism-related crimes. BOP identified these inmates by 

including offenders who have been charged with or convicted of either a 

terrorism offense, such as receiving terrorist training, or an offense with a 

documented connection to terrorism, such as using the proceeds of 

criminal activity to support a terrorist group. In addition, regardless of the 

nature of the offense, BOP included inmates who are engaged in, or are 

under investigation for engaging in, radicalization and recruitment 

activities. BOP described the group of inmates for which they provided 

data as inmates with a history of or nexus (connection) to terrorism. While 

the Marshals Service does not classify individuals in its custody as having 

terrorism-related charges, it used other sources, including media reports 

and the nature of the pending charges, to identify individuals in its 

custody who might be considered to have such charges. To describe 

factors that would need to be considered if Guantánamo Bay detainees 

were transferred to DOJ facilities in the United States, we assumed that 

operations or conditions of confinement at facilities used by BOP or the 

Marshals Service may be the same as those as currently at Guantánamo 

Bay. While it is likely that conditions of confinement and related 

procedures for the detainees would change if they were moved into DOJ 

facilities, it is unclear what changes would occur. Thus, for the purposes 

of this report, when discussing factors for consideration if the detainees 

were moved to DOJ facilities, we assumed that most conditions and 

procedures would remain the same. Therefore, using this assumption as 

our framework, we identified challenges DOJ might face in conforming to 

relevant U.S. laws and policies, as well as DOJ corrections policies and 

operating procedures if Guantánamo Bay detainees were transferred to 

DOJ facilities. We also identified operational challenges that DOJ might 

face in providing the same scope and level of detention operations at its 

facilities in the United States as DOD provides at Guantánamo Bay. 

Factors we describe in this section provide a summary of several key 

issues DOJ may need to consider, and is not intended to be an allinclusive list. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 55 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to November 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Appendix II: Summary of Key Legislation 

Affecting the Potential to Transfer 

Guantánamo Bay Detainees to the United 

States 

Page 56 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

In addition to legal issues pertaining to the authority of civilian agencies to 

conduct military detention operations, since Executive Order 13492 was 

signed in January 2009, a number of statutes have limited or prohibited 

the transfer of Guantánamo Bay detainees to U.S. facilities. 

Legislation Date enacted Effect on transfer of detainees 

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 

Pub. L. No. 111-32 (2009) 

June 24, 2009 Prohibits the use of federal funds to transfer Guantánamo Bay 

detainees into the United States, except for prosecution or 

detention during legal proceedings, and requires the President to 

report this transfer to Congress 45 days in advance and provide 

detailed plans regarding potential risks and mitigation strategies. 

National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2010 

Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009) 

October 28, 2009 During the specified period, prohibits the use of funds made 

available to Department of Defense (DOD) to release detainees 

into the United States, and limits the authority of DOD to transfer 

detainees to the United States until after the President submits a 

comprehensive plan including, for example, potential risks, costs, 

and mitigation strategies for each detainee to be transferred. 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 

Pub. L. No. 111-117(2009) 

December 16, 2009 Prohibits the use of federal funds to transfer Guantánamo Bay 

detainees into the United States, except for prosecution or 

detention during legal proceedings, and requires the President to 

report this transfer to Congress 45 days in advance and provide 

detailed plans regarding potential risks and mitigation strategies. 

Ike Skelton National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 

Pub. L. No. 111-383 (2011) 

January 7, 2011 Prohibits the use of funds authorized for fiscal year 2011 to 

transfer Guantánamo Bay detainees to the United States. Prohibits 

the use of funds to construct or modify facilities in the United 

States for the purpose of detaining or imprisoning detainees under 

DOD control. 

Department of Defense and Full-Year 

Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 

Pub. L. No. 112-10 (2011) 

April 15, 2011 Prohibits the use of federal funds to transfer or assist in the 

transfer of Guantánamo Bay detainees into the United States, 

unless the detainee is a U.S. citizen or a member of the U.S. 

Armed Forces. 

Consolidated and Further Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2012 and 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012

Pub. L. No. 112-55 (2011) and Pub. L. 

No. 112-74 (2011). 

November 18, 2011 

and December 23, 

2011 

Both laws prohibit the use of federal funds to transfer or assist in 

the transfer of Guantánamo Bay detainees into the United States, 

unless the detainee is a U.S. citizen or a member of the U.S. 

Armed Forces. 

National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2012 

Pub. L. No. 112-81(2011) 

December 31, 2011 Prohibits the use of funds authorized for fiscal year 2012 to 

transfer Guantánamo Bay detainees to the United States. Prohibits 

the use of funds to construct or modify facilities in the United 

States for the purpose of detaining or imprisoning detainees under 

DOD control. 

Source: GAO analysis of relevant laws. 

Appendix II: Summary of Key Legislation 

Affecting the Potential to Transfer Guantánamo 

Bay Detainees to the United States 
Appendix III: Noninteractive Timeline of 

Guantánamo Bay Detention Operations 

Page 57 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

 

Appendix III: Noninteractive Timeline of 

Guantánamo Bay Detention Operations 
Appendix III: Noninteractive Timeline of 

Guantánamo Bay Detention Operations 

Page 58 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

 
Appendix III: Noninteractive Timeline of 

Guantánamo Bay Detention Operations 

Page 59 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

 
Appendix III: Noninteractive Timeline of 

Guantánamo Bay Detention Operations 

Page 60 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 61 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Justice 

Note: Page numbers in 

the draft may differ from 

those in this report. 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 62 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 63 GAO-13-31 Guantánamo Bay Detainees 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or LeporeB@gao.gov

David C. Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov

In addition to the contacts named above, Alissa Czyz (Assistant Director), 

Edward J. George, Jr. (Assistant Director), Carla Brown, Jennifer Bryant, 

Frances Cook, Michele Fejfar, Gregory Marchand, Tida Reveley, 

Kelly Rubin, Jennifer Spence, Amie Steele, Cheryl Weissman, and 

Yee Wong made significant contributions to this report. 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(351696) 
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