2013 IL 114639



### IN TH E SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF IL LI NOI S

(Doc ket No. 114639)
THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Appellee
, v. OMAR
J OHNSON, Appe llant.

Opinion filed September 19, 2013.

J USTI CE FREEMAN de livered the judgme nt of the c ourt, with opinion. Chief J ustice Kilbride a

nd J ustices Thomas, Gar

man, Kar meier, Bur ke, and T heis conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 This case conce rns wheth er s ec tion 4-2002.1(a ) of the Counties

Code (55 I L CS 5/4 -2 002.1(a) (West 2008)), which permits State’s Attorney s to collect a $50 fee “[f]or eac h day actua lly employ ed in the hear ing of a case of habea s corpus,” also permits State’s Attorney s to collect such a fee when they participate in the hear ing of a petition for relief from judgme nt pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-1401 (West 2008))

. T he circ uit court of Cook County assessed the fee
, and the appellate court aff irmed. 2012 I L App (1st) 111378. This court allowed J ohnson’s petition for leave
to appea l. I ll. S. Ct. R. 315 (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010). For t h e following

rea sons, we reve rse, in part, the judgme nts of the circ uit and appellate
courts and rema

nd this cause to the circ uit c ourt with dir ections that it vacate the $50 State’s Attorne y fee

.¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND

¶ 3 Petitioner Omar J ohnson was convicted of first deg re e m u rder
,

arme d robber

y , ag g ravated vehicular hijacking, ag g ravated kidnapping and conce alment of a homicidal death. He was sentenc ed
to a term of natura l life for murder; 60 y ear s’ imprisonment for arme d robber y , ag g ravated vehicular hijacking and ag g ravated kidnapping ; and 10 y ear s’ imprisonment for conce alment of a homicidal death. The appellate court aff

irmed J ohnson’s convictions and sentenc es on appea l, as well as the ci rc u i t court’s dismiss al of his subsequent postconviction petition (725 I L CS 5/ 122-1 et seq . (West 2004)). ¶ 4 J ohnson filed a section 2-1401 petition in 2008, which the circ uit

court err oneously dismiss ed, and the appellate court rem an d ed the

cause to the circ uit court for further proce eding s. Subsequently
, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. At a hear ing i n 2010, J ohnson withdrew his orig inal petition and filed an amende d petition. The State filed a motion to dismiss the amende d peti t i on and
req u es t ed that J ohnson be assessed filing fee s and court costs for filing a frivolous petition, as provided for in section 22-105(a ) of the Code of Civil P roce dure ( 735 I L CS 5/ 22-105(a ) (West 2010) ). That section permits a court to assess filing fee s and court costs ag ainst an inmate who files a petition that the court deter mines is frivolous. 735 I L CS 5/22-105(a) (West 2010). The circ uit c ourt g rante d the State’s motion to di s m i s s and assessed numerous fee s and costs ag ainst J ohnso n , i n cludi ng the $50 State’s Attorney fee at issue here
, pursuant to sectio n 4 -2002.1(a). J ohnson now appea ls to this court, challeng ing only

the impositi on of the $50 State’s A ttorney fee

.

¶ 5 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 6 The sole issue befor e us is whether the $50 State’s Attorney fee in section 4-2002.1(a ) of the Counties Code applies to J oh n s o n’s section 2-1401 petition. J ohnson co ntends that the fee was not statutorily authorized since section 4-2002

. 1 (a) does not mention a section 2-1401 pe tition for relief f rom judg ment. ¶ 7 The Sta t e re s p o n d s t h at the fee should apply to all collater al

proce eding s in w hich the State is employ ed in the hea ringof a case

. The State argues there is littl e rea son to differ entiate betwee n collecting a fee when the State’s Attorney is employ ed “in the hear ing of a case of habea s corpus” or i n t h e h earing of a section 2-1401 petition or postconviction petition.

-2-¶ 8 To an s we r the question prese nted on appea l, we must construe section 4-2002.1(a ) of the Counties Code, which provides in rele vant part: “(a ) State’s attorney s shall be entitled to the fo llowing fee s: * * *
For eac h day actua lly employ ed in the hear ing of a case of habea s corpus in wh ich the people are interested, $50.” 55 I L CS 5/ 4-2002.1(a ) (West 2010). ¶ 9 Our primary ob j ec t i v e i n construing a st atute is to asce rtain and
g ive eff ect to the i n t ent of the leg islature, bear ing in mind that the best evidenc e of such intent is the statutory lang uag e, g iven its plain and ordinary meaning

. Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills
, 2011 I L 111838, ¶ 11. Where the statutory lang uag e is clea r and u n a mbiguous, we will apply the s tatu t e as writ ten. Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America
, 186 I ll. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999). When statutor y t er m s are undefine d, we presume the le g islature intended the terms to have their popularly understood meaning

. People v. Smith
, 236 I ll. 2d 162, 167 (2010). Moreove r, if a term h as a settled leg al meaning
, the courts will normally i n fe r t hat the leg islature intended to incorporate the established meanin g

. Id. We revie w questions of statutory construction de novo

. Ries v. City of Chicago
, 2 4 2 I ll. 2d 205, 216 (2011). ¶ 10 T h e ap p el l at e co urt ag ree d with the circ uit court that the $50

