Department of Homeland Security 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers 

and Emergency Operations Centers 

OIG-12-15 December 2011 
Office ofInspector General

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528

Homeland

Security

DEC 6 20'11

Preface

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office ofInspector General (OIG) was

established by the Homeland Security Act of2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment

to the Inspector General Act of1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy,

efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department.

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of Fusion Centers and Emergency

Operations Centers relationships, interactions, and capacity to share information with one

another. It is based on interviews with employees and officials ofrelevant agencies and

institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We

trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We

express our appreciation to all ofthose who con . uted to the preRaration ofthis report.

...
Executive Summary .............................................................................................................1
 

Background..........................................................................................................................2
 

Results of Audit ...................................................................................................................6
 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Management..........................6 


Recommendations........................................................................................................11 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................11 


Roles, Capabilities, and Information Needs ................................................................13 


Recommendations........................................................................................................18 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................18 


Federal Coordination and Information Sharing Guidance ...........................................19 


Recommendation .........................................................................................................22 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................23 


Classification of Information .......................................................................................24 


Recommendations........................................................................................................27 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................28 


Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................29 


Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report .......................................30 


Appendix C: Fusion Center Map and List of State and
 

Major Urban Area Fusion Centers.......................................................37 


Appendix D: Major Contributors to this Report........................................................40 


Appendix E: Report Distribution ..............................................................................41 


Abbreviations 

CPG-502 	 Comprehensive Preparedness Guide-502, Considerations for Fusion 

Center and Emergency Operations Center Coordination 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 


DOJ Department of Justice 


EOC Emergency Operations Center 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 


FY fiscal year 

GAO Government Accountability Office 


I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis 


OIG Office of Inspector General 


Table of Contents/Abbreviations 
OIG
 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers play a critical role in 

linking state and local on-the-ground information with the strategies and 

response of the federal government. It is imperative that they foster 

relationships to work together effectively and establish policies and 

protocols to coordinate and share relevant information and intelligence 

during daily operations and emergencies to enhance the safety of the 

public. 

Fusion Centers and Emergency Management efforts are enhanced with 

better interaction and information sharing. Some Fusion Centers are allcrimes oriented and do not consider Emergency Operations Centers as 

partners in their operations. Many Emergency Operations Center officials 

view Fusion Centers as solely law enforcement entities and either do not 

see a need or do not know how to effectively coordinate with them. These 

officials would benefit from building stronger mutual relationships. 

Officials at Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers we visited 

were not always aware of each other’s roles, capabilities, and information 

needs. In some areas, these officials had limited or no interaction, which 

could hinder response to natural or man-made disasters. Fusion Center 

and Emergency Operations Center officials also were not always aware of 

and did not always utilize federal guidance developed to address 

coordination and information sharing efforts. More than 83% of the 

locations visited were either unaware of or did not utilize federal guidance 

for Fusion Center and Emergency Operations Center interaction provided 

in Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502. 

Finally, the classification of information impedes effective information 

sharing between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

officials. Classification challenges exist at the federal level and with state 

law enforcement agency practices. 

We are making eight recommendations that, when implemented, should 

improve Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers interaction 

and information sharing efforts. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 1 
Background 

According to The 9/11 Commission Report, a breakdown in 

information sharing contributed to the collective failure to prevent 

the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. To promote greater 

collaboration and information sharing among federal, state, and 

local intelligence and law enforcement entities, states and some 

major urban areas have established a network of Fusion Centers 

throughout the country. (Appendix C includes a map and list of all 

72 federally recognized state and major urban area Fusion 

Centers.) A Fusion Center is a collaborative effort of two or more 

agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the 

center with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, 

investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorism activity. 

(Figure 1 illustrates the fusion process.) 

Figure 1. Fusion Process 

Source: Department of Homeland Security. 

Fusion Centers are a valuable information sharing resource for 

state and major urban areas, serving as the focal but not exclusive 

point within the state and local environment for receiving and 

sharing terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement 

information related to terrorism. Fusion Centers provide their core 

and ad hoc customers1

 with an array of products and messages, 

1

 Core (involved in Fusion Center activities on a regular basis) and ad hoc (one-time or limited participation 

in fusion activities) partners include entities from the following areas: agriculture; food, water, and the 

environment; chemical industry and hazardous materials; criminal justice; emergency services; information 

and telecommunications; military facilities and defense industrial base; private security; public works; and 

transportation. Each Fusion Center may define its core or ad hoc partner sectors. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 2 
 

including Alerts, Warnings, and Notifications; Law Enforcement 

Briefs; and Regional Crime Patterns and Trends. Table 1 lists 

some of the products that Fusion Centers provide to stakeholders. 

Table 1. Examples of Fusion Center Products 

Alerts, Warnings, and Notifications Risk Assessments for Local Major 

Events 

Law Enforcement Briefs Fusion Center Quick Notes 

Regional Crime Patterns/Trends State Critical Infrastructure Threat 

Assessments 

Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource 

Threat Reports 

Monthly Fusion Center Bulletins 

Fusion Liaison Officer Communication 

emails, calls, and conferences 

Common Operating Picture 

Over time, Fusion Centers have become an integral part of the 

federal government’s approach to information sharing with state 

and local partners. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have worked with Fusion 

Centers since their inception. In August 2006, DHS and DOJ, in 

collaboration with state and local partners, published the Fusion 

Center Guidelines. These guidelines provide assistance for 

developing Fusion Centers and were intended to improve 

consistency among the state and major urban area Fusion Centers, 

enhance coordination, strengthen regional and national 

partnerships, and improve Fusion Center capabilities. Further, in 

October 2007, the first National Strategy for Information Sharing, 

which designated Fusion Centers as the primary state and local 

entities for sharing terrorism-related information, was released. 

Since 2004, when states began creating Fusion Centers, DHS has 

taken steps to partner with these centers to accomplish DHS’ 

information sharing goals. Congress formally mandated that DHS 

support Fusion Centers in the Implementing Recommendations of 

the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). This law also 

requires DHS to implement systems to support information sharing 

within the Department and among federal, state, and local partners. 

DHS’ Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is the 

Department’s lead component for coordination with Fusion 

Centers, and the DHS Support Implementation Plan for State and 

Local Fusion Centers, released in June 2006, designated I&A as 

the executive agent for managing the DHS role in the nationwide 

fusion center initiative. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 3 
Figure 2. New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center 

Source: DHS. 

DHS I&A’s mission is to equip the homeland security enterprise 

with the intelligence and information it needs to keep the Nation 

safe, secure, and resilient. DHS I&A’s strategic plan contains 

goals that include strengthening the Nation’s network of Fusion 

Centers and building support for and integrating a robust 

information sharing capability among state, local, territorial, and 

tribal authorities and the private sector. 

Within DHS I&A, the State and Local Program Office unifies and 

coordinates federal and departmental support to the national 

network of Fusion Centers and serves as an advocate for the 

Fusion Centers within the federal government activities. Among 

its activities to support Fusion Centers, the State and Local 

Program Office led the initiative to deploy intelligence officers2

 to 

Fusion Centers to facilitate and coordinate information sharing 

between the centers and DHS. Its goal was to deploy intelligence 

officers at all 72 Fusion Centers and establish 10 regional 

representatives by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2010. As of June 

2011, there were 64 intelligence officers and 9 regional 

representatives at the Fusion Centers. The State and Local 

Program Office also coordinated the installation of classified and 

unclassified information technology systems at Fusion Centers to 

support information sharing. 

2

 DHS intelligence officers serve two roles: (1) partner with Fusion Centers to better achieve the Baseline 

Capabilities and (2) manage the intelligence cycle in their area of responsibility to include the sharing of 

threat-related information between state, local, tribal, and territorial partners and the federal government. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 4 
An Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is the physical location 

where information and resources are coordinated to support incident 

management (on-scene operations) activities.3 An EOC may be a 

temporary facility to meet short-term goals or may be permanent. 

