[PUBLIS H]
IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ No. 1 1- 12 17 9

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ D.C. Dock etNo. 1 :1 1- cv -2 04 14 -MGC
ERIKSON HARRIS SON, Pl ai nt iff - App el le e,
vers us NCL (BAHAMAS) LTD., d.b .a. NCL, Defen da nt- App el la nt .

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

th e Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co urt forth e So ut he rnDis tri ctof F lo rid a

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ (Au gu st22 , 20 12 ) Befo re CARNES, BAR KETT andHILL, Circu itJu dg es . BARKETT, Circ ui t J ud ge : Erik so n Harris so n, a f

orm er s eam an em

pl oyee of NCL (Bah am as ) Ltd
. (“NCL”), was in

jure d o n t he job an d s ue d NCL i n F lo rid a st at e co urt cl ai m in g t ha tNCL was n eg li ge ntun de r th e Jo ne s Act , 46 U.S.C. § 3 01 04 , andfai le d t o 1 pr ov id e m ai nt en an ce an d c are a s re qu ire d b y U.S. m ari ti m e la w. NCL, not in g t ha t Harri ss on ’s em

pl oym en t co nt ractrequi redth e p art ie s t o s ub m itdi sp ut es to arb it rat io n, re m ov edth e cas e to fed eral di st ric t co urt u nd er 9 U.S.C. § 2 05 , whi ch pe rm it s re m ov al wher e “ th e su bjec t m at te r of anact io n o r pr oc eed in g p en di ng in a St at e co urt re la te s t o a n arb it rat io n a gr eem en t o r awardfal li ng un de r” t he Co nv en ti on on th e Rec og ni ti on an d En fo rcem en t o f Fo rei gn Arbi tra l Award s (t he

“ Co nv en ti on ”). 9 U.S.C. § 2 05
. Afterth e rem ov al , th e d is tri ctco urt i n asi ng le 2

The Jones Act permits seame n to sue their employers f or injuries duringthe cour se of 1 employ ment, apply

ing la ws that reg

ulate injury

rec overie s for ra ilway

employ ees. Section 205 states in total that: 2 Where the subject matter of an action or proce eding pending in a State court relates to an arbitration agree ment or awa rd falling under the Convention, the defe ndant or the defe ndants may , at any time befor e the trial there of, remove such action or proce eding to the district co u rt o f the United States for the district and division embraci n g th e place wher e the action or proce eding is pending
. The proce dure for remova l of cause s otherwise provided by law shall apply , except that the ground for remova l provided i n this section need not appea r on the fac e of the complaint but may be shown in the petition for remova l. For the purposes of Chapter 1 of this title any action or proce eding remove d under this section shall be deemed to have b een brought in the district court to which it is removed. As well, 9 U.S.C. § 203 provides fe dera l district courts with orig inal jurisdiction over actions that fa ll under the Convention. Additionally , the par

ties do not dispute that Harrisson’s Jones Act claim does not, by itself, permit remova l to feder al cour t. See L ewis v. L ewis & Clark Marine , Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 455 (2001) ( J ones Ac t claim was not subject to re moval to fede ral c ourt).
2or de r de ni edNCL’ s m ot io n t o e nf or ce t he arb it rat io n c laus e o n t he ba si s t ha t t he arb it rat io n c laus e was vo idun de r th e Co nv en ti on for vi ol at in g p ub li c p ol ic y

