On a Steel Horse I Ride

A History of the MH-53 Pave Low 

Helicopters in War and Peace

Darrel D. Whitcomb 

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

September 2012
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the 

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government 

agency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

155 North Twining Street

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6026

http://aupress.au.af.mil

AFRI

Air Force Research Institute

Copyright 2008 by Darrel D. Whitcomb. The author retains all rights to this work granted 

under 17 USC §106. The US Air Force retains nonexclusive royalty-free license to 

publish and distribute this work.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Whitcomb, Darrel D., 1947–

On a steel horse I ride : a history of the MH-53 Pave Low helicopters in

war and peace / Darrel D. Whitcomb.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-58566-220-3

1. Sikorsky H-53 (Military transport helicopter)—History. 2. United States. Air 

Force—Search and rescue operations—History. 3. United States. Air Force—History. 

I. Title. II. Title: History of the MH-53 Pave Low helicopters in war and peace. 

UG1232.T72W55 2012

358.4—dc23

 2012022142

Cover photo of MH-53M #68-10357 courtesy of Air Force Special Operations Command 

Public Affairs
Dedicated to

the Airmen of Pave Low who conceptualized it, 

created it, operated it, maintained it, lived it, loved it, 

and, yes, sometimes cursed it. It was your creation—

your Steel Horse—and you rode it well. You were 

the “quiet professionals,” the reality of the motto 

Any Time, Any Place, and yours were the collective 

“hearts of man” that made it all work.

v

Contents

List of Illustrations xiii

Foreword xix

About the Author xxi

Acknowledgments xxiii

Introduction xxix

PART I

A RICH HERITAGE

1 From End to Beginning 3

Last Mission 3

The Beginning 6

2 Of Jolly Greens . . . 11

Air Force Use 11

Combat Aircrew Recovery Aircraft 14

To Southeast Asia 18

40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron 21

Pave Star 23

40th and 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery

Squadrons 25

The Son Tay Raid 29

Pave Imp 34

40th and 37th Aerospace Rescue and 

Recovery Squadrons 36

3 . . . And Knives 57

21st Special Operations Squadron 57

40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron 71

1975 Southeast Asia Endgame 74

The Evacuations 75

SS Mayaguez 77
vi

CONTENTS

PART II

FROM CONCEPT TO CAPABILITY

4 Black Knights and Red Scarves: ~1973–80 91

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 92

Pave Low 94

20th Special Operations Squadron 103

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 105

20th Special Operations Squadron 109

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 111

Pave Low 115

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 119

20th Special Operations Squadron 120

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 124

Pave Low 132

5 Necessity to Nadir: ~1980–84 139

Kirtland AFB, New Mexico 139

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 140

Crisis in Iran 141

USAF Helicopter Reorganization 143

Desert One 144

A Second Effort—Operation Honey Badger 150

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 167

20th Special Operations Squadron 169

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 173

20th Special Operations Squadron 175

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 176

20th Special Operations Squadron 179

Twenty-Third Air Force 182

Congressional Interest 183

2d Air Division 187

Joint Special Operations Agency 188

20th Special Operations Squadron 189

Operation Urgent Fury 189

Action on Many Fronts 190

Initiative 17 194

First and Second Losses 198
vii

CONTENTS

6 Congress Acts: ~1984–86 207

Washington, DC 207

20th Special Operations Squadron 211

Twenty-Third Air Force 213

Pave Low IV 216

A New Command 218

7 The Buildup: ~1986–89 223

Hurlburt Field, Florida 223

Twenty-Third Air Force 230

United States Special Operations Command 230

Initiative 17 231

20th Special Operations Squadron 232

Twenty-Third Air Force 234

Pave Low Training 236

More MH-53s and Aircrews 237

39th Special Operations Wing and 21st Special 

Operations Squadron 244

Yarrawonga 246

Pave Low Training 248

A New Air Rescue Service 249

353d Special Operations Wing and 31st Special

Operations Squadron 250

United States Special Operations Command 251

21st Special Operations Squadron 253

20th Special Operations Squadron 254

Operation Pokeweed 256

Clear and Present Danger 258

Mountain Training 259

8 First Combat: 1989 263

Just Cause 263

Air Force Special Operations Command 275

Pave Low Training 277

20th Special Operations Squadron 279
viii

CONTENTS

PART III

FROM CAPABILITY TO COMMUNITY

9 War in the Desert: ~1990–91 285

The Middle East 285

20th Special Operations Squadron 286

Combat Search and Rescue 291

Eager Anvil 296

Proven Force 301

21st Special Operations Squadron 302

Somalia 303

Proven Force 304

Eve of Combat 305

Stroke 65 309

Corvette 03 312

Slate 46 315

Special Operations Missions 320

21st Special Operations Squadron 330

Provide Comfort 331

10 Interim Years—Volcanoes, Challenge, 

and Change: ~1991–93 337

31st Special Operations Squadron 337

Mount Pinatubo 338

Kirtland AFB, New Mexico 344

Air Force Reorganization 350

Air Force Special Operations Command 352

20th Special Operations Squadron 356

21st Special Operations Squadron 358

31st Special Operations Squadron 359

Air Force Special Operations Command 363

21st Special Operations Squadron 364

11 Into the Balkans: ~1993–96 369

RAF Alconbury 369

Air Force Special Operations Command 372

31st Special Operations Squadron 373

20th Special Operations Squadron 374

Air Rescue Service 377
ix

Kirtland AFB 377

Clear and Present Danger 379

Air Force Special Operations Command 379

Commando Vision 380

Haiti 381

The Balkans 384

20th Special Operations Squadron /

16th Special Operations Wing 388

Air Force Special Operations Command 390

A Joint Special Operations Aviation Command? 391

21st Special Operations Squadron 392

31st Special Operations Squadron 398

58th Special Operations Wing / 551st Special

Operations Squadron 400

Air Force Special Operations Command 401

21st and 20th Special Operations Squadrons 402

Operation Assured Response 405

20th Special Operations Squadron 408

58th Special Operations Wing / 551st Special

Operations Squadron 411

12 Combat Search and Rescue: ~1997–98 419

Air Force Special Operations Command,

Hurlburt Field 419

21st and 20th Special Operations Squadrons 421

Hurlburt Field 423

31st Special Operations Squadron 428

58th Special Operations Wing / 551st Special

Operations Squadron 429

Air Force Special Operations Command 432

20th Special Operations Squadron 438

21st Special Operations Squadron 440

31st Special Operations Squadron 441

551st Special Operations Squadron 441

13 A Mature Force: ~1999–2000 445

Back to the Balkans 445

Vega 31 448

Hammer 34 455

CONTENTS
x

CONTENTS

Return to Mildenhall 460

20th Special Operations Squadron 461

Air Force Special Operations Command 463

31st Special Operations Squadron 466

58th Special Operations Wing / 551st Special

Operations Squadron 466

Air Force Special Operations Command 468

Operation Atlas Response 470

20th Special Operations Squadron 474

31st Special Operations Squadron 476

551st Special Operations Squadron 477

PART IV

INTO THE MILLENNIUM

14 9/11 487

Hurlburt Field 487

31st Special Operations Squadron 490

21st Special Operations Squadron 491 

September 11 493

21st Special Operations Squadron 499

The Path to War 501

15 Operation Enduring Freedom: ~2001–2 505

Hurlburt Field 505

Pakistan—and Points Beyond 509

Knife 03 514

Heavy Combat 519

21st Special Operations Squadron 534

Jacobabad 535

Kirtland AFB 541

16 Operation Iraqi Freedom: 2003 549

Washington, DC 549

20th Special Operations Squadron 553

Desert Combat 556

21st Special Operations Squadron 567

20th Special Operations Squadron 577
xi

Air Force Special Operations Command 581

58th Special Operations Wing 582

17 The Terminal Years: ~2004–8 587

Iraq 587

20th Special Operations Squadron / Expeditionary 

Special Operations Squadron 588

Multi-National Force–Iraq 593

21st Special Operations Squadron 594

551st Special Operations Squadron 596

Air Force Special Operations Command 597

21st Special Operations Squadron 598

20th Special Operations Squadron 599

Air Force Special Operations Command 605

58th Special Operations Wing 607

Air Force Special Operations Command 610

58th Special Operations Wing 613

21st Special Operations Squadron 613

20th Special Operations Squadron / Expeditionary

Special Operations Squadron 615

Surge in Iraq 619

Air Force Special Operations Command 620

58th Special Operations Wing / 551st Special

Operations Squadron Inactivation 620

21st Special Operations Squadron Inactivation 622

20th Special Operations Squadron / Expeditionary

Special Operations Squadron 623

Air Force Special Operations Command 630

Fini Pave Low 631

18 Standing Down 643

Enduring Heritage 643

Hurlburt Field 644

Epilogue: In Memoriam to Those Lost 651

Appendix A Tail Number Listing of All USAF

CH/HH/MH/NCH/TH-53 Aircraft 655

Appendix B Pave Low Squadron Commanders 659

CONTENTS
xii

CONTENTS

Appendix C Crews on the Last Flight, 

26–27 Sept 2008 663

Appendix D Pave Low Distinguished Awards 665

Appendix E Pave Low Chief Master Sergeants 669

Appendix F Pave Low General Officers 671

Abbreviations 673

Bibliography 683

Index 709
xiii

CONTENTS

Illustrations

Figures

1 Southeast Asia 12

2 Black Knight patch 99

3 Panama—Operation Just Cause 265

4 Desert Storm/Shield area of operations 305

5 Balkans area of operations 386

6 Operation Enduring Freedom area of operations 507

7 Operation Iraqi Freedom area of operations 561

Photos

Chapter 1

Pave Lows taking off from Balad AB, Iraq, 

on last sorties 4

Initial Sikorsky plan for an H-53 6

Chapter 2

USMC CH-53A loaned to the USAF

for initial testing 17

One of the first HH-53Bs arriving in

Southeast Asia 20

In-flight helicopter refueling was developed

in Vietnam War 28

1st Lt Woody Bergeron after rescue from

Mu Gia Pass, Laos 37

Capt Ben Orrell and 1st Lt Steve Connelly,

40th ARRSq 41

Jolly Green 67, HH-53C #68-10365 46

Rescue forces were proud of their saves 51

Chapter 3

CH-53C #68-10933 and wingman inserting

indigenous forces in Laos 65

CH-53C #70-1628 serving with the 21st SOS 70
xiv

HH-53 and CH-53s operating off of

the USS Midway 76

Two CH-53s shot down on Koh

Tang Island, Cambodia 80

Chapter 4

CH-53C #70-1629 at Sembach AB, Germany 93

HH-53B #66-14433, first Pave Low prototype 95

Black Knight test members 98

Cabezon Peak, New Mexico, a well-known

landmark 127

Chapter 5

US Navy RH-53D helicopters aboard the 

USS Nimitz 145

Debacle at Desert One 146

Message directing movement of Pave

Lows to Hurlburt 152

Lt Col Bill Takacs, 20th’s commander

during Pave Low conversion 157

Michael Army Airfield, Utah, a training site

for Honey Badger 160

“Four Horsemen” of the 20th SOS 171

Pave Lows training with US Army Rangers 181

Chapter 6

Cong. Earl Hutto, a key supporter of Pave Low 211

Chapter 7

Maj Ed Reed at NARF for delivery of first MH-53J 234

21st SOS Pave Lows flew rescue operations

for the Yarrawonga 247

Pave Low crew practicing rope insertions 252

Chapter 8

Just Cause combat crew with MH-53J #68-10363 268

Operation Just Cause combat crew 272

TSgt Clark Dawson, 1550th Training Squadron,

trains Pave Low gunners 277

contents
xv

Chapter 9

Pave Low being loaded aboard a C-5 for Desert Storm 288

Pave Low in classic desert colors 289

Pave Low pilot Capt Randy O’Boyle 294

Task Force Normandy crew 300

Pave Low crew that made the attempt to

recover Stroke 65 310

Crew of Moccasin 05 316

Moccasin 05 view of burning truck 318

Actual rescue of Slate 46 Alpha 319

Chapter 10

Mount Pinatubo explosion 340

31st SOS change of command 343

Flight simulators at Kirtland AFB 345

CH-53A #66-14470 training aircraft at 

Kirtland AFB 346

Flight line for the 31st SOS at Osan AB 361

Chapter 11

Lt Col Donny Wurster as the 21st SOS commander 370

21st SOS home away from home for seven years 371

Flight line at Brindisi, 1994 371

20th SOS Pave Lows at Guantanamo 

Naval Station, Cuba 383

Pave Lows fly by the USS America during

Uphold Democracy 385

“Elephant Cage” antenna array at San Vito 387

CT-43 crash site near Dubrovnik, Croatia 403

MH-53J lands at American Embassy in

Monrovia, Liberia 406 

Chapter 12

In-flight refueling with an MC-130 422

MH-53 flyby for the crew of Jolly Green 67 425

Lt Col Tom Hull and Lt John Alvarez, USN 427

Chapter 13

Moccasin 60 crew the morning after 

rescuing Vega 31 452

contents
xvi

contents

Skat 11 and 12 crews the morning after 

rescuing Hammer 34 458 

Pave Low refuels over Mozambique during

Atlas Response 471 

21st SOS provides support to President

Clinton’s UK trip 474

Overwater training with the 31st SOS 477

A customer’s view of Pave Low 479

Col Steve Connelly, USAF 482

Chapter 14

Lt Col Mike Kingsley, 20th SOS commander 488

21st SOS Scottish dining-in 491

21st SOS crew practices ship landings aboard

the USS Kalamazoo 492

Pave Low over the Pentagon 496

Pave Low over New York City 497

MH-53M #68-10369 aboard the USS Intrepid, 

Hudson River 497

MSgt Nelson Neal checks his GAU-2B

prior to flight 498

21st SOS flight line at RAF Mildenhall 500

Chapter 15

Pave Lows aboard the USS Peleliu before

flying into Pakistan 508

Pave Low on the fantail of the USS Peleliu 510

Living in the hangar at Jacobabad 511

A tail gunner’s view of Afghanistan 513

Crews of Knife 03 and 04 517 

20th SOS at Jacobabad, Pakistan 526

The ever-dangerous brownout landing 531

Refueling over the barren stretches

of Afghanistan 532

Capt Lee Anderson and his crew 533

Ninja 12 crew 537

Refueling at night 538 

Brig Gen Rich Comer as AFSOC vice-commander 542

TH-53As departing for their final flight to

Davis-Monthan 543
xvii

CONTENTS

Chapter 16

Ali Al Salem flight line through NVGs 554

Lt Col Brad Webb addresses his Airmen

before OIF 557 

Loading special forces during initial

actions of OIF 559

Preparing to carry special forces teams into Iraq 564

Col R. K. Williams, USAF 567

Col Greg Lengyel, USAF 568

Lead 21st SOS crew into northern Iraq 573

Maj Steve Plumhoff, USAF 579

Chapter 17

MSgt Byron Allen receiving Combat

Action Medal 592

MSgt Robert Colannino receives

Bronze Star 592

Capt Matthew Berry receives Distinguished

Flying Cross 600

Pave Low over New Orleans after

Hurricane Katrina 604

Flooded New Orleans from the back ramp 605

MH-53J #68-10367 being filmed for

The Transformers 609

Crew that flew the last Pave Low from

the 551st SOS 621

Pave Lows of the 21st SOS in formation

along the cliffs of Dover 623

ARINC Pave Low support team 625

CMSgt John DeSalle in Iraq 632

Last Pave Low at Hurlburt departs on its

retirement flight 635

MH-53Ms in the boneyard 638

Chapter 18

Lt Gen Donny Wurster speaks at 

inactivation dinner 645 

Lt Col Gene Becker at Pave Low 

inactivation ceremony 648
xviii

CONTENTS

Pave Low commanders 648

Brig Gen Brad Webb briefs President Obama 650
xix

Foreword

It is my honor to contribute to this book—a tribute to the Pave 

Low weapon system and its place in our nation’s proud heritage of 

military aviation. The passing of time since the Pave Low was retired 

in September 2008 has given the community of those who were involved with these venerable aircraft—including those who still serve 

in Air Force special operations forces (SOF), very often in harm’s 

way—an opportunity to reflect on this milestone and its significance 

to the US Air Force and the US Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM). This volume is a thoughtful retrospective not only for 

Pave Low veterans but also for those who have never had the privilege 

of working on or with this historic aircraft.

The “quiet professionals” of the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) make up a close-knit community—one that takes 

great pride in holding to its traditions and in helping to provide for 

our nation’s security, often through unique and game-changing contributions, and with little fanfare. Along with its joint comrades-in-arms 

in USSOCOM, this community of Airmen has embraced, over the 

decades, a handful of principles that came to be known as the SOF 

Truths. The first of these precepts—“Humans are more important 

than hardware”—captures the essence of what sets SOF apart: the 

people of SOF, not necessarily the equipment. SOF personnel believe 

that the right people, when properly trained and working as a team, 

can accomplish the mission with the appropriate equipment, and that 

no level of technology can compensate for the lack of properly 

trained, experienced people in creating SOF effects. This is especially 

true at H-hour, when mission execution is at hand.

But this does not alleviate the need for very capable equipment to 

complement our people when they are called upon to act. Hardfought experience also informs us of the critical need to invest in 

equipment that has been designed for the most demanding missions—

a lesson that our nation has learned in the aftermath of both operational successes and disappointments. This lesson led to the development of the first CH-53s to meet requirements that were established 

nearly five decades ago by the US Marine Corps, just as the lessons 

learned in Vietnam and beyond led to the development of a series of 

Pave Low modifications for the US Air Force’s C/HH-53 variants, enhancing their capabilities considerably. The Pave Low became a critical 

component of AFSOC, whose largest subordinate unit, the 1st Special 
xx

Operations Wing, proudly maintains the motto Any Time, Any Place. 

The Pave Low was a key enabler of that promise.

In its era—which spanned some three decades—the Pave Low, 

along with crews and support personnel, deployed to combat and humanitarian operations in hot spots across the globe, such as Panama, 

Kuwait, Haiti, Bosnia, Serbia, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and 

Iraq. Of the original 72 C/HH-53 aircraft that were built for the Air 

Force, only 30 made it to retirement—a testament to the perilous environments and dangerous times in which they flew. 

Ultimately, the story of Pave Low bears out the first SOF Truth: 

Pave Low proved to be a highly capable and impressive aircraft, but 

more significantly, the people behind Pave Low, and those who served 

with it, were, and always will be, even more impressive. The Pave Low 

family spans the decades, beginning with the veterans of conflict in 

Southeast Asia who conceptualized the Pave Low, tested it, made it 

operational, and served as the initial cadre of leaders of units equipped 

with Pave Low. Those who followed cut their teeth in action during 

the 1990s and served as leaders of operations in the aftermath of 9/11. 

More recently, the young troops and crew members who came into 

their own during the demanding missions in Afghanistan and Iraq 

have acquitted themselves admirably, tirelessly maintaining and flying these aging but storied aircraft through the last years of Pave 

Low’s operational service life. We must also remember the members 

of this family who have passed during the Pave Low era, including 

those who gave their lives in selfless service to our nation. The story 

of Pave Low is the story of all who envisioned, created, modified, 

maintained, and operated Pave Low throughout its service life, and to 

them goes the credit for the remarkable contributions of this unique 

aircraft and the red scarves that adorned her cabins. 

NORTON A. SCHWARTZ

General, USAF

Chief of Staff

FOREWORD
xxi

About the Author

Darrel Whitcomb is a career aviator. A 1969 graduate of the US Air 

Force Academy, he served three tours in Southeast Asia as a cargo 

pilot and forward air controller (FAC), including duty as a Raven 

FAC. After a tour as a T-38 instructor pilot, he transferred to the Air 

Force Reserve, where he flew A-37s and A-10s. He attended the Army 

Command and Staff College and the National War College and also 

served on the Air Staff and Joint Staff and at the Air Force Doctrine 

Center, retiring as a colonel in 1999. 

The author was also a career airline pilot for Delta Airlines and 

retired as an international captain in 2003. 

A noted writer on aviation history, personnel recovery, and combat search and rescue, he has published numerous articles in several 

magazines and periodicals. His first book, The Rescue of Bat 21, was 

published in 1998; his second book, Combat Search and Rescue in 

Desert Storm, in 2006; and his third book, Call-Sign Dustoff: A History 

of U.S. Army Aeromedical Evacuation from Conception to Hurricane 

Katrina, in 2011. Still active in aviation, he served a tour as a contract 

pilot in Iraq in 2004. 

xxiii

Acknowledgments

This work has afforded me an opportunity to meet an eclectic 

group of individuals who have facilitated its creation. I acknowledge 

their support and enthusiasm and state openly that I could not have 

done this without them. I began this project with a trip to Hurlburt 

AFB, Florida. There I met with Mr. Herb Mason, the AFSOC historian. He and his office mates, Tim Brown, Randy Bergeron, and 

Cindy Scharf, helped me complete all of the administrative processing necessary to gain the accesses I required to start my work. 

Through my successive visits, they were absolutely selfless in helping 

me research and find the story. 

The 1st Special Operations Wing, also located at Hurlburt, is the 

premier AFSOC unit and has adopted as its motto Any Time, Any 

Place. It has had Pave Low helicopters assigned to it since 1980, and 

its historian, Keith Alexander, opened the unit’s voluminous files for 

my use. 

While on that initial visit to Hurlburt, I also attended the Air Commando Association annual reunion and began to meet veterans from 

the Pave Low community. The next week, I was able to attend the bittersweet ceremonies held to mark the retirement of the fleet of the Pave 

Low aircraft.

I was also able to meet with Lt Gen Donny Wurster, the commander of AFSOC. He graciously gave me an illuminating interview 

and his thoughts and guidance on this project. 

Those events gave me an opportunity to conduct interviews with 

several Pave Low crew members. My first was with Col Gary Weikel, 

USAF, retired, a consummate warrior who truly lived the early years 

of Pave Low and, in his own way, helped to infuse into the community 

an earnest desire to fly and utilize the machines to their very limits in 

support of the special forces teams that they carry. I made the acquaintance of John Grove, another retired Air Force officer and Pave 

Low veteran. After his flying days ended, he maintained a strong affiliation with the Pave Low community and, de facto, became its “historian.” It immediately became abundantly clear to me that I could 

not find or follow the Pave Low story without his help. Early on, he 

sat with me for an interview, provided many critical “vectors” for this 

journey, and helped me contact many others so critical to the telling 

of the story. Unfortunately, John passed away quite suddenly and unexpectedly just two months later. The powerful and moving response 
xxiv

acknowledgments

of the Pave Low community to his passing was vivid testimony to its 

love and respect for this man. 

Hurlburt has a well-stocked base library, and I was able to accomplish initial basic research in their facility. I gratefully acknowledge 

the generous support provided by the librarians there. The Air Commando Association also opened its library to me, and its leader, Felix 

Sambogna, and office support personnel were most helpful in obtaining some great historical data. 

I had an opportunity to travel to Stratford, Connecticut, to visit the 

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. While there, I spent several hours in 

its archives and, with the assistance of the archives’ director, Mr. Dan 

Libertino, was able to find quite a bit of information on the initial 

production of the Air Force HH- and CH-53 helicopters. I was also 

able to have a long and interesting discussion with Mr. Tom Lawrence, 

a 31-year Sikorsky veteran, who explained the initial evolution of the 

Pave Low program from Sikorsky’s perspective. 

The Pentagon is a rich source of information, and I was able to do 

some significant research there, graciously supported by Col Henry 

Sanders and the Airmen in the AFSOC Liaison Office, located in the 

Air Force section of the building. 

A few weeks later, I traveled to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, to 

visit with Ms. Diana Cornelisse, the historian for the Aeronautical 

Systems Center of the Air Force Materiel Command. She shared with 

me a wealth of documents pertaining to the conceptualization and 

initial development of Pave Low. I also visited with Col Ron Thurlow, 

USAF, retired. He has collected an extensive history of the Pave Low 

aircraft by specific tail number and generously reviewed his collection with me. Dr. Jeff Greenwood hosted me for a quick visit to the 

Research Division of the National Museum of the US Air Force. There 

Brett Stolle and his assistant, Christina Douglass, helped me find documents and photographs in their collections.

From there, I went to Maxwell AFB, Alabama, to visit the Air Force 

Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), where I was greeted by Dr. 

Forrest Marion. He, Joe Caver, and Joe’s two able assistants, Sylvester 

Jackson and Juan Rackley, helped me find a trove of documents and 

histories. Many were still marked as classified or otherwise restricted, 

and Archie Difante and Anne O’Connor were able to review and release most of them. All of the AFHRA staff members were absolutely 

selfless in their support of my efforts as I made several subsequent visits 

to their facility.
xxv

acknowledgments

I made a research trip to Fort Rucker, Alabama, the home of US 

Army Aviation, to visit the Aviation Technical Library. Jill Redington, 

Beata Totten, and their team helped me collect a great deal of data 

concerning Pave Low operations in conjunction with various Army 

aviation units, especially the famed 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment—the Night Stalkers. 

Traveling to MacDill AFB, Florida, I visited the Special Operations 

Command History Office. Lt Col Mike Simpson and Ms. Gaea Levy 

generously supported me as I reviewed historical documents pertaining to the creation of that command and specific items relating to 

Pave Low. 

One of the unsung heroes in the Pave Low saga is former congressman Earl Hutto. From 1979 to 1995, he represented the 1st Congressional District of Florida, which includes Hurlburt AFB and Pensacola. 

He played a key role in supporting the Pave Low program in its formative years. His congressional papers are now held in the special 

collection section of the John C. Pace Library at the University of 

West Florida in Pensacola. I visited the facility, and the curator, Mr. 

Dean DeBolt, graciously allowed me to peruse the collection and 

copy several key documents pertaining to the congressman’s involvement with Pave Low.

Kirtland AFB and Cannon AFB, New Mexico, were my next stops. 

At Kirtland, I was able to do some great research in the historical files 

at the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, generously 

facilitated by its historian, Dr. Barren Oder, and his assistant, Stephen 

Watson. I also conducted interviews with numerous Pave Low crew 

members now serving in the 71st SOS and 58th SOW, as well as with 

retired veterans in the area. At Cannon AFB, I interviewed Pave Low 

veterans now stationed there with the 27th SOW. Returning to Kirtland, I was also able to procure documents concerning CH/HH/MH53 crashes from Mr. Louie Alley at the Air Force Safety Center. I also 

visited the 377th Air Base Wing, where the unit public affairs director, 

Jillian Speake, helped me conduct research in the historical files of its 

base newspaper. 

Throughout my research, I made many trips to Hurlburt. So many 

helped me collect data at many locations on the base and in the Fort 

Walton Beach area. Lt Col Kent Landreth at the 18th Flight Test 

Squadron allowed me to spend a day with his archivist, Anissa Rush, 

who provided me the opportunity to dig through the squadron’s test 

files on Pave Low. Lt Col Gene Becker, the last 20th SOS commander, 
xxvi

acknowledgements

and TSgt Vince DePersio are the local keepers of the Pave Low lore 

and helped me find and review a trove of historical “stuff ” collected 

by that unit over the years, including some formal histories, after 

action reports, photos, and personal vignettes containing rich portions of the story of Pave Low. Ms. Linda Murchison is the archivist 

for the Northwest Daily News in Fort Walton Beach. She graciously 

helped me recover numerous articles from the newspaper tracing the 

history of Pave Low and the 20th SOS. I was also able to visit the 

offices of the Hurlburt Patriot, where Ms. Deborah Tipton helped me 

collect several articles that had been done on the Pave Lows and their 

Airmen. While visiting Robins AFB, Georgia, I was able to have a 

long background conversation with Mr. Steve Sherburne, Mr. Walt 

Seefeld, and Mr. Scott Stringer, who all provided me with a tutorial 

on the logistical history of the Pave Low helicopters. 

I must also recognize the unwavering support of my key partner in 

this endeavor—my wife, Chris. She has been with me throughout this 

journey, working transcriptions, reviewing my writing, and providing me with the critical guidance so necessary to bring a project like 

this to maturity. She is the sweetness in my life. 

Throughout the project, though, I have labored with one formidable limitation. A great deal of the Pave Low story is classified, and 

must remain so for a long time, if not forever. This has made the 

research process challenging and, at times, frustrating, as I am unable 

to use key parts of the story. That immutable fact precludes a full telling of the tales in this effort. So it must be.

I offer a sincere thank you and salute to all of the men and women 

whom I interviewed for the work. My mythical goal was to interview 

all who ever flew or were associated with these aircraft. Practically, 

though, that was unachievable. However, I amassed quite a list of potential interviewees, nominated to me by the participants themselves. 

I subsequently interviewed a broad cross-section of the community, 

enabling me to capture the essence—but certainly not all—of the 

story. However, no book can tell it all. 

I have done my best to accurately record and use their words and 

hold in deepest confidence all of those background discussions so 

necessary to the understanding of the larger story. To all I interviewed 

I say, your words are the heart of the tale; they are the heart of man. 

I honor, too, those who did not want to be interviewed. I understand that. So much of this story is about war. That searing experience 

touches its participants in different ways. Some troops love it; some 
xxvii

acknowledgements

troops hate it; all are changed in so many unpredictable ways by 

the experience. 

To all—I offer a sharp and humble hand salute!

xxix

Introduction

Any Time, Any Place

—1st Special Operations Wing motto

The Conjure

Pave Low. The term itself generates an image: a dark, wispy night; 

a low, pulsating rumble approaching from the distance. The rumble 

becomes a presence, a large helicopter that settles onto the ground 

amidst the deep darkness. Earnest men of determination spew forth 

from it. Heavily armed, they quickly set up to collect intelligence, kill 

enemy troops, rescue downed or isolated friendly personnel, or 

otherwise conduct a direct action mission.

Mission complete, they just as quickly reassemble, reboard the aircraft, and then disappear into the consuming darkness. It is a powerful image—a conjure, if you will—that strikes fear into any enemy of 

the United States. 

But the conjure is real. It is a helicopter called the MH-53J/M. That 

machine is the end result of the evolution of state-of-the-art avionics, 

communication, and navigation equipment crewed by highly motivated, enthusiastic, and smart young operators well steeped in the 

principles, heritage, and credo of special operations. It is the classic 

combination of men and machine. 

Those aircraft and Airmen were assigned to the US Air Force Special 

Operations Command (AFSOC), “America’s specialized airpower . . . 

a step ahead in a changing world, delivering special operations power 

anytime, anywhere.”1

 AFSOC controls a mixed fleet of both rotaryand fixed-wing aircraft to facilitate the fulfillment of that mission. 

However, the single aircraft that, in its day, has best epitomized that 

role is the Pave Low helicopter. It, perhaps more than any other aircraft, allowed the AFSOC to realize its purpose. 

But it was not always so. The aircraft themselves were revolutionary 

combinations of new, more powerful turbine engines with rotarywing aircraft to produce vastly increased lifting power. Conceptualized, built, and designated for simpler missions, they were immediately 

swept up into the long war in Southeast Asia. There they proved the 
xxx

introduction

efficacy of the aircraft for dangerous rescue missions, for the initiation of a whole new generation of developing avionics and navigation 

technology, for providing challenging direct support to small special 

forces teams and indigenous forces inserted behind enemy lines, and 

for a myriad of other things that heavy-lift helicopters could be assigned to do. In accomplishing all of that, they also trained a whole 

generation of men who learned of combat along the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail in Laos and at other places like Quang Tri, South Vietnam; Son 

Tay, North Vietnam; and Koh Tang Island, Cambodia. 

After that conflict, those aircraft and men were returned to peacetime locations and duties, and much was forgotten of those dangerous 

times and missions. However, a cadre of dedicated combat aviators 

and commanders felt that the aircraft and community of Airmen had 

much more to give. Foreseeing an ever-dangerous world, they harnessed those aircraft to a series of evolving new technologies that 

vastly improved the aircraft by giving them the ability to traverse airspace in any weather conditions, day and night, and to avoid enemy 

threats. That concept was validated in operations in Panama, Kuwait, 

Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan, and many more smaller and quieter operations in between. The men and aircraft also showed the larger utilitarian value of the aircraft as, over the years, they were called out 

many times to provide natural disaster and humanitarian relief from 

Africa to New Orleans, Louisiana. 

As good as the new technology was, though, that validation was 

the end result of the hard work and sweat equity of a small but driven 

cadre of officers and enlisted Airmen who took the concepts and 

promises of the engineers and technicians and made it all work. The 

second commander of AFSOC, Maj Gen Bruce Fister, explained this 

critical relationship when he stated, “In order for Air Force special 

operations forces (AFSOF) to fight and win, only one factor is more 

important than technology—its people. This is not to underestimate 

the importance of technological superiority. However, no technology 

supporting AFSOF has or will ever count unless its people are superior 

as well.”2

That combination of the right technology with the right aviators 

was the essence—the very heart—of what Pave Low became. This 

was an attribute long understood by military commanders and historians. In the mid-1800s, the noted French commander and theorist Charles Ardant du Picq conducted detailed and exhaustive 

studies into this relationship. Studying conflict over eons and leav-
xxxi

introduction

ening his work with his own observations in several conflicts, he 

noted presciently, “The art of war is subject to many modifications 

by industrial and scientific progress. However, there is truly one 

constant, and that is the heart of man.”3

It is doubtful that many Pave Low crew members were students of 

du Picq. It is certain, though, that this identified essence was clearly 

understood and passed down from generation to generation through 

the Pave Low community. The aircraft were ultimately retired but not 

the spirit and values that were instilled in its personnel. That power 

still exists and has been spread throughout the AFSOC and Air Force 

as they continue to serve this great nation today. 

But Pave Low was never exclusively about work; there were light 

moments, too. When the young Airmen had the opportunity to party, 

they enjoyed those times with just as much verve and enthusiasm, 

accompanied by the calling card of youth—ever-present loud music. 

Long ago, one of the young Airmen heard a vibrant tune that seemed 

to capture their spirit. That song, “Wanted Dead or Alive” (performed 

by the American rock band Bon Jovi), proclaims:

I’m a cowboy, on a steel horse I ride

I’m wanted dead or alive

Wanted dead or alive . . . 

I play for keeps, ’cause I might not make it back.4

The men of Pave Low stole that song as their anthem. When the Pave 

Low guys sang it, they sang it loud and enthusiastically. It’s a Pave 

Low thing. 

Notes

1. “Air Force Special Operations Command,” USAF fact sheet. 

2. “Quotes,” permanent file, box 253, AFSOC/HO. 

3. Jacobs, “Human Element of Battle,” 36.

4. Waller, Commandos, 172.

PART I

A Rich Heritage

Chapter 1

From End to Beginning

It wasn’t just a job; it was a brotherhood.

—TSgt Corey Fossbender

20th Expeditionary Special

Operations Squadron

Last Mission

27 September 2008, Southwest Asia

It was almost 2 a.m. when the six helicopters from the 20th Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron (ESOS) approached the airfield in formation. The pilots of the MH-53 aircraft, using the call 

signs Cowboy 21 through 26 and led by their squadron commander, 

Lt Col Gene Becker, called the control tower for landing instructions. 

Pro forma, they were directed to land in their designated parking 

area on the crowded west side of the huge complex. 

It had been a relatively routine night for the crews. Unlike most 

other evenings, the Pave Low crews were not involved in any direct 

action missions against enemy forces. Maj Brian Roberts, the designated flight lead, had initially planned and led the mission that night, 

with Capt Dan Florence—the most junior Pave Low pilot—as his copilot. Colonel Becker rode in the back. After a six-ship takeoff, Roberts 

directed the formation to split into three two-ship elements to deliver 

supplies and personnel to multiple safe houses and forward operating 

locations (FOL) to further facilitate taking the fight to the enemy. 

Toward the end of the evening, Roberts reassembled the formation 

at an airfield about 15 minutes from the crews’ home base for gas and 

an impromptu rally with other squadron personnel assigned there to 

work with the Iraqi air force. After the last element of Pave Lows 

landed and refueled, Colonel Becker took Roberts’s place. Captain 

Florence assumed that he would be the pilot to give up his seat. Instead, Becker made it clear that he wanted to fly with Florence so that 

the senior and junior Pave Low pilots present would fly together on 

this last mission to lead the formation back to their assigned base. 

Florence was deeply appreciative of the gesture.1
4 │ FROM END TO BEGINNING

The approaches and landings were uneventful. As the aircraft 

reached their designated parking spots, the crew chiefs signaled to 

the aircrews to shut down their engines. Becker had briefed that they 

would shut down together and explained, “Once all of the crews were 

ready to shut down the engines, we announced on radio, ‘3, 2, 1, 

throttles off now,’ and then a few seconds later, ‘3, 2, 1, rotor brake 

now.’ All six aircraft’s rotors stopped together.”2

It was with a heavy heart that the flight engineers pulled the 

throttles to shut off, engaged the rotor brake, and listened, for the last 

time, to the sound of the engines and rotors slowly spinning to a halt. 

For not only were the missions complete for the night, the lifetime 

mission for the last active MH-53 Pave Low aircraft was also at its 

end. These six aircraft were the last of the entire Pave Low fleet to fly. 

All of their sister aircraft had been decommissioned over the previous 

two years. Said career flight engineer SMSgt Mark Pryor, as he stepped 

off of his aircraft, “When I grabbed those throttles and pulled them 

off for the last time and realized that this is the last time I will fly on 

the Pave Low and work with this group of guys, it was bittersweet.”3

Some of the aircraft had “extra” crew members on board. The Air 

Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) commander, Lt Gen 

Donald Wurster, himself a former Pave Low pilot, made a quick trip 

Courtesy US Special Operations Command Public Affairs

Pave Lows taking off from Balad AB, Iraq, on their last sorties
FROM END TO BEGINNING │ 5

to the theater to mark the occasion. He wanted to share the memories 

and risk of that last mission with his young air commandos and 

jumped aboard the lead aircraft. 

Col Scott Howell also flew along on the last aircraft, or “Chalk six,” 

as it was officially designated. He had previously commanded the 

20th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) and also wanted to share 

the ride with his troops. The aircraft commander was also a volunteer 

of sorts. Capt Phil Cooper specifically asked to be put on the flight in 

the last aircraft. His request was granted, and as his aircraft crossed 

over the airfield boundary for landing as the tail-end Pave Low, he 

remarked on the aircraft intercom that he was proud to know that he 

was the last Pave Low guy in combat. His remark was intended to 

identify himself as the last pilot. However, before he could refine his 

statement, his tail gunner, SSgt Shawn Lewis, corrected him by pointing out that it was in reality he who—by the nature of his position at 

the tail of the aircraft—was the last one.4

Created to fly in combat and a vital weapon in the war on terror, 

these aircraft had reached the end of their usefulness and, like all of 

their cohorts, were being decommissioned. Within days, all six would 

be packaged up and flown by cargo aircraft back to the United States. 

Some would be put in the massive aircraft storage area just south of 

Tucson, Arizona. Others would be put on permanent static display at 

bases and locations across the country, quiet reminders of the valiant 

service that they had provided for the nation. Colonel Becker, noting 

the poignancy of the moment, said, “We really feel like we are standing on the shoulders of giants. . . . As the Pave Low goes on to retire 

from combat today, she goes out as she came in—the very best.” Planeside, the Airmen held an impromptu celebration as the unit troops 

and visitors chatted and reminisced. Captain Florence remembers 

that “we were all smiles, and some tears . . . all hugging and shaking 

hands in the back of the helicopter as we collected our gear.”5

 General 

Wurster shook hands with everyone. Slowly, though, everybody 

drifted away. Wurster lingered a bit and cast a last look at the aircraft. 

They were dirty and grimy but now eternally quiet as the maintenance troops began to disassemble them for shipment home. In that 

peaceful moment, as the first hint of dawn began to appear, he was 

reminded of the sweet words of Paul the Apostle when he wrote, “I 

have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the 

faith.” To him, it was a perfect epitaph for the final flight of these 
6 │ FROM END TO BEGINNING

“Steel Horses.”6 However, there was much more to the story because 

those last six sorties were about six decades in the making. 

The Beginning

It all began with the United States Marine Corps (USMC). Hard 

lessons learned on the bloody beaches of the Pacific and the development of nuclear weapons convinced post–World War II USMC commanders that amphibious landings like those carried out at Normandy 

or Iwo Jima, which required the concentration of large, ponderous 

forces into relatively narrow approach zones, were no longer plausible. 

Future operations would have to be conducted with mobile forces 

able to rapidly concentrate to seize critical objectives and then just as 

quickly disperse for survival. Several vehicular alternatives were considered, but recent successes with helicopters seemed to offer the most 

promise. Mr. Igor Sikorsky of the Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation—

considered the “gentle genius” of the helicopter community—even 

suggested that helicopters capable of hauling as many as 40 troops in 

a single lift were possible. Based upon this premise, the USMC 

commandant, Gen Alexander Vandergrift, accepted the concept in 

principle and in 1947 took a series of actions that wed the USMC to a 

Courtesy Sikorsky Historical Archives

Initial Sikorsky plan for an H-53
FROM END TO BEGINNING │ 7

new doctrine: the vertical assault concept for amphibious operations. 

Vandergrift noted in the report that “on the premise that the helicopter 

offers a valuable means of accelerating ship-to-shore movement, it is 

recognized that . . . it would appear necessary that there be designed . . . 

large helicopters capable of lifting divisional loads.”7

 Field tests with 

the handful of helicopters then owned by the Marines showed that 

the concept was indeed feasible, and within two years, the USMC 

submitted a request for a large, multiengine assault helicopter capable 

of carrying 20 combat-equipped troops. This was consolidated with 

a larger US Navy (USN) request for more powerful helicopters for 

fleet operations.

Subsequent combat operations in the Korean conflict afforded the 

USMC an opportunity to further develop and refine its helicopter 

tactics and procedures. At the same time, Sikorsky Aircraft developed 

a prototype to meet the combined service request. That aircraft was 

the Sikorsky model S-56, designated the HR2S by the USMC but 

more commonly known as the H-37. The aircraft had the classic single 

five-bladed main rotor and four-bladed antitorque rotor on the tail. 

Two 4,200-horsepower Pratt and Whitney R-2800-54 piston engines 

mounted above the spacious cabin powered the aircraft. Impressive 

on paper, the aircraft was actually underpowered and hard to maintain. The H-37 never reached its expected potential, and the USMC 

purchased only 55 of the originally intended order of 180 aircraft.8

As turbine engines were refined and came into more general use, 

production companies began to match them to helicopters. Manufacturers immediately noted that turbines created more lift per 

engine pound, thus providing a larger useful load or lift capacity. This 

was always the fundamental challenge of helicopter design. Sikorsky 

built the first functional helicopter in 1909 but abandoned it when he 

could not find an engine that could produce enough lift to carry a 

useful load. This began to change in the 1950s with turbine-engine 

development. A series of helicopters was produced by several companies, 

culminating in the Sikorsky model S-64. Known in the military as the 

CH-54 Tarhe, it was essentially a bare-bones flying crane that could 

lift up to 25,000 pounds.9

Aware of this trend, in 1961 the USMC solicited a new turbinepowered assault helicopter to replace the HR2S. In August 1962, 

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation won the competition with a proposal 

for its model S-65, essentially an S-64 with a full cargo/passenger 

cabin. Given the Department of Defense (DOD) designation of CH-
8 │ FROM END TO BEGINNING

53A, it would be equipped with new General Electric T64-GE-6 engines, 

each producing 2,850 shaft horsepower (shp).10

Sikorsky built two YCH-53A prototype aircraft, which began flying in October 1964. Initial design gross weight was 33,490 pounds, 

allowing for a maximum useful load of 8,000 pounds carried to a 

range of 100 nautical miles. The internal cabin was 30 feet long, 

seven-and-a-half feet wide, and six-and-a-half feet high. It could 

carry 37 combat troops or 24 stretchers for casualties and attending 

medics. Aft clamshell doors and a moveable ramp allowed the loading 

of vehicles and even a 105-millimeter (mm) howitzer. The aircraft 

was equipped with a newly designed automatic flight control system 

(AFCS) incorporating a stability augmentation system (SAS) and an 

autopilot. It was also outfitted with aluminum main rotor blades 

mounted on pressurized spars, monitored for integrity by a blade inspection method system. Although the aircraft was initially unarmed, 

provisions were made to mount machine guns on both sides.11

The CH-53As were certified for use in 1966 and put into general 

production. In early 1967, they deployed with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463) to South Vietnam for combat duty 

as our nation steadily built up its participation in that conflict. 

Quickly embraced by the commanders there, the heavy-lift helicopters were heavily tasked. In 1968 they were integral to supporting the 

surrounded USMC forces at Khe Sanh, where the first CH-53As delivered over one million pounds of cargo. During one particularly 

trying period, HMH-463 logged 1,252 sorties in one week. By the 

end of 1968, the USMC had taken delivery of over 100 CH-53A aircraft, and they were being dispatched for duty with Marine units all 

over the globe.12

The USMC also explored modifying the CH-53As for use at low 

altitude in all weather and visibility conditions. USMC personnel 

worked with Sikorsky to incorporate a terrain-following radar (TFR) 

and integrated helicopter avionics system (IHAS) in conjunction 

with the AFCS and SAS systems. The TFR and IHAS could also be 

combined with an automatic station-keeping radar, allowing the CH53As to fly in formation in such conditions. Sikorsky explained that 

the IHAS avionics package will permit the CH-53A to realize its full mission 

performance potential under the most demanding conditions—including 

zero or low visibility, controlled proximity to other aircraft and high airspeeds 

and low altitudes. . . . The terrain following radar permits the CH-53A to fly at 

extremely low levels. The pilot is provided with a vertical display showing a 
FROM END TO BEGINNING │ 9

complete picture of the terrain contours ahead of the aircraft. The terrain following radar also has a ground-mapping display as an added navigational aid.13

Over the next year, a prototype aircraft was equipped with the 

components and flown through several scenarios. The TFR designed 

by the Norden Division of the United Aircraft Corporation scanned 

forward five miles. Its radar return was presented on a visual display 

with three-dimensional cueing that calculated a flight path to maintain terrain clearance and combined with other symbology displaying airspeed, altitude, pitch and roll, and vertical velocity. The test 

series provided Sikorsky and the Marines valuable performance information, and the overall concept seemed feasible. The USMC, however, chose not to bring the concept to fruition for its fleet of aircraft. 

The Sikorsky engineers filed the data away for future use.14



“Necessity,” stated the great Greek philosopher Plato, “is the 

mother of invention.” The horror of another Normandy or Iwo Jima 

drove the USMC to create an alternative strategy based upon vertical 

envelopment to replace large amphibious landings. That created a 

need for a heavy-lift helicopter that American industry provided as 

the H-53. Observing the success of that aircraft, other services would 

also purchase the aircraft for more esoteric uses well beyond its initial 

conceived purpose. 

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in 

the bibliography.)

1. Florence, interview. 

2. Becker, interview; and Becker to the author, e-mail, 6 Aug 2009.

3. Pryor, interview. 

4. Cooper to the author, e-mail; and Howell, interview. 

5. Florence, interview. 

6. Michael Hoffman, “MH-53s Fly Final Combat Mission,” Air Force Times, 13 

Oct 2008, 16; Thacker, “MH-53s’ Final Mission,” 35; Florence and Wurster, interviews; and Lt Gen Donald Wurster, comments, Pave Low inactivation dinner, Hurlburt Field, FL, 16 Oct 2008.

7. Barich, “History of Heavy Lift?,” 2.

8. Ibid., 29.
10 │ FROM END TO BEGINNING

9. Lawrence, “Design and Development of the Sikorsky S-65 Helicopter,” 2.

10. Ibid.; and Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1963–64, 279.

11. Lawrence, “Design and Development of the Sikorsky S-65 Helicopter,” 2.

12. Sikorsky News, Feb 1968, 3.

13. Ibid., Apr 1967, 4.

14. Ibid., June 1968, 4.
Chapter 2

Of Jolly Greens . . . 

An integrated system to enable the . . . helicopters to perform 

the essential elements of search and rescue [SAR] under 

conditions of total darkness and/or low visibility. 

—SEA Operational Requirement #114

Air Force Use

Officers within the US Air Force also watched the development of 

the H-53. As USAF involvement in the Vietnam War continued to 

rise, an increasing number of aircraft were being shot down, and ever 

more aircrews were being killed and captured. Additionally, USAF 

aircraft and crews were involved throughout the Southeast Asia 

(SEA) region, not just in South Vietnam. Consequently, they were far 

away from US field units that could provide immediate ad hoc rescue. 

For such contingencies, the USAF had a rescue force—the Air Rescue 

Service (ARS)—assigned to the Military Air Transport Service 

(MATS). This was a worldwide organization with both rotary- and 

fixed-wing aircraft and crews on call for recovery duty. 

However, the ARS was focused on noncombat rescue and optimized for the recovery of B-52 crews lost after strategic strikes on the 

Soviet Union. As the fighting ratcheted up in SEA, though, the USAF 

dispatched rescue forces to the region. In the spring of 1964, the first 

aircraft and personnel deployed to the growing USAF air bases at Da 

Nang on the coast in northern South Vietnam and Udorn in northern 

Thailand. All rescue forces were under the command of the 38th Air 

Rescue Squadron (ARSq). However, their Korean-era SU-16 aircraft 

and unarmed, short-range HH-43 helicopters were not adequate for 

rescue in the deep jungles and vast expanses over which USAF and 

other service personnel flew in both Vietnams, Laos, and Cambodia.1

As an interim solution, in July 1965 these aircraft were reinforced 

with two new CH-3E aircraft recently purchased from Sikorsky Aircraft and dispatched TDY to a newly built air base in northeast Thailand, Nakhon Phanom (NKP). This base was 110 miles east of Udorn, 
12 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

just four miles from the Mekong River separating Thailand from 

Laos. Mu Gia Pass, one of the key entry points for the Ho Chi Minh 

Trail (fig. 1) that North Vietnamese forces were using to move supplies and troops to the battlefields in South Vietnam, was just 90 

miles farther east. These aircraft were stronger and faster than the 

HH-43s, with a longer range and some armor protection. Additionally, 

they could fly higher to avoid the ever-increasing enemy antiaircraft 

guns. Adorned in a mottled coat of camouflage paint, the aircraft 

were quickly dubbed the “Jolly Green Giants” after the characters 

used to advertise canned vegetables back in the United States.

Two months later, two new HH-3E helicopters arrived and assumed 

rescue duties at Udorn. The CH-3s from NKP then consolidated there 

with them. The HH-3E aircraft were specifically optimized for rescue. 

C H I N A

 NORTH

 VIETNAM

SOUTH

VIETNAM

L A O S

BURMA

C A M B O D I A

T H A I L A N D

Tay Ninh

Sihanoukville

An Loc

Long Binh

Saigon

Phnom Penh

Bangkok

Xuan Loc

Phuoc

Long

Ban Me Thuot

Kontum

Dak To

Kham

Duc

Hue Khe Sanh Tchepone

Nape

Ban

Ban

Sam Neua

Dien Bien Phu

Na Khang

Muong

Soui

Long

Tien

Vientiane

Hanoi

 Xien

Khouang

Vinh

Thanh Hoa

Kien An

Hai Duong

Bac Giang

Quang Tri

Dong Ha

Polei

Kleng

Tan Son Nhut

Bien Hoa

Phan Rang

Nha Trang

Tuy Hoa

Phu Cat

Da Nang

Pleiku

Ubon

Nakhon Phanom

Nam Phong

Korat

Takhli

Don Muang

U-Tapao

Udorn

Cam Ranh Bay

A Shau Valley

DMZ

Yankee Station

Gulf of Tonkin

South

China

Sea

Gulf of Siam

Ban Karai Pass Truong Son mountain range

Haiphong Harbor

Plain of Jars

Red River

River

Black

Mekong

Mekong

HO

CHI

MINH TRAIL

River

River

T h u d R i d g e

Mugia Pass

Fish Hook

Tonle Sap

Parrot’s

Beak

Koh Tang Island

Hainan

Son Tay

Luang Prabang

Savannakhet Muang Phine

C H I N A

 NORTH

 VIETNAM

SOUTH

VIETNAM

L A O S

BURMA

C A M B O D I A

T H A I L A N D

Tay Ninh

Sihanoukville

An Loc

Long Binh

Saigon

Phnom Penh

Bangkok

Xuan Loc

Phuoc

Long

Ban Me Thuot

Kontum

Dak To

Kham

Duc

Hue Khe Sanh Tchepone

Muang Phine

Sarvane

Savannakhet

Nape

Ban

Ban

Sam Neua

Dien Bien Phu

Na Khang

Muong

Soui

Luang Prabang

Chiang Mai

Phitsanulok

Long

Tien

(LS 98)

Vientiane

Hanoi

 Xien

Khouang

Vinh

Thanh Hoa

Kien An

Hai Duong

Son Tay Bac Giang

Quang Tri

Dong Ha

Polei

Kleng

Tan Son Nhut

Bien Hoa

Phan Rang

Nha Trang

Tuy Hoa

Phu Cat

Da Nang

Pleiku

Ubon

Nakhon Phanom

Nam Phong

Korat

Takhli

Don Muang

U-Tapao

Udorn

Cam Ranh Bay

A Shau Valley

DMZ

Yankee Station

Gulf of Tonkin Hainan

South

China

Sea

Gulf of Siam

Ban Karai Pass Truong Son mountain range

Haiphong Harbor

Plain of Jars

Red River

River

Black

Mekong

Mekong

HO

CHI

MINH TRAIL

River

River

T h u d R i d g e

Mugia Pass

Fish Hook

Tonle Sap

Parrot’s

Beak

Koh Tang Island

Con Son

Island

20° 20°

4

6

1

1

1

9

12

13

13

2

© Darrel Whitcomb, 2010

0

0 50 100 Miles

50 100 150 Kilometers Airfields

Selected Roads

International Boundaries

© Darrel Whitcomb, 2010

Figure 1. Southeast Asia. (Copyright Darrel Whitcomb, 2010.)
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 13

They had external fuel tanks and an added internal tank for extended 

range, 1,000 pounds of armor plating arrayed around critical parts of 

the aircraft, shatterproof canopies, a hydraulic hoist with 240-foot 

steel cable for pulling personnel up out of the dense and sometimes 

triple-canopy jungle, and more powerful engines that allowed the 

helicopters to climb up to 12,000 feet to avoid antiaircraft guns.2

On 1 January 1966, MATS was renamed the Military Airlift Command (MAC), and the ARS was renamed the Aerospace Rescue and 

Recovery Service (ARRS). The name change was necessary to reflect 

a larger global mission because the ARRS was also assigned responsibility for recovery of space hardware for the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA). In subordinate fashion, its individual units would change their designations from Air Rescue to 

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery. 

 As the rescue force in SEA grew, the USAF, in early 1966, assigned 

the 3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group (ARRG) to deploy to 

Saigon, South Vietnam, and command and control all USAF rescue 

units and operations in the theater. It would still be administratively 

aligned under the ARRS, but under the operational control (OPCON) 

of the Seventh Air Force. Concurrently, the 37th Aerospace Rescue 

and Recovery Squadron (ARRSq) was activated at Da Nang, with the 

HH-3s at Udorn assigned as a detachment. The recovery forces continued to receive more HH-3E aircraft, building to a force of 32 of the 

newer aircraft to be split between Da Nang and Udorn to replace the 

Korean-era machines. 

The HH-3Es were also in-flight refuelable. This was an exciting 

development and the end result of some hard work and intense lobbying by a group of engineers and Maj Harry Dunn, an experienced 

helicopter pilot at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. The ARS had earlier 

published a worldwide operational requirement for in-flight refueling 

for helicopters. Dunn felt that the standard USAF KC-97s and newly 

arriving KC-135s had to refuel at too high an airspeed to be compatible 

with helicopters. He and the test engineers developed a test plan with 

USMC KC-130 tanker aircraft that seemed much more capable of 

refueling the helicopters. The tests were successful. They then briefed 

their findings to commanders at every level. Consequently, new HH-3s 

coming off the production line were modified with in-flight refueling 

probes, and all crews were trained in the procedures. The USAF allocated funds to modify 11 C-130 aircraft to serve as the initial cadre of 

HC-130 tankers.3
14 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

However, accumulating rescue after action reports were suggesting that the new HH-3s needed more onboard firepower and better 

hover capability at the higher elevations in the mountainous areas of 

Laos. Such reports generated deep concern among the rescue commanders that the HH-3 was not up to the evolving task in SEA. Maj 

Baylor Haynes, the detachment commander at Udorn, noted in a 

comprehensive field study that even though the HH-3 was the best 

recovery aircraft then available, it still had its shortcomings. While 

in-flight refueling gave it the range it needed, the steady increase of 

enemy antiaircraft guns put the aircraft at high risk in increasingly 

more areas. Additionally, studies showed that reaction time to aircraft shootdowns was critical. The longer an Airman was on the 

ground, the worse were his odds of being rescued. In this business, 

speed was life. A faster, more heavily protected and armed helicopter 

was needed.

Haynes also suggested that a night rescue capability would be 

extremely useful. Some night rescues had been attempted. But they 

really consisted of helicopters and fixed-wing escort aircraft dropping flares so that the crews could execute daylight procedures for a 

recovery. Haynes was aware of some developmental work being done 

with infrared sensors, low-light-level TV, and light-intensification 

systems and suggested that those technologies could possibly be useful in addressing the challenge. However, until such developmental 

breakthroughs existed, the only option extant was to plan for a sunrise recovery effort, further exposing the survivor(s) to capture.4

Combat Aircrew Recovery Aircraft

Air Force rescue commanders and planners agreed that a new 

rescue helicopter was needed to replace the HH-3. The 3d ARRG 

commander, Col Albert Lovelady, directed his staff to analyze rescue 

operations in SEA to date. Maj John McLeaish and Maj John Silvis 

carried out the project. Completed on 22 May 1967, that detailed and 

exhaustive report was chockablock full of data and analysis substantiating ARRS’s lack of preparation for or capability to conduct combat 

recovery as opposed to worldwide SAR. It included a requirement for 

a new combat aircrew recovery aircraft (CARA). 

However, the document had a larger purpose. It noted that the 

increasingly sophisticated and heavy antiaircraft defensive arrays being 
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 15

steadily deployed around Hanoi, at the coastal regions of North 

Vietnam, and near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in the south seriously 

challenged rescue in those areas. Repeating that all requirements had 

been detailed in validated Requirements Action Directive (RAD) 

7-39-1, dated 31 January 1967, it declared, 

The single most important parameter to successful combat aircrew recovery is 

to minimize the time from bailout to recovery, i.e., speed of reaction. CARA 

must be able to penetrate the most highly defended areas day or night, since 

this is where most aircrew are downed. Lastly, CARA must be able to survive 

in [the] pickup area. 

The pie-shaped area north of Hanoi between the Red River, from Hanoi 

northwest to the Chinese border, and the railroad complex from Hanoi northeast to Langson is presently denied to SAR forces. . . . [It] denied 79 Airmen a 

SAR effort. Twenty-two Airmen downed along the Gulf of Tonkin coast were 

denied rescue because of the heavily defended coastline.5

To address these challenges, the report suggested that CARA 

needed to have several specific capabilities. One of these was the ability 

to utilize developing electronic countermeasures (ECM) to facilitate 

penetration and operation in high-threat areas. However, the single 

biggest threat was visually aimed antiaircraft guns. To answer this 

threat, the report suggested a need for a ground fire-detection system, 

better aircraft armor, and heavier onboard weaponry for fighting the 

close-in fight, usually encountered in the hover recovery phase. 

The aircraft also needed to be multiengined for redundancy and 

safety and to operate effectively at slow speed and while hovering 

over heavily sloped and jungle terrain. It had to be capable of carrying auxiliary fuel tanks and refueling in flight for maximum mission 

planning and performance flexibility. CARA also required onboard 

advanced integrated avionics packages having secure communications 

capability with all SAR participants, including the survivor(s) if 

possible, and advanced navigational systems allowing precision navigation over a vast area. 

Perhaps most evolutionarily, the report suggested a need for operations at night and in low-visibility conditions. The explicitly stated 

reason was to provide quick recovery response under all conditions. 

Implicit, though, was the belief that night and low-visibility operations would also negate the capability of visually aimed weapons to 

shoot down low and slow helicopters. The report specified that

an integrated night and low visibility system will provide the CARA another 

tactic to penetrate “hot” areas under the cover of darkness at low level utiliz-
16 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

ing terrain avoidance radar. The system must solve navigation to the search 

area, establish [the] pinpoint location of the downed airman, provide for terrain/obstacle avoidance, program an automatic approach to the high (250’) 

hover mode, maintain the hover mode over all terrain environments, permit 

visual acquisition of the downed airman . . . and emit neither [infrared] nor 

electronic signals that would compromise the survivor, the air rescue crew, or 

the CARA.6

Seventh Air Force validated RAD 7-39-1 and submitted it to the 

Air Staff. The requirement for the night and low-visibility capability 

was submitted as a standalone requirement as SEA Operational Requirement (SEAOR #114) dated 3 April 1967. It called for “an integrated system to enable helicopters to perform the essential elements 

of search and rescue under conditions of total darkness and/or low 

visibility.” Those essential elements were to 

(1) navigate to and establish a pinpoint location at the search area,

(2) avoid hills and obstacles,

(3) program an approach to a 250-foot hover and maintain it over 

land or water,

(4) enter into both an automatic approach and hover mode at a 

selected altitude and maneuver precisely,

(5) locate a downed Airman from approximately five miles,

(6) “see” with instruments when lighting was equivalent to a 

moonless, starlit night,

(7) obtain information, not necessarily from the same source, 

through display instruments at both the pilot and pararescueman positions, and

(8) conduct operations in such a manner that the location of neither 

the downed Airman nor the rescue helicopter crew would be 

given away.7

The Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) commander, Gen John Ryan, concurred and in a separate message to MAC and the chief of staff of the 

Air Force (CSAF) pointed out that “the lack of [a] reliable night SAR 

capability was seriously impairing SAR effectiveness” and demanded 

that “interim measures” be taken to increase its capability to meet its 

current operational tasks.8

 Air Staff planners, though, concluded that 

the procurement of CARA would have necessitated a long and costly 
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 17

development and certification process. They also rejected any consideration for converting the HH-3s for this mission, determining 

that the HH-3s were already performing at maximum capability.9

Having seen the success that the USMC was having with the CH-53As, 

the Air Staff concluded that this machine could be procured as an 

off-the-shelf replacement and modified for the rescue mission as opposed to designing and developing the CARA. Furthermore, it believed that the performance and load capability of a modified CH-53 

variant was such that the airframe could meet most of the specifications for fuel flexibility and in-flight refueling, added armor, weaponry, 

and upgraded avionics—particularly to include the avionics developed 

to enable night and all-weather recovery operations, thus satisfying the 

requirements of SEAOR #114.10

One of the USMC CH-53As loaned to the USAF for initial testing

Courtesy National Museum of the US Air Force

When the USAF contracted to buy an initial batch of eight HH53B aircraft for rescue duties, Sikorsky loaned two CH-53As built for 

the USMC to the USAF and delivered them to the 48th ARRSq at 

Eglin AFB, Florida, for initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) 

and to train the first cadre of aircrews. Over the next eight years, the 

USAF would procure a total of 52 HH-53B/C aircraft and, collaterally, 20 CH-53C helicopters for special operations use.11
18 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

To Southeast Asia

In June 1967, the ARRS took delivery of the first HH-53B. It was 

picked up at the Sikorsky plant by Lt Col James Dixon, Capt Fredric 

Donohue, and other Airmen from Detachment 2 of the 37th ARRSq 

at Udorn AB, Thailand. En route to Eglin AFB, they stopped in Washington, DC, to display the aircraft for senior government and military 

leaders. They then continued on to Eglin and earnestly began training initial crews for SEA. Two months later that aircraft and the second 

production model were loaded aboard the USS Card, an old escort aircraft carrier, for transport to Vietnam. When the aircraft arrived at the 

port of Vung Tau a month later, Sikorsky technicians assembled them, 

and they were ferried to Udorn. The following table provides a comparison of the HH-3E capabilities with those of the HH-53B/C.

Table. Comparison of the HH-3E and HH-53B/C

HH-3E HH-53B/C

Gross weight (pounds) 

with crew and ammo

18,000 37,193/36,000

Useful load (pounds) 3,000 13,000

Engine(s)

shp (each)

2/T-58-GE-5

1,250

2/T-64-GE-7

3,080/3,925

Speed (knots)

cruise/maximum

120/143 140/190+

Altitude (ft. max.) 12,000 18,550/16,000

Range (ft. max.)

(unlimited with

in-flight refueling)

310 290

Hover altitude (ft. max.) 4,000 6,500

Crew 4 4–6

Armament 2XM-60

.30 cal

3XGAU-2B

7.62 mm

Hoist (feet) 240 240

Adapted from Earl H. Tilford, Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia (Washington, DC: Center for Air Force 

History, 1992), 91; John W. R. Taylor, ed., Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1969–70 (London: Jane’s Yearbooks, 

1969), 436; and Walter F. Lynch, USAF Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia (1 July 1969–31 December 1970), 

Project CHECO Report (Hickam AFB, HI: Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, 1971), 43, K717.0414-1, Air 

Force Historical Research Agency.
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 19

Arriving at Udorn, Colonel Dixon was designated the HH-53B detachment commander. He certified that the first crews were ready for 

combat, and the HH-53Bs began to augment the HH-3s sitting alert 

for rescue missions. Their initial use was limited, as maintenance 

crews had to work through some preliminary equipment challenges, 

and several aircrew members needed to qualify for in-flight refueling. 

Immediately, though, all participants could see that the HH-53 was 

indeed a major advancement over the HH-3. However, larger issues 

concerning capability still needed to be addressed. As one commander noted in a mission report, 

desperately needed in the Southeast Asia rescue effort are more HH-53s, 

equipped with an integrated night and low visibility system. In the hours of 

darkness or low visibility, rescue helicopters are, for the most part, ineffective 

for rescue and recovery, especially in mountainous terrain. A number of factors 

enter into the problem, such as navigation to the search area, terrain avoidance, 

as in rugged or mountainous areas, the descent to a hover mode, positioning the 

rescue craft over the downed airman, and finally, the establishment of a hover 

not to exceed a wander of five to seven feet laterally nor altitude deviations of 

greater than five feet.12

As the USAF was accepting completed aircraft, it dispatched four 

more HH-53Bs of the initial buy to Udorn. Colonel Dixon put HH53s and crews on alert at Udorn and NKP and even dispatched them 

to secure remote locations in northern Laos, such as Lima Site 98 

near the Plain of Jars. In an evolutionary development, Dixon also 

put the HH-53Bs into orbits with newly received HC-130 tankers 

where they could periodically refuel for several hours, remaining instantly on call for a recovery so that reaction and recovery times 

could be reduced as much as possible. 

When the aircraft arrived, an impromptu debate took place among 

the aircrews as to a proper nickname for the aircraft. The HH-43s 

were called “Pedros” and the HH-3s, “Jolly Greens”; on missions 

crews used those designators with an individual numerical suffix as 

their call signs. Initially, the HH-53s were called “Buffs,” which stood 

for big, ugly, fat fellows (with lots of variations for the last two words). 

Operationally, the crews also adopted the Jolly Green radio call sign 

and, de facto, came to be known as the “Super Jolly Greens.”13

The rescue forces at Udorn and NKP were responsible for the 

northern two-thirds of Laos and all of North Vietnam, a huge area 

indeed. On 23 October 1967, a Udorn HH-53B commanded by Capt 

Russ Cayler was scrambled to recover an F-105 pilot who had bailed 
20 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

out over Thailand after a midair collision. One month and two days 

later, the HH-53s logged their first combat rescue with a Udorn HH53B when Cayler and his crew scrambled off of the alert pad at Lima 

Site 98 in northern Laos to help rescue the crew of an Air America 

H-34 that had gone down 50 miles northeast of their location.14

In January 1968, two HH-53s commanded by Cayler and Maj John 

Allison supported a rescue operation in North Vietnam for the sixman crew of a downed EB-66. As they were en route, an HH-3 already there was also shot down. Reaching the area, Allison recovered 

three members of the EB-66 crew but could not find the others. Cayler 

and crew picked up the HH-3 crew, but their aircraft was damaged by 

ground fire and was leaking fuel. As they were climbing out of the 

area, both engines failed. Cayler and his crew were able to get one 

engine restarted and then proceeded to an emergency field nearby for 

Courtesy Air Force Historical Research Agency

One of the first HH-53Bs arriving in Southeast Asia in 1968
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 21

a safe landing. Six days later, an emergency beeper was heard in the 

vicinity of the three missing crewmen. Major Allison and crew 

launched again with an escort of A-1 aircraft to search for and possibly 

recover the three remaining EB-66 crew members. Arriving overhead, they and the escort A-1s could hear the beacon and also saw 

several pen-gun flares. As the helicopter flew low and slow over the 

trees, it began to take heavy antiaircraft fire from several different 

locations. The crew answered the enemy with sustained minigun fire 

as Allison pulled his aircraft out of the area. The aircraft had suffered 

23 hits; fortunately, none were serious. Allison and his crew had been 

lured into a classic trap, something the North Vietnamese were increasingly attempting to do. The HH-53 crews were now fully initiated 

into the risks and rewards of combat recovery. 

40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron

On 18 March 1968, the 40th ARRSq was activated at Udorn and 

assumed control of the six HH-53Bs there and at NKP. Its assigned 

mission was to “search for, locate, and recover distressed personnel 

engaged in combat operations in Southeast Asia.”15 Lt Col Jim Dixon 

was assigned as the commander. He focused on training for his crews 

and support personnel and was notified that within the year, the unit 

would be receiving at least three newer HH-53C aircraft with more 

powerful engines. A month later, he directed the 40th to establish an FOL 

at Ubon AB in southeast Thailand for possible use in southern Laos. 

Although dispatched to SEA for SAR duties, the HH-53s could 

perform just about any basic lift mission. Given its load capability, the 

40th began to get calls to recover downed aircraft, such as UH-1s, 

A-1s, and C-123s, or even to move heavy gear, such as generators and 

whole 25,000-pound tactical air navigation (TACAN) system units, 

between bases. It also got calls to support civil affairs efforts in Thailand, transport medical teams, and provide medical evacuation for 

local Thais in remote areas. On another occasion, four HH-53Bs were 

dispatched to evacuate 59 indigenous personnel and their American 

advisors who were under direct attack at an FOL in Laos. This was 

not rescue per se but direct support of ongoing operations by special 

operations–type units. As time passed, the Buffs would get an everincreasing number of requests to perform such missions. The aircrews were also busy, as personnel turnover dictated a continuous 
22 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

training and upgrade program. On several occasions, aircrews traveled to other bases to brief aircrew personnel on SAR procedures.16

During the year, unit crews participated in rescue or recovery operations for an F-111 crew capsule, the crew and passengers of an Air 

America Porter aircraft, an F-105 pilot and a pararescue jumper (PJ) 

inserted to care for him, an Air American H-34 helicopter, several 

F-4 crews, the crew of a US Navy P2V, and on and on, while USAF 

and allied aircraft continuously attacked enemy targets throughout 

the 40th Squadron’s area of responsibility (AOR). Many of these rescue operations took place in hostile areas, and on several occasions 

the helicopters were damaged by enemy guns. The unit was rapidly 

becoming a highly combat-experienced squadron. The crews and 

their ever-present escort A-1 “Sandys,” support tankers, command 

and control aircraft, and even forward air controllers (FAC) were 

melding into a cohesive team. 

HH-53 crews conducted two rescue operations at night. These 

were, by necessity, more limited and conducted in an ad hoc fashion. 

One after action report states that “tactics were developed during the 

rescue by the crews taking part. . . . Such operations are considered 

hazardous except under favorable circumstances, i.e., no hostile activity, terrain which is fairly level, good weather conditions, and a 

flare drop crew [in support].” The crews also realized that they could 

do the recoveries at night but were limited by the difficulties of trying 

to coordinate the actions of supporting A-1s to suppress enemy 

ground fire.17

In early June 1968, crews from the 40th responded with unit H-3s 

to the shootdown of a USN A-7, call sign Streetcar 304. The pilot was 

alive and located a few miles southwest of Tchepone on the Ho Chi 

Minh Trail in central Laos. For 40 hours an armada of helicopters and 

support aircraft made several attempts to rescue the survivor. In the 

melee, an A-1 was shot down and that pilot taken prisoner. The effort 

became a battle, as successive shifts of recovery and support aircraft 

tried to get the A-7 pilot out. They were supported by 44 F-4s and 42 

F-105s that relentlessly pummeled the enemy guns with an estimated 

86 tons of bombs and rockets. Almost mind-boggling at the time, 

that mission would soon be dwarfed many times over as the number 

of SAR missions continued to increase and the enemy fought tenaciously to oppose them. Many would become much more than SAR. 

They were horrific battles, dances of death for the purposes of facilitating a rescue. No quarter was asked, and no quarter was given.18
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 23

Being the first and, so far, only HH-53 unit in the war, the 40th 

received many distinguished visitors, such as the Honorable Dr. 

Harold Brown, secretary of the Air Force. Keenly interested in the 

squadron and its operations, he spent an entire day there. He later 

wrote of rescue operations that “the extent of the operation, the danger 

involved, and the dedication on an everyday basis month after month 

make these rescue operations something unique in our military history. These men are all heroes. . . . Certainly, the ARRS people deserve 

their immortality.”19

As 1968 ended, commanders took stock of their accomplishments. 

Blessedly, no HH-53s had been shot down; however, many had been 

damaged by the enemy guns. Their efforts had led to the recovery of 

100 personnel, 79 in noncombat conditions and 21 in combat. The 

HH-53s were performing well, although they were power limited at the 

higher elevations. All recognized, too, the need for a true night and allweather capability that could be used in combat conditions as specified 

in SEAOR #114, subsequently changed to Seventh Air Force Combat 

Required Operational Capability 11-70 (CROC 11-70). Those commanders had also been apprised that efforts were under way with 

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation to develop just such a capability.20

Pave Star

In 1967 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation was awarded a contract to 

develop onboard avionics with off-the-shelf technology to satisfy 

CROC 11-70. The project was named Pave Star, and USAF engineers 

estimated that eight HH-53s could be equipped with a fully tested 

system by early 1969.21

Building on its fundamental work with the IHAS initiative, Sikorsky engineers, working with the Norden Division of United Aircraft 

Corporation, developed a prototype kit that would provide the HH53 with a night operations system (NOS). The NOS would have two 

subsystems. First, a night-vision subsystem would provide terrain 

cues during low-level flight and detect a strobe light displayed by the 

survivor. Additionally, it would provide the necessary visual references for the pilots to maintain overall situational awareness during 

the critical approach and hover operations under very low light levels. 

Second, an approach and hover coupler subsystem would be integrated 

with the aircraft’s automatic flight control and stability augmentation 
24 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

systems. Reflecting almost 15 years of developmental work, this system 

would “allow the pilot to automatically transition from search altitude 

and cruise speed to hover and automatically maintain the hover with 

almost no assistance from the pilot. The equipment that provides this 

capability consists of new components and modifications to some of 

the existing components already installed on the aircraft.”22

The new systems would rely on the onboard TACAN and Doppler 

navigational systems for overall navigation and could conceptually be 

supplemented with TFR. Through 1968 and 1969, Sikorsky engineers 

and test pilots and flight personnel from MAC and the ARRS flew 

numerous test missions with the intent of delivering an operationally 

usable system by the end of 1969. The program, while closely monitored by MAC, was plagued with problems. It was not developing as 

desired or within projected time or cost constraints. Increasingly, it 

became clear that the program would require quite a bit of elemental 

development work because the Pave Star system would require over 

60 new components and 200-plus electronic interfaces and basic 

modifications to the HH-53. In May 1970, Lt Gen Otto Glasser, the 

Air Force deputy chief of staff (DCS) for research and development, 

and Lt Gen James Sherrill, the vice-commander of MAC, conducted 

a program review. Based upon their findings and budgetary constraints, the chief of staff of the Air Force, General Ryan, directed that 

the program be terminated and all remaining funds be redirected to 

the Aeronautical Systems Division of the Air Force Systems Command that was concurrently developing a limited night recovery system 

(LNRS) under the program “Pave Imp.” 

However, MAC did not intend to give up on the overall concept and 

in July 1970 published MAC Required Operational Capability (ROC) 

19-70, which specified, “A requirement exists for an integrated system 

to enable a rescue vehicle to perform search and rescue under conditions of total darkness and/or adverse weather in all geographical areas 

including mountainous terrain. Additionally, the rescue vehicle must 

have a low level capability to penetrate hostile territory against radar 

directed weapons in the above stated environmental conditions.”23

Regretfully, the Sikorsky engineers terminated their efforts. A summation report, however, captured an interesting conclusion: 

Considerable experience and expertise have been gained in the field of integrated radar and displays by the Sikorsky and Norden Divisons as the prime 

and/or subcontractors in the Integrated Helicopter Avionics and Pavestar 

programs. . . . [The] night recovery mission is the primary mission for which 
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 25

the NOS has been designed; however, during the extensive flight testing of the 

NOS and its subsystems, it was found that the system enabled the aircraft to 

perform a wide variety of night operations. Low speed maneuvering over all 

types of terrain could be accomplished under semi-automatic control.24

These concepts being pursued had potential far beyond their critical 

but relatively limited use specifically for SAR.

40th and 37th Aerospace Rescue

and Recovery Squadrons

The last of the HH-53Bs and then the improved HH-53Cs continued 

to flow into the theater through 1969 and 1970 until the 40th had 

received a total of six Bs and eight Cs. The 37th ARRSq at Da Nang 

was also equipped with C models, receiving eight. Both squadrons 

relinquished their HH-3s as the larger Buffs—as they were now semiofficially called—arrived. With a bombing halt in effect over North 

Vietnam, most combat SARs were now occurring in Laos and the 

western regions of South Vietnam. As the North Vietnamese continued to bring an increasing number of guns down from the north 

along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, ever more areas became high threat, 

and the scope of the rescue efforts continued to grow. On 17 January 

1969, an F-4 Fast FAC, Stormy 02, was shot down in the dangerous 

Tchepone area of central Laos. For three days, rescue forces including 

HH-3s and HH-53s made several attempts to recover the surviving 

backseater as he lay badly wounded. Hundreds of strike aircraft pummeled the enemy guns as they battled to control the area long enough 

for one of the helicopters to slip in and grab the wounded Airman. In 

the melee, a supporting A-1 was shot down and the pilot eventually 

rescued by one of the helicopters. But deteriorating weather and 

darkness precluded a pickup. 

The next day the battle resumed, and another A-1 was shot down 

with no survivor. Regardless, the battle went on. Sensing an opportunity, Jolly Green 68, an HH-53B, was cleared in to pick up the F-4 

backseater. Hovering over the survivor for 22 minutes as a PJ went 

down the hoist to help the badly injured survivor, the pilot had to 

keep the aircraft below the tops of the trees because of an active 37 

mm gun one kilometer to the south. As soon as the survivor and PJ 

were inside the aircraft, the pilot turned to the egress heading and 

departed the area.
26 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

Next, Jolly Green 67, another one of the 40th Squadron HH-53s, 

was cleared in to pick up the downed A-1 pilot. The crew rapidly 

moved in and recovered him. On departure, though, the aircraft was 

hit by several rounds of 37 mm fire. The damage was severe, and the 

pilots put their aircraft on the ground. Quickly, the escort helicopter, 

Jolly Green 70, another HH-53, dashed in and recovered the crew of 

Jolly 67 and the survivor. Since the area was too dangerous for a recovery 

operation for the damaged aircraft, a flight of F-4s destroyed the 

wreckage. HH-53B #66-14430 was the first of its breed lost in combat. 

But the battle was not yet over. Just as this action was ending, an 

O-2 FAC aircraft from Da Nang was shot down about 15 miles to the 

south, also along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Once again, the rescue 

forces mounted up and prepared to duel with the guns to facilitate 

another rescue for the two O-2 pilots. It took another 24 hours of intense action before the two survivors were finally pulled out by two 

different helicopters, the second man recovered by an HH-53B from 

the 40th.

The effort for Stormy 02 and the others dwarfed any rescue to date. 

The almost three-day event involved 264 aircraft, all playing their 

critical roles to bring out the downed Airmen. The amount of weapons tonnage expended was staggering. In-flight refueling, now almost routine, played a key role as the helicopters logged 14 refuelings, taking a total of 40,200 pounds of fuel from the HC-130s.25

Weather and darkness, too, played a negative role in the effort. But 

did they always have to be adverse factors? Aware of technological 

developments in the CONUS, one anonymous participant wrote during this time period that “weather and darkness can become assets 

rather than liabilities if and when systems are developed which permit effective rescue operations in these environments.” To those who 

had to face the massed guns at places like Tchepone or Mu Gia Pass, 

it was a beguiling thought. But one had to wonder if the lack of aiming capability at night for the enemy gunners would be worth the 

obvious loss of direct support from the escort A-1 crews, who could 

not dare to expend munitions without being able to clearly see the 

Jolly Greens.26

For the rescue units, as the year 1969 progressed, the battle pace 

remained steady; missions of desperation and, sometimes, life or 

death shattered endless periods of tedious alert. Additionally, the 

HH-53s were continuously called upon to perform military and civil 

medevacs, heavy lifts, and civic actions operations. Occasionally, the 
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 27

units would get more calls to move indigenous forces. Above and beyond their primary mission, they were in constant demand. For the 

year, the HH-53s logged 48 combat saves and 164 other “saves.”27

The new year started ominously for the rescue forces when, on 28 

January 1970, an HH-53B and crew from the 40th ARRSq were lost 

in North Vietnam. It was one of four helicopters launched to recover 

an F-105G crew of two shot down north of Mu Gia Pass in North 

Vietnam while escorting an RF-4C. Two of the helicopters were in an 

orbit over Laos refueling from an HC-130 when two MiG-21s attacked 

HH-53B #66-14434—flying as Jolly Green 71—and its wingman and 

escort A-1s. No MiG combat air patrol (MiGCAP) USAF fighters 

were available, and a heat-seeking missile from one of the MiG-21s 

hit and destroyed the Jolly Green. There were no survivors, mute testimony that vulnerable aircraft like rescue helicopters and HC-130 

tankers could not operate without air superiority. It was a tragic and 

egregious mistake.28

On 30 June, an OV-10 from the 23d Tactical Air Support Squadron 

(TASS) based at NKP was shot down while supporting a US Army 

(USA) special forces team in southern Laos. Only the backseater, an 

Army sergeant, survived. Two HH-53s from the 40th ARRSq at 

Udorn responded. While flying over the area to locate the survivor, 

HH-53C #68-8283 was engaged by multiple enemy guns of varying 

calibers and blown out of the sky. A second helicopter recovered the 

original survivor, but there were no survivors from the stricken 

Jolly Green.29

To readily locate and communicate with isolated personnel, the 

HH-53s were equipped with ultrahigh frequency (UHF) radios that 

could be tuned to the same frequencies programmed into the survival radios. The helicopter radios were also equipped with a “direction finder” capability that allowed them to receive steering guidance 

from voice or beeper communication from the survivor’s radio. However, these auxiliary systems were notoriously finicky and too often 

unreliable. In November the 3d ARRG forwarded an operational requirement to MAC for an “electronic location finder” (ELF) to replace this built-in device. MAC published MAC ROC #27-70 to address this requirement on a worldwide basis because the capability 

would be useful anywhere. The ROC specified a “capability to locate 

and expeditiously maneuver to a hover over a survivor in a combat 

environment.” That generated a requirement for an ELF that would 

provide a terminal location to within 10 feet at close ranges, operate 
28 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

covertly and under jungle canopies without significant degradation, 

function effectively day and night and in all weather conditions, work 

with developing night recovery systems and with issued personal survival equipment, and be transportable on rescue helicopters. Cubic 

Corporation received the contract and went to work to develop and 

test the system on a priority basis.30

Not all of the HH-53s produced for the USAF were deployed to 

the war in SEA. Several were based at various locations in the United 

States, Europe, and Asia for more routine SAR duties. To highlight 

their versatility for missions on a more global scale, in August two 

HH-53Cs were flown to SEA. The trip took nine days. The helicopters 

were accompanied by 2 HC-130N tankers, enabling them to fly nonstop legs up to almost 13 hours. In flying the almost 9,000 miles from 

Eglin AFB to Da Nang AB, South Vietnam, the aircraft and crews 

logged 69 hours and 42 minutes of flight time on eight legs. “The entire mission went much better than we had anticipated,” said the mission commander, Maj Larry Butera. “This first flight of an HH-53 

across the Pacific was a near flawless mission.”31

In-flight refueling for helicopters, critical for long-range and long-duration 

operations, was developed during the Vietnam War.

Courtesy National Museum of the US Air Force
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 29

The Son Tay Raid

In mid-November, the 40th received an unusual order to stand 

down for a few days, ostensibly to spend additional time doing maintenance on the hard-flown helicopters. However, the directive also 

stipulated that the unit would have five aircraft ready to go on 20 

November. Late that evening, several C-130s arrived from Takhli AB, 

Thailand. They disgorged a small force of US Army and Air Force 

personnel, who then transferred to the ready HH-53s and also an 

HH-3. That force and several accompanying HC-130 tankers took off 

just a few minutes before midnight and turned northeast. They were 

headed for a POW camp in North Vietnam near the village of Son 

Tay, about 30 miles northwest of Hanoi, and would combine with 

other elements departing other airfields and even aircraft carriers in 

the Gulf of Tonkin in an effort to recover the estimated 75 US and 

allied POWs being held there. 

Planning for the mission had begun the previous August when 

Brig Gen Leroy Manor, then serving as commander of the USAF special operations force headquartered at Eglin, was called to the Pentagon for a meeting with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(CJCS), Adm Thomas Moorer. The chief asked Manor and US Army 

colonel Arthur “Bull” Simons if they would be interested in studying 

the feasibility of conducting the mission and then executing it if it 

appeared doable. Both men answered affirmatively. Moorer appointed Manor as the commander of a joint task force (JTF) with 

Simons as his deputy and gave them broad authority to recruit personnel for the operation, buttressed with the priorities necessary to obtain 

materiel, facilities, and exercise areas to begin training their force. 

Manor and Simons immediately established a joint planning group 

of 26 experts from all services to consider the effort from all aspects, 

especially operational security, as any unusual movement of equipment or troops could be spotted and possibly compromise the element of surprise, so important to such a small operation. The planning determined that the best approach would be by helicopter. A 

small contingent of Army special forces would be inserted to conduct 

the ground operation. The USAF would provide the air element.32

Given the ranges and loads involved, the only USAF helicopter lift 

option was the air-refuelable HH-53s of the 37th and 40th ARRSqs 

already located in SEA. Additionally, their onboard miniguns could 

be used to suppress any enemy reaction, and personnel aboard could 
30 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

also be equipped with Starlight scopes for improved night vision. 

Consequently, the ARRS commander, Brig Gen Frank Everest, was 

approached for his advice and support. He assigned a top-notch HH53 pilot, Lt Col Warner Britton, the chief of training at the Air Rescue 

and Recovery Training Center (ARRTC) at Eglin, to the planning 

staff. Britton’s initial analysis was straightforward: “From the outset it 

was clear that Rescue participation would be vital to the operation, 

because it possessed the properly-configured helicopters, the only 

tankers to refuel them, and the essential technical expertise which the 

mission required.”33 Subsequently, he and 18 other officers and enlisted Airmen from the ARRTC, three from the 37th ARRSq, and six 

from the 40th ARRSq would be selected to serve as the HH-53 aircrews on the mission.34

Since Udorn AB in northern Thailand would be a perfect launch 

point, the 40th was furtively directed to supply the HH-53s. The 

planners determined that the mission would have the best chance of 

success if it were conducted at night. The HH-53s still did not have 

any optimized night recovery capability. Additionally, this was not a 

classic rescue mission per se. The intent of the mission was to directly 

attack a well-guarded enemy facility for the purposes of rescuing as 

many as 75 unarmed and probably weakened individuals. It would 

require a significant force of support aircraft to provide night illumination and direct fire support. Accordingly, several MC-130s and 

A-1s were included in the task force.35

Manor and Simons collected their force at Eglin AFB. There they 

could train on the large land ranges without drawing any attention. 

All participants were volunteers, especially sought out for their recognized expertise and recent SEA experience. Of all the rescue 

crews interviewed for the operation, only one refused to join the 

effort. The task force trained diligently through September. Planners also added an HH-3 to the operation; it would be used to insert 

a small strike team of 13 Soldiers directly into the prison, thereby 

achieving immediate surprise. However, the aircraft would be destroyed in the process.36

Working with various governmental and military intelligence 

agencies, Manor and Simons determined that the operation was feasible, with an acceptable element of risk, and so briefed Admiral 

Moorer and the secretary of defense (SecDef), the Honorable Melvin 

Laird. Having considered the lunar and predicted weather patterns, 

Manor also recommended that the operation occur on 21 October. 
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 31

Moorer and Laird agreed. Pres. Richard Nixon then gave his approval 

but not in time to allow the operation on 21 October. The new date 

would be 21–22 November.37

In early November, Manor and Simons made arrangements to 

move all of the mission aircrews to Thailand. The two flew to Hawaii 

to brief the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) commander, Adm 

John McCain, and then to Saigon to brief the Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam (MACV), commander, Gen Creighton Abrams, 

and his air deputy, Gen Lucius Clay Jr., Seventh Air Force commander. Clay’s forces would provide vital F-105s for surface-to-air 

missile (SAM) suppression and F-4s for MiG suppression if the North 

Vietnamese chose to respond. Manor and Simons then met with 

Adm Fred Bardshar, the commander of Task Force 77, the aircraft 

carrier force in the Gulf of Tonkin. He agreed to support the operation with an air strike force launched to draw the attention of the 

North Vietnamese air defense forces, as the task force would slip in 

quietly over the mountains from Laos.

General Manor oversaw the arrival of his forces in Thailand and 

watched them make their last preparations. He decided to move the 

operation forward 24 hours, though, when his team weathermen determined that a developing typhoon near the Philippines could disrupt the operation on 22 November. With all preparations finalized, 

he proceeded to Da Nang to monitor the operation from a major 

command center there. 

The 40th ARRSq had the five HH-53s for the mission ready to go 

plus five spares. The selected HH-53s and the one HH-3 lifted off 

exactly on schedule from Udorn, followed almost immediately by an 

HC-130 tanker and two MC-130 Talons for navigation and flare support. A few minutes later, a flight of five A-1s took off from NKP and 

rendezvoused with one of the MC-130s. The weather was clear in the 

helicopter refueling area, and all six took on fuel without incident. 

The tanker then proceeded back to Udorn for more fuel, which the 

helicopters would need after the raid. Above, the fighter force of F-4s 

and F-105s approached the Son Tay area, and the large USN strike 

package drew away the attention of the North Vietnamese air defenders. 

Arriving over the prison camp, the HH-3 and first two HH-53s 

landed and unloaded their assault troops as the MC-130s filled the 

sky with flares and the F-105s dueled with the now fully alerted North 

Vietnamese SAM sites. While orbiting and awaiting the signal to land 

and pick up the raiders and freed POWs, the HH-53 crews used their 
32 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

miniguns to decimate watchtowers around the camp. Firefights broke 

out in the compound as enemy troops began to respond. Hurriedly, 

the American Soldiers searched through the prison, systematically 

going from cell to cell. But their efforts were for naught; the prisoners 

were gone. They had been moved a few weeks earlier, probably because of flooding of the local area caused by heavy rains. After 29 

minutes on the ground, all of the assault troops were reloaded and 

accounted for; the helicopters lifted off, and the task force turned 

southwest for the long flight back to Thailand. The force sustained no 

losses and only two injuries—a sprained ankle and a minor bullet 

wound. One F-105G was damaged by a SAM. The crew made it well 

into Laos before it bailed out and was then rescued by one of the HH-53s. 

Overall, the mission was a failure in that it did not bring back any 

POWs. However, it did force the North Vietnamese to collect all 

prisoners into larger groups, where they received better care. This 

improved morale, as did the prisoners’ inevitable discovery of the effort. Remembered Jay Jayroe, one of the Son Tay prisoners, “We were 

not forgotten; our country cared. During the hard times ahead, our 

renewed faith in God and Country served us well.”38

Tactically, however, from an HH-53 perspective, the mission was 

quite successful. The helicopters and crews performed magnificently. 

This was not a rescue mission so much as it was a special operations 

mission. With their heavy-lift helicopters, though, and without any 

equipment that optimized them for night operations, the crews were 

able to enter enemy airspace and operate without any losses for 29 

minutes just 30 miles from the North Vietnamese capital of Hanoi. 

Maybe there were tactical advantages to operating at night doing rescue 

or whatever else those heavy-lift helicopters were needed to do.

The Son Tay mission did have one more unintended consequence. 

It helped one young Air Force Academy cadet decide that he wanted 

to fly rescue helicopters. Just a few months prior to the raid, Cadet 3d 

Class Rich Comer got to take a ride on an HH-53 when his cadet class 

visited Norton AFB, California, as part of its summer training. He sat 

on the back ramp of the aircraft as his pilot, Maj Frederic Donohue, 

took him and several others on a low-level tour of southern California. 

Sitting next to him was a young USAF PJ, SSgt Stu Stanaland, who 

bragged that Donohue was “the greatest helicopter pilot in the world!” 

Four months later, when the news of the Son Tay mission broke, 

Comer read everything he could find about the mission. And when 

he discovered that Donahue had flown one of the HH-53s, he decided 
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 33

that he would ask to fly rescue helicopters when he was commissioned. His request would be honored, and four and one-half years 

later, he would fly on a mission just as dramatic and desperate. With 

him on that mission would be Stanaland, now a tech sergeant.39

All and all, though, except for the two terrible losses, SAR activity 

in 1970 was much less intense than in previous years. For the year, the 

HH-53s logged 54 combat and 23 noncombat saves.40

The new year, 1971, started as several before it had in SEA. Third 

ARRG helicopters sat on alert at Da Nang, Udorn, NKP, Ubon, Bien 

Hoa (South Vietnam), and intermittently at Dong Ha and Pleiku in 

South Vietnam and several sites in Laos depending on operational 

requirements. Most alert aircraft were now HH-53s, as the Buffs were 

steadily replacing the HH-3s. Jollys also maintained orbits over Laos 

and occasionally off the coast of North Vietnam when reconnaissance aircraft were operating there. Most helicopters and crews were 

ready from first light to last light. Unit aircraft were launched for several 

SARs in Laos, with the majority occurring near Tchepone, Laos, 

where South Vietnamese forces tried to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 

February and March.41

On 21 July, Jolly Green 54, HH-53C #68-8285, was dispatched into 

northwest Laos to recover some “aerospace hardware.” The PJ was 

hoisted down to attach a sling to the equipment. As he did so, he 

heard ground fire and called for extraction. As the hoist was descending down to him, the load began to slip down the hill, pulling the 

helicopter down into the trees. The aircraft commander jettisoned 

the load and auxiliary tanks. Regardless, the aircraft settled into the 

trees, crashed to the ground, and rolled several times. The crew members 

were able to escape, but several were seriously injured. They were recovered by a civilian aircraft. The area was considered insecure, and 

the aircraft and load were destroyed. In response to this debacle, the 

squadron initiated an intensive sling-load training and qualification program.42

Over the next several days, the 40th ARRSq moved to NKP and 

absorbed its Detachment 1. This allowed the unit to consolidate its 

operation at one base and placed it 90 miles closer to the Ho Chi 

Minh Trail, the arena of most of its rescues. The unit also shipped its 

two oldest HH-53Bs, #66-14431 and #66-14432, back to Hill AFB, 

Utah, for use as trainer aircraft.43
34 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

Pave Imp

With the demise of the Pave Star program in 1970, remaining 

hopes for a night and adverse-weather recovery system to satisfy the 

original SEAOR #114 requirement rested with the LNRS, now called 

Pave Imp. Two HH-53Bs in the states and six HH-53Cs scheduled to 

be shipped to Thailand would be modified for field testing. However, 

one of the aircraft was lost in combat. 

The aircraft were modified with the latest iteration of avionics and 

AFCS modifications comprised of low-light-level television, infrared 

illuminators, a direct viewing device, a television monitor, an automatic approach coupler, an automatic hover coupler, and a hover 

trim controller. MAC and the ARRS conducted the initial testing at 

Eglin AFB in late 1970. The aircraft in Thailand would be tested after 

they arrived. All participants realized that this would only partially 

fulfill the requirement initially stated in SEAOR #114.44

Testing at Eglin identified numerous problems with onboard systems interface and larger logistical support challenges. The field test 

was conducted by the crews of the 40th and extended into early 1971. 

When enough statistical data were collected, the commander, Lt Col 

John Morse, wrote up a final report. It pronounced,

The present configuration of the Pave Imp, HH-53 helicopter will not support 

the theater commander’s requirement for a night, all weather rescue vehicle. . . . 

The extremely limited terrain avoidance feature that presently exists on the 

Pave Imp aircraft could not provide necessary clearance in most areas. 

In reviewing all the factors involved it does not appear justified for commitment of the Pave Imp rescue vehicle to an unrestricted operational status at 

this time. However, the system should continue to be utilized to the fullest 

extent possible within the limits of capabilities. Engineering improvements 

and a terrain avoidance system should be provided as quickly as possible. Protection, ECM and fire support concepts and requirements should also continue to receive priority consideration.45

General Clay concurred with the finding that Pave Imp did not 

satisfy CROC 11-70. However, he did not concur with the recommendation to keep it in-theater and recommended that all Pave Imp 

aircraft be returned to the United States and replaced with otherwise 

combat-ready machines. 

MAC responded with an almost plaintive message requesting reconsideration. It pointed out that the MAC ROC 19-70 recommended 

modifying the Pave Imp aircraft with terrain following/terrain avoid-
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 35

ance (TF/TA) radar and stated that an LNRS HH-53 was scheduled 

to be tested with such a radar in January 1972. It further persisted,

The Pave Imp system represents the only [existing] night combat rescue capability. The system is operational within the limits of VFR [visual flight rules], 

permissive environment, and open area. The increased capability provides an 

option to effect night rescues on a selective basis with no degradation of the 

SAR posture or capability. More importantly, continuing operational experience is essential to the development of a system satisfying the total requirement. Reconsideration of your recommendation to de-modify the aircraft and 

PACAF support of the MAC recovery program . . . is requested.46

Seventh Air Force, in reviewing all the messages, concurred with 

retention in-theater of the Pave Imp configuration. However, the approval came with a few “recommendations.” For instance, all equipment modifications should be fully tested prior to deployment to the 

theater, and all aircrews should receive their mission training in the 

CONUS. Also, in-theater testing would be restricted only to the development of tactics and procedures. The bottom line, though, was 

that Pave Imp aircraft—as limited as they were—would remain in 

SEA and be used where and when they could as the best technology 

available. Two HH-53Cs equipped with the LNRS would stand ready 

on 45-minute alert at NKP or Ubon.47 However, all parties realized 

clearly now that for the LNRS to become a fully capable system, it had 

to have an improved navigational system tied to a flight director and 

computer interface system, TF/TA radar that allowed “blind” flying 

to defeat enemy threats while also circumnavigating terrain, and a 

terminal location device to swiftly locate a survivor so that the helicopter could quickly be brought to a hover over his position.48

Building upon the lessons learned in both Pave Star and Pave Imp, 

the Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright-Patterson awarded a 

contract to the Norden Division of United Aircraft Corporation and 

Sikorsky in early 1972 to design, build, and install a terrain-following 

radar on an HH-53B at Edwards AFB, California. Norden procured 

an APQ-141 radar from the US Army and optimized it for the HH-53 

while Sikorsky technicians installed it on the aircraft and modified 

cockpit displays for its use. The Air Force then tested and evaluated 

its use as a night, all-weather rescue vehicle. The new project was 

named Pave Low.49
36 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

40th and 37th Aerospace Rescue 

and Recovery Squadrons

The commander of the 3d ARRG, Col Warner Britton, was also concerned about the increasing enemy threat posed by radar-controlled 

SAMs and antiaircraft guns. In November he forwarded a request to 

Seventh Air Force for radar homing and warning (RHAW) systems 

for the HH-53s so that the crews would receive visual and aural warnings when enemy radars were painting (detecting and tracking) or 

targeting them. Seventh Air Force approved the request and forwarded it to MAC as CROC 15-71. In May 1972, the first conversion 

kits arrived, and by September all HH-53s in SEA had working 

RHAW gear.50

During the year, the 37th ARRSq at Da Nang supported the FOL 

at Bien Hoa AB, just north of Saigon, with helicopters and crews for 

possible use in the southern regions of the theater. On 25 November 

1971, Jolly Greens 70 and 73 launched to recover the crew and passengers of a US Navy CH-46 shot down 90 miles to the south with 21 

people on board. Proceeding to the area at low level to stay out of the 

weather, they joined other US Army and Navy helicopters to recover 

the survivors. Jolly Green 70 landed at the crash site and recovered 14 

persons. The Jolly Greens then proceeded to Binh Thuy AB to drop 

them off. While there, the crews of both aircraft inspected their 

machines and discovered several small arms hits, none serious. The 

two crews then relaunched and headed back to Bien Hoa. En route 

Jolly Green 70, HH-53C #68-10366, was shot down by enemy fire. 

Jolly Green 73 immediately overflew the crash site and recovered one 

of the PJs. A Navy helicopter recovered another enlisted crew member, 

but the rest of the crew had been killed.51

In December, 40th crews at NKP were scrambled to rescue an F105G crew (Ashcan 01) and F-4 crew (Gunfighter 82) downed near 

Mu Gia Pass and an F-4 crew (Falcon 74) downed in northeastern 

Laos. All missions were long, involved, and dangerous and tasked the 

crews and machines to the limit. As a result of their efforts and the 

efforts of supporting A-1s and FACs, one man from the F-105 and 

both members of each of the F-4s were recovered and sent home.

However, those successes were not just blind luck. They were the 

result of some other improvements made to rescue forces in general 

in the theater. When the 40th was moved to NKP, it was then based 
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 37

with several other key and developing components of the overall SAR 

force. The 1st Special Operations Squadron (SOS), the remaining 

USAF A-1 unit, was also stationed there. Its primary mission was SAR 

support, and it kept several aircraft on alert at all times for SAR tasking. 

The 3d ARRG had a command and control center there, call sign 

Joker, which provided critical command and control and liaison for 

the various SAR forces. Joker had an intelligence section, and during 

1971, it established a critical intelligence link to Task Force Alpha 

(TFA), also located at NKP. TFA commanded and controlled all of 

the sensors implanted along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other areas of 

SEA. The data that it was collecting could be very useful in real time 

for SAR missions. As missions occurred, Joker began asking TFA for 

data, which it then began passing out to the rescue and support 

squadrons and/or briefing directly to the crews as they prepared for 

their missions. Additionally, Joker procured secure radios, giving 

TFA the capability to pass intelligence by voice via secure communications to the aircrews in their aircraft, which had compatible equipment. This node was in full bloom for the December SARs.

Courtesy Air Force Historical Research Agency

Satisfied customer. 1st Lt Woody Bergeron after being rescued from Mu Gia 

Pass, Laos, in December 1969.
38 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

Also stationed at NKP was the 23d TASS. This FAC unit currently flew the OV-10 and patrolled over large sections of Laos and 

Cambodia. Like all FAC units, its pilots were able to initiate and support SARs as a basic skill. Recently, though, 15 of its OV-10s had been 

highly modified with some new and exciting technology. The aircraft 

were equipped with the Pave Spot, an optical system that the weapons 

systems operator (WSO) in the backseat ran. It was designed to provide magnification for better visual reconnaissance along the Ho Chi 

Minh Trail. Built into the Pave Spot was a laser designation system 

that allowed the WSO to illuminate a target with an energy beam so 

that a laser-guided bomb (LGB) could track the beam to the designated target. This system was proving to be extremely useful against 

trucks and supplies along the trail. It was also effective for destroying 

antiaircraft guns, something of great use in SARs.52

Additionally, the 15 OV-10s were equipped with a long-range aid 

to navigation (LORAN) system, a precise (for its day) navigational 

device integrated into the Pave Spot system. When a target was designated on the ground with a laser beam, the crew would get a LORAN 

readout on its exact location, which could be expressed in either a 

military grid system or geographical coordinates. Those coordinates 

could be passed to another LORAN-equipped aircraft. That aircraft 

could then be flown to that point to drop bombs or cluster bomb 

units (CBU) on the position through the weather with reasonable 

accuracy. These CBUs could also be area-denial ordnance that could 

protect the survivor for a period of time until the rescue forces 

could arrive. 

If the delivering aircraft was dropping a bomb capable of being 

guided by the laser beam from the OV-10, the LGB could be dropped 

through the weather and then guided to the target by the laser designator on the “Pave Nail” OV-10s, as they came to be called. The use of 

a laser/LORAN combined system proved an effective way to deliver 

bombs through the weather, even for precision delivery, and to destroy antiaircraft guns. 

Beyond this, though, it did not take the crews long to realize the 

value of the laser/LORAN combination not only in SAR situations for 

finding and pinpointing survivors but also for leading non-LORANequipped aircraft at least to the area of the survivor, where they could 

then use their own limited navigational systems. Effectively, this 

meant that the Pave Nail could provide the precision navigation that 

was lacking on the LNRS aircraft. While not the optimum solution, 
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 39

certainly, this capability was a definite battlefield expedient until the 

HH-53s could be equipped with LORAN or some other long-range 

precision navigational device.53

Very soon, young officers from the various squadrons at NKP were 

holding informal conferences to compare tactics and to explore how 

these new technological advances could be used in the SAR arena. 

Such extemporaneous meetings led to many “bar-napkin agreements” among the participants as they jotted down their ideas in the 

various unit “hootch bars.” The Nails proposed that the Pave Nail aircraft should be called in early in any SAR situation to quickly determine the exact survivor position. They even developed a procedure 

whereby in bad weather that prevented visual search, they could use 

a collection of automatic-direction-finding cuts taken from a survivor’s radio using precisely recorded LORAN positions to calculate a 

location within 1,000 meters—accurate enough to enable SAR operations in instrument flight rule (IFR) conditions. The crews then 

used three-dimensional tactical maps of the area and literally 

planned a best approach to the survivor’s location through the 

weather, which could then be used by the Jolly Green crew in a Pave 

Imp–equipped aircraft. 

The after action report written for the Ashcan 01 SAR mission explained how this procedure was accomplished to recover the one survivor:

The SAR [task force] arrived back at the scene at [5:45 a.m.] . . . and awaited 

first light. Major [Ken] Ernest’s crew in Jolly Green 30 (Jolly Low) secured a 

Doppler fix [determined by a Pave Nail] from over the survivor’s position to 

aid in returning to him and . . . descended through a hole in the clouds and 

began searching. Beginning his run-in to Ashcan 01[A] from about two miles 

southwest, Major Ernest was IFR, and required assistance in locating the survivor. The assistance was provided by a Sandy [A-1] and Pave-Nail.54

The Jolly crew members spotted the body of the F-105G WSO, but 

he was clearly dead. No recovery attempt was made. Instead, they 

overflew him to get the pilot. The report continued to say that “the 

coordination between the Jolly, the Pave-Nail, and the Sandy resumed 

as Jolly Green 30 continued to inch its way toward the [pilot] until a 

hover was established over [the pilot]. Approximately one hour had 

been spent in mostly IFR weather.” The survivor then spotted them. 

He recalled, “I could see the penetrator with the PJs coming down, 

and I could see the bottom of the helicopter, but the top of it was in 

the clouds. I thought that the chopper pilot must be having one 

helluva tough time trying to hover there, with the gusty wind, and 
40 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

him just about IFR. Anyway, they got me on the penetrator and pulled 

me aboard.”55

These new procedures were used in varying combination a week 

later to recover the crews from Gunfighter 82 and Falcon 74. Drawing 

upon intelligence provided through Joker, the laser/LORAN combination on the Pave Nails was used effectively to pummel enemy forces 

in IFR conditions. Then the precision navigation capability of the system was used to help steer the SAR task forces to the SAR areas and 

establish the necessary Doppler reference for the HH-53 to find and 

recover the survivors. This was truly unexpected value added to the 

SAR team. It was also testimony to the inventiveness and creativity of 

young aircrews from the various squadrons who were able to take 

new technology designed for specific purposes and then use it in innovative ways. For the HH-53 crews, these missions showed that the 

LNRS system, while clearly recognized as a limited tool, could still be 

used in unforeseen ways to effect successful recoveries, even when 

facing stiff enemy opposition. The combination of the powerful H-53 

heavy-lift helicopter and evolving technology was a potentially potent mix, especially if it was further combined with eager and smart 

young operators who would push the technology well beyond intended uses and limits. 

All of this was captured by the NKP wing commander, Col Jack 

Robinson, who wrote directly to the Seventh Air Force commander, 

now Gen John Lavelle, of these amazing events:

Recent introduction of sophisticated navigation and ordnance delivery systems designed for IFR conditions . . . have major implications for USAF rescue 

capabilities.

. . . The PAVENAIL can lead the helicopter directly over the survivor and 

provide a zero reference for the Jolly’s Doppler navigation system. This technique permitted the rescue of Ashcan 01[A] . . . in IFR conditions, and the 

PAVE IMP instrumentation proved invaluable in this situation. 

. . . TFA sensor monitoring provided real-time targeting of traffic attempting 

to move through the route structure into the survivor’s location.56

As the year ended, the 3d ARRG announced plans to reduce the 

40th ARRSq from 10 to eight aircraft and the 37th from eight to five 

as part of the overall withdrawal of USAF assets from SEA. For the 

year, 3d ARRG crews conducted 149 combat saves and 109 noncombat saves. The numbers were no longer presented by aircraft type. 
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 41

Several of the noncombat events were medevac missions conducted 

with the Pave Imp aircraft in remote locations.57

Just a few days into the new year, 1st Lt Steve Connelly reported to the 

40th as a new copilot. After graduating from the Air Force Academy in 

June 1970, he attended undergraduate helicopter training (UHT) 

with the US Army at Fort Wolters, Texas. This was a new program 

designed to address the overall USAF shortage of helicopter pilots 

caused by the steady attrition of now eight years of continuous combat in SEA. Heretofore, all USAF helicopter pilots attended the standard fixed-wing undergraduate pilot training and then, at some later 

point, were transitioned to rotary-wing assignments. As an expedient, 

the USAF decided to direct young officers through the US Army 

UHT program, and Connelly was one of the first. 

Courtesy Col Steve Connelly, USAF, Retired

Capt Ben Orrell and 1st Lt Steve Connelly with the 40th ARRSq at Nakhon 

Phanom AB, Thailand, in 1972

After completing his training at Fort Wolters, Connelly reported 

to the 1550th Aircrew Training and Test Wing (ATTW) at Hill AFB, 

where he received some Air Force–specific training and his pilot 
42 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

wings. Then he entered the HH-53 qualification course for eventual 

assignment to the 40th ARRSq at NKP. His “stick buddy”—the fellow 

student he was paired with—was Capt Mark Schibler. 

Schibler was a highly experienced helicopter pilot. He had been 

commissioned in 1962 through the Reserve Officer Training Corps 

(ROTC) program at the University of Oregon. After pilot training at 

Williams AFB, near Phoenix, Arizona, he was assigned to helicopters 

and flew the H-43 at several locations including Bien Hoa AB and 

Clark AB, the Philippines, before receiving his orders to the HH-53 

and a second combat tour.58

Partway through the course, maintenance problems limited available training sorties. The two pilots and an instructor pilot (IP) were 

farmed out to Hamilton AFB, California, to accomplish a portion of 

their training with the 41st ARRSq. In late December, though, the 40th 

ARRSq needed pilots, and the 1550th ATTW was directed to send its 

two NKP-bound students who were furthest through the course on to 

NKP to complete their training there with the 40th. Connelly and 

Schibler packed their bags and caught MAC flights to NKP.

Arriving there a few days later, Connelly was a bit overwhelmed. 

With barely 30 hours in the aircraft and still learning the systems and 

basic flight characteristics of the aircraft, he was paired with Capt 

Dave Pannabecker, an experienced IP, and placed on the flight schedule. 

He also tried to learn all he could from the “older” experienced pilots. 

He remembers, “I was pretty clueless; I was still learning the 53 and 

understanding how that whole package worked. . . . The Nails and the 

Sandys . . . the guys like [Dale] Stovall and Ben Orrell and Lou Grant 

were all captains [and] just seemed to me like they knew everything, 

while I was struggling to find my way to first base.”59

He also encountered a bias for which he was not prepared. He, 1st 

Lt Jim Casey, and 1st Lt Brian McDowell—the first UHT graduates to 

arrive at NKP—immediately sensed resentment that they were somehow not “real” pilots but products of inferior Army training. The 

three of them became very protective of each other and formed an 

informal copilots union for mutual support. Connelly recalls that 

“the copilots union was the low-life, bottom-feeding vermin that 

hadn’t been to pilot training. . . . They were undergraduate helicopter 

Army-trained guys who knew how to hover but weren’t real pilots. 

We were all second-class citizens. . . . We were the first ones over 

there. . . . And we turned out to be pretty good copilots, and over 

time, it was dispelled, but [initially] we were clearly second class.”60
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 43

Regardless, they were there and learned about combat flying within 

the maelstrom of what would turn out to be some of the heaviest 

fighting of the entire war.

Captain Schibler arrived a few days after Connelly. His “welcome” 

was also rather rushed, and within a week, he was in the combat upgrade program, flying with Capt Ken Ernest, an old friend from a 

previous H-43 assignment. The 40th launched sorties each day to 

cover two orbits, strategically placed so that the HH-53s could more 

rapidly respond to shot-down aircraft. The northern one was along 

the Laos–North Vietnam border southeast of Hanoi, and the southern 

one was over lower Laos, near the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Schibler was 

dispatched to both and also sat alert at NKP and the FOL at Ubon. He 

easily qualified as a rescue crew commander and entered upgrade to 

IP and then flight examiner.61 

By early 1972, development of and CONUS testing on the ELF 

system specified in MAC ROC #27-70 were completed. In March, 

the 40th received the first kit to modify one of its LNRS aircraft, 

which would help locate survivors quickly and provide terminal 

guidance to expedite recoveries. At the same time the new commander of the 3d ARRG, Col Cy Muirhead, forwarded to Seventh 

Air Force a request for ECM equipment for the HH-53s. This request 

was based upon the increasing sophistication and proliferation of 

radar-guided antiaircraft guns and SAMs being steadily brought 

south by the North Vietnamese. The aircrews needed equipment 

that gave them the ability to jam or counteract them. Seventh Air 

Force supported the request and published it as CROC 6-72. Headquarters (HQ) PACAF demurred, pointing out several problems 

concerning weight tradeoff on board the HH-53s and the physical 

size of a jammer capable of overcoming the large radar cross-section 

generated by the main rotor. MAC otherwise concurred with the request and began testing to answer PACAF’s concerns.62

On 27 March, Joker at NKP launched Jolly Greens 52 and 62 when 

it received a report of a downed Jolly Green aircraft in northeastern 

Cambodia. Jolly Greens 60 and 61 had departed NKP earlier to rendezvous with Jolly Green 64, which had departed Da Nang and was 

en route to NKP via Cambodia. At one point, the other two crews lost 

sight of Jolly Green 61. When the Jolly 61 crew did not respond to a 

radio check, the two crews began a visual search and spotted a large 

fire with black smoke. They swiftly realized that it was Jolly Green 61, 

HH-53C #68-10359. The crews of Jolly Green 60 and 64 tried to hover 
44 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

over the wreckage but were driven away by enemy ground fire. Both 

sustained damage to their aircraft. When Jolly Greens 52 and 62 arrived and could find no survivors, they escorted 60 and 64 to friendly 

fields and then returned to the crash site. Eventually, a PJ was able to 

descend to the crash site but was unable to search it in any detail because of the lingering fire. When a search was finally conducted, no 

survivors or remains were found. Instead, the searcher discovered 

that the cockpit and cabin had been reduced to ashes.63

The reason for the ECM upgrade request became brutally clear the 

next night when a radar-guided SA-2 missile hit and destroyed an 

AC-130 Spectre gunship operating along the Ho Chi Minh Trail 

southwest of Tchepone. There were no survivors, and there was no 

SAR. Two nights after that, several rounds of radar-controlled 57 mm 

fire hit and severely damaged another AC-130, call sign Spectre 22, 

also working along the trail but farther south. One wing was on fire. 

The aircraft commander, Capt Waylon Fulk, ordered the crew to bail 

out. Two members did so immediately. However, since the aircraft 

was still somewhat controllable, the rest of the crew elected to stay on 

board to try to save it. Fulk declared an emergency and turned toward their home base at Ubon. En route, though, the wing fire continued, and the aircraft steadily lost controllability. Fulk again ordered the crew to bail out, and the remaining 13 Airmen did so into 

the cold Laotian night. 

Other Spectre aircraft and several Pave Nail FACs swarmed into the 

area and began to locate the survivors using their onboard sensor/laser 

systems. The area where most survivors were located was relatively 

benign and mostly flat, and Joker considered launching the LNRS 

HH-53 out of NKP for the pickups. However, dawn was just an hour 

away; instead, Joker used the time to organize for a first-light maximum effort to recover all the survivors at once. An Air America helicopter recovered the first two Airmen to bail out and flew them to 

Pakse. HH-53s from both the 37th and 40th recovered the other 13. 

Maj Ken Ernest commanded one crew, with Capt Mark Schibler as 

copilot; Capt Dale Stovall and copilot 1st Lt Steve Connelly led another crew; and Capt Ben Orrell commanded a third.64

That same month, SSgt Rick Simmon reported to NKP for duty as 

a flight mechanic with the 40th. The son of a career USAF navigator, 

he had enlisted in the USAF in 1966 and, after basic training, served 

as a crew chief on UH-1F helicopters at Malmstrom AFB, Montana. 

Two years later, Simmon was selected to serve as an initial cadre crew 
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 45

chief on the new HH-53Bs and went through aircraft maintenance 

training at the Sikorsky plant at Stratford, Connecticut. He then 

joined the 40th ARRSq at Udorn AB and served a one-year tour. Returning to the CONUS in 1969, he reported to Edwards AFB, where 

he served as a UH-1 flight mechanic and flew local base rescue support. In the summer of 1971, he received orders to Hill AFB to qualify 

as an HH-53 flight mechanic and then proceed to the 40th ARRSq, 

now at NKP, for a second combat tour. Arriving as a highly experienced crew member, he was quickly put on the flight schedule and 

began to fly his share of combat rescue missions. He also became involved in training the younger Airmen assigned to the aircrews, 

stressing to them the critical job that the flight mechanic performed 

as an integral part of the aircrew.65

As rescuers were conducting the Spectre 22 SAR, the entire war in 

SEA was changing dramatically. The previous day, a multidivision 

force of North Vietnamese regulars invaded South Vietnam across 

the DMZ separating the two countries and from Laos. Even though 

US ground forces were being pulled out of South Vietnam, USAF and 

USN combat power was abundant, and at once swarms of fighter and 

attack aircraft sprang into action against the invading divisions. The 

next nine months would be some of the most dramatic, and for the 

rescue crews, some of the most dangerous of the war, as aircraft fell 

from the sky almost every day. 

On 2 April 1972, as B-52s were bombing North Vietnamese armored and infantry units just south of the DMZ, a SAM shot down 

an accompanying EB-66, call sign Bat 21. Only one man of six, the 

navigator, was able to eject. He landed amidst 30,000 enemy troops. 

For the next 24 hours, several US Army helicopters and two HH-53s 

from the 37th ARRSq unsuccessfully tried to rescue the survivor. All 

were badly damaged or shot down. In the process, a supporting OV10 was also shot down. The pilot was captured, and the backseater 

was evading. The Air Force launched hundreds of supporting air 

strikes against the enemy units in an attempt to beat down the enemy 

guns. Three days later, Jolly Green 67, an HH-53C #68-10365, was 

shot down while trying to pick up the two men. All six men on board 

were killed. Captain Schibler was flying a backup aircraft on that mission and watched Jolly Green 67 go down. The message presented 

was obvious—even heavily armored helicopters would have a hard 

time surviving during daylight operations over massed and heavily 

armed enemy formations. Increasingly, as the North Vietnamese 
46 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

brought more antiaircraft guns and now even SAMs farther south, 

there were ever more places where helicopters could not go. 

Watching this debacle, the MACV commander, Gen Creighton 

Abrams, decreed that there would be no more helicopter rescue attempts 

for the men. Five days later, a small team consisting of a USMC lieutenant colonel, a US Navy SEAL, and seven South Vietnamese commandos extricated the two men in daring night surface recoveries.66

Courtesy Gary Ferentchek

Jolly Green 67, HH-53C #68-10365. On a mission to rescue two downed 

Americans in South Vietnam on 6 April 1972, the helicopter was shot down 

and destroyed, killing all six Airmen aboard.

On 13 April, in a battle almost as epic, a Jolly Green crew from the 

40th ARRSq, led by Capt Ben Orrell, flew into central Laos to recover 

a USMC A-6 pilot shot down while bombing enemy trucks and supplies on the Ho Chi Minh Trail destined for the major battles raging 

farther south. Again braving the massed enemy gunners along the 

now infamous trail, Orrell and his crew of the “low” bird reached a 

hover over Maj Clyde Smith. As the supporting A-1s laid down torrents of suppressive fire, Orrell held the aircraft steady long enough 

to get the pilot on board. Watching from above, Captain Stovall and 

his crew stood ready as the backup or “high” bird just in case the 

low bird needed assistance or had to abort. That day, though, their 

services were not needed, and they joined up with Orrell and flew back 
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 47

to NKP. For his efforts that day, Captain Orrell, described as “unpretentious, rock solid, steady, cool, and fearless,” was awarded the 

Air Force Cross.67

Three weeks after the loss of Jolly Green 67, the 37th was called out 

for a different type of rescue. The attacking North Vietnamese Army 

(NVA) forces had steadily pushed back the defending South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) forces and tried to envelop them as the ARVN 

struggled to defend the city of Quang Tri. The ARVN forces had their 

headquarters in an old French citadel in the center of the city. As the 

NVA pressed its attack, it slowly surrounded the citadel and threatened to capture the US Army, Air Force, and Marine advisors assigned to the headquarters staff. To evacuate them under fire, the 

37th dispatched five HH-53s with several A-1 escorts. Arriving as an 

attack was in progress, the first three Jollys landed one at a time and 

evacuated all 129 Americans as the A-1s provided perimeter defensive suppression. The fourth Jolly Green also landed in the citadel but 

left empty when the crew discovered that all of the Americans had 

already gotten out. Rescues came in all shapes and sizes.68

After the Jolly Greens exited the battle cauldron around Quang 

Tri, though, several USAF aircraft were shot down in the area over 

the next 24 hours. All were hit by the newly introduced SA-7 heatseeking missile. Capable of being carried and fired by one man, these 

weapons could be very effective against low-flying aircraft like helicopters. Consequently, decoy flare dispensers were rapidly installed 

on all HH-53s. No missile warning system was available. Detection 

had to be visual, and response had to be immediate. Consequently, 

the systems were configured so that any crew member could expend 

flares. Additionally, all crews carried flare guns that could also fool 

the missiles. As a result of these quick actions, no HH-53s were shot 

down by SA-7s in SEA.69

In response to the enemy offensive, the US military once again 

unleashed its airpower against North Vietnam. Strike packages 

headed for northern targets launched from air bases in Thailand and 

South Vietnam and from USN aircraft carriers. Accordingly, the Jollys 

began to get calls to fly farther north for recoveries.

Missions increased dramatically for the Jollys. Captain Stovall was 

on alert on 1 June when crews were scrambled to rescue an F-4 WSO, 

Capt Roger Locher. He had been shot down 23 days earlier northwest 

of Hanoi and had been evading. Launching with escort A-1s, Stovall 

and crew and their wingman proceeded north. As they crossed into 
48 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

North Vietnam, MiGs challenged their flight. The slow-moving HH53s and A-1s had to take wild, evasive action to keep from being shot 

down. Their actions depleted their fuel, and they had to return emptyhanded. Planning began immediately for a much larger effort the 

next day. Fully aware of the enemy threat so near Hanoi, the Seventh 

Air Force commander, Gen John Vogt, authorized a huge package of 

119 aircraft to provide support such as MiGCAP, SAM suppression, 

and tankers. Launching the next morning, Stovall and his crew were 

Jolly Green 30. His wingman was Jolly Green 60, commanded by 

Capt Jerry Shipman. This time, the Jolly/Sandy task force was able to 

reach the survivor. Stovall was flying one of the HH-53s with the 

newly installed ELF. It picked up Locher’s radio signal from 40 miles 

away and gave excellent guidance directly to him. Stovall brought his 

helicopter to a hover over Locher and swiftly hoisted him aboard as 

the escort A-1s attacked enemy guns in the area. The force then 

turned south and headed back to Thailand. En route, the A-1 pilots 

spotted an enemy train full of supplies and heavily damaged it. This 

was the deepest penetration of a rescue task force into North Vietnam in the entire war. Subsequently, all HH-53s in Thailand received 

the ELF system.70

On 20 May, Capt Mark Schibler led a crew that flew to within 35 

miles of Hanoi to recover the crew of an F-4 shot down in an air-toair engagement. They were able to recover the pilot, Capt John Markle, 

but could not reach the WSO before he was captured. Schibler received the Silver Star for that mission.71

On 27 June, Capt Dale Stovall and crew, including SSgt Rick Simmon, 

again proceeded deep into North Vietnam to pick up another downed 

F-4 crew member located 70 miles west of Hanoi, near the Red River. 

Coming to a hover as ground fire had already driven away another 

Jolly Green, Stovall held the aircraft steady as Simmon lowered the 

penetrator to the survivor and a PJ whom the other Jolly Green had 

inserted to help with the recovery. With escort A-1s attacking enemy 

forces and laying down smoke screens, the onboard PJs firing their 

miniguns, and enemy rounds striking the aircraft, Simmon stood in 

the open door and steadily raised the survivor and pararescueman 

into the aircraft. As they reached the cabin door, he dragged them 

into the aircraft and called for Stovall to depart the area. Simmon 

then instantly began applying first aid to another crew member who 

had been wounded while they held their hover. For their actions that 
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 49

day, all crew members were highly decorated. Sergeant Simmon was 

awarded the Silver Star.72

As part of the enemy offensive, small teams of Viet Cong routinely 

attacked the huge US air bases in South Vietnam. On 18 August, they 

bombarded the Da Nang airfield with a barrage of 122 mm rockets. 

One of them slammed into the Jolly Green alert area and severely 

damaged HH-53C #68-10361. Unfortunately, that proud veteran of 

the Son Tay raid was destroyed by the ensuing fire.73

The missions continued through the rest of the year as an average 

of two US and allied aircraft were being shot down a day. There were 

so many that it seemed as if they all ran together. As part of the continuing drawdown of US forces in Vietnam, the 37th ARRSq was inactivated on 30 November 1972. All remaining personnel, aircraft, 

and equipment were transferred to the 40th ARRSq at NKP. It would 

remain as the sole rescue unit in SEA and provide top cover for the 

residual USAF forces in Thailand. The 40th continued to maintain an 

FOL at Da Nang and Saigon.74

In late December, Captain Shipman and his crew were sitting on 

night alert with one of the LNRS aircraft when they received an alert 

for a possible recovery mission. Another AC-130 gunship, Spectre 

17, had been shot down, again along the Ho Chi Minh Trail southeast 

of the deadly Saravane area in Laos. Only two of the crew members 

had gotten out. The vicinity was considered acceptable for use of the 

LNRS, and Shipman and crew as Jolly Green 32 took off. Using the 

LNRS, Shipman was able to fly directly to the first survivor and hover 

the big helicopter directly over him. Shipman then sent one of his PJs 

down on the hoist. He easily found the man and brought him back 

up. The system worked perfectly. Shipman then flew to the second 

survivor. He was in some dense brush and took longer to recover 

because the helicopter rotor downwash caused the brush to move, 

affecting the sensors for the Doppler navigation system and, at one 

point, causing Shipman and his crew to lose sight of the survivor. 

Fortunately, another Spectre was orbiting above and monitoring the 

recovery. Its crew used its sensors to vector the Jolly back around to 

him and pick him up. With both men then on board, the crew of Jolly 

Green 32 hovered around the area to insure that no other crew 

members were alive. Satisfied that they had the only survivors, they 

returned to NKP and logged the first successful LNRS rescue. 

Shipman was impressed. Even though they had been right along a 

portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, they had encountered only minor 
50 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

ground fire. To all involved, the tactical benefits of operating at night 

were obvious. As Shipman later summed up, “The ability to go in 

there blacked out at night gives you a definite advantage because the 

gunners just can’t see you.” Shipman was also impressed with the role 

played by the Spectre crew, stating in his mission report that “the 

combination of the NRS [night recovery system] equipped HH-53 

and the AC-130 could play an increased role for night rescue operations if a limited training program could be developed.”75

Another dramatic rescue attempt occurred in December. While 

supporting the massive Linebacker II bombing operations against 

North Vietnam, an F-111, call sign Jackel 33, was shot down about 50 

miles west of Hanoi in the early morning hours of the 23d. The two 

pilots, Capt Robert Sponeybarger and 1st Lt Bill Wilson, evaded for 

three days before Sponeybarger was captured. A rescue task force of 

Jolly Greens and A-7s, now performing the Sandy mission, tried to 

get into the area but was blocked by the poor weather and thunderstorms. Wilson continued to dodge the enemy search teams, and on 

the 27th, four Jolly Greens from the 40th, led by Capt Rick Shapiro in 

Jolly Green 01 and supported by a task force of 13 A-7Ds, two HC130s, and 32 F-4s, flew in to pick him up. 

Entering the survivor’s area, the A-7s laid down a smoke screen 

and began to attack enemy targets as Shapiro went for the survivor, 

drawing enemy fire as he did. The flight mechanic, Sgt Chuck Rouhier, 

spotted Wilson and began to lower the penetrator. Wilson ran for the 

penetrator and was almost on when he slipped and fell down a steep 

incline. As Shapiro tried to reposition for another attempt, his copilot 

was hit in the arm and bleeding badly. Given this development and 

the steadily increasing and accurate ground fire, Shapiro decided to 

pull out without the Airman. 

Struggling with the now badly damaged aircraft, Shapiro rendezvoused with an HC-130 tanker over northeastern Laos because he 

did not have enough fuel to get back to any base in Thailand. Unfortunately, the enemy fire had also damaged the aircraft’s refueling 

probe, and it could not take on any fuel. Facing fuel starvation, Shapiro 

put the helicopter down in a benign area, and his wingman picked up 

Shapiro and his crew. However, the area was not secure, so the escorting 

A-7Ds had to destroy HH-53C #69-5788. Wilson evaded for several 

more days as other efforts were mounted to support him with supply 

drops. While evading, though, he stumbled into enemy troops and 

was captured.76
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 51

When the 37th ARRSq inactivated, most of its helicopters and a 

number of its personnel were moved to the 40th at NKP. This caused 

an overage of rescue crews in the 40th, and some personnel were allowed to curtail their tours and return home. Lieutenant Connelly 

had been flying as an aircraft commander since his upgrade in September and decided to take the early return. His 11 months at NKP 

had been eventful. He had flown on several significant missions, 

amassed a wealth of combat flight experience, and had 15 saves to his 

credit. He transferred to the 41st ARRSq at Hamilton AFB.77

Courtesy Air Force Historical Research Agency

Rescue forces were proud of their saves.

US military forces stopped all combat operations in South and 

North Vietnam on 28 January 1973, in accordance with the peace 

treaty signed in Paris between the United States, South Vietnam, 

and North Vietnam. The 40th terminated operations at its FOLs at 

Da Nang and Saigon. Combat operations in Laos ended one month 

later. But direct military operations did continue in Cambodia as 

well as support operations throughout the theater. To assist these 

operations, the 40th still had 11 aircraft, of which five were Pave 
52 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

Imp–modified. The unit kept two HH-53s on alert at NKP and two 

at Ubon AB for daytime rescue operations and one LNRS aircraft on 

alert at NKP at night.

Finishing his tour with the 40th ARRSq in March, Sergeant Simmon 

returned to Hill AFB. His tour had been fruitful. He learned to use 

the first generation of NVGs and had upgraded to flight mechanic 

instructor. He had flown on several intense SAR missions in Laos and 

North Vietnam. For his individual actions, Simmon had been 

awarded two Silver Stars, two Distinguished Flying Crosses, and numerous air medals and campaign ribbons, quite an accomplishment 

for an enlisted man. At Hill, he would train new HH-53 flight mechanics and pass along to them the intricacies of the fine art of the 

integral crew coordination so critical to the safe and effective operation of the HH-53.78

In March an HH-53 flew to a US Navy ship off of Saigon to deliver 

a doctor and medical supplies to care for a critically sick Sailor. Two 

months later, a USAF A-7D went down in the Tonle Sap Lake in central 

Cambodia, killing the pilot. A 40th crew recovered the body. The 

next day, the Ubon HH-53s were launched to successfully rescue the 

pilot and WSO of an F-4 that went down in northeast Cambodia. The 

unit also began to get increased calls from units and bases within 

Thailand to perform medevac missions.

Tragically, on 14 June 1973, Jolly Green 64, HH-53C #68-10362, 

experienced an undetermined flight control malfunction and crashed 

in the Tonle Sap Lake. Three crew members were killed. The two PJs 

were able to bail out and were successfully recovered. On 15 August 

1973, per US congressional mandate, all combat operations ceased in 

Cambodia. The Ubon FOL was then terminated and all 40th operations consolidated at NKP. As of that date, USAF rescue forces were 

credited with 2,683 combat and 1,290 noncombat saves in SEA. More 

importantly, the rescue forces helped to maintain the morale of the 

aircrews who had to fly in every corner of the war. Stated General 

Vogt, the Seventh Air Force commander in 1972 and 1973, rescue 

was “absolutely essential for the morale of the combat crews. The guy 

had to have a feeling that he had some chance if he were shot down. . . . It 

did instill in the combat crews a feeling that they had a fighting chance.”79
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 53

Notes

1. Anderson, United States Air Force Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia [hereafter 

referred to as USAF SAR in SEA for all editions], 1961–66, Project CHECO (Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations) Report, 16. 

2. Ibid., 42.

3. Tilford, Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 84.

4. Ibid.; and Anderson, USAF SAR in SEA, 1961–66, Project CHECO Report, 76.

5. McLeaish and Silvis,“Southeast Asia Operational Analysis,” 3d ARRG study, 6, 10.

6. Ibid., 12–18.

7. History of the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (hereafter referred to as 

History of ARRS), 1 July 1970–30 June 1971, vol. 1, 191.

8. Ibid., 190.

9. Ibid., 191.

10. McLeaish and Silvis, “Southeast Asia Operational Analysis,” 3d ARRG study, 12.

11. Tilford, Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 90, app. A.

12. Durkee, USAF SAR in SEA, July 1966–November 1967,Project CHECO Report, 17.

13. LaPointe, PJs in Vietnam, 356.

14. Ibid.; and Galdorisi and Phillips, Leave No Man Behind, 326.

15. History of the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (hereafter referred to as History of 40th ARRSq), Detachment 1, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1968, 1.

16. Ibid., 9; and Overton, USAF SAR in SEA, November 1967–June 1969, Project 

CHECO Report, 21.

17. History of 40th ARRSq, Detachment 1, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1968, 3.

18. Overton, USAF SAR in SEA, November 1967–June 1969, Project CHECO Report, 

39. Kenny Fields, the A-7 pilot, eloquently tells this story in his book, The Rescue of Streetcar 304: A Navy Pilot’s Forty Hours on the Run in Laos, published in 2007.

19. Overton, USAF SAR in SEA, November 1967–June 1969, Project CHECO Report, 69.

20. Ibid., 54.

21. History of ARRS, 1 July 1970–30 June 1971, vol. 1, 194.

22. “H-53 Night Operation,” Sikorsky News, May 1972, 4–9.

23. Gambone, Pave Low III: That Others May Live, 5, 25; Overton, USAF SAR in 

SEA, November 1967–June 1969, Project CHECO Report, 54–57; History of ARRS, 1 

July 1970–30 June 1971, vol. 1, 194; message, 191331Z MAY 70, CSAF to MAC, subject: Pave Star Night Recovery System; message, 212209Z MAY 70, CSAF to AFSC, 

MAC et al., subject: Pave Star, 21 May 1970; and message, 251620Z AUG 71, MAC to 

CINCPACAF et al., subject: Pave Imp Combat Eval.

24. “H-53 Night Operation,” May 1972, 4, 13. 

25. Overton, USAF SAR in SEA, November 1967–June 1969, Project CHECO Report, 

42–46, app. A.

26. Lynch, USAF SAR in SEA, 1 July 1969– 31 December 1970, Project CHECO 

Report, 7.

27. Ibid., table 1.

28. History of the 3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group (hereafter referred to 

as History of 3d ARRG), 1 Jan–31 Mar 1970, 17.

29. Ibid., 1 Apr–30 June 1970, 18.
54 │ Of JOLLY GREENS . . .

30. Lowe, USAF SAR in SEA, 1 January 1971–31 March 1972, Project CHECO 

Report, 27.

31. “Pilots Praise HH-53C in Pacific Run,” Sikorsky News, Sept 1970, 5.

32. Manor, “Son Tay Raid,” 8.

33. History of ARRS, 1 July 1970–30 June 1971, vols. 1, 2.

34. Ibid., viii. 

35. Manor, “Son Tay Raid,” 8.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Comer, interviews.

40. Lynch, USAF SAR in SEA, 1 July 1969–31 December 1970, Project CHECO 

Report, table 3.

41. History of 3d ARRG, 1 Apr–30 June 1971, 13.

42. History of 40th ARRSq, 1 July–30 Sept 1971, 24.

43. History of 3d ARRG, 1 July–30 Sept 1971, 13, 24.

44. Lynch, USAF SAR in SEA, 1 July 1969–31 December 1970, Project CHECO 

Report, 16–18; and History of the 3d ARRG, 1 Apr–30 June 1971, 16.

45. Lt Col John H. Morse, “Final Evaluation Pave Imp Operational Test Order 

6-6-71, HH-53,” 9 July 1971; message, 120900Z AUG 71, Headquarters (HQ) 7AF 

TSN AFLD RVN to PACAF and various, subject: Pave Imp; message, 251620Z AUG 

71, MAC to PACAF et al., subject: Pave Imp Combat Eval; and message, 130800Z 

SEP 71, HQ 7AF TSN AFLD RVN to CINCPACAF/DO, subject: Pave Imp. See also 

History of 3d ARRG, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1971, vol. 1, 14. 

46. Ibid. 

47. Ibid.

48. History of ARRS, 1 July 1971–30 June 1972, vol. 1, 139.

49. “HH-53B Modified for PAVE LOW,” Sikorsky News, June 1972, 8.

50. Francis and Nelson, USAF SAR in SEA, 1 April 1972–30 June 1973, Project 

CHECO Report, 17.

51. History of the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (hereafter referred 

to as History of 37th ARRSq), 1 Oct–31 Dec 1971, 15. 

52. History of the 23d Tactical Air Support Squadron, 1 July–30 Sept 1971, in 

History of the 504th Tactical Air Support Group, vol. 3, 3–6.

53. Ibid.

54. Ernest, “Craziest SAR I’ve Ever Seen.” 

55. Ibid. 

56. Col Jack Robinson, 56 SOW commander, to 7AF/CC, subject: Improvements 

in Search and Rescue (SAR) Capabilities, letter, 30 Dec 1971, in History of the 56th 

Special Operations Wing (hereafter referred to as History of 56th SOW), 1 Oct–31 

Dec 1971, vol. 2.

57. History of 3d ARRG, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1971, vols. 1, 9, 15.

58. Schibler, interview.

59. Connelly, interview.

60. Ibid. 

61. Schibler, interview.
Of JOLLY GREENS . . . │ 55

62. Lowe, USAF SAR in SEA, 1 January 1971–31 March 1972, Project CHECO 

Report, 31.

63. Ibid., 71; History of 40th ARRSq, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1972, mission narrative; and 

Morse to the author, e-mail. 

64. Lowe, USAF SAR in SEA, 1 January 1971–31 March 1972, Project CHECO 

Report, 70; History of 40th ARRSq, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1972, mission narrative; and 

Connelly, interview.

65. Simmon, interview. 

66. This event is fully explained in Whitcomb’s book The Rescue of Bat 21.

67. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 1–5. 

68. History of 3d ARRG, 1 Apr–30 June 1972, 17.

69. Francis and Nelson, USAF SAR in SEA, 1 April 1972–30 June 1973, Project 

CHECO Report, 17.

70. History of 40th ARRSq, 1 Apr–30 June 1972, mission narrative; and Stovall, 

interview.

71. Schibler, interview.

72. Simmon, interview. 

73. History of 3d ARRG, 1 July–30 Sept 1972, 5-1.

74. Francis and Nelson, USAF SAR in SEA, 1 April 1972–30 June 1973, Project 

CHECO Report, 10.

75. Ibid.; Shipman, interview; and Hobson, Vietnam Air Losses, 244.

76. History of 3d ARRG, 1 Oct 1972–31 Dec 1972; Hobson, Vietnam Air Losses, 

244; Francis and Nelson, USAF SAR in SEA, 1 April 1972–30 June 1973, Project 

CHECO Report, 48; and Rouhier to the author, e-mail. 

77. Connelly, interview.

78. Simmon, interview.

79. History of 40th ARRSq, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1973, 102; ibid., 1 Apr–30 June 1973, 

152; History of 3d ARRG, 1 July–30 Sept 1973, 1; and Gen John Vogt, USAF oral history interview, transcript, 197, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA).

Chapter 3

. . . and Knives

The distinguished work of the . . . 21st [SOS] in Southeast 

Asia strengthened the Air Force’s entitlement to future special 

air operations roles. 

—Col Ray Bowers

21st Special Operations Squadron 

As part of the acquisition contract for the H-53, the Air Force 

ordered 12 CH-53C cargo helicopters in 1968 for special operations 

use. This was in response to a Headquarters Seventh/Thirteenth Air 

Force and MACV direct request. Increasingly, the joint headquarters 

had to call for heavy-lift helicopter support from units in South Vietnam for a variety of missions, such as aircraft recovery, artillery 

movement for indigenous forces, and the general transport of large or 

heavy equipment items. US Army CH-54s or USMC CH-53As were 

dispatched to fulfill the missions, but the transit times consumed 

large amounts of flying time and created serious logistical challenges. 

When the Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force requested the permanent 

assignment of a detachment of CH-54s in northern Thailand, MACV 

demurred and instead requested that the USAF acquire its own 

heavy-lift helicopters. On 20 April 1968, the Honorable Clark Clifford, 

secretary of defense, approved the initial buy of the 12 CH-53Cs, with 

later options for eight more.1

These aircraft were similar to the HH-53B/Cs, lacking only the 

in-flight refueling capability and some onboard armor protection. 

Interestingly, the acquisition did include one refueling kit and armor 

kit per two aircraft for later assignment flexibility. The first aircraft 

were destined for shipment to SEA for duty with the 21st SOS at NKP, 

Thailand. They would join a squadron highly experienced in all aspects 

of “special air warfare.”2

The 21st SOS derived from the 21st Helicopter Squadron (HS) and 

has a long heritage reaching back to its initial activation as a pursuit 

(fighter) squadron in 1936. Inactivated in 1946, the 21st SOS was 
58 │ . . . AND KNIVES

briefly reactivated from 1956 to 1957 as a helicopter squadron. It 

was again reactivated as a helicopter squadron at Shaw AFB, South 

Carolina, on 15 July 1967. Initially commanded by Lt Col Harry 

Hauser, the squadron formed 10 crews as personnel arrived and then 

trained them as much as the short time allowed. The squadron’s eight 

assigned CH-3 aircraft and 157 of its troops deployed to NKP in 

December. Arriving there, the 21st HS received another four CH-3s 

from the 20th HS based in South Vietnam but serving throughout 

the theater, and it prepared to begin operational missions. 

At NKP the unit was assigned to the 56th Air Commando Wing 

(ACW), commanded by Col Heinie Aderholt. The wing had recently 

been formed at NKP to prosecute increased air operations against the 

Ho Chi Minh Trail as the North Vietnamese developed and increasingly used it to move their supplies and troops to the battlefields in 

South Vietnam and Cambodia. Under the operation Muscle Shoals, 

the trail area would be seeded with a variety of electronic sensors to 

detect enemy forces and vehicles. The 21st would directly support 

that operation. Its assigned missions were to “(1) implement and support designated portions of Muscle Shoals by airlifting personnel 

and/or sonic or seismic detection devices to designated targets; (2) 

conduct intra- and intertheater airlift as required for self-support to 

provide faster reaction time of unit aircraft; (3) maintain a search and 

rescue capability; [and] (4) sustain a flare drop capability in support 

of local base defense and nearby Special Forces defense.” Precise 

placement of the sensors was critical. They had to be delivered to 

specific known locations to provide valid data for vehicle and troop 

movement analysis. Strike aircraft could then use the information as 

targeting data. Preliminary testing at Shaw AFB showed that this was 

a challenging task for the CH-3 crews, and it initiated an intense 

training program to bring the crews up to proficiency.3

By early January 1968, the crews were trained, and the unit was 

ready to execute its assigned mission. Using the call sign of Dusty and 

a numbered suffix, the aircraft would always fly in formations of two 

for mutual support and immediate rescue, if necessary. Within the 

next 60 days, the crews implanted 239 sensors along the trail and 

another 78 devices around the encircled USMC forces at the Khe 

Sanh forward base in South Vietnam. On 30 March, the 21st HS’s first 

aircraft was shot down on an insertion mission. The escort aircraft 

recovered all crew members. Once the crews were proficient at their 

primary task, they began to get secondary missions such as night 
. . . AND KNIVES │ 59

base-perimeter surveillance and purely administrative and logistics 

runs to other bases. 

To better determine the sensor locations, a special camera was 

mounted on the aft of the aircraft to visually record the implant position. The squadron also began flying missions to insert or extract 

small allied special forces teams for surveillance purposes. Unfortunately, the gross weight of the aircraft in full combat dress limited its 

hover capability to 1,500 feet, a serious limitation since much of the 

Ho Chi Minh Trail was in terrain above that elevation.

On 23 May 1968, Dusty 51, the leader of a three-ship mission to 

deliver sensors around Khe Sanh, had to abort the mission because of 

bad weather. The three helicopters scattered and tried to climb above 

the clouds. For unknown reasons, Dusty 52 crashed into the top of a 

pinnacle. Continued bad weather and enemy forces in the area precluded a ground search, and the five crew members and a combat 

cameraman on board were reported as missing in action.

As the squadron became known in the theater, it received more 

calls for missions. Several times, squadron members were directed to 

move heavy ground equipment such as aircraft engines, TACAN, or 

radar sites. They also received taskings to insert small teams into or 

extract them from North Vietnam, thus becoming adept at tactical 

mission planning, threat analysis, map reading, and working with 

FACs, A-1s, A-26s, and T-28s. In July a Dusty crew recovered the 

crew of a FAC O-2 that made an emergency landing at a small field in 

central Laos. The next day, another Dusty returned to the site and 

recovered the aircraft. That same month, the squadron was temporarily 

redesignated from a helicopter squadron to an air commando squadron. 

On 1 August 1968, per an order from PACAF, all air commando units 

were to change their designation to special operations units. The 56th 

ACW became the 56th Special Operations Wing (SOW). In parallel, 

the 21st also changed. However, its transition was a bit more notable 

because in a period of 31 days, the 21st went from being a helicopter 

squadron, to an air commando squadron, to the 21st SOS. 

The 21st gradually reduced its sensor-placing missions as other 

platforms, especially LORAN-equipped F-4s, arrived in the theater to 

drop the sensors. However, it did see a corresponding increase in insertion and extraction missions, especially in Laos. Frequently, it was 

called upon to augment the 20th SOS, which had those as its primary 

missions throughout the theater and used primarily CH-3s to do 

them. This role was formalized when the 21st’s mission statement was 
60 │ . . . AND KNIVES

modified to include infiltration/exfiltration as a secondary mission. 

The unit began conducting these assignments, called X-ray missions, 

for special operations personnel into northern Laos. It also began to 

support the Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and 

Observation Group (MACVSOG), which, under Operation Prairie 

Fire (PF), involved working with covert US Army teams in Laos. 

Many of the unit members had worked with these teams before in a 

variety of ways and were much more comfortable with this mission as 

opposed to the sensor mission. It was what classic air commandos—

now special operations forces—did.

On 11 December, an RF-4 was shot down in central Laos. An H-3 

Jolly Green from Udorn picked up the pilot but did not recover the 

WSO. The next day, Seventh Air Force directed the 21st to conduct 

an infiltration/search mission to find the missing man. The squadron 

launched three aircraft that delivered an indigenous team. It searched 

diligently but to no avail. Even though the mission was unsuccessful, 

the crews had to overcome some difficult challenges to get in and out 

of the landing zones. It further sharpened their skills and reinforced 

their confidence that they could handle the more demanding special 

operations missions. They flew five more PF missions that month. As 

1968 was ending, the squadron commander, Lt Col Harold Welch, wrote,

The most significant event during this quarter was the Squadron involvement 

in Operation PRAIRIE FIRE. The impact of this operation reached every operating level and required a complete and immediate reappraisal of tactics, procedures, and training. Flight line activities increased manyfold in configuring 

the aircraft to meet the new mission. All flight crews and operations supervisors 

responded to the commitment and in minimum time re-shaped our entire 

operational concept to assure the least possible exposure to enemy fire. This 

mission falls more in the role of the helicopter than did our previous mission.4

Unfortunately, events early in the new year would bring into question the ability of the CH-3 to accomplish these ever more arduous 

missions in this terrain, against this enemy. On 15 January 1969, 

Knife 52 (the new squadron call sign) and Knife 53 were en route 

from Dong Ha, South Vietnam, to NKP when they were contacted by 

a FAC who needed them to extract a small MACVSOG team that was 

in trouble. The two helicopters descended through the weather and 

rendezvoused with the FAC. As they were orbiting in preparation for 

the extraction, several rounds of 12.7mm fire hit Knife 52, rendering 

it uncontrollable and causing it to crash through 30-foot trees. Fortunately, the crew survived, and Knife 53 was able to extract all members. 
. . . AND KNIVES │ 61

A second aircraft was lost a month later on a sensor drop mission. 

Ground fire shot out one engine. The aircraft was flyable but could 

not climb high enough to clear the surrounding terrain. The pilot put 

the aircraft down in a controlled landing, and the wingman scooped 

in to pick up the crew. All missions were now flown as a minimum 

two-ship, and that policy was certainly saving lives. 

A third aircraft was lost a few nights later while performing night 

reconnaissance duties. This was not in combat and was attributed to 

pilot error. However, the accident did highlight the dangers of disorientation when flying at night and away from lighted fields and structures. 

All of these incidents reflected poorly on the CH-3. Additionally, 

21st SOS officers attending a PF planning conference in January had 

to explain to their Army counterparts that the aircraft was severely 

hover-limited at the higher elevations the teams needed for increased 

mission effectiveness. They confirmed that the CH-3s had to be limited 

to landing zones at a maximum of 3,000 feet above mean sea level. 

Even with these constraints, though, the Knives inserted 72 sensors 

and 147 special mines along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and hauled 

1,087 passengers and 51,885 pounds of cargo in the first quarter of 

the year.5

Over the summer, the 21st steadily reduced its sensor implant missions. Also, a detachment of CH-3s from the 20th SOS stationed at 

Udorn was reassigned to the 21st, increasing the squadron’s aircraft 

to 14. While the squadron kept some aircraft on call for more PF missions, their crews began to receive more taskings to work with indigenous forces in Laos and to support remote TACAN sites. In September 

Knife crews were dispatched into northern Laos to move 95 troops 

from a Laotian special guerilla unit (SGU) into an ongoing battle 

where the Soldiers were inserted under fire. The next week, those 

same aircraft flew to central Laos to move 756 refugees from Moung 

Phine to Moung Phalane. Eight helicopters made the move in one 

day, along with 11,460 pounds of cargo, to include live pigs. They 

replicated this mission three days later by moving another 660 personnel. Then the Knives were tasked to support Hmong forces in the 

Plain of Jars area of northern Laos. On another support mission for 

the Hmong, five CH-3s sling-loaded 183,500 pounds of equipment in 

two days of lifts.6

The Knives were now in high demand. One daily log entry from 

this period captures the diversity of their efforts:
62 │ . . . AND KNIVES

On 3 October, Major Arnau, Lt Col Hartman, TSgt Stagers, and TSgt Ramsey 

were low bird in a flight of three CH-3s on an emergency exfiltration of a forward 

reconnaissance team. The team had been under hostile fire, but Spads [A-1s] suppressed it before the helicopters went in to make the pickup and the aircraft 

received no hits. On the same day, six Knife helicopters transported 201 Laotian 

troops and 13,500 pounds of cargo from the SGU camp to Muong Phine.

The unit and its crews were becoming inextricably linked into the 

clandestine “out country” operations that were the “secret” part of the 

larger conflict in SEA. As the year was ending, the intelligence section 

of the 21st gave its Airmen an ominous warning. Tracking the number 

of antiaircraft guns being moved out along the Ho Chi Minh Trail by 

the North Vietnamese, it estimated that the number of firings against 

aircraft would triple in the next four months. Already, the HH-3s 

were having difficulty flying high enough to skirt the guns now available. This portended challenging times ahead.7

As 1970 began, the 21st crews continued to support indigenous 

forces in Laos. Early in January, they launched 13 aircraft and joined 

with several HH-53s from the 40th ARRSq to move Hmong tribes in 

response to an attack by NVA forces. Over a period of 10 days, they 

carried 232,000 pounds of cargo and 4,291 personnel while dealing 

almost continuously with low ceilings and visibility. 

Prairie Fire and X-ray missions continued as Knife crews responded 

to increasing calls for infiltration and exfiltration missions. When an 

A-1 unit was ordered to move from Udorn to NKP, the Knives flew 

several sorties to haul shipping containers full of unit equipment. At 

one point, they were asked to recover an A-1 that had crashed on the 

Plain of Jars. The load was too heavy for a CH-3, and the Knives 

escorted a US Army H-54 that deployed from South Vietnam to do 

it. The 21st also continued to receive calls to perform various civic 

action and medevac missions around the local area. Everybody had 

something for the helicopters to do. Then, in late February, the unit 

was informed that it would begin to receive new CH-53s projected to 

arrive at a rate of two per month starting in August. It would be better 

able to handle the steadily increasing enemy antiaircraft guns now 

along all sections of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. All CH-3s would be 

returned to the CONUS.8

In March 1970, Lt Col Wilbur Huff from the USAF Tactical Air 

Command (TAC) took delivery of CH-53C #68-10922. The first of 12 

ordered, it would be flown to Shaw AFB, where the first crews were 

training for duty in SEA with the 21st SOS.9
. . . AND KNIVES │ 63

On 8 August, the 21st SOS received its first CH-53C. A week later, 

the aircraft began initial training missions for the newly arriving 

crews. By early September, it began to replace the CH-3s on tactical 

missions and easily carried passenger and cargo loads three times 

larger than the CH-3s could hold. Its first combat mission was to support the insertion of indigenous troops into southern Laos to cut a 

portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. That same month, the unit received 

a new mission statement. All references to sensor delivery were removed. Now the unit was ordered to provide

1. airlift and limited defensive firepower in support of MACVSOG and . . . 

(controlled American source) operations;

2. mass evacuation of troops, dependents, and refugees from remote areas; 

3. helicopter support for remote TACAN sites; 

4. night reconnaissance support for air base defense; 

5. airlift of personnel and equipment to and from remote areas in case of 

aircraft crash, explosive ordnance disposal, and emergency medical evacuation;

6. unit aircrew training;

7. search and rescue as back up for the ARRS;

8. airlift for civic action in Thailand;

9. airlift for VIPs; [and]

10. other mission support as directed by higher headquarters.10

The unit continued to receive taskings for all of these missions as 

more CH-53s arrived. By the end of the year, seven CH-53Cs were on 

hand and flying missions in all areas under this more focused and 

specialized mission directive.11

As 1971 began, the 21st received two more CH-53s. The unit increasingly began to fly the more demanding combat missions as the 

CH-3s were pulled back for use on the logistics, administrative, and 

civic missions. The CH-53s were now used for X-ray missions and PF 

operations and began to suffer battle damage. Since the new aircraft 

and their pilots were new to these missions, the CH-53 crew spent a 

great deal of time listening to the “old heads” as they shared with 

them their accumulated knowledge of the theater and its weather patterns, how best to conduct tactical missions, and the overall heritage 

and legacy of these special operations missions. Steadily, too, they 
64 │ . . . AND KNIVES

developed the skills to make steep, high-speed approaches and departures from remote landing zones while under fire and supported 

by an assortment of FACs and fighter escorts, especially the venerable 

A-1s from NKP.12

New personnel also arrived to fly the CH-53s. One was Capt John 

Grove. He had been commissioned in 1965 and sent directly to pilot 

training. With his shiny new pilot wings, he flew C-141 transports 

until 1969, when he was sent to helicopter transition and then 

switched to flying H-3s—known as “Banana Boats”—at Patrick AFB, 

Florida, where his unit provided launch support for the Apollo space 

program. While there, he was asked if he would like to go to Southeast Asia to fly the new CH-53. He took the assignment. That fall he 

was at the transition course at Shaw and reported to the 21st at NKP 

in December 1970. As an experienced fixed-wing and helicopter pilot, 

he quickly upgraded to aircraft commander, then IP, and eventually 

flight examiner for the unit. Additionally, he was qualified to do functional check flights (FCF) for aircraft after they had received intensive 

maintenance and flew the acceptance flight for several of the new 

CH-53s as they arrived in Thailand. 

Grove also began flying the full gamut of missions that the Knives 

flew, especially support for the “Heavy Hook” MACVSOG operations. In mid-May1971, he flew the lead aircraft in a major POW recovery effort for a USAF OV-10 FAC shot down near Tchepone on 

the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The young pilot, 1st Lt Jack Butcher, had been 

shot down and captured by NVA forces a month prior. However, he 

had escaped, and intelligence sources indicated that he was evading 

near Tchepone. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center within MACVSOG headquarters in Saigon mounted a “Bright Light” recovery effort. 

Grove led the four CH-53s dispatched with a Heavy Hook team to 

recover him. Unfortunately, Butcher had already been captured, and 

enemy forces were waiting for the MACVSOG team. The Soldiers were 

attacked as they were unloading at the infiltration site. FACs overhead directed supporting A-1s against the enemy forces as the Soldiers 

broke contact, and Grove and his wingmen extracted all of the troops 

with several wounded.13

Reporting to the 21st SOS at about the same time was SSgt Tom 

Green. He had enlisted in the USAF in 1965 and trained as a crew 

chief on B-52s. In 1969 he volunteered for duty in Southeast Asia, 

trained as a helicopter crew chief, and then reported to the 40th 

ARRSq at Udorn AB to serve as a crew chief on the new HH-53s. 
. . . AND KNIVES │ 65

When that tour ended, he returned to Patrick AFB but soon volunteered for duty as a CH-53 flight mechanic and subsequently reported 

to the 21st SOS at NKP, Thailand. Quickly combat qualified, he flew 

the full gamut of missions common to the unit, especially several big 

missions to move large formations of Laotian troops into remote locations and infiltration and extraction missions in support of the 

MACVSOG teams. Green also flew many of the humanitarian missions that the unit was called upon to perform within Thailand.14

The 21st SOS lost its first CH-53 on 18 February 1971, when #68-

10929 encountered heavy antiaircraft fire while inserting a PF team 

in Laos. The accurate enemy fire destroyed the tail rotor just as the 

pilot, Capt Roger Korenberg, was flaring for landing. The resulting 

hard landing broke the tail pylon, destroying the aircraft. Fortunately, 

there was no fire. The crew was able to get out safely, although one 

crew member sustained a leg wound.15

The squadron lost its second CH-53 11 days later when #68-10931 

was hit by multiple rounds of enemy fire as it crossed a ridgeline in 

northern Laos and descended into a tight landing zone. The enemy 

rounds hit and damaged the left engine. With the loss of the engine, 

the pilot, Maj Milton Ramsey, did not have enough power to properly 

Courtesy Air Force Historical Research Agency

CH-53C #68-10933 and wingman, serving with the 21st SOS, inserting indigenous forces in Laos in 1971. It was destroyed on 13 May 1975 when it crashed 

37 miles south of Nakhon Phanom, killing its crew of five and the 18 security 

police Airmen on board. 
66 │ . . . AND KNIVES

flare and land the aircraft. The helicopter hit hard, began to break up, 

and caught fire. The two pilots, Ramsey and copilot Capt Albert Tijerina, 

were killed. The flight mechanic and gunners were able to escape, as 

were all passengers, although three were badly burned. Later in the 

month, Knife crews performed two rescues. The first was accomplished by a crew on a tactical mission in Laos when it picked up the 

crew of an Air America Pilatus Porter that lost its engine near the 

Ho Chi Minh Trail. The second occurred when a CH-53 crew on 

base defense recovered the crew of an AC-119 that bailed out 10 miles 

north of NKP.16

New CH-53s continued to arrive as the CH-3s were slowly withdrawn. By the end of the year, all CH-3s were gone, and 11 CH-53s 

were in the squadron. The squadron’s overall experience level steadily 

dropped as the initial cadre of CH-53 pilots began to rotate home. 

Additionally, the unit pilot training load increased when an ever 

higher percentage of the new arrival pilots were individuals who had 

cross-trained from fixed-wing aircraft or were recent graduates of helicopter pilot training. Capt John Grove spent the second half of his 

tour with the Knives instructing the new aircrews or administering 

check rides. He left the 21st in December 1971 for duty at Shaw as an 

H-3 IP.17

As Sergeant Green’s tour with the 21st SOS was ending in early 

1972, he realized that he had come to enjoy life in Thailand. Young 

and still single, he decided to volunteer for another combat tour, this 

time as a flight mechanic on HH-53s with the 40th ARRSq also there 

at NKP. His request was approved, and he just changed squadron 

patches. The flight mechanic duties for the two aircraft were almost 

identical; Green just had to be certified for in-flight refueling, which 

he accomplished on a local training mission. He adjusted easily, noting, though, that the two units had different work tempos. The 21st 

crews, most of the time, had a predictable flight schedule. They rarely 

maintained aircraft on alert anymore for immediate response. This 

made life at the 21st fairly routine. However, the 40th ARRSq always 

had aircraft and crews on alert for SAR duties. Life in this unit was 

much more reactive and much less predictable. The change took 

some adjustment. Green remembered of the two units, “At the 21st it 

was ‘you call—we haul.’ At the 40th, it was ‘you crash—we dash.’ ” 

Green’s timing was fortuitous. He subsequently flew in many of the 

large SARs that occurred during that halcyon year. He was on one of 

the Jolly Greens that flew in the Jackel 33 recovery effort. When Captain 
. . . AND KNIVES │ 67

Shapiro had to land his Jolly Green at a remote site in Laos because he 

could not refuel, Green’s aircraft commander, Capt Roger Bradley, 

landed near the downed aircraft. Green and one of the PJs aboard his 

aircraft ran to the other aircraft and collected several high-value and 

classified items before it was destroyed. After serving his three combat tours on both the CH-53 and HH-53, he finally left the 40th 

ARRSq in 1973 and was reassigned to the HH-53-equipped 76th 

ARRSq at Hickam AFB, Hawaii.18

When the North Vietnamese invaded South Vietnam in late March 

1972, numerous Thailand-based USAF units began supporting the 

South Vietnamese Army. The 21st SOS was not so tasked. Instead, it 

continued to conduct its standard assigned missions, with a decrease 

in controlled American source support flights and an increase in 

training sorties and night base-protection missions around NKP, to 

include working with local Thai police and river patrols on the Mekong 

River. These night sorties always carried two security policemen using 

starlight scopes for night vision. The unit also received a steady increase in requests for logistical and administrative sorties between 

the USAF bases in Thailand as all units stepped up operations against 

the enemy offensive.19

In September, 2d Lt Lorren “Rus” Stiles joined the unit. He had 

been commissioned out of the Air Force Academy in 1971 and had 

gone through helicopter flight school with the US Army. After finishing the HH/CH-53 course at Hill AFB, he reported to the 21st to find 

a unit full of mostly young officers and enlisted troops who were full 

of spirit and perhaps too much experience for their age. Within a few 

weeks, he was fully trained and combat ready and took his place on 

the flying schedule. His timing was fortuitous, for in October combat 

activity picked up for the 21st SOS when the squadron was tasked to 

support Laotian troops counterattacking NVA forces near Saravane 

in southern Laos as part of Operation Black Lion III. For several days, 

eight unit aircraft ferried 1,904 troops, several artillery pieces, and 

over 40,000 pounds of combat cargo in support of the successful 

effort to take control of the strategic town. Stiles participated in those 

operations and rapidly accumulated combat hours and an ability to 

read and navigate from military maps, especially at the low altitudes 

at which they had to fly to avoid the SA-7 heat-seeking missiles carried 

by the NVA troops. He also flew his share of TACAN site replenishment missions and civic action flights in Thailand.20
68 │ . . . AND KNIVES

On 22 November, Knife 30 joined two HH-53s and an HH-43 

from the 40th ARRSq to recover six crew members from a USAF 

B-52 that went down 12 miles southwest of NKP. One of the Jolly 

Green crews served as the on-scene commander as the Knife picked 

up four of the survivors and the HH-53 recovered the other two.21

The 21st SOS also continued to fly the base security mission each 

night over and around NKP. On the night of 18–19 December, a B-52, 

badly damaged on a Linebacker mission over North Vietnam, attempted to fly back into Thailand before the crew had to bail out. Rus 

Stiles was flying base security when the damaged aircraft flew near 

NKP, and he and his crew watched the B-52 crew eject. As the Airmen floated to the ground, a crew member on board using a starlight 

scope spotted the survivors, and Stiles and his crew rescued several. 

At one point, the base command center called them and asked if the 

alert NRS HH-53 should be launched. Stiles and his crew rejected the 

help and completed the mission. 

The last assault mission for the 21st SOS in Laos took place on 20 

January 1973, when seven of its aircraft teamed up with two Air 

America CH-47s to insert 1,166 Laotian troops to reopen a major 

road from Vientiane on the Mekong River to Luang Prabang in the 

north. Under the cover of USAF FACs and many air strikes, the operation was successful; however, ground fire damaged four of the Knife 

aircraft to varying degrees. Just 33 days later, though, the Knives, 

along with all other USAF forces in Thailand, were prohibited from 

entering Laotian airspace per a side agreement to the Paris Peace Accords that ended the Vietnam War. The Laotian and Hmong forces 

that we had supported since 1964 were now on their own.22 With the 

major reduction of missions, the 21st was soon tasked to provide 

night reconnaissance around the other major US air bases at Udorn, 

Ubon, and U-Tapao. This appeared to be a long-term commitment.

In February a new organization arrived at NKP. The Joint Casualty 

Resolution Center (JCRC) took up tenancy and began preparing 

teams to carry on the challenging task of finding and recovering the 

bodies of Americans who had been reported missing in the conflict. 

The 21st SOS was well known for its ability to transport teams of 

varying sizes to remote locations, and it received the mission to provide tactical transport to the JCRC. 

However, combat operations were still ongoing in Cambodia. 

Receiving orders from the United States Support Activities Group 

(USSAG)—the new headquarters set up at NKP as a detachment of 
. . . AND KNIVES │ 69

Seventh Air Force—the Knives began flying logistics support missions to the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh and also positioned 

aircraft at Ubon AB for possible emergency evacuation duty for 

American and designated allied personnel in Cambodia under 

Operation Eagle Pull. This requirement necessitated the cancellation 

of the night reconnaissance missions at the other bases. Unit crews 

also began flying training missions with the JCRC. In June Knife 

crews were called upon to recover the wreckages of an F-111 that 

crashed in central Cambodia and a Jolly Green 64 that crashed in the 

Ton Le Sap Lake. Stiles flew on those missions.23

The 21st received a new mission statement in June. It was to provide heavy-lift helicopter capability and defensive firepower for missions as directed by USSAG. This could include support for controlled 

American sources, TACAN site support, refugee evacuation, explosive ordnance disposal, civic actions, Security Service site support, 

general USAF support, and support for the JCRC. Training plans 

were designed accordingly and stepped up as newly arriving personnel replaced the experienced departing veterans. The next month, the 

Knives supported their first JCRC mission when they airlifted a team 

of 86 personnel led by Capt Chuck Hightower and 10,600 pounds of 

cargo to a site near Nha Trang, South Vietnam, to look for the 

remains of seven US Soldiers killed in the crash of a UH-1H in 1969. 

The mission was successful. 

The Knives flew logistics missions into Cambodia until all military 

activity there ceased on 15 August 1973. Their focus then shifted to 

maintaining the Eagle Pull alert at Ubon and conducting a panoply of 

missions throughout Thailand that utilized their heavy-lift capabilities. However, with the cessation of combat activity, flying hours were 

reduced, and the Thai government closed two key training areas and 

firing ranges. Training suffered until flight hours could be increased. 

That summer the unit was assigned the following CH-53C aircraft: 

#68-10925, -10926, -10927, -10928, -10930, -10932, -10933, #70-

1625, -1626, -1627, and -1628.24

In the latter half of the year, the 21st SOS maintained its alert posture 

at Ubon and worked to establish a full-spectrum training program to 

instruct the newly arriving personnel, to include live fire on a gunnery 

range for its gunners. It also flew several missions to recover aircrew 

who bailed out in Thailand and to provide medevac to local civilians. 

The 21st was also tasked to maintain the ability to launch sorties to 
70 │ . . . AND KNIVES

evacuate American and selected allied personnel from several sites in 

Laos under Operation Talon Blade. 

The squadron received an increase in flying hours as 1974 began. 

The JCRC requested its support on several training events as it prepared for more recovery missions. Working with crews from the 40th 

ARRSq, FACs, A-7s from Korat Royal Thai AB, and HC-130 “King” 

aircraft, the 21st initiated and staged a large SAR event just southwest 

of NKP. In May two Knife aircraft, again led by Captain Hightower, 

supported a United Nations team at Chiang Mai, Thailand, as it conducted operations to disrupt the production of opium. In this mission, the Knives hauled 295 passengers and moved 83,600 pounds of 

cargo. Another team flew to Phitsanulok, Thailand, to support a 

combined airborne exercise with US and Thai troops. Knife crews 

were also called upon to assume SAR alert several times to support 

the 40th ARRSq and to recover reconnaissance drones that went 

down in Thailand. As the unit adapted to a peacetime regimen, it was 

busier than ever supporting a true diversity of missions. At the same 

time, the older heads like Stiles were rotating out and being replaced 

Courtesy National Museum of the US Air Force

CH-53C #70-1628 serving with the 21st SOS. The CH-53s were called upon 

to perform all manner of utility operations.
. . . AND KNIVES │ 71

by mostly inexperienced younger Airmen. But such was the process. 

Stiles departed, though, well satisfied with his tour. He had amassed 

over 1,000 hours of solid tactical flying and had upgraded to aircraft 

commander and IP. He also felt that he had been given an extraordinary 

amount of responsibility for a new pilot on first assignment.25 

As the year was ending, the unit was alerted for possible execution of Operation Talon Blade as communist elements threatened 

two areas in Laos where American diplomatic personnel were located. 

The mission was cancelled, though, when the Laotian government 

interceded and protected those threatened. Reflecting this overall increase in activity, the squadron commander, Lt Col Carl Crews, wrote 

that “the morale of the 21st [SOS] is at an all time high. Increased flying and the diversity of the missions flown contributed to this state. . . . 

The ‘can-do/will-do’ capability of the 21st [SOS] has been most apparent to the 56 SOW, USSAG/7AF and JCRC.”26

40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron

After the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, the rest of 1973 was 

a quiet period for the 40th ARRSq. The Airmen who flew the heavy 

missions in 1971 and 1972 had all rotated home. With the drawdown, 

too, many more were given early returns and transferred to rescue 

units elsewhere in Asia, Europe, or the CONUS. Many had converted to helicopters for this tour and returned to assignments flying C-141s, C-130s, and so forth. The experience level in the squadron 

rapidly dropped. Consequently, the operational focus shifted to 

training and planning. Aircraft were kept on alert both day and night 

for inevitable calls for taskings such as intra-Thailand rescues, medevacs, and civic action responses. However, the unit mission remained 

as before; that is, the squadron had to be prepared to “search for, locate, 

and recover distressed personnel in combat operations in Southeast 

Asia.” Like the Knives, though, 40th crew members could also be 

called for medevac and heavy equipment movement within Thailand. 

The squadron planned and initiated training exercises to keep the 

aircrews qualified for all taskings.27

In October the 3d ARRG tasked the unit to reopen its FOL at Ubon 

and maintain aircraft there on alert status. This was in support of a 

contingency plan that dealt with the reinitiation of military operations 

in Cambodia. Along with the Knives, the unit was specifically to be 
72 │ . . . AND KNIVES

ready to support Operation Eagle Pull—the evacuation of remaining 

Americans and select indigenous personnel from Phnom Penh.28

In early 1974, the unit was also tasked to be ready to support Operation Talon Blade—an operational contingency to evacuate Americans and selected indigenous personnel from Vientiane, Laos. A series 

of local training exercises utilizing FACs from the 23d TASS, also still 

at NKP, and the A-7s based at Korat AFB was designed to practice the 

necessary command and control procedures and tactics, techniques, 

and procedures (TTP) necessary for this and Eagle Pull. Such training was also necessary to train the constant influx of new personnel, 

most of whom arrived with no combat experience.

One of those was 1st Lt Gary Weikel. Growing up in Ohio and 

graduating from the University of Cincinnati in the summer of 1970, 

he initially tried to join the Ohio Air National Guard (ANG) to fly 

F-100s. Problems with his flight physical, however, delayed his entry, 

and he was drafted. He subsequently enlisted in the Air Force and 

attended basic training at Lackland AFB, Texas. Graduating from 

that course, he was immediately selected for a commission and then 

walked across the street to attend Officer Training School. He graduated from that program as a distinguished graduate and requested 

pilot training with a desire to fly A-1s. Unfortunately, though, the 

A-1s were slowly being retired, and a slot in fixed-wing pilot training 

would not be available for possibly 14 months. However, a slot was 

available in the next helicopter training course, and Weikel took it. 

He then attended training with the US Army at Fort Wolters, Texas, 

and Fort Rucker, Alabama, and graduated at the top of his class. At 

both locations, he flew with older USAF officer instructors who had 

logged many hours of combat in SEA. Weikel was especially taken 

with their skills and wisdom, and they convinced him that he wanted 

to fly with the 20th SOS still in South Vietnam. He subsequently attended USAF helicopter top-off training at Hill AFB and then received an assignment to fly the UH-1P gunship with the 20th SOS. 

The UH-1P qualification course was also taught by MAC at Hill AFB, 

and Weikel flew with several IPs who had more combat experience, like 

Maj Herb Cullers and Maj Mike Douglas, who reinforced his desire 

to get into the 20th. By the time his course was complete, though, the 

USAF had begun reequipping the 20th SOS with UH-1N aircraft, and 

Weikel was diverted to Luke AFB, Arizona, a TAC base, where he did 

fly the UH-1P with returning 20th SOS veterans in the base support 

flight. He and Lieutenants Bill Hudspeth, Ron Vickroy, and Mike 
. . . AND KNIVES │ 73

Williams flew a great deal, soaked up a tremendous amount of tactical 

sense from the old heads, and upgraded to aircraft commander before Weikel received an assignment to HH-53s with the 40th ARRS at 

NKP, reporting in November 1974. 

In late spring of 1974, Weikel once again reported to Hill AFB, this 

time for qualification on the HH-53. While there, he learned to fly the 

much larger aircraft from instructors like Steve Connelly, Mark 

Schibler, and Ben Orrell. Weikel initially chafed at the program because MAC was much more regulations-oriented than TAC. Regardless, the instructors suffused him with another dose of hard-learned 

combat knowledge, to include NRS training, before sending him on 

his way to NKP.29

Right behind Weikel was 2d Lt Rich Comer. He graduated from 

the Air Force Academy in June 1973, one of 25 new lieutenants in his 

class who decided to go to helicopter pilot training (2d Lt Donny 

Wurster was also in that class). A month later, he reported to Fort 

Rucker, Alabama, to attend basic helicopter training with the US 

Army. There he trained on TH-55 and UH-1H helicopters. He did 

well in his class and was able to select an assignment to HH-53s with 

the 40th ARRSq at NKP. Then he proceeded to Hill AFB for his HH-53 

class date in August 1974. In his class of eight students, all were heading for the two squadrons at NKP. His flying partner was 1st Lt Dick 

Brims, going over to fly the CH-53. Also in the class was Lt Col John 

Denham, initially assigned to the 40th. While at Hill, though, Denham 

was reassigned to take command of the 21st SOS. One of his IPs was 

Captain Connelly, who qualified Comer in the NRS aircraft. Finishing 

the course in October, Comer then took some leave before departing 

for Southeast Asia, arriving at NKP on Christmas Eve. Within a week, 

he was on the flying schedule, quickly qualified as a combat copilot, 

and crewed with Capt Barry Walls. Then he and his crew sat alert 

periods at NKP and also rotated down to Ubon AB for the same duty.30

Realizing that the fighter aircraft were steadily being reduced in 

Thailand, the 40th squadron training and tactics personnel reviewed 

mission reports from the later combat years and designed a series of 

exercises to work with AC-130s to refine night recovery procedures. 