EOCs may be organized in different ways, including by function 

(e.g., fire, law enforcement, or medical services), jurisdiction (e.g., 

federal, state, regional, tribal, city, or county), or some combination 

of the two. The core responsibilities of an EOC include 

coordination, communication, resource allocation and tracking, and 

information collection, analysis, and dissemination related to a 

specific incident. EOCs help coordination of on-scene command by 

forming a common operating picture, and secure additional 

resources during an incident. EOCs also aid in the sharing of allhazards operational information and provide subject matter expertise 

to support incident management and response activities. 

Figure 3. Oklahoma City, OK, Emergency Operations Center 

Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

Fusion Centers and EOCs serve distinct but complementary roles 

in supporting the country’s homeland security efforts. Fusion 

Centers share information across all levels of government to 

support homeland security partners in preventing, protecting 

against, and responding to crime and terrorism, while EOCs 

primarily provide information and support to incident management 

and response and recovery coordination activities. Collaboration 

between Fusion Centers and EOCs enables both to carry out their 

individual missions more efficiently. 

3

 Emergency Operations Centers are part of the emergency management structure. During our review, we 

interviewed emergency management officials to obtain an understanding of their interactions with Fusion 

Center officials. In this report, when we discuss interactions with EOCs, we refer to interactions with 

emergency management officials, both on a day-to-day basis and when an EOC is operational. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 5 
 

In many situations, Fusion Centers and EOCs may have information 

that others may be able to use. For example, if a Fusion Center 

receives information regarding a threat to an event that could cause 

mass casualties, the EOC and other emergency responders could 

use that information to be better prepared to respond. Conversely, 

information received at an EOC that seems inconsequential could 

be part of a larger pattern, which may be recognized only if that 

information is sent to the Fusion Center for analysis. 

DHS and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grants 

help fund both Fusion Centers and EOCs. Five different grant 

programs comprise the Homeland Security Grant Program,4

 and 

according to a FEMA official, each can be used to support Fusion 

Center activities. However, it is unknown how much Homeland 

Security Grant Program funding went to Fusion Centers in the last 

fiscal year, or any years prior, because FEMA did not track this 

information. According to FY 2011 grant guidance, states for the 

first time must include whether grant funding will be used to 

support Fusion Center activities. There is also a separate EOC 

Grant program designed to fund construction of and improvements 

to state and local EOCs. In FY 2010, the EOC grant program was 

funded at $57.6 million, of which just over $10 million was 

awarded through a competitive process. 

Results of Audit 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency 

Management 

Some Fusion Centers consider themselves all-crimes or counterterrorism5 

focused; others have adopted an all-hazards approach.6 Where there is an 

4

 State Homeland Security Program, Urban Areas Security Initiative, Operation Stone Garden, 

Metropolitan Medical Response System, and Citizen Corps Program. 5

 All-crimes and counterterrorism typically refer to an approach that incorporates terrorism and other highrisk threats into the existing crime-fighting framework, to ensure that possible precursor crimes are 

screened and analyzed for linkages to larger-scale terrorist or other crimes. This approach recognizes the 

nexus between types of criminal activity (e.g., illegal drug operations, gangs, money laundering, fraud, 

identity theft) and terrorism.

6

 All-hazards typically refers to an approach that prepares for terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 

emergencies. Although the application of this approach varies, it generally means that the Fusion Center 

has identified and prioritized types of major disasters and emergencies, beyond terrorism and crime, that 

could occur within its jurisdiction and gathers, analyzes, and disseminates information that would assist the 

relevant agencies (e.g., law enforcement, fire, public health, emergency management, critical 

infrastructure) with prevention, protection, response, or recovery efforts. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 6 
all-crimes or a counterterrorism focus, emergency management is not 

always considered a partner in fulfilling Fusion Center responsibilities. 

Designations such as all-crimes and counterterrorism may omit the 

emergency management perspective. Where Fusion Centers adopt such 

designations, information sharing with EOCs is significantly limited or 

nonexistent. Additionally, many EOC officials view Fusion Centers as 

solely “law enforcement entities” and do not see the benefits of 

coordinating with Fusion Centers. These perceptions limit the 

effectiveness and efficiency of both Fusion Centers and EOCs. 

The Emergency Management Role in the Fusion Process 

Congress has stressed the importance of emergency management 

as being part of the fusion process. The conference report 

accompanying the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Report Act of 2007 states that “[e]mergency response 

providers are able to provide valuable information to the overall 

intelligence picture.” It further states that “the fusion center 

governing boards and the fusion process should be structured so as 

to enable the consideration of nontraditional information from 

emergency response providers in a collaborative environment.” 

Additionally, the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Report Act of 2007 states that the DHS Secretary, in 

consultation with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines 

that “create a collaborate environment for the sharing of 

intelligence and information among Federal, State, local, and tribal 

government agencies (including law enforcement officers and 

other emergency response providers), the private sector, and the 

public.” 

According to the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review released 

in February 2010, the vision of homeland security is to ensure a 

country “that is safe, secure and resilient against terrorism and 

other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and way of 

life can thrive.” The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 

further notes that “Homeland security will only be optimized when 

we fully leverage the distributed and decentralized nature of the 

entire enterprise in the pursuit of our common goals.” Both Fusion 

Centers and emergency management are critical components of the 

decentralized homeland security apparatus. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

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Benefits of an All-Hazards Approach 

An all-hazards approach to securing the homeland includes 

preparing for terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 

emergencies. This approach does not mean being prepared for 

every possible hazard that could occur. Rather, it means that a 

jurisdiction should identify and plan for the types of emergencies 

and major disasters, whether they are terrorism or crime-related, 

natural or manmade, which could occur within its coverage area. 

This suggests that a jurisdiction can enhance its preparedness and 

response abilities when the spectrum of intelligence, law 

enforcement, and emergency management disciplines share 

information and coordinate their efforts. 

The purpose of DHS is to link prevention, preparedness, response, 

and recovery into a single operational department, and an allhazards approach is necessary for a robust homeland security 

apparatus. As critical partners in our Nation’s homeland security 

efforts, Fusion Centers can better support the common goals of 

homeland security laid out by DHS by incorporating an all-hazards 

approach and building effective relationships with EOCs. 

Fusion Center and emergency management officials explained how 

adopting an all-hazards approach and partnering with one another 

enhances both Fusion Center and EOC operations. For example, 

one Fusion Center director stated that his staff was able to provide 

valuable information to the State Office of Emergency 

Management about flooding in the state using the Fusion Center’s 

geospatial mapping capabilities. Another Fusion Center was able 

to support a county EOC during a natural disaster by disseminating 

information through its various partner organizations, widening the 

reach of the EOC. As a result of this collaboration, the Fusion 

Center was incorporated into the county’s Comprehensive 

Emergency Management Plan. Emergency management officials 

in another county worked with their Department of Public Works 

partners to provide the “eyes and ears” of park employees to watch 

for signs of terrorist activity in the county’s parks, which could be 

reported to the Fusion Center. When officials on both the Fusion 

Center and emergency management sides viewed each other as 

partners in an all-hazards approach, they described how this 

enhanced both of their operations. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 8 
Approach Incorporated by the Fusion Center Affects 

Relationships With Emergency Management 

The Fusion Center Guidelines (Guidelines) released jointly by 

DHS and DOJ in August 2006 emphasize the importance of 

emergency management as a Fusion Center partner. The Guidelines 

state that “If an incident occurs, all [of these] resources will be 

needed to successfully minimize loss and apprehend suspects. The 

Fusion Center provides intelligence to the EOC regarding the 

disaster or related events (regardless of whether the Fusion Center 

is all-crimes or all-hazards). Because of the investment, expertise, 

and capability integrated within a Fusion Center, plans and 

procedures should include how each Fusion Center will support the 

jurisdiction’s emergency management structure during a crisis.” 

The Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion 

Centers (Baseline Capabilities)

7 expands upon this by denoting one 

of the baseline capabilities for all Fusion Centers as the ability to 

coordinate with response and recovery officials. 

Nevertheless, Fusion Centers are owned and operated by state and 

local entities. Therefore, DHS does not have the authority to 

compel them to take either an all-crimes or all-hazards approach. 

Under the Baseline Capabilities, recognizing the sovereignty of the 

state, local, and tribal governments that own and operate the 

Fusion Centers, the decision on whether to take an all-crimes or 

all-hazards approach is left up to the individual Fusion Center. 

The missions of Fusion Centers vary based on the environment in 

which each center operates. 

Although a Fusion Center can adopt either approach for its 

operations, the all-crimes approach may sever part of the link 

between preparedness and response, a link that is critical to 

protecting American lives. During our fieldwork, Fusion Centers 

that considered themselves all-crimes oriented typically did not 

develop relationships with emergency management officials. 

Some Fusion Center officials said that the primary reason they 

opted to take an all-crimes approach was that an all-hazards 

approach might result in duplication of functions with EOCs. 

However, technical assistance provided by DHS and DOJ outlines 

how to mitigate this concern by clearly defining roles and 

responsibilities. 

7

 The Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers document was released jointly 

by DHS and DOJ in September 2008. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 9 
As of June 2011, DHS did not formally track whether Fusion 

Centers have taken an all-crimes or all-hazards approach in their 

operations. DHS also does not know the amount of funding it 

provides to Fusion Centers; however, this information will be 

captured for the first time as part of the FY 2011 homeland 

security grant application and reporting processes. In accordance 

with the FY 2011 Homeland Security Grant Program guidance, 

DHS is also requiring grantees to coordinate with the Fusion 

Center when developing fusion center investment prior to 

submission. Fusion Centers leveraging Homeland Security Grant 

Program funds must prioritize the allocation of these grant funds to 

address any capability gaps identified as a result of the 2010 

Baseline Capabilities Assessment. A more direct tie between 

funding and achievement of baseline capabilities should provide 

DHS an opportunity to have greater influence on the development 

of partnerships between Fusion Centers and the emergency 

management community. DHS officials also stated that they are 

working with FEMA to expand how grant funds can be used to 

further facilitate information sharing and coordination efforts 

between Fusion Centers and emergency management officials. 

Some Fusion Centers are just standing up and do not yet have the 

personnel and other resources to be all-hazards centers. Over time, 

however, it would be beneficial for Fusion Centers to evolve to 

encompass all hazards. DHS has invested substantially in the 

Fusion Center network and should promote the benefits of using an 

all-hazards approach to leverage emergency management resources. 

Emergency Operations Center officials can provide Fusion Centers 

with situational awareness of ongoing events and serve as a warning 

point during activation. 

Conclusion 

Adopting an all-hazards approach to Fusion Center operations 

fosters building effective relationships with emergency 

management. Fusion Center officials who did not view their 

operations as having all-hazards responsibilities generally saw 

little or no value in coordinating and sharing information with 

EOCs. As a result, the information that the emergency 

management structure could provide to Fusion Centers may not be 

gathered. Additionally, information that could allow emergency 

managers to prepare for a response may not be received from the 

Fusion Center in a timely manner, if at all. DHS Intelligence and 

Analysis needs to encourage Fusion Centers to adopt an allRelationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 10 
hazards approach in accordance with the national homeland 

security strategy. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, State and Local Program Office 

and Assistant Administrator, National Preparedness Directorate: 

Recommendation #1: Develop and distribute materials for Fusion 

Center and Emergency Management officials that outline the 

benefits of partnering in an all-hazards approach to homeland 

security, and gather and publish best practices from jurisdictions that 

have adopted an all-hazards approach. 

We recommend that the Director, State and Local Program Office 

and Assistant Administrator, Grant Programs Directorate: 

Recommendation #2: Report annually on the amount of homeland 

security grant funds awarded for Fusion Center use, as well as the 

number of Fusion Centers that have adopted an all-hazards approach 

or can demonstrate communication and coordination with 

Emergency Operations Center officials. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Recommendation #1: DHS I&A and FEMA concurred with this 

recommendation. DHS I&A said that it has worked with federal, 

state, local, tribal, and territorial partners to develop and publish 

guidance in support of implementing all-hazards approaches. DHS 

I&A also said that, working with its departmental and interagency 

partners, it will continue to support the identification, 

documentation, and sharing of best practices and lessons learned 

from Fusion Centers as they work with their partners to implement 

all-hazards approaches. DHS I&A suggests that a full-time FEMA 

Protection and National Preparedness detailee be assigned to the 

State and Local Program Office to support efforts to integrate and 

coordinate emergency management participation in the Fusion 

Centers. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 11 
FEMA said that the Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program 

completes best practice summaries on Fusion Center-EOC 

partnerships and makes write-ups available on the Lessons Learned 

Information Sharing System. FEMA also said that examples of 

best practices were included in CPG-502. 

Although DHS I&A and FEMA have taken steps to encourage 

Fusion Center-EOC partnerships, more needs to be done. During 

our fieldwork many Fusion Centers and EOCs that we visited had 

limited or no coordination and information sharing between each 

other. Additionally, emphasis needs to be placed on promoting an 

all-hazards approach in these partnerships. 

We consider this recommendation resolved because steps are being 

taken to implement it; however, it will remain open until DHS I&A 

and FEMA demonstrate more progress in promoting Fusion 

Center-EOC partnerships and adoption of an all-hazards approach. 

Recommendation #2: DHS I&A and FEMA concurred with this 

recommendation. DHS I&A said that the State and Local Program 

Office is documenting the number of Fusion Centers that have 

adopted an all-hazards approach or can demonstrate 

communication and coordination with emergency management 

partners. DHS I&A also said that FEMA’s Protection and 

National Preparedness Grant Programs Directorate is responsible 

for reporting the amount of homeland security grant funds 

leveraged for Fusion Centers, and it will support FEMA in its 

efforts to determine the most effective manner to capture this 

information. DHS I&A will continue to work with FEMA’s 

Protection and National Preparedness Grant Programs Directorate 

to recommend revisions to the EOC grant guidance as well as the 

Emergency Management Performance Grant Program guidance to 

support all-hazards approaches. 

FEMA said that it has the ability to track Fusion Center spending 

and it is capable of reporting annually on the amount of Homeland 

Security grant funds awarded for Fusion Center use. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 12 
We consider this recommendation resolved because steps are being 

taken to implement it; however, it will remain open until evidence 

is provided that DHS I&A is documenting the number of Fusion 

Centers that have adopted an all-hazards approach and FEMA is 

tracking and reporting the amount of homeland security grant funds 

awarded for Fusion Center use. 

Roles, Capabilities, and Information Needs 

Fusion Centers and EOCs are not always aware of each other’s roles, 

capabilities, and information needs. Fusion Center officials rarely had 

memorandums of understanding with EOCs and did not always solicit 

feedback. Some Fusion Centers we visited had reached out to EOCs, but 

others had made no attempts to establish relationships or communications. 

Fusion Centers and EOCs would be well served if they coordinate to better 

prepare for response and recovery operations. Specifically, Fusion 

Centers and EOCs need to understand each other’s information 

requirements. Additionally, Fusion Centers should disseminate 

appropriate products to share information with, and solicit feedback from 

EOCs. Similarly, EOCs should reach out to Fusion Centers and facilitate 

two-way communications before and during events. 