an d
rem an de d t he m at te r ba ckto st at e co urt. NCL ap pe al s thi s o rd er. Harri ss on m ov es to di sm is s NCL’s ap pe al arg ui ng th atby con cl ud in g t ha t th e arb it rat io n c laus e was nu ll an d v oi d a ndth us no lo ng er a b as is forjuri sd ic ti on , th e d is tri ctco urt d is m is se d t he cas e fo r la ckof s ub ject- m at te r juri sd ic ti on . The refo re, Harri ss on arg ue s t ha t p ur su an t t o 2 8 U.S.C. § 14 47 (d ) we are pre cl ud ed fro m rev ie win g t he ord er re m an di ng th e cas e to st at e co urt. 2 8 U.S.C. § 14 47 (d ) pr ov id es : An or de r rem an di ng a cas e to th e St at e co urt fro m whi ch it was rem ov ed is no t rev ie wab le on ap pe al or ot he rwis e, ex cep t th at an or de r rem an di ng a cas e to th e St at e co urt fro m whi ch it was rem ov ed pu rs ua nt to se ct io n 14 42 or 1 44 3 o f th is ti tl e sh al l b e rev ie wab le by app eal or o th erwi se . 3 InTherm tro n P ro du ct s, In c. v. Herm an sd or fer, t he Supr em e Co urt l im it ed§ 14 47 (d ) to rem an ds ba se d o n t he gro un ds sp eci fie d i n 2 8 U.S.C. § 14 47 (c), wh ic h
are alac k o f subjec t-matte r juri sd ic ti on or ade fectin th e rem ov al pro cedur e. 42 3 U.S. 33 6, 3 42 -4 4 (1 97 6) ; 2 8 U.S.C. § 14 47 (c), (d ). 4 The pa rties do not contend that the district c ourt remove d the ca se pursua nt to 28 U.S.C
. 3 § 1442 or § 1443. Section 1447(c) states, in part, that: 4 A mo t i o n t o re m and the case on the basis of any defe ct other than lack of subject matter jurisdicti o n m u st be made within 30 day s afte r the filing of the notice of 3NCL arg ue s t ha t § 14 47 (d ) do es no t ap pl y be cau se we sh ou ldco ns tru e th e
rem an d a s b as edon th e d is tri ctco urt’s i nt erp ret at io n o f a co nt ractclaus e an d n ot
as ba se d o n t he di st ric t co urt l ack in g s ub ject- m at te r juri sd ic ti on . Alte rn at iv el y , NCL arg ue s t ha t ev enif § 14 47 (d ) ap pl ie s, we ca n re vi ew th e d en ia l o f th e m ot io n to co m pe l arbi tra ti on ba se d o n e xc ep ti on s t o t he rul e o f § 1 44 7( d)
. Dis cus si on Sect io n 1 44 7( d) ge ne ral ly prev en ts anap pe ll at e co urt fr om rev ie win g a di st ric t co urt’s o rd er re m an di ng a cas e b ackto st at e co urt fo r a l ackof
subjec t-matte r juri sd ic ti on , “ ev en if t he di st ric t co urt’s d eci si on is cle arl y
erro ne ou s.” New v . Spo rts & Rec reat io n, In c., 11 4 F .3d10 92 , 10 96 (11 th Cir
. 19 97 ); s ee al so Kirc he r v. Pu tn am Fu nd s Tru st , 54 7 U.S. 6 33 , 64 2 (2 00 6) (sa m e). Lik ewis e, 28 U.S.C. § 1 44 7( d) als o g en eral ly bars ou r rev ie w of t he di st ric t co urt’s de te rm in at io ns rel at edto a rem an d b as edon a la ckof juris di ct io n, b ecau se up on de te rm in in g alac k o f juri sd ic ti on , th e d is tri ctco urt “ ha s n o ju ris di ct io n t o t ou ch th e cas e o n t he m eri ts .” Kirc he r, 54 7 U.S. at64 4. Howev er, t he pa rti es foc us on two ex cep ti on s t o thi s s ta tu to ry ba r. Fir st , we are p erm it te d t o re vi ew a rem an d o rd er t ha t i s b as edon gro un ds ot he r th an a la ck

remova l under section 1446(a)
. I f at any time befor e final judgme nt i t ap p ea rs that the district court lac ks subject matter jurisdiction, the c ase sha ll be rema nded. 4of