They tested using an X-band beacon on top of the helicopter that 

would allow the AC-130 to view it with its side-looking radar. Such a 

capability would allow the AC-130 then to provide immediate precision navigation assistance or direct fire support.31
74 │ . . . AND KNIVES

1975 Southeast Asia Endgame

As the new year began, the US Air Force still had a considerable 

presence in Thailand. Located at the Udorn, Korat, and NKP Air 

Bases were six fighter squadrons with F-4s and A-7s, a reconnaissance squadron with RF-4Cs, a gunship squadron with 17 AC-130s, a 

FAC squadron with 40 OV-10s, and the two helicopter units—the 

21st SOS and 40th ARRSq at NKP—with 10 and nine aircraft, respectively. Both were providing top cover for their brother units and were 

involved in a variety of missions utilizing their unique capabilities 

and the skills of their crews. 

The 21st SOS had aircraft and crews engaged in a variety of missions 

across Thailand. The US Army Advisory Group / Seventh Air Force 

(USAAG/7AF) accepted a request from the Southeast Asia Treaty 

Organization to dispatch two CH-53s to support a multinational 

medical team operating throughout Thailand. Later in the month, 

two more aircraft were dispatched to southern Thailand at the request of the king of Thailand to provide disaster relief after a typhoon 

devastated the area. The squadron suffered a terrible loss on 24 January 

when CH-53C #70-1628 crashed while on an FCF. The crew and a 

maintenance specialist were killed. 

Communist forces in Cambodia continued to mount threats 

against the central government, and the security of Americans still in 

that country was increasingly in doubt. The next month, USSAG/7AF 

tasked the squadron to conduct a rehearsal of Eagle Pull. Eight aircraft were launched and arrived at their designated landing zones on 

time. Additionally, unit aircraft started working with AC-130 gunships as they developed procedures for vectoring the helicopter onto 

landing zones and then providing protective fire. The daytime procedures worked well, but the use of lasers on board the AC-130s during 

night operations was disorienting to the Knife pilots and was not accepted as a valid tactic. As events continued to deteriorate in Cambodia, 

the 21st received ever more explicit instructions for pending operations 

and, by the end of March, was maintaining crews on six-hour alert.32

The 40th ARRSq became steadily more interlinked with the 21st 

SOS as it also dispatched helicopters to help with the typhoon flooding in southern Thailand and then responded to the CH-53 crash in 

January. In March the unit was ordered to move its FOL from Ubon 

to Korat. As conditions continued to deteriorate in Cambodia—and 

the US ambassador, the Honorable John Gunther Dean, ordered the 
. . . AND KNIVES │ 75

initiation of phased evacuation operations under Operation Eagle 

Pull—the 40th was also placed on alert for that operation, and the 

two squadrons began to coordinate their actions. Both units began 

to receive increased direct logistical support from the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) under a project called Pacer Topaz, which 

dramatically increased their aircraft in-commission rates. 

The Evacuations

On 11 April, both squadrons were ordered to launch aircraft to 

Ubon for their first potential combat action in over 20 months. The 

21st launched nine CH-53C aircraft. Arriving at Ubon, three went 

immediately on 30-minute alert and the rest on one-hour alert. The 

40th launched seven HH-53Cs, also to Ubon. The next day, 

USAAG/7AF ordered the complete evacuation of all American and 

selected allied personnel from Phnom Penh. Two 40th HH-53s 

launched with combat control teams (CCT) on board. First Lts Don 

Backlund and Gary Weikel flew the lead aircraft. As they descended 

into the designated landing zone, a large bird smashed into the windscreen, smearing its entrails all over it and severely obstructing forward vision. The windshield washers were able to clear away enough 

of it so the pilots could continue the mission. They and their second 

aircraft inserted the teams into the designated landing zones around 

Phnom Penh and then departed. The teams directed the flow of helicopters in and out. The 21st launched all nine of its aircraft to holding 

points north of the city. However, the evacuees were all taken out by 

USMC CH-53s and CH-46s operating off of the aircraft carrier USS

Midway, located in the Gulf of Thailand. 

The Knives returned to Ubon without evacuating any personnel. 

As the USMC helicopters finished evacuating 276 persons, the two 

Jolly Greens returned to the landing zones to recover the CCTs and 

then proceeded back to Ubon. Both aircraft sustained battle damage 

for their efforts.33 Both squadrons returned to NKP the next day, only 

to be notified that communist forces were threatening Saigon, South 

Vietnam, and that both units were now to begin detailed planning for 

Operation Frequent Wind, the evacuation of American and designated allied personnel from that city.

When the US ambassador to South Vietnam, the Honorable Graham 

Martin, directed that evacuation operations should begin, the 21st 
76 │ . . . AND KNIVES

SOS received an execution order and on 19 April deployed eight aircraft to U-Tapao AB in southern Thailand, while the 40th followed 

with seven aircraft. Both contingents took extra crews and maintenance support. The next morning, six CH-53s and four HH-53s 

departed U-Tapao and flew to the USS Midway, located in the South 

China Sea, 50 miles southeast of Saigon. They joined the fleet of 

USMC CH-53s and CH-46s that had flown the Phonm Penh mission. 

Two days later, the 40th was ordered to return two aircraft to U-Tapao, 

and two more Knives were dispatched to take their place, leaving 

eight CH-53s and two HH-53s. All HH-53s were then moved to 

Ubon AB to assume SAR alert for the pending operation.

Collaterally, the 40th received another recovery mission. On the 

morning of the 29th, the unit was directed to launch two HH-53s to 

recover a Sailor with a broken back off of a ship in the Gulf of Thailand. 

The two crews made the 2,000-mile round-trip with no difficulties. 

That same afternoon at 3 p.m., USSAG/7AF directed that Operation Frequent Wind be executed. Immediately, the collected CH-53s 

of both services, HH-53s, and CH-46s lifted in a coordinated fashion 

to begin the evacuation. For the next 13 and a half hours, they shuttled 

An HH-53 and two CH-53s operating off the USS Midway during the evacuation of Saigon

Courtesy Air Force Historical Research Agency
. . . AND KNIVES │ 77

back and forth from the ship to several landing zones in the city. 

None of the aircraft from the two squadrons suffered any damage 

from enemy fire, although the crews observed a great deal of it. One 

CH-53, #68-10928, had a serious mechanical problem and could not 

fly. It provided parts to the other aircraft. Another CH-53 had a complete electrical failure while flying at night. Quick action by the crew 

recovered one generator, and it was able to safely land aboard the 

aircraft carrier. 

After departing Saigon for the last time the next morning, the helicopters shuttled evacuees between various ships. The next day, the 

Knives were alerted to make one more run into Saigon, but that directive was subsequently cancelled. Both the Knives and Jolly Greens 

were alerted to fly an evacuation mission to Con Son Island off the 

coast of South Vietnam. But that mission, too, was cancelled. 

On 2 May, the 21st and 40th aircraft and crews departed the Midway

for U-Tapao, carrying with them 97 American evacuees from Saigon. 

The next day, the Jolly Greens returned to NKP. However, the Knives 

received another mission at U-Tapao. During the evacuation of Saigon, 

numerous South Vietnamese aircraft had been flown to the huge air 

base. There, they and the persons they carried were interned. The 

Thai government wanted the aircraft either removed or destroyed, 

and the Knives were directed to sling-load 27 A-37 and 14 F-5 aircraft 

aboard the USS Midway for shipment back to the United States. Finally, 

the Knives returned to NKP on 6 May.34 

Both squadrons brought home aircraft in dire need of maintenance, and technicians swarmed over the aircraft as the aircrews tried 

to enjoy a respite from their busy schedules of late. But the hiatus was 

short-lived, as unforeseen events began to dictate their redeployment.

SS Mayaguez

On 10 May, Cambodian Khmer Rouge forces seized a US-registered 

cargo ship, the SS Mayaguez, in international waters near Koh Tang 

Island off the southwestern coast of Cambodia. This precipitated a 

recovery operation that would again involve both squadrons. This 

mission has been well captured in many works, the best of which is A 

Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang by Lt Col 

Joe Guilmartin, USAF, retired, a participant in the operation. Only a 

condensed version based on the squadron histories is presented here. 
78 │ . . . AND KNIVES

At 6:30 p.m. on 13 May, the 21st SOS was alerted to prepare to 

deploy back to U-Tapao with Air Force security police forces on 

board as part of a mobility security force, along with a maintenance 

kit and team. The crews would fly there, drop off their Air Force personnel, and reload with US Marines who could then be used as assault troops on Koh Tang Island, where the Mayaguez crew was reportedly being held. The first 21st SOS CH-53s departed at 8:30 p.m. 

An hour later tragedy struck when CH-53 #68-10933 suffered a mechanical failure 37 miles south of NKP and crashed, killing the fiveman crew and 18 security force personnel on board.35

After receiving its warning order on 13 May, the 40th dispatched 

one aircraft on SAR alert at Korat to U-Tapao and launched three 

others from NKP, led by Captain Walls and Lieutenant Comer. When 

the CH-53 crashed, the 40th also launched two more HH-53s on 

alert at Korat to proceed to the crash site for recovery operations. 

However, aircraft from NKP were already on the scene, so the two 

HH-53s then flew to U-Tapao. There, they joined the crews of six 

HH-53s and five CH-53s. Early the next morning, two HH-53s were 

launched to find and recover a US Navy crew of 10 persons possibly 

down in the Gulf of Thailand. The two rescue crews searched fruitlessly and received some hostile fire before they were notified that the 

loss report was a mistake. 

In the early morning hours of 15 May, the Knives and Jolly Greens 

launched to Koh Tang with their assault forces. The reported enemy 

force in the immediate area of the insertion was expected to be an 

element of 18 Khmer Kraham soldiers from a small battalion of 250 

troops on the island of Koh Tang. The Marines would be inserted on 

the east and west shores of a small isthmus of the island that pointed 

north, only 250 meters wide. 

Knife 21, 22, 23, and 31 approached the island just at early nautical 

twilight, with Knife 32 and Jolly Green 41 a few miles behind. The 

first two went to the west beach and the second two to the east. Just as 

Knife 21 settled over the beach and began to disgorge its Marines, the 

aircraft was raked with heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire 

and grievously damaged. Its aircraft commander, Colonel Denham, 

also the 21st SOS squadron commander, tried to fly out of danger but 

was forced to ditch the aircraft three-fourths of a mile to the west. 

Upon hitting the water, CH-53C #68-10926 rolled over and sank. The 

crew scrambled to escape the sinking aircraft. 
. . . AND KNIVES │ 79

Close behind Knife 21, Knife 22, commanded by Capt Terry 

Ohlemeier, was just settling to unload its Marines when it suffered 

the same fate. With the aircraft severely damaged, the commander 

aborted his delivery before any Marines were able to get off, flew his 

aircraft back to Thailand, and put the aircraft down on a beach. On 

the east side of the island, Knife 23, commanded by 1st Lt John Schramm, 

also had to abort its insertion because of the enemy fire. As it turned 

to leave, ground fire destroyed the tail rotor, and the aircraft, CH-53C 

#70-1627, crashed about 20 feet offshore. All on board scrambled to 

safety, although several were wounded. They set up a perimeter and 

began to engage the enemy force, which was now obviously larger 

than 18 soldiers. Right behind them, Knife 31, commanded by Maj 

Howard Corson, received the same withering fire. As Corson turned 

his aircraft to exit the area, CH-53C #68-10925 was mortally damaged and crashed just a few yards south of Knife 23. The copilot, 2d Lt 

Richard Vandegeer, was killed. The rest of the crew made its way out 

into open water and was picked up by the US Navy. Observing the 

demise of three fellow Knives, the crew of Knife 32, commanded by 

1st Lt Michael Lackey, aborted its run-in to the east beach. It spotted 

Knife 21 ditching and immediately diverted to pick up the crew. One 

flight mechanic on the stricken aircraft, SSgt Elwood Rumbaugh, was 

never found. The crew of Knife 32 then delivered its Marines to the 

west beach, where its aircraft was again badly damaged and two on 

board were wounded. Fortunately, the crew was able to make it back 

to U-Tapao. 

After the Knives had departed U-Tapao for their first sorties, three 

HH-53Cs—Jolly Greens 11, 12, and 13, commanded by 1st Lt Don 

Backlund, Capt Paul Jacobs, and 1st Lt Charles Greer, respectively—

departed with another load of Marines. The Jolly Greens’ objective 

was to offload the Marines onto the USS Holt, a destroyer supporting 

the operation. As they did that, two more Jolly Greens—42, commanded by 1st Lt Phil Pacini, and 43, commanded by Capt Wayne 

Purser—joined with Jolly Green 41, commanded by 1st Lt Tom Cooper, 

who had not yet put in his Marines, and all three put their troops 

onto the west beach. Overhead, an AC-130 gunship and several flights 

of fighters began pummeling enemy targets to support the Marines. 

The situation then turned into near chaos as ground units could 

not make communications linkups with their own units or even with 

the aircraft above. Many of the helicopters were also seriously 

damaged and had to fly back to U-Tapao with escorts. As they were 
80 │ . . . AND KNIVES

departing, the USS Holt deployed some Marines aboard the Mayaguez

and took possession of the ship. Additionally, another destroyer, the 

USS Henry B. Wilson, joined the fight and took up a position off the 

east beach. Her gunners began engaging enemy targets, and they 

launched the ship’s gig to pick up Airmen and Marines in the water 

from Knife 31. Meanwhile, Sailors aboard the Wilson spotted a small 

boat outbound from the mainland approaching the island. They were 

able to determine that it was carrying the crew of the Mayaguez. 

Attention turned to extracting the Marines. But it was not that 

simple. All helicopters except Jolly Green 41 had departed the area. 

Jolly Green 41 made several attempts to insert its troops before finally 

succeeding. They and the supplies that they brought were badly 

needed. Jolly Green 41 then limped back to U-Tapao and would not 

fly again without extensive repairs. Tactical airpower, and especially 

the AC-130 gunships, provided top cover for the Marines until the 

helicopters could return. 

At U-Tapao the crews from both squadrons mixed and compared 

notes. Now much wiser and true combat veterans, they prepared to 

deliver a second wave of Marines. Jolly Greens 11 and 12 were able to 

Courtesy Air Force Historical Research Agency

Two CH-53s shot down on Koh Tang Island, Cambodia, during the Mayaguez 

recovery operation
. . . AND KNIVES │ 81

insert their loads onto the west beach at about noon, followed shortly 

by Knife 51, commanded by 1st Lt Richard Brims; Knife 52, commanded by 1st Lt Robert Rakitis; and Jolly Green 43 after an abortive 

attempt to get in on the east beach. This addition of manpower allowed 

the Marines to suppress enemy firepower and link up scattered 

Marine elements from the west to the east beach. However, Jolly 

Green 43 was seriously damaged in the effort. The crew had to land 

aboard the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea for repairs to its fuel feed 

system. Jolly Green 11 escorted it and then refueled. 

Incredibly, the quick planning for the Mayaguez recovery effort 

did not include the use of any FACs. By early afternoon though, commanders recognized that mistake and dispatched several OV-10s to 

U-Tapao. There, the assigned FACs refueled, received quick tactical 

briefings, and then launched to take over as on-scene commanders at 

Koh Tang. Arriving overhead, they were able to use their multiband 

radios to contact all participants and then coordinate what was now 

a rescue mission for the Marines below. As the FACs coordinated the 

efforts of the Marine elements, the two destroyers providing support, 

the gunships and fighters, and the remaining flyable H-53s supplemented by two SH-3s from the Coral Sea would have to bring out the 

Marines. Given the damage done to the fleet from NKP and the fortuitous arrival of another HH- and CH-53 from that base, four H-53s—

Jolly Greens 11, 12, and 43 and Knife 51—would have to accomplish 

the rescue. 

As the day began to ebb, the FACs pounded enemy positions with 

numerous air strikes and the AC-130 gunships. Sensing that the situation was right and noting the lowering sun, they cleared Jolly Green 

into the east beach to pick up Marines there. With a raging battle 

ensuing around them, the crew members of Jolly Green 11 held their 

hover for three minutes until the aircraft was filled with 25 Marines 

and helicopter crewmen. As they were pulling off the beach to head 

to the Coral Sea, a C-130 dropped a 15,000-pound bomb several 

miles to the south to “apply maximum psychological pressure” to the 

enemy. Almost immediately, Jolly Green 12 attempted to pick up survivors believed left in the wreckage of the earlier crashed Knife aircraft. 

There were none, but enemy gunners took advantage of the crew’s 

efforts and seriously damaged the aircraft so that it had to make an 

emergency landing on the Coral Sea. 

As the sun set and light slowly faded, Knife 51 and Jolly Green 43 

were joined by Jolly Green 44, which had come down from NKP. 
82 │ . . . AND KNIVES

They cycled into the west beach and extracted the Marines as the 

FACs and AC-130 gunships provided the best support they could in 

the dwindling light. Jolly Green 11, now flown by Capt Barry Walls 

and 2d Lt Rich Comer, also relaunched and joined the fray. But their 

efforts were not needed, as the others extracted all the Marines and 

Airmen. Finally, at 8:10 p.m. with everybody apparently recovered or 

accounted for, the helicopters were released to return to U-Tapao, 

and the operation was terminated.36

It took several days for all the aircraft and crews of the two squadrons to return to NKP. Numerous aircraft were so badly damaged that 

they needed extensive repairs just to make the flight home. And the 

crews? One participant wrote later that it was “an incredibly intense 

experience.” They were drained but extremely proud of their actions 

and acutely aware that they had just participated in a historically significant event.37

For the two units, the cost of the battle was high. Every aircraft was 

damaged to some extent. The 21st SOS was devastated with the destruction in combat of three aircraft. Combined with the aircraft lost 

in January and the second one in the initial deployment to U-Tapao, 

the squadron had lost one-half of its aircraft. The materiel, logistical, 

and personnel ramifications of that loss would be huge. 

Analysts, too, were puzzled by the fact that the 21st had three aircraft shot down while the 40th, operating in the same locations, had 

none. Was that due to the HH-53s having more armor plating than 

the CH-53s and a third minigun on the back ramp to specifically protect the rear of the aircraft? Was it due to some difference in tactics? 

Or, perhaps, was it just the whims of happenstance and the fact that 

the battle plan called for the two units to have somewhat different 

roles to play in the overall effort? Regardless, one thing was immutably 

clear: HH-53s were large targets. Their survival in clear daylight in an 

area well defended by massed antiaircraft artillery (AAA) or even 

small arms was problematic. A career rescue veteran, Lt Col Joe 

Tyner, stated in a later overall mission analysis that “in the last stages 

of the Southeast Asia conflict, the enemy got more man-pads [shoulderfired surface-to-air missiles] and better AAA. . . . The tragic helicopter 

losses during ‘Mayaguez’ seemed to mark the end of helicopters on a 

modern battlefield.”38

Congratulatory messages arrived from many commands and individuals. The CJCS, Gen George Brown, said that 
. . . AND KNIVES │ 83

the success of the unique operation to recover the SS Mayaguez and her crew 

by the combined efforts of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps represents 

an outstanding display of the versatility, dedication and professional competence of all participants. It is not possible to praise too highly the bravery and 

determination exhibited by all concerned in the assault on Koh Tang Island. 

The overall operation, fraught with unknowns from the outset and extremely 

difficult to execute under even the best conditions, was conducted by all airmen, sailors and Marines in the highest tradition of our armed forces. I want 

every individual who participated in this operation to receive my personal 

congratulations.39

The crews were also individually rewarded for their efforts. Jolly 

Green 43 aircraft commander Capt Wayne Purser, Jolly Green 11 aircraft commander 1st Lt Don Backlund, Knife 51 aircraft commander 

1st Lt Richard Brims, and Knife 31 flight mechanic SSgt John Harston 

all received the Air Force Cross for their heroic actions. Many others 

were presented Silver Stars, Distinguished Flying Crosses, and Air 

Medals for their actions that day. One more “honor” accrued to the 

Mayaguez veterans several years later. The last names inscribed on 

the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, DC, were those lost in this 

last mission. 

Perhaps more importantly, though, now the crews of both squadrons were well bloodied in the heat of combat. At the beginning of the 

year, most of the aircrews were inexperienced. It had been 20 months 

since the squadrons flew sustained combat operations, and an entire 

iteration of aircrews had come and gone. Fortunately, they had passed 

down through their training programs and unit heritage a pride and 

level of performance and professionalism that had now been inculcated into the psyches of a new generation of young officers and Airmen. This stunning trial by fire matured these two squadrons, one for 

rescue and the other for special operations, into units that could separately or in tandem now handle a wide range of missions. It gave them 

the confidence to do anything that their helicopters could do. Maj Joe 

Guilmartin of the 40th explained the power of this confidence: 

Units with confidence in the will and ability of their members to perform under stress assume competence and rise above it. If they have practiced some of 

the options in training, the self-reinforcing mechanism is stronger still. Units 

in which no such confidence exists tend to assume individual incompetence, a 

lack of will, or both, making group incompetence a self-fulfilling prophesy. 

These expectations flow from the cohesive mechanism that holds units and 

crews together in combat. That mechanism is a group phenomenon, not an 

individual one.40
84 │ . . . AND KNIVES

Returning to NKP, both units resumed their training programs and reviewed the other contingencies under which they could be tasked. Operation Talon Blade was a highly probable mission as communist forces 

now overran all of Laos, and both units kept aircraft and aircrews on 

alert for that contingency. 

In June, the 21st SOS was notified that its aircraft losses would not be 

replaced and that the squadron would inactivate in January 1976, as the 

government of Thailand decided that it wanted all US forces removed 

from the country as soon as possible. Many squadron members received 

orders curtailing their tours. At the end of the month, the 56th SOW 

was moved to MacDill AFB, Florida, and the 656th SOW was activated 

to essentially shut down NKP by 31 October 1975 as part of the overall 

American withdrawal from Thailand. 

The 21st SOS inactivation was further moved up to 23 September, 

and it was directed to fly several of its aircraft to U-Tapao. There, they 

would be moved by ship to Europe where they would be assigned to a 

less challenging mission set with the newly forming 601st TASS at 

Sembach AB in Germany. That unit belonged to the 601st Tactical Control Wing (TCW). The wing controlled and operated the tactical air 

control system (TACS) for US and allied units in Europe. With a vast 

array of mobile radars and ground control teams, the CH-53s and crews 

would facilitate the control of US and allied airpower over Europe as 

part of the great North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. 

The CH-53s had as their assigned mission the requirement to “assist 

redeploying units, provide logistics support to mobile TACS units, assist 

in the rapid movement of the air support radar teams, and render assistance in emergency rescue or medical evacuation missions.”41

The 21st SOS remained on call to support Operation Talon Blade 

until early September, when all local flying was terminated, and the last 

aircraft were then moved to U-Tapao for transfer. The remaining unit 

personnel remained at NKP and dismantled the squadron as their reassignment orders trickled in. Most aircrews were reassigned to the 601st 

TASS in Germany, with a few going to Hurlburt Field, Florida, and other 

scattered locations. There is no record that any consideration was given 

to reassigning the 21st SOS with its aircraft and highly experienced 

crews to the 1st SOW at Hurlburt Field, as the 16th SOS with its AC-130 

gunships was being so assigned. Instead, the proud 21st SOS—a repository of eight and a half years of accumulated special operations combat 

experience—would be moved to the inactive list and its personnel and 

aircraft dispersed to other units for other jobs.42
. . . AND KNIVES │ 85

Upon returning to NKP from the Mayaguez operation, the 40th 

ARRSq resumed its alert duties while also maintaining two aircraft on 

alert at Korat. Training flights resumed as personnel continued to rotate 

in and out. The unit also had to remain prepared to respond as part of 

Operation Talon Blade. The personnel section was busy processing over 

150 major award recommendations for the missions just flown. The unit 

continued to get calls for local civic actions support and medevac missions. In July a Korat alert aircraft was launched to assist a ship in danger 

of sinking. The next month, an HH-53 launched to recover an American pilot who bailed out over the Gulf of Thailand. He was subsequently 

picked up by a Thai fishing boat and moved to a local airport where the 

Jolly Green crew picked him up.

In September as NKP prepared to close down, the 40th was ordered 

to move to Korat AB, Thailand. It did so by the end of the month and 

absorbed a flight of four HC-130s from the inactivating 56th ARRSq. 

Still with the unit and now a first lieutenant, Rich Comer was the last 

pilot to upgrade to aircraft commander in Thailand. In November the 

unit was notified that it would be inactivated on 31 January 1976, with 

personnel, aircraft, and equipment reassigned to other units. Several of 

the aircrew received orders to the 601st TASS at Sembach, Germany, its 

sister unit; the 701st TASS at Bergstrom AFB, Texas; other rescue units; 

or the 1st SOW at Hurlburt Field, Florida. 

The 40th maintained aircraft on rescue alert as top cover for the remaining USAF units in Thailand until all tactical aircraft had departed. 

Comer flew as the recovery aircraft in the last combat rescue exercise 

with the A-7s before its unit, the 3d Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS), 

redeployed to the CONUS. The 40th finally ended its alert commitment 

as the last Jolly Green flight landed at 1 p.m. on 20 December 1975. The 

unit then loaded its aircraft aboard C-5s. Two went to Kadena AB, 

Okinawa, one to Royal Air Force (RAF) Woodbridge AB in the United 

Kingdom, and six to McClellan AFB near Sacramento, California. The 

personnel themselves were some of the last to leave Thailand, taking 

with them a wealth of knowledge and experience based upon eight years 

of HH-53 combat rescue experience in that long and divisive war.43



Observing the success of the USMC with the newly developed 

CH-53A, the USAF determined that variants of the H-53 could meet 
86 │ . . . AND KNIVES

its needs generated by combat action in Southeast Asia for a large 

rescue helicopter and a cargo helicopter for special operations use. 

For almost eight years, the HH-53s and CH-53s served in two rescue 

squadrons that ultimately consolidated as the 40th ARRSq and the 

21st SOS. Those units saw duty in almost every corner of the war. By 

the end of the conflict, 52 USAF HH-53s and 20 CH-53s had been 

produced. Of those, nine HH-53s and seven CH-53s had been destroyed in the war, with another two HH-53s and one CH-53 lost to 

accidents in the United States.

Both the squadrons performed myriad missions befitting heavylift helicopters, besides their primary functions of rescue and special 

operations. Yet, given the exigencies of that war, on many an occasion 

each would delve into the other’s specialty as operational requirements dictated. By the end of the conflict, both were highly experienced and motivated units, well schooled in their mission areas. 

Beyond that, though, each made a specific contribution. The HH-53s 

in the 40th became the test bed for newly evolving technology, called 

for initially to provide a night, all-weather capability that would allow 

quick recovery of downed aircrews. The concept never came to full 

fruition in SEA. But the seeds had been sown and were being further 

developed in the United States, as many believed that the technology 

would have applicability far beyond rescue. 

The men of the 21st SOS developed a squadron capable of supporting classic special operations activities. Successive iterations of 

aircrews learned the heritage and traditions of the unit, added to 

them, and so passed them to later arrivals. Tactical lessons hardlearned by the H-3 crews were adopted and adapted by the crews of 

the later CH-53s as they carried on those traditions and air commando spirit. The unit’s “can-do/will-do capability,” which Colonel 

Crews cited when he commanded the unit in 1974, was its standard 

of performance and tradition. After the war, a noted USAF historian, 

Col Ray Bowers, wrote, “The distinguished work of the . . . 21st 

Squadron in Southeast Asia strengthened the Air Force’s entitlement 

to future special air operations roles.”44 Both squadrons had become 

“units with confidence,” as Major Guilmartin said, “with the will and 

ability of their members to perform under stress” and create “the cohesive mechanism that holds units and crews together in combat . . . a 

group phenomenon, not an individual one.”45

Each squadron, the 40th and the 21st, in its own way made signal 

contributions to what would later become Pave Low and spawned a 
. . . AND KNIVES │ 87

generation of Airmen who would initially develop and fly them. In 

the rush to withdraw from SEA, though, the USAF inactivated both 

squadrons and dispersed their aircraft and personnel to other units, 

locales, and missions. That was unfortunate because just about five 

years later, their skills would be desperately needed in another part of 

the world. Their nonselection, or even availability, for a variety of reasons in that operation would contribute to a failure that would precipitate significant changes in the US military. 

Notes

1. Bowers, United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: Tactical Airlift, 456.

2. Ibid., 425.

3. History of the 56th Air Commando Wing, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1967, 1.

4. Ibid., 1 Jan–31 Mar 1968, vol. 1, 26; ibid., 1 Apr–30 June 1968, 7; History of 56th 

SOW, 1 July–30 Sept 1968, vol. 1, 5, 11; ibid., 1 Oct–31 Dec 1968, vol. 2, table 1, 7; and 

Hobson, Vietnam Air Losses, 169.

5. Message, 56SPOWG to 7AF/DO and MACVSOG/Saigon, subject: Prairie Fire 

Missions, in History of 56th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1969, vol. 2, 2.

6. History of 56th SOW, 1 July–30 Sept 1969, vol. 2, 5–7.

7. Ibid., 1 Oct–31 Dec 1969, vol. 2, n.p.

8. Ibid., 1 Jan–31 Mar 1970, vol. 1, 7; and ibid., 16.

9. “First CH-53C Goes to US Air Force,” Sikorsky News, Apr 1970, 6.

10. History of 56th SOW, 1 July–30 Sept 1970, vol. 1, 8, 46.

11. Ibid., 1 Oct–31 Dec 1970, vol. 1, 5; and Haas, Apollo’s Warriors, 307.

12. Haas, Apollo’s Warriors, 312.

13. Grove, interview; and Hobson, Vietnam Air Losses, 213.

14. Green, interview.

15. History of 56th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1971, vol. 1, 7.

16. Ibid., 7–8.

17. Grove, interview.

18. Ibid.

19. History of 56th SOW, 1 Apr–30 June 1972, vol. 1, 6.

20. Ibid., 1 July–31 Dec 1972, vol. 1, 54; and Stiles, interview.

21. Ibid., vol. 2, supporting doc. 26.

22. Haas, Air Commando!, 92; and History of 56th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1973, vol. 1, 

35. Note: At the time, the author was a Raven FAC assigned to Laos and provided air 

cover for this mission.

23. History of 56th SOW, 1 Apr–30 June 1973, vol. 1, 32; and ibid., 8.

24. Ibid., 1 July–30 Sept 1973, vol. 2, 5, doc. 13. 

25. Stiles, interview.

26. History of 56th SOW, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1973, vol. 1, 3–4; ibid., 1 Jan–31 Mar 1974, 

vol. 1, 4; ibid., 1 Apr–30 June 1974, vol. 2, 6; and ibid., 1 July–30 Sept 1974, vol. 1, 6.

27. History of 40th ARRSq, 1 July–31 Dec 1973, 2. 

28. Ibid., 7.
88 │ . . . AND KNIVES

29. Weikel, interview.

30. Comer, interview.

31. History of 3d ARRG, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1974, 12.

32. History of 56th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1975, vol. 1, 4–5 and addendum doc.

33. Ibid., 1 Apr–30 June 1975, vol. 1, 5; History of 40th ARRSq, 1 Jan–30 June 

1975, 4; and Weikel, interview.

34. History of 40th ARRSq, 1 Jan–30 June 1975, 4–5; and History of 56th SOW, 

1 Apr–30 June 1975, vol. 1, 5–7.

35. History of the 656th Security Police Squadron, 1 Apr–30 June 1975, 3.

36. History of 56th SOW, 1 Apr–30 June 1975, vol. 1, 7–8, app. 1; History of 40th 

ARRSq, 1 Apr–30 June 1975, 5–13; and Guilmartin, Very Short War, 84–141. In fact, 

three young Marines were left behind and subsequently executed by Khmer forces; 

remains were repatriated in 2001. See Dunham and Quinlan, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 

262; and Wetterhahn, Last Battle.

37. Guilmartin, Very Short War, xix.

38. Tyner, AF Rescue and AFSOF, 27.

39. DCS/Plans and Operations, HQ USAF, summary report, subject: Assault on 

Koh Tang, 23 June 1975, in History of 56th SOW, 1 Apr–30 June 1975, vol. 3, supporting doc. no. 73, 38.

40. Guilmartin, Very Short War, 41–42.

41. History of the 601st Tactical Control Wing (hereafter referred to as History of 

601st TCW), 1 Apr–30 June 1980, vol. 4, 33.

42. History of 56th SOW, 1 July–30 Sept 1975, vol. 1, 1–5.

43. History of 40th ARRSq, 1 July 1975–31 Jan 1976, 9–17; and Comer, interview.

44. Bowers, United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: Tactical Airlift, 425.

45. Guilmartin, Very Short War, 41–42.
PART II

From Concept to Capability

Chapter 4

Black Knights and Red Scarves

~1973–80

When they were building it, Frank [Pehr] and Leo Gambone came down here and pitched this and said, “We’ve got 

something you guys want to see. We built this for rescue, but 

it’s really a special ops machine.” 

—Steve Connelly 

By early 1976, all USAF H-53s had been transferred from Thailand. The HH-53s had been dispersed to rescue units across the 

globe. The change had been even more dramatic for the CH-53s. All 

of the 21st SOS aircraft had been either moved to the CONUS to the 

701st TASS, which had been activated at Bergstrom AFB, Texas, in 

late 1974 as part of the 71st Tactical Air Support Group, or shipped to 

Germany for duty with the 601st TASS at Sembach. At both locations, their mission was starkly different from what they had been 

doing in SEA. Now, instead of team insertions, covert force movements, and major evacuations, the two units’ assigned duty was to 

move heavy equipment, such as TACAN stations and radar sites, to 

support tactical air control units equipped and organized to integrate 

airpower on modern battlefields like the plains of central Europe. 

Somewhat more frivolously, the Sembach aircraft and crews were 

called upon to provide VIP transport and “Rhine River tours” for visiting dignitaries, much to the disdain of the flyers. As the 601st received its aircraft and crews, it suffered a terrible tragedy on 26 September 1975, when CH-53C #70-1632 crashed near Gϋtersloh, 

Germany. The crew of four Airmen and 12 passengers were en route 

to conduct a site survey of a training area just east of the town of Oldendorf when the aircraft experienced in-flight icing, causing both 

engines to flame out. The pilots attempted to autorotate to the ground 

but were not successful. There were no survivors. Flight operations 

were curtailed until an accident board determined the cause of the 

accident and the lost members were properly honored. Crew training 

then resumed, and the unit was fully integrated into training exercises 
92 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

with US and allied units across the theater. Six months later, the 601st 

lost another aircraft when CH-53C #68-10927 crashed on a training 

sortie near Sembach AB, killing the four crew members. The aircraft 

was a scarred veteran of the mission to Koh Tang Island. All four of 

the crew members were also hard-trained veterans of that war, both 

rescue and special operations. It was another tragic loss.1

After his tour with the 40th ARRSq at NKP, Capt Rich Comer was 

posted to the 601st TASS at Sembach and reported to the unit in 

January 1976. As a new aircraft commander, he found that the flying 

was not as tactically challenging as the rescue missions. However, he 

and all the pilots became proficient at instrument flying, facilitated by 

the challenging European weather. They also got to fly over much of 

the continent using simple VFRs. All aircraft had been stripped of 

armor and guns, and the mission focus was on the sling-load movement of the heavy field equipment. The pilots became adept at hovering with 5,000-pound loads and placing them precisely where needed. 

Except for the tragic helicopter accidents, though, Comer enjoyed his 

tour at Sembach. He was able to upgrade to IP and served in the 601st 

until December 1978, when he received orders to move to Kirtland 

AFB, New Mexico, to serve as an HH-53 IP.2

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

When the 40th ARRSq and the 3d ARRG inactivated, their aircraft 

and personnel, for the most part, were reassigned across the larger 

ARRS command as it resumed its overall responsibility of providing 

a global rescue capability, albeit with combat rescue as its priority 

mission. As 1976 began, the command had its headquarters and staff 

at Scott AFB, Illinois, and commanded three wings and numerous 

separate squadrons, detachments, and operating locations. Its subordinate wings were the 39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing 

(ARRW), the 41st Rescue and Weather Reconnaissance Wing 

(RWRW), and the 1550th ATTW. 

The 39th ARRW at Eglin commanded and controlled three rescue 

squadrons and smaller detachments in the CONUS and Europe. Its 

primary emphasis was on combat rescue. In particular, its assigned 

55th ARRSq, also at Eglin, was charged with the responsibility to develop, test, and document combat rescue tactics. The unit was also 

tasked with responding to requirements for support in contingency 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 93

operations and exercises such as the new Red Flag combat training 

program that TAC was just beginning at Nellis AFB, Nevada. Given 

its location, the 55th was able to work with USAF special forces units 

at Hurlburt Field, just nine miles to the west of Eglin, and the Tactical 

Air Warfare Center, also at Eglin. 

Other theaters were beginning to ask for combat rescue capability. 

After commanding Seventh Air Force in Saigon in 1973–74, General 

Vogt was reassigned to Europe, where he commanded the United 

States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). Using his experiences from the 

heavy aerial combat in SEA, he began to make changes in the command. One of the first shortfalls he noted was a lack of combat rescue 

capability in Europe. He also noted that the HH-53s did more special 

operations–type missions than rescue. He requested that the ARRS 

form or move an HH-53-equipped squadron to central Europe and 

suggested consolidating it with the CH-53-equipped 601st TASS at 

Sembach. Staff analysis, though, determined that the base could not 

properly support such a combined helicopter force without significant construction. As an interim solution, the 67th ARRSq at RAF 

Woodbridge, UK, was directed to modify its war plan tasking to be 

prepared to move significant rescue forces forward for contingency 

operations and also to increase its participation in USAFE exercises.3

CH-53C #70-1629 at Sembach AB, Germany, in the late 1970s

Courtesy Wayne Mutza
94 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

The 41st RWRW at McClellan AFB, California, commanded and 

controlled all rescue units in the Pacific area that provided air recovery 

support for air and space personnel and equipment. As a collateral mission, it also commanded and controlled several weather reconnaissance units. This was a recent change caused in part by the movement 

of the wing headquarters from Hickam AFB. When that move took 

place, the long-resident 76th ARRSq assigned under the wing was 

inactivated, leaving a void of rescue capability in the area. There were, 

however, some USAF HH-53s and HC-130s at Hickam. Six HH-53s 

were assigned to the 6594th Test Group, a subordinate unit of the Air 

Force Systems Command (AFSC). Its mission was to recover highvalue air and space vehicles as part of the overall national space program, and it carried the motto Catch a Falling Star. As the 76th prepared to inactivate, the MAC commander, Gen Paul Carlton, 

contacted Gen Samuel Phillips, the AFSC commander, to explore the 

possibility of having the 6594th assume SAR tasking for long-range 

missions in the central Pacific region. After dual staff analysis, the 

commanders signed an agreement specifying that the 6594th would 

perform the mission on a noninterference basis. The agreement also 

specified that the 6594th crews were not trained or equipped for 

combat recovery. 

The 1550th ATTW at Hill AFB was the ARRS schoolhouse and 

commanded the squadrons that trained all rescue crews. The wing 

also oversaw testing and evaluation of all rescue aircraft and equipment. It was slated to move to Kirtland AFB in early 1976. At that 

time, the ARRS possessed 32 HH-53B/C aircraft assigned as follows: 

1550th Flying Training Squadron (FTS), Hill AFB—nine (plus one 

CH-53 as a trainer aircraft); 41st ARRSq, McClellan AFB—six; 55th 

ARRSq, Eglin AFB—six; 67th ARRSq, Woodbridge RAF, UK—five; 

and 33d ARRSq, Kadena AB, Japan—six.4

Pave Low

The two predecessor programs, Pave Star and Pave Imp, had provided only a limited night or all-weather capability, and to meet the 

requirements of MAC ROC 19-70, the Pave Low project was initiated 

in 1972. At Edwards AFB, Sikorsky engineers installed a forwardlooking radar, the AN/APQ-141—initially designed for the US Army 

AH-56 Cheyenne gunship—on HH-53B #66-14433, an NRS-modified 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 95

aircraft and veteran of combat duty in SEA. Lt Col Richard Boivin, 

the project engineer, directed the program. The project pilot, Maj 

Paul Balfe, was assigned to the helicopter section of the 6512th Test 

Squadron and was assisted by fellow 6512th pilot, Maj Jon Hannan. 

Maj Don Jensen, a test pilot from the 1550th ATTW at Hill AFB also 

joined the effort. Jensen needed another pilot to assist him and asked 

a fellow SEA combat veteran, Maj Frank Pehr, to join the project. A 

bevy of experienced helicopter veterans was being collected to address this challenge. 

Courtesy Lt Col Frank Pehr, USAF, Retired

HH-53B #66-14433, the “Black Knight,” first Pave Low prototype

Pehr was a highly experienced HH-53 pilot, currently serving as 

an instructor at Hill. He had entered the USAF in 1956 through the 

Aviation Cadet program. After pilot training and commissioning, he 

flew F-84s and F-100s. He was then transferred to B-52s and flew 

them until receiving an assignment to fly B-58s at Bunker Hill AFB, 

Indiana. In 1970 he was assigned to fly HH-53s. After attending helicopter transition and the HH-53 course at Hill AFB, he reported to 

the 37th ARRSq at Da Nang in August 1970 and served with Jensen. 

Things were relatively quiet then, and he mostly flew training sorties. 

However, he did launch on a sortie to recover a wounded Soldier in 

the A Shau Valley of South Vietnam in March 1971. Pehr was 

wounded in the leg by enemy fire as the crew hovered for the pickup. 

Evacuated back to the CONUS, he spent several months at Chanute 

AFB, Illinois, recovering from the wound. Then he reported for duty 
96 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

as an HH-53 IP at Hill AFB, where he eventually became the lead 

instructor for the NRS program. When he received Jensen’s invitation 

to join Pave Low, he did not hesitate. 

Test flights started in April 1972 and ran until December. The pilots logged a total of 73 flights that showed the efficacy of the combination of the radar with the helicopter. The crews also identified numerous technical and material deficiencies for later correction. The final 

flight report stated that “further development and testing is required 

before a production model can be achieved.”5

 Pehr was generally impressed with the concept, although he felt that the Doppler navigation system was wholly inadequate for the requirement. Nevertheless, the radar did provide for terrain avoidance, and he reported, 

“This is great stuff. We really need it and recommend it. Yes, we 

should go ahead toward production.”6

Consequently, the Air Staff directed the Pave Low II program to 

develop a “night/adverse weather rescue system” with the ability to 

avoid terrain during low-level operations—including exposure to 

hostile radar / sensor-directed weapon threats, to navigate precisely 

to the rescue area at low level, and to accurately locate and hold a 

hover position over a survivor. Specifically, the new system needed to 

harness two distinct capabilities:

1. Low-level penetration of enemy territory. A . . . TF/TA radar could provide 

the pilots with the necessary information while maintaining a minimum 

altitude of 200 feet over the ground.

2. Increased navigation accuracy. Existing Doppler technology could be harnessed with improved on-board systems and a projected map display system 

(PMDS) and flight director instruments that would give the pilots a visual 

display correlated to the radar ground map display. The existing ELF [extremely 

low frequency] system could be integrated to allow point hover hold over 

the survivor’s location. Enhanced low-light-level television (LLLTV) and 

night viewing devices would facilitate night operations.7

The Pave Low II effort was a three-phase research and development effort also conducted at Edwards on HH-53B #66-14433. Jensen 

and Pehr, augmented with other MAC/ARRS pilots, flew the operational 

effectiveness evaluation and found that the TF/TA radar and existing 

NRS capability significantly increased the capability to perform the 

night rescue mission. Subsequently, the AFSC Directorate of Combat 

Systems at Wright-Patterson submitted a development plan to spend 

$14.2 million to modify eight NRS HH-53s to the Pave Low II con-
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 97

figuration. However, when all tests were completed, the cost estimate 

was revised to $20 million. Concerned about the cost increase and 

unwilling to spend that amount of money, the Air Force CSAF 

directed a full review of all possible alternatives to develop a Pave 

Low production prototype helicopter for a maximum of $3 million. 

The project was assigned to the Aeronautical Systems Division Specialized System Program Office (ASD/SDY) in the Prototype Directorate of the AFSC at Wright-Patterson. The division put together an 

in-house team of experts who developed a concept that used mostly 

off-the-shelf equipment already in the Air Force supply inventory 

and proposed a prototype for $3.2 million. Now called Pave Low III, 

the program was initiated in February 1974 as a Class V modification 

to an existing aircraft.8

The team consisted of several individuals who had successfully developed modifications for several cargo aircraft, such as the C-130, to be 

used as gunships in SEA. As that effort was winding down, team director 

Col Ronald Terry, USAF, was looking for another project to hold 

those members together and volunteered them for the Pave Low III 

task. When assigned the project, they reviewed MAC ROC 19-70 and 

began working. 

Using DOD inventories, Terry and his team were able to identify 

and begin procuring required components for the modification. 

Three specific and special items had to be directly procured: a Doppler 

radar borrowed from the Canadian Marconi Company; a forwardlooking infrared (FLIR) radar unit borrowed from Texas Instruments, Incorporated; and a symbol generator from Systems Research 

Laboratories, Incorporated. 

Again, HH-53B #66-14433 was selected for the tests and flown to 

Wright-Patterson AFB, where the 4950th Test Wing would do all of 

the prototype fabrication and modification. Preliminary structural 

analysis indicated that modifications to the aircraft nose and operations console would be required and that an avionics rack would 

need to be built in the cargo area to hold all of the additional avionics 

components. Additionally, electrical modifications were necessary 

throughout the entire aircraft to provide for the new components. To 

better support the added weight being put on the aircraft, #66-14433 

received upgraded T-64-GE-7A engines. 

When Colonel Terry received transfer orders, he passed direction 

of the project to Lt Col William Craven. Reviewing the background 

of his team members, Craven realized that he did not have anybody 
98 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

with experience on helicopters and asked MAC for an operational 

HH-53 pilot who had an engineering degree and combat experience. 

Major Jensen was asked to suggest a pilot, and he immediately suggested Frank Pehr. Pehr did not have an engineering degree, but he 

had the other requirements in spades. The MAC staff concurred with 

Jensen’s recommendation and agreed to assign Major Pehr to the 

project. He would be assigned to the MAC detachment at WrightPatterson and act as the MAC liaison to the system program office 

(SPO). Since the 4950th Test Wing did not have any HH-53 aircraft 

or pilots assigned, he also served as the chief of the HH-53 section of 

the wing standardization/evaluation (stan/eval) division. His supervisor there was Lt Col Vic Genez, a test pilot on H-3s. Pehr would 

teach him to fly the HH-53. TSgt Rick Simmon and SSgt Andy 

Straughn would serve as the flight mechanics.9

After his return from NKP in March 1973, Simmon had served at 

Hill AFB as a flight mechanic instructor and worked with new crews 

in the flight simulator. He had also gotten to know Pehr and was excited to hear that he would be working with him on Pave Low. He and 

Black Knight test members. Left to right: Capt Ron Swarz, maintenance officer; 

Lt Col Vic Genez and Maj Frank Pehr, project pilots; and Lt Col William Craven.

Courtesy Lt Col Frank Pehr, USAF, Retired
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 99

his enlisted compatriots would approach Pave Low from the practical 

view of the enlisted crew members so that the equipment and procedures were optimized, as much as possible, for the intense crew coordination necessary to make the system work. The overall cockpit 

workload was high enough that it could not be accommodated by 

just the two pilots; thus, the flight mechanic had to perform many 

more functions than in the “Slick” HH-53. This required a careful allocation of duties between pilots and flight mechanics—to the point 

where control panels had to be located within reach of the crew member 

assigned to operate the system. Sergeant Simmon’s contributions to 

the development of crew coordination and workload allocation were 

invaluable in achieving a workable solution.10

As the team began to earnestly work the project, Craven solicited 

the members for a project name. When Craven received no responses, 

he made one himself. Drawing upon the realization that the Pave 

Low was being designed to do its best work on dark nights, he suggested that the team seize upon that theme by labeling it the “Black 

Knight.” No one objected, and the team had a patch designed that 

showed a black chessboard knight under the classic rescue motto 

That Others May Live.11

Team members recognized early on that the TF/TA radar was perhaps the most critical component to the modification, and they 

scoured DOD inventories for the existing unit that could best fulfill 

the mission. They selected the AN/APQ-126, a radar produced by 

Figure 2. The Black Knight patch designed by Lt Col Bill Craven. (Courtesy 

Air Force Historical Research Agency.)
100 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

Texas Instruments and used by US Navy A-7s that provided excellent 

terrain following/avoidance and ground mapping. After procuring 

one, they began adapting it to the HH-53. Specifically, Pehr had them 

modify it so that the aircraft could use it at 100 feet above the ground. 

He also emphasized to all that, as important as the TF/TA system 

was, the key component was a precision navigation system. More 

than the Doppler system was needed, and he suggested a Doppler / 

inertial navigation system (INS) combination. Additionally, it all had 

to be tied together by a central computer to accept all of the data and 

then synthesize it into accurate navigation information useable by the 

other subsystems.12

By early 1975, the test aircraft had been modified with the initially 

identified components. To signify the achievement of that milestone, 

Colonel Craven wanted to hold a formal rollout ceremony and scheduled a preceremony for essentially the entire test team in March. In 

preparation, the crew members accomplished a series of electrical 

power-on checks to ensure that all components were working properly. Unfortunately, when they applied full power, the aircraft began 

to fill with smoke. They removed the power, and an investigation determined that an electrical wire carrying a 400-volt charge was improperly connected and had allowed a short to occur. 

The preceremony was rescheduled for April. However, before that 

could occur, the aircraft had to be flown on an FCF. Bad luck struck 

again. Pehr and his crew started engines normally and made ready to 

fly. When the crew chief pulled the arming pin from the ejection 

charge on the right-side external fuel tank, the charge detonated, and 

the fuel tank—filled with 320 gallons of JP-4—dropped from the aircraft and split open, spilling the fuel beneath the aircraft. Pehr immediately taxied the aircraft away from the volatile fuel as the base 

fire department responded and hosed down the fuel spill. 

The project was put on hold while this potentially serious accident 

was investigated. Ultimately, technicians determined that a jettison 

toggle switch had been improperly installed when the aircraft had 

been manufactured, allowing the charge to fire at that moment. The 

problem was corrected and the project restarted. The crew flew the 

initial FCF on 9 June 1975, and the overall flight test program proceeded. When the FLIR and radar arrived, they were installed and 

included in the tests.13

With all now proceeding according to plan, Colonel Craven scheduled the formal ceremony for 18 September 1975. Over 200 people 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 101

were invited, including the commanders of the ASD, the ARRS, and 

the 4950th Test Wing and the mayor of Fairborn, the city just outside 

of Wright-Patterson AFB. The ceremony was also open to the public. 

The aircraft was set up for static display, and visitors were allowed to 

walk through the aircraft as the test team personnel answered questions. Local media covered the event. 

Once the flight test plan was completed and all components were 

properly evaluated, Pehr worked with representatives from MAC, the 

4950th Test Wing, and the 1550th ATTW to write the flight test report, ASD-TR-75-15. Essentially, all agreed that the concept was valid 

and that Pave Low III could achieve its required operational capability. 

The pilots reported one problem with the FLIR: its line of sight 

needed to be biased one and a half degrees below aircraft horizontal 

to ensure ground clearance.14 Evaluating the aircraft from the flight 

mechanic perspective, Simmon was impressed and remembers that 

“it was a lot of stuff, yes. Initially, I thought it was almost too much 

stuff, but as time went by, and learning the systems on my own or being taught by Colonel Pehr, it started to come to me. . . . I began to 

realize that, yes, it can be done with just three people in the cockpit 

and, of course, the crew members in the back. I think that the mission 

was able to be accomplished successfully.”15

The results were forwarded to MAC. It had two choices: first, terminate the program and return the test aircraft to its original configuration and mission; and, second, decide on modification of a specific number of aircraft to fulfill MAC ROC 19-70. After intense staff 

analysis, MAC decided to have eight aircraft modified to Pave Low III 

standards and also receive new T-64-GE-7A engines that delivered 

11 percent more power and could better provide for the added weight 

of the avionics. The prototype would be demodified and returned to 

the fleet. General Carlton was briefed on the program. He was well 

pleased and informally suggested that perhaps the entire ARRS HH53 fleet could be modified to Pave Low III.16

The ASD then determined that the total cost for modifying the 

eight aircraft would be $27.5 million and that it would take 34 months 

to complete after the program management directive (PMD) was 

signed. Reviewing the entire process, Brig Gen Robert Bond, deputy 

director of operational requirements on the Air Staff, signed the 

PMD on 29 April 1977. It called for the delivery of the first modified 

aircraft in early 1979 and delivery of the eighth aircraft no more than 

one year later. The aircraft designated for modification were HH-53C 
102 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

numbers 69-5790, 69-5791, 73-1647, 73-1648, 73-1649, 73-1650, 73-

1651, and 73-1652.17

MAC then focused on developing an operational employment and 

deployment concept. At a follow-up Pave Low III project meeting, its 

representatives proposed that

the P[ave]L[ow] III system is required to operate worldwide in terrain and 

climatic extremes. The PL III helicopters may be employed in areas that contain the best of enemy defenses in support of the primary mission of combat 

rescue. Mission scenarios will be varied and designed to counter the expected 

hostile threat levels. Mission options may include in-flight refueling waiting 

for the cover of darkness or weather, the use of several support aircraft, and 

the use of forward staging locations. The cover of darkness will be used to the 

utmost for hostile area missions. . . . Peacetime humanitarian and rescue missions may be supported on a 24-hour capability.

Employment—The eight PL II helicopters will be employed in one unit located 

at a main operating base with the capability of supporting contingency operations. The helicopters can be employed in secondary combat roles or peacetime 

search and rescue. Air crew training, developing new tactics as the threat dictates, and maintaining a state of readiness will be the foremost requirements. 

Humanitarian and rescue mission[s] involving the civilian population will be 

secondary missions.

Deployment Plans—The first four aircraft will be delivered to Kirtland AFB, 

New Mexico, where initial qualification of aircraft will be accomplished. The 

fifth through eighth will be deployed to a non-CONUS location after completion of system acceptance checks. . . . The unit will remain at the non-CONUS 

location with a deployment capability of operating from a forward operating 

base (FOB) for thirty days independent of the main operating base (MOB) or 

deploying to an overseas area with a contingency plan to operate indefinitely 

from an FOB or MOB.18

With that guidance, the various commands could now begin to develop logistical and personnel support plans to ensure that the new 

capability would get the materiel and properly trained Airmen it required to fulfill its mission. 

The ASD team, working with personnel from the Warner-Robins 

Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) that provided logistical support for 

all USAF H-53s, then turned its attention to finding a contractor to 

modify the aircraft. However, when it conducted a search to determine which companies could do the modifications, it found only five 

companies capable of handling the project. Of those five, the ASD 

team had a high degree of confidence only in Sikorsky. However, 

Sikorsky proposed a price well beyond the available funding.
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 103

One of the personnel on the Pave Low team suggested that the 

team consider using the Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF) at Pensacola Naval Air Station (NAS), Florida, as the prime contractor. That 

facility did the major periodic maintenance on all US Navy and Marine H-53s. The facility was full of master craftsmen highly experienced in fabricating and installing aircraft parts on complicated aircraft. Colonel Craven and several assistants traveled to Pensacola to 

visit the facility and speak with the commander. In his trip report, 

Craven wrote that “all functions at NARF, Pensacola, relative to Pave 

Low III modification requirements have been investigated and found 

to be totally adequate and clearly superior in comparison to projected industrial facilities. . . . It is the Program Office’s decision to 

solicit US Navy acceptance of the modification workload as a true 

joint service program.”19

Craven began working with his counterparts at WR-ALC and the 

NARF to craft the contract proposal for the project. When the package was complete, Craven flew to the Pentagon to brief the responsible 

US Navy commanders on the project. They agreed to do the modifications, and the parties signed the Depot Maintenance Interservice 

Agreement, coded NAVAIR 25BFTG and dated 18 November 1976. 

The first aircraft modification would begin in September 1978, and 

the last would be completed by January 1980, within the original PMD.20

20th Special Operations Squadron

Following the removal of US forces from SEA, special operations 

forces (SOF) helicopter responsibilities were assigned to TAC. As the 

Pave Low III aircraft was coming to fruition in late 1975, TAC directed that the 20th SOS, the veteran unit of long service in SEA, be 

reactivated as part of the 1st SOW at Hurlburt Field to serve as a residual helicopter SOF and repository of experience. Initially authorized four CH-3E and six UH-1N aircraft, primarily from ARRS 

stocks, the 20th slowly began taking possession of the aircraft as assigned personnel arrived, some from duty with other units in SEA 

but most from throughout the USAF. A high percentage, though, 

were veterans of the war and were determined to reestablish the 

“Green Hornets” as a professional and highly spirited combat-ready 

unit. As the squadron once again came to life, its assigned missions 

were as follows:
104 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

Primary: 

 Conduct day/night infiltration, exfiltration, reinforcement, and resupply 

into hostile or enemy controlled territory using air-land and airdrop techniques over land or water. Conduct psychological operations, to include 

aerial dispensing of leaflets.

Secondary: 

1. Recovery of personnel. 

a. Escape and evasion operations.

b. Combat search and rescue operations for unconventional warfare 

(UW) forces. Where ARRS forces are not readily available, SAR operations include locating survivors, recovery by air-land or aerial recovery by 

rescue hoist, minimal first aid, and transportation to the nearest medical facility.

2. Shipboard operations.

3. Medical evacuation of personnel.

4. Humanitarian and civic action operations.

5. Limited photoreconnaissance, either by handheld or modularly installed 

camera systems.

6. Other missions as directed. 21

To accomplish its missions, the unit was authorized 32 pilots and 

44 support personnel and was initially commanded by Lt Col Robert 

Mayo. Capt Gary Weikel reported to the 1st SOW, having recently 

returned from his tour with the Jolly Greens at NKP. Originally, he 

had intended to transfer to the Air Force Reserve (AFR) and serve 

as an Air Reserve technician at Luke AFB. However, he had a change 

of heart when he heard that the 20th SOS was being reactivated, and 

he accepted orders to Hurlburt. He had to go through the school at 

Hill AFB again, this time to qualify in the UH-1N. Now a highly 

experienced combat pilot, he was assigned to the wing tactics office 

but flew regularly with the 20th. Another early assignee was 1st Lt 

Joe Vallimont, also just returned from the 40th at NKP. He took 

over as the squadron tactics officer and quickly began to develop 

tactical training plans for the unit.22 A few new pilots just out of 

flight school also joined the unit. Lt Michael Collins recounted during that time, “I came to the 20th from flight school and was one of 

five lieutenants assigned. Most of the squadron’s first crew members 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 105

were battle-hardened pilots, flight mechanics, and gunners from 

Vietnam. It was a humbling feeling for a 2d Lt . . . to be placed with 

such a dynamic mix of characters.”23

Throughout the year, the squadron was busy with self-help projects 

to develop the squadron area and facilities. Weikel and Vallimont began a review of UW doctrine and the role that the 20th SOS could 

play in that arena. They gave briefings to the staffs of several superior 

headquarters. Additionally, they began to build a tactics database for 

all possible missions and began looking at the use of evolving night 

vision goggles (NVG) to enhance their night operations. The two also 

established low-level training routes for crew qualification and M-60 

machine gun training for the aircrews. By September the unit had 

received its first two CH-3s and now had four UH-1N crews fully 

trained and ready to be mobilized. Two more of both CH-3s and UH1Ns had been identified for the squadron.24

The 20th Squadron’s parent unit, the 1st SOW, was the remaining 

special operations force in the USAF. The 1st SOW was the lineal 

descendent of the air commandos formed in World War II, where it 

saw heavy action in the China-Burma-India theater. This force was 

reduced to almost nothing until it was rejuvenated for the long war in 

SEA. During that period, USAF special operations forces grew to 

over 10,000 personnel operating 550 aircraft. The postwar drawdown 

was severe, though, and by early 1976, the 1st SOW, with affiliated 

ANG and AFR units and one small squadron each in Europe and the 

Pacific, consisted of about 3,000 Airmen, who were assigned 28 aircraft, including CH-3Es, UH-1Ns, AC-130As and Hs, and MC-130s.25

Almost all the aircraft were over 20 years old. The SOF units were the 

lowest priority for TAC funding, and Hurlburt Field was considered 

a “sleepy hollow, nice place to visit or retire.”26 The reactivation of the 

20th breathed a bit of life back into the wing.

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

As these events were occurring at Hurlburt, Major Pehr continued 

the developmental testing and evaluation of aircraft #66-14433 at 

Wright-Patterson, stressing the integration of the Doppler/INS system 

with the central avionics computer and the projected map display. 

SecDef Donald Rumsfeld visited the base and took a ride on the aircraft. 
106 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

At the same time, the 1550th ATTW accomplished its move from 

Hill to Kirtland AFB. Aircraft #66-14433 was flown to Hill AFB for 

some navigational testing because the initial strip maps used by the 

Pave Low navigational system were made for that area. Then the aircraft was flown to Kirtland for the formal IOT&E, which was conducted in two phases at Kirtland and at Howard AFB in the Panama 

Canal Zone. For the tests, Pehr worked with the test group and flew 

with several highly qualified HH-53 IPs, such as Capt Don Backlund, 

Capt Phil Pacini, Capt Bill Kramer, and Maj Ken Ernest from MAC/

DOV (stan/eval). These early pilots were joined by flight mechanics 

SMSgt R. A. Hohl and Technical Sergeants E. J. Koebernik, Rick Simmon, 

and Andy Straughn, who focused on flight mechanic duties and overall crew integration.27

The results were encouraging. However, Pehr and the team constantly made or suggested refinements to the various systems. It became obvious, too, that future pilots and flight mechanics transitioning to the aircraft would need to receive a considerable amount of 

training to be able to operate the evolving technology and execute 

advanced tactics for safe and effective mission accomplishment. 

Overall, though, the IOT&E was very successful, and the test report, 

unanimously agreed to by all who flew in the flight series, stated:

The results showed that operational crews could fly the system down to 100 

feet set clearance above the ground level (AGL) at night and navigate to the 

survivor’s area while employing terrain masking techniques. . . .

The flight crews determined that with sufficient training and with two flight 

mechanics on the crew, they could satisfactorily accomplish terrain following / 

terrain avoidance flight, inertial/Doppler navigation, and survivor location/

recovery without the addition of a systems operator at a separate console. . . .

Future training requirements were assessed and it was determined that individual training must be increased for pilots and flight mechanics for the Pave 

Low III mission. . . .

The FLIR performance was very good in cool, dry climactic conditions but 

marginal in hot, humid conditions. . . .

The recommendation of this evaluation is to proceed with procurement of the 

Pave Low III system. The unanimous opinion of each crew member that participated in the evaluation is that Pave Low III provided the first realistic capability to accomplish the combat rescue mission in conditions of total darkness 

and in marginal weather.28
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 107

The report also contained specific recommendations concerning the 

selection and training of Pave Low crew members, saying:

The personnel assigned to a Pave Low III unit must be screened. The mission is 

demanding and personnel not properly motivated will have difficulty learning 

the system. The system does not allow strong crew members to carry weak ones. 

If one man cannot perform, it will degrade the entire performance. The mission 

does not allow for a margin of error. Basic experience and high motivation 

should be the driving forces when considering Pave Low III crew members.29

It was also becoming obvious to anyone who cared to notice that 

this radically modified aircraft had capabilities well beyond combat 

rescue. When the aircraft first went to Kirtland, Pehr and another 

team member, Leo Gambone, met with the HH-53 pilots and said, 

“We’ve got something you guys want to see. We built this for rescue, 

but it’s really a special ops machine.” On another occasion, Pehr and 

Gambone made a pitch for the aircraft to some USAF special operations personnel. Pehr and Gambone told them, “You guys ought to 

get on board this program. This is the kind of system you need.” Their 

response was dismissive. “Ha, you give us a set of NVGs and a stopwatch and we can go anywhere in the world and do anything we need 

to do. We do not need all of this sh--,” said the young tigers in the 

20th SOS.30

The MAC commander, General Carlton, closely monitored the 

Pave Low program. Satisfied with the developmental results, he directed his staff to establish a requirement for 29 Pave Low III aircraft 

for a projected cost of $55 million. He also directed his staff to explore the possibility of requesting the transfer of the 10 remaining 

CH-53s from TAC and USAFE for conversion to Pave Low III.31 One 

young staff officer, Capt Jerry Shipman, briefed the proposal to a senior commander at Bergstrom AFB. The officer was unimpressed 

with these possible expansion plans and only wanted to know when 

the helicopters were going to get “the hell off my ramp.”32

As Pave Low was proceeding according to plan, the ARRS commander, Maj Gen Ralph Saunders, continued to work with USAFE 

concerning the movement of significant numbers of HH-53s to Europe. When the Sembach option was rejected, he proposed moving 

all of the NRS HH-53s from McClellan and Kirtland AFBs to RAF 

Woodbridge for integration into the 67th ARRSq. The currently assigned HH-53s and crews were already integrating into ongoing 

USAFE operational exercises with NATO partners. Saunders briefed 
108 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

the USAFE commander, Gen Richard Ellis, on present and developing ARRS capabilities, and Ellis supported his ongoing initiatives.33

Saunders also had his staff participate in an ongoing DOD study to 

consider some form of “interservice helicopter commonality.” Subsequently, the study group recommended that if commonality appeared 

to be cost effective, then procedures for its implementation merited 

further study. Seizing upon that theme, General Saunders informally 

proposed that ARRS become the single manager for all USAF helicopters. This would include the current ARRS forces and missions 

plus Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF), the Strategic Air 

Command (SAC) missile site support mission, rescue support at TAC 

ranges, support of AFSC missions, and the distinguished personnel 

mission in the Washington, DC, area. However, in post-SEA mission 

and unit planning, MAC and the ARRS had agreed that rescue forces 

should perform combat rescue functions but should not perform covert combat operations, as had become somewhat commonplace in 

later years in SEA. MAC/ARRS would focus on the “white hat” missions while leaving other forces to focus on the classic SOF, or “black 

hat,” missions, but under one common command. However, the idea 

was premature. Following the removal of special operations forces 

from SEA, the SOF helicopter responsibilities were assigned to TAC. 

It was up to TAC to form and equip units such as the 20th SOS to 

carry out those missions, and it did not support the single manager 

proposal. This concept would be revisited in the future.34

During 1976 HH-53s were also used in contingency operations. In 

June, two HH-53s from the 67th ARRSq at RAF Woodbridge deployed to RAF Akrotiri on the island of Cyprus for possible use in a 

noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) for American citizens in 

Lebanon. However, their services were not needed when all personnel 

were evacuated by US Navy ships. Two months later, HH-53s from 

the 33d ARRSq at Kadena AB responded as part of a large USAF task 

force to the murder of two US Army Soldiers by North Korean troops 

at Panmunjom, Korea. For 19 days, the helicopters maintained a 

combat recovery alert at Osan AB, Korea, to provide support for possible air operations against the North Koreans. However, the incident 

was resolved without further bloodshed, and the rescue forces returned 

to Kadena. ARRS forces, including the HH-53s, also became steady 

participants in large USAF and joint exercises such as Red Flag at 

Nellis and several held by overseas commands. These exercises produced many lessons learned, highlighting a continuing need for 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 109

realistic training and equipment improvements. Overall, the exercises 

were highly successful. Lt Col Bruce Purvine, ARRS director of tactical 

operations, described how “Red Flag has provided outstanding realistic 

combat training for our participating aircrews . . . , increased our aircrews’ knowledge of the enemy . . . , [and] given them the opportunity 

to develop an ability for combat decision making. Red Flag has unearthed numerous problem areas that must be corrected.”35

ARRS HH-53s and other helicopters also participated with TAC 

fighter units to begin a long-term program to determine the best tactics for fighters to use to attack helicopters and for helicopters to use 

against fighters and other attacking helicopters. This program was 

called Joint Countering Attack Helicopter (J-CATCH) and the tests, 

initially done at Hill and Eglin AFBs, would eventually also involve 

the 20th SOS. The results, from a helicopter perspective, were significant. The recommendations were that helicopter crews emphasize 

low-level tactics with a corresponding adjustment in training, radar 

warning systems be installed on all combat rescue helicopters as soon 

as possible, and heat-seeking missiles be installed on all combat rescue helicopters. These results correlated with those of a supporting 

threat study on expected enemy defenses in the central European 

area. It concluded that to survive, trained aircrews would need to 

conduct night operations using nap-of-the-earth (NOE) navigation 

down as low as 50 feet AGL while utilizing radar homing and warning equipment and infrared countermeasures. Pave Low III was being designed specifically to address these requirements.36

20th Special Operations Squadron

By early 1977, the 20th SOS had received three of its CH-3s and 

five of its UH-1Ns. In January the unit generated an in-house exercise 

to practice new tactics based on post-SEA threat analysis and assigned mission tasks. This included NOE navigational techniques, 

which put a real premium on accurate map reading. Captain Weikel 

in wing tactics scripted ROCs for aircraft radar warning receivers, 

radar altimeters, infrared jammers, and upgraded engines for both 

aircraft. The enhanced tactical training served the squadron well 

when it received a TAC operational readiness inspection (ORI) in 

March, passing with no answerable write-ups. Nonetheless, it was 

still limited in mission capability because of shortages of required air-
110 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

craft radios as well as armor and maintenance problems caused by 

the aircraft’s old age. 

Later in the year, the 20th had an opportunity to participate in a 

TAC-sponsored Blue Flag exercise at Hurlburt Field. Unit crews were 

able to fly several tactical sorties, including a simulated combat recovery of an aircrew shot down deep behind enemy lines. They also 

began to conduct mountain flying in northern Georgia and lift training for US Army Ranger exercises in that area and the swamps just 

north of Eglin AFB, affording excellent joint training for both service 

units. The 20th’s tactics division also participated with Headquarters 

TAC to write a helicopter tactics manual for the CH-3 and UH-1N 

aircraft. It also sent a representative to meetings at TAC headquarters 

to establish an analysis and training program for helicopter air-to-air 

tactics against both fixed- and rotary-wing adversaries. In November 

the unit deployed two UH-1N aircraft with aircrews and maintenance support to participate in a Red Flag exercise at Nellis. Other 

unit aircrews rotated in at the midpoint of the exercise, providing 

valuable training for almost all UH-1N crews. While there, the Green 

Hornets flew almost every day as well as on several nights. Their missions were SOF-focused, allowing them to make numerous low-level 

flights into hostile territory to work with the threat simulators, engage in air-to-air battles with opposing force fighters, and practice 

basic SOF skills. The Hornets became adept at inserting small special 

forces teams optimized to destroy SAM sites. The results of the exercise showed that the 20th’s aircraft and crews could reasonably survive in a medium- to high-threat area with proper training and support. However, several continuing limitations now became readily 

apparent and were noted in the unit after action report, which stated, 

“We found the UH-1N to have adequate power to work in the high 

desert, but found that the lack of radar warning receivers (RWR), 

infrared countermeasures (IRCM), night terrain following equipment, and precise navigation equipment made night work very difficult. Another shortcoming of the UH-1N is that it does not have 

sufficient range.”37 These limiting factors suggested that the 20th 

SOS, with its current equipage, was not able to provide significant 

infiltration capability for any SOF forces beyond small teams over 

short distances.38

Maj John Grove joined the unit in November. Since returning 

from SEA in late 1971, he had been at Shaw AFB, initially as an H-3 

IP and then as director of the base altitude chamber. In that position, 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 111

he had worked for the base hospital commander, an arrangement that 

did not benefit Grove’s career. The new 1st SOW commander, Col 

Richard Dunwoody, had known Grove at NKP and felt that his vast 

experience could be of benefit to the 20th. Dunwoody called him 

with a job offer. Grove gladly accepted and moved to Hurlburt. The 

first day on base, he ran into Captains Weikel and Vallimont at the 

Officers’ Club. Both were hip deep in building up the unit’s capabilities, in large part through their strong personalities. Weikel was a 

bona fide hard charger who did everything at max press and seemingly never slept. He was a whirling dervish of ideas and favored 

seeking forgiveness vice requesting permission. Joe Vallimont 

matched Gary Weikel stride for stride. Weikel described him as 

one of the most colorful characters ever. Middle linebacker . . . almost an ace 

(married four times that I know of), semi-pro ice hockey star, carried his “ax” 

(guitar) with him everywhere he went. Was lead for JG [Jolly Green] rock and 

roll band . . . could play/sing almost any/all 50s/60s/70s rock, knew all the SEA 

songs/lyrics, could entertain/regale for hours, started fights everywhere, and 

was an endless source of scandal and humor. Fu Manchu out-of-limits walrus 

mustache . . . the total “up-yer-ass” package.39

Weikel and Vallimont briefed Grove on what the squadron was 

doing, and he felt right at home. His services were immediately put to 

good use; he initially began instructing in the H-3 and then progressively moved into other positions of authority and responsibility.40

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

At the outset of 1977, the ARRS engaged with MAC and TAC in an 

extension of the interservice helicopter commonality discussions to 

examine an Air Staff proposal to transfer SOF helicopter support for 

joint special operations to the US Army. If such a mission transfer 

occurred, it would be without any personnel or aircraft. The TAC 

UH-1N and CH-3E aircraft would then be transferred to the ARRS. 

As this discussion was ongoing, General Saunders pointed out that if 

the CSAF and MAC commander decided to assign the SOF mission 

to the ARRS, it could certainly provide the necessary leadership and 

management expertise to handle the mission. However, no further 

action was taken on the proposal.41

Throughout the year, rescue units were always on call to provide 

civil SAR. The HH-53s would occasionally be called for recoveries. 
112 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

On 14 January, an HH-53 crew from the 55th ARRSq helped rescue 

32 US Army Rangers caught in a flood in the swamps north of Eglin. 

On the same day, another HH-53 crew from the 41st ARRSq at 

McClellan recovered eight campers trapped in the deep snow of 

the High Sierra Mountains north of Lake Tahoe. 

General Saunders also reengaged USAFE concerning an increase 

of HH-53s at RAF Woodbridge. In a visit to that command in January 

1977, he met with the new USAFE commander, Gen Richard Ellis. 

Based upon USAFE’s continued desire for increased combat rescue 

capability, Saunders suggested moving all NRS HH-53s to Europe, 

possibly based at RAF Woodbridge. When Saunders back-briefed 

General Carlton, however, Carlton stated that at least two NRS aircraft and all NRS training would remain at Kirtland. 

The ARRS lost another HH-35C when #68-10368, assigned to the 

67th ARRSq at RAF Woodbridge, crashed near Stuttgart, Germany, 

on 24 June 1977. The aircraft was transporting personnel to a training 

site in Germany and was approaching a US Army air base when the 

accident occurred. All 14 on board were injured but survived.42

The ARRS, MAC, and USAFE staff had begun doing the necessary coordination for the movement of the aircraft when, in July, 

the director of plans on the Air Staff nonconcurred. Instead, he stated 

that the eight Pave Low III aircraft would be assigned to RAF Woodbridge as they were modified and flight-tested. However, the ARRS 

and MAC were directed to move five more HH-53s to the 67th to 

replace the crashed aircraft and to provide increased daytime combat 

recovery capability for USAFE. The ARRS then proposed that the 

NRS aircraft be split between the 41st ARRSq at McClellan AFB, 

California, and the 33d ARRSq at Kadena AB, Japan. This would move 

NRS capability into the western Pacific region and also allow continuous NRS participation in the ongoing Red Flag exercises at Nellis. 

However, analysis showed that this could not be done while still 

maintaining the NRS training capability at Kirtland, and the project 

was dropped.43

Throughout the year, aircraft #66-14433 continued its operational 

testing and evaluation (OT&E), conducted at both Wright-Patterson 

and Kirtland AFBs, and accomplished all milestones. HQ USAF formally declared that all Pave Low III aircraft would now be officially 

identified as HH-53H aircraft. HQ USAF also authorized MAC to 

program for 21 more aircraft modifications, starting with the NRSmodified aircraft. However, funding was not yet provided. 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 113

Anticipating full funding for all 29 aircraft, which now included 

the prototype, #66-14433, the MAC staff began planning for full implementation based upon modification of the initial eight. A revised 

concept of operations was published on 18 August 1977. It specified 

the following:

1. Initial basing of six Pave Low aircraft would be at the 67th ARRSq in the 

UK and mixed with three standard aircraft to provide day and night combat rescue capability. 

2. Two Pave Low aircraft would be retained at Kirtland AFB for crew and 

maintenance training. 

3. Pave Low and NRS aircraft would not be mixed. 

4. Pave Low aircraft would be reserved for high-threat and/or night/bad 

weather conditions and not used in day/VFR conditions unless the only 

[ones] available. Pave Low aircraft could conduct other heavy-lift operations 

such as sling lifts and evacuations. 

5. Pave Low aircraft could operate single ship behind enemy lines.

6. The requirement for Pave Low aircraft to have active onboard ECM was 

still current (MAC ROC 12-73).

7. Both organizational and intermediate level maintenance would be established in Pave Low III units to support their unique systems and ARRS 

general systems such as ELF, RHAW, and flare dispensers.

8. Pave Low required unique specialists for

a. light controls, AFCS, and hover

b. instrumentation

c. radar, ELF, and nav aids

d. TF/TA radar system, Doppler, and IMU

e. FLIR sensor

9. Pave Low units must be manned for 24-hour operations.44

The 55th ARRSq at Eglin AFB began working on tactical procedures, and the MAC staff did preliminary studies with the training 

personnel at Kirtland AFB to develop a Pave Low training program 

for initial projected students in the summer of 1979. All first-cadre 

aircrews and maintenance personnel would have previous H-53 experience. Crew coordination would be essential, and each crew was to 

have two pilots, two flight mechanics, and two pararescue specialists.45
114 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

At Kirtland the 1551st FTS trained all H-53 crews and was directed to expand its program to include Pave Low III qualification for 

the selected crews. It had just revamped the helicopter combat recovery 

portion of its training to include the tactics necessary to deal with 

new and evolving threats. Now the 1551st began to develop its training program specifically for the Pave Low. The squadron commander, 

Lt Col Gary Lunt, and his senior IPs and flight mechanics started 

working directly with Major Pehr and Sergeant Simmon, who came 

TDY from Wright-Patterson AFB to script both flying and academic 

curricula for aircrews anticipated to begin arriving by late 1978.46 Following the abortive planning to move the NRS aircraft to Europe and 

the Pacific areas, MAC finalized an ultimate 29-aircraft HH-53H 

beddown plan. It called for nine aircraft at the 67th, RAF Woodbridge; five at the 41st, McClellan AFB; five at the 55th, Eglin AFB; 

five at the 33d, Kadena AB; and five at the 1550th, Kirtland AFB.47

Throughout the year, HH-53 crews continued to participate in 

major training exercises such as Red Flag, Brave Shield, and Bold 

Eagle, both in the CONUS and overseas, as well as in several smaller 

SAR exercises. HH-53 crews from the 41st and 55th ARRSqs and the 

1550th ATTW participated in the ever-expanding J-CATCH program.48

As 1978 began, the ARRS continued to push the concept of a consolidated helicopter force. TAC initially expressed interest in its proposal, especially when a USAF audit indicated that $2 million a year 

could be saved in tactical range support missions. General Saunders’s 

proposal received increased emphasis when Maj Gen Hoyt Vandenberg 

Jr., director of operations and readiness at HQ USAF, voiced support 

for the concept and asked the various commands to state their positions. Again ARRS and MAC supported it. However, Maj Gen Billy 

Ellis, the TAC DCS for operations, nonconcurred. He cited the close 

integration of the SOF and TACS helicopters with the Army special 

forces and tactical units they supported, stating, “SOF and TACS 

helicopters should remain separate from Rescue and immediately 

responsive to their respective missions. The proposed single manager 

concept does not offer benefits in readiness for the rotary wing force.” 

That effectively ended the discussion.49
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 115

Pave Low

At about the same time, HH-53B #66-14433 was moved permanently to Kirtland AFB for its follow-on operational test and evaluation (FOT&E). Now promoted to lieutenant colonel, Frank Pehr 

came with the aircraft because the 1550th ATTW commander said 

that he would not take the aircraft without him. Pehr became a special assistant to the commander and director for Pave Low. The wing 

test section was commanded by Lt Col Sid Gurley, and Pehr worked 

closely with him to do all operational testing and begin the logistic 

and maintenance planning to put the aircraft into operational use. 

One of the test pilots there was Capt Steve Connelly. He and Pehr 

were well acquainted from their time at Hill AFB, where Pehr had 

become a bit of a legend for his great flying abilities and no-nonsense 

professionalism. To many of the younger men, Pehr was a mentor.50

Following his tour with the 40th at NKP in 1972, Connelly had 

returned to HH-53 duty at Hamilton AFB, California, with the 41 

ARRSq. However, that unit inactivated in the summer of 1973, and 

Connelly was reassigned to instructor duties in the HH-53 school 

with the 1550th ATTW at Hill. Still a first lieutenant, he threw his 

meager belongings in his car and drove to Utah. He had a volunteer 

statement in for another SEA tour but remained at Hill AFB for the 

next two years, eventually becoming an instructor on the NRS aircraft. In 1975 he received orders to proceed to Webb AFB, Texas, to 

go through fixed-wing conversion flying T-37s and T-38s, with a followon return to operational flying in either fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft. 

While at Webb, he received a call from a USAF assignments officer 

who had another idea. The officer had been reviewing Connelly’s personnel file and noticed that he had an electrical engineering degree 

and a strong academic record. The USAF was looking for a young officer to send to helicopter test pilot school, and the assignments officer 

wanted to know if Connelly would consider being nominated for the 

slot. He needed a quick answer because the selection board started 

the next day. Connelly agreed, and his selection package was the only 

one with a full record but no actual application. Regardless, he was 

selected, and instead of a fixed-wing assignment, he reported to the 

US Navy Test Pilot School at the Patuxent NAS, Maryland, in January 

1976 for the helicopter test pilot course.51

Completing the program in December, Connelly was ordered back 

to the 1550th ATTW, now at Kirtland, for duties as an HH-53 test 
116 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

pilot in the wing flight test section. Arriving there in January 1977, 

his first assigned task was to do a test and evaluation on problems 

with the NRS system identified in a recent accident. It involved erroneous radar altimeter inputs that caused problems with both the 

Doppler navigation system and the hover coupler. When the project 

was complete, he worked several other programs and also checked 

out as an instructor in the HH-53 qualification course. Later that 

summer, his boss, Lt Col Ron Olsen, told him that he would be assigned to the Pave Low III project when the aircraft and Frank Pehr 

were moved to Kirtland. That was just fine with Connelly because he 

had already heard a great deal about it and especially looked forward 

to working with Pehr. He made several trips to Wright-Patterson, 

where he flew with Pehr on #66-14433 and began to integrate into the 

overall program. When Pehr and the aircraft permanently arrived at 

Kirtland, Connelly was ready. 

Capt Bob Stankovich also transferred from Hill to Kirtland as part 

of the unit relocation. He had flown CH-53s with the 21st SOS in 

Thailand in 1973 and 1974 and had returned to duties as an H-53 

instructor and training officer. Pehr also asked him to join the Pave 

Low effort, and he eagerly grabbed the opportunity to fly and qualify 

on the aircraft. He then focused on developing training programs for 

the aircraft.52

Pehr and his slowly growing cadre flew together quite often. Several of their missions were flown over Cabezon Peak, a flat-faced 

mountain about 50 miles northwest of Kirtland AFB and in the 

Grand Canyon, to test the TF/TA radar and determine the best procedures for ridge crossing. In September 1978, they took the aircraft 

to Nellis AFB to participate in a Red Flag exercise. To prepare the 

aircraft for the sorties, they had to manually open the projected map 

display to put in a map strip for the Nellis region. They actually accomplished that tricky task at one point, with the map filmstrip 

stretched out along the length of the cabin. That was no small feat 

because the strips had to be aligned exactly right, or they would cause 

navigational errors. 

One of the crew’s assigned missions was to do a night recovery of 

a “downed” Airman deep in enemy territory, actually the Tonopah 

Test Range, an area filled with a variety of “hostile” radars and threats. 

The “survivor” was 1st Lt Jim Teeple, a former Army warrant officer 

pilot who had switched over to the Air Force and was assigned to fly 

HH-53s with the 41st ARRSq. While temporarily assigned to Kirtland 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 117

AFB, Teeple had met Steve Connelly and expressed an interest in getting involved in the Pave Low. The aircrew took him along to Nellis, 

and he volunteered to be the survivor. 

The weather was windy and cold. Teeple and a survival instructor 

were driven to a site a few miles from the projected rescue area and 

directed to walk in. As Teeple was in good physical condition, he 

quickly separated from the instructor, who was later recovered by 

ground transportation. Equipped with a locating device, Teeple 

moved into the assigned area. At the appointed time, he set it up so 

that the Pave Low crew could find him. 

Using the full capabilities of the Pave Low, Pehr and Connelly flew 

through the dark—undetected across the middle of the range—and 

came to a hover over the survivor’s location. In the cabin, Rick Simmon 

saw Teeple and announced, “Penetrator is going down.” When the 

cold, soaked survivor was on board, they departed the range—again, 

fully undetected—and allowed Teeple to get some flying time on the 

machine.53 Simmon remembers that “it was a pretty interesting environment to be in with the capabilities of the aircraft. Low-level flying, 

in actual terrain at that point, on NVGs, what I call ‘down in the dirt.’ 

[It was] actually lower than the capability of the radar to carry us. It 

was some fun flying. I was a little nervous a few times, but it was 

pretty good flying.”54

That feat drew a lot of attention to the project. On another day, low 

clouds and fog again covered the tactical areas, and all missions except 

a few F-111s and the Pave Low were cancelled. Pehr and Connelly flew 

an operations normal mission through all of the ranges and never 

had to abort because of the weather.55

When flying into and out of the Nellis ranges, the Pave Low occasionally needed in-flight refueling, and HC-130 tankers would be 

sent up to rendezvous with them. Connelly and Pehr set up nocommunications procedures so that radio calls were not necessary, 

just a few light signals. Their integrated navigational system allowed 

them to navigate precisely to the rendezvous point exactly on time. 

On one occasion, just as they were finishing, the tanker crew was not 

sure where it was. Connelly checked his map display and was able to 

direct the tanker crew to make a turn before the aircraft entered one 

of the restricted areas.56

Thinking tactically, Connelly felt that such precise low-level navigational capability made the Pave Lows natural lead aircraft for formations of other helicopters, such as Army CH-47s for larger unit 
118 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

infiltrations or exfiltrations or for virtually any tactical purpose. He 

developed a test plan to validate the concept. However, the ARRS 

staff disapproved the plan with the pithy comment that “the Pave Low 

would never be used like that.”57

Hearing about these successes, the 1550th ATTW commander decided to take a flight with Connelly and Pehr. They went out at night 

and flew on NVGs as low as 15 feet above ground level through the 

ranges. When they landed, the commander demanded to know who 

authorized such a mission, clearly in violation of MAC regulations. 

Pehr pointed out to him that they flew that way because it was called 

for in the test plan that the commander himself had signed! Regardless, the commander called MAC headquarters and had them restricted to 100 feet. Additionally, they were forbidden any further use 

of NVGs until a proper test program had been conducted. Pehr could 

not believe the commander’s and MAC’s reluctance to accept the capabilities of the aircraft. Pehr said to them, “Listen guys, this is the 

best thing that ever happened to you. It is making you viable as a rescue organization, and it’s probably the best thing that’s ever going to 

happen to rescue. And you people are shooting it down. What is the 

matter with you people?”58

However, orders were orders, and Connelly developed a program 

to determine the best initial NVG use. Given the collage of lights of 

various colors arrayed throughout the cockpit, Pehr and Connelly 

rigged an old Army wool blanket from the ceiling so that the pilot 

flying could turn down all lights and use his NVGs, while the copilot 

and flight mechanic could then use their lights without bothering the 

pilot flying. It worked just fine. They could not admit that their light 

restrictor was just an old Army blanket. Instead, they had to list it as 

a “light isolation device.” Connelly later said that “we could have 

painted the windows black, and we could have done the mission.”59

Pehr later described the rationale for their expediency: 

Maybe we were being a little devious and a little untruthful, but it was almost 

like if we told them exactly what we were going to do or what we had to do, they 

wouldn’t have let us do it. And in order to get through the test phase, if we didn’t 

test it, how could we say that this is a way we could operate the aircraft? So we 

had to test all of this stuff beforehand so that we could put it into the training 

program so we could develop the capability to do that stuff. Of course, later they 

developed the night vision lighting package that made light compatible with 

both the goggles, and you could have the lights on and still be able to see outside 

with the goggles. But earlier in the program, you couldn’t do that. The lights 

would shut down the goggles; you couldn’t see past the windscreen.60
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 119

They were determined to aggressively carry out their testing of this 

revolutionary new technological marvel by seeking forgiveness for 

any discovered transgressions instead of requesting permission from 

a doubting and hesitant bureaucratic organization. But there were so 

many who just refused to believe in the system. Connelly and Pehr 

tried to talk some of the other HH-53 pilots into volunteering to fly 

with them. There was a dearth of interest. “You do not want to fly 

‘Grave Low,’ ” the pilots said. “They are all going to kill themselves.”61

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

In April, in anticipation of the initial assignment of Pave Low IIIs 

to the 67th ARRSq, that unit began to prepare for the arrival of the 

aircraft. It received manning authorization for a four-person intelligence cell to develop procedures for intelligence support for combat 

recovery in the theater. The squadron started coordination with various 

European governments for the use of air traffic routes and training 

areas, especially low-flying areas in Wales, Scotland, and Belgium. 

MAC and the ARRS plans divisions published MAC Programming 

Plan 78-18 designating an aircraft flow that showed all aircraft in 

place and operational at RAF Woodbridge by early 1981. MAC personnel began to program the necessary manpower billets to provide 

for an aircrew manning of 1.5 full crews per aircraft and enough 

maintenance and support personnel based upon 26 man-hours of 

support for each flying hour. 

As the designated conversion aircraft began to flow through the 

NARF at Pensacola, the ARRS did an overall reevaluation of the seven 

NRS aircraft. Given the increasing sophistication of enemy antiaircraft weaponry, it was now blatantly obvious that the NRS aircraft did 

not belong in high-threat arenas, day or night, especially with an 

increasingly obsolete navigational system. Accordingly, a special 

Rescue Study Group was convened to review the issue and offer recommendations. Realizing quickly that the aircraft was still operated 

as it was designed—for duty in SEA and viable only in low-threat environs—the study leader, Col Don Gibson, recommended that the NRS 

aircraft be relieved of its “special mission” requirements and restricted 

to night SAR missions only. General Saunders concurred, and the 

NRS capability was no longer maintained, nor were crews now 

trained to perform it.62
120 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

Other modifications were also programmed or considered for the 

HH-53 fleet in general. The ARRS took part in developmental work 

to design IRCMs that could defend the aircraft against SA-7-type 

heat-seeking missiles, now becoming a favorite weapon of enemy 

forces of all sorts. The ARRS also assigned one HH-53, #67-14994, to 

take part in the Army and Navy’s program “Compass Cool” to determine the feasibility of developing an infrared warning receiver. Additionally, 24 HH-53s were modified with hover couplers. These systems had been added to the NRS aircraft and allowed pilots to hold 

hover directly over a survivor. Lastly, the more powerful T-64-GE-7A 

engines were programmed for all of the non–Pave Low aircraft and 

would be installed over the next year.63

In November 1978, the 39th ARRW received a tasking to support 

recovery operations in Guyana, South America, when a US congressman was killed in a mass murder at a religious cult settlement near 

Jonestown. The 55th ARRSq was directed to deploy three HH-53s 

with a maintenance package to stage out of the Roosevelt Roads NAS 

in Puerto Rico in support of the operation. The crews deployed with 

aircraft numbers 73-1649, 73-1651, and 73-1652. They arrived at the 

site on 22 November and shuttled in and out of the compound for the 

next two days, flying 30 sorties to recover 603 bodies from the disaster 

site. It was a sad and macabre mission for the men of rescue, but they 

did not get to pick their missions.64

20th Special Operations Squadron

By the beginning of 1978, the 20th SOS now had all of its authorized 

UH-1Ns and all but one of its authorized CH-3s. The unit also welcomed a new commander, Lt Col John Roberts. Unit assigned missions remained the same as unit personnel participated in several 

more large exercises. Weikel and Vallimont attended a conference at 

TAC headquarters concerning 20th SOS participation in the JCATCH program, also attended by several representatives from 

MAC/ARRS and the other services. Weikel made a strong pitch that 

his unit had the equipment and expertise to replicate a Soviet helicopter force. That got the unit included in the program. 

Captain Vallimont also attended training on the use of NVGs. 

Based upon the findings from recent Red Flag exercises, the 20th was 

given 12 sets of AN/PVS-5 NVGs. Vallimont felt that once the already 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 121

well-trained crews of the 20th were further trained and certified to 

use the NVGs, they could be just as mission effective at night, thus 

adding to their mission capability and threat survival. Initially, 

though, TAC authorized only limited training with the NVGs. Consequently, he and Weikel sent their crews out at night with NVGs, 

jeeps, and tactical maps and had them navigate all over the tactical 

ranges to develop basic NVG proficiency. 

Additionally, Vallimont worked on a proposal to install a LORAN 

C/D navigational set on the unit helicopters. He flew with one on a 

UH-1N on a 50-kilometer flight, arriving within 80 meters of the target 

designated by the universal transverse mercator (UTM) and missing 

his time on target by 10 seconds. LORAN units were subsequently 

installed on two unit CH-3s. On one mission in the north Georgia 

mountains, the crew led a formation of 22 US Army helicopters on a 

73-mile course and arrived within 10 seconds of the planned time. It 

also used the LORAN-equipped CH-3 to perform a combat recovery 

of a “survivor” in the mountains. 

The unit participated in two exercises with Army special forces 

units in the Fort Bragg, North Carolina, area. In Solid Shield 78, the 

unit supported the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic, 

with two CH-3s and three crews who flew 116 hours, again using the 

LORAN with favorable results. Several missions included moving 

personnel and equipment on and off of ships, both day and night—

valuable training for joint operations. In Operation Diamond Jim, 

unit crews inserted and extracted several small special forces teams at 

night using NVGs on the small islands along the Carolina coast.

As part of the J-CATCH project, the 20th deployed all of its helicopters, crews, and maintenance and support personnel to Fort 

Rucker, Alabama, to participate in air-to-air engagements with an 

opposing force of US Army helicopters. Serving as the red force, the 

20th aircraft were “equipped” with various captive missiles and gun 

systems to replicate anticipated enemy threats and with video recording systems to record the engagements and flight parameters for data 

and kill analysis. Over a period of six weeks, unit crews flew in 54 

events, logging 418 individual sorties and 432 flight hours. The data 

collected was voluminous and was forwarded to TAC for analysis and 

dissemination. Needless to say, all crew members enjoyed the experience and received a great deal of excellent and timely training. 

All of these developments were encouraging and provided the 

crews with a heightened confidence that they could perform their 
122 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

increasingly joint missions as effectively as possible with the maximum chance of survival. At a commander’s call, the crews were also 

briefed on a new USAF tactical air force (TAF) statement of operational need (SON), 313-79, for a new special-operations-capable aircraft as a viable replacement for both the CH-3 and UH-1N. One 

possible candidate could be the new H-60 that Sikorsky was developing primarily for rescue but that was certainly adaptable for other 

missions. The crews were also allowed to make suggestions as to the 

capabilities that such an aircraft should possess.65

As 1979 commenced, the 20th continued its participation in JCATCH, flying air-to-air operations against fixed-wing opponents 

and then combinations of both fixed- and rotary-wing formations. 

The squadron eventually logged 700 flight hours on 547 sorties in all 

phases of the operational test. The tests generated a trove of information then used to develop classified TTP changes to both fixed- and 

rotary-wing crews to use against potential modern adversary aircraft. 

Major Grove participated in many of the J-CATCH missions and felt 

that they were particularly good training for the helicopter crews. He 

could also not help but notice the pointed cockiness that developed 

in his pilots as they quickly learned to use the natural advantages of 

their helicopters against the fighter aircraft. He recalls that 

our tactics were pretty much restricted to what we thought the Russians would 

do, except when it came to our fighters. The more arrogant they thought they 

were, the harder we fought with them. But it’s easy to do in a helicopter because you just fly in a crab—you point the nose to one side or the other and go 

in the opposite direction. . . . Fighter guys couldn’t figure out why we were 

pointing that way. . . . All you have to do is break lock once and you are home 

free. So we did that to them, . . . and that really pissed them off.66

Needless to say, the fighter guys did not like getting beaten by the 

helicopters. At a J-CATCH operations review conference, the TAC 

commander, Gen Wilbur “Bill” Creech, became irate when he was 

briefed on the exercise results. At one point, the Ninth Air Force 

commander, Lt Gen Arnold Braswell, visited the 20th and flew a mission in one of the CH-3s as it was engaged by F-15s. He was favorably 

impressed with the flight and unit and so told the assembled members. 

The 20th was gaining quite a reputation within the fighter community. 

It now was continuously getting invitations to various flag exercises, 

testimony to the realistic training the unit was conducting.67

On another occasion, the 20th guys were celebrating at the Officers’ Club with some fighter guys, when one of the fighter “pukes” 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 123

teased them about not wearing any distinctive colored scarves that 

were the staple of any well-dressed fighter pilot. Never one to miss the 

moment, Gary Weikel grabbed a red tablecloth, sliced it into sections 

with his boot knife, and handed the sections to his mates. They then 

wrapped them around their necks and tucked them down into their 

flight suits just above the zipper—totally nonregulation but in keeping with their independent and cocky ways. From that point on, the 

scarves were part of their attire. Picking up on the theme, the 20th 

SOS maintenance crews also draped a red tablecloth from their maintenance vehicle out on the flight line.68

Capt Joe Vallimont continued to expand the NVG training, and 

the 20th became the only USAF unit fully qualified to use NVGs. He 

and the tactics division were then directed to begin working with 

other special operations units to help them develop NVG capabilities. 

Additionally, the unit received authorization to equip all of its helicopters with RWRs optimized for helicopter use.

Throughout the year, the unit received ever more opportunities to 

jointly exercise with special forces elements from other services. 

These took place primarily at Fort Bragg or in the tactical ranges just 

north of Eglin AFB. By the end of 1979, the 20th had developed into 

a fiercely spirited and highly trained unit. Its pilots were capable of 

performing their disparate and demanding unit missions to the limits 

that their assigned aircraft would allow. Addressing the limitations of 

the assigned aircraft, the 1st SOW commander, Colonel Dunwoody, 

forwarded to Ninth Air Force a detailed list of requested improvements to the 20th SOS aircraft in early 1980. Citing the need for an 

overall new aircraft presented in TAF SON 313-79, he pointed out 

that the current 20th SOS aircraft needed the following upgrades to 

maintain mission viability:

1. New SOF helicopter to replace the general purpose CH-3 and 

UH-1N based on 1950s technology, per the validated but unfunded TAF SON 313-79.

2. Precision, self-contained navigation system to permit accurate 

night terrain flight at very low altitudes using NVGs. 

3. CH-3 aerial refueling for worldwide deployment capability 

without dedicated strategic airlift and extensive teardown and 

buildup requirements.

4. Adequate number of NVG sets to meet mission needs. 
124 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

5. Longer-range defensive systems, such as .50-caliber machine 

guns, and possibly Stinger or Hellfire missiles, as dictated by 

the threat environment. 

6. Infrared countermeasures equipment for helicopters to jam, 

suppress, or provide shielding against heat-seeking missiles. 

7. CH-3 engine upgrades to provide better performance at higher 

elevations.

8. UH-1N engine and/or rotor blade improvements to be able to 

carry full fuel loads and weaponry on longer-range tactical 

missions.69

Since its reactivation in January 1976, the 20th SOS—as the only 

special operations helicopter squadron in the active Air Force—had 

embraced its mission and developed a cadre of hard-charging men 

who aggressively pursued every avenue available to them to optimize 

their capability to accomplish that mission. They leveraged evolving 

navigational and NVG technology and seized upon available joint 

and air-to-air training opportunities to hone their skills. Acting almost as a human Petri dish, they formed, molded, and gestated a 

squadron that proved in inspections and exercises that they had rekindled the air commando spirit and were now limited only by their 

antiquated equipment.70

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

The new year of 1979 started off badly for the ARRS when, in 

February, HH-53C #69-5787, assigned to the 33d ARRSq, crashed 

into the Pacific Ocean 53 miles northeast of Kadena AB. While refueling, 

the crew moved too far forward and hit the refueling hose with the 

main rotor blades. Collateral damage to the blades stimulated severe 

lateral vibrations and caused the tail rotor to separate. The aircraft 

crashed inverted near a coral reef, killing three crew members. The 

fourth man was rescued by a local fisherman. 

Shortly thereafter, PACAF asked MAC/ARRS for another aircraft 

to make up for the loss. No new aircraft were being built. MAC subsequently coordinated with TAC and HQ USAF to move CH-53C 

#68-10923 from the 701st TASS at Bergstrom to Kirtland for training purposes, thus freeing up an HH-53 to be sent to the 33d ARRSq 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 125

at Kadena. The 701st TASS was also ordered to inactivate on 1 January 1980.71

On 13 March 1979, the first production Pave Low III, HH-53H 

#69-5791, was rolled out of the hangar at Pensacola. Newly elected 

congressman Earl Hutto from the Pensacola area attended, as did the 

city’s mayor and the commanders of the ASD and ARRS. Hutto’s attendance was prescient. His congressional district also included Eglin 

AFB and Hurlburt Field, and in a few years, he would become a 

staunch champion of special operations forces in general and the 

Pave Low in particular. Addressing the crowd, William Craven, now 

a colonel, talked about the great challenges overcome to get to this 

point. He expressed that if the Black Knights had been available in 

SEA, perhaps the number of POWs would have been cut in half—a 

bittersweet commentary to the citizens of that Navy city, which had 

suffered more than its share of POWs during that long war. Colonel 

Pehr and crew then flew the aircraft to Robins AFB, Georgia; Andrews AFB, DC; and Wright-Patterson for static displays and orientation flights.72

Arriving at Kirtland AFB, the aircraft was used for more FOT&E 

designed to validate reliability standards, verify training programs, 

and evaluate technical data and evolving tactics. Immediately, weaknesses appeared in three key areas: the TFR gave low crossing altitudes when set to 100-foot clearance altitude, the inertial measuring 

unit (IMU) gave intermittent and erratic navigation performance, 

and the hover coupler caused vertical oscillations with the altitude 

hold feature engaged. Steadily, Frank Pehr, Steve Connelly, Rick Simmon, and the other 1550th personnel worked to resolve all discrepancies. Additionally, classes began for several new maintenance technicians needed for the new subsystems. The necessary manuals had 

not yet been published, and the Airmen had to work with various 

publications provided by the companies that had produced the individual components. Said SMSgt John Doyle, the senior Pave Low 

noncommissioned officer (NCO), “They [specialists] accept the challenge and don’t gripe about the lack of information. . . . They are going to keep it working. They’ve had to go ahead and take it upon 

themselves, relying on their past experience. With this system, they 

have to be well versed in their avionics specialty.” Quickly, too, they 

discovered that the integration of the various systems meant that 

many times, the fix to any particular problem required analysis and 

adjustments to several individual components. Maintenance on this air-
126 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

craft required a “holistic” approach, and the maintenance technicians 

soon realized that they needed to know much more than just their 

individual specified specialties. Working with the pilots, they learned 

how to keep the aircraft operational. Said one of the technicians, TSgt 

Michael Mayhew, with a definite air of pride, “The plane wasn’t just 

handed to us. We—the Air Force—built it, and we’re taking out the 

bugs ourselves, . . . the pilots, we mechanics and the ASD people at 

Wright-Patterson.”73

Capt Rus Stiles was now one of the test pilots working on the Pave 

Low FOT&E. After his duty in Southeast Asia with the 21st SOS, he 

had been transferred to Hawaii, where he flew for three years with the 

6594th Test Group. The HH-53s assigned there, code-named Crested 

Rooster, were highly modified for the satellite recovery mission. They 

had INSs, an internal auxiliary fuel tank, and a winch/carriage system 

to recover the capsules. Many of the recoveries were hundreds of 

miles out in open ocean. Stiles had great respect for the PJs, who 

would, when necessary, jump out into open water to facilitate the recoveries. He also participated in a collateral recovery mission for a 

Japanese sailor who needed immediate medical care for a ruptured 

appendix. That was a 14.7-hour mission, one of the longest on record. 

Finishing that assignment in May 1977, he then proceeded to Webb 

AFB for fixed-wing conversion training and was subsequently posted 

to the US Navy Test Pilot School at Patuxent NAS, where he completed the rotary-wing test pilot course and qualified as a helicopter 

test pilot. From there, Stiles was posted to the 1550th ATTW, where 

he joined the test division in January 1979. Well aware of the Pave 

Low III project and intensely interested in new technology development and adaptation, he asked Colonel Pehr and Captain Connelly to 

allow him to work on Pave Low as one of his projects. He was assigned to do the maintenance and reliability analysis tracking and 

follow-on studies. Subsequently, Captain Stiles flew many sorties 

working with the TFR and initial use of NVGs with various iterations 

of cockpit lights. He was also able to use the experience he gained in 

Hawaii with the INS to work through issues with overall flight navigation system integration.74

Through the year, four more HH-53s, #73-1650, #73-1651, #73-

1652, and #73-1649, went through the modification line, passed acceptance, and were also sent to Kirtland AFB for follow-on testing 

and validation. By year’s end, they would be followed by #73-1647, 

#73-1648, #67-5790, and the prototype, #66-14433, which would also 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 127

be formally modified to the HH-53H configuration but not completed until 1980.

Cabezon Peak, New Mexico, a well-known landmark used to calibrate and 

validate the TFR on the Pave Low

Courtesy Lt Col Frank Pehr, USAF, Retired

However, the modification schedule did not run that smoothly. 

The technicians at the NARF encountered numerous technical challenges that slowed the process for the last six aircraft, and the entire 

production line was slipped two and one-half months. This caused a 

cascading scheduling problem for the various crew and maintenance 

qualification classes at Kirtland AFB. The first two pilots for H-53 

training and then Pave Low qualification had arrived in May and 

were slated to begin Pave Low training in September. However, their 

Pave Low training had to be slipped to January 1980, when they 

would join with four other pilots and six flight mechanics currently 

serving on HH-53s to attend the first Pave Low qualification course. 

Maj Mark Schibler was in that first group. When his tour with the 

40th at NKP ended in early 1973, he reported to Hill AFB to serve as 

an instructor on the HH-53 and the NRS system. While there, he also 
128 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

taught academics and worked with Frank Pehr, Steve Connelly, and 

Bob Stankovich to produce new HH-53 crews. Captains Backlund 

and Pacini also joined him there when they returned from SEA and 

flew with him several times on Red Flag exercises at Nellis as they 

worked to integrate NRS rescue operations into the large aerial war 

games being conducted there.

In early 1976, Schibler was reassigned to Nellis to join the Red Flag 

staff as a rescue liaison officer for the purposes of institutionalizing 

ARRS participation in the ongoing exercises. For the next three years, 

he worked closely with the exercise planners to coordinate rescue assets that would provide real-world rescue capability on-site, as well as 

to insure that the various commanders and staffs trained there 

learned how to integrate rescue forces into their overall theater warfare air campaign planning. Major Schibler also worked with A-7 and 

A-10 pilots to teach them rescue escort tactics so that they could provide direct support to the rescue helicopters, as the A-1s had so ably 

done in SEA. In the summer of 1979, he was ordered to Kirtland to 

requalify on the HH-53 and then to be one of the first line pilots to 

upgrade into the Pave Low in the first class. He also had follow-on 

orders to the 67th ARRSq in England.75

The delays in the aircraft modification schedule also affected the IP 

cadre at Kirtland being formed by Maj Lou Grant in the 1551st FTS, 

now commanded by Lt Col Jerry Shipman. Captain Comer arrived at 

Kirtland in January from his tour at Sembach to serve as a Pave Low 

IP. But there was a problem. Since he had not received his IP training 

from MAC, that command did not consider him qualified to teach at 

the school without first completing its IP course. Fortunately for 

Comer, the training squadron scheduling officer was Maj Barry 

Walls. Comer went to Walls, who was able to work Comer into the 

schedule to get the necessary qualifications he needed to be an HH-53 IP. 

Those were six long and frustrating months, and he spent a lot of time 

serving as a classroom and simulator instructor. Once he was qualified though, he was certified as a flight examiner and began to fly 

quite a bit in the non–Pave Low aircraft. However, he still had to wait 

his turn to get the Pave Low qualification. 

Then fate intervened. Comer had been the top graduate in English 

studies in his class at the Air Force Academy, and he was invited to 

apply to be an English instructor there. Such an assignment would 

mean a break from operational flying. Comer weighed the plusses 

and minuses and decided to apply. He was subsequently interviewed 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 129

and selected. His orders specified that he would depart Kirtland in 

March 1980 to report to the University of North Carolina to study for 

a master’s degree in English, preparatory to his faculty assignment at 

the Air Force Academy.76

As Pehr, Connelly, Stankovich, and Simmon conducted the 

FOT&E testing at Kirtland, they determined that the aircraft was 

much more demanding on the aircrews than initially anticipated, and 

as a minimum, each aircrew member would need to fly at least 26 full 

Pave Low sorties every six months to maintain full aircraft currency. 

Such a schedule necessitated proper training areas, ideally close to 

the base. However, the first unit slated to get the aircraft, the 67th 

ARRSq at RAF Woodbridge, did not have adequate local areas for 

training of this intensity. This was a potentially huge issue that would 

need to be addressed if the Pave Lows were to be assigned there.77

Throughout the year, ARRS HH-53 crews were constantly engaged 

in operational exercises around the globe as well as in numerous civil 

SARs. The HH-53s from the 6594th Test Group at Hickam AFB also 

participated in the recovery of 19 sailors off of a sinking Japanese 

cargo ship 120 miles south of Hilo. 

Rescue forces including HH-53s were also deployed on two occasions in response to international crises. The first deployment was 

ordered when fundamentalist Islamic elements rose up against Shah 

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in Iran. Events began to spin out of control 

in late 1978 when riots broke out in several cities. In early 1979, as the 

violence escalated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed MAC to 

deploy C-5s and C-141s to assist in evacuating American civilians. 

When the Shah subsequently abdicated his throne and left the country, he left behind a weak central government with little support from 

the people. An exiled Islamic leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 

returned from France and called for the formation of an Islamic 

republic. Fighting broke out between his followers and the military 

and supporters of the standing government. Anti-American acts 

became more frequent, and a group of Iranians temporarily seized 

the US Embassy. Americans and selected foreigners rallied to the 

major airports, and MAC airlifters evacuated 5,732 passengers to 

sites in Europe. The JCS then directed the ARRS to provide six HH53s from the 67th ARRSq at RAF Woodbridge to deploy with aerial 

refueling HC-130s and maintenance and support personnel to Incirlik, Turkey, and to be prepared to evacuate additional personnel 
130 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

as directed. Colonel Purvine, vice-commander of the 39th ARRW, 

led the deployment. 

One of Purvine’s HH-53 aircraft commanders was Capt Mike 

Russell. Russell had been commissioned into the USAF in 1972. After 

pilot training, he initially served as a T-37 IP at Craig AFB, Alabama. 

When that base closed down, he served for a short time in a nonrated job before receiving his HH-53 assignment to the 55th at Eglin. 

He enjoyed flying the H-53 and usually volunteered for the TDYs, 

including the Jonestown, Guyana, debacle. Russell had heard about 

Pave Low, especially all of the bad rumors. Assignment to the 67th in 

England intrigued him somewhat. However, he decided to stay right 

where he was at Eglin. When augmentees were needed to support 

the Turkey deployment, Russell raised his hand and was shortly on 

his way.78

The HH-53 aircraft, crews, and support troops departed Woodbridge on 12 February. However, weather problems delayed the arrival of all aircraft and personnel until 18 February. The appearance 

of the aircraft at Incirlik was reported by the world press. Sensitive to 

the changes sweeping Iran, the Turkish government forbade the carrying of any weapons on board the helicopters and directed that the 

crews not launch until cleared by the Iranian government. During the 

next several days, the political situation in Iran stabilized somewhat, 

and almost all Americans except for a skeleton crew in the embassy 

were able to depart the country. At the end of February, the rescue 

task force was directed to redeploy to their home stations, and the 

force of 225 ARRS personnel was completely home by 11 March. The 

crews on the HH-53s logged 226.6 flight hours on the operation.79

Three months later, the ARRS was called to provide another evacuation force, this time to Central America. When the forces of the 

Sandinista National Liberation Front overthrew the government of 

Pres. Anastasio Samoza Debayle of Nicaragua, the JCS directed the 

ARRS to establish a rescue task force to deploy in support of the US 

Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) to evacuate Americans and 

selected foreigners from that nation. Accordingly, a task force of four 

HH-53s and crews, commanded by Col Barry Kamhoot, was collected from three different bases. The aircraft deployed with five supporting HC-130s for Howard AFB in the Panama Canal Zone, with 

most arriving by 21 June. Again, one of the pilots was Captain Russell 

from the 55th ARRSq at Eglin.80
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 131

As the situation continued to deteriorate in Nicaragua, USSOUTHCOM stepped up efforts to evacuate as many Americans as 

possible by civilian and military transport aircraft. As the remaining 

Americans were again consolidated in the US Embassy, USSOUTHCOM directed the HH-53s to move forward to the Llano Grande 

Airport in Liberia, Costa Rica. However, their arrival generated 

strong opposition from the civilian populace in Costa Rica, who especially objected to the fact that the Americans were armed. Colonel 

Kamhoot then ordered the helicopters back to Howard AFB, and the 

US Navy positioned the USS Saipan, an amphibious assault ship off 

of the east coast of Nicaragua, and A-7s and AC-130s were readied at 

Albrook AFB, Panama, to provide fire support if necessary.

The four HH-53s then deployed aboard the Saipan and assumed 

alert posture there. On 18 July, as the government fell to the Sandinistas, all crews assumed immediate alert in their aircraft. However, all 

American personnel still in the country were able to depart in C130s, and the HH-53s never launched. As the Sandinistas then consolidated their control of the nation, the situation quieted down, and 

the rescue task force was released to return home. The four HH-53s 

and crews stayed aboard the Saipan as it proceeded to Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba. From there, they flew back to their home bases. The HH53s and their crews logged 251 flight hours in the operation.81

Another one of the HH-53 pilots was Capt Ed Reed. He had graduated from the Citadel in 1975 with a USAF commission and had gone 

directly to helicopter pilot training at Fort Rucker. He did well in the 

course, especially enjoying the low-level navigation, and selected an 

assignment to HH-53s. Reed was in the last group of HH-53 crew 

members to report to Hill AFB before the entire training program 

was moved to Kirtland AFB. In fact, his group did its simulator training there and proceeded to Kirtland for flight training. He then reported to the 41st ARRSq at McClellan, where he was one of a few 

lieutenants among several SEA veteran lieutenant colonels and majors. 

The older Airmen mentored the younger troops and instilled in them 

a real passion for the rescue mission, along with a few nonregulation 

tricks and endless war stories. Reed got the opportunity to upgrade to 

aircraft commander and qualify on the (now antiquated) NRS aircraft. He also flew long-distance sorties on both the Jonestown and 

Nicaragua missions. Reed had watched the scenes of the last Americans fleeing Saigon in 1975 while still at the Citadel, and the pictures 

now coming out of Nicaragua looked very similar. He waited on the
132 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

Saipan with the others for the order to launch, which never came. 

Returning to McClellan AFB, he began preparations to move to RAF 

Woodbridge to join the 67th ARRSq as that unit converted to the 

Pave Low III aircraft due to arrive there in the not-too-distant future. 

He had seen the aircraft when Pehr and Connelly brought it up to 

McClellan for a visit and decided that he wanted to fly that machine. 

He was going to get his wish.82

Pave Low

For all the testing, studies, and training, though, Pave Low was 

still just a concept. While the dramatic test missions proved that the 

system would perform as expected, it took an unforeseen event to 

conclusively prove that Pave Low III would actually do what it was 

designed to do. That event occurred just a few miles northwest of 

Kirtland AFB on a low overcast Friday night in January 1980.

After a day of primarily maintenance checks and engine runs on 

HH-53H #73-1652, just recently received from the NARF at Pensacola, 

the crew chief put the aircraft in the hanger and started accomplishing 

the last postflight items. Captain Connelly happened to walk through 

the small flight operations center when one of the operations controllers 

said, “Hey, there has been a crash out on the Albuquerque mesa.”

A quick check with the control tower confirmed that, indeed, a 

small private aircraft had gone down. A light commercial helicopter 

had tried to fly into the area but could not get in because of low clouds 

and fog. The weather was worsening, and Kirtland AFB itself was 

about to close for traffic. Connelly was asked if he could take off in the 

Pave Low to find the wreckage and possibly recover any survivors. He 

said that he would and then told the crew chief to get the aircraft 

ready to fly. Next, he called the bowling alley to get Sergeant Simmon 

and MSgt John Adrian as his flight mechanics. When he “confirmed” 

that they had not yet had any alcohol, he directed them to get their 

flight gear and meet him at the aircraft. They dutifully excused themselves from their wives and proceeded. Connelly also asked for two 

PJs to accompany them and checked with the new wing commander, 

Colonel Purvine, who granted permission for the flight. Connelly 

was impressed that Purvine had such confidence in the aircraft and 

the crew that would be flying it. Connelly then called the 1551st FTS 

and procured Maj Barry Walls to fly as his copilot. 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 133

When the crew members arrived at the aircraft, they discovered 

that it was still warm from earlier engine runs and that the crew chief 

and Connelly had already aligned the INS and started up the systems. 

By the time they were aboard and had the engines running, the 

weather had completely moved in, and the airfield was closed. Connelly 

gave Walls a basic brief on the Pave Low system and loaded the survivor’s reported position into the navigation computer. Then they 

taxied out and took off into a very dark night at 7:00 p.m. Barry 

Walls said, “When we took off, I immediately had vertigo for the 

rest of the flight.” 

The pilots checked in with departure control for potential traffic 

and terrain separation, then turned northwest toward the crash site, 

descended to 100 feet AGL, and began using the TF/TA radar and 

FLIR. Connelly was well familiar with the area and was comfortable 

flying there at such low altitudes. The pilots turned on their spotlight 

and could barely see the ground. Connelly made several passes over 

the reported location before finally seeing some lights. As they flew 

over, Simmon stored the position in the central navigation computer. 

Connelly then set up an approach to the position and came to a hover 

100 feet above it. Nobody on board could see the ground, so he descended in the hover until the crew was able to see the crash site, and 

Connelly maneuvered the aircraft 100 feet away and landed. The PJs 

immediately deplaned, rushed to the crash, and began treating the 

injured pilot, a Catholic priest. Fortunately, the crash site was near 

Interstate 40, and police and news crews were already on site. The 

pararescue specialists had their pictures taken as they treated the pilot.

Connelly did not shut down the engines. He noticed, though, that 

he was slowly losing oil pressure in the transmission and told the 

specialists to hurry, or they would have to spend the night right where 

they were. They immediately moved the injured pilot to the helicopter, and Connelly took off. The airfield was still closed, and he used 

his TF radar to climb above the terrain and obstacles and then guided 

on the instrument landing system to align with the runway and land 

about 1,000 feet past the threshold and on the centerline. The elapsed 

time from takeoff to landing was 55 minutes, and a valid save was 

logged. The after action report said it best: “This successful employment of Pave Low III under actual night adverse weather conditions 

brings us in ARRS a long way from the dreams we had for NRS in the 

late 1960s.”
134 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

Technologically, Pave Low had come to fruition, and all of the 

skeptics had been proven wrong. Pehr was ecstatic over the mission 

and expected MAC to fund the modification of more HH-53s. However, that was another battle for another time. Reflecting on the accomplishment, though, from a longer perspective, Lt Col Ken Ernest, 

a bloodied veteran of the heroic rescues of 1972 and now the assistant 

project manager, said, “In Vietnam, what you had was one little war 

for the rescue mission. . . . Now we can sneak in at night, comfortably 

and solo. . . . I’ll tell you, it’s hard to describe the feeling when you had 

a guy down on ‘Thud Ridge’ with a beeper and darkness set in and 

you had to go home without him. With Pave Low’s new capability—

thank God!—we won’t be in that position anymore.”83



Returning from the long war in SEA, the helicopters and crews of 

the combined H-53 fleet were dispersed to other locations around the 

globe. The CH-53s were reassigned to direct duty to provide mobility 

support for USAF TACS units in Germany and Texas. The HH-53s 

were dispatched to rescue units in the CONUS, Europe, and the Pacific. 

The ARRS and MAC continued and expanded the Pave Low III 

development project, and as the 1970s were ending, that project, initially stimulated by SEAOR 114 in 1967 and transformed into MAC 

ROC 19-70, was finally coming to fruition. Nine aircraft were either 

modified to the HH-53H configuration or were in line to do so. 

Training courses were being readied and initial crews being selected. 

Based upon operational needs, an initial beddown base had been 

identified and was being prepared. Finally, the rescue forces of the 

USAF would have a day/night, all-weather rescue capability—a fact 

dramatically demonstrated on a cold wintry night at Kirtland AFB in 

January 1980. The rescue forces had finally achieved their long-sought 

capability, but it was perhaps constrained by uneven enthusiasm on the 

part of some ARRS commanders. 

During the same period, TAC reactivated one special operations 

helicopter unit, but it was equipped with older UH-1 and CH-3 helicopters. The organization was of limited value other than as a repository of vast tactical and practical helicopter experience that resided in 

the cocky attitude of just a few hard-charging young captains and 
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 135

majors. Although suffused with enthusiasm, the unit was greatly constrained by equipment capability. 

Regardless, troubling events were occurring in other parts of the 

world. The rescue deployments in 1979 to Central America and the 

Middle East portended perhaps turbulent times ahead in those particular regions, further reinforced when the Sandinista forces consolidated their hold on Nicaragua. On 4 November 1979, American 

diplomats, military personnel, and private citizens were taken hostage at the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran. 

As the decade ended, nobody could foresee that within barely six 

months MAC’s entire Pave Low plan would be in tatters and that 

those Pave Low III aircraft and crews would be presented with a 

much different demand for their services, leading to a fortuitous 

combination of capabilities and enthusiasm that would bring Pave 

Low to its full potential. 

Notes

1. History of 601st TCW, 1 Apr–30 Sept 1975, vol. 1, 8; ibid., 1 Jan–31 Mar 1975, 

vol. 1, xx, app. A; The Pave Cave, MH-53H/J/M Pave Low community website, http://

www.thepavecave.com; and Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 28.

2. Comer, interview.

3. History of ARRS, 1 July 1974–31 Dec 1975, vol. 1, 31; and Gen John Vogt, 

USAF oral history interview, transcript, 197, AFHRA.

4. History of ARRS, 1 July 1974–31 Dec 1975, vol. 1, 6, 16–19, 31, 62, CD–12.

5. Boivin, Schmidt, and Balfe, Pave Low—Evaluation of a Terrain Following Radar 

System for the HH–53 Helicopter, Technical Report no. 73–11, 48.

6. Pehr, interview.

7. Gambone, Pave Low III: That Others May Live, 15–18.

8. Ibid., 4, 18. 

9. Pehr, interview.

10. Simmon, interview; and Stiles to the author, e-mail, review comments.

11. Gambone, Pave Low III: That Others May Live, 70.

12. Ibid., 73; Pehr, interview; and Stiles to the author, e-mail. 

13. Gambone, Pave Low III: That Others May Live, 95–96.

14. Ibid., 103–5; and Connelly to the author, e-mail, review comments.

15. Simmon, interview.

16. History of ARRS, 1 July 1974–31 Dec 1975, vol. 1, 66. 

17. Gambone, Pave Low III: That Others May Live, exhibit 22, 121–23; and “Pave Low 

III Qualification/Acceptance Tests,” July 1981, in ibid., vol. 2, supplemental doc. 6, v.

18. Gambone, Pave Low III: That Others May Live, 133–34.

19. Ibid., exhibit 27.

20. Ibid., 149.
136 │ BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES

21. History of the 1st Special Operations Wing (hereafter referred to as History 

of 1st SOW), 1 Jan–31 Mar 1976, vol. 1, 1–9.

22. Ibid.; and Weikel, interview.

23. Mutza, Green Hornets, 56.

24. History of 1st SOW, 1 July–30 Sept 1976, vol. 1, 1–9.

25. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 18; and Tyner, AF 

Rescue and AFSOF, 9–10. 

26. Weikel, interview.

27. “Operational Test and Evaluation: Pave Low III,” HQ MAC report, B–1; and 

Simmon, interview.

28. “Operational Test and Evaluation: Pave Low III,” HQ MAC report, iv, 28–29.

29. Ibid.

30. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1976, vol. 1, 63; and Connelly and Pehr, interviews.

31. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1976, vol. 1, 64.

32. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 17.

33. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1976, vol. 1, 37.

34. Ibid., 22, 34–35. See also Koskinas, Black Hats and White Hats, for an eloquent discussion of this issue.

35. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1976, vol. 1, 75–77, 80–84.

36. Ibid., 92.

37. History of 1st SOW, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1977, vol. 1, 1–13.

38. Ibid.; ibid., 1 Jan–31 Mar 1977, vol. 1, 1–12; and ibid., 1 July–30 Sept 1977, 

vol. 1, 1–10.

39. Weikel to the author, e-mail, 25 Mar 2009. 

40. Ibid.; and Grove, interview. 

41. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1977, vol. 1, 4–5.

42. Ibid., 58.

43. Ibid., 20.

44. Ibid., vol. 2, supplemental doc. no. 103.

45. Ibid.

46. History of the 1550th Aircrew Training and Test Wing (hereafter referred to 

as History of 1550th ATTW), 1 July–31 Dec 1977, vol. 2, doc. 8.

47. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1977, vol. 1, 65–68.

48. Ibid., 79–80.

49. Ibid., 1 Jan–31 Dec 1978, vol. 1, 23–24; and ibid., vol. 2, supplemental doc. I–74.

50. Connelly, interview.

51. Ibid. 

52. Stankovich, interview.

53. Teeple, interview.

54. Simmon, interview. 

55. Connelly and Pehr, interviews; and History of 1550th ATTW, 1 July–31 Dec 

1978, vol. 1, 5.

56. Connelly, interview. 

57. Ibid. 

58. Connelly and Pehr, interviews. 

59. Ibid.
BLACK KNIGHTS AND RED SCARVES │ 137

60. Pehr, interview.

61. Connelly, interview.

62. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1978, vol. 1, 60–63.

63. Ibid., 62–64.

64. Ibid., 76–81.

65. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1978, vol. 1, 1–20; ibid., 1 Apr–30 June 

1978, 1–13; and ibid., 1 Oct–31 Dec 1978, vol. 1, 24–26.

66. Grove, interview.

67. Ibid. 

68. Weikel, interview; and 1st SOW/History Office (HO), file 120.00. However, 

there are many variations to this story. 

69. 1st SOW/CC to 9AF/CC, letter, subject: Special Operations Capability Requirements, 7 Mar 1980, in History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1980, vol. 2.

70. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 1979, vol. 1, 1–6.

71. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1979, vol. 1, 100–102.

72. Gambone, Pave Low III: That Others May Live, 207; History of ARRS, 1 Jan–

31 Dec 1979, vol. 1, 107; and Hutto, Captain Supreme Goes to Washington, 238.

73. Pugh, “New Eyes for the Giant,” 31–33.

74. Stiles, interview; and History of 1550th ATTW, 1 July–31 Dec 1979, vol. 1, 10.

75. Schibler, interview. 

76. Commander’s assessment, 23 May 1979, in History of 1550th ATTW, 1 Jan–

30 June 1979; ibid., 1 July–31 Dec 1979, 5; and Comer, interview.

77. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1979, vol. 1, 108–10.

78. Russell, interview.

79. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1979, vol. 1, 116–20.

80. Russell, interview.

81. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1979, vol. 1, 121–25.

82. Reed, interview.

83. Gambone, Pave Low III: That Others May Live, 223; Connelly and Simmons, 

interviews; and Pugh, “New Eyes for the Giant,” 33. 

Chapter 5

Necessity to Nadir

~1980–84

The jewels in the crown of our helo fleet were the . . . Pave 

Low H-53s.

 —Maj Gen Richard Secord, USAF 

Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

Just a few weeks after his rescue mission up on the Albuquerque 

flats, Capt Steve Connelly was assigned another engineering project 

of sorts. Delays incurred in the recent deployments of rescue aircraft 

and support teams indicated that the tactical procedures for mobilizing and shipping the helicopters needed to be analyzed and streamlined. While self-deployment of the aircraft was the preferred option, 

for longer-range movements, time/distance tradeoffs had to be considered. Connelly was directed to conduct a mobilization drill to generate the data for safe and quick loading of HH-3s, HH-53s, and, specifically, the HH-53Hs for deployment aboard C-5 aircraft. 

Connelly received a nine-man team led by a senior maintenance 

NCO for each aircraft. The team had to determine the minimum 

teardown requirements for each machine, capture the amount of 

time required, catalog the necessary procedures and possible tech order changes needed for tactical load procedures, and determine the 

necessary team skill requirements needed. Over a two-day period, 

team members disassembled the aircraft as necessary to fit them into 

the C-5. This required them to remove the main rotor blades, one tail 

rotor blade, the main rotor head and gearbox, tip tanks, and sponson 

pylons. The crews saved cargo space by storing many of the components inside the helicopter or by building special cradles for the outsize items such as the blades. After each aircraft was loaded, it had to 

then be unloaded and test flown. 

The test clearly showed that two aircraft of either model could be 

successfully loaded aboard a C-5 and that the nine-man team was 
140 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

optimum for the procedure. Suggested changes to tech order data 

were drafted for both helicopters and the C-5s. The computed total 

time of the entire operation from teardown through arrival test flight 

was 24.5 hours for the HH-53s and 20.5 hours for the H-3s. The test 

also confirmed that the C-5 was the optimum option for deployments 

beyond 2,500 miles from current H-3 or H-53 locations. Connelly 

was pleased with the results. He had to wonder, though, at the timing 

of the test. Rumors were running rampant about some kind of operation in the Middle East, possibly involving the American hostages in 

Iran. Of late, officers from Headquarters MAC had been on the base 

soliciting helicopter crew volunteers for something, but—whatever it 

was—it was close-hold information. Several weeks later, Colonel 

Pehr was read into the mission, one of very few on the base who were 

so briefed. However, he was not invited to join the effort.1

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 

As the new decade began, the Pave Low program was rapidly approaching fruition. Five aircraft had been modified and were back at 

Kirtland, where follow-on testing was being conducted and the initial 

flight and maintenance crews were being trained. As per MAC Programming Plan 78-18, the first two HH-53Hs would be deployed to 

RAF Woodbridge, UK, in March 1980. There they would be assigned 

to the 67th ARRSq, slated to become operational with the aircraft in 

April 1981, thereby fulfilling a long-standing requirement for day/

night, all-weather combat capability for USAFE. 

Unfortunately, though, worrisome problems began to appear. British 

authorities balked when they discovered the amount of night and 

low-level flying the Pave Lows would need to do. In fact, at the beginning of the year, they had just established restrictions against any 

night flying below 1,000 feet between the hours of 2300 and 0700. 

USAFE and MAC representatives met with British Ministry of Defense representatives at RAF Mildenhall in January. The British made 

it clear that no immediate resolution of the problem was possible. 

The MAC staff scrambled to develop alternative options. When 

briefed, the MAC vice-commander, Gen Thomas Ryan, directed that 

the Pave Lows be reassigned to the 41st ARRSq at McClellan AFB, 

near Sacramento, California, and ordered that all aircraft and personnel transfers to Woodbridge be stopped. HQ USAF initially con-
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 141

curred with the action but, citing war-fighting needs, directed MAC 

and USAFE to either work out the UK basing issues or establish a war 

plan to rapidly move the HH-53Hs to forward European bases for 

contingencies. Subsequent in-depth analysis by the MAC staff indicated that McClellan had all of the facilities and flying areas necessary 

for full Pave Low beddown and training. Additionally, the recent mobility testing at Kirtland provided the necessary planning data to 

rapidly deploy the unit to Europe if necessary. After considering 

and favorably reviewing all factors, the Office of the Secretary of the 

Air Force announced on 27 March 1980 that all nine of the Pave Lows 

would now be assigned to the 41st ARRSq at McClellan. MAC then 

published Programming Plan 80-6 directing the move and also ordering the 41st to send its currently assigned HH-53Cs to the 55th ARRSq 

at Eglin to make room for the Pave Lows.2

On 16 April 1980, the NARF at Pensacola completed modification 

of the last of the HH-53s, #66-14433, and returned it to the Air Force 

for ferry to Kirtland. All of the alterations had been completed on 

time and almost $2 million under budget. MAC finally had a tried 

and proven fleet of Pave Low helicopters capable of performing allweather, day/night rescues.3

Crisis in Iran

On 22 April, the 1550th ATTW received a short-notice order to 

deploy two Pave Low aircraft with crews and a maintenance team to 

a classified location to support Exercise Flintlock ’80. Steve Connelly 

and Frank Pehr were given the mission and were able to put into 

practice the lessons learned in the mobility project in which Connelly 

had participated two months prior. 

Maj Mark Schibler would also go along as one of the mission pilots. He had just completed his initial upgrade in the Pave Low and 

was about to start IP qualification. Schibler enjoyed flying the HH-53 

again and quickly felt comfortable handling the aircraft. However, he 

found the Pave Low avionics, integrated systems, and computers intimidating. He was also impressed with the amount of crew coordination necessary to properly fly the Pave Low, especially the critical 

role that the flight engineers now played in flying the aircraft. Until 

recently, they had been designated as flight mechanics. However, the 

Air Force changed their title to correspond to the enlisted flight positions 
142 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

on fixed-wing aircraft and to reflect their status as an integral part of 

the flight crew vice maintenance personnel. Schibler remembers that 

“the [flight] engineer became a backup to the pilots . . . and ran the 

equipment that the pilot flying could no longer access. . . . He was a 

big part of the cross-check.”4

MSgt Rick Simmon was one of the flight engineers assigned to the 

mission, and the crews and aircraft departed the next day aboard 

C-5s en route to Dover AFB, Delaware, and then on to Bahrain. There 

they would assume SAR alert for a mission being conducted to recover the American hostages held in the American Embassy in Tehran. While crossing the Mississippi River, though, they were notified 

that the rescue force had suffered a terrible crash and that the mission 

had been aborted. They proceeded on to Dover, where they remained 

for a day, and then were ordered to return to Kirtland, where they 

learned the horrible details of what had happened at a remote site in 

the Iranian desert called Desert One.5

The debacle at Desert One began the previous November, when 

radical supporters of Imam Ayatollah Khomeini seized the American 

Embassy in Tehran as his minions overthrew the Iranian government. In the seizure, they captured 53 Americans, who were now being held hostage in the embassy compound. Pres. Jimmy Carter ordered the US military to prepare a recovery operation. Defense 

secretary Harold Brown and JCS chairman Gen David Jones directed 

Maj Gen James Vaught, USA, to form JTF 1-79 to carry out the mission. Assigned to assist him were Maj Gen Philip Gast, USAF, as a 

special advisor and Col Jim Kyle, USAF, as his air deputy. The assigned mission was direct: “Prepare a plan and train a force to rescue 

American citizens illegally held in Iran, and be prepared to execute it 

‘ON ORDER.’ ”6

Vaught named the project Operation Rice Bowl. Over the next five 

months, JTF 1-89 was assigned US Army Soldiers from the Special 

Forces Operational Detachment–Delta (SFOD-Delta), activated two 

years prior and commanded by Col Charlie Beckwith. A USAF element, it consisted of MC-, EC-, and AC-130s and combat controllers 

from the 1st SOW; a US Navy squadron of RH-53D helicopters capable 

of operating from aircraft carriers; as well as a large support force 

from the various services. 

The mission would involve moving the force with the MC- and 

EC-130s to Desert One. The AC-130s would provide direct, on-call 

fire support. As the tasking came down to Hurlburt, the wing units 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 143

shifted into high gear to train for the mission. Still working in the 

wing tactics office, Capt Gary Weikel was read into the program. 

While he tried to define a need for the 20th SOS in the mission, he 

clearly saw no role for the unit’s aircraft. Weikel’s suggestion that 

many pilots like himself at Hurlburt and throughout the USAF, experienced in flying such missions in HH- and CH-53s, could enthusiastically contribute to the mission was for naught. US Navy pilots from 

Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 16 (HM-16) would fly 

the helicopters. They would launch off of aircraft carriers and join the 

force at Desert One. The Soldiers would transfer to the helicopters for 

the flight to a hide site 50 miles from Tehran. The Army assault force 

would then move to the embassy by truck. A smaller unit would also 

move to retrieve three hostages being held at another location. After 

recovering the hostages, the force would move to a soccer field in the 

city. The helicopters would then pick them up and move them to the 

air base at Manzariyeh, 40 miles southeast of Tehran, where C-141s 

would be waiting to fly them all to safety.7

It was an ambitious plan and required many of the elements to do 

things they had never trained to do. Regardless, the various teams began working together to develop the synergy and cohesion necessary to 

enter the hostile city and bring home the hostages. As the training proceeded, though, it became clear that the US Navy pilots assigned to the 

mission were not up to the task, as determined by their poor performance on early rehearsals. After a mission review, USMC pilots from 

tactical units largely replaced them. A USAF captain, Russell “Rotor” 

Rakip, a CH-53 standardization and evaluation pilot assigned to the 

701st TASS at Bergstrom, also joined the task force. 

USAF Helicopter Reorganization

Observing the difficulties that the Rice Bowl task force was having 

in developing the necessary helicopter component, Lt Gen Charles 

Gabriel, the USAF DCS for operations, plans, and readiness, decided 

to reinitiate the on-again-off-again intra-USAF discussion of consolidating all USAF helicopters under a single manager. He believed 

that dispersing the existing 244 helicopters among commands with 

units assigned to specific missions (e.g., combat rescue; special operations; or tactical air control system, tactical range, or missile site support) would allow them not only to better accomplish their assigned 
144 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

functions but also to improve their support of special taskings such as 

Rice Bowl. 

Gabriel sent a message to General Gast, now serving as the vicecommander of TAC, with copies to his contemporaries at MAC, SAC, 

PACAF, and USAFE, suggesting that to address both issues, such a 

force could be formed under a reinvigorated AFSOF headquarters or 

hub that could then function as a counterpart to the Army’s John F. 

Kennedy Center at Fort Bragg. He further recommended using the 1st 

SOW at Hurlburt Field as the basis for such an organization. The responses were generally supportive. MAC responded that it was anxious 

to be part of any new SOF structure. USAFE stated that the current 

fragmentation of SOF forces among several commands was counterproductive and suggested a possible consolidation of combat rescue 

forces into any new AFSOF structure. PACAF endorsed the idea and 

the consolidation of combat rescue forces into the new structure. However, the discussion was tabled as the events in Iran unfolded.8

Desert One

The eight RH-53Ds of HM-16 would launch from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz and fly to Desert One. From that point, the operation 

needed a minimum of six to continue. On 24 April, all forces were in 

place; President Carter gave the order to execute Rice Bowl. As the 

sun set over Iran, the disparate elements of the task force began to 

move. The RH-53s lifted off of the carrier at 7:05 p.m. and entered 

Iranian airspace at low level. Almost two hours later, as the formation 

was about 145 miles inside Iran, the commander of aircraft number 

six landed his machine when a warning light indicating a serious 

problem with his main rotor blades illuminated. Helicopter number 

eight landed with him, recovered the crew and all classified material, 

and then relaunched to rejoin the flight. 

In the clear night air, the helicopter crews could see the M/EC-130s 

proceeding to Desert One. The good visibility ended a few minutes 

later when the helicopters entered a dust storm. The pilots had to tuck 

in tight to hold formation. This increased their workload, made even 

more uncomfortable by the fine sand grit leaking into the cockpit and 

an air temperature that had risen to about 100 degrees Fahrenheit. 

When the flight leader in aircraft one could no longer see the ground, 

he made a left 180-degree turn. The pilots in number two saw him and 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 145

Courtesy AFSOC History Office

US Navy RH-53Ds aboard the USS Nimitz

followed. The other five aircraft did not see the maneuver and proceeded on course. The group of seven helicopters was now scattered 

and badly disorganized. More importantly, the pilots were becoming 

unnerved as they guzzled water and tried to keep the sweat and grit 

from getting in their eyes. They increasingly began to suffer disorientation and vertigo, and all realized that they had never trained for a mission like this.

The formation experienced further misfortune when the number 

five aircraft suffered a series of failures to the primary flight and navigation systems. Its aircraft commander decided to turn back. He made 

a right 180-degree turn and set course for the Nimitz, with the full 

realization that the aircraft barely had enough fuel to do so. 

The other six helicopters pressed on and, after five tense hours of 

flying, arrived at Desert One. They parked behind the waiting C-130s 

and began refueling. All aircraft still had their engines running as the 

Army troops began to marshal onto their assigned helicopters. Unfortunately, the number two helicopter arrived with a serious hydraulic 

malfunction. USAF colonel Jim Kyle was the air commander and discussed this with the crew and senior Marine officer on site. They 

agreed that the aircraft could not be flown, leaving five aircraft available. 

However, all planning and analysis had determined that six aircraft 

were needed to continue to the next stage of the operation. Kyle then 

discussed the situation with Beckwith, the Army commander, and 

recommended that the mission be aborted. Colonel Beckwith reported 
146 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

this to General Vaught, who forwarded the recommendation to 

Washington. President Carter was then briefed and concurred with 

the recommendation. 

At Desert One, the Army troops returned to the C-130s while the 

flyable helicopters were ordered to return to the Nimitz as soon as 

they refueled. Helicopter number two would be destroyed in place. 

To expedite the refueling of the helicopters, numbers three and four 

had to be air taxied to new positions. As number three lifted off, 

though, its pilot became disoriented by the billowing dust and collided with one of the MC-130s. The resulting explosion and fire engulfed the area as men scrambled away from the burning wreckage. 

Working through the chaos, Colonel Kyle, subordinate commanders, 

and NCOs worked feverishly to bring some semblance of order to 

organize the departure. The collision, fire, and secondary explosions 

caused collateral damage to three of the helicopters. The senior Marine 

ordered his crews to abandon all the helicopters and get on the 

C-130s. Kyle began releasing the C-130s to take off and got on the 

last one when he was sure nobody had been left behind. Sitting in the 

Courtesy AFSOC History Office

Debacle at Desert One
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 147

back of the aircraft surrounded by demoralized and wounded Soldiers, 

Airmen, and Marines, Kyle tried to reckon the losses and understand 

what had gone wrong. Eight Airmen and Marines were killed in the 

crash, and five more were seriously wounded. It was a somber flight 

back to their staging base at Masiriah.9

The postmortems began immediately. All key leaders were swiftly 

flown back to Washington for debrief. Within two weeks the JCS had 

commissioned a special operations review group to conduct a “broad 

examination of the planning, organization, coordination, direction, 

and control of the Iranian hostage rescue mission, as a basis for recommending improvement in these areas for the future.” Quickly 

dubbed the Holloway Commission after its leader, Adm James 

Holloway, USN, retired, the group dug intensely through the entire 

operation before releasing its findings in late August. It would identify a plethora of issues, from command and control to weather support. However, the group quickly sensed significant issues with the 

helicopter portion of the effort, citing questions on the number of 

helicopters assigned—which could easily have been increased—and 

especially on pilot selection. While USN and USMC pilots had been 

selected because of expediency and their skill in the aircraft, they 

lacked familiarity with the mission. At the time, the USAF had 114 

pilots qualified on HH/CH-53s and another 86 with relatively recent 

experience on them. Given these pilots’ background, the commission 

members believed that some of the pilots could easily have converted 

to the RH-53Ds and accomplished the mission.10 The report stated,

The real question to be addressed is: is transition to a new and highly complex 

mission in the same aircraft more or less difficult for an experienced pilot to 

master than transition to an aircraft variant in the same mission? Mastering a 

new, difficult, and more complex mission requires a pilot to acquire and hone 

new skills and more importantly, a new mind-set. Transitioning from an HHor CH-53 to an RH-53 requires only learning a few new flight parameters and 

slightly altering already established procedures, something every experienced 

pilot has done several times. This point is not new. Experience gained in Project “Jungle Jim” (circa 1961) illustrated that learning new and vastly different 

complex mission skills is far more difficult than transitioning to an aircraft of 

similar design and performance characteristics.11

The specific reference to Project Jungle Jim is instructive, particularly 

since one of the commission members, Maj Gen John Piotrowski, 

USAF, served with the Jungle Jim team in South Vietnam in 1961 as 

a young pilot. 
148 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

Colonel Kyle, the air component commander, felt that the Navy/

Marine pilots showed poor judgment at several points and should have 

been leavened with experienced USAF H-53 pilots. His Army counterpart, Colonel Beckwith, the Delta Force commander, had an even more 

pungent view of the pilots. He thought that they simply did not have 

the necessary skills or attitude for the mission: “We were looking for 

aces, daredevils, barnstormers, guys who flew by the seat of their pants, 

hot rodders, pilots who could pick it up, turn it around on a dime and 

put it back down with flair. These Navy pilots didn’t believe in taking 

the risks we knew were required of the pilots flying into an enemy-held 

city.”12 Perhaps Beckwith’s words should be tempered somewhat—to 

many he seemed to have a bias against anyone on the task force who 

was not Delta. Mark Bowden in his book Guests of the Ayatollah noted 

that “it had not been lost on the other commanders working with him, 

most of whom outranked Beckwith, that the pugnacious colonel regarded them all as inferiors, as supporting players. The pilots, navigators, the aircrews, the fuel equipment operators, the rangers, the combat controllers . . . were all ordinary mortals, squires, spear-carriers, 

water boys. Their job was to serve Delta, to get his magnificent men in 

place for their rendezvous with destiny.”13

As Beckworth had built up the SFOD-Delta organization over a 

long process of several years and had trained his pilots to such an 

edge, his frustrations were certainly understandable. At one point at 

Desert One, as he realized that only five helicopters were capable of 

continuing, he believed that the USMC pilots wanted to scuttle the 

mission. Not familiar with the complexity of the helicopters, he felt 

that the problem was not one of failed equipment but of faltering 

courage.14 Regardless, it is somewhat disheartening to recall that just 

five years earlier, the USAF had two squadrons—the 40th ARRSq and 

the 21st SOS at NKP, Thailand—that performed challenging longrange missions similar to Rice Bowl at Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Koh 

Tang Island. Notably, during the initial response planning that followed the taking of the hostages, the Air Force considered using its 

special operations helicopters. Lt Gen William Boykin, then a young 

captain assigned to SFOD-Delta and quickly detailed to the Pentagon 

planning team, later recalled that “a Spec Ops colonel said: ‘We’re 

looking at going in on Air Force helos. Spec Ops has CH-53s, so we’re 

looking at those and Army Chinooks to see if they can play a role.’ ”15

The results suggest that perhaps the 40th and 21st individually, or 

in some combination or derivation, were the missing piece at Desert 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 149

One. They were considered, at least initially, but were not available. 

Regrettably, their absence was the result of USAF leadership taking a 

particular course of action. Instead of bringing the squadrons back 

from Thailand as formed and cohesive units, like the AC-130-

equipped 16th SOS when it returned to Hurlburt Field, the two units 

were inactivated and their equipment and personnel disbursed 

around the world. Perhaps more disappointing was the decision to 

take the CH-53s from the 21st SOS and assign them to logistical support vice SOF duties. Colonel Kyle certainly thought so, writing later 

that “Special Ops had recently taken another blow . . . when some 

myopic planner gave all of our heavy-lift [CH-53] choppers to a tactical 

communications unit. This left us without the means to deliver assault forces deep into enemy territory—short-sightedness that would 

come back to haunt us.”16

Why wasn’t an extant ARRS squadron used for the mission as at 

Son Tay? USMC colonel Charles Pittman was the senior Marine aviation planner and officer in charge of the Marine pilots assigned to 

Rice Bowl. A few years later, while he was visiting the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, one of 

the USAF students there asked why the military had not used ARRS 

helicopters and avoided refueling in the desert. Pittman replied that 

“when we called the Air Force special operations folks, they answered 

that the Air Force could not do the mission. All they had were some 

Huey gunships and some old CH-3Es. At that point, we [hung] up 

the phone and looked at the Marines.”

That was certainly true enough. But when the student persisted 

with a follow-up question, Pittman recalled that the Marines did not 

call the ARRS after that because they went to the AFSOF as the experts for special operations. Once the corporate Air Force said it 

could not do the mission, the planners looked elsewhere. They concluded that this response reflected the USAF corporate attitude because General Gast, the TAC vice-commander, would have been part 

of making such a decision, perhaps reinforced by the “white hat” bias 

of General Saunders, the ARRS commander. Notably, one year prior, 

67th ARRSq HH-53s had been dispatched to Incirlik, Turkey, for the 

initial evacuations from Iran, a classic “white hat” mission.17

Would the use of a squadron such as the 40th ARRSq or the 21st 

SOS have made a difference? The Holloway Commission looked at 

the selection of the RH-53D unit to do the mission as issue 13. The 

members agreed that it was the right choice since that unit’s aircraft 
150 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

was selected for the mission. However, the report stated, “It is believed the preservation of an established squadron’s inherent unit cohesion could have facilitated the training, enhanced the information 

flow, and increased aircrew knowledge, all of which could lead to 

more integrated unit operation. It cannot be demonstrated nor is it 

suggested that these factors would have altered the outcome. However, they would have enhanced training and more likely increased 

the chance of success.”18

Perhaps the best summation of the failure at Desert One from an 

Air Force perspective was offered by another member of the Holloway Group, Lt Gen Leroy Manor, USAF, retired. He led the Son Tay 

raid and later observed that “in the decade of the seventies, we allowed our capability to dissipate to zero. When this happened in Teheran, we didn’t have the capability. We could have taken B-52s and 

bombed the hell out of Iran, but that would not have solved the 

problem. . . . The only capability that had been developed and maintained was Delta. It had a tremendous capability, but there wasn’t the 

means to get it where it was needed. The Air Force is largely at fault 

for not having maintained that capability.”19

Other findings dealt with numerous issues of organization, command and control, operational security, training, equipping, and so 

forth. The report concluded with two recommendations:

1. Establish a counterterrorist joint task force (CTJTF) as a field 

agency of the JCS with a permanent staff and permanent small, 

limited forces with unique capabilities in special operations. 

2. Create a special operations advisory panel of senior defense 

personnel (active and retired) to provide the most objective 

and independent assessment possible of considered operations. 

Members should have backgrounds in special operations or at 

the commander-in-chief or JCS levels and have maintained an 

interest in special operations or defense policy matters.20

A Second Effort—Operation Honey Badger

The postmortem process, though, would take several months. 

President Carter was not prepared to wait that long. On 28 April, he 

ordered Secretary Brown to prepare another effort. As Col Jim Kyle 

arrived back at the Pentagon for his mission debrief, he noticed an-
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 151

other group of officers and Airmen sequestered in a nondescript 

room and had to assume they were the beginning of that effort. 

General Vaught was kept on to lead the second mission. General 

Secord was directed to serve with him as his vice-commander and air 

component commander. Several other key staff members, especially 

in the intelligence division, were also kept on board, and within two 

weeks were again working long shifts. Defense Secretary Brown made 

it clear that this time all needed resources would be available. The 

planning operation was given the unclassified title of Honey Badger 

and would be done by the Joint Test Directorate assigned to the Office 

of the Joint Chiefs. 

Secord did a quick read of all available after action reports and 

then began to analyze the overall air operation. He decided that the 

helicopters were key and wanted the HH-53H Pave Low III aircraft 

for the operation. Eight were currently available at Kirtland, where 

they were being made ready for transfer to the 41st ARRSq at McClellan AFB. The ninth was still at the NARF at Pensacola. Subsequently, General Secord requested that MAC deploy the aircraft with 

crews and support personnel to the 20th SOS at Hurlburt Field to 

support Honey Badger. The MAC commander, Gen Dutch Heyser, 

objected but was overruled. On 14 May, Gen Robert Mathis, the 

USAF vice-chief of staff, sent a message to MAC, TAC, and other 

support commands directing the move of the nine Pave Low III aircraft from Kirtland to Hurlburt Field. On 15 May, the secretary of the 

Air Force, Dr. Hans Mark, visited Kirtland AFB. While there, he was 

given a full briefing on the Pave Low III aircraft.21

The FOT&E for Pave Low III was suspended. All Pave Low III 

training was immediately curtailed as the wing rushed to comply 

with the order. Within four days, the eight aircraft at Kirtland were 

flown to Hurlburt, accompanied by 21 aircrew and operations support personnel and a 41-man maintenance team. The ninth aircraft 

would arrive directly from Pensacola two weeks later when it finished 

its modification. Colonel Pehr, as the de facto team leader, and Captain 

Connelly led the aircraft and Airmen down, along with several of the 

instructors—Majors Mark Schibler, Ken Ernest, Lou Grant, and Joe 

Barnes and Captains Jim Blewitt and Don Thompson—and crews flying the other machines. Additionally, the 20th would be reinforced 

with six more Slick HH-53B/Cs and eight HC-130 tanker aircraft for 

the operation. At the 41st ARRSq at McClellan, Captain Reed heard 

about the request for supplemental Slick HH-53s and crews and 
Courtesy Air Force Historical Research Agency 

The transfer message directing the initial movement of the Pave Lows to 

Hurlburt Field
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 153

immediately volunteered. Within days, he was given one of the 41st’s 

NRS aircraft and dispatched to Hurlburt. As the helicopters arrived 

there, they were immediately fitted with mounts for .50-caliber 

machine guns.22

At Hurlburt the men and machines would be attached initially in 

TDY status to the 20th SOS, commanded by recently appointed Lt 

Col George Borinski, a CH-3 pilot. That was somewhat problematic 

because the 20th would keep its assigned UH-1Ns but lose its CH-3s 

and crew members to make room for the Pave Lows, which would 

eventually be assigned permanently to the unit. Plans called for 200 

additional personnel and $2.4 million for military construction for 

the 20th SOS. Captain Weikel and others were out on the ramp to 

greet the Kirtland crews as they arrived, handing them cold beers and 

red scarves. However, the welcome was not universally congenial. 

The men of rescue proudly wore the ARRS patch on their flight suits. 

Connelly was shocked to notice when he went to the men’s room that 

someone had placed decals of the rescue patch in each of the urinals.23

General Secord also paid a visit to Hurlburt. He had served there 

during the Vietnam War and was stunned to see how it had changed. 

Gone were the A-26s, A-1s, AT-28s, and A-37s used to train a generation of the air commandos who served in that conflict. The only helicopter unit, the 20th SOS, was equipped with antiquated machines. 

The conventional USAF had cut spending to special operations, and 

it showed. The morale was low, and the base seemed to be in a stupor. 

He resolved that many changes had to be made and began working to 

have key wing leaders replaced. 

As in Rice Bowl, a multitude of 1st SOW men and equipment 

would play a key role in Honey Badger. Once again, the MC- and AC130s would be involved. This time they would be joined by the HH53s now assigned to the 20th SOS. Although Secord could see that 

the rescue pilots needed a lot of training, he believed that the merger 

of the Pave Low III aircraft with the 20th SOS was a good move. It 

was, indeed, a critical one because he envisioned using the Pave Lows 

as pathfinder aircraft for the rest of his rescue force. 

That force was growing in size. In addition to the Delta Force and 

other special operations elements, the Army would also provide two 

Ranger battalions and an aviation unit designated Task Force (TF) 

158. It consisted of new UH-60s from the C and D Companies of the 

158th Aviation Battalion and CH-47s from the A Company of the 

159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion, both from the 101st Airborne 
154 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

Division (Air Assault). Capt Bryan D. Brown commanded C Company and worked tirelessly to build the task force into a strong and 

capable unit. The task force also included OH-6s, procured from a 

Mississippi Army National Guard unit and flown by 101st pilots from 

the 229th Attack Helicopter Battalion. In toto the aviation package 

would consist of almost 100 aircraft directly assigned, with countless 

support aircraft performing a myriad of functions.24

At its height the task force included almost 4,000 troops. The basic 

plan was to insert the Delta Force with the HH-53s led by the Pave 

Lows to secure the hostages. The helicopters would use in-flight refueling to proceed directly to the hostage locations. A larger force would 

seize the Mehrabad Airport, located on the western edge of Tehran, 

with a Ranger-led assault. C-130s, C-141s, and C-5s would immediately land and disgorge the Army helicopters, which would then fly to 

support the hostage rescue force and bring them to Mehrabad. However, intelligence sources indicated that the captives were now being 

moved between possibly five different locations. Consequently, the 

plan had to develop 12 different iterations depending upon the actions of the Iranians.25

As the plan was evolving, the 20th SOS was training hard to perform its role. However, the squadron was nowhere near combat ready 

with the Pave Low III and had much individual training to do to certify its crews. Several students from the initial course at Kirtland also 

accompanied the aircraft. Mark Schibler, now a qualified IP, would do 

much of the training. Upon meeting the pilots from the 20th SOS, he 

was shocked to realize that they had no idea of how challenging it was 

going to be for the aircrews to qualify on the aircraft. He was further 

chagrined when a 1st SOW senior officer told the pilots at a crew 

meeting that they weren’t going to use the Pave Low equipment those 

airplanes had but were going to learn to fly by map reading, compass, 

and clock.26

Fortunately, that line of thinking did not prevail, and the Kirtland 

crew members were quickly assimilated into the squadron, developing a shared sense of purpose and synergistic combination of the best 

of what both groups brought to the mix. Pilots and flight engineers 

previously qualified on any version of the H-53 were offered transition to the Pave Low III. Major Grove and Captains Weikel and 

Vallimont enthusiastically volunteered, as did Captain Reed from the 

41st. Connelly, Blewitt, and Grant quickly designed a training program. Maj Bob Stankovich also joined them. The previous year, he 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 155

had departed Kirtland for a staff job at ARRS headquarters. To help 

support the rapid conversion of the 20th, he was sent TDY to Hurlburt to help train the needed new crews and also serve as an aircraft 

commander for Honey Badger. He was crewed with Capt Mike Damron. 

Capt Mike Homan also joined the unit. Formerly an HH-1H pilot 

with a missile support unit, he was at Kirtland going through the 

H-53 and Pave Low transition, with an assignment to RAF Bentwaters, 

when he was diverted to the 20th at Hurlburt.27

Given their backgrounds flying H-53 aircraft, Grove, Vallimont, 

and Weikel were immediately inserted into training and qualified 

with just a few sorties, Weikel eventually becoming an instructor and 

then evaluator in the Pave Low. Two pilots came over from the 55th 

ARRSq at Eglin. One was not comfortable with the program and 

withdrew. The other, Capt Mike Russell, was good friends with Maj 

Joe Barnes and expressed an interest in the program. Barnes put in a 

good word for him, and he was ordered to report to the 20th SOS. 

The disparate young officers took to the new challenge and embraced it. Russell recounts that

the hardest part was learning the systems and learning how to use an analog 

computer that they had in there with maximum 18 waypoints. . . . As far as running the crew and stuff like that, I didn’t have a lot of trouble with that. . . . 

Learning to do the coupled approaches—that was something that was new 

and always a challenge because the parameters that you had to fly to were 

pretty exacting, and the system just wasn’t all that great. If you were outside 

the parameters, it would do really weird things. There you are at 100 feet, in a 

zero-illume night with no NVGs, trying to figure out what the system is doing 

so you could compensate for it. That was kind of a challenge. But the 53 is a 53; 

they flew well. I love the helicopter; it’s an absolutely amazing machine.28

As the pilots qualified, they were placed on FCF orders and used their 

additional time on the aircraft to fully learn the new systems. Reed 

and Maj Ken Ernst, from the 1550th ATTW, also volunteered for FCF 

duty and began working part-time at the NARF as the aircraft rotated 

in and out of that facility for various modifications. When not testing 

or training on the Pave Low, Reed was “hard crewed” with Capt John 

Folkerts to fly an NRS HH-53 for the actual mission.29

It was a stressful time for the Airmen of the 20th as they transitioned the unit to the new aircraft and scrambled to fulfill their designated role in Honey Badger. But it was not just the process of converting a squadron to a new aircraft. Certainly, that was happening, 

but the men of the 20th were also essentially validating the aircraft 
156 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

under the most demanding of conditions. They had to show not only 

that the new technology would work but also that the aircraft and 

aircrews could handle the pressure of such a demanding task. Everybody knew that another failure would be a huge shock to the nation, 

and the decision makers wanted to make doubly sure that the helicopter force would not fail.30

At one point, Captain Connelly was sent to the Pentagon to brief 

Secord and the JTF 1-79 planners on Pave Low III capabilities and 

employment options. He was straightforward with them, pointing 

out that the aircraft was still not fully developed because much of the 

field testing was still in progress and logistical support was in development. Once he returned to Hurlburt, leaders in the 1st SOW who 

took great exception to what he had briefed in the Pentagon accosted 

him. Incensed, they directed him and a few others to return to Kirtland. Colonel Pehr was offered command of the 20th SOS. When he 

declined the offer, he was also told that his services were not needed. 

He went back to Kirtland and resumed his duties there.31

By June 181 ARRS personnel were TDY at Hurlburt Field. In an 

attempt to reduce costs and insert some stability into the program, 

HQ USAF on 17 June 1980 directed the permanent change of station 

(PCS) assignment of the Pave Low III aircraft and personnel to the 

1st SOW. On that date, all of the ARRS transferees removed the MAC 

patches from their uniforms and replaced them with TAC patches. 

Additionally, MAC had to adjust manning and aircraft assignments 

at several rescue squadrons to support the continued temporary duty 

of the additional HH-53s and HC-130s. Almost 300 ARRS personnel 

would ultimately support Honey Badger in a TDY status. This caused 

many hardships, personnel stress, and family problems.32

Lt Col George Borinski had taken command of the 20th in January 

and spent long hours struggling with the transition. However, he had 

no experience in H-53s and did not train into the Pave Low III. 

Senior leaders in TAC and MAC decided that the 20th needed an 

experienced H-53 pilot to take his place. When Pehr declined, Lt Col 

Bill Takacs replaced Borinski in August.33

Takacs was a career USAF helicopter pilot with thousands of hours 

of flight time as an aircraft commander, IP, and evaluation pilot on 

several different helicopters, including the HH/CH-53, and a tour as 

an advisor in SEA. Described by one of his pilots as “a no-nonsense, 

straight-talking, out-front leader who was totally intolerant of excuses, bureaucratic impediments, and personal agendas,” he was con-
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 157

sidered one of the finest helicopter pilots in the entire Air Force. 

Takacs was the right guy at the right place and time to bring together 

the evolving technology of Pave Low III and the highly spirited young 

men of the 20th SOS and the rescue units. Transferring from Bergstrom, where he had commanded the 701st TASS and then served as 

the 602d Tactical Air Control Wing assistant deputy commander for 

operations, he seized control of the unit and steadily forged it into a 

unit capable of meeting its tasking for Operation Honey Badger.34

Takacs set a challenging pace for the unit because the mission demanded it. However, he always took care of his troops. He told his 

Airmen, “Do what I say, and if it is wrong, I will take the heat.” Mark 

Courtesy 20th SOS historical collection

Lt Col Bill Takacs (shown as a colonel in a later assignment) commanded the 

20th SOS as it converted to the Pave Lows.
158 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

Schibler accepted Takacs as a hard-nosed commander who had a 

keen sense of mission and “could get the crews motivated to do whatever it took.” At one point, his flyers were having trouble getting travel 

vouchers filed because they worked and flew mostly at night and had 

to rest during the day. When the wing finance officer complained 

about tardy vouchers from the 20th, Takacs turned tables on him and 

demanded that he have clerks available all night so his troops could 

submit their vouchers without having to break their crew rest. The 

finance office went on 24-hour service.35 Capt Ed Reed was also 

mightily impressed with Takacs, remembering that “he just knew 

how to get things done. You would do anything for him. It was obvious that he had his act together. . . . He immediately got great respect, 

and there was no doubt that somebody in charge had picked the right 

guy to run the operation.36

Reed subsequently decided to stay with the 20th, and Takacs gave 

him two weeks to go back to McClellan AFB to sell his house and 

move his wife and child to Hurlburt. Reed got it all done. However, 

he, like many others on the mission, discovered that the intense program at Hurlburt was tough on families. The men had to deploy frequently and often on short notice. They could not tell their families 

what they were doing; nevertheless, the families watched the nightly 

news and were able to surmise what was going on and why their men 

were training so hard. Some families were deeply tested by the strain.37

Sergeant Simmon also made the initial move to Hurlburt and developed excellent relationships with Colonel Takacs, whom he deeply 

respected, and most of the unit pilots and crew members as they earnestly trained for their mission. He also decided to stay with the 20th 

and became intimately involved in training the Pave Low flight engineers. The dramatic change in mission forced him to alter his mode 

of operation. He explains that “being in a rescue unit . . . , everything needs to be done by the book. The book has been written, and 

there are no changes to it. . . . With the 20th . . . it became evident that 

the book wasn’t written and it needed to be written and rewritten 

again. That’s what we did. My mind finally changed [to] figuring out 

ways to do things to make things simpler and to just get that ‘can do’ 

attitude and do it.”38

So adapt he did to fit into the mission, eventually developing a 

fondness for it and a deep pride in being able to wear the “red scarf.” 

He trained young flight engineers like SSgt Dean Larsen, who had 

been crewed on the CH-3s with the 20th but came over to the Pave 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 159

Low fleet. Larsen found the academic and tactical training load challenging and even intimidating. Regardless, under the leadership of 

“old guys” like Simmon, he was able to adapt to the special operations 

world, even coming to enjoy the challenges of the criticality of their 

immediate tasking and the new skill sets necessary to accomplish the 

larger mission.39

As the units assigned to Honey Badger completed their individual 

training needs, they began to work together with other task force elements. Crews were merciless in using what came to be called their 

“cowboy priority” to bump other aircraft off of the ranges around Eglin 

so that they could train. They deployed to many Army bases to work 

with the “customers” that they would be hauling into Iran. Focusing 

on conducting night operations and airfield seizures and living in 

austere field conditions, they also went through intense training in 

Texas, Nevada, the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, the 

Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah, Fairchild AFB in Washington, 

and Fort Huachuca in Arizona. All units trained to use NVGs, a new 

and challenging skill for many. Nightly, the Paves practiced leading 

ever larger formations of TF-158 helicopters on ever longer missions 

as all the crews developed the skills and edge necessary for such a 

challenging mission. Before going back to Kirtland, Connelly flew 

several of these missions. 

We would use the Pave Lows as lead with the TF system and navigation 

system and do the packages of support helicopters. During a typical night, 

we would launch four Pave Low assault ships, which would have four or five 

assault Blackhawks in trail with a ton of gas. We would send out four Pave 

Lows with two Chinooks and a Slick-53 as Chalk 4 as support guys filled 

with gas. . . . The assault packages would come in. The -53s would hit the 

[HC-130] tankers . . . the Blackhawks . . . would suck fuel out of the . . . H-47s . . . 

and then we would be off to our strike.40

Overall, though, Captain Russell was not impressed with the Army 

crews. He found the joint training to be challenging and recalls how 

the Army guys didn’t join us until we went to Michael Army Airfield. There was 

a lot of tension at first. . . . We tried to work together with those guys. . . . The 

company commander—a captain, [was] charismatic, fast-charging, knew what 

he wanted and [went] after it. . . . We did a big graduation exercise out there, and 

I’ll never forget this. We were in the theater. . . . It really went bad. . . . We scattered 53s all over the countryside; the 60s didn’t join up with the Pave Lows like 

they were supposed to at the rendezvous point. Everybody made his way back 

in bits and pieces instead of in a big formation and accountability and all of this 

other stuff. 
160 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

I’ll never forget in the hotwash, in the theater, typical Air Force . . . we bare our 

souls so we could fix things and make things better the next time. When it 

came time for the Army portion of it, I still remember [the Army captain] 

walking down the aisle of the base theater going, “You guys f---ed this up; we 

did everything right.” That was my first eye-opener, first exposure to the way 

the Army . . . operated.41

Courtesy AFSOC History Office

Michael Army Airfield, Utah, one of the sites used by the joint force as it 

trained for Honey Badger

Gary Weikel was also not impressed with the Army pilots, noting 

that the majority did not have instrument ratings. But they did become adept at flying formation off the Pave Lows. As the 20th pilots 

began to adapt to their role, they began to repeat the mantra “Pave 

Low leads.” It just seemed to be the natural occurrence.42
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 161

On 18 July, one of the support HH-53Cs, #69-5786, crashed at the 

San Juan County Airport, Utah, while supporting an exercise. Of the 

seven men on board, one was killed and five were injured. The crew 

experienced a flight control malfunction caused by a lateral fuel 

transfer failure. When it tried to make an emergency landing, the 

aircraft hit hard, rolled over, and burned.43

In late summer, a major portion of the task force staged a practice 

assault on Reese AFB, a USAF pilot training base near Lubbock, 

Texas. This was done on a Saturday night under “blacked out” conditions to cause minimum disruption to the units there and to draw 

minimum local attention. Unfortunately, the noise generated by the 

aircraft and weapons charges did alarm many of the locals near the 

base, who reported it to the police. A cover story had been developed 

for such an event and blamed the whole episode on overly aggressive 

training by a Texas Army National Guard unit.44

At the 20th SOS, Colonel Takacs used his career knowledge of the 

tactical helicopter community to try to recruit “sharp young guys” to 

join the unit. He approached Captain Connelly, but Connelly had 

had enough of Hurlburt and TAC. When he returned from the initial 

deployment to Hurlburt, he had intended to resign from the Air 

Force and had all of his papers ready. However, his commander at 

Kirtland talked him out of it. He subsequently took another job in 

flight test, working on the new rescue variant of the H-60 now being 

considered by MAC.45

Takacs also tried to recruit Major Stankovich, who had helped 

qualify several of the initial pilots and was now flying practice missions for the Honey Badger effort. Stankovich knew that Pave Low 

was an exciting and sorely needed capability and also had some personal history with Takacs, whom he had met when assigned to the 

21st SOS in Thailand. Takacs was on the PACAF Standardization and 

Evaluation Team and came out to NKP to give CH-53 check rides. 

Although Stankovich found Takacs’s invitation appealing, he passed 

on the offer for personal and professional reasons and returned to his 

duties at Scott AFB.46

Still trying to build up his unit, Takacs called Capt Rus Stiles, who 

was still active with the test program at Kirtland AFB. “Rus, you have 

to come with us on this,” Takacs pleaded. Stiles was torn because he 

had a long and enduring relationship with Takacs based on his visits 

to Thailand and later to the 6594th Test Group in Hawaii, where Stiles 

was stationed. Consequently, such an offer from Takacs was compel-
162 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

ling. However, Stiles had two colonels who did not want him to leave 

Kirtland. He chose not to make the move to Hurlburt, remaining instead in the test community at Kirtland for another two years. As his 

responsibilities slowly transformed, though, from flying to desk duties, he decided to leave active USAF duty to join the Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation as a helicopter test pilot.47

Coincidentally, other officers were also looking for sharp pilots for 

Pave Low. Maj Fred Manke was serving as the helicopter assignments 

officer at the USAF Personnel Center in early 1980. While earlier attending a helicopter instructor course at Fort Rucker, he met Army 

chief warrant officer (CW-3) Jim Walters. Walters had been an Army 

pilot since 1969 and had served in Vietnam. He had over 3,500 hours 

of helicopter time and was now a highly experienced helicopter instructor and specialist in NVG operations. He had recently received a 

college degree and was interested in transferring to the USAF as a 

commissioned officer and pilot. In early 1980, Manke helped Walters 

do all the paperwork for the transfer and get a slot in the Officer 

Training School at Maxwell AFB. While there, Walters also met a 

USAF flight evaluation board and received a rating as an Air Force 

pilot. Manke then secured him an HH-53 assignment to the 33d 

ARRSq at Kadena, and Walters reported directly to Kirtland for qualification in the aircraft. Out on the ramp one day, he met a Pave Low 

crew passing through on a Honey Badger training mission and became interested in the 20th and its mission. He also heard about the 

squadron commander, Bill Takacs, who the Pave Low guys all said 

was an outstanding leader. When Major Manke subsequently called 

to tell Walters that he was going to get a change of orders sending him 

to the 601st TASS at Sembach, Walters expressed an interest in joining the Pave Low program. The next day, Manke called back to inform him that he was now going to the 20th.48

Jack Kelly followed a similar path. He had also been an Army chief 

warrant officer with combat experience in Vietnam. After procuring 

a USAF commission in November 1979, he went through H-53 qualification at Kirtland. He stood on the ramp there and watched Pehr 

and Simmon as they departed with two Pave Low aircraft for Saudi 

Arabia. Arriving at the 55th ARRSq at Eglin AFB three months later, 

he found out what was happening at the 20th and immediately volunteered, becoming another of the squadron’s highly qualified seniorpilot-winged second lieutenants waiting to work their way through 

Pave Low qualification. In later years, many more Army warrant of-
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 163

ficers would follow this path to Pave Low and, again, add a great deal 

to the force.49

By August JTF 1-79 had conducted 10 major rehearsals, and both 

General Vaught and General Secord believed that the men were 

ready. They so reported to General Jones and Secretary Brown. Stated 

Secord, “The JTF was on razor’s edge: morale was high, the equipment was ready, and we were raring to go.” However, intelligence 

sources were having difficulty ascertaining the precise locations of 

the hostages, and without that critical information, nobody was willing to commit the task force.50

Regardless, the training continued as the commanders waited for 

favorable intelligence data. In October, under Operation Potent 

Charge, the Pave Lows led TF-158 elements as they inserted several 

teams of Delta Force troops and Rangers onto eight widely dispersed 

targets. Over five days and nights, the Paves and CH-47s inserted and 

then exfiltrated the teams, concluding the operation with a continuous 

16-hour burst of activity. Three weeks later, they repeated the exercise 

on an even larger scale in Operation Storm Cloud as the JTF maintained its edge.51

Second Lieutenant Jim Walters arrived at the 20th in October. 

With the heavy operations and training tempo, he could not immediately enter Pave Low training. Instead, he flew the attached HH-53s 

to initially build up his time in type and, eventually, train the other 

pilots and crew members in NVG operations. Most NVG training 

took place at night. However, he and the other instructors became 

adept at using a combination of blue Plexiglas on the windscreens 

and yellow helmet visors on the student pilots to replicate night flying 

during the day. The pilot flying could use the yellow visor to restrict 

his vision while the safety pilot, flight engineers, and gunners wore 

clear visors for terrain and traffic avoidance. Walters hated this expedient, but it was necessary to get the troops trained. He later recalled 

that “from sitting on the ground, you had to take off, fly TF/TA en 

route, and land completely IMC [instrument meteorological conditions] so to speak. Although it was in daylight conditions, you were in 

the clouds from takeoff to landing. That was a true test of training. 

And that was the standard that people had to meet.”52

The training was hard. Some pilots could not make the transition 

and left the program. A few months later, Walters finally was able to 

qualify in the Pave Low. He found the shift to a larger crew a bit of a 
164 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

challenge and quite different from what he had experienced in the 

Army. He remembered that

in the Army, in the Huey, you just had a pilot and a copilot. . . . I went from that 

concept, from two people, to six people. So my learning curve was deep . . . pilot, 

copilot, two flight engineers—one acting as a scanner—two gunners. . . . And 

[I had] that plus the amount of checklists that I was introduced to in the Air 

Force. . . . But I just sat back, took a breath, and you just learned the teamwork 

that it takes to fly safely with six guys instead of two guys. Once you develop 

that, you got it down to such a rote, precise system that it just turned out okay.53

However, the continual training and operations demands levied on 

the 20th remained such that it would take almost a year for Lieutenant 

Walters to fully work his way through the myriad requirements to 

qualify first as an HH-53B/C and then as a full HH-53H Pave Low III 

aircraft commander. He would eventually upgrade to IP and then 

flight examiner and become a solid pillar of knowledge, experience, 

and strength in the squadron.54

With the election of Pres. Ronald Reagan in November 1980, the 

relationship between the United States and Iran began to shift. The 

Iranian leadership believed that the new president might be inclined 

to order an even larger military operation against their country. Diplomatic representatives of the Carter administration wanted a hostage release before the new president took over and worked earnestly 

behind the scenes to arrange such an outcome. JTF 1-79 was ready to go 

but was still constrained by a lack of definitive locations for the hostages. 

However, other fundamental changes were occurring that would 

dramatically affect Honey Badger. At a hearing before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee in late summer, Senator Sam Nunn asked 

Colonel Beckwith what he had learned from the Rice Bowl mission 

and what could be done to preclude such an outcome from happening 

again. Beckwith waxed elegantly about the importance of teams 

training together vice ad hoc operations, using a Bear Bryant analogy 

to make his point. As far as preparing for the future, he stated that 

“my recommendation is to put together an organization which contains everything it will ever need, an organization which could include Delta, the Rangers, Navy SEALs, Air Force pilots, its own staff, 

its own support people, [and] its own aircraft and helicopters. Make 

this organization a permanent military unit. Give it a place to call 

home. Allocate sufficient funds to run it, and give it sufficient time to 

recruit, assess, and train its people. Otherwise, we are not serious 

about combating terrorism.”55
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 165

Based upon the recommendations of the Holloway Commission 

for a CTJTF and testimony like Beckwith’s, Defense Secretary Brown, 

within a month of the publication of the Holloway report, directed 

the creation of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) at Fort 

Bragg. It activated on 15 December 1980. Initially, its unclassified mission was to study special operations tactics. Its real mission, not 

declassified until 1992, was to “provide the joint service expertise 

for a standing Joint Special Operations Task Force [JSOTF].” One 

week later, it assumed responsibility for hostage rescue in general 

and Operation Honey Badger, relieving JTF 1-79 of the mission. 