Understanding Roles and Responsibilities 

Not all Fusion Centers and EOCs identify and coordinate with one 

another to implement and maintain plans and procedures to ensure 

a common understanding of roles and responsibilities. The 

Baseline Capabilities states that Fusion Center plans should 

identify roles, responsibilities, and protocols to govern the timely 

reporting of significant events occurring within state or local 

jurisdictions to federal authorities and, when appropriate, other 

states, localities, or regional entities. 

In a Baseline Capabilities Assessment completed in 2010, most 

Fusion Centers identified their own intelligence and analytical 

roles and responsibilities in support of response and recovery 

activities. However, coordination with EOCs in developing 

response and recovery coordination plans is lagging. For example, 

one Fusion Center director said they do not have a plan to 

coordinate with response and recovery officials; “they just do it.” 

On the other hand, some Fusion Centers have policies, but admit 

they still must do a better job of implementing them. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 13 
Fusion Centers that are colocated with EOCs 

and share reporting authorities coordinate 

Figure 4. Additional Best Practices for response and recovery efforts more 

Fusion Center and EOC Coordination effectively. In one location, the Fusion 

Center and the state EOC were not only Emergency Management Analyst— colocated but were also under the same chain Performs detailed research and analysis 

on all-hazards information for the of command. Colocation fosters faster 

production of intelligence for all information flow, and the two operations are 

homeland security stakeholders. almost completely integrated. 

Fusion Center and EOC Detailees— Colocation not only permits direct access to Staff serve in facilities to improve 

information sharing during events or partners, but also allows centers to use the 

full-time. colocated agency’s resources (e.g., systems 

and personnel) for expedited information flow 

Fusion Center Liaison Officer or to share responsibilities (e.g., shared Program—Network of law security officer) to achieve baseline enforcement, emergency services, and 

private sector officials who are capabilities. DHS has also identified this best 

responsible for reporting and practice. Figure 4 outlines additional best 

disseminating information from the practices identified during our review. 

Fusion Center to local agencies. 

Not all jurisdictions have the resources to Open Houses—Brings EOC personnel colocate. The FEMA-administered EOC into the Fusion Center to demonstrate 

capabilities and responsibilities. grant program’s guidance clearly prohibits 

money from being used to “fund the 

Exercises—To become familiar with construction or renovation of State, local, or 

staff, test capabilities, and identify tribal Fusion Centers.” Officials told us that 

issues. this language discourages states and urban 

areas from colocating Fusion Centers and 

EOCs for fear that they might not be eligible 

for the EOC grant program. 

Information Requirements 

The Baseline Capabilities states that information requirements for 

the Fusion Center shall be defined, documented, updated regularly, 

and consistent with the center’s goals and objectives. It is 

imperative that Fusion Centers coordinate information 

requirements with their partners, including EOCs. It is also 

important that EOC officials specify exactly what information or 

intelligence they need, why they need it, and when they need it. 

One municipal EOC director said that they shared the purpose and 

mission of their EOC with the area Fusion Center; however, 

confusion remains regarding the Fusion Center’s interaction with 

lower-level EOCs. This confusion exists because the Fusion 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 14
Center communicates only with the county EOC and not the 

municipal EOCs. Another EOC director in the area said that the 

Fusion Center is aware and has an understanding of what the EOC 

needs, including having all comprehensive emergency operations 

plans from the region. However, the official expressed concern 

over the interaction between the Fusion Center and local EOCs 

during a disaster because there have been no major disasters in 

their region, so the process has not been tested. 

Without dialogue between Fusion Center and EOC personnel, 

shared information may not be useful. Providing timely, accurate, 

and relevant information is the key to successful interaction. In 

one case, unnecessary information was being passed along to an 

EOC. The EOC quickly responded and informed the Fusion 

Center that it was sending information that was easily available 

through other sources. A relationship nurtured through dialogue 

enabled this problem to be rectified quickly. Conversely, states 

with one Fusion Center can have difficulty building individual 

relationships with each of the EOCs. In some cases, the Fusion 

Center will send information to the state EOC, and further 

dissemination to local EOCs is dependent on the state. However, 

as discussed below, if this information flow is not documented, 

information sharing with local EOCs may be inconsistent. 

Product Dissemination Plans 

According to the Baseline Capabilities, each Fusion Center shall 

develop a high-level dissemination plan that documents the 

procedures and communications mechanisms for timely 

dissemination of Fusion Center products to core and ad hoc 

customers, which include EOCs. Fusion Centers should develop 

these dissemination plans with their partners to ensure that 

information needs are being met. 

Our discussions with Fusion Center officials showed that some did 

have dissemination plans; however, they did not always include the 

end user in drafting these documents. Some Fusion Center 

officials said they did not have the resources and personnel to 

develop written dissemination plans. Other Fusion Center leaders 

were fairly new to their positions and had not yet begun 

developing written policies and procedures. 

Other Fusion Centers used undocumented processes to disseminate 

products and information to EOCs. For example, some Fusion 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 15 
Center officials rely on personal contacts and their functional 

experience to disseminate information. Changing personnel, 

rotations, and reassignments can greatly hamper the flow of 

information, especially when processes are not documented. 

Results from a 2010 DHS survey indicate that 66% of Fusion 

Centers have documented dissemination plans and procedures. 

However, when DHS validated the results of this survey, it 

determined that nearly half of the Fusion Centers actually relied on 

ad hoc processes to distribute their products to customers, and only 

47% had plans in place for disseminating Alerts, Warnings, and 

Notifications. 

Fusion Centers have made progress since this study was 

conducted. DHS resurveyed Fusion Center directors on their 

progress and released a report on its findings in April 2011. The 

report highlights the improvement Fusion Centers have made in 

developing written dissemination plans for their customers. 

Specifically, 64% of Fusion Center directors indicate that their 

centers had implemented their plan, policy, or standard operating 

procedure to distribute products. 

Soliciting Feedback 

According to the Baseline Capabilities, Fusion Centers shall define 

and implement a feedback mechanism that allows recipients of 

information or products to make suggestions to improve products. 

Soliciting feedback from customers for the products and 

information they provide allows those customers the opportunity to 

evaluate their performance. However, half of the Fusion Center 

directors we asked said they do not solicit feedback. In fact, 

according to the 2010 Baseline Capability Assessment, 60% of all 

Fusion Centers have not developed and implemented a feedback 

mechanism. Fusion Center officials indicated the need for more 

guidance and training to develop an effective feedback mechanism. 

Progress has been made since the 2010 baseline capabilities 

assessment. Based on a survey conducted by DHS in April 2011, 

there has been significant improvement. More than 76% of Fusion 

Center directors reported having developed and implemented a 

feedback mechanism; however, only 55% evaluated whether their 

feedback mechanism was effective. 

Some Fusion Center officials said that they do include feedback 

forms in their regularly disseminated products. However, this 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 16 
method may not provide effective results. Of the Fusion Centers 

we visited that provided feedback forms, none actually received 

responses that would be useful to improve their product. Numerous 

Fusion Centers are adamant about the ineffectiveness of the more 

passive approaches, such as the feedback forms in their regularly 

disseminated products. Another reason Fusion Centers said they 

did not have written procedures for soliciting feedback is that they 

do not have a strong relationship with the EOCs. Likewise, many 

EOCs said they do not have an opportunity to provide feedback 

because they do not receive information from the Fusion Center on 

which to comment. 

An important part of the feedback process is updating the center’s 

information requirements, collection plan, and analytic production 

strategy based on customer feedback. However, the Baseline 

Capabilities Assessment completed in 2010 found that fewer than 

50% of Fusion Centers have established this process. In addition, 

only 38% of Fusion Centers indicated that they have mechanisms 

in place to receive stakeholder feedback on all parts of the 

intelligence cycle. 