juri sd ic ti on or ade fectin th e rem ov al pro cedur e. Therm tro n, 4 23 U.S. at 3 42
- 44 ; s ee al so Samm ie Bo nn er Co ns t. Co ., Inc . v. West ern Sta r Tru ck s Sa le s, In c., 33 0 F .3d13 08 , 13 11 -1 2 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 3) . Seco nd , we m ay rev ie w ord ers “ th at le adto , bu t ar e se pa rat e fro m , ord ers of r em an d a ndha ve a co nc lu si ve effe ctup on th e en su in g s ta te co urt ac ti on .” Aqu am ar S.A. v . Del Mo nt e Fre sh Pro du ce, 1 79 F.3 d 1 27 9, 1 28 6 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 9)
. 5 Rel y in g o n S napp er, In c. v. Re dd an , NCL arg ue s tha t t hi s ca se fal ls un de r th e fi rs t ex cep ti on , con te nd in g t ha t t he di st ric t co urt d idno t re m an d fo r a l ackof
subjec t-matte r juri sd ic ti on . 17 1 F .3d12 49 (11 th Cir . 19 99 ). W e fi ndSn ap pe r
co m pl et el y in ap po si te . The Sn ap pe r de fen da nt s re m ov edth ei r cas e b as edon

6 di ve rs it y juri sd ic ti on , whi ch was n ev er co nt es te d, an d t he di st ric t co urt re m an de d

There is also the “matter of substantive law” exception to the statutory bar, which 5 permits this Court t o revie w a de termination of the pa rties’ substantive rights that is not i ntrinsic to the district court’s de cision to remand. See Her nandez v. Seminole Cnty ., Fla., 334 F .3d 1233, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 2003). B eca use this case was re movable only under 9 U .S.C. § 205, t he exis tence of a va lid arbitration agree ment under the Convention was intrinsic to the rema nd decision. It “went to the ve ry essenc e of the remova l question and ce rtainly was not external to it.” I d. at 1240. “[A]bsent the feder al question of [the Convention] , no subject matter jur isdiction exis ted,” a

nd there fore “[r]ejection of [NCL ’s ar bitration agree ment] argument was mer ely a step towards the c onclusion that the court lac ked jurisdiction.” In re L oudermilch, 158 F .3d 1143, 1146 (11th Cir. 1998). Ther efor e, the matter of substantive law e x ception does not a pply
. The Supreme Court in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc. empha siz ed that our 6 revie w to deter

mine whether

the district court re manded f or a la ck of subjec t-matter jurisdiction, “to the extent it is permissible at all, should be limited to confirmingthat that char acte rization was c olorable[.]” 551 U.S. 224, 234 (2007). I f a “ District Court relied upon a g round [to rema nd] t hat is colorably

char acte rized as subject matter jurisdiction, appellate r eview is ba rre d by § 1447(d).” I d. 5ba ckto st at e co urt af te r itde te rm in edth atth e fo ru m sel ect io n c laus e in th e
co nt ractwaiv edth ei r ri gh t t o re m ov al . Id. at12 51 -5 2. In pe rm it ti ng ap pe ll at e
rev ie w, we exp la in edth at“ th e fed eral co urt h as he ldth e p art ie s t o t he term s o f th ei r ag reem en t, as wit h a ny oth er co nt ractua l ad jud ic at io n.” Id. at12 53 . Thu s, th e d is tri ctco urt i n S napp er h ad , andne ve r lo st , juri sd ic ti on to he ar the cas e, bu t
ru le d o nl y

th atrem ov al was i m

pr op er b as edon th e la ng ua ge of t he co nt ract . In
co nt ras t h ere, t he co urt re vi ewedth e arb it rat io n c laus e to de te rm in e if itpro vi de d
an y ba si s fo r th e d is tri ctco urt’s jur is di ct io n i n t he fir stpl ace. Aft er fi nd in g t ha t th e arb it rat io n c laus e was nu ll an d v oi d u nd er the Co nv en ti on , th e d is tri ctco urt la ck edan y

juri sd ic ti on al ba si s an d t hu s re m an de d t he cas e to th e st at e co urt. 7 Eve n i f we fi ndth atth e d is tri ctco urt re m an de d fo r a l ackof ju ris di ct io n, NCL co nt en ds th atth e rem an d i s s ep arat e fro m th e d en ia l o f th e m ot io n t o c om pe l arb it rat io n a ndth atwe canrev ie w th e d en ia l, p ur su an t t o C it y of Waco v. Un it ed St at es Fid el it y

