Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

STEVEN KNECHT GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana

Lafayette, Indiana

ERIC P. BABBS

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

LAMAR HERRON, JR., )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 79A04-1201-CR-58

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE TIPPECANOE SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Randy J. Williams, Judge

Cause No. 79D01-0711-FA-39

October 24, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Lamar Herron, Jr. appeals his sentence following his conviction for dealing in 

cocaine, as a Class B felony, after he pleaded guilty. Herron raises a single issue for our 

review, namely, whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and his character. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In October of 2007, Officer Walters of the Tippecanoe County Police Department 

learned from an informant the phone number of a crack cocaine dealer. Officer Walters 

called the number and arranged to buy $100 of cocaine. Upon his arrival, with other 

officers, at the location agreed upon with the dealer, Walters arrested Herron.

On November 1, the State charged Herron with dealing in cocaine, as a Class A 

felony, and dealing in cocaine, as a Class B felony. Thereafter, Herron received two 

psychological evaluations and was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Based on those 

evaluations, on April 30, 2008, the State entered into an agreed order with Herron’s 

counsel that he was currently incompetent to stand trial. The parties further agreed that 

Herron would be reevaluated by the Logansport State Hospital within ninety days of the 

agreed order and that a final determination of his competency would be based on the 

reevaluation. On August 27, doctors reevaluated Herron’s mental condition and 

diagnosed him with “History of Substance-Induced Psychotic Disorder” and “Personality 

Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (NOS) with Antisocial, Narcisstic, and Histrinoic 

Features.” Appellant’s App. at 68. The doctors concluded that he had “attained the 
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ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of his defense.” Id. at 

67.

On November 25, 2008, Herron entered into a plea agreement with the State. 

According to the terms of the agreement, Herron would plead guilty to the Class B felony 

charge and the State would dismiss the Class A felony charge. Sentencing was left open 

to the trial court’s discretion. After a hearing, the trial court accepted the plea agreement 

and, on January 8, 2009, the court sentenced Herron to sixteen years, with twelve years 

executed and four years suspended to probation, which is six years above the advisory 

term for a Class B felony but four years below the maximum. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5. 

This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Herron argues that his sentence is inappropriate. Although a trial court may have 

acted within its lawful discretion in determining a sentence, Article VII, Sections 4 and 6 

of the Indiana Constitution “authorize[] independent appellate review and revision of a 

sentence imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007) (alteration original). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B) requires the 

appellant to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his 

offense and her character. See Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B); Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 

867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We assess the trial court’s recognition or non-recognition 

of aggravators and mitigators as an initial guide to determining whether the sentence 

imposed was inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
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However, “a defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met 

th[e] inappropriateness standard of review.” Roush, 875 N.E.2d at 812 (alteration 

original).

Moreover, “sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial 

court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 

1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor 

an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented. See id. at 1224. The principal 

role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the outliers.” Id. at 1225. Whether we 

regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the 

culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and 

myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.

Herron first asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense. In particular, Herron notes that “this drug sale is a fairly typical instance of 

Dealing in Cocaine. . . . There is nothing about this offense that requires an enhanced 

sentence.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. But Herron apparently had a history of dealing 

cocaine. An informant had called Officer Walters and told him that Herron was a dealer, 

Officer Walters then promptly called Herron to set up a drug buy, and Herron was 

immediately available with the amount of cocaine requested. And the State dismissed its 

Class A felony charge in exchange for Herron’s guilty plea. Had Herron been convicted 

of the Class A felony, he would have been subjected to a greater sentence than the one he 

received. We are not persuaded that the nature of this offense merits revision of Herron’s 

sentence.
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Herron also contends that revision of his sentence is inappropriate in light of his 

character. Specifically, Herron downplays his extensive criminal history as old and 

unrelated to the current offense. And Herron emphasizes his history of mental illness in 

light of his recent diagnosis of schizophrenia.

We are again not persuaded. Herron’s criminal history includes nine felony 

convictions, including three counts of aggravated battery. He has an additional ten 

misdemeanor convictions. His most recent conviction was in August of 2007. He was 

on probation when he committed the instant offense, and he exhibited poor behavior 

while incarcerated in the Tippecanoe County Jail after he was returned there by the 

Logansport State Hospital. And the evidence of his mental health is at best equivocal.1 

We cannot say that Herron’s sentence is inappropriate in light of his character.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., and MAY, J., concur.

 

1

 Insofar as Herron’s argument on this issue is that the trial court abused its discretion because it 

did not assign the proper mitigating weight to his mental illness, we note that that argument is not 

available for appellate review. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007).