Conclusion 

Coordination with response and recovery officials in developing 

policies and procedures for disseminating products to EOCs is 

essential to Fusion Centers’ ability to fulfill their responsibilities. 

Fusion Centers need to ensure that customers are receiving 

consistent, timely, and relevant information to help them perform 

their duties during the steady state or in an emergency. Without 

soliciting useful feedback, Fusion Centers cannot adequately assess 

the usefulness and quality of information provided to EOCs. This 

could adversely affect the Fusion Centers’ efforts to enhance their 

interaction and relationship with EOCs and improve their 

information sharing capabilities. Furthermore, EOC officials 

should avail themselves of opportunities to interact with Fusion 

Centers, including participating in Fusion Center open houses and 

inviting Fusion Centers to participate in exercises. 

Many best practices have been identified to increase coordination 

and communication between Fusion Centers and EOCs, 

particularly colocating the Fusion Center and the jurisdiction’s 

EOC; however, this requires both resources and a desire to do so. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 17 
Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, State and Local Program Office: 

Recommendation #3: As a part of the Baseline Capabilities 

Assessment, assess the effectiveness of marketing activities and 

outreach efforts of Fusion Centers to promote the products, 

services, and information they can provide to Emergency 

Operations Center officials and other partners. 

Recommendation #4: Provide Fusion Centers with guidance and 

technical assistance to ensure that they adhere to the Baseline 

Capabilities to have written procedures for the products and 

information they disseminate to core and ad hoc customers, 

including Emergency Operations Center officials. 

Recommendation #5: Provide technical assistance to Fusion 

Center officials to conduct stand-alone periodic surveys to assess 

the usefulness and quality of the products and information provided 

to their partners, including Emergency Operations Center officials. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Recommendation #3: DHS I&A concurred with this 

recommendation and said that as a component of the annual Fusion 

Center Assessment Program, it is documenting Fusion Centers’ 

communication and outreach efforts to promote awareness of the 

products, services, and information they can provide to their 

customers, including non-law enforcement partners. 

We consider this recommendation resolved because steps are being 

taken to implement it; however, it will remain open until evidence 

is provided that DHS I&A is not only documenting but is also 

assessing the effectiveness of Fusion Centers’ marketing activities 

and outreach efforts to promote the products, services, and 

information they can provide to their customers, including EOC 

officials. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 18 
Recommendation #4: DHS I&A concurred with this 

recommendation and said it will continue to assist Fusion Centers 

with developing final, approved plans, policies, and/or standard 

operating procedures for their business processes. This includes 

supporting Fusion Centers’ ability to further disseminate threat 

information to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and 

private sector entities, including law enforcement and non-law 

enforcement partners. 

We consider this recommendation resolved because steps are being 

taken to implement it; however, it will remain open until DHS I&A 

provides evidence that all Fusion Centers have written procedures 

for the products and information they disseminate to core and ad 

hoc customers, including EOC officials. 

Recommendation #5: DHS I&A concurred with this 

recommendation and said it will continue to assist Fusion Centers 

by sharing best practices and emphasizing the importance of 

collecting feedback on the usefulness and quality of the products 

that Fusion Centers provide to law enforcement and homeland 

security partners. 

We consider this recommendation resolved because steps are being 

taken to implement it; however, it will remain open until DHS I&A 

provides evidence that it has a plan to provide technical assistance 

to Fusion Centers to conduct stand-alone surveys for assessing the 

usefulness and quality of products and information provided to 

their partners, including EOC officials. 

Federal Coordination and Information Sharing Guidance 

Fusion Centers and EOCs are not always aware of and do not always use 

federal guidance intended to assist them in their efforts to coordinate and 

share information. Although Fusion Centers and EOCs are not required to 

follow federal guidance, it is a good business practice to use any resource 

that can enhance their working relationships and assist with achieving 

desired results. Because Fusion Centers and EOCs may not be aware of or 

using the guidance issued specifically to address coordination and 

information sharing efforts, they may not be applying best practices or 

practical steps designed to help coordinate and integrate their operations. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 19 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 

FEMA, in conjunction with the joint DHS/DOJ Fusion 

Process Technical Assistance Program,

8 developed 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide-502: 

Considerations for Fusion Center and Emergency 

Operations Center Coordination (CPG-502). CPG-502 

provides guidance for coordination between Fusion 

Centers and EOCs. It outlines the roles of Fusion 

Centers and EOCs within the fusion process and 

provides steps by which these entities can work 

together to share information and intelligence on an 

ongoing basis. 

CPG-502 recommends a four-step process to help 

Fusion Centers and EOCs coordinate and integrate 

operations (see figure 5). 

Figure 5. Four-Step Coordination Process 

Source: DHS. 

Step 1: Fusion Center and EOC personnel should familiarize 

themselves with each other’s capabilities, needs, and requirements. 

Step 2: Once the Fusion Center and EOC are aware of each 

other’s capabilities, needs, and requirements, partnerships should 

be created. 

8 The DHS/DOJ Technical Assistance Program, which began in 2007, is a collaborative effort to develop 

and enhance the national Fusion Center network by offering classes and workshops delivered by subject 

matter experts. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 20 
Step 3: Agreements should be in place describing what 

information will be shared and how it will be shared (taking 

security clearances into account), particularly during steady-state 

and active-state operations. 

Step 4: Numerous training courses are applicable to 

EOC/emergency management and Fusion Center personnel. One 

of the best ways for Fusion Center and EOC staff to familiarize 

themselves with each other’s staff and operations is to jointly 

attend training, workshops, and exercises. 

Fusion Centers and EOCs can use CPG-502 as a catalyst to further 

develop their relationships, allowing for a better understanding of 

each other’s capabilities, information needs, and requirements 

while also leveraging all available resources during a disaster or an 

emergency. Although almost all Fusion Center officials and many 

of the EOC officials had seen CPG-502, the document was not 

effectively disseminated to all EOC officials, nor was the 

importance of its implementation promoted. 

During our visits to the 17 Fusion Centers, 1 told us that it had 

never seen the CPG-502 document and 11 said that they were 

aware of it but were not using it. Of the 31 EOCs visited, 3 were 

using the CPG-502 document, 12 had never seen it, and 16 had 

received it but are not using it to improve the coordination and 

integration of Fusion Center and EOC operations. One Fusion 

Center director told us that he does not see the connection between 

Fusion Centers and EOCs; therefore, he has not used CPG-502. 

Another Fusion Center director said that products like CPG-502 

are released all the time, but there is not enough time to read them 

to identify how they can be useful. The director also said that 

CPG-502 is just another document unless resources are available to 

implement it. Finally, a local EOC manager felt that CPG-502 

applied only to state Fusion Centers and EOCs because of the 

structure of the organizations outlined in the document and the 

structure of the guidance. 

One Fusion Center director we visited believes that creating 

partnerships is the most important aspect of CPG-502; however, 

throughout our visits, we encountered Fusion Centers and EOCs 

that were not partnering with each other. This director said that the 

biggest benefit to the document was the emphasis on personal 

relationships between the Fusion Centers and EOCs. Many of the 

EOCs, though, have little or no interaction with their Fusion 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 21 
Center. For example, an EOC director said that if he needed 

actionable information, he would go to the city police instead of 

the Fusion Center. Some police personnel said that they would 

contact other state Fusion Centers before contacting their own 

Fusion Center. A personal relationship with all partners fosters an 

appreciation of the roles, responsibilities, and endeavors undertaken 

by each center. Written procedures can be developed from these 

interactions. 