However, the JTF stayed ready to deploy until the hostages were back 

under US control before finally standing down. Many of its personnel 

subsequently joined the new organization.56

To provide direct support to the JSOC, the vice CSAF, General 

Mathis, established the Air Force Element Operations Evaluation 

Group at Pope AFB, North Carolina, to work directly with the new 

organization. Its mission was to “conduct research and testing on 

special procedures and projects assigned by the CSAF.” Additionally, 

the 1st SOW was tasked to make available to the JSOC commander 

two MC-130s, two AC-130s, and two HH-53Hs on a daily basis.57

Shortly thereafter, the Carter administration was able to reach an 

agreement with the Iranian government for the return of all hostages 

as quid pro quo for the release of certain Iranian funds and assets 

frozen by the US government in the last year. The actual release would 

take place on 20 January 1981, literally moments after President Reagan 

took the oath of office.58

Although Operation Honey Badger was never executed, its benefits were incalculable. Born from failure, it became an instrument to 

forge a truly joint force capable of dealing with the ever-growing 

threat of international terrorism. JSOC was now a reality, and the 

Army decided to formalize the ad hoc TF-158 into TF-160 as a battalionsized special operations aviation element within the 101st Division. 

Within just a year, it would be redesignated as the 160th Aviation Battalion, given the moniker of the “Night Stalkers,” and eventually upgraded to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR).

59

Honey Badger also served as the catalyst to move the Pave Low III 

aircraft from the ARRS to the 20th SOS, where a group of earnest and 

dedicated young air warriors led by the best possible mentor would 

bring Pave Low III to full fruition. Later, Captain Reed noted that “we 

were developing tactics and doing things with equipment that no-
166 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

body had ever planned to do. Essentially, I think it jump-started special 

ops—at least the helicopter part of it. . . . Despite everyone thinking 

that rescue and SOF would not come together, the mission forced 

everybody together. The guys who wanted to leave at the end, left. 

And the guys who wanted to stay, stayed.”60

A later 1st SOW award nomination for this period stated:

Integrating the HH-53H Pave Low helicopter into special operations in the 

short time between May and September 1980 was a major accomplishment. 

The highly sophisticated helicopter possessing terrain following/terrain 

avoidance radar and forward-looking infrared sensor capability arrived on 

very short notice at Hurlburt where there were no personnel in operations or 

maintenance trained in the system. . . . The Pave Low provided the Wing with 

a heavy lift capability previously lacking and a helicopter which could, by using its 

terrain systems and on-board computers, operate at extremely low altitudes 

in areas previously denied by enemy defenses.61

The young Airmen of the 20th SOS turned their squadron into an 

asset ready to take our best Soldiers, Airmen, and Sailors to meet the 

enemy any time, any place. As Orr Kelly wrote in a later history of air 

commandos, “By the time the Honey Badger exercises were completed, the Air Force had this new weapon in its arsenal along with 

crews highly trained to get the most out of the new machine. It was 

the beginning of . . . the modern era in Air Force special operations.”62

The dramatic changes that had swept the 20th SOS required modification of its mission statement. The unit’s new designed operational 

capability statement specified two assigned missions: unconventional 

warfare and psychological operations. Its mission description now 

called for low-level penetration of hostile territory for infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of unconventional warfare forces. Also, the 

required special equipment list included items unique to the Pave 

Low IIIs. All other missions—including personnel recovery, medevac, and humanitarian missions—were now listed as corollary. 

In November the 1st SOW established the Special Operations Mission Planning Division under the deputy commander for operations 

and manned it with 11 Airmen, headed by a lieutenant colonel. It 

would be the coordinating facility for special 1st SOW taskings and 

commitments and would serve as the wing focal point and communications channel for interface with the JSOC and for coordination with 

other Air Force and service units and agencies tasked by the JSOC.63

These combined factors would have, for the Pave Low Airmen at 

least, a significant unforeseen consequence. Within the Air Force, 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 167

aircrews generally identified themselves with their aircraft or at least 

class of aircraft (fighters, attack, bombers, cargo, etc.), and each had 

its own “tribe,” an identity and support group that created community loyalties. For the Pave Low crews, though, working as closely as 

they were now with the special forces from the other services, they 

would soon come to identify more strongly with the special forces 

than they did with their Air Force brethren. One air commando later 

wrote of this phenomenon, “It has a lot to do with association with 

the customer . . . generally a SEAL or SF [special forces]. We do somewhat consider ourselves the same as those guys. . . . We feel a very 

close camaraderie with them.”64

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

The abrupt transfer of the Pave Low III aircraft, crews, and support 

capability to TAC was quite an unexpected blow to MAC/ARRS. For 

almost 10 years, that organization had nurtured the program through 

all of the conceptualizing, funding, programming, testing, production, training, and now organizing necessary to convert a clear operational need into a force in being. At the very moment of its realization, it had been forced to give up the entire force to TAC for a wholly 

different, but critical, mission. Sensing the bitter frustration of the 

MAC/ARRS Airmen, on 12 June 1980, Gen Lew Allen, the CSAF, 

sent Gen Robert Huyser a personal note that said the following:

1. My staff has restudied problems associated with the transfer of the Pave 

Low III helicopters. We are in the unfortunate position of having to allocate a scarce resource between two competing demands, combat rescue 

and the counterterrorist (CT) mission, and we cannot satisfy full, the requirements of both.

2. . . . Senior OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] officials are actively 

working the establishment of a permanent, integrated force capable of 

achieving an effective response to future terrorist incidents. . . . The Joint 

Chiefs are developing an organization consisting of personnel and equipment from all services. Deemed essential to this structure are the unique 

capabilities of Pave Low.

3. . . . I have looked at alternatives to the Pave Low assignment but have concluded these assets and personnel must be organizationally integrated into 

TAC. . . . 

4. The personnel sensitivities of this transfer are well understood. 
168 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

5. It is recognized the transfer of Pave Low assets to TAC will leave an obvious 

hole in ARRS capability. Therefore, in event of contingency, arrangements 

and procedures will be worked out to pull and use Pave Low to support 

your needs. . . . I’ve directed the staff to work in conjunction with MAC to 

prepare options for rebuilding an enhanced combat rescue capability. The 

basis may be to develop some of the Pave Low capability in the forthcoming H-60 or an alternate candidate.65

Facing squarely the reality of this dramatic change, General Huyser 

on 23 July responded to General Allen, stating, “If the Air Force wants 

a rescue capability for both peacetime and wartime, we better get 

with the program on restoring some lost capability.” He acknowledged 

that the loss of the nine HH-53Hs had devastated his command. The 

further assignment of the additional HH-53B/Cs from the 41st and 

55th had also eliminated his capability to respond to current war 

plans. Huyser proposed that MAC/ARRS brief Allen on a projected 

“way ahead.” Allen acceded, and in August the ARRS commander, 

Maj Gen Cornelius Nugteren, presented it. He covered several shortterm intracommand steps being taken to address the combat recovery shortfall caused by the Pave Low transfer. He also suggested that, 

long term, the answer was the acquisition of a new rescue helicopter, 

labeled H-X—possibly a variant of the new H-60 being developed by 

Sikorsky. Missing was any request for money to modify more HH-53s 

to the Pave Low III configuration.66

In support, General Huyser also continued to push for some form 

of consolidation of all USAF helicopters under one command, most 

preferably the ARRS. It had lost the Pave Lows to TAC, but he hoped 

to make a case for consolidation and control of the larger collective 

fleet. As discussions continued between the MAC/ARRS staffs and 

the Air Staff, he openly declared in a letter on 12 November 1980 to 

Generals Allen and Mathis that the USAF’s basic problem was that 

there were “more mission airframe requirements than existing airframes,” and, again, he called for procurement of a new helicopter and 

more efficient management of existing resources. He further stated:

MAC owns the preponderance of USAF helicopter . . . expertise, experience, 

command structure, and resources. Also, MAC has extensive experience with 

special operations in SEA such as the Son Tay Raid, the Mayaguez incident, 

and subsequent long-range deployments like [the] Jonestown, Guyana, incident in South America. MAC has never failed to rapidly respond. I strongly 

believe that if all helicopters and SOF C-130s are consolidated under MAC, a 

stronger, more viable force could be projected in response to international 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 169

contingencies without the intercommand difficulties and personnel disruptions which have occurred in the recent past.67

For the next few months, the various USAF commands responded 

to Huyser’s proposal, generally in support but with numerous alternative suggestions and expansions/restrictions. As 1980 ended, 

though, the immutable fact was that the ARRS HH-53 fleet and commensurate combat rescue capability had been dramatically reduced. 

Only 21 aircraft were assigned, and they were still located at Kirtland, 

McClellan, Kadena, Eglin, and Woodbridge. Additionally, the five 

Honey Badger HH-53B/Cs were still at Hurlburt. Two weeks into the 

new year, General Mathis responded to General Huyser, noting that 

the Air Staff was considering several alternatives and that the Joint 

Staff was also looking at some form of DOD joint command with 

SOF assets from all of the services.68

20th Special Operations Squadron

It is doubtful, though, that any of these discussions about the overall organization of the USAF helicopter fleet were of any concern to 

the Green Hornets. They had been training intensely since the delivery 

of the Pave Lows and were more than relieved when notified that 

Honey Badger was cancelled. By mid-February, the five augmentee 

HH-53B/Cs, crews, and support personnel were released and returned to their units. NVG training continued, and the 20th began a 

rotation of Pave Lows to Dobbins AFB, Georgia, so that crews could 

accomplish training in the Appalachian Mountains. The 20th also began semipermanent rotations to Pope AFB to work with Army special forces units at nearby Fort Bragg and Camp Mackall, at one point 

putting on a demonstration for SecDef Harold Brown and an interdepartmental group on terrorism. A few days later, six Pave Lows and 

an AC-130 flew separate long, overwater navigation routes with refueling and precisely rendezvoused at a location near Dahlonega, Georgia, 

to exfiltrate a special forces team and fly it to Hurlburt.

In January 1981, SSgt John Sprouse reported to the 20th SOS for 

assignment as a gunner. Initially, the Pave Lows were manned with 

PJs. However, with the clear focus on special operations, they were 

taken off and replaced with gunners. Throughout 1980 the USAF had 

advertised for volunteers, and slowly individuals came forward. 

Sprouse enlisted in the USAF in 1975, training as a weapons load 
170 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

specialist and serving tours working on A-7s and B-52s before submitting his paperwork for assignment to the Pave Lows. Joining the 

Green Hornets, he found a small cadre of gunners consisting primarily 

of former SEA-era Airmen. The gunners did not undergo a formal 

training program. Sergeant Simmon oversaw the training and used 

another flight engineer, MSgt John Selfridge, and the initial gunners 

to conduct it. 

Initially, Sprouse was trained to serve just as a crew member. Once 

he completed that training, he began a series of range and tactical 

rides to become mission ready. However, the frantic pace of squadron 

operations did not allow such singular focus. At the same time, he 

was going on mission exercises and working to develop tactics for 

specific tasks like fast-rope insertions of small teams and NVG operations. He also worked directly with MSgt Robert Hall as they acquired all of the accoutrements necessary to utilize both miniguns 

and .50-caliber machine guns on the Pave Lows. As one of the 13 

original gunners on the Pave Lows, Sprouse enjoyed it all and quickly 

became a loyal member of the 20th. He also began to feel the uniqueness of his job and position, remembering that “we were too young to 

be afraid of anything. We thought we were king of the hill—which we 

were. We were an elite group of guys. . . . We original 13 gunners were 

probably some of the best helicopter gunners that have ever been. . . . 

We could put rounds on targets—now!”69

Sprouse flew several of his missions with Capt Gary Weikel, who 

was flying more than ever, in some months logging 70 hours as an instructor and flight evaluator. They and the other pilots continued to 

push the aircraft and crews hard as they literally evolved the best tactics 

for their missions. Weikel, John Grove, Mike Russell, and Joe Vallimont 

informally made up the tactical essence of the unit. Aggressive, hardcharging, always irreverent and totally unimpressed by things like rank 

and titular position, they were assigned the moniker of the “Four 

Horsemen” of the 20th SOS, as if replicating in behavior and appearance the four scourges of the Bible. The nickname arose, Weikel recalls, 

“after a particularly long and difficult stretch of constant TDYs, routine 

in-flight emergencies, tough missions, with interspersed training of 

new guys and the notorious amount of outrageously bad behavior and 

hard partying interwoven. The prevailing view [was] that we were 

never going to live through this, so we were going to go out with our 

spurs on and tall in the saddle . . . like cowboys.”70
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 171

In March the 20th received a real-world mission. Because of instability in Nicaragua, JSOC was directed to deploy a helicopter force to 

Howard AFB, Panama Canal Zone, as part of Operation Nimble 

Warrior. By the end of the month, the 20th deployed eight Pave Lows. 

As in Honey Badger, they were joined by six more HH-53B/Cs from 

the 41st and 55th ARRSqs and the 1550th ATTW. All of the helicopters 

flew directly to the Canal Zone from Hurlburt, facilitated by in-flight 

refueling from six HC-130s. 

Courtesy Col Gary Weikel, USAF, Retired

The “Four Horsemen” of the 20th SOS. Left to right: Gary Weikel, Mike Russell, 

John Grove, and Joe Vallimont.

Lt Col Bill Takacs was the commander of the helicopter task force. 

Based upon the requirements of the missions, he directed that his 

Pave Low aircraft commanders (including Lieutenants Walters and 

Kelly) would lead the missions regardless of their military rank. This 

upset many of the rescue pilots, who felt that their more senior pilots 
172 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

had the edge on flight experience. Takacs did not care about the rancor; he told them to get on with their assigned duties. In early April, 

several of the helicopters were used in a classified mission, and then 

the task force was released to return home. The Pave Lows were flown 

back to Hurlburt, and the HH-53B/Cs were flown by C-5 directly 

back to their bases. Col Owen “Al” Heeter, the 1550th ATTW vicecommander, served as the ARRS mission commander and wrote an 

after action report. He specifically stated that the 1550th ATTW was 

not organized or equipped for such deployments. While the aircraft 

were deployed, wing H-53 crew training was reduced by 50 percent. 

The wing had not been issued mobility gear for its personnel or war 

readiness spares kits (WRSK) for its aircraft. Additionally, to be fully 

capable of such combat operations, the wing HH-53s needed to be 

modified with updated Doppler and INSs, secure communications 

radios, the more powerful -7A engines, armor plating, cockpits modified for NVG use, flare dispenser systems, and radar warning receivers. 

In subsequent correspondence, General Ryan, MAC vice-commander, 

and General Gabriel, on the Air Staff, agreed that the training mission of the 1550th was critical for supporting overall USAF needs. 

The unit was subsequently relieved of such tasking responsibility unless it was needed for a national emergency and correspondingly provided necessary support and funding.71

In April, the 20th deployed two Pave Lows and a support team to 

Pisa, Italy, to participate in Operation Muflone 81. The aircraft were 

flown over and back in C-5s. While there, the crews gained valuable 

experience working with US and European special forces units. The 

movement by MAC assets also provided the maintenance crews an 

opportunity to better define their aircraft deployment procedures 

and needs. Later in the month, the 20th’s Airmen participated in another major exercise, Operation Solid Shield 81, with special forces 

from all services. In this exercise, they flew two HH-53s and four 

UH-1Ns and operated out of an austere airfield in central Florida. 

They practiced and perfected the aircraft-to-aircraft ground refueling 

procedure that had been so problematic at Desert One. The training 

with US Navy SEALs was particularly valuable, and the Airmen 

learned many lessons about working with those forces. The unit also 

supported its share of static displays, firepower demonstrations, and 

mission demonstrations for VIPs. 

These exercises set the pattern for the rest of the year as 20th crews 

and support personnel participated in several more exercises, includ-
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 173

ing Gallant Knight, Marvel Exodus, Bold Eagle, Certain Tribute, and 

Bright Star, in the United States and overseas. Additionally, they 

trained for all of their mission areas and even another airfield seizure 

with other elements of JSOC. The 20th showed that it was capable of 

performing its missions either separately or as part of a joint UW task 

or coalition force. Pave Lows were also used in several domestic 

SARs. However, the pace was relentless, putting a real strain on the 

aircraft and maintenance. In the last three months of the year, the 

20th logged 356 sorties in 92 calendar days. An influx of new aircrew 

members, including Capt Jeff Walls and Capt Walt Heidmous, also 

created a high demand for training, which suffered under the operational load. The 1st SOW history for that period notes that “the heavy 

operational tasking on the 20 SOS interrupted upgrade flying training and caused inconsistent and extended training.”72

The long duty days—up to 14 hours—were also hard on the aircrews, as they again led sometimes large formations of other helicopters, day and night. Major Grove had to give up flying when he developed 

severe arterial blockage of the heart, which ended his flying career. 

He would remain with the 20th, though, as a plans officer for several 

more years.73

Colonel Takacs himself had a close call that summer. He flew on an 

HH-53B commanded by Maj Barry Walls in support of a JSOC exercise at Fort Stewart, Georgia. They were doing a night airfield seizure. 

However, when Walls came in to land, his tailskid did not extend, and 

the tail rotor hit the pavement. The tail rotor shattered and threw 

shrapnel into the aircraft. Takacs was slightly wounded by flying debris that hit his right calf muscle. An Army Ranger was also wounded, 

and Weikel flew him out for medical care. The medics tried to evacuate the bleeding Takacs. He would have none of it. Instead, he just 

taped up his leg wound and stayed out with his troops until all other 

flying was completed for the night before he allowed them to care for 

him. It just added to his stature with his Airmen.74

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

As a result of tactical lessons learned in Nimble Warrior, the ARRS 

established a program to develop rescue special operations low-level 

(R-SOLL) techniques to facilitate combat rescue operations and contingency mission requirements. Starting 1 July 1981, the program 
174 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

primarily focused on HC-130 crews, but the ARRS also directed the 

41st ARRSq at McClellan to begin a one-year test program to qualify 

all HH-53 crews to utilize NVGs to fly low-level night recovery missions. This was intended to reestablish an ARRS combat recovery capability after the loss of the Pave Lows. However, this intense training 

program conflicted with normal alert responsibilities. These were 

correspondingly relaxed, as were normal daytime training accomplishments. Within three months, the 41st had trained several crews 

to accomplish the mission.75

Reflecting the reality of current events and the growing interest in 

some form of helicopter consolidation, MAC and ARRS planners 

throughout 1981 continued to take steps to position the ARRS to be 

the command of choice for such a merger. After an examination of all 

ARRS-assigned missions, they drafted a revision of Air Force Regulation (AFR) 23-19, the ARRS mission statement. While still listing 

combat rescue as the primary mission of the ARRS, the AFR acknowledged its long history of involvement in special operations at 

places like Son Tay and Koh Tang Island—as well as the most recent 

operation, Nimble Warrior—and added support for special operations/UW and “other DOD/USAF requirements as directed” to its 

myriad list of missions. Revised missions for its subordinate wings 

were also published.76

Throughout the year, the MAC commander, General Huyser, continued to advocate for the ARRS as the single manager for USAF helicopters. However, he encountered unexpected resistance from the 

TAC commander, General Creech, who, responding also for USAFE 

and PACAF, wrote that he saw only a “marginal relationship” between 

most aspects of the SOF mission and the airlift mission and that TAC, 

USAFE, and PACAF should retain SOF resources to execute the counterterrorist and UW missions. He concluded, “In short, the SOF mission 

is where it belongs and we believe no case exists to move it.”77

Realizing that he had no service consensus on the issue, General 

Huyser wrote a letter directly to the SecDef, Casper Weinberger, in 

which he stated, “I recommend the Air Force consolidate all helicopter 

and certain C-130 assets under MAC as a single manager. . . . I urge 

you to take the initiative in this area as it appears to be in the ‘too 

hard’ category below your level.” Not having received a response from 

Weinberger, Huyser retired in June and was replaced by General Allen. 

Two months later, the ARRS commander, General Nugteren, was reassigned and replaced by Brig Gen William Mall. Nothing more was 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 175

done on the consolidation issue for the rest of the year as the two new 

commanders settled into their jobs. Considering the losses that the 

ARRS had taken within the last year, though, one piece of good news 

did surface when the USAF announced that the 6594th Test Group in 

Hawaii would be closing in 1986 and that the ARRS would receive its 

six HH-53Cs.78

20th Special Operations Squadron

As 1982 began, most 20th Airmen were unaware of the large issues 

roiling above them as the various major commands bickered about 

the best way to organize their helicopter fleet. The squadron was the 

only Pave Low III–equipped unit in the USAF, and the new year was 

essentially a replay of the previous year except that the sophistication 

of the exercises increased as the proficiency of the various forces 

aligned with JSOC matured and became comfortable with one another. The squadron training load dropped off a bit as only two new 

pilots, Capt Tom Hull and Capt Clay Spriet, entered the unit. Static 

displays and VIP visits were constant as word of the existence of the 

Pave Low spread. One visitor of note was Mr. Lynn Rylander, assistant 

for policy planning, OSD, who wanted to see firsthand the capabilities 

of the Pave Low. The unit was also tasked under several war plans to 

support both JSOC and the new Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 

(RDJTF), designed and organized after the failure of Rice Bowl. However, mission analysis showed that the unit needed at least 14 aircraft 

to meet any tasking beyond more than one contingency but that the 

preferred force would be 21 Pave Lows.

In late January, the unit provided six aircraft and crews to support 

Gallant Knight, a large RDJTF exercise held in Florida and focused 

on helping to defend a friendly nation in Southwest Asia. Performing 

all classic SOF missions and SAR, the crews flew 22 sorties. This 

exercise provided the unit with a good knowledge of that part of the 

world. At almost the same time, the JSOC initiated a no-notice exercise 

called Vagabond Warrior, and a contingent of 49 Airmen from the 1st 

SOW, including crews and support personnel for two Pave Lows, deployed to Barking Sands, Hawaii. Arriving there by C-5, the Pave Low 

crews flew 11 sorties over the next three days as the JSOC task force 

achieved all of its training objectives. The two deployments, while 

successful, completely disrupted the 20th SOS training plan. For the 
176 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

quarter, the 20th was able to fly only 70 percent of its allotted sorties, 

even though unit manning was at 105 percent.

Fully aware of the travails of the 20th SOS, the 1st SOW commander, 

Col Hugh Cox, addressed the problem with his superior command, 

TAC’s Ninth Air Force. He was aware that the 6594th Test Group in 

Hawaii was going to inactivate in 1986 and asked if its HH-53Cs could 

be assigned to the 20th with additional manning and WRSK support to 

address its shortfalls. No swift answer was forthcoming.

In April, two Pave Lows, crews, and support personnel deployed 

for a return visit to Pisa, Italy, for Operation Muflone 82. The exercise 

lasted almost six weeks, and a second team of personnel replaced the 

original deployers at the halfway point to spread the training to as 

many Airmen as possible. While there, the 20th flew 47 missions, 

both operational and administrative, and the crews worked both day 

and night with various US and allied special forces teams. However, 

restrictions that the Italian authorities placed on the operation limited the effectiveness of the night missions, causing the deployed 

commander, Lt Col Joe Barnes, to greatly constrain his aircrews.

The next month, the unit participated in another major exercise, 

Ocean Venture 82. Two HH-53Hs were committed to the program, 

but the unit would fly out of Hurlburt Field. This was a JCS-directed 

exercise, working mostly with forces from the United States Atlantic 

Command (USLANTCOM), and ran from 26 April to 17 May. During that period, the 20th crews flew 13 sorties, primarily inserting 

and extracting small teams of SEALs, USAF combat controllers, and 

US Army special forces.79

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

The H-53 community suffered another loss on 27 July 1982 when 

HH-53C #69-5792 crashed while on a training sortie at Kirtland. The 

crew had conducted night refueling training and was descending for 

a low-level navigation leg when the aircraft impacted the ground and 

was destroyed. The crew—Maj Barry Walls, Capt Pat Behnke, 1st Lt 

Hardy Delay, and SSgt Aylwyn Fortner—were all killed. Walls was a 

veteran of the Mayaguez mission and had flown with Captain Connelly 

on the fateful Pave Low III rescue in Albuquerque two and a half 

years prior. It was a terrible loss to the H-53 community.80
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 177

There is no record that Defense Secretary Weinberger ever responded to General Huyser’s somewhat plaintive retirement letter. 

However, Huyser’s arguments did receive promising support from 

two unexpected events. In late 1981, two independent studies that 

tangentially looked at the consolidation issue were launched. The first 

was an Air Force 2000 study that DOD staff conducted. Its purpose 

was to divine, in broad terms, USAF needs and resources in the year 

2000. It considered technological developments and economic, demographic, and environmental issues. The study assumed that current 

trends in international relationships would not change appreciably, 

that terrorist activities would increase, and that the United States 

could expect conflicts ranging from political unrest to small-scale regional confrontations, requiring a tailored rapid response. It also 

stated that the Air Force’s future mission would need to include augmenting counterterrorist and counterinsurgency crisis operations 

with airpower and special operations capabilities. The capability requirements section states that “to provide the organizational support 

necessary to enhance special operations, the Air Force should consider placing it under HQ USAF as a Special Operating Agency, or 

within a Major Command as a numbered air force.”81

The second project was a functional management inspection that 

the USAF inspector general’s (IG) office conducted to look specifically at the USAF’s special operations capability. It examined current 

requirements delineated in existing directives, plans, and programs 

and assessed the USAF’s capability to meet those requirements. The 

results were telling and supported the conclusion that “the Air Force 

is not currently capable of fully supporting JCS/unified command 

special operations.” With shortfalls found in doctrine, command and 

control, and current and programmed force structure, the report recommended combining “all ARRS and USAF SO [special operations] 

assets under an organization or numbered air force within a MAJCOM 

with overseas units under operational command of AF component 

commanders.” This report was briefed to the MAC commander, Gen 

James Allen, on 16 July 1982.82

A series of meetings took place at the Air Staff in the Pentagon to 

digest the results of the two reports. As colonels and then generals at 

the Air Force Council reviewed the issue, they came to a consensus 

that special operations and combat rescue functions should be consolidated under a single command. On 7 September, the CSAF, Gen 

Charles Gabriel, directed the TAC and MAC commanders to develop 
178 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

proposals to combine their two affected components. A staff team 

from MAC and another from TAC, led by Col Gary Lunt and Col 

Ron Fogleman, respectively, met separately to prepare recommendations for unit location, command and control structures, logistical 

and personnel support systems, fiscal issues, and a transition schedule. 

As the two teams were working, Generals Allen and Creech had a 

series of discussions concerning which major command would own 

the consolidated new unit. When Maj Gen Duane Cassidy, the MAC 

DCS, made the point to General Creech that helicopter and M/HC-130 

crew members and support personnel would have a better chance at 

promotion in MAC vice TAC, Creech stated, “I agree with the position. I take away my objections. I will give you the special ops forces.” 

He and General Allen then agreed that MAC and TAC teams would 

combine as a joint organizational working group (JOWG) and submit a single briefing to the Air Staff. However, General Creech outlined some of his core philosophies that he believed were pivotal to 

the transition: 

1. Theater commanders would retain operational command of 

forces deployed in the theater.

2. They would determine rational beddown locations for SOFs. 

3. Rescue and special operations forces would retain their separate identities.

4. This was not an inter–Air Force battle for real estate but a resource consolidation for the good of the USAF.

5. Residual TAC assets at Hurlburt would be treated fairly. 

6. Both parties needed to recognize that the JSOC mission was 

only part of the special operations function. 

The MAC staff had no problems with any of these issues, and the 

detailed planning commenced.83

The JOWG worked through the fall with all impacted staff elements from both commands to hammer out the details of the consolidation. The overarching new command would be the newly established Twenty-Third Air Force, located at Scott AFB and reporting 

directly to MAC. Subordinate to it, the ARRS would still command 

all rescue units. The 2d Air Division (AD)—a unit that had served in 

World War II, the Cold War, and SEA—would be reactivated and 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 179

would command the special operations units. It would be collocated 

with the 1st SOW at Hurlburt Field. It would also have administrative 

control of the 1st SOS in the Pacific, the 7th SOS in Germany, and a 

special operations detachment in the Panama Canal Zone. Commanders felt that SOF personnel would have better career progression opportunities within MAC since it had the predominance of 

USAF helicopters and C-130 type aircraft, as opposed to TAC, which 

was almost exclusively a fighter command. In addition, MAC would 

assume programming management responsibilities for all special operations forces and equipment. The entire plan was briefed to and 

approved by the Air Force Council in late November and then finally 

approved by General Gabriel on 7 December 1982. Subsequently, the 

orders were published activating the Twenty-Third Air Force and 2d 

AD on 1 March 1983.84

20th Special Operations Squadron

Commanders at Hurlburt were certainly aware of the efforts being 

made to realign both the combat rescue and special operations forces 

and provided numerous background papers for the staff teams. The 

wing commander, Colonel Cox, favored the creation of an air division to command all of the special operations units. At that point, 

though, the wing and 20th SOS had more immediate matters to deal 

with. As the 20th was written into more theater contingency plans, 

the nine aircraft and personnel were stretched further and further. 

However, USAF programming documents did not show any increase 

in Pave Lows. Marginal improvements were made to the engines—

allowing a slight increase in maximum gross weight—and to the TF/TA 

radars. The aircraft were also programmed to receive the AAQ-4 active 

infrared jamming system.85

On 1 August, Lt Col Wayne Corder replaced Colonel Takacs as the 

20th SOS commander. Takacs had commanded the unit through its 

time of great turbulence and was deeply respected by his Airmen. He 

would move up to be the assistant director of operations (DO) for the 

wing. One of the squadron members, then a young pilot, remembers 

three simple truths that he learned from Takacs: “(1) Get the mission 

done and do it safely; (2) Develop and use your own sense of judgment; and (3) Show me you have got it, and you will do just fine.”86
180 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

They were enduring lessons, absorbed and practiced by subsequent generations of Pave Low Airmen. In his time as the 20th SOS 

commander, Takacs played a crucial role in the development of the 

Pave Low. He proved to be the critical catalyst necessary to merge the 

technological advancements of Pave Low with the best and correct 

young crew members so necessary to utilize the aircraft to its full 

capacities—and beyond. It was he who infused them with the critical 

values of independence and unconventional thinking so that “Pave 

Low Leads” became a mantra for their community and the generations of Airmen that followed. 

At the 20th SOS, life went on as the unit adapted to its new commander. Throughout the remainder of the year, the Green Hornets 

were constantly busy participating in primarily JSOC-directed training exercises. They worked with the US Army’s TF-160, leading longrange infiltration missions and practicing aircraft-to-aircraft ground 

fuel transfer procedures. They deployed aircraft and crews to Army 

posts, Navy and Air Force bases, and remote training areas all over 

the United States, the Panama Canal Zone, and the Caribbean. Hornet crews honed their skills as they routinely flew with NVGs and 

perfected the techniques for small team infiltration and extraction.

The training regimen was hard on the aircrews, support personnel, 

and families. Lt Jim Walters (now called “Pappy” by his squadron 

mates) recalls that 

we had hundreds and hundreds of joint ops through JSOC in the early days. . . . 

When we did deploy . . . I would go home, get my bag out, start packing. My wife 

would say, “Where are you going?” I said, “I don’t know.” “When are you coming 

home?” I said, “I don’t know.” And that was the norm. It went like that for years. 

We trained to that level. We were not able to call home. We were not able to 

discuss anything with the family. So the wives would get together and joke when 

we were gone for weeks and weeks at a time. They would get together and play 

“Spin the Globe.” And they would watch CNN . . . and try to determine where 

in the world we were. And, of course, when we came home, we couldn’t tell 

them where we had been or what we had done.87

The Green Hornets worked with Army Rangers, the SFOD-Delta, US 

Navy SEALs from several different SEAL teams, and some special 

forces units from allied nations. They also trained occasionally with 

ARRS R-SOLL helicopter crews from the 41st ARRSq at McClellan and 

continued to routinely deploy aircraft and crews to northern Georgia 

for mountain training. In August the 20th deployed six HH-53Hs and 

personnel to Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, to participate in Exercise 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 181

Roughen Wood. There they received a no-notice tasking to insert a 

force of SFOD-Delta Soldiers to rescue POWs being held at a mock 

compound. Using NVGs, the crews rendezvoused with HC-130 tankers 

and then delivered the troops as AC-130s orbited overhead. The Pave 

Lows also orbited to provide fire support and then extracted the SFODDelta troops with their “recovered” POWs and departed the area. The 

troops were on the ground for only 24 minutes.88

Pave Lows training with US Army Rangers

Courtesy Wayne Mutza

This training pattern continued into the winter months with deployments to Fort Bragg, Fort Stewart, and Exercise Foal Eagle in Korea, 

where a 20th SOS crew performed a real-world SAR to recover an F-16 

pilot. The unit also expanded aircrew training in joint service shipboard operations with US Navy ships and special forces units. 

In December the wing was notified that General Gabriel had 

signed the orders to consolidate rescue and special operations. A 

wing transition team, headed by Col Ray Turczynski, a veteran of Operation Rice Bowl, was formed to work all of the issues that would 

arise with the change. The team put together a “red book,” named for 

the color of the binder, detailing the operations and training tempo of 

the unit since the beginning of preparations for Rice Bowl. It laid out, 
182 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

in great detail, the various exercises in which wing assets participated 

and explained their missions, capabilities, and limitations. The book 

subsequently saw great use as an increasing number of high-level 

personnel from Washington and the other services came to Hurlburt 

for briefings on USAF special operations. 

Because of limited space on the base, the 2d AD would move into 

the same building with the 1st SOW wing headquarters. The 1st SOW 

would lose 73 personnel billets in the realignment, with most, like the 

wing intelligence section, moving to the 2d AD. Many believed that 

the move to MAC would generate more career opportunities for personnel associated with the helicopters and C-130 aircraft than were 

available in TAC, almost exclusively focused on fighter operations. In 

January 1983, General Creech visited Hurlburt. He presented the 

wing two awards: an Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for the period 

15 May 1980–30 April 1982 and his personal Achievement Award for 

the period 1 January 1979–28 February 1982. While both recognized 

the hard work of the wing’s Airmen through an exceptionally difficult 

period, the second award was particularly special. When the general 

personally presented it, he said that 

the 1st Special Operations Wing increased the combat capability, readiness, and 

stature of the Tactical Air Forces by developing and testing new special operations techniques and procedures and by courageous participation in worldwide 

operations of great national and international significance. These achievements 

attest to the superior ability and dedication to duty displayed by personnel of the 

1st Special Operations Wing and earn them the special recognition symbolized 

by this personal award from the Commander, Tactical Air Command.89

Twenty-Third Air Force

Throughout the winter months, the MAC and TAC staffs pounded 

out the myriad programming, logistical, and personnel actions necessary 

for such a significant reorganization involving so many units. On 28 

February 1983, Lt Gen Robert Coverdale, the vice-commander of 

MAC, officiated at the activation of Twenty-Third Air Force at Scott 

AFB. Its first commander was General Mall; he was succeeded at the 

ARRS by Brig Gen Philip Prince, the first career helicopter pilot to be 

promoted to general officer. The Twenty-Third and ARRS would 

share a headquarters building located across the street from the MAC 

headquarters. Initially intended to be a command designed to con-
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 183

solidate all USAF helicopter units and missions, the Twenty-Third 

extant was much more robust and diverse.

The next day, the 2d AD was reactivated at Hurlburt Field. The 

MAC commander, Gen James Allen, officiated at this ceremony. In 

attendance were Lt Gen Robert Russ, TAC vice-commander; Lt Gen 

John Piotrowski, Ninth Air Force commander; Colonel Cox, the 2d 

AD’s first commander; and Col Hugh Hunter, the 1st SOW’s new 

commander. Colonel Takacs was the troop commander for the ceremony. After the ceremony, all of the assembled Airmen changed their 

command patch from TAC to MAC, although many were not happy 

with the move, believing that they were being reassigned to what they 

saw as a “support” command as opposed to the “combat” command 

they were leaving. To more properly “celebrate” the moment, though, 

SSgt John Sprouse remembered that a bunch of the 20th guys got together at the Hurlburt Officers’ Club down on the Gulf Waterway. 

There, they took their TAC patches and put them on a small boat 

which—à la a Viking funeral—was then lit on fire and cast out into 

the waters.90

As General Mall began working with his staff to divide their efforts 

from those of the residual ARRS staff, challenges and issues rose to 

the fore. Twenty-Third Air Force would now lead the fight for the 

new HH-60 helicopter for use as a rescue platform and also now as a 

possible SOF asset. Additionally, Mall wanted to grow Twenty-Third 

Air Force to parity with the long-serving Twenty-First and TwentySecond Air Forces in MAC and began lobbying for the transfer of the 

375th Aeromedical Airlift Wing (AAW) at Scott and the 1606th Air 

Base Wing (ABW) at Kirtland to the Twenty-Third.91

Congressional Interest

In April 1983, Congress began to show interest in the changes taking 

place in the rescue community. The Readiness Subcommittee of the 

House Armed Services Committee, chaired by Cong. Dan Daniel 

from Virginia, held hearings on rescue forces, specifically to begin 

considering the possible need to create some form of overarching 

DOD rescue organization. General Mall testified at the hearing. He 

provided a short history of USAF rescue, discussed the intent of the 

new Twenty-Third Air Force—specifically explaining its dual tasking 

of combat rescue and SOF support—and detailed current equipment 
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shortfalls and limitations. He highlighted the transfer of the nine 

HH-53Hs to SOF and suggested that the modification of more H-53s 

to the HH-53H configuration would not be cost effective. General 

Mall also pointed out that MAC had already received 12 UH-60A 

Black Hawks, but future plans rested on procuring the much more 

technologically advanced HH-60D Night Hawk for all-weather, day/

night combat rescue. He also mentioned the developmental work being 

done with the joint vertical-lift aircraft (JVX), a new tilt-rotor concept, as a longer-range asset for rescue. The subcommittee members took 

his testimony and asked few follow-up questions; no substantial 

action resulted from the hearing. However, the budding congressional 

interest was a harbinger for future actions, and the MAC staff was 

already aware of political discussion concerning the reorganization 

of SOF assets into some sort of larger DOD-wide special operating 

agency for special forces or even a new US unified command for 

special operations.92

Six months later, General Mall reviewed with his staff the efficacy 

of the structure of Twenty-Third Air Force. Realizing that the staffs at 

the Twenty-Third, ARRS, and 2d AD did not have enough authorized 

billets to properly support all required duties, he considered several 

options for realignment or consolidation before finally deciding to 

reassign the 39th ARRW, the 41st RWRW, and the 1550th ATTW, 

currently reporting to the ARRS, to now report directly to TwentyThird Air Force. MAC approved his plans and also authorized the 

reassignment of the 375th AAW and the 1606th ABW to the TwentyThird Air Force. 

The movement of the 39th, 41st, and 1550th Wings to the TwentyThird effectively changed the ARRS from a functioning headquarters 

into a coordinating agency for all rescue activity in the contiguous 

United States, ending its 35-year service as “the” rescue command 

during which its units had saved over 20,000 lives worldwide. The 

ARRS commander, General Prince, was offered the position of vicecommander of Twenty-Third Air Force, but he declined and retired. 

It was a somewhat ignominious end for the first helicopter general 

officer, a fact not lost on the young helicopter pilots of the TwentyThird who had been told they would have more promotion potential 

in MAC.93

Concurrent with all of the realignments, MAC established the 

Special Missions Operational Test and Evaluation Center (SMOTEC) 

at Hurlburt Field. This center would combine OT&E functions of the 
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1550th ATTW at Kirtland and the 1st SOW into one organization for 

both combat rescue and special operations functions. The 2d AD 

commander would also serve as the SMOTEC commander and report 

directly to the MAC commander on all SMOTEC matters. During the 

year, the SMOTEC would conduct testing on NVG use by rescue and 

special operations crews, aircraft compatibility tests for new survival 

radios, and the use of several types of machine guns aboard various 

helicopters.94

As the units were reorganized, Twenty-Third Air Force finalized 

its mission statement:

The mission of the Twenty-third Air Force is to exercise command over assigned 

forces worldwide, consisting of the following:

a. Two operational wings responsible for combat rescue, locating and recovering downed Airmen on a global basis, . . . 

b. One training wing responsible for training USAF helicopter [crews] . . . 

c. One air base wing . . . 

d. The Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service . . . 

e. The Second Air Division responsible for providing a focal point for all Air 

Force special operations matters. In this role, the Second Air Division develops, 

plans, and maintains the capability for deployment of combat ready special 

operations forces for use in unconventional warfare, counterterrorist operations, collective security, and other operations in any area of the world.95

On 30 June 1983, General Ryan succeeded General Allen as the MAC 

commander. Well-versed in all of the current issues, he directed his staff 

to maintain its sharp focus on the current MAC special operations forces 

and plans for enhancement to satisfy projected requirements. 

Mr. Noel Koch, the principal deputy assistant SecDef for international security affairs (PDASD-ISA), was another tireless advocate 

for building up special operations forces. Through magazine articles, 

he continuously advocated for more money, personnel, and hardware 

for special operations forces. He also played a role in setting up another outgrowth of the Holloway report, a committee of senior retired 

military leaders called the Special Operations Policy Advisory Group 

(SOPAG). Its charter members were Admiral Holloway; Lt Gen Sam 

Wilson, USA; Brig Gen Donald Blackburn, USA; General Manor; Lt 

Gen James Ahmann, USAF; and General Secord. All were highly respected in their fields and strongly supportive of revitalized SOF 
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forces. Koch was able to set up the SOPAG so that it could report 

directly to the SecDef.96

On 3 October, the SecDef reiterated high-level interest in this issue 

through a letter written by the Honorable Paul Thayer, deputy SecDef, 

which directed several actions to insure the revitalization of special 

operations forces “as a matter of national urgency.” He sent his letter 

to the top management of the OSD, the JCS, and the secretaries of the 

military departments and outlined a four-point program for special 

operations forces:

1. Necessary force structure expansion and enhancements in command and 

control, personnel policy, training, and equipment will be implemented as 

rapidly as possible and will be fully implemented not later than the end of 

Fiscal Year 1990 (emphasis in original). 

2. Collateral activities will be enhanced as necessary to provide fully effective 

support to the planning and execution of special operations.

3. Each service will assign SOF and related activities sufficient resource allocation priority and will establish appropriate intensive management mechanisms to ensure that these objectives are met.

4. Resource decisions for current and programmed SOF, once made at the 

Secretary of Defense level, will not be changed or reduced by OSD or Service staffs unless coordinated by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense (International Security Affairs) and the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller) and approved by the Secretary of Defense.97

In response to the tasking, now known as the Thayer memorandum, HQ USAF directed MAC to codevelop with the Air Staff a draft 

special operations master plan for submission to the PDASD-ISA by 

1 March 1984. It would include information on force structure, associated command and control, personnel, training, equipment, 

maintenance, and logistics requirements through the year 2000. Both 

staffs got to work on this critical project.98

At the end of 1983, MAC possessed 30 C/HH-53s of several variations, as follows: 1550th ATTW (Kirtland)—two CHs and five Hs; 

20th SOS (Hurlburt Field)—nine HH-53Hs; 67th ARRSq (Woodbridge)—five HHs; and 41st ARRSq (McClellan AFB)—nine HHs. 

The USAF had 16 additional C/HH-53s: 6594th Test Group (Hawaii)—

six HHs; 6514th Test Squadron (Utah)—two HHs; and 601st Tactical 

Air Support Group (Germany)—eight CHs.99
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2d Air Division

With the reactivation of the 2d AD, the USAF finally had its special operations forces under one major command. MAC was a truly 

diversified command with a global outlook and mission. The movement was also quite timely. While the Soviet bloc represented the 

most dangerous global threat, active conflict with it was unlikely. 

Conversely, low-level conflict or terrorism appeared to be the norm 

for the foreseeable future, and special operations forces could be 

more effective than conventional forces in such scenarios. Noted one 

early 2d AD study, “The overriding concerns of special operations are 

operational security, detailed intelligence, extensive planning, and 

precise execution.” To properly execute their missions, special forces 

ground teams needed to be moved into possible hostile territory in all 

weather conditions, day and night, to accomplish their missions.100

The 2d AD and 1st SOW commanders worked through the challenges of the new command arrangement, facilitated greatly by the 

fact that both headquarters were in the same building. The Wing Special Planning Division, which worked closely with the JSOC, was reassigned to the 2d AD as their Special Plans Division, with the same 

responsibilities. The 20th SOS continued to train. First-generation 

Pave Low crew members were now being rotated to other assignments, and new Airmen, such as Capt Dave Harris (a USMC transfer) and Maj Horace “Bo” Johnson, were arriving. While all were 

H-53 qualified, they had to get their Pave Low qualification at Hurlburt, initially in the Central Training Flight and then in the 20th. 

Squadron detachments were constantly being dispatched to participate in joint training with JSOC and various special forces elements 

in CONUS exercises such as Solid Shield, Casino Dancer, and Robin 

Sage. On 7 June, squadron personnel again provided a comprehensive briefing and aerial demonstration to Koch, who had developed a 

keen interest in the Pave Low and what the 20th crews could do with 

it. On many occasions, MAC R-SOLL HH-53s would also participate 

and be led by the Pave Lows. Two Pave Lows, crews, and support 

personnel deployed to Europe for the 1983 version of the Flintlock 

series of exercises in Europe. The 20th was now integrated into European, Pacific, and RDJTF war plans, and evolving taskings indicated 

that eight, 12, and eight Pave Lows, respectively, were needed to fulfill 

anticipated needs. 
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Such a demand dictated a constant high ops tempo for the 20th as 

the sole Pave Low unit. Throughout this period, too, the 20th was 

directed to support counterdrug operations with its UH-1N aircraft 

and crews as part of Operation BAT (Bahamas, Antilles, and Turks). 

No Pave Lows were involved; however, for a period expected to be 

only a few months, the squadron leadership had to direct and supervise the unit efforts, which involved working with US Coast Guard 

and local police units in the BAT region of the Caribbean to interdict 

the flow of drugs. This “temporary” program would continue for several years, adding to the overall unit workload.101

Joint Special Operations Agency 

In an effort to better organize and coordinate the actions of various 

special operations components in the disparate commands, the JCS 

Operations Directorate (J-3) Special Operations Division (SOD) suggested in October 1983 that each unified command have a designated 

special operations command (SOC). Within a few months, the various 

commands had redesignated their special operations and unconventional task forces as Special Operations Component, US European 

Command (SOCEUR), Special Operations Component, US Pacific 

Command (SOCPAC), and Special Operations Component, US 

Central Command (SOCCENT), for example, thus eliminating a 

seeming maze of acronyms, such as JUWTFEUR, JUWTFPAC, and 

SOTFE. At the same time, in an effort to finally answer the Holloway 

recommendation to form a high-level agency to provide oversight of 

special operations activities and a standing planning cell, and with 

the Thayer memorandum now working its way through the Pentagon, the JCS created the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA). Effective 1 January 1984, it would absorb the SOD and add additional personnel. Its mission was to advise the JCS on “all matters pertaining to 

special operations and the military activities related thereto, including national strategy, planning, programming, budgeting, resource 

development and allocation, joint doctrinal guidance, exercise and 

readiness evaluation, and employment of forces.”102

The SOPAG recommended to the SecDef that the director be a 

three-star officer. Secretary Weinberger decided that the director 

would be rated at only two stars. The JSOA would have a field grade 

officer representative in each unified command. That representative 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 189

would be knowledgeable of all plans under which special forces were 

tasked in that command. The first JSOA director was Maj Gen Douglas 

Rice, USMC. This organization would prove to be weak and ineffectual because it had no significant support from the individual services. However, it was the first general officer position on the JCS 

since the Vietnam War that was designed to provide advocacy for 

special operations to that body.103

20th Special Operations Squadron

Regardless of the changes taking place at higher levels, the 20th 

continued to train and participate in an endless series of exercises, 

static displays, and briefings for visitors and dignitaries interested in 

its aircraft and capabilities. In September, one Pave Low and crew 

were dispatched to Eglin AFB to participate in Operation Granite 

Star II. This was a test program designed to validate the use of new 

equipment on several SOF aircraft to provide countermeasures for 

infrared-guided antiaircraft missiles. The results were classified but 

were very positive for the aircrews, since these types of missiles were 

a serious threat to aircraft such as the Pave Low. During this period, 

too, the squadron deployed several crews to Georgia to work with US 

Army special forces teams and to conduct mountain training. For the 

period July–December 1983, the 20th SOS logged 527 HH-53 sorties 

for 1,278.3 flight hours.104

Operation Urgent Fury

From 20 October until early November, the 2d AD and 1st SOW 

were heavily involved in Operation Urgent Fury, an effort designed to 

protect and evacuate Americans, mostly students at a medical school, on 

the island of Grenada in the southeast Caribbean and to prevent a communist takeover of its government. The 1st SOW provided AC-130s, 

MC-130s, and CCTs to the effort as part of JTF 120, which invaded 

the island in the early morning hours of 25 October. The 20th SOS 

was initially alerted to supply eight HH-53s for the operation to insert a Ranger force to seize the large airfield at Point Salines, but it 

was subsequently removed from the plan when an airborne assault 

was judged to be the quicker option. The assault took place but was 

extremely dangerous and chaotic. Subsequent helicopter special op-
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erations missions were conducted by an aviation element from US 

Army special operations aviation, now organized as the 160th Aviation Battalion but referred to as TF-160. Combat operations lasted for 

only three days until all objectives were achieved. Most 1st SOW aircraft and crews had returned to Hurlburt by early November, with 

two AC-130s remaining over the island until late November. Ultimately, more than 600 American students and 82 endangered foreign 

citizens were evacuated from the island, and the communist putsch 

was prevented. However, the US military noted many lessons learned, 

primarily focusing on the challenges of joint and combined operations; the difficulty of integrating special forces operations with conventional operations; problems with intelligence planning, communications, and command and control; and the critical need for tactical 

mobility capable of night and all-weather operations.105

Action on Many Fronts

As 1983 was drawing to a close, more and more political leaders 

were paying attention to the travails of the special forces, especially 

Congressman Daniel, a firm believer in the need for SOF revitalization. Working in his office was a key aide named Ted Lunger, who had 

served in the US Army special forces and shared his passion. The two 

were a relentless force. Daniel had recently led a successful effort to 

create the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) as a unified command to watch over key national interests in the Middle East region. 

He was now ready to engage on the SOF issue. Lunger had developed 

extensive contacts throughout the SOF community and Pentagon, 

such as Noel Koch and his assistant, Lynn Rylander. He had also developed connections with a cabal of young military officers furtively 

called the “SOF Mafia” and mostly from the 1st SOW: Lt Col Lee 

Hess, Lt Col T. J. Doherty, Maj Gary Weikel, Maj Greg Colvin, and 

Maj Gary Heckman. All were crew members on the various 1st SOW 

aircraft. Several had left Hurlburt in the fall of 1983 to attend the 

Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, and had then reported for duty in various divisions of the Air Staff in the Pentagon. 

At about the same time, Capt Ed Reed left the 20th and proceeded 

to Headquarters MAC to serve as a systems program manager for 

SOFs and, in particular, to work modification issues for the HH-53s. 

He was the first Pave Low pilot assigned to the headquarters and was 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 191

ensconced in a small office with Maj Donny Wurster. Commissioned 

out of the Air Force Academy in 1973, Wurster was an experienced 

H-3 rescue pilot with operational tours in Korea and Alaska and instructor/evaluator duty at Kirtland AFB. He was now on the MAC 

staff as the weapons systems program manager for the HH-60 program. The two forged a strong friendship, working partnership, and 

common vision for future USAF helicopters for both SOF and combat rescue. Over the next several years, this relationship would have a 

direct and positive impact upon the fortunes of the Pave Low force in 

many different ways.106

To replace the departing Pave Low flyers, the 20th SOS received 

four new pilots: Captains Bob Maldonado, Corby Martin, Lyle Koenig, and Randy O’Boyle. Martin was arriving from duty with the 67th 

ARRSq at RAF Bentwaters. He had graduated from the Air Force 

Academy in 1980 and had gone directly to helicopter flight school. 

Subsequently, he went through the H-53 transition at Kirtland before 

going to England. There, he found it challenging to work his way into 

a squadron full of highly qualified SEA veterans. However, he was 

able to slowly build up his flying time and qualify as an aircraft commander before departing for Hurlburt at the end of 1983.

Arriving at the 20th in early 1984, Martin liked what he found. The 

unit was training hard, and the first guys he met—Jack Kelly and Tom 

Aldrich—were tactically oriented and focused on supporting the 

JSOC. This was much different than the attitude at Bentwaters. Here 

at Hurlburt, the tone was, “We are going to war tomorrow. We need 

to be ready. We need to train the way we fight.” Martin believed that 

his squadron was more ready to go to war than any he had ever seen. 

He started out on night sorties, where he learned to use NVGs. However, it was several months before Martin could start his Pave Low 

qualifications. Subsequently, he went on TDYs to Asheville, North 

Carolina, initially for mountain training, and then to the Philippines 

for jungle training.107

Martin was already fully experienced on the H-53, and he found 

the tactical mission to be interesting and challenging. However, mastering the new technology—the computers, INS, moving map display, FLIR, and new secure radios—took some work. Martin also immediately saw that the flight engineer was absolutely integral to flying 

the aircraft; he was constantly updating the navigational gear while 

the pilots focused on aircraft control. Martin recalled that “you could 

load only eight waypoints. You’d load eight more in store points. If 
192 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

you had a 35-point waypoint list, you were continually updating and 

moving. The guy who did that was the guy sitting in the center seat 

because the pilots were trying to keep the ‘shiny side down,’ so to 

speak. So he did a lot of work, a lot of manual inputs.”108 He was also 

keenly aware that it took all six aboard to properly handle the machine and that the human dynamics of crew integration were critical 

to safe operations. Martin pointed out that in learning to fly the aircraft, “we took great pains to make sure that everybody was in the 

decision process. It wasn’t always democratic, but at least everyone 

had a shot, and you knew what was going to happen.”109 Finally completing his training in August, Martin then joined the line as a fully 

qualified Pave Low aircraft commander. 

As Captain Martin was mastering the intricacies of the HH-53H, 

Weikel was settling in at the Pentagon and was ready to apply his 

special operations–derived “assault mentality.” Almost immediately 

he found common ground with others so committed. Collectively, 

the civilian staffers and the young officers from Hurlburt believed 

that the United States needed to build an effective special operations 

capability to deal with the evolving world where lower-intensity conflict was much more probable than high-intensity theater war. They 

sensed that acquisition, especially of aircraft, was essential and that 

there was some interest in Congress to recommend funding more 

Pave Lows, which various war game analyses had shown were needed. 

However, funding for special operations forces had always been cyclical, 

and the great challenge was to find a way to make it steady and predictable. The larger problem was to raise the priority of SOFs in the 

resource decisions that the services and OSD were making. SOF advocates emphasized the “jointness” issues demonstrated in Rice Bowl 

and, more recently, Urgent Fury. 

SOF proponents had also closely watched the USAF’s recent moves 

to consolidate its special operations units under 2d AD. The 2d AD 

appeared to be getting lost in the larger Twenty-Third Air Force, 

which, although initially justified as an effort to reprioritize and focus 

special operations, now seemed more of an effort to form another 

globally focused multifunctional command.110 This observation was 

reinforced when, on 1 January 1984, the 375th AAW was assigned to 

the Twenty-Third Air Force. Subsequently, the missions of aeromedical 

evacuation and operational support airlift were added to the other 

responsibilities of the command, further diluting the importance of 

the SOFs and their use. 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 193

Two months later, the MAC, Twenty-Third Air Force, and 2d AD 

finished their version of the Special Operations Forces Master Plan as 

required by the Thayer memorandum. It was a milestone in the history of USAF SOF force structure development because it was the 

first time that the USAF held a concise document that attempted to 

consolidate all requirements with a plan for their accomplishment. 

Several hundred pages in length, the plan laid out the role of special 

forces in current USAF doctrine. It defined how they could support 

national policy and strategic and tactical objectives in the FY 1986–

2000 time frame across the spectrum of conflict, within existing acquisition programs and realistic fiscal constraints. Its special operations forces would provide JSOTFs with rapid response and quick 

employment of long-range, low-level penetration of hostile airspace 

to conduct and support offensive operations. Based upon analysis of 

the projected scenarios and evolving technology, the plan presented 

suggestions for command and control, communications improvements, intelligence needs and dissemination, significant aircraft increases, and the procurement of third-generation NVGs for SOF 

crews. In reference to Pave Low, unclassified portions of the plan projected that the new HH-60D helicopter would be procured to serve 

the night, all-weather requirements and that the new JVX would be 

the eventual replacement for the HH-53H.111

In the interim, 36 HH-53s were required to meet contingency 

taskings for the combatant theaters. HH-53B/C aircraft equipped for 

the R-SOLL missions could be used to meet this requirement, as 

could the new HH-60Ds. However, the HH-60s could not replace on 

a one-per-one basis. Additionally, the HH-53s in the 6594th Test 

Group and the CH-53Cs in the 601st TASS in Germany could be 

modified to the R-SOLL configuration for the mission, as well as the 

HH-53s at the 41st ARRSq at McClellan. Under the plan, the R-SOLL 

and R-SOLL-capable H-53s were now considered SOF augmenting 

or collateral air assets. All H-53s should also go through a service life 

extension program (SLEP) and receive numerous upgrades. However, there were no recommendations that any more aircraft be modified to the Pave Low standard.112

MAC submitted the master plan to the Air Staff Board, which approved it on 24 February 1984, with one office stating that “the Air 

Force, for the first time, has a long-range plan to improve and then 

maintain combat capability to conduct and support joint special operations.” General Gabriel signed it, as did the secretary of the Air 
194 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

Force, the Honorable Verne Orr, on 4 April, although both noted that 

funding limitations and research and development lead times would 

prevent the USAF from achieving the FY 90 objectives laid out in the 

Thayer memorandum.113

Programming documents emanating from MAC and TwentyThird Air Force indicated that, based upon the master plan, 18 more 

H-53s could be modified so that they were R-SOLL capable and able 

to perform most missions, except those that absolutely required the 

TF/TA capabilities of the Pave Lows. The six HH-53s from the 6594th 

Test Group would be used to form a special operations squadron in 

the Pacific. Additionally, the Pave Lows and augmentation aircraft 

were programmed to receive ALR-69 radar warning receivers, flare/

chaff dispenser systems, secure voice / jam-resistant radios, satellite 

communications (SATCOM) capabilities, and improved cockpit 

lighting compatible with the new third-generation NVGs. The SLEP 

program would also be funded to allow the helicopters to operate 

until the year 2000.

Unfortunately, though, as the master plan was being approved, the 

Air Force Council reduced the HH-60D project buy from 155 to 99 

aircraft. These were the only near-term aircraft acquisitions for rescue and possibly special operations use.114

Initiative 17

Two months later, another action took place that also seemed to 

indicate a lack of interest on the part of USAF leadership concerning 

its rotary-wing SOF forces. It originated from an effort to resolve or 

at least clarify a wide range of joint issues that had beguiled both the 

US Army and Air Force since the latter’s separation from the senior 

service in 1947 and that had been examined in previous joint working groups and initiatives. The two current Army and Air Force 

chiefs, Gen John Wickham and Gen Charles Gabriel, respectively, 

initiated another attempt to increase cooperation for battlefield synchronization and integration by fabricating a new method of mutual 

force development, including cross-service budgeting and programming procedures. Increasing cohesion between the two services was 

also receiving renewed emphasis because the US Army, moving forward from its post-Vietnam malaise, had recently rewritten its warfighting doctrine and adopted the concept of “AirLand Battle” to 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 195

meet and defeat the forces of the Warsaw Pact, should they ever attempt to invade and conquer Western Europe. 

The two chiefs were old friends from their time together at West 

Point and, working through their respective deputies for plans and 

operations, in April 1983 had formed ad hoc groups within their service staffs. Bypassing formal staff processes, these groups shaped 31 

initiatives to address some of the most contentious issues. The USAF 

team was drawn primarily from the Checkmate office of the Air Staff, 

led by Col Joseph Redden. It had no SOF members and did not coordinate its findings pertaining to special operations forces with the 2d 

AD, Twenty-Third Air Force, or even MAC. The formal memorandum of agreement between the two chiefs was signed on 22 May 

1984, culminating what was really a decade-long effort to wrestle 

with these contentious issues about doctrine, employment of forces, 

and a wide range of challenges concerning the joint employment of 

combat power. Initiative 17 addressed SOF rotary-wing assets, stating that “the Air Force will transfer the responsibility for providing 

rotary-wing lift support for SOF to the Army. A detailed implementation plan will be jointly developed.”115

The intent of the initiative was somewhat unclear. What did “responsibility” mean? Did it mean that the USAF would transfer the 

nine HH-53Hs, and possibly nine UH-1Ns and six CH-3s in a USAF 

Reserve unit, to the Army? To some US Army and even USAF officers, 

it seemed to make sense to give them to the Army, which operated 

thousands of helicopters and had just formed an aviation branch to 

manage its officers as a recognized career combat specialty. In fact, 

though, Initiative 17 represented a mortal threat to the USAF Pave 

Low community and had to be stopped.

Initially, the MAC staff assumed that this initiative merely involved 

the transfer of the mission and would not require the reassignment of 

aircraft, equipment, or personnel to the Army and that all planned 

helicopter enhancements and crew training would continue. It also 

estimated that the SOF master plan would require only minimal 

changes and that the Pave Lows, UH-1Ns, and CH-3s could be moved 

over to combat rescue duties under the Twenty-Third Air Force. 

However, strong doctrinal issues were at stake in the mission transfer. 

The long-range movement of forces had traditionally been a USAF 

function, and any mission transfer would allow the Army to argue 

that it would then need the aircraft and force structure to do it. The 

Army could argue that it should receive the Pave Low aircraft and 
196 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

possibly even the JVX when it entered the fleet. MAC’s position was 

that in the mission transfer, no collateral transfer of assets, people, 

force structure, or funding would occur.116

Congressman Daniel was briefed on Initiative 17 and did not like 

what was happening. He called for a hearing before his Readiness 

Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, which also 

included Florida congressman Earl Hutto, Democrat and chairman 

of the subordinate and newly formed Special Operations Panel. This 

assignment was quite a plum opportunity for the three-term congressman. Several Army and Navy special operations facilities were 

in his congressional district, as was Hurlburt Field. However, Hutto 

was already well familiar with the Pave Low aircraft because he was 

involved with the initial modification of the aircraft at NAS Pensacola 

in the late 1970s. He had every incentive to strongly support and protect the aircraft and the 20th SOS, in particular.117

Ted Lunger was still working in Daniel’s office and through routine 

staff processes had gotten to know Maj Gary Weikel, who started 

feeding him back-channel data showing that Army aviation did not 

have the expertise to take over, maintain, and operate Pave Low. 

Weikel recalled his days of flying with the Army special operations 

crews. He felt that they did not have the necessary equipment and 

training to do the tasks assigned. He was aware that in the previous 

year, they had suffered four serious accidents that killed 22 Soldiers. 

He also knew that in reviewing this entire program, the Army leadership had come very close to canceling the whole endeavor outright. 

Weikel shared that information with the congressional staffers.118

On 6 September 1984, Noel Koch, the PDASD-ISA, testified about 

the progress being made in special operations readiness. He was generally optimistic about recent developments but also expressed strong 

concern about the transfer of the helicopter mission to the Army. 

Koch also said, “The memorandum of understanding basically says 

the Army is going to take over the mission. [But] if the Air Force divested itself of the [SOF aviation] mission, the Army had no ability to 

pick up the mission.” Koch and several other “SOF Mafia” cohorts 

argued to all who would listen that the Army just did not have the 

doctrine, training base, and logistical support necessary to do the 

type of flying that the Pave Low crews routinely did and that it would 

take a very long time to develop it. In a subsequent committee meeting, General Secord, a sitting member of the SOPAG, testified that if 

the Army were to attempt to create such a long-range capability from 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 197

scratch, it would cost “well over $1 billion” for the Army to separately 

match the Air Force current long-range helicopter capability. The 

Army requested that it be given the Pave Low aircraft and support 

equipment as well as the services of an Air Force training program to 

instruct its initial cadre of crews and maintenance personnel—an estimated 50 and 370 personnel, respectively. General Gabriel agreed to 

the request, stating that he wanted the transfer of the mission and the 

nine HH-53H Pave Low III aircraft and support equipment, but not 

squadron personnel, to be complete by July 1986, 22 months hence.119

At Headquarters MAC, staffers were shocked and upset about the 

possible transfer of the Pave Lows to the Army. Still new to MAC and 

staff duties, Captain Reed decided that he would take some action. 

He did some deep research and determined that the Air Staff had offered the ARRS funding for 28 more Pave Lows in 1979. However, the 

ARRS commander, General Saunders, wanted instead to use the 

money to further enhance the selection and production of the H-X, 

which eventually became the HH-60. Reed realized that offers of 

funding were opportunities best met by preparation. He determined 

to use his staff position to influence the Pave Low and drafted MAC 

Statement of Operational Need (MAC SON) 11-84, defining a need 

for a fleet of upgraded Pave Low aircraft. 

The document called for a SLEP for all USAF H-53s to extend 

their service life to FY 2000, an upgrade of additional HH-53B/Cs to 

an improved Pave Low configuration—Pave Low III (Enhanced), 

modifications to enable shipboard capability, increased gross weight 

capability, enhanced defensive and weapons systems, improved 

secure communications and Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation systems, and better reliability and maintainability for all aircraft systems. The SON was coordinated through the staff and forwarded to the Air Staff for approval and action. However, the Air 

Staff never approved it, citing limited funding for modifications in 

the current fiscal year, conflicts with Initiative 17, and potential impacts on the projected acquisition of the new HH-60s. Regardless, 

Reed had created a document that was widely distributed and could 

easily be used to precipitate the modification of more H-53s if, by any 

chance, some funding source should avail itself.120

Other voices spoke out against the transfer of the aircraft to the 

Army. All of the SOPAG members were aware of the recent Army 

special operations helicopter accidents and, in unison, addressed a 

strongly worded letter to the SecDef that read, “We do not believe the 
198 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

country’s best interests are served by this agreement [Initiative 17] 

and recommend that it be reconsidered. . . . The Air Force had been 

considering converting a large number of existing HH-53s to fully 

capable Pave Lows at a cost of about $200M. We believe it would be 

far more costly to start from scratch in the Army rather than build on 

the existing capability in this manner.” One SOPAG member, Lt Gen 

Sam Wilson, US Army, dissented from the group opinion and submitted his own. It was more strident and said, “The Army is not capable of supporting long-range Special Operations missions with the 

H-60 BLACKHAWK while the Air Force has amply demonstrated in 

numerous joint exercises that it can do the job effectively with the 

HH-53 Pave Low. End of argument.”121

At the conclusion of the hearings before his committee, Congressman Daniel, on 4 October, wrote to Deputy Secretary William Taft, 

expressing serious concerns about the transfer and suggesting a 

short-range/long-range split between the Air Force and Army. Taft 

responded 13 days later, saying that he approved in concept the proposal to transfer both the responsibility for the mission and the Pave 

Low helicopters from the Air Force to the Army. Daniel replied to 

him on 30 October, with copies to Generals Gabriel and Wickham, 

saying he still felt that the transfer was not sensible and considered 

neither the input from the unified commands nor the impact on 

combat rescue, critical contingency response, and direct support of 

Navy SOFs. It was evident that a huge fight was brewing between Air 

Force leadership and Congress, which represented a particularly difficult situation for both the MAC and Twenty-Third Air Force commanders since they had to satisfy both to do their jobs.122

First and Second Losses

On 17 October 1984, the Pave Low community suffered a terrible 

loss when HH-53H #73-1647 crashed while on a mission as part of 

Exercise Cope Thunder in the Philippines. It was the second aircraft 

of a flight of two Pave Lows led by Maj Mark Schibler. He was flying 

with Capt John Spier as his copilot, SMSgt John Selfridge and SSgt 

Greg Vanhyning as his engineers, and SSgt John Sprouse and MSgt 

Ron Dorazio as his gunners. On a night mission, the two aircraft encountered a thunderstorm while flying through mountains. Schibler 

was able to climb above the terrain. In the confusion, the second air-
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 199

craft crew became spatially disoriented and flew into a mountain, 

completely destroying the aircraft and killing the crew of six Airmen. 

John Sprouse was the left scanner and watched the second aircraft hit 

the mountain. The squadron commander, Lt Col Lou Grant, met 

Schibler and his crew when they landed. Sprouse gave Grant his eyewitness report, which he had to repeat later for the accident investigation board. The loss devastated the unit.123

Also in October, MAC commander Gen Thomas Ryan visited 

Hurlburt Field to talk to the troops and personally tell them of the 

pending reassignment of the Pave Lows to the Army. Coming as it 

did just a few days after the loss of the crew in the Philippines, it was 

a second blow to the morale of the Airmen of the 20th. The 450 troops 

affected by such a move began to wonder what this meant to them 

and their careers. Ryan had several staff specialists to begin working 

the myriad personnel, logistical, and operational details. Many Pave 

Low personnel discovered that they would be frozen at Hurlburt for 

an indeterminate period as the base soon began to train the Army 

crews and support personnel. The maintenance specialists were flabbergasted that the Army could believe that it could maintain the Pave 

Low. It was full of complex systems for which the Army did not have 

trained specialists or even designated military operational specialties.124 As one 2d AD staff officer lamented, “The transfer of the Pave 

Low helicopters to the Army would be like giving the space shuttle to 

Chad.”125 One unit member, MSgt Bill Halcomb, had just bought a 

house in Fort Walton Beach. In a fit of pique, he took the leftover “for 

sale” sign from his front yard and placed it in front of the squadron 

building. The troops loved it; however, a “senior wing officer” directed that it be removed.126

Returning to Scott AFB, General Ryan directed his staff to develop 

a plan to make the transfer move as smoothly as possible so that there 

was no loss of national capability during the process. All recognized 

that this would generate a huge training requirement for both Kirtland AFB and Hurlburt Field because the Army had no capability to 

train its own personnel on the Pave Low system. 

Congressman Hutto was briefed on the visit and had a different 

opinion. He stated, “I don’t feel that moving the rotary lift mission 

from the Air Force to the Army would be in the best interests of either 

service. We, in the Armed Services committee, are expressing in the 

strongest terms possible, our disagreement. The services have considerable latitude in what they do, but Congress funds the military and 
200 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

Congress turns to our Committee for guidance. It is incumbent on us 

to see that the right thing’s done, and the Defense Department hasn’t 

satisfied us that this is right.”127

Hutto was also hearing from his constituents on the proposed 

transfer. Gwen Grant, Colonel Grant’s wife, wrote to the congressman. Citing the tragic loss of the crew in the Philippines and the parallel bad news of the Pave Low fleet, she penned on 30 October:

The official announcement [of the crash] was difficult to deal with and split our 

concerns at a time when our only priority should have been honoring our dead 

and taking care of their families as best we could. They deserved better. . . .

This squadron has the most professional, dedicated, and highly trained men 

in the helicopter world. These men and their families have sacrificed for a mission we all believe in. . . . The 20th family endures because we are all dedicated 

to the mission. . . . 

I hope in some way this letter will encourage you to continue your fight not only 

for this squadron, but for what I believe is for the best interest of this country. 

In responding, Hutto wrote, “Your comments are very helpful—

extremely supportive of my arguments for requesting the Army and 

the Air Force to reconsider their proposal. Let me assure you that I 

will do all I can to reverse this decision.”128

On 14 November 1984, the 20th SOS experienced a second loss of 

an HH-53H when aircraft 73-1650 crashed on a JSOC day-training 

mission at Fort Bragg. The aircraft, commanded by Capt Jack Kelly, 

was conducting an in-flight refueling when the tail rotor gearbox 

separated from the aircraft. The copilot, Capt Dave Harris, was flying 

the aircraft when the failure happened. The aircraft reacted violently 

as the tail gunner, TSgt Jerry Price, said on the intercom, “Our tail 

rotor just fell off!” Kelly took the controls and autorotated the aircraft 

toward a remote clear area. While the tradeoff of rotor revolutions 

per minute for energy to glide to the clearing insured that the aircraft 

would not come down on trees, it would, however, land extremely 

hard. In fact, although the touchdown destroyed the aircraft, it probably saved lives. 

All seven crew members and eight Army Rangers on board were 

wounded, three seriously, including Lt Col Bo Johnson, who was also 

aboard. All would fly again, except for Kelly. His grievous wounds, 

including a broken back, would keep the flight surgeons from ever 

recertifying him for flying duties. Instead, he would face a series of 

operations and long rehabilitation. He would be highly rewarded and 
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 201

decorated for his quick actions that saved the lives of the crew and 

passengers. These included a Distinguished Flying Cross and the 

Kolligian Award for 1984. However, they were dismal consolation for 

a flying career too soon ended.129

The next night General Gabriel, Congressman Daniel, and several 

staff members, including Ted Lunger, arrived at Fort Bragg for Pave 

Low rides and briefings. That evening, Daniel called all the 20th Airmen together in the hangar and gave them a pep talk. Essentially he 

said, “Your problem is that you have never had a daddy rabbit. Now, 

I am your daddy rabbit.” He left, resolved to lend the full weight of his 

key legislative position to Pave Low. His support was timely and critical 

because Pave Low was at its absolute nadir. His words were exactly 

what the men standing before him needed to hear. Those officers and 

Airmen had become the initial cadre that brought Pave Low to its 

tactical fruition. They were supporters—zealots—who devoutly believed in it and were not about to give up the fight.130

Notes

1. Reiter, “Packing Rescue for Special Delivery,” 18–23; and Connelly, interview. 

2. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1980, vol. 1, 71–77.

3. Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs (ASD/PA), Wright-Patterson 

AFB, OH, news release, Public Affairs Memorandum (PAM) 80-126, n.d. 

4. Schibler, interview.

5. History of 1550th ATTW, 1 Jan–30 June 1980, vol. 1, xi; “Commander’s Assessment, 23 May 1980,” ibid., vol. 2, doc. 6; Connelly, interview; and Kyle, Guts to Try, 154.

6. Lenahan, Crippled Eagle, 39. Gast had recently served for two years as chief, 

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Iran, and was currently on the TAC staff. He 

was slated for promotion to lieutenant general and assignment to the position of 

vice-commander of TAC effective 1 March 1980. For this operation, he provided his 

knowledge of Iran and also supervised the training program for the helicopter crews. 

Koskinas, Black Hats and White Hats, 185.

7. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 1–2; and Greeley, “Desert One,” 1–9. The 

Iranian rescue attempt has been well documented. Perhaps the best reading is The 

Guts to Try by Col James Kyle, USAF, retired.

8. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1980, vol. 1, 17–18.

9. Kyle, Guts to Try, 268–345.

10. Holloway, Holloway Report, “Issue 11: Helicopter Force Size”; and “Issue 12: 

Alternate Helicopter Pilots,” 33–36.

11. Ibid., Issue 12, 35.

12. Beckwith and Knox, Delta Force, 224.

13. Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah, 453.

14. Ibid.
202 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

15. Boykin, Never Surrender, 110.

16. Kyle, Guts to Try, 27.

17. Lenahan, Crippled Eagle, 52. Beckwith later said of Gast, “He knew all there 

was to know about navigational systems, but he didn’t know how to fly a helicopter. 

He’d been a jet jockey.” Beckwith, Delta Force, 229.

18. Holloway, Holloway Report, “Issue 13: Helicopter Unit,” 37. 

19. Kelly, From a Dark Sky, 254. 

20. Holloway, Holloway Report, chap. 5, “Recommendations,” 61.

21. Message, 142310Z MAY 80, CSAF/CV [vice-commander] to MAC and TAC 

commanders et al., subject: Pave Low III Beddown, in History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 

1980, vol. 2, supplemental doc. I-45; and History of 1550th ATTW, 1 Jan–30 June 1980, 

vol. 1, xii.

22. Koskinas, Black Hats and White Hats, 110; History of 1st SOW, 1 Apr–30 June 

1980, vol. 2, 52; and Connelly and Reed, interviews.

23. Connelly and Schibler, interviews. 

24. Pushies, Night Stalkers, 15.

25. Secord, Honored and Betrayed, 153–59; and Lenahan, Crippled Eagle, 160–64. 

26. Schibler, interview.

27. Stankovich and Homan, interviews.

28. Russell, interview. 

29. Grove, Reed, Stankovich, and Russell, interviews.

30. Weikel, interview. 

31. Connelly and Pehr, interviews. Lt Col Frank Pehr retired from the USAF in 1985. 

Subsequently, he was hired by the Systems Research Laboratory and helped design and 

engineer the highly upgraded MH-53J. He remained with that firm, overseeing Pave Low 

and other programs as a technical representative until 1999, when he retired again. He 

then went to work for Lockheed Martin at Kirtland AFB as an academic and simulator 

instructor for the Pave Lows, until finally retiring in 2002. He claims 30 years of 

service—1972 to 2002—on the Pave Low (Pehr, interviews). 

32. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1980, vol. 1, 78–79, 101–2.

33. Pehr, interviews. 

34. Nomination package for Col Bill Takacs for the Air Commando Hall of 

Fame, n.d., provided by Col Gary Weikel, USAF, retired.

35. Grove and Schibler, interviews. 

36. Reed, interview. 

37. Ibid.

38. Simmon, interview. 

39. Larsen to the author, e-mail. 

40. Connelly, interview.

41. Russell, interview. 

42. Grove and Weikel, interviews; and Pushies, Night Stalkers, 15. 

43. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1980, vol. 1, 79.

44. Secord, Honored and Betrayed, 159–60; and Kelly, From a Dark Sky, 255–6.

45. Connelly, interview. 

46. Stankovich, interview. 

47. Stiles, interview.

48. Walters, interview.
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 203

49. Kelly, interview.

50. Secord, Honored and Betrayed, 162–3.

51. Lenahan, Crippled Eagle, 179–83.

52. Walters, interview. 

53. Ibid. 

54. Ibid.

55. Beckwith and Knox, Delta Force, 295. 

56. Ibid., 299; and Lenahan, Crippled Eagle, 170–71, 184.

57. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1980, vol. 1, 24–25. 

58. Lenahan, Crippled Eagle, 185. 

59. Pushies, Night Stalkers, 16. 

60. Reed, interview. 

61. History of 1st SOW, 1 Oct 1982–28 Feb 1983, vol. 1, I-10. 

62. Kelly, From a Dark Sky, 264. 

63. History of 1st SOW, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1980, vol. 1, II-28–29; and designed operational capability statement, in ibid., vol. 2. 

64. Koskinas, Black Hats and White Hats, 112; and Marquis, Unconventional 

Warfare, 56. 

65. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1980, vol. 1, 20–21.

66. Ibid., 22. 

67. Ibid., 25–27. 

68. Ibid., 29, 63. 

69. Sprouse, interview.

70. Weikel to the author, e-mail, 20 Aug 2010. 

71. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1981, vol. 1, 78–81; History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–

31 Mar 1981, vol. 1, II-66–67; and ibid., vol. 2, 3. 

72. History of 1st SOW, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1981, vol. 1, II-72. 

73. Ibid., 1 Apr–30 June 1981, vol. 1, II-44, II-47–48; ibid., vol. 2, 3; ibid., 1 Oct–31 Dec 

1981, vol. 2, 4; and Grove, interview.

74. Weikel, interview. 

75. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1981, vol. 1, 96–97. 

76. Ibid., 3–4.

77. Ibid., 15–16. 

78. Ibid., 16–17. 

79. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1982, vol. 1, I-11, II-45, II-62, II-66; and 

ibid., 1 Apr–30 June 1982, I-12, II-40–46, II-52–53.

80. History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1982, vol. 1, 30.

81. Cross, Birth of the Twenty-Third Air Force, 6–7.

82. Ibid., 7–8; and History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1982, vol. 1, 10–12. 

83. Cross, Birth of the Twenty-Third Air Force, 8–10; and History of ARRS, 1 Jan–31 

Dec 1982, vol. 1, 13–16. 

84. Cross, Birth of the Twenty-Third Air Force, 11–15. 

85. History of 1st SOW, 1 July–30 Sept 1982, vol. 1, I-6, I-32.

86. Stiles, interview. 

87. Walters, interview. 

88. History of 1st SOW, 1 July–30 Sept 1982, vol. 1, II-78, II-89; and Reed, interview.
204 │ NECESSITY TO NADIR

89. SSgt Phil Rhodes, “From TAC to MAC Transition Tuesday,” Commando, 25 

Feb 1983, 1; and History of 1st SOW, 1 Oct 1982–28 Feb 1983, vol. 1, I-14.

90. History of the Twenty-Third Air Force and Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Service (hereafter referred to as History of 23d AF and ARRS), 1 Jan–31 Dec 1983, vol. 1, 

14–16; Koskinas, Black Hats and White Hats, 120; and Sprouse, interview. 

91. History of 23d AF and ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1983, vol. 1, 18–19. 

92. Ibid., 19–20; and Maj Gen William Mall, “Presentation to the Committee on 

Armed Services, Readiness Subcommittee,” 5 Apr 1983, in ibid., vol. 5, supplemental 

doc. I-40. 

93. History of 23d AF and ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1983, vol. 1, 21–28. 

94. Ibid., 26. 

95. Ibid., CD–3. 

96. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 82. 

97. History of 23d AF and ARRS, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1983, vol. 1, 139–41. 

98. Ibid. 

99. Ibid., 44, 54. 

100. History of the 2d Air Division (hereafter referred to as History of 2d AD), 1 

Mar–30 June 1983, vol. 1, I–28–I–30. 

101. Ibid., chap. 3; ibid., vol. 6, 248–50; and “Background Paper on Special Operations Force Structure Requirements,” ibid., vol. 2, 468. The background paper also suggests procuring and modifying the six HH-53s of the 6594th Test Group in Hawaii, 

slated to inactivate in FY 86.

102. History of 2d AD, 1 July–31 Dec 1983, vol. 1, I-6–I-8.

103. Ibid.; and Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 85–86. 

104. History of 2d AD, 1 July–31 Dec 1983, vol. 1, II-55, II-69, II-88. 

105. Ibid., IV-123–IV-171; and Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 105–6. 

106. Weikel and Reed, interviews; and Reed to the author, e-mail, review comments, 

3 Jan 2011. 

107. Martin, interview. 

108. Ibid. 

109. Ibid. 

110. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 86–87.

111. The FY 1985 USAF budget request included money for 24 HH-60Ds and 

start-up money for 54 JVXs. History of the Twenty-Third Air Force (hereafter referred 

to as History of 23d AF), 1 Jan 1984–31 Dec 1985, vol. 1, 25. 

112. “Special Operations Forces Master Plan,” 4 Apr 1984, History of 23d AF, 1 

Jan 1984–31 Dec 1985, vol. 2, B-1-7, B-1-14–15. 

113. History of 2d AD, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1985, vol. 1, I-32, I-64.

114. “Chronology of the 23d Air Force,” AFSOC/HO, permanent file, box 5.

115. Davis, 31 Initiatives, v, 111. 

116. History of ARRS, 1 Jan 1984–31 Dec 1985, vol. 1, 28; and point paper, subject: 

Implications of the MAC Position on Transfer of SOF Rotary-Wing Responsibility to 

Army, 19 Sept 1984, in ibid., vol. 2, II-289–90. 

117. Cong. Earl Hutto, “Report from Washington,” newsletter, July 1984, box 1989–

1994, file: Newsletters, Congressman Earl Hutto Special Collection (hereafter cited as 

Hutto Collection), John C. Pace Library, University of West Florida, Pensacola, FL.
NECESSITY TO NADIR │ 205

118. Stewart, Sandler, and Fischer, Command History of the United States Army 

Special Operations Command: 1987–1992, 225–27; and Weikel, interview. 

119. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 88; History of ARRS, 1 Jan 1984–31 Dec 

1985, vol. 1, 30; History of 2d AD, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1984, vol. 1, I-90; and Weikel, interview. 

120. Reed, interview; USAF MH-53J Helicopter Requirements, point paper, n.d.; 

and PMD 5249 (2), 10 Jan 1986. 

121. To secretary of defense, memorandum, subject: Rotary-Wing Support for 

Special Operations, 10 July 1984. 

122. History of ARRS, 1 Jan 1984–31 Dec 1985, vol. 1, 30. 

123. Ibid., 67; Schibler, interview; Schibler to the author, e-mail, 17 Sept 2010, 

follow-up comments; and Sprouse, interview.

124. Hester, interview. 

125. Koskinas, Black Hats and White Hats, 137. 

126. Halcomb to the author, e-mail. 

127. Brian Doyle, “Fight Brewing over 20th SOS’s Future,” Okaloosa Daily News, 

24 Oct 1984, 1.

128. Mrs. Gwen Grant to Cong. Earl Hutto, letter, 30 Oct 1984, and Hutto to 

Grant, letter, 14 Nov 1984, box 329-87-142, file 12 of 20, Hutto Collection. 

129. Kelly, interview. 

130. History of 2d AD, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1984, vol. 1, II-21; ibid., vol. 2, 134–38; and 

Weikel, Kelly, and Harris, interviews. 

Chapter 6

Congress Acts

~1984–86

We could no longer wait around for something to be done . . . . 

So . . . Congress acted. 

—Cong. Earl Hutto

Washington, DC

Congressman Daniel’s words were certainly heartening to the Pave 

Low troops. However, they served as a preamble to the difficult work 

that lay ahead. On 29 November 1984, Deputy Secretary Taft responded 

to Daniel’s 30 October letter, stating, “I understand that you will be 

holding hearings on this matter. I have suggested to Generals Wickham 

and Gabriel that they meet with you personally to explain their rationale and discuss your concerns. We will of course reconsider the transfer proposal if further deliberations produce a convincing set of arguments for doing so.” Taft added a handwritten note at the bottom of the 

letter that said, “Mr. Chairman: If you are not satisfied after meeting 

with Generals Wickham and Gabriel, please let me know. I think that 

they have made a good case. If you disagree after having heard them, 

however, we will not pursue this over your objection.”1

Congressmen Daniel and Hutto met with the generals on 3 December. There are no notes of what they discussed. However, Hutto 

followed up with a strong letter to General Gabriel expressing his 

concern that the transfer might be phase one of a plan by the Air 

Force to divest itself of the entire special operations mission. He 

wrote, “These realignments . . . signal a willful abrogation of a combat 

mission, eventually leaving a truncated Air Force totally unable to 

operate in the lower end of the spectrum of warfare.”2

On 11 December, Daniel also sent a memo to General Gabriel relaying that he could see no way to implement Initiative 17 without 

unacceptably degrading this critical national capability. He communicated that he favored the Army supporting the short-range mission 
208 │ Congress Acts

and the Air Force retaining the long-range mission. In a follow-up 

memo to Deputy Secretary Taft, he explained that his study of the issue indicated that the 1st SOW should receive a force activity designator (FAD) rating of FAD-1 (highest supply priority, something that 

young Maj Gary Weikel had been pushing both overtly and covertly). 

Daniel’s memo also said that nine HH-53s should be sent to Hurlburt 

from the 41st ARRSq at McClellan and that unit backfilled with UH60s from the 55th ARRSq at Eglin. It added that during the programmed H-53 SLEP, 27 more H-53s should be modified to the Pave 

Low configuration. 

In response, on 20 December the USAF chief of plans and operations sent a message to all commands stating that the Army and Air 

Force should continue to work to implement the intent of Initiative 

17. However, the transfer of Pave Low assets would be deferred. Accordingly, all personnel, programming, and logistical actions initiated in conjunction with the transfer of the Pave Lows would be rescinded, and MAC should move quickly to meet the deferred 

operational needs of the 20th SOS. Within just a few days, MAC 

stopped all transfer actions, cancelled all Army training classes, returned the 20th SOS to full SOF combat-ready status, and transferred 

an HH-53C from McClellan AFB to Hurlburt to partially make up 

for the two aircraft recently lost. Additionally, MAC drafted plans to 

transfer the four UH-1Ns still in the 20th SOS to a rescue squadron 

within the next year.3

It was a stunning reversal of fortune for the Pave Lows. In a period 

of just seven months, the community went from the specter of complete transfer to another service to the development of political top 

cover that aborted the reassignment. Now just seven helicopters, the 

struggling fleet seemed to face a much brighter future that included 

possible growth. The Air Force Times announced this victory in a 7 

January 1985 article, “Plans Scrubbed to Transfer Helicopter Mission 

to Army,” disclosing that the Air Force intended to keep the Pave 

Lows for the “immediate future.” However, Initiative 17 had not yet 

been totally cancelled. 

In April 1985, Mr. Thomas Cooper, the USAF assistant secretary 

for research, development, and acquisition, stated that Initiative 17 

was dead. The PDASD-ISA, Noel Koch, seemed to signal as much 

when he proposed in an Armed Forces Journal article, “I’d leave the 

mission with the Air Force. Those guys have done brilliant work, and 

they’ve committed their careers to a tough and thankless job. There’s a 
Congress acts │ 209

body of experience there that it will take the Army years to duplicate. . . . 

I can argue about hardware: The Air Force has it; the Army doesn’t; and 

the costs for the Army to get it [are] backbreaking if not prohibitive.”4

The actions at the DOD and congressional levels had sent a signal 

to senior USAF officers that special operations needed their attention 

and support.5

 It seemed, though, that the reports of the death of Initiative 17 were a bit premature. The two chiefs still favored the idea 

and continued to discuss it. The Army intended to build another aviation battalion equipped with either new MH-60s or MH-47s to service the mission. By May they both agreed on the split-mission idea 

roughly based upon range, with the Army taking the short-range requirement and the Air Force remaining with the long-range mission 

requiring in-flight refueling, at which the USAF pilots were very proficient. At some point, it was also expected that the Army would 

develop a longer-range capability. However, to do that, it would have 

to develop the ability to refuel in-flight. 

At a program review with Taft in May, the Army was asked to explain how its pilots would do the refueling. The Army briefer explained how the pilot would fly the helicopter up behind a refueling 

aircraft, usually a USAF MC- or HC-130. That aircraft would be trailing a refueling drogue, or basket, that was 27 inches in diameter and 

on the end of an 81-foot-long hose. The helicopter pilot would then 

have to insert the end of his 33-foot refueling probe into that basket, 

regardless of the weather or turbulence, day or night. When pressed 

for the details of how that was actually accomplished, the briefer 

rather smugly stated that it was far too technically complicated to 

explain to a bunch of civilians and they should just trust the Army on 

the soundness of the plan. Koch was at the briefing. Sensing an opportunity to make a point, he had brought along his key assistant, 

Lynn Rylander. When the Army brief was finished, Koch had Rylander 

lay out a 33-foot section of rope that stretched into the hallway. Standing at the end of the rope, Koch then held out a 27-inch piece of paper 

replicating the refueling drogue and said for all to hear, “Ladies and 

gentlemen, this is 33 feet.” He also reminded them that the drogue 

would most probably be moving around a bit in the wind stream and 

would most likely be a bit difficult for the pilots to see in the weather 

or at night while wearing NVGs. Koch’s dramatic act shattered the 

audience’s confidence in the briefer’s flippant suggestion that Army 

pilots could easily master this challenging procedure.6
210 │ Congress Acts

In May and June 1985, Deputy Secretary Taft sent memos to the 

two chiefs directing that the Army develop cost estimates for a longrange helicopter program and show that the Army could do the inflight refueling through a valid test. Additionally, the USAF was to 

continue restoring the capability of the 20th SOS and add additional 

Pave Low III or enhanced aircraft while supporting controlled transfer 

of SOF rotary-wing aircraft to the Army as it built capability. Three 

months later, after the Defense Review Board assessed the initiative 

and noted the Army’s estimate that it would cost $1.3 billion to fully 

absorb the SOF rotary-wing mission, Taft, in a Solomonic decision, 

specified that the Army would accelerate MH-60 development and 

acquisition and develop the MH-47 at a reduced rate. Furthermore, 

the USAF would retain the mission of long-range rotary-wing support for special operations and modify more HH-53Hs to the Pave 

Low III (Enhanced) configuration by reprogramming funds. The 

program decision memorandum that accompanied this decision, 

signed by Assistant Secretary of Defense David Chu, required that 

the Army improve its short-range capabilities and plan for the procurement of the MH-47E by 1991. The USAF was to procure 10 Pave 

Low III (Enhanced) aircraft and retrofit two existing helicopters to 

make up for the two Pave Lows recently lost.7

The next month, the House Committee on Appropriations directed 

no transfer of the mission to the Army without full and comprehensive congressional budget review. It inserted into the FY 1986 Defense Appropriations Bill $76 million to facilitate the H-53 SLEP, 

modify two H-53s to replace the two lost in 1984, and modify 10 

more to the Pave Low configuration. Capt Ed Reed felt vindicated. 

When it became apparent that the money would be available, his 

MAC SON 11-84 magically resurfaced and became the basis for the 

program management directive that was then published to facilitate 

the initial modification of the first two aircraft to the HH-53H configuration. This reactivated the Pave Low modification line at the 

NARF at NAS Pensacola, reenergizing the subcontractor production 

lines necessary for the acquisition of all the components necessary 

for the conversion. Once that support system was remobilized, the 

only thing lacking was more funding to modify as many aircraft as 

the USAF or Congress desired. Congressman Hutto was happy, too. 

More funds would flow to the NARF and to Hurlburt, both—just 

coincidentally—in his congressional district.8
Congress acts │ 211

Courtesy Hutto family

Cong. Earl Hutto (D-FL), a key supporter of Pave Low

20th Special Operations Squadron

During 1985 the 20th maintained its busy schedule of training, 

static displays, VIP visits, deployments to mountain training in Georgia 

and New Mexico, and exercises—both CONUS and overseas. The 

heavy emphasis was still on working with “customers” from the other 

services’ special operations communities. The transfer of the Slick 

HH-53C from the 41st ARRSq at McClellan AFB helped with proficiency 
212 │ Congress Acts

training and currency, but actual Pave Low operations were reduced 

because of the loss of the two aircraft in 1984. In October 1985, the 

unit transferred its UH-1Ns and some personnel to the newly activated 48th ARRSq at Homestead AFB, Florida, where they continued 

Operation BAT. Several UH-1N pilots—Captains Grant Harden, Jack 

Hester, Don Hoover, Dennis Jones, and Jim Shaffer—were selected to 

stay with the squadron and transition to Pave Lows. Now the 20th 

was a pure H-53 unit with one HH-53C and the seven remaining 

HH-53H Pave Low III aircraft. They continued to be modified with 

improvements as they were developed and approved; however, the 

larger H-53 fleet SLEP program encountered funding difficulties and 

was slipped almost two years.

In another unfortunate accident, the 6594th Test Group lost HH53C #68-10355 on 15 January 1985. The aircraft was launched as the 

lead of a two-ship formation to recover a seriously ill seaman aboard 

a merchant vessel 540 miles northwest of Hawaii. As the aircraft came 

to a hover over the ship, it suffered a main blade structural failure and 

crashed on the ship’s deck. All seven crew members were killed, and 

the resulting fire damaged the ship’s main deck and superstructure. 

With the loss of a third aircraft in less than six months, the USAF 

H-53 fleet continued to shrink.9

While all of these changes were taking place, MAC was undergoing 

a budget shortfall that was affecting numerous programs. In August 

1985, the Air Force Council cancelled the entire HH-60 program and 

delayed the follow-on JVX. However, to replace the two Pave Lows 

lost in 1984, HQ USAF did approve the modification of two CH-53s, 

#68-10923 and #70-1629, to be converted to the Pave Low III configuration. As before, the NARF in Pensacola would do the work, to 

be completed in 1986. In conjunction with this action, MAC requested the conversion of 25 more H-53s to either the Pave Low III 

standard or a new “enhanced” version redesignated the MH-53J, in 

keeping with the “M” aircraft prefix identifier generally used for special operations–specific aircraft. 

The enhancements, to be done in conjunction with the SLEP program, included a detailed listing of upgrades to the single central avionics computer—the Doppler/INS navigation system—such as a new 

ring-laser gyro system. Also specified were the possible installment 

of the new GPS navigation kits on the aircraft, IRCM jamming pods, 

flare/chaff dispensers for those aircraft not currently equipped, upgraded ECM jamming pods, improvements to the FLIR system, better 
Congress acts │ 213

NVG-compatible cockpit lighting and computer display units, crashworthy crew and passenger seats, an improved suite of secure radios, 

crashworthy 650-gallon external fuel tanks, and improved mounts 

for the machine guns. Titanium composite main rotor blades that 

provided almost 2,000 pounds more lift capability were also prescribed, along with hydraulic system upgrades, an external reskinning, and several structural refinements enabling an increase in gross 

weight lift capability. All of this was good news to the Airmen of the 

20th as they did the best they could with their seven Pave Lows and 

one Slick HH-53. Additionally, such an expansion of aircraft suggested more Pave Low–equipped squadrons, possibly even overseas.10

However, the current paucity of Pave Low aircraft was highlighted 

in another way when the MAC IG team arrived at Hurlburt on 2 December 1985 to conduct an ORI and management effectiveness inspection (MEI) for the 1st SOW. While the results were classified, the 

ORI had to be terminated on 11 December. Overall, the wing was 

graded satisfactory, but problems were cited on the operational missions dealing with “HH-53H operational restrictions.” Press reports 

indicate that at one point in the inspection, the wing was not able to 

generate any operational aircraft to meet a mission tasking. Obviously, many challenges still needed to be addressed.11

Twenty-Third Air Force

In September 1985, General Mall completed his tour as the 

Twenty-Third Air Force commander and was replaced by Maj Gen 

Robert Patterson. Given the now high-level military and political interest in special operations and cancellation of critical aircraft procurement programs, Patterson immediately directed his staff members to conduct a study to see if his forces were optimally organized 

to accomplish their assigned missions and, if not, to recommend 

changes. For the next two months they dutifully conducted the study 

titled Forward Look. Their central idea was, first, to emphasize the 

capabilities of the units’ resources rather than allocating resources to 

each of the various missions of the command and, second, to develop 

a plan for basing new MC-130s and the projected increase in Pave 

Lows while still focusing on the two primary missions of combat recovery and special operations. 
214 │ Congress Acts

The staff concluded that the command should retain the 375th 

AAW, the recently renamed 1550th Combat Crew Training Wing 

(CCTW), and the 1606th ABW at Kirtland AFB as currently configured. However, it recommended the reorganization of the 2d AD and 

its three operational wings—the 1st SOW, 39th ARRW, and 41st 

RWRW—into four multipurpose “special air warfare” wings, one in 

the Pacific, one in Europe, and an eastern and a western wing in the 

CONUS. All of this could be done without any appreciable manpower increases except those authorized for the additional MC-130s 

and Pave Lows. Under Forward Look the 2d AD would be inactivated, 

and the 1st SOW would report directly to Twenty-Third Air Force—

as had been done with the ARRS and its operational wings in 1983. 

When completed, the plan was briefed to the new MAC commander, 

Gen Duane Cassidy, in November. He endorsed it and directed the 

MAC staff to begin detailed planning to carry it out.12

In early December, General Patterson briefed Forward Look to the 

Special Forces Panel of the Readiness Subcommittee of the House 

Armed Services Committee, chaired by Congressman Hutto. Fully 

aware of the criticisms voiced by the chairman, Congressman Daniel, 

and a growing number of others, Patterson explained his command 

plan for reorganization and detailed how the forward wings could be 

much more responsive to theater needs. He updated the panel on the 

status of the SOF master plan and detailed the modifications that 

were scheduled for SOF aircraft, especially the Pave Lows.13

The plan was an honest look at the command, with the recognition 

that smaller, low-intensity conflicts were more likely than a large regional conflict to occur in the near future. Forward Look concluded 

that special operations forces were more likely to be used than larger 

conventional forces. The current structure of Twenty-Third Air Force 

was not optimized to integrate forces and enhance special operations. 

Moving to the projected four wings would help better position forces 

and command structure to provide “maximum integration and flexibility of the forces available to the theater and specialized users—a 

true melding of core and augmenting forces.14

Under the plan, the four special air warfare wings (later changed to 

special operations wings) would provide streamlined command, control, and coordination for AFSOF in the CONUS, Europe, and the 

Pacific, providing theater focus and responsiveness across the spectrum of conflict. The Twenty-Third Air Force would remain as the 

lowest level of worldwide AFSOF management. It would still provide 
Congress acts │ 215

planning, logistics, intelligence, training, and standardization of all 

subordinate units and, in addition to the four wings, would place 

small detachments with various other commands to facilitate the 

swift movement and integration of AFSOF forces when needed in 

any theater. It would expand its staff to better accomplish these functions by inactivating the 2d AD. The plan also presented initial 

guidance for each of the projected wings.

In the Pacific, the wing (initially projected to be the 353d SOW) 

would be built around the 1st SOS, an MC-130 unit, currently located 

at Clark AB, Philippines. There the 31st ARRSq would be reassigned 

from the 41st RWRW and equipped with MH-53 Pave Lows as they 

were available and become the 31st SOS. It would provide the longrange capability for special operations and combat rescue. Other rescue squadrons in the region would be reassigned from the 41st 

RWRW to the new wing. Additional special operations squadrons 

could be added as new aircraft became available.15

In Europe the 39th ARRW would move from Eglin to Rhein-Main 

AB, Germany, to provide the nucleus for its wing. The 7th SOS with 

its MC-130s would transfer, as would the 67th ARRSq with its HH53B/Cs. They would eventually be replaced by MH-53s as they became available to provide the long-range special operations and combat rescue capability needed in that theater. The 67th ARRSq would 

inactivate and be redesignated as the 21st SOS, recapturing the rich 

heritage of that unit from its eventful days in Southeast Asia. Again, 

new squadrons could be added as aircraft became available. Congressional approval was required to exceed authorized theater manpower ceilings.16

In the CONUS, the West Coast wing would be formed around the 

41st RWRW. It would maintain its focus on weather reconnaissance 

but still command several rescue squadrons with older H-3s and HC130s.17 The East Coast wing would form around the 1st SOW with the 

8th, 16th, and 20th SOSs. It would also be assigned the 55th ARRSq, 

equipped with U/HH-60s, and possibly the 48th ARRSqs, equipped 

with UH-1Ns and HC-130s. All rescue squadrons would be redesignated as special operations squadrons. This wing would be the primary deployment force for short-notice contingency tasking and for 

forces tasked to SOUTHCOM and USLANTCOM. The 20th SOS 

would gain up to 14 MH-53s as they became available. The inactivated 2d AD would provide some necessary manpower positions to 

the wing.18
216 │ Congress Acts

Such dramatic reorganizations would generate large personnel 

movements. MAC staff was working that issue, with the understanding 

that personnel authorizations would not increase. Training for aircrews 

had to be addressed, particularly for the Pave Low crews. Given the 

small number of modified aircraft, all specific mission qualification 

training had to take place at Hurlburt. Crew training had been consolidated there in the Central Training Flight. However, that unit 

worked closely with the 20th SOS, and the impact of training sortie 

needs was a constant drain on the unit as it struggled to answer its realworld commitments, especially after the loss of the two aircraft in 1984. 

However, the modification of more H-53s to the Pave Low configuration created the possibility of perhaps assigning some to the 1550th 

CCTW so that initial Pave Low qualification could take place at Kirtland as part of the aircraft qualification courses. 

Logistical planning continued with the assumption that the H-53 

SLEP and similar programs for the other aircraft would proceed 

apace. The designation of FAD-1 status for AFSOF forces was key to 

the success of Forward Look. Most necessary unit movements and 

equipment changes would start in FY 86 and be completed by FY 88, 

except for those involving anticipated use of the new JVX tilt-rotor 

aircraft, which was now projected to be available in FY 95 at the earliest. 

General Patterson also considered moving the Twenty-Third Air 

Force from Scott AFB to Hurlburt Field because he believed that the 

command needed an increased focus on special operations. In late 

December, General Cassidy approved the plan, including the TwentyThird Air Force relocation to Hurlburt.19

As 1986 began, Twenty-Third Air Force was now well immersed in 

the details of Forward Look. On 28 May, the Air Force Council approved the plan. However, the plan was modified significantly to include several unit inactivations or consolidations as Congress initiated significant budget cuts for the DOD. Larger changes, too, were 

on the horizon as Congress also finally determined to make significant organizational changes to the US military in general and its special 

operations forces in particular. 

Pave Low IV

In March 1986 at Scott AFB, Captain Reed finished his tour with 

the MAC staff and was transferred to Washington, DC, to work for 
Congress acts │ 217

Brig Gen Tom Eggers in the acquisition office under the secretary of 

the Air Force. He would handle special operations programs, the 

perfect billet from which to quietly implement the still unapproved 

MAC SON 11-84 and a similar program for the MH-60Gs and MC130P/Ns. Reed also made a special effort to get to know the senior 

OSD secretaries and staffers working in key offices in the Pentagon. 

Many had served in the building for long periods and were a sort of 

collective corporate knowledge, especially when it came to funding 

sources and management. They were able to show him many tricks 

that allowed him to tap into funding sources and draw off what 

eventually amounted to a large amount of money through small but 

widespread “donations” from numerous Air Force programs for 

Pave Low projects as part of the MH-53 SLEP and safety modification process. He also began to develop “hidden in plain sight” pots 

of money for future use.20

Reed also worked directly with several “competing” Army aviation 

staff officers who were working their service programs, and in congressional staff meetings, he never passed up an opportunity to extol 

the virtues of the Pave Low aircraft and crews. He developed some 

close relationships with key congressional staffers and was able to 

brief them frequently on Pave Low advancements. He was also keenly 

aware of the dangers inherent in Initiative 17 and understood that 

while Congress had slowed its funding for Army special operations 

aviation, the still agreed upon intent of the Army and Air Force was 

that the senior service would assume the long-range delivery mission 

if/when the MH-53s went away. 

Resolved to delay or forestall that action as much as possible, Reed, 

with help from Weikel, resorted to subterfuge. They knew that the 

Army was behind the Air Force in the technological advancement of 

its SOF helicopters and sensed that the Army could use a little “help.” 

Consequently, Reed developed a concept for a new iteration of Pave 

Lows called Pave Low IV. He created a briefing and technical specifications to convince the Army staffers that this new Pave Low would 

be fully state of the art. The presentation included made-up slides 

with highly detailed cockpit and airframe illustrations, complete with 

a full glass cockpit and a new TF/TA radar initially designed for the 

now cancelled HH-60D. Weikel then conveniently arranged for the 

Army staff officers to “steal” a copy, which they then used to redesign 

their proposal for the new and expensive MH-60K and MH-47E helicopters to replace the MH-53s. This caused significant and costly 
218 │ Congress Acts

delay in the Army’s program, such that when the funding was forthcoming, the MH-53J Pave Low III Enhanced modification line was 

ready to go, while the Army was at least two years away from even 

prototype production. Said Reed later, “It was amazing what you 

learn at the Hurlburt Special Operations School—you can actually 

use those things in the Pentagon.” Pave Low IV never existed (in this 

iteration), but it successfully accomplished its mission, costing the 

Army substantial development and testing delays and embarrassment 

with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congress.21

A New Command

After six years of trying to prod the military services to place increased emphasis on their special forces components, key leaders in 

both the House of Representatives and Senate now felt that their efforts were for naught and that they would have to take strong legislative measures to make those changes. Joining Congressmen Hutto 

and Daniel in this effort were Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and William 

Cohen (R-ME). Each of these gentlemen served on their respective 

Armed Services Committees. All were convinced that the nation had 

to establish clearer organizational focus and chains of command for 

its special operations forces and that those forces should also be provided with their own funding authority, which could not be siphoned 

off by the individual services for other programs. In the spring of 

1986, after a series of hearings, Senator Cohen introduced a bill in the 

Senate that called for a joint military organization for special forces 

and the establishment of an assistant secretary position in the Defense Department to insure adequate funding for and policy emphasis 

on low-intensity conflict and special operations.22

In the House, Congressman Daniel took a different tack. He and 

writer Ben Schemmer (with lots of back-channel factual and ghostwriting support from Ted Lunger, Major Weikel, and Maj Greg Colvin) 

had been openly speaking out for over a year in a series of articles in 

the Armed Forces Journal, calling for a “sixth service” and arguing 

that “SOF has never been [a] truly institutional part of [the other] 

services” or their core imperatives, and because of that, SOF needed 

its own “unifying, intellectual core of philosophy; a professional 

home; a budget that does not compete directly with [conventional 

forces]; an acquisition system; a high level advocate; [and] a direct 
Congress acts │ 219

link to the National Command Authorities.”23 Daniel knew, though, 

that there was no general support for his position and dropped the 

sixth service idea, proposing, instead, a national special operations 

agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the JCS and report 

directly to the secretary of defense. This structure would keep the 

services out of the SOF budget process, a key concern for Daniel.24

Throughout the summer, the two Armed Services Committees 

held hearings on the two proposals. The JCS and DOD opposed both 

bills. The chairman of the JCS, Adm William Crowe, proposed an 

alternative Special Operations Forces Command (SOFC) led by a 

three-star general. In support of SOFC, Richard Armitage, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (ASD-ISA), 

testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Noting in detail how spending on SOF programs had expanded almost fourfold 

since 1980, Armitage specifically pointed to force expansions in the 

Army, with its 1st Special Forces Command, and the Air Force, with 

its creation of Twenty-Third Air Force. He also cited the criticality of the 

SOF rotary-wing force by referring to it as “the long-range infiltration/

exfiltration capacity without which such operations cannot be conducted.” Moreover, he pointed out that authorization was now in 

place to fund 12 newly modified MH-53 helicopters and 33 Army 

special operations helicopters. In addition, he suggested that such a 

new command should have access to a new funding line for special 

operations that would be controlled by the individual services.25

However, the committees were not happy with his suggestions. They 

wanted a four-star commander and were supported in this by numerous retired officers, including several of the SOPAG members. 

Both committees passed their versions of the SOF reform bills. 

They then went to a conference committee for reconciliation; they 

reached a compromise that satisfied most concerns voiced by both 

committees. The resulting bill directed the president to establish a 

unified combatant command (COCOM), led by a four-star general 

for special operations forces. The SecDef would be authorized a position for an assistant secretary of defense for special operations and 

low-intensity conflict (ASD/SOLIC). Additionally, a new major force 

program (MFP-11) would be created specifically for this new command to have control over its own resources, better enabling it to 

modernize its forces. Subsequently titled the Nunn-Cohen Amendment, the bill was attached to the FY 1987 Defense Appropriations 
220 │ Congress Acts

Act and signed by the president on 14 November 1986 as Public 

Law 99-661. 

The act amended the recently passed Goldwater-Nichols Act, Public 

Law 99-433, passed into law in October 1986, which had been a larger 

effort to enact numerous changes to the organization of the United 

States military forces. Goldwater-Nichols strengthened the role of the 

unified COCOMs, streamlined the command and control of operational forces, and, overall, placed a long-needed increased emphasis 

on joint force operational procedures. The changes now mandated by 

the Nunn-Cohen Amendment fit very well into the structure created 

by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The amendment also specified that 

the secretary of defense, after consulting with the CJCS and the commander of the new command, could designate those forces from each 

of the services to be assigned to the new command. The new command was assigned 10 activities as they related to special operations: 

direct action, strategic reconnaissance, UW, foreign internal defense, 

civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian 

assistance, theater SAR, and other activities as specified by the president or SecDef.26

Later that summer, at a conference sponsored by his Special Operations Panel, Congressman Hutto offered five findings, or truths, 

especially for fellow congressional leaders that seemed to define the 

essence of what special forces were:

1. Humans are more important than hardware.

2. Their quality is more important than quantities.

3. Special operations forces cannot be mass-produced.

4. Competent SOF [units] cannot be created after emergencies 

occur.

5. Most special operations require non-SOF assistance.27

Over the next several months the JCS dealt with the details of creating the new command. It asked the JSOA for recommendations on 

how to proceed. That group reported back with a recommendation 

that they name it the United States Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM) and have it take the place of the US Readiness Command (USREDCOM) at MacDill AFB, which could be inactivated. 

The SecDef accepted the plan. In January 1987 USREDCOM was inactivated, and its facilities, billets, and many of its personnel were 
Congress acts │ 221

assigned to USSOCOM. President Reagan subsequently approved 

the establishment of the new command, and the DOD activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987, with Army general James Lindsay as its first 

commander. Congressman Hutto was most pleased to see the fruits 

of his and Congressman Daniel’s labor, ably assisted throughout by 

their various staff members and the “SOF Mafia,” or “a bit of a fifth 

column,” as General Cassidy labeled them. Hutto later wrote, “We 

could no longer wait around for something to be done. The Defense 

Department and the military services would not do it, so . . . Congress 

acted.”28

Those young Air Force officers, out of a genuine belief that their 

service could not forsake its SOF units, also took great delight in the 

role they played in this accomplishment. Said Maj Ed Reed later, 

Imagine being in an organization which was trying to get rid of the mission, 

get rid of an aircraft, and, at the same time, your task was to make sure that 

didn’t happen and that new aircraft were built. Thank goodness we had some 

understanding and tolerant generals at the time on the Air Staff who understood that the chief of staff of the Army and the chief of staff of the Air Force 

cut a bad deal. General Gabriel sooner or later would leave the Air Force, and 

the guy coming behind him might not be so willing to get rid of the mission 

of the aircraft. Congress stepped in and made sure it didn’t happen.29

Notes

1. History of ARRS, 1 Jan 1984–31 Dec 1985, vol. 1, 31.

2. History of 2d AD, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1984, vol. 1, I-94. 

3. History of ARRS, 1 Jan 1984–31 Dec 1985, vol. 1, 32–34; and message, USAF 

chief of plans and operations to all commands, subject: Update of SOF Rotary-Wing 

Issue, 20 Dec 1985, in ibid., vol. 2, II-384–5.

4. History of 2d AD, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1984, vol. 1, I-98. 

5. History of ARRS, 1 Jan 1984–31 Dec 1985, vol. 1, 33; and History of 2d AD, 1 

Jan–31 Dec 1984, vol. 1, I-95, I-98. 

6. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 114. 

7. Ibid., 114, 128; and Meyer, “Taft Makes ‘Solomonic’ Decision,” 85, 28. 

8. General Patterson’s testimony to House Armed Services Committee panel on 

SOF forces, point papers, 4 Dec 1985, Heritage File, box 51, AFSOC/HO; PMD 5223 

(2) 13262, 26 June 1985, author’s personal collection; Gambone, Pave Low III: That 

Others May Live, 258; and Reed, interview. 

9. History of 23d AF, 1 Jan 1984–31 Dec 1985, vol. 1, 88. 

10. Ibid., 51–52, 90; and ibid., vol. 2, supp. docs. 124–26. 

11. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1985, vol. 1, I-24; and Schemmer, “December 

Was Not a Good Month for USAF Special Operations,” 26. 

12. History of 23d AF, 1 Jan 1984–31 Dec 1985, vol. 1, 18–21.
222 │ Congress Acts

13. General Patterson’s testimony to House Armed Services Committee panel on 

SOF forces, point papers, 4 Dec 1985, Heritage File, box 51, AFSOC/HO.

14. Forward Look, Twenty-Third Air Force staff study directed by General Patterson, 

1985, 2–4, in ibid. 

15. Ibid., 11–12. 

16. Ibid., 18–19.

17. Ibid., 13–14.

18. Ibid., 15–17. 

19. Ibid., 22–27.

20. Wurster, interview. 

21. Reed, interview; and Reed to the author, e-mails, review comments, 18 Oct 

2009 and 5 Sept 2011. 

22. USSOCOM, United States Special Operations Command 10th Anniversary 

History, 2. 

23. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 122.

24. Ibid., 139. 

25. “Statement by Mr. Richard Armitage, Asst. Secretary of Defense (International 

Security Affairs) before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Force Projection, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate Second Session, 99th Congress, Special Operations Forces Reorganization,” 5 Aug 1986, AFSOC/HO. 

26. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Public Law 99-661, 

99th Cong., 2d sess., 14 Nov 1986; Establishment File, Assignment of Forces to SOCOM, 

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)/HO; and Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 145–46. 

27. Collins, Green Berets, Seals and Spetsnaz, xiii. 

28. USSOCOM, United States Special Operations Command 10th Anniversary 

History, 14; Gen Duane Cassidy, USAF oral history interviews, transcript, 4 Aug and 

17 Aug 1989, 19, AFHRA; and Hutto, Captain Supreme Goes to Washington, 239.

29. Reed, interview. 
Chapter 7

The Buildup

~1986–89

We relied on that cadre of Pave Low guys to train all the rest 

of us and make us one whole unit. It was really, really good.

 —Brig Gen Mike Kingsley 

Hurlburt Field, Florida

As the definitive changes mandated by Congress and the TwentyThird Air Force were being orchestrated, the Green Hornets of the 

20th SOS continued to train to meet their multiple mission taskings 

as still the sole Pave Low–equipped squadron in the Air Force. In 

January 1986, they were called upon to perform a capabilities demonstration for Gen John Piotrowski, now serving as the vice chief of 

staff of the Air Force. He was the highest ranking SOF officer in the 

service and held a proprietary interest in the success of the SOF 

forces. Later that month, the squadron sent another team to Dobbins 

AFB, Georgia, for mountain training and then a series of deployments to work with Army troops at Fort Bragg. It also dispatched 

aircraft and crews to Kirtland AFB for radar update testing for the 

SMOTEC and to NAS Norfolk for several ship-boarding exercises 

with naval forces. In April the squadron received another aircraft 

when HH-53H #68-10923 (the first converted CH-53) arrived from 

its modification at the NARF at Pensacola. In May five aircraft and 

crews deployed to austere sites in the western United States to participate in Exercise Elated Cyclone. On 21 May, one of the unit aircraft, HH-53H #73-1651, crashed north of Nellis AFB and was completely destroyed. The aircraft was on a classified low-level mission 

with a team of 16 personnel and was leading two HH-53s from the 

41st ARRSq when it went down. One of the Pave Low pilots, Maj 

Richard Brims, a recipient of the Air Force Cross for his actions on 

the mission to Koh Tang Island and just a few months into his tour 

with the 20th SOS, was killed. The accident report was highly classified 
224 │ THE BUILDUP

but did state that the Pave Low crews needed to develop better formation procedures when working with the HH-53B/Cs. Briefed on the 

tragic accident, Congressman Hutto, ever watchful over the Airmen 

at Hurlburt, wrote a letter to Brims’s wife expressing his deepest sympathy at the loss of her husband, offering any help he could provide 

her, and further stating, “I have always considered our crew members 

of the PAVE LOWs as unique resources—highly trained and extremely motivated and skilled individuals.”1

On 2 July, Lt Col Horace “Bo” Johnson replaced Lt Col Lou Grant 

as the squadron commander. One of the first things he was assigned 

to do was to dispatch several of his aircraft and crews to Kirtland AFB 

and fly with several R-SOLL-qualified crews from the 41st ARRSq to 

refine flight procedures but, more importantly, to resolve the level of 

distrust that had built up between the two units. The Pave Low guys 

labeled the program “Forced Friendship.” One of the 20th copilots, 

Capt Dennis Jones, recollects that “there was a lot of bad blood there 

between the two units after that accident. They basically said, ‘You 

guys will go out to Albuquerque; you will train together’—which is 

why we called it Forced Friendship—‘so that you can learn to trust 

each other and be an effective team.’ ”2

Bo Johnson also attended the training. At one point, he called all 

of the crews together and announced that he wanted to build the 20th 

into the best helicopter squadron in the USAF. He invited the 41st 

guys to transfer down to Hurlburt. Maj Rich Comer had just recently 

returned to flight duty after his assignment to the Air Force Academy 

and was now an HH-53 pilot with the 41st. Comer called Maj Gary 

Weikel—who had just left the Pentagon and joined Johnson as his 

operations officer—and expressed his interest in joining the 20th. 

Weikel then talked to Johnson, who subsequently invited Comer to 

join the 20th.3

Also with Johnson at Kirtland at that time was Capt Corby Martin. 

However, he was not there for the exercise. Instead, he was to go 

through the formal IP upgrade so that he could return to Hurlburt 

and work with Lt Col Mark Schibler and Maj Walt Heidmous in the 

Central Training Flight to train and requalify the new crews necessary to fly the expanded Pave Low fleet.4

Weikel was glad to be out of the Pentagon, especially to be sent 

back to Hurlburt to train and lead those new Pave Low crews. As 

Johnson gave Weikel the job, he said, “[Training] is your job. You are 

going to have to fly every night and be an IP and flight examiner and 
THE BUILDUP │ 225

check these guys out and help screen them.” Weikel eagerly seized his 

duties. Feeling good about his successes in the Pentagon, he looked 

forward to infusing another generation of Pave Low warriors with the 

assault mentality of special operations and his pet proclivity to “seek 

forgiveness vice permission.”5

Indeed, new personnel were inbound. When MAC announced that 

the 41st ARRSq at McClellan AFB would inactivate in September 1987 

as part of Forward Look, its aircraft were dispatched for Pave Low 

conversion, and HH-53 crew members from the unit began receiving 

orders to the 20th. Major Comer was one of them and joined the unit 

in May 1987. Fully qualified and experienced in H-53 aircraft, he flew 

mostly with Capt Tommy Hull and Capt Corby Martin and found the 

Pave Low checkout to be challenging—especially the heavy emphasis 

on night tactical training and the integrated use of the various Pave 

systems. As a senior major, Comer was then directed to run the 

scheduling and training programs.6

Another 41st pilot, Capt Joe Becker, was right behind Comer. Joe 

had been commissioned in 1982 through ROTC at San Diego State 

University. He reported directly to Fort Rucker for undergraduate helicopter pilot training. After receiving his wings, Becker got an HH-53 

assignment to the 41st. While there, he upgraded to aircraft commander and qualified with NVGs. He also became deeply involved in 

the R-SOLL program and operational plans, giving him exposure to 

the 20th SOS. After three years in the 41st, he was available for reassignment and possibly even fixed-wing conversion. However, he wanted 

to go into special operations and the Pave Low and made his interest 

in the 20th known to Johnson and Weikel. 

His timing was just right. As the squadron was expanding, Weikel 

and Johnson had started an informal recruitment program and began 

“inviting” USAF helicopter pilots and flight engineers to apply for 

Pave Low. They accepted Becker. Like Lt Col Bill Takacs seven years 

earlier, they also expanded their efforts surreptitiously to the USMC 

and Army in an attempt to entice their rotary aviators, officers, and 

warrant officers to do interservice transfers for Pave Low duty. Their 

efforts were successful, and soon Weikel and his other IPs had a lot of 

training to do.7

Becker reported to the 20th SOS in April 1987. Walking into the 

squadron building for the first time, he literally ran into Bo Johnson 

and Steve Connelly, who welcomed him to the unit. They told him 

that he would soon be starting his Pave Low upgrade and work in the 
226 │ THE BUILDUP

plans section with Capt Dave Harris and Capt Randy O’Boyle. However, first they needed to send him TDY to Fort Bragg to support 

some customers. Within days, he was at Bragg and in the midst 

of what special operators do. He was impressed because in the 

rescue community he would never have been given such responsibility so soon.8

Also arriving from the 41st ARRSq was SMSgt Tom Green. After 

he left SEA, he served with several rescue units and on the ARRS staff 

before joining the 41st as the senior flight engineer. With the demise 

of that unit, he decided to transfer to Hurlburt. Arriving there, 

though, he had to make a choice. Recently selected for promotion to 

chief master sergeant, he was offered the position of senior enlisted 

advisor to the 1st SOW wing commander, Col Dale Stovall, with 

whom he had flown combat in the 40th ARRSq at NKP, Thailand, in 

1972. However, Green was very proud of the young flight engineers 

whom he had trained in the 41st and wanted to insure that they were 

properly accepted into the rapidly building 20th SOS. He decided to 

pass on the advisor job and go into the 20th. It was a fateful choice. 

He found a hard core of established flight engineers who had developed a strong sense of brotherhood and were slow to accept outsiders, 

especially guys from rescue units. Green worked diligently to help the 

unit expand and train the large number of flight engineers needed to 

fly the rapidly growing fleet and projected new operational squadrons. Challenges abounded as the new troops of varying backgrounds 

worked through the numerous qualifications and types of training 

necessary to become fully combat qualified on both the HH-53H and 

MH-53J variants of the Pave Low. Although Green had some difficulties with other NCOs in the 20th, they were able to work through the 

issues as the unit trained hard on the endless exercises that had the 

troops continually on the road.9

Joining Pave Low at about the same time as Tom Green was Sgt Jim 

Kradel. He had enlisted in the USAF in 1983 and initially trained as a 

weapons specialist. While serving a remote tour in Korea, he heard 

that enlisted gunners were needed at Hurlburt Field, and he volunteered, not knowing that he would be going to helicopters. Arriving 

at the 20th, he was overwhelmed by what he found, realizing that he 

did not even know how to put on a flight suit. The 20th SOS superintendent, SMSgt John Selfridge, took him under his wing and pointed 

him in the right direction. He was able to fly a few training sorties at 

Hurlburt to begin learning his crew duties before going TDY to Kirt-
THE BUILDUP │ 227

land for his initial qualification. While at Kirtland, he learned the 

Pave Low aircraft and weapons systems, the basics of crew coordination, and scanning duties. However, because of aircraft scheduling 

problems and lack of weapons range availability, he was not able to 

fire any of the Pave Low weapons. Returning from the school after a 

month, he received the rest of his crew and combat qualification 

training at Hurlburt and was fully qualified for tactical missions by 

February 1988. Now the proud wearer of a red scarf to go with his 

flight suit, he was assigned to a crew and began to deploy for the endless exercises to work with all of the “customers” now requesting Pave 

Low support.10

Another individual who heard about the Pave Low program 

through the grapevine was Maj Gene Correll. Commissioned out of 

the Air Force Academy in 1973, he initially flew as a T-37 IP before 

receiving an assignment to HH-53s in 1978. After rotary wing conversion and then H-53 school, he reported to the 6594th Test Group 

of AFSC in Hawaii to fly in the Crested Rooster program. He flew 

with the group until 1982, upgrading to flight examiner and participating in numerous satellite recovery missions and some shipboard 

medical extractions. With over 1,000 hours in the H-53, he then 

transferred to Kirtland AFB to serve as a MAC H-53 instructor. Unfortunately, MAC did not recognize his flight examiner status in 

AFSC, and he had to go through its qualification program before he 

could teach. However, he could instruct in the H-53 simulator and 

went right to work doing that. Between the two jobs, he became quite 

familiar with numerous Pave Low guys, including Gary Weikel. In 

1987 he talked to Weikel, who asked that Correll be assigned to the 

20th. Correll received orders soon after.11

Another of the new arrivals was Capt Mike Kingsley, a native of 

Sacramento, California. He had watched the HH-53s fly around 

McClellan before being commissioned in 1984. After attending helicopter 

pilot training, he served a tour in Korea flying H-3s with the 38th 

ARRSq and upgraded to aircraft commander. At the completion of 

that tour, he received orders to RAF Bentwaters, UK, to fly the HH-53 

with the 67th ARRSq. He completed his HH-53 upgrade at Kirtland 

during 1987 and also attended the Squadron Officer School at Maxwell 

AFB. While at Maxwell, his orders were changed, and he was diverted 

to Hurlburt to join the 20th. Kingsley had to scramble to reroute his 

hold baggage and autos before they were shipped to the UK. 
228 │ THE BUILDUP

Arriving at Hurlburt, Kingsley met his immediate supervisor, 

Capt Steve Otto. The training pipeline was a bit backed up, and Otto 

arranged for Kingsley to take a TDY to work directly with a team of 

Soldiers from the 3d Special Forces Group (SFG) on a long exercise 

in northwest Florida. When that was completed, he started upgrade 

training on the HH-53H. His initial impressions of the unit were 

strongly positive. He remembers that 

we had a cadre of people who were diehard Pave Low: Tommy Aldrich, Pappy 

Walters, Corby Martin. They had flown Pave Lows, so they were the cadre who 

were instructing other people who were coming from different organizations. 

We had people from the 41st—like Joe Becker and J. D. Clem. We also had 

people coming from Europe—Jim Eustace came from Germany. . . . We had a 

menagerie of people who were coming from lots of different experiences. We 

relied on that cadre of Pave Low guys to train all the rest of us and make us one 

whole unit. It was really, really good. I thought the morale was very high. We 

had quite a bit of flying that we were doing, and there were lots of exercises. 

For the next 18 months, Captain Kingsley would be in constant upgrade mode as he initially qualified on the HH-53H. Like all the other 

Pave Low crew members, Kingsley trained at Hurlburt and at Asheville, North Carolina, for mountain training. He finally became a 

fully qualified Pave Low aircraft commander in 1989.12

Maj Steve Connelly also joined the unit that summer. After he returned to Kirtland from Hurlburt in 1980, he continued in flight test 

and was then reassigned to Edwards AFB for the HH-60D program. 

In the spring of 1987, he contacted Weikel and talked himself into a 

job. Arriving as a lieutenant colonel select, he became an assistant 

operations officer and focused on the myriad issues involved with 

routing aircraft to and from the NARF at Pensacola, as the Pave Low 

modification line was again open. 

A few days after Weikel started his new job, he and Johnson were 

subsequently called to attend a “close-hold” briefing by MAC for 

selected commanders and personnel on the Forward Look TwentyThird Air Force reorganization, especially the inactivation of 2d AD 

and the impact on Hurlburt and its units and personnel. The next 

week, the squadron received another aircraft when HH-53H #70-

1629 arrived from its modification at the NARF. Through the rest of 

the year, the crews participated in major exercises Display Determination and Gallant Eagle, although MAC put limitations on the number 

of major exercises they could be tasked to support so they could focus 

their training on their “customer” base within JSOC. Consequently, 
THE BUILDUP │ 229

the crews continued to deploy to Army and Navy bases around the 

country for continuous training, focusing on NVG long-range operations, infiltrations/exfiltrations, and shipboard operations. In November 

the 20th hosted a rotary-wing Special Operations Aircrew Interchange 

Program for crews from 14 different units. For four days the crews of 

HH-53s, HH-3s, and UH-60s flew with each other, exchanging tips 

and experiences as they practiced air refueling, hot ground refueling at 

austere locations, NVG operations, and formation procedures.13

Throughout the year, the aircraft began to receive the various navigation, avionics, communications, and countermeasures modifications previously approved, and available flying time for the aircrews 

was reduced as the aircraft were being modified. Additionally, Deputy 

Secretary of Defense Taft directed the USAF to upgrade the 10 

previously designated H-53s to the Pave Low III Enhanced or MH-53J 

configuration by the beginning of 1988. This number was increased 

to 11 after the crash in May, as $59.6 million was made available for 

the project that the NARF would accomplish. The enhancement 

would include the installation of the INS/GPS combined navigational 

systems as well as improvements to the radar and FLIR, the NVGcompatible head-up display (HUD), the NVG-compatible instrument lights, internal fuel bladders for increased range, and further 

improvements to countermeasures systems and secure communications. In anticipation of the aircraft increases, the unit was authorized 

more personnel, and they began to slowly join the unit. 

That same summer, Congress directed that 41 H-53s of any variant 

in existence be converted to the Pave Low III Enhanced configuration 

and become MH-53Js. MAC published Program Management Directive 5249(4)/3279 to direct the Pave Low III Enhanced modification 

funded at $451 million. In Washington, Maj Ed Reed kept visiting 

myriad offices using the FAD-1 designation for Pave Low to get priority for equipment modifications. He was aggressive in insisting that 

the Pave Low aircraft should be some of the very first USAF aircraft 

to receive GPS navigational systems. Reed relays that

we had a FAD-1 designator for the H-53 aircraft. So I went to the first GPS 

meeting. I was a junior major there and everybody listed all of the aircraft that 

were going to get GPS and . . . every fighter was covered, every bomber was 

covered. And then some line in the nineties, the H-53 was going to get it. Wrong 

answer! I said, “Sorry, I’ve got a FAD-1 so I move to the front of the line.” They 

said, “You can’t do that. We’ve got this list!” I said, “You’d better call this office 

and find out if that’s going to be your list at the end of the day. So later I got a nice 
230 │ THE BUILDUP

phone call. They said, “You can have the first boxes off the line.” I said, “That 

would work just fine.”14

To support this growing and ever more complex fleet of aircraft, 

MAC began to assign more maintenance specialists to Hurlburt to 

learn and maintain these sophisticated and integrated systems.15

In related developments, on 30 September 1986, the 6594th Test 

Group at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, inactivated. Its five HH-53s were 

loaded aboard MAC C-5s and flown to Kirtland. There they were assigned to the 1550th CCTW, with the understanding that they would 

soon be in the queue for MH-53J modification.16

Exactly one month later, HH-53C #68-10354, assigned to the 

6514th Test Squadron at Hill AFB, Utah, crashed while carrying a 

survey team to a designated remote landing site on Swasey Peak, 120 

miles southwest of the base. The crew made a hard landing at the site, 

which was at 9,500 feet elevation, and a subsequent fire destroyed the 

aircraft. Fortunately, the crew and all passengers successfully egressed 

the aircraft without any significant injuries; however, it was a tragic 

loss of an aircraft slated for Pave Low III Enhanced modification.17

Twenty-Third Air Force

As 1987 began, the USAF announced that Twenty-Third Air Force 

would move to Hurlburt Field by 1 September. The announcement 

stated that the move “would allow the Twenty-Third Air Force to perform its special operations functions more efficiently and . . . eliminate 

the need for 2d Air Division.” Consequently, on 1 February the 2d 

AD quietly inactivated, and the 1st SOW reverted to direct control of 

the Twenty-Third Air Force with minimal impact on the subordinate 

squadrons. Units in the Pacific and Europe also started to realign as 

directed under Forward Look, and Twenty-Third Air Force activated 

an FOL at Hurlburt to begin the preliminary planning and coordination of the move.18

United States Special Operations Command

When USSOCOM was activated in April, it was not initially assigned any forces or components. However, the enabling legislation 

stated that “unless directed by the Secretary of Defense, all active and 
THE BUILDUP │ 231

reserve special operations forces of all armed forces stationed in the 

United States shall be assigned to the Special Operations Command.” 

Accordingly, Secretary of Defense Weinberger assigned the TwentyThird Air Force to USSOCOM as the Air Force component (AFSOC), 

along with the 1st SOCOM from the Army (ARSOC), and the Naval 

Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM). A few months 

later, he would also assign the Joint Special Operations Command 

when USSOCOM was fully operational.19

However, Twenty-Third Air Force was still a numbered air force in 

MAC, and the commander, General Patterson, now had to answer to 

two commanders as well as move his command to Hurlburt. The command, now being informally referred to as AFSOC, was in place by 1 

August, and in early September, General Lindsay and his operations 

officer, USAF major general Hugh Cox (former commander of the 1st 

SOW and 2d AD), visited the base. While there, General Lindsay made 

it very clear that he did not consider rescue a special operations mission and also that he wanted to “purify” the command of any missions 

except special operations. As General Lindsay and General Cassidy 

conferred on Lindsay’s concerns, the Twenty-Third Air Force staff began to draft a plan to divest the non-SOF-type units over the next few 

years. In parallel, based upon guidance from Headquarters USAF, 

MAC published a special order in September reassigning the 375th 

Aeromedical Airlift Wing, the 1606th ABW, and several other smaller 

units from Twenty-Third Air Force to other MAC commands. The 

Twenty-Third commander, General Patterson, was in a tough position 

as he tried to placate and serve two very different commanders.20

Initiative 17

As General Lindsay worked to bring his command up to full speed, 

he also directed a reevaluation of Initiative 17. Dutifully, his J3 and J5 

reviewed the initiative to date and reported back to him that it was 

alive and well. However, current funding provided for both MH-53s 

and MH-47Es. The Air Force remained committed to retaining its 

SOF helicopter mission until the Army produced and fielded sufficient MH-47Es to meet SOF requirements. The Air Force MH-53s 

would support SOF until at least the mid 1990s. However, the MH53s were projected to be serviceable until at least 2000, making them 

available for other missions. USSOCOM would definitely have its 
232 │ THE BUILDUP

rotary-wing support from both the Air Force and Army, with their 

portions being dictated by funding, and with the underlying “understanding” that at some nondefined point in the future, the Army 

would take over the entire mission.21

20th Special Operations Squadron

Given the missions assigned to the new command, the 20th SOS 

was considered a key element of the AFSOC. Its aircraft and crews 

represented the command’s ability to vertically insert and extract the 

special operations teams. The 20th crews and support personnel realized that many more aircraft and Airmen were coming to the unit. 

Additionally, they would be the forming cadre for more Pave Low 

squadrons. The training load was staggering. Consequently, the 20th 

cut back on its participation in exercises and dramatically stepped up 

its training program. In April the squadron deployed four aircraft 

and crews to Knoxville, Tennessee, to conduct mountain training. 

This was considered a better site than Dobbins AFB because around 

Knoxville the crews could get almost twice as much actual mountain 

flying per sortie than in Georgia. During the seven-week period, the 

crews logged 210 student sorties and completed mountain training 

for 19 pilots, engineers, and gunners. 

The mountain training was critical for both qualifying the crews 

and developing unit identity and cohesion. The focused training away 

from home station also afforded the new troops an opportunity to 

show that they could achieve those standards and establish themselves as members of the 20th. 

The aircrews were now entering the squadron from diverse 

backgrounds—rescue, tactical lift, and test squadrons; former 20th 

SOS UH-1N guys; and the general USAF helicopter fleet. Major Correll 

felt that the unit devolved, somewhat, into individual cliques and 

noted, too, that there was a bit of resentment on the part of some of 

the “original” Pave Low crew members, who believed that such a 

large and rapid expansion was degrading unit standards. They also 

seemed to feel that they had a proprietary right to first consideration 

on the flight schedule and should be able to amend and modify it to 

fit their personal desires. To Maj Rich Comer, it seemed that the 

squadron had informally developed an “A” team / “B” team mentality. 

He remembered the problems that existed like this back when he was 
THE BUILDUP │ 233

in the 40th ARRSq at NKP, Thailand, and moved aggressively to 

staunch such cronyism, believing that the squadron needed to train 

to one standard and prepare all of its personnel to be able to handle 

any one mission or a long-duration air campaign.22

Additionally, several of the new pilots were nonvolunteer assignees 

from the 601st at Sembach. They were not happy with the assignment 

and also held hard feelings toward the 20th because of the death of 

one of their heroes, Dick Brims, in the Nellis crash. Johnson and 

Weikel were certainly aware of these buzzings but felt that these issues 

would fade as more aircraft arrived, flying hours for all increased, and 

the troops got their training, refocusing them on the missions. 

The squadron kept a four-ship of Pave Lows up at Knoxville, initially 

using the H models until the new J models (even with missing FLIR 

and radar units) could replace them. Much of the conversion training 

took place there too, as the pilots and flight engineers developed and 

then practiced new procedures to fully capitalize on the capabilities 

in the new enhanced INS/GPS system. In a larger sense, though, the 

deployed mountain training program contributed greatly to unit 

bonding. Several more deployments were made to Knoxville throughout the year. However, the training load was almost stifling to a unit 

that had to be ready to respond to a real-world tasking on short notice, 

and the 1st SOW, Twenty-Third Air Force, and MAC training officers 

held discussions about possibly moving some of the mission training 

to the 1550th CCTW at Kirtland AFB.23

The 20th SOS also supported several classified equipment tests conducted by the SMOTEC and deployed an aircraft and crew to Robin 

AFB, Georgia, to test new titanium main rotor blades for the aircraft. 

As much as possible, the 20th also responded to requests from JSOC to 

provide lift support for other service elements. On 17 July, the squadron 

took possession of the first Pave Low III Enhanced MH-53J, #67-14994, 

when the aircraft was flown to Hurlburt from the NARF at NAS Pensacola. Coordinating the movement of the aircraft from the NARF to 

Hurlburt, Lt Col Steve Connelly was also heavily involved with the testing and validation of the aircraft. He, Capt Joe Barnes, and Capt Tom 

Hull spent a great deal of time at Pensacola performing flight tests and 

equipment verifications. Those tasks and the heavy training and deployment regimen continued throughout the year. By the end of December 1987, the aircraft and crews of the 20th had logged 1,912 sorties and 4,192.8 flight hours, a record for any USAF H-53 squadron 

ever. All indicators seemed to suggest that 1988 would be even busier.24
234 │ THE BUILDUP

The new year of 1988 started on a sad note when a long-time staunch 

supporter of SOF, Cong. Dan Daniel of Virginia, died on 23 January. 

He had courageously led the fight for SOF renewal and revitalization, 

and his steady hand and great concern for the servicemen and women 

of the nation would be sorely missed. A few months later, Lt Col Mark 

Schibler nearly suffered the same fate when he experienced a severe 

heart attack one Sunday afternoon. After Honey Badger, he had stayed 

at Hurlburt, upgrading to Pave Low flight examiner and helping to 

train the second generation of Pave Low crews. He eventually moved 

up to the standardization and evaluation office at the 1st SOW, and 

then Twenty-Third Air Force, until his affliction caused his permanent 

removal from flight status. Instead of taking a medical retirement, 

though, he continued to serve until he reached his mandatory retirement date in November 1990.25

Twenty-Third Air Force 

At the headquarters, General Patterson had a full plate of issues to 

deal with as he addressed the challenges of his two roles. In February 

Courtesy Lt Col Ed Reed, USAF, Retired

Maj Ed Reed visits the Pensacola NARF for the delivery of the first MH-53J, 

#67-14994.
THE BUILDUP │ 235

he formed a special commander’s staff group to focus on the AFSOCunique issues as they arose and to insure that they were tracked and 

resolved as expeditiously as possible. He also directed his vicecommander, Brig Gen Hanson Scott, to form a special operations 

program integration team to oversee all of the phenomenal changes 

that AFSOC’s existing and newly acquired aircraft were undergoing. 

Eight programs were now going on simultaneously involving the 

MH-53s, MC-130s, AC-130s, U/H-60s, and several other classified 

projects. Additionally, the team also monitored the development of 

new training devices and flight simulators at Kirtland AFB, where the 

equipment was used in the integrated flight training program. 

Patterson was also becoming increasingly more involved with USSOCOM as that command settled in and began to function. General 

Lindsay made it clear that he wanted his command to begin utilizing 

the acquisition authority it now had under MFP-11. He commissioned a study group to define the process so that USSOCOM could 

work through the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 

(PPBS) process and submit a program objective memorandum 

(POM) for 1992–96. He was also aware that with the creation of USSOCOM, the services had dramatically cut their budgets for special 

operations forces, and he had to lobby heavily with key members of 

Congress to realign that authority under MFP-11. He also had his 

staff build a classified joint special operations forces baseline master 

plan to determine what capabilities his command currently possessed 

and what needed to be developed through the POM cycle. Under its 

enabling legislation, USSOCOM could function as a supported or 

supporting command and had to develop the ability to do both deliberate and crisis action planning.26

Since Twenty-Third Air Force was still a numbered MAC air force, 

it got funding from both commands, which drew their monies from 

different MFPs. This was a real challenge for the Twenty-Third staff to 

keep straight. However, General Patterson did take advantage of his 

dual status in one particular instance. When the Twenty-Third Air 

Force received its dual tasking, the command was not authorized any 

more manpower. Patterson had the staff develop a concise plan for 

needed staff augmentation with 137 new billets, which he then presented to both MAC and USSOCOM for validation and funding. By 

the summer, 121 of the billets were validated, and they received funding within the next six months.27
236 │ THE BUILDUP

Pave Low Training

Another specific issue which had to be resolved was that of aircrew 

training, a responsibility that both MAC and USSOCOM felt was 

theirs. A special working group with representatives from both and 

the DOD studied all aspects of the problem, including the heavy 

training load managed by the Central Training Flight at Hurlburt. It 

was still conducting all mission qualification training for all of the 

aircrews in AFSOC, now running at about 200 students per year and 

expected to grow with the expansion of AFSOC aircraft and forces. 

The working group recommended that all MH-53 and MC-130 training be moved to Kirtland AFB. Congressman Hutto learned about 

this proposal and moved as he could, with the backing of Cong. John 

Kasich from Ohio, to block it. He wanted the training to be kept at 

Hurlburt and wrote a letter to Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci 

requesting his support. The issue would take more effort to resolve.28

In March 1988, the two commands conducted another study and 

once again recommended that the training be moved to Kirtland 

AFB. Additionally, USSOCOM wanted to designate the training location as the United States Special Air Warfare Center to serve on a par 

with collateral centers established by the Army and Navy at Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina, and Coronado Naval Base, California, respectively. In June the deputy secretary of defense, William Taft IV, reviewed the study and directed another, much broader, study that 

would develop a series of recommendations. This Air Force Special 

Operations Forces Aircrew Training Working Group reviewed all the 

studies to date and then in coordination with the acting ASD/SOLIC, 

the Honorable John Marsh, also the serving secretary of the Army, 

developed a series of options varying by time phasing of aircraft and 

locations of units. Col Charles Holland, the 1550th CCTW commander, and his staff developed an entire program to modify the 

wing and base for the expanded training mission and were able to 

brief that plan to the MAC staff, the Twenty-Third Air Force staff, and 

Marsh. Marsh then reviewed the options and determined that Kirtland AFB was the best choice for MH-53J and MC-130E/H training. 

USSOCOM acquiesced but did not lose its desire to turn the 1550th 

into some form of special operations organization.29

As these various actions were taking place, the 1551st FTS was still 

conducting H-53 training, although its fleet of aircraft had been 

added to the Pave Low modification schedule. Regardless, it still had 
THE BUILDUP │ 237

a cadre of IPs and engineers who could act as a logical nucleus for a 

Pave Low school, as well as specialized tactical and NVG training. 

Anticipating that the Pave Low training would be transferred to Kirtland AFB, the 1551st FTS sent two flight engineer instructors, MSgt 

Sam Moore and MSgt Peter Zilink, to the Central Training Flight at 

Hurlburt Field to develop and write courseware for the MH-53J flight 

engineer’s course. Additionally, both were certified as academic instructors on the aircraft while there. Both then returned to Kirtland 

AFB, where they established the course under the direction of Capt 

Mark Perkins. 

Captain Perkins and Capt Brandon Thompson also traveled to 

Hurlburt to become certified as MH-53J academic instructors so that 

they could begin building the qualification course for the MH-53J 

pilot and copilots. Their initial plan was to begin Pave Low qualifications by the beginning of 1989. However, that was predicated upon a 

final basing decision and the assignment of MH-53J aircraft to the 

1550th CCTW.30

More MH-53s and Aircrews

At Hurlburt Field, the operations tempo remained high as the 20th 

SOS maintained its capability to answer national taskings and prepared for the influx of the added Pave Lows and crews. Occasionally, 

though, more mundane missions occurred that put the crews to good 

use. On 26 April 1988, Colonel Weikel with Maj Mike Letica and 

crew were conducting a night training mission with NVGs when they 

heard a distress call from the Eglin AFB tower controller asking for 

assistance to locate a US Army helicopter with a patient that had 

landed somewhere in the area because of a mechanical problem. The 

patient was a young woman who had suffered a severed arm in an 

aircraft accident, and the Army helicopter was transporting her to a 

hospital in Mobile, Alabama, but had to land in a field near Crestview, Florida. Weikel had a flight surgeon, Capt Kory Cornum, on 

board and diverted to Crestview, where he landed next to the Army 

helicopter. There his engineers and gunners transferred the patient to 

the Pave Low. Cornum immediately comforted her and made sure 

that the severed arm was properly cared for as Weikel and Letica used 

the sophisticated navigational gear on the aircraft to chart a course 

from Crestview directly to the hospital in Mobile. Fortunately, several 
238 │ THE BUILDUP

intervening limited-use areas were inactive, and traffic controllers 

helped with the necessary air traffic clearances. Arriving at the hospital, Weikel and his crew discovered that it had a very small landing 

area. Regardless, the crew members put their special training to good 

use and were able to land on the pad. The young woman was quickly 

taken into surgery where the doctors worked to stabilize her condition and reattach her arm. For the Pave Low crews, their training 

mission turned into a good night’s work.31

The transformation of the USAF H-53 fleet was going well. 

Throughout the year, the aircraft cycled through the NARF at Pensacola for the SLEP and their MH-53J modifications. Five CH-53Cs 

were transferred from the 601st TCW at Sembach AB to RAF Woodbridge to be flown by the forming 21st SOS before being returned to 

the CONUS for MH-53J conversion. Another two CH-53Cs were returned to the CONUS for conversion and assignment to Kirtland and 

Hurlburt. Additionally, the USAF and USMC concluded an agreement that allowed for the assignment of six CH-53As, numbers 66-

14468, -14469, -14470, -14471, -14472, and -14473, to the 1550th 

CCTW at Kirtland AFB for use as TH-53A trainer aircraft. In April 

the SMOTEC at Hurlburt Field conducted a qualification OT&E using the recently modified MH-53J #67-14994 to validate that the aircraft in this configuration could accomplish its stated capabilities. 

The classified test was successful. However, the community suffered a 

setback on 20 October when two aircraft, HH-53H #70-1629 and 

MH-53J #68-08286, were damaged while conducting a training mission at Fort Picket, Virginia. The first aircraft suffered a hard landing 

when the crew members encountered brownout conditions as they 

approached the landing zone to extract 28 Army troops. The pilots of 

the second aircraft abandoned their approach and attempted another 

from a different angle. As the aircraft came to a hover, the crew once 

again encountered brownout conditions. The right scanner also informed the pilot that there were people below them, and he arrested 

the aircraft’s rate of descent. Unfortunately, while in the dust cloud, 

the aircraft drifted to the left, hitting a power pole, power line, and 

some large trees. The aircraft came to a rest 75 feet from the landing 

zone. Fortunately, only one crewman was injured. But the repairs to 

the two aircraft cost $6.7 million, money somehow acquired by the 

magical Maj Ed Reed.32

The 20th was also steadily receiving more Airmen. A few more arrived from the 601st TASS at Sembach as that unit also inactivated. In 
THE BUILDUP │ 239

March 1988, 1st Lt Tom Trask reported for duty as a Pave Low pilot. 

He had been commissioned almost four years earlier out of the ROTC 

program at Embry-Riddle University, Daytona Beach, Florida. Trask 

had originally intended to be an aeronautical engineer. However, one 

of his professors had been an Army helicopter pilot in Vietnam. He 

told Trask that the Air Force was about to buy a bunch of HH-60Ds 

and suggested that he go to pilot training and fly helicopters. That 

sounded reasonable, so Trask took the tests and got a training slot to 

Fort Rucker. His class of 90 students also included future Pave Low 

pilots 2d Lt Al Bridges and 2d Lt Matt Shazda. 

Trask enjoyed the training, especially the NVG work and tactical 

navigation. Graduating in June 1985, he received an assignment to fly 

UH-1Ns with the rescue detachment at Edwards AFB. While there, 

he upgraded to aircraft commander and IP. His unit still trained for 

combat recovery, and he was able to participate in several training 

exercises with the new A-10s at England AFB, Louisiana, to sharpen 

his skills.

In the summer of 1987, MAC had determined that the UH-1N was 

no longer viable as a combat recovery aircraft, and the various detachments were inactivated. Trask wanted an assignment to the Pave 

Lows at the 20th SOS. Before he could get the assignment, though, he 

had to conduct a telephone interview with the 20th commander, Lt 

Col “Bo” Johnson. Surviving that 30-minute forthright conversation, 

Trask reported to Kirtland AFB in October for his transition training.

 There he joined with 1st Lt Larry Munz and 1st Lt Brad Webb, also 

former UH-1N pilots from sister detachments, who had also received 

assignments to the 20th. The qualification course was six months 

long and was conducted on C/H-53Bs and Cs. Trask was also able to 

stay at Kirtland for six more weeks to receive formal NVG training, 

which was a separate course. While there, he also received training of 

another sort. He found out that the red scarf worn by the men of the 

20th was something really special and not lightly earned. As part of 

his move to the 20th, he had contacted the squadron and had been 

assigned Capt Kevin Ewing as his host officer to help him get established in the unit. Ewing had himself just arrived from the 41st 

ARRSq and—not aware of the squadron traditions—sent Trask 

patches for his flight suit and a red scarf. When Lieutenant Trask received them, he was impressed and decided to put the patches on his 

flight suit and to wear the scarf. A few days later, he heard that a 20th 

Pave Low had just flown in. He found out that the crew was at the 
240 │ THE BUILDUP

Officers’ Club and decided to go over and meet them. He walked in 

and found Maj Jeff Walls and Capt Pappy Walters. As Trask approached, Walters spotted him and his red scarf. Trask remembered,

I didn’t know what it meant. It was just like any other squadron; you get the 

patches and you put them on. . . . Pappy Walters . . . saw me wearing the red 

scarf, and he came across that bar just about as fast as I have ever seen him 

move before or since. He started thumping me in the chest. “Who the hell are 

you, and why the hell are you wearing my scarf? What gives you the right? 

Who told you that you could wear it? If I don’t know who you are, you definitely never earned it!”. . . The other guys had to drag him off of me. We were 

about to go to blows right there. We hadn’t even been drinking yet; . . . it was 

only about 5 o’clock in the afternoon. I learned that I was not to wear my scarf 

until I got qualified in the Pave Low.33

Lieutenant Webb also met Walters at Kirtland, although the encounter was much more benign. He recalled Walters saying that “you 

had better be prepared to play hardball when you come to the 20th. 

It’s going to happen, and it’s going to happen big.” That was fine with 

Webb. The son of an Air Force officer and SEA combat veteran, he 

graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1984 and selected helicopter pilot training. He then picked a UH-1N assignment in hopes of 

doing a lot of flying. Assigned for two years at Hill AFB, Utah, he 

learned a great deal about the nuances of helicopter and mountain 

flying from the “old heads” and participated in some civilian rescues 

while also learning to fly with NVGs. He was ready and eager to fly 

the Pave Low.34

When Lieutenant Trask finally arrived at the 20th, Walters saw 

him and profusely apologized for his actions. Trask then found Colonel Johnson and formally reported in. Johnson had a million things 

on his mind at that moment, but he still took the lieutenant into his 

office for a quick brief. He made it clear that Trask was a lucky guy to 

get the assignment and that if he did not measure up, Johnson would 

have no problems with showing him the door. He also explained that 

Trask was arriving just ahead of a large influx of personnel and might 

be able to get right into his Pave Low conversion. With that, he gave 

the lieutenant a handshake and sent him down to the orderly room to 

begin his in-processing.

Walking through the squadron, Trask was rather put off by the arrogance which radiated from the Pave Low crewmen. Several tried to 

grab him to work various projects that needed a goodly amount of 

“grunt” work, and the squadron flight scheduler explained to him 
THE BUILDUP │ 241

how low he really was on the training list. By the end of the week, 

Trask was a bit dispirited and beginning to wonder just what he had 

gotten himself into. Fortunately, he met Steve Connelly. Seeing Trask’s 

despondent mood, Connelly told him that they were going over to 

the Officers’ Club. There, he assured Trask that the week just completed would be his worst in the squadron and told him how neat it 

was going to be flying the Pave Lows with such a great group of Airmen. Trask was further heartened on Monday when he again saw 

Colonel Johnson, who told him that he would be put to work in the 

plans office working for a sharp young captain named Randy O’Boyle. 

A few days later, he was also told that he would be able to start his 

academics with the Central Training Flight, thus beginning his Pave 

Low qualification.35

Six weeks later, Colonel Weikel replaced Lt Col Bo Johnson as the 

commander of the 20th SOS. He chose Lt Col Mike Russell to serve 

as the operations officer. One of the initial 20th SOS Pave Low pilots, 

Russell left the unit in 1984 for a one-year tour in Korea. That was 

followed by duty in the classified programs division on the TwentyThird Air Force staff at Scott AFB and then at Hurlburt when the 

Twenty-Third Air Force headquarters was moved down there. Settling into the 20th, Russell had to receive a requalification on the HH-53H. 

He took several local rides in the aircraft, and then Capt Randy 

O’Boyle gave him his check ride, writing on his evaluation form, 

“Once a Pave Low God, always a Pave Low God.”36

With Weikel’s concurrence, Russell reorganized the flight system 

in the squadron to better prepare for the large influx of crew members coming to the unit. He also had to deal with a number of personnel issues. Several transferees from the Sembach unit were not volunteers for Pave Low and openly resented being there. Additionally, 

some of the transplants from the 41st ARRSq believed that the 20th 

SOS was a clear step down from their old unit and said so openly. Of 

more concern to Russell, though, was what appeared to be a lack of 

professionalism across all areas of performance. Some higher-ranking 

Twenty-Third Air Force officers, including the commander, General 

Patterson, believed that the three Pave Low crashes were, in part, a 

manifestation of an atmosphere of sloppiness. Russell later related,

What I found when I got to the 20th was for the most part [that] General 

Patterson’s concerns were not as bad as he had made them to be but that they 

were founded. The guys—some of the old guys—were, in fact, running on the 

extremes. They were good pilots; they flew the aircraft really well; but there 
242 │ THE BUILDUP

was a lack of discipline. That was my big challenge as the DO: to bring discipline and what I call “professionalism” in all aspects of the mission and to give 

us a little bit better credibility with the customer. . . . Working on our image 

and professionalism was my big challenge as the DO.37

Lt Col Rich Comer was elevated to assistant operations officer and 

given responsibility for the war readiness section, which included 

mobility, plans, and tactics. Unfortunately, he and Russell had different 

personalities and found it challenging, at times, to find common approaches to issues. Their differences did cause some friction in the unit.38

MSgt Rick Simmon was still involved in training Pave Low flight 

engineers. He had left the squadron in 1986 for a tour on H-3s with 

the 31st ARRSq at Clark AB in the Philippines. Returning in late 

1987, he was now working with the 1st SOW Standardization and 

Evaluation Office with Capt Pappy Walters. Both were using their extensive aircraft and mission knowledge to insure that the new flight engineers and pilots were fully trained and mission capable.39

The squadron was also filling up with enlisted troops to serve as 

the flight engineers and gunners. One of them was SSgt Ed Hux. He 

had grown up in California and, after high school graduation in 1978, 

had enlisted in the USAF. He initially trained as an aircraft mechanic 

and served as a crew chief on F-4s before switching over to helicopters and then qualifying as a flight engineer on UH-1Ns. He did tours 

with UH-1N units in Nevada and then Panama, where he entered 

special operations and began to train for the uniqueness of the missions. When the Panama unit was inactivated, he transferred to the 

20th SOS in late 1987. For the next 18 months, he attended initial 

H-53 qualification training at Kirtland and then worked his way 

through the myriad of NVG and tactical qualifications at Hurlburt 

and mountain training at Dobbins. He trained on both the HH-53H 

and the MH-53J, discovering that his initial special operations training acquired on the UH-1N actually gave him an advantage in getting 

through the program. However, like all of the other crew members, 

he found it challenging to rise to the level of performance needed to 

serve as one of six men on board the Pave Low. He was intimidated 

by all that he had to learn about aircraft systems and performance, 

the new enhanced navigation system, the self-protective equipment, 

and all of the sophisticated radio gear. Hux remembered that “it was 

actually pretty awe-inspiring at the time. It was quite a step up. What 

helped me was having that prior [special operations] experience.”40
THE BUILDUP │ 243

Most important, though, Hux realized that the safe and efficient 

operation of the Pave Low, in any variation, required full and complete crew integration regardless of the relative rank among the crew 

members. He said,

If they [were] not working as one team, you couldn’t do the mission. The FE 

[flight engineer] is running stuff up front; he obviously can’t fly the aircraft. 

The guys up front . . . we take a huge load off so they can concentrate on actually 

flying and executing the mission. It’s almost a voice-activated cockpit; they 

can ask for information or ask for something to be done, and the FE in the seat 

is hopefully doing it already or getting it done for him.

As they go to make their approaches or landings, . . . the pilots lose sight of the 

LZ [landing zone]; they are relying on those three guys in the back to get them 

in. The Pave Low is 88 or 90 feet long; they have no idea what is going on behind them that last 75 to 80 feet. It’s got to work as a well-orchestrated team, 

or the mission just never gets done. Sometimes the [flight engineer] in the seat 

[has the] job to keep everybody focused and on track. What was neat was 

sometimes if he got overtasked or maybe he wasn’t on his game, there were 

five other people to pull him back. You had another FE in the door. “Hey, have 

you run such-and-such a checklist yet?” “Oh!”

The Pave Low is clearly and truly a crew airplane. We trained it; we harped on it.41

The entire mission qualification process for new pilots like Trask 

and Webb took, on average, nine full months after their Kirtland 

training. It culminated with a long TDY to Dobbins or Knoxville to 

get mountain training so necessary to qualify with the TF/TA radar. 

Trask began his training on the HH-53H. While he was working 

through the course, though, the squadron began to receive the MH53Js. As they became available for flight, some were immediately 

used for training duties. However, as Trask noted, the two aircraft 

models were hugely different. They were a full generation apart in 

their level of technology. Given the vagaries of aircraft availability on 

the flying schedule, Trask had to learn to fly both. This vastly increased his training load but qualified him to fly both aircraft models. 

Finally, though, in early 1989, he was fully qualified as a copilot on 

both aircraft, giving him a real advantage.42

Then he earnestly threw himself into learning the planning process. 

He became a Pave Low liaison officer to the US Army Rangers and 

spent a great deal of time with the 2d Battalion of the 75th Ranger 

Regiment. This required him to travel quite a bit with the battalion, 

including two rotations to Panama in 1989 for focused training there. 

On the second exercise, called Pave Jungle, he, Maj Rich Comer, Capt 
244 │ THE BUILDUP

Brad Webb, and several other pilots got to fly missions in the Canal 

Zone and became quite familiar with the area and specific landing 

zones. USSOCOM contingency planners noted this fact and filed it 

away for future use. Ultimately, all three Ranger battalions rotated 

through the training and also gained a goodly bit of familiarity with the 

geography of Panama. One specific Pave Low flight, though, had unintended consequences. Comer and Webb inadvertently flew over a Panamanian restricted area where a key Panamanian unit, Battalion 2000, 

was located. This caused quite a reaction from the Panamanian government, which protested the “aggressive behavior” of the US forces.43

In the summer of 1989, Trask qualified as a Pave Low aircraft commander. Just a few days behind him was Webb. However, Webb received 

only a minimal qualification on the HH-53H before being switched 

over to the MH-53Js, where he then progressed through the full local 

and mountain training and deployments and qualified as a new aircraft commander on the Pave Low IIIE. Completing the long and intense process, he remembered thinking then, “I love this machine, 

really love it.” He and Trask were the youngest aircraft commanders 

in the unit.44

39th Special Operations Wing and

21st Special Operations Squadron

On 1 March 1988, per the Forward Look plan, the 39th ARRW at 

Eglin AFB was redesignated the 39th SOW, commanded by Col James 

Hobson. The wing’s subordinate 55th ARRSq was also redesignated as 

the 55th SOS. It had been equipped with the initial nine H-60s purchased by the USAF. After completing his tour on the MAC staff, Maj 

Donny Wurster transferred to the unit. He brought a wealth of rescue 

and staff experience to the 55th to help develop it into a top-notch 

special operations unit capable of performing both SOF and combat 

search and rescue (CSAR) taskings and showing that the H-60 could 

serve as a viable replacement for the now aged H-3s as a CSAR aircraft. Like the growing Pave Low fleet, the aircraft and crews of the 

55th also became direct competitors with the US Army 160th SOAR.

Additionally, the 9th SOS was activated at Eglin and assigned HC130s. The 39th also received command of the MC-130-equipped 7th 

SOS, still based at Rhein-Main, and several other smaller detachments stationed in the Atlantic region. Two months later, the 21st 
THE BUILDUP │ 245

SOS was reactivated at RAF Woodbridge after a 12-and-a-half-year 

hiatus from its great service in Southeast Asia. The 21st would receive 

its MH-53Js starting that summer as they completed their modifications at the NARF.45

Lt Col Steve Connelly was assigned to take command of the 21st, 

and he transferred over from Hurlburt Field. The unit was authorized 

63 personnel and picked up several pilots and flight engineers from 

the 67th ARRSq, which was converting to an HC-130 unit and redesignating as the 67th SOS. As the aircraft were being modified, the 

21st crews would fly the HH-53s from the 67th and CH-53s passed 

from the 601st TCW at Sembach, Germany.

The 21st also needed 16 gunners, and they were slow to arrive. One 

of the first to come over was TSgt John Sprouse. Connelly recruited 

him to serve as his initial weapons and tactics gunner and basically 

build the program for the 21st SOS. He and others not only did the 

paperwork necessary to establish the supply accounts for all of the 

weapons and ammunition but also built an armory for the unit. They 

also worked with the UK authorities to procure access to weapons 

ranges so that the gunners could accomplish live-fire training. After 

six months, Connelly moved Sprouse over to serve in the squadron 

standardization and evaluation office as his gunner evaluator. However, Sprouse had a wild side to him—having earlier received several 

Article 15s—and occasionally needed a bit of guidance. At one point, 

Connelly had to admonish him by saying, “Either I’m going to walk 

your ass into a mud puddle, or you’re going to straighten up and fly 

right.” Sprouse held great respect for Connelly and took that advice. 

He was later selected to attend the USAFE NCO Academy.46

The two flying units and the collocated 667th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron formed a cohesive team. All were under 

the OPCON of the SOCEUR, the European component of USSOCOM. Their mission was to conduct special operations as directed 

by SOCEUR. 

Almost immediately the 21st dispatched aircrews to Hurlburt for 

Pave Low qualification. In July it dispatched three CH-53s to participate in a joint and combined classified mission and two more for 

NATO exercise Display Determination in Italy. Through the rest of 

the year, more crews went to Hurlburt for their qualifications, and the 

unit dispatched the CH-53s to many locations to begin intensive 

training with various special operations forces, both US and NATO. 

They practiced all of the classic SOF missions and focused on ship-
246 │ THE BUILDUP

board training and NVG operations. In October, the first two MH53Js arrived aboard a C-5 direct from NAS Pensacola. The next 

month, two more MH-53Js arrived, and the last CH-53s were all 

loaded aboard C-5s and flown to the CONUS. With four Pave Lows 

now on station, the direct operational training was almost continuous 

as the squadron received increasing calls for support. 

However, not all of the aircraft arrived with their full complement 

of Pave Low modifications completed. Some of the suppliers had 

trouble meeting the delivery dates for specialized components like 

the TFR and FLIR kits, and the aircraft were shipped to Bentwaters 

with only partial modifications. Flight training had to be modified 

accordingly, and the crews did the best they could until the modifications were complete. As word of their arrival spread, though, helicopter 

units from other NATO countries began sending their crews to 

Woodbridge to work with the Airmen of the 21st on NVG techniques 

and special operations flight procedures. Between July and December, 

the squadron flew 378 sorties for 672.5 flight hours.47

Yarrawonga

The new year of 1989 started off dramatically for the Pave Low 

community, when the 21st SOS at RAF Woodbridge was called upon 

on 14 January to launch its MH-53Js in support of a rescue operation 

for the bulk carrier Yarrawonga. An 827-foot-long Cypriot freighter 

ship with 32 persons aboard, it was floundering in heavy seas and in 

danger of possibly sinking 360 nautical miles northwest of Shannon, 

Ireland. Conditions were terrible, with 500-foot ceilings, visibility at 

1,500 feet, winds gusting from 50 to 80 knots, and seas cresting at 30 

to 40 feet. Two Pave Lows—#66-14431 (a veteran of the SS Mayaguez

crew rescue) and #69-5796—were prepared, along with two HC-130s 

from the 67th SOS, to attempt a recovery. The SOCEUR commander 

approved the rescue plan. 

A support team was immediately dispatched to the Shannon Airport, and the crews prepared for what would be a grueling mission. 

After delays caused by maintenance problems and worsening weather 

over most of Great Britain, the two helicopter crews—led by Capt 

Dennis Jones and Capt Dave Freeman, along with extra copilots, PJs, 

and fight surgeons—launched for the effort. However, because of 
THE BUILDUP │ 247

continued severe weather, the helicopters had to land at the Shannon 

Airport to await better conditions. 

Weather conditions were markedly better the next morning. The 

two MH-53 crews launched and immediately rendezvoused with an 

HC-130 to refuel before heading for the ship, which was now rapidly 

taking on water and listing 30 degrees to port. Arriving at the ship, 

they discovered that the cloud ceiling was now at 2,000 feet and that 

winds were still gusting from 50 to 60 knots. Captain Jones took his 

helicopter in first and hovered over the ship. He lowered one of his 

PJs so that he could organize the ship’s crew for rescue. As the helicopter buffeted and rocked in the ferocious winds, 17 survivors were 

hoisted up from the dying ship. Jones then moved away, and Captain 

Freeman repeated the procedure, rescuing the remaining persons on 

board. Once all crew members were safe, the two helicopters then 

refueled from the HC-130s and proceeded to Shannon Airport, 

where the survivors were provided medical care for their extended 

exposure to the harsh elements. The rescue crews then had to deal 

with the crush of media teams awaiting them. Adm William Crowe, 

the chairman of the JCS, and General Lindsay both sent their congratulations, as did a long list of other individuals and organizations 

for a tough job expertly done by the outstanding crews of the 21st and 

67th and all of the support personnel who made the missions possible.48

Courtesy Air Force Historical Research Agency

Pave Lows from the 21st SOS flew rescue operations for the Yarrawonga bulk 

carrier when it floundered in heavy seas west of Ireland.
248 │ THE BUILDUP

On 5 May 1989, the 39th SOW lowered its flag at Eglin AFB, 

Florida. Its subordinate 9th SOS and 55th SOS transferred to the 1st 

SOW at Hurlburt Field. Three days later, the 39th flag was raised at 

Rhein-Main AB, Germany, as the unit, with its assigned 21st and 67th 

SOSs and support units, became the European wing of the TwentyThird Air Force.49

Pave Low Training

Reluctantly, Cong. Earl Hutto concurred with the operational decision to move to Kirtland as earlier recommended by the series of 

studies and, ultimately, the ASD/SOLIC, Secretary John Marsh. However, the USSOCOM commander, General Lindsay, still wanted the 

establishment of the Special Air Warfare Center. Hutto insisted that it 

be activated at Hurlburt. In further conversations, though, General 

Lindsay and the MAC commander, General Cassidy, decided that the 

center would be duplicative of other existing headquarters, and the 

issue was dropped.50

With the resolution of the basing issue, the 1551st FTS of the 

1550th CCTW prepared to begin MH-53J qualification training in 

May 1989. The qualification course would last seven and one-half 

months, divided into three phases: day tactical, night tactical, and 

Pave Low. Four MH-53Js had returned from the Pave Low modification but lacked some key components that would require alternations 

to the training schedule. Additionally, the course could start with 

four of the six CH-53A aircraft from the USMC. However, to bring 

them up to USAF standards for use as trainer aircraft, they needed 20 

significant modifications and upgrades. Consequently, they were also 

being sent to the NARF at Pensacola NAS for extensive rework and 

refurbishment. Regardless, the first class started on time with two 

student pilots and two student flight engineers. In June the squadron 

received two fully qualified Pave Low IPs and a fully qualified flight 

engineer from the 20th SOS. Now it was capable of gradually relieving Hurlburt of its training load so that the Green Hornets could focus 

on operational training. However, the 1551st training load also included qualifying other residual H-53 pilots and flight engineers remaining at Kirtland on the Pave Low. It was a very busy time.51

Additionally, the 1551st FTS did not have any training aids for the 

radar, FLIR, or enhanced navigation systems and had to use the air-
THE BUILDUP │ 249

craft themselves as they arrived or until training components were 

manufactured and delivered. However, the equipment and aircraft 

steadily arrived, and by the end of 1989, the 1551st squadron operations officer, Maj John Folkerts, noted that the unit now had 16 qualified H-53 IPs with two—Maj Jim Eustace and Maj Hugh “Paco” 

Burrell—fully Pave Low qualified. Additionally, the unit also had four 

other pilots in instructor upgrade, plus five more inbound to the unit. 

Very soon, the unit would be prepared for a significant increase in 

training, as it would train the pilots, flight engineers, and gunners 

necessary to crew a fleet of 41 Pave Lows.52

A New Air Rescue Service 

As the Twenty-Third Air Force steadily matured and focused ever 

more of its attention on special operations, the rescue portion of the 

command atrophied. The ARRS had been divested of its operational 

wings and basically converted into a headquarters to monitor rescue 

operations. In 1985 there were 18 squadron-level rescue units; only 

four were projected by 1990. When the PACAF commander, Gen 

Merrill McPeak, questioned this dramatic reduction, the USAF chief 

of staff, Gen Larry Welch, raised this issue with General Cassidy. After 

a staff review, Cassidy directed that MAC redesignate the ARRS by its 

original title, the Air Rescue Service, by 1 August 1989 and that the 

ARS fall under MAC and be assigned all of the rescue squadrons. 

The MAC staff began the detailed planning needed to make the 

transformation. Consequently, as the ARS reactivated as scheduled, it 

commanded the 37th ARRSq at F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming; the 41st 

ARRSq at Patrick AFB; the 56th ARRSq at Keflavik Naval Installation, Iceland; and the 71st ARRSq at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. The two 

rescue squadrons in the Pacific region—the 33d ARRSq at Kadena 

and the 38th ARRSq at Osan—would be assigned to the ARS as opposed to the newly forming 353d SOW at Clark AB, as projected under 

Forward Look. Additionally, five rescue units would be reactivated 

and assigned to Misawa AB, Japan; Nellis AFB, Nevada; Holloman 

AFB, New Mexico; Hill AFB, Utah; and Incirlik AB, Turkey. Concurrently, the 41st RWRW would be inactivated and the ARS headquarters 

moved to the vacated 41st RWRW facilities at McClellan AFB.53

The mission statement of the ARS was straightforward, declaring 

that “Air Rescue Service is the focal point for USAF rescue. . . . The 
250 │ THE BUILDUP

primary mission of the ARS is combat rescue which traditionally involves the helicopter recovery of downed aircrew members from a 

hostile environment, usually supported by HC-130 tankers and dedicated fighter aircraft.”54

Because of the conversion, though, of all the HH-53s to Pave Low, 

the rescue squadrons were or would be equipped with the older and 

much less capable H-3s. In a practical sense, the ARS was now back 

to where it was in 1967 before it became the ARRS, received HH-53s, 

or even conceptualized what would become Pave Low. It was as if the 

command had gone through a 22-year time warp. Perhaps adding to 

the insult was the realization that the one squadron of U/HH-60s that 

belonged to the Twenty-Third Air Force was the 55th ARRSq, which 

was converted to the 55th SOS with the 39th SOW. As it reactivated, 

the ARS effectively did not have the aircraft needed to perform its 

mission of combat recovery in anything other than a low- or perhaps 

medium-threat environment. To address this need, General Cassidy 

had to replace his aged H-3s. He directed his staff to program for the 

acquisition of new HH-60s at the rate of 10 per year for FY 90–98, 

with the first arriving in February 1990.55

353d Special Operations Wing and 

31st Special Operations Squadron

The unit changes dictated by Forward Look continued to take 

place. On 6 April 1989, the 353d SOW was activated at Clark AB as 

the Pacific component of AFSOF. Its heritage derived from the 3d Air 

Commando Group, which operated in the Philippines in World War 

II. The MC-130-equipped and collocated 1st SOS was assigned to the 

unit, as was the 31st ARRSq, which was redesignated as the 31st SOS. 

The squadron had been stationed at Clark AB almost continuously 

since 1952. The commander was Lt Col Dale Cook, a career helicopter 

pilot. The 31st was equipped with C/HH-3s but was slated to receive 

MH-53J aircraft as they were available, possibly in 1990. A few 

months later, the 17th SOS was activated with HC-130 tankers and 

also assigned to the wing.

In the interim, the 31st SOS performed its mission with its assigned 

HH-3s. It still responded to SAR taskings and calls for medevac but 

began to shift its training emphasis to the development of special 

operations skills, especially the infiltration and exfiltration of small 
THE BUILDUP │ 251

teams into sensitive or denied areas. The crews began to work with 

special operations forces from other services and countries in the region. They also flew some operational missions in December 1989, 

when they supported Thirteenth Air Force involvement in the coup 

attempt against the Philippine government administration of Pres. 

Corazon Aquino. Several of the missions involved working with 

USMC CH-53s as well as with their US Army and Navy counterparts. 

This pattern continued into the first half of 1990 as the squadron increased its crew training with NVGs, deck landing qualifications, and 

deployments to work with US and allied special operations forces in 

major exercises like Cobra Gold in Thailand. The squadron was also 

notified that it could expect to receive its first MH-53J aircraft by the 

second half of the year.56

United States Special Operations Command

As Twenty-Third Air Force restructured and prepared to lose its 

rescue units as per General Cassidy’s decisions, its relationship with 

USSOCOM continued to evolve. In November 1988, General Lindsey 

approved a statement on his views about USSOCOM and CSAR.57

While allowing that the recovery of personnel from “hostile, denied, 

or politically sensitive Territory” could be a special operation, he emphatically stated that “Combat Search and Rescue is not a mission for 

which Special Operations Forces . . . are trained, organized, and 

equipped. . . . Accordingly, it is the view of this headquarters that . . . it 

is inappropriate to assign overall theater CSAR responsibilities to the 

theater SOC, assign SOF units the dual mission of both SO and 

CSAR, or to place SOF air assets on standing alert to meet short notice SAR/CSAR requirements.”58

There is no indication that this declaration was coordinated with 

the newly reforming ARS. That command, as it reconstituted, lacked 

the ability to perform combat recovery or—as USSOCOM was now 

calling it—CSAR. In reality, a disconnect of sorts had been created. 

