IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE MARY FUNG KOEHLER, Appellant,

v. REXFORD LAWRENCE, Respondent. No. 68539-2-1

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: July 22, 2013 COO

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Verellen, J. — Mary Fung Koehler appeals from numerous trial court orders that culminated in a receiver's sale of a condominium to the estate of Rexford Lawrence. Because Koehler's appeal is untimely as to all but one ofthe challenged trial court orders, and because she provides no argument or citation to the relevant trial record or legal authority regarding that order, we affirm. FACTS In 1999, Lawrence sought to purchase a new residence, but was unable to obtain
a mortgage due to credit problems. Mary Fung Koehler, a licensed real estate broker, agreed to take out a mortgage as the nominal purchaser of a condominium that Lawrence would then occupy. Lawrence and Koehler executed two contracts: (1) a 20- year residential lease requiring Lawrence to pay rent equivalent to the monthly 

### mortgage payments and all expenses; and (2) a purchase option giving Lawrence theNo. 68539-2-1/2 

### option to buy the property from Koehler by paying off allencumbrances and paying Koehler one-third of the net appreciation ofthe property. 

### On September 22, 2005, Lawrence gave Koehler notice of his intent to exercise 

### the option to purchase, but Koehler refused to comply. Lawrence filed a complaint for breach ofcontract and prevailed, winning a moneyjudgment inthe amount of 

### $109,076.77.1 During that trial but prior to entry of judgment, Koehlerfiled an unlawful detainer 

### lawsuit against Lawrencein King County SuperiorCourt, and recorded a declaration of homestead with the King County Recorder's Office. The trial court resolved the unlawful detainer issue in favor ofLawrence, concluding that thejudgment inthe 2005 

### lawsuitterminated the priorlease agreement, that Lawrence's ongoing occupancy and 

### payment ofrent resulted in the creation ofa month-to-month tenancy, and thatKoehler had not given any notice to terminate that tenancy. Due to concerns that Koehler's actions would dissipate the value ofthe property, 

### the superior court converted the unlawful detainer to a generaljurisdiction action and 

## appointed areceiverforthe condominium.2 Upon Lawrence's death in 2008, the receiver leased thecondominium to Lawrence's heirs for market rent.3 In2011, the receiver determined that itwas appropriate to sell the condominium 

### and close the receivership. Atabout the same time, Koehlerfiled forChapter 7


### 1This court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Lawrence v. Koehler, noted at 152Wn.App. 1012(2009). 

### 2RCW 7.60.055 (trial court has authority over receiver and subject property). 3"The receiver, with the court's approval after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, 

### or lease estate property other than in the ordinary course ofbusiness." RCW 7.60.260.No. 68539-2-1/3 bankruptcy and received her discharge. The superior court authorized a sale, declared Koehler's declaration of homestead invalid, and identified an equitable lien on the condominium infavor of Lawrence's estate inthe amount ofthe previousjudgment. In the bankruptcy proceedings, Koehler unsuccessfully sought to avoid the equitable lien. On January 29, 2012, after the superior court determined the date that the equitable lien attached, the bankruptcy court made its final determination that Koehler could not avoid the equitable lien on the condominium. Once the bankruptcy court determined the equitable lien survived Koehler's 

### bankruptcy, the receiver sold the condominium to Lawrence's estate on February 3, 2012. The estate paid infull the balance owing on the mortgage and alltransaction costs. As previously approved by the superior court, the estate paid the balance of the 

### sale price in the form of a credit against the equitable lien. On March 2, 2012, the receiver was awarded attorney fees and discharged. Koehler filed a notice of appeal on March 26, 2012. DISCUSSION Koehler seeks review of numerous trial court orders, some dating as far back as 2008. But RAP 5.2 is a restrictive rule, and provides only a 30-day period within which 

### a party must file a notice ofappeal. Koehler's appeal was timely onlyas to the March 2, 2012 order. That order awarded expenses and attorney fees to the court-appointed custodial receiver, and discharged the receiver.No. 68539-2-1/4


### An appeal from an award ofattorney fees does not bring up for review the prior 

### orders entered in theaction.4 The portion oftheMarch 2orderdischarging thereceiver does notpurportto approve a final report by the receiver.5 The mereremoval ofa receiver is not appealable as a matter of right. RAP 2.2, when enacted in 1976, 

### departed from the prior rules allowing an appeal of right for an order appointing or 

### removing a receiver. Removal issubjecttodiscretionary review.6 Koehler argues that thetrial court "has yet to issue afinal order,"7 but she makes noargument in support of discretionary review. She presents no persuasive authority that the March 2 order was 

### prejudicially affected by prior rulings ofthetrial court.8 Accordingly, welimit ourreview to the portion ofthe order concerning attorney fees. Although Koehler's notice of appeal is timely as to the trial court's award of attorney fees to the receiver, Koehler fails to assign error to the fee award and does not cite relevant portions ofthe record or legal authority supporting any challenge to the fee



### 4Carrara. LLC v. Ron &E Enters. Inc.. 137Wn. App. 822, 825, 155 P.3d 161 (2007).

### 5This factdistinguishes thiscasefrom Johnsonv. Joslvn. 47 Wash. 531, 92 P. 413 (1907), cited by Koehler in herApril 19 letter to this court. That case held that in proceedings supplemental to execution on a moneyjudgment, an order approving the receiver's final report ofthe collection and distribution of money and discharging him is appealable as a final order made afterjudgment and affecting a substantial right. 

### 62A Karl B.Tegland, Washington Practice: Rules Practice RAP 2.2 n.32 at 130-31 (7th ed. 2011) (discussing rule drafters' advisory task force comments submitted to Supreme Court prior to adoption of original 1976 set of RAP rules). 

### 7Appellant's Br. at 7. 

### 8RAP 2.4(b).No. 68539-2-1/5
award.9 Koehler demonstrates no error that entitles her to relief. We affirm the trial court's order. Motion 

### In her reply brief, Koehler moves the court "forpermission to submit pagination of the cases and authorities cited inAppellant's Incomplete Opening Brief, and to have this 

### Court base its opinion on the pleadings inthe Clerk's Papers as well as the incomplete 

### opening brief."10 The motion isdenied.
Affirmed. 

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WE CONCUR: 

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9State v. Olson. 126 Wn.2d 315, 321, 893 P.2d 629 (1995) (when an appellant 

### fails to raise an issue inthe assignments oferror and fails to present any argument on 

### the issue orprovide any legalcitation, an appellate courtwill not consider the merits of that issue): see also Ana v. Martin, 154 Wn.2d 477, 487, 114 P.3d 637 (2005). 

### 10 Appellant's Reply Briefat 1.