Conclusion 

More than 83% of the locations visited during our fieldwork either

did not receive or were not using CPG-502. Coordination between

Fusion Centers and EOCs is vital to enhancing our Nation’s

security. Fusion Centers and EOCs need to develop positive

relationships to share information and intelligence on a daily basis

as well as when responding to disasters. CPG-502 has information

that can help Fusion Centers and EOCs enhance their relationships

by providing guidance on how to gain a better understanding of each

other’s roles and responsibilities. CPG-502 can also support Fusion

Centers in their implementation of the Baseline Capabilities, and

help EOCs fulfill their emergency management responsibilities. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Director, State and Local Program Office 

and the Assistant Administrator, National Preparedness 

Directorate: 

Recommendation #6: 

 Ensure that the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG)-502 

and other federal guidance regarding coordination and 

information sharing efforts between Fusion Centers and 

Emergency Operations Centers is disseminated to all state, 

local, and tribal Emergency Operations Centers; 

 Promote the benefits of using CPG-502 and explain how it is 

designed to enhance Fusion Center and Emergency Operations 

Centers coordination and information sharing activities; and 

 Ensure that CPG-502 is applicable to local Emergency 

Operations Centers. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 22
Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Recommendation #6: DHS I&A did not concur with this 

recommendation. DHS I&A said that emergency management 

partners, including EOCs, are FEMA’s primary stakeholders, and 

ensuring the dissemination and applicability of CPG-502 to both 

state and local EOCs is a recommendation best directed to FEMA. 

However, DHS I&A said that it has and will continue to disseminate 

CPG-502 to Fusion Centers and explain its purpose and support 

FEMA with disseminating this guidance to emergency 

management partners. 

FEMA concurred with this recommendation and said that it has 

assisted with the dissemination of CPG-502 to Fusion Centers and 

the 10 FEMA Regions. FEMA has also put the document and a 

factsheet on its website. FEMA also stated that a new Fusion 

Process Technical Assistance offering has been developed to 

implement the concepts of CPG-502. Finally, FEMA believes that 

CPG-502 is already designed to be applicable to all jurisdictions. 

We consider this recommendation unresolved and open since we 

believe DHS I&A should further promote the benefits of CPG-502 

with both Fusion Centers and EOCs. When engaging EOC 

officials, DHS can refer to CPG-502 as a tool to enhance and 

develop their relationships. CPG-502 outlines the roles of Fusion 

Centers and EOCs within the fusion process and provides steps by 

which these entities can work together to share information and 

intelligence on an ongoing basis. Opportunities exist to promote 

this guidance through best practices identified for Fusion Center 

and EOC coordination such as the Fusion Center Liaison Officer 

Program and conducting open houses. 

While CPG-502 is not written exclusively for state use, some local 

EOC officials we interviewed expressed concerns that the 

functions and positions outlined in CPG-502 do not translate to 

their operations. FEMA needs to document either that local EOCs 

were sufficiently consulted in the drafting of CPG-502 or that they 

have taken steps to modify CPG-502 to ensure its applicability to 

local EOCs. FEMA also needs to provide us with their plans to 

further disseminate and promote the benefits of CPG-502 to local 

and tribal EOCs. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 23 
Classification of Information 

Information classification significantly affects how that information can be 

shared. Many emergency managers do not have clearances, and EOCs 

often do not have the secure information technology systems necessary to 

transmit or receive classified information. As a result, the federal 

government and Fusion Centers need to find other ways to share 

information with emergency management personnel and to minimize the 

amount of information that requires a security clearance. 

Overclassification of information can prevent information from being 

shared with those who may be able to benefit from it, such as emergency 

managers who may need to pre-position goods or lean forward in 

anticipation of an incident. Both federal and local levels face challenges 

with overclassification, as well as the use of the “law enforcement 

sensitive” designation. The federal government is taking steps to reduce 

overclassification; however, guidance to accomplish this is still being 

finalized and has not been implemented. 

Federal Requirements Governing Classified Information 

A number of federal laws and Executive orders govern the 

classification of information, which aims to prevent the 

unauthorized disclosure of information that could be damaging to 

national security. However, information that is not shared because 

of classification can also decrease security. The 9/11 Commission, 

mandated by Congress to provide recommendations on preventing 

future terrorist attacks, recommended that intelligence reports be 

written in their most shareable but still meaningful form to ensure 

that the largest number of people can access and use the 

information. 

Congress has moved to improve information sharing not only 

within the federal government, but also with state and local 

partners in the national and homeland security structure. Congress 

passed the Reducing Over-Classification Act (P.L.111-258) in the 

belief that decisions on classification need to consider the potential 

benefits to national security by sharing information rather than 

withholding it. The law requires the Secretary of Homeland 

Security to develop a strategy to prevent the overclassification of 

homeland security and other information and to promote the 

sharing of unclassified information. President Obama released 

Executive Order 13549, Classified National Security Information 

Program for State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities, in 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 24 
August 2010 to ensure the proper safeguarding of classified 

information shared with state, local, tribal, and private sector 

entities. 

Distributing Intelligence Reports With “Tear Lines” 

The Reducing Over-Classification Act assigns the Secretary of 

Homeland Security the responsibility to “prepare finished 

intelligence and information products in both classified and 

unclassified formats, as appropriate, whenever reasonably expected 

to be of benefit to a State, local, or tribal government (including a 

state, local, or tribal law enforcement agency) or a private sector 

entity.” It requires the Director of National Intelligence to create 

guidance on “portion marking” to address situations in which 

intelligence reports that contain both classified and unclassified 

information can be shared more easily by removing the classified 

information. Some Fusion Center officials said that information 

coming from DHS and other federal partners could be more clearly 

marked as to which portions can be shared. They also said that it 

would be helpful to receive training on how to handle these 

marked documents. 

DHS I&A officials said that they send out as many products as 

possible with “tear lines.”9

 They said they are impeded, however, 

when they go back to the originating agency asking for portion 

markings and the request is denied, or when they prepare an 

unclassified version of the product but the originating agency 

denies permission to release the unclassified version. DHS I&A 

has responded to 15 requests by state and local officials for 

downgrading classification levels or providing tear lines for the 

information provided by the department. However, the DHS 

official responsible for officially challenging the classification of 

information from other federal agencies said that DHS I&A has not 

launched any official challenges in more than a year. 

Classified National Security Information Program 

The Reducing Over-Classification Act created a Classified 

Information Advisory Officer position within DHS to develop and 

administer training programs to assist state, local, and tribal 

9

 A “tear line” is a portion of a classified intelligence report or document that contains a sanitized version of 

the information in that report. By using tear lines, important information in a highly classified intelligence 

report can be shared more widely with those who need it but do not have the necessary clearances to read 

the full report. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 25 
entities to develop plans and policies regarding the use of classified 

information, including ways to communicate with noncleared 

personnel, and the appropriate procedures for challenging 

classification determinations. The Secretary of Homeland Security 

appointed this officer in December 2010 by adding this 

responsibility to the Chief of the Administrative Security Division 

at DHS, and tasked the Classified Information Advisory Officer to 

implement Executive Order 13549. 

The Implementation Directive for Executive Order 13549 is in the 

final draft stages, needing only one more federal agency’s 

concurrence and the Secretary of DHS’ signature to become 

effective. This directive will standardize the process by which 

sensitive information is shared with state and local partners, 

establish a standard process for challenging the classification of 

information, and establish training requirements for those who 

handle classified information at the state, local, tribal, and private 

sector levels. The dissemination and implementation of this 

guidance should alleviate many of the classification issues 

identified by Fusion Center and EOC staff during our review. 

“Law Enforcement Sensitive” Designation 

Designation of information as “law enforcement sensitive”10 

presents an equal challenge to information sharing. Just as the 

federal government has struggled in the past with overclassifying 

information, state and local jurisdictions have a similar tendency to 

overclassify information as law enforcement sensitive, preventing 

it from being shared with non-law enforcement officials such as 

EOC personnel. However, by removing personally identifiable 

information or criminal information from law enforcement 

sensitive products, Fusion Center staff can share overall threat 

information with non-law enforcement partners. 