ARS now had the CSAR mission but would not, for at least 18 months, 

have the aircraft or trained crews to perform it. Conversely, USSOCOM was now eschewing the mission, preferring its classic assignments, while owning both the aircraft and crews best equipped and 

trained to perform the mission in dangerous areas.59
252 │ THE BUILDUP

In January 1989, Assistant Secretary of Defense Taft signed a 

memorandum giving the USSOCOM commander budget authority 

over MFP-11, effective in FY 1990, marking the first time that a combatant commander was given such financial authority and responsibility. General Lindsay intended to use it. He continued to press for a 

closer alignment between his command and the Twenty-Third and 

suggested that the Twenty-Third be declared a USAF major command and a component command of USSOCOM. In July Headquarters MAC held a summit. Generals Lindsay and Cassidy were 

there, as were the USAF chief, Gen Larry Welch, and several other 

senior commanders. General Welch was aware of the changes being 

made within the Twenty-Third Air Force and agreed to the divestiture of non-SOF elements from the command. However, the sticking 

point was the validation and prioritization of SOF requirements and 

the development and acquisition of SOF-peculiar equipment. The generals could not come to agreement on those issues, and they were 

deferred for later action. The next week, General Lindsay signed out 

the USSOCOM Operational Concept that clearly defined the command mission, principles, organization, mission activities, and joint 

mission analysis program, which emphasized the closely integrated nature of USSOCOM operations. General Patterson attended many of 

the meetings. However, his time was drawing short, and he gave up 

A Pave Low crew practicing rope insertions with a special forces team

Courtesy Sikorsky historical archives
THE BUILDUP │ 253

command of the Twenty-Third Air Force to Maj Gen Thomas Eggers 

on 7 September 1989.60

At about the same time that Taft sent his letter, the 20th SOS, as 

part of the 1st SOW, deployed to Pope AFB and received a four-week 

ORI. The inspection was conducted as the 1st SOW participated in 

the JCS-directed USSOCOM exercise Jaguar Bite. The wing received 

an overall rating of excellent, but the mission and unit specifics were 

classified. While there, the crews flew long day and night missions to 

Florida, the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, and Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 

to insert and extract various teams as the inspectors watched. The 

troops lived in open-bay barracks and worked extended days and 

nights. It was a tremendous bonding experience for the unit and 

showed how far it had progressed. Colonel Weikel was most pleased. 

It validated his belief that with more aircraft and more flying hours, 

unit pride and morale would rise accordingly.61

21st Special Operations Squadron

After the excitement of the Yarrawonga rescue, the 21st Squadron 

settled into the steady regimen necessary to become combat ready 

with the MH-53J. Training continued as the crews returned from 

their mission qualifications at Hurlburt Field. However, tactical training was hampered somewhat by equipment limitations because not 

all of the aircraft arrived with their full complement of Pave Low 

equipment—primarily the FLIR and TF/TA radars. The crews just 

had to work around the shortages as they became ever more deeply 

engaged in training exercises across Europe with US and other NATO 

special forces units. Additionally, as their presence in Europe became 

known, they received a steadily increasing number of requests for 

training support. 

The 21st finally received 12 gunners and by June had its full complement of 65 authorized personnel. In the fall, it received visits from 

Brig Gen Richard Potter, the SOCEUR commander, and Maj Gen 

Thomas Eggers, the new Twenty-Third Air Force commander. For 

1989, its first full calendar year in operation, the unit flew 913 sorties 

for 1,759.8 flight hours—with just four MH-53Js.62
254 │ THE BUILDUP

20th Special Operations Squadron

In its own way, the 20th was helping the 21st stand up so quickly 

because it mission-qualified all of the 21st’s crew members. That continued at an ever-higher pace during 1989, as the unit steadily received 

the MH-53Js as they came from the modification line at Pensacola. 

Indeed, many of its aircrews logged extra flight time supporting the 

NARF with FCFs and operations checks on components as they were 

installed. With the aircraft also came more troops, and the squadron 

swelled to 210 assigned personnel against 147 authorized positions, 

with another 35 Airmen attached for various lengths of time for 

training or exercises. 

One of the early 1989 arrivals was Capt Charles “Mike” Beard. A 

1981 graduate of the Air Force Academy, he had initially served as a 

T-37 IP before receiving an assignment to HH-53s with the 67th 

ARRSq at RAF Bentwaters. He arrived there just as that unit began its 

transition to the 21st SOS. He received his Pave Low qualification at 

Hurlburt and, after a small amount of training at Bentwaters, conducted FCFs on the MH-53Js as they came off of the modification 

line. He was given an opportunity to cut short his tour with the 21st 

and transfer to the 20th, and he did not hesitate.63

By June all but three of the 20th’s HH-53H aircraft had been dispatched for conversion, and the flight line was jammed with 15 MH53J aircraft with a projected growth to 24 Pave Lows. With so many 

machines and personnel now, some element of the unit was on the 

road at almost any time—participating in capability exercises at Fort 

Bragg, deploying to Dobbins AFB for mountain training, doing deck 

landing qualifications with the Navy, or working with special forces 

teams somewhere in the CONUS or overseas in exercises like Flintlock or Solid Shield.64

In July the 20th deployed four aircraft, crews, and support personnel to Soto Cano AB, Honduras, for four weeks to support joint/

combined exercise Cabanas 89. There they worked primarily with 

JTF-Bravo ground and aviation elements to develop operational procedures and experience operating in that region of the world. Using 

their new GPS navigation systems, they determined that the tactical 

maps for the area were inaccurate and needed to be resurveyed before 

they could be used for operational missions. Unit personnel also participated in several civic action missions, delivering goodwill items 

and medical teams to several local villages. Two months later, the 
THE BUILDUP │ 255

20th dispatched another team of two aircraft, crews, and support 

troops to Mountain Home AFB to support Exercise Knife Blade 90. 

In this exercise, the crews did a fair amount of mountain flying and 

led flights of Army aircraft, especially at night. Operations were classified, but the 20th crews logged 46 flight hours in the exercise. 

That summer the 20th lost one of its best and most highly qualified 

pilots when Capt Pappy Walters decided to retire. Not comfortable 

with the rapid expansion of the Pave Low community, he believed 

that he had contributed what he could as an Air Force officer. With 21 

years of flying, he had seen almost everything and accomplished 

about all that he could. Even though he had kept up his professional 

development as an officer, he was clearly much older than others in 

his referential group, meaning that his chances for promotion were 

problematic at best. Weikel tried to talk him out of leaving, pointing 

out that he could still contribute in staff duties. However, Walters was 

able to gain a position with Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated 

(ARINC), which had established a maintenance subsidiary at the 

NARF at Pensacola NAS to manage the Pave Low modification and 

SLEP line. There he would be able to put his extensive experience to 

further use overseeing the modification flow and eventually being 

able to again fly the Pave Lows on maintenance and acceptance flights. 

As he left active duty though, he said of the men he flew with:

I thanked all the guys in the back first—the flight engineers and the scanners 

because they saved our lives more times than we could count because they 

would see things that I couldn’t see or didn’t see. At that time we had only had 

[three] crashes, but our counterparts in the Army had had dozens and dozens 

of crashes that most people do not know about to this day. So that crew concept was critical in saving our lives on many, many occasions.

I think everyone just sensed that we were the tip of the spear. You’ve heard that 

term before, but we truly believed that we were trained to be the tip. If there 

was something that the national command authority needed to be done, anywhere in the world, under any conditions, we felt like we were trained to a 

level to go out, right out of the chute, complete the mission—sight unseen, no 

rehearsal. . . . It was “you either do it, or you fail.” 

[We had] an incredible sense of pride. . . . People worked so hard 24/7 [and 

had] such a strong work ethic together. We were all . . . like true brothers. It 

didn’t matter if you were the pilot, the flight engineer, the gunner—we were all 

one crew. . . . Everybody knew what his job was, and you weren’t about to 

screw up and let the other guys down.65

Of such men, great units are made.
256 │ THE BUILDUP

Operation Pokeweed

During this period, the 20th also received a classified real-world 

mission in the Caribbean region designated Operation Pokeweed. 

Weikel was ordered to generate four aircraft to fly to the USS Forrestal 

at a location in the Caribbean, south of Jamaica. There they would 

pick up a team of SEALs and fly them to Panama for an attempt to 

capture Pablo Escobar Gaviria, the Colombian drug lord from the 

Medellin cartel. Intelligence sources indicated that he would be traveling to the island of Bocas del Toro off the northern Caribbean coast. 

The 20th had most of its aircraft and crews deployed to several 

locations, and Weikel had to work closely with his maintenance 

troops to get the required number of aircraft airborne. The plan called 

for a long overwater outbound leg to the Forrestal, with in-flight refueling by MC-130s at low altitude in bad weather; a landing aboard the 

ship to pick up the SEALs; a delivery leg; and a long flight home. Capt 

Joe Becker planned the mission, and Colonel Weikel led it. The 1st 

SOW commander, Col George Gray, was aboard one of the aircraft to 

witness his men in action. Capt Tom Trask was aboard as the copilot 

on the second aircraft with Corby Martin and Becker as a spare pilot.66

The mission went well for the first three refuelings, but then the 

aircraft ran into a heavy line of thunderstorms that could not be 

avoided. The helicopters needed one more refueling to make the aircraft carrier, and no safe alternate airfields were in range. The remaining MC-130 had only the right refueling hose working. To best avoid 

the weather, the pilot dropped down to 300 feet above the water. As the 

crews fought to hook up and receive their vital fuel, Trask remembers, 

“Lightening was going off everywhere; everyone’s got vertigo. It’s just 

black as . . . . You couldn’t see anything, even with goggles . . . except 

when the lightning bolts illuminated the sky.”67

During this refueling, Trask was in the right seat, with Martin in 

the left. The weather was so rough that they fell off the boom several 

times. Martin and Trask swapped the controls about every 90 seconds 

because fighting the turbulence was so fatiguing. Joe Becker came up 

and offered, several times, to swap seats with either pilot. Both refused 

because they did not want to have even a few seconds where two 

pilots were not in position to control the aircraft. All pilots also experienced severe vertigo and had to strictly discipline themselves to 

maintain full and thorough instrument cross-checks to control it. All 

they really knew was that they were flying to a set of coordinates in 
THE BUILDUP │ 257

the midst of a large body of water where they were supposed to find 

the Forrestal, which was proceeding to the designated position at over 

35 knots.68

There was a palpable sense of relief when they began to see the ship 

on their radars. Then they saw it through their goggles. The entire 

mission was taking place with the barest communications so that the 

possibility of detection was minimized. They could see that the deck 

was clear, and the four helicopters landed on it, with Weikel putting 

his aircraft out on the angle deck. As they settled, no Navy personnel 

were visible. One of the Pave Low gunners jumped off of his helicopter and literally went over and banged on the deck door to the carrier 

island. Navy personnel then came out to secure the aircraft and instruct them to shut down their engines and come inside. The crews 

did so, logging 12.8 hours on the flight. The Sailors were horrified to 

discover that one aircraft had landed on the angle deck, explaining 

that “nobody ever goes out there in the dark.” The admiral wanted to 

know who landed there. “Of course, it was Weikel,” recalled Trask, 

“once again, seeking forgiveness, I’m sure. That was his way.” 

Weikel and his somewhat shaken Airmen then joined the ship 

crew inside, only to be notified that the mission had been scrubbed 

when the intelligence sources reported that Escobar had not traveled 

as planned. Regardless, the Forrestal crew warmly welcomed the Pave 

Low guys aboard. In fact, Colonel Gray was personal friends with the 

ship’s captain because they had previously served together on the staff 

at US Atlantic Command. The captain told the assembled Pave Low 

crews that he thought the plan was absolutely crazy and expected that 

at least one Pave Low and possibly crew would be lost in the operation. The commander of the air group then debriefed the Pave Low 

crews on the complete operational aspects of the mission. When he 

had finished, the captain allowed Weikel to conduct a crew-only debrief. It was an astounding event. Deeply shaken by the experience, 

Trask felt that he could not do this job for a living, that it was much 

too scary, and that he was on the very edge of his capabilities. He just 

could not believe that Corby Martin could be sitting there so calm 

and cool throughout the mission, while he was at his wits end. Trask 

assumed, too, that he was the only one who was so rattled. The crew 

debrief was an epiphany. Trask recounts, 

We get into the debrief, when everyone left, and we were in the ward room. They 

left us to do a crew debrief, and even Weikel, after everyone else had left, nothing but Pave Low pilots in the room, said, “Damn, that was the most scared I 
258 │ THE BUILDUP

have ever been in my whole f---ing life!!” Everyone kind of exploded with emotion 

about how rough that flight had been. Then I felt much better that at least I was 

not the only one who had been scared to death through that night.69

The 1st SOW commander, Colonel Gray, also sat in on the debrief. 

However, he had a very different opinion. Sure, the flight had been 

rough, but they had made it, and he was ecstatic at their performance. 

Several years of hard training by the right crews matched with the 

right equipment had recreated the piece of the puzzle that was missing at Desert One. It was a seminal event for Pave Low, and Gray 

sensed the signal importance of their accomplishment. Approaching 

Puerto Rico, the Pave Lows lifted and flew to Roosevelt Roads NAS. 

There Gray put the crew members up in a nice hotel for a few days so 

they could unwind before returning to Hurlburt.70

Clear and Present Danger

Almost coincidentally the Pave Low fleet received some surprising 

advertisement when the preeminent military action writer Tom 

Clancy published his latest techno-thriller, Clear and Present Danger. 

Clancy was already famous for several great novels that used recent 

developments in global events and the modernization of US military 

forces as the basis for the story line. This one focused on the growing 

danger of narcotics trafficking from South to North America and a 

mythical covert US military response. An MH-53J and crew were featured in the story as they infiltrated American Soldiers deep into Colombia to conduct intelligence collection and interdiction raids. 

Clancy’s presentation of the aircraft and crew was uncanny, highlighting the criticality of crew coordination and the “uniqueness” of 

the Pave Low crew members. He even included a flight through a 

hurricane and shipboard operations as he weaved his tale. 

However, Clancy had received firsthand information on the Pave 

Low. While writing the novel, he had sent a request to USAF public 

affairs asking to be allowed to speak with a Pave Low pilot. That tasking went to Maj Ed Reed, who met the author at the Officers’ Club at 

Fort Myer, Virginia, for drinks and helped him to understand the 

intricacies of the Pave Low, even suggesting some modifications to 

the story line. Reed was just finishing his Pentagon tour and departing to be a Pave Low instructor at Kirtland AFB when the book came 

out. He took great delight when his Army special operations com-
THE BUILDUP │ 259

petitors in the Pentagon “went absolutely nuts” upon discovering that 

Clancy had used the Pave Low instead of one of their aircraft in the 

story. The popularity and timeliness of the book immediately spawned 

discussion of a movie adaptation and speculation that a Pave Low 

would be used in the filming.71

Mountain Training

Not every mission was as exciting as Pokeweed. During the entire 

year, the 20th supported 28 exercises and had Airmen deployed to 

Dobbins for 275 calendar days. Weikel again used the mountain 

training TDY as a bonding experience for the Airmen who were joining Pave Low from many different backgrounds and, collaterally, as 

an opportunity to give his sharp lieutenant colonels, majors, and even 

captains some leadership opportunities. In the last six months of the 

year, the squadron trained 46 pilots and 47 flight engineers while 

constantly supporting the NARF and also provided aircraft and manning for 89 static displays. The 20th logged 6,597 flight hours and 

3,185 sorties for the year and qualified 28 pilots on the Pave Low, 

bringing the total number of pilots qualified on the Pave Low since 

Frank Pehr first flew it to 99. 

The performance of the 20th SOS in 1988 had been phenomenal. 

Its continued efforts in 1989 built upon that solid foundation and 

produced an enlarged cadre of Pave Low Airmen able to provide the 

essential tactical mobility necessary for USSOCOM to place its forces 

wherever and whenever they were needed—a capability demonstrated through many tactical deployments and operations such as 

Pokeweed. In the very near future, the men of the 20th would be able 

to display that capability for all to see.72

Notes

1. History of 2d AD, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1986, vol. 5, 791–800; History of 23d AF, 1 Jan 

1986–31 Dec 1987, vol. 1, 93; and Cong. Earl Hutto to Mrs. Richard Brims, letter, 17 

June 1986, box 329-91-169, file 15 of 27, Hutto Collection, John C. Pace Library. 

2. Jones, interview.

3. Comer, interview. 

4. Martin, interview. 

5. Weikel, interview.

6. Comer, interview. 
260 │ THE BUILDUP

7. Joe Becker and Weikel, interviews.

8. Joe Becker, interview. 

9. Green, interview.

10. Kradel, interview.

11. Correll, interview.

12. Kingsley, interview. 

13. History of 23d AF, 1 Jan 1986–31 Dec 1987, vol. 1, 164.

14. Reed, interview. 

15. History of 2d AD, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1986, vol. 1, I-35–36; and Reed, interview.

16. History of 23d AF, 1 Jan 1986–31 Dec 1987, vol. 1, 92.

17. Ibid., 93. 

18. Ibid., 42.

19. USSOCOM, United States Special Operations Command 10th Anniversary 

History, 7. 

20. History of 23d AF, 1 Jan 1986–31 Dec 1987, vol. 1, 47. 

21. Staff Summary Sheet, Doctrinal Employment Concept of MH-53 and HC-130 

Aircraft, 7 Dec 1987, and supporting docs., file: SOJ3 MC-130/MH 53 Basing Proposals, USSOCOM/HO. 

22. Comer and Correll, interviews. 

23. Comer, interview. 

24. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1987, vol. 1, II-112, II-180; ibid., vol. 3, 

689–98; and Connelly, interview.

25. Schibler, interview.

26. History of 23d AF, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1988, vol. 1, 7–16. 

27. Ibid., 45–46.

28. Ibid., 19–25; and Congressman Hutto to Adm William Crowe, letter, 8 Dec 1987, 

1988, box 2: Directorates and Components, file: Rotary Aircraft, Hutto Collection, John 

C. Pace Library. 

29. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 180; and History of 23d AF, 1 Jan–31 Dec 

1988, vol. 1, 3–4, 19–28.

30. History of 1550th CCTW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1988, vol. 1, 23–27.

31. Victoria Hanson, “MH-53 Crew Flies Rescue Mission,” Commando, 6 May 1988, 1.

32. History of 23d AF, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1988, vol. 1, 53–55, 104; and History of 1st 

SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1988, vol. 1, II-112.

33. Trask, interview. 

34. Webb, interview. 

35. Trask, interview. 

36. Russell, interview.

37. Ibid. 

38. Ibid.; and Comer, interview. 

39. Simmon and Walters, interviews. 

40. Hux, interview. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Trask, interview. 

43. Joe Becker, interview.

44. Trask and Webb, interviews. 
THE BUILDUP │ 261

45. Reed to the author, e-mail, review comments, 3 Jan 2011; History of 23d AF, 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1988, vol. 1, 3; and Wurster, interview. 

46. Sprouse, interview. 

47. History of the 39th Special Operations Wing (hereafter referred to as History of 

39th SOW), 1 Jan–30 June 1988, vol. 1, vii, 1–2; and ibid., 1 July–31 Dec 1988, vol. 1, n.p.

48. Ibid., 1 Jan–30 June 1989, vol. 1, n.p.

49. History of 23d AF, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1989, vol. 1, 9–11.

50. History of 1550th CCTW, 1 Jan–30 June 1989, 17–18.

51. Ibid., 7–10, 25–29; and History of 23d AF, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1989, vol. 1, 87–90. 

52. History of 1550th CCTW, 1 July–31 Dec 1989, supporting doc. 60.

53. History of 23d AF, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1989, vol. 1, 4–8. 

54. History of the Air Rescue Service (hereafter referred to as History of ARS), 1 

Jan 1989–31 Dec 1990, xxx. 

55. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 35.

56. History of the 353d Special Operations Wing (hereafter referred to as History of 

353d SOW), 1 July–31 Dec 1989, vol. 2, 9; and ibid., 1 Jan–30 June 1990, vol. 1, 3, 7, 13.

57. When created, USSOCOM was assigned theater search and rescue (TSAR) as a 

mission. To divorce the recovery mission from the more classic SOF missions, SOCOM 

planners began using the term CSAR instead. 

58. “USCINCSOC Position Statement on Combat Search and Rescue,” 3 Nov 

1988, in History of 23d AF, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1989, vol. 6, supporting doc. 1-12. 

59. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 46–47.

60. USSOCOM, United States Special Operations Command 10th Anniversary 

History, 10; and History of 23d AF, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1989, vol. 1, 25–34. 

61. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 1989, vol. 1, ix; and Weikel, interview. 

62. History of 39th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 1989, vol. 3, n.p.; and ibid., 1 July–31 Dec 

1989, vol. 3, n.p. 

63. Beard to the author, e-mail.

64. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 1989, vol. 1, II-67; and ibid., vol. 3, n.p.

65. Walters, interview. 

66. Waller, Commandos, 210; and Weikel, Trask, and Gray, interviews.

67. Trask, interview. 

68. Trask and Gray, interviews. 

69. Trask, interview. 

70. Joe Becker and Gray, interviews.

71. Clancy, Clear and Present Danger, numerous references; and Reed to the author, 

e-mail, 18 Sept 2009. Several individuals claim to have been the background source.

72. History of 1st SOW, 1 July–31 Dec 1989, vol. 1, II-35, II-63, II-77; ibid., vol. 3, n.p.; 

and Comer, interview.

Chapter 8

First Combat

1989

None of us were the same. It wasn’t just training anymore.

—SSgt Dave Duffy 

Just Cause

As 1989 was ending, events in Panama, 1,600 miles to the south, 

drew the attention of the American leaders. For decades that small 

country had been a bit of a backwater as the United States focused on 

other threats overseas. However, contingency plans still existed to defend it and the vital Panama Canal. Increasingly, the US bases still there 

were used as staging sites for possible contingency operations against 

the communist intrusions into the area. US forces, particularly special 

operations forces, trained in the area with steady frequency. 

After a military coup in 1968 overthrew the last elected government, a series of military dictators had ruled the country. The latest 

was Gen Manuel Noriega, an intelligence officer. He ingratiated himself with other officers through bribes, intimidation, and corruption, 

eventually seizing power. 

Noriega also assisted the United States through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when it was conducting covert operations 

against Nicaraguan and El Salvadoran leftists. However, Noriega’s operations eventually became so extreme that he was indicted in a Florida 

court for involvement in the drug trade, the smuggling of weapons to 

antigovernment rebels in Colombia, and collusion with Cuba to 

evade US economic sanctions. Within Panama he also conducted a 

bloody and brutal campaign against all opposition. He used his power 

to nullify national elections conducted in May 1989 and survived a 

coup attempt, declaring himself “maximum leader for life.”1

As Noriega consolidated his power, relations between the Panamanians and US personnel soured. Missions to other nations in the region stopped as the US military shifted focus to the political situation 
264 │ first combat

within Panama. Life slowly deteriorated as businesses closed down 

and public services fell into disrepair. When American leaders questioned Noriega’s harsh tactics, he ordered his heavily armed Panama 

Defense Forces (PDF) and paramilitary forces to harass US troops. 

When several Americans were detained and killed and one man literally had to fight his way out of a possible hostage situation, Pres. 

George H. W. Bush decided to take action in mid-December 1989. 

Panama was within the area of responsibility of USSOUTHCOM. 

Its commander, Gen Maxwell Thurman, had watched these developments with growing unease and had directed increasingly more detailed planning for military intervention. He slowly but steadily 

moved more military combat units into the country. When directed 

by President Bush to act, he initiated Operation Just Cause to secure 

the Panama Canal, protect US personnel, restore the Panamanian 

government to its elected officials, and take Noriega into custody to 

stand trial on drug-trafficking charges. 

As part of a JTF, the XVIII Airborne Corps deployed 13,000 Soldiers from the 82d Airborne and 7th Infantry Divisions (ID), a USMC 

battalion task force, and a JSOTF consisting of the 75th Ranger Regiment and other special operations units. The JSOTF’s mission was to 

specifically attack the PDF leadership, command and control facilities, and airfields. Special ops forces would also rescue hostages, conduct reconnaissance, and locate and seize Noriega. The conventional 

and special forces were airlifted into Panama to join locally assigned 

forces, 13,000 more Soldiers from other units, and Marines who had 

been quietly moved there in the preceding months.2

USSOCOM planners designated the 1st SOW to support both the 

JSOTF and conventional forces in the operation and its commander, 

Col George Gray, to lead his force of over 500 Airmen with nine AC130A/Hs, three MC-130Es, two HC-130s, four MH-60s, and five 

MH-53Js. On 18 December, Lt Col Gary Weikel was aboard one of 

the MC-130s with the command element. Lt Col Mike Russell led the 

Pave Lows and three US Army MH-47s as they flew nonstop from 

Hurlburt with HC-130 tankers to the Canal Zone. Capt Corby Martin and Lt Col Rich Comer did not deploy because they had both 

signed out on long-planned vacations. Martin was on board an Amtrak train heading for the West Coast, and Comer was on a skiing trip 

to Colorado and out of immediate contact. Capt Tom Trask was 

aboard Russell’s aircraft as a relief pilot and additional pilot for the 

operation. All of the Paves had extra crews, ammunition, and main-
first combat │ 265

tenance equipment in their cargo compartments because Weikel anticipated 24/7 operations and hard flying. Many of his crews had already flown in Panama because of the frequent deployments there, 

and Weikel felt an added confidence in his aircraft because he knew 

that they had been partly optimized for Central American operations 

since the Pave Low’s earliest operational testing.3

Figure 3. Panama—Operation Just Cause. (Copyright Darrel Whitcomb, 

2010. Adapted from map provided by Brig Gen Thomas Trask.)

Capt Jack Hester and Capt Joe Becker were flying the number 

three aircraft in the Pave Low flight. The formation flew through 

quite a bit of weather to get to Panama. During one of the refuelings, 

they climbed up to 10,000 feet to conduct it in the clear. The CH-47s 

did not need to refuel and stayed down at low level, below the weather. 

When the Pave Lows all had their fuel, the flight descended back into 

the weather to rejoin the CH-47s below. As Hester and Becker were 

descending, Hester experienced severe vertigo, and Becker took control of the aircraft. Unfortunately, their windscreen fogged up as they 

descended, and they lost sight of the other aircraft. Of necessity, 

Panama

City 

COLOMBIA

CO S TA

P A N A M A

 R I C A
266 │ first combat

Becker then turned the aircraft away from the flight as per the “lost 

wingman” procedures and announced his predicament on the radio. 

They then climbed back up above the clouds and watched as the rest 

of the flight also popped up into the clear air. Once they were reestablished as a formation, they were able to descend back down to rejoin 

the CH-47s. The entire process took about 100 miles but was just one 

part of the 14-hour flight.4

Capt Steve Otto and Capt Bob Leonik were flying another Pave 

Low. As they were getting ready to go at Hurlburt, their assigned 

extra pilot could not be contacted. They spotted Capt Mike Kingsley, 

who was out on the ramp preflighting spare aircraft. He was not slated 

to deploy because he had scheduled some leave for a family reunion 

in California. His wife and child had already departed, and he intended to leave the next day. However, as directed, he had reported to 

the squadron with all of his required mobility equipment. He was 

ordered to board Otto’s aircraft and flew as their relief pilot on the 

flight to Panama. Above the flight of Pave Lows and CH-47s heading 

south, a gaggle of over 250 USAF aircraft of all varieties was moving 

the massive force into the small country.5

Arriving at Howard AFB, Panama, the Pave Low teams went into 

crew rest at a house on base for anticipated operation within 24 hours. 

For the last several months, the 20th had been training with several 

special ground units to conduct a grand raid to capture Noriega at his 

big villa, possibly obviating any other significant operations. The unit 

participated in several full rehearsals, even from home station, flying 

all night to an old Army maneuver area in Louisiana, where a replica 

of one of Noriega’s hacienda locations was constructed. The members 

of the 20th arrived in Panama ready to do the mission. In fact, the 

conduct of a big, fully orchestrated grand mission—the “Big Mish” as 

some called it—had been in a way the stock in trade for the 20th since 

Honey Badger. Trask had flown in the rehearsals but would be preempted on the mission by Colonel Russell. The five designated crews 

were ready to go.6

In the early morning hours of 20 December, US forces attacked the 

PDF and “dignity battalions” of street thugs at locations and facilities 

across the country. US Army Rangers and a brigade from the 82d 

Airborne Division parachuted onto the Torrijos-Tocumen Airport 

and several other sites. In conjunction with several other conventional force task forces and the special operations elements, they 

overwhelmed the Panamanian forces. In one especially vicious engage-
first combat │ 267

ment, US ground and air forces, including AC-130s, attacked a strong 

Panamanian force in La Comandancia, the PDF headquarters, and 

literally destroyed the facility. Several of the Pave Low crew members 

climbed up on the roof of their quarters and watched the gunships 

work. It was not hard to see since it was only two miles away.7

However, when the attacks were launched, intelligence sources indicated that Noriega had gone into hiding, and the big raid on Noriega’s 

villa was cancelled. The Pave Low crews were told to stand by for 

tasking. Needless to say, the disappointment within the Pave Low 

ranks was palpable. Russell recalled the impact on the crews: “That 

mission was cancelled. [Headquarters] went into an ad hoc mission 

[mode]; they put us into crew rest, and the planning group came up 

with a mission. You put crews against it; you planned, worked with the 

customer, and flew the mission. We spent the next week doing that.”8

US forces were organized into task forces of varied sizes. From the 

initiation of combat operations, the Pave Low crews were told to be 

ready to support Task Force Red (75th Ranger Regiment), Task Forces 

Green and Black (other Army special operations forces), and Task 

Forces Blue and White (Navy SEAL Team 4 and special boat units). 

With no idea how long the operation would last, Russell then split his 

force into night and day crews. They were ordered back into crew rest 

so that they would be ready to go in 12 hours. Capt Mike Kingsley 

was paired as a copilot with Capt Tim Minish as a day crew.9

At the initiation of hostilities, the Pave Lows began to receive taskings. Captain Hester and crew were first to fly. He joined with two 

MH-60s led by Capt Gene Haase from the 55th SOS. Hester’s aircraft 

had been configured as the medevac aircraft for the raid on Noriega’s 

villa, and he launched to carry several Soldiers to support Navy SEAL 

Team 4, badly shot up at the Paitilla Airfield, until it could be extracted. He could also provide gun support for the SEALs with his 

.50-caliber machine guns, which were more powerful than the miniguns the MH-60 carried. Flying with Hester was SSgt Dave Duffy as 

the left gunner. He saw more than his share of enemy gunfire that 

night. However, he did not return fire because all of the incoming was 

inaccurate. Instead, the crew trusted the cover of the darkness. This 

was the first-ever actual combat mission for a Pave Low.10

Captain Trask and crew launched to track a helicopter thought to 

possibly be carrying Noriega. After completing that assignment, he 

and the crew began to respond to continuous taskings until they were 

out of fuel and had to return to base. Pave Low crews were then directed 
268 │ first combat

to insert small teams and snipers at locations in Panama City. Capt 

Tom Aldrich and Major Correll and crew were next to go. They 

launched with a load of reinforcements for raiding forces that secured 

the key Pacora River Bridge northeast of the city, attacked several 

prisons, and released American and Panamanian hostages. Furthermore, they provided overhead direct fire support for SEAL teams at 

Paitilla Airfield so that Noriega could not use a private aircraft based 

there to escape. 

Courtesy Col Gene Correll, USAF, Retired

Combat crew during Operation Just Cause with MH-53J #68-10363. Left to 

right: Lt Col Gene Correll, MSgt Vic Morrow, Capt Tom Aldrich, SSgt Bob 

Brumble, SMSgt Phil Mitchell, and TSgt Mike Weber.

Captain Trask and his crew also conducted several fire support 

missions. At one point, Trask’s gunners asked him what rules of engagement (ROE) to use for determining when or when not to fire 

their guns. No one had given Trask any ROEs. He thought for a moment and then concocted what he thought sounded reasonable based 

upon previous training and experiences. He so instructed his gunners, and they followed his rules explicitly. He could not have been 

prouder of them.11

On the second day of the operation, Pave Lows supported Army 

Ranger operations at the Tocumen Airport and exfiltrated Soldiers 
first combat │ 269

from a sharp fight at the Pacora River Bridge. Captain Trask and his 

crew flew another support mission for Navy SEALs at Paitilla, as did 

Aldrich and Correll. Both crews flew top cover for the SEALs to prevent snipers from firing at them as other SEALs in rubber boats resupplied their unit. That night, Capt Randy O’Boyle led two Pave 

Lows carrying a force of 174 heavily armed Army Rangers and other 

special forces units to the American Embassy when it was threatened 

by Panamanian forces. Trask and his crew flew as part of a larger formation of helicopters carrying 140 troops sent to secure a bunker 

where Noriega was reported to be located. However, the mission was 

aborted when, again, intelligence reported that Noriega had moved.12

Capt Lou Caporicci and Captain Becker supported another SEAL 

operation but in a different way. The SEALs wanted to use an MH-6 

to quietly insert a small team into a beach house. However, the MH-6 

did not have any precision navigation capability. Consequently, Caporicci 

and crew used their GPS and the TF/TA radar to vector the “little 

bird” crew to the target and then break off so as not to alert the defenders. The Pave Lows and crews could be utilized to do many 

things, giving new meaning to the motto “Pave Low leads.”13

Pave Lows were used in another mission when they combined with 

a mixed fleet of helicopters to move 150 Rangers to attack the Caldera 

Airfield so that Noriega and his senior leaders could not use it to flee. 

They orbited over the Ranger force to provide direct fire support and 

engaged and destroyed some Panamanian antiaircraft guns that tried 

to challenge them. Capt Rob Schmaltz and Capt Mike Kingsley flew 

one of these missions. They picked up their Rangers in the enclosed 

quadrangle of square-shaped barracks. As they attempted to take off, 

though, they realized that they were too heavy to get up and over the 

building. Kingsley was flying and followed the guidance of his scanners 

as they talked him down onto the helipad. His seat flight engineer then 

calculated how many Rangers had to dismount to allow a safe takeoff. 

He told the pilots, “If we estimate that each Ranger weighs 300 pounds 

with their ruck [sic] and everything, we’ll be able to reduce our weight 

by 1,500 pounds, and we should be able to get over the barracks.” They 

immediately unloaded five Rangers, and the heavily laden aircraft then 

cleared the high walls. Kingsley was deeply impressed with his crew, 

remembering, “The coordination was amazing with the gunners and 

flight engineers . . . being able to safely guide our helicopter. Throughout my career . . . my life has been saved many times by these brave men 

in the back of the helicopter.”14
270 │ first combat

However, Weikel was upset with this operation. It was conducted 

during the day, when his aircraft and crews were much more vulnerable. He felt that they should have had escorting fighters or gunships, 

a lesson hard learned in SEA. He was also appalled at the poor communications procedures between the various units. Operation Urgent 

Fury had highlighted the necessity of joint communication capability, 

and the USAF and USSOCOM had purchased outstanding radios for 

their units. However, radio discipline among the units was almost 

nonexistent, with callers interrupting one another constantly and not 

using proper, complete call signs. The sloppiness caused a great deal 

of confusion in far too many instances.15

Monitoring the action closely, Weikel called back to the 20th and 

had it prepare six more Pave Lows, crews, and support personnel for 

deployment to Panama. Weikel wanted to bring them down because 

he was especially concerned about the wear and tear on his Airmen, 

as he and Russell adjusted the squadron operations schedule to allow 

for 24/7 operations for an undetermined length of time. Despite his 

efforts, JSOC headquarters refused the request, and the extra helicopters and personnel were not deployed.16

Lt Col Rich Comer heard about the invasion on the television news 

and tried to return to Hurlburt. However, a heavy snowfall enveloped 

the Colorado mountains, and the passes were not open. It took a day 

before he could drive back to Denver to catch a flight. Returning to 

Hurlburt, he encountered the 1st SOW vice-commander, Col Gary 

Vycital, who told him to join his unit in Panama. Very soon, he was on 

a C-141 heading south, arriving on the afternoon of 23 December.17

When Colonel Comer arrived, he found the 20th and reported in. 

Colonel Russell was not happy that he had come down, believing that 

he should have stayed at Hurlburt to watch over the squadron personnel and aircraft still there. Regardless, Comer was there and subsequently set up a schedule with Russell so that either was in the 

squadron operations area around the clock. This was critical because 

after two days of heavy fighting, helicopter support was becoming 

scarce. The 160th Special Operations Aviation Group had also deployed significant assets to Just Cause: 22 A/MH-6s, seven CH-47s, 

and 19 MH-60s. However, each aircraft brought only one crew vice 

the two per aircraft that the 20th SOS brought. Consequently, after 

about 36 hours of continuous operations, the 160th commander, Col 

William Miller, had to ground his crews for necessary crew rest. Regardless, the Pave Lows continued to fly.18
first combat │ 271

As the fighting tapered off, the Paves began to receive taskings to 

fly logistical missions and sat alert to fly medevac. Pave Lows used 

their precision navigation system to lead forces dispatched to other 

cities and locations throughout the country as the search for Noriega 

and his key commanders widened. Working closely with AC-130s 

and Army attack helicopters, they covered special forces ground units 

as they convinced Panamanian units to surrender. Two Pave Lows 

also supported special forces units that attacked and defeated Panamanian elements at a major military compound near the small city of La 

Coronado, 20 miles west of Panama City, and other classified missions. 

Within four days all operational objectives were met, and the governmental leaders elected in May 1989 were rightfully installed in 

office. At that point, General Thurman’s focus shifted to rounding up 

the scattered and disparate remnants of the PDF and capturing 

Noriega, who had sought refuge in the Papal Nuncio in Panama City. 

On 23 December, Pave Lows carried Army forces as they conducted a raid on PDF facilities at Playa Coronado. That same day, 

two Pave Lows inserted a force into Panama City to recover several 

Panamanian hostages and supported a task force pursuing dispirited 

enemy elements at Nueva Guerra. Throughout, too, the Pave Lows 

received constant requests to fly general support missions for the 

various task forces.19

On 24 December, Captains Trask and Becker flew a mission with 

CMSgt Tom Green as flight engineer and SSgt Jim Kradel as one of 

the gunners to carry a special forces element to capture a “Major 

Hernandez,” reportedly a high-level intelligence officer in the Noriega 

regime. Colonel Comer flew on board as a mission commander. The 

crew flew two sorties in support of the operation, which netted Hernandez 

and three other enemy soldiers. On most missions the Pave Lows 

would be leading the task force, taking advantage of their precision 

navigation capability. However, after the first day, there was little actual 

combat. Like Kradel, most gunners never fired their weapons.20

As the Panamanian forces dispersed, General Thurman was concerned that a residual force would move into the high mountains in 

the western sections of the country and develop a guerilla force to be 

led by Noriega. He initiated Operation Surrender, designed to talk 

enemy forces into peacefully laying down their weapons.

On Christmas Day, Colonel Weikel, Captain Otto, and crew were 

directed to fly a reconnaissance mission to look for evidence of enemy 

activity. They took off with several Army special forces troops on 
272 │ first combat

board and proceeded along the Pacific coast before turning inland 

west of the city of David. The crew then had to maneuver to avoid 

rain showers and thunderstorms as they climbed above the rising 

terrain. As they entered the clouds, they used the TF/TA radar and 

skimmed 100 feet above the terrain. Flying over the objective area, 

the crew realized that nobody with conventional helicopters could have 

gotten there. Checking in with their command headquarters, they were 

directed to proceed to David and help facilitate the surrender of a PDF 

force at a military facility in the city, commanded by Col Del Cid. 

Approaching the city, Weikel could see a small baseball stadium near 

the facility. In the darkness, he landed the aircraft right on the pitcher’s 

mound. Some of the Army special forces troops then got off and went to 

talk to the Panamanian forces commander while Weikel and his crew 

stayed alert. They had a full complement of ammunition on board for 

their mini and machine guns, as well as their personal weapons. 

After speaking with the local forces, the Army troops reported that 

the area was safe and decided to remain there. They asked that an additional security force be flown in the next day. Weikel had shut his 

Operation Just Cause combat crew. Left to right: (standing) Capt Tom Trask; 

SrA Bill Smith; TSgt Mike Barton; Capt Joe Becker; and crew chief, SSgt Marty 

Moore; (kneeling) SSgt Jim Kradel; CMSgt Tom Green; and SrA Jim Sergeant.

Courtesy CMSgt Tom Green, USAF, Retired
first combat │ 273

engines down to save fuel. Suddenly, the stadium lights came on, 

shocking the crew. Local civilians began to swarm into the stadium, 

even climbing over the fences. The crew was alarmed as the mass approached the aircraft. Weikel ordered everybody to stand by his station and arm the guns. He had no idea of the intentions of the crowd 

and had to consider that it was possibly going to attack the aircraft 

and crew. He ordered his crew not to let anybody board the aircraft 

and began the start sequence for the number two engine. However, it 

rapidly became evident that the people were excited to have the 

Americans in their midst with their “Star Wars” machine. Some of the 

Army troops on board then disembarked and spoke with the people. 

Several reached up to Weikel, and he shook their hands. “Vayan 

ustedes con Dios,” they shouted, as they pushed their children forward to shake hands. It was a love-in, thought Weikel. 

When his Army team commander told him that all was secure in 

David and that he and his team intended to stay, Weikel started the 

other engine. He had the people back away from the aircraft and turn 

off the stadium lights so that the crew could adjust their eyes for night 

vision, and then they lifted off into the now clear night sky for the flight 

back to Howard AFB. As they reached altitude, one of the flight engineers called on the intercom and wished the rest of the crew a Merry 

Christmas. Weikel recalled that “on that night, coming back on Christmas night, just leaving the town of David, we left some deliriously 

happy people who were delighted to have a chance to sort out their 

lives and families once again.” It was, he later remembered, a “sweet but 

intense feeling of accomplishment and personal satisfaction.”21

While Weikel was in David, the other four Pave Lows joined several 

Army aircraft to airlift a company-plus-sized force into the David airfield just to make sure that the PDF actually did what they had agreed 

to do. Instead of opposition, though, they received the same type of 

friendly greeting.22

On 27 December, two crews led by Lt Col Mike Russell flew a 

medevac mission to the San Blas Islands off the east coast of Panama 

to rescue an eclectic group of 19 sick international students at a resort. The crews had to work their way through heavy rain and thunderstorms for six hours before depositing the students at the Howard 

AFB hospital.23

With the sequestering of Noriega in the Papal Nuncio, calm was 

rapidly restored to Panama. Pres. Guillermo Endara had been sworn 

into office as American forces began their attacks and subsequently 
274 │ first combat

ordered the Panamanian military to stand down. Except for a few 

die-hard elements, it did so. US Army civil affairs units then began to 

arrive, and Operation Promote Liberty was initiated to restore public 

safety, health, and population control measures. On 3 January 1990, 

Noriega surrendered to US forces and was extradited to the United 

States for trial. Operation Just Cause was winding down, and the Airmen of the 1st SOW, along with their USSOCOM and conventional 

forces compatriots, were sent home. 

During the operation, the crews of the 20th flew 193 sorties and 

logged 406.1 hours of flying time.24 But their accomplishments are 

told in more than statistics. As Captain Trask explained, since Honey 

Badger, the 20th had taken its new technology and trained earnestly 

to use it. Its focus had always been on leading the big mission, and it 

trained to do that for nine years. The Noriega seizure was just the latest 

iteration. But when that mission was cancelled, the squadron very 

quickly had to rerole to do whatever needed to be done. Then it was 

not so much the technology that the crews used; it was their basic 

skills as air commandos equipped with high-technology heavy-lift 

helicopters. “Humans are more important than hardware,” Congressman Hutto had postulated back when he was an advocate for creating 

USSOCOM and supported the Pave Low.25 Operation Just Cause validated that point. 

The variety of missions that the crews were called upon to fly demanded the larger set of skills that they had been mentored to maintain all those years by leaders such as Bill Takacs. In many cases, they 

were back to doing what their predecessors in the 20th and 21st SOS 

had done in Southeast Asia 20 years before—only now with the ability 

to do it day and night, good weather and bad, if the mission demanded it. They weren’t Pave Low; they were air commandos 

equipped with Pave Low, and the quickness with which they re-roled 

and carried on in Panama proved it, especially to themselves. They 

had been tested and had excelled. Two Green Hornets in particular 

were lauded for their efforts during the operation. Maj Jeff Walls received the Lance Sijan Award for 1990 in recognition of his overall 

performance and efforts to protect and recover a US Army Ranger 

team pinned down by enemy forces. Additionally, Capt Randy 

O’Boyle was selected as the air commando MAC pilot of the year for 

leading several direct-assault missions into downtown Panama City 

and other enemy positions.26
first combat │ 275

On 16 January 1990, Just Cause officially ended. USSOCOM’s official history states that “JUST CAUSE clearly validated how SOF 

were trained, equipped, and organized: this operation showcased 

joint SOF capabilities, the high training standards for operators and 

staffs alike, and the value of interoperability procedures.”27 Bragged 

Colonel Weikel in the unit’s biennial history for the second half of 

1989, “We’ve developed procedures to more effectively support elite 

classified units, who may operate as isolated elements after our longrange infiltrations. . . . Another self-initiated development involves 

the innovative use of our airborne ground mapping radar to provide 

vectoring assistance to elite US Navy forces as well as other aerial 

platforms. . . . We are the recognized experts in USAF SOF helicopter 

operations.”28 Perhaps SSgt Dave Duffy, the left gunner aboard Jack 

Hester’s aircraft the first night, said it best in a far simpler way. “Just 

Cause was the beginning of a new pace for the squadron. None of us 

were the same. It wasn’t just training anymore.”29

Air Force Special Operations Command

As the Airmen of the 1st SOW were reconstituting from Just 

Cause, MAC and USSOCOM staffs continued to work on converting 

Twenty-Third Air Force to a MAJCOM and component command of 

the latter. In March 1990, General Lindsay submitted a reorganization plan to Gen Larry Welch, the USAF chief of staff. The two staffs 

continued to work through the issues. When the reviews were complete and a consolidated plan had been developed that was agreeable 

to all parties, General Welch wrote to General Lindsay stating his approval for the requested conversion. Ever attentive to developments 

at Hurlburt, Congressman Hutto signaled his approval in a press release, anticipating that the development could lead to as many as 100 

more permanent manpower billets in his district.

Planning proceeded apace as the transition began. One specific issue that needed to be finalized was the training of aircrews. USSOCOM formally agreed to allow MAC’s 1550th CCTW at Kirtland to 

conduct the initial aircraft qualification training for its MC-130s and 

MH-53s, at least through 1991, and subject to review after that. By 

May all major issues had been resolved, and on the 22d, General Welch 

flew to Hurlburt to officiate at the redesignation ceremony as TwentyThird Air Force became the Air Force Special Operations Command, 
276 │ first combat

a “testimonial to the dynamic growth of special operations,” as the 

chief pointed out to the crowd. In supporting remarks, the MAC 

commander, Gen Hansford T. Johnson, said of the command MAC 

was losing, “The most important accomplishment of the 23d has been 

to build a sturdy foundation for the Air Force role as a member of the 

joint special operations team.” General Lindsay also attended to welcome them aboard his command. He said to the proud “blue suiters” 

standing before him, “Air Force special operations has an especially 

significant role to play in dealing with terrorists, regional conflict, narcotic trafficking, insurgencies, and . . . readiness for general war. . . . 

Only special ops Airmen could have pulled off an operation as complex as the one in Panama. You are truly the tip of the USSOCOM 

spear.” General Eggers, now the AFSOC commander, responded by 

saying that his Airmen would meet the challenges and live up to the 

high standards of the air command heritage. With that straightforward ceremony, all of the units under Twenty-Third Air Force 

were transferred to AFSOC, and once again, the Airmen of the 

20th SOS, along with their worldwide brethren, changed their 

command patches.30

Another unit activation ceremony occurred just a few days before 

the AFSOC event. At Fort Campbell, Kentucky, the 160th Special 

Operations Aviation Regiment activated as an element of the US 

Army Special Operations Command. It was the outgrowth of the 

battalion-sized task force formed by the Army after the Desert One 

debacle and subsequently expanded into the interim 160th Special 

Operations Aviation Group. It trained and competed regularly with 

the Pave Lows of the 20th. In fact, the two units were becoming 

staunch competitors and even rivals in the eyes of some. The unit 

trained hard and had already lost 28 crew members in training accidents. Its Soldiers had also seen combat in Grenada and Panama and 

had flown protection missions for oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. As 

the first commander, Col Joseph Fucci, assumed his new post, he 

highlighted his unit’s close bond with its companion Army ground 

special operations units. He said, “We live in the field with them, 

train alongside them, get dirty and tired and worn out, just like they 

do. We’re not ‘pretty boys’ with fancy scarves. Our customers know 

we’ll come and get them, regardless of the situation.” He subscribed to 

the idea that “Soldiers should carry Soldiers.” Indeed, the Pave Low 

community had some worthy competition.31
first combat │ 277

Pave Low Training

Under MAC/USSOCOM-approved training plans, the 1550th 

CCTW was tasked to produce 24 fully qualified Pave Low pilots, 20 

flight engineers, and 28 gunners in 1990 to fully man the expanding 

Pave Low force. In the first half of 1990, the 1551st FTS finally received 

all of its assigned MH-53Js. However, they were still 20-plus-year-old 

aircraft and broke constantly. This directly impacted training, especially the production of Pave Low IPs and engineers. Colonel Holland 

at the 1550th formed a “tiger team” to address the problem. It suggested 

that the wing borrow two MH-53Js, two IPs, and two instructor flight 

engineers from Hurlburt; initiate several maintenance changes; request 

as many as 18 maintenance technicians from the 1st SOW; and dispatch current instructors and students to joint exercises. 

Courtesy Air Force Historical Research Agency

TSgt Clark Dawson of the 1550th Training Squadron trains Pave Low gunners 

SSgt R. D. Shore and MSgt P. J. Cook.

Aircrews from the 1551st also joined still ongoing mountain training with the 20th SOS. Colonel Comer was now running that program 

for the 20th, and he and his instructors fully qualified Lt Col John 

Folkerts and Lt Col Pat St. Romain from the 1551st FTS. Subsequently, 

Folkerts took command of the 1551st on 28 June.32
278 │ first combat

As these changes were instituted, training began to smooth out 

somewhat. In June the 1551st graduated its first fully qualified Pave 

Low pilot, Maj John Zahrt. By July the wing had eight fully qualified 

Pave Low IPs, nine instructor engineers, and five instructor gunners, 

and new students like Capt R. K. Williams and Capt Tim Leahy reported for Pave Low qualification. As the training program at Kirtland steadily came up to speed, Pave Low training at Hurlburt was 

reduced to squadron-level mission training only.33

The 1550th also used flight simulators in its training program and 

had an H-53 simulator on base. Since the H/CH-53s were now gone, 

technicians in the Air Training Devices Branch were able to modify it 

to replicate the TH-53s now being used in the qualification course. 

This in-house effort saved $500,000 in projected contractor costs and 

would allow for the substitution of simulator training time for actual 

flight time. Students began simulator training in March.

The next month, the wing also received a new MH-53J flight simulator from the General Electric Corporation. This $35 million visual 

and motion weapons system trainer (WST) was state of the art and 

included a worldwide terrain database that allowed the students to 

“fly” in varied terrain and geographical regions. Planners estimated 

that the realistic training the simulator provided would reduce the 

flight sorties each student needed by 13, a huge cost savings. Maj Ed 

Reed had recently arrived for instructor duty after his staff tour in the 

Pentagon, where he had been replaced by his longtime fellow zealot, 

Lt Col Donny Wurster. Colonel Holland knew that Reed had had a 

hand in procuring the simulator and told him to make the program 

work. Reed again attacked the problem with his intense, high-energy 

approach and purposeful vision. He called the Pentagon and talked 

to Wurster, who then performed more of the funding magic for which 

Reed and then Wurster had become adept. And the funds flowed to 

Kirtland AFB. 

Reed also decided that he needed some more operationally experienced Pave Low crew members to help make the training realistic. 

He contacted Jack Kelly and asked him to join the management team 

for the program at Kirtland. Kelly was now retired and living in Fort 

Walton Beach, Florida. He had worked a few short-term projects but 

was otherwise not committed to anything work related. Reed was 

able to talk him into a visit to Kirtland. There Kelly took a senior 

management position and helped run the ever-improving simulators, 

both helicopter and fixed wing. His affiliation with the various train-
first combat │ 279

ing programs would last for the next 17 years, allowing him to help 

train two more generations of Pave Low crews.34

Students began training on the new simulator on 1 August. By December two more Pave Low IPs had been certified, and the course 

developers—Maj Jim Jobe and Capt Scott Pugmire—had rewritten 

lessons to take full advantage of the simulators. As a result, the training backlog had been substantially reduced, and the crews for the 

newly forming 31st SOS at Clark AB were being trained. The 1551st 

was well on its way to becoming a first-class training organization.35

20th Special Operations Squadron

One month after the AFSOC ceremony, Lt Col Mike Russell was 

selected to serve as the deputy DO for the 39th SOW, now in place at 

the Rhein-Main AB, and departed for that assignment. A few days 

later, Gary Weikel passed command of the 20th SOS to Rich Comer 

and left for a one-year student tour at the National War College in 

Washington, DC. There he would join other officers and leaders of 

recognized accomplishment and potential from all services and governmental branches and prepare for future assignments and challenges. 

Weikel had much to be proud of in his tenure as a Pave Low pilot 

and commander. He had directly contributed to the development of 

the 20th SOS into a “unit of confidence,” just like the ones that Joe 

Guilmartin had documented at Koh Tang Island. Weikel and his predecessors all the way back to Lt Col Bill Takacs had found those “aces, 

daredevils, barnstormers, guys who flew by the seat of their pants, hot 

rodders, pilots who could pick it up, turn it around on a dime, and 

put it back down with flair,” that Col Charlie Beckwith was looking 

for at Desert One and turned them into a cadre of like-minded and 

highly motivated air commandos. It was especially fitting and perhaps poignant too that he was passing the squadron guidon to Colonel 

Comer, a fellow Koh Tang veteran.36

Almost immediately Comer decided to make a few changes. He 

selected Lt Col Gene Correll to serve as his operations officer. He also 

turned his attention to the squadron stan/eval program. As the 

squadron had grown, its stan/eval shop had been challenged to stay 

up with the expansion. Comer decided to address that issue with a 

personnel change. He called in Capt Paul Harmon and offered him 

the job as chief of the shop. Harmon had been commissioned in 1975 
280 │ first combat

and was a career helicopter pilot with two overseas tours and experience as a stan/eval pilot at Kirtland AFB. He had been with the 20th 

since August 1988 and had received great training from Steve Otto, 

Randy O’Boyle, and Jack Hester. He was now a qualified MH-53J aircraft commander, waiting his turn to acquire higher qualifications. 

He was a little uncomfortable with the offer since he was not yet an 

instructor or evaluator. Comer told him, “Just go up to Dobbins [for 

mountain training] and get your IP checkout. We’ll make you an 

evaluator. We need somebody who knows how to run standardization. I’ve got plenty of Pave Low guys, but I want somebody to run 

standardization. . . . You come from Kirtland. If Kirtland is good for 

anything, it’s good for making things look good.”

Harmon jumped at the job and proceeded as directed. However, 

he saw his charter in a larger sense. Sure, he had the stan/eval program to administer. That was no small task when he realized that he 

had 65 pilots, 65 flight engineers, and almost 130 gunners who had 

formal evaluation folders that had to be maintained to exacting standards. However, his requirement was really a larger one. Working 

with the commander and operations officer, Harmon’s job was really 

to insure that everybody in the squadron could accomplish whatever 

he had been trained and qualified to do. Working with sharp young 

captains like Mike Kingsley and Tim Minish, he got to work.37

For Comer, however, there were so many other things to do. As he 

settled into his position, he was somewhat intimidated by what he 

was taking on. He felt that he had inherited what, at that moment in 

time, was the finest squadron in the entire US Air Force.38



As the decade was ending, the Pave Low community was well into 

its growth spurt. The USAF now had 47 H-53s on its aircraft roster. 

Six were the TH-53As borrowed from the USMC and designated for 

use by the 1550th CCTW at Kirtland for aircrew training and qualification, along with four MH-53Js. The 21st SOS in England had four 

MH-53Js, with two more promised. The 20th SOS at Hurlburt had 25 

of the newly modified MH-53Js and the remaining eight MH-53Hs, 

all awaiting conversion to the J variant. The 31st SOS in the Pacific 

would become the third Pave Low unit with six aircraft as the machines completed the modification line.39
first combat │ 281

The decade had been one of great change and challenge. Pave Low 

had just come to fruition for fulfilling the need for an all-weather, 

day/night rescue aircraft. However, the debacle at Desert One in Iran 

had interceded, and the Pave Lows had been diverted to special operations for a second rescue attempt. When that was cancelled, they 

remained with the special operations community and developed a 

new set of skills. When the senior Air Force leadership agreed to 

move them to the US Army, a relatively junior group of hard-charging 

officers worked closely with several congressional leaders to staunch 

the move. When they and other congressional leaders created the 

USSOCOM, the Pave Low force became an integral part, and its fleet 

received funding to grow sixfold. It was now fully integrated into the 

new command, and its leaders and Airmen identified perhaps more 

with their fellow special operators than they did with their fellow Air 

Force brethren.

Increased training produced the cadre of crews and support personnel necessary to maintain and fly those aircraft. As the personnel 

numbers steadily grew, Pave Low became a nascent community of 

highly spirited, motivated, and aggressive young air commandos who 

validated their creation in Operation Just Cause, where they proved 

that Pave Low was the sum total of the advanced technology and the 

“aces, daredevil, and barnstormers” to fly them to the limits of their 

capabilities. That capability had become the essence of the 1st SOW 

motto Any Time, Any Place. Lurking in the background, though—

still present, still alive—was Initiative 17, held in abeyance only by 

eternal vigilance. 

However, the world is never a static place, and events were building 

in other areas that, in the not-too-distant future, would necessitate 

the dispatch of American forces to do battle with another tyrant. 

For the Airmen of Pave Low, the conundrum about CSAR between 

USSOCOM and the ARS would rise up like a phoenix and, ironically, 

require the crews to perform the mission for which the Pave Low was 

originally modified, in addition to its new special operations taskings. 

Notes

1. Stewart, American Military History, vol. 2, 397.

2. Ibid., 398; and Clancy, Stiner, and Koltz, Shadow Warriors, 302.

3. Weikel, Trask, and Hester, interviews.

4. Weikel, Joe Becker, and Trask, interviews.
282 │ first combat

5. Cole, Operation Just Cause, 33; and Kingsley and Weikel, interviews.

6. Waller, Commandos, 211; and Trask, interview. 

7. Cole, Operation Just Cause, 40; and Trask, interview. 

8. Russell, interview. 

9. Kingsley, interview. 

10. Hester, interview.

11. Trask and Correll, interviews. 

12. Kelly, From a Dark Sky, 283; Trask, interview; and Trask, personal mission narrative, provided to the author. 

13. Joe Becker, interview. 

14. Kingsley, interview. 

15. Kelly, From a Dark Sky, 285. 

16. Weikel, interview.

17. Comer, interview. 

18. Ibid.; Russell, interview; and Stewart, Sandler, and Fischer, Command History 

of the United States Army Special Operations Command, 233, 254. 

19. Trask, interview.

20. Ibid.; Trask, personal mission narrative, provided to the author; and Comer, 

Green, and Kradel, interviews.

21. Weikel, interview. 

22. Trask, interview. 

23. Operation Just Cause, file 220.00, 1st/16th SOW HO; and History of 23d AF, 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1989, vol. 1, 167–72. 

24. History of 1st SOW, 1 July–31 Dec 1989, vol. 3, n.p. 

25. Collins, Green Berets, Seals and Spetsnaz, xiii. 

26. Cole, Operation Just Cause, 40; and Capt Joe Becker to 1st SOW historian, letter, 

16 Sept 1993, file 220.00, 1st/16th SOW HO. Sijan data is from HQ USAF/A1SOU 

(Uniforms and Recognition Branch). 

27. USSOCOM, United States Special Operations Command 10th Anniversary 

History, 32. 

28. History of 1st SOW, 1 July–31 Dec 1989, vol. 3, n.p. 

29. Duffy to the author, e-mail. 

30. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan 1990–31 Dec 1991, vol. 1, 47–59. 

31. Dyhouse, “Coming Home to a Changed World,” 12; and Stewart, Sandler, 

and Fischer, Command History of the United States Army Special Operations Command, 225–27.

32. History of 1550th CCTW, 1 Jan–30 June 1990, vol. 1, 4, 22. 

33. Ibid., vol. 1, 16–18; ibid., 1 July–31 Dec 1990, vol. 1, 14–16; and Comer and 

Williams, interviews.

34. Reed and Kelly, interviews.

35. History of 1550th CCTW, 1 Jan–30 June 1990, vol. 1, 27–29; and Reed and 

Pugmire, interviews.

36. Weikel, interview. 

37. Harmon, interview.

38. Comer, interview. 

39. History of 23d AF, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1989, vol. 1, 87; and MAC SON 11-84, subject: 

MH-53J Pave Low 3 “Enhanced,” 10 Jan 1990, Pave Low file, Air Force Operational Test 

and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC)/HO. 
PART III

From Capability to Community

Chapter 9

War in the Desert

~1990–91

Pave Low leads.

—Maj Gen Rich Comer

The Middle East

From the very beginning of Pave Low development, Lt Col Frank 

Pehr realized that the aircraft required a good overall navigational 

system to fully integrate the FLIR and TF/TA radar into a true allweather, day/night capability. Initially, he and the design engineers 

tried to rely on the Doppler system, replacing that with an INS as it 

improved in capability. In the 1980s, the USAF developed the GPS, a 

quantum leap forward in accurate navigational capability. Maj Ed 

Reed was aware of this development and presciently pushed to procure some of the first units the USAF bought for installation on the 

Pave Lows as they went through the J-model conversion. 

Key to the GPS system was a planned constellation of 24 satellites. 

They would orbit the entire globe and transmit signals 24/7, which 

any GPS receiver could use to determine location, accurate to within 

10 meters. The first GPS satellite was launched in 1978. By the summer of 1990, 18 satellites had been launched, and 13 were operating 

normally. However, this array did not provide for the desired global 

24/7 coverage, and several more were in preparation for launch. Controlled by the 2d Satellite Control Squadron in Colorado, another 

GPS satellite, #PRN-021, was successfully fired into orbit on 2 August 

1990. Its area of focus was the Middle East.1

As the satellite was settling into its orbit, dramatic events were taking place literally below its high station. On that very same morning, 

heavy mechanized and special operations forces from Iraq were invading and overrunning the nation of Kuwait. “This will not stand,” 

declared US president George H. W. Bush as he held earnest meetings 

with key political leaders, including the secretary of defense, Dick 
286 │ war in the desert

Cheney; CJCS, Gen Colin Powell; and CENTCOM commander, Gen 

Norman Schwarzkopf. Subsequently, President Bush directed initial 

economic and political steps to punish Iraq, considered military options, and established four clear political objectives: (1) remove the 

Iraqis from Kuwait, (2) eliminate production and storage of weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD), (3) end Iraq’s capacity to threaten its 

neighbors over the next five to 10 years, and (4) ensure that the full 

military capabilities of the United States would be used. The president and his key leaders also established a crucial limiting factor—

the desire to hold American military and Iraqi civilian casualties to a 

minimum. This last factor was critical and put a premium on having 

a CSAR capability in-theater.2

As the president was making these decisions, orders were issued to 

military units across the land to prepare for deployment. Two aircraft 

carriers, the USS Independence and the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, 

and their supporting task forces immediately sailed for the area. Air, 

naval, and ground units across the land began to mobilize for deployment to the countries of the Persian Gulf to stop further aggression 

and, eventually, initiate offensive operations to drive the Iraqi forces 

out of Kuwait. Ultimately, the United States would deploy over 

540,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines to the Gulf, where 

they would join forces from 25 other nations to repel the aggression.3

 20th Special Operations Squadron

The 1st SOW at Hurlburt Field immediately became a beehive of 

activity. Most of the wing’s squadrons were tasked under various contingency plans, including Operation Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90 for the 

CENTCOM region. Indeed, CENTCOM had just recently completed 

the war game Internal Look, and several 1st SOW and 20th SOS personnel had participated and helped update 1002-90. The 1st SOW 

commander, Col George Gray, knew that his Airmen were going to 

the desert—and probably very soon. 

On 6 August, the 20th received its orders. Lt Col Rich Comer was 

ordered to prepare eight aircraft, 16 crews, and a maintenance support package for deployment to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The squadron 

was told to expect possible use of chemical weapons and an initial 

deployment of 30 days. Obviously, not everybody from the 20th 

would be deploying; one of those was Capt Joe Becker. He had been 
war in the desert │ 287

at Hurlburt for three years now and was available for reassignment. 

Before Colonel Weikel gave up the squadron, he told Becker that if he 

would volunteer for the converting 31st SOS at Clark AB, he would 

upgrade Becker to flight examiner so that he could go over and fulfill 

that function. From a career perspective that made a lot of sense, and 

Becker accepted. The PCS orders were cut for an August move. However, Becker’s wife, Susan, was pregnant with their first child, and he 

got a move delay to October. When the 20th SOS was alerted to deploy to the desert, though, Becker went to Comer and told him that 

he wanted to go with the squadron. Comer decided that he needed to 

leave a flight examiner behind to handle the ongoing training and 

told Becker, “Sometimes it sucks to be my friend. I need to leave an 

evaluator here. . . . I’m going to leave you behind.” A day later, Becker 

went to Comer’s office and tried to get the decision reversed. Comer 

just smiled at him and remarked that he would have been disappointed if Becker had not tried to push back, but the answer was still 

no. So Becker saluted smartly and helped pack the rest of the troops 

off to the desert. He then flew local training and evaluation flights 

while preparing to move his wife and new baby to Clark AB.4

For the deployment to Saudi Arabia, Colonel Comer split his deploying package in half. Lt Col Gene Correll would take one package 

over, and Comer would take the other. The Airmen loaded aboard 

several C-5s and C-141s and departed on 11 August. Arriving at Riyadh 

two days later, they were redirected to Dhahran. Arriving there, they 

disembarked into the blistering heat and began unloading their 

equipment, personal gear, and aircraft. They were now assigned 

OPCON to SOCCENT as part of Operation Desert Shield.

Comer was assigned a local elementary school for use as their billet and issued MREs and bottled water for his troops. He had only 26 

maintenance troops, and they did not have their full complement of 

tools. Regardless, the Airmen hustled to get the aircraft ready to fly. 

However, the merciless heat took its toll on the specialists. Lt Col 

Mark Cunningham, the squadron flight surgeon, closely monitored 

the troops as they worked to near exhaustion. Fortunately, British 

forces on the base had a hangar that was partly air conditioned and 

allowed the 20th Airmen to use it for rest breaks.5

Despite the harsh conditions, Comer’s troops had four of the aircraft in flying condition in just four days. When it became clear to all 

that this deployment was not going to be short term, Comer directed 

Correll to return home to command the rear elements and to be 
288 │ war in the desert

ready to swap out with him. Arriving home, Correll was put on Gseries orders as acting commander, authorizing him to take certain 

time-critical administrative actions for the unit. He also had to oversee ongoing training and attend to relatively mundane matters, such 

as the delivery of a Pave Low to Travis AFB, California, for shipment 

to the 31st SOS at Clark. He and Capt J. D. Clem made that flight and 

had to write some letters when they returned to Hurlburt concerning 

their transit of the Grand Canyon.6

At Dhahran, two aircraft and crews were put on alert to extract 

special forces teams stationed along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border if Iraq’s 

forces crossed the border. Shortages of machine guns, ammunition, 

chaff, and flares limited further operational usage until the shortages 

were corrected. Within a few days, the 39th SOW dispatched weapons for the Pave Lows. Sergeant Kradel was one of the first gunners to 

deploy. A fully qualified instructor now, he taught the younger gunners how to maintain the weapons and coordinated with the British 

to use their hanger facilities to clean them.7

As the crews began orientation flights, it became immediately obvious that flying over the flat Arabian Desert, especially at night, was 

going to be a serious challenge. Moonless nights offered little ambient 

A Pave Low being loaded aboard a C-5 for deployment to Desert Storm

Courtesy Air Force Historical Research Agency
war in the desert │ 289

light, and the sand suspended in the air generally limited both normal 

visibility and use of NVGs, making it difficult to spot sand dunes. 

Kradel was crewed with Capt Tim Minish and Capt Ken Sipperly. 

They flew a night refueling mission over the trackless sands of western 

Saudi Arabia on an exceedingly dark night. While they were supposed 

to be at 500 feet, the radar altimeter did not correctly read altitudes 

over the sand. No one noticed that they were slowly descending, until 

the gunners realized that they were about to hit the sand dunes. Their 

“climb, climb!” calls alerted the pilots and prevented an accident.8

On another training mission, Comer himself lost ground visibility 

during a brownout landing—as the pilots came to call them—and an 

external tank was damaged when he did not notice the drift of the 

aircraft. Flying with Comer that night as his gunners were SMSgt 

Larry “Large Sarge” Hunter, one of the original Pave Low gunner instructors, and his newest student, A1C John Stricklin, a former armaments specialist who had requested and received a special duty assignment as a Pave Low gunner. Fortunately, neither they nor any 

other crew members were hurt in the accident. In response, Comer 

directed extra training for all crews and the development of modified 

procedures for landings in sand conditions. As naval ships were also 

made available, his crews requalified on shipboard landings. 

A Pave Low in classic desert colors

Courtesy 58th SOW History Office
290 │ war in the desert

On 18 August, Comer met with Col Jesse Johnson, the SOCCENT 

commander. Johnson directed the 20th to move to the newly constructed King Fahd International Airport (KFIA), 40 miles to the 

northwest. Two weeks later, the unit moved to King Fahd and joined 

several other special operations units and squadrons from the 1st 

SOW—the majority of the AFSOC portion of the eventual 7,700 special operations forces deploying to the theater. Colonel Gray had arrived and took over command of the deployed wing, accompanied by 

his DO, Col Ben Orrell. Gray was also selected to serve as the commander of the Air Force component of SOCCENT (AFSOCCENT), 

under Colonel Johnson, and would spend a great deal of his time in 

the SOCCENT command center working directly with Johnson.9

The 20th then received its second shipment of four aircraft and 

crews, along with guns, ammunition, and full maintenance kits. Now 

the unit had its full, designated complement of Airmen and equipment for the deployment. Two of the MH-53Js that had originally 

been HH-53Bs were replaced because of problems that developed 

with the sponson support struts, unique to those aircraft.10

When enough tents arrived, 1st SOW troops literally built their 

own compound. Unfortunately, though, they had to share the airfield 

with a USAF fighter wing and the 101st Airborne Division with its 

300-plus helicopters. Regardless, Comer and his Airmen set up their 

own squadron area and began building wooden doors for the tents, 

plank walkways, barbeque pits, a small snack bar, and other amenities to make life a bit more bearable. As much as possible, Comer 

tried to keep his aircrews and support troops billeted together for 

unit cohesion. Unsure of how long the deployment was going to last, 

he also began to develop plans to rotate his troops back to home station so that everybody in the unit shared the burden of the deployment. He also wanted to expose as many of his troops as possible to 

combat operations and prevent a resurgence of the “A”/“B” team split 

that had previously existed in the unit. However, the actual initiation 

of any rotation policy rested with Colonel Gray and CENTCOM/

CENTAF policies. Comer organized his crew members into hard 

crews and, as much as possible, put them together in tents. Capt Paul 

Harmon assumed duties as the squadron flight scheduler and began 

to build a comprehensive training plan. Comer began holding unit 

meetings, working closely with his senior NCOs—MSgt Larry Hunter 

and MSgt Dick Pinkowski—to ensure that the younger Airmen were 

being properly cared for.11
war in the desert │ 291

As other special operations forces arrived in the theater, they were 

also assigned to SOCCENT. The 20th was joined by the 55th SOS 

with its MH-60Gs. The US Army dispatched the 3d Battalion of the 

160th SOAR with MH-47Es and MH-60Ks, which bedded down at 

the King Khalid Military City (KKMC) airfield, about 200 miles 

northwest of KFIA. The USAF mobilized its 71st SOS from the Air 

Force Reserve with its GPS-equipped MH-3s. The US Navy mobilized two special operations helicopter units from its reserve forces, 

Helicopter Combat Support Special Squadrons 4 and 5 (HCS-4 and 

HCS-5). They were assigned together in a combined unit and placed 

from tactical control (TACON) to SOCCENT. All told, the units provided 42 helicopters for special operations use. As the joint special 

operations air component commander (JSOACC) for SOCCENT, 

Colonel Gray, along with Colonel Orrell as his deputy, would direct 

their use, and they immediately began working up operations plans.

Combat Search and Rescue

However, another issue had to be resolved. All conventional USAF 

forces being dispatched to the Gulf were under the operational control of the CENTCOM air forces, or CENTAF, commanded by Lt Gen 

Chuck Horner. Functionally, he would also serve as the CENTCOM 

joint forces air component commander (JFACC). In that capacity, 

one of his assigned duties under OPLAN 1002-90 was to serve as the 

theater SAR coordinator and plan and coordinate a theater rescue 

campaign. Under then-current doctrine, each service component 

was obligated to provide for its own rescue capability. Horner, though, 

was required to develop an overall plan such that if one service 

could not facilitate a rescue, another service could provide the 

forces to do so. 

The general did not have a helicopter force that could perform 

CSAR for his aircrews, who were expected to be shot down behind 

enemy lines. CENTAF was receiving large numbers of fighter, reconnaissance, surveillance, and support aircraft. Unfortunately, the realignments and reorganizations of the USAF rescue forces during the 

1980s had resulted in the ultimate reformation of the USAF Air Rescue Service as a service with CSAR as its primary assigned mission, 

but without the necessary modern aircraft and trained crews to do it. 

The ARS had recently received several new HH-60s, but the crews 
292 │ war in the desert

were not fully trained, and the units were not ready for deployment. 

When tasked, the ARS commander, Col John Woodruff, demurred 

and did not dispatch any USAF helicopter rescue units for General 

Horner to use. Capt Fredrick Helmer, a spokesman for Woodruff, 

stated, “It was a command decision not to send our aircraft” to the 

Gulf. However, the ARS did dispatch almost 100 individuals of various specialties to augment special operations units and man rescue 

and command centers.12

Instead, the recovery tasking went to the SOCCENT. The debate 

within and between the USSOCOM, AFSOC, MAC, Air Staff, CENTAF, 

and SOCCENT was fast, furious, fractious, and, at times, bitter. However, whereas the SOCOM had recently eschewed the mission, its helicopter forces were now in a theater of operations under the control of 

a combatant commander. Under the revisions to military organization legislated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act passed in 1986, the theater 

commanders could organize their forces as they saw fit. And quite 

honestly, those helicopter forces—especially the MH-53s—were optimized for the mission with their equipment modifications and aircrews, many of whom had earlier been assigned to rescue units. For 

all of these reasons, General Schwarzkopf signed off on giving the 

mission of combat recovery to SOCCENT. Said Colonel Gray, “We 

got the rescue mission by virtue of our being the only ones left out 

there that had the weapons system that was capable of doing it.”13

Through a strange twist of fate and circumstance, the Pave Lows 

would now be assigned the specific mission for which they were originally conceived some 23 years earlier in the bitter days of the long war 

in Southeast Asia.14 To Capt Mike Kingsley, who had deployed in 

September, the rescue mission made sense. He said, “The Pave Low 

can do CSAR better than any other helicopter. We had radar; we had 

a GPS; we had forward-looking infrared; we had capabilities that no 

other helicopter had. . . . It’s a very, very honorable mission.”15

More to the point, though, was the reality of what was possibly 

ahead for the allied forces if they had to attack Iraq. That nation had 

a large and well-developed air defense capability. Based on the Soviet 

Union model, it was a well-integrated system of massive surface-toair missiles—both radar and infrared guided—and 8,000-plus fixed 

and mobile antiaircraft guns of numerous calibers. Loss estimates 

varied from 40 to 60 fighter-type aircraft during a projected six-week 

air campaign. However, planners took close note of the fact that when 

Iraq attacked Kuwait on 2 August, the modern and integrated Kuwaiti 
war in the desert │ 293

air defenses shot down 39 Iraqi aircraft before they were overwhelmed 

by Iraqi ground forces.16

The Pave Low crews would fly as special operations assets vice 

conventional rescue assets. This was a key and critical point. General 

Horner was responsible for theater SAR and had OPCON of all the 

fighter and support forces that he needed for the mission. He would 

create and operate a joint rescue coordination center (JRCC) within 

his tactical air control center (TACC) to oversee rescue operations. 

But he did not have OPCON of the special operations helicopters that 

would do the actual recoveries. Colonel Johnson and his JSOACC, 

Colonel Gray, did. They readily agreed to accept the rescue tasking, 

even declaring it their number one mission and assigning recovery 

duties to their Army special forces and US Navy SEAL teams. However, both colonels made it clear that while they would do the recovery portion of CSAR, they were not equipped to do the search portion of the mission. CENTAF had the assets to do that. Colonel Orrell 

argued to all who would listen that helicopters had no business doing 

search patterns in high-threat areas. As the resident expert on the 

capabilities and limitations of helicopters, he pointed out that on the 

modern battlefield, the survival of any helicopter was problematic, 

and their use in such areas had to be carefully planned and flown. 

SOCCENT would maintain OPCON of the helicopters, reserving the 

right to make the individual launch decision and then passing TACON 

of the helicopters to the JFACC/JRCC upon launch. Johnson and Gray 

also developed a decision matrix for accepting a recovery mission 

that included (1) knowing the location of the survivor(s), (2) having 

evidence of aircrew survival via visual parachute sighting and/or 

voice transmission from the crew member and voice authentication, 

and (3) getting a favorable threat analysis.17

Coordinating their efforts with Colonel Orrell, Gray and Comer 

developed a relatively simple concept of operations for recoveries. To 

reduce response time, they would work with their intelligence section 

to develop and continuously update threat matrix templates so that 

they could make quick launch decisions. They wanted to push their 

helicopters forward as close as possible to the combat arenas. Also, 

they would take maximum advantage of the technology on the helicopters by operating as much as possible at night and in bad weather. 

Additionally, they would use their GPS navigational systems to fly at 

low level and avoid enemy threats. Comer then began to assign the 

detailed planning to his young officers. He appointed Capt Randy 
294 │ war in the desert

O’Boyle to be the sole Pave Low representative to the CENTAF strategic planning cell, directed by Brig Gen “Buster” Glosson. There he 

would be “read in” to the overall Top Secret strategic air campaign 

plan that Glosson and his team were developing and would be able to 

coordinate CSAR plans with the larger directive. Captain Minish was 

directed to develop the squadron CSAR plan. Working with O’Boyle 

and Capt Corby Martin, he divided the Iraq-Kuwait AOR into four 

sections—west, central, east, and north—and identified possible 

FOLs where helicopters could sit CSAR alert, respectively, at Al Jouf 

and Arar, Rafha, and Ras al Mishab on the Gulf coast. The northern 

sector was more problematic, since it was almost 900 miles away 

from the southern bases. The officers realized that another recovery 

force, possibly stationed in Turkey, would be needed to effectively cover 

that area. Working with intelligence specialists, Minish and Martin 

designated a series of known points that became a database used to 

predevelop “spider routes” that the GPS-equipped helicopters could 

then use to enter and exit Iraqi and Kuwaiti airspace at minimum risk.18

Courtesy Air Force Historical Research Agency

Capt Randy O’Boyle, Pave Low pilot, who served as the SOCCENT liaison to 

the CENTAF staff during Desert Shield/Storm
war in the desert │ 295

In early September, Colonel Comer attended a meeting in the 

JRCC. It was his first chance to meet other key CSAR participants in 

the theater. He was a little shocked to discover that all of the controllers were either TDY personnel from the USAF Rescue Coordination 

Center at Scott AFB or random augmentees from the other services. 

As far as Comer could determine, none had any CSAR vice SAR experience. His concern was further heightened when he listened to the 

director’s plan. It was simplistic and seemed to take no consideration 

of the threat faced by the recovery forces. Remembered Comer, 

“There was nothing combat about it. It was all peacetime.”19

Over the next several months, the JRCC drafted an overall theater 

CSAR plan. While it was being staffed and sent out for coordination 

and comment, the JRCC began a series of six CSAR exercises. Using 

a crawl-walk-run approach, the exercises became increasingly more 

complicated and extensive. All service components were involved in 

practice missions that occurred on both land and water, day and 

night. They stressed communications, tactics, procedures, command 

and control, and intelligence integration. Scenarios were increasingly 

more complicated and challenging and stressed all manner of isolated personnel, from downed fighter crews to special forces teams to 

hostage rescues. The scenarios exercised helicopters alone and as part 

of large rescue task forces with A-10s and other support and fighter 

aircraft. All the helicopter units assigned to SOCCENT participated. 

The last exercise was in January 1991. Capt Tom Trask took part in 

the exercises and noted that the flying was just terrible. The training 

areas the Saudis had designated were remote and, on moonless nights, 

extremely dark. The sand there was very fine, which made for challenging brownout landings. However, like most crew members in the 

20th, he had earlier flown rescue and was well familiar with the tactics and techniques.20

General Glosson and Colonel Gray dispatched Captains O’ Boyle, 

Martin, and Minish to visit various combat squadrons and brief crews 

on what to expect if they were shot down. They explained the overall 

campaign recovery plan and stressed the importance of knowing the 

procedures that would be daily updated in the air tasking order special instructions. Earnest and honest with their fellow aviators, the 

three captains encouraged them to ensure that they were prepared to 

be that stranded survivor and described, in some detail, the procedures that the Pave Low crews or other special operations elements 

would use to recover them. O’Boyle remembered, “I said, ‘This is how 
296 │ war in the desert

we are going to try to come and get you.’ And I talked all about . . . 

some of the things that we were going to use . . . and basically gave 

them the plan, which was a real rah-rah speech but, I thought, realistic. I don’t think that I overstated it. Before I got back, one wing commander called General Glosson and said, ‘That was s--t hot. That was 

what the guys needed to hear.’ ”21

Eager Anvil

As the development of the strategic air campaign progressed, planners realized that they needed to include a thorough plan to overcome the Iraqi air defenses. Captain O’Boyle made a novel suggestion. Intelligence showed that the Iraqis had placed three early 

warning radars as close as one mile to the Saudi border. He suggested 

using SOCCENT-assigned Army SOF teams from the 5th SFG to attack and destroy the sites. They would infiltrate on foot and be extracted by MH-60s from the 3d Battalion, 160th SOAR, after they had 

destroyed the sites. SOCCENT worked up a plan to accomplish that. 

However, to be successful, the teams needed precision navigation 

gear and 72 hours to move to and penetrate the two sites. The navigational gear was certainly available, but General Schwarzkopf had already told President Bush that he could initiate combat with just 60 

hours of preparation, and, in a rather heated meeting with Col Jesse 

Johnson, Schwarzkopf disapproved the plans. 

A few weeks later, the Iraqis moved the three radar sites 20, 27, and 

40 miles, respectively, back into Iraq and hardened the sites. Captain 

O’Boyle then suggested that MH-53s, enabled with GPS navigation 

capability, attack the sites with their 50-caliber machine guns. Colonel 

Johnson briefed this plan to Generals Horner and Schwarzkopf, who 

approved the concept for further planning. When Colonel Comer 

heard of the plan, he designated Captain Martin to be the planner 

flight leader for the mission, with Maj Ben Pulsifer, Maj Bob Leonik, 

and Captain Kingsley to serve as the other aircraft commanders. 

However, Comer was skeptical of the initial plan, believing that the 

machine guns would not be powerful enough to satisfactorily destroy 

the sites. A young captain from the 3d Battalion of the 160th SOAR 

contacted Colonel Gray and suggested that the mission be given to 

his battalion, which could attack the sites with its MH-60s armed 

with 2.75-inch rockets and 7.62 mm miniguns. Comer rejected that 
war in the desert │ 297

proposal for essentially the same reason, believing that, in reality, the 

Army special operations aviators were just looking for a way to block 

the Pave Low guys from being in the mission.22

Comer discussed the mission with Colonel Orrell, who suggested 

that the mission include US Army AH-64s with Hellfire missiles, 

Hydra-70 rockets, and 30 mm machine guns to do the job. Colonel 

Gray was briefed on the new suggestion and received permission 

from Colonel Johnson to talk to Lt Col Dick Cody, USA, commander, 

1st Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment, an Apache battalion assigned 

to the 101st Air Assault Division, also located at the King Fahd Airport. 

The mission concept was relatively simple. The MH-53s would 

lead the Apaches, as they had been training to do for the last 10 years. 

Crews would use their GPSs to get them to the correct firing positions because they were much more accurate and reliable than the 

Doppler systems on the Army helicopters. One of the Pave Low gunners suggested to Captain Martin that they lead the Apaches to a predesignated position and then mark it with chemical night lights. The 

AH-64 pilots could then fly over that point and update their Doppler 

systems for the final run in to their targets. The idea was simple and 

logical, and Martin wrote it into the plan.

Kingsley was also concerned that one or some of the Apaches 

might get lost in the possible mayhem and run out of fuel. One of his 

flight engineers, TSgt Jeff Morrison, developed a procedure so that, if 

necessary, a Pave Low could ground transfer fuel from its tanks to the 

affected Apache and also made sure the necessary equipment was 

aboard each Pave Low.23

As the plan was maturing, intelligence reported that the three sites 

had again been moved, this time about 10 miles closer to the border, 

and consolidated into just two sites with several Soviet-style search 

and acquisition radars each. Accordingly, the 20th pilots modified 

the plan and then took it to Colonel Johnson at SOCCENT. He 

backed it and took it up to General Schwarzkopf, who approved the 

use of Apaches from the 101st Division and cleared them to begin 

training. Comer then met with Colonel Cody, and they began planning the mission in detail. The force would be called Task Force Normandy. Two flights of two MH-53s each would lead four Apaches to 

each site and provide combat recovery support. The two units trained 

for the mission through the fall. They also received permission to 

live-fire six Hellfire missiles in the Saudi desert.
298 │ war in the desert

In late October, Colonel Gray personally briefed General Schwarzkopf that the joint team was ready to execute its mission. When Gray 

assured him that the mission would be 100 percent successful, 

Schwarzkopf replied, “Okay, Colonel, then you get to start the war.” 

The joint team held a final rehearsal in January, and it went perfectly. 

“We were eager for the mission to fly,” said Colonel Comer, and noted 

in his personal journal that “not since Desert One in Iran had special 

operations helicopters been given a better chance for a good mission.”24

Gray ordered Comer and three other squadron commanders 

home to Hurlburt in late October. His operations officer, Colonel 

Correll, replaced him at KFIA. At home, Comer and the other commanders were able to attend the MAC squadron commander’s course, 

catch up on backlogged squadron administrative items, and deal with 

some personnel issues. He also discovered that Hurlburt crews were 

training intensely with other SOCOM assets to perform a variety of 

missions, one of which was called Pacific Wind, a possible evacuation 

of the American Embassy in Kuwait that still harbored several dozen 

Americans and other protected personnel. He attended a training exercise focused on this mission and other possible JSOC taskings in 

the CENTCOM region. The exercise was directed by the JSOC commander, Maj Gen Wayne Downing. 

During the exercise, Comer spoke with the USAF colonel who was 

assigned to the JSOC as the air component commander. Comer could 

not help but notice, though, that the colonel had been assigned by 

Downing to the plans division. Comer also noticed that Lt Col Doug 

Brown, the commander of the designated JSOC Army special operations aviation unit—the 1st Battalion of the 160th SOAR—did his 

best to insure that the aviation unit of choice was his unit vice the 

20th. Comer tried to highlight the differences in capabilities of the 

aircraft in the units to Downing. However, the JSOC commander 

preferred Brown’s unit and was functionally using Brown as his aviation component commander.25

At Hurlburt, though, Comer had some more immediate unit concerns. Many unit families were upset about the extended deployment 

and were filing complaints. Working with his wife, Stephanie, he tried 

to address every one of them and to assure the family members that 

their loved ones were doing important work and would not be kept 

away from home any longer than needed.26

As part of the rotational flow, SSgt Jim Kradel returned home in 

December. However, while there, he received orders to transfer to 
war in the desert │ 299

Kirtland AFB to serve as a gunner instructor. The school was increasing the size of the training classes to fill the growing 21st and 31st 

SOSs. Consequently, he did not rotate back to Saudi Arabia.27

While Colonel Comer was back in the United States, President 

Bush was beginning to doubt that the diplomatic and economic measures being taken against Iraq were going to be sufficient to force 

Sadam Hussein to withdraw his troops from Kuwait. Accordingly, he 

directed General Schwarzkopf to prepare for offensive action and 

authorized him to increase his force with an entire US Army–heavy 

corps. In parallel, General Horner increased the size of his force, 

called for the deployment of another aerial force into Turkey, and 

directed his planning staff to finalize its overall air campaign plan. By 

December General Glosson had it completed. It directed an air campaign of four phases:

1. Strategic air campaign—to gain control of the airspace and attack Iraqi leadership, strategic weapons, long-range missiles, 

and electric-generation capability. 

2. Superiority over the Kuwaiti theater of operations—to support 

phase 1. 

3. Battlefield preparation—to direct attacks on Iraqi fielded forces 

to degrade fighting morale and destroy 50 percent of Iraqi 

equipment. 

4. Ground war—to provide direct support to the massive coalition 

ground units as they destroyed the Iraqi army.28

In readying for the campaign, General Glosson visited the combat 

air bases and gave the combat crews an overall brief on the theater 

campaign plan. Like Captains O’Boyle, Martin, and Minish, he also 

addressed CSAR. However, his discussion was a bit different than 

that of the three Pave Low pilots. He was much more sanguine about 

rescue and assured the aircrews that “if you get shot down, you 

[won’t] have to spend the night. . . . You are not going to spend 24 

hours on the ground. . . . We will pick you up if we have to stack helicopters on top of each other and get them all shot down. But we are 

not going to leave you out there.” Glosson was a veteran of air combat 

in Southeast Asia and was thinking back to that paradigm. On the 

issue of CSAR, he and the men of AFSOC were on different intellectual frequencies. In a few short weeks, this difference would lead to a 
300 │ war in the desert

contentious misunderstanding between USAF conventional and special operations forces.29

Comer returned to the squadron at KFIA in early December with 

Maj Mike Homan, who would serve as his deployed operations officer 

and oversee current operations and scheduling. Homan had just 

completed his Pave Low requalification and wanted to go to the Gulf. 

He would fly as a copilot for his first few missions and then lead his 

own crew, in addition to his larger duties. 

Back with his deployed Airmen, Comer found a few things that 

concerned him and required his immediate attention. Fortunately, 

he had the unit flight surgeon, Maj Mark Cunningham, with him. 

Cunningham worked daily with the officers and Airmen of the unit 

to address their medical needs and keep them fit for the rigors of 

their mission and life in the desert. However, the Army aviators from 

the 3d Battalion, 160th SOAR, were still trying to get the Eager Anvil 

mission. While he was gone, Colonel Johnson had directed the 20th 

to provide him with an MH-53 for VIP support as he took several of 

his subordinate commanders to Al Jouf in central Saudi Arabia to 

inspect that area as a possible forward deployed site for his forces. 

Capt Brad Webb served as the aircraft commander on the week-long 

mission and took a small maintenance team to support him. While 

out in the harsh desert environment, though, the Pave Low suffered a 

complete loss of its navigational system, making navigation over the 

flat desert much more difficult. Colonel Johnson was very disapCourtesy Col Corby Martin, USAF, Retired

Task Force Normandy crew. Left to right: (standing) Sgt Phil Carroll, Capt 

Corby Martin, Capt Bill Lemenager, and MSgt Mike Lael; (kneeling) SSgt Mike 

Harte and Sgt Barrett Harrison.
war in the desert │ 301

pointed in the Pave Low’s performance and believed that the aircraft 

might not be able to handle the radar site mission. He spoke to Lt Col 

Dell Dailey, the 3d Battalion, 160th SOAR commander, about this 

situation. Dailey had just received GPS receivers for his MH-60s and 

suggested that his crews could provide the precision navigation 

needed for the mission. Comer talked to Colonel Cody and asked 

that they hold another mission rehearsal to revalidate the capabilities 

and reliability of the Pave Lows. Within a week, they did so satisfactorily, and the arguments ended. However, Comer was surprised that 

such “blue-green” bickering and competition that had evolved from 

the Initiative 17 debate could extend forward into a combat theater 

when the lives of so many were at stake. He realized, though, that he 

would always have to deal with Army aviators who believed that “Soldiers should fly with Soldiers.” He was determined that his unit would 

fly the Eager Anvil mission.30

Proven Force

When President Bush first considered responding with military 

force, Secretary Cheney and General Powell envisioned deploying US 

and possibly NATO forces into Turkey to attack Iraq from the north. 

Over the next several months, planning took place at the United 

States European Command (USEUCOM) headquarters to build a 

task force primarily based upon the 52d Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) 

at Spangdahlem AB, Germany. Consisting primarily of F-111s, F-15s, 

and F-16s accompanied by a large fleet of supporting aircraft, this 

contingent would be known as Proven Force and would deploy to 

several air bases in Turkey to operate from there, subject to approval 

of the Turkish government. It would also include a small SOCEUR 

contingent of aircrews and support personnel flying MC-130s and 

MH-53Js from the 67th and 21st SOSs of the 39th SOW, along with 

special forces Soldiers from the 10th SFG, to perform CSAR duties 

and SOF missions as assigned. This JSOTF would be called Elusive 

Concept and be directly commanded by the SOCEUR commander, 

Brig Gen Richard Potter.31
302 │ war in the desert

21st Special Operations Squadron

The 21st SOS was ready for the mission. Now in possession of 

five of its six designated MH-53Js, throughout 1990 the squadron 

had continued to receive new personnel as they completed their 

training at Kirtland AFB. Taskings steadily arrived from SOCEUR, 

directing the unit to participate in training with other US and 

NATO special forces elements in several countries. The unit also 

accepted SAR taskings, launching one aircraft in February to search 

for the bodies of two F-111 crew members killed in a crash off the 

east coast of Great Britain. In March the unit deployed three aircraft 

and crews for Exercise Cold Winter ’90 in Evennes, Norway, to train 

with other special forces units. While there, two Norwegian paratroopers had a midair collision while conducting a night jump onto 

a frozen lake and were injured—one critically. A 21st SOS Pave 

Low, flown by Capt Bill Bassett and Capt Brendan Clare, diverted to 

medically evacuate the soldiers. They had to be very careful as they 

gently set the heavy aircraft down on the frozen lake without melting the ice or cracking through it. As the aircraft settled on the ice 

and snow, medics quickly loaded the two injured soldiers aboard, 

and the pilots lifted off and headed for a local hospital. Landing 

there on its helipad was a challenge because it was built for much 

smaller helicopters. Regardless, the crew was able to land safely, and 

the soldiers were quickly taken inside for immediate medical care. 

In the opinion of the doctors who treated the more severely 

wounded soldier, the quick actions of the Pave Low crew saved his 

life. The Norwegian army Jaegers honored the crew members for 

their lifesaving mission.32

In May, the 21st deployed to Pisa, Italy, to participate in Exercise 

Flintlock ’90. While there, the unit received an ORI conducted by the 

MAC inspector general. Overall, the unit was rated outstanding, testimony to the hard work of all those assigned to it.

On 24 June Lt Col Robert Zdenek succeeded Lt Col Steve Connelly 

as the commander of the 21st SOS. Zdenek selected Lt Col Russell 

Rakip, the sole USAF helicopter pilot veteran of the disaster at Desert 

One, as his operations officer. The squadron was ready for any operational challenge.33

Later that summer, as the Airmen of the 21st SOS observed the 

events occurring in the Gulf, they sensed that they, too, would become involved. In October Capt Steve Otto transferred to the unit 
war in the desert │ 303

from the 20th. He had initially deployed to Saudi Arabia with that 

unit and shared his limited experiences with his new squadron. He 

explained to them how the Pave Lows were being tasked for both 

combat rescue and SOF and that the helicopters based in Saudi Arabia 

could not easily cover northern Iraq. 

When the OPLAN for Proven Force and then Elusive Concept arrived, Zdenek put his troops to work getting ready for possible deployment to the small Turkish base at Batman, 35 miles east of the big 

air base at Diyarbakir but still 110 miles from the Iraqi border. By 

November they were ready to deploy and perform whatever duties 

they were assigned. However, their deployment depended upon the 

willingness of the Turkish government to allow them to enter and 

operate from its country.34

Somalia

As 1991 began, Saddam Hussein still showed nothing but intransigence against the demands leveled at his actions. Accordingly, all 

units in the Gulf were finalizing their plans for eventual offensive action. Almost completely ready now to meet its rescue tasking and fly 

the preplanned Eager Anvil missions, the 20th SOS received another 

tasking from another completely unexpected quarter. 

For some time, serious internal unrest had been sweeping the 

nation of Somalia on the eastern coast of Africa. On 10 January, 

CENTCOM alerted the 20th to be ready to fly to two locations there 

to evacuate US and coalition personnel. This threw the unit into 

chaos since it was now faced with the possibility of having three 

simultaneous missions in three different parts of the world. Fortunately, the orders were changed. The Pave Low crews were about to 

start engines when their participation was cancelled. CENTCOM 

decided to send a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) instead. A rescue force of 55 Marines and Navy SEALs launched off of the USS 

Trenton recovered 281 Americans and other nationals from the US 

Embassy. The Airmen of the 20th stayed focused on their two assigned missions. Said Colonel Comer, “As it turned out, [the deployment] didn’t happen. The marines got the mission . . . . It was a 

good thing.”35
304 │ war in the desert

Proven Force

As the United States was completing the Somalia mission, US and 

other national leaders were still trying to diplomatically resolve the 

crisis as the allied force in the Gulf region, now over 600,000 strong, 

made final plans for the initiation of combat operations to force 

Saddam to withdraw his troops and honor the sovereignty of Kuwait. 

On 13 January, US government representatives met with Turkish 

government officials and presented them with a formal full briefing 

on Operations Proven Force and Elusive Concept. Some aircraft were 

already in place under previously existing agreements, and Turkish 

president Turgut Özal approved the full deployment. Almost immediately 

the larger deployment commenced, and, eventually, the full complement of 24 F-16, 22 F-15C, 18 F-111E, eight F-4G, six RF-4, six 

EF-111, three Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and 

14 KC-135 aircraft moved onto Incirlik AB. 

The 39th SOW deployed its assets four days later. They consisted of 

two MC-130Es, four HC-130N/Ps, and three MH-53Js from the 21st 

SOS. The Pave Low’s primary mission was to support joint search and 

rescue (JSAR) vice CSAR because the Turks did not want to say 

overtly that anybody was flying combat missions out of Turkish bases. 

Arriving in Turkey during the coldest and shortest days of winter, the 

MH-53s were moved forward to the small, austere air base at Batman, where the crews were literally given an open icy, muddy field to 

work from and had to provide totally for themselves. The senior gunner, TSgt John Sprouse, was not impressed with the accommodations. He remembers that “they dropped us off on a taxiway . . . and 

said, ‘There is your home.’ They had a little row of tents set up—no 

lights, no heat. We went three weeks without any running water. You 

get to know people very well.”36 A few days later, the 20th at Hurlburt 

flew over two more MH-53Js with three more aircrews. Regardless of 

the primitive conditions, the Airmen of the 21st made the best of the 

situation and within two days were able to assume JSAR alert as a 

supporting force to SOCCENT, with the tasking worked through a 

JRCC set up at Incirlik that was directly linked to the JRCC in Saudi 

Arabia. However, the use of Proven Force elements in action against 

Iraq was still subject to the Turkish government’s final approval.37
war in the desert │ 305

Eve of Combat

On 11 January, SOCCENT activated an FOL at Al Jouf, and Colonel 

Comer was ordered to move his unit with all MH-53s there. Three 

days later, he and his Airmen completed the move. Colonel Cody and 

his Apaches also deployed forward. On 16 January, it was obvious 

that all nonmilitary efforts to resolve the Kuwaiti occupation had 

Figure 4. Desert Storm/Shield area of operations. (Copyright Darrel 

Whitcomb, 2010.)
306 │ war in the desert

failed, and President Bush directed that military operations begin. 

SOCCENT notified all of its forces that the war would start the next 

morning at 3 a.m. Comer alerted his personnel that Eager Anvil 

would be going that night. To cover his rescue taskings, he dispatched 

Captains Minish and Trask and crews to Rafha to sit alert for the central sector. The western sector would initially be covered by SH-60s 

from HCS-4/5 and then by the MH-53s from Task Force Normandy 

when that mission was complete. Since the 21st had not yet arrived in 

Turkey, there was no immediate coverage in the north. The eastern 

sector was covered by MH-3s from the 71st SOS, now located at Ras 

al Mishab on the Persian Gulf coast.38

At 9:30 p.m., Colonel Comer held a final flight briefing for his Pave 

Low and the Apache crews. There really was nothing more to say. All 

recognized that they were about to take part in a significant event 

and, while nervous, were extremely confident that they were the right 

force at the right time and place. All used the short time available 

before proceeding to their aircraft for private moments, actions, and 

prayers. Captain Kingsley felt the gravity of the moment, noting that 

“I immediately had ‘butterflies’ in my stomach. [I thought,] oh my 

gosh, the weight of the world is on this mission. A lot of people could 

die if we fail.” He grabbed Capt Corby Martin and went over the details of the mission for the “hundredth” time before heading out to 

the aircraft.39

The crews coordinated their engine starts so that the entire formation lifted off at Al Jouf at 1 a.m. The “Red Team” Pave Lows led by 

Martin and Major Pulsifer and crews were joined by their four 

Apaches and set course for the western target now designated 

“Nevada.” Capt Newman Shufflebarger led the Apaches. The second 

section of “White Team” Pave Lows led by Captain Kingsley and Major 

Leonik and crews did likewise and proceeded to the eastern target, 

now designated “California.” Colonel Comer flew as Leonik’s copilot 

and maintained communications contact with the SOCCENT command center, where Colonels Gray and Johnson were closely monitoring the mission. Lt Col Dick Cody led their accompanying 

Apaches. Trailing in combat rescue support were the two SH-60s 

from HCS-4/5—led by their skipper, Cdr Neil Kinnear; they took up 

an orbit just north of Arar. 

At 2:12 a.m., the Task Force Normandy helicopters crossed into 

Iraq, varying their flight path as necessary to avoid known or suspected enemy observation posts or Bedouin locations. The western 
war in the desert │ 307

target was 13 miles farther; the eastern target, 23 miles. The Pave 

Lows used their TF/TA radar and FLIR to stay less than 50 feet above 

the ground. At one point, the navigational system on Leonik’s Pave 

Low failed, and the crew had to scramble to reset it. All crews observed some small arms tracers, but they were inaccurate and of no 

consequence. The Pave Lows flew to the prebriefed drop-off points, 

where the gunners and engineers threw out bunches of green chemical 

sticks, and the pilots then turned south. As they departed, the Apaches 

slowly passed over the chemical lights and updated their Doppler 

navigational systems for the final 10-mile run to their individual targets. Slipping through the clear, dark night, they pulled into firing 

position exactly 90 seconds early. The Apache crews could see the 

sites, which matched the intelligence pictures they had been shown. 

The Apache crews also saw enemy troops around the structures. 

Suddenly, the lights began to go off. One of the pilots mused, “I 

think they know we are here.” Thirty seconds prior, the Apache crews 

turned on their ranging lasers. At exactly 2:37:50 a.m., White Team 

Apache pilot 2d Lt Tom Drew keyed his radio and broadcast, “Party 

in 10.” Precisely 10 seconds later, all crews began firing their Hellfire 

missiles. Twenty seconds later, the deadly weapons began to detonate 

against the structures. The generators were first, then the command 

bunkers, and, finally, the radar dishes themselves. The enemy soldiers 

died in the melee. 

Once the Hellfires were totally expended, the helicopters flew toward the sites and ripple-fired their rockets. Two thousand meters 

from the sites, they opened up with their 30 mm chain guns and riddled what remained of the compounds with every bullet they had. 

Four minutes after it started, it was over. The Apaches had expended 

27 Hellfire missiles, 100 Hydra-70 rockets, and 4,000 rounds of 30 

mm cannon fire. They turned south, rejoined with the Pave Lows, 

and headed home. En route, Captain Martin’s crew observed what 

appeared to be the launch of two SA-7 missiles. Utilizing onboard 

defensive systems and some aggressive maneuvering, the crew managed to escape them. 

Outbound, Comer radioed a code-word message to SOCCENT 

headquarters reporting their complete success: “SOF targets destroyed.” 

Colonel Johnson personally reported the results to General Schwarzkopf’s command center. “Thank God!” the general responded.40

The combination of the Pave Lows and Apaches had worked as 

hoped. All of the planning, calculating, and training had paid off. As 
308 │ war in the desert

Martin was leading his formation back to the south, he could see in 

the clear night air above the massive formations of allied aircraft 

heading for the radar gap. He remembered how “you could look off 

to the south, and there were blinkers lined up. You could see a long way 

on goggles. And it’s also desert, so it’s clear. There were anticollision 

lights lined up; it looked like an LA freeway, . . . and they were all 

chasing these big blinkers . . . [the] tankers. Then, all of a sudden, 

there was a point where there were no more lights. So they would get 

gas, drop off, turn lights off, and head north.”41 One F-15E fighter pilot who was in that massive gaggle of firepower wrote a thank-you 

letter to the men of Task Force Normandy that said, “During our 

[flight intelligence] brief, we noticed our route of flight took us right 

over an active [radar] site. . . . We were told not to worry about it! We 

saw the explosions and your helicopters in our FLIR as we flew over 

you. There was immense relief!”42 Capt Mike Kingsley noted their 

contribution to the operation when he said, “We were the logical 

choice because we have an advanced navigational system. . . . They 

had the confidence in us to lead them in so that when it was time to 

destroy these radar sites they were fresh and ready to go.”43 “Pave Low 

leads,” declared Colonel Comer. The task force of Air Force and Army 

Airmen had blown open the door for their fellow combat aviators to 

begin the air campaign against Iraq. They were the right force, at the 

right place, at the right time.44

Approaching Arar, the four Pave Lows of Red Team and White 

Team assumed rescue alert duties as their Apaches proceeded back to 

Al Jouf. The Pave Low crews monitored the CSAR SATCOM frequency, along with the two Pave Lows at Rafha and the H-3s at Ras al 

Mishab. They were backed up by the entire SOCCENT helicopter 

fleet, if necessary. However, throughout the night, the frequencies 

were eerily quiet. In contradiction to the best estimates, only one 

manned aircraft was lost, an F-18 from the USS Saratoga. However, 

the pilot, Lt Cdr Michael Speicher, had not been heard from since his 

strike package had departed its target, the Iraqi airfield at Al Taqaddum, 

and rescue forces were not dispatched. Subsequently, Secretary of 

Defense Cheney announced that Speicher had been killed. Throughout the night, the rescue crews monitored the frequencies, making 

occasional radio checks to insure that the relative silence was not because of communications problems. The predictions of horrendous 

losses were obviated by years of technological development and hard 

training.45 General Horner was most pleased.
war in the desert │ 309

The strategic portion of the air campaign was now in full swing as 

allied aircraft swarmed over Iraq and Kuwait. On 17 January, the 

Turkish government finally gave its approval for Proven Force to begin combat operations. Colonel Gray was relieved that he now had a 

recovery force for the northern part of the country. He divided Iraq at 

latitude 33 degrees and 30 minutes north, assigning the 21st SOS any 

recoveries above that demarcation. His SOCCENT assets in the south 

would continue to handle their three sectors. On that day and the 

next, though, the Iraqi air defenders began to strike back, downing 

eight fighter aircraft. Most crews went down directly over enemy airfields or ground units and were either killed in the downing or immediately captured. There were no calls for rescue.46

Stroke 65

On 19 January, thick clouds enveloped the region as several large 

packages of fighter aircraft attacked targets in the Baghdad area. Iraqi 

SAMs shot down two USAF F-16s. One pilot, Capt Harry Roberts, 

ejected over enemy units and was immediately captured. The second 

pilot, Maj Jeff Tice, call sign Stroke 65, was able to fly halfway back 

toward Saudi Arabia before he had to eject. While descending under 

his parachute through the thick clouds, Tice was able to report his 

status to an orbiting AWACS aircraft, which then passed the information to the JRCC. When Tice landed, though, he was immediately 

taken prisoner by Bedouin tribesmen and was not able to report his 

capture to those orbiting above.

Unaware of his status, his wingmen reported his location to the 

AWACS aircraft and then had to depart the area. The AWACS crew 

directly forwarded that information to the JRCC, which passed the 

mission to SOCCENT. Colonel Gray and his staff did a quick mission 

analysis and determined that a rescue using Pave Lows was possible. 

Two 20th SOS Pave Lows, commanded by Captains Minish and Harmon, 

were en route from Al Jouf to Rafha. On board with Harmon was the 

unit flight surgeon, Maj Mark Cunningham. Colonel Comer contacted them and gave them the mission and available data. While refueling at Rafha, Minish used his spider-route matrix and latest intelligence updates to design a path to the survivor’s location. Harmon 

was directed to unload the flight surgeon. Major Cunningham would 

have none of it and refused to leave the aircraft. He was assigned 
310 │ war in the desert

scanner duties, and, when the refueling was complete, the two aircraft took off and headed north. 

Approaching the border, the two helicopters descended to 80 feet 

above the ground and entered low clouds. Minish began navigating 

with his TF/TA and FLIR as Harmon maintained position off of his 

aircraft. Encountering especially thick fog, though, Harmon lost visual contact with the other aircraft and had to pull away for safe separation. He and his crew then used their radar to maintain a trail formation on the lead aircraft as they continued through the weather, 

which was now providing a cover for the two aircraft. As they continued north, fighter aircraft contacted them on the radio and offered 

their support. The fighters were able to provide airborne protection 

above the helicopters. However, they were never able to see the Pave 

Lows and could not risk dropping ordnance without visual identification and deconfliction. 

Courtesy Col Paul Harmon, USAF Retired

The Pave Low crew that made the attempt to recover Stroke 65. Left to right: 

(standing) Sgt Rob Turner, Capt Paul Harmon, Capt Ken Sipperly, Sgt Jeff 

Mucha, SSgt Mike Hulin, and TSgt Troy Arce; (front) Sgt Ismael Gonzalez and 

SrA Martin Brown.

About 10 miles from the survivor’s reported location, Minish 

called for the survivor on the rescue radio frequencies. When Tice 

did not respond, the two helicopter crews coordinated a sector search. 

For 30 minutes, they fruitlessly swept the area, flying over several 

Bedouin encampments—one of which was holding Tice, who heard 

them fly over. The AWACS crew then gave them another set of coordinates, which was the F-16 wreckage site. Flying to that site, Pave 
war in the desert │ 311

Low crews were notified that Iraqi forces in the area were aware of 

their presence and actively searching for them with radar and direction finding devices. The AWACS monitoring their progress then ordered them out of the area, which was very satisfactory with the 

crews since they were low on fuel. Still enshrouded by the low clouds, 

the two aircraft turned south and left the area after logging over five 

hours in enemy territory. 

The recovery attempt for Maj Jeff Tice had been unsuccessful but 

not because of the efforts of the two Pave Low crews or their aircraft. Both had done exactly what had been asked of them. The 

crews proved that the aircraft could overcome the limitations of 

weather and low visibility conditions that earlier rescue forces had 

faced. Furthermore, they had operated in hostile territory against a 

fully alerted enemy force and had used the formerly restrictive 

weather as a defensive cover. Captain Harmon recalls that “this was 

the first time that the Pave Low had been fully used as designed—

Vietnam lessons learned, adverse weather, night capability, etc. It 

was actually the first time the airplane had ever done what it was 

designed to do. We never considered turning around because of the 

weather. We just continued north. Tim [Minish] had already configured his airplane to set up his hover coupler to descend through 

the weather had he needed to once we got into the area, had Tice 

come up on the radio.”47

Comer was pleased, too. He shared Harmon’s satisfaction. However, it was more tempered, for he felt that his crews would be 

spending a great deal more time in enemy territory, and he was concerned by the capabilities that the enemy forces had displayed in 

trying to track the Pave Lows. He knew that war was a process of 

tactic-countertactic, and only the quickest survived. 

Regardless, the war went on. As the large force packages were attacking near Baghdad, Saddam Hussein ordered his forces to launch 

intermediate range missiles against Saudi Arabia and Israel from sites 

in western Iraq. Fearing an Israeli intervention, General Schwarzkopf 

directed General Horner to attack the suspected launch positions. On 

short notice, strike flights were refragged from well-planned targets 

to hit hastily identified potential missile locations near the IraqJordan border. 
312 │ war in the desert

Corvette 03

One of the strike flights so redirected was the Corvette 01 flight 

from the 4th TFW. That wing was the first to be assigned the new 

strike version of the premier air-to-air fighter; it was one of Horner’s 

key USAF units in the war. Corvette 01 was dispatched as a flight of 

six aircraft to hit sites near the Iraqi city of Al Qaim, an area heavily 

defended by multiple SAM and AAA batteries. 

Flying as the crew of Corvette 03 were Col Dave Eberly and Maj 

Tom Griffith. As they entered the target area, a SAM struck and mortally wounded their aircraft. Both men ejected. Arriving on the 

ground, they were able to join up, move away from Al Qaim, and 

make some radio calls. 

The Corvette 01 crew immediately notified the AWACS that their 

wingman had gone down. The AWACS crew notified the JRCC. Rescue specialists in the JRCC began working with intelligence and other 

sources to determine an accurate location of the survivors while also 

passing a warning order to SOCCENT. Colonel Gray got the message 

and alerted the crews at Arar. Captain Martin and crew were first on 

alert and quickly began planning as they awaited location data and 

intelligence updates. However, initial reports indicated that the crew 

of Corvette 03 was down near Al Qaim, an extremely dangerous area 

and north of the sector dividing line. While his intelligence section 

began a threat analysis, Gray pressed the JRCC for an accurate location and also got Colonel Johnson’s approval to contact the 21st SOS 

guys at Batman. 

For the next several hours, the AWACS, Rivet Joint RC-135s, and 

SAR satellites attempted to gain an accurate location of the PRC-90 

radio being used by Eberly and Griffith. However, they were not able 

to provide anything but a general location. The JRCC suggested that 

Gray dispatch Pave Lows into the area to do a search. Colonel Orrell 

was adamantly against that, recalling his experiences flying HH-53s 

in Southeast Asia. He wanted a good location so that the Pave Low 

crews could take advantage of their precision GPS navigational capability to get in and out quickly at low level, and preferably at night, 

giving the crew the best chance at success and survival. 

Unfortunately, the fighter crews of the 4th TFW did not know all 

of that. General Glosson had told them that if they were shot down, 

the helicopters would be there regardless. Now their buddies were on 

the ground, and they could hear them on the radios. Yet, apparently, 
war in the desert │ 313

the rescue forces were doing nothing. Captain O’Boyle in the TACC 

was accosted several times by fighter guys who did not understand 

the delays. At one point, O’Boyle tried to explain by saying, “You just 

can’t go trundling into some place in a high-threat environment 

without knowing exactly where the guy is.”48

Despite the situation, the pressure was building on Colonel Gray 

to make an attempt—at least for morale purposes. He asked the JRCC 

for its best position on the two men. When it provided that, he realized that the 21st crews were the obvious choice and, with Colonel 

Johnson’s approval, passed the mission to them.

Colonel Zdenek and his crews seized the opportunity. Two helicopters, commanded by Capt Grant Harden and Capt Steve Otto, 

would go in, accompanied by an HC-130 tanker. The crews had already tasked intelligence for the latest possible data and the JRCC for 

supplemental information. However, they had some practical problems based upon their location in Turkey. First of all, the crews had to 

make sure they could get clearance through Turkish airspace to fly 

their missions. Next, in doing threat analysis, they determined that 

their best approach to the Al Qaim area was directly through Syria. 

They had already requested permission to fly through Syrian airspace. However, the necessary clearances were not forthcoming to 

allow them to fly that night, and they had to delay until the next evening. 

The next day, several aircrews flying through the Al Qaim area 

heard Eberly and Griffith on the radio, adding to the frustration 

building in the fighter community. Unsure of what was happening 

with the rescue forces, the two Airmen decided to try to walk into 

Syria. Later that evening, they stumbled into some enemy soldiers 

and were captured. US intelligence sources and commanders did not 

know that. 

At Batman, the Pave Low crews got ready. The three aircraft would 

fly due south through Syria. The tanker would refuel them en route. 

Besides the crew of six, the Pave Lows would carry two PJs, a combat 

controller, and six US Army special forces Soldiers. General Potter, 

the SOCEUR commander, determined this because he wanted the 

rescue crews to be able to insert the team for a short overland recovery. It was a calculated way to generate another rescue tactical option 

if the threat in the immediate area of the survivor precluded the helicopter from getting in. 

At launch time, approval to fly through Syria had still not been 

granted. Regardless, the three aircraft took off and turned south. 
314 │ war in the desert

Twenty minutes into Syria, the crews finally received their clearance. The two helicopters then refueled from the HC-130, separated from it, and proceeded to a holding point near Al Qaim. 

Crews were instructed to make no attempt to pick up the two Airmen unless they had voice contact with them. The recovery forces 

would be supported with an air strike that would bomb SAM and 

AAA sites as they made the pickup. Additionally, one of the fighter 

flight leads would contact the survivors and authenticate them for 

the pickup.

The helicopter crews were right on time. But the air strike was 

late and hastily conducted. The Pave Low pilots watched the 

bombs explode and the enemy guns and SAM sites return fire. 

They heard a few radio calls to Corvette 03, with no response. 

Then the fighters were gone. Captain Harden and his copilot, Capt 

Matt Shazda, called on the PRC-90 radio frequencies for the two 

Airmen. As they did, they could not help but notice that the calls 

drew ground fire. The pilots suspected that the enemy was trying 

to direction find against their radio calls, and this seemed to confirm it. Capt Shazda relates, 

I got on the radio and started trying all the different frequencies to contact 

him. . . . We realized that the SAR net was nothing more than a . . . pilotcontrolled AAA. We would key the mike, and they would start firing. I told 

Harden, “Look! They’re DFin’ [direction finding] us. Watch this!” So I made a 

radio call, and they started shooting again. He told me, “Cut that out!” They 

definitely had a trap set up for us. They were waiting for us, because the final 

location that we got [was] where all the AAA was coming from.49

With no contact, the crews departed the area and proceeded 

back to Batman. They went back into crew rest, anticipating another attempt the next night. Colonel Gray also planned another 

attempt from the south using a task force of MH-53s, MH-60s, 

and an HC-130. Captain Martin would plan and lead the mission. 

However, without a solid location and contact with the survivors, 

Gray would not commit to another attempt. The operation was 

subsequently cancelled when he received confirmation that the 

men had been captured. Unfortunately, the fighter crews were not 

aware of the efforts of the Pave Low crews or the difficulties that 

CENTAF was having in trying to locate its downed crew members. They just knew that their buddies had not been rescued. It 

caused a significant morale problem among those who bore the 

biggest burden of combat.50
war in the desert │ 315

Slate 46

On 20 January, in the midst of the Corvette 03 effort, 20th SOS 

crews at Arar were alerted for two more possible CSAR missions. 

SOCCENT reported that enemy missiles had downed an A-6 and an 

F-14 from the USS Saratoga while they were conducting early morning strikes in western Iraq. The SOCCENT force at Arar also included 

four US Navy SH-60s from the HCS-4/5 detachment, and, understandably, those crews wanted to rescue their service brethren. Unfortunately, the airfield was enshrouded in heavy fog and below the 

takeoff minimums for those aircraft. Since the Pave Lows could 

launch in those conditions, the local SOCCENT element commander, 

Lt Col Jerry Garlington, gave them the mission. He selected Captain 

Kingsley as lead and Capt Mike Beard as copilot for one crew, and 

Captain Trask and Major Homan, respectively, for the other. Both 

crews began planning their missions right away. Within a few minutes, though, the A-6 landed at an airfield in Saudi Arabia, and 

Kingsley’s mission was cancelled.

Flying with the call sign of Moccasin 05, Trask and his crew lifted 

off into the weather and, using their Pave Low navigational gear, 

headed north into Iraq to recover the pilot, Lt Devon Jones, and the 

radar intercept officer, Lt Larry Slade, of the downed F-14, Slate 46. 

The fog ended at the border, and the crew members found themselves 

traversing an almost completely flat and trackless region of Iraq with 

almost unlimited visibility. Trask descended to just 20 feet above the 

ground and utilized the best spider route for the area. As they flew, 

the crew received constant threat updates from an AWACS aircraft 

that was watching them. Additionally, the AWACS crew arranged 

for F-15s to provide combat air patrol and A-10s to support them 

on the recovery. 

As the Pave Low crew cruised to the reported location of Lieutenant 

Slade and tried to make contact with him, the AWACS warned them 

that Iraqi fighter aircraft and helicopters were headed in their direction. The crew avoided them by flying just above the ground and using what little terrain masking was available. But flying at such low 

altitudes prevented them from making radio contact with either 

Jones or Slade. An orbiting EA-6B that had been part of the strike 

package with Slate 46 contacted Moccasin 05 and told them that the 

survivors were about 50 miles to the north of their position. After 

checking with AWACS and SOCCENT, Trask widened their search 
316 │ war in the desert

area, which was dangerously close to the Mudaysis AB. Their best efforts were unsuccessful, and Moccasin 05 returned to Arar for fuel 

and better survivor data. Unbeknownst to them, Slade was subsequently taken prisoner by Iraqi troops. 

As Moccasin 05 headed for Arar, a flight of A-10s—Sandy 57 and 

58, Capt Paul Johnson and 1st Lt Randy Goff—was diverted to the 

CSAR effort. Johnson heard Jones calling on his survival radio and 

was able to contact him and fly to his location. When the survivor 

said that he could see the A-10 over his location, Johnson marked his 

location with his INS and reported it to AWACS. 

At Arar, Trask and his crew were refueling. They were instructed to 

take off and fly to Al Jouf so that their aircraft could receive some 

needed maintenance. However, they had been monitoring the emergency radio frequency and could hear Johnson talking to Jones. Believing that Pave Low best operated when utilized with an “assault 

mentality,” Trask asked Colonel Garlington for permission to relaunch for the recovery. With the weather now clear, the US Navy 

crews of HCS-4/5 concurrently were again asking for the mission to 

rescue their service-mates. Since Trask and his crew had just flown 

through that area, Garlington believed they had a tactical advantage. 

Courtesy National Museum of the US Air Force

The crew of Moccasin 05. Left to right: TSgt Jim Peterson, Sgt Craig Dock, MSgt 

Tim Hadrych, Capt Tom Trask, Maj Mike Homan, and TSgt Greg Vanhyning.
war in the desert │ 317

He directed Moccasin 05 to go, accompanied this time by Moccasin 

04, with Kingsley and crew flying as wingmen.51

As the two Pave Lows headed north, they could still hear Captain 

Johnson talking to Lieutenant Jones. Moccasin 05 contacted Johnson 

directly. He reported that he was in the area of the survivor but 

needed to depart to refuel. “Just give me the survivor’s location,” responded Trask. Using a secure means of communication, Johnson 

gave them the survivor’s coordinates as determined by his INS, and 

then he and Lieutenant Goff departed to find a tanker. 

Trask and Homan quickly loaded the location into their enhanced 

navigational system and plotted it on their maps. They realized immediately that the survivor was in the northern sector, which was 

supposed to be covered by the 21st SOS troops at Batman. Regardless, they reported to SOCCENT via SATCOM that they were pressing on to his location. But they would have to cross the main eastwest highway from Baghdad to Jordan. The road was heavily used 

and guarded, and Trask instructed Kingsley to hold south of it while 

he proceeded to the survivor. 

After crossing the road, Trask and crew steered directly for the 

survivor’s location. As they did, the AWACS crew informed them that 

a Roland SAM site ahead of them had become active and gave them 

its coordinates. Homan plotted its location and determined that it 

was at almost the exact same position as the survivor. When the 

Roland site was displayed on the MH-53J’s radar warning receiver, 

Trask maneuvered his aircraft to stay out of its engagement zone as 

the AWACS controller shouted at them to turn to the east. A few 

minutes later, Sandy 57 and 58 returned full of fuel and contacted 

Moccasin 05. Trask reported that he was in the vicinity of the survivor. Johnson could not see him. Trask realized that the INS on the 

A-10s had probably drifted quite a bit, since Johnson and Goff had 

now been airborne for almost eight hours, and he used his main radio 

to home in on Johnson’s transmissions.

 Johnson and Goff spotted Moccasin 05 and dropped down to escort it to the survivor. Johnson contacted Lieutenant Jones and told 

him to get ready for the pickup. Then Jones saw the helicopter, and he 

remembers, “I . . . saw the Pave Low, about five feet off of the ground. 

I started talking to him. I have never seen such a beautiful sight as 

that big brown H-53.”52

Very excited now, Jones started giving Trask vectors. Unfortunately, Iraqi forces in the area were also monitoring his transmissions 
318 │ war in the desert

Courtesy MSgt Tim Hadrych, USAF, Retired

and began homing in on his location in two trucks. The left gunner 

on Moccasin 05, MSgt Tim Hadrych, spotted them and called them 

out to the rest of the crew. Homan called Sandy 57 and 58 and told 

them to “smoke the trucks!” Sandy 58, Lieutenant Goff, hit the lead 

truck with several rounds of 30 mm fire, stopping it and setting it on 

fire. Captain Johnson also shot it with more 30 mm fire for good measure. The second truck turned around and fled. Throughout the engagement, Trask continued his approach to the survivor, who was 

now standing and quite visible. Trask set the Pave Low down between 

Lieutenant Jones and the now furiously burning enemy vehicle. He 

cleared his two PJs to disembark and secure Jones. 

The burning truck as seen by the crew members of Moccasin 05 as they 

approached Slate 46 Alpha’s position

When all three were aboard, he lifted off and, with the A-10s again 

providing escort, turned south. He was immediately joined by Captain Kingsley and crew in Moccasin 04, who had crossed the main 

road to provide assistance if needed. The A-10s guided them back 

across the busy highway and stayed with them until they crossed the 

Saudi border. Captain Johnson and Lieutenant Goff then headed off 

to find another tanker before flying back to their base at KFIA. The 

two Pave Lows headed for Al Jouf and a thunderous welcome. 
war in the desert │ 319

As Lt Devon Jones stepped off of the helicopter, his recovery as 

well as the unsuccessful attempts for Stroke 65 and Corvette 03 

made it obvious to all that the Pave Lows could finally perform the 

mission for which they had been modified. However, the astounding capabilities of the Pave Low also highlighted a larger CSAR deficiency. While a precision day/night, all-weather recovery capability 

now existed, the USAF had a larger problem. For optimal use, the 

Pave Low needed precision GPS coordinates for its survivors. In the 

years since Southeast Asia, the USAF had not developed the capability either with its survival radios or intelligence collection platforms to provide those coordinates. As good as Pave Low was technologically, it was only as good as the system that supported it. On 

all three missions, the crews flew the aircraft to the limits of its capabilities. Of the five Airmen awaiting rescue, though, only one was 

recovered—in large part because the crew of Moccasin 05 was able 

to overcome the larger limitations in the USAF’s CSAR capability at 

that time. Lamenting that revelation, Colonel Comer later noted, 

“We didn’t have the technology on our people . . . to know their location. We had GPS, but GPS was brand new. We didn’t understand 

that it changed the world.”53

Courtesy USSOCOM Public Affairs

The actual rescue of Slate 46 Alpha, US Navy lieutenant Devon Jones
320 │ war in the desert

About that same time, Colonel Comer received a call from Col 

Ben Orrell informing him that Colonel Johnson wanted him to 

move four of his aircraft and crews back to KFIA to better support 

the SOCCENT ground SOF elements. Comer was somewhat concerned that his unit’s initial emphasis on rescue might provoke 

some USAF officers to suggest that the 20th focus exclusively on 

that mission. He did not want to have to engage in a repeat of the 

endless debate on that issue and welcomed Johnson’s directive. 

However, he did not want to split his aircraft maintenance element 

and suggested that he be allowed to provide a planning staff for duty 

at KFIA with the SOCCENT command element, but keep his aircraft at Al Jouf for better maintenance. When necessary, aircraft and 

crews could be provided for missions.

Colonel Johnson did not concur with Comer, and on 25 January, 

four aircraft and crews, and a portion of the 20th SOS maintenance 

team, flew to KFIA. Comer was not happy with the arrangement. 

However, he had come to realize that in the Army, the primary emphasis was on directly supporting the combat forces, and all other 

considerations were secondary. Colonel Johnson was the SOCCENT 

commander and had OPCON of the deployed element of 20th SOS. 

It was his call. However, he never developed a feel for the needs of his 

highly specialized AFSOC aviators. Gradually, Comer realized that 

the best way to deal with him was to use Colonels Gray and Orrell as 

conduits of sensibility and sound reason.54

Special Operations Missions

Colonel Comer’s concern about his overutilization for rescue was 

also inadvertently addressed by events in the war. The diversion of 

the air campaign to attack the Iraqi surface-to-surface missile (Scud) 

did not completely dissuade Iraq from firing its missiles into both 

Saudi Arabia and Israel. When Israeli intervention with special forces 

and possibly air strikes looked imminent, the senior British commander in the Gulf, Sir Peter de la Billière, suggested to General 

Schwarzkopf that he be allowed to insert several British Special Air 

Service (SAS) teams into the western portions of Iraq to find and 

destroy the missiles. Schwarzkopf agreed and on 20 January, as both 

the Corvette 03 and Slate 46 efforts were under way, several teams 

entered Iraq—some by vehicle and some by insertion via RAF CH-47s. 
war in the desert │ 321

Almost immediately the teams began harassing Iraqi forces and interdicting supply convoys. At SOCCENT headquarters, Colonel Gray 

suggested that the British elements provide a direct liaison officer to 

them for operational deconfliction. He also believed that the aviation 

support package sent with the British force was not sufficient to support their teams if they got in serious trouble and wanted to be able 

to provide support quickly with his larger force if it were needed.55

That need quickly appeared. The Iraqis reacted violently to the intrusions and engaged the British SAS teams in numerous stiff battles. 

One team, Bravo 20, was hit especially hard and had to evade. In the 

process, the team was split up as it tried to make its way to the Syrian 

border. On 27 and 28 January, Capt Corby Martin, Capt Bill Lemenager, 

and the crew flew two long missions with a British CH-47 from the 

RAF 7th Squadron in an attempt to find the remnants of Bravo 20. 

The Brits provided them the planned route that the team was supposed to follow, and Martin and crew led them along it using their 

Pave Low equipment. At one point, USAF F-15 pilots tracked the aircraft, but they left the rescue crews alone once they determined who 

they were. Regardless, both missions were unsuccessful. The crews 

learned later that only one troop from Bravo 20 made it to safety in 

Syria. The rest were either killed or captured.56

When the 20th moved its four helicopters and crews back to KFIA, 

Colonel Comer accompanied them so that he could deal directly 

with the SOCCENT leadership. Maj Mike Homan remained at Al 

Jouf to run the unit operation there. But Comer found himself with a 

significant challenge. His squadron was spread over a vast distance. 

He still had aircraft and crews back at Hurlburt working directly with 

other JSOC elements to develop contingency capabilities for operations in other areas of the world. He had two aircraft and three crews 

at Batman with the 21st. Now his unit element in Saudi Arabia was 

split between two locations, still sitting rescue alert as its primary 

mission but also supporting ongoing British SAS operations and now 

planning to operate with other SOCCENT elements. Comer had to 

rely on his young majors, captains, and NCOs to provide the necessary leadership for each of these dispersed teams. At KFIA he put 

Captain Harmon to work developing plans to work with SEALs on 

water operations in the Gulf. Harmon talked to the commander of 

the 71st SOS, the USAF Reserve unit activated and deployed to Saudi 

Arabia with its MH-3s. The aircraft had been modified with GPS receivers, and its pilots were trained to operate with NVGs. Harmon 
322 │ war in the desert

recalled that the aircraft were capable of landing on the water and 

suggested that they support the SEALs. The SEALs concurred, and 

Harmon designed a plan to utilize mixed flights of MH-53s and 

MH-3s to insert and cover the SEALs for missions in the northern 

Gulf region. On 6 February two Pave Lows, commanded by Harmon 

and Capt Jeff White, led a mission with H-3s from the 71st SOS to 

insert SEALs in the northern Gulf as planned. Comer also assigned 

White to work with Kuwaiti special forces and US Army Operational 

Detachment Alpha (ODA) special forces A-Team units to plan operations to insert their teams into Kuwait and possibly the adjoining 

areas of Iraq.57

As additional support for the anti-Scud effort in western Iraq, the 

SOCCOM commander, Gen Carl Stiner, recommended to General 

Schwarzkopf that SOCCOM deploy a JSOTF to Saudi Arabia for that 

purpose. Schwarzkopf was not a huge supporter of special forces and 

had been hesitant to allow such a force into his theater unless it was 

under his direct control. When the details were worked out, he allowed a task force of 400 operators—including two squadrons from 

the Delta Force, a company of Rangers, a small detachment of SEALs, 

and a portion of the 1st Battalion of the 160th SOAR commanded by 

Colonel Brown—to deploy to Arar. There they would be supported 

by a detachment of A-10s, the MH-47s from the 3d Battalion of the 

160th SOAR, and possibly the Pave Lows of the 20th SOS. 

The JSOTF package began to arrive on 30 January. As troops 

were unloading from the C-141s, the base was rocked by a large 

explosion and alarm warnings. Assuming it was a Scud attack, they 

scrambled for cover. The alarm was cancelled when the commanders there determined that the explosion was actually caused by a US 

Navy antiradiation missile that had erroneously homed in on the 

base TACAN station. 

The JSOTF was led by Maj Gen Wayne Downing. He and his staff 

promptly began working with the British to learn from their successes and failures and to establish clearly defined areas of operation 

for deconfliction and maximum effectiveness. By mutual agreement, 

the British would work in areas close to the Saudi border, while US 

forces would utilize their aviation assets to operate farther north 

around the ever-dangerous city of Al Qaim.58

When General Downing discovered that the MH-47s of the 3d 

Battalion of the 160th SOAR lacked IRCM countermeasure equipment 

to protect them from the dangerous shoulder-fired, heat-seeking 
war in the desert │ 323

missiles like the SA-7, he requested that the 20th SOS support his 

operation. SOCCENT approved the request, and the 20th was so 

tasked—its fifth concurrent commitment. The aircraft and crews at 

Al Jouf would now have to maintain their rescue commitment while 

also supporting the JSOTF. Colonel Comer shuttled every other day 

between KFIA, Al Jouf, and Arar as he tried to keep a handle on the 

now scattered and separate operations of his unit. At one point, 

Colonel Gray, in looking forward to the evolution of the overall campaign, suggested that the unit might need to be able to move forward 

into Kuwait City to set up an operation there. Comer quickly pointed 

out that such a move would definitely require more aircraft and personnel from Hurlburt. 

The first insertion mission for the JSOTF was conducted on 7 February. Captain Martin and crew led the mission, which also included 

Pave Lows commanded by Major Homan and Captain Kingsley and 

two MH-60s from the 1st Battalion, 160th SOAR. The Paves carried 

specially modified Pinzgauer fighting vehicles to be used by the 

teams. They were covered by an extensive support package of electronic jamming and strike aircraft. Because of the tactical needs of 

the inserted teams, the helicopters were loaded to their absolute top 

tactical weight of 50,000 pounds. Colonel Comer authorized this 

procedure based upon operational necessity and earnest discussions 

with his crews and maintenance personnel. Additionally, the length 

of the mission was such that the Pave Lows required an in-flight 

refueling from MC-130s from the 8th SOS. Arriving at the landing 

zone, the Pave Low pilots discovered that the aerial photos used to 

plan the mission had not shown some distinctive, dangerous variations in the terrain, forcing them to modify their procedures to safely 

deliver the team and its vehicles.59

Over the next three weeks, the 20th SOS Pave Lows and crews flew 

eight missions in direct support of the JSOTF, leading and sometimes 

being led by the helicopters of the 1st of the 160th. Frequently operating at their maximum weight of 50,000 pounds, they inserted teams 

and their fighting vehicles and necessary supplies as the special troops 

attacked Iraqi facilities, searched for Scud missiles, disrupted Iraqi 

communications, and generally wreaked havoc on the enemy forces 

and bases. Reminiscent of their training missions in the 1980s, the 

Pave Low crews—commanded by Major Homan and Captains Corby 

Martin, Mike Kingsley, Tim Minish, and Kevin Ewing—became adept 

at doing detailed planning with the ground and aviation elements 
324 │ war in the desert

and flew with flights of MH-47s and MH-60s over the trackless desert, 

wadis, and hills through the dark night. 

Captain Minish and Capt Tim Brown and crew led another mission on 17 February with three MH-47s and two MH-60s to insert a 

ground team and vehicles deep into Iraq. The delivery flight was uneventful, but they had difficulty getting the heavy helicopters into the 

landing zone because of brownout conditions that forced two crews 

to abort their initial landing attempts and circle for another approach. 

Upon landing, the back ramp on the Pave Low would not properly 

lower so that the vehicle being carried could be unloaded. Fortunately, the flight engineers and gunners were able to resolve the problem and unload the special vehicle so that the ground team could 

execute its mission.60

The JSOTF senior Army officers were impressed with the performance of the 20th crews, displanting years of misunderstanding and 

distrust. They were especially impressed with Martin. He was already 

lean and mean-looking and flew in BDUs instead of the darker flight 

suit. Additionally, he had grown a thick, bushy mustache that the 

grunts all wanted to copy. However, they were most taken with his 

self-confidence. It was a confidence based on mastery of his aircraft, 

mission experience, and nine months in-theater—all leavened with a 

steep dose of a direct-assault mentality. Said Martin,

You get so you are part of the machine. . . . I felt that I was part of the helicopter. 

It was part of me, part of my body. When I scratched my nuts, it scratched its 

nuts. I felt that way. I was a captain. I was impervious—bulletproof! . . . Young 

to senior captains—all we did was fly. When you do that every day for almost 

a year, you get very good at it.

[We had] the mentality “let’s get the mission done. Let’s do it right. Let’s do it 

the way it’s supposed to be done.”61

Comer continually shuttled back and forth from KFIA to Al Jouf 

and Arar to maintain contact with his crews and liaise with Colonel 

Brown, the commander of the 1st of the 160th, concerning the aviation support of the JSOTF. Brown was now assigned as the air component commander for the JSOTF and was also a firm member of the 

“Soldiers should fly with Soldiers” clan. Comer believed that Brown 

constantly looked for ways to push his aircraft and crews vice the 

Pave Lows for missions. Strangely enough, he also found among 

many of his Air Force brethren a belief that the USAF should just go 

with the flow and let the Army have the SOF aviation mission à la 
war in the desert │ 325

Initiative 17. Comer found such talk infuriating, believing that “we 

had the best machines and the best thinkers about how to execute 

long range missions. . . . Our doctrine had given us the aircraft and 

trained us to do this job in DESERT STORM better than anyone else 

could.”62 He was resolved that he would fight tirelessly to insure that 

his unit and troops got the missions for which they were uniquely 

and best qualified. That disparity was put on graphic display in the 

dark night of 21 February. A special forces Soldier was injured in the 

western area and needed to be evacuated. An MH-60 from the 1st of 

the 160th was dispatched to pick him up. When the aircraft returned 

to Arar, the field was blanketed in a thick shroud of fog. The Pave 

Lows routinely operated in and out of it; unfortunately, the MH-60 

was not so equipped. While trying to land in the restricted visibility, 

the crew crashed, killing all seven Soldiers on board.63

As the missions with the JSOTF were proceeding, Colonel Comer 

was spending more and more time working with the commanders at 

SOCCENT as they developed ground and sea special operations 

forces missions to support the planned ground campaign designed to 

drive the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. He spoke several times with 

Colonel Correll back at Hurlburt and discovered that the squadron 

there had just received new chemical warfare flying suits, and several 

crew members had certified flying with them. Comer approached 

Colonel Gray about bringing over Correll, two more Pave Low aircraft, and several of the crews trained on the chemical warfare suit as 

reinforcements for the ground campaign. Gray concurred and arrangements were made to do so. Comer also asked that the two 20th 

SOS aircraft and crews at Batman be transferred down south with his 

detachment. He received one of the 20th crews but not the aircraft. 

Additionally, Comer observed the planning that Capt Paul Harmon 

and Capt Jeff White were doing to involve the Pave Lows in SEAL 

operations in the Gulf and deep penetration strategic reconnaissance 

missions into Kuwait and Iraq with Army ODA teams. He also developed an excellent relationship with CW3 Vernon Ward, the ground 

liaison supervisor in SOCCENT, who helped him understand the 

needs of the special teams who would perform these missions. Ward 

had an uncanny understanding of Army internal politics and mentored Comer on that minefield too.

Captain Harmon’s detailed planning paid dividends when, on 12 

February, a Pave Low led a 55th SOS MH-60G and two 71st SOS 

MH-3s on a mission to insert SEAL elements into the waters of the 
326 │ war in the desert

northern Gulf. The teams were being inserted for several covert missions preparatory to the massive ground campaign designed to eject 

Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Over the next 11 days, Captains Harmon, 

White, and Sipperly led crews several more times to repeat this mission as the SEALs collected intelligence data and helped support the 

deception plan designed to convince the Iraqis that a large amphibious 

landing would be conducted upon the shores of Kuwait. On 22 February another crew, led by Capt Joe Turnage and copilot Capt Brad 

Webb, flew as part of a joint four-ship formation to insert more allied 

teams in support of this operation.64

Captain Trask and his crew were assigned a mission to place an 

Army ODA deep into Iraq to intercept and stop a train by setting off 

a charge under the engine. They derisively titled it the “Throw Mohammed from the Train” mission, hijacking the title of a Hollywood 

movie then popular. But the Army team members would not completely destroy the train. Instead, they would board it and search for 

specific pieces of equipment. Once the equipment was found, they 

would abandon the disabled train, blocking the tracks for several 

days. The team rehearsed the mission several times near KFIA before 

repositioning to Al Jouf for the execution order. However, it was 

never ordered to go. Instead, after 10 days the mission was cancelled, 

and Trask and his crew were released for general tasking—after missing several opportunities to fly other missions.65

Also working closely with Chief Warrant Officer Ward in the 

SOCCENT command center, Captain White formulated the plans to 

support the infiltration of Army special forces deep into Iraq to support the allied ground campaign, now slated to start on 24 February, 

to pressure the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. On 23 February, Captains 

Mike Kingsley, Frank Gray, Jeff White, Joe Turnage, Mike Beard, 

Kevin Ewing, and Ken Sipperly led crews that flew up to 150 miles 

into Iraqi territory to deposit Army ODA teams. Their mission was to 

overwatch key roads for possible movement of Iraqi forces as they 

reacted to the movements of the VIIth Corps and XVIIIth Airborne 

Corps preparing to sweep into Iraq to envelop and trap the Republican Guard forces of Iraq ensconced in Kuwait. Each mission was 

challenging in its own way. When one of the aircraft experienced a 

severe hydraulic malfunction, its flight engineers were able to repair 

it at the team site while the Soldiers provided security. The special 

forces team that Kingsley and crew inserted was compromised as it 

began to set up its hide site and had to be immediately extracted. In 
war in the desert │ 327

the confusion that ensued, Kingsley and crew became critically short 

on gas and had to arrange for an in-flight refueling in enemy territory. Overall, the crews averaged over two and a half hours behind 

enemy lines.66

The next morning, General Schwarzkopf unleashed his allied 

ground forces. As the battle was unfolding, the Pave Low crews of the 

20th were also constantly supporting the British and JSOTF forces in 

the west with resupply, infiltration, and extraction missions. On 24 

February, Captain Harmon and Major Homan and crews led two 

MH-47s and two MH-60s on another mission deep into western Iraq 

to insert another 20-man special forces team and four special vehicles. 

Both Pave Lows were, again, over their authorized maximum gross 

weight. They proceeded to their assigned landing zone as supporting 

air strikes hit known enemy locations around which they had to maneuver. The mission proceeded normally until the helicopters departed to return home. En route, Harmon’s Pave Low developed a 

fuel transfer problem. An MC-130 tanker was able to rendezvous 

with the flight just north of the Saudi-Iraqi border and provide it with 

enough fuel to return to Arar.67

On another mission on 26 February, Capt Tom Trask and crew 

planned and led a joint flight of Pave Lows and several helicopters 

from the 1st Battalion of the 160th SOAR on a mission to deliver 

two teams of Army Rangers to neutralize a communications center 

near the Jordanian border. The site was heavily defended, and the 

attack had to be coordinated with significant covering air strikes to 

neutralize the enemy AAA and SAM positions in the area. The 

Rangers were able to destroy the facility and collect a great deal of 

significant intelligence data. During the egress back to Saudi Arabia, 

the helicopters had to take extensive evasive actions to avoid enemy 

air defense sites.68

The next day, three Pave Lows, flown by Captains White, Webb, 

and Minish and crews, led six other helicopters on two sorties into 

the Kuwait International Airport, just south of Kuwait City. Flying at 

maximum weight through the thunderstorms and thick smoke created by the burning oil heads set alight by the now retreating Iraqi 

forces, the crews had to use their NVGs. They also had to maneuver 

around the massive allied forces sweeping through the area and then 

land on the airfield, littered with wrecked aircraft and vehicles, mines, 

and unexploded ordnance. Regardless, they delivered their teams, 

who were then able to secure the field for immediate use by allied 
328 │ war in the desert

aviation forces. Lt Col Gene Correll had recently returned to the 

theater and flew the first mission with Webb. He then remained at the 

airfield to determine if the Pave Lows could use it as an FOL.69

Flying over the devastated landscape, the crews encountered an 

unusual problem. The slimy oil sludge from the plumes of smoke 

coated the aircraft and was difficult to scrub off. The sludge collected 

grime and began to build up on the aircraft. Fortunately, it did not 

affect the FLIR radar or navigation systems, and the crews carried on 

with their missions, deferring any significant sludge removal until 

hostilities ended—hopefully soon. Through this mess, Webb and his 

crew also flew two missions directly supporting US Navy SEALs 

working along the coastlines.70

By 28 February, the allied coalition forces had achieved all of their 

objectives, and President Bush declared a cease-fire, effective at 8 a.m. 

Kuwaiti time. Regardless, the Pave Lows continued to fly. Just before 

the cease-fire, Captain Webb and crew helped deliver the first US 

forces to the American Embassy so that it could be returned to US 

control. Three Pave Lows led by Capt Doug Moore and crew flew to 

the Kuwait International Airport carrying 13 personnel. Two of the 

crews were then put on rescue alert there. Two hours later, Moore and 

his crew were launched to search for an emergency beacon that had 

been heard about 40 miles north of Kuwait City, near where a US 

Marine had gone down a few days earlier. They flew through poor 

weather mixed with the sooty oil smoke over Iraqi fortifications and 

abandoned equipment but did not observe any hostile actions by 

enemy forces. The next day, those two Pave Lows were tasked to fly a 

search for an F-16 pilot shot down in Kuwait on 27 February and an 

Army helicopter crew also shot down while trying to rescue him. 

They did not find the pilot or helicopter crew, discovering later that 

all had either been killed or taken prisoner. That afternoon another 

Pave Low led seven other helicopters as they flew to western Iraq and 

recovered members of the JSOTF. Three days later, three Pave Lows 

flew deep into Iraq to recover more JSOTF teams and their vehicles 

and ODAs emplaced to support the ground campaign. Capt Jeff 

White led one of the flights. His copilot, Capt Tim Leahy, was a brand 

new Pave Low pilot. He had finished his Pave Low course at Kirtland 

in January and, after reporting to Hurlburt, was shipped directly to 

the 20th detachment in the Gulf, where he quickly received his initial 

aircraft mission qualification and was inserted into the flying schedule. His transition went well—a testimony to the excellent training 
war in the desert │ 329

that the 1551st FTS was conducting. These were the last Pave Low 

sorties of the conflict.71

With the cease-fire, General Schwarzkopf began to release units for 

return home. He decreed that units would redeploy based upon their 

arrival dates in the theater. The 20th would be one of the first units 

released, and that evening, Comer let Captain Martin and Captain 

Kingsley and several enlisted troops catch a C-141 for home. However, Comer was directed to leave three Pave Lows and four crews in 

Saudi Arabia for what would ultimately become Southern Watch. 

They subsequently flew humanitarian missions to several locations in 

Kuwait and southern Iraq and also flew support to recover the bodies 

of the crew of Spirit 03, an AC-130 shot down on 31 January 1991 off 

the coast of Kuwait.72

Throughout the period of the conflict, Comer insisted that all crew 

members got an equal opportunity to fly in combat. In all, 39 pilots, 

35 engineers, and 35 gunners logged combat sorties. During the Desert Shield/Storm deployment between August 1990 and March 1991, 

the 20th SOS flew 1,946 hours on 920 sorties, of which 806 hours and 

360 sorties were in combat. Of those, 49 sorties were flown into enemy 

territory. Several unit members received key recognition for their 

time in the Gulf: Capt Corby Martin was selected as the AFSOC pilot 

of the year as well as the Col James Jabara Award recipient for 1992; 

Capt Mike Kingsley, the AFSOC company grade officer of the year; 

Maj Mark Cunningham, the AFSOC and USAF flight surgeon of the 

year; and Capt Tom Trask and his crew, the Cheney Award recipients 

for 1991. Additionally, Comer began working with his commanders 

and the personnel assignment system to move some of the exceptionally high performers into key positions within the wing, AFSOC, and 

even the larger USAF.73

The outstanding squadron that Lt Col Rich Comer had taken over 

from Lt Col Gary Weikel had just gotten better. And some of the 

members of the unit had learned some immutable truths applicable 

to their trade. Trask felt that some of his Pave Low brethren had developed a cockiness bordering on rashness that was held in check by 

communal self-policing. He observed, 

I think that there was an element of the Pave Low community that was really 

done right. . . . You got forced by your peers to focus on where you were and 

what you were doing right at that moment. Anybody who ever tried to get too 

grandiose . . . was put back in his place pretty quickly. . . . You could tell if guys 

were getting out in front of their headlights a lot. You weren’t allowed to do 
330 │ war in the desert

that in our business. It became part of our culture . . . the way you trained [to]

focus on the task in front of you and make sure that every day you are preparing and training as thoroughly and realistically as possible.74

Martin offered a similar view but one more focused on working 

with the various “customer” groups in JSOC, a critical element of 

Pave Low operations. He remarked that “if they [JSOC] know who 

you are and know that you are not an idiot, they’ll work with you. If 

they think you are an idiot, they won’t even talk to you. You’ll never 

get in the door.”75

These were two lessons passed down to these young captains by 

the men of that earlier generation who mentored them. Such lessons 

were validated by the experiences of hard combat and then passed on 

to those who would follow in the business of Pave Low. They were 

staples of a “unit with confidence,” just as they were for those units at 

Koh Tang Island.76

Three months after the unit returned to Hurlburt Field, Trask and 

crew had an opportunity to fly a Pave Low to the Air Force Academy 

for a recruiting visit. They landed their helicopter in the middle of the 

grassy area between the chapel and other buildings. Many cadets paid 

the crew a visit. Several young cadets—Mike Grub, Shawn Cameron, 

Steve Plumhoff, Leighton Anderson, Pete Doty, Joe Michalek, and 

others—were quite impressed with the aircraft and intrigued with the 

mission. Michalek got the opportunity to take an incentive ride along 

the face of the mountains, quite a treat for a cadet third class—as it 

was for cadet Rich Comer, who also received such a ride 21 years 

prior. The three cadets decided that they wanted to fly Pave Lows. 

Little did they know that this choice would take them on a journey 

that would fulfill their desires in places and ways that, at that moment, they could not even imagine.77

21st Special Operations Squadron

While the tactical assets in Proven Force were quite active, attacking targets in Iraq on a daily basis, the operations schedule for the 

special operations forces was much more benign. After the Corvette 

03 nonrecovery, the 21st SOS crews maintained 24/7 JSAR alert. A 

Pave Low was launched on 20 February for an F-16 that missed a 

tanker and was critically short of fuel. The aircraft flamed out short of 

Incirlik, and the pilot ejected. He was recovered by Turkish forces 
war in the desert │ 331

before the Pave Low could arrive. On several occasions the crews also 

planned and practiced missions with the troops from the 10th SFG. 

However, no special operations missions were executed. One crew 

did fly in support of a classified mission for another governmental 

agency, and several flew in support of explosive ordnance disposal 

taskings. Regardless, the crews of the 21st did log 196 sorties for 381.9 

flying hours during their deployment. By 18 March, all members of 

the 21st SOS returned to their home station at RAF Woodbridge.78

Provide Comfort

Their homecoming was short-lived. After the crushing defeat of 

Iraq’s military forces, minority groups within the country rose up in 

open rebellion against Saddam Hussein. He used his remaining military forces to crush them. One of the groups was the Kurds, located 

essentially in the northern quarter of Iraq. As Saddam’s forces attacked, an estimated 700,000 fled for their lives into the cold and 

snow-covered mountains along the northern Iraq-Turkey border. 

They lacked all basic necessities of life. It was a potential humanitarian 

disaster of the first order. On 5 April, the United Nations Security 

Council passed Resolution 688, calling upon Iraq to stop its repression and asking other nations to assist the Kurds. President Bush ordered US military forces to do so. The orders quickly flowed to 

USEUCOM and USAFE, and the 39th SOW was directly tasked to 

again deploy M/HC-130 and MH-53 aircraft, crews, and support personnel to southeastern Turkey for Operation Provide Comfort. The 

second week of April, the 21st SOS shipped all five of its MH-53s 

aboard C-5s to Incirlik, with 47 personnel. When the scope of the 

tasking became clearer, the 39th SOW commander, Col Byron Hooten, 

requested augmentation of his helicopter forces and received two 

more MH-53s from Hurlburt and 13 more aircrewmen and support 

personnel from Hurlburt and Kirtland. 

The forces of the 21st SOS joined what eventually became a combined joint task force (CJTF) of personnel from 13 different nations, 

including a force of 52 helicopters and almost 21,000 personnel, military and civilian. They supported a sprawling mass of refugees sequestered in an area centered on the small city of Zakho, approximately 150 by 40 kilometers. The 21st SOS crews were assigned duty 
332 │ war in the desert

as the CJTF rescue force and assumed 24/7 alert. A 21st SOS crew did 

perform a SAR mission when a US Marine CH-53E crashed. 

In addition, their capabilities as heavy-lift helicopters were constantly put to good use as they ferried VIPs and task force personnel, 

moved huge loads of supplies and materiel, performed area reconnaissance, and accomplished medical evacuation missions that resulted in seven saved lives. In many cases, it was the same types of 

missions that their predecessors with the 21st SOS in Thailand had 

performed over 20 years prior. 

With the coming of spring, though, allied leaders felt that the situation was stabilizing and began to withdraw the coalition forces. Additionally, ground vehicles were able to take over for the aircraft, and 

the 39th SOW elements were released to return to their bases. All of 

the MH-53 aircraft, personnel, and augmentees were home by 10 

June 1991.79

Sensing allied weakness, Saddam Hussein ordered his forces to intimidate the Kurds. As a show of force, allied fighter aircraft began 

patrolling the airspace over the region to enforce a cease-fire as part 

of Provide Comfort II. On 23 July, four MH-53s, crews, and support 

personnel from the 21st SOS again returned to Incirlik to assume 

JSAR alert in support of the fighters now flying in the no-fly area. A 

few days after arriving, though, maintenance technicians inspecting 

one of the MH-53s discovered serious cracks near the hinge point on 

the tail boom. The aircraft was immediately grounded and flown by 

C-5 to Pensacola. There technicians determined that airframe vibrations caused the cracks. Inspections of several other MH-53s found 

the same problem, and all MH-53s were inspected and identified for 

repair as necessary. However, the repairs had to be done at Pensacola. 

All of the 21st SOS aircraft had the same cracks and were grounded 

for an unspecified period pending repair. Consequently, the 39th 

SOW had to request augmentation to fulfill the JSAR mission at Incirlik. The 55th SOS at Hurlburt received the tasking and dispatched 

four MH-60G “Pave Hawk” crews and support personnel to assume 

the JSAR role for the task force. 21st SOS personnel returned to RAF 

Woodbridge but were not able to fly again until their aircraft were 

repaired and returned to the unit in December 1991.80
war in the desert │ 333

Notes

1. Rip and Hasik, Precision Revolution, 75; and Whitcomb, Combat Search and 

Rescue in Desert Storm, 44, 248. 

2. Murray and Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf, 32; and Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 43.

3. Ibid.

4. Joe Becker, interview.

5. Comer, “History of Desert Shield / Desert Storm,” 1–5, 1st/16th SOW HO.

6. Correll, interview. 

7. Kradel, interview. 

8. Ibid.

9. Comer and Gray, interviews; and Stricklin to the author, e-mail, review comments, 23 Jan 11. 

10. Bergeron, Desert Shield / Desert Storm, 13, 25–26, AFSOC/HO.

11. Comer, “History of Desert Shield / Desert Storm,” 10–18, 24, 1st/16th SOW HO. 

12. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 46–47; and Schemmer, “No USAF Combat Rescue Aircraft in Gulf,” 37. 

13. Gray, interview by the author, 3 May 2001, for Whitcomb, Combat Search 

and Rescue in Desert Storm, 48.

14. Ibid., 47–48; and Clancy, Stiner, and Koltz, Shadow Warriors, 47–48.

15. Kingsley, interview.

16. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 68–69.

17. Ibid., 62.

18. Ibid., 62–63.

19. Ibid., 58–59.

20. Ibid., 67–68; and Trask, interview.

21. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 82–84.

22. Comer, “History of Desert Shield / Desert Storm,” 45–46, 1st/16th SOW HO; 

and Kingsley, interview.

23. Kingsley, interview.

24. Bergeron, Desert Shield / Desert Storm, 77–83, AFSOC/HO; and Comer, 

“History of Desert Shield / Desert Storm,” 23, 1st/16th SOW HO.

25. Comer, interview. 

26. Comer, “History of Desert Shield / Desert Storm,” 28–32, 1st/16th SOW HO; 

and Clancy, Stiner, and Koltz, Shadow Warriors, 410.

27. Kradel, interview.

28. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 67.

29. Ibid., 82–83.

30. Comer, “History of Desert Shield / Desert Storm,” 23, 48–49, 1st/16th SOW 

HO; and Comer and Webb, interviews.

31. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 73–74; Thigpen, Praetorian Starship, 357; and Bergeron, Desert Shield / Desert Storm, AFSOC/HO, 41.

32. History of 39th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 1990, vol. 3.

33. Ibid. 

34. History of 39th SOW, 1 July 1990–31 Dec 1991, vol. 1, 20–34.

35. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan 1990–31 Dec 1991, vol. 1, 316.
334 │ war in the desert

36. Sprouse, interview.

37. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 85; and History of 

AFSOC, 1 Jan 1990–31 Dec 1991, vol. 1, 299–301.

38. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 86; Bergeron, Desert 

Shield / Desert Storm, 76–77, AFSOC/HO; and Trask, interview. 

39. Kingsley, interview. Pave Low aircraft and crews on the Eager Anvil mission 

were as follows:

White Team

Lead–MH-53J #68-10356

Pilot Capt Mike Kingsley

Copilot Capt Mike Beard

Flt. Eng. Sgt Todd Corey

Flt. Eng. MSgt Robert Pinkowski

Gunner MSgt Robert Jensen

Gunner SSgt Dennis Shindle

Chalk 2–MH-53J #68-10367

Pilot Maj Bob Leonik

Copilot Lt Col Rich Comer

Flt. Eng. TSgt Dan Sherriff

Flt. Eng. SSgt Bob Rice

Gunner Sgt Mike Pearce

Gunner Sgt John Summers

Red Team

Lead–MH-53J #70-1630

Pilot Capt Corby Martin

Copilot Capt Bill Lemenager

Flt. Eng. MSgt Mike Lael

Flt. Eng. SSgt Mike Harte

Gunner SSgt Barry Harrison

Gunner Sgt Phil Carrol

Chalk 2–MH-53J #68-10369

Pilot Capt Ben Pulsifer

Copilot Capt Penny Woodson

Flt. Eng. Sgt Tom Hinson

Flt. Eng. SSgt Melvin Wells

Gunner TSgt Phillip Taylor

Gunner TSgt Terry Null

40. Comer, Kingsley, and Martin, interviews.

41. Martin, interview.

42. Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment (AH–64), Eager Anvil, after action report, file 500.600, TF Normandy, 1st/16th SOW HO; and Martin, interview. 

43. Kingsley, interview. 

44. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 90–92; Bergeron, 

Desert Shield / Desert Storm, 85–87, AFSOC/HO; Schemmer, “USAF MH–53J Pave 

Lows Led Army Apaches”; and Comer, interview.
war in the desert │ 335

45. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 99. The story of the 

sad loss of Lt Cdr Michael Speicher is told in No One Left Behind by Amy Yarsinske. 

His remains were repatriated in 2009.

46. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 100–110, 260.

47. Ibid., 117–18.

48. Ibid., 127.

49. Whitcomb, “Nonrescue of Corvette 03,” 111.

50. Ibid.; Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 122–37; and 

Martin, interview.

51. Trask, interview.

52. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 151.

53. Ibid., 142–52; Paul Johnson, “Desert Rescue,” essay 22, in Vriesenga, From 

the Line in the Sand, 177–84; and McConnell, “Rescue in Iraq!,” 75–82.

54. Comer, “History of Desert Shield / Desert Storm,” 58–59, 1st/16th SOW HO. 

55. Waller, Commandos, 340; and Gray, interview.

56. Waller, Commandos, 431; “Chronology of Desert Storm Missions,” n.d., 

1st/16th SOW HO; and Martin, interview.

57. Comer, “History of Desert Shield / Desert Storm,” 62–64, 1st/16th SOW HO; and 

mission narrative for both events, n.d., 20th SOS, historical files, 1st/16th SOW HO.

58. Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, 244.

59. Comer, “History of Desert Shield / Desert Storm,” 65–67, 1st/16th SOW HO; 

and Martin and Kingsley, interviews.

60. Mission narrative, n.d., 20th SOS, historical files, 1st/16th SOW HO.

61. Martin, interview.

62. Comer, “History of Desert Shield / Desert Storm,” 65–67, 78–79, 83, 1st/16th 

SOW HO.

63. Ibid., 65–67, 78–79, 83; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, 246; “Chronology of 

Desert Storm Missions,” n.d., file 500.608, 1st/16th SOW HO; Waller, Commandos, 345; 

and Martin, interview.

64. “Chronology of Desert Storm Missions,” n.d., file 500.608, 1st/16th SOW 

HO; Gordon and Trainor, Generals’ War, 368–69; Clancy and Horner, Every Man a 

Tiger, 319; and mission narrative, n.d., 20th SOS, historical files, 1st/16th SOW HO. 

Col Corby Martin, USAF, retired, supplied mission data.

65. Trask, interview. 

66. Kingsley, interview.

67. Mission narrative, n.d., 20th SOS, historical files, 1st/16th SOW HO. 

68. Trask, interview.

69. Correll, interview.

70. Webb, interview.

71. “Chronology of Desert Storm Missions,” n.d., file 500.608, 1st/16th SOW 

HO; Col Corby Martin, USAF, retired, Desert Storm log, provided to the author; 

Comer, “History of Desert Shield / Desert Storm,” 85–88, 1st/16th SOW HO; mission narrative, n.d., 20th SOS, historical files, 1st/16th SOW HO; and Williams to the 

author, e-mail, 24 Jan 2011. 

72. Kingsley, interview.

73. Trask, interview. 

74. Ibid.
336 │ war in the desert

75. Martin, interview. 

76. Guilmartin, Very Short War, 41–42.

77. Grub to the author, e-mail.

78. Whitcomb, Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, 200; and History of 

39th SOW, 1 July 1990–31 Dec 1991, vol. 3, 2–43.

79. History of 39th SOW, 1 July 1990–31 Dec 1991, vol. 1, 35–42.

80. Ibid., 43–44, 66.
Chapter 10

Interim Years—Volcanoes, Challenge, 

and Change

~ 1991–93

As air commandos, we stay a step ahead of any adversary by 

anticipating and responding to changing demands. 

—Maj Gen Bruce Fister 

31st Special Operations Squadron

On 5 August 1990, as the 20th SOS was packing up to deploy to the 

Gulf, the 31st SOS at Clark AB, Philippines, received its first two MH53Js. It had already received several fully qualified crew members 

from Kirtland, although several key maintenance personnel were yet 

to arrive. Regardless, the squadron recorded its first Pave Low flights 

just three days later. The next week, Lt Col Dale Cook relinquished 

the unit to Lt Col Lee Massey, and the unit flew a mixed fleet of MH53s and H-3s until 26 September, when two more MH-53s arrived. 

The H-3s were then shipped back to the United States, and the 31st 

was a full-fledged MH-53 squadron. The unit began a steady training 

program to qualify its crews for the panoply of missions assigned to 

them. For the next several months, the crews deployed to various 

joint and coalition training exercises, such as Extended Knight and 

Aqua Wally II in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, and Korea. They focused on day/night water infiltration and exfiltration procedures utilizing inflatable boat drops, fast rope and rope ladder procedures, hoist operations, and short-field landings, especially with 

US, Philippine, and Thai Navy SEAL teams and US Army ODAs. The 

crews also maintained alert for peacetime emergency rescue and humanitarian operations and provided VIP transport when requested 

by Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force, also at Clark AB. By the end of 

the year, the unit had several crews trained but had only 45 of 64 authorized personnel.1
338 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

Capt Joe Becker arrived at Clark AB in October for his assignment 

as the flight examiner for the 31st SOS. However, he did not bring his 

wife and new daughter, Emily. Before departing he was notified that 

because of an increased threat to US personnel in the Philippines, he 

could not take his dependents for an accompanied tour. Becker tried 

to change his orders but could not. He also tried to resign from the 

Air Force but was denied that because Pave Low crew members were 

blocked from leaving by “stop-loss” policies initiated as part of the 

military response for Desert Storm. 

When Becker got to Clark AB, he was met by his squadron commander, Colonel Massey, who also expected to see Becker’s wife and 

child. Becker explained what he had been told. Massey checked and 

found out that as soon as Becker had on-base housing, he could bring 

them over. Becker arranged their travel, and the personnel office at 

Clark amended his assignment to an accompanied 24-month tour 

with the 31st.2

By January 1991 Captain Becker had housing, and his family 

joined him. While awaiting their arrival, he joined the 31st SOS and 

integrated into the operation. The training and deployment pattern 

continued as the Airmen of the 31st worked to develop full mission 

capability and integrate their skills into those of the 353d SOW. This 

routine was soon to be interrupted by events from an entirely unexpected quarter, changing life irrevocably for everyone at Clark AB.

Mount Pinatubo

Clark AB, located on the Philippine main island of Luzon, had 

been in existence in some form since US forces arrived in the area in 

1898. From that simple beginning, it had grown into the largest US 

military facility outside of the United States. It was home to the Thirteenth Air Force, the 3d TFW, the 353d SOW, and many subordinate 

units; an estimated 20,000 US active and retired military lived in the 

immediate area. 

Unfortunately, that region of Luzon was seismically active. In July 

1990, the area suffered a severe earthquake that killed almost 2,000 

people. The 31st launched numerous humanitarian relief missions as 

part of the recovery efforts. More ominously, though, Mount Pinatubo—

a rather unobtrusive 5,700-foot-high peak located just 10 miles 

southwest of the air base—began to spew white smoke on 2 April 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 339

1991. US Geological Survey (USGS) scientists indicated that an accompanying explosion had spread out ash as far as six miles. They 

quickly installed monitoring equipment and determined that molten 

lava was rising below the mountain: a major eruption could be expected within one year.

Over the next month, the seismic activity steadily increased. USGS 

specialists dramatically advanced their estimates, now stating that 

the mountain could erupt at any time. Unit commanders scrambled 

to develop evacuation plans for personnel and equipment. The 3d 

TFW was already in the process of drawing down, and most of its assigned F-4 aircraft had been ferried back to the CONUS. However, all 

residual aircraft and assigned personnel had to be cared for. Col Lee 

Hess, the 353d SOW commander, worked closely with Maj Gen 

William Studer, the Thirteenth Air Force commander, and Col Jeff 

Grime, the 3d TFW commander, to coordinate the mass move of 

their equipment and personnel to NAS Cubi Point, Subic Bay Naval 

Base, and other smaller locations throughout the Philippines. As information became available, it was broadcast to all US personnel 

through the base television station and printed media. Detailed evacuation planning guides were developed and passed out to all. Personnel were told to expect a short-duration evacuation and then a return 

to Clark. 

In the early morning hours of 9 June, USGS technicians observed 

that pressure was building up below the mountain so rapidly that a 

major explosion could be expected within 24 hours. When briefed, 

General Studer directed the evacuation of all aircraft and personnel. 

As base personnel gathered, with only a minimum of personal items, 

to form preplanned convoys, the 31st SOS launched three of its Pave 

Lows to Cubi Point. A fourth, undergoing heavy maintenance, flew 

out the next day. Crew members on unaccompanied tours were assigned to fly the aircraft out. Per Colonel Massey’s directions, the rest 

of the 31st personnel rallied at the squadron building at 5:30 a.m. 

They were in 30 vehicles, and Captain Becker organized them into 

groups of 10, each group equipped with short-range radios for coordination. They then joined 14,000 other base personnel on the 52-

mile, six-and-a-half-hour journey to NAS Cubi Point and a few other 

smaller locations, as the 31st SOS Pave Lows flew traffic escort. Arriving at their destinations, the Clark Airmen were met by local personnel, who scrambled to find whatever space they could for so many 

short-notice “guests.” All 31st SOS personnel went to Cubi Point. Joe 
340 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

Becker knew several members of the USN SEAL detachment there, 

including the unit executive officer, Lt Cdr Bob Harward, who made 

arrangements for the group to move into the air-conditioned unit 

classroom and use the facility bathrooms until something better 

could be arranged with Navy families on base. Within a day, Becker 

and his family moved in with the family of a USN warrant officer.3

A predesignated group of 1,500 Airmen, mostly security personnel and engineers, stayed behind at Clark. At Cubi, all four Pave Lows 

were put in one of the hangars and protected as much as possible 

from the looming threat.

Courtesy 353d SOG History Office

Mount Pinatubo explosion

At 8:50 a.m. on 12 June, Mount Pinatubo erupted. A horrendous 

column of thick brownish-gray ash began climbing skyward, eventually reaching 70,000 feet. The 31st SOS put two aircraft and crews on 

alert for possible rescue duty. Collateral explosions continued until 

the morning of 15 June, when, in one huge multihour, climactic eruption, a pyroclastic lava mass began to flow down into the valleys. 

More than six miles of the mountain ridgeline rose simultaneously 

and dissolved into a massive blanket of ash, twice as large in volume 

as the Mount St. Helens explosion in Washington State in 1980. The 

ground shook violently in tune with the eruptions. Unfortunately, as 

the mountain was going through its angry spasms, a tropical storm, 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 341

Typhoon Yunya, swept the area and dumped seven inches of rain. It 

mixed with the ash and fell to the ground as a sticky goo that covered 

everything. At times Becker went outside and was shocked to see that 

it was almost as dark as night. Clark AB was now blanketed under up 

to 10 inches of the muck. Many buildings collapsed under the weight 

or were damaged by the flooding caused by the rainfall. Clark AB was 

no longer a functioning facility. 

The ash also covered Subic Bay and Cubi Point, in some places 

eight inches thick. Power lines were down, and the electricity was off. 

As base personnel began to dig out from under the gooey mess, the 

damage was immediately obvious. At the direction of the US Embassy, all Clark dependents would be evacuated to the CONUS or 

other Pacific USAF bases. They would not be allowed to return to 

Clark, even to retrieve their personal belongings or pets. Several US 

Navy ships—including the USS Midway, USS Abraham Lincoln, and 

USS Long Beach—pulled into Subic and loaded the evacuee families 

for transport to the island of Cebu, where they were met with MAC 

and charter aircraft to fly them back to the CONUS. The troops of the 

31st SOS were declared mission essential and would remain at Cubi 

with their aircraft, pending relocation decisions. Consequently, the 

31st SOS dependents were processed for return to the United States 

through Guam. Becker and his squadron mates delivered their dependents and pets and what little they were able to carry for movement to the ships. Susan and Emily Becker traveled to her parents’ 

home in Portland, Oregon, where both arrived sick. They also had to 

ship their dogs. Unfortunately, all animals had to go through inspection at Guam, and their dogs finally arrived in Portland after a lengthy 

delay, and much the worse for wear. Many other 21st SOS, 353d SOW, 

Air Force, and Navy families shared the same fate.4

The Pave Lows were safely ensconced in their assigned hangar and 

were not harmed. Colonel Hess was notified that the 353d SOW 

would be temporarily relocating to Kadena AB, Okinawa. He submitted a request through channels for sealift to move the Pave Lows to 

Okinawa. On 26 June, the USS Midway steamed back into Subic Bay, 

and three of the Pave Lows were flown aboard. The fourth was not 

flyable because of missing parts. Three days later, the three aircraft 

were flown off of the Midway to USMC Air Station Futenma, located 

six miles south of Kadena. When the fourth aircraft was finally flyable 

six days later, its crew flew it to Futenma with an HC-130 escort from 

the 17th SOS. 
342 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

The Airmen of the 31st SOS were somewhat taken aback about 

being placed at Futenma vice Kadena. However, the placement was 

determined by the 313th Air Division commander, Brig Gen Joseph 

Hurd. He commanded the USAF units on Okinawa and was very 

concerned about anti-US sentiment among the population around 

Kadena. He believed that while the MC-130s would blend in well at 

Kadena, the MH-53s would be noticeable and potentially antagonizing. He further reasoned that the MH-53s would more easily blend in 

with the USMC helicopters at Futenma and received permission 

from the commander there to place the Pave Lows on the parking 

ramp temporarily. Henceforth, the 31st Airmen were designated 

“Hurd’s Kurds.”5

 As the eruptions of Pinatubo abated, recovery teams began to return to Clark to assess the damage and begin the cleanup on base—

the recovery of hundreds of pieces of equipment and the salvage of 

whatever supplies possible. Because of the widespread destruction, 

Clark would no longer be an active USAF base. The Philippine government decided not to renew the US lease of the base, and by July, 

US and Philippine officials signed documents directing the United 

States to withdraw all forces from Clark. Like other units, personnel 

from the 31st went to the homes of their evacuated members and 

shipped their hastily left-behind personal belongings and pets to 

wherever the Airmen and families had been reassigned. By November all 353d SOW personnel either had relocated to Okinawa or had 

been returned to the CONUS, as Clark AB was formally returned to 

the government of the Philippines. Having recently replaced Colonel 

Hess as the 353d commander, Col Robert Stankovich (the first Pave 

Low pilot to achieve wing command), returned to Clark for the transfer ceremony aboard one of the 31st SOS MH-53s and lowered the 

wing flag for temporary transfer to Kadena. Many 353d personnel 

flew down on MC-130s from the 1st SOS for the ceremony. However, 

AFSOC had not yet made a decision on a permanent location for the 

353d. Pending that decision, the TDY costs for its personnel at 

Kadena were rapidly depleting command travel funds.

While the multitudinous details attendant to the evacuation had to 

be steadily worked out, the 31st SOS tried to regain its operational 

footing. Most of the unaccompanied officers and Airmen stayed. 

They were drawing full per diem at Futenma and collecting a sizeable 

sum of money. However, those there on accompanied tours were allowed to return to the CONUS to be with their families. Several Pave 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 343

Low troops went back to Hurlburt. Captain Becker received orders to the 

551st FTS at Kirtland AFB and departed Futenma in December 1991.6

Since the unit did not currently have a permanent assigned station, it could not receive PCS replacements. Consequently, the unit 

required TDY manning, primarily from the 20th SOS, to maintain 

any mission capability. AFSOC addressed this need with Operation 

Scimitar Sweep, which provided enough personnel on TDY status to 

the units of the 353d. By September, the 31st was manned with sufficient personnel on varying 60-day orders to initiate a steady flying 

and training schedule, initially taking advantage of US Navy ships in 

the area to do shipboard training. The next month, squadron aircraft 

and crews deployed to Korea to participate in Foal Eagle 91 with US 

and allied special forces units. On 18 December, Colonel Correll arrived from Hurlburt Field and took command of the squadron from 

Lt Col Lee Massey in a ceremony at Futenma. A few days later, Correll was notified that the 353d would be assigned provisionally to 

Kadena AB, but the permanent location for the wing or any of its 

squadrons was still undetermined.7

31st SOS change of command from Lt Col Lee Massey to Lt Col Gene Correll

Courtesy Col Gene Correll, USAF, Retired

That fall SSgt John DeSalle arrived at the 31st SOS as a new gunner. 

He had enlisted in the USAF in 1981 and had served several tours as 

a weapons loader on F-111s and F-15s. During Desert Storm, he was 
344 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

at Luke AFB when he saw a message soliciting volunteers for duty as 

gunners on the Pave Lows, and he submitted a request. His transfer 

was approved, and after attending the necessary survival schools, he 

reported to Kirtland AFB in May for his crew and gunnery training. 

He found the academics to be challenging but enjoyed the actual flying as he learned his scanning duties and overall crew member obligations. DeSalle also enjoyed learning to fire the .50-caliber machine 

gun and the 7.62 mm minigun, qualifying on live-fire missions to the 

Red Rio and Melrose Ranges in central and eastern New Mexico. At 

the completion of his training, he flew over to Kadena, arriving in 

September 1991. He was quickly inserted into the exercise rotation 

schedule and did his share of trips to Thailand, the Philippines, and 

Korea before leaving in April 1992 to transfer to the 21st SOS in the UK.8

Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

As the 20th and 21st SOSs were participating in the turbulent 

events in the Middle East, life was a bit more mundane at the 1550th 

CCTW. Its 1551st FTS continued to qualify aircrew members utilizing its assigned MH-53J and CH-53A aircraft and the newly received/

modified simulators owned by the 1550th Technical Training Squadron (TCHTS). That unit also took possession of new equipment that 

facilitated self-guided training and a part-task trainer, which provided focused training for the students on the enhanced navigation 

system, map display functions, utilization of the FLIR and radar systems, and cockpit procedures. The equipment was also instrumental 

in teaching crew coordination and saved several flight hours.