& Gua ran ty Co., 29 3 U.S. 1 40 , 14 3- 44 (19 34 ). Und er Waco, co urts
m ay rev ie w an i nt erl oc ut ory

ap pe al of a n o rd er t ha t i s co ns id ered(1) “ se pa rab le ”
The dissent’s c ontention that Snapper c ontrols here to permit appellate revie w ig nores 7 the cr itical distinction t hat the district cour t in Snapper dec ided to rema nd based on its interpre tation of a c hoice- of-law provision in the arbitration agree ment, which as w e explained in Snapper, is not a r emand ba sed on a la ck of subjec t-matter jurisdiction. 171 F.3d at 1253. In contra st here, the district court did not remand ba sed on an inter pretation of a choic e-of

-law provision, but indis putably beca use the district cour

t determined that it lacked any subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the c ase. B eca use the re mand was ba sed on a la ck of subjec t-matter jurisdiction, § 1447(d) applies. 6fro m

th e rem an d o rd er, an d (2 ) ha s a “ co nc lu si ve effe ct ” upo n t he subs eque nt
co urt ac ti on . Aqu am ar, 1 79 F.3dat 1 28 6; see als o Waco , 29 3 U.S. at14 3- 44 (p erm it ti ng ap pe ll at e rev ie w of adi sm is sa l o f a cro ss -co m pl ai ntth atpre ced eda
rem an d b as edon a la ckof d iv ers it y juri sd ic ti on ). W e fi ndth e o rd er n otto be “ co nc lu si ve ” u nd er Waco. Anord er i s
co nc lu si ve pu rs ua ntto W aco on ly if itwil l b e “ fu nc ti on al ly unr ev ie wab le inth e st at e co urt, an d i t ch an ge s t he co nt ou rs of t he st at e co urt ac ti on aft er re m an d.” Hern an de z, 33 4 F .3dat 1 24 1 (i nt ern al qu ot at io ns an d c it at io ns om it te d) . Und er si m il ar fa ct s t o t ho se be fo re u s, t he Fif th Cir cu itin Dahi y a v . Talm id ge In te rn at io na l, Ltd . hel d t ha t the do ct rin e in W aco do es no t p erm itrev ie w of a de ni al of t he m ot io n t o c om pe l arbi tra ti on pri orto a rem an d fo r a cas e rem ov ed
un de r § 2 05 , in pa rt, b ecau se th e d en ia l was m ad e “ in th e p ro ces s o f rem an di ng a
cas e fo r la ckof ju ris di ct io n, [a ndth us ] th atde te rm in at io n i s ju ris di ct io na l an d c an be rev is it edby a sta te co urt upo n re m an d.” 37 1 F .3d20 7, 2 11 (5t h C ir. 2 00 4)
. Co ll at eral est op pe l d oe s n otba r th e st at e co urt fr om rev is it in g t he cla im

be cau se

“ § 1 44 7( d) pre ve nt s t he [ap pe ll an ts ] fro m ap pe al in g t he Dis tri ctCo urt’s d eci si on .” Kirc he r, 54 7 U.S. at64 7. Here, t he di st ric t co urt’s an al y si s o f th e arb itrat io n c laus e was li m it edto th e qu es ti on of wh et he r th e cl au se was v al idforpu rp os es of s ub ject m at te r
7juri sd ic ti on . The d en ia l o f th e m ot io n t o c om pe l arbi tra ti on do es no t p recl ud e th e st at e co urt fr om

reco ns id eri ng th atqu es ti on de no vo an d fr eel y de te rm in in g whe th er t he arb it rat io n c laus e is va li d. Se e id . at 6 47 (no ti ng th atst at e co urts are

“pe rfec tl y free to rejectth e rem an di ng co urt’s re as on in g” ); I n re Lou de rm il ch , 15 8 F.3 d a t 1 14 6 (s am e); see als o C it y of Ol ds m ar v . Sta te , 79 0 S o. 2 d 1 04 2, 1 04 6 n .4 (Fl a. 20 01 ) (n ot in g tha t, u nd er Fl or id a la w, col la te ral est op pe l ap pl ie s o nl y when a
m at te r ha s b een “ fu ll y

li ti ga te d a ndde te rm in edin a co nt es t t ha t re su lt s i n afin al de ci si on of aco urt o f co m pe te ntjuri sd ic ti on ”). 8 Fo r th e fo reg oi ng reas on s, we g ran t Harris so n’s m ot io n t o d is m is s NCL’s ap pe al forlac k o f juri sd ic ti on . DISMI SSED FOR LACK OF JURI SDICT IO N.