Many Fusion Center officials, particularly in all-crimes Fusion 

Centers, do not feel that information in law enforcement sensitive 

documents needs to be shared outside those with arrest authority. 

In some cases, state laws prohibit the sharing of information 

outside the law enforcement community. However, a better 

understanding of the information needs of emergency management 

might encourage Fusion Centers officials to remove the law 

10 The definition of “law enforcement sensitive” varies from state to state; however, it tends to describe 

detailed information about potential subjects of criminal investigations that could hinder prosecution if 

released. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 26 
enforcement sensitive portions of products so that emergency 

managers (and other partners) can use the remainder. 

Conclusion 

DHS needs to create intelligence products that are clearly portion 

marked or have tear lines, whenever possible. It also needs to train 

Fusion Center officials on how to handle and disseminate these 

products on a much broader scale to the emergency management 

community, as well as other partners. The finalization, 

dissemination, and implementation of DHS’s Implementing 

Directive for Executive Order 13549 will help accomplish this. 

To improve information sharing, Fusion Centers need to be able to 

remove the law enforcement sensitive information from the 

intelligence products they create, just as the federal government 

needs to create unclassified versions of its intelligence products. 

Although Fusion Centers have to comply with state laws governing 

the sharing of law enforcement sensitive information, DHS I&A 

can provide training and technical assistance to help the centers 

work within existing state laws to better share information. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, State and Local Program Office: 

Recommendation #7: Effectively disseminate the Implementing 

Directive for Executive Order 13549, once it is finalized by the 

DHS Administrative Security Division, to all applicable 

stakeholders, and adhere to the policies regarding portion marking, 

training, and classification challenges. 

We recommend that the Assistant Administrator, National 

Preparedness Directorate: 

Recommendation #8: Provide training for Fusion Center staff on 

how to handle portion-marked products and redact law enforcement 

sensitive information from products generated at the state and local 

levels. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 27 
Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Recommendation #7: DHS I&A concurred with this 

recommendation and said it will assist in the dissemination of the 

Implementing Directive for Executive Order 13549 to Fusion 

Center stakeholders. DHS I&A also said that it will continue to 

adhere to all policies regarding portion marking, training, and 

classification challenges issued by the DHS Administrative 

Security Division. 

We consider this recommendation resolved because steps are being 

taken to implement it; however, it will remain open until evidence 

is provided that DHS I&A is disseminating the Implementing 

Directive for Executive Order 13549 to all applicable stakeholders. 

Recommendation #8: FEMA concurred with this 

recommendation and said that the Fusion Process Technical 

Assistance Program offers a Security Technical Assistance 

workshop designed to assist Fusion Centers on handling, 

collecting, storing and sharing classified and controlledunclassified information. DHS I&A said that in coordination with 

the Office of Security, it will support FEMA with this 

recommendation and lead outreach on training opportunities to 

Fusion Center stakeholders. 

We consider this recommendation resolved because steps are being 

taken to implement it; however, it will remain open until FEMA 

provides documentation on the course materials used for training 

Fusion Center staff on how to handle portion-marked products and 

redact law enforcement sensitive information. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 28 
 

Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The objective of our audit was to determine to what extent Fusion 

Centers and Emergency Operations Centers interact and share 

information. To accomplish our objective, we reviewed and 

analyzed the President’s National Strategy for Information 

Sharing, Baseline Capabilities, the Comprehensive Preparedness 

Guide 502: Considerations for Fusion Center and Emergency 

Operations Center Coordination, prior OIG and Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) reports relevant to our review, grant 

guidance, Fusion Center baseline capability assessments, and other 

applicable documents. 

We interviewed officials from the DHS Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis and the FEMA Grant Programs Directorate in order to 

determine national-level policy and procedures. We conducted 

these interviews at DHS and FEMA headquarters in Washington, 

DC. We also attended the National Fusion Center Conference in 

Denver, Colorado. 

Additionally, we interviewed officials at 17 Fusion Centers and 31 

Emergency Operations Centers in 9 of the 10 FEMA Regions. We 

selected a judgmental sample of sites of various sizes and locations. 

For example, the Fusion Centers included both state and urban area 

centers, and the Emergency Operations Centers included state, 

local, and tribal locations. The centers were located in Maynard 

and Roxbury, Massachusetts; Trenton, New Jersey, and 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Orlando and Miami, Florida; Chicago, 

Illinois, and Madison, Wisconsin; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and 

Santa Fe, New Mexico; Kansas City and Jefferson City, Missouri; 

Las Vegas and Carson City, Nevada; Salem, Oregon, and Seattle, 

Washington; and Charleston, West Virginia. At the site visits, we 

asked interviewees a standardized list of questions and requested 

that they provide specific documents relative to their interaction 

and information sharing activities. 

We conducted this performance audit between October 2010 and 

June 2011 pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended, and according to generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

upon our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

upon our audit objectives. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 29 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

u.s. IHparl"'••l '" 1I000....d Sootyrily

W.'hi.:t..... lie 10518

.~. Homeland

• Security

SEP 1'3 /011

RECORD

MEMORANDUM FOR: Malt Jadacki

Assistant Inspe<:tor General for Emergency 0/Management Oversight

Department ofHomeland Security

FROM: C,,,,"

Under

A.

Secretary

W'll""

ford~lntell" cc and Anal i

SUBJECT: Corrective Action Plans r Recommendations Contained in OIG·

ll-007-EMO-FEMA, Relationships Between Fusion Centers ond

Emergency OperatiollS Centers

The Department of Homeland Security (DepanmentlDHS) apprt'Ciatcs the opportunity to review

and comment on the Office ofInspector General (OIG) draft report for 0IG-ll-007-EMOFEMA, Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers. The

Department, particularly the Office of Intclligence and Analysis (I&A), is addressing any

pertinent and relevant issues identified in the report.

Our responses to each ofthe recommendations from the draft report can be found below:

We reeommend that the Director, State and Local Program Office and Assistant

Administrator, National Preparedness Directorate:

Recommendation #1: Develop and distribute materials for fusion center and Emergency

Management officials that outline the benefits of pannering in an all-hazards approach to

homeland security, and gatht>t and publish best praeticcs from jurisdictions that have adopted an

all-hazards approach.

I&A Response: Concur. As stated in both the National Strategy for Information

Sharing and the Baseline Capabilitiesfor State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

(Baseline Capabilities), state and major urban area fusion cenlt'l'S are ownt'd and managed

by state and local governments. The Baseline Capabilities specifically recognizes that a

fusion center's mission (whcther it be "all--crimcs" and/or "all.hazards·') should be

defined based on jurisdictional needs. Funbennore, DHS has workt'd with federal, state,

local, tribal, and territorial (SLIT) partners to develop and publish guidance in support of

implementing all-hazards approaches, including the following appendices to the Baseline

Capabilities: Critical Infrastructure alld Key Resources (CIKR): Protection Capabilities

for Fusion Centers, Fire Service bllegrolionjor Fusion Centers, and Health Security:

Public Health and Medica! ImegrOliollfor Fusion Cell/ers.

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 


Page 30
 
·2·

DHS supports this guidance lind also supports fusion centers in the fonn of deployed

personnel, training, technical assistance, exercise support, Sc<:urily clearances,

oonncctivity to ft,'dcral systems, technology, and grant funding. As a component ofthe

joint DHS/Dcpartmcllt ofJustice Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program, I&A's

Stale and local Progrdm Office (SLPO), working ,..,jlh its Departmental and intcl'llgcncy

partners, will continue to support the identification, documentation, and sharing of best

practices and lessons !earned from fusion centers as they work with their partnm to

implement all-hal.ards approaches.