The 1551st FTS was also called upon to provide operational support to the deployed units in the Middle East for Desert Shield/Storm. 

It dispatched 10 Pave Low crew members, who flew with both the 

20th and 21st SOSs. They were joined by a larger group of 30 maintenance technicians drawn from other 1550th CCTW squadrons, 

which provided augmentation to the two units. Two more Pave Low 

pilots, Maj Dave Harris and Capt Paco Burrell, were sent to Fort 

Bragg to work with the JSOC. They both deployed with the JSOTF 

that it dispatched to conduct operations in western Iraq.

Throughout Desert Shield/Storm, the 20th SOS was also required 

to maintain a capability at Hurlburt to support other JSOC taskings 

that might arise. To support that contingency, the 1551st dispatched 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 345

two of its MH-53s to Hurlburt. They were accompanied by another 

team of four maintenance technicians, who augmented the residual 

20th SOS maintenance element. While there, they also provided 

some support at the NARF, NAS Pensacola, where MH-53s were still 

being modified or going through the SLEP upgrade.9

After the termination of combat, the 1551st was tasked to provide 

another Pave Low crew to augment the 21st SOS on Operation Provide Comfort. Capt Bill Bassett had recently joined the unit after 

completing his tour with the 21st in England. He volunteered to lead 

a crew with Capt Keith Kollarik, MSgt Ben Wilhelm, TSgt David 

Smith, SSgt David Dean, and SSgt William Nelson. They joined the 

unit in Turkey and subsequently flew 36 missions, carrying supplies 

to the refugees, surveying relocation sites, and moving displaced 

Kurds and Iraqis.10

On 2 March, two 1551st crews received real-world experience at 

Kirtland when they were dispatched to a wilderness area 180 miles 

southwest of Albuquerque to recover a group of 26 lost backpackers. 

As the two aircraft arrived in the area, the crews immediately located 

and extracted 11 members of the group. However, the rest were not 

The flight simulators at Kirtland were an integral part of Pave Low training.

Courtesy 58th SOW History Office
346 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

found until after nightfall. They were in a much more remote area 

where the Pave Lows could not land or safely perform night hoist 

operations. Instead, the crews directed the backpackers to move to a 

more open area, where they were subsequently recovered. This was 

not only the second largest single rescue in the history of the 1550th 

CCTW but also good training for the Pave Low crews.11

On 1 July 1991, Colonel Folkerts passed command of the 1551st to 

Lt Col Mike Planert and departed to attend the National War College 

in Washington, DC. Four months later, MAC directed the 1550th 

CCTW and collocated the 1606th ABW to consolidate and reorganize as the 542d Crew Training Wing (CTW). In the change, the 

1551st FTS was redesignated as the 551st FTS and the 1550th TCHTS 

as the 542d TCHTS. Both units continued with their assigned missions. Through the remainder of 1991 and 1992, the 551st steadily 

provided flight training to Pave Low crews utilizing its six assigned 

TH-53As (augmented with two NCH-53As received from AFSC) 

and six MH-53Js. All aircraft rotated to Pensacola at least once for 

modifications, upgrades, or SLEP. The TH-53As were modified to 

carry guns and became the primary aircraft used for gunnery training.

CH-53A #66-14470, one of the training aircraft at Kirtland

Courtesy Wayne Mutza

In March 1992, the building housing the weapons system trainer 

suffered a power surge, seriously damaging the trainer and disrupting the training schedule. It took a month for the maintenance tech-
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 347

nicians to fix the problems. By the end of 1992, the WST was joined 

by a fully operational TH-53A simulator, all requested computerbased training units, a night-vision training laboratory, several parttask trainers, and the ultramodern Mission Rehearsal System (MRS). 

All of these integrated training devices dramatically reduced needed 

actual aircraft flight time and provided excellent training, as evidenced by 99 percent of students passing their crew qualification 

check rides with no major discrepancies over this training period.12

Arriving at the 551st FTS in January 1992, Capt Joe Becker took 

over as the MH-53 flight commander. To his delight, he found that he 

now had several operationally experienced guys like Capt Bill Bassett 

from the 21st SOS and Capt “Paco” Burrell and Capt Jim Billings on 

board. That pleased him because his first impression was that the 

training squadron lacked an operational focus, and he took that issue 

as his personal “windmill” to attack. He convinced the squadron 

commander, Colonel Planert, to allow crew members to volunteer to 

go forward on occasion to augment the operational squadrons, as 

well as to establish a program to deploy an operational crew to Saudi 

Arabia on a continuing basis to augment the still-deployed 20th SOS 

there, seeing it as a gain for both units. Planert supported both initiatives. In reviewing the overall pilot and flight engineer programs, 

Becker discovered that very few were graduating as scheduled. He 

worked with his instructors to restructure the courses and flying 

schedule and eliminate outdated material, significantly reducing the 

late graduation rate. However, his goal was not just to train MH-53 

crews but to train crews who could leave Kirtland thinking like special operators. That was why he was so pleased to have instructors 

with operational experience. He wanted his students to adopt the 

special operations frame of mind—the “aggression in the attack” 

mode that made them so effective—and pushed his instructors to instill that in every student. Becker put his heart into training students 

and thoroughly enjoyed the year, especially flying the TH-53As, or 

“sports cars,” as he called them. He also remembered, in particular, 

two first lieutenants—Jim Slife and Carlos Halcomb—who came 

through. Both were mature for their rank and showed great potential, 

seeming to take to the aircraft and mission naturally.13

Jim Slife was commissioned as a second lieutenant out of the 

ROTC program at Auburn University in 1989. He proceeded directly 

to pilot training at Fort Rucker, graduating at the top of his class. Jim 

had heard about Pave Low and really wanted to fly it, but his class 
348 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

received an HH-60 assignment. Although he had first pick, he reasoned that if he took it, he would stay in HH-60s forever. Consequently, he agreed to stay as an instructor and ask for Pave Low after 

Rucker. Six months later, though, the USAF training unit at Fort 

Rucker was shut down, and Slife did not have an assignment. He 

asked for Pave Lows since it would be his “second” flying assignment. 

He got the assignment, reported to Kirtland in the fall of 1991, and 

fell under the wise guidance of Joe Becker. Slife recounts that

Joe Becker was probably the most credible instructor pilot out there. He had 

been in the 41st; he was in the 20th for a long time; he had been in the Philippines and stood up the 31st. He was a very credible guy. . . . We just really 

idolized Joe. The thing that made Joe stand out was (a) he was a good instructor, but (b) frankly, he treated us like human beings. . . . Joe started right there 

imparting the history of Pave Low to me. . . . I mean, I could tell you all the 

Pokeweed stories and all that stuff. . . . So I knew the “who begat whose”. . . . I 

really felt connected to the generation who had just preceded me.14

Another Pave Low student who flew with Joe Becker was Capt 

Scott Howell. He was a classic case of the value of mentoring. Howell 

attended the Air Force Academy, graduating in 1987. While there, 

one of his direct supervisors was Capt Art Schwall, who had flown on 

one of the MC-130s at Desert One. Schwall spoke to the young cadet 

about special operations and helped him arrange a summer visit to 

Hurlburt in 1985. Howell loved it, especially the helicopter operations. Two years later, another officer, Maj Mike Collins, an early HH60 pilot, helped him get one of the four helicopter training slots available to his class. After commissioning in 1987, he proceeded to 

Rucker, where he learned to fly helicopters. Graduating from there, 

he went to Fairchild AFB, Washington, to fly the UH-1N. His commander for a while was Maj Roger Smith, who had flown UH-1Ns 

with the 20th SOS in Vietnam and further encouraged Howell to 

consider special operations and Pave Lows.

Unfortunately, though, young pilots like Howell had a large systemic problem that lurked in the background. With the cancellation 

of the purchase of the UH-60D, the USAF now had a glut of young 

helicopter pilots. Working with the Army, the USAF was able to establish an exchange program whereby the Army would accept 50 

USAF helicopter pilots for a period of three or four years as a way of 

utilizing them instead of moving them all into nonrated jobs or releasing them outright. Hearing about the program, Howell believed 

that it was a chance to fly the UH-60 and volunteered. He was sent to 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 349

Fort Hood, Texas, to fly with the 2d Armored Division in early 1990. 

As luck would have it, as he arrived, the 2d was slated for inactivation, 

and he was moved to the 1st Cavalry Division to fly UH-1Hs. Arriving there, he was qualified to fly with NVGs and assigned to Echo 

Company of the 227th Aviation Regiment, a utility lift unit. That 

summer, Saddam invaded Kuwait, and in September, Captain Howell 

deployed with his unit to Saudi Arabia. 

Howell flew with his unit through all of the movements and operations in which the 1st Cavalry was involved. During the ground campaign in February 1991, he served as the pilot for the aviation brigade 

commander, flew in several major engagements, and watched the allied “Big Army” maul the Iraqi forces. He also learned how dark and 

dangerous night flying over the open desert could be. Returning to 

Fort Hood in April, he visited the USAF Personnel Center in San 

Antonio and inquired about the “early out” program now in effect 

because of the post–Cold War and Desert Storm force reductions. He 

was informed that his referential year group was not considered in 

that program, so he asked for reassignment back into the USAF. That 

looked very good. He asked if he had any choices of assignment. He 

was told that with his level of experience, he could have an HH-60 at 

Iceland or an MH-53 at Hurlburt. That was not really a choice, and in 

1992 he reported to Kirtland AFB for his MH-53 qualification training with Jim Slife.15

From the very beginning, he just loved it. He had some outstanding instructors/evaluators, Maj Scott Pugmire and Maj Jim Eustace. 

Both helped him learn how to fly the beast and use all of the special 

systems that made Pave Low so unique. Eustace, especially, taught the 

TF/TA radar. He made the students learn it and then use it until they 

developed the confidence to truly rely on it. From Joe Becker, though, 

he learned something different. Paralleling Slife’s experiences, Howell 

added that “he was the first guy who kind of took it away from the 

nuts and bolts of flying and learning the machinery to [explaining]: 

‘There’s a reason we have these machines, and the reason is the guys 

we put in the back.’ He was the first one who started talking about the 

customer focus and what these guys were trying to accomplish. ‘How 

can we support their plan?’ Which was good; I got a lot out of it.”16

Finishing his Kirtland training in July 1992, Howell drove to Hurlburt to join the 20th SOS, just a few weeks behind 1st Lt Jim Slife. 

In the spring of 1993, Captain Becker moved over to the wing 

safety office for some broadening. He still instructed but only as an 
350 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

adjunct to the squadron guys. This duty was fairly straightforward, 

and he began to look for another assignment back somewhere in operations. He was subsequently selected to transfer to the AFSOC Air 

Support Operations Squadron at Fort Bragg in 1994 as a newly selected major.17

Throughout 1993 operations were fairly mundane at the training 

squadron. To expedite requalification training for aircrew members 

returning to the aircraft, MAC granted a training waiver to reduce 

the course length to a maximum of 99 days. This obviated the need 

for a PCS assignment for training. Also, each student could influence 

his course length based upon his course performance and individual 

training needs. The first student through under this program finished 

his training in February and needed only 38 days of school time. By 

June the unit had qualified 10 pilots, four IPs, 10 flight engineers, and 

four gunners. On 11 June, Lt Col Michael Planert gave up command 

of the 551st to Lt Col Michael Damron.18

Air Force Reorganization

In late 1991, while the Airmen of the 31st SOS were battling with 

the aftermath of the Mount Pinatubo eruption and subsequent relocation of the unit, the Air Force leadership was contemplating a 

wholesale reorganization of the entire service. Noting the stunning 

collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and the recent victory 

in the Persian Gulf, the CSAF, General McPeak, and Air Force Secretary Donald Rice realized that the nation would now demand significant cuts in its military forces. They both accepted that the USAF 

would be required to reduce its force structure and personnel by perhaps as much as 25 percent. They directed a top-to-bottom restructuring analysis focused on maintaining as much combat capability as 

possible as the cuts took effect.19

Additionally, McPeak tasked his staff members to take a back-tobasics approach. He wanted them to look at all levels of the service 

and accomplish several things: (1) decentralize power and authority 

down to the working Airman level; (2) strengthen commanders so 

that they have the authority to achieve results; (3) streamline and flatten the organizational structure; (4) consolidate where practical to 

bring resources under a single field commander; and (5) clarify functional responsibilities. McPeak recognized that the squadron was the 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 351

basic combat or operational organization of the Air Force. He directed that the traditional wing organizational structure—which had 

squadrons assigned to three colonels serving as deputies for operations, maintenance, and resource management—be reorganized. Flying squadrons would be reassigned to an operations group, and the 

various maintenance, supply, and logistics units would be reassigned 

to a logistics group. Other units, such as medical groups and so forth, 

would also be so organized. 

McPeak also mandated that, as much as possible, the USAF would 

have on any base “one base, one wing, one boss”; this new structure 

would be known as the “objective wing.” He also wanted most wing 

commanders to be general officers, and he realized that such wings 

would probably end up as composite units with possibly more than 

one operations group or logistics group. The wings would be very 

flexible organizations. Additionally, McPeak directed that as part of 

the overall restructuring of the USAF, his staff would examine the 

heritage and lineage of all the USAF wings to insure that there was no 

duplication of numbers and that units with the longest periods of 

service or most distinguished combat honors were retained.20

Above the wing level, McPeak decided to eliminate air divisions 

and strengthen the numbered air forces. He also decided to consolidate several major commands to reduce staff duplication, save manpower spaces, and improve operational efficiency. Specifically, AFSC 

and the AFLC would merge into the Air Force Materiel Command 

(AFMC). SAC, TAC, and MAC would be consolidated into two new 

commands: Air Mobility Command (AMC) and Air Combat Command (ACC). All of these changes were slated to take place on 1 July 

1992. Subsequently, the Air Training Command and Air University 

would combine at a later date to become the Air Education and Training Command (AETC), which would improve overall training and 

education effectiveness and standardization.21

AFSOC was not dramatically affected by these structural changes, 

other than eventually taking possession of Hurlburt Field and being 

required to change some unit numerical designations. However, it 

was directed to develop a proposal to revamp its wings as objective 

wings. As 1992 began, the AFSOC staff worked with its three wings 

to develop their plans. When AFSOC presented them in April to the 

Air Staff, though, AFSOC was informed that only the 1st and the 

39th SOWs would reorganize as objective wings under the wing–

subordinate group structure. The 353d SOW would realign as the 
352 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

353d Special Operations Group (SOG) and be attached to a larger 

wing to be determined.22

Air Force Special Operations Command

That was just one of many items that the AFSOC had to deal with 

as the new year began. With the demise of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, a large theater war was now seen as highly unlikely. Instability in many regions of the world pointed to smaller or low-intensity 

actions across the full spectrum of conflict, which would put a high 

demand on special forces. The AFSOC mission was to organize, train, 

and equip forces for worldwide deployment and assignment to regional 

unified commands to conduct the five special operations missions: unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense. Collaterally, they would also be 

prepared to provide humanitarian assistance, psychological operations, counternarcotics, and personnel recovery operations.23

Maj Gen Bruce Fister had taken command of AFSOC from General 

Eggers on 21 June 1991. He believed that his command needed to be 

proactive in addressing its mission and capabilities. To his Airmen, he 

explained, “As air commandos, we stay a step ahead of any adversary by 

anticipating and responding to changing demands. Our strategy remains to provide specialized air power for special operations forces 

and, where appropriate, act as a conventional force multiplier.”24

The personnel recovery tasking was a bit contentious. The term 

itself was an updated but more inclusive moniker for CSAR and referred to all of the actions, training, equipage, and actual missions 

flown to recover personnel trapped or isolated in enemy or neutral 

territory. Lessons learned from Desert Storm reaffirmed the need for 

a dedicated rescue force, and the ARS was in the midst of a program 

to redevelop its force structure to reassume the mission. However, 

AFSOC still had the 21st SOS and the 55th SOS providing rescue 

alert forces in Turkey for Provide Comfort II and 20th SOS assets in 

Saudi Arabia supporting residual forces in that area for Operation 

Desert Calm. Later that fall, the 20th’s assets would reposition to Kuwait International Airport to support Operation Southern Watch. 

To cleanly address this issue, AFSOC published the white paper 

Combat Rescue—Bridging the Gap.

25 Reviewing the history of combat 

rescue and the more recent events of Desert Storm, it concluded that 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 353

the USAF could not afford to build a fleet of fully mission-capable 

helicopters to adequately perform the mission. It recommended that 

AFSOC be given additional aircraft and personnel to do the mission, 

either as an additional reinforcement force to the ARS or with a complete change of doctrine to assign the mission to AFSOC with a 

wholesale transfer of CSAR force structure from MAC/AMC to AFSOC. 

In support, the Air Staff developed a cost estimate for the conversion 

of mothballed USMC CH-53A aircraft to the Pave Low IIIE configuration. The USAF had taken possession of 34 of the aircraft, including 

two NCH-53A aircraft initially modified to test the special retrieval 

gear subsequently installed on the HH-53s assigned to the 6594th 

Test Group at Hickam. These 34 aircraft could be modified to the 

MH-53J configuration for $15 million each.26

However, that debate was sidetracked by a larger issue when, in 

July, Senator Sam Nunn, in a speech on the Senate floor, asked why 

the US military had “four separate air forces—one for each service.” 

He suggested that since the US Army owned and maintained a fleet 

of over 5,000 helicopters, it was more than capable of managing and 

operating all Army and USAF helicopters, including the AFSOC 

MH-53s. His position was a reincarnation of the dormant—but not 

dead—Initiative 17. The AFSOC staff dusted its off position papers 

on the issue and again provided the convincing logic against such a 

move. Two months later, the new SOCOM commander, General 

Stiner, reviewed the issue and informed AFSOC that any discussion 

of transferring the helicopters to the Army was dead.27

Several other issues of a more general nature arose concerning the 

Pave Low force that required AFSOC actions. During the year, the 

aircraft entered another SLEP program. This one directed 14 different 

modifications to various aircraft systems. It also called for blade and 

tail modifications to allow for folding so that the aircraft could be carried aboard naval ships. Lastly, engineers validated the procedures 

adopted by Colonel Comer and his crews in Desert Storm to operate 

the aircraft up to a maximum takeoff weight of 50,000 pounds vice 

their previous 42,000-pound limit. 

Some personnel issues were also developing. As the Pave Low fleet 

was expanding in the 1980s, pilots were essentially drawn from the 

inactivating tactical air support or rescue squadrons. That infused the 

Pave Low community with a strong cadre of experienced aircrew 

members. However, that source had dried up; consequently, AFSOC 

coordinated with the Air Staff to begin drawing experienced fixed-
354 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

wing pilots to cross-train to rotary-wing qualification and enter the 

Pave Low program. 

Debriefs coming in from the operational squadrons and the training squadron at Kirtland indicated that an uncomfortably high number of flight engineer candidates did not have the requisite skills necessary to qualify in that position. As the Pave Low became more 

technologically advanced, the flight engineers were increasingly 

tasked to perform duties that were not classically taught to flight engineers, including mission planning, navigation, systems integration, 

electronic warfare, and flight gunnery. On the six-man Pave Low 

crew, the flight engineer was the key focal point who needed to be 

able to recognize quickly what needed to be done, work directly with 

the pilots to set priorities, and, if necessary, direct actions. A Pave 

Low flight engineer needed to have skills well beyond the initial mechanical skills that had been the traditional qualifiers to become a 

generic flight engineer. Consequently, AFSOC took necessary actions 

to increase the required Aptitude Qualification Examination scores 

to qualify for the position and worked with the instructors at the 

1551st FTS to better focus what was already the longest flight engineer course in the USAF to better train the young Airmen volunteering for this critical job.

Additional feedback coming from the AFSOC operational units 

indicated that many of the now combat-experienced aircrews in all 

aircraft had become quite cocky about their flying skills and displayed 

a willingness to disregard regulations and sound safety processes to 

complete missions.28 These concerns were doubly reinforced on 29 

October 1992, when an MH-60 from the 55th SOS crashed while taking part in a classified joint training exercise southwest of Salt Lake 

City, Utah. The operation involved 11 aircraft, USAF and Army, including one 20th SOS MH-53, flown by Capt Brendan Clare and Maj 

Richard Kianka, and three AFSOC MH-60s. The Army aircraft were 

from the 160th SOAR. While maneuvering at night to insert assault 

elements into a simulated denied area, one of the AFSOC MH-60s 

descended and hit the shallow water on the west side of the Great Salt 

Lake. Twelve Airmen and Soldiers aboard were killed, and one crew 

member, copilot Maj Steve Laushine, was wounded. Clare and his 

crew were not airborne when the accident occurred because they had 

a maintenance problem with their aircraft. However, when notified of 

the accident, Clare determined that his aircraft was safe to fly and 

launched to the crash site with two USAF PJs onboard. Arriving 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 355

overhead, he inserted his PJs by hoist so that they could assist ground 

elements who had recovered Laushine and were now recovering the 

bodies from the horrible crash scene. 

The subsequent accident report was very disturbing. It pointed to 

problems with joint flight standards, a breakdown in MH-60 crew 

integrity, cockpit crew loss of spatial orientation, and poor intraflight 

coordination. Corrective actions pointed to the need for intraformation 

positioning lights, better joint operating procedures, and more emphasis on aircrew professionalism. Additionally, the MH-60s received 

some mission restrictions, but none were placed on the MH-53s.29

Concerned that the AFSOC Airmen were pushing the careful balance between risk and reward, the AFSOC DO, Col Lee Hess, wrote 

a letter to all AFSOC operational flying units. In it, he reemphasized 

the duties and responsibilities of the aircraft commanders and flight 

leaders to properly and fully plan their missions and conduct thorough flight briefings. He admonished them to insure that all participants were present for the complete briefing. Additionally, he told his 

staff, “It’s up to all of us to fight off that ‘cowboy image.’ ” He instructed 

his stan/eval team to emphasize crew coordination, aircrew discipline, and situational awareness on all check rides. He needed to raise 

the standard for the entire command and determined that his standardization and evaluation process was the most efficient way to 

quickly and effectively change ingrained attitudes. The aircrews flying 

the 28 Pave Lows with the 20th SOS, the six with the 21st SOS, and 

the four with the 31st SOS quickly got the message. However, this 

change had unintended consequences. The amount of time that the 

Pave Low crews and 160th crews worked together now was dramatically reduced, and an air of insolence seemed to shade the relationship. Said one anonymous Pave Low pilot of that period, “The 160th 

would lie, cheat, or steal to make the Air Force look bad.”30

Colonel Hess also started another initiative called Commando 

Look. This program was designed to screen volunteers for Pave Low 

to determine if they had the true determination to handle the aircraft 

and mission. It addressed a specific concern that General Fister had 

about the Pave Low crews. He had encountered several who he felt 

were either not fully committed or simply unsuited for the demands 

of the Pave Low program. Some recent flight engineer classes had suffered 33 percent washout rates. He noted that several other USSOCOM 

components had very successful screening programs and directed 

Hess to ascertain whether such a program would prove useful for 
356 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

Pave Low. Working with his staff and the 20th SOS, Hess designed a 

four-day orientation at Hurlburt. Prospective volunteers would attend an orientation at the 20th and mingle with members of the unit. 

They would receive a psychological screening, go through underwater 

egress survival training, and take a night NVG flight on a Pave Low. 

Sponsor personnel within the 20th would shepherd them through 

the screening process and then help determine which candidates 

were selected for the program. The 1st SOG commander, Col Norton 

Schwartz, reviewed the recommendations from the 20th and approved them, with the suggestion that the program should be expanded 

to the other AFSOC aircraft. Colonel Hess noted that request but initially limited the program to Pave Low. He believed that as many as 108 

candidates could be screened per year, enough to select sufficient new 

personnel to fulfill Pave Low aircrew needs through 1999.31

20th Special Operations Squadron

The new year of 1992 started off well for the 20th when it was notified on 17 January that the unit had been selected as the AFSOC 

squadron of the year for 1990, the award delayed because of the war 

in the Gulf. Considering the tough competition from so many units 

that had performed well during that difficult time, it was a tremendous honor. The 20th troops were also involved in the lessons-learned 

process for Desert Storm as all of the operational squadrons had to 

record and send in their findings and larger histories. Additionally, 

several unit members—Captains Trask, Kingsley, and Martin in 

particular—were in high demand for presentations on their exploits 

in the conflict.32

The 20th also watched as the 1st SOW prepared to convert on 1 

October to the objective wing structure. The 20th would be assigned 

to the newly forming 1st Special Operations Group, a simple change 

from its perspective. Additionally, the collocated 834th ABW that 

commanded most of the support functions on the base would combine with the 1st SOW sometime within the next year, as the AFSOC 

formally took control of Hurlburt Field. 

On 8 June, Lt Col Rich Comer passed command of the 20th SOS 

to Lt Col Russell “Rotor” Rakip and departed to attend the US Marine 

Corps Senior School at Quantico, Virginia. As he was preparing to 

leave, the squadron was notified that it had also been selected as the 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 357

AFSOC squadron of the year for 1991 for its performance in Desert 

Storm. Comer was extremely proud of his unit and very well satisfied 

with his command tour. His one regret was that he had never had his 

unit all in one place, at one time during his entire tenure. In fact, as 

he signed out of the 20th, the squadron had aircraft and crews operating in four different countries. But that was what the 20th SOS did.33

Rakip was well qualified for the job. He had flown CH-53s in SEA 

with the 21st SOS at Nakhon Phanom AB, Thailand, and later was the 

sole USAF helicopter pilot in the ill-fated 1980 hostage rescue attempt in Iran. He took over a squadron that had just about recovered 

from its challenging experiences in the desert, although some of the 

helicopters were still carrying maintenance discrepancies from that 

hard duty. The unit also still had personnel deployed to Saudi Arabia 

and Kuwait sitting rescue alert for Operations Desert Calm and then 

Southern Watch. In August, the 20th dispatched one aircraft and 

crew to Aviano AB, Italy, to support the 21st SOS on a short-notice 

tasking. That same month, the squadron dispatched two aircraft from 

home station to transport a CCT to Homestead AFB to support recovery operations in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew that devastated southern Florida. While there, the control team provided critical traffic control. The Pave Lows, led by Capt Brad Webb, participated 

in the rescue and recovery operations in the ravaged area. The Green 

Hornets also routinely participated in classified exercises with other 

special operations forces, similar to the one at Salt Lake. Even though 

the squadron was essentially in-garrison for the year, it was still a 

busy unit.34

In June 1992, 1st Lt Jim Slife reported to the 20th SOS. He was the 

youngest officer there. Being well versed in the Pave Low history, he 

was blown away to be part of something so consequential with guys 

such as Captains Tom Trask, Mike Kingsley, Corby Martin, Grant 

Hardin, Brendan Clare, and Matt Shazda and the new generation, 

such as Capt R. K. Williams and Capt Tim Leahy, and he turned his 

junior rank to advantage by soaking up all he could from the older 

types. However, he also determined that there was a downside to being the sole unit lieutenant. Slife noticed that most of the guys in the 

unit, officer and enlisted, just ignored him. Fortunately, R. K. Williams 

took him under his wing and helped work him into the social and 

professional structure of the squadron. At the time, Williams was 

serving as the squadron flight scheduler and within a few months had 

himself and Slife paired up for a deployment to Kuwait for Southern 
358 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

Watch. While there, Slife was able to log some serious tactical training. 

He also learned to never leave his personal camera unattended whenever gunners were present.35

Two months later, Captain Howell reported to the 20th SOS. He 

was impressed when Colonel Rakip walked up from behind and said, 

“Hello, Scott.” 

“Gosh,” he thought, “the squadron commander knows my name.” 

He was put to work in current operations and scheduling. However, 

he remembered Becker’s words about planning and asked to be put in 

that shop. Like Slife, he was overwhelmed by the caliber of men in the 

unit, who had been out in the operational squadrons and in combat 

and had done what Pave Low was all about. They had done the Big 

Mish and so much more.36

21st Special Operations Squadron

The beginning of 1992 also heralded the start of a busy year for the 

Airmen of the 21st SOS. In January their parent unit, the 39th SOW, 

moved its headquarters from Rhein-Main AB to RAF Alconbury, 

UK. Colonel Zdenek was still in command of the 21st and had his 

hands full preparing the unit to move from RAF Woodbridge to join 

the 39th at Alconbury. In March he dispatched three Pave Lows and 

crews to Norway to support Exercise Teamwork 92, an opportunity 

to work with special forces from several countries in arctic conditions. On 15 May, Zdenek passed command of the squadron over to 

Lt Col Mike Russell, who completed the move a week later.

The next month, Russell deployed his helicopters and crews to 

Rota, Spain, to conduct deck qualification training aboard US Navy 

ships. In May, the 21st received a request from the 20th to augment 

that unit in Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Calm. Russell had to 

turn that down; he had to deploy crews to participate in Operation 

Ellipse Bravo, a classified training exercise with special forces units in 

Europe. He had been notified that the 21st would again deploy to 

Turkey in August to support Provide Comfort II as rescue assets. Additionally, the unit was directed to deploy two aircraft and a support 

package to Aviano AB in northern Italy for a classified tasking.37

That spring SSgt John DeSalle reported to the 21st SOS from his 

short tour with the 31st. He upgraded to instructor gunner and was 

promoted to tech sergeant and assigned duty as the technical orders 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 359

NCO. His job was to ensure that the unit was receiving and using the 

latest versions of all flight and training manuals and aircraft technical 

orders, an onerous job but crucial for safe and efficient operations. 

On rotations to Turkey and Italy, he also worked with crews from 

other allied nations to insure operational standardization on coalition operations and was subsequently upgraded to aerial gunner 

evaluator. While with the 21st, he met and married a woman who was 

also in the USAF.38

On 19 August, the 21st SOS flew four of its Pave Lows and support 

personnel to Incirlik, Turkey, for another tour of CSAR support for 

Provide Comfort II. The next month, a 21st crew assisted in the recovery of the wreckage of a US F-16 in Turkey. However, the tour was 

relatively uneventful, and the 21st crews returned home at the end of 

the year. 

In mid-September, AFSOC notified the 39th SOW that it had been 

authorized to reorganize as an objective wing. This was accomplished 

on 1 October, when the 39th activated its operations and logistics 

groups as provisional units, pending final approval from AFSOC for 

the reorganization. Five days later, though, AFSOC announced that the 

39th would inactivate on 1 December and that the 352d Operations 

Group—drawing its personnel and assets from the 39th and deriving 

its lineage from the 2d Air Commando Group from World War II—

would activate to replace the 39th SOW. The 21st SOS would be one of 

its four operations units, all finally together at RAF Alconbury.39

31st Special Operations Squadron

As 1992 began, the commander, Lt Col Eugene Correll, was not 

happy. His squadron was in messy disarray, sequestered at MCAS 

Futenma on Okinawa while his parent 353d SOW was still in provisional status at the Kadena base, several miles away. Most of his original 

Airmen from Clark had returned to the CONUS, and he faced constant turnover of TDY personnel who now filled the unit under Scimitar 

Sweep. However, this situation did allow the unit to stay functional, 

pending the decisions necessary to find permanent locations for the 

353d SOW and its component units.

Opportunities for good tactical flying on the island of Okinawa 

were limited. To address the need for mountain flying, access to 

weapons ranges, and day/night low-level flying, the 31st SOS estab-
360 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

lished an FOL at Osan AB, Korea. Correll dispatched two of his aircraft to the base and began rotating his crews to reacquire their skills. 

The 31st also deployed aircraft, crews, and a support package to exercises in Thailand.40

By February the necessary political agreements between the 

United States and Japan had been resolved, and AFSOC announced 

that the 353d SOW would be permanently assigned to Kadena AB, 

except for the 31st SOS, which was still being considered for location 

elsewhere. The effective date of the directive was 5 February. As of 

that date, personnel were assigned PCS to the wing at Kadena, and as 

they steadily arrived over the next several months, they replaced the 

TDY personnel, who then returned to their permanent units. 

Through the spring, the Airmen of the 31st SOS continued to 

travel to the Osan FOL for training and to exercises from Korea to 

Malaysia, working with the special forces of other nations. The location at Osan was working well, and representatives from the US government formally requested that the Korean government allow the 

USAF to permanently assign the 31st to that base. By April the Korean 

government agreed, and in a formal announcement, the US State Department declared that the 31st SOS and a maintenance support team 

would permanently move to Osan in July. Surprisingly, some of the 

strongest resistance to the movement of the 31st to Osan came from 

the current residents, the 51st Fighter Wing (FW). Quite simply, they 

did not want a helicopter unit on their base, citing operational and 

safety concerns. General Fister visited the base and had an office call 

with the wing commander and the Seventh Air Force commander, Lt 

Gen Ron Fogleman, to iron out any differences of opinion. Soon after, 

the 353d SOW commander, Colonel Stankovich, signed a memorandum of agreement with the Osan AB commander in June, and, on 

schedule, the 31st SOS relocated to Osan.41

As the 31st SOS settled into its new home, it was immediately 

tasked to support another series of exercises, classified and unclassified, in Korea and other Asian nations. Colonel Correll had to work 

through a series of personnel challenges as his TDY personnel departed and he finally received PCS troops for one-year tours. He discovered that the majority of his new maintenance troops were not 

fully qualified to work on the complex Pave Low systems. Working 

through the 353d SOW and AFSOC, he was able to arrange for all 

minimally qualified technicians being assigned to the 31st SOS to receive a short TDY tour to the 20th SOS for several weeks to acquire 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 361

some of the specific training they needed to be fully qualified before 

coming to Korea. Additionally, the two headquarters agreed to insure 

that, from then on, a minimum of 50 percent of his maintenance 

technicians would arrive fully qualified in their specialties.42

One of the new pilots to join the rebuilding 31st SOS was Capt Greg 

Lengyel. The son of a USAF flyer who had been a POW in SEA, he had 

attended Texas A&M and was commissioned through ROTC in 1985. 

He had a burning desire to be a fighter pilot and was accepted into the 

Euro-NATO joint jet pilot training program at Sheppard AFB, Texas. 

Unfortunately, the doctors there determined that he had a spinal defect 

that precluded him from sitting on an ejection seat, and he was assigned to nonflying duties in Colorado. With perseverance, Lengyel 

was able to obtain a waiver to fly in non-ejection-seat assignments. 

Since helicopters were the only way to do that, he volunteered and was 

accepted and sent to Fort Rucker with Capt Scott Howell. Graduating 

from there with his pilot wings, he went to Fairchild AFB to fly UH1Ns in support of the USAF Survival School, again with Howell. 

Lengyel learned quickly and upgraded to instructor and then flight 

evaluator. At one point, he flew to Nellis AFB for some training and 

met Capt Brad Webb from the 20th SOS. They had a long talk, and afterwards Captain Lengyel applied for Pave Lows. He was accepted and 

reported to Kirtland in July 1991 for the long course. 

Courtesy SSgt Glen Fleming, USAF

The flight line for the 31st SOS at Osan AB
362 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

Lengyel found the program to be challenging. While the flying was 

similar, there was just so much to the aircraft itself, especially all of the 

Pave Low gear. He also found that working with a larger crew than he 

had on the UH-1N took some adjustment. The pilot quickly got used 

to the cockpit cadences and rhythm necessary to maneuver the aircraft, especially into challenging landing zones both day and night. 

Impressed with the role that the flight engineers played on the 

crew, Lengyel remembers that “[their] position is tough, it really is. 

We asked a great deal of the Pave Low engineers, especially the guy in 

the seat. The guys who made it through [training] were worth their 

weight in gold.” Lengyel also began to form definite opinions about 

the Pave Low gunners. He chronicles how

the gunners tended to be more of the happy-go-lucky, free-spirited, party 

members of the crew. . . . Gunners were an important part of the crew; they 

could kill you as much as anybody could by talking your tail rotor into the 

trees or something like that. They had that crucial role on the crew. The whole 

cadence of the approach, where the pilots are so restricted—particularly at 

night—on visibility, that they are so dependent on the flight engineer calling 

out altitude and air speed, and then the rest of the crew calling you in to a 

landing zone. Right, left, tail. Left and tail are gunners; they are two-thirds of 

that call. . . .

They were definitely a different tribe than the flight engineers just because 

they could get away with being a little more carefree. . . . Sometimes if there is 

a little too much tension, they would be the ones who’d try to crack a joke or 

do something silly.43

Lengyel finished his training in April 1992 and qualified as a mission 

pilot, which meant that he would not need to come back to Kirtland 

to achieve aircraft commander qualification. That could now be done 

in his tactical squadron. Lengyel received a remote assignment to the 

rebuilding 31st SOS and prepared to travel to Osan.44

Anticipating a follow-on assignment to the 20th SOS, Lengyel first 

went to Hurlburt to procure housing for his wife and new baby before 

crossing the Pacific. He arrived at Osan before the squadron did. After in-processing, he was sent down to Futenma to join the units. 

There he was put on a C-5 and deployed with the unit to an exercise 

in Thailand. A few weeks later, he helped the unit move to Osan. 

Once the move was complete, he deployed to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, to train for a possible real-world 

mission. There he was crewed with Capt Bill Bassett, a TDY augmentee 

from the 551st at Kirtland AFB, with whom Lengyel had recently 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 363

trained. They worked for several days on rehearsals with special 

forces elements. The missions involved long legs over water, lots of air 

refuelings, and use of the TF/TA in real weather conditions to deliver 

their units to precise locations. Lengyel learned a great deal on that 

exercise. During his one-year tour, he was able to upgrade to aircraft 

commander and spent more time on the road than he did at Osan. He 

left the 31st SOS in May 1993, with orders to report to the 20th SOS 

at Hurlburt Field.45

On 1 December 1992, as per AFSOC direction, the 353d SOW was 

officially redesignated the 353d SOG. Colonel Stankovich remained 

in command of the now downsized unit as it became a tenant of the 

18th Wing, also at Kadena. Regardless of the unit designation change, 

though, little was different. The Airmen of the 353d continued to 

conduct their day-to-day missions and activities, and Stankovich had 

to admit that he felt much more comfortable as a group as opposed to 

a wing commander on such an active and essential air base in the 

western Pacific. The change also meant little to the Airmen of the 31st 

SOS at Osan. A few days later, they were launching sorties to participate in Exercise Foal Eagle, a joint and combined exercise in Korea. 

They were just happy that they had finally found a permanent home 

that would serve the unit well for the next nine years as they finally 

settled into a steady operational rhythm.46

Air Force Special Operations Command

At times it seemed that certain issues would just never go away. 

Just two weeks before 1992 ended, the CJCS, General Powell, released 

a draft roles and missions modification proposal and sent it to all of 

the services for comments. It was intended to initiate a series of force 

reductions facilitated by the demise of the Soviet Union and the end 

of the Cold War. In it was a proposal to transfer all of the USAF’s 

helicopters to the Army and all of its HC-130s to the Marines. It was 

Senator Nunn’s proposal all over again. It was Initiative 17 on steroids, now including all utility helicopters and those assigned to the 

ARS for rescue duty, plus all the tankers. The transfers would begin 

within six months.

For the second time in less than a year, the AFSOC staff pulled out 

all of its briefing papers on Initiative 17, including justification for 

keeping the HC-130s, and rebutted the proposals. The countereffort 
364 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

had the desired effect; eight weeks later General Powell issued a revised plan. Directly addressing Senator Nunn, Powell said, “America 

has only one air force, the United States Air Force.” The revision 

lacked any mention of any reassignment of USAF helicopters or 

HC-130 tankers. In fact, budget projections showed a steady increase in spending for SOCOM and its components. James Locher 

III, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations, pointed 

out that since 1986, special operations forces had doubled in size 

with no cuts anticipated. Increasingly, in a world devoid of any significant major threat, uncertainty abounded, and the SOF became 

the force of choice.47

One week later, AFSOC received some relief for a long-standing 

commitment when the 66th Rescue Squadron (RQS) of the ARS deployed to Kuwait to replace the 20th SOS from its continuous combat 

recovery tasking since the termination of combat in Desert Storm. 

When the 20th helicopters and personnel departed, the 30-month 

presence of the Green Hornets in the region ended. Wishing them a 

warm farewell, the commander of Joint Task Force Southwest Asia 

said, “Bravo Zulu [outstanding] to all AFSOC personnel involved. 

You did an outstanding job in carrying out a difficult mission under 

challenging circumstances. . . . You provided a blanket of security for 

coalition aircrews. . . . Be proud of the role you have played in this 

long watch.”48

21st Special Operations Squadron

Into 1993 the 21st SOS was still supporting Provide Comfort II in 

Turkey. In early January, 21st crews flew medevac missions to recover 

injured coalition personnel. On one of the missions conducted on 5 

January, Colonel Russell and Maj John Brainerd and crews flew their 

Paves into northern Iraq to recover an injured French officer. Because 

of recent hostile incidents between coalition and Iraqi forces, the 

mission was politically sensitive. The two aircraft flew at night 

through snowstorms and icing conditions to Zakho, Iraq, where the 

patient was located. They had to fly at low level through the mountains and utilized all of the special navigation equipment on their aircraft to safely do so. At one point, they received ground fire from 

enemy forces. Regardless, they recovered the French soldier, reversed 

their course, and delivered him to critically needed medical care at 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 365

Incirlik AB. The two crews logged 6.3 hours of flight time in some of 

the worst flying conditions possible, tasking the aircraft and crews to 

their limits. For their efforts, Russell and Brainerd were awarded the 

Cheney Award for 1993. Over the next several months, 21st crews also 

flew a rescue mission for a Turkish pilot who went down in the Mediterranean Sea and two missions to secure aircraft crash sites. That longterm Pave Low commitment ended in mid-July, when the 21st SOS 

completed its rescue alert mission as part of Provide Comfort II at Incirlik. MH-60s and personnel from the 55th and 71st SOSs replaced 

the Pave Lows and crews in that role. The Airmen of the 21st packed up 

their equipment and flew their aircraft back to RAF Alconbury, completing an almost uninterrupted 27-month TDY commitment.49

Also during 1993, the congressionally mandated Base Realignment 

and Closure Commission announced the shutdown of the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) at Pensacola. This would directly affect the Pave 

Low community since all of its major maintenance and modifications 

were still being accomplished there. AFSOC staff members had to 

modify their long-term logistics plan to support the aircraft. Working 

with USMC planners, they began to develop a logistics and funding 

program to transfer the work to the large H-53 depot at Cherry Point 

MCAS, North Carolina. However, interruptions to modifications were 

inevitable as the highly skilled technicians who were the heart of the 

NADEP began to retire or transfer to other locations.50

Notes

1. History of 353d SOW, 1 July–31 Dec 1990, vol. 4, 1–19.

2. Joe Becker, interview.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Anderegg, “Ash Warriors,” 1, 43–52; Grier, “Last Days of Clark,” 56–60; History 

of AFSOC, 1 Jan 1990–31 Dec 1991, vol. 1, 197–200, 209; History of 353d SOW, 1 

Jan–30 June 1991, vol. 1, viii–ix, 8–9; and History of the 353d Special Operations 

Group (Formerly 353d Special Operations Wing) (hereafter referred to as History of 

353d SOG [Formerly 353d SOW]), 1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1, 84.

6. Joe Becker, interview.

7. Crawford, “Nomads of the Pacific,” pamphlet, 16–18, Heritage File, AFSOC/

HO; and Marion, “Ash Warriors,” 23.

8. DeSalle, interview.

9. History of 1550th CCTW, 1 Jan–30 June 1991, vol. 1, 15, 22. 

10. Bassett, interview. 

11. History of 1550th CCTW, 1 Jan–30 June 1991, vol. 1, 8, 15, 22, 25, 39. 
366 │ INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE

12. Ibid., 1 July–30 Sept 1991; and History of the 542d Crew Training Wing (hereafter referred to as History of 542d CTW), 1 Oct 1991–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1, xxi, 1, 4, 

25–27, 52–54. 

13. Joe Becker, interview; and Waller, Commandos, 176.

14. Slife, interview. 

15. Howell, interview. 

16. Ibid.

17. Joe Becker, interview. 

18. History of 542d CTW, 1 Jan–30 June 1993, vol. 1, 7, 15, 18, 23, 56–58. 

19. McPeak, Selected Works, 52. 

20. Ibid., 247–51. 

21. Ibid., 53–57.

22. Thigpen, Praetorian Starship, 378–79.

23. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vols. 1, 2. 

24. Ibid., 34.

25. AFSOC, Combat Rescue—Bridging the Gap, white paper.

26. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 3, supporting doc. 1–19; and Lt Col 

Donny Wurster, SAF/AQQU, point paper, Conversion of Additional MH–53Js, n.d.

27. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1, 4. 

28. Ibid., 104.

29. HH–60G Class A Flight Mishap Report, AFSOC/HO.

30. Colonel Hess to AFSOC operational flying units, letter, subject: Duties and 

Responsibilities of the Aircraft Commander, 11 Dec 1992, AFSOC/HO; History of 

AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1, 55–56, 104, 221; and anonymous Pave Low pilot.

31. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1, 94–98.

32. Martin, interview. 

33. Comer, interview. 

34. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1, x, 4, 8, 40, 108, 199. 

35. Slife, interview; and Slife to the author, e-mail, concerning the retirement of 

Col R. K. Williams.

36. Howell, interview. 

37. History of 39th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1, xi, 26, 76.

38. DeSalle, interview. 

39. History of 39th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1, xiv–xv, 20–21. 

40. History of 353d SOG (Formerly 353d SOW), 1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1, 32; 

and Crawford, “Nomads of the Pacific,” pamphlet, 18, Heritage File, AFSOC/HO. 

41. History of 353d SOG (Formerly 353d SOW), 1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1, xi, xii, 

and 32; Crawford, “Nomads of the Pacific,” pamphlet, 20, Heritage File, AFSOC/HO; 

and Stankovich and Correll, interviews. 

42. History of 353d SOG (Formerly 353d SOW), 1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1, 64, 80.

43. Lengyel, interview. 

44. Ibid. 

45. Ibid. 

46. History of 353d SOG (Formerly 353d SOW), 1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1, 21; 

and Crawford, “Nomads of the Pacific,” pamphlet, 20, Heritage File, AFSOC/HO. 

47. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1993, vol. 1, 2; William Matthews, “Powell 

Calls for Consolidation, but No Major Overhaul,” Air Force Times, 22 Feb 1993, 4; 
INTERIM YEARS—VOLCANOES, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGe │ 367

and George Wilson, “Special Operators, Losers Now Winners,” Air Force Times, 22 

Feb 1993, 14.

48. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1993, vol. 1, 101. 

49. Ibid., xvii, xix, 103; and ibid., 1 Jan–31 Dec 1994, vol. 1, v, supplemental docs. 

II–35, II–37. 

50. Ibid., 1 Jan–31 Dec 1994, vol. 1, 212.

Chapter 11

Into the Balkans

~1993–96

We were all sweating bullets, and it was the hardest flying 

that I have ever done in my life. 

—Capt Steve Kelly 

RAF Alconbury

As the 21st SOS settled back in at its home base, Lt Col Mike Russell 

gave up command of the unit to Lt Col Donny Wurster on 9 July 

1993. Wurster had been serving as the squadron operations officer 

since the summer of 1991. Although relatively new to the Pave Low, 

he brought to the job a wealth of operational experience flying the 

HH-3 and MH-60. That experience was leavened with his staff tours 

at MAC and then the Pentagon, where, in tandem with Maj Ed Reed, 

he had fought tirelessly for the modification of the MH-53s and MH60s for both SOF and CSAR use. 

On his Pentagon tour, Wurster replaced Reed in the OSD’s acquisition division when Reed departed for Kirtland AFB and the challenges of building a world-class flight and simulator training facility. 

In the Pentagon, Wurster fought for the programs in the incessant 

daily give-and-take of staff duty. In doing so, he developed a reputation as an even-tempered and highly effective staff officer. His efforts 

also earned him an unusual nickname. After one particularly contentious staff session, he stopped by the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and 

encountered Col Gary Weikel and Army colonel Mark Lewis, to 

whom he expressed some firm comments about the recent session. 

After he left, Lewis remarked, “You could misjudge that guy because 

he looks like Mr. Peepers but could easily sidle up next to you, and 

you would find yourself bleeding from multiple stab wounds before 

you knew it.”1

 Completing that tour, Wurster received orders to Kirtland for Pave Low transition and then onto the 21st SOS. Arriving in 
370 │ INTO THE BALKANS

England, he was thrilled to be back in an operational unit and joined 

a squadron well founded and full of young, aggressive officers such as 

Capt Steve Otto, Capt J. D. Clem, and Capt Grant Harden.2

Taking command of the 21st, Wurster’s attention was squarely 

drawn to events occurring in the Balkans region of Europe. Longdormant ethnic tensions were simmering to a boil there as the former 

nation of Yugoslavia disintegrated and violence broke out in several 

areas among different ethnic groups. Relations were also strained between Serbia—which wanted to maintain some semblance of the former Yugoslavia but under its control—and the other areas, including 

Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which wanted to be independent nations. In an attempt to staunch the fighting, the United 

Nations in July 1992 inserted a Protection Force (UNPROFOR) of 

23,000 troops from over 20 nations to attempt to separate and protect 

the various factions. To sustain that mission, NATO initiated Operation Provide Promise, a joint and coalition airlift campaign to deliver 

supplies by air through landing or airdrop. 

Courtesy Lt Gen Donny Wurster, USAF

Lt Col Donny Wurster as the commander of the 21st SOS
INTO THE BALKANS │ 371

In February 1993, the 21st SOS was tasked to support the operation as part of a larger SOCEUR joint special operations task force, 

designated JSOTF2. It moved three of its aircraft, crews, and a maintenance support package from Turkey to Brindisi AB, located on the 

heel of Italy. Initially, the squadron was assigned CSAR alert, a 

legitimate precaution since an 

Italian cargo aircraft had been 

shot down and several other coalition aircraft had been damaged 

by enemy ground fire. As available, the Pave Lows could also be 

used for some precision cargo delivery or the movement of key US 

or allied leaders. However, as the 

Airmen from the 21st SOS settled 

in at Brindisi, they did not realize 

that this commitment would last 

over six years and also involve 

Pave Low personnel from all four 

of the units.3

A few months after Wurster 

took command of the 21st SOS, 

TSgt Jim Kradel reported to the 

352d SOG as a gunner evaluator 

in the stan/eval office. He flew 

with the 21st crews and also deployed on a few training exercises before he and TSgt John DeSalle attended the same NCO Academy 

class at RAF Upwood, graduating in the summer of 1994. Both enjoyed and appreciated the course, which, unfortunately, was the last 

USAF course conducted at that RAF base.4

While Kradel and DeSalle were in school, Serbia tried to interfere 

with the support missions that the USAF and coalition forces were 

flying and unleashed its ground and air forces to attack Croatia and 

Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the UN passed a series of resolutions that 

failed to force the Serbians to desist, it asked NATO to enforce a nofly zone for Serbian aircraft over Bosnia. NATO accepted the task and 

began dispatching AWACS aircraft and allied fighters from several 

nations to patrol the area, starting on 12 April 1993, as Operation 

Deny Flight. To support this additional operation, the 21st SOS team 

The 21st SOS home away from 

home for seven years

Courtesy Lt Col Jim Breck, USAF

Courtesy Col Bill Bassett, USAF, Retired

Flight line at Brindisi, 1994
372 │ INTO THE BALKANS

at Brindisi was tasked to provide CSAR cover for the aircraft on patrol. The squadron dispatched two more of its aircraft to meet the 

minimum five-aircraft tasking. Additionally, the 21st SOS was tasked 

to provide personnel to serve on the JSOTF2 staff and at other headquarters. By midsummer, the operations tempo was so high that it 

was obvious the 21st SOS would not be able to honor this tasking 

without AFSOC providing substantial augmentation.5

Air Force Special Operations Command

As 1993 continued, in addition to the developing crisis in the Balkans, AFSOC monitored the participation of Pave Low crews and support personnel as they also joined exercises and training events literally all over the world. The Pave Lows were in high demand. The 

AFSOC staff also had to monitor and balance the aircraft fleet among 

the units as the Pave Lows went through their SLEP updates and other 

required maintenance inspections. Of the 37 MH-53Js available—26 

with the 20th as the national reserve, six with the 21st, and five with 

the 31st—on average, 13 were off of the flight line for these two processes at any one time.

The AFSOC DO, Colonel Hess, continued his efforts to better standardize the crews. He directed his safety office to build briefings for all 

crew members on operational risk management and human factors. 

He also drafted a directive ordering the operational squadrons to form 

hard crews of individuals who would train and fly together and, where 

possible, to organize their units into formal flights for better personnel 

management and officer and NCO leadership development.6

Under Hess’s guidance, the Commando Look program received 

funding. The project leader, Lt Col Douglas Layne, and his senior 

NCO, MSgt Leonard Sullivan, traveled to Fort Campbell to watch the 

160th SOAR do its “new guy” assessments and left with a number of 

ideas. Working with Colonel Hess, they drafted a proposal to be forwarded to the USAF Personnel Center requesting that Pave Low assignments be considered special-duty assignments and that more 

fixed-wing aviators be directed to the program. During the year, they 

held two Commando Look assessment sessions. At the first one, Lt 

Col “Rotor” Rakip, the 20th SOS commander, told the aspirants, “Being in special operations requires a total commitment. . . . Sure, the 

job is exciting and rewarding, but we need people who accept the 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 373

risks and sacrifices as well. Special operators have to have candor in 

knowing that when needed, they’ll respond. . . . Special operations is 

high-risk, high gain, the most demanding [missions] I have flown.”7

One of the candidates was 1st Lt Mike McKinney, currently flying 

UH-1Ns at F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming. He and the other candidates 

also met with retired colonel Bill Takacs. The now silver-haired but 

still cigar-chomping Pave Low icon was even more blunt: “I can remember leaving on Christmas Eve, not being able to tell the wife and 

kids where we were going to or when we’d return. It is going to be 

that kind of life. . . . Staying alive in Pave Low means having crew 

coordination—everyone has to do his job to keep the airplane away 

from trouble. That takes dedication and professionalism. You’ve got a 

responsibility to everyone else on that helicopter. There aren’t any 

Lone Rangers in this business.”8

The messages were well received by the attendees. “There is no 

doubt that I want to be a special operator,” said 1st Lt Eric Braganca, 

as he and flight engineer SSgt Mark Pryor joined McKinney and the 

other Airmen who applied and were accepted for Pave Low duty in 

the initial iterations of Commando Look.9

A few female Airmen also expressed an interest in the program. At 

the time, service opportunities were being vastly expanded for females. In April 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin issued a new 

policy allowing women to serve in most career fields, including pilot, 

navigator, and enlisted aircrew, on almost all USAF aircraft. That 

policy applied to the AFSOC C-130s of all variants. Conspicuously 

absent on the list, however, was the MH-53. Women were not accepted for crew duty on the Pave Lows because doing so would put 

them at too high a risk of being engaged in ground combat. Pave Low 

crew duty would remain all male.10

31st Special Operations Squadron

The 31st SOS, now fully settled at Osan, received the mandates on 

the hard crews and flight system with mixed reviews. The guidance 

was clear. AFSOC wanted to realign the structure so that (1) the best 

possible crews could be sent to supported operations, (2) leadership 

opportunities for aircrew members could be improved, and (3) aircrew members would begin to think and operate as a crew vice as a 

specific position on the crew. The guidance further postulated that 
374 │ INTO THE BALKANS

“the crew that trains together as a team, better understands each other’s capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses, thus maximizing their 

chances for success when called upon.” The squadron was directed to 

form one crew per assigned aircraft by 30 September 1993.11

Some 31st SOS crew members had served on other aircraft and 

understood the concept. Others questioned the efficacy of doing it in 

a small squadron, with everybody on one-year tours. Every month, 

about 10 percent of the squadron turned over; the only personnel 

constant was change. Additionally, the crews were to form into flights, 

with the officers now doing efficiency reports for the enlisted. Several 

of the NCOs resented losing their opportunities to be supervisors of 

the younger Airmen. Regardless, the squadron did its best to comply 

as the 31st SOS “nomads” traveled far and wide across the Pacific—

Australia, Thailand, Malaysia—to participate in an endless spate of 

exercises and adjust to the challenges of flying in Korea, where the 

airspace and ranges were limited and in high demand. Behind all of 

the training, too, was the sobering thought that North Korea still 

posed a threat to the south and still served as one of the main reasons 

for the existence of the 353d SOG. In November the entire 353d deployed to Korea and was given an ORI based on the Korean scenario. 

The unit received an “excellent” rating, clarion testimony to the great 

work that the 352d and 31st SOS did to reconstitute themselves after 

the debacle of Mount Pinatubo. Colonel Correll was certainly pleased. 

On 20 December 1993, he gave up command of the 31st to Lt Col 

Craig Jensen and returned to Hurlburt to serve on the AFSOC staff.12

20th Special Operations Squadron

The 20th SOS troops who had been the last ones in Kuwait had 

been home only 10 days when another team was dispatched to support the 21st SOS in its two deployments. One aircraft, crew, and 

small maintenance team went to Incirlik for Provide Comfort II, and 

two aircraft, three crews, and another maintenance team went to 

Brindisi, Italy, to support the growing Provide Promise operation. 

Most of the 20th and 21st personnel knew one another, either from 

their Pave Low training or from previous tours, and they blended 

well. The 20th guys also could not help but sense that the 21st guys 

really appreciated the support since they had been tasked to carry 

such a heavy dual deployment load for quite a while by now.
INTO THE BALKANS │ 375

Back at Hurlburt, the 20th began deploying to Asheville, North 

Carolina, for continuation mountain training in June. This training 

gave the squadron an excellent opportunity to begin tactical flying 

under the AFSOC-mandated hard crew concept. Each crew was 

formed with nine members: three pilots, three flight engineers, and 

three gunners. This allowed for the maximum flexibility in scheduling. However, there were still growing pains as the squadron adjusted 

to the new system. Capt Scott Howell was crewed with Capt Tom 

Trask, in charge of the stan/eval section; flight engineer TSgt Eddie 

Parris; and gunner MSgt Willie Taylor, both also from stan/eval. For 

a year, Howell flew almost exclusively with them—learning the finer 

nuances of the aircraft, tactics, and crew management through their 

mentorship—as they traveled to various exercises and worked with 

the standard customers. He was able to work his way into the plans 

section and then began to see the big picture of what the 20th could 

be called upon to do worldwide. That was a very sobering discovery. 

Similarly, 1st Lt Jim Slife was hard crewed with Capt Matt Shazda and 

found that experience to be most enlightening, enjoyable, and professionally enhancing.13

In May 1993, Capt Greg Lengyel reported to the 20th from his tour 

at the 31st SOS. Like Capt Scott Howell earlier, Lengyel was also a bit 

intimidated by what he found. First of all, the squadron commander, 

Colonel Rakip, was a legend within the Pave Low community. Additionally, the squadron was still full of guys who had flown hard combat in Desert Storm. Third, it had its own assigned organizational 

maintenance section, growing the squadron to over 600 officers and 

Airmen. Perhaps most importantly, though, it was literally the Pave 

Low place to be—the “show,” using the term made famous by the 

movie Bull Durham. It was the unit that worked with all of the best 

special forces elements, got the really important national force missions, and stood to a global commitment. These were the crews that 

flew the Big Mish. 

Additionally, Lengyel could tell that the unit had exceptionally 

high standards. It expected more of its officers and Airmen, although 

he sensed that it could be rather impersonal at times because it was so 

large. Regardless, he liked being in a unit that self-policed to high 

levels of performance and standards. Overall, he found it to be a “very 

impressive” unit.14

The 20th was not affected in any significant way when on 1 October 1993 the 1st SOW was redesignated the 16th SOW, per General 
376 │ INTO THE BALKANS

McPeak’s desire to restructure the USAF. As part of that process, he 

stipulated that wings would not hold identical numerical designations. At that time, there were three 1st wings: the 1st Fighter Wing, 

the 1st Space Wing, and the 1st Special Operations Wing. The 1st 

Space Wing was scheduled to inactivate. However, McPeak specifically wanted the heritage of the first 13 pre-USAF wings protected. 

The 1st FW was one of those, and the 1st SOW was not. The 1st SOW 

certainly had a long and distinguished heritage; however, when 

compared to the 1st FW using a formula devised by the historical 

analysts at the Historical Research Agency, the 1st SOW lost. Consequently, the 1st SOW was designated the 16th SOW, derived from 

the 16th Pursuit Group, a unit that had been one of the 13 originals 

and had a heritage dating back to 1923. Its subordinate groups and 

support squadrons also changed their designations to the 16th, and 

life went on.15

Just a few days after the wing designation change, the 20th SOS 

was directed to fly nine MH-53s to Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba, 

for a classified contingency operation. Rakip led the formation—

airborne within 16 hours of notification—and landed in Guantanamo without incident. Crew members remained there for five days 

and then returned to Hurlburt, also without incident. While at Guantanamo, they worked directly with the 1st Battalion of the 2d Marine 

Regiment. After the deployment, the regimental commander wrote 

to the 16th SOW commander, Brig Gen Maxwell Bailey, “The spirit of 

cooperation, teamwork, and motivation exhibited by Lt Col Rakip 

and his staff and aircrews was simply outstanding.”16

Two months later, the 16th SOW and 20th SOS held another 

Commando Look screening. One of the candidates was SSgt Robert 

Dinsmore, who had enlisted in 1988 and had trained as a weapons 

loader. After two tours loading bombs, missiles, and 20 mm ammunition on B-52s and F-4s, he was ready for something new. After hearing about Pave Low, he signed up for the evaluation as a gunner and 

traveled from his current assignment at Kadena to Hurlburt. He liked 

the program, and the evaluators found him compatible. Consequently, he received an assignment to the 20th SOS as a gunner. During the summer and fall of 1994, he went TDY to the 551st SOS for 

his gunnery and crew training. While there, he logged 17 training 

flights and qualified with both the .50-caliber machine gun and the 

20 mm minigun on the great Red Rio Bombing Range. He also 

learned his manifest duties as a scanner and overall Pave Low aircrew 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 377

member. However, he broke a thumb while at Kirtland and was not 

able to finish his training until he returned to Hurlburt. By early 1995, 

though, he finished his qualification and, when certified as combat 

ready and proudly wearing his red scarf, immediately left on a series 

of training exercises with the various customers with whom the 20th 

routinely trained.17

Air Rescue Service

The realignment of all USAF units as directed by General McPeak 

had one perhaps unintended consequence. With the dissolution of 

MAC, the Air Rescue Service was initially reassigned to the AMC. 

Since its reactivation on 1 August 1989, it had worked steadily to reestablish its CSAR capability and by 1992 had seven combat-ready 

rescue squadrons equipped with HH-60G and HH-3E aircraft. Regardless, on 2 July 1993, the ARS was reassigned from AMC directly 

to the DO at ACC and transferred all of its squadrons to the host 

units at their assigned bases. Operational control would be exercised 

by the affected overseas command or ACC. The ARS staff was absorbed under the ACC/DO, and the ARS was redesignated the USAF 

Combat Rescue School at Nellis. For the first time since it was formed 

as a separate service, the USAF did not have an operational rescue 

command. There was no clarity of mission or even one individual in 

any high position as the overall leader of its rescue forces. Rescue was 

now a dispersed set of squadron-level units, all under the command 

of officers who had other priorities.18

Kirtland AFB

On 1 July 1993, AETC was finally activated. Reflecting this consolidation, the 542d CTW was reassigned from the AMC to AETC 

effective that same date. In accordance with McPeak’s desire to renumber the wings to best preserve unit lineage and historical honors, 

the 542d was notified that within a year, it would receive a new designation, to be determined. 

These changes had little impact on the 551st. For the rest of the 

year, it continued to qualify crew members for the Pave Low units, 

although it did have several individuals, especially flight engineers, 

either fail the course or self-eliminate from the program. Unit crews 
378 │ INTO THE BALKANS

were also allowed to participate in training exercises with US Army 

special forces units and move outsized containers for other organizations on Kirtland. Weapons training for the gunners and flight engineers was improved when the 542d TCHTS began using inert ammunition to teach proper weapons procedures in the helicopter 

part-task trainer. 

On two occasions, crews were again called out to perform local 

rescue or humanitarian missions. They were dispatched to perform 

SAR missions and humanitarian relief for remote towns cut off by 

heavy snows, especially on the Navaho Indian reservations. A 551st 

crew was also launched to recover an F-111 crew that ejected while 

on a tactical mission in eastern New Mexico. Lt Col Mike Damron 

commanded the crew that picked up the two Airmen and returned 

them to their unit at Cannon AFB, New Mexico. Even the training 

crews occasionally got to perform real-world missions.19

As 1993 was drawing to a close, the Airmen of the 542d CTW were 

notified that their unit would inactivate, as per the McPeak reorganization/restructuring of the USAF, on 1 April 1994. It would be replaced by the newly activated 58th SOW, which would be assuming 

the numerical designation from the 58th FW formerly at Luke AFB. 

The 58th SOW would still be assigned to AETC’s Nineteenth Air 

Force. The subordinate 58th SOG would have assigned to it the 551st 

which, along with the 550th FTS, would change from a flying training 

squadron to a special operations squadron. Additionally, the 542d 

TCHTS would convert to the 512th SOS and become the training 

squadron for the UH-1s and H-60s.20

On 1 April 1994, the changes took place as scheduled as the various unit flags were furled and unfurled and the various commanders 

rendered their salutes and then made the obligatory speeches. However, the mission for the wing and the flying squadrons remained the 

same. The 551st, with its six assigned TH-53As and four MH-53Js, 

continued to produce new pilots, engineers, gunners, and instructors 

for the operational squadrons. At the time, the TH-53s were being 

modified with air refueling gear so that they could be used for that 

phase of training. Throughout the year, the squadron also accomplished some operational training as it participated with aircraft and 

crews in the latest series of Chili Flag exercises with US Navy SEALs, 

Army special forces units, and USAF CCTs and PJs. Its crews also 

responded to statewide SAR calls when they happened—quite a service for the state of New Mexico. Additionally, the 551st deployed 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 379

maintenance personnel to support the ongoing operations in Saudi 

Arabia and Turkey.21

Clear and Present Danger

In 1994 Paramount Pictures produced and released the movie version of Tom Clancy’s Clear and Present Danger. Harrison Ford played 

the arch-hero Jack Ryan in the widely viewed and acclaimed narcothriller. Members of the Pave Low community initially flocked to theaters to see the film, anticipating a key role for the Pave Lows, since 

they had been so well featured in the book. However, they were sorely 

disappointed because the Pave Low helicopters were not included in 

the script. Instead, the movie used US Army special operations helicopters similar to those in the 160th SOAR. Ed Reed, in particular, 

was upset with the substitution since he had been part of the initial 

effort to get the Pave Lows in the book. He did some checking, only 

to discover that apparently some skullduggery had taken place. Production representatives from Paramount had contacted USSOCOM 

for production assistance. The Army officers who received the request did not contact AFSOC for help. Rather, they peremptorily approved the use of the Army 160th SOAR helicopters versus the Pave 

Lows for the movie.22

Air Force Special Operations Command

On the same day that the 58th SOW was activated at Kirtland 

AFB, one of the very last unit changes dictated by the McPeak realignment took place at Hurlburt Field. The Special Missions Operational Test and Evaluation Center was inactivated, and all of its personnel, facilities, and funds were transferred to the newly activated 

18th Flight Test Squadron (FLTS). The 18th also inherited a long list 

of ongoing SOF-specific projects. With the unit change, though, came 

added responsibility. In 1993, as part of a tactics review process, 

General Fister questioned how the AFSOC developed proper and 

current defensive maneuvers. To address that shortfall, the 18th FLTS 

would also be given the responsibility to develop, test, validate, and 

disseminate new tactics for AFSOC. Consequently, the 18th grew 

from 98 to 142 personnel to address these new tasks.23
380 │ INTO THE BALKANS

Many of the ongoing projects dealt with the Pave Low helicopters, 

such as testing related to the almost continuous SLEP modifications, 

installing folding blades for shipboard operations, and increasing 

gross weight limits to 50,000 pounds for emergency war-plan contingencies. The 18th assumed responsibility for initial testing begun in 

1993 on a new proposed modification to the aircraft called the Interactive Defense Avionics Systems/Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical 

Terminal (IDAS/MATT). This sophisticated and highly classified 

concept would integrate several onboard sensor systems with the 

overall enhanced navigation system and existing ECM and flare/chaff 

dispenser systems. Additionally, the system would be able to receive 

real-time intelligence and operational data that could then be displayed on both existing and newly proposed display screens, providing the aircrews greatly increased tactical situational awareness and 

an improved capability of dealing with threats. It was an exciting concept and one that could add to the technological brilliance of the Pave 

Low aircraft. However, the concept needed to be fully matured and 

refined before it could be accepted for the fleet, and the 18th was given 

responsibility to accomplish the necessary testing to make it work.24

Commando Vision

In early 1994, the AFSOC commander, General Fister, directed a 

review of the readiness posture of the command as the long-standing 

Soviet threat disappeared and the “new world order” of dispersed regional and ethnic threats and potential humanitarian needs became 

the primary concerns. His planners reviewed the current AFSOC 

force structure initially developed under the Twenty-Third Air Force 

Forward Look program 10 years earlier. They concluded that it had 

been structured to support two theaters simultaneously but was now 

being called upon to support contingencies in all six foreign theaters. 

The command TDY rate around the globe had increased 100 percent 

since the pre–Desert Shield days. In response, the planners developed “Commando Vision,” designed to consolidate AFSOC forces in 

the CONUS and establish a theater orientation in line with regional 

defense concepts that could more equitably provide special operations aviation assets to theater commanders. 

As a result of the study, a program change request was created that 

dictated a two-phase plan. Phase I would realign several active USAF 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 381

and USAF Reserve AC- and MC-130 units for better utilization. 

Phase II would pursue the activation of another special operations 

wing, to be based in the western United States (as per the intent of the 

earlier Forward Look plan) with a mix of C-130-type aircraft and 

possibly Pave Lows. The two overseas SOGs would remain in place 

but possibly lose some force structure to equip the new wing. However, 

their special operations support squadrons would receive increased 

manning to provide more dispersed command and control capability. 

For contingencies, CONUS-based aircrews and maintenance teams 

could be rotated in to augment the permanent units as needed. 

The plan was straightforward and could be completed with internal assets and manpower. However, the development of a CONUS 

West Coast SOW was problematic at a time when force structure 

was being reduced. One potential course of action was to be vigilant 

for a possible base that might become available through the Base 

Realignment and Closure Commission, which Congress was intermittently conducting.25

Haiti

Perhaps in vivid testimony to the need for Commando Vision, in 

the summer of 1994 AFSOC forces were deployed as part of a much 

larger multinational task force to Haiti to quell a military takeover of 

their democratically elected government and the civil unrest that ensued. Thousands of Haitians fled the country in small boats heading 

for Florida. After initial political efforts failed, Pres. Bill Clinton decided to dispatch military forces for Operation Uphold Democracy 

to intervene and stabilize the country. A sizeable force of paratroops 

from the 82d Airborne Division from Fort Bragg was launched. 

However, the opposition politicians agreed to a negotiated settlement, and the forcible entry was cancelled. Instead, a multinational 

force of 20,000 US personnel, primarily from the 10th Mountain Division, and 2,000 troops from other Caribbean nations entered the 

country to stop an outbreak of lawless activity and stabilize the political and social situation. AFSOC had been planning for this contingency for some time and dispatched a task force to Haiti and its 

environs. Most of it came from the 16th SOW, which sent 1,600 Airmen to fly and support MC- and AC-130s, MH-60s, and Pave Lows 

throughout September. 
382 │ INTO THE BALKANS

At the time, the 20th was well engaged in its yearly training plan 

and routinely had crews and maintenance personnel deployed across 

the CONUS to several classified and unclassified training exercises 

with various special forces units. However, the majority of those 

were cancelled when the 20th, now led by Lt Col Don Hoover, who 

had taken command in June from Colonel Rakip, received its deployment order. Hoover had been serving as the operations officer 

for the squadron, so the transition had been smooth. Like “Pappy” 

Walters and Tom Aldrich, Hoover was another former Vietnamexperienced US Army warrant officer who had successfully transferred over to Pave Lows, adding to the community his vast flying 

knowledge and experience. He selected Lt Col Bob Maldonado to be 

his operations officer.26

Within 24 hours of being told to go, he had the 20th airborne to 

support the operation with 14 MH-53 aircraft, manned and supported with 170 operations and maintenance personnel and augmented by two complete aircrews and 12 maintenance troops from 

the 58th SOW. 

Retracing their activities in the previous December, the helicopters, led by Capt Mitch Petersen, launched out across the Gulf of 

Mexico in a driving rainstorm and very poor visibility. The passage 

was challenging, with lots of problems with spacing and lost wingmen. Like the year before, the helicopters flew to Guantanamo Bay 

and conducted support operations from there. The crews were told to 

plan for direct-action assault missions that would include an initial 

large insertion of a Ranger force—another Big Mish type of operation 

for the 20th crews. Anticipating enemy reaction, Colonel Hoover directed the crews to carry extra barrels for their machine guns and 

additional loads of ammunition. He also ordered them to carry additional fuel, making the aircraft extremely heavy for assault landings 

into confined landing zones. Some of the crews were very concerned 

about the extra weight and addressed the issue with Hoover at a contentious crew meeting. He held fast to his orders. However, the 

“forced entry” mission was cancelled. Instead, the crews were ordered 

to prepare to conduct humanitarian missions, SAR alert, and support 

missions for various ground SOF elements. Their helicopters were 

the first to land in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, with food and medical 

supplies. Aircraft maintenance was superb, and Hoover could count 

on nine aircraft being ready to fly every day. Many of the missions 

were classified. 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 383

On one multiship mission, Capt Jim Slife was the flight lead as the 

crews inserted and then extracted a special forces team. After recovering their customers, Slife turned the flight toward Guantanamo. 

Arrangements had been made for an MC-130 to meet the flight halfway for an in-flight refueling to insure that the helicopters had sufficient fuel reserves to safely make the air base. Unfortunately, the MC130 did not receive the correct refueling point and was much farther 

away from the helicopters than they had planned for. One of the 

crews, commanded by Capt Greg Lengyel, was very low on fuel. Slife 

and Lengyel quickly developed a revised plan, and the rendezvous 

was accomplished. All aircraft were able to get their needed fuel and 

proceeded to Guantanamo without further incident. The flight crew 

debriefing, also attended by Colonel Hoover, was somewhat animated as the crews dissected their mistakes.27

Courtesy USSOCOM Public Affairs

20th SOS Pave Lows at Guantanamo Naval Station, Cuba, for Operation 

Uphold Democracy in Haiti, 1994

The majority of the flying was relatively routine. While deployed 

for just over one month, the 20th crews logged 716 flight hours on 

196 sorties, with a 100 percent launch rate. The high launch rate was 

indicative of the commendable job the maintenance troops had been 

doing to sustain unit aircraft. Their efforts were also reflected in the 
384 │ INTO THE BALKANS

20th receiving the 1993 Air Force Maintenance Effectiveness Award 

for best rotary-wing unit prior to its deployment.28

Capt Scott Howell also participated in the Haiti operation but in a 

very different form. A few months prior, he had been assigned to 

serve as the AFSOC liaison officer to the 75th Ranger Regiment. As 

the Paves were getting ready to deploy, he traveled to Savannah, 

Georgia, to join his headquarters unit as it deployed for the Haiti operation. Howell was with his commander on the USS America for 28 

days, working all manner of joint air-ground operations issues. He 

also met a number of rising officers and NCOs in the Ranger community with whom he would work in later operations. A few months 

later, he was able to take over as the squadron chief of plans when his 

boss, Maj Lance Bodine, departed the squadron.29

The Balkans

As 1994 began, AFSOC continued to provide support and augmentation as necessary for the 352d SOG and 21st SOS as they continued to fulfill their CSAR tasking under Operation Deny Flight. 

They realigned their operations with hard crews as directed by AFSOC. 

January passed peacefully. The tense quiet was shattered, though, on 

5 February, when Serb forces fired artillery into the central marketplace in Sarajevo, Bosnia, killing 68 civilians and wounding 200 more. 

NATO forces declared a weapons-free zone around the city and announced that they would bomb any weapons found in that zone. As 

tensions mounted, one of the 352d’s more senior Pave Low pilots, 

Capt J. D. Clem, attended a NATO standardization conference to better coordinate CSAR procedures for all NATO members. Personnel 

from the 21st SOS subsequently trained with aircrews from the 

French air force and others on common procedures. At the same 

time, 16th SOW personnel began to arrive at Brindisi to replace the 

352d troops so they could return to Alconbury to prepare for and 

then conduct an ORI through May. The troops of the two units were 

used to working together, and the transition was smooth.30

Three weeks later, in another provocative move, the Serbs dispatched a flight of six Galeb light-attack aircraft to bomb Bosnian 

forces near the city of Novi Travnik. They were intercepted by two 

F-16s from the 526th Fighter Squadron (FS) flying out of Aviano AB, 

Italy, and piloted by Capt Robert Wright and Capt Scott O’Grady. 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 385

Wright (a.k.a. Wilbur) promptly shot down three of the aircraft, scoring the first-ever air-to-air kills for an F-16. When the remaining Serbian aircraft attempted to flee, another flight of two more F-16s shot 

down a fourth and watched a fifth crash into a mountain as its pilot 

tried to evade the USAF fighters.31

The next day, a US Navy F-14 went down in the Adriatic Sea, and 

a 20th SOS MH-53 from Brindisi assisted in the recovery. While 

politicians from both sides wrestled to work out a cease-fire, it appeared that air action was going to steadily increase. Two weeks later, 

NATO aircraft began dispatching fighter aircraft to provide direct 

support for peacekeeping troops and UNPROFOR observers. By 

early April, NATO aircraft were bombing enemy targets, and the Serbian forces were engaging NATO aircraft with antiaircraft artillery 

and SAMs. 

On 15 April 1994, a French aircraft was damaged by enemy fire. 

The next day, the 20th SOS scrambled its CSAR task force in response to the downing of Vixen 23, a British AV-8 Harrier shot down 

by Serbian forces near Goražde, Bosnia. The MH-53s held over the 

Adriatic Sea for two hours and refueled twice before being directed 

Courtesy AFSOC History Office

20th SOS Pave Lows fly by the USS America (CV-66) during Operation

Uphold Democracy.
386 │ INTO THE BALKANS

to return to Brindisi. They were, at that point, unaware that the pilot 

had been recovered by friendly Bosnian Muslims, taken through 

Serbian lines into Goražde, and turned over to a small British SAS 

team. A few days later, the pilot and SAS team were able to evade out 

of the besieged city, avoid Serbian forces, and reach a designated recovery point where a French Puma landed in total darkness and recovered them.32

Figure 5. Balkans area of operations. (Copyright Darrel Whitcomb, 2010.)
INTO THE BALKANS │ 387

During April and May, the 352d SOG received its ORI. It occurred 

in two phases and involved deployed operations during Exercise Ellipse Bravo in eastern Europe. As the inspection was being conducted, 

two MH-53s had to be immediately grounded to conform to a timecompliance technical order modification. Nonetheless, the 21st was 

able to adjust its operations, and the squadron and the SOG in general 

passed the ORI with high grades.33

In June, the 21st SOS personnel returned to Brindisi to resume 

their JSOTF2 tasking, and the troops from the 16th SOW returned 

home, except for two 20th crews that remained as augmentees. On 

11 July 1994, Lt Col Jeff Walls replaced Colonel Wurster as the 21st 

SOS commander. Wurster departed for the Pentagon and staff duty 

in the OSD. 

The wholesale deployment of the 21st SOS aircraft and personnel 

to Brindisi to support ongoing operations in both Provide Promise 

and Deny Flight made it impossible for the 21st to participate in any 

other operational exercises occurring in 

the theater. Additionally, maintaining several aircraft and crews 

on alert tied up these 

resources so that flight 

training while at Brindisi was minimal. To 

solve this problem, 

Walls requested that 

the 20th crews be returned to Hurlburt so 

that the flying time allocated to them at Brindisi could be used for the 21st crews to accomplish the training that they were receiving at Alconbury. This was approved, and the 21st was able to fulfill its training requirements for 

the second half of 1994 at Brindisi, including an emphasis on ship 

landing and boarding operations. However, CSAR alert was still its 

primary mission, as NATO countries now had almost 170 combat 

and support aircraft operating in the region. 

TSgt Jim Kradel augmented the 21st crews and flew several missions into Bosnia. On one mission he and his crew carried Lt Gen 

Mike Ryan, the Sixteenth Air Force commander and the Allied Air 

Courtesy Lt Col Jim Breck, USAF

A well-known landmark, the “Elephant Cage” 

antenna array at San Vito
388 │ INTO THE BALKANS

Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH) NATO commander, and his 

aides on a mission to search for mass grave sites. The weather was 

cloudy, and the Paves had to use their TF/TA radar to navigate in the 

tight valleys and land at various sites and airfields. It was also cold, 

and the general did not appreciate the Pave Low crews flying with 

their windows open. Kradel had to explain to him that the enemy 

AAA threat required them to have their guns at the ready and gave 

him a thicker Gortex flight jacket to wear. 

On another occasion, a Pave Low crew dropped off General Ryan 

for a meeting with several Serbian commanders. The Pave Low crew 

then took off with instructions to return to the same landing zone at 

a specific time. As Ryan spoke with the Serbians, a thick fog settled 

over the area and showed no signs of dissipating. As the designated 

landing time approached, Ryan asked to be taken back to the landing 

zone. The Serbians questioned the ability of the Pave Low to land in 

such poor weather. Regardless, they proceeded to the landing zone 

and watched in amazement as the Pave Low touched down at the 

designated place and time. The Serbs were greatly impressed as Ryan 

climbed aboard and the crew lifted off back into the fog.34

20th Special Operations Squadron/

16th Special Operations Wing

After the Haiti mission, Captain Slife volunteered and received orders 

for a two-year assignment to the 31st SOS. He was most pleased and 

began organizing his family to go to Korea. However, the USAF decided to institute an intern program for sharp young captains. They 

would spend two-year tours on the Air Staff in Washington and be 

exposed to the bigger picture. Hoover directed Slife to submit an application package for the program. General Bailey, the 16th SOW 

commander, had witnessed Slife’s performance in Haiti and wanted 

to nominate him. Slife submitted the package and was selected for the 

assignment. He reported to the Air Staff in August 1995. 

The assignment was beneficial in two ways. First, he got to see issues from the total USAF perspective and meet and work with a 

number of individuals of great potential. Second, in a most unexpected way, he received some first-class mentoring. When he arrived 

there, he contacted Colonel Wurster, whom he had met on a Brindisi 

tour. Wurster was back in the Pentagon, now working for the ASD/
INTO THE BALKANS │ 389

SOLIC. For several months, he had a series of meetings with the 

younger officer and gave Slife a trove of information to enhance his 

staff experience. It was mentoring of the finest kind. Slife would leave 

the intern tour in May 1997 having amassed a wealth of practical 

knowledge on the USAF, in general, and officership, in particular, 

which he would find useful in later assignments.35

In the spring of 1995, the 16th SOW held another Commando 

Look screening. One of the candidates was Capt Vince Becklund. He 

had been commissioned from the Air Force Academy in 1990 and 

was currently flying UH-1Ns with the 76th Rescue Flight at Vandenberg AFB, California. Those aircraft had recently been modified with 

FLIRs, and the pilots routinely used NVGs. Consequently, their UH-1Ns 

were referred to as “Pave Hueys.” Becklund had recently met Maj Bob 

Leonik, who had come to Vandenberg to observe the squadron’s 

NVG program. Becklund briefed him on how pilots used the NVGs 

for their range control duties along the coast. Leonik then regaled 

Becklund with Pave Low stories from Desert Storm and beyond. That 

sounded like interesting duty, and Becklund mentioned it to his operations officer, who had him sign up for the visit to Hurlburt. While 

there, he was able to get a Pave Low ride with Captain Lengyel and an 

interview with Colonel Hoover. Becklund told Hoover that he was 

interested in Pave Lows but was also considering the MH-60s. Hoover 

looked directly at him and asked, “Do you want to lead or follow? 

That’s the only question you have to answer.” Becklund returned to 

Vandenberg and requested assignment to Pave Lows and the 20th 

SOS. He reported to Kirtland AFB in June, where he shared his training flights with Maj Paul Harmon, who had just finished a year at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, attending the Army Command and General 

Staff College, and was about to start a tour with the 551st SOS.36

Becklund really enjoyed flying with Paul Harmon. He appreciated 

how easily Harmon dealt with his crews and openly depended upon 

his enlisted guys. Harmon used the training to make concrete suggestions and observations based upon his vast operational knowledge of 

the aircraft and mission. Again, Harmon was providing mentoring to 

the younger officer, a growing staple of the Pave Low community. 

However, it was mentoring on several levels. Becklund later explained 

that “you watch how the older guys do it. There are some that you go: 

‘That’s how I want to do it. When I get to be in leadership, that’s how 

I’m going to do it.’ Or, ‘when I get to be in leadership, that’s not how 

I’m going to do it.’ You learn good and bad from watching the guys.”37
390 │ INTO THE BALKANS

Captain Becklund also noticed something else at Kirtland. Not all 

of the pilots going to Pave Low had gone through Commando Look. 

Several of his fellow pilot students were former first-assignment 

IPs—or FAIPs, as they were labeled—who had flown T-37s or T-38s 

and were not too happy about being sent to helicopters. Some of them 

struggled with the aircraft and even the mission. Some also made it 

clear that if given the opportunity to return to fixed wing or possibly 

to get a civilian airline job, they would gladly go. Not everybody 

wanted to be a Pave Low pilot.38

Air Force Special Operations Command

As 1995 began, AFSOC was the proud parent of a steadily maturing Pave Low fleet and community. Its three operational squadrons 

operated 37 MH-53J aircraft and were all almost fully manned. The 

squadron numbers for officers and Airmen were 60 and 494 for the 

20th, 22 and 146 for the 21st, and 22 and 222 for the 31st, respectively. All aircraft had completed the SLEP program before the 

NADEP at Pensacola was closed. From this point on, long-term 

maintenance and modifications would be done at the Cherry Point 

MCAS, where the USMC logistics depot for its H-53s was located. 

The closure of the Pensacola NADEP also required another change. 

Since 1991 Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated (ARINC) had kept a 

maintenance office at Pensacola that employed several Pave Low retirees, including Tom Aldrich, “Pappy” Walters, and Rick Simmon, to 

conduct test flights on MH-53s, which received modifications at that 

facility. However, with the closure of the NADEP, ARINC arranged to 

move that facility to Hurlburt Field. There the maintenance technicians could provide maintenance flight support directly to the 16th 

SOW. They would perform functional, operational, and acceptance 

test flights and ferry flights to and from Cherry Point.39

At the same time, the 18th FLTS at Hurlburt was busy testing the 

IDAS/MATT modification, which appeared capable of significantly 

improving flight crew situational awareness in challenging environments. Acknowledging the key role that the Pave Low played in the 

AFSOC, the command historian, Mr. Herb Mason, commented in 

the 1995 command history that “the importance of the Pave Low cannot 

be overstated. As the primary long range vertical airlift system, in 

many critical SOF missions, it provided that last bit of critical airlift 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 391

so necessary to a successful mission.” In that continued role, it directly supported the AFSOC mission. Mason added that “AFSOC is 

America’s specialized air power. It is a step ahead in a changing world, 

delivering special operations combat power, anytime, anywhere.”40

In the not-too-distant future, AFSOC would be receiving a new aircraft to further enhance that capability. In January the CSAF, Gen Ron 

Fogleman, committed to the purchase of 50 CV-22s, beginning in 

2000, that were to achieve operational status by 2003. Crew training 

was slated to be assigned to the 58th SOW at Kirtland, and the first 

operational squadron would be located at Hurlburt, with follow-on 

squadrons at the 352d and 353d Groups. With their 230-knot cruising 

speed, 500-mile combat range, in-flight refueling capacity, and allweather, day/night precision navigational capabilities, these aircraft 

were not intended as wholesale replacements for any specific aircraft 

but as new machines with unique capabilities allowing the air commandos of AFSOC to address mission requirements in different ways. 

However, AFSOC planners anticipated that some MH-60s, MH-53s, 

and aging MC-130s would be inactivated as the new aircraft arrived. It 

was exciting news for the command and portended steady technological 

advance for the air commandos well into the 21st century.41

A Joint Special Operations Aviation Command?

The announced acquisition of the new CV-22 to supplant the Pave 

Lows and MH-60s was exciting news. However, the AFSOC was not 

the only service operating helicopters in the special operations arena. 

The 160th SOAR of the US Army SOC was also an outstanding unit 

and competed aggressively with AFSOC forces. In fact, the October 

1992 crash of the MH-60 suggested that this spirited competition 

may have contributed to a lack of common operational standards and 

procedures. Current USSOCOM strategic guidance already called for 

the establishment of a single proponent for special operations aviation 

(SOA). To address these issues in a concerted fashion, the USSOCOM 

commander, Gen Wayne Downing, directed the establishment of a 

joint special operations aviation study group to develop a plan to establish a single proponent for SOA at Hurlburt, most probably 

within AFSOC, to standardize all SOA aircrew procedures, safety, 

training, doctrine, and tactics. 
392 │ INTO THE BALKANS

Maj Gen James Hobson had recently taken command of the AFSOC 

from Maj Gen Bruce Fister. He directed his staff to tackle the problem 

aggressively and develop a proposal to reorganize the SOA of both services under a single subunified command called the Joint Special Operations Aviation Command (JSOAC). The AFSOC commander would 

also serve as the JSOAC commander, with an Army brigadier general 

as his vice-commander. 

As the single focal point for SOA issues, the JSOAC would address 

the standardization challenges. However, the AFSOC staff proposed a 

larger mission. It recommended that the JSOAC also be the single 

source for prioritizing SOF air requirements for USSOCOM surface 

forces; determining requirements for SOA acquisitions and modifications; centralizing SOA doctrine, policy, and planning; managing command, control, communications, and computer systems (C4); and integrating SOF assets into the deep battlefield. 

This was a bold proposal that met the commander’s intent but suggested much more, including upgrading the AFSOC commander to a 

lieutenant general position. It gained a great deal of support among the 

USSOCOM staff. General Downing received the briefing with General 

Hobson in attendance at a USSOCOM Board of Directors meeting. 

However, as the briefing commenced, senior Army general officers at or 

represented at the meeting made it abundantly clear that they vigorously objected to any such overall subunified command, and, as the 

meeting devolved into fractious acrimony, they voted to scrap the entire 

project. Instead, a joint air staff division would be set up within the USSOCOM/J3 (operations directorate), with both Army and USAF representatives. The two special operations aviation communities would remain separate and in direct competition with each other. Once more it 

seemed as if the poison of Initiative 17 had arisen to divide the two communities. While struggling with the JSOAC issue, SOCOM published 

operational guidance for dissimilar helicopter formation flight procedures and disseminated it to all of the rotary-wing squadrons.42

21st Special Operations Squadron

As these fractious debates took place, the 21st SOS was still at 

Brindisi, working with the JSOTF2 on CSAR alert for the ongoing 

NATO operations in the Balkans. When possible the crews began flying with other service helicopters to gain experience. Additionally, 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 393

Colonel Walls worked with his Airmen to sharpen their skills for possible use as extraction vehicles on noncombatant evacuation operations, a mission for which H-53s had been used since their creation. 

The crews also stepped up their CSAR training with other coalition 

forces and A-10s from Spangdahlam AB. 

Through the spring of 1995, the 352d SOG was finally able to move 

all of its scattered units to their permanent location at RAF Mildenhall, the home of the 100th Air Refueling Wing. The 21st sent most of 

its troops home in March to complete their move from Alconbury to 

Mildenhall, and personnel from the 16th SOW and 20th SOS, augmented with an MH-53J and crew from the 58th SOW, assumed the 

alert tasking at Brindisi.43

After its move was completed, the 21st SOS returned to Brindisi 

and resumed duties as part of JSOTF2. NATO aircraft continued to 

fly in the area, especially reconnaissance and combat air patrol missions in support of Deny Flight. However, conditions remained relatively calm as politicians for both sides tried to broker an agreement 

to resolve the underlying issues of the conflict. This hiatus ended, 

though, on 1 May, when ground forces from Croatia attacked Serbian 

forces still occupying an area near Zagreb. NATO ordered limited air 

strikes against specific Serbian units that had violated restrictions 

against the use of heavy weapons. On 2 June, an F-16, call sign Basher 

52, from the 555th FS based at Aviano AB, was shot down near the 

Bosnian city of Banja Luka. The pilot, Capt Scott O’Grady, ejected, 

and his flight lead—again, coincidentally, Captain Robert Wright— 

watched him float to the ground. O’Grady did not make initial contact with Wright or anybody else, and his status was unknown. 

JSOTF2 was immediately alerted for CSAR, and A-10s and other 

support aircraft were prepared at Aviano and other bases. However, 

without contact with the survivor, they would not be launched until 

the status or even existence of the survivor was verified. 

A US naval task force was afloat in the Adriatic Sea, led by the helicopter carrier USS Kearsarge, and included the 24th MEU, a battalionsized force with aviation assets, including helicopters. It also had a 

platoon-sized team trained to conduct tactical recovery of aircraft 

and personnel (TRAP) operations. The task force was under NATO 

control. The senior NATO commander in the area was US Navy 

admiral Leighton Smith. He kept his intelligence sources focused on 

locating or otherwise determining the status of O’Grady. On the evening of 7 June, reconnaissance assets detected signals that could have 
394 │ INTO THE BALKANS

been the survivor. Aviano-based F-16s were dispatched to the area, 

and in the early morning hours of 8 June, one of the pilots made voice 

contact with O’Grady. JSOTF2 assets were available for the mission 

but were not given the tasking. Instead Admiral Smith directed the 

MEU to execute a TRAP recovery of O’Grady. A force of several 

USMC CH-53s, AH-1s, and AV-8 Harriers launched and, within four 

hours of initial contact, landed in Bosnia, rescued Capt O’Grady, and 

returned to safety without loss.44

The overall situation in the region became even more chaotic as 

Serbian forces continued to attack UN forces and protected enclaves 

throughout the summer. When senior NATO leaders logged vigorous 

complaints with the UN secretary general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he 

authorized significant offensive air strikes. USAF lieutenant general 

Michael Ryan, still serving as the Sixteenth Air Force commander 

and the AIRSOUTH NATO commander, was directed to create a 

campaign plan for strikes against Serbian forces. He and his staff developed an operational plan called Deliberate Force, which identified 

almost 550 targets. Political leaders authorized about one-third of 

them for strike, including several Serbian air defense sites, with an 

initiation of operations on 30 August. Again, JSOTF2 would provide 

CSAR support, and it requested assistance from the 20th SOS. It was 

augmented with three aircraft and crews from the 20th SOS. Lt Col 

Mike Homan, the CSAR veteran of Desert Storm, had just taken over 

command of the 20th from Lt Col Don Hoover in late June, when 

Hoover departed to attend the Naval War College in Rhode Island. 

Homan scrambled to put together a package of aircraft and personnel 

and had them on the way to Brindisi within 96 hours. 

On the morning of 30 August, dozens of NATO aircraft began 

pounding the targets. The Serbian defenses put up a spirited array of 

SAMs and antiaircraft artillery, shooting down a French Mirage 2000K, 

call sign Ebro 33, 20 miles southeast of Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 

two crewmen ejected and were immediately captured by Serbian forces. 

NATO forces were unaware of that situation, and JSOTF2 was ordered 

to launch two Pave Lows and an MC-130 to hold off of the Croatian 

coast pending contact with the crew members. When no contact was 

established, they were ordered to return to Brindisi.45

NATO forces continued to search for the men. Over the next several days, they collected several pieces of intelligence suggesting that 

the two men were alive and evading in the area. Admiral Smith 

briefed this information to his NATO superiors, and they authorized 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 395

him to initiate rescue operations as he saw fit. The US Navy aircraft 

carrier USS Roosevelt was on-station and had SH-60s on board with 

a detachment of SEALs. He assigned them the mission. JSOTF2 at 

Brindisi was also monitoring the situation and developing contingency plans.

In the early morning hours of 6 September, as more NATO air 

strikes pounded the Serbs, two SH-60s and SEALs launched from the 

Roosevelt. Unfortunately, as they crossed the coastline, they encountered a solid line of thunderstorms and fog that covered the mountains and completely blocked their path. When the second aircraft in 

the flight was struck by ground fire, they turned around and returned 

to the ship.

Admiral Smith reviewed all available intelligence and decided to 

launch another effort. This time, the mission was assigned to the 

JSOTF2. There the mixed 20th and 21st crews were already working 

the mission. The two lead pilots—Capt Charles (Mark) Harmon from 

the 21st and Capt Brad Webb, who had recently transferred from the 

20th to the 21st SOS—both wanted to lead the mission. A coin toss 

gave it to Harmon. He and his wingman, Capt Paul Moncrief from 

the 20th SOS, and crews would fly as Knife 44 and Knife 47, respectively. That night they launched with a support package consisting of 

two MC-130 Talons, two MC-130 Shadows, an AC-130 gunship, and 

A-10s and F-18s from Aviano. Additionally, each Pave Low would 

have a French special forces soldier on board for linguistic purposes. 

Webb led a second flight of two MH-53s as a backup force, which 

held over the Adriatic.46

Harmon’s flight entered Bosnia in the dark of night and at low 

level, utilizing the Pave enhanced navigation capability and the crews’ 

NVGs. As Knife 44 and 47 entered the Pale Valley, the French soldiers 

on board began calling to the crew of Ebro 33 on all possible frequencies. The crews were able to search for 45 minutes before thick mountain fog formed and prevented any further visual search. At several 

points, the crews observed ground fire from 37 mm AAA and machine guns. Sergeant Dinsmore was aboard the second aircraft and 

called out the ground fire. The two crews turned for home. Knife 47 

was hit by one round of small arms fire.

The two crews flew again the next night with a similar support 

package. This time, though, the weather was perfectly clear. The 

JSOTF2 intelligence section had determined several probable hiding 

sites for the two Frenchmen, and the two Pave Low crews and an ac-
396 │ INTO THE BALKANS

companying AC-130 searched each site in detail. Perhaps anticipating another recovery effort, the Serbian forces in the area brought in 

an estimated eight antiaircraft guns and put up a stiff fight. The AC130 and accompanying A-10s and F-18s struck several targets, and 

even the gunners in the two Pave Lows fired repeatedly, as the French 

soldiers on board called in vain for their countrymen. Again Dinsmore 

was aboard the number two aircraft as the left gunner. At one point, 

he observed ground fire from a farmhouse and fired 200 rounds from 

his minigun at it. As the aircraft maneuvered, the enemy continued to 

fire at the Pave Low, and the right gunner, TSgt Billy Breedlove, fired 

800 rounds at the same farmhouse. One AK-47 round hit Dinsmore’s 

aircraft but was stopped by a protective Kevlar blanket. In the ensuing 

melee aboard the lead Pave Low, gunner SSgt Randy Rutledge and 

flight engineer SSgt Dennis Turner were seriously wounded. Convinced now that the risk to the crews far outweighed the possibility of 

finding the French crewmen, the two Pave Lows departed for Brindisi 

as the supporting aircraft continued to bomb enemy guns.47

Admiral Smith forbade any further attempts pending the availability 

of further intelligence that the two Frenchmen were still evading. 

Three weeks later, updated intelligence indicated conclusively that 

the men were being held by Serbian forces, and the mission was terminated. Subsequently, Rutledge and Turner were awarded Purple 

Hearts for the wounds that they received, and Captains Harmon and 

Moncrief were dually awarded the 1995 USAF Cheney Award for 

their outstanding leadership of the mission.48

Taken aback by the ferocity and intensity of the air campaign, Serbian leaders initially tried to resist the onslaught, which was coordinated with ground attacks by friendly forces in the area. By 14 September, though, they had suffered terrible losses and began to remove 

their forces as directed. Operation Deliberate Force was terminated. 

During the 17 days of bombing, 3,535 attack and support sorties had 

been flown. They had dropped 1,026 bombs, 70 percent of which 

were precision weapons, and had struck 338 individual targets.49

However, small incidents requiring a NATO response continued to 

occur until 12 October, when both sides were able to agree on a ceasefire. At the urging of the United States, both sides were invited to 

Wright-Patterson AFB to discuss and craft a Bosnia peace accord. After 

several days of often fractious discussions, the presidents of Bosnia, 

Croatia, and Serbia scripted and initialed what came to be known as 

the Dayton Peace Accord, formally signed in Paris on 14 December. 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 397

The accord stipulated that the UN would cease operations in the 

region and turn all control over to NATO. This was accomplished on 

20 December. A multinational organization was formed for Bosnia, 

with sectors under the overall control of British, French, and US 

forces. Its mission was to implement the peace accord, and the force 

was subsequently titled the Implementation Force, or IFOR. The 

overall operation was labeled Joint Endeavor and detailed the American sector as the northeast section of Bosnia, centered on the city of 

Tuzla, which included a large military base and airfield. Joint Endeavor was scheduled to last for one year and involve 60,000-plus 

soldiers, sailors, and marines from several nations.50

With the cessation of Deliberate Force, the operations tempo at 

Brindisi slowed down noticeably. Now more sorties were available for 

training. Three Pave Lows and crews from the 20th were dispatched 

to Egypt to participate in a Bright Star training exercise with other 

teams from the 16th SOW. One of the helicopters developed a leak en 

route and diverted into Souda Bay, Crete, for repairs. When it was 

fixed, the aircrew flew on to its assigned base in Egypt. As it entered 

Egyptian airspace, it unknowingly flew near Egyptian president 

Hosni Mubarak’s private palace and generated a serious international 

incident that took several days to resolve. Belatedly, the crew also discovered that Egyptian forces guarding the palace had fired at its aircraft. Once all of that was resolved, the exercise was relatively uneventful. One of the crews even got to land in the Qattara Depression 

in southern Egypt, 500 feet below sea level.51

The 21st SOS continued to receive requests to fly various highranking officers and leaders into various sites in Bosnia. Like General 

Ryan earlier, they seemed to prefer the Pave Lows for two reasons. 

First, the pilots could use the aircraft’s enhanced navigations systems 

to get into just about any location in any weather. Second, the commanders, especially, just seemed to enjoy arriving and departing in 

big, ugly, “bad-assed” looking helicopters, as the young Pave Low 

crews could not help but notice. In fact, Pave Lows were used to flying 

Admiral Smith, the IFOR commander, and Brig Gen Michael Canavan, 

commander of the Special Operations Command Implementation 

Force (SOCIFOR), into Sarajevo using the TF/TA radar repeatedly. 

The crews accomplished flawless landings in zero visibility, delivering these key officers to attend the transfer of authority from the UN 

to NATO.52
398 │ INTO THE BALKANS

The level of activity continued to decrease, and in December, the 

JSOTF2 was inactivated. In its place, the SOCIFOR was activated 

with control over the assets of the 20th and 21st SOS. There was still 

much to do to implement the peace accords in the Balkans.53

31st Special Operations Squadron

Throughout 1995 operations were fairly stable for the 31st SOS at 

Osan, with its parent 353d SOG still at Kadena AB. The 353d staff 

members were able to review the Commando Vision plan in detail. 

Assuming that the conceptual West Coast wing would have a Pave 

Low unit, they realized that it would probably be the 31st SOS. However, they pointed out that to meet their support requirements to 

SOCPAC for a force of 4 MH-53s permanently assigned in-theater, 

AFSOC would have to establish a program providing for a steady rotational assignment of varying lengths for aircrews and support personnel. Additionally, war plan contingencies would have to be revised 

to provide many more aircraft and crews as any developing scenario 

would dictate. 

Like the other units in the group, the 31st was constantly on the go. 

It dispatched aircraft, crews, and support teams to operational exercises like Balance Mint and and Balance Piston and to joint combined 

exchange training in Thailand, Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia, 

and Korea. A team of two MH-53s and support personnel deployed 

to northeast Thailand to participate in Cobra Gold ’95 in May. While 

there, they operated from several of the same airfields that the crews 

of the 40th ARRSq and 21st SOS had used 25 years earlier. These deployments allowed the crews to work with other USAF, USN, USMC, 

and USA elements, allied forces, and special operations forces while 

performing the full panoply of missions of which the crews and aircraft were capable.54

In May TSgt John DeSalle transferred in from the 21st SOS for 

another tour with the 31st. His wife was also with him, and they both 

served concurrent overseas one-year tours. Although DeSalle and his 

wife, Janet, had signed the paperwork for two-year tours, the personnel 

specialist at Osan would not allow them to do a concurrent two-year 

tour. Subsequently, he deployed with the unit to the standard set of 

TDYs in Thailand, Singapore, and Okinawa. She was an electronic 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 399

warfare specialist and supported the F-16s and A-10s also stationed 

there at Osan.55

Also serving in the 31st at that time was Capt Jonathan Owens. 

He had been commissioned into the Air Force from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in 1986, where he was a member of the Corps of Cadets. After helicopter pilot training, he served 

a short tour flying UH-1s at Malmstrom AFB, Montana, before accepting an assignment with the Army like Scott Howell. Owens flew 

as an OH-58 scout pilot with the 7th ID at Fort Ord, California, and 

served a short deployment to Panama for Operation Just Cause. He 

attended MH-53 school in 1991–92 and then flew with the 20th 

SOS and participated in the Haiti mission before transferring to the 

31st in 1995. 

On 6 June 1995, Owens was the aircraft commander aboard MH53J #68-10932, a veteran of the Koh Tang mission in Cambodia, on 

a tactical sortie to the Koon-Ni Range. Prior to arriving at the range, 

Owens and his crew—consisting of Capt Carlos Halcomb, flight engineers SSgt Jeff Franco and SrA Erik Fricsons, and gunners SSgt J. P. 

Herman and SSgt Rick Shore—had performed several practice tactical insertions. While holding for the assigned range time, the crew 

heard a loud bang and felt a severe engine vibration. Halcomb was 

flying, and Owens directed him to land at a nearby helipad. Suddenly, the aircraft experienced a complete failure of the right engine 

that resulted in a hard landing. The engine failure was caused by the 

malfunction of a shaft coupling that disintegrated and threw pieces 

of metal through fuel and oil lines, starting a fire in the engine compartment. Luckily the crew was able to escape without any injuries. 

However, an Air Force Academy cadet along for an orientation ride 

was slightly hurt. The $27 million aircraft was completely destroyed.56

Four weeks later, the unit received a replacement Pave Low for 

the aircraft lost in June, and within days, the squadron commander, 

Lt Col Lyle Koenig, and his Airmen were back on the road supporting exercises. In August the west coast of Korea was swept by tropical storm Janis. All aircraft at Osan AB, including the Pave Lows, 

were forced to evacuate as the torrential rain flooded the base. Returning home a few days later, the Airmen resumed their series of 

exercise deployments to allied nations in the theater.57
400 │ INTO THE BALKANS

58th Special Operations Wing/

551st Special Operations Squadron

Continuing with the force reductions initiated after the end of the 

Cold War, Congress dictated another round of base closures in 1995 

as part of the base realignment and closure (BRAC) process. One of 

the suggested closures was Kirtland. The 58th SOW was directed to 

analyze what it would cost to move the wing to Holloman AFB, New 

Mexico; Beale AFB, California; or Hill AFB, Utah. For two months, 

wing staff personnel, alongside Air Staff officers and local community 

leaders, worked the issue. Economic analysis showed that the closure 

would cost the Albuquerque area almost 12,000 jobs directly or indirectly. Additionally, the cost of moving the wing to Holloman, Beale, 

and Hill was $231, $150, and $114 million, respectively. Reviewing 

the results, Air Force Secretary Sheila Widnall and Defense Secretary 

William Perry reported to the BRAC Commission that the closure of 

Kirtland and relocation of the 58th SOW would not be cost effective. 

The commission agreed and removed it from the closure list.58

Within the wing, MH-53 training continued unabated at the 551st 

SOS. All TH-53s had received their air-refueling modifications and 

were now being used for that training event, saving flight hours on 

the MH-53Js. The TH-53s were also programmed to receive GPS 

navigational systems, as was the weapons systems trainer, so that 

both were more compatible with the operational fleet Paves. Pilot 

manning was an issue for the 551st SOS, as only 60 percent of its slots 

were filled. To partly address this shortfall, the 551st commander, 

Colonel Damron, requested that three contract pilots be hired to do 

all maintenance FCFs. To keep his crews operationally oriented, he 

also allowed them to participate in the ongoing Chili Flag exercises 

held periodically at Kirtland with US Navy SEALs and other special 

operations forces. His crews also answered calls for local SAR missions as they occurred. On 26 July, he passed command of the 551st 

SOS to Col Robert Maldonado. Training operations continued apace, 

and in 1995, the squadron qualified or requalified 30 pilots, 19 flight 

engineers, and 20 gunners.

The wing staff analyzed training that summer and found that all 

academic and simulator training needed to be centralized under one 

unit as it had been with the earlier 542d TCHTS, which had been 

inactivated as part of the reorganization into the 58th SOW. The wing 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 401

requested a waiver to the objective wing structure from the Air Staff 

to activate another squadron for this purpose. In August the waiver 

was issued, and the 58th Training Support Squadron (TRSS) was activated with Lt Col Edward Reed as its first commander. It was authorized 24 officers, 30 enlisted personnel, and 24 DOD civilians and 

would directly manage 229 contractors. Its assigned mission was to 

plan, develop, and evaluate aircrew academics and simulator and 

flight training in the UH-1, H-53, HH-60, HC-130, and MC-130 aircraft. Additionally, it would manage and operate the sophisticated 

and constantly upgraded WSTs and all of the ground training systems, including a new Aerial Gunner Scanner Simulator (AGSS), 

many of which existed because of the funding brilliance of Ed Reed. 

The 58th TRSS would provide the critical support for ground and 

simulator training essential to optimize the actual flying training so 

that the graduates of the various programs could then report to their 

operational units as highly trained as possible.59

Air Force Special Operations Command

As 1996 began, the AFSOC commander, General Hobson, laid out 

his worldview for his Airmen. Reviewing the “new world order” extant since the demise of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, he saw a 

rise in regional powers with access to terrible weapons, a surfeit of 

humanitarian tragedy, and economic and ethnic strains, all of which 

could lead to conflict. Concerned for the impact these forces were 

having on the Airmen of his command, he wrote, “The Cold War is 

over, downsizing is almost complete, turbulence created by external 

and internal changes is stabilizing—all good news. However, this 

progress has not occurred without cost: a rise in hot spots around the 

globe, increased operations requirements, and increasingly scarce resources. The outlook for the future demands on our personnel and 

equipment remains high.”60

Doing more with less, while a USAF mantra, was a challenge for 

AFSOC. As the force of choice in many of the evolving world hot 

spots, AFSOC personnel were busy. The overall USAF goal for TDY 

days per calendar year was 120 per Airman. For the various AFSOC 

aircrews, though, the average was 120–48 days a year. All of the Pave 

units were busy: the 21st SOS was still directly involved in operations 

in the Balkans, and its crews were averaging 150 days a year there; 
402 │ INTO THE BALKANS

both the 20th SOS and 31st SOS were supporting the 21st while also 

answering an endless demand for joint and bilateral training all over 

the world. Stated Colonel Weikel, the AFSOC deputy director for 

plans, programs, and acquisition management, “We are stretched so 

thin it’s just amazing. . . . It really impacts us because we are on the 

front lines.”61

21st and 20th Special Operations Squadrons

As “the” Pave Low unit assigned to Europe, the 21st SOS still had 

its detachment at Brindisi, Italy, supporting Operation Joint Endeavor. It now worked for the JSOAC of the SOCIFOR, which was 

relocated to Stuttgart, Germany, and put under the direct control of 

NATO. Its crews, almost always augmented with additional aircraft, 

crews, and support equipment and personnel from the 20th SOS—to 

the point that the two units could almost be considered a consolidated operation—continuously received taskings to move key allied 

leaders into and out of various locations in Bosnia. They also flew 

several classified missions with various special operations forces and 

continued to train for the multitude of missions that they could be 

assigned. Some missions required the aircrews to fly above 10,000 

feet. Since the Pave Lows did not have onboard oxygen systems, AFSOC 

had to develop specific waiver provisions and procedures for the use 

of portable systems to safely accomplish missions. Several of their 

helicopters had problems with their cabin heaters catching fire. For 

obvious safety reasons, their use was restricted until a NADEP team 

could evaluate the problem and determine corrective actions. Given 

the cold winters in Europe, this was a serious crew problem until 

fixed by late spring.62

Any sense of schedule normalcy changed on 3 April 1996, when the 

JSOAC received a report from the NATO combined air operations center 

(CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy, that a NATO aircraft had crashed at approximately 3 p.m. while trying to land in bad weather at the airport in Dubrovnik, Croatia. The CAOC told the JSOAC to prepare two MH-53s 

and an MC-130 for imminent SAR operations. At 5:20 p.m., the CAOC 

directed them to launch. Ten minutes later, the two Pave Lows—call 

signs Facet 23, commanded by Capt Steve Kelly, 21st SOS, and Facet 24, 

commanded by Capt John Conley, 20th SOS—launched and proceeded 

to Dubrovnik. Both were carrying special tactics squadron (STS) teams. 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 403

Arriving in the area 

one hour later, the 

crews found other aircraft searching along 

the coast. It was not 

clear what type of aircraft had gone down. 

With the crash area 

still shrouded in low 

clouds and daylight 

rapidly fading, searching was difficult, especially with the other 

aircraft now in the area. Regardless, the Pave Low crews persevered, 

discontinuing their search to land at Dubrovnik to refuel and then returning to the site. While at the airport, the Pave Low crews learned 

that the downed aircraft was a USAF CT-43 carrying the US secretary 

of commerce, Mr. Ronald Brown, and possibly as many as 30 personnel 

on his team. This was a mission of tremendous political importance.

After refueling, Facet 23 and 24 remained at Dubrovnik Airport 

for updates. They were informed at about 9:30 p.m. that Croatian police had found the crash site on the side of a steep hill, secured it, and 

discovered one female survivor. Captain Kelly wanted to launch at 

once to recover the woman. After some discussion with the CAOC 

about who controlled the crash site, Kelly was cleared to take off singly. 

A special tactics team and several Croatian policemen were also proceeding to the site to recover the wounded survivor. Kelly launched at 

10:30 p.m. and found low clouds still hanging over the crash area. He 

made three attempts to get through the weather to the crash site but 

was unable because of the poor visibility, rain, and ruggedness of the 

terrain. Kelly remembered, “We were all sweating bullets and it was 

the hardest flying I have ever done in my life.” However, they could 

not get in safely to drop off their troops and returned to the airport.63

The Croatian police were notified that the Pave Low could not get 

in because of the weather. Unfortunately, in the intervening period, 

the woman died, and the Croatians brought her body down the 

mountain. The SOCIFOR commander, General Canavan, then took 

control of the recovery operation and began marshalling a significant 

SOF force of many components to carry out the mission. As Kelly 

and his crew were making their attempt, Canavan and a small comCourtesy Lt Col Jim Breck, USAF

CT-43 crash site near Dubrovnik, Croatia
404 │ INTO THE BALKANS

mand and control element flew to Dubrovnik Airport aboard two 

more Pave Lows, Facet 25 and 26, and set up a small command post 

in a warehouse. Major Webb, serving as the safety officer for the 352d 

SOG, was with him to act as mission commander for the Pave Lows 

supporting the operation.64

Departing Dubrovnik Airport after dropping off Canavan and his 

team, Facet 25, commanded by Capt Mark Harmon, flew over the 

crash site and, through a small, brief hole in the clouds, spotted it and 

determined its coordinates. Harmon called those coordinates back to 

the two crews at the airport. Captain Conley in Facet 24 then launched 

and headed to the site, just eight miles away. He found a small hole in 

the weather through which they could work and called for Kelly to 

also launch. By the time Kelly and his crew arrived, though, fog and 

low clouds had moved back in, obscuring the site. Nevertheless, they 

made several attempts to land, also having to take evasive action to 

avoid unmarked telephone poles. Kelly found a clear area about a 

mile away, landing there instead to unload his special tactics team. 

Facet 24 did the same, and both teams were then able to link up with 

Croatian police and reach the crash site. There they immediately began to mark the locations of all human remains with chemical lights. 

Back at the Dubrovnik Airport, General Canavan had a rapidly 

growing joint and combined special forces team. He personally led 

them to the crash site, arriving at the base of the hill on which the 

crash site was located at about 3:30 a.m. After he received permission 

from the Croatian police to enter the area, accompanying British 

forces informed him that the area was possibly mined. Canavan decided to wait until sunrise to start up the hill. When they finally made 

the climb, they found the special tactics team still searching for the 

bodies. Throughout the day, the four Pave Low helicopters, now staging out of Dubrovnik Airport, flew to the crash site and retrieved 20 

bodies using their hoists. One aircraft, Facet 20, flown by Capt Brett 

Hauenstein and crew from the 20th SOS, flew to Split to pick up the 

Croatian minister of state. They returned him to Dubrovnik so that 

he could meet with the senior US leaders there. 

Once hoisted out of the crash site, the bodies were taken back to 

the airport, where a small morgue had been set up. The next day, the 

weather was appreciably worse, and plans were made to move the 

remaining 15 bodies down the hill by hand. However, two of the Pave 

Lows were able to get into the site and hoist out all 15 human remains. 

By the next day, all bodies had been properly prepared and were now 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 405

on their way back to the United States. Mission complete. General 

Canavan then ordered all SOCIFOR forces back to their respective 

homes or deployed bases.65

Operation Assured Response

The Pave Low crews had been back at Brindisi only for a day when 

they received a warning order for another operation, this time an 

NEO, to the South African country of Liberia. That nation was experiencing serious civil unrest caused by the disintegration of its government. The US ambassador to Liberia, the Honorable William Milam, 

reported that the area around the US Embassy in Monrovia had become a focal point for intense fighting and that the Americans in the 

embassy were essentially hostages, surrounded by as many as 10,000 

enraged Liberians. The embassy had only five armed US Marines to 

guard it, and many in the State Department saw this situation as reminiscent of the 1979 takeover of the American Embassy in Teheran. 

Milam requested that a military assessment team be sent to determine the danger to American personnel there and estimated that as 

many as 15,000 individuals—including Americans, some foreigners, 

and some local citizens—would need evacuation. Additionally, MC130s and MH-53s from the 352d SOG, as well as aircraft from the 

16th SOW, were put on alert for a possible evacuation. It would be 

conducted by a JTF as Operation Assured Response and commanded 

by General Canavan, with Col Steve Connelly from the 352d SOG as 

the JSOAC commander.66

At Brindisi three 21st SOS helicopters were broken down and 

loaded aboard C-5s, which were then airborne within 15 hours of 

initial notification. The C-5s also carried special equipment such as 

small cranes to facilitate the reassembly of the helicopters. Other 

C-5s departed Mildenhall carrying other required support equipment, supplies, and support troops. 

Initial plans were to base the helicopters at Freetown, Sierra Leone, 

190 nautical miles from Monrovia, and the fixed-wing aircraft at Dakar, 

Senegal, another 490 miles away. Fortuitously, the C-5s converged on 

Freetown almost simultaneously on the afternoon of 8 April. Maintenance and support troops began unloading the aircraft and equipment and preparing them to fly. Maj Brad Webb was designated to be 

the overall flight leader for the Pave Low team. With him were Capt 
406 │ INTO THE BALKANS

Steve Kelly and Capt John Conley and their crews from the Brown recovery. They joined a rapidly building task force of US Navy SEALs 

and US Army paratroops and special forces personnel.67

The next morning, one of the arriving Pave Lows received an FCF and 

was ready for operations. Webb loaded up SEALs, Army special forces, 

and some USAF special tactics Airmen and departed for the embassy in 

Monrovia. He flew over water until 10 miles out and then turned directly 

to the compound. The US Marines at the embassy popped green smoke 

signaling that it was safe to land. He did so on the very tight landing zone 

and then instructed the SEALs to remove certain poles, flowerpots, and 

trees for added safety. As soon as his inbound passengers had cleared the 

aircraft, Webb had them load him with 26 evacuees. He then lifted out of 

the embassy and retraced his route from Freetown. Landing there, he 

disgorged his evacuees into a waiting MC-130 that flew them to Dakar. 

Webb refueled his aircraft, loaded up with General Canavan and his staff, 

and flew back to the embassy, where he swapped them for another load 

of 25 evacuees and repeated the process. When he and his crew were out 

of crew-duty-day limits, another crew took the aircraft, which ended up 

operating for 21 straight hours before its engines were shut off.68

A 21st SOS MH-53J lands at the American Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia, for 

Operation Assured Response.

Courtesy AFSOC History Office
INTO THE BALKANS │ 407

On 10 April, two more Pave Lows, crews, and support personnel 

arrived from the 20th; they and the second 21st aircraft were quickly 

made ready for operations. The third 21st Pave had a mechanical 

problem and never flew. Instead, it provided parts for the other aircraft. The crews launched and made steady runs to the embassy 

throughout the day and night. They also carried supplies, food, and 

water to the security troops in the embassy. The next day, 11 April, 

one of the Pave Low crews, commanded by Lt Col Steve Dreyer, observed two rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) fired at their aircraft. 

Canavan then suspended helicopter operations until the fighting subsided. Believing that the shots were just a fluke as opposed to an enemy 

attempt to stop the NEO, Dreyer suggested to Canavan that the Paves 

be allowed to fly a four-ship formation around the city to test for any 

further response. Canavan consented and the flight was uneventful, 

leading to a resumption of evacuation flights; however, a larger portion 

of flights were now flown at night using NVGs. 

The next day, four MH-47Ds from the 160th SOAR arrived from 

Fort Campbell. They were assigned to the JSOAC, were quickly made 

ready, and entered the helicopter flow. That same day, MC-130s from 

the 352d SOG and 16th SOW set up a refueling track off the Liberian 

coast. This obviated the need to refuel back at Freetown, and the 

flights increased at a rapid rate. Concerned about the crew fatigue 

that was starting to appear in small ways, Colonel Connelly set up a 

more formal flying schedule for both the USAF and Army helicopter 

crews, which was less stressful for them. This also helped the Soldiers 

in the embassy plan for a smoother flow of evacuees—something almost akin to a bus schedule. Most evacuees did depart from the embassy; however, on two occasions, both Pave Lows and MH-47s flew 

to other compounds in Monrovia to pick up evacuees. By 17 April, 

virtually no more personnel in Monrovia desired evacuation, and the 

AFSOC assets were released to return to their home or deployed 

bases. As they were preparing to leave, Major Webb said of the 

evacuees, “They lost everything. When we talked to them, we could 

sense the mixture of elation at escaping and sadness of leaving their 

lives behind. It was gratifying, though, to know we helped get people 

out of a dangerous situation.”69

An MEU arrived the next day to replace the JTF, but little more 

needed to be done. By the end of the deployment, 2,126 people from 

76 countries had been evacuated by the SOF forces without any significant difficulties or accidents and without having fired a shot. It was 
408 │ INTO THE BALKANS

a great demonstration of how effective SOF forces could be when they 

had been able to train together and develop strong intratheater habitual relationships. The Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen of SOCEUR, as 

an integrated military force within EUCOM, had successfully executed 

this vital mission. Delighted with the results, USSOCOM commander 

Gen Hugh Shelton described the operation as a remarkable “synergy—

the right organization, the best equipment and, most important, the 

finest men and women ever fielded in special operations.”70

Over the next three days, the Pave Lows departed; this time, they 

were carried aboard new C-17s—a first for that aircraft. The 20th SOS 

aircraft returned to Hurlburt. The 21st SOS sent two to Mildenhall 

and one back to Brindisi for continued duty there. However, all 

needed some increased maintenance. Each of the four operational 

Pave Lows flew several missions with weights up to 54,000 pounds. 

Upon their return to home station, each aircraft was grounded for 

one week so that engineers could determine whether the aircraft had 

been damaged by the overuse. Fortunately, such was not the case.71

In the 21st SOS, several individuals were specifically cited for their 

outstanding efforts. Major Webb was noted for his sterling performance in the back-to-back CT-43 recovery and then Assured Response mission where he and his crew flew 13 sorties and evacuated 

an estimated 350 people. As a result, he was nominated for and received the Cheney Award for 1996 in recognition of his “act of valor 

or self-sacrifice in a humanitarian interest performed in connection 

with an aircraft.” Likewise, Capt Steve Kelly was awarded the Aviator 

Valor Award for his work in both operations. Additionally, Maj Mark 

Harmon and his crew were awarded the Tunner Award as the “best 

airlift crew of the year” for their efforts in Assured Response.72

20th Special Operations Squadron

While the troops were busily engaged at Brindisi, the 16th SOW at 

Hurlburt faced a more fundamental challenge. From 20 April through 

20 May, it received an ORI that was conducted as part of the large 

CJTF Exercise ’96. The wing was directed to mobilize and deploy to 

Cecil Field, near Jacksonville, Florida. While there, it was given a series 

of tasks and exercises to fully test its ability to accomplish its assigned 

real-world missions, including working with British and Australian 

forces as well as with US special forces at Camp Blanding, Florida. 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 409

Overall, the wing received an “excellent” rating. The 20th SOS flew 23 

evaluated missions, which required the crews to perform all assigned 

skill sets on their mission essential task list. The crews were especially 

lauded for their excellent coordination with their customers to enhance mission accomplishment. Flight planning and threat analysis 

were very well done. Out of 49 graded events, the average time-ontarget deviation was 10 seconds. The inspectors rated the performance 

of the 20th SOS as excellent and noted that “20th SOS crews demonstrated their ability to react to changing situations, remaining flexible 

during the most demanding circumstances. Rapid and appropriate responses were observed on missions affected by inclement weather, 

broken aircraft, and other changing circumstances. . . . Mission accomplishment under adverse conditions reflected an attitude of perseverance and professionalism prevalent throughout the 20th SOS.” Perhaps most pleased at the 20th’s performance was the commander, 

Colonel Homan. In his after action report, he specifically cited the 

squadron mobility section, the planning section, his aircrews, and the 

maintenance section. He said, “Incredible performance during the 

ORI. All sorties launched on time. . . . Hard work equaled flawless results.” A few months later, he passed command of the unit to Lt Col 

Thomas Hull, retired from the USAF, and went to work with Bell Helicopter Aircraft Corporation in Fort Worth, Texas.73

Settling into the job, Hull decided that he wanted to reorganize the 

squadron with a formal flight system with majors in charge of essentially deployable packages of crews, and he put his staff to work to 

make it happen. He also addressed one relatively mundane “personnel” 

item. He hired retired major John Grove, Pave Low pilot #19, into the 

squadron as a jack-of-all-trades. His general duties were to serve as an 

unofficial unit historian and provide general administrative support as 

needed. As he established himself in the squadron, though, Grove began to spread out into other efforts. He started a project to establish a 

scholarship fund for children of deceased Pave Low personnel. He 

took over the administration of the squadron store, in charge of procuring shirts and other memorabilia for sale in the squadron or at 

squadron parties. His efforts would increase in magnitude over the 

years as he became a staple of squadron life. Grove was fond of saying, 

“Once a Green Hornet, always a Green Hornet.”74

In another personnel move, Hull decided to make MSgt John 

Sprouse his squadron superintendent. Sprouse was happy to take the 

job. He had returned from England in 1991, served in both the 20th 
410 │ INTO THE BALKANS

SOS and 16th SOG stan/eval sections, and made some deployments 

to Brindisi. He would serve in the squadron superintendent billet for 

about a year until it was upgraded to a chief master sergeant position. 

Then he would move over and serve as the gunner superintendent. 

Both jobs afforded him the chance to work directly with his Airmen, 

fly as a crew member and instructor, and go on TDYs with the crews.75

With the conclusion of Assured Response, the 20th and 21st SOS 

troops returned to Brindisi and resumed their mission in support of 

the SOCIFOR and their multiple taskings there. On 17 July, Lt Col 

Douglas Salmon replaced Lt Col Jeffrey Walls as the commander of 

the 21st SOS. 

The day after Salmon took over, the 21st dispatched two aircraft, 

crews, and a maintenance team to Szolnok AB, Hungary, for Partnership for Peace exercise Cooperative Chance. For the next nine days, 

the Airmen participated in a highly scripted series of humanitarianrelief-type missions, emphasizing the use of “soft” military power like 

medical and engineering teams for nation-to-nation cooperative 

ventures. This did not include any night flying. The next month, the 

crews at Brindisi, when not on CSAR alert, were able to participate in 

joint and combined training exercises with other US special forces 

and both French and Italian SOF and rescue units on classic special 

ops missions, including shipboard operations and CSAR procedures. 

The Pave Low pilots were able to log some dissimilar formation flight 

time with Italian HH-3s and French Pumas. In some cases, the CSAR 

training involved the use of Italian fighter pilots as survivors.76

In September, the 21st SOS was directed to support a visit by a US 

presidential delegation to Bosnia, and two Pave Lows and crews were 

scheduled for the mission. They rehearsed and then flew a series of 

flights to transport several high-level dignitaries to several locations 

within Bosnia and, in particular, the US zone.

The Airmen of the 21st SOS received another excellent chance to 

participate in coalition training when the operations squadrons of 

the 352d were invited to participate in Exercise Popex at San Javier 

AB, Spain, in November. Two Pave Lows and crews deployed along 

with several MC-130s and spent two weeks performing the classic 

Pave Low missions with Spanish SOF units. The exercise was shortened somewhat when the 352d SOG received a warning order for a 

possible deployment of assets to central Africa to provide humanitarian 

relief for refugees fleeing tribal strife in Zaire and Rwanda. This was 

labeled Operation Guardian Assistance. Some MC-130s and AC-
INTO THE BALKANS │ 411

130s from Hurlburt were sent. However, the Pave Lows were not deployed and in December were released from the potential tasking.77

On 20 December 1996, the mandate for the IFOR and Operation 

Joint Endeavor terminated. However, it was abundantly clear to all 

that although the NATO forces had separated the warring factions, 

allowed for the peaceful transfer of certain territories, and forced the 

movement of heavy weapons into storage areas, they could not leave. 

The endemic racial and ethnic hatreds were just too strong and ingrained. Consequently, the NATO leaders agreed to establish a longerterm stabilization force under Operation Joint Guard, which would 

run for at least 18 months but could be lengthened as necessary. This 

force would be only one-half the size of the IFOR force. Its missions 

were to deter hostilities, contribute to a secure environment, and promote the reestablishment of civil authority in Bosnia. 

With the change, SOCEUR disbanded SOCIFOR. All SOF forces 

were consolidated under a combined joint special operations task 

force (CJSOTF) located in Bosnia. SOCEUR still had responsibility 

for CSAR and reestablished the JSOTF2 at Brindisi, with a further 

requirement for MC-130s and MH-53s on location, either from the 

21st or 20th. SOCEUR also directed the 352d to man the staff. Reviewing the continued tasking, the 16th SOW commander, Brig Gen 

Norton Schwartz, requested that the AFSOC commander hold discussions with SOCEUR about moving the CJSOTF2 to consolidate 

with the CJSOTF staff in Bosnia and to allow the CSAR tasking to be 

absorbed by the joint and allied 150-plus helicopter force in that 

country. Additionally, this would eliminate some TDY billet requirements and allow the AFSOF helicopters to become more frequently 

involved in classic SOF missions. Schwartz did not receive any immediate response to his request.78

58th Special Operations Wing/

551st Special Operations Squadron

The training units of the 58th SOW continued a steady if predictable operational pattern as they entered 1996. The Chili Flag exercises 

were now a regular occurrence and allowed the 551st SOS instructors 

and some students to gain initial or continued experience interplaying with all of the customer units with whom the operational Pave 

Low units worked. Crews continued to answer SAR calls coming in 
412 │ INTO THE BALKANS

from statewide communities. The TH-53s were especially useful for 

this since they were lighter and more nimble at the mountain altitudes. The 551st was now conducting 11 different courses for the 

various Pave Low crew positions. The initial qualification courses for 

the pilots and flight engineers had been consolidated and were now 

30 weeks long; all other courses were shorter. Based upon requests 

from AFSOC, in March the unit received guidance through AETC 

to begin training crews on heavyweight handling and dissimilar aircraft formation procedures. Flight engineers and gunners also received additional training on some new infrared aiming devices for 

the aircraft defensive guns. These items were incorporated into the 

various training syllabi. The yearly refresher training for all crew 

members was also reorganized into focused one-week courses. Pilots received 18 hours of academics and 17 hours of simulator training; flight engineers received the same 19 hours of academics and 8.5 

hours in the simulator; and gunners received their refresher training 

on the AGSS.79

All of the simulators and training devices were operated and maintained by the 58th TRSS. The 22 different units for all of the aircraft 

taught at Kirtland ranged from the full-motion, highly sophisticated 

WSTs (simulators) to other less complex instructional systems such 

as the AGSS. The MH-53 crews specifically used the H-53 helicopter 

procedures trainer, TH-53A Operational Flight Trainer, MH-53J Part 

Task Trainer, and MH-53 Weapon System Trainer and Mission Rehearsal System. The development of the SOF Intersimulator Network 

(SOFNET) also provided a capability to link the data of different aircraft flight simulators together. This facilitated the interrelated use of 

different simulators for dissimilar formation work and in-flight refueling training. The 58th was rapidly becoming one of the DOD’s most 

advanced mission training and rehearsal systems. It was all consolidated in one massive building complex costing almost $7.5 million 

and completed in October 1996. The next month, Colonel Reed 

passed command of the 58th TRSS to Lt Col Robert Leonik, another 

Pave Low pilot and veteran of heavy action in Desert Storm. Reed 

then retired from the USAF and put his extensive knowledge of flight 

simulators to good use in civil aviation.80

Simulator training was well integrated with the flight training 

done by the 551st. The squadron was still short several instructors, 

but AETC was working to fix that issue. Its six TH-53As and five 

MH-53Js were steadily producing trained crew members for the op-
INTO THE BALKANS │ 413

erational squadrons. Included in its small fleet was MH-53J #66-

14433, the original Pave Low III, which logged its 10,000th flight 

hour in November.81

One of the pilots who received his initial MH-53 qualification 

that year was Capt Kent “Lando” Landreth. It was the fulfillment of a 

desire first spawned in him when, as a young Air Force Academy 

cadet, he had expressed an interest in special operations. That earned 

him a visit to Hurlburt, where he observed “those awesome machines” 

flying in loose formation along the coast. With further investigation, 

he also determined that they were the ones actually out doing “the” 

special operations mission and resolved that he wanted to fly them. 

After receiving his commission in 1991, he reported to Vance AFB, 

Oklahoma, for pilot training. Upon graduating from flight school 

the next year, though, his class did not receive any helicopter assignments. Instead, he took an assignment to HC-130Ps with the 67th 

SOS at RAF Alconbury.

From 1993 to 1995, he flew the HC-130s as they directly supported 

the Pave Lows in many operations. Landreth truly enjoyed the special 

operations mission and upgraded to aircraft commander while with 

the 67th SOS. However, he could clearly see that the HC-130’s mission was to support the Pave Lows while they actually conducted the 

direct action missions. That observation further whetted his desire to 

transition to the MH-53, especially when he heard that there was a 

shortage of Pave Low pilots and the USAF was even allowing fixedwing pilots to volunteer for the program. However, when Lando formally requested a Pave Low assignment, he was closely questioned by 

his supervisors, who doubted the wisdom of his request. They also 

pointed out to him that the USAF was offering a bonus to fixed-wing 

pilots who stayed in the USAF after their initial assignment was complete. But the bonus was not being given to the helicopter pilots, 

which meant that Landreth would be passing up a sizeable chunk of 

money to go to Paves. To Landreth, though, that was not an issue. He 

wanted to get into the mission. His request was approved, and in 

November 1995, he reported to Fort Rucker, Alabama, for a 12-week 

helicopter transition and then traveled to Kirtland to qualify in the 

Pave Low.82

Landreth already had over 1,000 hours of flying time and found 

the transition to helicopters to be exhilarating, recalling that one of 

his former commanders had told him that “helicopter flying is the 

best flying I ever did in the Air Force.” He especially enjoyed flying 
414 │ INTO THE BALKANS

the TH-53s. They were “overpowered, agile, and just an absolute ball 

to fly.” Then he switched over to the Pave Lows and engrossed himself 

in the tactical employment of the aircraft. He remembered,

That’s where you really get an idea of the mission because now you have the 

FLIR, the TF/TA radar. Flying at night was easy for me because I had already 

spent all of my previous time flying on goggles. But learning what the airplane 

could do and how to land in [landing zones] and mountainous terrain at night 

was a significant challenge. . . . It’s stressful, but it’s rewarding. That includes the 

TF/TA part: being up in the caldera up in Albuquerque at 11,000 feet with goggles up, just relying on radar to fly through the mountains. It was awesome . . . 

everything that I had hoped it would be. 

I really got a great appreciation for how integral the crew is. . . . Everybody was 

always engaged, and they were all integral to making whatever flight it was a 

success. There was that bond . . . the MH-53 crews and how they have to work 

together. [At Kirtland], you really got to see how it’s so orchestrated and it’s 

almost like music when a crew really works well.

The other side is when you don’t really click, it can be really painful. You rely on 

one another. I was a weak link more than I can count. It makes a difference.83

Strangely enough, Landreth also discovered that there were times 

when Pave Low flying involved long periods of just droning along to 

get to a distant objective. He discovered that crews would find ways 

to enliven even these moments. He recalls an instance when “the instructor engineer tapped me on the shoulder. I looked back down the 

cargo compartment, and there was a gunner, on the tail, with a .50-cal, 

gunner’s belt, boots, and helmet—that’s all. I don’t know where it 

came from or who initiated it, but, by God, if there was time to kill, 

there was a gunner.” He added that “the personality of each crew position [was] always entertaining because whether it’s gunner hugs or 

an engineer in the seat who decides that he is going to fly in his 

underwear, there was never a shortage of excitement. There was 

enough during the mission, but any lull in traffic, and I’ll tell you 

what—someone will be doing something.”84

Capt Kent Landreth finished up at Kirtland and reported to the 

20th SOS at Hurlburt Field in September 1996. Arriving there, he 

took his wife and children for a quick drive around the base. As he 

passed by the 20th SOS building, he was staggered to see 22 Pave 

Lows parked out on the ramp. Then he was exhilarated to realize that 

he was now a part of a small and unique force that operated the most 

sophisticated helicopters in the world as part of a command that knew 
INTO THE BALKANS │ 415

how to use them. He was ready to accomplish their—his—assigned 

missions “any time, any place.”85

Notes 

1. Weikel and Wurster, interviews. Mr. Peepers was a TV character popular in 

the 1950s. Played by Wally Cox, he was an iconic representation of a quiet teacher, 

unruffled by the general give-and-take of daily events but very much aware of unfolding events and skilled at reading people. He possessed the innate ability to stay 

two steps ahead of others and was quite capable of inserting, at the exact moment, 

the perfectly pithy—and sometimes wickedly devastating—comment, but always delivered with the utmost courtesy. Wurster accepted the moniker as a compliment. 

2. Ibid. 

3. History of the 352d Special Operations Group (hereafter referred to as History 

of 352d SOG), 1 Dec 1992–31 Dec 1993, vol. 1, xvii; Nalty, Winged Shield, vol. 2, 1950–

1997, 497; and Hilkert, “History of SOCEUR 1954–2004,” n.p., USSOCOM/HO.

4. Kradel, interview. 

5. Nalty, Winged Shield, 499–500; and History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1993, 

vol. 1, 110.

6. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1993, vol. 1, 162, 185, 189. 

7. Rhodes, “Commando Look,” 10.

8. Rhodes, “Wild Bill,” sidebar to “Commando Look,” 10.

9. Rhodes, “Commando Look,” 10.

10. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1993, vol. 1, 39. 

11. History of 353d SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 1993, vol. 1, 48.

12. Ibid., 2, 45, 48–50; and ibid., 1 July–31 Dec 1993, vol. 1, 1–4.

13. “20th SOS History for 1993,” unpublished report, 20th SOS historical files, 

1st/16th SOW HO; and Howell and Slife, interviews. 

14. Lengyel, interview.

15. History of the 16th Special Operations Wing (hereafter referred to as History 

of 16th SOW), 1 July–31 Dec 1993, vol. 1, 9–11.

16. “20th SOS History for 1993,” unpublished report, 20th SOS historical files, 

1st/16th SOW HO. 

17. Dinsmore, interview. 

18. History of ARS, 1 Jan 1991–2 July 1993, 1–6. 

19. History of 542d CTW, 1 July–31 Dec 1993, vol. 1, 1–2, 11, 17, 21–23.

20. Ibid., 1 Jan–31 Mar 1994, vol. 1, 1–3.

21. History of the 58th Special Operations Wing (hereafter referred to as History 

of 58th SOW), 1 Apr–31 Dec 1994, vol. 1, 1–3, 19, 21, 22. 

22. Reed to the author, e-mail, 18 Sept 2009.

23. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1996, vol. 1, 16.

24. Ibid., 1 Jan–31 Dec 1994, vol. 1, 15, 30, 229–30; and ibid., vol. 5, supplemental 

doc. 1–66.

25. Ibid., 1 Jan–31 Dec 1996, vol. 1, 23–25, 127–28.

26. Hoover, interview.

27. Hoover, Slife, and Lengyel, interviews. 
416 │ INTO THE BALKANS

28. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1994, vol. 1, 128, 135; History of 16th SOW, 

1 July–31 Dec 1994, vol. 1, 61–63, 65–68; ibid., 1 Jan–30 June 1994, vol. 1, 113; and 

Hoover and Slife, interviews. 

29. Howell, interview. 

30. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 1994, vol. 1, 126. 

31. Nalty, Winged Shield, 501. (Captain Wright was a former Pave Low maintenance officer.)

32. Richardson, No Escape Zone, 140, 229; and History of 16th SOW, 1 July–31 

Dec 1994, vol. 1, 62. 

33. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 1994, vol. 1, xix. 

34. Ibid., 1 July–31 Dec 1994, vol. 1, 17, 41, 117; and Kradel and Connelly, interviews. 

35. Slife, interview

36. Becklund, interview.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid. 

39. Walters, interview. 

40. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1995, vol. 1, 2, 100. 

41. “AFSOC to Acquire CV–22 Osprey Aircraft,” 3. 

42. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1995, vol. 1, 9–10; and “Just a Good Ole 

Lynchin’,” anonymous, n.d., in ibid., vol. 2, SD1–9. 

43. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1995, vol. 1, xvi, 1, 50. 

44. Berndt, “Recovery of Basher 52,” 41–47.

45. Owen, Deliberate Force, 137.

46. Webb, interview. 

47. Dinsmore, interview.

48. Whitcomb, “Searching for Ebro 33,” 36; and Greeley, “Search for Ebro 33,” 6. 

49. Owen, Deliberate Force, 337; and Nalty, Winged Shield, 506–10.

50. Nalty, Winged Shield, 510.

51. Strong, interview. 

52. Webb, interview.

53. 20th SOS AFSOC Outstanding Squadron Nomination Package 1995, 20th 

SOS historical files, 1st/16th SOW HO; History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1995, 

vol. 1, xv–xix, 75, 102; and History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1995, vol. 1, 154–55.

54. History of 353d SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 1995, vol. 1, 11–12, 30–31.

55. DeSalle, interview. 

56. Crawford, “Nomads of the Pacific,” pamphlet, 16, Heritage File, AFSOC/HO; 

and Owens to the author, e-mail.

57. History of 353d SOG, 1 July–31 Dec 1995, vol. 1, 21, 47.

58. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 1995, vol. 1, 1–5.

59. Ibid., 1 July–31 Dec 1995, 2–5, 8, 21, 46.

60. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1996, vol. 1, 18. 

61. Ibid., 24; and History of 352d SOG, 1 July–31 Dec 1996, vol. 1, 9. 

62. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 1996, vol. 1, 43, 130. 

63. Murphy and Northacker, Response to Disaster, 11.

64. Ibid., 1–17; and Webb, interview. 

65. Murphy and Northacker, Response to Disaster, 17–39. 

66. Partin and Rhoden, Operation Assured Response, 1–2; and Webb, interview.
INTO THE BALKANS │ 417

67. Partin and Rhoden, Operation Assured Response, 13–20; and History of 16th 

SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1996, vol. 1, 108–11. 

68. Thigpen, Praetorian Starship, 422; Partin and Rhoden, Operation Assured 

Response, 36; and Webb, interview.

69. Greeley, “They Lost Everything,” 7.

70. Thigpen, Praetorian Starship, 422; and Partin and Rhoden, Operation Assured 

Response, 37–41, 48–49. 

71. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 1996, vol. 1, 132. 

72. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1997, vol. 1, 55; and data supplied by HQ 

USAF A3O–ATF (Air Staff). 

73. History of 16th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1996, vol. 1, 149–59. 

74. CJTFEX 96/ORI After Action Report, 14 June 1996, 20th SOS, historical files, 

1st/16th SOW HO; and Homan and Grove, interviews. 

75. Sprouse, interview. 

76. History of 352d SOG, 1 July–31 Dec 1996, vol. 1, 28; and History of 16th 

SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1996, vol. 1, 74. 

77. History of 352d SOG, 1 July–31 Dec 1996, vol. 1, 28–29, and Thigpen, Praetorian 

Starship, 424. 

78. Hilkert, “History of SOCEUR 1954–2004,” n.p., SOCOM/HO; and History of 

352d SOG, 1 July–31 Dec 1996, vol. 1, 46. 

79. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 1996, vol. 1, 9, 14, 15, 23.

80. Ibid., 1 July 1996–30 June 1997, vol. 1, 54; and Reed, interview. 

81. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 1996, vol. 1, 25; and ibid., 1 July 1996–30 

June 1997, vol. 1, ix, 23. 

82. Landreth, interview.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

Chapter 12

Combat Search and Rescue

~1997–98

The CSAR mission area is insufficiently manned and 

equipped to meet its growing operational demands. . . . It is 

a broken mission area. 

—Gen Richard Hawley

The Pave Low can do CSAR better than any other helicopter. 

 —Brig Gen Mike Kingsley

Air Force Special Operations Command, 

Hurlburt Field

As 1997 began, Maj Gen James Hobson was well into his third year 

as the AFSOC commander. Overall, he was pleased with the evolution of his command to the changing world paradigm. However, he 

was concerned about a couple of issues directly affecting the Pave 

Low fleet. The first was the operations tempo for his crews and support personnel. The ongoing commitment in the Balkans was driving 

the force, especially the 21st SOS, to exceed the USAF individual 

TDY standard of 120 days per year by a significant amount. As a result, 

that unit could not accomplish any significant training at home station 

and could rarely support any other European theater training events. 

The larger 20th SOS continued to augment with aircraft and personnel; 

however, the steady commitment also affected them in the same manner. 

The second issue was the overall handling of the CSAR mission. 

Keying upon the request for relief that General Schwartz had sent to 

him a few months prior, Hobson attempted to address the larger issue 

of CSAR tasking of AFSOC units. He noted that CSAR requirements 

were still being maintained for operations in the Balkans and northern 

and southern Iraq. Rescue units were now fully equipped and trained 

with HH-60s under ACC control. However, they were not fulfilling 
420 │ combat search and rescue

the majority of taskings. Instead, AFSOC was still providing aircraft 

and crews, even though CSAR was still a secondary task for the AFSOC 

forces. Revising the white paper that his predecessor floated in 1992, 

Hobson proposed combining all ACC CSAR assets within the AFSOC 

and formally assigning the mission to that command. This would include the reserve component rescue forces and possibly the assignment of some to the proposed western AFSOC base, if that ever materialized. Such a reassignment would lead to an economy of forces, 

training and deployment efficiencies, and a better trained and standardized force that “would achieve more synergy and greater effectiveness,” the general believed. Hobson also suggested that the addition 

of the now programmed CV-22 would further enhance his force. 

However, Hobson was not able to move his proposal beyond the 

initial discussion stage before he retired in July, passing the reigns of 

AFSOC to Maj Gen Charles Holland. Upon taking command, Holland immediately engaged with ACC to have it assume more responsibility for the rescue operations in northern and southern Iraq. He 

began to explore options for AFSOC to become involved in the ongoing 

Operation Joint Guard support. However, he could not, at this point, 

make the CSAR issue his primary focus.1

Initially, he needed to deal with more immediate issues within the 

command. He continued to support the Commando Look program, 

which had been successful in helping AFSOC find the right personnel 

to enter the challenging and unique air command career fields. It had 

already helped to dramatically reduce the number of individuals who 

had self-eliminated from the training schools because of a lack of 

character or desire. He directed the staff to increase its efforts to assign promising young officers and NCOs to key joint and service staff 

assignments to properly season its personnel for increased authority 

and responsibility, as well as to better expose the larger USAF and 

other services to the capabilities of AFSOC. To assist this process, he 

directed his staff to initiate Commando Spotlight to identify the 

sharpest young operations captains in the seven-to-nine year groups 

for early assignment to the AFSOC staff for initial seasoning and 

mentoring. AFSOC officers and NCOs were steadily being promoted 

at rates ahead of the USAF overall, and General Holland wanted to 

continue and nurture that trend.2

Collaterally, efforts continued to steadily upgrade and improve 

the Pave Low fleet. In late 1996, the Air Force Operational Test and 

Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) at Kirtland AFB initiated a field test to 
combat search and rescue │ 421

investigate the feasibility and applicability of the potential IDAS/

MATT upgrade for the MH-53J. Over the next several months, personnel from the AFOTEC detachment at Hurlburt worked with personnel from the 18th FLTS and the 20th SOS to modify and test one 

of the Pave Lows. The project showed that the IDAS/MATT was operationally effective and had the capability to decrease the overall aircrew 

workload and enhance situational awareness in a hostile environment. The modification would provide yet another tool to make the 

Pave Low more effective and useful in an ever-changing and ever more 

dangerous world as the “prime mover of the rotor-wing force of AFSOC.” 

Later that fall, General Holland approved modifying up to 25 of the 

Pave Lows with the IDAS/MATT equipment, and a contract was 

signed with the Crestview Aerospace Corporation, located at Crestview, Florida, to perform the modifications, with the first aircraft to 

be delivered to Hurlburt in April 1998.3

21st and 20th Special Operations Squadrons

Under the auspices of Joint Guard, the political, economic, and 

domestic situation in Bosnia continued to stabilize. The 21st SOS 

maintained its presence at Brindisi under JSOTF2. The unit was augmented with two more MH-53s as backup aircraft inventory to provide 

for more flying and training at home station. Additionally, the 20th 

SOS still augmented at Brindisi, although the number of aircraft and 

crews varied from time to time. The missions were relatively routine 

but did require some crews to deploy to Tuzla or other forward locations for several days to provide shorter response times if any ground 

force special operations needed help or had detained “persons indicted 

for war crimes” who needed to be extracted. This gave the crews some 

experience using the unique Pave Low navigational systems over the 

challenging Bosnian terrain.4

In March the 352d was alerted to prepare several MC-130s and 

two MH-53s for deployment to the Central African Republic and the 

Republic of the Congo to conduct another NEO. However, the MH53 portion of the task force was cancelled. In April combined 

20th/21st crews flew support for a visit to Sarajevo by Pope John Paul 

II to hold a mass for the beleaguered citizens of Bosnia in the city’s 

main soccer stadium. 
422 │ combat search and rescue

In an attempt to reduce the impact of deployments on his troops, 

the 352d commander, Col Mike Planert, directed mandatory postdeployment breaks for all personnel to allow them to spend time with 

their families and restore their domestic lives. As operations steadily 

slowed at Brindisi, he was able to bring home more of the aircraft and 

crews. This necessitated an increase in local flying. However, the 21st 

now had to compete with other units in the UK for ranges and restricted airspace use.

In August 1997, Capt Jim Slife reported to the 21st SOS from MH53 requalification at Kirtland. A much more experienced and enlightened officer now, he met with Lt Col Doug Salmon and was assigned to work in the plans office. He was glad to have such an 

interesting and responsible job. However, at the time, the unit was 

doing rotations only to Brindisi, and little planning was needed to do 

that. He did notice that the squadron operations officer, Lt Col Paul 

Harmon, was always extremely busy, and he asked Harmon if he 

could take over some of the current operations load. Harmon was 

happy to share the workload and effectively made Slife an assistant 

DO by broadening his authorities and responsibilities.5

In addition to its continued support to JSOTF2, the 352d SOG was 

notified by AFSOC that in the fall of the year, it would receive an ORI. 

In-flight refueling with an MC-130

Courtesy SSgt Glen Fleming, USAF
combat search and rescue │ 423

Consequently, the group and its subordinate units began a series of 

readiness exercises designed to prepare them for the inspection. 

Crews from all units deployed to several different countries and conducted joint and combined training with US and allied special forces 

elements. They all participated in endless “Warrior Day” drills at 

Mildenhall to sharpen their skills. The ORI was conducted in October 

and required the SOG and subordinate squadrons to deploy to an 

airfield in Norway above the Arctic Circle. There they operated with 

various allied forces as part of Exercise Nordic Retrieval. Overall, the 

352d received an “excellent” rating. MH-53J operations were rated 

outstanding, with many substantive comments similar to those the 

20th SOS received on its recent ORI—all reflecting a standard of excellence across the entire Pave Low community. At the same time, the 

combined 21st/20th crews at Brindisi averaged 70 sorties a month in 

support of Joint Guard.6

Hurlburt Field

At Hurlburt, the 20th SOS, with its 21 assigned MH-53Js, averaged 

165 sorties per month as it continued to participate in an endless 

schedule of exercises—classified and unclassified, both domestically 

and internationally. Since reporting to the 20th SOS in 1996, Capt 

Vince Becklund had had his share of those deployments, especially 

the Brindisi trips and the continued Southern Watch rotations. At 

one point, Becklund was dispatched to Kuwait to replace another pilot 

who had gotten sick. He had just qualified as an IP and was giving a 

checkout ride to a new copilot. While doing a dust-out landing in an 

MH-53J, he inadvertently landed in an area of soft sand and snapped 

off the nose wheel. Fortunately, the aircraft was not further damaged. 

A safety investigation determined that Becklund had been within 

proper landing parameters; the unanticipated soft sand was the reason 

for the crash. Colonel Hull requested that AFSOC allow Becklund to 

resume his duties, and it did so. Hull told Becklund, “Go forth and do 

great things. You are still an IP. Get out there and keep doing it.” 

Becklund really appreciated that and finished out his tour in Kuwait 

as an IP.7

The 20th crews still deployed to Asheville, North Carolina, for 

mountain qualification and proficiency training. Three Pave Lows 

and crews also deployed to NAS Oceana, Virginia, for two weeks in 
424 │ combat search and rescue

April to participate in Exercise Kyrpton Vessel. While there, they 

worked with elements of the 160th SOAR and naval SOF units. They 

conducted several sorties involving shipboard operations and small 

team insertions. The crews reported to a command element located 

at a base on the West Coast. Now serving as the 20th’s plans officer, 

Captain Becklund reported in the exercise after action report that it 

was an outstanding deployment and exercise, with much valuable 

training accomplished by all participants and several valuable tactical 

lessons learned. 

In May 1997, Col Rich Comer took command of the 16th SOW 

from Brig Gen Norton Schwartz, who departed to command 

SOCPAC. Comer was the third Pave Low pilot to take wing command.8

 Comer was replaced as the operations group commander by 

Col James Connors. Three months later, Connors received a shortnotice critical assignment to SOCCENT in Bahrain to serve as the 

vice-commander. Col Donald Wurster was selected to replace Connors. 

Wurster had just completed the Industrial College of the Armed 

Forces. He received a quick MH-53J requalification at Kirtland AFB 

and reported to Hurlburt to take command of the 16th SOG. Shortly 

thereafter, AFSOC notified the 16th SOW that it would be receiving 

an ORI in 1998, and Wurster set to work to prepare his group for 

that challenge.9

Settling into his assignment with the 20th SOS, Capt Kent Landreth 

was initially directed to work in current operations and scheduling. 

He was also quickly thrust into his share of joint training deployments, which helped him to steadily develop his talents and upgrade 

to aircraft commander and then IP. Additionally, he was able to work 

in the weapons and tactics office, which challenged him to develop an 

even deeper knowledge of the aircraft and its capabilities. This was a 

fortuitous time because the squadron was just receiving its first two 

IDAS/MATT-modified aircraft, and he was able to receive one of the 

earliest qualifications. He especially enjoyed working for Lt Col 

Tommy Hull, whom he found to be the kind of commander who was 

able to find that fine balance between dealing with the rules of any 

ever-growing service bureaucracy and the unique needs of the Pave 

Low customers with whom the crews routinely worked and had to 

support operationally, often on short notice. Said Landreth, Hull was 

definitely a member of the “seek forgiveness, not permission” clan. 

Landreth was also given the opportunity to attend the USMC Helicopter Weapons and Tactics Course at the MCAS Yuma in Arizona. 
combat search and rescue │ 425

There he developed an intricate knowledge of the larger tactical uses 

of helicopters. He was somewhat shocked to discover how primitive 

the majority of USMC helicopters were, lacking precision navigation 

capabilities and countermeasures equipment. One of the IDAS/

MATT aircraft was sent out for Landreth to use in the course. The 

Marines were amazed at the capabilities of the aircraft and correspondingly gave Pave Low crews lead responsibilities on all of the big 

missions. After one large nighttime insertion, one of the Marine commanders thanked Landreth by telling him, “We’re just not used to 

going exactly where we are supposed to go.”10

In November 1997, the Airmen of the 20th SOS were called upon 

to perform a duty to honor the larger and longer brotherhood of 

USAF H-53 veterans. Two Pave Low crews, led by Capt Gene Becker 

and conducting mountain training in North Carolina, flew to northern 

Virginia and performed a flyby at the Arlington National Cemetery. 

They were there to honor the crew of Jolly Green 67, which had been 

shot down and killed in HH-53C #68-10365 near Dong Ha, South 

Vietnam, on 6 April 1972 while trying to rescue two downed Airmen. 

In 1996 a recovery crew found the remains of that crew and returned 

Courtesy Col Darrel Whitcomb, USAF, Retired

Two MH-53s perform a flyby at Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia for 

the burial ceremony for the crew of Jolly Green 67, shot down and killed 

while trying to rescue two American Airmen in South Vietnam in April 1972.
426 │ combat search and rescue

them to the United States. Several hundred family members and 

friends attended the ceremony, conducted by Capt (Chaplain) Steve 

Schaick. Looking at the assemblage of highly decorated Airmen there 

to honor their brothers, he noted, “The price of entry here today is a 

Silver Star.”11

Colonel Wurster brought a large contingent of individuals from 

the 16th SOW, and they paid their respects to the families. Lt Gen 

Dave Vesely, the assistant vice chief of staff, Headquarters USAF, 

Washington, DC, and himself a veteran helicopter pilot who served 

in the 20th SOS in Vietnam, made the official remarks. He stated that 

“all of us who have flown in harm’s way know what a difference it 

makes to believe that every effort will be made to rescue us if we are 

down. . . . While we count the high cost, we should also count ourselves fortunate to be the beneficiaries of these, the best of men—who 

gave their lives so ‘that others may live.’ ” The roar of the two MH-53s 

passing overhead, trailing green smoke as a salute to their fallen 

countrymen, perfectly accentuated the general’s message.12

While serving in the 20th SOS, Colonel Hull had been witness to a 

dramatic incident of incredible personal and professional courage 

and determination. Frequently, exchange officers from both the 

USMC and USN were assigned to the 20th. In 1996 US Navy lieutenant 

John Alvarez was aboard as a Pave Low pilot. Alvarez was fluent in 

Spanish and occasionally was tasked with other AFSOC units. In 

September 1996, he was deployed with a small foreign internal defense team from the 6th SOS to Ecuador. Alvarez was working a mission one day as a passenger on an Ecuadorian Gazelle helicopter 

when the machine crashed. The pilot was killed. Fortunately, Alvarez 

and one other American were able to escape. However, Alvarez was 

seriously wounded with two badly mangled legs and several other 

grievous injuries. He was medically evacuated to a civilian hospital in 

Quito, Ecuador, where doctors had to amputate the lower half of his 

left leg. When his wounds were stabilized, he was transported by a 

C-141 to the Wilford Hall Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas, 

where his wife and children could join him. 

Lt Col Tommy Hull visited him and told him that he expected to 

see Alvarez back flying with the Green Hornets. Alvarez did not appreciate Hull’s attempt at humor and told him so. Hull then informed 

him that he had been doing some research and discovered that other 

amputees had returned to full military service, including a Navy 

SEAL. From then on, Alvarez determined that he would return to the 
combat search and rescue │ 427

Pave Low cockpit. As 

soon as he could, he 

began physical therapy 

and was walking by 

November. He was 

also able to call upon 

the services of Dr. 

John Uribe, the team 

surgeon for the Miami Dolphins, and 

Mr. Raymond Francis 

of Tidewater Prosthetics in Norfolk, 

Virginia, who designed a high-technology prosthetic leg for him. 

Throughout, the Airmen of the 20th were constantly helping out, 

building special ramps in his home, generally assisting with whatever 

chores needed to be done, and always offering companionship and 

encouragement for strengthening physical activity. 

Once he had regained his strength and mobility, he began the 

arduous process of returning to flight duty. He took and passed simulator evaluations with both the Air Force and Navy and actual fixedwing flight evaluations with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

evaluators. He passed both Navy and AFSOC physical fitness tests 

with outstanding scores. Traveling to Pensacola, he endured a weeklong series of tests and a “thorough” flight physical, which he also 

passed. Then he had to stand before a panel of 15 Navy senior flight 

surgeons. They determined that he was fit for duty and returned 

him to flight status. After the formal paperwork flowed up the Navy 

chain of command and over to the necessary offices in the USAF, he 

was returned to flight duty as a Pave Low pilot in the 20th SOS and 

flew again on 4 September. Colonel Hull was very moved by Alvarez’s enduring courage and resolve to return to flying. At the time 

he said, “Lieutenant Alvarez represents the warrior spirit, the special operations spirit in the 20th. He has the right attitude, outstanding motivation and continuous drive—the stuff it takes to be a 

special operator. The country gets a valuable asset back.” Alvarez 

credited the USAF for his return to flying, stating, “I truly believe 

that if I were not in Air Force Special Operations Command and 

not part of the 20th Special Operations Squadron, I wouldn’t be flying again. It was amazing to see all these people from the special 

Courtesy Col John Alvarez, USAF, Retired

Lt Col Tom Hull and Lt John Alvarez, USN.

(At the time, Alvarez was USN. Later, he transferred 

to the USAF, retiring as a colonel.)
428 │ combat search and rescue

operations community, many of whom I didn’t even know, just 

come out and help me. What we really have here is a brotherhood, 

not just a job.”13

31st Special Operations Squadron

For the Korea-based Pave Low troops, their operations tempo as 

1997 began was dictated by a steady schedule of exercises as the unit 

personnel rotated in and out on their one-year tours. In late January, 

Capt Jim Cardoso completed his tour with the unit. A 1988 graduate 

of the Air Force Academy, he had flown for four years as a T-38 instructor pilot before training on the MH-53 and joining the 31st the 

previous January. He loved flying the Pave Low and during his time 

in Korea upgraded to aircraft commander while logging several hundred 

hours of challenging operational flying in this forward theater. He 

particularly enjoyed the camaraderie of the crews, the focus on tactical 

flexibility, and the application of the assault mentality. He also quickly 

discovered that low-level flying presented a unique set of challenges, 

especially when he realized that the Koreans did not do a thorough 

job of reporting the construction of flight obstacles such as towers 

and power lines so that aircrews would be aware of these threats. 

Completing his tour at Osan, he would now report to the 20th SOS to 

join the “show” and continue his Pave Low career, having learned lessons that would serve him well in the not-too-distant future.14

But not all was routine for the Airmen of the 31st as, occasionally, 

real-world events would intercede. In July 1997, the 353d SOG was 

deployed for a humanitarian mission. Civil unrest in Cambodia 

caused by governmental instability led to the directed evacuation of 

most Americans from that country. The 353d was ordered to fly MC130s and MH-53s for possible NEO operations as part of USPACOM 

joint contingency force Bevel Edge, led by the SOCPAC commander, 

General Schwartz. Capt Joe DeCaro was the commander of one of 

the Pave Lows. Commissioned out of the Air Force Academy in 1990, 

he had followed the then-standard flow for Pave Low pilots: Fort 

Rucker, a tour in UH-1Ns, and then Pave Lows. After an initial tour 

with the 20th, he had accepted a remote tour with the 31st and was 

part of the Pave Low package for this operation. On the ninth, the 

contingency force arrived at U-Tapao AB, Thailand, and joined waiting AMC C-5s and C-141s. The arrival of the Pave Lows was reminis-
combat search and rescue │ 429

cent of their predecessors’ arrival at this very same air base for the 

Mayaguez rescue 22 years and two months prior. Also similar to the 

Mayaguez mission, US Marines from Okinawa arrived and were organized for load aboard the Pave Lows if they needed to be inserted 

for evacuation site security. The Airmen and Marines of the contingency 

force then stood by on short notice for movements to sites in Cambodia. However, the governmental crisis was resolved without endangering any Americans, and the force did not need to conduct an NEO. 

All elements were released to return to their home bases at the end of 

the month.15

58th Special Operations Wing/

551st Special Operations Squadron

In February 1997, Col John Folkerts assumed command of the 

58th SOW. He was the second Pave Low pilot to achieve wing command. Crew production continued unabated, as did all of the other 

operational activities of the Pave Low instructors and crews. In May 

the 551st received a most unusual and disheartening tasking. It was 

directed to deploy a team of 18 individuals, including a flight surgeon, a chaplain, and PJs, to the crash site of an A-10 that had gone 

down in the Rocky Mountains near Eagle, Colorado. In an incident 

that was never fully explained, the pilot flew the armed aircraft from 

Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, where he was undergoing transition 

training, to Colorado and then committed suicide by crashing the 

aircraft. The team members deployed on 15 May aboard two Pave 

Lows. For the next three days, they flew eight sorties to support the 

recovery operations. The pilots had to hover at elevations as high as 

13,000 feet to insert and extract the recovery teams. Fortunately, good 

weather facilitated an expeditious operation, and the aircraft and personnel returned to Kirtland on 18 May. 

Throughout 1997, the 58th SOW also deployed operations and 

maintenance personnel from the 551st and associated squadrons to 

several locations in the world to support ongoing operations. In June 

Lt Col Randy O’Boyle took command of the 551st SOS from Lt Col 

Robert Maldonado. He had only been in his new job about a month 

when the USAF announced that at some point, probably no later 

than 2003, the 551st SOS was a candidate to become the training unit 
430 │ combat search and rescue

for the CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft that the service would soon be acquiring, possibly as a replacement for the MH-53s.16

One of the pilots who went through Pave Low training under 

Colonel O’Boyle that summer and fall was Capt Pete Doty. He had 

graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1992. Ever since his first 

exposure to the Pave Low supplied by Capt Tom Trask on his visit to 

the Air Force Academy in 1991, Doty had a strong desire to fly helicopters in general and Pave Low in particular. After flight training, he 

served a three-year tour with the 76th Rescue Flight at Vandenberg 

flying the UH-1N “Pave Hueys” with Vince Becklund and several 

others who would later fly the MH-53s. In fact, it seemed as if the 

76th during the 1990s was a pipeline for pilots going to MH-53s, in 

part because Pave Low veterans like MSgt Eddie Parris also served in 

the unit and mentored the younger officers. 

Like Becklund, Doty enjoyed his assignment at Vandenberg, finding the flying interesting and challenging. And the social life was also 

good. He was invited out to dinner one evening by Becklund and his 

wife, who introduced him to a mutual friend, Isabelle. She and Pete 

were quite taken with each other, and shortly thereafter she became 

his wife and later an extended member of the Pave Low family. 

However, Captain Doty did not have an opportunity to go through 

the Commando Look program. Sometime after Vince Becklund went 

through the screening, the program for officers was terminated because of a lack of funding. Enlisted troops were still screened. Doty 

got his assignment to Pave Low through the standard officer assignment system and some forthright phone calls to Maj Tim Brown, a 

Pave Low pilot then serving as the pilot assignment officer at AFSOC 

headquarters. Reporting to the 551st SOS at Kirtland, Doty found the 

Pave Low training both demanding and rewarding. He requested and 

received a follow-on assignment to the 20th SOS, arriving at the unit 

in the spring of 1998.17

In May 1997, Greg Lengyel was promoted to major while serving 

as an instructor with the 551st. He had transferred in from the 20th a 

year earlier, after having advanced all the way to flight examiner. His 

last commander there, Lt Col Mike Homan, encouraged him to volunteer for an instructor job, believing that the school needed instructors who were well grounded operationally. After two consecutive 

tours where he had averaged 200 days a year TDY, Lengyel also 

wanted to spend a bit more time with his wife and two children. 
combat search and rescue │ 431

He found schoolhouse instructor duty quite challenging and rewarding, noting that his NVG skills were dramatically sharpened by 

developing the ability to teach others to use them. Like most other 

instructors, he also enjoyed flying the TH-53As, especially with their 

excess power and maneuverability. During the assignment, beyond 

his instructor duties, he was able to serve as the 551st assistant DO, as 

a flight examiner, and as chief of standardization and evaluation for 

the 58th SOG. He also developed an excellent working relationship 

with Colonel Folkerts before departing Kirtland in July 1999 for a 

staff tour with USSOCOM in Tampa, Florida.18

In November 1997, SSgt Brian Cessop reported to the 551st SOS 

for aerial gunner training. He had been in the USAF for 10 years and 

was a weapons loader, primarily on fighter aircraft. However, he had 

heard about Pave Low and volunteered to attend Commando Look at 

Hurlburt earlier in the year. He did well on all of the tests and interviews and liked what he saw. He was accepted into Pave Low as an 

aerial gunner. He then attended the various survival schools before 

reporting to Kirtland AFB. 

He was a bit surprised at what he found. He expected that his job 

would be just to fly on the aircraft and fire the guns when ordered to 

do so. He did well in academics and easily mastered the handling of 

the .50-caliber machine gun and the minigun and the tactical use of 

NVGs. However, he did not know that he would also have significant 

duties as a scanner and be an integral part of the crew, especially as 

the tail gunner. He remembered, “I was pleasantly surprised. It’s awesome to be on an aircraft where the crew is tight. We interacted well 

together. . . . Shooting the guns is the smallest part of the job. You are 

more a scanner than you are a gunner. . . . You are calling things that 

the pilots may not see.”19 

Sergeant Cessop also learned that the gunners had some more informal duties. He explained that

part of the gunner mission was to keep the crews in good spirits. That was one 

of our charters. Don’t know where that came from. It was always the gunner’s 

responsibility to bring levity to the crew. We were pretty good at it. It was just 

one of those things that we did . . . 15 hours into a sortie, and everyone wanted 

to fall asleep. It was the gunner telling stories that kept everyone awake and 

laughing. . . . Laughter is one of those things that we used a lot in Pave Low. . . . 

I don’t think that . . . any other airframe has the camaraderie that we had 

among the crew. It worked because it had to work. There was no alternative. It 

either worked, or people were going to die.20
432 │ combat search and rescue

Finishing his training in May 1998, he reported to the 20th SOS. 

He immediately entered the training program under the supervision 

of MSgt John Sprouse, a.k.a. the “Big Daddy” gunner, and was soon 

on the road to exercises with various “customers.” Cessop was impressed with the squadron, the size, the operations tempo, and just 

the general panache exuded by the members. It was all so cool, and he 

could tell that he had arrived at the “show.” 

Also attending that iteration of Commando Look was SSgt Bernard 

“B. J.” Jobling. English by birth, he was the son of an RAF veteran and 

had married an American girl and moved to the United States. There 

he enlisted in the USAF in 1989 and eventually became a computer 

technician. However, he sensed that he wanted to be more than that, 

and when he saw the invitation message for Commando Look, he 

signed up. His assessment also went well, and he was accepted into 

the program to train to be a flight engineer. He then went through the 

same series of schools plus a basic flight engineering course before 

starting his Pave Low qualification training with the 551st SOS. He 

found the course to be challenging but also intriguing because it was 

obvious that what he was training to do was serious and unlike anything he had ever done or really even imagined. He also found that, 

at times, the course was actually enjoyable, remembering that “it was 

fun to have a whole bunch of guys who were all going in the same 

direction. They all [had] different personalities, but to see the personalities merge into a common goal was only a taste of what it was like 

once you got out in the field. I enjoyed it.” Jobling reported to the 20th 

SOS in May 1999. He also flowed right into the mission readiness 

training program and was on deployments hither and yon for the 

next year to become a fully qualified Pave Low flight engineer.21

Air Force Special Operations Command

As Sergeants Cessop and Jobling were beginning their respective 

schools, Gen Michael Ryan was sworn in as the 16th chief of staff of 

the Air Force. Previously, he had served in Europe and had become 

intimately involved in the Balkan problems. He was well aware of the 

changes that had swept the world and the United States since the end 

of the Cold War and sensed that the USAF had to change further to 

stay relevant. Starting with the basics, he directed all commands to 

review their mission essential task lists (METL), which delineated 
combat search and rescue │ 433

those specific tasks that each command and its subordinate units 

were required to accomplish as essential parts of their assigned mission. 

METLs were integral to both unit organization and operation and 

defined the metrics against which units were inspected and graded. 

Receiving the tasking, in early 1998 General Holland directed his 

staff to form a strategic planning working group to use guidance in 

volume 2 of the USAF Strategic Plan to revise the AFSOC comparable 

plan as necessary and determine what or how AFSOC METLs needed 

to be changed to meet General Ryan’s tasking. The process would 

stretch into the fall before it was completed. Aware of the USAF revision, USSOCOM also directed AFSOC to insure that all USAF METLs 

were in compliance with their published joint METLs to insure proper 

joint integration and unity of effort. The AFSOC planners worked diligently to insure that all were properly and coherently integrated.22

General Ryan also wanted to make fundamental changes to the 

way the USAF operated. Having participated in the massive relocation of US forces from overseas locations to the CONUS after Desert 

Storm, and realizing that US military forces would most probably 

continue to shrink, he believed that the USAF needed to be restructured. He thought the Air Force needed the ability to respond to the 

more nebulous global threats now extant with a leaner, lighter, and 

more mobile force, optimized for expeditionary operations. It could 

be more easily tailored for quicker deployment in support of the requirement of the US global combatant commanders. Accordingly, he 

directed that the USAF operational forces, both active and reserve 

components, be reorganized into 10 air expeditionary forces (AEF). 

Each would consist of geographically separated but operationally 

linked units that would develop habitual relationships but could be 

further tailored to the initiating contingency, whether a rapidresponse crisis or an ongoing operation. The concept was optimized 

to smooth out the impact on personnel by providing more predictable work and training schedules and to provide the theater commanders with the forces they needed to meet military objectives and 

contingency requirements.

AFSOC planners began strategizing how special ops could best integrate into the AEF concept, indicating where and how they could 

provide their unique contributions to each package of forces. However, the chief of plans, Col John Stephens, pointed out that within 

the USSOCOM structure, each COCOM already had a theater special 

operations component, and AFSOC forces with their CONUS wing 
434 │ combat search and rescue

and two forward deployed SOGs were already well structured to support highly mobile forces for crisis response and contingency operations. All were well versed in forming JSOTFs to support their theater 

commanders. Additionally, the AFSOC forces possessed specific 

skills adapted to nonconventional operations across the spectrum of 

conflict, such as operations other than war, humanitarian operations, 

and smaller-scale contingencies. Given their operational flexibility, 

they were considered a deploying “enabling force.” Their units would 

not be assigned to specific numbered AEFs. Instead, they would remain on call as needed for any particular contingency that could best 

be handled with their unique skill sets. Their mission to deliver special operations combat power “any time, any place” was not altered in 

the AEF reorganization. The AFSOC units in general and the Pave 

Low units in particular would continue to do what they were doing.23

As noted earlier, General Hobson had tried to start another dialogue about moving the CSAR mission to his command. In early 

1998, the ACC commander, Gen Richard Hawley, decided that the 

issue needed to be addressed directly. The need was obvious. With 

the inactivation of the Air Rescue Service in July 1993, all rescue 

squadrons were transferred to ACC, and the command picked up the 

responsibility for mission area proponency; policy making; and organizing, training, and equipping the rescue forces. Regardless, the 

AFSOC continued to receive taskings to dispatch its helicopters and 

M/HC-130s to assume CSAR alert. There were two reasons for this. 

First, the SOF forces had better equipment, especially the helicopters. 

All knew that the MH-53s of the 20th, 21st, and 31st SOSs had been 

initially modified to provide night, all-weather rescue capability 

based upon lessons learned in Southeast Asia. This had been reinforced by their performance in Desert Storm. They, and the derivative MH-60s of the 55th SOS, were the best aircraft and crews available for the mission. Second, the theater commanders liked having 

the SOSs in their theaters because they knew that, if necessary, the 

SOSs could also perform SOF taskings. These factors created a dichotomy. ACC had the mission but the lesser equipment. AFSOC 

had the better equipment but the mission only as a secondary tasking. The roots of this conundrum ran all the way back to the transfer 

of the original HH-53H Pave Lows from MAC to TAC in May 1990 

to address the debacle at Desert One.24

 In 1997 General Hobson proposed to square the issue by consolidating all USAF rescue forces in AFSOC. General Hawley would 
combat search and rescue │ 435

have none of that. Instead, in January 1998 he directed his ACC staff 

to form a tiger team to examine the issue thoroughly. For the next 

seven months, the team did its analysis. The findings were sobering 

and highlighted deficiencies with personnel, training, and equipment, as well as allocation imbalances between active and reserve 

forces among the helicopter and tanker squadrons and the PJ units. 