State’s Attorney fee should apply to J ohnson’s section 2-1401 peti t i o n

. The court held that the statute ref err ed to habeas corpus proce eding s “g ener ically ” and w as meant to encompass a section 2- 1401 petition. 2012 I L App (1st) 111378, ¶ 13. The court further held that t he statute applied to all collater al proce eding s since the leg islative intent was to deter frivolous filings. 2012 I L App (1 st) 111378, ¶ 13. ¶ 11 We disag ree with the appellate court’s i n t erp retation. As stated

above, section 4-2002.1(a ) of the Counties Cod e al lows State’s Attorney s to collect a fee “[f]or ea ch day actua lly employ ed in the hear ing of a case of habea s corpus in which the people are interested.” Since the term “ habeas corpus ” is not define d in the Counties Code,

we will presume the leg islature intended the term to have its popularly understood or settled leg al m eaning. The term “ habeas
corpus ,” which is L atin for “that y ou have the body ,” ref ers to a “wr it employ ed to bring a person befor e a court, most fre quently to ensure

-3-that the party ’s imprisonment or detention is not illega l.” Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary 715 (7th ed. 1999). There are numerous ty pes of wr its of habeas corpus ( e.g., habeas corpus ad deliberandum et recipiendum (“[a] writ used to remove a person for t ri al from one county to the county wher e the person alleg edly committed the offe nse”) ; habeas
corpus ad faciendum et recipiendum (“[a] w rit used in c ivil ca ses to

remove the case , and also the body of the defe ndant, from an inferior
court to a superior court” ); habea s co r pus ad prosequendum (“[a] writ used in criminal case s to bring befor e a court a p ri s o n er to be tried on char g es ot her than those for which the prisoner is cu rr entl y being confine d”); habeas corpus ad respondendum (“[a] writ used in civil case s to remove a person from one court’s custody into that of another court, in which the person may then be sued”) ; habeas corpus ad subjiciendum (“[a] writ direc ted t o s o meone detaining another
person and commanding that the detainee be broug ht to court” ); and habeas corpus ad testificandum (“[a] w rit used in c ivil and criminal

case s to bring a

prisoner to c ourt to testify ”))

. Id

. ¶ 12 Giving the term “ h a b ea s co rpus ” in section 4-2002.1(a ) of the

Counties Cod e i t s p l ain and ordinary meaning
, we conclude that it only applies t o the various ty pes of habeas corpus proce eding s. We reje ct the State’s contentions that the fee should a pply “g ener ically ” to all collater al proceeding s, as t he appellate c o u rt conclude d. 2012 I L App (1st) 111378, ¶ 13. The statutory provision t h at al lows imposit ion of the $50 fee first appea red in the statute in a 1907 amendment, and has rema ined unchang ed, despite the cre ation of additional collater al proce eding s such a s a s e c ti o n 2

- 1 401 petition and

a postconviction petition. The leg i s l ature could have amende d the 1
statute to include additional collater al proceeding s, but it never did. We wi ll not rea d words or meaning s into a statute when the l e g i s l a t u r e h a s c h o s e n n o t t o i n c l u d e t h e m

. S e e Bridgestone/Firest o n e, Inc. v. Aldridge
, 179 I ll. 2d 141, 154-55 (1997). There fore
, any reme dy lies with the leg islature, not the courts,

T h e st atuto ry pro visio n tha t pre ced ed a sec ti on 2- 1401 pet it ion was 1

ena ct ed in 1872 when the Gene ra l Asse m bly abo li she d the wri t of er ror

cor am nobi s

. Peop le v. Touh y , 397 I ll

. 19, 23 (19 47)

. T he l e gis la tur e

ena ct ed the Post

- Convict ion Hear ing A ct in 1949 . I ll . Rev . Stat . 1949, ch. 38, ¶¶ 826-832. Addi ti ona ll y, the abo ve def ini ti ons of the vario us types of wri ts of habe as c orp us ar e s ubs ta nti al ly the sa m e a s t hey wer e i n 19 07.

-4-if the leg islature may be so inclined. See W illiams v. Manche

ster , 228 I ll. 2d 404, 427 (2008). ¶ 13 Fur

ther, we are not persua ded by the appellate court’s opinion in People v. Gutierrez
, 2011 I L App (1st) 093499, to which both parties cite. I n Gutierrez
, the appellate court vacated the $50 State’s Attorney fee that was assessed to the defe ndant following t h e summary dismiss al of his postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 65. The court rea soned that since the defe ndant’s postconviction petition was dismiss ed at the first st ag e, which occur red without any

input from the State, the State had not been “employ ed” in the hear ing of the case , and there fore was not permitted to rec over the fee

. Id. ¶ 65. Howeve r, the appellate court did not first consider whether the fee should apply to

a postconviction pro ce ed ing. To the extent the appellate court in Gutierrez assumed the fee could appl y to a postconviction petition,

we dis agree with that assumption. As stated above, we hold the fee only applies to habeas corpus proce eding s. Acc ording ly
, we rema nd this cause to the circ uit co u rt wi t h direc tions that it vacate the $50 State’s Attorney fee assessed ag ainst J ohnson and corr ect the mittimus

.

¶ 14 I I I . CONCL USI ON ¶ 15 For the fore g oing rea sons, t h e j u d gm en t s o f t h e ci rc u i t and

appellate courts are reve rsed i n part. The cause is rema nded to the circ uit court with direc tions that it vacate the $50 State’s Attorney fee and cor rec t the mittimus

.

¶ 16 J udg ments reve rsed in par t. ¶ 17 Cause re manded with dire ctions.

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