As we ha ve found that the arbitration clause wa s examined only for pur poses of the 8 jurisdictional analy sis, the parties agree that collater al estoppel doe s not apply to preve nt them from pre sentingarguments reg ardingthe validity of the a rbitration clause to the state cour t. Our holdingthat the district court’s f indings re g ardingthe ar

bitration agree ment are not “conc lusive” does not, as the dissent contends, “r ationalize away ” fe dera l appellate r eview of the district court’s de cisions under the Wac o doctrine. Rathe r, Waco re quires our c ourt to first deter mine whether

the district court de cisions are “conc lusive.” See Wac o, 293 U.S. at 143. And § 1447(d) ba

rs our re view, eve n if our cour t may disagree with the district court’s finding s or if such f

indings involved the me rits of fede ral que stions. S ee Kirche r, 547 U.S. at 640 (“w e have rele ntlessly repe ated that a

ny rema nd order issued on [a lack of subjec t-matter jurisdiction] grounds . . . is immuni zed from all forms of a ppellate r eview, whether

or not that order might be de emed e rrone ous by an appe llate cour

t.”); see also id. at 647-48 (holdingthat § 1447(d) ba

rre d appellate revie w of district cour t’s finding , prec edinga re mand, that fe dera l law did not preclude a state se curities lawsuit and state courts upon re mand wer e fr ee to r evisit “the merits of [this ] federa l question”). 8HILL, Circ ui t J ud ge , di ss en ti ng :

I di ss en t. I di sa gr ee wi th th e m ajor it y de ci si on to di sm is s t hi s ap pe al forlac k o f juri sd ic ti on . W e h av e ap pe ll at e juri sd ic ti on to rev ie w th e d is tri ctco urt’s o rd er d en y in g NCL’s m ot io n t o c om

pe l arbi tra ti on un de r th e Co nv en ti on . Thatpart o f th e o rd er is im m ed ia te ly app eal ab le un de r 9 U.S.C . § 1 6( a)(1 )(C) , andm ad e ap pl ic ab le to th e Co nv en ti on by 9 U.S.C. § 2 08
. Here t he di stric t co urt erredin refu si ng to ord er ar bi tra ti on . Its subs ta nt iv e fin di ng th atNCL’ s ag reem en t t o a rb it rat e was un en fo rceabl e was ba se d upo n Th oma s v. C

ar ni va l Co rp . , 57 3 F .3d11 13 (11 th Cir . 20 09 ), a cas e ru le d in co ns is te ntwit h o urpri orpre ced en t. Se e Bau tista v . St ar Cr uise s , 39 6 F .3d12 89 , 13 02 (11 th Cir . 20 05 ); Li ndo v . NCL (Ba ha mas ) Ltd. , 65 2 F .3d12 57 , 12 77 -7 8 (1 1t h C ir. 2 01 1)
. 1 The di stric t co urt’s re m an d o rd er was ba se d upo n i ts in te rp ret at io n o f th e

Thomas err oneously

held that we c an re fuse to enf orcean agree ment to arbitrate under 1 the United Nations Convention on t he ground that it is “null and void as a matter of public policy .” Thomas , 573 F.3d a t 1122-24. By sua sponte addinga public policy defe nse, Thomas overlooke d this circuit’s pre cede nt which dictates that a district court must enfor ce a n agree ment to arbitrate as null and void only in limi ted situations “such as f raud, mistake, dur ess, and wa iver . . . [which are] standar d brea ch of c ontrac t defe nses . . . that ca n be applied ne utrally

on an international sca le.” Bautista , 396 F.3d a t 1302; Lindo , 652 F.3d at 1276. 9m ean in g o f a ch oi ce-o f-l aw orfor um sel ect io n c laus e; th is is a rev ie wab le de ci si on , ext ern al to th e rem ov al pro ces s. Se e Sn ap pe r In c. v. Red

an , 17 1 F .3d 12 49 , 12 52 -5 3 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 9) ; Cu nn in gh am v. Fl eetwo od Homes of