Succinctly, the ACC rescue force could not meet its wartime taskings. 

General Hawley reviewed the report, stating that “the CSAR mission 

area is insufficiently manned and equipped to meet its growing operational demands. ACC is taking internal actions to fix CSAR. We 

will need help from the Air Force. . . . But we can’t defer action on 

CSAR any longer. It is a broken mission area.”25 In his statement, 

though, Hawley did not indicate any plan to fix the now identified 

deficiency. For AFSOC, this meant that it could still expect CSAR 

taskings for the foreseeable future. 

Regardless, AFSOC carried on as it sustained its force of 12,500 

Airmen to accomplish their assigned deployments and missions. Col 

Steve Connelly, now serving as the AFSOC director of operations, 

had several other Pave Low officers and NCOs working for him on 

the staff as those veterans continued to move up to higher levels of 

authority and responsibility. 

Another longtime Pave Low veteran, Col Gary Weikel, was also 

serving on the AFSOC staff as the deputy to the director of plans and 

was specifically charged with heading up the integrated product team 

working to procure and integrate the new CV-22 into the command. 

AFSOC officers and NCOs were now being consistently and steadily 

promoted at rates higher than the USAF at large in almost all grades. 

The Commando Look program was still operating and screening 

personnel for the Pave Low program. Throughout 1998, 68 personnel 

were screened, and 52 were accepted and entered crew training.26

However, AFSOC also had a developing problem specifically with 

Pave Low pilot manning. Many of the first-assignment IPs who had 

cross-trained into the MH-53 in the mid-1990s were now leaving the 

service. Commando Look was helping, but it was not covering the 

losses and anticipated future needs for CV-22 pilots. Noting that the 

US Army had a surplus of warrant officer pilots, the USAF and AFSOC 

began scripting a program to recruit Army warrant officers with 

college degrees to change services and fly Pave Lows. 

The lead project officer for this program was Maj Douglas Goodlin. 

He conceptualized a process that would involve an interservice transfer 
436 │ combat search and rescue

to the USAF, commissioning through Officer Training School, a direct 

USAF pilot rating, and conversion to the Pave Low. Before the program 

was even finalized, potential volunteers began to appear. Two of the 

very first were warrant officers Mike “Big Daddy” Holder and Frank 

Lazzara. Both had joined the Army after college in the late 1980s but 

decided to become warrant officers so that they could fly. Both subsequently served a series of classic US Army aviation assignments. Both 

also harbored a strong desire to transfer to the USAF as commissioned officers and fly the Pave Low. Each found out about the program through personal initiative and signed up to transfer over. 

Holder was the first, transferring on 1 March 1998. Lazzara made the 

switch one month later. Maj Jon Owens had transferred to the 551st 

after his tour at the 31st and instructed both in the Pave Low qualification course, noting that “both did very well in the program.” The 

USAF used these two to validate and formally establish the process.27

The following September, the USAF held a formal board at the 

USAF Personnel Center at Randolph AFB, Texas, to consider 17 officers 

and 37 warrant officers for the program. Of those, five officers and 

eight warrants were selected and offered transfer: CW3 Paul Alexander, 

CW2 Sean Borland, CW2 Pat Fronk, CW2 Ted Glover, 2d Lt Jay 

Humphrey, 1st Lt Anthony Kram, CW3 Francis Lankist, 1st Lt Paul 

Lawrenz, 1st Lt Bryan Martyn, CW2 David Millett, CW3 Martin 

Schweim, 2d Lt Jeffrey Siino, and CW2 Randal Voas. 

Volunteers were also selected for assignment to HH-60Gs and 

UH-1Ns. For the MH-53 selectees, the average total rotary-wing flying time was 1,619 hours, with an average of 466 hours logged as instructor or evaluator pilots. Three of the selectees had flown CH/

MH-47D/E aircraft, and three had flown combat. It was a selective 

group of aviators who would bring a great deal of experience into the 

Pave Low program. In reality, the transferees fell in behind a long list 

of US Army pilots, such as Tom Aldrich and “Pappy” Walters, who 

had come over in the 1980s and put their wealth of helicopter experience to great use in Pave Low. The USAF would hold several more 

boards in the next few years.28 However, the pilot shortage was part of 

a larger phenomenon across the USAF, and the Air Staff was looking 

at the issue with the expectation that it might take several years to 

solve it.29

AFSOC was also constantly pursuing ways to upgrade or otherwise improve the Pave Lows. In April 1998, AFSOC took delivery of 

the first MH-53 fully outfitted with the IDAS/MATT-modified system. 
combat search and rescue │ 437

It was assigned to the 16th SOW. There the Airmen of the 20th SOS 

began developing a training program to convert their crews to the 

modified machine. They had to quickly learn how to integrate the 

new capabilities for enhanced situational awareness and threat detection and avoidance into crew operations for maximum effectiveness and safety. 

IDAS/MATT was a significant upgrade to the aircraft. Its sophisticated communication and sensor equipment generated a unique logistics trail above and beyond that which was already established for 

the aircraft. The AFSOC chief of plans, Col John Stephens, recognized this uniqueness and felt that the aircraft needed a new mission 

design series (MDS) designation instead of MH-53J. Notionally, the 

next designation for the aircraft would be MH-53K. However, within 

the USSOCOM, the elements of the 160th SOAR already flew the 

MH-60K and MH-60L aircraft. To forsake any confusion, Stephens 

formally requested that the IDAS/MATT-modified Pave Lows be 

designated the MH-53M. Collaterally, he also requested that the 

MH-53Js, heretofore informally known as the Pave Low IIIE, be formally given that moniker, while the MH-53M would be officially designated as the Pave Low IV. Two months later, Headquarters USAF 

approved both requests, and the IDAS/MATT-modified Pave Lows 

were now officially designated the MH-53M Pave Low IV aircraft.

The intent of the designation changes was to facilitate the logistical 

support of the modified aircraft as it now required support unique 

from the Pave Low IIIE. The differences had to be coordinated between the AFMC, several air logistics centers, and all Pave Low–

equipped units. To insure that all of the necessary cross-coordination 

was properly in place as the aircraft became operational, the official 

redesignation date for the MH-53M Pave Low IV was set for 1 February 1999. 

The conversion of the aircraft now occurred at a steady rate. By the 

end of 1998, 11 IDAS/MATT-modified Pave Lows were on the ramp 

at Hurlburt Field. They joined the nine MH-53Js of the 20th SOS, 

eight assigned to the 21st SOS, six assigned to the 31st SOS, and five 

MH-53Js with the 551st SOS. Regardless of the “official” designation 

date for the new MDS, tailor shops specializing in the production of 

stylized nametags for flight suits went to double shifts to produce the 

now high-demand nametags for the Pave Low IV crews.30
438 │ combat search and rescue

20th Special Operations Squadron

As 1998 began, the 20th was busy getting ready for the ORI with 

the rest of the wing units and averaging 175 sorties per month while 

supporting classified and unclassified training exercises with other 

special operations elements all over the CONUS. It had readiness exercises in January and February and actually received the ORI in the 

second half of March, six months earlier than originally scheduled. 

The wing was ready. It deployed to Edwards AFB and took the inspection while working with other JSOC units. The inspection terminated with a large direct action exercise that required the wing to 

launch 24 of 25 available aircraft. Maintenance delivered the necessary sorties, and the crews performed admirably, regardless of moderate to heavy turbulence over the operational area that made inflight refueling a real challenge. All operational aspects of the wing’s 

performance were rated as excellent. At the same time, too, the wing 

had personnel deployed to Joint Guard in Bosnia and Korea and on 

short notice in support of operations in Southwest Asia. Colonel 

Comer was delighted with the wing’s ORI performance and rating. In 

a larger vein, though, he noted that “we had an ORI and didn’t even 

notice. As it turned out, it increased our ops tempo not a whit in this 

one. . . . We felt the pain of the contingencies that came up, but not 

the ORI.”31

At the same time, the 20th also had two aircraft, crews, and support personnel at Brindisi with the Airmen of the 21st in what had 

effectively become a consolidated operation for the two units. The 

Pave Low procedures specified by the stan/eval team at AFSOC were 

so thorough that the units could now operate together almost seamlessly with little or no initial disruption or hesitation. The 20th supported the short-notice deployment to Southwest Asia as part of 

Desert Thunder. Two MH-53s, crews, and support personnel were 

part of a JSOAC deployed in support of possible combat operations 

to enforce the no-fly zone over southern Iraq. Until June, the 20th 

had personnel in Kuwait to assume CSAR alert and support for special 

operations forces in the area. 

That summer several changes of command involving Pave Low officers occurred at Hurlburt. In early June, Colonel Wurster passed 

command of the 16th SOG to Col Lyle Koenig. A week later, Wurster 

took command of the 16th SOW from Colonel Comer and became 

the fourth Pave Low pilot to assume wing command. As Comer gave 
combat search and rescue │ 439

up command of the wing, he was notified that he had been selected 

for promotion to brigadier general, another first for Pave Low. One 

month after that event, Colonel Hull gave up command of the 20th 

SOS to Lt Col Jack Hester, one of the earliest Pave Low pilots and the 

first aircraft commander to fly a combat mission in the Pave Low in 

Operation Just Cause. Lt Col Tom Trask returned to the squadron 

after a four-year hiatus of school and staff tours to serve as his operations officer.32

As Hester took over, the pace did not slacken. During the summer, 

the 20th began training programs for its crews to convert to the newly 

arriving IDAS/MATT-modified aircraft. The systems specifications 

suggested a dramatic improvement in their combat mission capability, including

a color, multifunctional, night vision capable digital map screen . . . located on 

the helicopter’s instrument panel [that] gave an MH-53 crew a clear picture of 

the battlefield. Crews had access to near real time events, including the aircrew’s route of flight, man-made hazards such as power lines and even many 

electronic threats that were “over the horizon.” 

Transmissions were beamed from a satellite to the helicopter’s computer and 

then decoded; the data from the screen provided a perspective of potential 

threats and their lethal threat radius. The heart of the system, advanced software, included an integrated electronic warfare system. Infrared countermeasure controls, including missile warning, radar warning, and jammer inputs 

as well as chaff and flare countermeasures, were on one display. Crews would 

receive instant cautions and advisories on threats with immediate communications, including when to disperse countermeasures.33

This was quite a dramatic improvement in aircraft combat capabilities, and the crews embraced it wholeheartedly. One exercise, held 

in the Hurlburt area that summer, allowed the crews to use the system in an operational environment. Additionally, they participated in 

13 other CONUS training exercises and then had to evacuate their 

aircraft with the rest of the wing twice because of hurricane activity. 

In the fall, they were tasked to deploy several aircraft and crews to the 

Persian Gulf region for contingency training. This time, they were 

organized as part of a CJSOTF and focused almost exclusively on 

special operations events with US Army Green Berets and US Navy 

SEALs. As the national strategic repository of this unique capability, 

the 20th was a constantly active unit.34
440 │ combat search and rescue

21st Special Operations Squadron

The 21st was still equipped with eight MH-53Js, with conversion 

to the MH-53Ms scheduled for mid-1999. Three of its aircraft were 

down at Brindisi supporting the Joint Guard operation, usually with 

augmentation from the 20th. The addition of the two extra aircraft 

did allow Capt Jim Slife to develop plans to begin participating again 

in exercises with other national special forces elements across the 

theater. However, access to training ranges in Great Britain was a 

constant struggle because there was so much competition for their 

use. This was also a problem in Italy, especially after a USMC EA-6B 

clipped a cable on a ski lift in the Italian Alps and killed several civilians. Regardless, the crews optimized their allocated time on the 

ranges despite the restrictions to maximize the results of their required training. 

In May, the 21st received an unusual tasking. President Clinton 

was slated to visit Great Britain for two days in May. While there, he 

would fly in his special USMC H-3 helicopter. The 352d SOG was 

directed to support the operation, forming a JSOAC to do so. The 

21st was assigned to the JSOAC to provide four helicopters and crews 

to move the presidential support team and provide on-call SAR capability. The package included six US Army UH-60s. Jim Slife was selected to be the chief planner and lead pilot. He met with the White 

House and USMC planners to organize the mission and then participated with his crews as they flew the routes and practiced landings at 

all possible landing sites. The actual missions were conducted on 17 

and 18 May and occurred as planned. As the president departed for 

the United States, the JSOAC was dissolved, and the 21st returned to 

routine operations, taking great pride in a flawless operation. Two 

months later, Colonel Salmon passed command of the 21st SOS to Lt 

Col Paul Harmon, another Pave Low veteran of Desert Storm, who 

was still serving as the squadron director of operations. Maj Mike 

Kingsley also joined the 21st SOS as an assistant DO. Since leaving 

the 20th SOS in 1994, he had attended the Army Command and 

General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and had done a 

staff tour at the Pentagon. Additionally, Lt Col Corby Martin arrived 

to take command of the 352d Operations Support Squadron and lend 

his expertise to the ongoing operations in the Balkans.35

Harmon slid easily into his job and continued to address the various 

challenges that the 21st faced as it worked to maintain its capabilities 
combat search and rescue │ 441

to carry out its assigned missions under SOCEUR. The unit was also 

notified that NEO was now a priority mission, and unit planners had 

to develop several contingency plans. At Brindisi, Joint Guard duty 

had become quite routine, as the crews flew about 100 hours a month 

on mundane support missions. However, because of the USMC EA-6B 

accident, training flights in Italy were now more restricted than ever. 

More worrisome was the fact that Serbian forces had become active 

again, this time in Kosovo, another region of the former Yugoslavia, 

located just south of Serbia itself. News reports indicated that Serbian 

forces were committing atrocities against the local population. This 

was an ominous development with the portent of perhaps more conflict ahead in that region.36

31st Special Operations Squadron

Throughout 1998, the 31st SOS, still assigned to Osan AB, continued to maintain a presence within the greater Pacific theater and proficiency in all of its assigned mission sets with its six MH-53J heavylift helicopters as its crews and support personnel participated in a 

full plate of various types of exercises. The unit also participated with 

the 353d in an AFSOC-administered ORI. That inspection was carried out at Kadena and Osan in late October as the 353d supported 

the huge annual Exercise Foal Eagle in Korea. Almost lost in the huge 

event involving 500,000 Korean troops and 30,000 Americans, the 

353d was rated as overall excellent, matching the recent performance 

of its brother units on their ORIs and serving as a true testament to 

the general level of professionalism of the AFSOC operational and 

support units.37

551st Special Operations Squadron

Life remained relatively stable and quiet at the training unit during 

1998 as it continued to offer eight courses of instruction for MH-53 

crew members. The 551st graduated 62 flight crew personnel during 

the year. It also received several more pilot and flight engineer instructors, which helped to even out the training load among the instructors. 

Four different joint training exercises were conducted through the 

summer, affording the 551st crews and their students opportunities to 

work with USMC units, Navy SEALs, and Army Green Beret teams at 
442 │ combat search and rescue

Fort Bliss, Texas. In the fall, another Chili Flag exercise was held at 

Kirtland, where several crews got the opportunity to infil and exfil 

Army special forces Soldiers. In small increments, 551st personnel 

were dispatched to overseas ongoing operations as augmentees, although no full crews were sent during this period.38

On 22 October 1998, MH-53J #66-14431, assigned to the 58th 

SOW, was completely destroyed in a tragic accident at the NADEP at 

MCAS Cherry Point. The aircraft had received long-term maintenance checks and repairs. At the completion of its workup, the aircraft received an acceptance check flight. Because the tail gearbox 

had not been properly lubricated, the gearbox seized while the aircraft was in a hover, causing it to crash. Fortunately, the USMC check 

pilots were not killed. The aircraft had a long and distinguished flight 

career with the 21st SOS, having flown on the Yarrawonga rescue in 

1989 and the rescue attempt for Corvette 03 in Iraq in January 1991.39

Next door to the 551st, the 58th TRSS had its simulators running 

almost 24/7 to meet the heavy demand of the upgrading students as 

well as MH-53 crews that now came to the 58th for their simulator 

refresher training. Crews were increasingly using the MH-53 WST 

with its global database to practice potential missions anywhere in the 

world. All combined, it was a powerful consolidated training capability. 

For 1998 the 58th SOW qualified 31 pilots, seven flight engineers, and 23 

gunners for the Pave Low fleet.40

Notes

1. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1997, vol. 1, 30–35.

2. Ibid., 51–53.

3. Ibid., 70, 376; and ibid., 1 Jan–31 Dec 1998, vol. 1, 123–24.

4. Newman, “Hunting War Criminals,” special ops website. 

5. Slife, interview. 

6. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 1997, vol. 1, 7, 22, 51, 100; and ibid., 1 

July–31 Dec 1997, vol. 1, 12, 37, 54, 79–80, 107.

7. Becklund, interview. 

8. Col John Folkerts took command of the 58th SOW in February as the second 

Pave Low officer to command a wing. 

9. History of 16th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1997, vol. 1, 4–5, 99; and Exercise Krypton 

Vessel After Action Report Inputs, 30 Apr 1997, 1st/16th SOW HO, 20th SOS, historical files. 

10. Landreth, interview.

11. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1997, vol. 1, 67; and Whitcomb, Rescue of 

Bat 21, 162–64.
combat search and rescue │ 443

12. Ibid.

13. Davenport, “Leg to Stand On,” 2–5.

14. Cardoso, interview.

15. History of 353d SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 1997, vol. 1, 14, 19, 21, 24, 66; ibid., 1 July–31 

Dec 1997, vol. 1, 31; and DeCaro, interview. 

16. History of 58th SOW, 1 July 1996–30 June 1997, vol. 1, 54; and ibid., 1 July–31 

Dec 1997, vol. 1, 15.

17. Doty to the author, e-mail.

18. Lengyel, interview.

19. Cessop, interview. 

20. Ibid. 

21. Jobling, interview. 

22. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1998, vol. 1, 6–8. 

23. Ibid., 13–17.

24. Ibid., 17–18. 

25. Ibid., 17–19. 

26. Ibid., 35–36, 178.

27. Holder and Lazzara, interviews; and Owens to the author, e-mail.

28. “1998 Helicopter Interservice Transfer Pre-Screening Selection Board,” 6 Oct 

1998, procured from Maj Sean Borland.

29. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1998, vol. 1, 36–37; ibid., 1 Jan–31 Dec 

1999, vol. 1, 43; and Holder, interview. 

30. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1998, vol. 1, 123–26, 277.

31. History of 16th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 1998, vol. 1, 8–9; and Comer, interview. 

32. History of 16th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 1998, vol. 1, 1, 3, 35–37; and Trask, interview.

33. History of 16th SOW, 1 July–31 Dec 1998, vol. 1, 32–34.

34. Ibid., 31, 34.

35. Kingsley and Martin, interviews. 

36. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 1998, vol. 1, 21–25; ibid., 1 July–31 Dec 

1998, vol. 1, 18, 102; and Slife, interview. 

37. History of 353d SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 1998, vol. 1, 34, 37–39, 59; ibid., 1 July–

31 Dec 1998, vol. 1, 16, 22–23; and Crawford, “Nomads of the Pacific,” pamphlet, 22, 

Heritage File, AFSOC/HO. 

38. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 1998, vol. 1, 7, 44; and ibid., 1 July–31 

Dec 1998, vol. 1, 71, 85.

39. Stringer, interview. 

40. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 1998, vol. 1, 2, 7, 32, 40, 78; and ibid., 1 

July–31 Dec 1998, vol. 1, 62, 101.

Chapter 13

A Mature Force

~1999–2000

Wires! Climb! Climb!!!

—TSgt Ed Hux

Back to the Balkans

Unfortunately, though, as 1999 began all was not quiet in the fractious Balkans. NATO’s benevolent and persistent actions brought 

relative peace and stability to Bosnia. However, NATO did not completely quash the virulently nationalist enthusiasm of Serbian leader 

Slobodan Milosevic. He turned his attention to Kosovo, one of the 

few remaining Yugoslavian provinces. Located just south of Serbia, it 

had been a historic part of the larger nation, and Serbian roots there 

ran deep. However, by the 1990s Albanians comprised 90 percent of 

the population in that province, and they had been given a form of 

local autonomy. After the loss of Bosnia, Milosevic used his overbearing military to suppress the Albanian Kosovars. In response, 

they formed a guerilla-type movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army 

(KLA), and began to retaliate against the Serbs.

The Serbs stepped up their actions and, in one particularly bloody 

attack, killed 45 Albanian civilians in the Kosovar village of Racak. 

NATO leaders then invited all involved parties to peace talks in Rambouillet, France, in February 1999.1

The talks were futile, as Milosevic refused to accept a NATO peacekeeping force so vital to enabling any cease-fire and maintaining stability in that area. He unleashed his troops to conduct what had 

clearly been preplanned offensive operations in Kosovo. Heavily 

armed mechanized troops, special forces, and paramilitary elements 

ravaged both city and countryside in an orgy of arson, murder, and 

rape. It was a repeat of the horrible events in Bosnia—ethnic cleansing of the worst sort—all designed to drive out the Albanians and 

establish Serbian hegemony over the area. The casualties mounted 
446 │ A MATURE FORCE

into the thousands, and hundreds of thousands of refugees fled into 

the mountains or into Albania and Macedonia, threatening to overwhelm those small nations and destabilize the entire area. Allied aircrews flew over 500 missions hauling supplies into Albania, where 

American engineers quickly built three camps to care for the more 

than 60,000 refugees. 

NATO members resolved to counter the Serbian aggression with 

strong military actions. However, the supreme allied commander in 

Europe, US Army general Wesley Clark, ruled out an allied ground 

campaign. Instead, he directed USAF lieutenant general Michael 

Short, the commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe, to conduct 

Operation Allied Force (OAF), an air campaign similar to Deliberate 

Force. General Short had a massive array of allied airpower under his 

command, consisting of 650 US combat and support aircraft and 550 

comparable allied aircraft from all other NATO partner nations. 

Short would use this force to achieve three political objectives:

1. Demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to Belgrade’s [Serbia’s] 

aggression in the Balkans. 

2. Deter President Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on 

helpless civilians and create conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing. 

3. Damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or spread 

the war to neighbors by diminishing or degrading its ability to wage military operations.2

All US forces in OAF were organized as JTF Noble Anvil. As expected, SOCEUR would provide supporting special forces. Its commander, now US Army brigadier general Eldon Bargewell, activated 

JSOTF Noble Anvil to do so. Under it, the JSOTF2 at Brindisi was 

again assigned to specifically provide recovery capability. The 21st 

SOS reinforced its element there to four MH-53Js and crews. The 

20th SOS was directed to deploy augmenting forces. Capt Jim Cardoso 

was serving as the B Flight commander and deployed his flight with 

five MH-53Js, crews, and support personnel for the operations, as 

requested by the 21st SOS so that it could have a standardized fleet 

and intermix crews. However, as the Airmen and aircraft were en 

route, AFSOC ordered them to return the aircraft to Hurlburt for 

replacement with five MH-53Ms. They were joined by four MH-60s 
A MATURE FORCE │ 447

and crews from the 55th SOS as part of the larger Task Force Helo, 

commanded by Lt Col Paul Harmon.3

The 21st SOS weapons and tactics officer at that time was Capt 

Mark Daley. He had served as an intelligence officer before becoming 

a pilot and was able to leverage that background to develop an overall 

squadron CSAR plan that became the basis for the detailed planning 

done for the rescue forces in OAF. He and his team developed the 

navigation spider routes for the area and scripted the initial procedures to integrate the operations of the crews from the 21st, 20th, and 

55th into a well-functioning task force. They also scripted several 

courses of action utilizing a mixed package of MH-53s, MH-60s, and 

STS teams to maximize the inherent strengths of all.4

General Bargewell took a proprietary interest in the rescue mission and closely watched the preparation and training. Harmon 

briefed him on the options that Daley and his team had scripted. 

Bargewell knew that the Serbians expected the allied force to mount 

recovery operations for any downed aircrews and wanted his Airmen 

to have the best possible chance for success and survival. He did not 

want the Pave Lows operating singly or even in two-ship formations. 

Instead, he accepted a three-ship mini-task-force option consisting of 

two MH-53s—one MH-53M and one MH-53J—and an MH-60G. 

The MH-53s would lead and provide fire support, while the MH-60 

would be the designated recovery aircraft. A rescue mission commander (RMC) would be aboard the lead Pave Low. This individual 

would be someone seasoned—such as Lt Col Steve Laushine, the 

55th SOS commander, or Lt Col Tom Trask, the 20th SOS operations 

officer—who would be in charge and empowered to make whatever 

tactical decisions needed to execute the recovery. All helicopters 

would have PJs aboard for the actual pickup. Additionally, Bargewell 

ordered a US Army special forces ODA unit reinforced with some 

USAF special tactics personnel to be dispersed on board the helicopters. The ODA element would be available as another tactical option 

if, for some reason, it made sense to land the team members and have 

them execute some form of initial overland recovery. 

Several of the USAF crew members objected to having the “extra” 

troops on board, arguing that it forced the helicopters to fly with less 

fuel and placed more lives at risk. They took their concerns to the 21st 

SOS commander, Colonel Harmon. He addressed the issue with 

Bargewell who “in no uncertain terms” made it clear to the helicopter 

crews that this was the way the missions were going to be organized. 
448 │ A MATURE FORCE

He dictated very specific considerations and criteria for their deployment and use. When that was cleared up, the aircrews assumed alert 

posture at Brindisi.5

Vega 31

Combat operations would begin on 24 March. Colonel Harmon 

worked with Capt Jim Slife to build five helicopter teams, each led by 

a very experienced flight lead: from the 20th, Capt Jim Cardoso and 

Capt Paul Pereira, and from the 21st, Capt Jim Breck, Maj Lou Caporicci, 

and Capt Jim Slife. Every 24 hours, two teams would be on alert as 

primary and secondary. They would rotate through on the schedule 

with secondary, primary, and local duties. The primary would move 

forward to Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, reducing reaction time over 

Serbia, and the secondary would sit alert at Brindisi and primarily 

respond to calls in Kosovo. Since two models of Pave Lows were on 

site, whatever type the lead crew flew would lead. The two squadrons 

did not intermix their personnel. Captain Cardoso agreed with this 

plan. He had now flown both the MH-53J and M models and knew 

that the newer M models were more technologically advanced. However, he also believed that the theater experience of the 21st SOS guys 

was clearly a mitigating factor, later stating that “having theater experience outweighs the machine.”6

The bombing campaign began as scheduled. That night the primary rescue task force, led by Captain Slife, flew to Tuzla and assumed strip alert there. On the night of 27 March, a 20th SOS crew, 

including Captain Cardoso as flight lead for the rescue package and 

copilot Capt John Glass, took off in an MH-53M. Their call sign was 

Moccasin 60. One wingman, Moccasin 61, was an MH-53J from the 

21st SOS, flown by Capt Shawn Cameron with copilot Captain Daley 

and crew. The other wingman was Gator 07, an MH-60G from the 

55th SOS, commanded by Capt Chad Franks with copilot Capt Matt 

Glover and crew. Colonel Laushine was aboard Moccasin 60 as the 

RMC. As directed, an ODA package from the 1st Battalion, 10th SFG, 

as well as USAF special tactics personnel were dispersed among the 

three aircraft.

As the flight of three helicopters proceeded to Tuzla, the crews 

checked in with the NATO AWACS on station and overseeing the 

strikes that evening. The weather over the region was poor, with 
A MATURE FORCE │ 449

mixed rain showers and low visibility, and many strikes had been 

cancelled. Cardoso and his group landed at Tuzla and taxied to the 

refueling pits to fill their tanks. As they were doing so, the crews 

aboard Moccasin 61 and Gator 07 heard a Mayday call on the UHF 

“Guard” (military aircraft emergency) frequency. 

Immediately, Laushine and the aircraft commanders went into the 

Tuzla command center to determine what was going on. There they 

were told that an F-117 had gone down in Serbia. They quickly began 

to formulate a recovery plan and tasked intelligence for the most accurate location of the pilot, Lt Col Dale Zelko, call sign Vega 31, from 

the 49th FW at Holloman. Laushine asked for data on the enemy 

threats that they would have to deal with to get him out. Cardoso was 

a bit concerned, thinking, “a Stealth just got shot down and now 

[they] want us to go in there?” However, he was now a highly experienced Pave Low pilot and knew that, while the immediate plan was 

not clear, the crews knew what they had to do and would figure out a 

way to get Zelko out of there.7

The requested information promptly flowed into the command 

center. Intelligence sources indicated that Vega 31 was down near 

Novi Sad, Serbia, an estimated 90 miles from Tuzla. Those sources 

also reported that the Serbs realized they had shot down an F-117 

and were scrambling to capture the pilot. Several flights of A-10s and 

other supporting aircraft were being launched to assist in the rescue. 

With that information, Laushine directed his task force to take off 

and head north to set up a rendezvous with the A-10s near Osijek in 

northeast Croatia. 

The three helicopters quickly launched and headed north. In this 

area, at least, the air was clear, and night visibility was good, although 

the moon was slowly setting. En route, though, they had difficulties 

establishing communications with the A-10s and other support aircraft as Laushine tried to organize the recovery effort. Meanwhile, 

Zelko had been able to use his handheld GPS to determine his location and had securely passed it to a C-130 orbiting over Kosovo. The 

C-130 crew quickly forwarded it through intelligence channels to 

Laushine. The reported position, validated by the A-10 flight lead, 

Capt John Cherrey, who had established radio communications with 

and authenticated the survivor, indicated that Vega 31 was on the 

ground just south of the city of Ruma, 25 miles farther south. This 

was much closer to Belgrade, the heavily defended Serbian capital, 

and necessitated a complete rework of the recovery plan as the heli-
450 │ A MATURE FORCE

copter crews quickly entered Zelko’s reported GPS location into their 

navigation systems. 

To save fuel, Cardoso directed his flight crews to land their helicopters and dismount their PJs and some ODA troops to provide site 

security. He, copilot Glass, and seat flight engineer SSgt Bill Clemons 

frantically built a new route to the survivor while the crew of Moccasin 61 coordinated for a MC-130P to refuel the helicopters. Once 

that was worked out, the helicopters relaunched, quickly rendezvoused with the tanker, just 700 feet above the ground, and took on 

fuel as ground fog and low clouds were forming in the area. They repositioned to a holding point west of Ruma but still in Bosnian airspace and awaited the arrival of Cherrey’s flight, which would escort 

them in to the survivor and provide top cover against any threats that 

challenged them. 

Enemy forces were now aware of Zelko’s presence and were fully 

mobilizing to capture him. Time was of the essence. As Captain 

Cherrey was orchestrating his portion of the effort, he received an 

intelligence report that Zelko had been captured. Cherrey called him 

on his survival radio and reauthenticated him. The rescue was on. 

At the holding point, Cherrey briefed Cardoso and his flight on 

the escort and recovery plan. He told Cardoso to call him when they 

were two miles from Zelko so that he could tell Zelko to turn on his 

signaling device. They all acknowledged the plan, and Cherrey directed them to execute. 

Throughout the night, the helicopters had been operating mostly 

in clear air. As they turned inbound to Zelko, though, they encountered a layer of low-hanging clouds, fog, and rain. Flight engineer 

TSgt Ed Hux, serving as the right-door gunner and scanner on Cardoso’s 

aircraft, noted, “It was probably in the top five of the darkest nights 

that I have ever flown in 30 years of flying.” As visibility rapidly deteriorated, Cardoso and his crew, already wearing NVGs, began utilizing the FLIR system to proceed. Unfortunately, as they entered the 

low scud, Cherrey and his flight could no longer see the helicopters to 

provide direct fire support. They themselves were being engaged by 

deadly SA-6 missile batteries and were now occupied just avoiding 

Zelko’s fate.8

Entering the scud at about 50 feet above the ground, the two other 

helicopters held tactical formation on Moccasin 60 so that they did 

not get separated while so dangerously close to the ground. On board 

all three helicopters, gunners and flight engineers were earnestly 
A MATURE FORCE │ 451

scanning for immediate physical threats such as trees, towers, or 

power lines—anything that could damage or destroy a helicopter—as 

well as enemy forces. Suddenly, Hux spotted an uncharted power line 

in the haze, just ahead and level with the helicopters. He quickly 

shouted, “Wires! Climb! Climb!” as copilot Glass echoed his call. 

Cardoso immediately reacted and pulled back on the controls, flying 

his helicopter up and over the threatening wires. The other two crews 

maintained formation and also avoided the threat. Once clear of the 

wires, Cardoso descended the flight back down about 100 feet and 

proceeded toward Zelko.9

As the helicopters approached a point two miles from the survivor, 

Zelko was instructed to turn on his covert signal. He did so, not realizing that it was not working. Without visual contact, the helicopters 

began to orbit the position. Zelko could hear them. He also could 

sense that enemy forces were very near. Cardoso could also now see 

the enemy forces in the area. 

Time was now extremely critical; they needed to move in very 

quickly. Cardoso called to Zelko, “Just give me any signal!” Zelko lit 

one of his overt signal flares, and everybody in the helicopter task 

force and probably every Serbian within two miles saw him. Cardoso 

issued a few last-second directions as Gator 07, the primary actual 

recovery aircraft, maneuvered to land and pick up the survivor. Captain Franks and crew quickly and expertly landed their MH-60 just a 

few feet from Zelko as the two MH-53s orbited above, guns at the 

ready. Franks ordered his two PJs, SSgt Eric Giacchino and SrA John 

Jordan, to dismount and retrieve Vega 31. As they were doing so, Cardoso, flying above, spotted Serbian vehicles 50 meters away but did 

not direct his gunners to shoot them since he did not want to unnecessarily highlight his helicopter. Below, the two PJs quickly moved to 

secure Zelko and put him aboard the MH-60. Gator 07 was on the 

ground only about 40 seconds before the three men were aboard and 

Franks lifted off and rejoined the formation. 

As the helicopters rejoined into their prebriefed formation, the 

three aircraft turned west and headed back to Tuzla. When they 

landed there after their six-hour-and-30-minute adventure, an effusively thankful Dale Zelko was handed over to the flight surgeon and 

then flown to Aviano AB, Italy, for repatriation. The next day the 

crews held a debrief and reviewed the operation, identifying lessons 

learned and issues that needed to be addressed. To Cardoso, the 
452 │ A MATURE FORCE

results spoke for themselves. “We went in with 37 [personnel],” he 

said, adding, “We came back with 38.”10

Courtesy Col Jim Cardoso, USAF

The crew of Moccasin 60 the morning after rescuing Vega 31, Lt Col Dale 

Zelko. Left to right: MSgt John Dubuisson, Capt John Glass, TSgt Ed Hux, SSgt 

Bill Clemons, SrA Chris Bloomfield, and Capt Jim Cardoso.

The members of the task force reconstituted and were put back in 

the rotation schedule. Later, the rescue mission received the acclaim 

that it deserved; all participants were recognized for the roles they 

played, with several receiving Silver Stars, Distinguished Flying 

Crosses, Bronze Stars, and Air Medals. For his key leadership, Capt 

Jim Cardoso was presented the 2000 Jabara Award for “superior performance in fields directly involved with aerospace vehicles.”11

However, this mission had another significance, perhaps unrecognized at this time but profound in its historical implications. In 1967, 

at a time when the USAF was engaged in an intense theater war and 

losing aircraft and aircrews on a daily basis, its commanders in SEA 

forwarded to the Pentagon a requirement, SEA Operational Requirement 114, which called for “an integrated system to enable . . . helicopters to perform the essential elements of search and rescue under 
A MATURE FORCE │ 453

conditions of total darkness and/or low visibility.”12 That requirement 

provided the impetus for the development of the technology that 

changed HH- and CH-53s into MH-53Js and then MH-53Ms. However, it took the right crews, young air commandos, men of consummate professionalism and intense drive, to operationally bring those 

helicopters alive, to give them the honor of being Pave Lows. It was 

the men and machines together that made it all work. The right machines plus the right Airmen together were “Pave Low.”

At the heart of the combination was the individual crew, highly 

trained and formally structured. Each of the two officer pilots and 

four enlisted flight engineers and gunners had an integrated role to 

play based on a foundation of fundamental trust. Never was that 

more graphically on display than when Ed Hux called out those wires. 

Their presence at that precise moment was an immediate and perhaps mortal threat to those helicopters. However, the Pave Low navigational equipment did not detect them; Ed Hux did, using his “Mark 

One” eyeballs. His timely verbal warning made the difference. Given 

the relatively tight formation in which the helicopters were flying, if 

they had flown into those wires, it is very possible that any or all of 

the helicopters could have been destroyed, along with their crews. 

Hux saw them and called them out. His warning to the crew was not 

questioned; there was no request to repeat or validate or explain. 

Cardoso and Glass did what needed to be done to protect the flight—

instantaneously. Seconds later, the danger was behind them, and they 

were back on task, a bit wiser nonetheless. Hux rather casually said of 

that event later, “We had been flying as a group for a little while back 

at home station, and we could do those things—a simple testament to 

the idea that you ‘train like you fight.’ ”13

Then, the pickup itself was classic Pave Low. Moccasin 60 did not 

land to recover Vega 31, although it could have done so. Instead, it 

provided the overall leadership for the mission to facilitate the recovery 

action by the brave crew of Gator 07. The true meaning of “Pave Low 

leads” was on display.

Ultimately, the simple truth is that in the early morning hours of 

28 March 1999 in the skies over Serbia, a concept germinated 32 years 

earlier in the frustrations of the long war in Southeast Asia finally 

came to fruition. Fully 32 years of conceptualizing, planning, modifying, organizing, and training jelled in one seminal moment, and the 

rescue of Vega 31, Lt Col Dale Zelko, was the final and ultimate fulfillment of that requirement. His freedom was the end result of the 
454 │ A MATURE FORCE

right equipment and the right men at the right place at the right time, 

and for all of the right reasons.

As the air campaign continued, however, some bad blood was developing between the 20th and 21st guys. At the time the secretary of 

the Air Force had dictated that no personnel could be TDY overseas 

for more than 179 days in any 365-day period. Slife kept exact counts 

on all of his personnel. Unfortunately, just after the Vega 31 recovery, 

most of the 21st SOS personnel ran out of days. Colonel Harmon requested a waiver, but it was denied. Consequently, the squadron, 

which had been sitting on the Brindisi deployment for several years, 

would be denied the opportunity to possibly do the Big Mish because 

of an administrative rule. That did not sit well with the men of the 

21st SOS as they were replaced with more 20th crews. This animosity 

would not soon evaporate.14

Some even more serious issues were raised about command and 

control of SOF forces as they provided combat recovery support for 

the combined forces air component. General Short felt that there was 

not enough coordination between the two and had some sharp disagreements with General Bargewell. At one point, the CSAF, General 

Ryan, visited the theater and spoke with Short. He then visited the 

JSOAC, where Major Kingsley, serving as the JSOAC J-3, briefed him 

on the Vega 31 mission. Ryan was not happy with what he was hearing and terminated the briefing by abruptly getting up and leaving 

the room. It was clear to all that the disagreements between the 

USSOCOM elements and the USAF about CSAR were fundamental 

and not easily solved.15

The NATO air campaign continued unabated. JSOTF2 maintained 

the CSAR package forward at Tuzla and also a second backup package at Brindisi. Colonel Trask served as the RMC on several rotations 

but never had to respond for a recovery. Two weeks after the Vega 31 

mission, JSOTF2 was directed to dispatch two MH-53s and two MH60s to Albania to perform humanitarian-relief missions in support of 

Operation Shining Hope. Ten days later, the SOCEUR dispatched 

Task Force Hawk—a 5,000-Soldier, US Army–led force of 24 AH-64s 

and artillery and ground force elements—to Albania to support the 

KLA that was forming in Albania. As the KLA tried to initiate significant operations into Kosovo, these aviation elements were designated to 

provide them direct fire support. Capt Mike Grub and his 20th SOS 

crew and Captain Daley and his 21st SOS crew flew humanitariansupport missions forward to the small towns of Kukes, Krume, and 
A MATURE FORCE │ 455

Bajram Curri in eastern Albania. JSOTF2 identified another package 

of two MH-53s and two MH-60s to support TF Hawk out of Brindisi 

as a backup CSAR force if its internal recovery team was not sufficient. The Brindisi team was led by Capt Kent Landreth, who had just 

deployed over with crews to replace the initial Cardoso contingent. 

Landreth and the JSOTF2 crews met with their Army counterparts to 

develop TTPs, coordinate communications plans, and conduct some 

mission rehearsals. Captains Shawn Adkins and Pete Doty, also from 

the 20th SOS, piloted another of the Pave Lows that supported this 

mission. They flew sorties into Kosovo to perform bomb damage assessments and coordinate actions with US ground forces as they 

eventually moved into the area. TF Hawk did have two Apaches go 

down. However, Army aviation assets handled the recoveries, and the 

services of the Pave Low and Pave Hawk crews were never directly 

needed. The commitment was terminated at the end of May.16

Hammer 34

On 2 May, JSOTF2 was notified that an A-10 had been hit by 

ground fire over Kosovo. The rescue task force began initial mission 

planning when it was subsequently notified that the A-10 pilot had 

safely landed his aircraft at the airport at Skopje, Macedonia. That 

evening, though, allied forces were not so lucky. An F-16, Hammer 

34, from the 555th FS stationed at Aviano was shot down by an SA-3. 

The pilot, Lt Col David Goldfein, ejected and was on the ground in 

Serbia, about 40 miles southwest of Belgrade. His position and status 

had been initially reported by his flight lead, Hammer 33. 

The recovery package that night at Tuzla was the same structure as 

the Vega 31 package. Coincidentally, the RMC was again Colonel 

Laushine. However, he had different helicopter crews. This time, the 

Pave Low flight leader was Captain Landreth, the weapons and tactics 

officer from the 20th SOS. He and his crews were just lounging 

around near the command center at Tuzla when the alert arrived. The 

pilots swiftly collected critical mission information and intelligence, 

while the flight engineers and gunners went out to make sure the 

aircraft were fully ready to launch quickly. When an initial plan had 

been developed, Laushine ordered the task force to launch. 

Flying with the call sign of Skat 11, Landreth and crew prepared 

for takeoff. The second MH-53 was Skat 12, flown by Capt Tom Lang, 
456 │ A MATURE FORCE

1st Lt Dan Nielsen, and crew. The MH-60 was Skat 13, flown by Capt 

Bill Denehan, 1st Lt Tom Kunkel, and crew. It was a humid night, and 

all of the aircraft windows and NVGs were fogged up. It took a few 

moments to clear up that problem. Then Landreth led the formation 

into the crystal clear night air over Serbia with an almost full moon. 

En route, Laushine checked in with higher controlling agencies, 

which informed him that it would take two hours to assemble all necessary support aircraft, including A-10s, F-15s, and F-16s. Laushine 

realized that such a delay would push the entire rescue effort past 

sunrise. He believed that the cover of night was more valuable than 

the support package and directed Landreth to execute the recovery 

operation with just his formation of helicopters and troops on board. 

The Serbian border in this area was a river, and Landreth could see 

that it was covered with a fog bank. His copilot, Capt Tom Palenske, 

was flying the aircraft, and Landreth directed him to fly right over the 

mist so that the other two aircraft would maintain visual contact. 

Suddenly, they observed two explosions a few miles directly ahead of 

them. Within seconds, they also realized that the explosions were the 

launches of two SA-6 radar-guided missiles tracking directly toward 

their aircraft. Palenske performed a hard left turn and initiated onboard countermeasures as the two wingmen followed suit. The missiles passed a few hundred feet above the helicopters. Landreth then 

used the IDAS/MATT system to determine an escape corridor to 

avoid the radar sites. As they proceeded into Serbia, though, they observed another missile shot, this time an SA-9 infrared-guided missile. All helicopters dispensed flares, and the missile passed harmlessly overhead. They then set a course directly to the survivor’s 

reported position, taking them over an area of foothills. Several times 

they observed antiaircraft fire directed at them and actually overflew 

a 23 mm gun position that did not fire. 

Arriving at the reported location, they could not see the survivor’s 

wingman, supposedly orbiting above. Also, they could not make contact with the survivor on the survival radio frequencies. Then they 

received an updated position on the survivor from a higher controlling agency. Landreth entered it into the aircraft’s enhanced navigational system and discovered that it was 19 miles closer to Belgrade. 

Cross-checking the new position with the IDAS/MATT system, 

Landreth could see that it was just on the edge of several SA-3 and 

SA-6 radar missile threat rings. He announced to the crew, “Okay, 
A MATURE FORCE │ 457

guys, that is where we are going. It’s going to be tough. The crew responded, ‘Let’s go!’ ”17

As the helicopters turned toward the updated location, the crew 

members could see the lights of Belgrade ahead. They could also see 

occasional missile launches, although not at them. However, they did 

see ever-increasing small arms fire coming up at their aircraft. They 

were low enough that they could also hear the shooting, even over the 

roar of the aircraft engines and whirling blades. At one point, Landreth received intelligence data indicating that the Serbian air defenses were aware that his task force was in Serbian airspace and had 

been ordered to shoot them down. Landreth’s response was classic. 

“No s---!” he responded. “I figured that out at the border!”18

As the formation approached the updated location, several Serbians 

fired at the aircraft from the second story of a building. SSgt Rich Kelley, 

the flight engineer on the MH-60, returned a six-second volley with 

his minigun, which suppressed the enemy and partially sawed the 

building in half. Then crew members heard the ejected pilot talking on 

his survival radio. Using their precision locator system (PLS), they 

were able to determine a general direction to him. The survivor, Colonel 

Goldfein, heard the helicopters and tried to vector them to him. As 

the pilots were maneuvering the aircraft, the flight engineer in the 

cockpit, SSgt William “Scooter” Kerwood, was able to get an accurate 

heading and distance to him with the PLS. They turned directly to his 

location and could see personnel on the ground with flashlights. 

Some were randomly firing their weapons. However, the helicopter 

gunners did not engage them. As the helicopter formation closed 

within one mile, the crew on Skat 13 saw the survivor’s flashing beacon 

and made an approach to his location, while the two Pave Lows set up 

overwatching orbits, ready to suppress any credible threat to the operation. Skat 13 landed and within 40 seconds had Goldfein on board. 

They lifted off, and the two Pave Lows moved in around them to 

escort them out.19

The three helicopters headed west into the rising terrain along the 

western Serbian border. As they did, they could see the first tinge of 

early twilight beginning to appear directly behind them. However, 

they were not yet safely home. Palenske chose a different border 

crossing point for their leg to Tuzla. Regardless, they drew antiaircraft 

fire at two different points. As they crossed the border, Skat 11’s second 

flight engineer, SrA Vince DePersio, manning the right door, was hit 

on his helmet with a piece of shrapnel. Fortunately, he was not hurt, 
458 │ A MATURE FORCE

and the rest of the journey was uneventful. The helicopters landed at 

Tuzla, and crewmen transshipped the survivor to a waiting MC-130 

that took him to Aviano.20

Courtesy Lt Col Kent Landreth, USAF

The crews of Skat 11 and 12 the morning after rescuing Hammer 34. Left to 

right: (top) TSgt Lou Orrie and 1st Lt Tom Lang; (middle) SSgt Vince DePersio, 

SSgt Dan Weimer, SrA Grady Galvin, SrA Erik Fricsons, and 2d Lt Dan Nielson; 

(front) Capt Kent Landreth, SSgt Barry Bergschneider, 1st Lt Tom Palenske, SSgt 

Dub Scott, and SSgt Bill Kerwood (deceased).

It was another successful rescue operation for the men of the 

JSOTF2. The IDAS/MATT modification clearly contributed directly 

to the overall situational awareness of Landreth and his crew. However, all three helicopters were damaged with multiple small arms 

hits. The lead Pave Low, #67-14995, lost all of the oil out of its accessory 

gearbox. The maintenance technicians estimated that it would have 

lasted another 10 minutes before complete failure, which would have 

caused a full hydraulic failure and possibly severe electrical problems. 

Regardless, the performance of the crews was superb. Said Landreth 

of the mission, “There was so much fluidity in everything we did, it 

seemed that every crew [member] knew what the other was doing. 

The discipline that was shown is a great credit to everyone involved.”21
A MATURE FORCE │ 459

For a total of 78 days, NATO aircraft pummeled Serbian targets 

within Kosovo and the homeland with over 38,000 sorties. Using primarily precision-guided weapons delivered from higher altitudes to 

avoid the Serbian air defenses, they destroyed oil refineries and reserves, bridges, command posts, military airfields, and over 100 aircraft on the ground. Ten Serbian fighters were also destroyed in airto-air combat. 

The strategic damage to Serbia was profound, especially when the 

NATO attacks were focused upon the national electricity grid and the 

petroleum distribution system. Finally, on 3 June, President Milosevic 

agreed to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and accede to NATO’s 

demands. He signed a formal treaty with NATO commanders on 9 

June. NATO aircraft stopped patrolling over Serbia the next day when 

it was confirmed that Serbian forces were, in fact, withdrawing. On 

20 June, Operation Allied Force was officially terminated. Over the 

next two weeks, JSOTF2 kept CSAR forces on alert at Brindisi, although the 21st SOS aircraft, crews, and support personnel were released to return to Mildenhall, ending their seven-year stay at that 

forward base. On 9 July, SOCEUR commander General Bargewell 

inactivated JSOTF–Noble Anvil and JSOTF2. However, four 20th 

SOS MH-53Ms, crews, and support personnel remained at Brindisi, 

while a rescue detachment of four Moody-based 41st RQS HH-60s 

arrived to also assume CSAR duty.22

Lt Col Tim Minish remained to serve as an RMC. He did not believe that the 41st crews were ready to assume their assigned mission 

and asked Captain Landreth and his crew to stay for a few weeks to 

help them. Landreth and his Airmen agreed and were shocked to discover that the 41st RQS HH-60s had M-240 machine guns instead of 

miniguns and did not have infrared flare dispensers. Landreth was 

concerned about these deficiencies and said so. When the Moody 

crews explained that they were willing to accept the added risk, Landreth 

took his concerns to Minish, who requested that the 55th leave four 

of its fully equipped and armed MH-60s at Brindisi for the 41st crews 

to fly. This was approved, and the 55th crews went back to Hurlburt 

to prepare for the inactivation of their unit.23

Landreth had other issues with the 41st crews. They sharply questioned the efficacy of carrying the ODA personnel. Landreth explained that it was General Bargewell’s firm direction to do so. Landreth himself had initially questioned the purpose of the added Army 

and Air Force special operations personnel. However, after taking 
460 │ A MATURE FORCE

part in the rescue of Colonel Goldfein, he realized that his force 

would have only one chance to rescue Hammer 34 from the midst of 

a fully alerted Serbian nation. The ODA team provided one more 

possible tactical option to be used under specific criteria, and he concluded that such planning constituted very prudent tactical planning 

and balance of risk and reward.

Landreth was also shocked to discover that the 41st crews preferred 

to conduct their rescue operations during the day. They questioned 

Colonel Laushine’s decision to push his rescue force into Serbia under 

the cover of darkness instead of waiting for a large support force to assemble and provide daytime direct firepower support. Landreth was 

absolutely convinced that the only way he could have rescued Hammer 

34 was at night and, having done so, believed that he had the moral 

authority and responsibility to say so. He subsequently returned to 

Hurlburt unsure whether his arguments had changed the thinking of 

the 41st crews. Fortunately, the cessation of hostilities in the region 

precluded the rescue crews from ever having to put their planned procedures to the test against the lethal air defenses of Serbia.24

Return to Mildenhall

It was a cheerful homecoming for the Airmen of the 21st SOS as 

they finally settled back in at RAF Mildenhall. As SOCEUR’s sole 

heavy-lift helicopter SOF unit, it was again on call for taskings to perform SAR, CSAR, humanitarian relief, NEOs, or the classic SOF missions. With eight Pave Lows available and almost fully manned with 

experienced troops, the squadron began to expand its participation 

to exercises in Germany, Denmark, Scotland, and other classified locations. Colonel Harmon received notification that the squadron 

would soon be swapping six of its eight MH-53Js for the newly modified MH-53Ms by the end of the year, and he directed the squadron 

to insure that the necessary training capability was in place for both 

aircrew and support personnel to properly utilize the aircraft. Maj 

Jim Slife was the first to convert. He was able to get the necessary 

training from Captain Cardoso at Brindisi and began giving his 

troops the three days of academics and three required flights up in 

the mountains and electronic combat ranges in Scotland needed to 

become proficient on the advanced equipment. 
A MATURE FORCE │ 461

In recognition of the great work Captain Daley did as the chief of 

the squadron weapons and tactics office, his efforts during Operations Allied Force and Shining Hope, and overall outstanding work 

throughout the year, Colonel Harmon nominated him for the Sijan 

Award for 1999. Daley was subsequently selected for the honor and 

presented with the award in early 2000. Through December, the 21st 

averaged 70 sorties a month, one-fourth of which were on deployments. Even though the squadron was “home,” the Airmen of the 

21st still traveled across the expanse of EUCOM as they reengaged 

with their traditional US and allied customers.25

20th Special Operations Squadron

The redeploying Airmen of the 20th SOS also returned to a squadron 

in full stride. Indeed, while their teams were at Brindisi, the squadron 

continued to support exercises all over the nation. Unfortunately, on 

one exercise at Fort Bragg, MH-53J #68-10364, flying with the call 

sign of Pave 02, was destroyed on 2 June 1999 when the crew landed 

hard in a dust-out landing at the Camp Mackall Special Operations 

Training Facility. The aircraft commander was Capt John Glass, who 

had flown as copilot with Capt Jim Cardoso and crew on the Vega 31 

rescue in late March. The tail gunner, SSgt Kurt Upton, was fatally 

injured. Colonel Hester had to visit Upton’s wife to give her the official notification. As the senior squadron gunner, MSgt John Sprouse 

was directed to accompany him, along with a preacher and a lawyer. 

Sprouse later recalled that it was “quite the thing I never wanted to 

have to do again.”26

The next month, Capt Kent Landreth departed to serve a threeyear tour as a liaison officer with the Naval Special Warfare Development Group at Virginia Beach, Virginia. Additionally, Lt Col Jack 

Hester gave up command of the 20th SOS to Lt Col Tom Trask and 

departed to attend the Air War College (AWC) at Maxwell AFB. 

Trask was one of the most experienced Pave Low pilots in the community and was fully capable and ready to assume command of the 

squadron with which he had already served in two conflicts. He took 

over, determined to inculcate in his troops the continued drive for 

quiet professionalism inherent in the Pave Low community. “Train 

like you fight!” was his mantra, learned indelibly on his first searing 

combat experience in Panama. He took seriously his charge to mentor 
462 │ A MATURE FORCE

the newest generation of Pave Low crews. Two weeks after Trask took 

command of the 20th, Col Donald Wurster relinquished command 

of the 16th SOW to Col David Scott and departed for Scott AFB,

where he would serve as the AMC inspector general. He was also 

notified of his selection for promotion to brigadier general.27

As Allied Force concluded, Lt Col Mike Kingsley reported to the 

20th SOS to serve as Colonel Trask’s ops officer. They would be a 

powerful combination. The unit was still supplying CSAR forces to 

Kuwait for Operation Southern Watch, and Kingsley went over to 

serve a short tour as the Pave Low mission commander at the large 

military airfield at Ali Al Salem, a few miles to the west of Kuwait 

City. Deployed with him as his senior NCO was MSgt John Sprouse. 

Sprouse worked diligently to make the living and duty accommodations for his troops as comfortable as was possible in the desert. He 

coordinated several improvement projects with the civil engineers 

and held barbeques for his troops. Two crews were always on alert for 

CSAR taskings. Their alert tent was a bit sparse. To make it somewhat 

more accommodating, Sprouse ordered a big-screen television for 

the facility. 

A few days later, one of the Pave Lows made a logistics flight down 

to the Kuwait International Airport. While there, the crew members 

spotted a crated big-screen television. They called Sprouse, who confirmed that he had, in fact, ordered one for the unit. Sprouse told 

them to load it, and they put it aboard their aircraft for transport to 

Ali Al Salem and took off. Unwittingly, they had actually loaded a 

television that the Kuwaiti government had purchased for its embassy 

in Egypt. Kuwaiti authorities ordered the Pave Low to return to the 

airport. When it did, Kuwait police surrounded it and reclaimed the 

television. Almost simultaneously, Kingsley received a phone call 

from the American Embassy and instructions to give the television 

back as soon as possible, as a serious international incident seemed to 

be brewing. He immediately ordered his troops to do so.

A USAF inspection team was dispatched to Kuwait to investigate. 

It interviewed Sprouse, who readily admitted his role in the affair and 

took full responsibility for all of it. This was typical of Sprouse because he would not allow the two enlisted crew members involved in 

this incident to be punished for regulations infractions when they 

were following his directions. In response, his troops developed a 

deep loyalty and respect for him and his counsel.
A MATURE FORCE │ 463

Based upon the gathered evidence and testimony, the inspection 

team found Sprouse culpable, and he was ordered home for disciplinary 

action. However, when he agreed to put in his retirement papers, disciplinary actions were quietly terminated. One other young sergeant 

was also implicated but was transferred to the 31st SOS in Korea, 

providing him an opportunity to redeem himself. The incident quietly 

faded away, but the willingness of Sprouse to stand up for his enlisted 

crew members was never forgotten by those who served with him—

especially Pave Low gunner SSgt John Stricklin, who noted this as an 

excellent example of NCO leadership. Back at Hurlburt, Sprouse continued his aircrew and instructor duties and oversaw the move of the 

20th SOS to a new building on the east side of the field before retiring 

in 2001 with 26 years of “interesting” Air Force service and eight Article 15s.28

Throughout the rest of the year, the 20th SOS received more MH53Ms and by August was able to launch a 10-ship formation of MH53Ms. The squadron had not had enough personnel at home at one 

time to mount such a formation in several years. The crews and support troops participated in an endless variety of exercises to be ready 

to respond to support the operational theaters, as they had for so long 

at Brindisi, or to support national taskings as a supplier of forces to 

JSOC. In November Trask took two Pave Lows and crews and several 

other squadron personnel to Moody AFB to participate in a CSAR 

exercise with the 41st and 71st RQSs there.29

Air Force Special Operations Command

General Holland and his senior leaders at AFSOC were also glad to 

see the termination of operations in the Balkans. During that period, as 

much as 10 percent of their force was in some way tied up in that once 

seemingly interminable operation. As their Airmen returned to their 

home bases, the overall command TDY rate steadily dropped. The 

JCS directed a review of all ongoing training and annual theater exercises with the intention of consolidating those as much as possible—

consistent with mission and training needs—to reduce TDY requirements. These two events together reduced the AFSOC personnel 

tempo (PERSTEMPO) from an average of 117 days per Airman per 

year in 1998 to 67 days in 1999. 
464 │ A MATURE FORCE

Other changes were afoot at AFSOC. Perhaps reflecting the increasing role that AFSOC was playing in worldwide operations, 

Headquarters USAF, in June 1999, upgraded the AFSOC commander’s 

billet to lieutenant general rank, and General Holland passed command to Lt Gen Maxwell Bailey on 5 August 1999. Holland then departed for Germany to serve as the vice-commander of USAFE and 

was subsequently himself promoted to lieutenant general. 

As Bailey took over, he found a command that was reconstituting 

and reorganizing to fit into the larger developing USAF AEF structure. The resultant reduction in PERSTEMPO seemed to be boosting 

the retention rates. He also was pleased to discover that promotion 

rates for both officers and NCOs were, in almost all categories, above 

those for the USAF in general. 

However, he noticed that his rotary-wing force was about to be 

reduced. USSOCOM program objective memorandum guidance for 

FY 2000, approved by the Command Board of Directors in 1998, 

directed the inactivation of the 55th SOS in fall 1999. Its MH-60Gs 

would be transferred to ACC for rescue duty. Additionally, the board 

directed that the 31st SOS at Osan AB, Korea, inactivate in the spring 

of 2001. The 160th SOAR would then take over the roles formerly 

assigned to both units. Initiative 17 was slowly, but inexorably, being 

consummated. However, the twin actions also freed up personnel 

and funds for the steadily advancing arrival of the AFSOC CV-22s.30

The Pave Low fleet continued to improve as the “M” conversions 

proceeded on schedule. Within a year, both of the remaining operational squadrons would have a full complement of the incredible machines. AFSOC and ACC combined their efforts to develop a weapons 

instructor course (WIC) for MC-130, AC-130, and MH-53 crews. 

The courses would be similar to those taught at Nellis for the other 

combat components. AFSOC selectees would attend the academic 

block of instruction with the other students at Nellis to learn the 

overall process of planning and orchestrating airpower in a theater of 

operations, as well as to teach the conventional force officers about 

the intricacies of special operations forces. They would also be afforded the opportunity to develop the personal relationships necessary to better facilitate the close integration of USAF special operations forces and conventional airpower. The AFSOC students would 

then return to Hurlburt for the flying phases of the courses. WIC 

selectees would be young officers who demonstrated maturity and 

growth potential. After graduation, they would be directed to assign-
A MATURE FORCE │ 465

ments in key service, joint, and combined forces headquarters and 

command centers. It was an ambitious but exciting plan, and the 

forecast was for the first AFSOC student to attend in 2002.31

Pilot manning for the Pave Lows was still a problem, but more US 

Army warrant officers were transferring. However, the shortage had 

unintended consequences. Capt Vince Becklund had finished three 

years at the 20th and was due for a change of assignment. He applied 

for and was accepted to be an air officer commanding at the Air Force 

Academy, something he greatly wanted to do. However, he was informed that because of low Pave Low manning, he would not be able 

to leave the Pave Low cockpit. Becklund was so incensed that he considered leaving active duty and even began working with a recruiting 

firm for the Fortune 500 companies. However, an uncle who worked 

for a major corporation advised him to stay in the USAF for a career, 

pointing out that the experiences he could have in the USAF could 

not be replicated anywhere else and that after retiring from the service, he could enter the corporate world. Becklund accepted his advice 

and received an assignment to be an IP at Kirtland with the 551st.32

AFSOC also had to deal with one more issue that was a worldwide 

concern in general. In the 1970s, when computers first came into 

general use, their internal clocks were programmed to read some 

dates and years in two digits. As the calendar moved inexorably toward the year 2000, engineers realized that there was a great possibility that on six specific dates, early programming features could cause 

various computers to lock up or misread dates. Consequently, many 

key actions had to be completed by 31 March 1999. However, one 

specific concern was that nobody knew what the computers would do 

when, at midnight, they would trip over from year 99 to year 00. 

Would they continue to work as advertised or somehow assume that 

the year was now 1900 and do things totally unexpected and potentially very damaging? The implications of the possible ensuing confusion were troublesome, and the impact on combat readiness could 

not be risked. Needless to say, the Year 2000 problem, nicknamed 

Y2K, occupied everybody’s attention. Like all organizations that now 

relied on computers to run just about everything, AFSOC had to 

work with USSOCOM, the USAF, and the DOD to insure that it did 

not lose the capability to fulfill its mission requirements because its 

computers failed. Many actions had to be taken, right down to the 

individual aircraft level, to prevent any disruption. This most certainly included all of the Pave Lows. The effort cost AFSOC $4 million 
466 │ A MATURE FORCE

and endless man-hours, but as the computers were steadily reprogrammed, they did not suffer any significant degradation, and Y2K 

turned out to be a footnote to the approach to the millennium.33

31st Special Operations Squadron

Throughout 1999, the 31st was still forward deployed at Osan AB, 

providing PACOM with its needed special operations precision infil/

exfil and all-weather, heavy-lift capability. Its six Pave Low aircraft, 

crews, and support personnel were constantly on the road throughout the theater, engaging in exercises of all types to maintain mission 

capability and to constantly hone their ability to work with both US 

and allied special operations forces. There were far more requests 

than they could possibly honor. During the summer, Lt Col Steve 

Otto, the veteran of the Corvette 03 rescue attempt, took command of 

the unit. In the second half of the year, he and his squadron planners 

worked with Korean and US planners to review and update overall 

contingency options for the defense of the peninsula against a series 

of potential North Korean attack scenarios. This was the first time 

that personnel from the 31st were allowed to participate in such detailed strategizing with their Korean counterparts.34

58th Special Operations Wing/

551st Special Operations Squadron

The year 1999 was another relatively quiet one for the training 

units at Kirtland AFB. In July Colonel Folkerts finished his tour as the 

commander and was selected for promotion to brigadier general. He 

passed command to Col Michael Planert, another former Pave Low 

pilot, and departed for another staff tour at the Pentagon. In October 

the 58th received an ORI from AETC. After spending 11 days with 

the wing looking into every aspect of its operations, the inspection 

team awarded the 58th an overall rating of excellent, with many laudable unit and individual accomplishments. The wing was especially 

recognized for the aggressive actions it was taking to prepare for the 

arrival of the CV-22, possibly as early as 2003.35

One of those “excellent” unit ratings went to the 551st SOS. The 

unit still had its mixed fleet of six TH-53As and five MH-53Js. Both 

aircraft were optimally used throughout flying training. Eleven dif-
A MATURE FORCE │ 467

ferent courses were now being conducted by the 551st to produce the 

combat crew members needed out in the operational squadrons. 

Their use was balanced with the training provided by the 58th 

TRSS simulators and part-task trainers. That unit continued to develop what had truly become a state-of-the-art system. All of its flight 

simulators, including the TH-53A operational flight trainer and the 

MH-53J WST, were integrated into a massive distributed mission 

training program that linked with other computers into the larger 

SOFNET system. This network capability allowed aircrews to fly realtime missions against other aircrews in other simulators at other 

bases. Additionally, the system had access to a global geographical 

database and satellite-based navigation simulation that allowed crews 

to literally “fly” a mission anywhere in the world. The practical result 

of this synergy was obvious—AFSOC now had a simulator system in 

which combat crews could practice a mission anywhere under any 

simulated weather conditions. Mistakes heretofore seen only in actual operational situations could now be captured in simulation, 

studied, and corrected. This was a quantum advance in the operational use of evolving computer flight simulation technology. 

On a smaller but no less important scale, the 58th TRSS had built 

an Aerial Gunner Scanner Simulator (AGSS) to train the Pave Low 

gunners and flight engineers. The interactive and real-time system 

allowed these young Airmen to practice crew coordination, target 

recognition, gunnery procedures, and visual scanning techniques. It 

simulated the cabin of an MH-53 and was equipped with either a 

50-caliber machine gun or 7.62 mm minigun that could be “fired” 

and scored for maximum safe and dollar-efficient training.36

The combined flight and simulator training was further leavened 

with occasional real-life rescue opportunities that occurred in New 

Mexico and sometimes other areas in the general southwest region of 

the United States. In 1999, 551st crews rescued a trapped hiker in the 

Sandia Mountains and flew several missions in an unsuccessful effort 

to find a lost Cherokee Piper aircraft and occupants along the New 

Mexico/Colorado border. The crews and occasionally students also 

got to participate in the frequent bilateral and Chili Flag training 

events held in the area, allowing them to work with the classic special 

operations customers with whom they could possibly work in operational theaters. During the year, the 551st qualified 32 pilots, 22 flight 

engineers, and 21 aerial gunners for Pave Low crew duty. On 3 June 

1999, Lt Col Randy O’Boyle handed over command of the 551st SOS 
468 │ A MATURE FORCE

to another career Pave Low pilot, Lt Col Dennis Jones, one of the 

heroes of the Yarrawonga rescue in 1989.37

Air Force Special Operations Command

As the last year of the century began, AFSOC was still catching its 

breath from the Balkans experience. Within the command, General 

Bailey worked with his staff to make the necessary organizational and 

personnel changes to support the USAF as it reorganized its forces 

into AEFs to better support contingency operations. With 10 years of 

almost constant deployments and contingency operations, the AFSOC 

was well experienced now at providing its forces to accomplish the 

classic SOF missions in whatever tailored packages were needed. Additionally, its Pave Low units were still capable of providing first-class 

rescue capability, even as a collateral mission, as was dramatically illustrated a few months earlier in Serbia. In fact, the CSAF, General 

Ryan, had received briefings on the CSARs and, while pleased with 

the results, was concerned that a disconnect existed between service 

CSAR doctrine and the current allocation of CSAR-capable forces. 

He was well aware of the recent history of CSAR in the USAF and the 

AFSOC’s several attempts to address shortfalls in the service’s ability 

to provide CSAR forces to the COCOMs. He had also seen the mission from the war-fighting commander’s perspective and knew that 

assigned SOF helicopter and tanker elements could perform CSAR as 

well as SOF missions, while assigned rescue forces were trained for 

CSAR duty only. Succinctly, the war fighters felt that they got more 

value for their dollar with SOF than with the conventional Air Force 

CSAR units. The math was easy. Ryan directed AFSOC and ACC to 

sort it out and improve CSAR integration.38

In response, the AFSOC director of operations, Col Steve Connelly 

(followed by Col James Connors, who replaced Connelly in April 

2000 when Connelly gave up the position pending his mandatory retirement), directed the 16th SOW and 352d and 353d SOGs to place 

a priority on participating in exercises that specifically focused on 

CSAR and utilized their tanker, helicopter, and special tactics squadron 

assets. Their schedulers also built a sequence of six CONUS exercises 

and two conferences in which the 16th SOW assets would participate.39

However, both AFSOC and ACC planners realized that neither the 

AFSOC Pave Low units nor the combat air forces rescue units alone 
A MATURE FORCE │ 469

could continuously provide CSAR coverage in all the areas where it 

might be needed. To provide proper coverage for all AEFs, ACC 

and AFSOC had to work closely and insure that their units utilized 

common TTPs for uniformity of effort. Additionally, to better address 

the issue of conventional and SOF force integration, efforts continued toward developing and initiating the WIC, now on track to 

graduate its first students in 2002. Classrooms were procured in the 

20th SOS building, and the initial cadre of instructors began developing course syllabi.40

To honor the participants of the Serbian rescue missions, the USSOCOM commander, Gen Peter Schoomaker, traveled to Hurlburt 

Field on 4 February 2000 to present three Silver Stars, 15 Distinguished Flying Crosses, and one Bronze Star to 19 Airmen from those 

missions as squadron mates, families, and local dignitaries looked on.41

A few days after the Hurlburt award ceremony, Colonel Trask, 

crews, and support personnel took two Pave Lows and flew to Moody 

AFB for another personnel recovery conference and CSAR exercise 

with the Moody-based 41st and 71st RQSs and several other units 

and organizations. Arriving, they found a rather frosty atmosphere. 

The ACC rescue personnel, who were the designated rescue force, 

openly resented that the Pave Lows were getting most of the operational taskings and, correspondingly, the acclaim inherent in their 

recent missions in the Balkans. Lt Col Paul Harmon was also there, 

and he and Trask tried to make the case that they were merely doing 

what they were ordered to do. Trask pointed out that CSAR was a 

collateral—but assigned—mission, even remarking in one session 

that, in his opinion, Pave Low SOF and CSAR missions and TTPs 

were 80 percent similar. Colonel Connelly, still serving in his last 

months before retirement, also tried to remind all attendees that even 

though they wore different command patches, they all still served in 

the same Air Force. The conventional rescue guys were not in a very 

receptive mood, and the bitterness remained. 

Regardless, as this exercise was going on, two more Pave Lows and 

Airmen deployed to Fallon NAS, Nevada, to participate with a large 

joint force in a two-week series of missions utilizing the great tactical 

ranges in northern Nevada. The 20th also dispatched another rotation of four Pave Lows, crews, and 68 support personnel to Ali Al 

Salem AB to provide real-world on-call CSAR support for allied aircraft operating over Iraq as part of Southern Watch.42
470 │ A MATURE FORCE

In a somewhat related move, the AFSOC staff took actions to provide more career continuity and stability for the Pave Low gunners by 

redesigning their career field. Heretofore, all aerial gunners had carried the Air Force specialty code of weapons mechanics. Given the 

unique role they performed on board several AFSOC aircraft, command staff members worked with their counterparts at USAF personnel to create a 1A7 Air Force specialty code for gunners as their 

own separate and unique identifier. This change would also allow 

first-term Airmen, just out of basic training, to go directly into aerial 

gunner assignments under a process unofficially called the highschool-to-flight-school program. Additionally, all gunners would 

now receive flight pay as long as they were assigned to flying duty 

positions. These changes were effective at the end of October 2000.43

Operation Atlas Response

While attending the CSAR exercise at Moody, Harmon got a call 

directing him to return to the 21st SOS as soon as possible. The nation 

of Mozambique in southeastern Africa had just been inundated with 

heavy rains and subsequent flooding. USEUCOM was tasked to prepare a humanitarian mission, and the 21st SOS might be directed to 

deploy Pave Lows and crews to participate in the effort. Already, a 

humanitarian assistance survey team had been dispatched to the 

area. As relief supplies began to flow into that beleaguered nation, 

another tropical cyclone swept ashore and dropped additional torrents of rain, causing widespread destruction and population displacement. On 1 March, Secretary of Defense William Cohen authorized the deployment of US forces to support humanitarian assistance 

and disaster relief in Mozambique and its neighboring countries. Immediately, USEUCOM issued an execute order to form a JTF for 

Operation Atlas Response (JTF-AR). In support, the 352d SOG was 

directed to provide up to six MH-53s, three MC-130Ps, three MC130Hs, and 100 support personnel to deploy to Maputo, Mozambique, 

as the joint special operations air component (JSOAC) of a subordinate JSOTF-AR, under SOCEUR control and commanded by Col 

Mike Russell, the current vice-commander of SOCEUR. He selected 

Lt Col Corby Martin to deploy with him and act as his director of 

operations. Their assigned missions would be to provide SAR sup-
A MATURE FORCE │ 471

port as needed and conduct long-range supply and distribution operations over extended distances.

The 352d SOG commander, Col John Zahrt, would act as the 

JSOAC commander. He decided to dispatch three 21st SOS MH-53s. 

Initially, he also asked SOCEUR to augment him with three US Army 

H-60s. However, he changed his request and instead asked that three 

USAF HH-60Gs from the 41st RQS based at Moody (and augmented 

with personnel from the 56th RQS based at Keflavik NAS, Iceland, 

who were just finishing a Northern Watch tour in Turkey) be diverted 

with their crews and support personnel to assist in this operation. His 

request was approved, and they were rerouted, arriving at the airport 

near Hoedspruit, South Africa, on 8 March, where they were under 

the tactical control of JSOTF-AR. 

On 11 March 2000, the first MH-53 arrived by C-5 at a South 

African air base at Hoedspruit. The next day, the crew launched into 

Mozambique and began delivering needed 

supplies. Two days 

later, the other two 

MH-53s were in place 

and also supporting 

the operation. Their 

missions were to rescue people, perform 

medical evacuations 

as needed, integrate 

into the growing effort 

now involving numerous international and 

nongovernmental organizations, move people and supplies, and conduct photographic 

reconnaissance to assess damage from the flooding and to locate 

isolated refugees. With the helicopters now in place, relief operations started in earnest. The HH-60s flew up to the airfield at Beira, 

Mozambique, and worked primarily over the northern portion of 

the country. The Pave Lows stayed at Hoedspruit and worked 

mainly over the southern half of the nation. Both groups of helicopters were supported by the MC-130P tankers, enabling them to 

work at much longer ranges to deliver supplies to the flooded outlying areas.

A 21st SOS Pave Low refuels over Mozambique 

during Operation Atlas Response.

Courtesy AFSOC History Office
472 │ A MATURE FORCE

This deployment provided a unique experience for the Airmen of 

the 21st SOS. There was not enough billeting for all of the troops on 

Hoedspruit, and several were housed in tents on a game preserve. At 

night they feasted on locally killed game and watched the wild animals prowl about. One evening they were even taken on a driving 

tour of the area. For many, it was a surreal experience for which some 

people would pay thousands of dollars.44

For the next two weeks, the MH-53s and HH-60s flew missions as 

required to provide support to the effort. On one occasion, one of the 

Pave Lows flew a search mission to find a 352d SOG Airman lost on 

a recreational outing designed to give the hard-working maintenance 

and support personnel a well-deserved chance to relax. Unfortunately, Amn Jeffrey Costa had fallen into a fast-moving river and was 

swept over a waterfall. He was killed, and his body was recovered by 

South African forces. The Pave Low search effort realized a small 

amount of good fortune when PJs on board spotted two stranded 

hikers, one of whom was injured, and returned them to safety. 

By 26 March, the Mozambique authorities felt that they had the 

situation firmly under control, and the USAF assets began to leave. At 

completion, the JSOTF aircraft had flown 319 sorties carrying 203 

tons of cargo and 387 passengers. The HH-60s and personnel were 

the first to leave since this had been an extension of their original 

deployment. The Paves and their crews left via C-5 on 30 March, with 

the Airmen feeling satisfied that they had made a tremendous contribution to the overall relief effort.45

Returning to Mildenhall, the 21st SOS resumed its standard training 

schedule as aircraft and crews were dispatched to work and train with 

both US and allied special forces elements in Scotland, Norway, and 

throughout the theater. In June Colonel Harmon relinquished command of the 21st SOS to Colonel Minish, his fellow Desert Storm 

rescue veteran, to whom he had seemingly been joined at the hip almost ever since, and departed to attend AWC. Major Slife departed to 

attend the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) and ultimately also 

the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) at Maxwell AFB. 

Lt Col Joe Becker joined the squadron to serve as the operations 

officer. Since leaving the 551st FTS in 1994, he had served in a series 

of nonflying assignments, primarily in the special operations world. 

His last assignment had been at SOCEUR headquarters. When his 

assignment to the 21st SOS and requirement to requalify in the 
A MATURE FORCE │ 473

MH-53 arrived, he happily packed up his wife, Susan, and three 

daughters, Emily, Ellen, and Elise, and moved to England.46

Becker was joined there by MSgt John DeSalle. He had served four 

years with the 20th as the NCO in charge of scheduling and for a 

short period as the squadron first sergeant, while also doing his share 

of Brindisi rotations. Now serving at the 21st as the squadron operations superintendent with Becker, he was also flying and going on 

TDYs to get crews ship-landing qualified and to work with the various 

allied special forces elements throughout the theater. He helped train 

the gunners, although the 21st did not have as many as the 20th, before 

moving up to the 352d SOG to serve in the standardization and evaluation office. Regardless, he was right where he wanted to be, and his 

wife, now a technical sergeant, was with him on a concurrent tour.47

In November Minish led the squadron in a somber duty. It gathered 

in the base chapel to hold a remembrance ceremony for a unit predecessor, long gone. Twenty-five years earlier, 2d Lt Richard Vandegeer, 

a copilot flying a CH-53 with the 21st SOS, then assigned to Nakhon 

Phanom AB, Thailand, had been killed when his CH-53 was shot 

down and destroyed near Koh Tang Island, Cambodia. He was officially declared the last US casualty of that long and long-ago-divisive 

war. His body had been recovered in 1995 and positively identified in 

2000. On 1 November 2000, his remains were buried at Arlington 

National Cemetery. Minish gathered his Airmen to remember that 

young lieutenant and his sacrifices as a precursor to what would later 

become the community of Pave Low. 

One month later, in early December, the 21st SOS was once again 

tasked to support a presidential visit as President Clinton decided to 

travel to Dublin and Belfast in Ireland and to London. The entourage 

would include 100 people requiring transportation. Colonel Becker 

was the 21st SOS operations officer and did the planning. Looking at 

the projected travel itinerary, he realized that the 21st would not be 

able to move such a group on its own and requested support through 

SOCEUR. It assigned him six US Army CH-47s and three UH-60s to 

assist with the mission. Becker had to arrange to support operating 

locations in Dublin and at RAF Brize Norton in the UK. Given the 

visit schedule, the operation would require flying with NVGs and 

into some tricky landing zones in all three cities. Regardless, the almost ad hoc “task force” that Becker had to build performed well and 

had only a few minor glitches. In all, the teams flew 12 sorties, logging almost 70 hours in the support effort—really a short-notice, 
474 │ A MATURE FORCE

high-profile, no-fail mission that brought out the best attributes of 

SOF forces. For the second half of 2000, the squadron averaged about 

115 sorties a month, half of which were at deployed locations, quite a 

testament to the Pave Low maintainers at RAF Mildenhall.48

Courtesy AFSOC Public Affairs

The 21st SOS provides support to President Clinton’s trip to the United Kingdom.

20th Special Operations Squadron

Back at Hurlburt, the 20th assisted in the preparations for the WIC 

by preparing rooms for the classes while also participating in the 

endless flow of exercises and training deployments that were the 

unit’s regimen. The squadron was flying about 170 sorties a month 

with its 19 assigned MH-53s. In September, the 20th coordinated 

with its supporting 16th Helicopter Generation Squadron (HGS) to 

mass launch 13 MH-53s at one time. The crews then replicated a series of tactical missions until thunderstorms sweeping through the 

area forced a cancellation of the flights. The aircraft were regenerated 

and made ready for a second mass launch after dark. Continued inclement weather forced cancellation of that launch. Regardless, it was 

quite an accomplishment for the maintenance teams to generate so 

many sorties at once and spoke well of their expertise and dedication 

to supporting the mission. 
A MATURE FORCE │ 475

The next week, five of the aircraft were flown to Fort Campbell 

with support teams to work with US Army ground and aviation units 

there. They focused on direct-action-type assaults into urban areas 

and simulated terrorist-fortified areas. The next month, the 20th dispatched its helicopters and Airmen to Norfolk to work with US Navy 

SEAL Team 2 and conduct deck qualification training on the USS 

Shreveport. At almost the same time, Colonel Trask led a task force of 

three Pave Lows and an MC-130 to Pope AFB to work with the 75th 

FS, an A-10 unit based there, on combat rescue missions. For three 

days and nights the two groups worked through a variety of scenarios 

to provide excellent training for both groups. Wrote Trask in his after 

action report, “Execution was not flawless but the lessons learned 

were extensive and operations improved over the three days. This 

type of bilateral exercise should remain one of our regular options as 

we try to do at least a quarterly CSAR exercise.”49

Similar to the rescue units at Kirtland, the 20th SOS responded to 

rescue calls from the southeastern region of the United States. Such 

was the case when on 13 December 2000, the unit diverted a Pave 

Low on a training mission to recover an F-16 pilot who had bailed 

out into the Gulf of Mexico. Working with a US Coast Guard HU-25 

Falcon, the Pave Low crew dropped down below a 400-foot ceiling to 

find the pilot floating about 20 miles off the coast south of Apalachicola, Florida. The two flight engineers, TSgt T. J. Carmichael and 

SSgt Gary Mishey, pulled him out of the water and provided first aid 

as the pilots delivered him to the hospital at Tyndall AFB, Florida. It 

certainly was not as dramatic as the rescue of Vega 31; however, it was 

another of the many missions that the crews could and did do with 

the world’s finest and most capable heavy-lift helicopters on an almost routine basis.50

At the same time, the AFSOC staffers located just down the flight 

line from the 20th SOS were still struggling with the CSAR issue. In 

reviewing the results from the now almost steady CSAR exercises so 

far in 2000 and recent CJCS concerns expressed by combatant commanders about CSAR coverage, Colonel Connors—replacing Colonel 

Connelly as the AFSOC DO—provided guidance to all units to participate in a minimum of three major CSAR exercises a year. Connors 

further proposed to ACC that the AFSOC would commit to provide 

a CSAR task force of four MH-53Ms, two MC-130s, and an STS team 

each spring for a 90-day deployment to Southern Watch. This would 

allow that command to reduce the operating tempo of its rescue units 
476 │ A MATURE FORCE

to an acceptable level while still meeting the theater commander’s 

needs. For AFSOC, the CSAR issue was not going away. Even though 

it was doctrinally a collateral mission, the immutable reality was that 

the USAF did not have enough conventional air rescue force structure to cover all contingencies. It still needed augmentation. It was 

widely understood, too, that the MH-53M was far and away the best 

CSAR aircraft for the mission and was being operated by a community 

of crew members who were now highly experienced as a result of an 

almost continuous decade of contingency and combat operations.51 

31st Special Operations Squadron

The last year of the century found the “nomads of the Pacific” still 

based at Osan with their six assigned MH-53Js. True to their moniker, 

they were constantly on the move. They availed themselves of the rich 

training opportunities extant with all of the customers available to 

them in the theater. Accordingly, their aircrews also became adept at 

long-range, overwater flights and air-to-air refuelings under any conditions. However, being the only AFSOC Pave Low unit assigned to a 

remote location, and geographically separate from its mother unit, the 

squadron was constantly challenged to maintain a stable 248-person 

maintenance and support workforce, especially its highly specialized 

Pave Low technicians. Regardless, the unit possessed one of the best 

maintenance records in the USAF. On 30 June, Colonel Otto handed 

over command of the unit to the operations officer, Lt Col Brendan 

Clare, and departed to attend AWC. Within a week of assuming command, Clare and the 31st deployed with other 353d elements to Taegu 

AB, Korea, to participate in another exercise as a workup for an ORI 

expected in the fall. As planned, the 353d SOG returned to Taegu in 

mid-October with 492 personnel to participate in the huge annual Exercise Foal Eagle. As part of the exercise, the 353d formed a headquarters and functioned as a combined joint special operations air component (CJSOAC) for US and Korean forces. The 31st was tasked to 

support the exercise and inspection with four aircraft, which were then 

assigned classic SOF missions. The 353d received an overall “excellent” 

rating for the operational readiness portion of the inspection. Since 

Korean elements were involved in the operations, the detailed ORI report was classified. The rest of the year was relatively mundane as the 

31st then began to prepare for its planned inactivation in 2001.52
A MATURE FORCE │ 477

551st Special Operations Squadron

As the end of the century approached, life remained stable and 

predictable at the training unit. The basic qualification course for pilots and flight engineers remained at 160 days and still utilized the 

TH-53As and MH-53Js. Scheduling was a bit tight, though, because 

the unit was manned with only 80 percent of its authorized pilot and 

aerial gunner instructors and 90 percent of flight engineer instructors. In October the 551st SOS was notified that it would be receiving 

the MH-53Js from the inactivating 31st SOS sometime the next year 

to replace the TH-53As that would then be retired. The unit also 

learned that none of the Kirtland MH-53Js would be modified to the 

“M” configuration. 

The part-task trainers and simulators maintained and operated by 

the 58th TRSS continued to directly supplement the procedures and 

flight training, although course syllabi were constantly analyzed and 

adjusted for efficiencies. The simulators were also used for the threeday recurrent training for the Pave Low crew members who came to 

Kirtland for the training.

Courtesy SSgt Glen Fleming, USAF

Overwater training with the 31st SOS
478 │ A MATURE FORCE

Reflecting the establishment of a specific Air Force specialty code for 

aerial gunners, AETC established a basic aerial gunner’s course at Kirtland. The course was slated to last 25 days, and graduates would receive 

an Air Force specialty code of 1A731, preparing them for follow-on specific gunner’s training for their assigned aircraft. This training track 

opened up the gunner’s career field to initial-tour USAF enlistees. The 

first class started in October. This change would have a direct, if initially 

indeterminate, impact on Pave Low. Heretofore, all gunners coming to 

the aircraft were at least second-tour enlistees, generally holding at least 

the rank of sergeant. This meant also that they were a bit more mature 

and settled in their lives. Now the Pave Low units could expect to begin 

receiving first-term Airmen, young men who not only needed to be 

trained as gunners but also would probably need a bit of help to mature. 

Fortunately, the Pave Low squadrons had a plethora of senior NCOs like 

MSgt John DeSalle to help them do just that.53

Throughout the year, crews from the 551st participated in several 

training exercises, affording them the opportunity to stay exposed to 

the various customer elements they would work with in the operational 

squadrons. Additionally, the 551st provided crews for newly developed 

virtual exercises being conducted with the MH-53 WST and integrated 

through the SOFNET system with flight simulators in other locations. 

This creative use of the WSTs provided an excellent opportunity for 

various command and control centers to accomplish some valuable 

decision-making training at much lower cost. In December 551st crews 

were called out to do another local SAR, this time to find and recover 

two missing teenagers lost while skiing near Santa Fe, New Mexico. A 

TH-53A with PJs aboard launched to the site and found the two skiers. 

Because of the rugged terrain, the two had to be hoisted out. Suffering 

from hypothermia, they were given first aid by the PJs and then flown 

to Kirtland AFB and transported to a local hospital.

For the year, the 551st qualified 32 pilots, 17 flight engineers, and 

nine aerial gunners for the operational Pave Low squadrons. Additionally, the 58th TRSS provided simulator refresher training for 118 MH-53 

pilots, 102 flight engineers, and 93 aerial gunners.54

   

It was an eventful decade for Pave Low. At its beginning, the 20th 

and 21st SOSs saw heavy duty in Operations Desert Storm and Provide 
A MATURE FORCE │ 479

Comfort, where their aircraft and crews flew CSAR, classic SOF support missions, and humanitarian operations. At the same time, the 

31st SOS was coming to fruition as the third Pave Low operational 

unit when the squadron was swept up in the debacle of the Mount 

Pinatubo eruption, completely disrupting the unit’s operations and 

necessitating its relocation to Korea. 

A customer’s view of Pave Low

Next, the Pave Low force was dispatched to the seemingly endless 

imbroglio in the Balkans, again performing a variety of missions, 

fully exercising the aircraft and crews across the broad spectrum of 

its capabilities. It also answered several taskings to deploy to various 

parts of Africa either for NEO or humanitarian missions. At the same 

time, AFSOC was constantly upgrading the aircraft and searching for 

those Airmen best fitted for Pave Low duty, while producing promising 

young officers and NCOs who showed potential for service at higher 

ranks and positions of authority. 

As the year 2000 was coming to a conclusion, the MH-53 fleet was 

healthy, although constantly going through some form of update—

Courtesy AFSOC Public Affairs
480 │ A MATURE FORCE

this time with the addition of Kevlar blankets in the cabin area, a 

Block 10 upgrade to the IDAS/MATT, and improved self-defense 

systems. The aircraft inventory consisted of two MH-53Js and 17 

MH-53Ms in the 20th SOS, eight MH-53Ms in the 21st SOS, six MH53Js in the 31st SOS, and five MH-53Js and six TH-53As in the 551st 

SOS.55 However, when considering that these MH-53s derived from a 

fleet that originally consisted of 52 HH-53s and 20 CH-53s, the staggering loss rate indicated that the missions assigned to them were 

inherently challenging and fraught with danger. 

The operational units were fully manned and functioning as designed, with the 21st and 31st as forward-based units specifically focused on the two most important theaters and the 20th SOS as the 

national reserve. Concurrently, the 551st SOS continued to produce 

qualified aircrews for all. Pilots who had flown Pave Low now numbered almost 400. Of those, 37 had risen to command these units, five 

had matriculated to wing command, and three had been selected for 

general officer. There is no way to count all of the great enlisted Airmen who either flew, maintained, or supported this fleet of aircraft. 

However, the performance of all the officers and enlisted troops together in Desert Shield/Storm, the various Balkans operations, the 

numerous NEOs, and all the myriad operations and rescues—classified 

and unclassified—in between speaks to their dedication and professionalism. This fact was validated in the series of ORIs that took place 

during the decade. It was clear that the cadre of individuals who had 

grown up with the MH-53 fleet in the 20th SOS during the 1980s had 

now become a full-fledged and matured community of like-minded, 

highly skilled, and professional Airmen who, when crewed on those 

marvelous aircraft, became Pave Low. It is most heartening, too, to 

note that as busy as the units were, they could still take time to remember their predecessors from the Jolly Green and Knives days in 

Southeast Asia by gathering as they did for the funeral of the six 

downed crew members of Jolly Green 67 and Lieutenant Vandegeer. 

At the end of this challenging decade, the entire Pave Low community seemed to have become a “unit of confidence,” harking back 

to the phrase coined by Joe Guilmartin to describe the 40th ARRSq 

and 21st SOS after their Koh Tang mission fully 25 years earlier. Like 

their earliest predecessors, the operational Pave Low units in existence had developed that “will and ability of their members to perform under stress” and create “the cohesive mechanism that holds 
A MATURE FORCE │ 481

units and crews together in combat . . . a group phenomenon, not an 

individual one.”56

However, there were still challenges. Initiative 17 appeared to be 

alive as a looming threat and seemingly a contributor to the inactivation of the 31st SOS. The whole issue of CSAR still festered as the 

USAF struggled to solve the mismatch of mission capability and mission requirement. The aircraft were aging and steadily dwindling in 

numbers. More ominously, though, Saddam Hussein was still there, 

as were a growing number of terrorist groups intent on directly challenging the Western world in general and the United States in particular. They presaged dramatic challenges in the new millennium. 

Such realities simmered in the background as Col Steve Connolly 

met his mandatory retirement in June 2000 after 30 solid years of 

service. His entire career was interlaced with the development and 

utilization of Pave Low, from the very first test aircraft, to three unit 

commands, to serving as the DO of the only organization in the 

world that operated the aircraft. It was a career long in distinction 

and too quickly ending. Lt Gen Clay Bailey officiated at his retirement ceremony, reminding all that Connelly was an “inspirational 

and irreplaceable leader” and highlighting Connelly’s incredible record of achievement before yielding the podium to the honoree himself. To the crowd of over 400 of his fellow air commandos, he said,

AFSOC is right where things are happening in the world. People come here 

because they are looking to put their lives into something meaningful. . . . 

Whether it be rescuing a downed fighter pilot, or providing food to some wartorn piece of Africa, or rescuing hostages or evacuees from who knows what 

little country in some little crowded embassy some place in a corner of the 

world—they want to be here.

It’s a great mission . . . the protection of freedom. . . . It’s the mission that pulls 

it all together. 

Speaking directly to his Pave Low brethren, he conveyed, “The 

MH-53s are going to be retired here in the next 10 years or so. I am 

glad that I left before they stuck one on a [pedestal] in the airpark 

somewhere. . . . But we’re not done with the MH-53s. They’ll be called 

again. And there’ll be no time to get ready. They’ll be packed up for a 

C-5 or C-17 and moved out of Hurlburt, and within 24–48 hours, 

they’ll fly into combat.”57

Nobody standing there that day could—in their wildest imagination—

divine how quickly those words would come true. 
482 │ A MATURE FORCE

Notes 

1. Stewart, American Military History, vol. 2, 446. 

2. Air War over Serbia, 1.

3. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1, xviii, 283.

4. Daley to the author, e-mail, 10 Sept 2010. 

5. Whitcomb, “Night They Saved Vega 31,” 70–75; and Harmon and Trask, interviews. 

6. Slife and Cardoso, interviews.

7. Cardoso, interview.

8. Whitcomb, “Night They Saved Vega 31,” 70–75; and Hux, interview.

9. Hux, interview.

10. Whitcomb, “Night They Saved Vega 31,” 70–75; After Action Report for CSAR 

for Vega 31, 5 April 1999, OAF file, 1st/16th SOW HO; and Cardoso and Hux, interviews.

11. Data supplied by Lt Col Steve Simon, USAF, retired, and Ms. Jean Bickford, 

Association of Graduates, Air Force Academy, CO.

12. History of ARRS, 1 July 1970–30 June 1971, vol. 1, 191.

13. Hux, interview; and Cardoso to the author, e-mail, review comments. 

14. Slife, interview.

15. Kingsley, interview.

16. Stewart, American Military History, vol. 2, 446; Trask and Landreth, interviews; 

and Doty to the author, e-mail.

17. Landreth, interview.

Courtesy Col Steve Connelly, USAF, Retired

Col Steve Connelly, who retired in 2000, foresaw a busy future for Pave Low.
A MATURE FORCE │ 483

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Hewson, “Operation Allied Force, Part 2,” 100; Wright and McKenna, “To 

the Rescue,” 17–19; and Landreth, interview.

22. Brown, “AFSOC in the Balkans,” 52–53, AFSOC/HO; History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–

31 Dec 1999, vol. 1, 120–21; and History of 352d SOG, 1 July–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1, vi.

23. Landreth and DePersio, interviews.

24. Landreth, interview.

25. History of 352d SOG, 1 July–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1, 1, 40, 48, 51; Slife, interview; 

and Daley to the author, e-mail, 10 Sept 2010.

26. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1, 137, 344; and Sprouse, interview.

27. Landreth and Trask, interviews; and History of 16th SOW, 1 July–31 Dec 

1999, vol. 1, 1–2.

28. Trask, Kingsley, and Sprouse, interviews; and Stricklin to the author, e-mail, 

22 Jan 2011.

29. History of 16th SOW, 1 July–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1, 23–24.

30. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1, 21, 38, 44; History of 353d 

SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 2001, vol. 2, supplemental doc. 1–9, AFSOC Programming Plan 

(PPlan) 99–04: Inactivation of 31st Special Operations Squadron, 30 Sept 1999, 1.

31. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1, 25–26.

32. Becklund, interview.

33. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1, 66, 168–70.

34. History of 353d SOG, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1, 4, 29–31.

35. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1, 1, 31–34.

36. Ibid., 2–4.

37. Ibid., 3, 14, 36, 51, 64, 139.

38. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1, 93.

39. Ibid., 1, 70, 93–95.

40. Ibid., 27, 33.

41. Ibid., 26.

42. History of 16th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 2000, vol. 1, 4, 22–23; History of AFSOC, 

1 Jan–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1, 94; and author’s personal notes, Moody conference.

43. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1, 48. 

44. Slife, interview. 

45. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1, 72–81; Partin, Herlocker, and 

Murphy, Special Operation Forces in Operation Atlas Response, 23–39, 74–75; and 

Slife, interview. 

46. Joe Becker, interview. 

47. DeSalle, interview. 

48. History of 352d SOG, 1 July–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1, xiii, 52–61, 77.

49. Pope AFB, Combat Search and Rescue Exercise After Action Report, 20 Nov 

2000, 20th SOS, historical files, 1st/16th SOW HO.

50. History of 16th SOW, 1 July–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1, 30–31, 63.

51. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1, 97.

52. History of 353d SOG, 1 July–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1, vii, 3–4, 8–10, 26; and History 

of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1, 105–6. 
484 │ A MATURE FORCE

53. DeSalle, interview.

54. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 2000, vol. 1, 17–18, 45, 47; and ibid., 1 

July–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1, 4, 9, 15, 20, 27, 39, 41.

55. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1, 233.

56. Guilmartin, Very Short War, 41–42.

57. MSgt Cathy Landroche, “A True Special Operator Says Goodbye,” Commando, 

9 June 2000, 12.
PART IV

Into the Millennium

Chapter 14

9/11

Everybody in America wanted to do something. Instead of 

just sitting around . . . we were busy and involved. . . . This 

was an event on par with Pearl Harbor.

—Col Brad Webb 

Hurlburt Field

With Lt Gen Maxwell Bailey still in command, the AFSOC entered 

the twenty-first century now fully established as the air arm of the 

USSOCOM. AFSOC’s 11,700 military and civilian personnel were 

active in all theaters and living by the command motto Air Commandos—

Quiet Professionals. It was now routinely providing unit packages for 

participation in the USAF AEF program. The CSAR issue was still 

not resolved, and AFSOC and ACC started a staff initiative to explore 

the possibility of moving the mission in toto to AFSOC. Although 

slowly shrinking, its Pave Low force had proven that it could accomplish all of its assigned tasks and was a key component of AFSOC’s 

ability to operate “any time, any place.”1

Collocated at Hurlburt Field, the 20th SOS was back into its training cycle. For most of January, the unit had three MH-53Ms, crews, 

and support personnel in San Diego, California, training with SEAL 

Teams 1 and 3 and focusing on those specific actions necessary to 

support the SEALs and their unique mission capabilities. These crews 

returned to Hurlburt to watch Lt Col Tom Trask pass command of 

the squadron to his Desert Storm 20th SOS co-veteran, Lt Col Mike 

Kingsley, on 1 February. Lt Col Brad Webb was selected to serve as 

the squadron operations officer. Trask then departed to attend the 

NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy. 

Kingsley inherited a full plate. Over the next several months, his 

troops supported the growing SOF MH-53 WIC being conducted at 

Hurlburt. Captains Mike McKinney, Lance Tilghman, and Paul Mullis 

had already been working with the weapons center at Nellis AFB to 

develop a Pave Low curriculum, and they and Capt Mark Daley had 
488 │ 9/11

been chosen as the initial cadre of instructors to stand up the course. 

Their initial training lasted through December, when they were 

awarded the coveted weapons instructor patch, and they then began 

to work to expand the course so that more of their brethren could 

attend and spread their tactical expertise into the operational units.2

Additionally, the 20th provided CSAR support for a Red Flag rotation at Nellis AFB and direct support for the USAF Weapons School 

there. All three initiatives highlighted the ongoing issues about integrating AFSOC elements into larger conventional air forces. However, many in the AFSOC community did not support the initiation 

of the weapons course at Hurlburt, believing that it was too much of 

a drain on limited AFSOC resources. As one of the first AFSOC graduates, though, Captain Daley believed that the WIC was an unqualified gain for the command, remembering that 

Courtesy Brig Gen Mike Kingsley, USAF

Lt Col Mike Kingsley commanding the 20th SOS as the new century began
9/11 │ 489

the WIC was very, very controversial. It was a resource drain on an already 

overcommitted force. We didn’t have the aircraft or the pilots to do it properly, 

and there was always a fight over use of aircraft and personnel. . . . It all came 

down to making a near-term sacrifice for a long-term gain—building tactical 

experts who could take SOF into the future. . . . 

The weapons officers we graduated had a huge, lasting impact on moving SOF 

from an organization that did not integrate well with the larger conventional 

force to one that better understood the “Big Air Force” capabilities and better 

integrated them into SOF air operations.3

In the not-too-distant future, these skills would be put to good use 

in dealing with challenges unimaginable in the near future. 

That winter and spring, the 20th SOS also deployed another package of aircraft, crews, and support personnel for Operation Southern 

Watch at Al Jaber AB, Kuwait. Capt Pete Doty and 1st Lt Greg Peterson were crewed together for the rotation. On 12 March, they supported recovery operations for five American troops and one New 

Zealand soldier killed and seven others (five Americans and two Kuwaitis) injured on the Udairi bombing range when a US Navy F-18 

misidentified a training target and dropped three Mk-82 500-pound 

bombs on an observation point. Doty was also directed to act as the 

initial investigating officer and had to secure and preserve all of the 

“evidence,” pending the formal investigation.4

 

At the same time, Kingsley had to get his squadron prepared for a 

two-phase ORI that the 16th SOW would be receiving in April and 

June. As scheduled, the wing took its inspection. Overall, the wing 

was rated excellent, with the tactical aspect ratings all classified. 

Several “outstanding” ratings were also awarded, one to the 16th 

HGS that provided the direct maintenance for the Pave Lows. In the 

overall ORI report, the squadron received specific kudos:

During the launch, technicians displayed a strong sense of urgency as they 

transferred the crew and equipment from one helicopter, which had developed 

a first stage hydraulic system malfunction, to a spare aircraft. Aggressive 

maintainers quickly replaced the faulty hydraulic pump and the aircraft departed with minimum delay, allowing the eight MH-53s to accomplish the 

takeoff within the required timelines. The squadron’s remarkable maintenance 

at the ORI location produced an astonishing 354.2 hours from 67 sorties with a 

94 percent MRE [mission effectiveness rate].5

Also of note is that for the preceding 24 months, the 16th HGS had 

kept the 20th SOS Pave Low fleet above a 75 percent overall missioncapable rate. That certainly made Kingsley’s job much easier. A few 
490 │ 9/11

days after the ORI concluded, the Pave Low community received another honor of sorts, when a sixth Pave Low veteran, Col Lyle Koenig, 

achieved wing command as he took over the 16th SOW from Col 

David Scott.6

31st Special Operations Squadron

As directed by USSOCOM, the 31st SOS at Osan AB prepared for 

its inactivation. The ceremony took place on 31 March 2001, when 

Brig Gen Rich Comer, now serving as the AFSOC vice-commander, 

traveled to the unit to officiate. He was joined by former commanders 

Col Lee Massey and Col Gene Correll, both now retired, as the last 

31st SOS commander, Lt Col Brendan Clare, furled the squadron 

flag. Squadron personnel were then released for other assignments, 

and four of the aircraft prepared for shipment to training duty with 

the 58th SOW at Kirtland AFB to replace the TH-53As. 

However, the six-ship MH-47E unit designated to take the 31st 

SOS’s place, Echo Company of the 160th SOAR, was not fully combat 

capable. Consequently, two MH-53s were held at Osan as a residual 

fleet until the MH-47Es and support element were ready to assume 

the mission. AFSOC coordinated with the 16th SOW to provide necessary personnel. The 20th SOS sent a small detachment over to attend 

Exercise Tandem Thrust in Australia, which allowed the crew to work 

with the Australian Special Air Service Regiment. One of the pilots 

on that deployment was 2d Lt Sean Borland, among the recent Army 

warrant officers who had come over to the USAF to fly the Pave Low. 

Typical of that selective group, he brought with him a wealth of helicopter and NVG experience as an AH-1 and AH-64 pilot. He flew 

quite a bit on the 45-day TDY and, upon return to Hurlburt, began 

his upgrade to first pilot and then mission pilot. Clearly, the Army 

exchange program was already benefiting the Pave Low force. 

The 21st SOS also provided several aircrew members and maintenance troops to help uphold residual Pave Low capability at Osan. 

This augmentation force remained at Osan until late June, when Colonel 

Clare and Col Doug Salmon flew the last Pave Low sortie and Echo 

Company fully accepted the mission. The Pave Low no longer had 

any permanent presence in the Pacific theater, and the replacement of 

USAF special operations helicopter assets by US Army special operations assets proceeded apace as per Initiative 17. During its almost 12 
9/11 │ 491

years in existence as the sole Pave Low unit in the huge theater, the 

31st SOS “nomads of the Pacific” had been commanded by 11 officers 

and had provided an excellent training venue for a whole generation 

of air commando officers and Airmen.7

21st Special Operations Squadron

During the first six months of the new year, the 21st SOS also maintained its normal peacetime routine. However, its flight activities were 

severely restricted over the UK when that nation suffered a terrible 

outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease that devastated its cattle herds. 

The unit received its full complement of eight MH-53Ms. The aircraft 

and crews were dispatched to joint and combined exercises with various elements throughout the SOCEUR area. However, one of the 

aircraft required more attention than the rest. The previous year, 

MH-53M #69-5784 had been seriously damaged in a crash on one of 

the training ranges. Extensive repairs were made, and the aircraft was 

returned to flight status. However, as if assuming the role of a Jonah, 

21st SOS Scottish dining-in

Courtesy Lt Col Pete Doty, USAF
492 │ 9/11

the aircraft suffered several more incidents, all of which required significant maintenance repair. Fortunately, by the summer it was again 

fully mission capable. Also during this period, 21st SOS crews flew 

several support sorties to locate two F-15 pilots who had gone down 

in a midair collision. In another incident, Capt Steve Plumhoff diverted his crew off of a training sortie to successfully rescue two seamen adrift in a small boat that had lost power. 

A 21st SOS crew practices ship landings aboard the USS Kalamazoo

Courtesy Air Force Historical Research Agency 

On 26 June, Lt Col Tim Minish gave up command of the 21st SOS 

to Lt Col Joe Becker and departed to attend AWC. The next month, Lt 

Col Greg Lengyel joined the squadron to serve as the operations officer. 

On the flight over, he and his family traveled with Capt Pete Doty and 

his family, also proceeding to the 21st where Doty would serve as the 

squadron chief of standardization and evaluation. Arriving, they encountered Steve Plumhoff. He was just completing his tour in England and preparing to move his family back to the United States. He 
9/11 │ 493

and his wife, Yvete, convinced Pete and Isabelle that they should 

move into the rustic country “guesthouse” on a traditional family estate 

named Kilverstone, not far from the base where the Plumhoffs had 

enjoyed living while there on their tour.8

Four weeks later MSgt Jim Kradel followed Colonel Lengyel and 

Captain Doty. Upon completing his previous tour with the 352d in 

June 1997, Sergeant Kradel had returned to Hurlburt Field but was 

assigned as a gunner to the 55th SOS. He served with the unit until he 

was reassigned to the AFSOC stan/eval team as a gunner evaluator. 

His assignment back to the 21st SOS coincided with his selection for 

promotion to senior master sergeant, and he would serve as the 

squadron superintendent. However, just prior to moving to England, 

Kradel had broken a wrist and would not be able to fly until it healed.9

September 11

The terrible and tragic events on that beautiful late-summer day 

are well documented. Like all Americans and freedom-loving individuals, the Airmen of Pave Low were shocked and appalled as they 

watched the television screens. Most realized, too, that in all probability, many of them would soon be in some form of action, most 

likely somewhere in the Middle East. 

Colonel Kingsley, along with several other 16th SOW squadron 

commanders, was engaging in a paintball contest with the wing senior 

NCOs at the newly installed facility at the south end of Hurlburt 

when all of their beepers began to erupt. One individual then shouted 

that the news stations were reporting that an aircraft had just hit one 

of the Trade Towers in New York City. That ended the paintball contest, as they all headed back to their units.10

AB Eric Ezell was on a work detail at Lackland when he heard 

about the events in New York and Washington, DC. Just two weeks 

into his Airman basic training, he and several of his cohorts were doing 

some general cleaning when their supervisor sat them down in a 

snack bar and told them to watch the TV as the stark events unfolded. 

Simultaneously, the noise and energy level in the building rapidly increased as everybody else became aware of the news. Ezell and his 

team were then moved on to several other tasks as the base responded 

to the security alerts being sent out to all bases. Ezell was a bit concerned. He had joined the Air Force expecting to spend four or maybe 
494 │ 9/11

more years training and traveling and taking advantage of educational opportunities. The possibility of combat duty was distant at 

best. As he watched the events unfold on the TV, though, he began to 

sense that they would involve him personally. He had enlisted under 

the high-school-to-flight-school program to be an aircraft gunner, 

and it slowly dawned on him that aircraft that carried gunners would 

probably soon be very busy.11

As Kingsley drove back to the squadron, he could see that base 

security was being dramatically increased. He ran into the squadron 

building to find his Airmen in a somber mood, gathered around the 

televisions as the horrifying events of the day unfolded. TSgt Brian 

Cessop, the duty superintendent, could not keep up with the ringing 

phones. He ended up working a 16-hour day as all squadron personnel were recalled and speculation ran rampant with rumors sweeping 

through the building.12

Colonel Kingsley received a phone call from the 16th Operations 

Group commander, Col Frank Kisner, telling him to get helicopters 

and crew ready to provide immediate disaster-relief support to both 

New York City and the Pentagon. Across the base, all units were moving quickly to dramatically increase base security. The wing commander, Colonel Koenig, was at the head of the effort. He told his 

troops, “We’ll continue to do whatever is necessary to help . . . keep 

our people safe and our base secure.”13

Just a few days earlier, Kingsley had dispatched Colonel Webb with 

three Pave Lows, crews, and support personnel to Fort Bragg for joint 

training and Capt Paul Pereira with four Pave Lows and crews to 

Asheville, North Carolina, for mountain training. On 11 September, 

one of Webb’s crews, with Capt Dave Tabor and Capt Joe Michalek 

and their engineers and gunners, had taken off at 4 a.m. to work with 

JSOC elements. Webb and his other crews were sleeping late in preparation for several days of night flying. When Webb arose and turned 

on his television, he learned of the ongoing events. Tabor’s crew had 

already been instructed to land at nearby Pope AFB, where they kept 

their aircraft. Webb immediately called the 16th SOW command post 

at Hurlburt and was instructed to get all of his troops into the JSOC 

compound as soon as possible. Arriving there, he talked with Kingsley, 

who instructed him to get his aircraft airborne as soon as possible 

and fly to McGuire AFB, New Jersey, and report to the Twenty-First 

Air Force commander for tasking as needed. Kingsley also called 
9/11 │ 495

Pereira and told him to send two aircraft and support personnel to 

join Webb at McGuire and to dispatch the other two back to Hurlburt. 

These actions were taken strictly on verbal orders from Lt Gen 

Robert Fogelsong, the DCS for air and space operations, Headquarters 

USAF, who directed all USAF units to “go help Americans.” The crews 

quickly got the helicopters ready to go. However, Webb and Kingsley 

took several hours to work out airspace coordination with the FAA. 

Regardless, while en route, the helicopters were intercepted and visually inspected by fighter aircraft now on patrol above several major 

cities, especially in the northeast. Webb and his crews stopped at 

Andrews AFB to get gas. They also procured maps of the local Washington flying area from the 1st HS just in case they were instructed to 

return. Taking off from Andrews, they proceeded directly to McGuire, 

arriving there at about 11:00 p.m., followed shortly by the aircraft and 

crews from Asheville. Webb then contacted the McGuire command 

post and was directed to report for the 6:00 a.m. battle-staff update. 

He put his aircrews into crew rest as his maintenance team made sure 

that the aircraft were ready for possible heavy action the next day.14

That evening as the Pave Low crews were proceeding to McGuire 

AFB, Pres. George W. Bush addressed the nation regarding those 

horrific events: 

Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack 

in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. . . . Thousands of lives were 

suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.

The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures 

collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding 

anger. These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into 

chaos and retreat. But they have failed; our country is strong.

A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can 

shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the 

foundation of America. . . . 

America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and 

security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.15

The next morning Webb reported as ordered, only to find staff 

members more concerned with supporting Operation Noble Eagle, 

the now ongoing air defense shield of fighters and tankers that had 

been initiated immediately after the twin strikes in New York. They 

had no idea what to do with the Pave Lows and directed him to contact 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) representatives 
496 │ 9/11

for tasking. He spoke with them, and they linked him with liaison 

personnel for several urban SAR task forces also working for FEMA. 

Captains Tabor and Michalek were instructed to fly a FEMA crew 

to the Pentagon. Michalek had flown in the 1st HS and knew the local 

route structure by heart. They flew as instructed in MH-53M #68-10357 

and then returned to McGuire AFB. Webb was also requested to send 

two aircraft up over New York City. Led by Capt Steve Gregg and 

copilot Capt Casey Ward, they were able to procure permission to 

land on the USS Intrepid, a retired aircraft carrier docked on the Hudson 

River now serving as a floating museum. There they were able to link 

up with elements from the New York City Fire and Police Departments, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and whoever else needed 

their support. Initially, the demand for flights was high. The assigned 

police helicopters could not fly over the area because of residual dust 

and smoke and lingering concrete particulates in the air. FEMA requested that the Pave Low crews move medical teams around the city 

and take aerial photography of the downtown area. 

On 15 September, Tabor, Michalek, and crew flew a mission using 

their FLIR system to attempt to identify residual hot spots or areas 

where humans might still be trapped. The 16th SOW augmented 

Webb’s team with additional maintenance personnel who kept the 

aircraft mission capable throughout.16 Captain Tabor was interviewed 

several days after his experiences that day. Clearly understanding the 

Courtesy Brig Gen Brad Webb, USAF

A Pave Low over the Pentagon
9/11 │ 497

role that the Pave Lows could and would play in this unfolding tragedy, 

he conveyed:

We’re here to help in any way possible. . . . The crews are motivated and the 

morale is high. . . . The Pave Low’s high-lift capability and “long-legs” make it 

an ideal platform for these types of operations. Combine that with the . . . 

crews’ training and experience with night flying, [and] the Pave Low is an 

amazing asset in such operations. The Pave Low is the largest and most powerful helicopter in the Air Force inventory, and the most technologically advanced helicopter in the world. . . . What we can do here are the things we’ve 

trained for and done in places such as Mozambique and Kosovo.17

Courtesy Brig Gen Brad Webb, USAF

MH-53M #68-10369 aboard the USS Intrepid on the Hudson River

A Pave Low over New York City

Courtesy Brig Gen Brad Webb, USAF
498 │ 9/11

As the 20th SOS crews were flying over the still smoldering wreckage, 

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld began to issue initial guidance to the 

men and women of the armed forces by stating that “the task of vanquishing these terrible enemies and protecting the American people 

and the cause of human freedom will fall to you—the men and 

women of the Department of Defense. I know we are ready, I know 

America can continue to count on your selflessness, courage, and 

dedication to duty.”18

Intelligence reports quickly linked the 9/11 attacks to elements of 

an extremist organization called al-Qaeda (meaning literally “the 

base”) led by a shadowy Saudi named Osama bin Laden. As calls 

mounted for retaliation, the United States and its allies began intense 

diplomatic efforts to isolate his influence, find him and his organization, and hold them to account. Anticipating the president’s actions, 

on 14 September the US Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing 

“the use of United States armed forces against those responsible for 

the recent attacks launched against the United States.” Secretary 

Courtesy Air Force Historical Research Agency

MSgt Nelson Neal checks his GAU-2B minigun prior to flight.
9/11 │ 499

Rumsfeld immediately signed orders calling thousands of guardsmen 

and reservists to active duty. Bin Laden and a subordinate bevy of his 

group leaders were reported to be in Afghanistan as “guests” of the 

brutal and demonic Taliban regime in power there. All signs pointed 

to a winter combat campaign in the high terrain of that distant and 

little-understood nation. After reviewing options, President Bush 

directed the launch of a joint air-ground effort relying primarily on 

airpower and, initially at least, special forces elements. That would, 

most certainly, include Pave Lows as the United States engaged in the 

global war on terror, or GWOT, as it was quickly termed by the press.19

The pace was almost frantic at Hurlburt as the 16th SOW prepared 

elements from all of its operational and support squadrons for deployment. Colonel Kingsley rapidly identified four crews and a small 

support package for deployment as the aircraft were also prepared. 

On 18 September, he directed Colonel Webb to return his team to 

Hurlburt to join the process. The team, which had swelled to almost 

90 personnel, complied and was home by the next day. Webb had a 

lot of catching up to do. He knew that the Pave Lows would be some 

of the first to deploy. He also knew that Kingsley would want to go 

with the initial detachment, meaning that he would remain at Hurlburt and serve as the acting squadron commander. There was so 

much that needed to be accomplished quickly.20

21st Special Operations Squadron

Colonel Becker learned about the attack while deployed to Tazar 

AB, Hungary, for EUCOM exercise Jackal Cave. He was there with 

five Pave Lows, most of the squadron, and a large support team, including Colonel Lengyel, Lt Col R. K. Williams, who was serving as 

the exercise operations officer, and SMSgt Jim Kradel, who was still 

nursing his broken wrist but was there to provide planning and operations supervision. The crews were in the flight planning section 

getting ready for some night sorties when the 352d SOG commander, 

Col Jeff Walls, walked in and said, “We have to find a TV. I just got a 

message that something is happening in New York City.” Some of the 

Airmen thought that he was making an input for the exercise and 

chided him for the unreality of such a suggestion. Walls assured them 

that he was serious and repeated his request. That was a problem because Tazar was an austere location, and any unsecured means of 
500 │ 9/11

There at RAF Mildenhall, the rest of the 21st SOS had worked with 

the host 100th Air Refueling Wing to also dramatically increase base 

security. This was a real challenge because the town of Mildenhall had 

grown up intertwined with the base. Several main roads literally crisscrossed the military areas, and security gates had to be installed on 

several main roads. Colonel Becker lived in the town, one mile from his 

office. Pre-9/11 transit time was about 10 minutes. With the new security, though, it now took him about 40 minutes to get to work.22

The 352d SOG was also directed to launch, ultimately, 27 sorties to 

reposition key SOCEUR personnel. Immediate intelligence indicated 

that al-Qaeda elements in the eastern Mediterranean area were transporting weapons and money aboard several ships transiting that area. 

communication was problematic. However, they were able to find 

one, and the unit communications technicians were able to link it to 

a satellite feed. As the troops watched the dizzying events, Colonel 

Walls received a message that the exercise was cancelled and he and 

his Airmen were to return to Mildenhall as soon as possible. They 

departed early the next morning, spent that night at an air base in 

Germany, and arrived at home station on the 13th. Colonel Lengyel 

could not help but notice how courteous and supportive the usually 

irascible European air traffic controllers were as the Pave Lows flew 

through their almost empty airspace.21

Courtesy Col Paul Harmon, USAF, Retired

The 21st SOS flight line at RAF Mildenhall
9/11 │ 501

Anticipating some form of tasking, Lengyel put together a series of 

“Purple Flex” train-ups and local exercises working with various elements from Naval Forces, Europe; the US Sixth Fleet; and SEAL 

Teams Two and Ten to sharpen the shipboarding and assault skills of 

the 21st SOS crews.23

The Path to War

On 20 September, President Bush addressed a joint session of 

Congress, where he made his views clear about what the American 

people could expect in terms of the country’s response to the 9/11 

attack and its policy toward terrorism in general. 

On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against 

our country. . . . All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell 

on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack. . . .

Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking: Who attacked 

our country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of 

loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. . . . 

Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not 

end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and 

defeated. . . . 

These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of 

life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating 

from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we 

stand in their way. . . .

Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and 

every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the 

global terror network. 

This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive 

liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war 

above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a 

single American was lost in combat.

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. 

Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any 

other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and 

covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, 

turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is 

no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven 
502 │ 9/11

to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either 

you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the 

United States as a hostile regime.24

The president’s declarations quickly came to be labeled the “Bush 

Doctrine.” They were incorporated into the next iteration of the US 

National Military Strategy and fundamentally changed the way the 

United States would ensure its national security. Preemptive action 

would now be a strategic cornerstone of security and would require a 

fully expeditionary force capable of rapidly imposing America’s will 

on hostile foreign soil and then maintaining a robust presence to 

ensure lasting change. It was the kind of challenge for which the 

USSOCOM was created. Planners at its headquarters in Tampa were 

hard at work divining force packages for deployment as directed by 

the president. Afghanistan was rapidly becoming the initial destination. However, there were real challenges to operating there, and 

already debates were taking place within the headquarters about 

which helicopter force would be most appropriate for the mission.25

Notes

1. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2001, vol. 1, 2, 18.

2. Daley to the author, e-mail, 16 Sept 2010. 

3. Ibid.; and follow-up e-mail, 19 Sept 2010.

4. Doty to the author, e-mail; and Paul Richter, “Warning Came Too Late in Kuwait Bomb Run,” Los Angeles Times.com, 14 Mar 2001.

5. History of 16th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 2001, vol. 1, 36.

6. Ibid., 1, 25–28, 36–37.

7. Borland, interview; History of 353d SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 2001, vol. 1, 3; and 

History of 352d SOG, 1 July–31 Dec 2001, vol. 1, 40.

8. Doty to the author, e-mail. 

9. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 2001, vol. 1, 4, 32, 54, 56; and Lengyel and 

Kradel, interviews.

10. Kingsley, interview.

11. Ezell, interview.

12. Cessop, interview.

13. Kingsley, interview; and “Mission Continues despite Attacks,” Commando,

14 Sept 2001, 1.

14. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2001, vol. 1, 12; Webb, interview; and 

Stricklin to the author, review remarks, 23 Jan 2011.

15. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 22.

16. Webb, interview; and Michalek to the author, e-mail. Note: In June 2003, 

FEMA presented a special award to the 20th SOS for its direct support of that agency 
9/11 │ 503

in the initial recovery efforts in both New York City and at the Pentagon. Michalek, 

personal notes, provided to the author; and “Pave Low Squadron Honored by 

FEMA,” Commando, 27 June 2003, 1.

17. “Pave Lows Support Relief Efforts,” Commando, 21 Sept 2001, 1, 5.

18. Garamone, “Rumsfeld Charges DoD to Vanquish Terror Enemies.”

19. Briscoe et al., Weapon of Choice, 33.

20. Kingsley and Webb, interviews.

21. History of 352d SOG, 1 July–31 Dec 2001, vol. 1, xvi, 33–34; and Williams 

and Lengyel, interviews.

22. Joe Becker, interview.

23. Lengyel and Williams, interviews.

24. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 23.

25. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2001, vol. 1, 133–34.

Chapter 15

Operation Enduring Freedom

~2001–2

You guys are the CSAR force . . . in Enduring Freedom!

 —Col Paul Harmon

Hurlburt Field

As President Bush was making the case for offensive operations in 

Afghanistan, operational deployment orders were streaming to US 

military units around the world for what had initially been labeled 

Operation Infinite Justice but had subsequently been changed to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Initial planning directed that elements from the CIA and various special forces units would be inserted into that country from both the north and south. They would 

work closely with an armada of fighter and bomber aircraft to destroy 

al-Qaeda and its supporting Taliban allies throughout the country. 

The air campaign was being rapidly developed. A key component 

would be the inclusion of aviation elements capable of providing 

CSAR support from both the north and the south. Defense Secretary 

Rumsfeld and the CJCS, Gen Hugh Shelton, were in agreement that 

the air campaign would not be initiated until CSAR forces were in 

place and capable of responding. Both feared that the initial capture 

of an American aircrew member could negatively impact support for 

the operation.1

At the 20th SOS, Colonel Kingsley was ordered to prepare his initial six aircraft, six crews, and a support package for deployment to an 

unspecified destination. He handed control of the squadron and remnants at Hurlburt to Colonel Webb, and on 21 September, he and his 

Airmen and an element from the 8th SOS departed Hurlburt on C-17s. 

Several hours later in the middle of the night, they landed at the British air base on Masirah Island, off the coast of Oman—the same airfield from which the ill-fated mission to Desert One had been 

launched over 21 years prior. Kingsley knew the history of that event 
506 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

and the impact that it had had on special operations forces in general 

and Pave Low in particular. 

He and his Airmen were greeted by the British troops who were 

conducting an exercise, the Omani base commander, and a representative from the American Embassy, who informed Kingsley that he 

had no place to billet them. Kingsley spotted an empty warehouse 

and received permission to bed down his troops there in the sleeping 

bags they had brought with them. The next day, he met a retired 

USAF chief master sergeant who was working for a local contract 

support company and had access to a large repository of equipment 

specifically pre-positioned for such operations. He allowed Kingsley 

and his small task force to draw tents and equipment that they used 

to set up as a separate camp. The facility steadily grew in size as more 

and more elements from the 16th SOW and other USAF units continuously arrived. De facto, Kingsley was the commander of a growing expeditionary force.2

The US Navy also operated a small detachment of P-3s on the airfield, and Kingsley was able to work with them to establish a secure 

communications link. He utilized that link to contact Col Paul Harmon, who was serving as the head of the special operations liaison 

element within the CAOC for the combined forces air component 

commander (CFACC), CENTCOM—Lt Gen Chuck Wald (USAF), 

located at Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB) in Saudi Arabia. That headquarters would be responsible for conducting the air campaign in 

Afghanistan and its surrounding countries. Harmon gave Kingsley 

his operational tasking. “You guys are the CSAR force to start this 

mission in Enduring Freedom,” Harmon explained to Kingsley 

through the secure telephone unit, STU-III. He added that Colonel 

Kisner, the 16th SOG commander, would be deploying to an airfield 

in Uzbekistan to serve as the overall air component commander for 

special operations aviation forces deploying to the theater. Kisner 

would be receiving elements from the 160th SOAR and would directly support a large task force from the US Army 5th SFG, which 

was deploying to insert its ODAs into Afghanistan. Kisner would be 

Kingsley’s direct, if distant, operational supervisor.3

With that mission guidance, Kingsley put his aircrews to work to 

develop a CSAR plan for Afghanistan from Masirah Island. The 

maintenance crews built up the Pave Lows, and the flight crews flew 

some local sorties and practiced higher altitude refuelings with the 
operation enduring freedom │ 507

8th SOS MC-130Es required over the high mountains of Afghanistan. At the same time, as the senior USAF officer present, Kingsley 

had to deal with the multitude of problems inherent with the arrival 

of the ever-expanding USAF contingent at this remote base. His incessant requests for support from the British and Omanis quickly began to strain relations between him and his local counterparts. Fortunately, he had within his task force a cadre of excellent senior NCOs 

who effectively took over the running of what was literally growing 

Figure 6. Operation Enduring Freedom area of operations. (Copyright 

Darrel Whitcomb, 2010.)
508 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

into “Camp Kingsley.” In one of his many STU-III telephone calls to 

Colonel Harmon, Kingsley implored him to work with the CFACC 

staff to get a USAF colonel to come to Masirah and take over as the de 

facto base commander so he could focus on his mission.

Kingsley had reason to be concerned about the operational tasking. Masirah was just too far from Afghanistan. Even with in-flight 

refueling, his crews would take several hours to reach those areas 

where aircrews might be shot down. He needed to get his forces closer 

to the action. At one point, General Wald visited Masirah and gave 

Kingsley a direct and stern admonition. “You’ve got CSAR in your 

hands. Don’t screw this up.”

“Got it,” Kingsley responded, and then he directly asked Wald for 

a USAF O-6 to take over as the Masirah base commander so he and 

his Airmen could concentrate on their operational assignment.4

One of the options that Kingsley and Harmon considered was the 

possibility of placing at least two Pave Lows aboard a US Navy ship 

that could then move much closer to the Pakistani coast. An entire 

amphibious ready group with a USMC contingent was already operating in the Arabian Sea, and plans were developed to put the Pave 

Lows aboard the USS Peleliu (LHA 5).5

 Kingsley was notified that the 

Pakistani government had given permission for him to move his entire 

contingent to a combined civil/military airfield near Jacobabad in 

Courtesy Maj Mike Holder, USAF

Pave Lows aboard the USS Peleliu before flying into Pakistan
operation enduring freedom │ 509

central Pakistan, just 200 nautical miles from the Afghan border. 

Kingsley ordered Maj Tom Dermody, serving as the 20th SOS deployed 

operations officer, to lead the Pave Lows aboard the ship. While 

aboard, he was to be prepared to perform CSAR and figure out how 

to get the aircraft and crews to Jacobabad. Dermody complied and 

led four Pave Lows aboard the Peleliu. The remaining two Pave Lows 

at Masirah would proceed later to Jacobabad. 

On 7 October, Kingsley loaded the rest of his task force aboard 

C-130s for the flight to Jacobabad. He had also been assigned Lt Col 

Steve Hadley, a USAF pilot-rated ophthalmologist, as his deputy. As 

they were leaving, Kingsley happily passed responsibility for the 

growing USAF complex at Masirah to a newly arrived USAF colonel 

and then turned his attention to what lay ahead.6

Pakistan—and Points Beyond

The task force arrived at the airport at Jacobabad and parked its 

C-130s on a ramp at midfield in front of an old hangar. The Pakistani 

officer greeting the task force members said that they could use the 

hangar as a mass billet. That made sense from a security perspective. 

However, the hangar was old, dirty, and long unoccupied. In fact, it 

was infested with birds and various critters—including a colony of 

bats up in the rafters—all of which had deposited sizeable droppings 

throughout the hangar. Additionally, the building had just one primitive latrine with four Arab-style toilets—literally just holes in the 

ground—for what was going to be a troop component of several hundred individuals. Kingsley had to put his troops to work to make the 

facility fit for habitation. SSgt Brian Cessop was on one of the first 

crews to arrive. As bad as it was, though, he knew that really tired 

troops could sleep anywhere. He also knew that the Airmen arriving 

could handle such arrangements because they already knew how to 

respect one another’s privacy.7

Again, Kingsley was the senior USAF officer present. He met with 

the Pakistani base commander to facilitate the beddown of the American forces and discuss overall base security, which was provided by a 

sizeable Pakistani army force. Additionally, Kingsley received a 

250-person contingent of US Marines for an internal security perimeter 

directly around their immediate area. 
510 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Courtesy Maj Mike Holder, USAF

Pave Low on the fantail of the USS Peleliu

Also on 7 October, 1st Lt Mike Holder led the four Pave Lows off 

the USS Peleliu to fly to Jacobabad. They were supposed to be joined 

by two MC-130s from Masirah for in-flight refueling. Unfortunately, 

the MC-130 crews received the wrong rendezvous coordinates and 

time. Consequently, the second two Pave Lows, commanded by Major 

Dermody and Captain Pereira, had to return to the ship. They and the 

two remaining aircraft would be flown to Jacobabad the next day. 

To save fuel, Holder and the second aircraft commanded by 1st Lt 

Frank Lazzara had to land at a remote site in Pakistan until the MC130s could join them. They then relaunched with only 700 pounds of 

fuel remaining and were able to take on the fuel they needed to fly 

directly to Jacobabad. 

Just a few hours after Colonel Kingsley had arrived, Holder and 

Lazzara landed. As they shut down their engines, Kingsley was there 

to meet them. He knew that they had done their initial CSAR flight 

planning into Afghanistan. When he determined that the aircraft 

were mission ready, he directed the two crews to assume CSAR alert. 

He then called Col Paul Harmon at the CFACC CAOC and reported, 

“I have my crews here. We are ready to go.” Harmon dutifully reported that status up the chain of command, and President Bush 

directed the air campaign to begin that night. Within hours B-1s, 
operation enduring freedom │ 511

B-2s, and B-52s were joined by swarms of carrier-based F-14s and 

F-18s and cruise missiles launched from US and British ships as they 

struck al-Qaeda and Taliban positions and forces across Afghanistan.8

As at Masirah, a steady stream of cargo aircraft began to arrive at 

Jacobabad and disgorge more equipment and troops. Kingsley had to 

billet them all in the hangar, with small operations areas for each specialty group. The steady growth in personnel quickly overwhelmed 

the primitive toilet facilities. Kingsley had his troops dig slit trenches. 

However, the water table was very high in the area, and the trenches 

quickly filled with putrid water. He had to direct them to burn the 

feces. After being apprised of the problems at Jacobabad, General 

Wald dispatched a civil engineer team that built a tented toilet facility 

with drainable waste tanks. However, even this was not sufficient for 

the rapidly growing troop population. Consequently, the engineers 

worked with the Pakistanis to develop a large leach field to handle the 

waste problems. The contingent of Airmen also included a number of 

females. The only amenity Kingsley could grant them was the designation of one toilet for women only.9

With the initiation of air operations, Kingsley relied on his aircrews to handle flight operations. Once again, he had been thrust into 

Courtesy Maj Mike Holder, USAF

Living in the hangar at Jacobabad
512 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

the role of an air base commander as more US military elements 

arrived at the airfield. The hangar also lacked any adequate shower or 

bathing facilities. Within days Kingsley began to receive reports that 

the lack of cleanliness was beginning to cause medical problems, with 

the development of hacking coughs, skin rashes, and folliculitis. One 

of the problems was that the hangar was surrounded by areas with 

standing water—perfect breeding areas for mosquitoes, another major 

irritant and health concern. One of the collateral arriving units was a 

small medical team. It supported the troop population as best it could; 

however, the team commander recommended to Kingsley that he shut 

down his operation for health reasons. Kingsley could not do that. He 

had to maintain his CSAR capability in place and operational. Kingsley 

worked with the civil engineers and was able to arrange the delivery of 

some portable shower facilities for his Airmen. 

After a couple of weeks, Kingsley began to disperse some of his 

personnel because, collectively, they were just too much of a target. 

He was able to use some revetted areas on the base and had the helicopters moved there with their crews nearby. Pave Low flight engineer MSgt Rob Colannino recalls that 

for security purposes, we decided to disperse the crews because if we were to 

get hit with a mortar in that one building, it would wipe out a bunch of us. So 

we lived in F-16 revetments, right next to where our bird was parked. . . . All 

you had was a cot and some mosquito netting; showers were a bottle of water. 

We had to pull security duty, so we would leave one guy up at night with 

goggles on to scan to make sure no bad guys were getting in. The aircraft was 

literally 50 yards from where we slept, so when the horn went off, in 10 minutes 

we were airborne.10

Kingsley relied on his cadre of solid NCOs who ran the facilities 

and worked constantly to improve them for their troops and the new 

arrivals. During this extremely busy period, he had zero discipline 

problems, remembering that “if there is a lesson in leadership, it’s 

‘keep your people busy, and they will surprise you with how well they 

do.’ ” He was also called upon to escort several distinguished visitors 

to the facility such as the US ambassador to Pakistan, the Honorable 

Wendy Chamberlain, and Senators John Warner and Carl Levin. As a 

lieutenant colonel and squadron commander, Kingsley was being 

called upon to perform duties well beyond his position or rank.11

On 19 October, AFSOC MC-130s airdropped 200 US Army Rangers 

and USAF STS personnel onto a remote desert landing strip and 

small compound 90 miles southwest of Kandahar, Afghanistan, code-
operation enduring freedom │ 513

named Objective Rhino, to seize it as a base for future operations. 

AC-130s provided direct support for the mission, and 160th SOAR 

helicopters shuttled in and out to support the operation. One MH60K crashed at the site and was destroyed. The crew escaped, but two 

Soldiers were wounded and pinned in the wreckage. Two Pave Lows 

led by Major Dermody were launched to provide medevac. He landed 

his aircraft near the crash site and ordered one of his gunners, TSgt 

John Stricklin, to dismount and help the Soldiers recover the wounded 

from the wreckage. As he ran over to them, Stricklin could see that 

the Rangers were using their knives and other accoutrements to disentangle the two men. Once free, they were quickly loaded aboard the 

Pave Lows for return to Jacobabad. Unfortunately, both died en route. 

Stricklin could not help noticing that one Soldier still wore his wedding ring. He quietly reminded himself that “these Soldiers are the 

reason we put ourselves in harm’s way on every mission.”12

Overall, though, the operation was a solid success. US and Australian special forces immediately occupied the compound. In the nottoo-distant future, it would become an even more crowded place.13

Courtesy SSgt Glen Fleming, USAF

A tail gunner’s view of Afghanistan
514 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Within days Pave Lows were flying classified missions into and out 

of Rhino. Other special forces and CIA elements began to arrive at 

Jacobabad. Colonel Kingsley was designated as the commander of a 

JSOAC, and some of these elements were assigned to his command. 

Major Dermody and the other Pave Low pilots began meeting with 

the other elements to consider further possible missions into Afghanistan. Crews flew night surveillance missions in the local area 

and inserted weather observation teams. They also developed an 

evacuation plan for the base in the unlikely, but still possible, event 

that the base was overrun by al-Qaeda sympathizers. In late October, 

Kingsley received a possible tasking for two Pave Lows to insert some 

personnel into Afghanistan north of Kabul. He assigned the mission 

to First Lieutenants Mike Holder and Frank Lazzara and their crews. 

They were deep into planning the mission when it was cancelled due 

to unacceptable risk of flight over the extreme elevations along the 

flight route.14

In later October, a combined CIA and US Navy SEAL team infiltrated southern Afghanistan and brought back an Afghan politician 

named Hamid Karzai and seven supporters. They were kept in a 

highly secure location so that the Pakistanis would not know of their 

presence. Colonel Hadley met with them and tended to their medical 

needs. Kingsley and his crews then began to work with a 5th SFG 

team, ODA 574, to develop a plan to return Karzai and his cohorts 

back into southern Afghanistan to incite the tribes in that area to rise 

against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as were their brethren in the northern 

portion of the country.15

Knife 03

On 2 November, the 20th SOS was assigned a mission up into northern Afghanistan. A member of 5th Group ODA team 555, located in a 

valley about 10 miles northeast of Kabul, was suffering from altitude 

sickness, and his brain was swelling. A 160th SOAR MH-47 launched 

to recover him but was unable to penetrate the severe weather hanging over the northern mountains. Colonel Kisner called Kingsley and 

gave him the mission. Kingsley had two Pave Lows on CSAR alert 

that night, one flown by Capt Bill Rowell with 1st Lt Sean Borland 

and the other by Capt Mark Newell with 2d Lt Steve Cherrington. 

However, since Lieutenants Lazzara and Holder had recently planned 
operation enduring freedom │ 515

a mission into that area, he pulled them out of crew rest and assigned 

them the mission. They would fly as Knife 03, commanded by Lazzara, and Knife 04, commanded by Holder. Both had formed crews 

including PJs and a combat controller. Additionally, specifically for 

the CSAR tasking, Knife 03 had a rescue mission commander, Maj 

Pete Lehew, and direct support operator, TSgt Navid Garshasb, also 

on board. This crew configuration was similar to that used for CSAR 

operations in Serbia, with a USAF STS element but lacking the additional ODA detachment.16

The two aircraft took off at sunset and headed north. The weather 

was clear, with a temperature above 90 degrees and an almost full 

moon. Near the Afghanistan border, they rendezvoused with an MC130E and refueled. As they continued now more northeast, crew 

members on Knife 03 noticed that their TF/TA radar had failed. They 

switched over to the FLIR system and continued with the flight. As 

the flight passed 30 miles west of Gharzi, they encountered an area of 

solid clouds. Lieutenant Lazzara determined that the visibility was 

too poor to continue safely and did a 180-degree turn to hold in a 

clear area. Lazzara then cleared Holder in Knife 04 to see if he and his 

crew could proceed with their TF/TA radar.

Knife 04 had a fully functioning TF/TA radar and took the lead. Its 

crew estimated that visibility was about one mile with snow showers 

and instructed Knife 03 to rejoin it. It did so, and the formation 

turned to head up the valley. Almost immediately, though, the crew 

in Knife 03 lost sight of Knife 04 and made an immediate separation 

turn to the left while notifying Knife 04. In doing so, Lazzara could 

see that the weather was also closing in behind them and elected to 

abort the mission. He called for Knife 04 to return to Knife 03’s position so that it could rejoin and follow Knife 04 back to Jacobabad. But 

the two aircraft were not able to rendezvous and rejoin. Lazzara and 

crew noticed that their FLIR was now losing its effectiveness in the 

steadily deteriorating weather. They called for Knife 04 to return for 

them and attempted to pass their coordinates. Lieutenant Lazzara realized 

that they were rapidly approaching steeply rising terrain and attempted 

to make a high bank turn. As he did, his airspeed bled off; the aircraft, 

MH-53M #69-5791, descended, impacted the ground, and broke up. 

Fortunately, there was no fire.17

As the aircraft came to a rest on the ground, the crew shut off the 

engines and scrambled to exit the machine. Lazzara took out his survival radio and made contact with US Navy F-18s that had been at-
516 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

tempting to escort the two Pave Lows. One of the combat controllers 

from the USAF STS element on board also made emergency radio 

calls. However, he used his assigned tactical radio call sign of Jaguar 

03. This caused some confusion for the various agencies trying to coordinate a rescue response until the different call signs were rectified.

Crew members on Knife 04 heard some of the radio calls and several 

also made by an orbiting AWACS aircraft indicating that the helicopter 

was down. They attempted to return to the estimated position of 

Knife 03 but were blocked by rapidly rising high terrain and deteriorating weather. Instead, Holder held over a dry lake bed for about 30 

minutes as they discussed options and hoped for the weather to improve before turning south to rendezvous with an MC-130 to refuel. 

While receiving their gas, they observed what appeared to be an RPG 

shot at them as they traversed the ridges. When the aircraft was full 

of fuel, the Knife 04 crew again turned north to proceed to the crash 

site. The crew received updated coordinates for Knife 03’s location 

from one of the F-18s and proceeded back to attempt a recovery. 

At the crash site, all 11 members of the crew were together, although several had injuries, and had established a perimeter. The tail 

gunner, Sergeant Cessop, had suffered a broken bone in his back and 

another in one foot. Some local tribesmen attempted to render aid to 

the crew, but their approach unnerved several of the Airmen. TSgt 

Navid Garshasb, the direct support operator, talked to them and 

warned them to keep their distance.18

Monitoring all of this at Jacobabad, Colonel Kingsley ordered two 

more Pave Lows—Knife 01 and Knife 02—to take off and join the effort. 

Those were the aircraft commanded by Rowell and Newell. The crews 

were already communicating with Maj Martha McSally, the SAR duty 

officer at the JSAR at PSAB, and were aware of the overall situation. 

McSally was also coordinating with Maj Jon Owens, who was working as a night duty officer in the special operations liaison element at 

the JFACC CAOC at PSAB and scrambling to deconflict the mission 

with other operations ongoing in the theater. Unfortunately, the aircraft were over two hours away from the crash site. They launched 

and rendezvoused with an MC-130 along the border and held there, 

pending developments at the crash site. While refueling, though, they 

received ground fire.19

Any quick recovery would have to be accomplished by Knife 04. 

As Holder approached the crash site, the orbiting F-18s indicated that 

the weather was noticeably clearing. Additionally, the Knife 04 crew 
operation enduring freedom │ 517

was able to establish the elevation of the survivors as 10,400 feet. 

Holder’s flight engineer, SSgt Chad Ackman, quickly determined that 

to take off from that elevation with all 11 survivors, Knife 04 would 

have to dump its current fuel down to 1,000 pounds. That meant that 

as soon as it lifted off from the crash site, a tanker needed to be available. 

Knife 04 flew over the survivors’ location, and its crew visually 

sighted the wreckage, crew, and CCT on the ground. Kingsley then 

arranged for an MC-130 to be right over the helicopter as it lifted off. 

When that was confirmed, the crew activated the fuel dump system 

until Ackman indicated that the necessary fuel had been dumped. 

Holder then maneuvered to land the Pave Low next to the survivors. 

As he hovered down through 10 feet, blowing snow obscured the 

pilot’s view. Immediately, the scanners talked him to the ground. 

When the helicopter settled, Knife 04’s PJs dismounted, collected all 

11 survivors, and loaded them aboard. Holder lifted the aircraft off of 

the ground as the engines strained at full power. Luckily, he had a 

slight river gully to fly down, which allowed him to build up just 

enough airspeed to achieve effective translational lift. With a great 

deal of assistance from his copilot, Capt Jay Humphrey, and Sergeant 

Ackman, he was able to finesse the aircraft so that they could climb to 

altitude to safely rendezvous with the MC-130E at 11,000 feet and 

receive some fuel. The high-altitude training at Masirah had paid off. 

Courtesy Maj Mike Holder, USAF

The crews of Knife 03 and 04
518 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Lieutenant Holder passed control of the aircraft to Humphrey, 

who flew the refueling. However, Knife 04 was not able to receive a 

full load because as it gained the weight of the transferring fuel, it 

could not maintain position behind the MC-130, forcing Humphrey 

to disconnect. Thirty minutes later, the crew initiated another refueling and then repeated this procedure several more times as the aircraft steadily descended over the lower terrain of Pakistan until it was 

able to reach Zhob. Knife 01 and 02 had been diverted there and, using 

onboard security teams, would establish a secure transload site so 

that the casualties from Knife 03 could be transferred to an MC-130 

for direct movement to Masirah.20

Only Sergeant Garshasb and Major Lehew required evacuation. 

The rest of the Knife 03 crew remained aboard Knife 04 as it flew back 

to Jacobabad, where it had to land in low-visibility conditions. After 

the numerous debriefings, Cessop was able to relax and take off his 

boot. His foot was black and blue. Medical personnel noticed his foot 

and confirmed the broken bone in his foot and then his back with X-rays. 

He was immediately medevaced all the way back to Hurlburt.21

The flight back to Jacobabad was a bit more interesting for Knife 01 

and 02. They received AAA several times, and their gunners returned 

fire. One small arms round hit the cockpit of Knife 01, slightly wounding the flight engineer on the side of his head. Fortunately, Colonel 

Hadley was on the aircraft and quickly determined that the Airman 

was only superficially scratched. They proceeded on to Jacobabad 

and also had to make the difficult and challenging approach through 

the combination of smoke, haze, and fog.22

The Knife 04 crew members logged 10.4 hours on the mission, exhausted but very proud of their efforts. The actions of all the crew 

members had directly led to the successful recovery of their squadron 

mates. It was a stunning display of outstanding crew coordination, 

for which the Airmen of Knife 04 were awarded the Mackay Trophy 

for 2001.23

Colonel Kingsley was there to meet the crews as they landed. He 

had already directed that the two Knife 03 crewmen who had gone to 

Masirah could go home from there. The others went back into the 

rotation schedule. They needed to be ready to support the steadily 

increasing activities of the various special forces elements streaming 

into Jacobabad to conduct highly classified missions in the region.

Unfortunately, the wreckage of Knife 03 was in an area that could 

not be secured. Consequently, US Navy fighters bombed it to prevent 
operation enduring freedom │ 519

the use of any of its components. However, insurgent forces did recover pieces of it, which then appeared in video clips shown worldwide. The next day, with much better weather conditions, a civilian 

contract helicopter was able to finally retrieve the ailing Soldier from 

ODA 555. He fully recovered from what turned out to be a case of 

meningitis. Reviewing the recovery mission for Knife 03, though, the 

CFACC, General Wald, was not satisfied with the command and control arrangements in place for the Pave Lows while they were on theater 

CSAR alert. He decided to ask the USAF to deploy a conventional 

rescue squadron that would be under his operational control. Within 

two weeks, the 66th RQS based at Nellis was deployed with its HH-60s 

and supporting PJs and maintenance team to the theater to perform 

this mission. The 20th retained its requirement to perform recovery 

missions for SOF elements, but the removal of the larger theater 

requirement allowed the Pave Low crews to now focus on classic 

SOF missions.24

Heavy Combat

On 14 November, two Pave Lows launched to carry ODA 574 and 

Karzai and his seven supporters to a remote site near the Afghanistan 

border. There they landed and transferred the group to waiting MH-60s 

from the 160th SOAR, which then flew them into tight landing zones 

20 miles west of the mountain village of Tarin Kowt. Karzai and the 

team were being inserted to attempt to rally the tribes of southern 

Afghanistan to join the efforts of the northern tribes to destroy the 

Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies. Over the next three weeks, several 

more Pave Low sorties were flown to support the team and Karzai in 

their efforts. They delivered necessary supplies and reinforcements 

and evacuated wounded personnel.25

The number of Americans in Afghanistan increased dramatically 

on 25 November, when 1,000-plus US Marines from the 15th MEU 

were helilifted from ships in the Arabian Sea to Objective Rhino. The 

force included four CH-53s and six CH-46s. After a few days, they 

seized the airport at Kandahar and began building it into a major 

joint and combined stronghold, signifying sustained US and coalition presence in that area. Pave Lows flew several missions into 

both locations.26
520 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Later in the month, Colonel Kingsley put himself on the schedule 

to fly a mission to insert some special forces troops in Afghanistan. 

En route to the site, though, his aircraft experienced an engine failure. 

He aborted the mission and decided to recover in Pakistan. The closest 

airfield was at Quetta, about 150 miles northwest of Jacobabad. He 

did not have enough time to notify the American Embassy by satcom 

prior to landing, and as he and his wingmen arrived at the airfield 

unannounced and touched down on the runway, Pakistani troops 

surrounded them. Luckily, Kingsley had previously met the Pakistani 

base commander. He arrived and calmed the situation so that Kingsley could do what needed to be done to protect his crews and passengers and arrange to have the aircraft flown on its single good engine back to Jacobabad.27

In early December, two more Pave Lows and relief crews arrived at 

Jacobabad. This group, led by Lt Col Brad Webb, included a crew with 

pilots Capt Jim Peterson and Capt Joe Michalek, flight engineers TSgt 

Wayne Lively and SSgt Brian Fahey, and gunners TSgt Ryan Crowley 

and TSgt Michael Ferguson. In Afghanistan ODA 574 and Hamid 

Karzai had been somewhat successful in rallying tribal leaders in the 

south to join forces against the Taliban. Their team requested some 

resupply and reinforcements, and in the early morning hours of the 

fifth, four Pave Lows, flown by a mix of original and relief crews, arrived at a small landing zone near the mountain village of Shawali 

Kowt to deliver the requested goods and personnel. The aircraft were 

quickly unloaded and departed to return to Jacobabad. The resupply 

mission was much appreciated by the members of ODA 574 because 

they and their growing allies were engaged in a running battle with 

Taliban forces. Shortly after sunrise, the ODA requested air support, 

and a B-52 arrived overhead to deliver GPS-guided bombs to support 

the team. The ODA passed very precise coordinates for a suspected 

enemy position to the circling bomber and cleared it to deliver a 

2,000-pound bomb. The bomber crew programmed the coordinates 

into its weapons delivery computer, followed the resulting aiming 

guidance, and dropped the bomb. After a 35-second fall, the bomb 

landed precisely on the designated coordinates and detonated with a 

horrendous blast. 

Through a series of human errors, the coordinates passed to the 

bomber crew were not for an enemy position but for a fighting position occupied by friendly troops. The team and its supporting local 

tribesmen suffered massive casualties, and the team leader called in 
operation enduring freedom │ 521

an emergency medical evacuation request as he tried to assess the 

damage, account for all of his troops, and determine the number of 

killed and wounded. Even Hamid Karzai was wounded, although 

only slightly. The evacuation request was forwarded to the special 

operations liaison team with MEU 15 at Rhino and to Jacobabad for 

the 20th SOS. The initial report did not indicate that the injuries 

were caused by fratricide. 

Rhino was much closer than Jacobabad, and the special forces liaison personnel went to see the 15th MEU commander, Brig Gen James 

Mattis. He listened to their request but refused to dispatch his helicopters until he knew what the tactical situation and enemy threat 

were at Shawali Kowt.28

Colonels Kingsley and Hadley were both asleep when the Jacobabad 

command center got the message because they had stayed up until 

their resupply aircraft had returned from the position of that very 

team. When they were awakened, they directed that all crews be summoned to the operations center ASAP because they had no idea of 

how many casualties they would have to extract. However, as they 

gathered, Hadley could see that they were all exhausted and illegal to 

fly per the stringent rules for mandatory crew rest. Hadley pointed 

out the obvious to Kingsley, who was considering sending the crews 

regardless. However, Maj Shawn Silverman pointed out to him that 

just a few hours earlier, two more Pave Low crews had arrived to swap 

out with crews that had been there since the initial deployment to 

Masirah. Kingsley directed him to summon them for flight duty and 

also directed that two PJ CSAR teams be selected for the mission. 

Then he called the maintenance section and ordered it to prepare two 

aircraft for immediate launch. 

The pilots were the first crew personnel to reach the operations 

center. The flight lead would be Capt Steve Gregg with 2d Lt Marty 

Schweim as his copilot, and the wingman would be 1st Lt Pat Fronk 

with 1st Lt Paul Alexander. Except for Gregg, all had recently come 

from the Army under the warrant officer transfer program. The crews 

would again use the call signs of Knife 03 and 04, respectively. Kingsley 

introduced them to Colonel Hadley, who had developed a close relationship with the Soldiers of ODA and Hamid Karzai and would be 

aboard the lead aircraft as the mission commander. He would also 

perform as a doctor as the patients required. This was going to be an 

unusual and rare daytime mission. Kingsley’s briefing to the crews 

was direct and to the point. He told them,
522 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Welcome to the war, gentlemen. Americans are requesting emergency MEDEVAC 

north of Kandahar, at the same location our squadron flew last night. We’ve 

got the routes, we know where they are, but that’s about it. I know you haven’t 

been briefed on intel, routes, or procedures, and I wouldn’t be asking you to fly 

if you weren’t our only option. Lt Col Hadley has been in on every intel brief 

since we got here, and he has flown dozens of missions into Afghanistan. He 

will brief you en route. Flight time is just shy of three hours. From the moment 

you cross the border, you will be flying in bad-guy country all the way. . . . As 

I learn more, I’ll relay it to Lt Col Hadley. Ground crews are turning around 

two of the -53s that flew last night; they’re already refueled. CSAR teams are 

getting their gear and will meet you at the aircraft. Godspeed.29

As the pilots quickly put together a tactical plan and began arrangements to coordinate tanker support, Colonel Hadley turned to 

medical issues. He had no idea yet of how many casualties awaited 

their arrival or what exactly had caused their wounds. He went to the 

small medical detachment on base and requested the services of its 

most qualified doctor. “Doc Frank,” a family practice physician, 

stepped forward and shook hands with Hadley. They grabbed several 

bags of medical supplies and packets of whole blood, and Hadley led 

Doc Frank to the helicopters and assigned him to the second aircraft 

while Hadley would fly in the lead. The crews were already strapping 

in. Kingsley met Hadley there and told him, “It’s daylight, and this is 

a no-shit very dangerous mission. Get the job done and bring everybody in my squadron home alive.”30

The two helicopters lifted off from Jacobabad, and Captain Gregg 

leveled off at about 300 feet above the ground. Lieutenant Fronk 

reminded him that shooting at helicopters was a national sport in 

Pakistan, and Gregg dropped the formation down to about 50 feet. 

On Knife 03, Hadley made radio contact with the team members at 

Shawali Kowt and told them that the helicopter would be there in two 

hours and 45 minutes. The Soldier replied, “Sir, Americans are dying. 

Please hurry. Please.” Hadley leaned forward and said to Gregg, “Fly 

the most direct route we can avoiding any towns.” Gregg pushed the 

aircraft to the maximum airspeed possible and replied, “I think we 

can make it in two hours.” As they crossed into Afghanistan, Gregg 

dropped the aircraft down to 25 feet, the best altitude for evading any 

heat-seeking missiles. Hadley knew that by flying over enemy-controlled 

terrain in broad daylight, they were at great risk. He tried to make 

light of it by saying, “This is something that I never thought I would 

see, Afghanistan in the daylight.” Captain Gregg certainly felt the 

urgency of the situation. In-theater for less than 24 hours and already 
operation enduring freedom │ 523

flying combat, he was reminded of the sense of urgency that he had 

also felt as he flew over the smoldering wreckage in New York City, 

fewer than 90 days earlier.31

About an hour out of ODA 574’s location, the Pave Lows were 

joined by a flight of F-18s that provided escort protection. The team 

medic contacted Hadley and provided a casualty update. Two Americans were dead, another was dying, and eight more were critically 

wounded. Thirty minutes later, the medic called again and asked how 

many wounded the helicopters could evacuate over to Camp Rhino. 

Hadley checked with the flight engineers on both aircraft and responded “32.” The medic replied, “Roger, you are going to need all the 

room you’ve got.” Hadley notified Doc Frank and the PJs. 

Arriving over the team’s location, the two crews spotted a prearranged signal and landed their helicopters in clouds of dust. Hadley 

told Gregg, “You are now the mission commander. I am going to shift 

to doctor,” as he took off his headset and left the helicopter to organize 

the loading. The flight engineers brought the engine throttles to idle 

but did not shut them down. Aboard Knife 03, the copilot, Lieutenant 

Schweim, noticed right after takeoff that their aircraft GPS was not updating correctly. Fortunately, he had brought along a handheld GPS. 

He turned it on, and when it was accurately locked onto available satellites and giving good positional data, he used its coordinates to update 

the INS portion of the navigational system. Schweim also had a map of 

the area and was fully prepared to use that as the ultimate backup 

navigational “system.” As they sat there, though, they felt extremely 

vulnerable. The gunners aboard both aircraft had not received any detailed briefings on the security situation at the site and remained suspicious of any personnel that they could not identify as American.32

Hadley was joined by Doc Frank, and they met several trucks carrying the American wounded and deceased. Quickly, they triaged each of 

the casualties and divided them up between the two helicopters. The 

most critical would go in Knife 04 so that it could take off first. However, there were 17 American wounded vice the nine that he had earlier 

been told to expect. As they were working, Hadley noticed that a large 

contingent of Afghan troops was approaching the aircraft. Hadley 

asked and was assured that they were friendlies, bringing in their 

wounded. Hadley was stunned. He had not been told that he would 

also be evacuating Afghan wounded and had made no allowances for 

them. He had to quickly change his game plan. 
524 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

When Knife 04 had a full load, Lieutenant Fronk called Captain 

Gregg and reported that he was ready to depart for Rhino. Neither 

pilot was happy with the thought of separating. However, medical 

necessity dictated it; several of their wounded were very near death. 

Gregg asked if Fronk could wait for a few more wounded, but Doc 

Frank told him that they needed to depart ASAP. Fronk lifted off and 

turned on a direct course for Rhino.33

The trucks with the Afghan wounded began to converge at the tail of 

Knife 03. The tail gunner, SSgt Scott Diekman, watched apprehensively 

as heavily armed men got out of the vehicles and began to bring their 

wounded toward the back ramp. Determined to protect his aircraft and 

crew, he quickly got permission from Gregg to depart the aircraft and 

try to sort this out. As he did, the left side gunner came back and 

manned his .50-caliber machine gun as Diekman walked toward the 

trucks. There he met one of the PJs who was tending to the wounded. 

The PJ assured him that the men were friendly, and Diekman directed 

the loading of the wounded aboard Knife 03, insuring that the most 

severely wounded were by the tail ramp for quickest offload at Rhino. 

They also loaded the body of one American Soldier. It was in a sleeping 

bag, covered with an American flag. 

 When Knife 03 was fully loaded and Hadley and the PJs were back 

aboard, Captain Gregg prepared for liftoff. Their plan was to proceed 

directly to Rhino, with Schweim tracking their progress on his map. 

But they had another problem. To carry more wounded, Gregg had 

dumped some fuel prior to landing. Also, they had remained on the 

ground for 45 minutes vice the 15 minutes planned. They needed gas 

ASAP! Gregg made a “Texaco” call, meaning that he was fuel critical 

and needed a tanker to come to him on an improvised refueling track 

instead of both trying to make it to a predesignated track. Gregg 

made radio contact with Ditka 04, an MC-130, for the impromptu 

refueling. When Hadley asked how critical they were, Gregg told him 

that they would flame out in 15 minutes at cruise power settings. 

Hadley made sure that the 18 casualties on board, stretching all the 

way to the aft end of the back ramp, were properly tied down and 

secure as Gregg took off and turned southwest. 

As Knife 03 climbed away from the landing zone, Gregg called 

Ditka 04 for the rendezvous. Unfortunately, at that very moment, 

Ditka 04 was refueling Knife 04. When Fronk heard Gregg’s call, he 

told Ditka 04 that he had the fuel he needed to get to Rhino and 

ended his refueling. Ditka 04 then turned back to the north to pick up 
operation enduring freedom │ 525

Knife 03. The MC-130 crew spotted the helicopter at 100 feet above 

the ground crossing over the suburbs of Kandahar. This was one of 

the most dangerous areas in Afghanistan, especially in midday. Regardless, it had to be done, and the pilots aboard Ditka 04 maneuvered 

the lumbering aircraft so that they were directly in front of the helicopter and about 100 feet higher. Gregg climbed the helicopter up 

into refueling position. “We are seven minutes to flameout,” Schweim 

said as Gregg then slipped the MH-53 refueling probe into the receptacle trailing from the right wingtip of Ditka 04. “Got it, we’re on,” 

Gregg announced as the fuel began to transfer into the Pave Low’s 

tanks. The relief among the crew was palpable, especially the gunners, who had been anxiously scanning for a place to land the helicopter if necessary.34

While Knife 03 was receiving its fuel, Knife 04 landed at Rhino. 

Fronk taxied his aircraft over next to two MC-130s, specially equipped 

with medical equipment, doctors, and technicians for such contingencies. To help with the transfer of the wounded, several SEALs 

from SEAL Team 3 arrived and carried the litters from the Pave Low 

to the MC-130s. 

With the necessary fuel now on board Knife 03, Ditka 04 departed, 

and Gregg set a direct course for Rhino, now 20 minutes away. Back 

in the cabin, Hadley and the PJs continued to tend to the wounded. 

At one point, one of the PJs determined that he needed to amputate 

the severely damaged arm of an Afghan soldier. He had to call upon 

Sergeant Diekman to hold the patient still while he performed the 

procedure, not something that the gunner was trained to do. In spite 

of the best efforts of Colonel Hadley and the PJs, one American and 

one Afghan died on the flight. The rest were awash in an almost continuous pool of American and Afghan blood that covered the cabin’s 

floor. The blood found its way to the back of the aircraft, and the rivulets escaped into the wind stream, forming a thin vapor trail of pink 

all the way to Camp Rhino.35

Two days later, Lt Col Mike Kingsley handed over command of the 

detachment to Lt Col Brad Webb, and Kingsley and several of his 

crew members and maintenance personnel departed for home. He 

was concerned that some of his returning troops were suffering from 

the stress of the intense operations and arranged to stop for a few days 

at Masirah for some relaxation. Since their initial visit in September, 

the base had been dramatically improved with facilities that would 

allow the Airmen to relax in a stress-free environment prior to re-
526 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

turning to their homes and families. As they arrived on the island, his 

only instructions were, “Don’t get in trouble.” Simple enough. Then 

he took his troops back to Hurlburt. Kingsley took some leave to 

spend with his family, even stealing away for a week to a resort with 

his wife. 

On 12 December, captains Peterson and Michalek and crew 

launched as the second Pave Low on a mission to recover Hamid Karzai 

and entourage from a secured compound. They would then deliver 

Karzai to Rhino so that he could be transported to Kabul to act as the 

head of a forming Afghan government. Friendly ground elements in 

the area reported that the helicopters received quite a bit of ground 

fire; however, the crews did not observe it, and their gunners did not 

return fire. The flight was essentially uneventful. However, Karzai did 

present the recovery team with his battle flag.36

Courtesy Lt Col Mike Grub, USAF

The 20th SOS detachment at Jacobabad, Pakistan, in December 2001 surrounding the Afghan flag given to them by Hamid Karzai.

The next night, Capt Mike Grub was scheduled to lead a four-ship 

of Pave Lows to resupply an ODA team that had occupied a compound north of Kandahar that belonged to Mullah Omar, a key alQaeda leader. His number two aircraft would carry in some civil 

engineering gear to a repair team at the Kandahar main airport so 

that the primary runway could be repaired for use by larger aircraft. 

The second two aircraft would also be carrying gear to Kandahar. He 

briefed his formation to proceed to the designated landing areas as 
operation enduring freedom │ 527

two two-ship formations with 90 miles of spacing to facilitate rendezvous and refueling from the assisting MC-130. Grub and his wingman proceeded to the compound, skirting around Kandahar City for 

obvious reasons. A fog layer developed as they proceeded, further 

complicating their approach to the compound located in a tight valley 

and with numerous objects sticking up around the landing zone. The 

crew of Grub’s number two aircraft lost sight of Grub’s aircraft and 

climbed above the fog. Grub and his crew had to use their TF radar 

to get into the area of the compound. As they were trying to work 

their way in, Grub’s wingman asked him how the visibility was down 

below the fog. It was an incredibly dark night. Grub notes that “there 

was not a single photon of light present in that part of Afghanistan” 

that night, as he gave a stark and blasphemous report to his wingman, 

basically explaining “how f---ing dark” it was.

Unfortunately, he broadcast his report over the satcom radio instead of his FM radio. This definitely insured that his wingman heard 

him—as well as anybody in the world who was monitoring that satcom radio frequency that night. Grub’s number two aircraft was 

eventually able to get below the fog and rejoin with the lead aircraft. 

Grub flew the approach to the compound down through the narrow 

valley. At 50 feet above the ground, he encountered terrible dust and 

aborted the approach. He and the crew maneuvered for another attempt and this time were able to get the aircraft safely on the ground. 

They then flew to Kandahar so that their number two aircraft could 

deliver its equipment. When that delivery was complete, they flew 

back to Jacobabad. The next day, Grub heard about his errant visibility 

report from everybody but took the ribbing in a good-natured way. 

To him, it was a minor item compared to the sheer difficulty and danger of flying in Afghanistan. Remembered Grub, “Every mission we 

ever flew in Afghanistan was the most dangerous mission we would 

ever fly.”37

When Kingsley returned to Hurlburt, he reengaged with the myriad 

issues inherent in being a squadron commander: reviewing the longrange rotational plans for OEF or whatever else came up and the ongoing squadron training program and exercise schedule. Responding 

to deficiencies he observed in Pakistan and Afghanistan, he engaged 

with the 551st SOS to improve high-altitude mountain training and 

brownout landing procedures. He also made sure that the unit remained prepared to answer any JSOC taskings that might arise on 

short notice.38
528 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

In mid-January 2002, Colonel Kingsley attended the change-ofcommand ceremony at AFSOC as Lt Gen Maxwell Bailey passed 

command to Lt Gen Paul Hester and retired after 31 and a half years 

of service. A career fighter pilot, Hester threw himself into the job. 

Taking his cue from President Bush’s comments that “Americans 

should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign . . . includ[ing] 

dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in 

success,” Hester quickly grasped the essence of air commando operations as a key part of the larger USSOCOM effort ongoing now in 

several parts of the world. Hester highlighted that performance by 

pointing out that “Americans . . . heard, saw, and read about the team 

of ‘Quiet Professionals’ in special operations. They learned that the 

Air Force was an integral part and full partner on that team.”39

At Jacobabad, Colonel Webb continued in the same modus as 

Kingsley as the JSOAC commander. However, within a few weeks the 

JSOAC headquarters was transferred to Masirah Island, and Col 

Tommy Hull, the former 20th SOS commander from four years earlier, 

was dispatched from Hurlburt to command it. Webb activated an Air 

Force special operations detachment (AFSOD) to command the 

eight Pave Lows, four MC-130s, their crews, four CSAR (PJ/CCT) 

teams, and support personnel at Jacobabad.

His Airmen were flying a steadily increasing schedule of classified 

missions supporting a variety of customers vice just standing by for 

CSAR. Almost exclusively, his crews were now flying up to Kandahar 

and supporting Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–

South, called Task Force K-Bar. It was led by Navy SEAL captain Robert 

Harward, the same SEAL who had assisted the 31st SOS at Cubi Point 

in the Philippines when it had evacuated Clark AB because of Mount 

Pinatubo. K-Bar included other special forces elements from the 

United States and coalition nations. They had moved up to Kandahar 

from Camp Rhino and were going after al-Qaeda and the Taliban 

with aggressive direct action missions. These actions were being coordinated with Hamid Karzai as he was working to form a coalition 

of the various ethnic groups in the south against al-Qaeda and the 

Taliban. Nightly, the Pave Lows would fly the teams and their specialized “nonstandard” vehicles into their designated landing zones. 

TSgt B. J. Jobling was over there then on a 90-day rotation and flew 

many of the missions with the vehicles. Some of them were very 

heavy and required a great deal of special handling. He and his crew 

flew mostly logistical support missions with a few direct action mis-
operation enduring freedom │ 529

sions interspersed. Since he had arrived at the 20th, he had done his 

share of deployments. However, it was here in the high mountains 

and valleys of Afghanistan where he felt that his training had fully 

matured, and he realized the key role the flight engineer played 

aboard the Pave Low. He explains that 

everyone in the crew is tasked, depending on how busy the mission is going to 

be. . . . We had six radios on that thing. Pilot and copilot—really it’s a pilot and 

commander and mission commander. Your one pilot is going to be flying everything; the other pilot is basically the safety pilot but also running the entire 

mission, so he is talking to the ground teams, the other aircraft in the formation, other aircraft that are up there also, command and control elements, and 

following the pace of the mission. 

The flight engineer is pretty much backing him up, keeping everybody up to 

speed on what’s going on in the airplane. . . . On the Pave, we were responsible 

for defensive systems; the navigation system because it was a center map, 

which was a great tool, but not being right in front of the pilots, we had to feed 

them a lot of information. We were radio operators in addition to monitoring 

the systems and fuel. . . . We are also trained as aero-gunners and loadmasters.

The gunners are doing their things [and] also scanning. You got a taste of it 

going through the schoolhouse here, but the more you do it, the more you 

realize that. . . . Do you watch ballroom dancing on TV? It’s watching six guys 

being able to dance together and knowing what each one will be doing next. 

You are thinking as a group. 

My thing about being a flight engineer: you’re the world’s best caddy. That’s 

what I try to teach the guys. “The pilots are the ones who fly; the pilots are the 

ones who take the shots. Your job is to make sure before they even think about 

it, you’ve already got the right club in their hand.”40

Nightly, Jobling and his fellow 20th SOS crew members were “playing 

through” on what had to be the most challenging “golf course” for 

helicopters and crews in the world. Flying as they were on the “edge 

of the envelope,” they constantly modified their procedures and use 

of the unique Pave Low navigational systems to make their operations safer, even developing a procedure to use oxygen on board at 

the higher elevations at which they flew. As Jobling recalled, the Pave 

Low mentality was “give us a task. We’ll figure out how to do it.”41

Settling into his job at Jacobabad, Colonel Webb was somewhat 

taken aback at what he found. He was used to a certain modicum of 

form and structure inherent in Air Force operations. He had been at 

FOLs before under combat or potential combat conditions, such as in 

Saudi Arabia and Bosnia. But Jacobabad was the “wild, wild West,” where 

approval procedures and processes were not mature. Webb recounts, 
530 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

I was in a position where I was making the calls for execution of direct action 

missions and what have you. It was thrilling: we had the highest of highs, and 

we had the lowest of lows. . . . We did the first direct action missions with coalition forces and . . . multiship helicopters that were landing at altitudes of 7,000 

feet and above to targets that were opposed. Guys were landing automatic 

flight control systems off. They failed but we continued the missions. The heroism during that time was unbelievable. It was, by my estimation, the accomplishment of what the early pioneers of Pave Low set out to do because we 

were employing TF/TA; we had an assault mentality assaulting directly on alQaeda strongholds and Taliban strongholds.42

The operations did not come without cost. In two accidents occurring on classified missions, the Pave Lows were seriously damaged, 

although no personnel were severely injured. It was obvious that the 

Pave Lows needed updates to their hover symbology systems, and the 

necessary data was sent back to AFSOC for analysis and corrective 

action. The combination of high elevations and brownout conditions 

was a serious operational challenge to the Pave Low crews. Webb 

found it to be “the single most demanding environment that you 

could ever ask of a helicopter pilot. It’s the high altitude, mountains, 

blacker than black, and dust-outs starting at 150 or 200 feet down.” 

Stalwart performers during that period were Captains Joe Michalek, 

Dave Tabor, Lee Anderson, and Shawn Cameron.43

On one notable night mission in January 2002, a flight of seven 

Pave Lows lifted a US and Canadian force to landing zones at 7,500 

feet elevation. Captain Anderson was flying in the fourth aircraft as 

leader for the last four in the force. All helicopters were heavily loaded 

with troops and equipment and operating above 50,000 pounds gross 

weight. After the teams were inserted, the helicopters took off and 

rendezvoused with an MC-130 and refueled. They then held at an 

orbit point while the ground force executed its mission and as AC-130s 

orbited overhead and provided on-call direct fire support for the 

ground teams.

When the assault elements had finished collecting weapons and 

intelligence and seizing several al-Qaeda personnel, they radioed for 

pickup. Anderson made another landing in brownout conditions to 

collect his element. He then took off and held above as the other three 

aircraft attempted to land and recover their loads. The number five 

aircraft was able to land and recover a team. However, aircraft six and 

seven were not able to land after several attempts and proceeded back 

to the MC-130 for more fuel, as did the covering AC-130. As the tactical situation rapidly deteriorated, Anderson did not want to leave 
operation enduring freedom │ 531

the ground elements with no top cover. He and his crew unanimously 

decided to bring out all remaining allied soldiers and landed to recover 

them. The mission narrative describes the challenges that Anderson 

and his crew faced as they attempted to take off:

With over triple the planned exfiltration load and barely enough power to 

break ground (less than 10 foot hover power available), the crew began their 

most dangerous maneuver of the night. With a high stone wall on one side, 

more compounds off of the nose and right side and rising terrain, the aircraft 

strained off the ground and slowly started forward as Capt Anderson carefully 

increased rotor thrust and watched the rotor speed decrease as the engines 

reached maximum available power. Drifting several feet off the ground in zero 

visibility, he maintained control using only the hover symbols as the aircraft 

accelerated slowly. Eventually, they gained flying airspeed and accelerated 

away from the ground and clear of the dust and immediately realized the narrow margin by which the main rotor blades had missed hitting the stone wall 

on the left.44

Anderson and his crew were not yet out of danger. They had less 

than 30 minutes of fuel available and needed to get to a tanker fast. 

Additionally, their aircraft was beset with intercom and radio communications problems, and they had a difficult time contacting tankers 

in the area. When they finally did, they discovered that they were already busy refueling the other aircraft from the formation. After a 

Courtesy SSgt Glen Fleming, USAF

The ever-dangerous brownout landing
532 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

quick realignment of refueling priority among the helicopters, an 

MC-130 was able to pull into position for Anderson to refuel. When 

the aircraft had sufficient fuel, the crew proceeded back to base and 

landed at sunrise, closing out a 14-hour duty period. 

Of the seven Pave Lows used on that mission, there were a total of 10 

blown tires and two airframes with significant structural damage sustained during the assault landings. However, the trove of intelligence 

collected and prisoners taken were well worth the effort. For his role in 

this intense and rewarding mission, Capt Lee Anderson was nominated for and was a corecipient of the Jabara Award for 2003.45

On another mission on 12 January, Captains Peterson and Michalek 

and crews flew a night direct action mission against a Taliban/al-Qaeda 

compound in Shkin, Afghanistan. The site was a suspected transit 

compound that senior Taliban leaders had used in the past and where 

they might be on 14 January. The crew flew as the second aircraft as 

Knife 12 and inserted an ODA from Fifth Group. The execution was 

perfect, as the assault team was in and out in 60 minutes. No senior 

leaders were found; however, the team detonated a cache of 105 mm 

Courtesy Maj Mike Holder, USAF

Refueling over the barren stretches of Afghanistan
operation enduring freedom │ 533

and 81 mm howitzer and mortar rounds. It also confiscated bags of 

Pakistani and Afghan money; AK-47s and ammo; RPGs; and crewserved weapons, passports, and propaganda posters, as well as photos 

of senior leaders at the compound, two bags of heroin, and hypodermic 

needles. The assault team detained seven terrorists who were transported out of the compound. The Pave Lows received small arms fire 

during the flight (not aimed) and had a bit of an emergency situation 

to deal with when a light illuminated behind the instrument panel 

and made NVG flight almost impossible. One of the flight engineers 

came up with a workable solution, and the crew completed the flight.46

Not all of the 20th crew members were so stalwart. Some were not 

up to the demands and presented Webb a huge leadership challenge. 

As if replicating the movie Top Gun, two pilots came to him and 

placed their pilot wings on his desk. He reminded them, “Look, this 

isn’t the movies. You don’t get to choose whether you’re going to do 

this mission. You’re doing the mission. I am expecting you to do your 

duty, and this is your duty!” As a result of the Knife 03 crash in November 

and several incidents since, Webb watched guys come off of landing 

zones so shaken that they could not find their tanker or did not have 

Courtesy Lt Col Lee Anderson, USAF

Capt Lee Anderson and his crew. Left to right: (top) SSgt Christian Mackenzie, 

SSgt Andre Bell, SSgt Dan Weimer, TSgt Brad Martens, Capt Lee Anderson, and 

Capt Chuck Augustin, USMC.
534 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

a backup plan. He remembers that “they were scared to death” and 

watched several struggle through some very difficult days and nights. 

But none actually refused to fly. He had to give constant attention to 

the crew combinations to ensure that each crew had the right mix of 

individuals who could work together and bring out the best in one 

another so that they could be as operationally effective and as safe as 

possible when flying. There was no shortage of challenges. 

In one instance, Webb took an entire crew off of the flight schedule, 

placing it in the plans office to give it a break. It had been flying 

steadily on very challenging missions, and the pilots in particular 

seemed a bit rattled. After a few days, though, the gunners and engineers on the crew wanted to get back in the action. One of the gunners, TSgt Aaron Bettison, went to his pilots and said, “Look, we’re 

going to do this. We’ll help you do this. . . . We’re going to get back on 

the horse and ride.” And the crew did. Webb was extremely proud of 

that, pointing out that it was an excellent example of NCO leadership 

where and when it was most needed. 

Regrettably, Webb had to rotate home in late February 2002 because of a family emergency. Colonel Kingsley came back over to replace him as the AFSOD commander at Jacobabad, amid the increasing operations at Kandahar.47

21st Special Operations Squadron

In late September 2001, as the wreckage in New York City and the 

Pentagon was still smoldering, the 352d SOG at RAF Mildenhall 

received an updated mission statement directing that it add counterterrorism and personnel recovery to the assigned missions for its operational units. In response the 21st SOS commander, Lt Col Joe Becker, 

deployed five aircraft, crews, and support packages to Stuttgart for a 

large multimission combined training exercise in November. Two 

weeks later, he deployed three of his aircraft and crews to NAS Sigonella, Italy, to conduct shipboard training aboard the USS La Salle. 

However, the 21st SOS was not initially called to support the growing 

operation in Afghanistan.48

These deployments continued into 2002 as the 21st SOS returned 

to Sigonella with five MH-53s, crews, and support personnel for two 

weeks in January and again in May. The USS La Salle remained a 

constant companion as the crews honed their skills for shipboard 
operation enduring freedom │ 535

operations. On the January deployment, one of the Pave Lows struck 

an antenna aboard the USNS Kanawha as it maneuvered to deliver 

exercise personnel. While damage to the ship was minimal, the helicopter’s rotor system was extensively damaged, grounding it for 

several months until repairs were completed. Throughout the period, 

21st SOS personnel also participated in numerous bilateral exercises 

with several other NATO member nations. 

In May, the 21st SOS was once again called upon to perform a distant sea rescue from home station when a 65-foot yacht in rough seas 

had two severely injured personnel on board who needed to be evacuated. Lt Col Greg Lengyel served as mission commander for a task 

force of two MC-130s, two MH-53Ms, and several PJs. The two aircraft commanders were Capt Sean LeRoy and Maj Kevin Churchill. 

They commanded the crews that planned the mission and then flew 

to the boat located almost 700 nautical miles southwest of RAF 

Mildenhall, recovering the two injured personnel while fighting a 40-

knot wind and 15-to-25-foot sea swells. Combined, the crews logged 

46.8 flight hours, accomplishing what was confirmed to be the longest distance air-sea rescue ever launched from the British Isles. In 

recognition of their leadership of this humanitarian mission, LeRoy 

and Churchill were nominated for and received the Cheney Award 

for 2002.49

Two months later, Colonel Becker passed command of the 21st SOS 

to Colonel Lengyel and departed for AWC. Lengyel easily slid into his 

new job as the squadron continued its training cycle and participated 

with the group as it passed an AFSOC-directed ORI with an overall 

“excellent” rating. In September the unit deployed a small contingent of 

operations and support personnel to a classified location in Afghanistan to support the 20th SOS.50

Jacobabad

When Lt Col Mike Kingsley returned to Jacobabad in late February, 

he found a base that had finally received the necessary infrastructure 

to make it generally inhabitable. He jumped right back into the operation as his crews were engaged in a plethora of classified operations 

throughout the theater. On 18 March, the 20th SOS lost another Pave 

Low, MH-53M #68-8286, while supporting allied forces on a mission 

in Afghanistan. As the crew approached the flare for landing in 
536 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

brownout conditions, one of the engines experienced a compressor 

stall that precipitated a hard landing and catastrophic damage to the 

aircraft. Injuries to the crew and passengers were not serious, but the 

aircraft—a veteran of the Son Tay mission in 1970—was destroyed. 

Two weeks later, two Pave Lows were launched out of Jacobabad to 

recover a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a GPS-guided bomb, 

which had been inadvertently dropped in Pakistan. Its expeditious 

recovery precluded an international incident and also prevented its 

use by al-Qaeda forces.51

In May 2002, Lieutenants Holder and Borland returned to Jacobabad 

for second tours with several other crew members. As they stepped 

off of the C-130 into the already oppressive heat, Holder thought, 

“Man, I can’t believe I am back here again.” Apprised of the detachment now up at Kandahar, he immediately volunteered to go upcountry. Two weeks later, Holder conducted a logistics mission up to 

Tarin Kowt where coalition forces were maintaining a medical facility 

for Afghans. As his helicopter and another commanded by Capt Paul 

Pereira landed at Kandahar and were being hot refueled, the pilots 

received a call from the command center asking if they could relaunch and fly to northeastern Afghanistan to perform an emergency 

extraction of a special forces team. The location was five hours away, 

north of Asadabad. Holder and Pereira accepted the mission and 

lifted off into the darkening sky.

The illumination was almost 100 percent as they flew through the 

crisp night air. Arriving in the recovery area, they were able to make 

radio contact with the team, divided into two elements almost half a 

mile apart in the rugged mountainside. The pilots decided that each 

would pick up one element of the separated team. They were in an 

area with hard lava rock and little dust. As Holder was landing to recover his team, he heard Pereira call “Mayday, Mayday” on the radio. 

Holder quickly got his Soldiers on board and then pulled pitch. As he 

gained altitude, he could see Pereira’s aircraft perched on a sandbar in 

the river below. On his attempted exfil of the team, Pereira had followed the directions of a team member and had landed on an upslope 

in a nose-high attitude. As his helicopter began to slide backwards, he 

applied forward cyclic in an attempt to stop the roll. When he did so, 

the main blades came down and hit the refueling probe and the leading edges of both engines and knocked off all of the forward pitotstatic probes. As this happened, Pereira believed that the main blades 
operation enduring freedom │ 537

had also hit one of the team members. He shut down his engines and 

discovered that his main rotor blades were seriously damaged.

Courtesy Maj Mike Holder, USAF

The crew of Ninja 12. Left to right: SSgt Eric Weidanz, 1st Lt Mike Holder, Capt 

Steve Cherrington, TSgt Shawn Hammond, TSgt J. B. Lackey (killed in Afghanistan in 2010), and SSgt P. J. Wright.

Flying overhead, Holder quickly contacted the second team on the 

radio and discovered that none of its members had been injured in the 

accident. Holder then landed his aircraft on the tight and narrow ridge, 

placing the second element of the team with the first for additional 

security at the downed aircraft. He had to leave Pereira’s crew and the 

entire team there as he flew his aircraft to the airfield at Bagram. The 

command center at Kandahar had been monitoring the mission and 

instructed him to shut down there and go into crew rest. As Holder was 

landing, his crew was contacted by an Army CH-47 crew with a quick 

reaction force (QRF) that wanted Holder to lead it to the team. Holder 

got permission to do so, refueled his aircraft, and led the CH-47 back 

to the team. The CH-47 offloaded a fresh team of Soldiers to secure the 

site and then loaded up the exfiling team. Holder and crew picked up 

the Pave Low crew members and brought them out. 
538 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

The next day, a recovery team with Lieutenant Borland as lead, 

copilot 2d Lt Geoffrey Petyak, and crew flew up from Kandahar with a 

10-man maintenance element led by MSgt Fred Bishop to repair the 

damaged aircraft so that they could fly it back. Sergeant Colannino 

was on that team and describes the effort:

We worked on the bird; we changed three main rotor blades, one tail rotor 

blade. We had to use speed tape to tape up the top of the aircraft so it wasn’t 

exposed. We had to take some parts of the aircraft off that were too damaged. As 

soon as the sun started to come up, we were getting in the seats. We fired it up, 

did a quick hover check, made sure nothing was going to fall off the aircraft or 

that it was going to rattle itself to death, and we took off back to the base. All we 

had for instruments was static stuff because everything else was out. It was a 

challenge getting back. We got it back though and landed. They fixed it up, and 

that aircraft lived on.52

Borland and his team were protected by a security element from 

the 10th Mountain Division. Regardless, they received harassing 

small arms fire as they worked. When the maintenance team indicated that the aircraft was ready to fly, Borland discussed the aircraft 

status with Petyak, who had been a helicopter maintenance supervisor in the Army. Petyak believed that the aircraft was “good to go.” 

Additionally, the entire maintenance team volunteered to fly on it as 

Courtesy Maj Mike Holder, USAF

Refueling at night
operation enduring freedom │ 539

a sign of confidence in its work. Borland was impressed. However, as 

a precaution, he called Bagram and requested that it dispatch another 

helicopter to come out and recover the maintenance team and security 

force. When it arrived, Borland made sure that everybody was aboard 

one of the two helicopters and then took off for Bagram. 

Landing there, Borland anticipated that the Pave Low would be 

loaded aboard a C-17 for return to the CONUS. However, because of 

runway repairs, a C-17 could not land there, and Borland was instructed to fly the aircraft to Kandahar. To minimize the threat, Borland 

and crew took off at sunset. They were escorted by another Pave Low. 

Most of the aircraft systems were operating normally, except for the 

pitot-static system and related indications. Flying southwest, they 

had to divert around a thunderstorm and then encountered a dust 

storm. Borland remembered,

The only thing I can equate it to is the movie, The Mummy. We hit a haboob; 

it was a wall of dirt that went up to . . . about 8,000 feet. We were at about 300 

feet on radar at the time. We still didn’t have any pitot-static indication, . . . but 

I’ve got ground speed, which is what really saved our lives that night. . . . We 

went from about 130 knots ground to 70 knots ground nearly instantaneously. 

It was so disorienting in the FLIR because when we hit that wall of dirt, it spun 

our gyros pretty quick.53

The haboob also caused problems for the left engine because the 

engine air particle separator had been damaged and removed, and 

the engine was ingesting great quantities of dirt, making the engine 

run much hotter than the right one and produce smoke. At the same 

time, the crew in the second aircraft was having a difficult time maintaining visual contact with Borland’s machine. Borland had his seat 

engineer, Sergeant Colannino, turn on all of the aircraft lights so that 

they were easier to see. Additionally, Borland started a climb to clear 

the haboob, while he and Petyak had to trade off control of the aircraft about every five minutes because of the heavy turbulence—an 

occurrence very similar to the crews that dispatched to rendezvous 

with the USS Forrestal in the southern Caribbean on Operation Pokeweed 12 years earlier. Once clear of the dust cloud, they were able to 

proceed directly to Kandahar. En route, they were directed to go to 

Jacobabad. Borland refused, citing his low fuel state and the fact that 

the two crews were just worn out. They would fly the aircraft down to 

Jacobabad the next day. The repairs to the aircraft cost over two million dollars.54
540 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

At about that same time, Kingsley determined that he needed to 

move his Pave Low force completely out of Jacobabad into Afghanistan because the flow of the fighting had concentrated in the eastern 

and southeastern portions of the country as allied forces pursued 

Osama bin Laden and his remnant minions. Initially, he tried to find 

room at the Bagram air base about 25 miles north of Kabul. However, 

that base was already overcrowded. Instead, he decided to consolidate his Pave Lows at Kandahar while awaiting space at Bagram. As 

the unit was beginning this move, though, he received an operational 

order to move four of his Pave Lows, crews, and support personnel 

and two MC-130Ps to Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, to support operations in that region. They moved as ordered, only to find another austere location that required a great deal of improvement to make it 

habitable. Regardless, they were part of an initial deployment of a 

CENTCOM crisis response element that included US Navy SEALs 

and other US special forces elements. They began operations with 

French, Spanish, German, and other coalition special forces units so 

that they could get used to one another and develop standard TTPs. 

Within a few months, they would be joined by a USMC task force to 

become JTF-Horn of Africa. This was another evolving front in the 

efforts against al-Qaeda.55

In June, with the dispatch of the last of his personnel from Jacobabad, 

Kingsley returned to Hurlburt to pass command of the 20th SOS to 

Colonel Webb and then attend the US Naval Postgraduate School in 

Monterey, California. Webb was assigned Lt Col Jim Slife to serve as his 

operations officer. At almost the same time, Brig Gen Lyle Koenig gave 

up command of the 16th SOW to Col Frank Kisner, an MC-130 pilot, 

and longtime Pave Low pilot Col Randy O’Boyle took command of the 

16th SOG.56

After assuming command, Colonel Webb joined his unit detachment at Djibouti for a six-week tour to develop a feel for that operation before returning to the United States with the 20th SOS contingent still in Afghanistan to prepare for other operations being 

contemplated in other parts of the world. Colonel Slife replaced him 

at Djibouti to command the small Pave Low detachment of four aircraft and six crews.57

Jim Slife shared many of the same experiences as Kingsley and 

Webb as he served there and in Afghanistan. He came to believe that 

in the longer nights of Afghanistan, the Pave Low community reached 

the pinnacle of its capability. He recalled how the “old heads” had 
operation enduring freedom │ 541

inculcated in the younger troops the expectation that in going into 

any conflict, they would be there to do the prime hit, or takedown, or 

rescue—and then head back home to acclaim. The Big Mish, they 

called it, kind of like Honey Badger or the Noriega grab in Panama. 

However, the reality was that plans changed, and campaigns dragged 

out. Instead of using the magic technology to go out and do the one 

big event, the truer norm was a longer and involved period of deployment such as Desert Storm or Bosnia, which stressed the units over 

time and called to the fore their full “bag of air commando tricks.” 

Like Webb, Slife remembers this intense period in Afghanistan:

We found ourselves in an environment—particularly in the early days in

Afghanistan—where we were flying missions every night that at any other point 

in the history of Pave Low would be the Big Mish. . . . You don’t have time to even 

write down who was on the crew two nights ago because you’re worried about 

tonight. We were flying seven-ship opposed assaults to compounds at 7,000-feet 

density altitude in talcum powder dust. Bullets are hitting the helicopter and 

you’re shooting back. That’s what we’re doing every night. 

[A long campaign] is a different proposition, and none of us had ever experienced 

it. As captains, as lieutenants . . . we didn’t know how to do this. We just knew how 

to get ready for a single mission. So this idea of conducting sustained operations 

and the relentless pace that we were operating at took some getting used to, 

frankly. You know, we adapted pretty well.58

Watching the dramatic actions in Afghanistan from afar, Brig Gen 

Rich Comer, still serving at AFSOC, was very concerned about the 

brownout landing problem and initiated quick actions to modify the 

Pave Low’s Hover Symbology Queuing System to provide the pilots 

critical visual inputs in the landing phase of flight to preclude the drifting 

issues inherent in the brownout conditions. Like Colonel Slife, though, 

he was impressed with the performance of the young Pave Low crews 

and their commanders, some of whom had served with him back in his 

days as the commander of the 20th SOS. He also believed that “it was in 

Afghanistan that Pave Low finally came to full fruition of its capabilities.” 

Just a few months later Comer would be promoted to major general, the 

first Pave Low pilot to reach that rank.59

Kirtland AFB

Given the turbulent events occurring in the world, the pace of life 

and operations was a bit more staid at the schoolhouse at Kirtland. 

The 551st SOS was steadily training Pave Low pilots, engineers, and 
542 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

gunners, although there were scheduling challenges because of a 

chronic shortage of instructors. The course syllabus was modified a 

bit to include increased classroom and flight instruction on CSAR, 

and the simulators assigned to the 58th TRSS were upgraded with the 

IDAS-MATT system in March, enabling the students to become familiar with the systems while still at Kirtland. However, the 551st was 

not slated to receive any MH-53Ms, so the actual flight training 

would have to occur either at the 20th or 21st. In June 2001, Lt Col 

Dennis Jones relinquished command of the 551st SOS to fellow Pave 

Low pilot and combat veteran Lt Col Tim Leahy and proceeded to 

Maxwell AFB to attend the AWC.60

During June and July, the 551st SOS received the MH-53Js from the 

inactivated 31st SOS. They were immediately put into the training program to replace the TH-53s. On 3 August, all of the TH-53s were flown 

to the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center (AMARC) at 

Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, for long-term storage. Henceforth, all 

Pave Low qualification training would take place in MH-53J aircraft. 

Four weeks later, the personnel of the 58th SOW were as devastated as 

their countrymen at the horrific scenes on their TVs. Kirtland AFB 

was also placed under maximum security, and all flights were cancelled 

for several days except for those specifically directed under Operation 

Courtesy Maj Gen Rich Comer, USAF, Retired

Brig Gen Rich Comer serving as the AFSOC vice-commander
operation enduring freedom │ 543

Noble Eagle. As training resumed, all 58th SOW personnel were infused with an increased sense of urgency concerning the training they 

were imparting to their students. All expected that soon the wing 

would be tasked to provide augmentation personnel for deployment 

with the operational squadrons. Many, too, knew that at some point in 

the future, they would also be assigned PCS to those same units. 

Courtesy 58th SOW History Office

In August 2001, the six TH-53As assigned to the 58th SOW depart Kirtland 

AFB, escorted by three MH-53Js, for their final flight to Davis-Monthan AFB.

As Colonel Kingsley and his Airmen were beginning operations at 

Jacobabad, Capt Derrick Stamos was beginning his Pave Low qualification at Kirtland. He had been commissioned in 1992 through 

USAF ROTC at the University of South Florida with a slot for pilot 

training. Post–Desert Storm, USAF pilot training was severely reduced, and Stamos was given a nonflying job as a contracting officer 

at Moody AFB until receiving orders for flight school at Columbus 

AFB, Mississippi, in June 1996. After his initial T-37 training, he 

selected the helicopter track and proceeded to Fort Rucker for rotarywing training. Graduating from that course with his pilot wings, he 

went to Vandenberg AFB to fly the UH-1N with the 76th Helicopter 
544 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Flight, as had so many previous Pave Low pilots. It was an assignment 

that he dearly enjoyed. The UH-1Ns there were modified with FLIRs, 

upgraded radios, and GPS navigation. Additionally, the crews flew 

with NVGs so that they could spot intruders into the restricted areas 

around the base at night. It was very good training for prospective 

Pave Low pilots; in fact, the pilots there still referred to their aircraft 

as the “Pave Hueys.” While there, Stamos logged over 1,000 hours of 

rotary-wing time on his four-year assignment. 

All of that was the precursor for the Pave Low. Stamos was well 

aware of the role that the Pave Lows were already playing in Afghanistan and had no misconceptions about where he was going or what 

he would be doing. He wanted to get all that he could out of the 

course and immersed himself in it. The TH-53As were gone, so all of 

his flights were in the MH-53Js, and he learned as much as possible 

about the various aircraft systems. He quickly discovered that unlike 

the UH-1N, he could not fly the Pave Low by himself. He found that 

the real challenge was on the human side and that the most important skill he needed to learn was “how to deal with, manage, utilize, 

and then go to war with a full up crew.” He further explained, “If you 

were going to put a Pave Low into a tight spot, you need the inputs of 

all six of those crew members to get you down safely. You can’t see 

your own landing gear; you don’t have the option of leaning out 

through an open window to look down and see the ground. So working with that crew—it was huge.”61

He had to learn the functions of each of the six crew members and 

to delegate duties as necessary to facilitate the operation of the aircraft to perform the mission. He also learned the now almost timeless 

“tricks” that had been passed down through the generations to fly the 

Paves. One of these was the use of the crew cadence. Stamos described 

the technique:

Learning to integrate all of those inputs and all of those voices is one of the 

biggest challenges in the entire program. They have something they call the 

“cadence.” You would say that you are on the approach; each crew member in 

turn would say his own piece all throughout the approach until it came back 

to you, and then you would give an update of what you were doing. So basically you would say that you are on the approach. 

The engineer would call the ground speed and altitude; the right door would 

look out and say, “I’ve got the LZ in sight; come left/come right.” Tail would 

say, “Clear on the tail.” The left gunner would say, “Clear on the left.” The non-
operation enduring freedom │ 545

flying pilot usually had nothing to say; he would give a navigation update if he 

needed to say something that he saw on the nav or FLIR. . . .

That skill, which was primarily honed in the tactical phase—which was the second 

half of the schoolhouse, done day and night, on goggles and radar—was probably 

the single greatest skill that we mastered. The helicopter itself is a helicopter. . . . 

But using the systems and integrating that crew is where it really becomes something special. It enhances the capability beyond the machine. It’s the men in the 

machine who give it the capability.62

This was what the great instructors at Kirtland taught. It took persistent instruction sortie after sortie and was ingrained in the Pave 

Low community year after year. Stamos also discovered that some of 

the mission debriefings could be quite harsh, with the enlisted instructors and crew members not hesitating to make sometimes stingingly critical comments concerning the performance of one another 

or the pilots. Comments were focused on the professional vice personal level; however, Stamos could quickly see that Pave Low duty 

was not for those with thin skins. The community had developed a 

fine-tuned ability to self-police because everyone knew that the price 

for poor performance could be measured in lives lost. He clearly remembers that “it was the case with the senior guys setting the example 

for the young guys and letting them know, in no uncertain terms, 

when they didn’t meet standards. It was understood that you had to 

rise to a certain level, particularly in combat, to execute the mission.” 

After Kirtland, Stamos was scheduled to report to the 21st SOS at 

RAF Mildenhall, where he would most assuredly put all of his newly 

acquired Pave Low training to good use.63

The new year of 2002 did not start well for the Pave Low community at Kirtland. On 9 January, a Cessna 172 with three persons on 

board crashed in the southern Colorado mountains near Durango. 

The pilot was able to walk out and make contact with emergency services on his cell phone. That evening the 58th SOW was contacted 

and requested to help. Two Pave Lows and an MC-130 were launched 

to assist in the search and possible rescue, made all the more urgent 

by the subzero temperatures in the mountains. 

Arriving in the area, the lead aircraft landed and picked up the 

pilot, who then helped the crew find the crash site. While hovering 

over the wreckage, the helicopter, MH-53J #68-10363, struck some 

trees with its main rotor blades and crashed. No one was seriously 

hurt. A ground rescue unit then found the site and picked up the 

Cessna pilot and passengers and the Pave Low crew. Maintenance 
546 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

technicians determined that the aircraft was salvageable. However, 

the crash site elevation of 9,700 feet made the Pave Low unrecoverable by helicopter lift; instead, it had to be hauled out. However, the 

site was quite remote with no road immediately available. Consequently, the recovery crew, led by CMSgt Mark Self, brought in a 

modified flatbed trailer to serve as a sled. Two large tractors were 

then driven up the mountain to push and pull the sled out through 14 

miles of wilderness. The entire operation took almost a month and 

added to the eventual $5 million total cost of repairing the Pave Low. 

The aircraft maintenance team was led by MSgt Jackie Powell, who 

said of his 10-person recovery team, “Each one of these guys worked unselfishly and with tremendous dedication to accomplish this recovery.” 

Based upon feedback coming in from the 20th and 21st Squadrons, 

the 551st continuously updated its course curriculum to graduate 

crew members as technically and tactically proficient as possible. 

However, the 551st would not receive MH-53Ms. Those aircraft were 

needed in the operational fleet. For the year, the instructors of the 

551st SOS and 58th TRSS qualified or requalified 26 pilots, 15 flight 

engineers, and 17 aerial gunners and provided simulator refresher 

training for 259 crew members. The training provided by the professionals at Kirtland AFB was vital to the standardization and professionalism of the Pave Low fleet operation. Given the challenges now 

faced by the Pave Low community in the GWOT and its indeterminate duration, those two attributes were more important than ever.64

Notes

1. Woodward, Bush at War, 152, 178.

2. Kingsley, interview.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.; and Holder, interview.

5. LHA is the Navy designator for an amphibious assault ship.

6. Kingsley, interview.

7. Cessop, interview.

8. Kingsley and Holder, interviews.

9. Kingsley, interview; and Blehm, Only Thing Worth Dying For, 67–69.

10. Colannino, interview.

11. Blehm, Only Thing Worth Dying For, 67–69; and Kingsley, interview.

12. Stricklin to the author, e-mail, review remarks, 23 Jan 2011. 

13. Briscoe et al., Weapon of Choice, 109–11, 113; and Stricklin to the author, e-mail, 

review remarks, 23 Jan 2011. 

14. Holder and Schweim, interviews.
operation enduring freedom │ 547

15. Blehm, Only Thing Worth Dying For, 67–69.

16. Kingsley, interview; and Knife 03 Incident Report, n.d., procured from Lieutenant Holder.

17. Knife 03 Incident Report, n.d., procured from Lieutenant Holder.

18. 1st Lt Brandon Lingle, “Pave Low Hero Earns 2002 Pitsenbarger Award,” 

Commando, 26 July 2002, 11; and Cessop, interview.

19. Borland, interview.

20. Ibid.

21. Cessop, interview.

22. Borland, interview.

23. 1st Lt James Holder, memorandum for record, subject: Knife 04 CSAR Report, 

4 Nov 2001, provided to the author by Holder. 

24. Robinson, Masters of Chaos, 157; and “66th Rescue Squadron,” fact sheet.

25. Blehm, Only Thing Worth Dying For, 88, 175, 260; and Briscoe et al., Weapon 

of Choice, 106.

26. Blehm, Only Thing Worth Dying For, 299.

27. Kingsley, interview.

28. Michalek, personal notes; and Blehm, Only Thing Worth Dying For, 260, 274–301.

29. Blehm, Only Thing Worth Dying For, 292–304.

30. Ibid., 304–7. 

31. Ibid., 312.

32. Schweim, interview.

33. Blehm, Only Thing Worth Dying For, 324–28.

34. Ibid., 333–35; and Schweim, interview.

35. Blehm, Only Thing Worth Dying For, 335–39; and Schweim, interview.

36. Michalek, personal notes.

37. Lt Col Mike Grub, personal mission narrative, n.d., provided to the author; 

and Grub to the author, e-mail.

38. Kingsley, interview.

39. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 23; and History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 

Dec 2002, vol. 1, 1.

40. Jobling, interview.

41. Bahmanyar and Osman, SEALs, 107–9; USSOCOM, History of the United 

States Special Operations Command, 107, USSOCOM/HO; and Jobling, interview.

42. Webb, interview.

43. Ibid.; and History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2002, vol. 1, 168–69.

44. Lt Col Leighton Anderson, personal mission narrative, n.d., provided to the author.

45. Ibid.; and Webb, interview. 

46. Michalek, personal notes.

47. Webb, interview.

48. History of 352d SOG, 1 July–31 Dec 2001, vol. 1, 10, 18, 57; and Lengyel, interview.

49. http://www.rotorheadsrus/documents/514.html, accessed 13 July 2009; and 21 

SOS/DO to Lt Col Gregory Lengyel, memorandum, subject: Mission Commander AAA 

for 21–22 May 02 Rescue Mission, provided to the author by TSgt John Hickman.

50. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–30 June 2002, vol. 1, 20, 39; ibid., 1 July–31 Dec 

2002, vol. 1, xi, xvii; and Lengyel, interview.

51. History of 16th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 2002, vol. 1, 20.
548 │ OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

52. Colannino, interview.

53. Borland, interview.

54. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2002, vol. 1, xxiv; and Borland and Holder, 

interviews.

55. Kingsley and Webb, interviews; and Sean Naylor, “Hunting Down Terrorists,” Navy Times, 7 Nov 2011, 24.

56. Ibid.; and History of 16th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 2002, vol. 1, 1–2.

57. Webb, interview; and Slife to the author, e-mail, review comments, 13 Sept 2010.

58. Slife, interview.

59. Comer, interview.

60. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 2001, vol. 1, 46; and Jones, interview. 

61. Stamos, interview.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–30 June 2001, vol. 1, 4, 12, 21; ibid., 1 July–31 Dec 

2001, vol. 1, 8–10; ibid., 1 Jan–31 Dec 2002, vol. 1, 12–16, 50–51, 68; and “Teams Led 

Helo out of Rockies,” Commando, 8 Mar 2002, 4.
Chapter 16

Operation Iraqi Freedom

2003

 If you start a rumor and repeat it enough times, it will catch 

on and can become the truth. 

—Brig Gen Greg Lengyel 

Washington, DC

Afghanistan was not the only area of concern. When the United 

States led the effort to free Kuwait in 1991, numerous pundits and 

governmental leaders felt that it was just a matter of time before Saddam Hussein would be overthrown by disparate, disaffected elements 

within Iraq. Indeed, expecting direct American and allied support 

almost immediately, primarily Shia groups revolted in the southern 

portions of the country. Very quickly after their victory, however, US 

and coalition forces pulled back into Kuwait and only watched as 

Saddam unleashed his remaining forces on the rebels, brutally suppressing them with both conventional weapons and chemical WMDs. 

These actions and similar ones taken in the north led to the death of 

tens of thousands of Shiites and Kurds and resolidified Saddam’s grip 

over the nation. 

Encouraged by the rapid departure of the allied forces from his 

country and the success of his suppression of the rebels, Saddam reassumed a defiant pose toward the Western powers. Once again, he 

began subtle but aggressive actions against Kuwait and was allegedly 

involved in an assassination plot against Pres. George H. W. Bush 

when he visited the Gulf region. Saddam ordered his air force to fly in 

violation of a United Nations–imposed no-fly edict, triggering coalition air forces to continuously patrol the two formalized no-fly zones 

in northern and southern Iraq. In response, he ordered his antiaircraft gunners to fire upon allied aircraft patrolling the sectors. For 

many years, Pave Low crews sat CSAR alert in Turkey and Kuwait 
550 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

supporting these operations. Fortunately, they never had to mount a 

CSAR effort.1

After assuming office in January 2001, Pres. George W. Bush directed his administration to review these long-ongoing operations. 

In doing so, it determined that Saddam’s hostile actions and intent 

and stated determination to develop and use more WMDs or pass 

them to international terrorists presented a serious danger to the 

United States and its interests in the Gulf region. President Bush addressed this threat in a speech at the United States Military Academy 

on 1 June 2002. To the gathered cadets, their families, faculty, and 

friends, he said,

The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism 

and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear 

weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even 

weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great 

nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught 

seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to 

harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power. 

For much of the last century, America’s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. 

But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist 

networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible 

when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver 

those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. 

We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot 

put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, 

we will have waited too long.2

Laid out in such stark terms, the president’s speech was immediately labeled a doctrine of preventive or preemptive war. The service 

chiefs realized that it most probably meant renewed hostilities with 

Iraq in addition to Afghanistan and stepped up preparations. 

Weighing Iraq’s belligerence, its interest in producing and using 

WMDs, and potential connections to international terrorist groups, 

President Bush decided to remove Saddam Hussein and his Baathist 

regime from power. Bush was heartened in that decision by the realization that the American people also saw Saddam’s governance as a 

threat and, in the face of the dramatic events of 9/11, were more supportive of his planned actions.3
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 551

While President Bush was making his case for war and Secretary 

of State Colin Powell was appealing to the United Nations for diplomatic support, the commander of USCENTCOM, Gen Tommy 

Franks, was driving his staff to develop the detailed plans necessary 

to execute an attack. However, the political dynamics within the Middle 

East region had changed greatly since 1991. As opposed to its unlimited support in Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia now put strict limits on its 

backing for any proposed campaign against Iraq. While Air Force 

and some ground units could be based there, any significant ground 

campaign with substantial conventional ground forces would have to 

be mounted from Kuwait. 

General Franks’s campaign plan, titled 1003V, directed that a main 

attack would be mounted from Kuwait with three-plus divisions and 

numerous auxiliary elements. A supporting attack would be launched 

from Turkey into northern Iraq. It would consist of Task Force Horse, 

formed around the 4th ID and its associated units, and a large number 

of special forces units. These two operations would be bolstered by a 

third effort in western Iraq. There a strong coalition special operations force would be inserted and reinforced to tie down Iraqi units 

and prevent the launching of surface-to-surface rockets from the region 

against Israel and Saudi Arabia, as had been done in Desert Storm. At 

the same time, a ceaseless air campaign would detect and destroy 

strategic Iraqi targets and directly assist the coalition ground forces as 

the three task forces converged on Baghdad and destroyed the regime. 

The timing of the campaign was not yet set. However, Franks wanted 

to initiate it as soon as possible, preferably in the cool weather of the 

winter months instead of the blinding heat of late spring and summer. 

February or March of 2003 seemed to be the most propitious time.

As forces continued to build up in Kuwait for the southern portion 

of the attack, the government of Turkey debated and then voted not to 

allow the passage of Task Force Horse through its territory to mount 

the northern attack. Some of the Soldiers and most of the equipment of 

the 4th ID and support units were aboard ships in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and General Franks ordered that they be diverted to ports 

in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. They would be fed into the campaign as 

they arrived. The northern effort would be centered around a special 

forces task force with ad hoc conventional force augmentation.4

US V Corps would conduct the southern attack from Kuwait with 

three divisions—the 3d ID (Mechanized), the 101st Airborne Division 

(Air Assault), and the 82d Airborne Division—with numerous 
552 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

supporting units. Joining V Corps would be the US I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) with its 1st Marine Division, the British 

1st Armored Division, and supporting units to attack generally northwest to destroy Iraqi forces, clear the main roads and adjoining towns 

and cities, and capture Baghdad. Subsequent operations would send 

forces farther north to seize Tikrit and Mosul. To partially replace the 

cancelled attack of Task Force Horse from Turkey, coalition special 

forces units would conduct supporting operations in northern Iraq in 

conjunction with the 173d Airborne Brigade and Kurdish forces in 

the region. 

Springing forth from Kuwait, the V Corps would attack on an 

axis—taking it generally through the cities of Jalibah, As Samawah, 

An Najaf, and Karbala—and then close in on Baghdad from the south 

and west. To its right, the I MEF would use British forces to clear the 

city of Al Basrah. Then it would sweep generally northwest to close in 

on Baghdad from the east and be prepared to continue operations to 

the north as needed.

AFSOC elements would deploy to support all three operations, and 

warning orders went out to the 16th SOW and the 352d SOG. Arriving in-theater, their forces would be under the operational control of 

SOCCENT. They would be organized by task into a JSOAC commanded by the 16th SOW commander, Col Frank Kisner. To optimally command and control his assets, he organized them into several 

detachments: AFSOD-A at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, which would 

support the ongoing operations there and included a small 20th SOS 

detachment; Joint Special Operations Air Detachment–North 

(JSOAD-N), to be located in Turkey, which would support northern 

Iraq operations; JSOAD-W, at Al Jafr AB, Jordan, which would support western Iraq operations; and AFSOD-S, to be located at Ali Al 

Salem AB, Kuwait, which would support southern Iraq operations.

 The 20th SOS was alerted for duty with the AFSOD-S, and the 

21st SOS was alerted for deployment to support the JSOAD-N.5

 Deploying to support the offensive were over 1,800 US and allied fighter, 

bomber, and support aircraft. Arrayed at airfields across the region 

and aboard aircraft carriers in the Gulf, these forces were led by officers 

who fought in the first Gulf War and largely consisted of personnel 

who had been in action against Iraq while flying missions in the nofly zones over Iraq. They would be supported by a significant CSAR 

force. Rescue task forces, each consisting of an HH-60 squadron, an 

HC-130 squadron, and a PJ squadron, would be assigned to support 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 553

operations in the south, west, and north, although the northern task 

force was facing the same restrictions as Task Force Horse. All would 

be under the operational control of the new CFACC, Lt Gen Michael 

“Buzz” Moseley, who would use them to conduct his theater rescue 

plan. However, the Pave Lows were not completely free of personnel 

recovery responsibilities. They still had to maintain two aircraft available to carry a QRF to recover any special operations forces in extremis.6

20th Special Operations Squadron

The squadron used the latter part of 2002 to absorb new personnel 

and prepare its aircraft and Airmen for the anticipated taskings. Colonels 

Webb and Slife did a complete review of the personnel structure of 

the squadron and made several changes to the flight system. Anticipating that the war against Iraq could be a long struggle, they wanted 

the talent of the unit to be spread out—no “A” or “B” team but balanced so that overall performance would be at a predictable standard. 

Webb formed hard crews, believing that they would be better for the 

challenges ahead. The two colonels were also deeply involved with 

the planning for the squadron’s anticipated deployment to Kuwait; 

they intended to take 10 aircraft and 15 crews with them. Counting 

the four aircraft and six crews in Djibouti, fully 80 percent of the 

squadron would be deployed for the war. Webb departed Hurlburt in 

December 2002 to travel to Djibouti, where Lt Col Mitch Petersen 

was now in charge. Capt Mark Newell and Capt Joe Michalek were 

also in Djibouti with their own crews. Webb directed them to begin 

working with US Navy SEAL elements in-theater to plan a series of 

missions into the Al Faw region of southern Iraq to seize and protect 

oil platforms and pumping sites there as part of a larger campaign 

into Iraq. In early January 2003, Colonel Webb traveled on to Kuwait to 

prepare for the arrival of his squadron team. He took Newell, Michalek, 

and their crews with him.7

While at Djibouti, Colonel Petersen was joined by SrA Eric Ezell. 

After basic training at Lackland AFB, he had gone through his airmanship and survival schools before attending the basic aerial gunner’s 

course and then MH-53 qualification at Kirtland. In October 2002, 

he reported to the 20th SOS, where he received his final mission qualification training and was immediately scheduled for deployment. He 

arrived at Camp Lemonier as a 19-year-old MH-53 gunner, still a bit 
554 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

in shock over the dramatic changes that had occurred in his life over 

the previous 16 months. There he was assigned to TSgt John Stricklin 

for his final training and mission qualification. Stricklin had total empathy for the young Airman, remembering his initiation to true operational flying under the supervision of SMSgt “Large Sarge” Hunter back 

in Desert Shield. He resolved to insure that the young troop learned everything he needed to know to do this job as safely and professionally as 

possible. Ezell remembers, “I went from being an 18-year-old kid with no 

responsibilities in the world to . . . my first deployment . . . held to the 

same standard as that of any NCO . . . in the flying world. [It] would be . . . 

a great personal experience.”8

Over the next two months, the 20th deployed aircraft and personnel 

to Ali Al Salem AB in Kuwait. Slife oversaw the deployment of his 

aircraft and people from Hurlburt through February and then led the 

last group over in early March. He arrived after Colonel Webb and 

discovered that the Green Hornets were tasked with three war-opening 

missions: two insertions of several ODA teams from the 5th SFG and 

a US Navy SEAL insertion on several oil platforms in the Al Faw 

region. Slife would lead the first ODA insertion, possibly prior to the 

beginning of declared hostilities, and Webb would act as the airborne 

mission commander on the SEAL mission, led by Capt Mark Newell. 

The third mission would be led by Maj Bill Rowell.9

Courtesy SSgt Glen Fleming, USAF

The Ali Al Salem flight line through NVGs
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 555

The 20th SOS lost the services of another aircraft, MH-53M #68-10930, 

on 13 February 2003, when a crew led by Capt “Woody” Woodworth 

made a hard landing in brownout conditions at night in the Kuwaiti 

fine dust. The nose gear collapsed on impact, allowing the main 

blades to strike the ground and severely damaging the tail structure. 

Captain Michalek was his flight leader and landed to recover the crew 

and passengers, none of whom was seriously injured. However, the 

aircraft was extensively damaged and had to be returned to the United 

States for significant and time-consuming repair. This was the same 

problem that the young crews of the 20th SOS had encountered in 

Saudi Arabia 12 years earlier and in Afghanistan just the previous 

year. This very aircraft had been part of that earlier Iraq deployment. 

It was flown by Capt Tom Trask and crew on the recovery of Slate 46A 

in January 1991. Needless to say, the Pave Low crew was quite shaken 

by this event. Slife flew with the crew in an attempt to sharpen its skill 

and reestablish its confidence.10

However, he and Webb and most of the Pave Low crew members 

had learned a great deal since Afghanistan. Slife came to the conclusion 

that because of individual personalities, some of the crews did not 

work well as assigned. Slife finally had to go to Webb and work out a 

plan to realign some personnel, a dramatic move surely, but one 

made necessary by the exigencies of impending combat. However, 

the changes were selective. Most crews had jelled as cohesive units, 

each developing its own distinct DNA, or identity and capacity for 

handling the steadily increasing stress as combat approached. Said 

Slife of this phenomenon, “There is some really intense bonding that 

takes place; guys develop their own personalities as crews.” 

Webb and Slife had another problem. The AFSOD-S commander, 

Col Randy O’Boyle, was collocated with them at Ali Al Salem. After the 

accident, he also turned a close eye to the 20th. He was hesitant to intrude 

into the actions of the squadron; however, he asked Webb pointedly if 

Webb needed to make any changes. It was ultimately Webb’s call, and 

he did make several more crew realignments. Slife also manipulated 

the flying schedule, making sure that key supervisors flew with certain 

crews on certain missions. It was all part of combat aviation.11
556 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Desert Combat

Intelligence sources indicated that the Iraqi people wanted to be 

rid of Saddam and would welcome an invasion by coalition troops to 

depose him and his Baathist regime. Skeptics believed that these reports were overinflated and that a large portion of the Iraqi response 

to any invasion would be the initiation of guerilla-type operations 

against allied forces. 

Saddam, believing that any substantial allied attack against Iraq 

would mirror the Desert Storm campaign, expected an extensive air 

campaign to precede any ground attack. Sensing an opportunity to 

achieve at least operational surprise, General Franks decided to initiate the ground campaign with the forces in Kuwait prior to the air 

campaign. He would do it in March, before the heat had built up.12

On 17 March, President Bush addressed the nation. He gave Saddam 

and his sons, Uday and Qusay, 48 hours to leave Iraq, explaining that 

“their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a 

time of our choosing.” Saddam immediately responded with his own 

appearance on television saying, “This will be Iraq’s last great battle 

with the malicious tyrant in our time, and America’s last great war of 

aggression, too.”13

Saddam and his sons did not withdraw as directed, and 48 hours 

later, General Franks was ordered to begin his campaign. The first mission to launch was a seven-ship of Pave Lows led by Lt Col Jim Slife. 

They proceeded into south-central Iraq to deliver several ODA teams 

from the 5th SFG, along with special “nonstandard vehicles” to perform 

strategic reconnaissance along US V Corps and I MEF advance routes. 

Slife was crewed with 1st Lt Tom Lessner, flight engineers TSgt John 

Tharp and TSgt Todd Buice, and gunners TSgt Aaron Bettison and 

Amn Eric Ezell.14

All of the helicopters were at their absolute maximum wartimewaivered takeoff weights. As they taxied out for takeoff, the maintenance crew members lined up to salute them, waving a large American flag illuminated by flashlights. The ground crew’s gesture touched 

the aircrews, especially when they considered how hard the maintenance crews had worked to get those almost 40-year-old aircraft 

ready to go to war one more time. 

Slife and his flight of three Pave Lows lifted off into a terrible sandstorm with low ceilings and poor visibility. Captain Michalek led the 

second element of four. At the first landing zone near the key city of 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 557

Nasiriyah, one of the crews in the first element, carrying ODA 553, 

crashed in the brownout conditions. The helicopter, MH-53M#67-14493, 

flipped on its side and was destroyed. The crew and passengers escaped, although several were injured. Michalek landed his helicopters around the crash site; a security team he was carrying secured the 

site so that the helicopter crew could be recovered. The men of ODA 

553 retrieved enough of their equipment to continue their mission, 

initially to overwatch a key bridge near the city and, eventually, to 

infiltrate into Nasiriyah and begin working with anti-Saddam forces.15

When Slife and his six remaining helicopters returned to Ali Al 

Salem, though, all was in chaos. The crews had another insertion 

mission to fly and were now behind schedule to get all teams in safely 

before sunrise. As they refueled and reloaded and the ODA troops 

began coming aboard, Slife could see that he had a serious morale 

problem. Colonel O’Boyle met him at the aircraft. He was very direct. 

“What do you think?” he asked of Slife. “We’ve got to go,” Slife responded firmly. “We cannot cancel at this point. We’ve got to go and 

do this second mission.” O’Boyle swallowed hard. “Okay,” he said and 

Courtesy Brig Gen Brad Webb, USAF

The 20th SOS commander, Lt Col Brad Webb, addresses his Airmen before 

the initiation of OIF.
558 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

walked away. Webb and Slife then talked with the other crews. Some 

were brimming with confidence; some, less so. One crew was obviously too shaken to continue. Webb replaced it with a spare crew, and 

the six aircraft lifted off with their teams.

Needing another aircraft, Slife and Webb grabbed the one spare that 

was available with its crew. The pilots were 1st Lt Jim Peterson and 1st 

Lt Matt Berry. Peterson was another of the highly skilled and experienced US Army warrant officers who had crossed over to Pave Low. 

Berry was in awe of Peterson’s flying ability and felt fortunate to be 

paired with him, in particular. Sergeant Jobling was the lead flight engineer. In preparing the aircraft for departure, the crew discovered 

several issues with its countermeasures, fuel, and hydraulic systems. 

Regardless, the crew members pressed on, receiving a quick mission 

brief as the US Army team with its equipment and vehicle were quickly 

loaded. The initial landing zone had been compromised, and they were 

handed another set of coordinates as their destination. The weather 

was still very poor with low clouds and limited visibility. Jobling had 

his hands full as his pilots battled vertigo in the dark, featureless night. 

He recounts, “I pulled such stuff out of my a-- that night. That is when 

I realized that I really knew how to do my job.” At the time, Jobling had 

a broken bone in one of his feet. The break had occurred in Afghanistan a year earlier, but he had deferred surgery on it twice to make deployments to Djibouti and then to Kuwait. He later admitted that “it 

was just uncomfortable.”16

Slife and his flight inserted ODA 555 near Samawah; however, 

they had to divert to an alternate landing site when intelligence 

sources informed them in-flight that enemy forces occupied the primary location. Unlike the first sortie, though, Slife and his flight were 

able to uneventfully insert all of the teams as planned. But the mission was not without excitement.

Returning from their insertions, Slife and his crews had a difficult 

time linking up with their designated tanker and almost ran out of 

gas while deep in Iraq. In the world of combat aviation, there are 

many stressors; concern for fuel is a primary one. Slife’s crews were 

flying so far into Iraq with such heavy loads that they could not do the 

missions without tanker support. A flight of MC-130s was scheduled 

to support them but was delayed when it encountered some active 

Roland SAM batteries. The batteries were most probably on high 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 559

alert because as Slife’s flight was delivering its loads in south-central 

Iraq, USAF F-117s and 39 cruise missiles were sweeping into Iraq in 

an attempt to kill Saddam Hussein. Slife’s flight was instructed to immediately climb to 1,500 feet as the cruise missiles transited their approximate location. 

Under General Franks’s war plan, the air campaign was not scheduled 

to begin until 22 March, after the conventional ground forces in Kuwait and the coalition special forces from Saudi Arabia and Jordan 

had initiated their attacks. However, when solid CIA sources reported 

Saddam’s location, General Moseley received permission from the 

president to attack it. The strikes went in as targeted; however, Saddam was not there. Intelligence had been faulty, and the element of 

surprise was lost. Apparently, the strategic impact of that development was minor, for the surface attack occurred as scheduled. However, for the MC-130s and six Pave Lows over southern Iraq, the unintended consequences could have been dramatic. For Slife and his 

crews, it was an eventful night.17

The actions of Slife and his crew that night had quite an impact on their 

junior member. Reflects Amn Eric Ezell, who flew as his left gunner,

I was the left scanner, Chalk Lead [the mission command helicopter]. I would 

say that I would consider at the time that it was the most important thing that I 

Loading special forces elements for insertion into Iraq during the initial actions 

of OIF

Courtesy SSgt Glen Fleming, USAF
560 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

had done. . . . There was so much going on. . . . We sit in the brief, hear the plan, 

talk to the teams. We go and preflight the aircraft. We load up vehicles and get 

ready to go. We launch; we take off. Here’s a [flight] of helicopters flying across 

to basically start a war. It was exhilarating, though it had some scary moments. . . . 

There were times where I was nervous or anxious, but I was with a really great crew. 

All the backenders were great . . . my being, at the time, a 19-year-old kid. They 

brought me in; we had probably been crewed together for not even a month, but 

they knew what was going on; they showed me all the ropes for training and 

whatnot. I think we meshed well as a crew. 

We had a problem with one of the tie-down straps on the truck. The vehicle had 

shifted a bit; it was pulled taut so you weren’t able to release the strap. What 

should have taken a matter of seconds to get the ramp down, pop the straps, and 

get the vehicle out was taking longer. You could hear the hesitation in the pilot’s 

voice. I [can’t] remember if it was [Slife] or Lessner who was asking, “What’s 

going on? What’s going on?” We said, “We’re working it!” “Okay, work it,” he 

replied. So it was one of those things where he trusted his people.18

During the day, maintenance crews worked diligently to prepare 

the aircraft for the next night’s big missions. The flight crews tried to 

sleep; however, with all of the local activity and missile alerts, sleep 

was in short supply. Crews kept having to move into the bunkers and 

several times had to don their protective chemical suits. For this mission, Colonel Webb flew with Capt Mark Newell as they led a flight of 

seven Pave Lows on a direct action mission to deliver several teams of 

US Navy SEALs and British Royal Marines. They were to seize oil 

platforms and facilities in the Al Faw area—preventing their destruction by Saddam’s forces as in the first Gulf War—or their use as ecological weapons. This was one of the highest priority missions of the 

campaign. Newell’s number two aircraft was commanded by 1st Lt 

Sean Borland.

Again, Capt Joe Michalek led the second flight of helicopters. He 

was extremely concerned about the threat of Iranian antiaircraft guns 

and the multiple SAM batteries in place just along the Iranian-Iraqi 

border. Maj Gene Becker flew as Capt Bill Rowell’s copilot on this 

mission as they landed the SEALs and their specially modified vehicles 

at several land sites, many located within oil fields or production 

facilities and platforms. 

Lieutenant Borland and his crew encountered an unusual problem. As they landed at their assigned spot, Borland’s SEAL team attempted to drive its vehicle off of the aircraft. But they had touched 

down in a field of soft, oil-soaked mud. As soon as the front wheels of 

the SEAL vehicle dropped into the mud, it was stuck fast in the muck 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 561

Figure 7. Operation Iraqi Freedom area of operations. (Copyright Darrel 

Whitcomb, 2010.)

with its rear half still in the Pave Low. When notified by his rear gunner, 

MSgt Flo England, Borland had no choice but to hold his position as 

his troops worked the problem. He did call Colonel O’Boyle above to 

apprise him of the situation and to request some on-call fire support 

from AC-130s and A-10s, if necessary. After a few minutes, Borland 

spotted an enemy vehicle trying to approach his location. He reported 

the target to a flight of A-10s, and the flight lead destroyed the vehicle 

with a Maverick missile. Working feverishly, Borland’s “back-end” 
562 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

team was finally able to get the vehicle clear of the aircraft. Borland 

then had to use all of the power that the aircraft could generate to 

break clear of the clinging mud—after having spent 20 minutes in 

enemy territory. The crew then flew to a forward arming and refueling point to pick up a team of British Royal Marines for another insertion. However, because of the delay, another crew had taken their 

load, and Borland’s crew assumed alert for rescue or medevac.19

Another SEAL team landed on the top of a bunker that had not 

been so identified by intelligence. The quickness of the assault so 

stunned the Iraqi soldiers that they just raised their hands in surrender. 

At another site, SEALs captured several Fedayeen fighters who had 

just executed seven Iraqi officers intending to surrender their position and units. 

The flying was very dangerous because the crews were landing 

their heavily laden helicopters in tight landing zones or on platforms 

with many obstructions around them. Before the initiation of hostilities, the crews rehearsed the mission several times with the SEALs on 

the Udairi Range complex. However, nothing could match the reality 

of the actual missions, especially when the Iraqis reacted to the attacks by firing missiles at coalition sites in Kuwait. Several times the 

crews, along with everybody else, had to don their bulky and uncomfortable chemical protection suits when the warning sirens announced that missiles were inbound. 

Another danger existed in the operation that night. They were not 

the only helicopters in the air in that area. British helicopters were also 

airborne, as were untold numbers of aircraft from the large US Army, 

Marine, and allied maneuver forces queuing up to move into Iraq. Maj 

Gene Becker was there when his crew observed a large aerial explosion. They assumed that it was an exploding missile. The helicopters 

then loaded their assignment of British Royal Marines and delivered 

them to several more targets. A few days later, though, they discovered 

that the explosion they had witnessed was actually a midair collision 

between two British helicopters that killed six British troops and one 

American. For several more nights, the crews of the 20th supported 

the SEALs and also British Royal Marine forces as they operated in the 

Al Faw-Basrah area on a variety of follow-up missions.20

During the assault on Al Faw, Colonel O’Boyle orbited above in an 

AC-130 as the air mission commander and worked diligently to coordinate the actions on the ground with the movement of all the helicopters shuttling in and out to support the 1,000-plus main assault 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 563

force, the fighter aircraft available above to provide immediate close 

air support, and the AC-130 gunships ready to provide the same. All 

of that had to be deconflicted from the other helicopter forces, the 

orbiting remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), and US Navy P-3s providing 

real-time intelligence and video link to the various commanders. The 

entire operation lasted over six hours. 

Captain Michalek remembers that mission clearly, stating, “This was 

one of the most exciting missions that I’ve ever done in my career. 

There was a massive air armada, where the gunships prepped the LZs 

and took care of the enemy, but this was definitely a Pave Low mission and a good one. . . . For us, this was months of intensive planning 

that was capped with a hugely successful mission.” Reviewing the 

performance of his crew in just the first two nights of the war, he also 

recalls that “these two [missions] were the biggest of OIF [Operation 

Iraqi Freedom] for my crew and, arguably, anybody in the war. We 

kicked off the war as the first crews to cross into Iraq and secured the 

#2 strategic priority, second only to the capture of Saddam Hussein.”21

Colonel Slife monitored the Al Faw missions from the joint operations center as they were carried out uneventfully—quite a relief from 

the semiterror of the first night. Approaching sunrise, he directed the 

crews to return to Ali Al Salem to terminate. As they arrived, Slife 

met the crews and congratulated them all for a great night’s work.22

The morning after the SEAL insertions, the strong forces of the US 

V Corps and the I MEF swept forward on their drive to Baghdad. 

Over the next several nights, Pave Low crews joined with other special 

operations assets to infiltrate and exfiltrate ODAs and other teams 

ahead of the advancing forces, to provide critical reconnaissance 

around major Iraqi cities and towns, and to team up with anti-Saddam 

elements. They developed plans to place several teams into the 

Karbala Gap, a narrow passageway between Lake Razzaza and the 

city of Karbala, through which the V Corps would have to pass to attack Baghdad. This mission was threatened with cancellation when a 

retired-military television talking head in the United States, while 

providing commentary on how the war would probably unfold, explained this very concept to anybody in the world who cared to pay 

attention. SOCCENT planners watched anxiously for any Iraqi response to the gaffe. When there was none, they executed the preplanned Karbala Gap missions. A flight of five Pave Lows, led by Maj 

Bill Rowell, inserted forces with more nonstandard vehicles and reinforced with USAF special tactics teams to seize an old Iraqi airfield at 
564 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Wadi al Khirr, near Najaf. It was to be used by MC-130s to bring forward even larger special forces elements to establish a base of operations for more ODAs operating ahead of the steadily advancing forces 

of the V Corps forces. Borland and his crew also flew on this mission, 

once again assuming the rescue role. Colonel Webb was on board and 

gave Borland the good news that he had been selected to attend the 

Weapons School starting in June 2003.23

After the turbulent events of the first few days, however, once the 

ground campaign started, the Pave Lows were steadily called upon to 

support the 5th SFG in particular and other special forces elements in 

general as they operated in front and on the flanks of the V Corps and 

the I MEF as they steadily advanced on Baghdad. 

Colonels Webb and Slife watched their crews and support troops 

closely as the grind of steady and dangerous operations slowly took 

its toll. Slife began to see manifestations of fear developing. He had 

crew members who were obviously shying away from flight duty, using 

medical excuses to be removed from the flight schedule. Some of it, 

he felt, was cowardice, and he addressed the issue with the flight surgeons, only to discover that if a crew member reported certain maladies, 

the flight surgeons were obligated to declare them DNIF (duty not 

Courtesy Wayne Mutza

Preparing to carry special forces teams into Iraq
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 565

including flight). Raised and inculcated with the idea that the Pave 

Low community was made up exclusively of heroic fire-eaters, he realized that this community, too, had its share of malingerers, individuals not so enamored with the mission or image, or those who did 

not have the true depth of courage which certainly was generally 

present among the group as a whole. He also realized that there was a 

difference between physical fear and cowardice as he watched crew 

members who developed nervous ticks or vomited before getting in 

the aircraft to fly successful missions. He accepted that as a leadership 

challenge and realized that he had to focus on the missions at hand, 

learning to recognize the externalization of fear that he now saw 

among a number of his troops. He had to help them deal with those 

challenges and also to isolate those nonperformers so that they did 

not detract from mission accomplishment or infect the others. Those 

were lessons hard learned earlier in the mountains of Afghanistan 

and now reinforced in the heat of Iraq. He and Webb did not hesitate 

to change the crews around as necessary to insure the best utilization 

of their personnel to accomplish the missions. It affected morale and 

upset many. But it had to be done.24

By early April, the V Corp had swept through the Karbala Gap and 

was attacking into Baghdad from the south, while the I MEF was attacking the capital city from the east and dispatching smaller task 

forces to sweep northward along the main north-south road to attack 

enemy units near Balad, Samarra, and Tikrit. The 20th continued to 

support the main effort with direct support to special forces elements 

continuing to screen the heavier forces. By mid-April, though, the V 

Corp divisions and I MEF units had fought into Baghdad and effectively terminated the Iraqi government. Saddam Hussein and his two 

sons were in hiding. On 14 April, the DOD issued a terse statement 

that all major combat operations had been concluded and began 

planning to rapidly reduce US presence to 30,000 troops for stabilization duty. 

During the main attacks on Baghdad, the 20th was assigned another SEAL mission. This time, it flew a mixed force of SEALs and 

Polish commandoes to the Mukarayin Dam, 57 miles northeast of the 

capital city. Intelligence sources indicated that Fedayeen or other former 

Iraqi soldiers intended to destroy the dam and flood the local area. As 

the Pave Lows hovered over the structure, the Soldiers and Sailors 

fast-roped down and took the guards by surprise. Some of the attackers 

took up their own guard duties as others searched the facility for 
566 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

explosives. Fortunately, no explosives were found, and enemy elements never attacked the structure.25

The Pave Low crews of the 20th continued to support their special 

operations customers as they attempted to sweep up remnants of resistance. The demand for sorties steadily declined. But disturbing reports of scattered resistance began to arrive at the various headquarters. 

In a last desperate attempt to foment social chaos to frustrate the allied forces, Saddam opened his prisons and armories, spreading 

armed fighters, weapons, and explosives across the country. At the 

same time, coalition leaders ordered the dissolution of the Iraqi 

armed forces. The rapid release of so many trained men from active 

and organized military service provided a recruiting pool for anticoalition forces, which were soon active along the road and within 

the villages and cities of Iraq. This became glaringly obvious when, 

on 24 April, an infantry battalion from the 82d Airborne Division 

entered the city of Fallujah, 25 miles west of Baghdad, and was met by 

a lawless, well-armed mob carrying signs saying, “US killers, we’ll 

kick you out.” Somebody fired a weapon, and the resulting “battle” 

led to the death of 17 Iraqis, with 60 more wounded. The action also 

signaled that perhaps this war was not yet over. Regardless, on 1 May, 

Pres. George W. Bush announced to the nation that “major combat 

operations in Iraq have ended. . . . Now our coalition is engaged in 

securing and reconstructing that country.”26

As did most other units, the men of the 20th SOS began packing 

up to go home. One of the first to leave was Sergeant Jobling, who 

went home and had surgery on his foot. Initial plans called for onehalf of the detachment to return to Hurlburt within the next several 

weeks, leaving five of its aircraft at Ali Al Salem and the four still at 

Djibouti. Lieutenant Borland and crew went over to Djibouti for several 

weeks. He had qualified as an IP just a few months prior to OIF and 

was dispatched to train new crew members in the relatively benign environment of the Horn of Africa for a few weeks prior to returning 

home to attend the Weapons School. 

During the major combat operations of OIF, the crews of the 20th 

had inserted 322 SOF teams and logged 966 combat flight hours on 

276 missions. Arriving back at Hurlburt, Lt Col Brad Webb passed 

command of the 20th SOS to Lt Col R. K. Williams on 30 June. Lt Col 

Jim Slife remained with the 20th as the operations officer.27
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 567

21st Special Operations Squadron

As early as the summer of 2002, the 352d SOG began to receive 

indications that it would be involved in any reengagement with Iraq, 

as both EUCOM and SOCEUR began to look at possible contingencies. 

During October, though, it had to focus on another ORI conducted 

by an AFSOC inspection team. The group deployed to RAF Fairford 

for over three weeks and performed well, receiving an overall excellent rating. The 21st SOS and one other squadron received “outstanding” ratings. Colonel Lengyel was extremely proud of his officers and 

Airmen for their accomplishments, especially their performance on 

the tactical missions. His squadron troops were also closely watching 

the operations of the 20th SOS in Afghanistan and learning from its 

experiences. Lengyel appointed Capt Matt Smith to serve as his primary planner for any Iraq contingencies as they began to consider 

what was apparently on the horizon for the unit. In that capacity, he 

would work closely with Maj Pete Doty, who had been transferred 

from the 21st SOS to the plans office in the 352d SOG and was working on the larger scheme for the entire group.28

As 2003 began, the 352d was now getting fairly clear guidance 

from SOCEUR that it would be deploying with the US Army 10th 

SFG and some other special forces elements to Turkey to support operations in northern Iraq as part of the overall 1003V plan. However, 

the Turkish government had not granted the United States entry 

rights for its forces, pending the outcome of a vigorous debate within 

Courtesy Col Darrel Whitcomb, USAF, Retired

Col R. K. Williams, USAF
568 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Courtesy Col Darrel Whitcomb, USAF, Retired

Col Greg Lengyel, USAF

the government concerning its support for the war. Regardless, the 

352d SOG commander, Col Otis Mannon, wanted to act proactively. 

He had the authority to move his units anywhere within the EUCOM 

area of responsibility. As his Airmen scrambled at Mildenhall to take 

care of last-minute items such as required shots and inoculations, he 

decided to deploy his operational forces forward to a military airfield at 

Constanta, Romania, on the Black Sea coast, only 200 miles from Turkish airspace. In mid-February, a 30-person advance element departed 

for Constanta to arrange for the arrival of the main body. One week 

later, the 21st SOS launched six Pave Lows for the long flight. Using a 

series of in-flight refuelings and quick “gas-and-goes” at airfields in 

Germany and Hungary, the crews made it to Constanta after a 17-hour 

duty day with all six aircraft mission ready. The crews were met by the 

advanced element and bedded down in an unused portion of the airport terminal. They joined an overall 352d contingent of 1,000-plus 

Airmen that also included AC-130 gunships from the 16th SOW. That 

contingent was also a component of a larger JSOTF named Task Force 

Viking, led by the commander of the US Army 10th SFG, Col Charles 

Cleveland. Maj Pete Doty was dispatched to serve with Colonel Cleveland as his joint air operations officer.29
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 569

Under operational plans extant at that time, the 21st SOS was instructed to be prepared to perform rescue for forces in the north and 

also serve as a potential recovery element as part of the overall theater 

rescue plan. It would also conduct its classic SOF missions in support 

of the 10th SFG and Kurdish forces deployed along the “Green Line,” 

a 350-kilometer front that divided them from 13 Iraqi army divisions 

arrayed along that line. Two Pave Low pilots, Maj Max Sears and Maj 

Ed Vanzandt, were attached to the 10th SFG to serve with two of their 

battalions as air liaison officers.30

The 21st’s ultimate mission was to work with the ground forces to 

keep those Iraqi forces tied up and incapable of reinforcing their 

units being engaged by the heavy coalition forces attacking out of 

Kuwait and the other special forces task forces attacking in the western 

part of Iraq.31 In Iraq the squadron would be under the operational 

control of the JSOAD-N, commanded by Colonel Mannon. He dispatched a small team including SMSgt John DeSalle to Qatar to act as 

a liaison element with the theater CJSOAC. 

The weather was predicted to be cold and snowy. The crews were 

told to prepare for their follow-on flight to the airfield at Batman, 

Turkey, the same airfield used by the 21st SOS helicopters in Desert 

Storm. Again, living conditions there would be austere. They were 

also told to begin tactical planning for several contingency missions 

in the region with various special forces and coalition elements. 

However, Turkey still had not approved the missions, and Lengyel 

was instructed to develop a CSAR contingency plan for providing 

coverage of forces in northern Iraq from Constanta. His planners did 

as directed, pointing out that current seasonal weather conditions, 

the topography of Turkey, and the distances involved made such a 

contingency minimally acceptable at best. Unsure as to how long they 

would be at Constanta, Lengyel also had Williams begin local flying 

so that his aircrews could maintain some level of flight currency. On 

one occasion, two aircraft were launched on local training sorties. 

However, heavy fog moved in over the airfield before they could recover. The crews put the aircraft safely down in fields one-and-a-half 

miles away. Security forces from the 352d dispatched to the site and 

worked with Romanian police to secure the aircraft until they could 

be flown onto the airfield the next day. However, the flight crews were 

assessed heavy beer penalties for violating squadron protocol dictating 

that such landings within two miles of the intended airfield were not 

looked upon as “manly.” Such penalties, though, could only be assessed 
570 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

back at Mildenhall since CENTCOM General Order Number 1 specified no alcohol in its theater. 

Lengyel and Williams realized that combat operations originating 

in Constanta were just not realistic. They grabbed aerial charts of the 

region and began to conceive a new plan. They were aware that the 

British had a large base at Akrotiri, Cyprus, and that other USAF elements were moving in there. Quick calculations indicated that the 

flying time from there into northern Iraq was just five hours for the 

Pave Lows. So Lengyel and Williams, believing that “if you start a 

rumor and repeat it enough times, it will catch on and can become 

the truth,” started the rumor that “the Paves are moving to Cyprus.” 

Lengyel let it germinate for a few days and then approached Colonel 

Mannon with a well-thought-out plan. He approved it and got the 

concept accepted by headquarters.

On 5 March, Colonel Williams and a small support team flew to 

Akrotiri and met with British and American commanders. They were 

amenable to the move but made it very clear that they could provide 

little beyond ramp space. Williams encountered some British personnel 

that he knew from their Special Boat Squadron. Using relationships 

that the squadron had established back in Great Britain, he was able 

to procure the use of some very fine tents and even four “chefs” to 

prepare meals for the 21st SOS Airmen. Williams put his small detachment to work setting up their small camp, quickly named “Camp 

Mohawk” in honor of several of the Pave Low flight engineers and 

gunners who had begun to cut their hair in the style of Mohawk Indians. He then called back to Colonel Lengyel and told him that they 

were ready for the aircraft and crews. Lengyel moved quickly, and all 

were in place at Akrotiri by 10 March. 

A few days later, another 21st SOS Pave Low with extra crew members 

flew down from Mildenhall and joined the unit. Initially left behind 

at Mildenhall to handle “rear area” items, the squadron superintendent, SMSgt Jim Kradel, was also able to join the unit there and even 

joined a formed crew. In fact, 10 full crews were now available for 

combat duty. Crew number 10 was led by Capt Steve Edwards; his 

copilot was Capt Derrick Stamos. Morale was high, and everybody 

felt that he was as prepared as possible. They were subsequently 

joined by a company of Soldiers from the 10th SFG and some special 

tactics teams from the 321st STS, also from the 352d SOG, and the 

123d STS from the Kentucky ANG. Two Pave Lows and crews were 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 571

placed on alert for CSAR. In place and ready to go, all now awaited 

the decision of the Turkish government.32

Unfortunately, permission for US and coalition forces to enter Iraq 

through Turkey was not forthcoming. The Turkish government debated the issue, and its parliament took a vote. While the yeas outnumbered the nays, the significant number of abstentions precluded 

a clear majority for approval. Accordingly, Task Force Horse was diverted to Kuwait, and CENTCOM began exploring other options to 

get its designated special forces into northern Iraq. The troops of the 

21st SOS monitored the efforts of the 20th SOS crews as they initiated 

operations on 19 March. Some crews even sat in their helicopters and 

used their SATCOMs to listen to the 20th crews conduct their missions. They also watched as the ground units in the south attacked on 

21 March. At the same time, behind-the-scenes efforts were ongoing 

to convince the Turkish government to authorize limited overflight 

privileges to US and coalition flights. Consideration was also given to 

diverting the 21st SOS to the coalition special forces task forces working in western Iraq.33

Finally, the Turks granted overflight permission on 25 March. In 

the early afternoon, two Pave Lows took off for the Bashur Airfield in 

northern Iraq. The lead aircraft was flown by Capt Randy Voas and 

Capt Craig Prather; Colonel Lengyel was aboard as the overall mission commander. Since the weather over Turkey was extremely bad, 

the flight had to return to Akrotiri. As the helicopters landed, Voas 

knew that other crews would want to take their place the next day. 

Before reentering the squadron area, he asked Lengyel, “Same crews, 

just rolling 24 hours. Right, sir?” Voas and Prather held their breath. 

Lengyel smiled and said, “Okay, we will do that.” Predictably, the 

other crews were not happy.

The two crews relaunched the next day. The weather was better en 

route, with clouds in the arrival area. Both aircraft were at their absolute maximum wartime weights for takeoff. Rendezvousing with an 

MC-130, they proceeded east along the Turkey-Syria border, refueling 

several times. As the two aircraft approached the Iraqi border, Lengyel 

replaced Prather in the right seat, explaining, “I’m the squadron commander. It is my prerogative to lead my squadron into combat.” Each 

helicopter had a partial ODA and an STS team aboard. Approaching 

Bashur Airfield, the crews had to use the full TF/TA, FLIR, and precision navigation capabilities of the Pave Lows to get down through the 

low clouds and darkness to land. Prather was a bit surprised at what 
572 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

he saw. He had expected Iraq to be desert. These mountains, with 

their accompanying grungy weather, looked a great deal like Scotland, where the 21st did its Pave Low mountain training.34

As the engines were shut down, Colonel Lengyel immediately disembarked and went to find whoever was in charge. He was soon accosted by a very excited senior officer who told him that his helicopters 

were sitting in the drop zone for a mass night parachute assault by 

two battalions of the 173d Airborne Brigade, expected in a few hours. 

Lengyel had the two crews start up and then flew about three miles 

farther south in the valley, where they landed, shut down their engines, 

and relaxed to watch the paratroopers. As scheduled, the lumbering 

C-17s entered the valley and began disgorging their heavy equipment 

first and then strings of paratroopers. The successive C-17s dropped 

their sticks of jumpers farther and farther to the south until Lengyel 

realized that some of the paratroops were in danger of landing on 

their machines. He shouted to the crews to turn on their position 

lights so that the falling Soldiers could see them. Regardless, several 

landed all around the helicopters, one with his parachute canopy 

draped over one of the stationary main rotor blades. The fields were 

wet and soggy from recent rain and snow, and several of the troops 

needed assistance from the Pave Low crews to dig themselves out of 

the mud. The crews enjoyed watching the “combat” jump as the 

troops of the 173d “seized” the airfield. Numerous troops were injured in the jump, and the 21st SOS troops transported 34 of them 

down to the first-aid station set up at the airfield. The crews then flew 

around the valley helping to locate and direct isolated “LGOPPs”—

little groups of pissed-off paratroopers. Quickly, though, the Soldiers 

of the 173d formed into ever-larger groups and within two hours 

were functioning as coherent units and occupying their initial designated 

positions. Above them the Pave Lows remained within the confines of 

the valley and under the weather; they rendezvoused one more time with 

an MC-130 to fill their fuel tanks before finally landing and terminating 

their mission. The crews slept in their helicopters. 

As their engines slowly wound down, Lengyel had a chance to reflect on the incredible events of that day. His crews had planned and 

launched out of a forward base into an austere airfield high in dangerous 

snow-capped and cloud-shrouded mountains of a nation torn by war. 

After arriving, they were engaged in a series of events that 24 hours 

before were hardly imaginable. His crews had shown great courage 

and imaginative skill in handling it all, logging 13 hours of flight time 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 573

during the mission. He was especially proud of his lead pilots, Captains 

Voas and Prather, and nominated them for the Cheney Trophy. They 

were subsequently selected to receive that prestigious award for 2003.35

Over the next several days, the rest of the Pave Lows, crews, and 

support personnel of the 21st SOS were moved into Bashur, many 

aboard MC-130s. Sergeant Kradel was part of that contingent. Upon 

arrival, he became decisively engaged with procuring the equipment 

and supplies that his Airmen needed to operate. He was also able to 

participate in several flights with his assigned crew, although he never 

had a requirement to fire his weapon in anger. Clearly, though, his 

focus was on providing for his troops, saying later of this time, “That 

was probably one of my proudest accomplishments of my career—

what we did in the initial stages of [the operation].”36

Two aircraft and crews were placed on CSAR alert. The rest began 

working directly with the Soldiers of the 10th SFG, many of whom 

they had worked with as far back as Bosnia and even Provide Comfort. All three battalions were now in place, with 51 individual ODAs 

Courtesy Maj Craig Prather, USAF

The lead 21st SOS crew into northern Iraq. Left to right: (standing) MSgt Doug 

Darner, 1st Lt Craig Prather, A1C Brandon Midthun, MSgt Paul Bratcher, and 

TSgt Shane Genis; (kneeling) 1st Lt Randy Voas and Lt Col Greg Lengyel.
574 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

performing a variety of missions. The Pave Low crews began to work 

with them as they teamed with Kurdish units to neutralize a terrorist 

element in that area known as Ansar al-Islam and led by Abu Musab 

al-Zarqawi. This estimated 700-man force was operating along the 

Iranian border and needed to be neutralized before any significant 

operations could be launched against Iraqi main force units along the 

Green Line. For several days, the five ODAs involved in the effort 

orchestrated an effective campaign with their Kurd allies to attack 

and neutralize the element. Pave Lows, staging out of a small airfield 

near As Sulaymaniyah, 70 miles southeast of Bashur, flew many support missions, providing reconnaissance, logistic support, and casualty 

evacuation for the allied forces. The Airmen of the 21st SOS were 

performing the same kind of air commando missions in Iraq that 

their predecessors in Laos had performed 33 years earlier—and with 

just as much professionalism and gusto. The Pave Lows also supported the ODAs and various Kurdish forces as they attacked and 

drove back Iraqi main force units to seize and hold the key cities of 

Kirkuk and Mosul. Their efforts prevented the units from being 

moved south to engage the allied forces converging on Baghdad.37

As the 21st SOS Airmen settled in at Bashur, Colonel Williams 

worked with Sergeant Kradel to provide for the care and feeding of 

his men and women. He had to set up strict rules and conditions for 

crew rest because his crews were clearly being worn out by the pace 

of operations. His maintenance teams were absolutely superb, sustaining a 98 percent launch rate in the most austere of conditions. All 

troops were billeted in 20-person tents with little privacy, except for 

one private toilet for the females. He had to insist on the highest decorum from all of his troops but rediscovered the timeless maxim 

that the best way to keep troops out of trouble is to keep them so busy 

that they have to use any off-duty time for sleep. Williams remembered 

telling them, “I don’t want to hear about any issues. You figure out 

what level of human dignity and respect is required, and the first 

issue—you’re on the next plane home. Whoever it is.”38

In early April, Williams received a personal phone call from Colonel 

O’Boyle, who had to address a personnel issue from the perspective 

of his “real” job as the commander of the 16th SOG at Hurlburt. One 

of his subordinate units, the 20th SOS, would be losing its commander, Lt Col Brad Webb, in a few months because he had been selected to attend the National War College. O’Boyle was going to need 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 575

a new commander for the unit and offered the job to Williams, who 

really didn’t need to answer the question. 

On 21 April, Colonel Lengyel moved his unit west to an airfield 

seized near the large city of Irbil. There Williams was able to find 

more permanent billeting for his troops, including some showers. 

Additionally, he rotated some of his troops home, replacing them 

with newly qualified Pave Low crew members and support personnel 

so that as many 21st Airmen as possible could gain combat experience. While at Irbil, Sergeant DeSalle was able to join the squadron 

and even fly a few sorties as a crew gunner. 

Likewise, Colonel Williams himself took an operational mission. 

When the JSOAD-S could not accept a mission because of poor 

weather conditions in the south, the 21st SOS received the tasking. 

Williams led a flight of three Pave Lows on a day mission to recover a 

SEAL element off of a dam they had seized and were guarding in 

central Iraq. They landed at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) to 

drop off the Sailors just as the sun was setting. Lifting off in the dark, 

they turned north for Irbil. Just a few minutes north of the city, they 

were engaged with ground fire from several positions. The gunners 

on all three aircraft returned fire and also observed an RPG directed 

at one of the aircraft. One helicopter did receive some small arms hits. 

A month later, Williams turned over his operations officer duties to 

Lt Col Mark Harmon and departed for Mildenhall so that he could 

move his family to Hurlburt.39

Most missions flown in support of the ODAs were flown during 

the day. Except right along the Green Line, most areas were low 

threat—many Pave Low crews never observed any ground fire and 

never had to fire their guns. Occasionally, A-10s flew into the area 

and provided escort for the Pave Lows whenever they flew into an 

area where there might be a threat. Captains Edwards and Stamos 

flew missions into several areas where heavy fighting with conventional Iraqi forces had taken place. They saw the death and destruction rained down upon Saddam’s forces. They also noticed great 

stockpiles of weapons and explosives scattered over the terrain and 

military bases completely unguarded. Ominously, they watched “civilians” as they looted the bases and stockpiles and carried off truckloads of those implements of death: bombs, grenades, RPGs, and 

machine guns. Those actions did not suggest peaceful times ahead.40

However, as relative calm began to return to Iraq, USAF and other 

coalition units were allowed to begin returning to their home bases. In 
576 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

June 2003, Colonel Lengyel was directed to return four of his aircraft 

and one-half of his personnel to Mildenhall. They flew their aircraft 

back to their home base. Craig Prather had upgraded to aircraft commander in combat. He commanded one of the aircraft on the flight 

home as they returned over Turkey, Greece, Italy, and France. Sergeant 

DeSalle flew out as a gunner on one of the last aircraft to return home. 

Arriving back at Mildenhall, he was selected to take over as the superintendent of the 352d SOG Weapons and Tactics Office.41

They had been home only a few days when the 21st SOS was called 

upon to deploy two Pave Lows, crews, and support personnel to assist 

with another NEO in Liberia, as once again that country was ravaged 

by political unrest and indications of possible civil war. The deployment was of only short duration as a USMC MEU replaced the 352d 

team. However, it highlighted the fact that NEO was still a key mission for the Pave Lows. The rest of the 21st SOS returned to RAF 

Mildenhall in July, and the JSOAD-N was inactivated. Responsibility 

for any residual SOF aviation activity in Iraq passed to the JSOAD-S.42

For the rest of the year, the 21st SOS returned to its cycle of training exercises and deployments as experienced personnel left the 

squadron and new ones arrived. There were deployments to Scotland, 

Belgium, Spain, and Germany. In September Lt Col Mark Harmon led 

a three-ship Pave Low deployment back to Albania to participate in a 

combined exercise with British elements. Major Doty was one of his 

aircraft commanders and enjoyed the flying over Albania, Macedonia, 

and Bulgaria. Sadly, though, those were his last flights in the Pave 

Low. Shortly after returning to England, he and his family were transferred back to the United States to a nonflying assignment.43

In November 2003, the 21st SOS was again called upon to support 

a US presidential visit to Great Britain when President Bush and the 

First Lady arrived for a three-day sojourn. Three Pave Lows were utilized as part of a larger fleet of helicopters to shuttle the president and 

entourage from London’s Heathrow Airport to Buckingham Palace 

and several other locations, all without incident, and in the best traditions of a now long history of such support by the 21st SOS. It was an 

anticlimactic end to a very climactic year.44
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 577

20th Special Operations Squadron

Standing in front of his troops as he assumed command of the 

20th SOS on 30 June, Lt Col R. K. Williams could not help but notice 

that very few of his troops were present. In fact, about a third of the 

squadron was still in Djibouti and Kuwait. After a short three weeks 

learning to find his office in the squadron building, he was off to Kuwait 

to observe the unit operations there. The unit was still at Ali Al Salem 

AB. What he found was an operation that had dramatically wound 

down. Expectations were heavy that the Pave Lows would be ordered 

home very soon, possibly at the end of July. Williams made plans to 

travel on to Djibouti to visit his unit element there. He was anxious to 

do so because its operations seemed to be picking up in support of 

the larger GWOT. One of the crews there was led by Maj Casey Ward 

and 1st Lt Matt Berry. Even though it was extremely hot, they felt that 

the deployment was relatively benign and provided an opportunity to 

gain some very good and low-stress training compared to the recent 

events in Kuwait and Iraq.45

However, disturbing events continued to occur across Iraq, especially the use of car bombs and improvised explosive devices (IED)

placed along roads. Indications seemed to point to the beginning of an 

organized resistance or even a guerilla-type effort by nascent proSaddamists. Williams began to realize that these events portended a 

longer mission for the Pave Lows. Within a week, Williams’s orders 

were changed; he was not going to Djibouti. Instead, he would remain in Kuwait and take command of the remaining JSOAD-S, with 

a residual force of four Pave Lows and other AFSOC assets and responsibility for SOF aviation throughout Iraq. Williams would report 

to the JSOAC under SOCCENT and work closely with the now consolidated CJSOTF-AP (Arabian Peninsula), which absorbed all of the 

residual units from the earlier multiple CJSOTFs and commanded 

the 5th SFG and a small detachment of US Navy SEALs. Williams 

flew up to Baghdad to coordinate with the 5th Group commander, 

Col Hector Pagan, as his Soldiers began to orient upon and attack 

these growing rebel groups. Pagan’s first request was that Williams 

bring his Pave Lows to Baghdad. Williams so moved his aircraft and 

personnel, dramatically reducing his unit’s response times for missions. He also began to coordinate with a US Navy Reserve helicopter 

unit that was supporting 5th Group so that the aviation elements of 

CJSOTF-AP could conduct joint operations. 
578 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Williams returned to Hurlburt in October, just in time to congratulate 

Col Otis Mannon as he arrived to take command of the 16th SOW 

from Col Frank Kisner. Before leaving Mildenhall, Mannon had 

given command of the 352d SOG to Col Dennis Jones, another career 

Pave Low pilot. Shortly thereafter, the 20th SOS received an operational order to deploy a Pave Low element back into Afghanistan to 

participate in Operation Mountain Resolve. Working quickly, Williams 

was able to convince USSOCOM to move his remaining element in 

Djibouti to Bagram. Lt Col Jim Slife went over to command that detachment. He understood that the environment in Afghanistan 

would be much more challenging than what his Djibouti crews were 

used to encountering, and he augmented it with more experienced 

Airmen from the 20th SOS as they moved to Afghanistan for the 

highly classified operation against al-Qaeda and Taliban elements 

established along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. Several Pave Low 

crew members from the 551st SOS also deployed with the detachment.

Tragically, that operation suffered a terrible loss on 23 November 

when MH-53M #70-1625, originally a CH-53 that had flown hard 

combat with the 21st SOS at NKP, Thailand, from 1971 to 1975, 

crashed nine miles east of the Bagram Airfield. The aircraft was the 

wingman in a two-ship formation flying an infiltration mission at 

dusk. The aircraft was heavy and experienced a stall and failure of the 

number two engine. The aircraft commander, Maj Steve Plumhoff 

from the 551st SOS, attempted to return to Bagram. He tried to jettison his external tanks, but they did not release. The aircraft could 

not maintain level flight at its current weight. While dumping fuel, 

Plumhoff next tried to land the aircraft on a small sandbar along a 

river. However, during the approach, the second engine failed, and 

the aircraft landed on a rocky riverbank. As it did, the tail boom separated; the helicopter rolled to the left, came to rest inverted, and burst 

into flames. Capt Mark Newell was the aircraft commander on the 

lead aircraft and landed nearby to attempt to rescue the crew and passengers. He and his crew braved the fire and exploding .50-caliber 

rounds to pull survivors from the wreckage. They were only partly 

successful. Major Plumhoff was killed, as were MSgt William Kerwood, 

TSgt Howard Walters, and SSgt Thomas Walkup Jr., all three from the 

20th SOS. Additionally, one Soldier on board was killed. The fire 

burned for several days, making remains recovery and identification 

challenging for Slife, who had to handle the attendant issues in Af-
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 579

ghanistan, and for Williams back at Hurlburt, who had to work in a 

straightforward fashion with the families of those lost.46

Courtesy 58th SOW History Office

Maj Steve Plumhoff, USAF

The accident was a terrible shock to the 20th SOS. Over the years, 

it had flown so much combat in so many theaters. It had lost numerous 

aircraft in both accidents and combat. However, in terms of troops 

lost, the numbers were small. Consequently, the loss of three of its 

guys and a fellow Pave Low pilot from Kirtland hit the unit hard, and 

it rallied around the families and surviving members. The 20th SOS 

held a moving memorial service to honor those lost, and Colonel 

Williams eulogized his Airmen, saying,

Bill, Howie, and Tom were pillars of esprit de corps, and added infinite strength 

to our unit cohesion. They were professional and moral leaders of our “Greatest 

Generation.” To them, everything was for the team . . . for the greater good . . . 

for all of us. . . . Through courage, honor, and character, and by their heroic 

actions, our brothers have shown us that our American freedom has been 

given to us on a golden platter . . . made by the hand of God . . . and paid for by 

the blood of our brothers. 
580 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Subsequently, three streets on the east side of Hurlburt Field were 

redesignated with the names of the Airmen as a form of permanent remembrance.47

Then they went back to work. The unit still had its detachment of 

four aircraft and personnel in Iraq, now firmly ensconced in Baghdad. Operation Mountain Resolve was terminated, and Colonel Slife 

and three aircraft, crews, and support troops moved to Baghdad to 

rejoin the 20th element there. In mid-December, Pave Low crews 

played a role in the mission that led to the capture of Saddam Hussein. 

All in all, 2003 had been as eventful a year for the 20th as it had been 

for the 21st.48

After his foot healed, Sergeant Jobling made another rotation over 

to the unit at BIAP. He returned to Hurlburt just before Christmas 

and went to work in the squadron tactics office. The unit still had responsibilities and obligations in other parts of the world. However, 

for the last two years, the unit had been operating exclusively in the 

Middle East. Jobling could see that its tactics training was being 

steadily modified to focus on the conditions in that region. He was 

concerned that no training was now being done for contingencies in 

the Pacific or South America. Questions were being asked, “Can we 

do this? Are we prepared to operate there?” In many cases, the answer 

now was no. Most ominously, though, he could sense that the unit as 

a whole was tired. Regardless, the rotations to Iraq continued. Jobling 

met the rotation schedule as his turn arrived.49

The Pave Lows would not be used again in Afghanistan. The reason was practical. When the aircraft were modified with foldable 

blades for storage aboard ships, the ensuing aircraft weight increase 

was about 3,000 pounds, which correspondingly reduced the useful 

load capability of the aircraft by the same amount. At the higher elevations of Afghanistan, this meant that the Pave Lows could not provide as much lift capability as the MH-47s, which did not have the 

blade-folding capability and limitation. However, Pave capabilities 

were perfect for the special forces units working in Iraq to attack and 

destroy the insurgent forces.50

Back at Hurlburt, Colonel Williams welcomed home his detachment returning from its classified deployment in Afghanistan and 

began to address several larger items. The unit appeared to be committed to Iraq for an indeterminate length. To help even out the personnel tempo of deployments for his troops, he and Colonel Slife 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 581

worked out a flight rotation plan whereby troops would deploy for 90 

days and then be home for 180 days, in general, as integral flights.

The 20th also needed additional aircraft. The losses in Afghanistan 

and Iraq over the last two years had left the squadron with only 17 

aircraft. Williams requested two machines from the 551st at Kirtland. 

These would be MH-53Js, since that was all Kirtland had. They would 

not be available for deployment. However, he could use them for local 

training and exercises. 

Williams further began an initiative to have the 21st SOS replace 

the 20th SOS in Iraq for a long duration so that the 20th could reconstitute. Such a move would require detailed coordination among 

USSOCOM, CENTCOM, and EUCOM and would eventually have 

to be decided at the OSD level. Regardless, Williams pushed the 

effort forward.51

Air Force Special Operations Command

As the USAF became increasingly involved in combat operations 

in OEF and now OIF, senior service leadership finally decided to address the long-festering problem of what to do with CSAR. After a 

series of extensive reviews that had been ongoing since the Bosnia 

operations and some of the difficulties identified by Lt Gen Chuck 

Wald in Afghanistan, the CSAF, Gen John Jumper, signed out a directive transferring all USAF CONUS CSAR-designated units from the 

ACC to AFSOC effective 1 October 2003. The intent was to enhance 

the mission training and efficiencies by combining similar missions, 

skills, and personnel within a single command. This would capitalize 

on synergies inherent in combined personnel and organizational 

structures. From a historical perspective, the reorganization harkened back to the Forward Look concept created when Twenty-Third 

Air Force was activated with rescue and SOF components. The ACC 

commander, Gen Hal Hornburg, concurred with the change, believing 

that it was a positive move for the rescue community overall. The directive also pointed out that these forces would not be USSOCOM 

assets. They were designated as USAF rescue forces and, when deployed into any operational theater, would be under the operational 

control of the C/JFACC, while the SOF forces would be assigned to 

SOF commands. Organizational efficiencies would be realized by 

unit realignments, and career opportunities for both officers and en-
582 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

listed would be broadened. The realignment would also allow each 

community to cross-train with the other on a steady basis so that 

TTPs could be better shared.52

AFSOC would take control of Moody AFB, Georgia. It would also 

take administrative control of the Moody-based 347th Rescue Wing, 

its subordinate 563d Rescue Group at Davis-Monthan, and the 66th 

RQS at Nellis. It would gain 45 HH-60s, 14 HC-130s, five C-130s, and 

122 new manpower authorizations, plus 3,993 officers and Airmen. 

Another 15 HH-60s, five HC-130s, and four MC-130s were also 

available from aligned AFR units, and another 12 HH-60s and five 

HC-130s from aligned ANG units, along with 1,140 AFR and 1,779 

ANG assigned personnel. It was a significant development for AFSOC. 

However, the two mission areas—special operations and CSAR—

would be handled separately. The move seemed to indicate that the 

USAF had finally decided to acknowledge that the HH-60 community 

was its de facto rescue force of choice, finally releasing the Pave Lows 

for complete focus on their special operations tasks. Only time would 

tell. General Hester set the vector for the change, though, when he 

stated that “the introduction of CSAR to AFSOC should mean little 

change to rescue organizations or individuals within these units. This 

realignment will be transparent, outside of the patch change on uniforms. There will be no change on how forces are presented to combatant commanders.”53 

58th Special Operations Wing

By design and intent, operations at the training unit were much 

more staid than they were at the operational units. Throughout 2003 

the 551st SOS and 58th TRSS trained and graduated 11 pilots, eight 

flight engineers, and eight aerial gunners for the fleet. Additionally, 

another 286 individuals received recurrent training in the MH-53 

simulator, which had now been upgraded with MH-53M modifications. The unit had 10 MH-53Js available for training; none was 

scheduled for the MH-53M modification. All actual MH-53M flying 

had to be done in the operational squadrons. On average, 5.8 aircraft 

were available daily for missions, a lower than normal rate due to a 

shortage of spare parts caused by the increased demand for the 20th 

and 21st Squadrons. 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 583

Responding to the experiences of Colonel Kingsley and the 20th 

SOS in Afghanistan, the flying curriculum was modified to include 

much more training on brownout landings. Instructor crews also 

made the training available to operational unit personnel prior to deployment. Overseeing these changes in the 551st SOS, Lt Col Tim 

Leahy handed over command of the unit to Lt Col Lance Bodine on 

20 June. Similarly, just two months later, Col Paul Harmon assumed 

command of the 551st’s parent unit, the 58th SOG.54

The 58th Wing and the 551st SOS also directly supported the units 

in combat by augmenting personnel. Unit Airmen went to Afghanistan with the 20th SOS and flew in the classified direct action missions in support of Task Force Dagger and Task Force K-Bar. They 

also augmented the 20th detachment at Djibouti, where on a mission 

in June 2003, one crew recovered the injured personnel from two 

USMC CH-53Es seriously damaged by bombs errantly dropped by 

B-52s on a bombing range in Djibouti. As the deployment of the 20th 

was extended in Iraq in the summer of 2003, the 551st sent six instructor crew members to help out. When the 20th sent the Djibouti 

detachment to Afghanistan in the fall, one of the 551st pilots, Maj 

Steve Plumhoff, was killed in the tragic crash in November along with 

the three enlisted Airmen from the 20th SOS while participating in 

Operation Mountain Resolve. To honor him, the entryway into the 

58th SOW area was named Plumhoff Way, a permanent reminder 

that even the training units had to bear the cost of war.55

Notes

1. Stewart, American Military History, vol. 2, 476.

2. White House, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point,” 

press release, White House website. 

3. Stewart, American Military History, vol. 2, 477. 

4. Ibid., 477.

5. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2003, vol. 1, 1. 

6. Whitcomb, “Rescue Operations in the Second Gulf War,” 95–102; and Webb, 

interview.

7. Webb and Slife, interviews; and Michalek, personal notes, provided to the author.

8. Ezell, interview; and Stricklin to the author, e-mail, 23 Jan 2011.

9. Webb and Slife, interviews. 

10. Slife, interview; and Michalek, personal notes, provided to the author.

11. AF Safety Report: Executive Summary, Aircraft Accident Investigation MH-53M 

#68-10930, n.d., AFSOC Judge Advocate’s Office (JAO), Hurlburt Field, FL; and Webb and 

Slife, interviews. 
584 │ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

12. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 478–79. 

13. Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, 93.

14. Ezell, interview.

15. H-53 Major Aircraft Accident List, n.d., AFSOC Safety (SE) Office; Robinson, 

Masters of Chaos, 277; and Michalek, personal notes, provided to the author.

16. Berry and Jobling, interviews. 

17. Berry and Slife, interviews; Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 169–77; and Michalek, 

personal notes, provided to the author.

18. Ezell, interview. 

19. Borland, interview. 

20. Berry and Gene Becker, interviews; and Whitcomb, “Rescue Operations in 

the Second Gulf War,” n.p.

21. Michalek, personal notes, provided to the author. 

22. Boyne, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 281–85; Bahmanyar and Osman, SEALs, 148–54; 

and Borland, interview.

23. Slife, interview; Robinson, Masters of Chaos, 248, 254; Briscoe et al., All Roads 

Lead to Baghdad, 134–39; and Rowell to the author, e-mail. 

24. Slife, interview.

25. Bahmanyar and Osman, SEALs, 155–57.

26. Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, 462; Stewart, American Military History, 

vol. 2, 486–90; History of 16th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2003, vol. 1, xx; and Gordon and 

Trainor, Cobra II, 463.

27. History of 16th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2003, vol. 1, xx; and Borland, interview.

28. Williams and Lengyel, interviews; and Doty to the author, e-mail. 

29. Robinson, Masters of Chaos, 296; and Williams, interview.

30. Doty to the author, e-mail. 

31. Williams and Lengyel, interviews.

32. Lengyel, Williams, and Kradel, interviews; and History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–

31 Dec 2003, vol. 1, n.p., original doc. n42.

33. Robinson, Masters of Chaos, 297–99.

34. Prather, interview.

35. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 340–41; Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point,

227–29; and Lengyel and Prather, interviews.

36. Kradel, interview.

37. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2003, vol. 1, n.p., original doc. n452; 

Robinson, Masters of Chaos, 324–35; and Williams, interview.

38. Williams, interview.

39. Ibid.

40. Stamos, interview.

41. DeSalle, interview.

42. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2003, vol. 1, n.p.; and Prather and 

Williams, interviews.

43. Doty to the author, e-mail. 

44. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2003, vol. 1, n.p.

45. Berry, interview.
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM │ 585

46. Todd Lopez, “Local Airmen Laid to Rest,” Commando, 23 Jan 2004; Williams 

and Slife, interviews; and Executive Summary: Helicopter Accident Investigation 

MH-53M #70-1625, n.d., AFSOC/JAO, Hurlburt Field, FL.

47. Williams and Becklund, interviews; and Williams to the author, e-mail, 9 Aug 2010.

48. Slife, interview.

49. Jobling, interview.

50. Becklund, interview.

51. Williams, interview.

52. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2003, vol. 1, 1, 27–33.

53. Ibid.; and Hebert, “CSAR, Under New Management,” 84.

54. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2003, vol. 1, 44–45, 56.

55. Ibid., 16–19.

Chapter 17

The Terminal Years

~2004–8

I didn’t care about heroics. What I cared about was guys not 

getting killed because we hadn’t given them the right flight 

equipment or tactics. I wanted them to do the mission and 

come home.

—Col Jim Slife

Iraq

Unfortunately, things were not settling down in Iraq quite as 

planned. More attacks were occurring across the country, and anticoalition forces consisting of former Saddam supporters and violent 

Islamist groups appeared to be growing and consolidating. In several 

instances, their forces set off huge truck bombs in public places, killing dozens of Westerners and Iraqis. In another incident, terrorists 

used a heat-seeking missile to shoot down a US Army CH-47, killing 

16 US troops and wounding 20 more. Redeployment orders for many 

US and coalition units were rescinded. The V Corps returned home, 

and overall command of forces was consolidated under CJTF-7. It 

would command multinational divisions throughout the country as 

they carried out stabilization efforts so that the Iraqis could form a 

functioning government. Additionally, the CJTF-7 forces began conducting operations against these groups and organizing and training 

a new Iraqi military to take over. The CJSOTF–Arabian Peninsula 

(AP) remained in Iraq in direct support of this effort. The US Army 

5th SFG was still its core unit, although slated to be replaced by the 

10th SFG in January 2004. Collocated with them was a small detachment of US Navy SEALs from another task force. Increasingly, they 

were carrying out reconnaissance missions and psychological operations and hunting for high-value targets. The 20th SOS detachment 

of four Pave Lows and troops, located now at BIAP, provided them 

with an “any time, any place” capability. 
588 │ the terminal years

20th Special Operations Squadron/

Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron

Lt Col Jim Slife was on-site as the commander. He also had control 

of a small detachment of US Navy SH-60s from HCS-4 and HCS-5 

and worked closely with a detachment still in Iraq from the 160th 

SOAR. One of his aircraft commanders there was Capt Joe Michalek, 

now a flight commander. He worked diligently to help enable the 

movement up to BIAP. Michalek and his flight helped plan for and fly 

numerous missions in support of CJSOTF-AP forces and subordinate 

task forces as they nightly attacked al-Qaeda and insurgent elements 

across Iraq. For his combined and consistent outstanding efforts during OIF, he was nominated for and received the 2004 Lance P. Sijan 

Leadership Award.1

As 2004 began, Lt Col Jim Slife was not happy having his helicopters based at BIAP because the airfield was about to be given back to 

the Iraqis. Just south of there, SOCCENT was building a large complex at the Radwaniyah Palace that included helipads. However, Slife 

felt that if he put his detachment there, it would have a difficult time 

getting the logistical support it needed to operate. Consequently, he 

made a quick trip up to the largely unoccupied air base at Balad, 40 

miles north of Baghdad, which was being slowly developed into a 

major military aerial port. A short discussion with the base commander indicated that it would be possible to lodge the Pave Lows 

and detachment in a compound in the northwest corner of the base. 

In February Colonel Williams arrived to take over the detachment, 

and he supervised the move. Shortly thereafter, other service aviation 

detachments joined them at Balad.2

At the same time, CJSOTF-AP was receiving an increasing number of taskings for direct action missions against the disparate elements aligned against the new Iraqi state. Actions and battles of varying size and intensity took place across the nation. In late March, 

insurgents kidnapped and brutally killed four American contractors 

working on a security detail near Fallujah, mutilated their bodies, 

and then hung them up for all to see. Shocked by the actions, the 

CJTF-7 commander, Lt Gen Ricardo Sanchez, ordered the I MEF to 

attack into the city and clear it of insurgents. I MEF launched Operation Vigilant Resolve on 4 April with two infantry battalions. When 

enemy resistance stiffened, two more USMC battalions were committed, 
the terminal years │ 589

and an Iraqi battalion was brought in to support the effort. Unfortunately, the battle wreaked havoc on the infrastructure and people of 

Fallujah. When the Iraqi battalion refused to fight against its “countrymen,” General Sanchez ordered the I MEF to desist and withdraw 

its forces.3

In support of this operation, the CJSOTF-AP performed several 

collateral missions. AC-130 gunships and the 20th SOS flew direct 

support for several of them. As the fighting raged, on 12 April, two 

Pave Lows commanded by Capt Steve Edwards and Capt Marshall 

Groves and crews—call signs Mongoose 33 and 34—departed BIAP 

in the late evening to fly a series of support missions to deliver supplies 

and personnel to special forces elements around Fallujah. Edwards 

and his crew were flying MH-53M #69-5797. Lifting off into the dark 

but clear evening sky, they proceeded to their first landing zone. As 

they arrived, though, they discovered that it was occupied by other 

helicopters and discontinued their approach. As Edwards and Groves 

were discussing whether or not to proceed on to the second planned 

landing zone, Edwards observed the firing of an RPG toward his helicopter from the 11 o’clock position. Before he had a chance to react, 

the RPG struck the aircraft on the front left side just below the center 

windscreen. When the missile hit, the copilot, Capt Thomas Lessner, 

was flying the aircraft straight and level at 200 feet above the ground 

and maintaining 100 knots. The resultant blast devastated the instrument panels, the center instrument cluster, and most of the windscreen. The entire overhead throttle quadrant and emergency panel 

were completely destroyed. Captain Edwards was seriously injured in 

the face and on both arms and legs from flying glass particles. The 

flight engineer, TSgt Christian Mackenzie, suffered injuries to his 

eyes, face, and upper torso and was no longer capable of functioning 

in his job. Lessner sustained injuries to his left eye and side of his face, 

his left shoulder, and both legs. None of the cabin crew was injured, 

although the intercom system was intermittent. Momentarily 

stunned, Edwards quickly regained his composure, grabbed the cyclic 

and collective, and announced over the intercom that he had control 

of the aircraft. Lessner did not realize that he had done so and initially 

tried to fight him for the controls until he realized that Edwards was 

flying the aircraft.

Edwards then realized that he had lost all aircraft instrumentation 

and he needed to put the aircraft on the ground as soon and as safely 

as possible, hopefully on a landing site that would not produce a 
590 │ the terminal years

brownout. He called his intentions to the crew over the intercom, and 

the left scanner, MSgt Randy Kensey, began immediately giving him 

guidance to a grassy field off of their left front quarter—the only area 

that Edwards could see through his undamaged left chin bubble. At 

the same time, the tail scanner, SSgt Jesse Lee, came forward in the 

aircraft to gain some protection from a possible hard landing. 

It all happened abruptly as Edwards brought the aircraft to a full 

and safe stop on the grassy field. As he did so, he called to Mackenzie 

to shut down the engines. The flight engineer replied that because of 

his injuries, he was not able to do so. Edwards then called to Kensey 

and the right scanner, MSgt Robert Colannino, to get Mackenzie out 

of the seat so that Colannino could shut down the engines. They 

quickly complied, placing the seriously injured Airman on the cabin 

floor. Colannino climbed up into what was left of the cockpit to shut 

down the engines. He remembers, 

I hopped in the pilot seat, and luckily I had a little headlight. I turned the headlight on and looked around the cockpit, and all the controls are gone. We 

couldn’t shut the aircraft down like we normally would with the throttles. The 

electronic switches were all gone. . . . I hopped back out, and there are cables that 

run in the roof of the aircraft for the throttles and for the fuel levers, and of 

course I’m an engineer, so I know where they are. I looked up, pulled all four of 

them, and the engine shut down. We got the hell out of there.4

At the same time, the rest of the crew was attempting to move to 

the rear of the aircraft for egress. Captain Lessner needed a great deal 

of help because he could not see out of either eye. Sergeant Lee 

grabbed his PRC-112B survival radio and stepped off of the aircraft 

so that he could call Mongoose 34 for an immediate pickup. 

Sergeant Lee did not need to make any radio calls because the crew 

members of Mongoose 34 had already acted. They had witnessed the 

firing of the RPG and, after taking immediate evasive action themselves, had watched Mongoose 33 thrash through its wild gyrations 

as it reacted to the devastating blow and then respond to Captain 

Edwards’s immediate inputs to put the aircraft safely on the ground. 

Captain Groves was flying his aircraft and quickly began to maneuver 

to land next to his Chalk Lead. In the middle of the turn, the flight 

engineer, SSgt Brian Bowling, observed what appeared to be another 

RPG off of the nose of their aircraft. The three scanners all dispensed 

flares that illuminated behind the aircraft and revealed to the tail 

gunner, TSgt Byron Allen, a group of about 12 enemy personnel. He 

fired 20 rounds at them with his .50-caliber machine gun. At the 
the terminal years │ 591

same time, Groves made an evasive right turn and descended. When 

enemy forces fired another projectile at the aircraft, he then made a 

hard left turn as the missile passed by. Groves continued to maneuver 

the aircraft to avoid the incessant enemy fire and locate Mongoose 33. 

Simultaneously, his copilot, Capt Matt Berry, made a Mayday call on 

the Guard frequency, asking for any immediately available help. Two 

AC-130s operating over Fallujah promptly responded, and one aircraft, Slayer 74, turned to head to their location.5

Unfortunately, in all of the evasive maneuvering, the crew of Mongoose 34 lost sight of Mongoose 33. The crew frantically searched 

until the tail scanner, Sergeant Allen, spotted the downed helicopter 

and called its relative position to his pilots. Groves immediately 

started a landing approach as all of the scanners provided him critical 

inputs for his landing. He put their helicopter down in the grassy 

field, just two rotor widths away from what was left of Mongoose 33. 

Groves had his gunners remain at the ready as he cleared two special 

forces Soldiers on board to dismount, proceed over to Mongoose 33, 

and render assistance. Overhead, Slayer 74 arrived and quickly oriented to the situation on the ground, guns at the ready and sensor 

systems rapidly scanning the immediate area for any individuals with 

apparent hostile intent. 

Aboard Mongoose 33, Captain Edwards and Sergeant Colannino 

picked up Sergeant Mackenzie to carry him over to the other aircraft. 

They met the two special forces Soldiers who assisted them aboard 

Mongoose 34. As the left and right scanners of Mongoose 34, A1C 

Casey Mabry and SSgt Chris Dalton, helped the crew members of 

Mongoose 33 get settled on their helicopter, the tail scanner, Sergeant 

Allen, assured that all personnel were on board and notified Captain 

Groves, who then lifted off. His scanners maintained an earnest watch 

for any further enemy action as they talked Groves around known or 

suspected enemy positions. Their efforts were warranted because Sergeant Allen spotted another rising projectile directed at the tail of the 

aircraft. “Break right, descend,” he called as Groves responded, the 

missile passing over the aircraft. Mabry then called out ground fire 

from the left side of the aircraft. Allen opened up on the site with his 

.50-caliber machine gun, later claiming that he fired only “10 or 15 

rounds.” With the AC-130 still watching from above, Mongoose 34 

then set a course for BIAP. Twenty minutes later, the crews touched 

down and were immediately met by ambulances and a trauma physician. 

Groves kept the engines running in case the physician determined 
592 │ the terminal years

that the wounded needed to 

be directly medevaced to 

the larger hospital at Balad 

AB. When the physician assured them that the wounded 

members could get the care 

they needed at the BIAP hospital, Groves told his crew to 

shut them down. They had 

only flown for about an hour 

and 15 minutes, but it had 

been a very eventful and, for 

all, unforgettable experience.6

As Mongoose 34 was conducting its recovery mission, the orbiting AC-130 above, Slayer 74, contacted local USMC forces below for a force to try to secure the wreckage. 

The commander of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment deployed a QRF commanded by 1st Lt Josh Glover consisting of 55 Marines 

in nine Humvees. With guidance and top cover from Slayer 74, the 

Marines quickly drove the 10 kilometers to the location and arrived just 

a few minutes after Mongoose 34 lifted off. They quickly set up a perimeter and recovered sensitive items from the helicopter. The next morning 

enemy mortar rounds began to land in their perimeter, and Lieutenant 

Glover ordered his force to return to base. As it was leaving though, enemy forces closed in around it, and the QRF had to literally fight a running gun battle as teams of terrorists salvoed RPGs at its vehicles and constantly raked it with machine gun and small arms 

fire. Of the 55 Marines who went to the Mongoose 

33 crash site, 21 came back wounded, and one was 

killed. Fallujah was a very dangerous place.7

The men aboard Mongoose 33 and 34 were 

well recognized for their efforts. All played 

their individual role in the chaotic events that 

night in the skies over Fallujah. Capt Steve Edwards was presented the Aviator Valor Award 

for 2004; Capt Marshall Groves received the 

Cheney Award for 2004; and MSgt Robert 

Colannino was given the Pitsenbarger Award 

for 2004, designed to recognize “an Air Force 

enlisted member who has performed a heCourtesy MSgt Byron Allen, USAF, Retired

MSgt Byron Allen receiving the Combat 

Action Medal from the CSAF, Gen Michael 

Moseley, for his actions to help rescue the 

crew of Mongoose 33

Courtesy AFSOC Public Affairs

MSgt Robert Colannino 

receives the Bronze Star 

for his actions on the 

Mongoose 33 mission.
the terminal years │ 593

roic act . . . that resulted in the saving of life or the prevention of 

serious injury.”8

Fallujah remained an extremely dangerous place, but the crews were 

not cowed by it. R. K. Williams remembered the experiences of another 

flight of two Pave Lows shortly after the Mongoose 33 mission:

A two-ship of helicopters was out flying a resupply mission. . . . It was a relatively routine mission, at night of course . . . south of Fallujah and west of 

Baghdad. . . . [The enemy] had figured out generally the routing of helicopters. 

They dispersed themselves into a cross-fire scenario with three [guns]. 

This two-ship took several bullet holes in the machines. . . . The crews executed perfectly; no one was injured; the helicopters were both damaged. So 

they aborted the mission and flew back to Balad. They landed and came off the 

aircraft. They said, “Maintenance, we need the two spare aircraft. . . . They had 

just taken significant fire with significant battle damage and all they wanted to 

do was to get into a fresh helicopter and go back and finish the mission. We 

started being a little bit concerned that the crews were a little too callous to the 

danger, but after several discussions and talks at crew commander level, that 

wasn’t the case. They weren’t calloused at all; they just had it in their minds 

that the mission was the mission and as long as they weren’t hurt or injured, 

equipment was equipment, humans were more important than hardware, and 

they were just going to get the other helicopters and go finish the mission.9

Taking advantage of the chaos sweeping over the land, local religious and political leaders such as Muqtada al-Sadr fomented opposition to the forming Iraqi government. They incited armed opposition in Najaf and other cities and towns. The Soldiers and Sailors of 

the CJSOTF-AP were very busy, as were the men of Pave Low who 

were carrying them on their highly classified missions during that 

fiery spring of 2004. 

Multi-National Force–Iraq

At about the same time, the overall coalition structure within Iraq 

was being changed. Gen John Abizaid had replaced Gen Tommy 

Franks as the CENTCOM commander a few months earlier and 

wanted to begin integrating the Iraqi military into the overall coalition structure in the country. Accordingly, he received approval to 

restructure his commands. The CJTF-7 would be inactivated; in its 

place two commands would be stood up. The new headquarters for 

US and coalition military operations in Iraq would be called Headquarters, Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I). It would provide theater 
594 │ the terminal years

strategic- and operational-level command and control of all coalition 

forces in Iraq. It would also directly deal with the various overarching 

governmental agencies and the emerging Iraqi government and synchronize security, diplomatic, economic, and information operations 

with the US Embassy and Iraqi government. In turn, the MNF-I 

would command the Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I), which 

would control tactical-level military operations of the several multinational divisions in place throughout the country. It would also 

oversee the operations of the CJSOTF-AP. The changes took place 

through the spring and summer of 2005. To the men serving with the 

Pave Low detachment at Balad, all of this was almost irrelevant. They 

received their tasking and flew their missions in support of the special forces units engaging the enemy every night.10

21st Special Operations Squadron

In June 2004, Lt Col Jim Slife handed over his position as the 20th 

SOS operations officer to Lt Col Scott Howell and moved to RAF 

Mildenhall, UK, to assume command of the 21st SOS from Lt Col 

Greg Lengyel. The ceremony took place on 21 June, and Lengyel 

moved to Virginia to serve as a military assistant to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Lt Col Mark Harmon had been serving as 

the 21st SOS operations officer and remained in that position. 

Settling into his job, Slife determined that the 21st was a well-run 

unit that had been fully vetted by its experiences in northern Iraq 

and, since returning, had reengaged in the full spate of activities inherent with being the only heavy-lift, all-weather helicopter unit in 

EUCOM. In fact, 21st SOS crews had supported Vice Pres. Dick 

Cheney’s visit to Switzerland in January and had participated in a 

series of exercises with US and allied special forces units in Scotland, 

Spain, Germany, and even Tunisia.11

However, Slife wanted to engage with one personnel issue at the 

squadron. He wanted to strengthen his cadre of NCOs, feeling that 

they saw themselves as engineers or gunners who were NCOs vice 

NCOs who held a particular job. He began moving to reorganize the 

unit so that NCOs were truly in charge of sections and programs and 

had to rate their troops and answer for specific actions. In this, he 

received a goodly amount of push-back, sensing that many intended 

to bide their time until he left so that they could settle back into their 
the terminal years │ 595

older habits. He would not allow that and gradually began to find that 

most rose to the occasion and performed very well. He tried to dispel 

the gunners-as-comic-relief paradigm and found that when he went 

beyond that and treated them as individuals with position and responsibility, they, in most cases, responded in kind. One gunner of 

whom Slife was most proud was TSgt John Stott, a charismatic and 

natural leader. Slife loaded him up with responsibility, and he rose to 

the task. There were others, too. Slife was humbled by the fact that of 

all the NCOs he sent through the NCO Academy, 78 percent of them 

were distinguished graduates.12

About a month after Slife took command, the unit was ordered to 

deploy to Balad Air Base, Iraq, to relieve the 20th SOS. This was only 

a personnel swap-out because the 20th left its aircraft. However, the 

21st SOS did ship two Pave Lows to Hurlburt to support the 20th there. 

Arriving at Balad, Slife was appointed to the position of JSOAD 

commander. The JSOAD also included MC-130 and Army and Navy 

detachments. Lt Col Mark Harmon commanded the MH-53 detachment. Slife designated senior individuals from the other groups to be 

in charge of their elements so that he could concentrate on the larger 

issues inherent in his position. Mission taskings were coming down 

nightly from the CJSOTF-AP and the MNC-I for direct action missions as well as standard logistics runs and occasional VIP support, 

and the Pave Low crews remained busy. 

Back at Mildenhall, Slife had decided to directly engage with the 

Pave Low crews on one particular issue that had been concerning 

him since his time at Hurlburt. He was a great believer in operational 

risk management, or ORM as it was called, and had come to the conclusion that low-level flying was no longer necessary, especially after 

the Mongoose 33 incident. His analysis indicated that there were six 

things that threatened helicopters: terrain, wires, towers, other helicopters, small arms and RPGs, and heat-seeking missiles. Of the six, 

five could be mitigated by flying above 3,000 feet. The heat-seeking 

missiles could be handled with the warning and flare dispenser systems 

on the aircraft, designed exactly for this threat. However, when he 

presented his ideas to the young pilots, they always rebutted by saying 

that the danger from the heat-seeking missiles was just too high in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. He steadfastly counterargued that flying even 

higher at 8,000 to 10,000 feet insured that the aircraft could also have 

enough flight energy and room to be maneuvered against approaching 

missiles. Many of the young pilots still resisted. Slife did not want to 
596 │ the terminal years

use “I said so” leadership and had the 18th Flight Test Squadron do a 

classified test, which showed that the helicopters were far more survivable at altitude than down at 100 feet. 

At Balad, Slife decided to change flight procedures. Using the report as his bludgeon, he gave firm guidance to his crews to do the en 

route portion of their flights at 8,000 to 10,000 feet or above. The 

grumbling was predictable and steady for a bit. But the crews began 

to appreciate that the flying was less stressful and less dangerous. 

They also noticed that they were returning from missions with fewer 

holes in their aircraft, and the carping began to dissipate. There were, 

however, the ever-present individuals who used any excuse to return 

to low level, and Slife had to reinforce his decision constantly and 

insist that his midlevel supervisors do the same. He was also heartened by the fact that R. K. Williams fully supported his actions as the 

21st crews utilized the higher-altitude tactics in their direct support 

of the CJSOTF-AP operations. This included several classified support missions when US and Iraqi forces reengaged enemy forces in 

Fallujah in November 2004 in Operation Phantom Fury. During this 

two-week operation, the forces surrounded the city and worked 

through it block by block, rooting out the terrorists, killing over 2,000 

enemy personnel, and capturing 1,200 more. However, the cost was 

high; 70 American and seven Iraqi troops were killed, with over 600 

more wounded. Such battles indicated that there was still much hard 

fighting to do.13

551st Special Operations Squadron

Throughout 2004 the training squadron and its fellow unit the 

58th TRSS worked steadily to produce more Pave Low crews. There 

were constant challenges as the unit received steady levies to send 

personnel TDY to the operational theaters. Spare parts continued to 

be a problem because the needs of the 20th and 21st were higher priority. In response to Colonel Williams’s request, the 551st was also 

ordered to send two of its MH-53J aircraft to Hurlburt to help that 

unit with home-base training. In July all wing training was curtailed 

for two weeks as the entire unit received an ORI. Overall, the wing 

did well, with a few problems noted. The 551st was one of only two 

units to be highlighted for superlative work. 
the terminal years │ 597

Regardless of the interruptions, the Pave Low training programs 

ran at a steady pace. The aircraft qualification courses were adjusted 

somewhat for various identified needs. However, they were still 

some of the longest courses in the USAF, with the pilot course running 171 days and the flight engineer course taking 173 days. For the 

year, 12 pilots, 12 flight engineers, and 12 aerial gunners were trained 

for the fleet; 197 other crew members received refresher training in 

the flight simulator.14

In March 2004, Capt Mike Holder reported to the 58th SOW for 

duty as a Pave Low IP. After his exploits in OEF, he had completed a 

rotation with the detachment at Djibouti. Then he attended the 

Weapons Instructor Course at Hurlburt and Nellis AFBs. At Kirtland, as the first MH-53 weapons instructor in AETC, he was directed 

to create a weapons and tactics office for the 551st SOS.15

Air Force Special Operations Command

As the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan continued unabated, 

the command remained decisively engaged in both arenas. Indeed, as 

the efforts of the antigovernment forces in Iraq continued to expand 

and become ever more violent, the 12,900 men and women of AFSOC 

were directly involved in the combined and joint efforts mounted to 

staunch and then defeat the enemy forces. Squadrons and detachments from its two wings and two groups were constantly present in 

Iraq, and it appeared that the Pave Low detachment, now ensconced 

at the Balad AB, was at least a semipermanent presence. Additionally, 

in support of the aerospace expeditionary forces concept, AFSOC began to designate detachments such as this as “expeditionary” units, 

and the 20th SOS detachment at Balad became the 20th Expeditionary 

Special Operations Squadron (ESOS). Henceforth, officers deployed 

for 90 days or more as commanders could now receive “G” Series 

orders officially designating them as such, which clarified their roles 

both administratively and operationally.16

The harsh conditions of Afghanistan, Djibouti, and Iraq were hard 

on equipment, especially the Pave Lows, and the AFSOC logisticians 

were monitoring the condition of the 32 remaining aircraft closely. 

The MH-53s were experiencing rising failure rates with small gearboxes, including the nose gearbox, intermediate gearbox, tail gearbox, and accessory gearbox. The machines also had continuing troubles 
598 │ the terminal years

with their engine air particle separator (EAPS) systems and main rotor 

swashplate and servo assemblies. The fine grit sand found in all of 

these areas was also eroding the main rotor blades. The stress of sustained combat operations further aged the already 35-plus-year-old 

aircraft. In fact, the aircraft most probably were older than the men 

who now flew them.17

On 1 July 2004, Lt Gen Paul Hester gave up command of the AFSOC 

and proceeded to Hawaii to take command of the Pacific Air Forces 

(PACAF), with a promotion to general. Replacing him at AFSOC was 

Maj Gen Michael Wooley, who was promoted to lieutenant general 

the next month. An airlift pilot by background, he had already served 

a tour as the AFSOC vice-commander and came to Hurlburt from 

command of the Third Air Force at RAF Mildenhall. Upon taking 

command, he laid out his priorities for the organization, focusing on 

his Airmen, their families, and their obligations as ambassadors for 

the nation in its many endeavors. And he reminded them that they 

were a part of the “tip of the spear,” as America’s military forces conducted operations in nearly two dozen nations, “seen and unseen,” in 

the ongoing GWOT.18

21st Special Operations Squadron

Lt Col Jim Slife brought his squadron home from Iraq in early February 2005, when another detachment from the 20th arrived to replace it and maintain the Pave Low force (20th ESOS) at Balad. After 

a well-deserved period of time off, the squadron reengaged in its 

standard exercises within EUCOM. Crews flew up into the hills and 

mountains of Scotland to accomplish classic Pave Low TF/TA training; they deployed to Spain and the eastern Mediterranean for deck 

landing qualifications; and they did combined training with coalition 

special forces units in Spain, Italy, and Albania. As the Pave Lows 

were traveling across the breadth and depth of Europe, Col Brad 

Webb arrived to take command of the 352d SOG from fellow Pave 

Low veteran Col Dennis Jones on 23 June 2005. Webb had served 

with the unit for three years during the long Bosnia experience and 

was most pleased that he had received this assignment. He arrived to 

the thrilling news that the unit would be receiving an ORI in the fall. 

In September Colonel Slife received an operational order directing 

the 21st SOS to deploy several crews and support personnel to augment 
the terminal years │ 599

the 20th ESOS at Balad. In October the AFSOC IG team arrived and 

submitted the 352d SOG to its ORI, and the 21st was operating with 

only a partial manning roster. Operational details of the exercise were 

classified, but the unit deployed to RAF Machrihanish, Scotland, for 

three weeks to display its capabilities. Overall, the group was rated 

satisfactory, with the 21st receiving an overall “outstanding” rating.19

20th Special Operations Squadron

Lt Col R. K. Williams used the respite from Balad duty to rebuild 

his squadron. Right after arriving and taking over as the operations 

officer, Lt Col Scott Howell had departed for Kirtland for his Pave 

Low requalification. He had been back to the squadron only a few 

weeks and was well into creating several training plans when Hurlburt was hit by Hurricane Ivan, and the entire 16th SOW had to evacuate. Howell and Williams dispatched all of the flyable helicopters and 

then remained behind with their families to watch over the rest of the 

squadron as best they could. Once the storm passed, they had to 

grant their troops liberal time off to deal with the damage and flooding. The time had to be taken out of their training plan as they were 

trying to prepare the unit for a return to Balad rotations in early 2005. 

However, the squadron was able to resume, even sending some aircraft and crews to Asheville for mountain training and other locations to work with special forces units from the other services.20

Working closely with Williams and Howell was SMSgt John DeSalle, 

now serving as the 20th SOS superintendent. He had returned from 

the 21st SOS in the summer of 2004 and initially served as a flight 

superintendent before moving up to the squadron position. Additionally, he maintained his gunner and evaluator qualification and 

flew when he could. However, watching out over the entire unit, especially the 175 enlisted troops, was a staggering responsibility. In 

particular, though, he placed a lot of emphasis on the development of 

his NCOs, making sure that they had specific responsibilities and opportunities to develop and grow professionally. He insured that they, 

too, were rotating overseas and serving in billets which required key 

NCO leadership. He rotated to the theater and flew missions as much 

as he could.

He was concerned, though, that in focusing exclusively on Iraq, 

the squadron was using its time at Hurlburt solely to prepare crews 
600 │ the terminal years

for those tours at the expense of developing them for other possible 

national missions. Training opportunities with other services and 

“customers” had been dramatically reduced. He observes, “I think we 

lost when we started doing OIF because we didn’t get those TDYs, 

especially when we started drawing down the Paves. The guys didn’t 

get to [go] to Fort Bragg or go to Fort Benning . . . we were always in 

Iraq. So the guys who became gunners and engineers, even pilots, 

after 9/11 really got cheated out of that, [which] gave them a deeper 

appreciation and the camaraderie with the teams.”21

DeSalle also put a great deal of emphasis on crew building, believing 

that, “The one thing about Pave Low is that it is truly a crew aircraft.” 

Unlike other squadrons with enlisted crew members, he would not allow 

separate sections for flight engineers and aerial gunners. Instead, he 

encouraged his Airmen to learn as much as possible about each other’s 

job. On TDYs, he encouraged the crews to billet together, do things 

together, and ask lots of questions about every facet of the aircraft and 

mission. He always stressed proper aircrew decorum but emphasized 

especially to the new pilots that “you have to listen to your backenders 

because that is where a lot of the experience is, and that’s where the 

knowledge of the systems is.” He reinforced that with a simple amplification. “There are too . . . many realms of flight that we could die in.” To 

all, he offered sage advice based upon his 15-plus years in Pave Low: “If 

you have thin skin, it will be hard for you to hang around. . . . If you don’t 

suck it up, then you are going to have issues. . . . That is how we weed out 

the weak.”22

In February Colonel Williams led his detachment to Balad for another tour with six crews and four aircraft. Like Colonel Slife, he was 

also ordered to serve as the JSOAD commander and did get to work 

somewhat with attached US Navy SH60s. Two months later, Colonel Howell 

came over and replaced him for a 90-

day tour in that role. After spending so 

much time away from operational assignments, Howell enjoyed being in 

the center of the action, directing joint 

and combined operations, and having 

to deal with real-time problems. Capt 

Matt Berry, now an aircraft commander, was back over for another 

tour. Carrying Iraqi special forces and 

Courtesy AFSOC Public Affairs

Capt Matthew Berry receives 

the Distinguished Flying Cross 

for his actions on the Mongoose 33 recovery.
the terminal years │ 601

police elements aboard, he flew several direct action missions right 

into Baghdad. He recounts one mission in particular, though, that 

remains foremost in his mind: 

It was my first deployment as an aircraft commander, probably my third or 

fourth mission. I led a 12-ship of helicopters and there were 18 air assets overall in the formation into As Sutarai, Iraq. It was coordinated a little more extensively; we knew that it was coming about a week in advance because we 

had a lot of air assets getting play. Here I am, a dude with less than 1,000 

hours, leading in an armada to take down this town that was just filled with 

insurgents. We pulled out 15 targets from that objective, everything from taking the town al-Qaeda leader down to the guy who was throwing IEDs out.23

Howell believed that his crews performed well. A goodly number 

of the missions were detailed and involved quite a bit of planning and 

precoordination. However, the majority were standard infiltration/

exfiltration or resupply of special forces elements. He utilized his senior 

officers, NCOs, and flight commanders to oversee various parts of the 

overall operation as a way to train and test them. He described how 

“guys like . . . Shawn Cameron, Joe Michalek, Steve Edwards, John 

Conmy, and Manny Fiterre . . . were combat flight commanders. 

When they deployed with their flight, they were a deployed squadron 

commander. . . . They commanded and they led.”24

In April the 16th SOW commander, Col Otis Mannon, visited 

Balad to observe his troops. He had another purpose to fulfill. While 

there, he cornered Howell and informed him that he would take 

command of the 20th SOS—now officially recognized as the second 

busiest squadron in the USAF—from Colonel Williams that summer. 

Howell came back to Hurlburt for the ceremony held on 1 June 2005. 

Lt Col R. K. Williams passed him the unit guidon and subsequently 

departed for duty at the Air Force Academy. 

Lt Col Vince Becklund then became the squadron operations officer. After his tour with the 551st SOS, he had spent two years at 

JSOC and then one year each at ACSC and SAAS and needed to 

requalify in the Pave Low. Replicating Howell’s experience, he immediately departed for Kirtland AFB to requalify on the Pave Low. Howell 

was on his own.25

Also joining Howell in the 20th was CMSgt Jim Kradel. He had 

returned to Hurlburt in June 2004 from his tour at the 21st SOS and 

was assigned to the 16th SOG standardization and evaluation team as 

the rotary-wing chief; he also served as the group operations superintendent. Now he would work directly with Howell as his squadron 
602 │ the terminal years

superintendent, a job he greatly relished. Very quickly, he was immersed with issues and problems to be addressed and solved.26

The personnel requirement for the 20th ESOS at Balad was such 

that one squadron flight could fulfill the need, and Williams and 

Howell had set up a very effective system to rotate the flights in and 

out. However, shortly after taking command, the 20th was ordered to 

dispatch two more aircraft and four more crews to provide a CSAR 

capability for a special operations task force in Iraq. Howell was still 

at Hurlburt, attending the squadron commander’s course, and had to 

develop a modified personnel flow to meet the added tasking. As he 

was working through that and trying to absorb what he was being 

taught in the course, he was notified that one of his helicopters had 

been damaged on a mission in western Iraq. 

Capt Scott Minas and Capt Tim Matlock were the pilots. They 

made a brownout approach onto a plowed field. As the aircraft settled 

on the soft ground, the nose wheels snagged on a dust-covered concrete drainage berm and collapsed the gear braces. The nose gear 

folded back up in the wheel well and damaged some control tubes, 

rendering the aircraft unflyable. The crew and passengers were unharmed. The second aircraft, flown by Captains Paul Lawrenz and 

Jonathan Graham and crew, brought Minas and his crew back to Balad. 

One of the 20th SOS flight commanders, Capt Steve Edwards, was 

at Balad, and Howell ordered him to handle the issue. Edwards and 

his replacement, USMC exchange officer Maj Nicholas “Buzz” Morris, 

did so, working with USMC forces in the area to secure the site and 

then procure a USMC CH-53E to lift the Pave Low back to Balad 

for repair.27

Finishing his course, Colonel Howell flew back to Balad for another rotation with the 20th ESOS. While there, he worked out a flow 

to extend his flights out for 120-day vice 90-day rotations. Additionally, he worked with the AFSOC DO, Col Eric Fiel, to request crew 

augmentation from the 21st SOS. When Slife got the request, he 

quickly obliged. With the augmentation, Howell now had a longterm sustainable plan to keep the necessary crews at Balad to meet 

operational requirements. The operational tempo for the units was 

steady and relentless. Through 2004 and 2005, they transported 216 

detainees, delivered/extracted 9,162 special operations forces personnel, and carried 731,800 pounds of cargo in support of the special 

forces elements.28
the terminal years │ 603

Integral to the operations of the 20th was the absolutely great support it received from the 16th Helicopter Maintenance Squadron 

(HMXS). Practically speaking, the two squadrons were literally 

joined at the hip because the 20th simply could not function without 

the efforts of the Airmen and officers of the 16th HMXS. Since the 

initiation of OEF, its personnel had deployed 23 times to four different areas in the Middle East with the 20th. The 16th HMXS had generated over 3,000 local flying hours and 1,500 deployed flying hours. 

Its personnel had recovered and repaired unit aircraft in several remote and dangerous locations. The squadron also made great strides 

in improving the safety and reliability of the aging and irascible fleet 

of MH-53s. Additionally, it had accomplished every major modification program for the aircraft while supporting the local flying and 

steady CONUS and overseas deployments. In recognition of its superior performance, in April 2005 the unit was awarded the 2004 USAF 

Maintenance Effectiveness Award in the rotary-wing aircraft category. This was the third year in a row that the unit had been so honored. Said Lt Col Stuart Lum of his unit, “This is the kind of unit that 

each of us joined the military to be part of, where people are committed to their values, achieve squadron goals, and show real teamwork. 

We’re a family of winners. . . . Here’s to us and those like us.”29

The next challenge for the 20th SOS came from a most unexpected 

quarter. In late August, a tropical storm formed southeast of the Bahamas and started tracking to the northwest. As it gained strength, it 

was declared a hurricane and named Katrina. The storm crossed 

Florida and entered the Gulf of Mexico, where it dramatically 

strengthened. It then turned north and slammed into New Orleans, 

doing great damage to the city, its suburbs, and most of southeast 

Louisiana and southern Mississippi. The next day, levees around New 

Orleans ruptured, allowing floodwaters to inundate the city and environs, adding to the destruction and misery. The USAF and AFSOC 

reacted swiftly. The 347th Rescue Wing, recently gained by AFSOC, 

prepared a task force of HH-60s and HC-130s that deployed to Jackson 

Airport, Mississippi, and began rescue and recovery operations as 

part of a huge national effort to help the people of the region. 20th 

SOS crews flew three aircraft on local sorties from Hurlburt, and they 

worked during the daytime with MC-130s to remain over the city 

and environs. Since Colonel Howell was still in Iraq and Colonel 

Becklund was at Kirtland for his Pave Low requalification, the 20th 

effort was commanded by one of the squadron assistant DOs, Lt Col 
604 │ the terminal years

“Rusty” Kaskel. Throughout, the Pave Low crews operated under the 

tactical control of the 347th. The Paves flew 17 sorties in the effort; 

the 347th Wing was credited with saving 1,395 people from the floodwaters and ferrying 272 more to safe areas and emergency support 

centers. Howell had family in New Orleans and watched the cable 

news channels as the recovery progressed. He was most heartened to 

see scenes of the Pave Lows flying over the city and assisting in the 

huge recovery effort. He later remarked, “We were tasked to send 

Pave Lows over to New Orleans and help rescue the folks there and 

do what needed to be done . . . not what we were used to doing, . . . 

but we had the capability and we had the right experience. So we 

stepped into the breech and did a great job with that.” It was another 

classic use of heavy-lift helicopters and very much in keeping with 

the broad type of missions that the Pave Lows and their HH and CH 

predecessors had performed from their very inception.30

Courtesy Lt Col Fred Koegler, USAF

A Pave Low over New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina

Lt Col Vince Becklund finally arrived at the 20th SOS in October 

2005. He found a squadron very different from what he remembered 

from the 1990s. Then, it was the “show,” the place to be, lots of specialty 

missions working with all manner of special operations elements on 

endless “really cool” exercises all over the CONUS and globe, with 
the terminal years │ 605

lots of TDY funds, nice hotels, and rental cars. All crew members had 

considerable experience and practically nobody was below the rank 

of captain or staff sergeant. It generated a great sense of trust. Now, 

the unit was filling with younger pilots right out of flight school and 

the 551st, arriving without the benefit of seasoning time in UH-1s or 

anything else. Additionally, the majority of the enlisted force was 

similar, with senior Airmen and staff sergeants abounding. Becklund 

had to scramble to get up to speed with the current training programs, continued rotation of his crews to Balad, and a wing ORI now 

looming on the horizon.31

Air Force Special Operations Command

The year 2005, the fourth year of AFSOC in the GWOT, was another year of change and challenge. On average, at any moment fully 

25 percent of its force structure was engaged in operations somewhere in the world, giving AFSOC the highest operations tempo of 

any MAJCOM in the USAF. The new USAF chief of staff, General 

Moseley, directed that the Air Staff and all MAJCOM staffs be reFlooded New Orleans from the back ramp

Courtesy Lt Col Fred Koegler, USAF
606 │ the terminal years

organized as “A-staffs” to parallel the joint staff structure of numbered 

vice named directorates. As an example, the director of personnel 

would now become the A1, the director of operations would now 

become the A3, and so on. AFSOC complied and was directed to 

form a war-fighting headquarters, which it did by creating the Air 

Force Special Operations Forces, with its own A-staff and the capability 

to function as an operational headquarters.

The new staff would be useful in allowing the AFSOC to better 

command its assets as it steadily expanded. The CV-22 program was 

part of that phenomenon. On 20 May, the 71st SOS was reactivated at 

Kirtland AFB as the training squadron for the new aircraft. Its new 

commander was Lt Col Jim Cardoso. After his time at the 20th SOS, 

he had attended staff college at the Western Hemisphere Institute for 

Security Cooperation and then served 23 months as an aide to the 

USSOCOM commander, Gen Charles Holland. That tour allowed 

the young officer to see the big picture of the ongoing conflicts and 

world situation. Additionally, Cardoso could see that Pave Low’s days 

were waning. In December 2003, he transferred to Kirtland AFB to 

serve as the operations officer of the 551st SOS until he was designated to take command of the 71st SOS.32

Additionally, AFSOC was developing plans to deploy operational 

CV-22 squadrons with the first unit at Hurlburt Field, possibly in 

2007. At the same time, the command was forthrightly expanding its 

use of RPVs, activating squadrons equipped with them. Personnel in 

the Pave Low community were now beginning to realize that they 

would have to reorient their careers, possibly into one of these two 

areas, as the command itself was evolving and changing. With this 

expansion, it was obvious, too, that AFSOC needed another base, 

especially one that was not as exposed to the vagaries of extreme 

weather such as the hurricanes which had so disrupted operations 

and life at Hurlburt over the last two years. 

Senior members on the AFSOC staff recalled that 11 years earlier, 

Maj Gen James Hobson had proposed a western AFSOC base as part 

of his “Commando Vision” plan. Now, another congressional base 

realignment committee was looking at bases to close. It had initially 

identified Cannon AFB in eastern New Mexico as a closure candidate. Cannon was spared, but its resident fighter wing was identified 

for inactivation, leaving Cannon available as possibly the elusive 

western AFSOC base. Throughout the year, AFSOC site survey teams 

traveled to Cannon and other West Coast bases to look for possible 
the terminal years │ 607

candidates. Their carefully considered recommendation was Cannon 

AFB. However, any decisions would not come before 2006.33

At the same time, changes were being programmed for the Pave 

Low fleet. USSOCOM program planning documents as early as 2000 

had indicated that the Pave Lows would be inactivated by 2012, and 

AFSOC plans reflected that eventuality. Consequently, some deep repair maintenance and supply contracts had been allowed to expire. 

This was already having an impact on the fleet. Plainly, the aircraft 

were wearing out; the gearbox failures were occurring more frequently. However, that supplier had been eliminated. Consequently, 

the AFSOC A-4 (logistics) developed a program with the US Navy to 

redesign the gearbox so that Navy parts could be used until a new 

supplier could be contracted. Additionally, USSOCOM, in its 2000 

program planning, had indicated that the 21st SOS at RAF Mildenhall, 

UK, would inactivate in 2007 and its mission would be assumed by 

US Army Special Operations Command MH-47s slated to be assigned to the theater.34

In conjunction with the planned drawdown, AFSOC considered 

requesting that the 551st SOS at Kirtland AFB be closed and the entire MH-53 training program be moved to Hurlburt by October 2006. 

This would include the transfer of the remaining seven MH-53Js, all 

training personnel, and a significant number of maintenance technicians. At Hurlburt, the 19th SOS would assume the training role. A 

site survey team conducted a study at Hurlburt and determined that 

a severe shortage of ramp and facility space would make any such 

move problematic and that any construction required to provide the 

needed facilities would take far too long. Accordingly, the initiative 

was tabled. However, as Colonel Cardoso had seen at USSOCOM, to 

anyone else who cared to ponder these developments, it was clear 

that Pave Low was in its terminal years.35

58th Special Operations Wing

On 4 February 2005, Lt Col Charles “Pat” Nussman, another career 

Pave Low pilot with over 3,300 hours in helicopters, assumed command of the 551st SOS. His assumption of command was a bit unexpected and unusual. Lt Col Lance Bodine had passed command of 

the unit to another officer three weeks earlier. However, that individual had allowed a breach of rules among his Airmen while over-
608 │ the terminal years

seas and was relieved of command of the 551st. Nussman took command of the unit under a bit of a cloud and had some personnel 

challenges to deal with. He also had some operational headaches. 

With the transfer of two aircraft to Hurlburt in 2004, throughout 

2005 the 551st struggled to meet its training goals. Since the 551st 

had only MH-53Js and the operational squadrons had mostly MH53Ms, the training squadron could not swap out its aircraft with other 

units so that they all wore out at the same rate. Consequently, its aircraft showed much higher maintenance abort and discrepancy rates 

than the other squadrons. Spare parts were still a problem, and for 

the year, the squadron qualified only nine pilots, 11 flight engineers, 

and 10 gunners. Another 134 Pave Low crew members passed 

through for simulator refresher training. 

Even though the CSAR units had been transferred to AFSOC, 

MH-53s could still be called out to do civil SARs if they were the best 

aircraft to handle the mission. Such was the case on 16 July 2005, 

when the 551st was asked to launch a Pave Low to rescue an injured 

climber near Pagosa Springs, Colorado, because of the high elevation. The mission was approved; however, severe thunderstorms in 

the Albuquerque area precluded launch until the next morning. The 

aircraft commander was Capt Mike Holder. His copilot was his fellow 

Afghanistan veteran, Capt Pat Fronk, both selected by Colonel Nussman 

because of their extensive high-altitude flying experiences in Afghanistan. In addition to their engineers and scanners, they had two PJs 

and a survival, evasion, resistance, and escape specialist on board. 

The crew launched and proceeded to Pagosa Springs to meet with the 

local sheriff and coordinate a recovery plan. They were then able to 

locate the climber and his party up at an elevation of 10,100 feet. The 

aircraft was too heavy to safely land at that elevation. Holder consulted with his flight engineers and determined that they could dump 

fuel to 2,000 pounds and accomplish the rescue. This would give 

them enough fuel to make it back safely to Pagosa Springs. Holder 

landed the aircraft, and the PJs recovered the climber. When he and 

all of the recovery team members were safely on board, Holder lifted 

off and proceeded to the airfield at Pagosa Springs. Arriving there, 

they transferred the patient to local medical control, refueled their 

aircraft, and flew back to Kirtland AFB, having logged a save for the 

58th SOW.36

Looking to the future, the Airmen of the 551st realized that the life 

of Pave Low was finite. The USSOCOM program plan was now com-
the terminal years │ 609

mon knowledge. It and supporting AFSOC plans called for a slow 

reduction of the 551st Pave Low fleet starting in 2006. This would 

begin to eliminate personnel positions across the board. Since the 

551st reduction would be part of a larger elimination of the entire 

Pave Low force, these individuals faced some amount of cross-training 

into new positions. The AFSOC RPV fleet seemed as if it might be a 

destination for some of the pilots. 

At the same time, the CV-22 fleet was growing. As it expanded, 

many new slots would be opening up, and many Pave Low troops—

from aircrew to specialist mechanics—would likely be switching over 

to the new aircraft. Colonel Cardoso at the 71st SOS was working 

hard to grab as many of them as he could. One of the pilots interested 

in switching over was the current 551st weapons and tactics officer, 

Capt Mike Holder. He put in a request for assignment and within a 

year was selected to be a member of the initial cadre of Pave Low pilots 

to convert to the CV-22 Osprey. 

At Kirtland AFB in 2005, another longtime Pave Low pilot received an additional opportunity to command a flying unit. Col Tom 

Trask took over the 58th SOW from Col Eric Fiel on 23 May 2005. It 

Courtesy 58th SOW History Office

MH-53J #68-10367 being filmed in its role as a Decepticon for the movie The 

Transformers in April 2006
610 │ the terminal years

would afford him the opportunity to once again qualify on the MH-53. 

He did not know at the time, though, that he would end up being a 

key participant in the steady inactivation of the Pave Low fleet.37

Colonel Trask could not have anticipated the very sad crisis that he 

would have to deal with on 12 February 2006. On that date, he was 

notified that the 551st SOS squadron commander, Colonel Nussman, 

had died in his sleep. The squadron operations officer, Lt Col Todd 

“Burt” Lancaster, was given command of the unit. He worked to rally 

the squadron and get it refocused on the mission because there were 

still Pave Low crew members to train, many of whom were going into 

combat in the not-too-distant future. After a moving memorial ceremony for Nussman, his body was cremated and his ashes were flown 

aboard a Pave Low and dispersed over the Gulf of Mexico.

Two months later, the squadron was able to assume a lighter duty 

when it was tasked to provide two Pave Lows to star in a movie. The 

aircraft, commanded by Capt Brian Reece and Maj Kevin Churchill, 

launched on 30 May and flew to Holloman. There they were filmed in 

several different settings and scenes for the movie The Transformers, 

where they replicated “Decepticons,” creatures that could portray 

themselves as Pave Low helicopters and then transform into hideous 

and overpowering “bad guys.” The filming lasted for several days, and 

Captain Reece was also filmed in several other settings. It was reminiscent of the filming of the movie Airport 1975, featuring an HH-53 

then assigned to the 551st’s predecessor, the 1551st FTS.38

Air Force Special Operations Command

As 2006 arrived at AFSOC, the rate of change steadily increased. 

In fact, sometimes it seemed that the only constant was change. On 

25 February, General Moseley decided to reverse the decision that 

Gen John Jumper had made three years earlier to move the CONUS 

CSAR force structure to AFSOC by ordering it moved back to ACC. 

Moseley directed ACC and AFSOC to expedite the move and have it 

done by 1 October. His action was not because of any dissatisfaction 

with AFSOC’s administration of the rescue force. He simply believed 

that CSAR was an inherently USAF mission and that ACC was best 

organized to properly administer and control it. He also felt that the 

USAF did a better job of advocating for the mission and its need for 
the terminal years │ 611

a new rescue helicopter than did USSOCOM. The ACC and AFSOC 

staffs immediately began drafting plans for the transfer.

Two days later, Maj Gen Donald Wurster replaced Maj Gen John 

Folkerts as the vice-commander of AFSOC. It fell to Wurster to fully 

explain the transfer, which he did in a subsequent speech, saying, 

The mission of rescue is closely tied to the combat air forces it supports. Rescue of an Airman from deep in enemy territory is inherently an air function. 

The [JFACC] owns the aircraft that was lost. He owns the aircraft that will 

support the search and rescue task force, and he owns the airpower that will 

enable our daring rescue crews to get to the area, find the survivor, and recover him or her to friendly control. Combat rescue is a deep air operation 

and a core task for our airpower responsibilities.39

This was essentially how General Moseley conducted his theater 

CSAR plan when he served in OIF as the CENTCOM JFACC. Wurster 

further explained that as AFSOC moved into the future, the command was divesting itself of its helicopter force. The MH-60s were 

gone, and the MH-53s had a pending end date. Beyond the fleet of 

C-130 variants, the command’s future was now tied to the CV-22 and 

increased utilization of RPVs and possibly other “specialty” fixedwing aircraft that were beginning to appear. The USAF rescue force 

belonged in ACC. He could also have added that in moving the consolidated CSAR force into ACC, the USAF was finally meeting its 

almost forgotten obligations laid out as Issue 16 of the controversial 

31 Initiatives signed between the USAF and US Army chiefs in 1984 

specifying that “the Air Force will remain the proponent for Air Force 

Search and Rescue . . . with Special Operations Forces . . . providing a 

back-up capability in special situations.”40

As the transfer of the rescue forces was taking place, the AFSOC 

staff was consolidating all of the site survey data concerning the possible AFSOC acquisition of Cannon AFB. All of the studies showed 

that the move was not only feasible but desirable. On 20 June 2006, 

the entire transfer plan was briefed to Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld. He approved it with a transfer date of 1 October 2007. The 

AFSOC staff began detailed planning for the move. The base was projected to receive AC- and MC-130s, possibly CV-22s, RPVs as they 

continued to develop, and various other unspecified “low signature” 

aircraft. It was done—AFSOC would finally get its western base. 

Conspicuously absent, though, was any mention of MH-53s.41

There was a very good reason why the Pave Lows were not in the 

Cannon plan—they were going away, sooner rather than later. In 
612 │ the terminal years

June 2006, the USSOCOM board of directors reviewed the current 

Pave Low structure and operational costs through the FY 2008–13 

POM. They decided to accelerate the inactivation of the remaining 31 

aircraft. All MH-53s would be decommissioned by the end of FY 

2008. This recommendation was forwarded to the USSOCOM commander, US Army general Doug Brown, for his approval. General 

Wooley then sent a memorandum to his staff directing them to program the inactivation of the remaining MH-53s at Kirtland by the 

end of March 2007, at the 21st SOS by the end of September 2007, 

and at the 20th SOS by the end of September 2008. He also notified 

them to begin terminating all vendor support contracts and initiate 

requisite personnel reassignments. He stated unequivocally that “aircraft sustainment concerns, coupled with operations and maintenance personnel issues, will make extending the MH-53 fleet past FY 

08 impractical.”42

There was another element to the Cannon AFB selection. Since the 

currently based 27th FW would be inactivating, General Wooley decided to transfer the 16th SOW flag there, hopefully allowing the 

Hurlburt wing to reclaim its designation as the 1st SOW. However, 

such a change was not a done deal. When General Hester was at AFSOC, 

he tried to generate some interest among the senior USAF leadership 

to reverse the decision General McPeak had made when he was the 

chief of staff to change the 1st SOW to the 16th SOW. As AFSOC was 

acquiring Cannon, Wooley seized the moment and was able to engage 

General Moseley on this issue and gain his concurrence. On 16 November 2006, the 16th SOW was officially redesignated the 1st SOW, 

and every subordinate unit went through the same process. Patch 

makers across the nation were inundated with orders for new patches.43

However, the 16th SOW flag did not transfer to Cannon AFB. Because of heritage regulations, since the 1st SOW was reestablished at 

Hurlburt Field, it reclaimed its original heritage and honors. This 

meant that the 16th SOW designation would have gone to Cannon 

with no recent heritage. The 27th FW, with its long and distinguished 

heritage, had been located at Cannon since 1959 and had existed 

since 1947. Additionally, the designation had strong local support. 

Therefore, General Wooley decided to retain the 27th Wing, now 

converted to a SOW.44 
the terminal years │ 613

58th Special Operations Wing

Notice of the acceleration of deactivating the Pave Lows came as a 

rude shock to the Pave Low troops at Kirtland AFB. Based upon the 

earlier guidance, the wing staff had already developed an overall plan 

for a slow phaseout of aircraft through the end of 2010. Now it was 

being told that all aircraft would be gone in nine months. Accordingly, all training plans for crew members and maintenance personnel had to terminate by the end of March 2007. The planners quickly 

adjusted all training schedules. An aircraft disposition plan was developed with the departure of the first two aircraft in December. One 

aircraft, MH-53 #66-14433, the original Black Knight flown through 

all of the initial testing at Wright-Patterson AFB and at Kirtland by 

Frank Pehr and Steve Connelly, would be retained at Kirtland as a 

static display. 

Colonel Lancaster went to work to find assignments for all of his 

Airmen and officers. However, he had to keep them focused on training; students were still going through the courses. All would be going 

to either the 20th or 21st SOSs and faced the real possibility that they 

would still see combat in the Pave Low. By the end of the year, the 

551st had fully qualified 15 pilots, five flight engineers, and 11 gunners 

and only had eight student pilots to finish up in 2007.45

21st Special Operations Squadron

On 10 February 2006, Lt Col Jim Slife passed command of the 

squadron to Lt Col Kirk Smith. For the last 44 months Slife had 

served as the operations officer and then commander with the two 

remaining operational Pave Low squadrons and had flown in Afghanistan, Djibouti, and Iraq. He would now serve a short tour 

working again with Col Brad Webb as his deputy commander of the 

352d SOG before departing in the summer to move to Washington, 

DC, to serve a one-year tour as a Secretary of Defense Fellow with 

Microsoft Corporation. 

Colonel Smith picked up the reigns and had his aircraft and crews 

on the road across the theater, training with other US and coalition 

special forces units. In June he dispatched two aircraft and crews to 

support President Bush’s visit to Hungary. The 21st continued to pro-
614 │ the terminal years

vide three Pave Low crews and several support personnel at Balad 

with the 20th.46

In July the 352d SOG received a real-world mission from SOCEUR. When Israel initiated combat operations against Hezbollah 

forces in Lebanon, the US ambassador to that country, the Honorable Jeffrey Feltman, requested military support to evacuate American citizens who wanted to leave, estimated to be about 5,000 of the 

approximately 80,000 Americans believed to be in the country. Similar to the evacuation conducted from Lebanon in 1976, the US military was directed to assist, with USMC forces afloat in the eastern 

Mediterranean the first forces to respond. The 352d SOG was ordered to augment the effort, and on 16 July, an initial element of air 

commandos flew into the RAF base at Akrotiri, Cyprus, the same 

base that supported the evacuation operation in 1976 and that the 

352d had used to launch into northern Iraq in 2003. Capt Derrick 

Stamos, now a fully qualified Pave Low aircraft commander, was dispatched as the Pave Low liaison officer. He quickly made arrangements for the arrival of helicopter crews and support personnel. Two 

days later, three MH-53s, two MC-130s, and the support team arrived at the base and became part of CTF-59, which included a US 

Army helicopter detachment, a USMC detachment, several US Navy 

ships, and coalition forces of various types. A fourth MH-53 joined 

the group a week later. Because of the large number of potential 

evacuees, several contract ships were dispatched to the Port of Beirut and began bringing out the larger portion of evacuees. Additionally, an air bridge was established between the American Embassy in 

Beirut and Akrotiri. 

For the next 78 days, the Pave Lows joined with US Army and 

USMC helicopters and a detachment of British CH-47s to extract 

evacuees from that war-torn country. The 21st SOS flew 100 percent 

of its requested sorties, hauling 117,000 pounds of cargo and supplies to the embassy and carrying out 520 Americans and 413 foreigners. The air bridge was terminated on 30 September, and US and 

British troops at Akrotiri staged a large party to celebrate their success. The elements from the 352d SOG remained at Akrotiri for two 

more weeks while the situation in Lebanon stabilized. Captain Stamos notes of the deployment, “We did some really good work there. 

We worked with ships [and] Marine Corps aircraft . . . , we flew the 

secretary of state in, [and] some of our birds went to Israel to bring 

the State Department folks to negotiate a cease-fire.”47
the terminal years │ 615

The various parts of the 352d SOG returned to Mildenhall. A few 

weeks later, Colonel Webb held a commander’s call for his troops to 

thank them for their great effort and also explain to them all of the 

things that were now happening in AFSOC, especially the now pending inactivation of the Pave Lows and 21st SOS. Colonel Smith was 

already seeing the impact of the pending changes. His personnel were 

beginning to get orders to CV-22 conversion, the 20th SOS, or other 

aircraft. He had to keep the squadron functioning as long as possible 

while still meeting its commitments to the detachment at Balad and 

dealing with an ever-dwindling number of Airmen and officers. To 

the last days though, the squadron was still the on-call, heavy-lift helicopter force for SOCEUR and EUCOM until replaced by the US 

Army MH-47s. It is interesting to note, too, that the unit’s last significant tasking prior to inactivation had been an evacuation, somewhat 

analogous to the mission to evacuate the crew of the SS Mayaguez, 

which had been the last major event for the 21st SOS at NKP, Thailand, prior to its inactivation there in September 1975.48

20th Special Operations Squadron/

Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron

During 2006 the 20th SOS maintained a continuous presence at 

Balad, Iraq, as part of OIF. Generally, one-third of the unit was there. 

They were now deep into counterinsurgency operations, and the pace 

was steady throughout the year as they provided direct support to the 

“shooters.” They continued to work with every special forces component in the country, both US and coalition. In February Colonel 

Howell was notified that Lt Col Vince Becklund was going to be deployed over to serve as the J3 with the CJSOAC at Balad. Howell 

appealed the selection, pointing out that Becklund was still new to 

the 20th SOS and was just flat needed in the unit as it covered the 

Balad deployment and now the approaching ORI. His appeal was not 

honored, and in April Colonel Becklund reported to Balad as ordered 

to work with the CJSOAC, commanded by Col Norm Brozenick, the 

1st SOW commander. The CJSOAC had operational control of numerous 

assets from both the 1st SOW and other service components, including the 160th SOAR. As the J3, Becklund directed joint and combined operations on a nightly basis. His forces worked at the highest 

operational tempo of the war to date, running direct action missions 
616 │ the terminal years

against insurgent forces that were trying to inflame a Shia-Sunni civil 

war. As part of that effort, the 20th ESOS—commanded by USMC 

major Buzz Morris—made a significant contribution, flying 558 direct 

action sorties and logging 2,891 combat hours during the year. The 

squadron hauled over 325,000 pounds of supplies and equipment to 

isolated units and returned with 304 captured insurgents and 70 

seized weapons. For eight months, the unit also maintained aircraft 

and crews on alert to provide specific CSAR and casualty evacuation 

support for a special operations task force operating in western Iraq. 

In June the 20th ESOS at Balad was directed to fly to the Baghdad 

Airport to provide support for President Bush and his entourage’s 

visit to Iraq. Four Pave Lows, as part of a group of 12 helicopters, 

picked up the visiting group members as they arrived on Air Force 

One and flew them into the Green Zone in the middle of Baghdad for 

meetings with key US military and Iraqi governmental leaders. When 

they were complete, the helicopters safely returned them to the airport. Both movements took place in daytime.49

While the Pave Low crews were supporting the president, their 

squadron mates back at Hurlburt were also busy preparing for the 

ORI. This was a real dilemma for Colonel Howell, who was at Hurlburt at the time. He fully understood how important such inspections were. However, he would not interfere with the squadron crew 

rotation schedule to stack the deck for the inspection at the risk of 

possibly weakening his operations at Balad. Consequently, the squadron 

flew with the personnel who were available on the flight rotation 

schedule. He trusted his flight commanders and NCOs, crews, and 

support personnel to do what was needed. His overall approach was 

simple: he focused on personal responsibility as the linchpin of their 

operations, admonishing his troops to “be ready” in every sense of 

the word to do those things that the nation was relying upon the 20th 

SOS and its Airmen to do, especially meeting assigned times on target, 

so critical for precision special forces operations. To his commanders 

and senior NCOs, he was also forthright, admonishing them to “take 

care of our Airmen. Develop our Airmen. We’re all developing leaders—

it’s the most important thing we can do, and we have to have that next 

generation to follow us. Make sure we are picking the right guys, 

mentoring them, developing them.” Similar to the experiences of 

Colonels Webb and Slife, Howell also had some malingerers. With 

them, he was just as direct, saying,
the terminal years │ 617

There were people in the squadron, some who had lingering injuries. I said, “I 

can’t have you in the squadron. This squadron is a deploying squadron. We are 

in the fight all the time. When you are sitting here with a hurt back or whatever your issue may be, the other guys notice that because they are rucking up, 

and they keep going. It’s not that I don’t love you, but I can’t have you in the 

squadron if you’re not deploying for me.” So I made a conscious effort to peel 

off some of these guys and find other jobs for them so they are not there in the 

middle of these guys who were fighting. . . . The message was getting through.50

During the ORI operations phase, four Pave Lows were deployed 

up to McChord AFB, Washington. There they flew numerous missions with US Army Rangers and were evaluated in multiple mission 

events. Right in the middle of the inspection, Howell received the 

notification of the USSOCOM decision to inactivate the Pave Lows. 

He quickly briefed his troops as best he could and told them to worry 

about it later. Then they returned to Hurlburt and participated in the 

drills designed to test their ability to survive and operate under wartime conditions and conventional, chemical, and biological threats. 

The 20th SOS as well as the 16th SOW received “excellent” ratings.51

Colonel Howell was extremely proud of his troops. He used one of 

his young pilots, Capt Matt Doberman, as an example of the caliber 

of troops he had in the 20th. When Doberman arrived at the squadron, 

he made it clear that he wanted to go over to Iraq to be in the action. 

A few weeks later, though, Howell found out that Doberman’s wife 

was pregnant. Howell’s policy was to have fathers home when their 

children were born, if at all possible. He told Doberman, who saw this 

as some form of personal failure. Howell assigned him to a flight that 

was training up for a deployment after the birth. A week prior to that 

deployment, Doberman suffered a burst appendix but fully intended 

to tough it out and deploy. However, when told of Doberman’s condition, his flight commander took him off of the deployment. Howell 

was tremendously impressed with Doberman’s determination and 

sense of mission and felt that it was indicative of the Pave Low spirit, 

or as he said, “It was a great tribute to the whole red scarf community.”52

Howell deployed back over to Balad in August for another 90-day 

rotation as the JSOAD commander. His crews began working steadily 

with Iraqi special forces elements to give them the training that they 

needed to be able to take over the fight. While there, the 1st Ops 

Group commander, Col Mark Alsid, now serving at Balad as the 

CJSOAC commander, called Howell and notified him that he had 

been selected for promotion to colonel. He also told Howell that he 
618 │ the terminal years

wanted him to pass command of the 20th to Colonel Becklund to 

give him a full tour as the commander before the squadron’s inactivation. The change of command was set for January 2007. Howell flew 

his share of missions and decided to have a final flight. He was assigned a direct action mission and selected Captain Doberman as his 

copilot. Doberman flew the assault approach to a confined compound. It was a dust-out approach, but Doberman handled it perfectly, and the mission was totally successful. Howell came home in 

December and prepared to hand over the squadron to his operations 

officer, Colonel Becklund.

Howell took some family leave over the holidays and was home in 

Kentucky. On 29 December, Lt Col Joe DeCaro, the deployed commander, called Howell to tell him that one of his gunners had been 

accidentally shot in the right eye. SSgt Eric Ezell, serving on his fifth 

combat tour, was injured when an Iraqi interpreter improperly 

charged his rifle as Ezell’s Pave Low approached a landing zone for a 

troop insertion. Becklund was flying a local night sortie and was recalled to begin working the myriad details. Howell called him to get 

all of the information that he could about the incident and then called 

Ezell’s parents and informed them of the accident. 

Fortunately for Ezell, combat medics were on the helicopter during 

the mishap, and they were able to start treatment immediately as the 

pilots aborted the mission and headed for Baghdad. There the physicians directed that he be flown to the big hospital at Balad; doctors were 

able to stabilize him and determine that while he had lost his right eye, 

there was no further serious damage to his brain or head. 

Ezell was then medevaced to Landstuhl, Germany, and on to the 

Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, DC. Colonel 

Howell and his squadron superintendent, CMSgt John DeSalle, traveled 

up to see him and insure that he was getting the care and handling 

that he needed and deserved. They stayed with him for a week and 

then had another squadron NCO come up to remain with him until 

he could return to Hurlburt. A week later, Howell gave up command 

of the 20th SOS to Lt Col Vince Becklund. 

Becklund inherited a full plate of issues that required his immediate 

attention. However, he spared no effort to work with Ezell to insure 

that he could stay in the USAF, remembering of the young Airman, 

“There’s a success story. Here’s a guy who is still in the Air Force, 

still contributing, without an eye. . . . We take care of guys like that. 

I think many other places would have said, ‘We’re sorry it happened 
the terminal years │ 619

to you. You’re out.’ . . . We did everything we could to keep him in 

the Air Force.”53

Surge in Iraq

As Becklund was settling into his command, dramatic changes 

were talking place in OIF. In 2005 the Iraqi government conducted a 

series of open and fair elections. Throughout 2006, as Iraq’s newly 

elected leaders struggled to implement their new government, alQaeda terrorists and Sunni insurgents unleashed a reign of terror 

that threatened the very stability of the government and nation. After 

meeting with his military leaders and members of Congress, President Bush decided to increase US military forces in that country by 

utilizing a surge strategy. On 10 January 2007, he announced that he 

was ordering an additional 20,000 troops—primarily conventional 

US Army forces—to deploy to Iraq. Forces already there would be 

extended by as much as six months. The CJSOTF-AP would also be 

reinforced. However, with the drawdown of the Pave Low fleet, no 

more aircraft could be deployed. As much as they could be tasked, the 

aircraft and crews of the 20th ESOS would be involved in the operations. The additional conventional troops would help stabilize and 

secure the Iraqi population, but it was the combined special forces 

elements that nightly went out and dealt with the hard-core al-Qaeda 

and insurgent forces.54

Maj Mark Daley witnessed the beginning of that surge effort. He 

deployed over to Balad in March 2007 to serve as the commander of 

the 20th ESOS for a 60-day period. While he was there, his young 

crews flew almost 400 hours, mounted 46 direct action missions, and 

captured 106 enemy combatants. Daley personally led his last sortie, 

an 11-aircraft joint and combined assault mission. For over seven 

hours, the strike force attacked four targets, coordinating its efforts 

with orbiting RPVs, F-16s, and AC-130 gunships. Daley had the 

ground force commander aboard his aircraft, which provided excellent coordination between the ground and air elements as the force 

brought back 27 detainees. Returning home to Hurlburt a few days 

later, Daley remembered this as his “most favorite” Pave Low mission.55
620 │ the terminal years

Air Force Special Operations Command

As the surge commenced, the logistics directorate of AFSOC was 

building a firm schedule for the inactivation of the Pave Low aircraft 

and transfer of all of their type-specific support equipment based 

upon the termination of Pave Low flying in September 2008. However, the 20th ESOS was still utilizing the aircraft very effectively in 

Iraq. Consequently, the aircraft were still getting upgrades, such as 

improvements to the ALE-40 chaff/flare dispenser system, strengthening of the flight engineer’s seat, and the new altitude hold and hover 

stabilization (AHHS) system, specifically designed to deal with the 

brownout problem. Some of the 20th crews tested the system at Hurlburt and found it to work well. 

The projected schedule called for all aircraft at Kirtland AFB and 

all except one at RAF Mildenhall to be inactivated in 2007. One aircraft from the 21st would be sent to Hurlburt for continued use. This 

would leave 13 aircraft still in commission for combat operations into 

2008. Additionally, several aircraft were being programmed for permanent static display. Projected plans called for Pave Lows at Kirtland 

AFB; Hurlburt Field; the Air Force Armament Museum, Eglin AFB; 

Hill AFB; the Air Force Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB; Robins 

AFB; the Pima Air Museum, Tucson, Arizona; RAF Cosford, England; and possibly Maxwell AFB. However, the details for all of that 

would be worked out over time. The more important item to stay focused 

on was the continued combat operations of the 20th SOS in Iraq.56

58th Special Operations Wing/

551st Special Operations Squadron Inactivation

As per the drawdown plan, activities at the Pave Low schoolhouse 

steadily waned. On 4 January, Col Tom Trask and Col John Maubach, 

the 58th SOG deputy commander, piloted MH-53J #66-4428, the 

first H-53 procured by the USAF 41 years earlier, on its last flight 

from Kirtland AFB down to the AMARC near Tucson. This mission 

was also Colonel Trask’s official “fini flight” as a USAF pilot because 

he relinquished command of the 58th SOW to Col Eugene Haase 

four weeks later and moved to Maxwell AFB to serve as the commandant of the Squadron Officer’s College and receive a promotion to 

brigadier general.
the terminal years │ 621

The 551st continued to train aircrew members until 31 March, by 

which time the last 11 pilots, 14 flight engineers, and four aerial gunners had been aircraft qualified and sent on to the 20th and 21st SOSs. 

The last listed qualified pilot was 1st Lt William Thompson—Pave 

Low pilot number 453. He was also very lucky because he was then 

held over at Kirtland and put into the CV-22 qualification course. The 

squadron cadre slowly began transferring out, with several pilot and 

flight engineer instructors going to the 71st SOS for CV-22 conversion, the gunners to HH-60s, others to nonflying jobs, and many into 

retirement. A small group of squadron personnel remained in place 

to accomplish the myriad details that were necessary to inactivate a 

training squadron, disperse its property and equipment, and attend 

to the endless administrative details that it all entailed. 

On 27 April, the official inactivation ceremony took place, and Lt 

Col Todd Lancaster returned the squadron colors to 58th SOG commander Col Leonard Smales. In addressing the crowd, Smales stated 

the obvious by saying, “For those of us who have flown the -53, it’s a 

sad day. . . . The guys who have flown the -53s will keep on the same 

Courtesy 377th ABW Public Affairs

The last Pave Low from the 551st SOS was flown to Davis-Monthan AFB, 

Arizona, for storage by TSgt Steve Gelling, Lt Col Todd Lancaster, and MSgt 

Mark Mapel.
622 │ the terminal years

traditions, which . . . will carry far into the future.”57 Another unit 

pilot, Lt Col Brett Hauenstein, said of the Pave Low,

The men made the machine what it is. The thing that is saddest for me is just 

the community of people that have been around and now are scattering off to 

do other things. Our community is really tight-knit. Those who’ve never 

flown the Pave might never understand. You have to wear the red scarf, its 

edges jauntily peeking out above the collar of the flight suit. Maybe you even 

have to sing Bon Jovi. But, mostly, you have to be part of a team that knows 

what happened to one happens to all.58

Six weeks later, MH-53J #66-14433 was enshrined in the 58th 

SOW’s airpark near the Truman Gate. The venerable Black Knight, 

possessor of over 13,000 flying hours and veteran of combat in two 

wars, had found its last resting place, fittingly, at the very base where 

it had brought Pave Low to technological fruition. It had honorably 

trained uncounted Airmen to exploit its capabilities as only air commandos could and had well earned its final place of peace.59

21st Special Operations Squadron Inactivation

Facing the inevitable, Lt Col Kirk Smith resolved to keep his 

squadron as engaged as possible while steadily losing its personnel. 

As long as he could, he maintained his augmenting crews and support troops at Balad, Iraq, so that he could not only help the 20th with 

the continuing requirement there but also get the maximum number 

of his troops some combat experience. The squadron also deployed 

aircraft and crews on a final round of exercises to Norway, Albania, 

and Romania to participate with US and allied special forces units as 

long as flying hours were still available. On 29 June, Col Brad Webb 

relinquished command of the 352d SOG to Col Brian Cutts and departed for Hurlburt Field to take command of the 1st SOW and oversee the final inactivation of the Pave Lows.

The 21st SOS stopped its augmentation to Balad in June but flew 

operational sorties at home through August, averaging 23 local and 

13 deployed sorties per month. In September the unit logged only 13, 

with five of those flown in one last formation over the coasts and 

fields of England on 13 September. On 9 October, Lt Col Kirk Smith 

presented the squadron guidon to Colonel Cutts for encasing, and 

the 21st SOS stood down. After the 21st closed, Colonel Smith went 
the terminal years │ 623

to AFSOC/A1 and worked to move Pave Low personnel throughout 

AFSOC. His purpose was straightforward, as he later explained,

I considered it my responsibility to take that core competence of SOF culture 

and airmanship and push that out to other aspects of SOF, whether it’s CV-22 

or the blue airplanes that we are now flying at Cannon AFB. I had . . . gunners 

go back to the gunships [and] flight engineers go to CV-22s or the 6th SOS. 

The key was to take that core culture that we had. . . . Every community has its 

own culture, but the core air commando culture is what I wanted to send back 

out. . . . [I wanted to] populate the rest of AFSOC, as much as we could, with 

our small numbers from the 21st.60

Courtesy Col Paul Harmon, USAF, Retired

The Pave Lows of the 21st SOS in formation along the cliffs of Dover

20th Special Operations Squadron/

Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron

Under the able leadership of Colonel Becklund, the 20th still 

maintained one-third of the unit on steady combat operations with 

the 20th ESOS at Balad, even as the unit was now beginning to lose 

aircraft and personnel in the fleet inactivation. Capt Derrick Stamos 

had transferred from the 21st to the 20th SOS in October 2006 and, 

within a month, was deployed to Balad on a 90-day tour as part of the 

steady crew rotation plan. He would ultimately complete six tours, 
624 │ the terminal years

remembering that going back over was like the movie Groundhog 

Day, where the main character was trapped in a time warp in which 

every day dawned as Groundhog Day, with the same set of situational experiences. However, in Iraq it was not benign daily events 

but “a mixture of direct action assaults and logistic runs” in support 

of US and allied special and conventional forces that framed the 

repetitive experiences.61

At the same time, the unit was also receiving the last crew members trained by the 551st. During the spring of 2007, the squadron 

received 18 pilots and flight engineers who needed mission readiness 

training. Colonel DeCaro was serving as an assistant DO and oversaw the training program. He worked with his instructors to provide 

the new crew members the mission readiness training they needed to 

deploy to Iraq, somewhat simpler now because all overwater training 

had been terminated. Additionally, the unit also needed to maintain 

the overall squadron upgrade program so that as the fleet of aircraft 

was drawn down, the 20th would still have the necessary first pilots, 

mission pilots, and instructors that it needed to carry out its last missions. One of his IPs was Capt Brian Roberts. Roberts had graduated 

from the Air Force Academy in 1998 and, like so many before him, 

went to Fort Rucker for his helicopter training and then did a tour in 

UH-1Ns before checking out in the Pave Low and reporting to the 

20th SOS in January 2005. He subsequently served a series of threeto four-month tours at Balad, where he flew a variety of direct action 

missions and more mundane logistics missions in support of the US 

and allied special forces elements. He also steadily upgraded each 

time he came home—first to pilot, then to mission pilot and IP—a 

path facilitated and necessitated by the progressive departure of older, 

highly experienced pilots to CV-22s and other assignments.62

One of those last pilots from the 551st was 1st Lt Mark Hamilton. 

He had been commissioned in 2004 after graduating from the Virginia Military Institute. He attended pilot training at Vance AFB and 

selected the helicopter training track at Fort Rucker. Receiving his 

wings in February 2006, he proceeded to Kirtland for the Pave Low 

course. His experiences there were similar to the several generations 

of students that had preceded him. Arriving at the 20th in March 

2007, he went directly through his mission readiness training in 

preparation for deployment to Iraq. Most flying was done with the 

squadron instructors and focused on specific tactical requirements 

such as mountain flying and AHHS qualification. However, his MH-53M 
the terminal years │ 625

conversion training was done mostly in the flight simulator with 

civilian instructors. He also received qualification training to conduct functional check flights. At Hurlburt the retired crews that 

worked for ARINC conducted these. However, since the ARINC contractors were not allowed to deploy to active theaters, the squadron 

needed a cadre of pilots and engineers to perform FCFs at deployed 

locations. To receive this training, Hamilton was able to fly with Tom 

Aldrich, Corby Martin, and Rick Simmon. These Pave Low veterans 

certainly qualified the young lieutenant to accomplish the FCFs. 

However, they were also training him on another level. Hamilton recalls of his encounter with these senior Pave Low Airmen, “I was a 

pretty green lieutenant, flying with some guys with serious Pave Low 

history to their names . . . flying with guys who . . . were some of the 

original authors of Pave Low. They were teaching me in a very quiet, 

experienced way. . . . [They] taught me a ton . . . from the second we 

briefed to the time we landed.”63

Courtesy Rick Simmon

The ARINC Pave Low support team. Left to right: Frank Gray, Rick Dolby, 

Chris Prokosch (on aircraft), Darrel Carter, Joe Barnes, Jim Walters, Tom Aldrich, 

Rick Simmon, and Bill Smith.

In June Lt Col Gene Becker arrived from an assignment at USSOCOM 

to serve as the 20th SOS operations officer. Fortuitously, he was a 
626 │ the terminal years

highly experienced Pave Low pilot and able to requalify with the 20th 

SOS since there was now no other option. Becklund certainly needed 

him. CONUS exercise requirements were being curtailed as were collateral training requirements such as deck landing and night overwater 

qualifications, and the entire squadron training plan was in a high 

state of flux. Becklund was becoming concerned at the rate at which 

he was losing his more experienced pilots and engineers, the guys 

who had logged long years in Pave Low and had been to Desert 

Storm, Bosnia, and endless exercises with national assets across the 

United States. They were being replaced with new troops—determined 

and enthusiastic but inexperienced, nonetheless—such as Lieutenant 

Hamilton, who deployed to Iraq on his first tour in February 2008. 

There he was placed with an experienced crew that collectively introduced him to combat flying.64

However, Becklund was developing a solid cadre of younger officers 

and Airmen who had now logged a great deal of time operating in 

Iraq. Becklund explained of his crews, “All they knew was deploying 

back and forth, living in tents . . . and doing those direct action missions night after night. . . . Those guys’ lives involved deploying forward for their 90-day rotation, coming home, taking leave, going 

right back into a train-up cycle 90 days before deployment, and then 

deploying again.” Regardless of the changes now overtaking the 20th, 

the combat flying and conditions were no less dangerous, and Becklund 

had to make sure that the crews he was sending over were ready for 

combat and then closely monitor them, remembering the sage words 

of former USSOCOM commander Gen Peter Schoomaker, who always admonished his subordinate commanders to “never confuse 

enthusiasm for capability.” More than once, Becklund had to tell his 

aircraft commanders, “I am not crazy about that. Let’s change it this 

way.”65 He began requiring the crews to brief risk assessment specifically as part of every mission preparation and kept them focused almost exclusively on direct action missions. 

Throughout 2007 the crews of the 20th flew 1,172 classified combat 

missions into insurgent-controlled locations and carried out 339 insurgent prisoners. On these and other support sorties, they carried 

216,600 pounds of cargo and supplies to coalition troops. Additionally, 

they participated in uncounted missions to train thousands of Iraqi 

soldiers and special forces personnel to assume more and more of the 

fighting. And they were doing all of this with helicopters with an 

average age of 38.5 years.
the terminal years │ 627

With the cessation of 21st SOS augmentation in June, though, 

Becklund needed to change the way the 20th deployed crews to the 

20th ESOS Balad. Until now, he had been rotating flights with four 

crews each on a 90-day cycle. Now he needed to supply six aircraft 

and crews. As the unit continued to lose aircraft and personnel at 

home, it was becoming increasing difficult to provide for deployment 

training for six crews at a time. Consequently, Becklund began to 

stagger his crews, swapping two crews every month on 90-day rotations so that he could maintain a range of experienced crews in-theater 

at any time. The flights and Airmen just had to adjust, and they did. 