Ga. , 25 3 F.3 d 6 11 , 61 7 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 1) (“ [a]gre em en ts to arb it rat e are ess en ti al ly fo ru m -s el ect io n c laus es ”); Pell ep or t In ves to rs , Inc . v. Bud co Qua li ty Th ea te rs , In c. , 74 1 F .2d27 3, 2 76 -7 7 (9 th Cir . 19 84 ); se e a ls o 28 U.S.C. §§ 14 47 (c) a nd(d)
. The m ajor it y

erro ne ou sl y

fin ds th at“ th e d is tri ctco urt’s an al y si s o f th e arb it rat io n c laus e was li m it edto th e que st io n o f whe th er the claus e was va li d fo r pu rp os es of s ub

ject m at te r juri sd ic ti on .” Here t he di st ric t co urt cl earl y co nduc te d two di st in ctsubs ta nt iv e an al y se s: (1) th atth e arb it rat io n p ro vi si on was n ul l an d
vo idas a ga in stpubl ic po li cy ; an d t ha t, t he refo re, (2 ) rem an d was pro pe r. The m ajor it y

res ul t m or

ph s t hes e tw o int

o o ne , th ereb y

fin di ng th ata

Cit y of W ac o v . Uni te d Sta te s Fi de li ty & Gua r. Co

. , 29 3 U.S. 1 40 , 14 2 (1 93 4) , rev ie w is in ap pl ic ab le an d u nn eces sa ry . Thi s l eap is rat io na li zedaway by the co m fo rti ng 2 th ou gh t t ha t “ [t]he de ni al of the m ot io n t o c om pe l arbi tra ti on do es no t p recl ud e th e st at e co ur t fro m reco ns id eri ng th atqu es ti on de no vo an d fr eel y de te rm in in g

W aco holds that an appe llate cour t may revie w a de cision of the district cour t that “in 2 logic and in fa ct . . . pre cede d that of re mand” a nd, “if not re verse d or set aside , is conclusive upon” the a

ppellant. W

aco , 293 U.S. at 142. W

aco allows revie w of orde rs that ar e sepa rable from the or der on r emand. Id. at 143; see also Aquamar v . Del MonteFresh ProduceN.A., Inc. , 179 F.3d 1279, 1285- 86 (11th Cir. 1999). 10whe th er t he arb it rat io n c laus e is in va li d.” (Em ph as is ad de d)
. It wo ul d, i nd eed , 3 pr ecl ud e th e fed

er al co ur t fro m rev ie win g t he di stric t co urt’s s ub st an ti ve de ci si on de nyin g a rb it rat io n, a m ajor fed eral qu es ti on , and“ co nc lu si ve up on ” th e ap pe ll an t. W ac o , 29 3 U.S. at14 2. I am ve ry co nc ern edwith t he res ul t ac hi ev edto da y . It h as far re ach in g
co ns eque nc es . The m ajor it y in te rp ret at io n u nd erm in es Co ng res s’s cl ear i nt en t t o al lo w forimm ed ia te rev ie w fro m ord ers de nyin g a rb it rat io n. Se e 9 U.S.C. § § 16 (a)( 1) (C); 20 8. I di ss en t.

The majority

opinion never me ntions Thomas by name. It glosses ove r this aspec t by 3 stating: “ In contra st here, the court re viewed the arbitration clause to dete rmine if it provided a ny basis for the district c ourt’s jurisdiction in the first place . After findingthat the ar

bitration clause was null and void under

the Convention, the district court lac ked any jurisdictional basis and thus rema nded the c ase to the state court.” This slight of hand, in e ssence , would breathe life ba ck into Thomas
. 11