Some Airmen ended up with shorter tours, some with longer tours; 

they could handle it. However, the rotations required constant management because the personnel situation was continually changing: 

training backing up because of maintenance or weather problems or 

crew members becoming sick, having family emergencies, and so 

forth. On one occasion, Becklund had to take a crew out of the 

rotation cycle because he just did not feel that it was ready to go. 

That was his job. 

Colonel Becklund also started receiving levies from the USAF Personnel Center to dispatch his more senior NCOs to Iraq for 365-day 

tours as advisors to the Iraqi air force. That was a difficult challenge 

and heavily taxed the 20th SOS because they were exactly the same 

men whom he needed to work with his young Airmen and pilots.66

Several crews flew notable missions in Iraq. In May Maj Kevin 

Kozuch and his crew were leading a two-ship of Pave Lows to insert 

a special forces team into a landing zone to conduct a quick search for 

some missing Soldiers when both aircraft came under heavy and 

well-aimed enemy fire from several machine guns hidden in trucks. 

The gunners on both aircraft engaged the enemy while Kozuch’s copilot contacted an orbiting AC-130 for supporting fire. Enemy fire 

damaged both Pave Lows, but the crews were then able to extract the 

special forces team that had collected critical information on the location of the missing Soldiers. 

In August Maj Sean Hoyer commanded the lead aircraft in a fiveship formation of MH-53s and MH-60s on a direct action mission. 

During the infiltration, one of the MH-60s hit some wires with its tail 

rotor and crash-landed. Hoyer immediately shifted to a rescue operation and became the on-scene commander. He called in an orbiting 

AC-130 for top cover to hold back advancing enemy Soldiers and 

directed one of the other MH-53s to land and recover the crew and 
628 │ the terminal years

passengers of the MH-60. When all were safely retrieved, he extracted 

the remaining friendly forces and flew them to a medical facility for 

treatment. From a historical perspective, these were exactly the same 

kinds of missions that the 20th and 21st SOSs flew 35–40 years 

prior—and in some of the very same aircraft. 

During this period, Capt Jonathan Graham was nominated for 

the Jabara Award for his sustained superior performance on his six 

combat tours as a Pave Low pilot. His nomination cited his constant 

selection to lead high-risk missions and his leadership of 23 joint 

and combined SOF air assault missions. While deployed, he developed detailed training programs for the increasingly inexperienced 

crews so that they could more quickly and thoroughly become combat ready and effective. He was selected for and received the award 

in 2008.67

At home the 20th remained busy as it slowly prepared for inactivation. The training load steadily decreased as the last Airmen trained 

at Kirtland arrived at the squadron, worked through their qualification on the MH-53M, and then prepared for combat. During the 

year, 68 percent of all squadron personnel deployed overseas, most to 

Iraq. The average length of deployment was 94 days, with over half of 

the squadron deploying for more than 180 days. During the year, too, 

20th crews continued to test and perfect the AHHS system on the 

Pave Low. This was a task ready-made for the squadron’s younger pilots, 

who had been raised on Xbox and Internet gaming technology and 

readily provided the critical human interface necessary for this system 

to work. The techniques they developed were then taught to all crews 

and exported to Balad. In the same vein, the squadron crews did 

some testing in conjunction with the 18th FLTS of a new landing system 

called the photographic landing augmentation system for helicopters 

(PhLASH). This was another attempt to deal with the dust-out problem. The system used an infrared camera to take a series of pictures 

of a landing zone just prior to the initiation of the brownout conditions. A computer would then combine those images with GPS navigational information, allowing the pilot to “fly the image” regardless 

of the dust. The system, developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory, showed great promise—if not so much for the retiring Pave 

Lows, then certainly for other helicopters or follow-on systems. 

The 20th SOS was a dynamic place in a somewhat chaotic way. At 

one point, the 1st SOW Wing vice-commander, Col Tim Leahy, asked 

Becklund how it was going. His response was stoic: “Sir, it’s like push-
the terminal years │ 629

ing a bus uphill, and every day the wheels fall off, and every day we 

put the wheels back on, and we keep pushing the bus uphill. [But] it’s 

kind of hard . . . because you guys are asking me to dismantle something I love.”68

The 20th SOS suffered another aircraft loss when MH-53M #69-

5794 crashed on a night sortie on the ranges at Eglin AFB on 7 September 2007. Colonel Becklund was commanding the 20th ESOS at 

Balad at the time and working with the current CJSOAC commander, 

Col Greg Lengyel, when Becklund got the call from Colonel Becker 

that he and his crew of seven were practicing NVG insertions and 

extractions when the tail gunner sensed increasing vibrations during 

a landing approach and called for a “go-around.” Becker took over 

from the copilot and initiated a right turn back to the landing zone 

for an immediate emergency landing. As he lined up for the approach, though, the aircraft went out of control and crashed. Fortunately, only two Airmen, A1C Bradley Jordan, a gunner, and Col William 

Nelson, a flight surgeon, were wounded seriously enough to require 

hospital care. Inspection determined that an intermediate gearbox in 

the tail pylon had failed, causing the vibrations and loss of control. 

The aircraft, a veteran of the Mayaguez rescue, where it was hit by 35 

rounds of enemy fire, and of four combat rotations in Afghanistan/

Iraq, was not recoverable. Now only 30 Pave Lows awaited retirement. Colonel Becklund could do little about the crash from Balad 

and relied on Becker to do all that needed to be done at Hurlburt to 

take care of those injured and the ensuing accident investigation. For 

his outstanding actions in handling the crash, Lt Col Gene Becker 

was nominated for the Koren Kolligian Jr. Trophy for 2007.69

A few days later, Colonel Lengyel stopped by Colonel Becklund’s 

office at Balad to share the news that Becklund had been selected to 

attend the National War College in August 2008. While he was aware 

that this was a great opportunity, Becklund also knew this meant 

that he would not be the last commander of a Pave Low squadron. 

The 1st SOG commander, Col Dennis Pennell, informed Becklund 

that he would pass command of the squadron to Lt Col Gene Becker 

in June 2008.70
630 │ the terminal years

Air Force Special Operations Command

Within the Air Force Special Operations Command, Pave Low 

veterans steadily matriculated up through the ranks. On 1 October, 

AFSOC officially took control of Cannon AFB, and Col Tim Leahy 

assumed command of the 27th SOW. Since Leahy was a career Pave 

Low pilot, Pave Low officers now commanded both AFSOC wings. 

On 28 November 2007, newly promoted Lt Gen Donald Wurster assumed command of the AFSOC from General Wooley. This was another crowning event for the Pave Low community because Wurster 

was the first Pave Low pilot to be promoted to lieutenant general and 

also the first to command AFSOC. 

Taking command, Wurster was swamped with a myriad of issues 

as AFSOC consolidated its finally achieved western base and worked 

through the strain of constant combat operations, aircraft acquisitions, and almost endless modifications. However, in one interview, 

he was able to share some thoughts about one particular group of air 

commandos that he especially admired. He said,

Of all the people we have in our business today, most of us in AFSOC remain 

astounded at the skill and determination of the maintenance people who continue to spin gold from straw on the flight line and in the back shops to get 

these flying machines airborne every night. . . . The maintainers, who watch 

those big ugly birds go out and then greet them when they come back—those 

are the heroes of AFSOC. . . . Without those committed professionals, our 

command could not do what needs to be done.71

Anybody associated with Pave Low in any way would certainly second that accolade. 

The general also had a soft spot in his heart for the venerable Pave 

Lows, and when asked to speak at the dedication ceremony for one of 

the aircraft at the Hurlburt Field Memorial Air Park, he could not 

refuse. The aircraft being dedicated was MH-53M #68-10928. This 

aircraft had started out as a CH-53C and had flown air commando 

operations in SEA with the 21st SOS at NKP, Thailand, and was in the 

Mayaguez rescue operation. After a long and distinguished operational history, its last flight in combat was with the 20th ESOS out of 

Balad, Iraq, on 29 July 2007 under the command of Maj Frank Cooper. 

Now it was cleaned up and ready to be enshrined in the airpark, right 

next to the main gate to Hurlburt Field, so that anybody entering the 

base would see it standing guard proudly. There is no full record of 

what General Wurster said to the crowd that day. However, he did 
the terminal years │ 631

point out that “this remarkable piece of equipment” belonged to two 

groups in the Pave Low community, “the crews who love and fear it 

and the crew chiefs who love and hate [it].” He was speaking to a 

sympathetic audience that day, many of its members wearing flight 

suits and red scarves. As 2007 ended, it was clear to all that over the 

next year, several more ceremonies like this would take place.72

Fini Pave Low

As 2008 began, the Pave Low fleet was in its twilight days. The 20th 

ESOS still operated at Balad, although meeting the tasking was progressively more difficult as personnel continued to leave the squadron. Colonel Becklund had to monitor his crews continually. In fact, 

both Col Brad Webb and Col Greg Lengyel served tours at Balad as 

the JSOAC commander and had begun to pull the Pave Lows back 

from the more demanding missions—a matter of risk assessment and 

operational necessity. As the calendar wound down, though, the rest 

of the year was just a series of “lasts.” 

One of the last 20th SOS pilots to deploy over to Balad was 1st Lt 

Dan Florence. A year earlier, he was the next-to-last pilot to complete 

the qualification course at the 551st SOS with 1st Lt Dave Hamilton 

and 1st Lt Bill Thompson. He had proceeded to Hurlburt but encountered numerous delays in his follow-on training. In May 2007, he went 

TDY to the 21st SOS and was able to fly several sorties with that unit in 

Europe before they stopped operations. Returning to Hurlburt, he received orders to Balad. However, he was not fully mission qualified and 

instead served a 45-day tour in one of the command centers there. Returning to Hurlburt in the fall, he was able to complete his aircraft mission qualification and, after volunteering several times to deploy, was 

finally dispatched in June 2008 to serve with the unit until it returned 

home. There he was assigned to a crew with Maj Brian Roberts, MSgt 

Mark Pryor, and TSgt Corey Fossbender. Initially, almost overwhelmed 

by all that was involved with combat flying, he learned quickly from 

this well-experienced crew and was soon flying his share of logistics 

sorties and direct action missions in which his crew assisted in the capture of al-Qaeda personnel and terrorists. Several of the missions were 

multiship formations with assaults directly into tight landing zones. 

Florence found the flying to be both challenging and rewarding. He 

had wanted to be a Pave Low pilot since he had first read about these 
632 │ the terminal years

aviators and the role they played in the Vega 31 rescue in 1999. He 

would log almost 70 hours of combat time in Iraq and return home 

with the rest of the unit in September.73

On 28 March, MH-53M #68-10357 was flown on its last career flight 

on a combat mission out of Balad. Flying it that night were pilots Lt Col 

Shawn Henrie and Capt Nathan Davidson, flight engineers MSgt Kevin 

James and TSgt Vince DePersio, and gunners MSgt Robert Strong and 

CMSgt John DeSalle. The mission involved an assault against an enemy 

position resulting in the capture of nine enemy combatants. The aircraft 

returned to home base mission ready. Instead, this last remaining veteran 

of the Son Tay raid into North Vietnam in 1970, call sign Apple 01, was 

dismantled for shipment by C-17 to Wright-Patterson AFB and permanent display in the US Air Force Museum. It arrived there still covered 

with the grit and grime of its last missions in Iraq. CMSgt John DeSalle 

sadly logged 357’s fini flight as his last operational Pave Low sortie. Waxing nostalgic about the closeness and integration of the Pave Low crews, 

he said, “It’s a closeness that other crews just don’t have. . . . It’s the same 

bond that connects all -53 crews and has created the ‘Pave Low community.’ Whether you were on a -53 in Vietnam or fly on a -53 today, you’re 

part of that community. And it is more than that; it’s a family.”74 

Courtesy CMSgt John DeSalle, USAF

 CMSgt John DeSalle in Iraq
the terminal years │ 633

In May several of the aircraft were swapped out until only six were 

left with the 20th ESOS at Balad: 67-14995, 68-8284, 68-10924, 69-

5785, 69-5790, and 70-1631. They would fly the last ever Pave Low 

sorties that would occur on combat missions—a most fitting end for 

such distinguished combat veterans and something that had never 

been accomplished by any other USAF aircraft.75

Maj Derrick Stamos was back at Hurlburt after his series of tours 

in Iraq. Now serving as an assistant operations officer, he began working on the dispersal of the remaining Pave Lows and coordinated his 

actions with Maj Fred Koegler, who was the project officer on the 

AFSOC staff. They tried to align the individual aircraft with locations 

with which they might have some personal history, similar to having 

MH-53J #66-14433 at Kirtland. Stamos coordinated with maintenance technicians to remove various classified equipment from the 

aircraft and began planning the delivery flights for the aircraft. To 

Stamos “it was a bittersweet thing to watch them go away.”76

In May the 20th SOS held a grand combat dining-in at the main 

maintenance hangar on the east side of Hurlburt for USAF members 

only. The 20th SOS got all the necessary approvals and invited all the 

senior officers and NCOs on base. Brig Gen Tom Trask was asked to 

be the guest speaker. While playing the “Star-Spangled Banner,” the 

audio equipment failed. Never one to miss the moment, Trask immediately began to sing, and all joined in. After dinner, he gave a 

great talk about Pave Low, rescue and special operations, and war and 

community. Retired major general Rich Comer was there, and General 

Wurster made a brief stop before leaving for another preplanned engagement. Then the games began, and the troops turned a bit rowdy. 

Colonel Webb checked with Colonel Becklund to ensure he had contingency plans so that the event would not get out of hand or that 

nobody would be arrested for drunk driving. As the combat obstacle 

course was opened and the dunking tank swung into high gear, Webb 

and several other more senior leaders departed. Regardless, the party 

went on for quite a while.77

In late May, back at Hurlburt, the 20th SOS deployed 90 operations 

and maintenance personnel and three helicopters to Roanoke, Virginia, 

for their last CONUS mountain deployment for TF/TA radar training. Colonel Becker led the team. A few days later, Colonel Becklund 

replaced him so that Becker could travel to Washington, DC, to receive the Koren Kolligian Jr. Trophy for his handling of the crash of 

MH-53M #69-5794 the previous September. Gen Duncan McNabb, 
634 │ the terminal years

USAF vice chief of staff, presented him the award as family and 

friends watched.78

A week after they returned, Becker replaced Lt Col Vince Becklund 

as the last Pave Low commander of the 20th SOS. His operations officer was Lt Col Joe DeCaro, at the time deployed to Iraq as the 20th 

ESOS commander. At Hurlburt squadron members continued to fly 

local sorties through the summer. However, they also had to begin 

clearing out their squadron building and turning in vast quantities of 

equipment and Pave Low–unique items.

At the end of July, Becker deployed back to the 20th ESOS at Balad 

to serve as the commander with the last crews. They were still steadily 

flying their taskings. Becker could not help but marvel at his young 

crews. Flying missions as tough as any ever flown by earlier Pave Low 

crews, they were doing them night after night. He also agreed with 

General Comer’s assessment that the Pave Low’s greatest test and accomplishment came in the later years. He watched it happen every 

night as the last generation of young Pave Low crews maneuvered 

those still strong but tired Steel Horses in and out of one dangerous 

landing zone after another.79

At Hurlburt the squadron began ferrying the aircraft to their final destinations. On 5 September, Lt Col Sean Hoyer and crew flew MH-53M 

#73-1652, the last H-53 produced by Sikorsky for the USAF, the short 

distance to the Air Force Armament Museum at Eglin. This was a 

homecoming of sorts because that very aircraft had at one time been 

assigned to the 55th ARRSq when it was stationed at Eglin. It was one 

of the aircraft flown to Jonestown, Guyana, for the horrible recovery 

operation of over 900 bodies in the massacre that occurred there in 

November 1978.

On 12 September, the 20th received one last call to launch a Pave 

Low to support a domestic SAR operation. Hurricane Ike was sweeping through the Gulf of Mexico, heading for Texas. A disabled Cypriotflagged freighter was in its path. The US Coast Guard wanted to evacuate 

the 22-man crew and called Hurlburt for help. Both a Pave Low and 

CV-22 launched to support the effort but had to turn back because of 

the strong and turbulent winds. Instead, a large tugboat was able to 

tow the ship to safety. It was a quiet but purposeful ending for Pave 

Low operations at Hurlburt. 

That same day, Capt Mark Hamilton was ordered to fly MH-53 

#73-1649 to the AMARC at Davis-Monthan. He had recently upgraded to first pilot on the Pave Low—the last one ever—and was the 
the terminal years │ 635

aircraft commander for the mission. It was his last Pave Low flight. In 

his relatively brief time in Pave Low, he logged almost 600 hours in 

the aircraft, a significant portion of which was in combat. He subsequently went on to fly the CV-22.80

Steadily, the aircraft disappeared. Colonel Becker also arranged to 

have senior contract pilots and engineers from the ARINC Corporation based in Fort Walton Beach fly the last Pave Low out. He did that 

for two reasons: first, he wanted to publicly acknowledge the enormous 

job the ARINC team had done over the years to help keep the Pave Low 

fleet as mission ready as possible while relieving 20th crews of FCF duties 

when at home station. Second, he also wanted to specifically honor the 

ARINC crew members (especially Rick Simmon) whose duty on CH/HH/

MH-53 aircraft reached back 40 years. As a result, pilots Tom Aldrich and 

“Pappy” Walters, flight engineers Bill Smith and Simmon, and gunner 

SSgt Michael Tritt flew out the last Hurlburt aircraft, MH-53M #68-10369, 

on 16 September. Tritt was the only active duty person on board and 

remarked of his august crewmates, “They have about 150 years of experience between them.” A large formation of 20th SOS troops were on 

the flight line to watch 68-10369 taxi out for takeoff, passing four new 

CV-22s of the 8th SOS and receiving a traditional washdown from the 

base fire trucks. As the aircraft lifted off, for the first time in 28 and a 

half years, there were no Pave Low helicopters on the ramp at Hurlburt. 

The ARINC crew ferried it to the Air Force Heritage Foundation 

Museum at Hill AFB, with a stop at the Air Force Academy in Colorado. 

To Simmon it was a poignant personal ending to his almost 30 years of 

flying the Steel Horse.81

Courtesy Jim Burns

The last Pave Low at Hurlburt, MH-53M #68-10369, departs on its retirement flight.
636 │ the terminal years

As intended, the 20th ESOS in Iraq would carry out the last flights. 

Crews flew their fragged sorties through the summer and into September. Colonel Becker worked with the CJSOAC to plan for one last 

mission that would include all of the remaining aircraft so that the 

detachment there could close out Pave Low as a unit. The mission 

was scheduled for 26 September. Maj Brian Roberts, now serving on 

his sixth combat rotation, was selected to serve as the flight lead. At 

the scheduled time, the crews were briefed and dispatched to their 

aircraft. They—well, we have already told that story.82



Begun with such hope, the new millennium quickly fell prey to old 

and simmering conflicts that ripped asunder any hope of a benevolent 

age. After the horrific events of 9/11, the United States responded to 

the attacks with swift action as its military forces were dispatched to 

several areas of the globe. USSOCOM led that effort in most areas 

and supported theater commands in others. AFSOC elements were 

almost always involved, and the Pave Lows were in the thick of it. 

Reduced to just two operational squadrons because of the inexorable 

pressure of Initiative 17 and its persistent supporters, the remaining 

20th and 21st SOSs were engaged in ongoing operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and Iraq from right after 9/11 until fleet inactivation in September 2008. During that period, they did everything that the Pave Lows and even their predecessor HH- and CH-53s 

were designed to do: SAR, CSAR, direct action missions, NEOs, 

humanitarian-relief missions, civil disaster-relief missions, medevac, 

and so many other things divined on the spur of the moment by Airmen who were trained for and capable of thinking “outside the box.” 

As ordered though, in September 2008 the Pave Lows were flown on 

their last sorties ever on combat taskings in Iraq. No other USAF aircraft has so ended its flying career. 

While the aircraft may have departed, the Pave Low community itself remained. It had fully matured into that “unit of confidence,” identified more than 30 years earlier by Joe Guilmartin in the aftermath of 

Koh Tang Island. That confidence had matured into a culture of professionalism, mentored to each succeeding generation and based upon 

high standards and a propensity to self-correct. General Trask explained that “one of the things that became part of our culture [was] 
the terminal years │ 637

you really got forced by your peers to focus on where you were and 

what you were doing. . . . ‘Train like you fight.’ . . . . Make sure that every 

day you are preparing and training . . . as realistically and thoroughly as 

possible.” Echoing the words of General Comer, Trask added, “The 

great chapter of Pave Lows was written after 9/11, in my opinion. The 

amount of things they did and the amount of work they did . . . the days 

in Pakistan and Afghanistan, going well beyond their capabilities as far 

as power and altitude, just amazing things.”83

Over its lifetime, the Pave Low community also spawned several 

generations of leaders who rose to high rank and responsibility in the 

AFSOC and USAF. An unofficial count conducted with the help of 

the AFSOC/A1 and several senior Pave Low individuals indicated 

that this community generated an estimated 60 squadron commanders, 18 group-level commanders, and 11 wing-level commanders. 

They came in all sizes and with all types of personalities. TSgt B. J. 

Jobling offered an enlisted troop’s view of Pave Low leadership when 

he explained, “For a guy to be in charge of a group of that type of 

people took an exceptional leader. And we had exceptional leaders. I 

had six commanders, I think, starting with Jack Hester. For somebody to be able to stand up and say, ‘All you cowboys and clowns and 

assholes and . . . whatever. . . .’ To lead, and to lead unquestioningly, 

took a certain caliber of man. And we had them. My hat is off to the 

guy who could lead that rabble.”84

For the larger enlisted Airman community, there is no way to determine the considerable number of individuals who rose to senior 

NCO leadership as did CMSgts Tom Green and John DeSalle. Their 

contributions and impact were just as immense, reflecting that “the 

enlisted troops provided the steadfast continuity of knowledge and 

experience which was a staple of Pave Low,” as pointed out by CMSgt 

Jim Mecke.85

No doubt, there is among the younger generation another cohort 

just as capable, and it is now flowing out through the AFSOC and 

USAF and using what it so earnestly learned in its Pave Low days to 

perform other missions with other “tools,” as Jobling highlighted. 

Lt Col Scott Howell believed that mentoring and leadership development were two of the real strengths of the Pave Low community 

and, along with Lt Col Kirk Smith, worked to facilitate that flow of 

Pave Low guys into the CV-22, the newly developing U-28, and the 

RPV programs. He believed that “exporting the culture” of Pave Low 
638 │ the terminal years

was a useful and laudable goal and a way to further derive benefit 

from the heritage of Pave Low. 

His successor commander at the 20th SOS, Lt Col Vince Becklund, 

took that thought a bit further when he remarked that “the heritage 

of the Pave Low community will not be the missions we did; it will be 

the continued leadership that [we] provide . . . throughout AFSOC.”86

As the aircraft steadily disappeared, the sense of loss was palpable 

among the Pave Low veterans. After his last ferry flight, SMSgt Rick 

Simmon commented, “She was such a good bird and I think that she 

has a lot left to offer, so it is really sad to see her go.” B. J. Jobling expressed, “Taking them to the boneyard is one of the saddest things 

ever.” Lt Col Kent Landreth, now commanding the 18th Flight Test 

Squadron at Hurlburt, was a bit more blunt in his remarks and caustic in his tone when he pointed out that “the most capable helicopter 

on the planet now sits in the boneyard.”87

From a longer historical perspective, though, the inactivation of 

the Pave Low fleet reflected the reality that Initiative 17, drafted 24 

years earlier and directing the USAF to “transfer the responsibility for 

providing rotary wing lift support for SOF to the Army,” had ultimately 

come to a full and final conclusion.88

And so it was.

Courtesy USAF 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group

“The most capable helicopter on the planet now sits in the boneyard.” 

—Lt Col Kent Landreth 
the terminal years │ 639

Notes

1. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 28, 36; and Williams, interview. Sijan Award data 

provided to author by Lt Col Joe Michalek.

2. Williams to the author, e-mail, 7 Aug 2010.

3. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 38–39.

4. Colannino, interview.

5. Berry, interview.

6. Mission narrative provided to author by Maj Steve Edwards.

7. West, No True Glory, 148–51.

8. History of 16th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2004, vol. 1, 34; and Air Force Instruction 

36-2805, Special Trophies and Awards, para. 4.6.

9. Williams, interview.

10. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 172–73.

11. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan 2004–31 Dec 2005, vol. 1, vi, 3; and Slife, interview.

12. Slife, interview.

13. Slife and Williams, interviews; and Wright and Reese, On Point II, 44.

14. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2004, vol. 1, 7, 12, 15, 28, 36.

15. Holder, interview. 

16. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2004, vol. 1, 20; and Slife to the author, e-mail, 

25 July 2010. 

17. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2004, vol. 1, 1, 37–38.

18. Ibid., 12–14.

19. Slife, interview; and Slife to the author, e-mail, review comments, 13 Sept 

2010. 

20. Howell, interview.

21. DeSalle, interview.

22. Ibid. 

23. Berry, interview.

24. Williams and Howell, interviews.

25. Becklund, interview.

26. Kradel, interview.

27. Matlock to the author, e-mail.

28. Howell, interview; and History of 16th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2005, vol. 1, 32.

29. Jamie Haig, “Three Years Running: HMXS Named AF ‘Best of Best,’ ” Commando, 6 May 2005, 6; and “HMXS 16th Helicopter Maintenance Squadron,” Commando, 20 May 2005, 14.

30. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2005, vol. 1, 121–29; History of 16th SOW, 

1 Jan–31 Dec 2005, vol. 1, 5, 32; and Howell, interview.

31. Becklund, interview.

32. Cardoso, interviews.

33. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2005, vol. 1, 66, 89, 96.

34. Ibid., 75.

35. Ibid., 76–77.

36. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2005, vol. 1, 16–20, 39.

37. Ibid., ix, 3; and Trask and Holder, interviews.
640 │ the terminal years

38. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2006, vol. 1, 3–4, 32–34.

39. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2006, vol. 1, 9.

40. Ibid., 7–10; and Davis, 31 Initiatives, 110.

41. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2006, vol. 1, 12–15.

42. Ibid., 43; and Lt Gen Michael Wooley to CDRUSSOCOM, memorandum, 31 

July 2006, received from Lt Col Vince Becklund.

43. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2006, vol. 1, 2.

44. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2007, vol. 1, 22.

45. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2006, vol. 1, 43–45, 59.

46. Smith, interview; and History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2006, vol. 1, vi, 2–3.

47. Stamos, interview.

48. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2006, vol. 1, 7–12, 23; and Smith, interview.

49. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2006, vol. 1, 37, and supplemental doc., 

20th SOS Nomination for the Special Operations Squadron of the Year; and Becklund, interview.

50. Howell, interview. 

51. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2006, vol. 1, 37, and supplemental doc., 

20th SOS Nomination for the Special Operations Squadron of the Year.

52. Howell, interview.

53. Becklund and Howell, interviews.

54. White House, “President’s Address to the Nation,” press release, 10 Jan 2007, 

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html. 

55. Daley to the author, e-mail, 10 Sept 2010. 

56. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2007, vol. 1, 61–62; and History of 1st SOW, 

1 Jan–31 Dec 2007, vol. 1, supplemental doc., AFSOC Aircraft Inventory, 2 Jan 2008, 6.

57. Maier, “551st Special Operations Squadron Deactivates.” 

58. Phil Casaus, “Pave Low, Sweet Chariot: The Choppers Fly Out of Kirtland for 

the Last Time,” Albuquerque Tribune, 21 May 2007, n.p.

59. History of 58th SOW, 1 Jan 2007–31 Dec 2008, vol. 1, 6–8.

60. History of 352d SOG, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2007, vol. 1, 1, 3, 8, 64; and Smith, interview.

61. Stamos, interview. 

62. DeCaro and Roberts, interviews.

63. Hamilton, interview. 

64. Gene Becker and Hamilton, interviews.

65. Becklund, interview.

66. Becklund, interview; and History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2007, supplemental doc. 2103, 20th SOS Nomination for AFSOC Squadron of the Year, n.d.

67. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2007, vol. 1, 18–20, and supplemental doc. 

2103, 20th SOS Nomination for AFSOC Squadron of the Year, n.d.; and Citation for 

the 2008 Colonel James Jabara Award for Airmanship, presented to Capt Jonathan 

Graham, provided to the author by Captain Graham. 

68. Becklund, interview.

69. Executive Summary, Aircraft Accident Investigation MH-53M S/N 69-05794, 

Hurlburt Field, Florida, 7 Sept 2007, USAF Safety Center, Kirtland AFB; Becklund, 

interview; and “Crash Crew Recovering,” Hurlburt Patriot, 14 Sept 2007, 3.

70. Becklund, interview.

71. Gresham, “Interview: Lt Gen Donald C. Donny Wurster,” 11.
the terminal years │ 641

72. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2007, vol. 1, 62.

73. Florence, interview.

74. Chapman, “AFSOC Retires a Legend, Hero,” 32; and DeSalle, interview.

75. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2008, vol. 1, 91; and History of AFSOC, 

1 Jan–31 Dec 2008, vol. 1, 504.

76. Stamos, interview.

77. Becklund, interview.

78. Amy Oliver, “SOS Completes Final Training in Mountains,” Hurlburt Patriot,

13 June 2008, 3; and Becker to the author, e-mail, 19 Sept 2010.

79. Gene Becker, interview; and History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2008, vol. 1, 72.

80. Hamilton, interview.

81. TSgt Kristina Newton, “Engineer Wraps Up 30 Years of Pave Low,” Hurlburt 

Patriot, 31 Oct 2008, 2.

82. History of 1st SOW, 1 Jan–31 Dec 2008, vol. 1, 73; and Becker, interview.

83. Trask, interview. 

84. Jobling, interview.

85. Mecke, interview.

86. Becklund, interview. 

87. Newton, “Engineer Wraps Up 30 Years of Pave Low,” 2; and Jobling and 

Landreth, interviews.

88. Davis, 31 Initiatives, 111.

Chapter 18

Standing Down

The art of war is subject to many modifications by industrial 

and scientific progress. However, there is truly one constant, 

and that is the heart of man. 

—Ardant du Picq

Enduring Heritage

Ardant du Picq was a French officer who fought and died in the 

1870 Franco-Prussian War. A great student of the art of war, he wrote 

prolifically about the human element in battle. Living through that 

colossal time of change, du Picq developed a deep appreciation of the 

impact of technology on warfare but intuitively knew that the weapons 

were really only tools to be used by the man in the arena. He knew 

that man himself was the weapon, and at the core of this combination 

was the “heart of man.”1

At du Picq’s point in history, he could not have imagined anything as 

sophisticated as the Pave Low. However, he would have clearly understood that it would take highly spirited and solidly confident individuals 

to make those machines function to their full capacity. It was the synergy 

of the aircraft and crews that made Pave Low successful. Every crew 

was unique; Lt Col Brad Webb understood that when he said that “each 

crew had its own DNA” and that its cohesiveness and ability to function 

under intense pressure were key to safe and effective operations. 

TSgt B. J. Jobling addressed this cohesion a bit differently but just 

as descriptively when he pointed out that the airplane “was almost 

the seventh crew member. But, at the end of the day, that airplane is 

just a tool. What made it all work was six guys who would not have 

gotten along stuck in an elevator together. For those six guys to work 

in concert as one unit was what made this airplane.”2 Corby Martin, 

ever the more direct individual, said in his own pithy way, “You get so 

that you are part of the machine. . . . I felt I was part of the helicopter. 

It was part of my body.”3
644 │ STANDING DOWN

These words speak powerfully to the bonds that were created between 

the men and their technologically advanced aircraft—a message that 

resonates throughout the entire history of Pave Low. Du Picq himself 

would surely have agreed. 

Life, though, waits for no one. The veterans of Pave Low would 

have many more roads to travel and challenges to meet. The courage, 

devotion, dedication, and professionalism that they had developed in 

the community of Pave Low would now be applied to other units, 

specialties, and crises so surely to appear. It was Lt Col Vince Becklund 

who captured this reality when he asserted, “Those guys were all Pave 

Low aircrew members, and now they are the future leaders of AFSOC. 

That will be the heritage of Pave Low.”4

Hurlburt Field

Ten days after those final sorties, Lt Col Gene Becker arrived back at 

Hurlburt with most of his Airmen. The combat flying was over, and the 

flight line at Hurlburt was empty; however, they had a great deal to do 

at home. Squadron troops were steadily departing, and those who remained had to go through their administrative processing. They had to 

clean and vacate the squadron building and turn in equipment. The 

remaining troops had to prepare for a final gala dinner and an inactivation ceremony on 16 and 17 October, respectively. Even in its last days, 

the sole Pave Low unit remained at a high ops tempo. 

The dinner was held at the Soundside Club at Hurlburt. It had 

once been the Officers’ Club and was a familiar setting for such occasions. Several hundred squadron members, veterans, and guests attended. The evening proceeded as expected, and after dinner, Becker 

made a few remarks. In an effort to honor all of the old veterans of the 

20th SOS and Pave Low in attendance, he presented a special award 

to retired major John Grove for his 20-plus years of support to the 

squadron, both on active duty and in retirement. The audience 

watched a special DVD that SSgt Chris Curtis created to celebrate the 

distinguished career of the 20th SOS, shown, of course, to the sound 

of Bon Jovi playing its theme song “Wanted Dead or Alive.”

The featured speaker for the evening was Lt Gen Donny Wurster. 

He had taken a direct interest in the inactivation of the Pave Lows. 

Additionally, he had been corresponding with Col Ron Thurlow, 

USAF, retired, an avid military historian who had developed a 
standing down │ 645

comprehensive knowledge of the history of those aircraft. Thurlow 

shared his work with Wurster, who then used a goodly portion of it at 

an earlier 20th SOS dining-in and at the enshrinement ceremony for 

MH-53M #68-10357 at the National Museum of the US Air Force at 

Wright-Patterson AFB three months earlier. At this last dinner, though, 

Wurster, as a Pave Low veteran, was among his own community of fellow veterans and could be much more personal and direct in his remarks. 

He began by talking about the aircraft. He reviewed the composition 

of the fleet as it was drawn from the USAF acquisition of the 52 HH53s and the 20 CH-53s for duty in SEA. From that collection, 22 aircraft were lost in combat operations, and another 20 crashed and were 

destroyed. Of the remaining 30, 20 had also been in serious accidents 

but had been rebuilt which, incredibly, meant that of the 72 aircraft 

built, 62 had catastrophically impacted the ground—some more than 

once. Those numbers attest to the high-risk nature of the missions that 

the aircraft flew over their life span, the countless flight hours logged in 

almost every significant conflict in which the United States had participated in the last 40 years.

Courtesy Col Darrel Whitcomb, USAF, Retired

Lt Gen Donny Wurster speaks at the inactivation dinner.
646 │ STANDING DOWN

His remarks about the aircraft, though, were just a prelude to his 

key points. The general could no longer resist his enthusiasm to talk 

about the people who flew those machines. He referred back to the 

rescue crews that initially developed the early technology as precursor to Pave Low and the special operations crews that adapted the 

CH-53s to their mission set. He told of the development of Pave Low 

III by Frank Pehr, Steve Connelly, and Rick Simmon, and especially 

their initial missions across the Nellis AFB test ranges where nobody 

had detected them. He talked of the transfer of the Paves to Hurlburt 

that had moved Pave Low from rescue into special operations and the 

efforts to procure congressional support for more aircraft. At that 

point, he asked Gary Weikel and Ed Reed to stand as he explained 

their roles in these events, as well as that of their mentor, Bill Takacs, 

who provided the necessary leadership to integrate the Pave Low into 

the 20th SOS and special operations. Wurster spoke of the initial unsuccessful efforts to transfer the Pave Lows to the Army as part of 

Initiative 17 and the successful efforts to modify the aircraft—first to 

the J- and then the M-models—ever improving and equipping them 

with the latest navigational, communications, countermeasure, and 

safety equipment. He explained how the SLEP programs had enhanced the aircraft and kept them flying for over four decades, lauding the services of the unnamed specialists in the various logistics 

centers who had played a major role in that accomplishment. Many 

of them were still working on refinements to the aircraft’s ability to 

land in brownout conditions even as it faced its final inactivation. He 

honored the maintainers—long-suffering and almost always in the 

background—but so critical to the success of Pave Low. 

General Wurster also pointed out that this fleet of 72 aircraft had 

been flown on missions from Southeast Asia to Iraq, with so many 

places in between, leading to the awarding of 13 Air Force Crosses, 

140 Silver Stars, and uncounted Distinguished Flying Crosses and 

Air Medals to its crew members. These numbers demonstrated that, 

ultimately, the success of Pave Low was due to its operators, those 

who had adopted its legacy of courage, each one hoping that his performance would prove him worthy to be counted as a brother in that 

very select community of Pave Low. He talked about that one true 

constant—the heart of man—that was at the center of the essence of 

Pave Low. The general concluded his talk with his personal vignette 

of the last flight in Iraq, just three weeks earlier. He told the audience,
standing down │ 647

After landing and shutdown, the mood was subdued but respectful. The early 

dawn showed the outlines of the big birds that would never fly again. Crews and 

maintainers traded hugs and signed their names on the machines as part of this 

worthy history. As I walked around the machines, I did not endure a sense of 

loss. It was the first time that I recognized that these machines looked war-worn 

and perhaps a bit tired, but proud of their service, faithful to their mission and 

calling, and committed to the end. Their stately elegance and now-silent repose 

reminded me of a verse from Paul the Apostle in the letter to Timothy that says, 

“I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith.” And 

they have.5

The formal grand inactivation ceremony for both the Pave Low 

and the 20th SOS was the next day. Under a brilliant blue sky and a 

favoring gentle onshore breeze, a large mixed crowd of military and 

civilians gathered in the airpark next to Pave Low #68-10928 for the 

event. The 1st SOG commander, Col Dennis Pannell, officiated. He 

introduced retired colonel Steve Connelly, who provided the invocation and said,

We gather in this airpark today . . . in this ceremony of remembrance and commemoration. We ask your blessings on us and on our nation, on these men and 

women among us still in uniform, on their families and ours. 

So ends the last chapter in the Pave Low MH-53 saga. Without question, the 

finest hour has been run, and a near-half-century long-distance race has been 

finished in a sprint. . . . The last men have built on all before them to make the 

close of this chapter the best in the book. 

We especially remember those few who yielded their lives in the line of duty, 

and we remember their families; they were the best of what we and the nation 

could offer in service. . . . Bless us Lord as we stand before you and remember.6

In his comments, Colonel Pannell stated, “The MH-53 has been a 

cornerstone in Special Operations airpower.” He called upon the audience to bring to mind how the courage and resolve that the 20th SOS 

showed in Southeast Asia “continued through the 1980s . . . Desert 

Storm and the Balkans” and into the global war on terror, where its 

Airmen executed “thousands of missions after the 11 September 2001 

attack.” Pannell praised Colonel Becker for his leadership in the last 

difficult days, calling them “a leadership nightmare,” which Becker 

handled in fine style.7

Colonel Becker spoke next. He thanked the crowd but, most importantly, thanked his troops for their admirable terminal efforts in 

Iraq and overall professionalism. When finished, he and Colonel 

Pannell cased the colors of the 20th SOS. Becker then presented a 
Courtesy Col Darrel Whitcomb, USAF, Retired

Pave Low commanders. Left to right: Col Joe Becker; Col Jim Slife; Col Gary 

Weikel, USAF, Retired; Col Steve Otto; Brig Gen Tom Trask; and Col Scott Howell.

Courtesy Col Darrel Whitcomb, USAF, Retired

Lt Col Gene Becker speaks at the Pave Low inactivation ceremony standing 

in front of MH-53M #68-10928 in the Hurlburt Field Memorial Air Park.
standing down │ 649

memorial plaque to the wing commander, Col Brad Webb, which had 

inscribed upon it the names of the 12 Airmen who lost their lives 

while serving on Pave Lows. In accepting the plaque, Webb echoed 

the words of praise and remembrance of Pannell and Becker. He continued by saying, “This is the most brilliant helicopter and most brilliant helicopter force that have ever existed.” Then, echoing the words 

of Lieutenant Colonels Howell, Smith, and Becklund, he added, “This 

culture is not going away. It lives on in the CV-22, U-28, AC-130H, 

AC-130U, Mi-17, UH-1, the Predator. The list goes on and on.” It was 

exactly the right sentiment to conclude the bittersweet event.8

Later that evening, the 20th troops and guests gathered together at 

one of the local hotels for a more informal barbeque, celebration, and 

last hoorah. Several hundred attended, and as the evening progressed, 

they enjoyed the food, beer, and easy camaraderie. Some of the old 

veterans showed up, too. Steve Connelly was there, constantly surrounded by a clutch of younger officers eager to hear his stories of 

early Pave Low. John Grove was there, tending to the squadron “store” 

and attempting to sell off the last stocks of 20th SOS shirts, hats, and 

other memorabilia. Later in the evening, General Wurster stopped 

by; he was quickly and steadily engaged by a constant stream of former 

Pave Low mates and friends who wanted to pay their respects or just 

share a portion of his time. He stayed with them for a bit, enjoying 

their company, knowing that even though the Pave Lows were now 

gone, it was here, in these fine young officers and Airmen, that the 

heritage of this great community now resided. 

Somewhere in the gathering, somebody turned on a CD player, 

and the music began to sweep over the crowd. Again, it was Bon Jovi 

playing the familiar tunes of its anthem, “I’m a cowboy, on a steel 

horse I ride. . . .” As the crowd began to sing along, one could not help 

but sense that as long as these Airmen were alive and still serving, 

Pave Low itself would survive in some form or manner—an indelible 

fact that gave another dimension to the oft-quoted mantra that “Pave 

Low leads.”

Provocatively, too, it suggested that as phenomenal and enduring as 

the saga of the Pave Low machines and men was, perhaps some of its 

best chapters were yet to be written. And that is a comforting thought. 
650 │ STANDING DOWN

Notes

1. Jacobs, “Human Element of Battle,” 36.

2. Jobling, interview.

3. Martin, interview

4. Becklund, interview.

5. Prepared comments by Lt Gen Donny Wurster, induction ceremony, MH-53M 

#68-10357 to the National Museum of the US Air Force, in Burns, “Green Hornets Case 

Their Flag,” USAF Rotorheads website; and Lt Gen Donny Wurster, comments, 20th SOS 

dining-out, 10 Nov 2007, recorded by the author.

6. Remarks by Col Steve Connelly, USAF, retired, provided to the author.

7. Kenneth Brook, “An Era Ends for MH-53, 20th SOS,” Hurlburt Patriot, 24 Oct 

2008, 1.

8. Ibid.

Official White House photo by Pete Souza

They still serve. Pave Low veteran Brig Gen Brad Webb, serving as the JSOC 

assistant commanding general, briefs Pres. Barack Obama, Vice Pres. Joe Biden, 

and other senior leaders and officers on the operation to capture Osama bin 

Laden on 1 May 2011.
Epilogue

In Memoriam to Those Lost

We especially remember those few who yielded their lives in 

the line of duty, and we remember their families; they were 

the best of what we and the nation could offer in service.

 —Col Steve Connelly, USAF, Retired

Pave Low Warriors Who Gave Their Lives While Flying

MH-53s in Service to Their Nation

Maj James Prowell Philippines 17 Oct 1984

Capt Michael Skeen

TSgt Wayne Johnson

TSgt Thomas Ortiz Jr.

SSgt Robert Barker

SSgt Max Lincks Jr.

Maj Richard Brims USA 21 May 1986

SSgt Kurt Upton USA 3 June 1999

Maj Steven Plumhoff Afghanistan 23 Nov 2003

MSgt William Kerwood

TSgt Howard Walters

SSgt Thomas Walkup Jr.1 

Pave Low Warriors Who Gave Their Lives While Flying

CV-22s in Service to Their Nation

Maj Randall Voas Afghanistan 8 Apr 2010

SMSgt James Lackey2
652 │ Epilogue

Notes

1. Kenneth Brook, “An Era Ends for MH-53, 20th SOS,” Hurlburt Patriot, 24 Oct 

2008, 1.

2. “2 Hurlburt Airmen Die in CV-22 Crash,” Hurlburt Patriot, 16 Apr 2010.
Appendices

Appendix A

Tail Number Listing of All USAF

CH/HH/MH/NCH/TH-53 Aircraft

HH-53B (8 Aircraft)

66-

14428 Pave Low

14429 Pave Low

14430

14431 Pave Low

14432 Pave Low

14433 Pave Low (first prototype)

14434

14435

HH-53C (4 Aircraft)

67-

14993 Pave Low, MH-53M

14994 Pave Low, MH-53M

14995 Pave Low, MH-53M: Last mission 26–27 Sept 2008, Iraq

14996

HH-53C (20 Aircraft)

68-

8283

8284 Pave Low, MH-53M: Last mission 26–27 Sept 2008, Iraq

8285

8286 Pave Low, MH-53M

10354

10355

10356 Pave Low

10357 Pave Low, MH-53M

10358 Pave Low

10359

10360 Pave Low
656 │ APPENDIX A

10361

10362

10363 Pave Low

10364 Pave Low

10365

10366

10367 Pave Low

10368

10369 Pave Low, MH-53M: Last Pave Low at Hurlburt Field

CH-53C (12 Aircraft)

68-

10922

10923 Pave Low

10924 Pave Low, MH-53M: Last mission 26–27 Sept 2008, Iraq

10925

10926

10927

10928 Pave Low, MH-53M

10929

10930 Pave Low, MH-53M

10931

10932 Pave Low

10933

HH-53C (14 Aircraft)

69-

5784 Pave Low, MH-53M

5785 Pave Low, MH-53M: Last mission 26–27 Sept 2008, Iraq

5786

5787

5788

5789 Pave Low

5790 Pave Low, MH-53M: Last mission 26–27 Sept 2008, Iraq

5791 Pave Low, MH-53M

5792

5793 Pave Low, MH-53M

5794 Pave Low, MH-53M
APPENDIX A │ 657

5795 Pave Low, MH-53M

5796 Pave Low, MH-53M

5797 Pave Low, MH-53M

CH-53C (8 Aircraft)

70-

1625 Pave Low, MH-53M

1626 Pave Low, MH-53M

1627

1628

1629 Pave Low, MH-53M

1630 Pave Low, MH-53M

1631 Pave Low, MH-53M: Last mission 26–27 Sept 2008, Iraq

1632

HH-53C (6 Aircraft)

73-

1647 Pave Low

1648 Pave Low, MH-53M

1649 Pave Low, MH-53M

1650 Pave Low

1651 Pave Low

1652 Pave Low, MH-53M

USMC Aircraft Used as TH-53As

66-

14468

14469

14470

14471

14472

14473

67-30046
658 │ APPENDIX A

NCH-53A Aircraft Intermittently Listed as Part of the USAF

H-53 Fleet

63-

13693

13694

These two aircraft were initially procured from the USMC to serve 

as testing platforms for the retrieval systems used by the “Crested 

Rooster” HH-53s based with the 6594th Test Group in Hawaii. When 

that program was inactivated, the aircraft were demodified and subsequently used as supplemental trainer aircraft.1

Notes

1. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC)/A4MYH to Mr. Tim 

Brown, AFSOC History Office, e-mail, 2 Sept 2008; Sikorsky Aircraft Ship Number 

Master List, 8 June 2002, Sikorsky Archives, Stratford, CT; USAF H-53 Tail Number 

History, www.PaveCave.com; History of 542d Crew Training Wing, 1 Jan–30 Jun 

1993, vol. 1, 55; and History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1, 154.
Appendix B

Pave Low Squadron Commanders

20th Special Operations Squadron

 Lt Col

George Borinski Jr. 1 Jan 1980

William Takacs 18 Aug 1980

Wayne Corder 10 Aug 1982

Louis Grant 16 July 1984

Horace Johnson 2 July 1986 

Gary Weikel 10 July 1988 

Richard Comer 11 June 1990 

Russell Rakip 8 June 1992 

Donald Hoover 10 June 1994 

Michael Homan 26 June 1995 

Thomas Hull 30 Aug 1996 

Jack Hester III 30 July 1998

Thomas Trask 16 July 1999 

Michael Kingsley 1 Feb 2001 

Marshall Webb 27 June 2002 

R. K. Williams 1 July 2003 

Scott Howell 1 June 2005 

Vincent Becklund 11 Jan 2007 

Eugene Becker 13 June 2008–

 17 Oct 20081

21st Special Operations Squadron

 Lt Col

Stephen Connelly 3 June 1988 

Robert Zdenek 25 June 1990

Mike Russell 15 May 1992

Donald Wurster 9 July 1993

Jeffrey Walls 11 July 1994

Douglas Salmon 17 July 1996

Paul Harmon 17 July 1998

Timothy Minish 30 June 2000
660 │ APPENDIX B

Joseph Becker 26 June 2001

Greg Lengyel 9 July 2002

James Slife 21 June 2004

Kirk Smith 10 Feb 2006– 

 9 Oct 20072

31st Special Operations Squadron

 Lt Col

Dale Cook 6 April 1989

Lee Massey 4 Aug 1990

Eugene Correll 18 Dec 1991

Craig Jensen 20 Dec 1993

Robert Hunt 13 Dec 1994

Lyle Koenig 7 July 1995

Clayton Spriet 26 July 1996

Steven Dreyer 4 Aug 1997

Tracey Goetz 3 Aug 1998

Steven Otto 16 July 1999

Brendan Clare 30 June 2000–

 31 March 20013

1551st Flying Training Squadron

551st Flying Training Squadron

551st Special Operations Squadron

 Lt Col 

Paul Jacobs 1 Nov 1988 

John Folkerts 28 June 1990 

Michael Planert 1 July 1991 

Michael Damron 11 June 1993 

Robert Maldonado 26 July 1995 

Thomas O’Boyle 2 June 1997 

Dennis Jones 4 June 1999 

Timothy Leahy 8 June 2001 

Lance Bodine 20 June 2003 

Charles Nussman 4 Feb 2005 

Todd Lancaster 13 Feb 2006– 

 8 Dec 20074
APPENDIX B │ 661

Notes

1. Various 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW) and 16th SOW histories.

2. Various 39th SOW and 352d Special Operations Group histories.

3. Crawford, “Nomads of the Pacific,” pamphlet, Air Force Special Operations 

Command History Office, Hurlburt Field, FL. 

4. Various 1550th Combat Crew Training Wing, 542d Crew Training Wing, and 

58th SOW histories.

Appendix C

Crews on the Last Flight,

26–27 Sept 2008

Cowboy 21 (MH-53M #69-5785)

Maj Brian Roberts

 Capt Dan Florence

 SMSgt Mark Pryor

 SrA Justin Foster

 TSgt Corey Fossbender

 SSgt William Sell

 Lt Col Gene Becker

 Lt Gen Donald Wurster

 Lt Col Larry Riddick

Cowboy 22 (MH-53M #70-1631)

 Capt Eric Maddox

 Capt Michael Blough

 TSgt Shawn Watkins

 SSgt Carl Smith

 TSgt Michael Welles

 SSgt Andrew Bickham

Cowboy 23 (MH-53M #67-14995)

 Capt Brian Daniels

 Capt Scott Dunning

 TSgt Morris Jefferson

 TSgt Terry Hobbs

 TSgt Daniel Mann

 SrA Justin Trumpower

 Col John Hicks
664 │ APPENDIX C

Cowboy 24 (MH-53M #68-0924)

 Capt Keith Snook

 Capt Matthew Gidley

 MSgt Kevin James

 TSgt Jesse Kennedy

 MSgt Robert Strong

 SrA Brooks Sadilek

Cowboy 25 (MH-53M #69-5790)

 Capt Ryan Vanveelen

 Capt Andrew Billhartz

 TSgt Vincent DePersio

 TSgt James Rhodes

 SSgt Matthew Garcia

 TSgt Linwood Stull

Cowboy 26 (MH-53M #68-8284)

 Maj Philip Cooper

 Capt Peter Hettinger

 TSgt Henry Woodie

 A1C Joshua Lucas

 SSgt Shawn Lewis

 SrA Eric Harp

 Col Scott Howell1

Notes

1. Flight crew lists, provided by Lt Col Gene Becker to the author.
Appendix D

Pave Low Distinguished Awards

Mr. Clarence Mackay Trophy

Sanctioned by the USAF, the Mackay Trophy recognizes the most 

meritorious flight of the year by an Air Force person, persons, or 

organization.

(1991) The Crew of Moccasin 04, 20th Special Operations Squadron 

(SOS):

Capt Thomas Trask

Maj Michael Homan

MSgt Tim Hadrych

TSgt Greg Vanhyning

TSgt James Peterson Jr.

SSgt Craig Dock

Sgt Thomas Bedard

Awarded for their rescue of the pilot of Slate 46 in Iraq during 

Operation Desert Storm. 

(2001) The crew of Knife 04, 20th SOS:

1st Lt James Holder

Capt Jay Humphrey

SSgt Chad Ackman

TSgt Vince DePersio

SSgt Mark Wolcott

SSgt Alberto Aguinaldo Jr.

Awarded for the rescue of the crew and passengers of Knife 03, 

 a fellow 20th SOS Pave Low that crashed in enemy territory in

Afghanistan in November 2001.1
666 │ APPENDIX D

Aviator Valor Award

Sanctioned by the USAF, the Aviator Valor Award is given for a conspicuous act of valor or courage performed during aerial combat or 

noncombat flight by a rated Air Force officer.

(1996) Capt Steven Kelly

(2004) Capt Steven Edwards2

Cheney Award

The USAF presents this award yearly to aviators for bravery in a humanitarian venture in memory of 1st Lt William Cheney, killed in an 

air collision over Italy in 1918.

(1993) Lt Col Michael Russell and Maj John Brainerd, 21st SOS

(1995) Capt Charles (Mark) Harmon, 352d Special Operations 

 Group, and Capt Charles Moncrief, 20th SOS

(1996) Maj Marshall Webb, 21st SOS

(2002) Maj Kevin Churchill and Capt Sean LeRoy, 21st SOS

(2003) Capt Randal Voas and Capt Craig Prather, 21st SOS

(2004) Maj Marshall Groves, 16th Special Operations Wing3

Col James Jabara Airmanship Award

The Jabara Award is awarded yearly to an Air Force Academy graduate 

who has demonstrated superior performance in fields directly involved with aerospace vehicles. 

(1992) Capt Corby Martin

(2000) Maj James Cardoso

(2003) Maj Leighton Anderson

(2008) Capt Jonathan Graham4

Koren Kolligian Jr. Trophy

Supported by the USAF, the Kolligian Trophy is awarded annually for 

“outstanding feats of Airmanship by aircrew members who by extra-
APPENDIX D │ 667

ordinary skill, exceptional alertness, ingenuity or proficiency, averted 

accidents or minimized the seriousness of accidents in terms of injury, 

loss of life, aircraft damage or property damage.”

(1984) Capt Jack Kelly

For saving his crew and passengers by successfully auto-rotating 

his aircraft into an open area when the tail rotor gearbox failed. 

(2005) Capt Steven Edwards 

For the successful recovery of his aircraft when it was severely 

damaged by enemy fire in Iraq in April 2004.

(2007) Lt Col Gene Becker

For actions that saved his crew when his MH-53M suffered 

catastrophic failure and crashed in September 2007.5

Lt Gen William H. Tunner Award

This award is presented by the Air Mobility Command (formerly 

Military Airlift Command) to the best airlift crew of the year. 

(1988) An HH-53H crew from the 20th SOS for recovering its aircraft 

from a serious in-flight emergency. 

Capt Paul Schumacher

Capt Jeff White

TSgt Keith Moore

SSgt Timothy Hill

SSgt James Roth

SSgt Michael Warren

Sgt Harold Hinson Jr.

SrA Thomas Brothers

(1997) Crew of Sealion 23 from the 21st SOS for evacuation flights in 

Operation Assured Response, Monrovia, Liberia.

Maj Charles (Mark) Harmon

Capt Gordon Moore

MSgt Michael Nicholas

 SSgt Todd Buice

 SSgt Joseph Frank Jr.

Amn Sean Burnett6

 
668 │ APPENDIX D

Lance P. Sijan USAF Leadership Award

Award named in honor of the late Captain Sijan, who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his intrepidity while held 

as a prisoner of war by North Vietnamese forces. It recognizes officers and enlisted leaders, assigned at wing level or below, who have 

demonstrated the highest qualities of leadership in the performance 

of their duties and the conduct of their lives.

(1990) Maj Jeffrey Walls

(1999) Maj Mark Daley

(2004) Capt Joseph Michalek7

Notes

1. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2805, Special Trophies and Awards, 6; and Mr. 

Kyle Rensler, USAF/A3O-ATF (Awards Office, Air Staff), Pentagon, Washington, DC.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Data supplied by Lt Col Steve Simon, USAF, retired, and Ms. Jean Bickford, 

Association of Graduates, Air Force Academy, Colorado.

5. AFSOC Commando Safety Journal, Winter 2009, 5; and www.jollygreen

/research/RonThurlow/NotableH53s.htm. 

6. History of the Twenty-Third Air Force, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1988, vol. 1, 47; and History 

of the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), 1 Jan–31 Dec 1997, vol. 1, 55.

7. History of AFSOC, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1990, vol. 1; ibid., 1 Jan–31 Dec 1999; AFI 

36-2805, Special Trophies and Awards, para 3.9; and “Official List,” provided by 

USAF/A1SOU (Uniforms and Recognition Branch).
Appendix E

Pave Low Chief Master Sergeants

 Victor Allen

 James Anderson

 Richard Bobo

 John DeSalle

 Thomas Green

 Scott Hedglin

 Gregory Kebil

 Jon Knox

 James Kradel

 James Mecke

 Randy Patrick

 John Selfridge

 Leonard Sullivan

 Kevin Thurman

 Pete Zilink

Appendix F

Pave Low General Officers

(as of publication)

Lt Gen Donny Wurster

Maj Gen Mark Clark, USMC

Maj Gen Rich Comer

Maj Gen John Folkerts

Maj Gen Michael Kingsley

Maj Gen Tom Trask

Brig Gen Scott Howell

Brig Gen Lyle Koenig

Brig Gen Tim Leahy

Brig Gen Greg Lengyel

Brig Gen Michael Planert

Brig Gen Brad Webb

Abbreviations

AAA antiaircraft artillery

AAW aeromedical airlift wing

ABW air base wing

ACC Air Combat Command

AD air division

AEF air expeditionary force

AETC Air Education and Training Command

AFHRA Air Force Historical Research Agency

AFLC Air Force Logistics Command

AFMC Air Force Materiel Command

AFOTEC Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation 

Center

AFR Air Force regulation; Air Force Reserve

AFSC Air Force Systems Command

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

AFSOCCENT Air Force component of SOCCENT

AFSOD Air Force special operations detachment

AGL above ground level

AGSS Aerial Gunner Scanner Simulator

AHHS altitude hold and hover stabilization 

(system)

AIRSOUTH Allied Air Forces Southern Europe

AMARC Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration 

Center

AMC Air Mobility Command

ANG Air National Guard

AOR area of responsibility

AR Atlas Response

ARINC Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated

ARRG Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group

ARRS Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

ARRSq aerospace rescue and recovery squadron

ARRW aerospace rescue and recovery wing

ARS Air Rescue Service

ARSq air rescue squadron

ASD-ISA assistant secretary of defense for international 

security affairs
674 │ ABBREVIATIONS

ASD/SDY Aeronautical Systems Division Specialized 

System Program Office

ASD/SOLIC assistant secretary of defense for special 

operations and low-intensity conflict

ATTW Aircrew Training and Test Wing

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

AWC Air War College

BAT (Operation) Bahamas, Antilles, and Turks

BIAP Baghdad International Airport

BRAC base realignment and closure

C4 command, control, communications, and 

computer systems

CAOC combined air operations center

CARA combat aircrew recovery aircraft

CBU cluster bomb unit

CCT combat control team

CCTW combat crew training wing

CENTAF US Air Forces, US Central Command

CFACC combined forces air component commander

CHECO Contemporary Historical Evaluation of 

Current Operations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CJCS chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJSOAC combined joint special operations air 

component

CJSOTF combined joint special operations task force

CJSOTF-AP Combined Joint Special Operations Task 

Force–Arabian Peninsula

CJTF combined joint task force

COCOM combatant command

CROC combat required operational capability

CSAF chief of staff of the Air Force

CSAR combat search and rescue

CTJTF counterterrorist joint task force

CTW crew training wing

DCS deputy chief of staff

DMZ demilitarized zone
ABBREVIATIONS │ 675

DO director of operations

DOD Department of Defense

DT&E developmental testing and evaluation

EAPS engine air particle separator

ECM electronic countermeasures

ELF electronic location finder

ESOS expeditionary special operations squadron

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAC forward air control/forward air controller

FAD force activity designator

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCF functional check flight

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FLIR forward-looking infrared

FLTS flight test squadron

FOB forward operating base

FOL forward operating location

FOT&E follow-on operational test and evaluation

FS fighter squadron

FTS flying training squadron

FW fighter wing

FY fiscal year

GAO Government Accountability Office

GPS Global Positioning System

GWOT global war on terror

HCS Helicopter Combat Support Special 

Squadron

HGS Helicopter Generation Squadron

HM-16 Helicopter Mine Countermeasures 

Squadron 16

HMH Marine heavy helicopter squadron

HMXS helicopter maintenance squadron

HQ headquarters

HS helicopter squadron

HUD head-up display
676 │ ABBREVIATIONS

ID infantry division

IDAS/MATT Interactive Defense Avionics Systems/

Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal

IED improvised explosive device

IFOR Implementation Force

IFR instrument flight rule

IG inspector general

IHAS integrated helicopter avionics system

IMC instrument meteorological conditions

INS inertial navigation system

IOT&E initial operational test and evaluation

IP instructor pilot

IR infrared

IRCM infrared countermeasure

J-3 operations directorate

J-CATCH Joint Countering Attack Helicopter 

JCET joint combined exchange training

JCRC Joint Casualty Resolution Center

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

JFACC joint forces air component commander

JOWG joint organizational working group

JRCC joint rescue coordination center

JSAR joint search and rescue

JSOA Joint Special Operations Agency

JSOAC joint special operations air component; 

Joint Special Operations Aviation Command

JSOACC joint special operations air component 

commander

JSOAD joint special operations air detachment

JSOC Joint Special Operations Command

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JTF joint task force

KFIA King Fahd International Airport

KKMC King Khalid Military City 

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

LNRS limited night recovery system
ABBREVIATIONS │ 677

LORAN long-range aid to navigation

LZ landing zone

MAC Military Airlift Command

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MACVSOG Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 

Studies and Observation Group

MATS Military Air Transport Service

MCAS Marine Corps air station

MDS mission design series

MEF Marine expeditionary force

MEI management effectiveness inspection

METL mission essential task list

MEU Marine expeditionary unit

MFP major force program

MiGCAP MiG combat air patrol

mm millimeter

MNC-I Multi-National Corps–Iraq

MNF-I Multi-National Force–Iraq

MOB main operating base

MRS Mission Rehearsal System

NADEP naval aviation depot

NARF Naval Air Rework Facility

NAS naval air station

NASA National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVSPECWARCOM Naval Special Warfare Command

NCO noncommissioned officer

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation

NKP Nakhon Phanom Air Base, Thailand

NOE nap-of-the-earth

NOS night operations system

NRS night recovery system

NVA North Vietnamese Army

NVG night vision goggles

OAF Operation Allied Force

ODA Operational Detachment Alpha 
678 │ ABBREVIATIONS

OEF Operating Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OPCON operational control

OPLAN operation plan

ORI operational readiness inspection

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OT&E operational testing and evaluation

PACAF Pacific Air Forces

PCS permanent change of station

PDASD-ISA principal deputy assistant secretary of 

defense for international security affairs

PDF Panama Defense Forces

PERSTEMPO personnel tempo

PF Prairie Fire (Operation)

PhLASH photographic landing augmentation system 

for helicopters

PJ pararescue jumper

PLS precision locator system

PMD program management directive

POM program objective memorandum

PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 

System

PSAB Prince Sultan Air Base

QRF quick reaction force

RAD requirements action directive

RDJTF Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

RHAW radar homing and warning

RMC rescue mission commander

ROC required operational capability

ROE rule of engagement

ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps

RPG rocket-propelled grenade

RPV remotely piloted vehicle

RQS rescue squadron

R-SOLL rescue special operations low-level

RWR radar warning receiver

RWRW Rescue and Weather Reconnaissance Wing
ABBREVIATIONS │ 679

SAAS School of Advanced Airpower Studies

SAC Strategic Air Command

SAM surface-to-air missile

Sandy call sign for rescue escort A-1s in Southeast 

Asia

SAR search and rescue

SAS Special Air Service (British); stability 

augmentation system

SATCOM satellite communications

Scud surface-to-surface missile

SEA Southeast Asia

SEAOR Southeast Asia operational requirement

SFG special forces group

SFOD-Delta Special Forces Operational Detachment–

Delta

SGU special guerilla unit

shp shaft horsepower

SLEP service life extension program

SMOTEC Special Missions Operational Test and 

Evaluation Center

SO special operations

SOA special operations aviation

SOAR Special Operations Aviation Regiment

SOC special operations command

SOCCENT Special Operations Component, US 

Central Command

SOCEUR Special Operations Component, US 

European Command

SOCIFOR Special Operations Command Implementation Force

SOCPAC Special Operations Component, US Pacific 

Command

SOD special operations division

SOF special operations force

SOFC Special Operations Forces Command

SOFNET SOF Intersimulator Network

SOG special operations group

SON statement of operational need

SOPAG Special Operations Policy Advisory Group
680 │ ABBREVIATIONS

SOS special operations squadron

SOW special operations wing

SPO system program office

stan/eval standardization and evaluation

STS special tactics squadron

STU secure telephone unit

TAC Tactical Air Command

TACAN tactical air navigation

TACC tactical air control center

TACON tactical control

TACS tactical air control system

TAF tactical air force 

TASS tactical air support squadron

TCHTS technical training squadron

TCW Tactical Control Wing

TDY temporary duty

TF task force 

TF/TA terrain following/terrain avoidance

TFA Task Force Alpha

TFR terrain-following radar

TFS tactical fighter squadron

TFW tactical fighter wing

TRAP tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel

TRSS training support squadron

TSAR theater search and rescue

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UHF ultrahigh frequency

UHT undergraduate helicopter training

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

USA United States Army

USAAG/7AF United States Army Advisory Group/

Seventh Air Force

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe

USASOC United States Army Special Operations 

Command

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

USEUCOM United States European Command

USGS United States Geological Survey
ABBREVIATIONS │ 681

USLANTCOM United States Atlantic Command

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

USPACOM United States Pacific Command

USREDCOM United States Readiness Command

USSAG/7AF United States Support Activities Group/

Seventh Air Force

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command

UTM universal transverse mercator

UW unconventional warfare

VFR visual flight rules

WIC weapons instructor course

WMD weapon of mass destruction

WR-ALC Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center

WRSK war readiness spares kit 

WSO weapons system operator

WST weapons system trainer

Bibliography

The bibliography is divided into the following sections: archival 

collections of unit histories from the Air Force Historical Research 

Agency (AFHRA); articles; books; reports, papers, and studies; e-mails 

to the author; interviews by the author; messages, letters, and memorandums; and miscellaneous. The archival collections, particularly at 

the AFHRA, and the interviews I conducted were the sources I referred 

to the most in telling the Pave Low story. All documents are unclassified, 

declassified, or redacted for the author’s use. 

Air Force Historical Research Agency

Maxwell AFB, AL

Unit Histories

1st Special Operations Wing (SOW)

1 Jan–31 Dec 2008, vol. 1 

1 Jan–31 Dec 2007, vol. 1 

1 Jan–31 Dec 2006, vol. 1 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1991, vols. 1, 3 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1990, vols. 1, 2, 3

1 July–31 Dec 1989, vols. 1, 3

1 Jan–30 June 1989, vols. 1, 3

1 Jan–31 Dec 1988, vol. 1 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1987, vols. 1, 3

1 Jan–31 Dec 1985, vol. 1 

1 Oct 1982–28 Feb 1983, vol. 1 

1 July–30 Sept 1982, vol. 1 

1 Apr–30 June 1982, vol. 1 

1 Jan–31 Mar 1982, vols. 1, 2 

1 Oct–31 Dec 1981, vols. 1, 2

1 Apr–30 June 1981, vols. 1, 2 

1 Jan–31 Mar 1981, vols. 1, 2 

1 Oct–31 Dec 1980, vols. 1, 2

1 Apr–30 June 1980, vol. 2 

1 Jan–31 Mar 1980, vol. 2 

1 Jan–30 June 1979, vol. 1
684 │ Bibliography

1 Oct–31 Dec 1978, vol. 1

1 Apr–30 June 1978, vol. 1

1 Jan–31 Mar 1978, vol. 1

1 Oct–31 Dec 1977, vol. 1

1 July–30 Sept 1977, vol. 1

1 Jan–31 Mar 1977, vol. 1 

1 July–30 Sept 1976, vol. 1

1 Jan–31 Mar 1976, vol. 1

2d Air Division (AD) (Including the 1st SOW) 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1986, vols. 1, 5 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1984, vols. 1, 2 

1 July–31 Dec 1983, vol. 1 

1 Mar–30 June 1983, vols. 1, 2, 6 

3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group (ARRG) 

1 Jan–31 Mar 1974 

1 July–30 Sept 1973 

1 Oct–31 Dec 1972 

1 July–30 Sept 1972 

1 Apr–30 June 1972 

1 Oct–31 Dec 1971

1 July–30 Sept 1971 

1 Apr–30 June 1971 

1 Apr–30 June 1970 

1 Jan–31 Mar 1970 

16th SOW 

1 Jan–31 Dec 2005, vol. 1 

1 Jan–31 Dec 2004, vol. 1 

1 Jan–31 Dec 2003, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 2002, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 2001, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 2000, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1998, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 1998, vol. 1 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1997, vol. 1 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1996, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1994, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 1994, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1993, vol. 1 
Bibliography │ 685

20th Special Operations Squadron (SOS)

See histories of 1st and 16th SOWs for the period specified.

21st Helicopter Squadron (HS) and 21st SOS

See histories of the 39th, 56th, and 656th SOWs; 56thAir Commando Wing (ACW); and 352d Special Operations Group (SOG) 

for the period specified.

Twenty-Third Air Force 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1989, vols. 1, 6 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1988, vols. 1, 3 

1 Jan 1986–31 Dec 1987, vol. 1

1 Jan 1984–31 Dec 1985, vols. 1, 2 

Twenty-Third Air Force and Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 

(ARRS)

1 Jan–31 Dec 1983, vols. 1, 5 

23d Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS)

1 July–30 Sept 1971 

37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRSq)

1 Apr–30 June 1972

1 Jan–31 Mar 1972

1 Oct–31 Dec 1971 

1 Jul–30 Sept 1971

1 Apr–30 June 1971

39th SOW 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1992, vol. 1 

1 July 1990–31 Dec 1991, vols. 1, 3 

1 Jan–30 June 1990, vol. 3

1 July–31 Dec 1989, vols. 1, 3 

1 Jan–30 June 1989, vols. 1, 3

1 Jan–30 June 1988, vols. 1, 2

40th ARRSq

1 July 1975–31 Jan 1976 

1 Jan–30 June 1975 

1 July–31 Dec 1973 

1 Apr–30 June 1973 

1 Jan–31 Mar 1973 

1 Apr–30 June 1972 

1 Jan–31 Mar 1972 

1 July–30 Sept 1971 

1 Jan–31 Mar 1968 (Detachment 1) 
686 │ Bibliography

56th ACW

1 Apr–30 June 1968, vol. 1

1 Jan–31 Mar 1968, vols. 1, 2 

1 Oct–31 Dec 1967

8 Apr–30 June 1967

56th SOW 

1 July–30 Sept 1975, vol. 1

1 Apr–30 June 1975, vols. 1, 2, 3 

1 Jan–31 Mar 1975, vols. 1, 2 

1 July–30 Sept 1974, vols. 1, 2

1 Apr–30 June 1974, vol. 2

1 Jan–31 Mar 1974, vol. 2

1 Oct–31 Dec 1973, vol. 1

1 July–30 Sept 1973, vols. 1, 2 

1 Apr–30 June 1973, vol. 1 

1 Jan–31 Mar 1973, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1972, vols. 1, 2, 3 

1 Apr–30 June 1972, vols. 1, 3

1 Oct–31 Dec 1971, vols. 1, 2

1 Jan–31 Mar 1971, vols. 1, 2

1 Oct–31 Dec 1970, vols. 1, 2

1 July–30 Sept 1970, vols. 1, 2

1 Apr–30 June 1970, vol. 1

1 Jan–31 Mar 1970, vol. 1 

1 Oct–31 Dec 1969, vols. 1, 2

1 July–30 Sept 1969, vols. 1, 2

1 Jan–31 Mar 1969, vols. 1, 2

1 Oct–31 Dec 1968, vol. 2 

1 July–30 Sep 1968, vol. 1 

58th SOW 

1 Jan 2007–31 Dec 2008, vol. 1

1 Jan–31 Dec 2006, vol. 1

1 Jan–31 Dec 2005, vol. 1

1 Jan–31 Dec 2004, vol. 1

1 Jan–31 Dec 2003, vol. 1

1 Jan–31 Dec 2002, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 2001, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 2001, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1

1 Jan–30 June 2000, vol. 1
Bibliography │ 687

1 Jan–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1

1 July–31 Dec 1998, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 1998, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1997, vol. 1 

1 July 1996–30 June 1997, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 1996, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1995, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 1995, vol. 1 

1 Apr–31 Dec 1994, vol. 1 

352d SOG 

1 Jan–31 Dec 2007, vol. 1

1 Jan–31 Dec 2006, vol. 1

1 Jan 2004–31 Dec 2005, vol. 1

1 Jan–31 Dec 2003, vol. 1

1 July–31 Dec 2002, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 2002, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 2001, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 2001, vols. 1, 2

1 July–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1998, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 1998, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1997, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 1997, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1996, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 1996, vol. 1

1 Jan–31 Dec 1995, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1994, vol. 1

1 Jan–30 June 1994, vol. 1 

1 Dec 1992–31 Dec 1993, vol. 1 

353d SOG 

1 July–31 Dec 2001, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 2001, vols. 1, 2 

1 July–31 Dec 2000, vol. 1 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1999, vol. 1

1 July–31 Dec 1998, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 1998, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1997, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 1997, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1995, vol. 1 
688 │ Bibliography

1 Jan–30 June 1995, vol. 1 

1 July–31 Dec 1993, vol. 1 

1 Jan–30 June 1993, vol. 1 

1 Jan–31 Dec 1992 (History of the 353d SOG, Formerly the 353d 

SOW), vols. 1, 2

353d SOW

1 July–31 Dec 1991, vols. 1, 5

1 Jan–30 June 1991, vols. 1, 3, 4, 5 

1 July–31 Dec 1990, vol. 4 

1 Jan–30 June 1990, vol. 3 

1 July–31 Dec 1989, vol. 2 

542d Crew Training Wing (CTW) 

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Miscellaneous

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2001.

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AFB, OH. News release. Public Affairs Memorandum (PAM) 80-126, 

n.d. In Gambone, Pave Low III: That Others May Live, supplemental docs. 

Briefing books. Secretary of the Air Force. Directorate of Long-Range 

Power Projection, Special Operations Forces, Airlift and Training 

(SAF/AQQU). Pentagon, Washington, DC. Provided to the author 

by Col Bill Bassett.

Burns, James. “Green Hornets Case Their Flag . . . The End of an Era.” 

Hurlburt Field, FL, 16–18 Oct 2008. A personal account. http://

www.rotorheadsrus.us/documents/GREEN%20HORNETS%20

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Cassidy, Gen Duane. Oral history interview. Transcript, 4 Aug and 17 

Aug 1989. AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.

Crawford, MSgt Robert. “Nomads of the Pacific: Chronology of the 31st 

SOS, 6 April 1989–31 December 2000.” Pamphlet, n.d. AFSOC/HO, 

Hurlburt Field, FL.

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HO, MacDill AFB, FL.

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51. AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt Field, FL. 

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MC-130/MH 53 Basing Proposals. USSOCOM/HO, Hurlburt 

Field, FL.

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AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, AL.
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georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01

/20070110-7.html.

Wurster, Lt Col Donny, SAF/AQQU. Point paper. Conversion of Additional MH–53Js, n.d. SAF/AQQU briefing book. Provided to 

the author by Col Bill Bassett.

I Marine Expeditionary Force, 552, 

556, 563–65, 588–89

1st Armored Division (British), 552

1st Battalion, 10th SFG, 448

1st Battalion, 160th SOAR, 323

1st Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment, 376

1st Fighter Wing, 376

1st Helicopter Squadron, 495–96

1st Marine Division, 552

1st Space Wing, 376

1st Special Operations Group, 356, 

629, 647

1st Special Operations Squadron, 37, 

176, 179, 215, 250, 323–25, 342, 631

1st Special Operations Wing, 84–85, 

103–5, 111, 123, 142, 144, 153–54, 

156, 165–66, 173, 175–76, 179, 

182–183, 185, 187, 189–90, 208, 

213–15, 226, 230–31, 233–34, 242, 

248, 253, 256, 258, 264, 270, 274–75, 

277, 281, 286, 290, 356, 375–76, 

612, 615, 622, 628

2d Air Commando Group, 359

2d Air Division, 178–79, 182–85, 187, 

189, 192–93, 195, 199, 214–15, 228, 

230–31

2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, 

243

2d Satellite Control Squadron, 285

Second Air Division, 185

3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Group, 13–14, 27, 36–37, 40, 43, 71, 92

3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), 551

3d Special Forces Group, 228

3d Tactical Fighter Squadron, 85

3d Tactical Fighter Wing, 338–39

Third Air Force, 598

4th Infantry Division, 551

4th Tactical Fighter Wing, 312

V Corps, 551–52, 556, 563–64, 587

5th Special Forces Group, 296, 506, 

514, 554, 556, 564, 577, 587

6th Special Operations Squadron, 426, 623

VIIth Corps, 326

7th Infantry Division, 399

7th Special Operations Squadron, 179, 

215, 244

Seventh Air Force, 13, 16, 23, 31, 35–36, 

40, 43, 48, 52, 60, 69, 74, 93, 360

Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force, 57

8th Special Operations Squadron, 323, 

505, 507, 635

9th Special Operations Squadron, 244, 

248

10th Mountain Division, 381, 538

10th Special Forces Group, 301, 331, 

448, 567–70, 573, 587

Thirteenth Air Force, 57, 251, 337–39

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 519, 521

16th Helicopter Generation Squadron, 

474, 489

16th Helicopter Maintenance Squadron, 

603

16th Special Operations Group, 407, 

410, 424, 438, 506, 540, 574, 601

16th Special Operations Squadron, 84, 

149, 388, 410

16th Special Operations Wing

1st SOW redesignated as 16th 

SOW, 375

16th SOW reverts to 1st SOW, 612

17th Special Operations Squadron, 

250, 341

XVIII Airborne Corps, 264, 326

18th Flight Test Squadron, 379–80, 

390, 421, 596, 628, 638

18th Wing, 363

Nineteenth Air Force, 378

20th Expeditionary Special Operations 

Squadron, 3, 588, 597–99, 602, 

615–16, 619–20, 623, 627, 629–31, 

633–34, 636

21st Helicopter Squadron, 57–58

21st Special Operations Squadron 

activation, 58

inactivation, 84, 612, 615, 622

Twenty-First Air Force, 183, 487, 494

Twenty-Second Air Force, 183 

Index
710 │ index

23d Tactical Air Support Squadron, 38, 

27, 72

Twenty-Third Air Force, 27, 38, 50, 72, 

178–79, 182–85, 192–95, 198, 213–14, 

216, 219, 223, 228, 230–31, 233–36, 

241, 248–53, 275–76, 380, 581

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 393

27th Fighter Wing, 612

27th Special Operations Wing, 630

31st Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Squadron, 215, 242, 250

31st Special Operations Squadron, 215, 

250, 279–80, 287–88, 299, 337–43, 

350, 355, 359–63, 373–75, 388, 398, 

402, 428, 437, 441, 434, 463–64, 466, 

476–77, 479–81, 490–91, 528, 542

33d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Squadron, 94, 108, 112, 124, 162, 249

37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Squadron, 13, 18, 25, 30, 36, 45, 49, 

51, 95, 249

38th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Squadron, 227, 249

38th Air Rescue Squadron, 11

39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Wing, 92, 120, 130, 184, 214–15, 244

39th Special Operations Wing, 214, 

244, 248, 250, 279, 288, 301, 304, 

331–32, 351, 358–59

40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Squadron, 21–23, 25–27, 29–31, 

33–34, 36, 40–46, 49–52, 62, 64, 

66–68, 70–71, 73–78, 82–83, 85–86, 

92, 104, 115, 127, 148–49, 226, 233, 

398, 480

41st Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Squadron, 42, 51, 94, 112, 116, 131, 

140–41, 151, 153, 174, 180, 186, 

193, 208, 211, 223–26, 239, 241, 249

41st Rescue and Weather Reconnaissance Wing, 92, 94, 114, 168, 171, 

184, 186, 214–15, 226, 239, 249, 

463, 469

41st Rescue Squadron, 459, 463, 469, 471

48th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Squadron, 17, 212, 215

49th Fighter Wing, 449

52d Tactical Fighter Wing, 301

55th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Squadron, 92, 94, 112–13, 120, 130, 

141, 155, 162, 208, 215, 244, 250, 634

55th Special Operations Squadron, 

244, 248, 250, 267, 291, 325, 332, 

352, 354, 434, 447–48, 464, 493

56th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Squadron, 85, 249

56th Air Commando Wing, 58–59

56th Rescue Squadron, 471

56th Special Operations Wing, 59, 71, 84

58th Special Operations Group, 378, 

431, 583, 620–21

58th Special Operations Wing, 289, 

345, 378–79, 382, 391, 393, 400, 

411, 429, 442, 466, 490, 542–43, 

545, 579, 582–83, 597, 607–9, 612–13, 

620, 622

58th Training Support Squadron, 401, 

412, 442, 467, 477–78, 542, 546, 

582, 596

66th Rescue Squadron, 364, 519, 582

67th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Squadron, 93–94, 107–8, 112–13, 

119, 128–29, 132, 140, 149, 186, 

191, 215, 227, 245, 254

67th Special Operations Squadron, 

245–46, 248, 301, 413

71st Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Squadron, 249

71st Rescue Squadron, 463, 469

71st Special Operations Squadron, 291, 

306, 321–22, 325, 606, 609, 621

75th Fighter Squadron, 475

75th Ranger Regiment, 243, 264, 267, 384

76th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Squadron, 67, 94

76th Helicopter Flight, 543–44

76th Rescue Flight, 389, 430

82d Airborne Division, 266, 381, 551, 566

100th Air Refueling Wing, 393, 500

101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division, 

153–54, 297, 551, 628

101st Aviation Regiment, 297

123d Special Tactics Squadron, 570

160th Aviation Battalion, 165, 190
index │ 711

160th Special Operations Aviation 

Regiment, 165, 276, 291, 296, 298, 

322, 327, 355, 379, 391, 424, 437, 

464, 490, 588

173d Airborne Brigade, 552, 572

313th Air Division, 342

321st Special Tactics Squadron, 570

347th Rescue Wing, 582, 603–4

352d Operations Support Squadron, 440 

352d Special Operations Group, 359, 

371, 374, 384, 387, 391, 393, 404–5, 

407, 410–11, 421–23, 440, 468, 

470–73, 493, 499–500, 534, 552, 

567–70, 576, 578, 598–99, 613–15, 

622

353d Special Operations Group, 340, 

352, 363, 374, 391, 398, 428, 441, 

468, 476, 576 

353d Special Operations Wing, 215, 

249–50, 338–39, 341–43, 351, 359–60, 

363

375th Aeromedical Airlift Wing, 183–84, 

192, 214, 231

512th Special Operations Squadron, 

378

526th Fighter Squadron, 384

542d Crew Training Wing, 346, 377–78, 

542d Technical Training Squadron, 

346, 378, 400

550th Flying Training Squadron, 378

551st Flying Training Squadron, 343, 

346–47, 362, 378, 430, 436, 465, 

472, 546, 581

551st Special Operations Squadron, 

376–78, 389, 400, 411–12, 429–32, 

437, 441–42, 466–67, 477–78, 480, 

527, 541–42, 546, 578, 582–83, 

596–97, 601, 606–10, 610, 620–21, 

596, 624, 631

555th Fighter Squadron, 393, 455

563d Rescue Group, 582

601st Tactical Air Support Squadron, 

84–85, 91–93, 162, 193, 238

601st Tactical Control Wing, 84, 238, 245

602d Tactical Air Control Wing, 157

656th Special Operations Wing, 84

701st Tactical Air Support Squadron, 

85, 91, 124–25, 143, 157

834th Air Base Wing, 356

1550th Aircrew Training and Test 

Wing, 41–42, 92, 94–95, 101, 106, 

114–15, 118, 126, 141, 155, 171–72, 

184–86

1550th Combat Crew Training Wing, 

184, 214, 216, 230, 233, 236–38, 

248, 275, 277, 280, 344, 346

1550th Flying Training Squadron, 94

1550th Technical Training Squadron, 

344, 346

1551st Flying Training Squadron, 114, 

128, 132, 236–37, 248–49, 277–79, 

329, 344–46, 354, 610

1606th Air Base Wing, 183–84, 214, 

231, 346

4950th Test Wing, 97–98, 101

6512th Test Squadron, 95

6594th Test Group, 94, 126, 129, 161, 

175–76, 186, 193–94, 212, 227, 230, 

353

A-1. See under aircraft by designation 

A-7. See under aircraft by designation 

A-10. See under aircraft by designation 

A-26. See under aircraft by designation 

AAA. See antiaircraft artillery 

AAW. See aeromedical airlift wing 

Abizaid, John, 593

above ground level, 106, 109, 118, 133

Abrams, Creighton, 31, 46

AC-119. See under aircraft by designation 

AC-130. See under aircraft by designation 

ACC. See Air Combat Command 

Ackman, Chad, 517

Aderholt, Heinie, 58

ADF. See automatic direction finding 

Adkins, Shawn, 455

Adrian, John, 132

AEF. See air expeditionary force 

aeromedical airlift wing, 183, 231

Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated, 255, 

390, 625, 635

Aeronautical Systems Division Specialized 

System Program Office, 97
712 │ index

Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center, 542, 620, 634

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, 

13–14, 18, 23–24, 30, 34, 63, 73, 

92–94, 96, 101, 103–5, 107–9, 111–14, 

118–20, 124–25, 128–30, 133–34, 

140, 149, 153, 155–56, 165, 167–69, 

172–76, 177–78, 180, 182–85, 197, 

214, 226, 249–50

AETC. See Air Education and Training 

Command 

AFCS. See automatic flight control 

system 

AFHRA. See Air Force Historical Research Agency 

AFLC. See Air Force Logistics Command 

AFMC. See Air Force Materiel Command 

AFOTEC. See Air Force Operational 

Test and Evaluation Center 

AFR. See Air Force Reserve 

AFSC Directorate of Combat Systems, 96

AFSC. See Air Force Systems Command 

AFSOCCENT. See Air Force component 

of SOCCENT 

AFSOD. See Air Force special operations detachment 

AGL. See above ground level 

AGSS. See Aerial Gunner Scanner 

Simulator 

AH-1. See under aircraft by designation 

AHHS. See altitude hold and hover 

stabilization (system) 

Ahmann, James, 185

aircraft by designation

A-1, 21–22, 25–27, 30–31, 36–37, 

39, 46–48, 59, 62, 64, 72, 128, 153

A-7, 22, 50, 70, 72, 74, 85, 100, 128, 

131, 170

A-10, 128, 239, 295, 315–18, 322, 

393, 395–96, 399, 429, 449, 455–

56, 475, 561, 575

A-26, 59, 153

AC-119, 66

AC-130, 44, 49–50, 73–74, 79–82, 

84, 131, 142, 153, 165, 169, 181, 

189–90, 235, 267, 271, 329, 381, 

395–96, 464, 513, 530, 561–63, 

568, 589, 591–92, 619, 627

AH-1, 394, 490

AV-8 Harriers, 385, 394

B-52, 11, 45, 68, 64, 95, 150, 170, 

376, 511, 520, 583

C-5, 85, 129, 139–40, 142, 154, 172, 

175, 230, 246, 287–88, 331–32, 

362, 405, 428, 472, 481

C-123, 21

C-130, 13, 29, 71, 81, 97, 131, 145–

46, 154, 168, 174, 179, 182, 373, 

449, 509, 536, 582, 611

C-141, 64, 71, 129, 143, 154, 270, 

287, 322, 329, 426, 428

Cessna 172, 545

CH-3, 12, 58–59, 60–63, 66, 105, 

109, 120–24, 134, 153, 158, 195

CH-46, 36, 75–76, 519

CH-47, 68, 117, 153, 163, 265–66, 

270, 320–21, 473, 537, 587, 614

CH-47D/E, 436

CH-53, 17, 62–67, 70, 73–78, 80–

82, 84, 86, 91, 94, 107, 116, 134, 

143, 147–49, 156, 161, 212, 223, 

245–46, 251, 278, 357, 394, 453, 

473, 480, 519, 578, 636, 645–46 

shot down, 80

CH-53A, 8, 17, 57, 85, 238, 248, 

344, 346, 353 

CH-53C, 17, 57, 62–63, 65, 69–70, 

74–75, 78–79, 91–93, 124, 193, 

238, 630

CH-54, 7, 57

CT-43

crash in Croatia and recovery 

efforts, 403, 408 

CV-22, 391, 420, 430, 435, 464, 466, 

606, 609, 611, 615, 621, 623–24, 

634–35, 637, 649

EA-6B, 315, 440–41

EB-66, 20–21, 45

EC-130, 142, 144

F-4, 22, 25–26, 31, 36, 47–48, 50, 

52, 59, 74, 242, 339, 376

F-15, 122, 301, 315, 321, 343, 456, 

492
index │ 713

F-16, 181, 301, 304, 309–10, 328, 

330, 359, 384–85, 393–94, 399, 

455–56, 475, 512, 619

F-18, 308, 395–96, 489, 511, 515–

16, 523

F-84, 95

F-105, 19, 22, 31, 36

H-3, 22, 60, 64, 66, 86, 98, 110–11, 

140, 191, 215, 227, 242, 244, 

250, 308, 322, 337, 440

H-34, 20, 22

H-47, 159

HC-130, 13, 19, 26–27, 29, 31, 50, 

70, 85, 94, 117, 129–30, 151, 

156, 159, 171, 174, 178, 181, 

209, 215, 244–47, 247, 250, 264, 

313–14, 331, 341, 363–64, 401, 

413, 434, 552, 582, 603

HH-3, 13–14, 17, 19–20, 25, 29–31, 

33, 62, 139, 229, 250, 369, 410

HH-43, 11–12, 19, 68

HH-53, 19–35, 36, 39–40, 42–45, 

47–48, 50, 52, 62, 64, 66–68, 73, 

75–76, 78, 82, 85–86, 91–96, 

98–101, 106–9, 111–12, 114–16, 

119–20, 124, 126–31, 134, 139–

41, 143, 149, 151, 153–55, 156, 

162–63, 168–69, 172, 174, 186–

87, 189–90, 193–94, 198, 208, 

213, 223–25, 227, 229–30, 245, 

250, 254, 312, 353, 453, 480, 

610, 636, 645

HH-53B, 17–21, 25–27, 33–35, 45, 

57, 94–97, 115, 151, 164, 168–69, 

171–73, 193, 197, 215, 224, 290

HH-53C, 17–18, 94, 164, 193

HH-53H, 112, 114, 125, 127, 132, 

134, 139–41, 151, 164–66, 168, 

176, 180, 184, 186, 192–93, 195, 

197–98, 200, 210, 212–13, 223, 

226, 228, 238, 241–44, 254, 434

HH-60, 183, 193, 191, 197, 212, 

215, 250, 291, 348–49, 401, 419, 

459, 471–72, 519, 552, 582, 603, 

621

HH-60G, 377, 436, 471

HM-16, 143–44

H-X, 168, 197

MC-130, 30–31, 105, 146, 165, 189, 

213–15, 235–36, 256, 264, 275, 

301, 323, 327, 342, 348, 391, 

381, 383, 394–95, 401–2, 405–7, 

410–11, 421–22, 428, 458, 464, 

475, 510, 512, 516–18, 524–25, 

527–28, 530, 532, 535, 540, 558–

59, 564, 545, 571–73, 582, 595, 

603, 611, 614

MC-130E, 236, 264, 304, 507, 515, 517

MC-130P/N, 217, 450, 470–71, 540

MH-47, 209–10, 264, 322, 324, 327, 

407, 514, 580, 607, 615

MH-47/D/E, 209–10, 217, 231, 264, 

291, 322, 324, 327, 407, 436, 

490, 514, 580, 607, 615

MH-53, 3–4, 215, 217, 219, 231, 

235–37, 247, 275, 292, 296–97, 

300, 304–6, 314, 322, 331–32, 

337, 342, 345, 347, 349, 353–55, 

369, 373, 376, 382, 385, 387, 

390–91, 395, 398–400, 402, 405, 

411–14, 421–22, 425–26, 428, 

430, 434–36, 438–39, 441–42, 

447, 451, 454–55, 455, 464, 467, 

470–74, 478–81, 487, 489–90, 

525, 534, 553, 582, 595, 597, 

603, 607–8, 610, 611–14, 627, 

634–35, 647

MH-53J, 212, 218, 226, 229–30, 

233–34, 236–38, 242–46, 248, 

250–51, 253–54, 258, 264, 268, 

277–78, 280, 290, 301–2, 304, 

317, 337, 344, 346, 353, 372, 

378, 390, 393, 399–400, 406, 

412–13, 421, 423–24, 437, 440–

42, 446–48, 453, 460–61, 466–

67, 476–77, 480, 542–44, 542, 

545, 596, 609, 620, 622, 633, 

581–82, 607–8

MH-53J #66–14433, first Pave Low 

aircraft, 94–95

MH-53M, 437, 440, 446–48, 453, 

459–60, 463, 475–76, 480, 487, 

491, 496–97, 515, 535, 542, 546, 
714 │ index

555, 557, 578, 582, 589, 608, 

624, 628–30, 632–35, 645, 648

MH-60, 209–10, 264, 267, 270, 296, 

301, 314, 323–25, 327, 354–55, 

365, 369, 381, 389, 391, 434, 

446–47, 451, 454–57, 459, 519, 

611, 627–28

MH-60G, 217, 291, 325, 332, 447–

48, 464

MH-60K, 217, 437, 513

crash in Utah, 1992, 354

MiG-21, 27 

O-2, 26, 59

OV-10, 27, 38, 45, 64

P2V (Navy), 22

Pave Low II, 96

Pave Low III, 97, 101–3, 106–7, 

109, 112–14, 116, 119, 125–26, 

132–35, 151, 153–54, 156–57, 

164–68, 175–76, 197, 210, 212, 

218, 229–30, 233, 413, 646

Pave Low IIIE, 244, 353, 437

Pave Low IV, 216–18, 437

RF-4C, 27

RH-53D, 142, 149

T-28, 59 

T-37, 115, 130, 227, 254, 390, 543

T-38, 115, 390, 428 

TH-53A, 238, 280, 346–47, 378, 

412, 431, 466–67, 477–78, 480, 

490, 543–44

TH-55, 73

UH-1, 21, 45, 134, 378, 399, 401, 

605, 649

UH-1N, 72, 103–5, 109–11, 120–

24, 153, 172, 188, 195, 208, 212, 

215, 232, 239–40, 242, 348, 361–

62, 373, 389, 428, 430, 436, 543–

44, 624

Air America, 20, 22, 44, 66, 68

Air Combat Command, 351, 377, 419–

20, 434–35, 464, 468–69, 475, 487, 

581, 610–11

air component commander, 148, 151, 

291, 298, 324, 506

Air Education and Training Command, 

351, 377–78, 412, 466, 478, 597

air expeditionary force, 433–34, 464, 

468–69, 487

aerospace expeditionary forces concept, 

597

Air Force 2000 study, 177

Air Force Academy, 32, 41, 67, 73, 

128–29, 191, 224, 227, 240, 254, 

330, 348, 389, 399, 413, 428, 430, 

465, 601, 624, 635

Air Force Armament Museum, 620, 634

Air Force component of SOCCENT, 290

Air Force Cross, 47, 83, 223

Air Force Element Operations Evaluation Group, 165

Air Force Heritage Foundation Museum, 

635

Air Force Historical Research Agency, 

18, 20, 37, 51, 65, 76, 80, 99, 152, 

247, 277, 288, 294, 492, 498

Air Force Logistics Command, 75, 351

Air Force Museum, 620, 632

Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, 420–21

Air Force Regulation 23-19, 174

Air Force Reserve, 104–5, 174, 291, 582

Air Force special operations detachment, 528, 534

Air Force Systems Command, 24, 94, 

96–97, 108, 227, 346, 351

Air Mobility Command, 351

Air National Guard, 72, 105, 570, 582

Air Rescue and Recovery Training 

Center, 30

Air Rescue Service, 11, 13, 249–51, 281, 

291–92, 352–53, 363–64, 377, 434

air tasking order, 295

Air War College, 461, 472, 476, 492, 

535, 542

Airborne Warning and Control System, 304, 309–12, 315–17, 371, 448, 

516

AIRSOUTH. See Allied Air Forces 

Southern Europe 

Akrotiri, Cyprus, 108, 570–71, 614

Al Basrah, Iraq, 552

Al Faw, Iraq, 553–54, 560, 562–63

Al Jaber AB, 489
index │ 715

Al Jafr AB, 552

Al Jouf, Saudi Arabia, 294, 300, 305–6, 

308–9, 316, 318, 320–21, 323–24, 326

al Sadr, Muqtada, 593

Albania, 445–46, 454–55, 576, 598, 622

Albrook AFB, 131

Aldrich, Tom, 191, 228, 268–69, 382, 

390, 436, 625, 635

Alexander, Paul, 436, 521

Ali Al Salem AB, 462, 469, 552, 554–55, 

557, 563, 566, 577

Allen, Byron, 590–92

Allen, James, 177–78, 183, 185 

Allen, Lew, 167–68, 174

Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, 

388, 394

Allied Force operation, 304, 332, 446–47, 

459, 461–62

Hammer 34 recovery, 455, 458, 460 

Vega 31 recovery, 448–49, 451–55, 

461, 475, 632

Allison, John, 20–21

Alsid, Mark, 617

altitude hold and hover stabilization 

system, 620, 624, 628

Alvarez, John, 426–27

AMARC. See Aerospace Maintenance 

and Regeneration Center 

AMC. See Air Mobility Command 

AN/APQ-126 radar, 99

AN/APQ-141, forward looking radar, 94

Anderson, Leighton (Lee), 330, 530, 

532–33

Andrews AFB, 125, 495

ANG. See Air National Guard 

Ansar al-Islam, 574

antiaircraft artillery, 82, 385, 394

AOR. See area of responsibility 

Aqua Wally II exercise, 337

Aquino, Corazon, 251

AR. See Atlas Response 

Arar, Saudi Arabia, 294, 306, 308, 312, 

315–16, 322–25, 327

Arce, Troy, 310

area of responsibility, 22, 264, 294, 568

ARINC. See Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated 

Armitage, Richard, 219

Army of the Republic of Vietnam, 47, 67 

Army Special Operations Command, 

231, 276, 607

Arnau (Major), 62

ARRS. See Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service 

ARRTC. See Air Rescue and Recovery 

Training Center 

ARS. See Air Rescue Service 

ARVN. See Army of the Republic of 

Vietnam 

Asadabad, Afghanistan, 536

ASD/SDY. See Aeronautical Systems 

Division Specialized System Program Office 

ASD/SOLIC. See assistant secretary of 

defense for special operations and 

low-intensity conflict 

Ashcan 01 rescue, 36, 39–40

Asheville, NC, 191, 228, 375, 423, 494–95, 

599

Aspin, Les, 373

assistant secretary of defense for special 

operations and low-intensity conflict, 219, 236, 248 

Assured Response operation, 405–6, 

408, 410

Atlas Response operation, 470–71

ATO. See air tasking order 

automatic flight control system, 8, 34, 113

Aviano AB, 357–58, 384, 393, 395, 451, 

455, 458

Aviator Valor Award, 408, 592

AWACS. See Airborne Warning and 

Control System 

AWC. See Air War College 

B-52. See under aircraft by designation 

Backlund, Don, 75, 79, 83, 106, 128

Baghdad International Airport, 575, 

580, 587–89, 591–92, 616

Baghdad, Iraq, 309, 311, 317, 551–52, 

563–66, 574, 577, 580, 588, 593, 

601, 616, 618

“bag of air commando tricks,” 541

Bagram, Afghanistan, 537, 539–40, 578
716 │ index

Bahamas, Antilles, and Turks operation, 45, 188, 212 

Bailey, Maxwell “Clay,” 376, 388, 464, 

468, 481, 487, 528

Bajram Curri, Albania, 455 

Balad AB, 4, 565, 588, 592–602, 605, 

614–19, 622–24, 627–34

Balance Mint exercise, 398

Balance Piston exercise, 398

Balfe, Paul, 95

Balkans, 369–70, 372, 384, 386, 392, 

398, 401, 419, 440, 445–46, 463, 

468–69, 479–80, 647

Bardshar, Fred, 31

Bargewell, Eldon, 446–47, 454, 459

Barnes, Joe, 151, 155, 176, 233, 625

Barton, Mike, 272

base realignment and closure, 365, 381, 

400

commission, 400 

Basher 52 recovery operations, 393 

Bashur, Iraq, 571, 573–74

Bassett, Bill, 302, 345, 347, 362, 371

BAT (Operation). See Bahamas, Antilles, 

and Turks (Operation) 

Bat 21 rescue, 45

Batman AB, 303–4, 312–14, 317, 321, 

325, 569

Beale AFB, 400

Beard, Mike, 254, 315, 326

Becker, Eugene (Gene), 3, 425, 560, 

562, 625, 629, 633–36, 644, 647–49

Becker, Joe, 225, 228, 256, 265, 269, 

271–72, 286–87, 338–39, 341, 343, 

347–49, 358, 472–73, 492, 499–500, 

534–35, 628–29 

Becklund, Vince, 389–90, 423–24, 430, 

465, 601, 603–5, 615, 618–19, 623, 

626–29, 631, 633–34, 638, 644, 649

Beckwith, Charlie, 142, 145, 148, 164–65, 

279

Behnke, Pat, 176

Beira, Mozambique, 471

Beira, 471

Bergeron, Woody, 37

Bergschneider, Barry, 458

Bergstrom AFB, 85, 91, 107

Berry, Matt, 558, 577, 591, 600

Bettison, Aaron, 534, 556

Bevel Edge operation, 428 

BIAP. See Baghdad International Airport 

Bien Hoa AB, 33, 36, 42

Big Mish, 266, 274, 358, 375, 382, 454, 541

Billings, Jim, 347

Binh Thuy AB, 36

bin Laden, Osama, 498–99, 540, 650

Bishop, Fred, 538

Blackburn, Donald, 185

Black Knight, 91, 95, 98–99, 125, 613, 622

Black Lion III operation, Khe Sanh, 67 

blade inspection method, 8

Blewitt, Jim, 151

Bloomfield, Chris, 452

Blue Flag exercise, 110

Bodine, Lance, 384, 583, 607

Boivin, Richard, 95

Bond, Robert, 101

Bon Jovi, 622, 644, 649

Borinski, George, 153, 156

Borland, Sean, 436, 490, 514, 536, 538–39, 

560–62, 564, 566

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 370–71, 394, 448

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 394

Bowden, Mark, 148

Bowers, Ray, 57, 86

Bowling, Brian, 132, 590

Boykin, William, 148

BRAC. See base realignment and closure 

Bradley, Roger, 67

Braganca, Eric, 373

Brainerd, John, 364–65

Braswell, Arnold, 122

Bratcher, Paul, 573

Breck, Jim, 371, 387, 403, 448

Breedlove, Billy, 396

Bridges, Al, 239

Bright Light mission, 64 

Bright Star operation, 173, 397

Brims, Richard, 73, 81, 83, 223–24, 233

Brindisi AB, 371–72, 374, 384–88, 

392–97, 402, 405, 408, 410–11, 

421–23, 438, 440–41, 446, 448, 

454–55, 459–61, 463, 473
index │ 717

British forces, 287, 321–22, 327, 397, 

404, 408, 506, 552, 560, 562, 570, 

576, 614

British Royal Marines, 560, 562

British Special Air Service, 320–21, 386

Britton, Warner 30, 36 

Brown, Bryan D. (Doug), 154, 298, 

322, 324, 612

Brown, George, 82

Brown, Harold, 23, 142, 150–51, 163, 

165, 169

Brown, Martin, 310

Brown, Ronald, 403, 406

Brown, Tim, 324, 430

brownout landing, 238, 289, 295, 324, 

527, 530–31, 536, 541, 555, 557, 

583, 590, 602, 620, 628, 646

Brozenick, Norm, 615

Brumble, Bob, 268

Buice, Todd, 556

Bunker Hill AFB, 95

Burrell, “Paco,” 249, 344, 347

“Bush Doctrine,” 502

Bush, George H. W., 264, 285–86, 296, 

299, 301, 306, 328, 331, 549

Bush, George W., 495, 499, 501, 505, 

510, 528, 550–51, 556, 566, 576, 

613, 616, 619

Butcher, Jack, 64

Butera, Larry, 28

C4. See command, control, communications, and computer systems 

C-5. See under aircraft by designation

C-17. See under aircraft by designation

C-123. See under aircraft by designation 

C-130. See under aircraft by designation 

C-141. See under aircraft by designation 

Cambodia, 11, 38, 43, 51–52, 58, 68–69, 

71, 74, 77, 80, 399, 428–29, 473

Cameron, Shawn, 330, 448, 530, 601

campaign plan 1003V, 551, 567

Camp Blanding, 408

“Camp Kingsley,” 508

Camp Lemonier, 540, 552–53

Camp Mackall, 169, 461

“Camp Mohawk,” 570

Camp Rhino, 523, 525, 528

Canadian forces, 530

Canavan, Michael, 397, 403–7

Cannon AFB, 307, 378, 606–7, 611–12, 

623, 630

CAOC. See combined air operations 

center 

Caporicci, Lou, 269, 448

CARA. See combat aircrew recovery 

aircraft 

Cardoso, Jim, 428, 446, 448–53, 455, 

460–61, 606–7, 609

Carlton, Paul, 94, 101, 107, 112

Carlucci, Frank, 236

Carmichael, T. J., 475

Carroll, Phil, 300

Carter, Darrel, 625

Carter, Jimmy, 142

Casey, Jim, 42

Casino Dancer exercise, 187 

Cassidy, Duane, 178, 214, 216, 221, 

231, 248–52

Cayler, Russ, 19–20

CBU. See cluster bomb unit 

CCT. See combat control team 

Cecil Field, 408

CENTAF. See United States Air Forces, 

US Central Command 

CENTCOM. See United States Central 

Command 

Central America, 130, 135

Central Intelligence Agency, 263, 505, 

514, 559

Certain Tribute exercise, 173 

Cessna 172. See under aircraft by designation 

Cessop, Brian, 431–32, 494, 509, 516, 

518

CFACC. See combined forces air component commander 

CH-3. See under aircraft by designation 

CH-46. See under aircraft by designation 

CH-47. See under aircraft by designation 

CH-53. See under aircraft by designation 

CH-53A. See under aircraft by designation 

CH-54. See under aircraft by designation 
718 │ index

chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29, 82, 

220, 286, 363, 475, 505

Chamberlain, Wendy, 512

Chanute AFB, 95

Checkmate, 195

chemical weapon, 286, 549

Cheney Award, 329, 365, 396, 408, 535, 

573, 592

Cheney, Richard “Dick,” 286, 301, 308, 

594

Cherrey, John, 449–50

Cherrington, Steve, 514, 537

chief of staff of the Air Force, 16, 24, 

97, 111, 165, 167, 177, 221, 223, 

350, 391, 432, 454, 468, 581, 592

Chili Flag exercise, 378, 400, 411, 442, 467

Chu, David, 210

Churchill, Kevin, 535, 610

CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency 

Cid, Del, 272

civil SAR, 111, 129, 608

CJCS. See chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJSOAC. See combined joint special 

operations air component 

CJSOTF-AP. See Combined Joint Special 

Operations Task Force–Arabian 

Peninsula 

Clancy, Tom, 258–59, 379

Clare, Brendan, 302, 354, 357, 476, 490

Clark AB, 42, 57, 215, 242, 249–50, 

277, 279, 287–88, 337–42, 359, 528

Clark, Wesley, 446

Clay, Lucius, 31, 34

Clear and Present Danger, 258, 379

Clem, J. D., 228, 288, 370, 384

Clemons, Bill, 450, 452

Cleveland, Charles, 568

Clifford, Clark, 57

Clinton, Bill, 381, 440, 473–74

cluster bomb unit, 38 

Cobra Gold exercise, 251, 398 

COCOM. See combatant command 

Cody, Dick, 297, 301, 305–6

Cohen, William, 218, 470

Colannino, Robert, 512, 538–39, 590–92

Cold Winter ’90 exercise, 302

Collins, Mike, 104, 348 

Columbus AFB, 543

Colvin, Greg, 190, 218

combat aircrew recovery aircraft, 14–17

combatant command, 219–20, 433, 468

combat control team, 75, 189, 357, 378, 

517, 528 

Combat Required Operational Capability 

6-72, 43

11-70, 23, 34

15-71, 36

combined air operations center, 402

combined forces air component commander, 506, 508, 510, 519, 553

combined joint special operations air 

component, 476, 569, 615, 617, 629, 

636

Combined Joint Special Operations 

Task Force–Arabian Peninsula, 577, 

588–89, 593–96, 619 

combined joint task force, 331–32 

CJTF-7, 587–88, 593

Combined Joint Task Force Exercise 

’96, 408

Comer, Rich, 32, 73, 78, 82, 85, 92, 128, 

224–25, 232, 242–44, 264, 270–71, 

277, 279–80, 285–87, 289–90, 293, 

295–301, 303, 305–9, 311, 319–25, 

329–30, 353, 356–57, 424, 438, 490, 

541–42, 633–34, 637

command, control, communications, 

and computer systems, 392

Commando Look, 355, 372–73, 376, 

389–90, 420, 430–32, 435

Commando Spotlight, 420

Commando Vision, 380–81, 398, 606

“Compass Cool,” 120

Conley, John, 402, 404, 406

Conmy, John, 601

Connelly, Steve, 41–44, 51, 73, 91, 115–19, 

125–26, 128–29, 132–33, 139–41, 

151, 153–54, 156, 159, 161, 176, 

225, 228, 233, 241, 245, 302, 405, 

407, 435, 468–69, 475, 481–82, 613, 

646–47, 649

Connors, James, 424, 468, 475

Constanta, Romania, 568–70

Cook, Dale, 250, 337
index │ 719

Cook, P. J., 277

Cooper, Frank, 630

Cooper, Phil, 5

Cooper, Thomas, 208

Cooper, Tom, 79

Cooperative Chance exercise, 410

Cope Thunder exercise, 198

Corder, Wayne, 179

Cornum, Kory, 237

Correll, Gene, 227, 232, 268–69, 279, 

287–88, 298, 325, 328, 343, 359–60, 

374, 490

Corson, Howard, 79

Costa Rica, 131

Costa, Jeffrey, 472

counterterrorist joint task force, 150, 165

Coverdale, Robert, 182

“cowboy priority,” 159

Cox, Hugh, 176, 179, 183, 231

Craig AFB, 130

Craven, William, 97–100, 103, 125

Creech, Wilbur (Bill), 122, 174, 178, 182

Crested Rooster, 126, 227

Crews, Carl, 71, 86, 469

Croatia, 370–71, 393–94, 396, 402–4, 449

CROC. See Combat Required Operational Capability 

Crowe, William, 219, 247

CSAF. See chief of staff of the Air Force 

CSAR forces transfer to ACC, 434 

CSAR forces transfer to AFSOC, 353 

CT-43. See under aircraft by designation 

CTJTF. See counterterrorist joint task 

force 

Cullers, Herb, 72

Cunningham, Mark, 287, 300, 309, 329

Cutts, Brian 622

CV-22. See under aircraft by designation 

Da Nang AB, 11, 13, 25–26, 28, 31, 33, 

36, 43, 49, 51, 95

Dailey, Dell, 301

Dakar, Senegal, 405–6

Daley, Mark, 447–48, 454, 461, 487–88, 

619

Dalton, Chris, 591

Damron, Michael, 155, 350, 378, 400

Daniel, Dan, 183, 196, 207–8, 221, 234

Darner, Doug, 573

Davidson, Nathan, 632

Davis–Monthan AFB, 429, 542–43, 621

Dawson, Clark, 277

Dayton Peace Accord, 396

Dean, David, 345

Dean, John Gunther, 74

Debayle, Anastasio Samoza, 130

DeCaro, Joe, 428, 618, 624, 634

Defense Review Board, 210

de la Billière, Peter, 320

Delay, Hardy, 176

Deliberate Force operation, 394, 396–97, 

446

Delling, Steve 

demilitarized zone, Vietnam, 15, 45 

Denehan, Bill, 456

Denham, John, 73, 78

Deny Flight operation, 371, 384, 387, 393

DePersio, Vince, 457–58, 632

Dermody, Tom, 509–10, 513–14

DeSalle, John, 343–44, 358, 371, 398, 

473, 478, 569, 575–76, 599–600, 

618, 632, 637

Desert Calm operation, 352, 357–58

Desert One, 142–46, 148, 150, 172, 

258, 276, 279, 281, 298, 302, 348, 

434, 505

Desert Shield operation, 287, 294, 305, 

329, 344, 380, 480, 554

Desert Storm operation, 288, 294, 305, 

325, 329, 338, 343–44, 349, 352–53, 

356–57, 364, 375, 389, 394, 412, 

433–34, 440, 472, 478, 480, 487, 

541, 543, 551, 556, 569, 626, 647

Corvette 03 rescue attempt, 312, 

314–15, 319–20, 330, 442, 466

Slate 46A recovery, 555 

special operations missions, Bravo 

20, 321

Task Force Normandy, 297, 300, 

306, 308

Desert Thunder operation, 438 

developmental testing and evaluation, 105

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 287–88 

Diamond Jim operation, 121
720 │ index

Diekman, Scott, 524–25

Dinsmore, Robert, 376, 395–96

direction find, 27, 314

Display Determination exercise, 228, 245

Ditka 04, 524–25

Dixon, James, 18

Diyarbakir AB, 303 

Djibouti, 540, 552–53, 558, 566, 577–78, 

583, 597, 613

DMZ. See demilitarized zone 

Dobbins AFB, 169, 223, 232, 242–43, 

254, 259, 280

Doberman, Matt, 617–18

Dock, Craig, 316

Doherty, T. J., 190

Dolby, Rick, 625

Donohue, Frederic, 18, 32

Dorazio, Ron, 198

Doty, Pete, 330, 430, 455, 489, 491–93, 

567–68, 576

Douglas, Mike, 72

Dover AFB, 142, 623

Downing, Wayne, 298, 322, 385, 391–92

Doyle, John, 125

Drew, Tom, 307

Dreyer, Steve, 407

DT&E. See developmental testing and 

evaluation 

du Picq, Ardant, 643–44

Dubrovnik, Croatia, 402–4

Dubuisson, John, 452

Duffy, Dave, 263, 267, 275

Dugway Proving Grounds, 159

Dunn, Harry, 13

Dunwoody, Richard, 111, 123

Eager Anvil operation, 296, 300–301, 

303, 306

Eagle Pull operation, 69, 72, 74–75

EB-66. See under aircraft by designation 

Eberly, Dave, 312–13

Ebro 33 recovery operations, 394–95 

EC-130. See under aircraft by designation 

ECM. See electronic countermeasures 

Edwards AFB, 35, 45, 94, 96, 228, 239, 438 

Edwards, Steven, 570, 575, 589–92, 

601–2

Eggers, Tom, 217, 253, 276, 352

Eglin AFB, 17–18, 28–30, 34, 92–94, 

109–10, 112–14, 123, 125, 130, 141, 

155, 159, 162, 169, 189, 208, 215, 

237, 244, 248, 620, 629, 634

Elated Cyclone exercise, 223

electronic countermeasures, 15, 34, 

43–44, 113, 212, 380

electronic location finder, 27, 43, 48, 113

ELF. See electronic location finder 

Ellipse Bravo operation, 358, 387

Ellis, Richard, 108, 112, 114

Elmendorf AFB, 249

Elusive Concept operation, 301, 303–4 

Endara, Guillermo, 273

Enduring Freedom operation, 505–7, 

527, 581, 597, 603

England AFB, 239

England, Flo, 561

Ernest, Ken, 39, 43–44, 106, 134, 151

Escobar Gaviria, Pablo, 256–57 

Eustace, Jim, 228, 249, 349

Everest, Frank, 30

Ewing, Kevin, 239, 323, 326

Extended Knight exercise, 337 

Ezell, Erick, 493, 553–54, 556, 559, 618

F-4. See under aircraft by designation 

F-15. See under aircraft by designation 

F-16. See under aircraft by designation 

F-18. See under aircraft by designation 

F-84. See under aircraft by designation 

F-105. See under aircraft by designation 

FAA. See Federal Aviation Administration 

FAC. See forward air control/forward 

air controller 

FAD. See force activity designator 

Fairchild AFB, 159, 348, 361

Falcon 74 rescue, 36, 40 

Fallujah, Iraq, 566, 588–89, 591–93, 596

FARP. See forward arming and refueling 

point 

FBI. See Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FCF. See functional check flight 

Fedayeen forces, 562, 565 

Federal Aviation Administration, 427, 495

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 496
index │ 721

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, 495–96

Feltman, Jeffrey, 614

FEMA. See Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Ferguson, Michael, 520

F. E. Warren AFB, 249, 373

Fiel, Eric, 602, 609

Fister, Bruce, 337, 352, 355, 360, 379–80, 

392

Fiterre, Manny, 601

flight mechanic, 44–45, 50, 52, 65–66, 

79, 83, 98–99, 101, 105–6, 113–14, 

118, 127, 132, 141

Flintlock exercise, 141, 187, 254, 302

FLIR. See forward-looking infrared 

Florence, Dan, 3, 5, 631

Foal Eagle exercise, 181, 343, 363, 441, 

476

FOB. See forward operating base 

Fogelsong, Robert, 495

Fogleman, Ron, 178, 360, 391

FOL. See forward operating location 

Folkerts, John, 155, 249, 277, 346, 429, 

431, 466, 611

follow-on operational test and evaluation, 115, 125–26, 129, 151

force activity designator, 208

Fort Bliss, 442

Fort Bragg, 121, 123, 144, 165, 169, 

181, 200–201, 223, 226, 236, 254, 

344, 350, 381, 461, 494, 600

Fort Campbell, 253, 276, 372, 407, 475

Fort Hood, 349

Fort Huachuca, 159

Fort Leavenworth, 149, 389, 440

Fort Ord, 399

Fort Rucker, 72–73, 121, 131, 162, 225, 

239, 347–48, 361, 413, 428, 543, 624

Fort Stewart, 173, 181

Fort Wolters, 41, 72

Fortner, Aylwyn, 176

forward air control/forward air controller, 

22, 25–26, 36, 38, 44, 59–60, 64, 68, 

70, 72, 74, 81–82

forward arming and refueling point, 562

Forward Look study, 213–14, 216, 225, 

228, 230, 244, 249–50, 380–81, 581

forward operating base, 102

forward operating location, 3, 21, 36, 

43, 49, 51–52, 71, 74, 230, 294, 305, 

328, 360, 529

forward–looking infrared, 97, 100–101, 

106, 113, 133, 166, 191, 212, 229, 

233, 246, 248, 253, 285, 292, 307–8, 

310, 328, 344, 389, 414, 450, 496, 

515, 539, 544–45, 571

Fossbender, Corey, 3, 631

FOT&E. See follow-on operational test 

and evaluation 

Francis, Raymond, 427

Franco, Jeff, 399

Franks, Chad, 448, 451

Franks, Tommy, 551, 556, 559, 593

Freeman, Dave, 246–47

Freetown, Sierra Leone, 405–7

French forces, 384, 395–97, 410, 540

Frequent Wind operation, 75–76

Fricsons, Erik, 399, 458

Fronk, Pat, 436, 521–22, 524–25, 608

Fucci, Joseph, 276

Fulk, Waylon, 44

functional check flight, 64, 74, 100, 

155, 254, 400, 406, 625, 635

FY 1987 Defense Appropriations Act, 219

Gabriel, Charles, 143–44, 172, 177, 179, 

181, 193–94, 197–98, 201, 207, 221

Gallant Eagle exercise, 228 

Gallant Knight exercise, 173, 175

Galvin, Grady, 458

Gambone, Leo, 91, 107

Garlington, Jerry, 315–16

Garshasb, Navid, 515–16, 518

Gast, Philip, 142, 144, 149

Gelling, Steve, 621

Genez, Vic, 98

Genis, Shane, 573

Giacchino, Eric, 451

Gibson, Don, 119

Glass, John, 448, 450–53, 461

Glasser, Otto, 24
722 │ index

Global Positioning System, 197, 212, 

229, 233, 254, 269, 285, 292–93, 

296–97, 301, 312, 319, 321, 400, 

449–50, 523, 544, 628

global war on terror, 499, 546, 577, 

598, 605, 647

Glosson, “Buster,” 294–96, 299, 312

Glover, Josh, 592

Glover, Matt, 448

Glover, Ted, 436

Goff, Randy, 316–18

Goldfein, David, 455, 457, 460

Goldwater-Nichols Act, 220, 292. See 

also Public Law 99-433 

Gonzalez, Ismael, 310

Goodlin, Douglas, 435

Goražde, Bosnia, 385–86

GPS. See Global Positioning System 

Graham, Jonathan, 602, 628

Granite Star II operation, 189

Grant, Gwen, 200

Grant, Louis (Lou), 42, 128, 151, 154, 

199, 224

“Grave Low,” 119

Gray, Frank, 326, 625

Gray, George, 256–58, 264, 286, 290–93, 

295–98, 306, 309, 312–14, 320–21, 

323, 325

Green Hornets, 103, 110, 169–70, 180, 

223, 248, 274, 357, 364, 409, 426, 554

Green Line, 569, 574–575

Green, Thomas (Tom), 64–67, 180, 

226, 271–72, 637 

Greer, Charles, 79

Gregg, Steve, 496, 521–25

Griffith, Tom, 312–13

Grime, Jeff, 339

Grove, John, 64, 66, 110–11, 122, 154–55, 

170–71, 173, 409, 644, 649

Groves, Marshall, 589–592

Grub, Mike, 330, 454, 526–27

Guantanamo Bay, 131, 376, 382–83

Guardian Assistance operation, 410

Guilmartin, Joe, 77, 83, 86, 279, 480, 

636

Gunfighter 82 rescue, 36, 40 

Gurley, Sid, 115

Guyana, South America, 120, 130, 168, 

634

GWOT. See global war on terror 

H-34. See under aircraft by designation 

H-47. See under aircraft by designation 

Haase, Eugene, 267, 620

Hadley, Steve, 509, 514, 518, 521–25

Hadrych, Tim, 316, 318

Halcomb, Bill, 199

Halcomb, Carlos, 347, 399

Hall, Robert, 170

Hamilton AFB, 42, 51, 115

Hamilton, Dave, 631

Hamilton, Mark, 624–26, 634

Harden, Grant, 212, 313–14, 370

Harmon, Charles (Mark), 395–96, 404, 

408, 575–76, 594–95

Harmon, Paul, 279–80, 290, 309–11, 

321–22, 325–27, 389, 422, 440, 

447–48, 454, 460–61, 469–70, 472, 

500, 505–6, 508, 510, 583, 623

Harris, Dave, 187, 200, 226, 344

Harrison, Barrett, 300

Harston, John, 83

Harte, Mike, 300

Hartman (Lt Col), 62

Harward, Bob, 340, 528

Hauenstein, Brett, 404, 622

Hauser, Harry, 58

Hawley, Richard, 419, 434–35

Haynes, Baylor, 14

HC-130. See under aircraft by designation 

head-up display, 229

Heavy Hook operation, 64

Heckman, Gary, 190

Heeter, Owen “Al,” 172

Heidmous, Walt, 173, 224

Helicopter Combat Support Special 

Squadrons 4 and 5, 291, 306, 315–16, 

588

Helicopter Mine Countermeasures 

Squadron 16, 143

Helmer, Frederick, 292 

Henrie, Shawn, 632

Herman, J. P., 399

Hess, Lee, 190, 339, 341–42, 355–56, 372
index │ 723

Hester, Jack, 212, 265, 267, 275, 280, 

439, 461, 637

Hester, Paul, 528, 582, 598, 612

Heyser, Dutch, 151

H-3. See under aircraft by designation

HH-3. See under aircraft by designation

HH-43. See under aircraft by designation 

HH-53. See under aircraft by designation 

HH-60. See under aircraft by designation 

Hickam AFB, 18, 67, 94, 129, 230

Hightower, Chuck, 69–70

Hill AFB, 33, 41, 45, 52, 67, 72–73, 

94–96, 98, 104, 106, 109, 115, 127, 

131, 230, 240, 249, 400, 620, 635

Ho Chi Minh Trail, 12, 22, 25–26, 33, 

37–38, 43–44, 46, 49, 58–59, 61–64, 66

Hobson, James, 244, 392, 401, 419–20, 

434, 606

Hoedspruit, South Africa, 471–72

Hohl, R. A., 106

Holder, Mike, 436, 508, 510–11, 514–18, 

532, 536–38, 597, 608–9

Holland, Charles, 236, 277–78, 420–21, 

433, 463–64, 606

Holloman AFB, 249, 400, 449, 610

Holloway Commission, 147, 149–50, 165

Holloway, James, 147, 185

Homan, Mike, 155, 300, 315–18, 321, 

323, 327, 394, 409, 430

Homestead AFB, 212, 357

Honduras, 254

Honey Badger operation, 150–51, 153, 

155–57, 159–62, 164–66, 169, 171, 

234, 266, 274, 541

Hooten, Byron, 331

Hoover, Don, 212, 382–83, 388–89, 394

Hornburg, Hal, 581

Horner, Chuck, 291–93, 296, 299, 308, 

311–12

Howard AFB, 106, 130–131, 171, 266, 

273

Howell, Scott, 5, 348–49, 358, 361, 375, 

384, 399, 594, 599–604, 615–18, 

637, 648–49

Hoyer, Sean, 627, 634

HUD. See head-up display 

Hudspeth, Bill, 72

Huff, Wilbur, 62

Hulin, Mike, 310

Hull, Thomas, 175, 225, 233, 409, 423–24, 

426–27, 439, 528

humanitarian-relief missions, 65, 102, 

104, 166, 220, 329, 331, 337–38, 352, 

378, 380, 382, 401, 408, 410, 428, 

434, 454, 460, 470, 479, 535, 636

Humphrey, Jay, 436, 517–18

Hunter, Hugh, 183

Hunter, Larry “Large Sarge,” 289–90, 554

Hurd, Joseph, 342

Hurricane Ike, 634

Hurricane Ivan, 599

Hurricane Katrina, 603–4

Hussein, Saddam, 303–4, 311, 331–32, 

349, 481, 549–50, 556, 559–60, 563, 

565–66, 575, 580, 587

Hutto, Earl, 125, 196, 199–200, 207, 

210–11, 214, 218, 220–21, 224, 236, 

248, 274–75

Hux, Ed, 242–43, 445, 450–53

Huyser, Robert, 167–69, 174, 177

H-X. See under aircraft by designation

IDAS/MATT. See Interactive Defense 

Avionics Systems/Multi–Mission 

Advanced Tactical Terminal 

IFOR. See Implementation Force 

IFR. See instrument flight rule 

IG. See inspector general 

IHAS. See integrated helicopter avionics 

system 

IMC. See instrument meteorological 

conditions 

I MEF. See I Marine Expeditionary 

Force 

Implementation Force, 397, 411

Incirlik AB, 249, 304, 365

inertial navigation system, 100, 105, 

126, 133, 191, 212, 229, 233, 285, 

316–17, 523

Infinite Justice operation, 505

in-flight refueling, 13–14, 17–19, 26, 

28, 57, 66, 102, 117, 154, 171, 200, 

209–10, 256, 323, 327, 383, 391, 

412, 422, 438, 508, 510
724 │ index

infrared countermeasure infrared 

countermeasures, 110, 120, 212, 322

initial operational test and evaluation, 

17, 106

Initiative 17, 194–98, 207–9, 217, 231, 

281, 301, 325, 353, 363, 392, 464, 

481, 490, 636, 638, 646

INS. See inertial navigation system 

inspector general, 177, 213, 302, 462, 599

instrument flight rule, 39–40

instrument meteorological conditions, 

163

integrated helicopter avionics system, 

8, 23

Interactive Defense Avionics Systems/

Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical 

Terminal IDAS/MATT, 380, 424, 

436–37, 439

IOT&E. See initial operational test and 

evaluation 

Iranian hostage crisis and recovery 

efforts, 135, 140, 142–43, 147–48, 

154, 163–65, 357

Iraqi Freedom operation, 549, 557, 

559, 561, 563, 566, 581, 588, 600, 

611, 615, 619

Irbil, Iraq, 575 

IRCM. See infrared countermeasure 

J-3 JCS Operations Directorate, 188, 454

Jabara Airmanship Award, 329, 452, 

532, 628

Jackel 33 rescue 

Jacobabad, Pakistan, 526

Jacobs, Paul, 79

Jafr AB, 552

Jaguar 03, 516

Jalibah, Iraq, 552

James, Kevin, 632

J-CATCH. See Joint Countering Attack 

Helicopter 

JCET. See joint combined exchange 

training 

JCRC. See Joint Casualty Resolution 

Center 

JCS. See Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JDAM. See Joint Direct Attack Munition 

Jensen, Craig, 374

Jensen, Don, 95, 98

JFACC. See joint forces air component 

commander 

Jobe, Jim, 279

Jobling, Bernard “B. J.,” 432, 528–29, 

558, 566, 580, 637–38, 643

John Paul II (pope), 421

Johnson, Hansford T., 276

Johnson, Horace “Bo,” 187, 200, 224–25, 

228, 233, 239, 240–41, 320

Johnson, Jesse, 290, 293, 296–97, 300, 

306–7, 312–13, 320 

Johnson, Paul, 316–18

Joint Casualty Resolution Center, 68–71

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29, 129–30, 142, 

147, 150, 177, 186, 188–89, 219–20, 

247, 463

joint combined exchange training, 398

Joint Countering Attack Helicopter, 

109, 114, 120–22

Joint Direct Attack Munition, 536

Joint Endeavor operation, 397, 402, 

411

joint forces air component commander, 

291, 293, 516, 581, 611

Joint Guard operation, 411, 420–21, 

423, 438, 440–41

joint operations center, 563

joint organizational working group, 178

Joint Personnel Recovery Center, 64

joint rescue coordination center, 293, 

295, 304, 309, 312–13

joint search and rescue, 304, 330, 332, 516

Joint Special Air Operations Detachment, 

552, 569, 575–77, 595, 600, 617

Joint Special Operations Agency, 

188–89, 220

joint special operations air component 

commander, 291, 293

Joint Special Operations Command, 

165–66, 171, 173, 175, 178, 180, 

187, 191, 200, 228, 231, 233, 270, 

298, 321, 330, 344, 438, 463, 494, 

527, 601, 650

joint special operations forces baseline 

master plan, 235
index │ 725

joint special operations task force, 165, 

193, 264, 301, 322–25, 327–28, 528, 

165, 322–25, 327–28, 344, 434, 446, 

459, 472, 568

Joint Special Operations Task Force 2, 

371–72, 387, 392–95, 398, 411, 

421–22, 446, 454–55, 458–59

Joint Task Force

1–79, 142, 156, 163–65 

1–89, 142

120, 189

Bravo, 254

Horn of Africa, 540

Joint Unconventional Warfare Task 

Force, Atlantic, 121

joint vertical-lift aircraft, 184, 193, 196, 

212, 216

Joker, 37, 40, 43–44

Jolly Green 64 crash, 52

Jolly Green 67, 37 mm fire damage, 

1969, 26 

Jolly Green 1972 shootdown, 45–46 

Jolly Green, flyby for, 425 

“Jolly Green Giants,” 12

Jones, David, 142, 163

Jones, Dennis, 212, 224, 246–47, 468, 

542, 578, 598

Jones, Devon, 315–19

Jonestown, Guyana, recovery mission, 

120, 130–31, 168, 634

Jordan, Bradley, 629

Jordan, John, 451

JOWG. See joint organizational working group 

JPRC. See Joint Personnel Recovery 

Center 

JRCC. See joint rescue coordination 

center 

JSAR. See joint search and rescue 

JSOA. See Joint Special Operations 

Agency 

JSOACC. See joint special operations 

air component commander 

JSOAD. See Joint Special Air Operations Detachment 

JSOC. See Joint Special Operations 

Command 

JSOTF. See joint special operations task 

force 

JSOTF2. See Joint Special Operations 

Task Force 2 

Jumper, John, 22, 581, 610

Just Cause operation, 263–65, 268, 270, 

272, 274–75, 281, 399, 439

Kabul, Afghanistan, 514, 526, 540

Kadena AB, 85, 94, 108, 112, 114, 124–25, 

162, 169, 249, 341–44, 359–60, 363, 

376, 398, 441

Kamhoot, Barry, 130–31

Kandahar, Afghanistan, 512, 519, 522, 

525–28, 534, 536–40

Karbala Gap, Iraq, 563, 565

Karbala, Iraq, 552, 563

Karzai, Hamid, 514, 519–21, 526, 528

Kasich, John, 236

Kaskel, “Rusty,” 604

Kelley, Rich, 457

Kelly, Jack, 162, 171, 191, 200, 278

Kelly, Orr, 166

Kelly, Steve, 369, 402–4, 406, 408

Kensey, Randy, 590

Kerwood, William “Scooter,” 457–58, 

578–79

KFIA. See King Fahd International 

Airport 

Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 129, 142

Kianka, Richard, 354

King Fahd International Airport, 

290–91, 297–98, 300, 318, 320–21, 

323–24, 326

Kingsley, Mike, 223, 227–28, 266–67, 

269, 280, 292, 296–97, 306, 308, 315, 

317–18, 323, 326, 327, 329, 356–57, 

420, 440, 454, 462, 487–88, 489, 

493–95, 499, 505–14, 516–18, 520–22, 

526–28, 534–35, 540, 543, 584 

Kinnear, Neil, 306

Kirkuk, Iraq, 575

Kisner, Frank, 494, 540, 552, 578

KLA. See Kosovo Liberation Army 

Knife 01, 516, 518

Knife 02, 516

Knife 03 crash, 515–16, 518, 533
726 │ index

Knife 04, 515–18, 523–25

Knife Blade exercise, 255

Koch, Noel, 185–87, 190, 196, 208–9

Koebernik, E. J., 106

Koegler, Fred, 604–5, 633

Koenig, Lyle, 191, 399, 438, 490, 540

Kollarik, Keith, 345

Kolligian Trophy, 201, 629, 633

Korat Royal Thai AFB, 70, 72, 74, 78, 85

Korenberg, Roger, 65

Kosovo, 441, 445–46, 448–49, 454–55, 

459, 497, 501

Kosovo Liberation Army, 445, 454

Kozuch, Kevin, 627

Kradel, Jim, 226, 271–72, 288–89, 298, 

371, 387–88, 493, 499, 570, 573–74, 

601

Kram, Anthony, 436

Kramer, Bill, 106

Krume, Albania, 454 

Kukes, Albania, 454 

Kunkel, Tom, 456

Kurdish forces, 552, 569, 574

Kyle, Jim, 142, 145–50

Lackey, J. B., 537

Lackey, Michael, 79

Lackland AFB, 72, 493, 553

Lael, Mike, 300

Laird, Melvin, 30–31

Lancaster, Todd “Burt,” 610, 613, 621

Landreth, Kent “Lando,” 413–14, 424–25, 

455–61, 638

Lang, Tom, 455, 458

Lankist, Francis, 436

Larsen, Dean, 158

Laushine, Steve, 354–55, 447–49, 

455–56, 460

Lavelle, John, 40

Lawrenz, Paul, 436, 602

Layne, Douglas, 372

Layne, 372

Lazzara, Frank, 436, 510, 514–15

Leahy, Tim, 278, 328, 357, 542, 583, 

628, 630

Lee, Jesse, 590

Lehew, Pete, 515, 518

Lemenager, Bill, 300, 321

Lengyel, Greg, 361–63, 375, 383, 389, 

430, 492–93, 499–501, 535, 549, 

567–73, 575–76, 594, 629, 631

Leonik, Bob, 266, 296, 306–7, 389, 412

LeRoy, Sean, 29, 150, 535

Lessner, Tom, 556, 560, 589–90

Letica, Mike, 237

Levin, Carl, 512

Lewis, Mark, 369

Lewis, Shawn, 5

Liberia, Costa Rica, 131

Liberia, South Africa, 405, 407 

light isolation device, 118

Lima Site 98, 19–20

limited night recovery system, 24, 24, 

34–35, 38, 40, 43–44, 49, 52

Lindsay, James, 221, 231, 235, 247–48, 

252, 275–76

Llano Grande Airport, 131

LNRS. See limited night recovery system 

Locher, James III, 364

Locher, Roger, 47–48

long-range aid to navigation, 38–40, 121

LORAN. See long-range aid to navigation 

Lovelady, Albert, 14

Luke AFB, 72, 104, 344, 378

Lum, Stuart, 603

Lunger, Ted, 190, 196, 201, 218

Lunt, Gary, 114, 178

Mabry, Casey, 591

MacDill AFB, 84, 220

Macedonia, 446, 455, 576

Mackay Trophy, 518

Mackenzie, Christian, 533, 589–91

MAC Programming Plan 80-6, 141

MAC SON 11-84. See Military Airlift 

Command Statement of Operational Need 11-84 

MACV. See Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

MACVSOG. See Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam, Studies and 

Observation Group 

Major Force Program 11, 219, 235, 252

Maldonado, Bob, 191, 382, 400, 429
index │ 727

Mall, William, 174, 182–84, 213

Malmstrom AFB, 44, 399

management effectiveness inspection, 213

Manke, Fred, 162

Mannon, Otis, 568–70, 578, 601

Manor, Leroy, 29–31, 150, 185

Mapel, Mark, 621

Maputo, Mozambique, 470

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 

463, 8

Mark, Hans, 151

Markle, John, 48

Marsh, John, 236, 248

Martin, Corby, 191–92, 224–25, 228, 

256–57, 264, 294–97, 299–300, 306–8, 

310, 312, 314, 321, 323–24, 329–30, 

356–57, 436, 440, 470, 625, 643

Martin, Graham, 75

Martyn, Bryan, 436

Marvel Exodus exercise, 173

Masirah Island, Oman, 505–6, 508–11, 

517–18, 521, 525, 528

Mason, Herb, 390

Massey, Lee, 337–39, 343, 490

Mathis, Robert, 151, 165, 168–69

Matlock, Tim, 602

MATS. See Military Air Transport Service 

Mattis, James, 521

Maubach, John, 620

Maxwell AFB, 162, 227, 461, 472, 542, 

620

Mayhew, Michael, 126

Mayo, Robert, 104

MCAS Cherry Point, 365, 390, 442 

MCAS Futenma, 341–43, 359, 362

MCAS Kaneohe Bay, 362

MCAS Yuma, 424

McCain, John, 31

McChord AFB, 617

McClellan AFB, 85, 94, 107, 112, 114, 

131–32, 140–41, 151, 158, 169, 174, 

180, 186, 193, 208, 211, 225, 227, 249

McDowell, Brian, 42

McGuire AFB, 494–96

McKinney, Mike, 373, 487

McLeaish, John, 14

McNabb, Duncan, 633

McPeak, Merrill, 249, 350–51, 376–79, 

612

McSally, Martha, 516

MDS. See mission design series 

Mecke, James (Jim), 637 

medevac, 26, 41, 52, 62, 69, 71, 85, 166, 

250, 267, 271, 273, 364, 513, 518, 

522, 562, 592, 618, 636

Mehrabad Airport, Tehran, 154 

MEI. See management effectiveness 

inspection 

Melrose Bombing Range, 344

METL. See mission essential task list 

MFP-11. See Major Force Program 11 

MH-47. See under aircraft by designation 

MH-60. See under aircraft by designation 

Michael Army Airfield, 159–60

Michalek, Joe, 330, 494, 496, 520, 526, 

530, 532, 553, 555–57, 560, 563, 

588, 601

Midthun, Brandon, 573

Milam, William, 405

Military Airlift Command Required 

Operational Capability 

12-73, 113

19-70, 24, 34, 94, 97, 101, 134

27-70, 27, 43

Military Airlift Command Statement 

of Operational Need 11-84, 197, 

210, 217

Military Air Transport Service, 11, 13

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 31, 46, 57, 60

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observation 

Group, 60

Miller, William, 270

Millett, David, 436

Milosevic, Slobodan, 445–46, 459

Minas, Scott, 602

Minish, Tim, 267, 280, 289, 294–95, 

299, 306, 309–11, 323–24, 327, 459, 

472–73, 492

Misawa AB, 249

Mishey, Gary, 475

mission design series, 437

mission essential task list, 409, 432–33
728 │ index

Mission Rehearsal System, 347, 412

Mitchell, Phil, 268

MNC-I. See Multi-National Corps–Iraq 

MNF-I. See Multi-National Force–Iraq 

Moncrief, Paul, 395–96

Mongoose 33 crash and recovery, 

589–93, 595, 600

Mongoose 34, 590–92

Monrovia, Liberia, 406

Monrovia, 405–7

Monterey, California, 540

Moody AFB, 459, 463, 469–71, 543, 582

Moore, Doug, 328

Moore, Marty, 272

Moore, Sam, 237

Moorer, Thomas, 29–31

Morris, Nicholas “Buzz,” 602, 616

Morrison, Jeff, 297

Morrow, Vic, 268

Morse, John, 34

Moseley, Michael “Buzz,” 553, 559, 592, 

605, 610–12

Mosul, Iraq, 552, 574

Mountain Home AFB, 180, 255

Mountain Resolve operation, 578, 580, 

583

Mount Pinatubo eruption, 338, 340, 

342, 350, 374, 479, 528

MRS. See Mission Rehearsal System 

Mu Gia Pass, Laos, 12, 26–27, 36–37

Mubarak, Hosni, 397

Mucha, Jeff, 310

Mudaysis AB, 316

Muflone operation, 172, 176

Muirhead, Cy, 43

Mukarayin Dam, Iraq, 565

Mullis, Paul, 487

Multi-National Corps–Iraq, 594–95

Multi-National Force–Iraq, 593–94

Munz, Larry, 239

Muscle Shoals operation, 58

NADEP. See Naval Aviation Depot 

Nail FACs, 44

Nakhon Phanom AB, NKP, 11–12, 19, 

21, 27, 31, 33, 35–45, 47, 49, 51–52, 

57–58, 60, 62, 64–68, 70, 72–75, 

77–78, 81–82, 84–85, 92, 98, 104, 

111, 115, 127, 148, 161, 226, 233, 

357, 473, 578, 615, 630

nap of the earth navigation, 109

NARF. See Naval Air Rework Facility 

NASA. See National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration, 13 

NAS Coronado, 236

NAS Cubi Point, 339, 341, 528

NAS Fallon, 469

NAS Keflavik, 249, 471

NAS Norfolk, 223

NAS Oceana, 423

NAS Patuxent, 115, 126

NAS Pensacola, 103, 196, 210, 233, 

246, 248, 255, 345

NAS Roosevelt Roads, 120, 258

NAS Sigonella, 534

National Military Strategy, 502

National War College, 279, 346, 574, 

629

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Naval Air Rework Facility, 103, 119, 

127, 132, 141, 151, 155, 210, 212, 

223, 228–29, 233–34, 238, 245, 248, 

254–55, 259, 345

Naval Aviation Depot, 365, 390, 402, 442

Naval Special Warfare Command, 231

Naval Special Warfare Development 

Group, 461

Naval War College, 394

NAVSPECWARCOM. See Naval Special Warfare Command 

NCO leadership, 111, 125, 139, 146, 

290, 321, 372, 463, 478, 507, 512, 

534, 594, 599, 616, 627, 637

Nellis AFB, 93, 108, 110, 112, 116–17, 

128, 223, 233, 249, 361, 377, 464, 

487–88, 519, 582, 597, 646

Nelson, William, 345, 629

NEO. See noncombatant evacuation 

operation 

Newell, Mark, 514, 516, 553–54, 560, 578

Nicaragua, 130–31, 135, 171

Nielsen, Dan, 456

night operations system, 23, 25
index │ 729

night reconnaissance, 61, 63, 68–69

night recovery system, 24, 50, 68, 73, 

94, 96, 107, 112–16, 119–20, 127–28, 

131, 133, 153, 155

“Night Stalkers,” 165

night vision goggles, 52, 105, 107, 117–18, 

120–21, 123–24, 126, 155, 159, 

162–63, 169–70, 172, 174, 180–81, 

185, 191, 193–94, 209, 225, 229, 

237, 239–40, 242, 246, 251, 289, 

321, 327, 349, 356, 389, 395, 407, 

431, 450, 456, 473, 490, 533, 544, 

554, 629

Nimble Warrior operation, 171, 173–74

Nixon, Richard, 31

NKP. See Nakhon Phanom 

Noble Anvil (Joint Special Operations 

Task Force), 446, 459

Noble Eagle operation, 495, 543

NOE. See nap of the earth 

noncombatant evacuation operation, 

108, 405, 407, 421, 428–29, 441, 

460, 479–80, 576, 636

Nordic Retrieval exercise, 423

Norfolk, VA, 190, 223, 427, 475

Noriega, Manuel, 263–69, 271, 273–74, 

541

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 

84, 107, 245–46, 253, 301–2, 370–71, 

384–85, 387–88, 392–97, 402, 411, 

445–46, 448, 454, 459, 487, 535

North Vietnamese Army, 47

Northern Watch operation, 471

Norton AFB, 32

NOS. See night operations system 

Novi Sad, Serbia, 449

NRS. See night recovery system 

Nugteren, Cornelius, 168, 174

Nunn, Sam, 164, 218, 353, 363–64

Nussman, Charles “Pat,” 607–8, 610

NVA. See North Vietnamese Army 

NVG. See night vision goggle(s) 

OAF. See Allied Force operation 

Objective Rhino, 513, 519

O’Boyle, Randy, 191, 226, 241, 269, 

274, 280, 293–96, 299, 313, 429–30, 

467, 540, 555, 557, 561–62, 574

ODA. See Operational Detachment 

Alpha 

OEF. See Operating Enduring Freedom 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations and 

Low-Intensity Conflict, 369

Officer Training School, 72, 162, 436

O’Grady, Scott, 384, 393–94

Ohlemeier, Terry, 79

OIF. See Iraqi Freedom operation 

Olsen, Ron, 116

Omar, Mullah, 526

OPCON. See operational control 

operational control, 13, 150, 220, 245, 

287, 291, 293, 320, 377, 519, 552–53, 

569, 581, 615

Operational Detachment Alpha, 322, 

325–26, 447–48, 450, 459–60, 514–15, 

519–21, 523, 526, 532, 554, 556–58, 

571

operational readiness inspection, 109, 

213, 253, 302, 374, 384, 387, 408–9, 

422–24, 438, 441, 466, 476, 480, 

489–90, 535, 567, 596, 598–99, 605, 

615–17

operational testing and evaluation, 

112, 184, 238

Operation Plan 1002-90, 286, 291

OPLAN 1002-90. See Operation Plan 

1002-90 

ORI. See operational readiness inspection 

Orr, Verne, 194

Orrell, Ben, 41–42, 44, 46–47, 73, 290–91, 

293, 297, 312, 320

Orrie, Lou, 458

Osan AB, 108, 249, 360–63, 373, 398–99, 

428, 441, 464, 466, 476, 490

Osijek, Croatia, 449

OT&E. See operational testing and 

evaluation 

Otto, Steven, 228, 266, 271, 280, 302, 

313, 370, 466, 476, 648

Owens, Jonathan, 399, 436, 516

Őzal, Turgut, 304
730 │ index

Pacer Topaz, 75

Pacific Wind, 298

Pacini, Phil, 79, 106, 128

Pagan, Hector, 577

Pahlavi, Shah Mohammed Reza, 129

Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 394–95

Palenske, Tom, 456–58

Panama Defense Forces, 264, 266–67, 

271–73

Panmunjom, Korea, 108

Pannabecker, Dave, 42

pararescue jumper, 25, 32–33, 36, 39, 

44, 48–49, 52, 67, 126, 132–33, 169, 

246–47, 313, 318, 354–55, 378, 429, 

435, 447, 450–51, 472, 478, 515, 

517, 519, 521, 523–25, 524, 528, 

535, 552, 608

Paris Peace Accords, 68

Paris Peace Treaty, 51

Parris, Eddie, 375, 430

part-task trainers, 347, 467, 477

Patrick AFB, 64–65, 249

Patterson, Robert, 213, 214, 216, 231, 

234–35, 241, 252

Pave Imp, 24, 34–35, 39–41, 94

Pave Low

first Pave Low rescue, 20–21 

inactivation ceremonies and last 

dinner, 644

last Pave Low mission, 636

manning challenges, 156, 176, 343, 

381, 400, 435, 465

mountain training, 180, 189, 191, 

211, 223, 228, 232–33, 242–44, 

254, 259, 277, 280, 375, 425, 

494, 527, 572, 599

utilization on 11 September 2001 

and subsequent operations, 

493–501, 647 

weapons instructor course, 464, 

469, 474, 487–89, 597

Pave Spot, 38

Pave Star, 23–24, 34–35, 94

PDF. See Panama Defense Forces 

Pehr, Frank, 91, 95–96, 98, 100–101, 

105–7, 114–19, 125–29, 132, 134, 

140–41, 151, 156, 162, 259, 285, 

613, 646

Pennell, Dennis, 629

Pereira, Paul, 448, 494–95, 510, 536–37

Perkins, Mark, 237

Perry, William, 400

personnel recovery, 64, 104, 166, 251, 

352, 469, 534, 553

personnel tempo, 463–64, 580

PERSTEMPO. See personnel tempo 

Petersen, Mitch, 382, 553

Peterson, Greg, 489

Peterson, Jim, 316, 520, 526, 532, 558

Petyak, Geoffrey, 538–39

PF. See Prairie Fire operation 

Phillips, Samuel, 94

Phantom Fury operation, 596

PhLASH. See photographic landing 

augmentation system for helicopters 

photographic landing augmentation 

system for helicopters, 628

Pima Air Museum, 620

Pinkowski, Dick, 290

Piotrowski, John, 147, 183, 223

Pisa, Italy, 172, 176, 302

Pittman, Charles, 149

PJ. See pararescue jumper 

Planert, Mike, 346–47, 350, 422, 466

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, 235

PLS. See precision locator system 

Plumhoff, Steve, 330, 492, 578–79, 583

PMD. See program management directive 

PMDS. See projected map display system 

Pokeweed operation, 256, 259, 348, 539

POM. See program objective memorandum 

Pope AFB, 165, 169, 253, 475, 494

Popex exercise, 410

Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 382

Potter, Richard, 253, 301, 313

Powell, Colin, 286, 301, 363–64, 551

Powell, Jackie, 546

PPBS. See Planning, Programming, 

and Budgeting System 

Prairie Fire operation, 60–63, 65

Prather, Craig, 571, 573, 576
index │ 731

precision locator system, 457

presidential visits to the United Kingdom, 440, 473–74, 576 

Price, Jerry, 200

Prince Sultan Air Base, 506, 516

Prince, Philip, 182, 184

program management directive, 101, 

103, 210, 229

program objective memorandum, 235, 

464, 612

Project Jungle Jim, 147

projected map display system, 96

Prokosch, Chris, 625

Promote Liberty operation, 274

Proven Force operation, 301, 303–4, 

309, 330, 487

Provide Comfort operation, 331–32, 345, 

352, 358–59, 364–65, 374, 478, 573

Provide Promise operation, 370, 374, 387

Pryor, Mark, 4, 373, 631

PSAB. See Prince Sultan Air Base 

Public Law 99-433, 220, 292. See also

Goldwater-Nichols Act 

Public Law 99-661, 220

Pugmire, Scott, 279, 349

Pulsifer, Ben, 296, 306

Purser, Wayne, 79, 83

Purvine, Bruce, 109, 130, 132

QRF. See quick reaction force 

Quang Tri evacuation, 47 

Quetta, Pakistan, 520

quick reaction force, 537, 553, 592

Racak, Kosovo, 445 

RAD 7-39-1. See Requirements Action 

Directive 7-39-1 

radar homing and warning, 36, 109, 113

radar warning receiver, 110, 123, 317

RAF 7th Squadron, 321

RAF Akrotiri, 108, 614

RAF Alconbury, 358–59, 365, 369, 384, 

387, 393, 413

RAF Bentwaters, 155, 191, 227, 246, 254

RAF Brize Norton, 473

RAF Cosford, 620

RAF Fairford, 567

RAF Machrihanish, 599

RAF Mildenhall, 140, 393, 405, 408, 

423, 459–60, 472, 474, 500, 534–35, 

545, 568, 570, 575–76, 578, 594–95, 

598, 607, 615, 620

RAF Upwood, 371

RAF Woodbridge, 85, 93–94, 107–108, 

112, 114, 119, 129–130, 132, 140, 169, 

186, 238, 245–246, 331–332, 358

Rafha, Saudi Arabia, 294, 306, 308–9 

Rakip, Russell “Rotor,” 143, 302, 356–57, 

372, 375–76, 382 

Rakitis, Robert, 81

Rambouillet, France, 445

Ramsey (TSgt), 62

Ramsey, Milton, 65–66

Randolph AFB, 436

Ranger (Army), 110, 112, 153, 173, 

180–81, 189, 200, 243–44, 264, 

266–69, 274, 327, 382, 384, 512, 617

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 

175, 187

Ras al Mishab, Saudi Arabia, 294, 306, 308 

RDJTF. See Rapid Deployment Joint 

Task Force 

Reagan, Ronald, 164–65, 221

Red Flag exercise, 93, 108–10, 112, 114, 

116, 120, 128, 488

Red Rio Bombing Range, 344, 376

red scarves, 91, 153, 158, 227, 239–40, 

377, 617, 622, 631

Redden, Joseph, 195

Reece, Brian, 610

Reed, Ed, 131, 151, 154–55, 158, 165, 

190, 197, 210, 216–18, 221, 229, 

234, 238, 258, 278, 285, 369, 379, 

401, 412, 646

Reese AFB, 161

remotely piloted vehicle, 563, 606, 609, 

611, 619, 637

Requirements Action Directive 7-39-1, 

15–16

rescue mission commander, 447–48, 

454–55, 459, 515

rescue special operations low level, 

173, 180, 187, 193–94, 225 

Reserve Officers Training Corps, 42, 

225, 239, 347, 361, 543
732 │ index

RHAW. See radar homing and warning 

system 

Rhein-Main AB, 215, 248, 279, 358

Rice, Donald, 350

Rice Bowl operation, 142–44, 148–49, 

153, 164, 175, 181, 192

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 286

RMC. See rescue mission commander 

Roanoke, Virginia, 633

Roberts, Brian, 3, 624, 631, 636

Roberts, Harry, 309

Roberts, John, 120

Robin Sage exercise, 187 

Robins AFB, 125, 620

Robinson, Jack, 40

rocket-propelled grenade, 407, 516, 

533, 575, 589–90, 592, 595

ROE. See rules of engagement 

Rota, Spain, 358

ROTC. See Reserve Officer Training 

Corps 

Roughen Wood exercise, 180–81

Rouhier, Chuck, 50

Rowell, Bill, 514, 554, 560, 563

RPG. See rocket-propelled grenade 

RPV. See remotely piloted vehicle 

R-SOLL. See rescue special operations 

low level 

rules of engagement, 268

Ruma, Serbia, 449–50

Rumbaugh, Elwood, 79

Rumsfeld, Donald, 105, 498–99, 505, 

594, 611

Russ, Robert, 183

Russell, Mike, 130, 155, 159, 170–71, 

241–42, 264, 266–67, 270, 273, 279, 

358, 364–65, 369, 470

Rutledge, Randy, 396

RWR. See radar warning receiver 

Ryan, John, 16, 24, 387–88, 433, 454, 468

Ryan, Thomas, 140, 172, 185, 199

Rylander, Lynn, 175, 190, 209

SA-2, 44

SA-7, 47, 67, 307, 323

SAC. See Strategic Air Command 

Saigon, South Vietnam, 13, 31, 36, 49, 

51–52, 64, 75–77, 93, 131, 148 

Salmon, Douglas, 410, 422, 440, 490

Salt Lake City, UT, 354 

SAM. See surface-to-air missile 

San Javier AB, 410

San Vito AB, 387 

Sanchez, Ricardo, 588–89

Sandy, 22, 39, 42, 48, 50, 316–18

Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 384, 

397, 421

Saravane, Laos, 49, 67

SAS. See stability augmentation system 

SATCOM. See satellite communications 

satellite communications, 194, 308, 

317, 520, 527, 571

Saunders, Ralph, 107–8, 111–12, 114, 

119, 149, 197

Schaick, Steve, 426

Schibler, Mark, 42–45, 48, 73, 127–28, 

141–42, 151, 154, 158, 198–99, 224, 

234

Schmaltz, Rob, 269

Schoomaker, Peter, 469, 626

Schramm, John, 79

Schwall, Art, 348

Schwartz, Norton, 356, 411, 419, 424, 428

Schwarzkopf, Norman, 286, 292, 

296–99, 307, 311, 320, 322, 327, 329

Schweim, Marty, 436, 521, 523–25

Scott AFB, 92, 161, 178, 182–83, 199, 

216, 241, 295, 462

Scott, David, 462, 490

Scott, Dub, 458

Scott, Hanson, 235

Scud surface-to-surface missile, 320, 

322–23, 450, 551

SEAOR 114. See Southeast Asia Operational Requirement 114 

Sears, Max, 569

Secord, Richard, 139, 151, 153, 156, 

163, 185, 196

Self, Mark, 546

Selfridge, John, 170, 198, 226

Sembach AB, 84–85, 91–93, 107, 128, 

162, 233, 238, 241, 245

Sergeant, Jim, 272
index │ 733

service life extension program, 193–94, 

197, 208, 210, 212, 216–17, 238, 

255, 345–46, 353, 372, 380, 390, 646

SFOD-Delta. See Special Forces Operational Detachment–Delta 

SGU. See special guerilla unit 

Shaffer, Jim, 212

Shapiro, Rich, 50, 67

Shaw AFB, 58, 62, 64, 66, 110

Shawali Kowt, Afghanistan, 520–22 

Shazda, Matt, 239, 314, 357, 375

Shelton, Hugh, 408, 505

Sheppard AFB, 361

Sherrill, James, 24

Shining Hope operation, 454, 461

Shipman, Jerry, 48–50, 107, 128

Shkin, Afghanistan, 532

Shore, R. D., 277, 399

Short, Michael, 446, 454

Shufflebarger, Newman, 306

Siino, Jeffrey, 436

Sijan Award, 274, 461, 588

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, 6–9, 11, 

17–18, 23–24, 35, 45, 94, 102, 122, 

162, 168, 252, 634

Sikorsky, Igor, 6–9

Silverman, Shawn, 521

Silvis, John, 14

Simmon, Rick, 44, 48–49, 52, 98–99, 

101, 106, 114, 117, 125, 129, 132–33, 

142, 158–59, 162, 170, 242, 390, 

625, 635, 638, 646

Simons, Arthur “Bull,” 29–31

Sipperly, Ken, 289, 310, 326

Skopje, Macedonia, 455

Slade, Larry, 315–16

SLEP. See service life extension program 

Slife, Jim, 347–49, 357–58, 375, 383, 

388–89, 422, 440, 448, 454, 460, 

472, 540–41, 553–60, 563–64, 566, 

578, 580, 587–88, 594–96, 598, 600, 

602, 613, 616, 648

Slovenia, 370

Smales, Leonard, 621

Smith, Bill, 272, 625, 635

Smith, Clyde, 46

Smith, David, 345

Smith, Kirk, 613, 615, 622, 637

Smith, Leighton, 393–97

Smith, Matt, 567

Smith, Roger, 348

SMOTEC. See Special Missions Operational Test and Evaluation Center 

SOCCENT. See Special Operations 

Component, US Central Command 

SOCEUR. See Special Operations Component, US European Command 

SOCIFOR. See Special Operations 

Command component for IFOR 

SOCPAC. See Special Operations 

Component, US Pacific Command 

SOD. See special operations division 

SOF Intersimulator Network, 412, 467, 

478

SOFC. See Special Operations Forces 

Command 

“SOF Mafia,” 190, 196, 221

SOFNET. See SOF Intersimulator 

Network 

Solid Shield operation, 121, 172, 187, 254

Solomonic decision, 210

Somalia, 303–4

Son Tay raid, 29, 31–32, 49, 149–50, 

168, 174, 536, 632

SOPAG. See Special Operations Policy 

Advisory Group 

Soto Cano AB, 254

Souda Bay, Crete, 397

Southeast Asia Operational Requirement 114, 16–17, 23, 34, 134

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 74

Southern Watch operation, 329, 352, 

357, 423, 462, 469, 475, 489

Spangdahlem AB, 301

Spanish forces, 410, 540, 594, 598 

Special Forces Operational Detachment–

Delta, 61–62, 142, 148, 150, 153–54, 

163–64, 180–81, 322

Special Missions Operational Test and 

Evaluation Center, 184–85, 223, 

233, 238, 379

Special Operations Command component for IFOR, 397–98, 402–3, 405, 

410–11
734 │ index

Special Operations Component, US 

Central Command, 188, 287, 290–97, 

304–9, 312, 315, 317, 320–21, 323, 

325–26, 424, 552, 563, 577, 588

Special Operations Component, US 

European Command, 188, 245–46, 

253, 301–2, 313, 371, 408, 411, 441, 

446, 454, 459–60, 470–73, 491, 500, 

567, 614–15

Special Operations Component, US 

Pacific Command, 188, 398, 424, 428

special operations division, 188

Special Operations Forces Command, 219

special operations liaison element, 

506, 516

special operations master plan, 186, 

193–95, 214, 235 

Special Operations Policy Advisory 

Group, 185–86, 188, 196–98, 219

Spectre 17 rescue, 49 

Spectre 22 rescue, 44–45

Speicher, Michael, 308

spider route, 294, 315, 447

Spier, John, 198

Split, Croatia, 3, 13, 100, 112, 198, 200, 

267, 287, 290, 320–21, 404

SPO. See system program office 

Sponeybarger, Robert, 50

Spriet, Clay, 175

Sprouse, John, 169–70, 183, 198–99, 

245, 304, 409, 432, 461–63

SS Mayaguez recovery operation, 77–78, 

80–83, 85, 168, 176, 246, 429, 615, 

629–30 

SS Yarrawonga, 246–247, 253, 442, 468

stability augmentation system, 8, 23

stabilization force, 411

Stagers (TSgt), 62

Stamos, Derrick, 543–45, 570, 575, 

614, 623, 633

Stanaland, Stu, 32–33

standardization and evaluation, 98, 106, 

143, 161, 234, 242, 245, 279–80, 

355, 371, 375, 410, 431, 438, 473, 

492–93, 601

Stankovich, Bob, 116, 128–29, 154, 

161, 342, 360, 363

Steel Horse, 6, 634–35, 649

Stephens, John, 433, 437

Stiles, Lorren “Rus,” 67–71, 126, 161–62

Stiner, Carl, 322, 353

Storm Cloud operation, 163

Stormy 02 rescue, 25–26 

Stott, John, 595

Stovall, Dale, 42, 44, 46–48, 226

Strategic Air Command, 108, 144, 351

Streetcar 304 rescue, 22 

Stricklin, John, 289, 463, 513, 554

St. Romain, Pat, 277

Strong, Robert, 632

Studer, William, 339

Stuttgart, Germany, 112, 402, 534

Subic Bay Naval Base, 339, 341

Sullivan, Leonard, 372

“Super Jolly Greens,” 19

surface-to-air missile, 31–32, 36, 43, 

45–46, 48, 110, 164, 185, 198, 218, 

237, 309, 312, 314, 317, 327, 353, 

385, 394, 558, 560

surge in Iraq, 619–20

Surrender operation, 271

Swarz, Ron, 98

system program office, 97–98

Szolnok AB, 410

T-28. See under aircraft by designation 

T-37. See under aircraft by designation 

T-38. See under aircraft by designation 

TAF. See tactical air force 

TAC. See Tactical Air Command 

TACAN. See tactical air navigation 

TACON. See tactical control 

TACS. See tactical air control system 

Tactical Air Command, 62, 72–73, 93, 

103, 105, 107–11, 114, 120–22, 124, 

134, 144, 149, 151, 156, 161, 167–68, 

174, 176–79, 182–83, 351, 434

tactical air control system, 84, 114, 134, 

143

tactical air force, 122–23

Tactical Air Force Statement of Operational Need 313-79, 122–23 

tactical air navigation, 21, 24, 59, 61, 

63, 67, 69, 91, 322
index │ 735

Tactical Air Warfare Center, 93

tactical control, 84, 91, 143, 157, 291, 

293, 471, 604

tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, 21, 314, 326, 393–94

tactics, techniques, and procedures, 72, 

122, 455, 469, 540, 582

Taegu AB, 476

TAF. See tactical air force

TAF SON 313-79. See Tactical Air 

Force Statement of Operational 

Need 313-79 

Taft, William IV, 198, 207–10, 229, 236, 

252–53

Takacs, Bill, 156–58, 161–162, 171–73, 

179–80, 183, 225, 274, 279, 373, 646

Takhli AB, 29

Talon Blade operation, 70–72, 84–85

Tampa, Florida, 431, 502

Task Force

TF 77, 31

TF 158, 153, 159, 163, 165 

TF 160, 165, 180, 190 

Alpha, 37, 40

Dagger, 583

Hawk, 454–55

Helo, 447

Horse, 551–53, 571

K-Bar, 528, 583

Viking, 568

Taylor, Willie, 375

Tazar AB, 499

Tchepone, Laos, 22, 25–26, 33, 44, 64

Teeple, Jim, 116–17

Tehran, Iran, 135, 142–43, 154

terrain following/terrain avoidance, 35, 

96, 99–100, 106, 113, 116, 133, 163, 

166, 179, 194, 217, 243, 253, 269, 

272, 285, 307, 310, 349, 363, 388, 

397, 414, 515, 530, 571, 598, 633

terrain-following radar, 8–9, 24, 35, 

125–27, 246

Terry, Ronald, 97

TF/TA. See terrain following/terrain 

avoidance 

TFR. See terrain-following radar 

TH-53. See under aircraft by designation 

TH-55. See under aircraft by designation 

Tharp, John, 556

Thayer, Paul, 186, 188, 193–94

The Transformers, 609–10

theater special operations component, 

433

31 Initiatives, 195, 611

Thompson, Brandon, 237

Thompson, Don, 151

Thompson, William, 621

Thurlow, Ron, 644–45

Thurman, Maxwell, 264, 271

Tice, Jeff, 309–11

Tijerina, Albert, 66

Tikrit, Iraq, 552, 565 

Tilghman, Lance, 487

time on target, 121

TRAP. See tactical recovery of aircraft 

and personnel 

Trask, Thomas, 239–41, 243–44, 256–57, 

264–69, 271–72, 274, 295, 306, 

315–18, 326–27, 329–30, 356–57, 

375, 430, 439, 447, 454, 461–63, 

469, 475, 487, 555, 609–10, 620, 

633, 636–37, 648

Travis AFB, 288

Tritt, Michael, 635

truck bomb, 587 

TTP. See tactics, techniques, and 

procedures 

Tunner Award, 408

Turczynski, Ray, 181

Turnage, Joe, 326

Turner, Dennis, 396

Turner, Rob, 310

Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 397, 

421, 448–49, 451, 454–55, 457–58 

Tyndall AFB, 475

Tyner, Joe, 82

Ubon AB, 21, 33, 35, 43–44, 52, 68–69, 

71, 73–76

Udairi Range, Kuwait, 489, 562 

Udorn AB, 11–14, 18–21, 27, 30–31, 

33, 45, 60–62, 64, 68, 74

UH-1. See under aircraft by designation 

UH-1N. See under aircraft by designation 
736 │ index

UHF. See ultrahigh frequency 

UHT. See undergraduate helicopter 

training 

ultrahigh frequency, 27, 449

unconventional warfare, 104–5, 121, 

166, 173–74, 185, 220, 352

undergraduate helicopter training, 

41–42

United Nations Protection Force, 370, 

385 

United States Air Forces, US Central 

Command, 290–94, 314

United States Central Command, 190, 

286, 290–91, 298, 303, 506, 540, 

551, 570–71, 581, 593, 611

United States Military Academy, 550

United States Readiness Command, 220

United States Southern Command, 

130–31, 215, 264

USSOCOM decision to inactivate 

the MH–53s, 612 

United States Special Operations Command, 220–21, 230–32, 235–36, 

245, 248, 251–53, 259, 264, 270, 

274–77, 281, 292, 355, 379, 391–92, 

408, 431, 433, 437, 454, 464–65, 469, 

487, 490, 502, 528, 578, 581–82, 

606–8, 611–12, 617, 625–26, 636

“units with confidence,” 83, 86

universal transverse mercator, 121

UNPROFOR. See United Nations Protection Force 

Uphold Democracy operation, 381, 

383, 385

Upton, Kurt, 461

Urgent Fury operation, 189, 192, 270

Uribe, John, 427

USAAG/7AF. See US Army Advisory 

Group / Seventh Air Force 

USAF Combat Rescue School, 377

USAF helicopter reorganization, 143

US Air Force reorganization, 182, 184, 

228, 350, 275, 291, 350, 359, 378, 581 

US Army Advisory Group/ Seventh 

Air Force, 74–75

US Army aviators to Pave Low, 300–301

US Army Rangers, 110, 112, 148, 153, 

163–64, 173, 180–81, 189, 200, 

243–44, 264, 266–69, 274, 322, 327, 

373, 382, 384, 512–13, 617

US Army Special Operations Command, 276, 391, 607

US Army Task Force 160, 165, 180, 190 

USARSOC. See US Army Special Operations Command 

USCENTCOM. See United States Central Command 

US Navy SEALs, 46, 164, 167, 172, 176, 

180, 256, 267–69, 293, 303, 321–22, 

325–26, 328, 337, 340, 378, 395, 

400, 406, 426, 439, 441, 475, 487, 

501, 514, 525, 528, 540, 553–54, 

560, 562–63, 565, 575, 577, 587

US Navy Test Pilot School, 115, 126

USNS Kanawha, 535

USREDCOM. See United States Readiness Command 

USS Abraham Lincoln, 341

USS Card, 18

USS Coral Sea, 81

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, 286

USS Forrestal, 256–57, 539

USS Henry B. Wilson, 80

USS Independence, 286

USS Kearsarge, 393

USS La Salle, 534

USS Long Beach, 341

USS Midway, 75–77, 341

USS Peleliu, 508, 510

USS Roosevelt, 120, 258, 395

USS Saipan, 131–32

USS Saratoga, 308, 315

USS Shreveport, 475

USS Trenton, 303

USSAG/7AF. See US Support Activities 

Group / Seventh Air Force

USSOCOM. See United States Special 

Operations Command 

USSOUTHCOM. See United States 

Southern Command 

US Support Activities Group/ Seventh 

Air Force, 68–69, 71, 74, 76

U-Tapao AB, 68, 76–82, 84, 428
index │ 737

UTM. See universal transverse mercator 

UW. See unconventional warfare 

Vagabond Warrior exercise, 175

Vallimont, Joe, 104–5, 111, 120–21, 

123, 154–55, 170–71

Vance AFB, 413, 624

Vandegeer, Richard, 79, 473, 480

Vandenberg AFB, 389, 430, 543

Vandenberg, Hoyt, 114

Vandergrift, Alexander, 6–7

Vanhyning, Greg, 198, 316

Vanzandt, Ed, 569

Vaught, James, 142, 146, 151, 163

Vesely, Dave, 426

VFR. See visual flight rule 

Vickroy, Ron, 72

Vigilant Resolve operation, 588

visual flight rule, 35, 92, 113

Vixen 23 recovery, 385 

Voas, Randal, 436, 571, 573

Vogt, John, 48, 52, 93

Vycital, Gary, 270

Wald, Chuck, 506, 508, 511, 519, 581

Walkup, Thomas, Jr., 578, 579

Walls, Barry, 73, 78, 82, 128, 132–33, 

173, 176

Walls, Jeffrey, 173, 240, 274, 387, 393, 

410, 499–500

Walters, Howard, 578–59

Walters, Jim “Pappy,” 162–64, 171, 180, 

228, 240, 242, 255, 382, 390, 436, 

625, 635

“Wanted Dead or Alive,” 644

Ward, Casey, 496, 577

Ward, Vernon, 325–26

Warner, John, 512

Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center, 

102–3

war readiness spares kit, 172, 176

weapon of mass destruction, 286, 549–50 

weapons instructor course, 464, 469, 

474, 487–89, 597

weapons system operator, 38–39, 47–48, 

52, 60

weapons system trainer, 278, 346–47, 

401, 412, 442, 467, 478, 

Webb AFB, 115, 126

Webb, Brad, 239–40, 244, 300, 326, 

357, 361, 395, 405, 487, 494, 496–97, 

499, 505, 520, 525, 528–29, 540, 

553–54, 557, 560, 564, 566, 574, 

598, 613, 615, 622, 631, 633, 643, 

649–50

Weber, Mike, 268

Weikel, Gary, 72–73, 75, 104–5, 109, 

111, 120–21, 123, 143, 153–55, 160, 

170–71, 173, 190, 192, 196, 208, 

217–18, 224–25, 227–28, 233, 237–38, 

241, 253, 255–57, 259, 264–65, 

270–73, 275, 279, 287, 329, 369, 

402, 435, 646, 648

Weimer, Dan, 458, 533

Weinberger, Casper, 174, 177, 188, 231

Welch, Harold, 60

Welch, Larry, 249, 252, 275

western AFSOC base, 420, 606, 611, 630

White Sands Missile Range, 159

White, Jeff, 322, 325–27, 328

WIC. See weapons instructor course 

Wickham, John, 194, 198, 207

Widnall, Sheila, 400

Wilford Hall Medical Center, 426

Wilhelm, Ben, 345

Williams AFB, 42

Williams, Mike, 72–73

Williams, R. K., 278, 357, 499, 566–67, 

569–70, 574–75, 577–81, 588, 593, 

596, 599–602

Wilson, Bill, 50, 80

Wilson, Sam, 185, 198

WMD. See weapon of mass destruction 

Woodruff, John, 292

Woodworth, “Woody,” 555

Wooley, Michael, 598, 612, 630

World War II, 6, 105, 178, 250, 359

WR-ALC. See Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center 

Wright, P. J., 537

Wright, Robert, 384, 393

Wright-Patterson AFB, 13, 35, 96–98, 

101, 105, 112, 114, 116, 125–26, 

396, 613, 620, 632, 645

WRSK. See war readiness spares kit 
738 │ index

WSO. See weapons system operator 

WST. See weapons system trainer 

Wurster, Donny, 73, 191, 244, 278, 

369–70, 644–45

Wurster, 4–5, 73, 191, 244, 278, 369–71, 

387–88, 424, 426, 438, 462, 611, 

630, 633, 644–46, 649

X-band beacon, 73

X-ray missions, 60, 62–63

Zahrt, John, 278, 471

Zakho, Iraq, 331, 364

Zarqawi, Abu Musab al-, 574 

Zdenek, Robert, 302–3, 313, 358

Zelko, Dale, 449–53

Zilink, Peter, 237
On a Steel Horse I Ride

A History of the MH-53 Pave Low Helicopters

in War and Peace

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Jeanne K. Shamburger

Copy Editor

Sandi Davis

Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustrations

L. Susan Fair

Composition and Prepress Production

Nedra Looney

Print Preparation and Distribution

Diane Clark
Courtesy National Museum of the US Air Force

MH-53M #68-10357 on display at the National Museum of the US Air Force

About the Book

The Steel Horses. Born of necessity in the long war in 

Southeast Asia, the US Air Force fleet of 52 HH-53s and 20 CH-53s 

was initially developed for search and rescue and special operations 

missions. After that conflict, US Air Force leaders recognized 

the need for a night, all-weather rescue capability, and nine of 

the aircraft were modified under a program called Pave Low, 

with evolutional radar and precision navigational capabilities to 

fulfill that requirement. However, when a place in Iran called 

Desert One clearly revealed the larger and more dramatic need for 

such a capability, these aircraft—and eventually the entire remaining US Air Force fleet of HH- and CH-53s—were reassigned 

specifically to support our growing special operations forces. 

Further modified and redesignated as MH-53Js and MH-53Ms, 

they subsequently flew and fought in every major US military action until their inactivation in Iraq in September 2008, when the 

last six of the 30 surviving aircraft flew their final sorties in combat. 

But the story is not just about the helicopters. It is also 

about the great Airmen—officers and enlisted members—who 

conceptualized, created, operated, maintained, loved, and, yes, 

sometimes cursed their Steel Horses. They and their great aircraft were the reality of Any Time, Any Place. This is their story, 

the men and machines, from first to last, presented with deepest 

appreciation and respect. Well done and hand salute!