Additionally, I&A fully supports the assignment of a full time Federal Elm:rgency

Management Agency (FEMA) Protection and National Prllmrcdncss dctailee to SLPO to

support efforts to integrate and coordinate emergency management participation in fusion

centers and associat/,'d national level guidance and policy.

Recommendation #2: Report annually on the amount ofhomt:land security grant funds awardcd

for fusion center use, as well as thc number offusiOn centers that have adopted an all-hazards

approach or can demonstrate communication and coordination with emergency management

partners.

I&A Respullse: Concur. As a component of the annual Fusion Center Assessment

Program, SLPO is documenting the numb/''f offusion ccnters that have adopted an allhazards approach or can demonstrate communication and coordination with emt'fg(:ney

management partners. Additionally, responsibility for reporting on the amount of

homeland security grant funds leveraged for fusion centers is under the purview ofthe

FEMA Protection and National Preparedness' Grant Programs Directorate (GPO), as this

data is self-reported by the respective State Administrative Agency biannually via GPO's

grant reporting too!' SLPO will support FEMA detennine the most effective manner to

capture this infonnation.

In order to leverage homeland security grant funds to support fusion center all-hazard

approaches, I&A will work with the GPO to rCCQmmcnd revisions to the Emergency

Operations Center (EOC) grant guidance to support all-hazards approaches and to allow

the use of llmds lor fusiun centcr purposes provided thaI the fusion center is oo-Iocated or

vinually linked with the EOC. I&A will also work with FEMA GPD to recommend

revisions to the Emergency Management Perfonnance Grant program guidance to

support all-hazards approaches and to allow the use offunds for hiring emerg/''T!cy

managemcnt analysts placed in fusion centers.

We recommend that the Direclor, Stale and Local Program Office:

Recommendation #3: As a part ofthe Baseline Capabilities Assessment, assess the

effectiveness ofmarketing activities and outreach efforts offusion centers to promote the

products, services, and infonnation they can provide to EOCs and other partners.

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 


Page 31
 
-3-

I&A Responsr: Concur. As a component oflhc annual Fusion Center Assessment

Program, SLPO is documenting fusion centers' communication and outreach efforts to

promote awareness ofthe products, services, and infonnation they can provide to core

and ad hoc customers, including non-law t:nforccmcnt partners.

Recommendation #4: Provide fusion centt:l"S with guidance and technical assistance to ensure

they adhere to the Baseline Capabilities to have written procedures for the products and

infonnation they disseminate to core and ad hoc customers, including EOCs.

I&A Responst: Concur. SLPO is leading Departmental and interagency efforts \0

assist fusion centers in building their capabilities, and specifically in mitigating capability

gaps identified by the 2010 Baseline Capabilities Assessmenl A key focus ofthese

mitigation efrons was to assist fusion centers in defining their business processes lhrough

the development offinal, appron::d plans, policies, and/or standard operating procedures.

As of December 31, 2010, fusion centers had made progress in meeting this objective.

SLPO will continue 10 assist fusion centers in this regard with a specific focus on

supporting their efforts to implement Crilical Operational Capability (COC) #3:

Disseminate, lbis COC is focusc<\ on supporting fusion centers' ability to further

disseminate threat infonnation 10 SLIT and private sector enlities within their

jurisdiction, including law enforcement and non-law enforcement partners,

Recommendation #5: Provide technical assistance to fusion center officials to conduct standalone periodic surveys to more effectively assess the usefulness and quality ofthe products and

information that is provided 10 their partners, including emergency management partners,

I&A Response: Concur. The Baseline Capabilities/or Stale and Major Urban Area

Fusion Cellter.s identifies the dC\'e!opment ofmechanisms to rccci\'e stakeholder

feedback and update the fusion centers' plans and procedures based on this feedback (IS a

capability necessary to execute the fusion process. SLPO will continue to assist fusion

centers in building this capability by sharing best practices and emphasize thc importance

ofcollecting feedback on the usefulness and quality ofits products from law enforcement

and homeland security partners,

We recommend that the Director, State and Local Program Office and the Assistant

Adminiurator, National Preparedness Directorate:

Recommendation #6:

• Ensure that the Comprehensive Preparedness Goide (CPG)-S02 and other fooeral guidance

regarding coordination and infonnalion sharing cfforts between fusion centers and EOCs is

disseminated to all state, local, and tribal EOCs;

• Promole the benefits of using CPO·SOl and explain how;1 is dcsignai to enhance fusion

center and EOC coordination and infonnation sharing activities; and

• Ensure that ePG·SOl is applicable to local EOCs_

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 


Page 32
 
- 4-

I&A Response: Non-Concur. As emL'fgcncy managcmcllt partners, including EOCs,

are FEMA'5 primary stakeholders, ensuring the dissemination and applicnbility ofCPG502 to both stnte and local EOCs is a recommendation bcst directed to FEMA. SLPO has

and will continue to disseminate erG-502 til fusion centers find e:-.:plain its purpose, and

wj1J support FEMA disseminate this guidance to emergency managcffiL111 partners. as

appropriate.

Additionally, I&A will support FEMA as it leads efforts to engage with State level EOCs

and cmtrg<..'11cy managt.-111l-'ll1 to ensure a statewide coordination/facilitation point for the

distribution ofinfonnation shared by the fusion centers to local emergency management

partners. By providing fusion centers with a primary emergency management p<:Jint of

contact (POC). this POC can ensurc information is appropriately disseminated to

local/county emergency managers and EOCs. At the same time, thi~ primary emergency

managemcnt POC can ensure pertinent information from these partners is also shared

with the fusion center.

\Ve recommend that the Direclor, State and I,ocal Program Office:

Recommendation #7: Effectively disseminate the Implementing Directive for Exceutivc OnkT

13549, once it is finalized by the DHS Administrative Security Division. to all applicable

stakeholders, and adhere to the policies regarding portion marking, training, and classilication

challenges.

I&A Response: Concur. Reeogl'lizing that the DHS Administrative Security Division is

leading the development of the Implemcnting Directive for Exttutive Order 13549, I&A

will assist in the dissemination ofthe directive to fusion Cl,'ntcr stakeholdlTs.

Additionally, I&A adheres, and will continue to adhere, to all policies regarding portion

marking, training, and classification challenges issued by the [)HS Administrative

Security Division.

We recommend Ihal the Assistant AdminiSlrator, National Preparedncss Directoratc:

Recommendation #8: Provide training for fusion center staff on how to handle portion-marked

products and redact law enforcemo::nt sensiti\·e information from products generated at tho:: state

and local levels.

1&/\ Response: Concur. In coordination with the Office of Security, !&A will support

fEMA with this recommendation and lead outreach on training 0pp<:Jrtullilies to fusion

center stakcholden;.

We appreciate this 0pp<:Jrtunity to review and comment on the draft rt-port. In addition to this

response, technical comments and a sensitivity review WlTC prol'idt.-Q. under separate COVCI.

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 


Page 33
 
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Page 36
 
Appendix C 

Fusion Center Map and List of State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers
 

Page 37
 
Appendix C 

Fusion Center Map and List of State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 

State Fusion Centers Urban Area Fusion Centers 

Alabama Fusion Center Nebraska Information Analysis Center Boston Regional Intelligence Center Alaska Information and Analysis Center New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center Central California Intelligence Center Arkansas State Fusion Center New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center Central Florida Information Exchange Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center New York State Intelligence Center Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center California State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center Nevada Threat Analysis Center Cincinnati/Hamilton County Regional Terrorism Early Warning Group Colorado Information Analysis Center North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center Delaware Valley Regional Fusion Center (Philadelphia) Commonwealth Fusion Center (Massachusetts) 

North Dakota State and Local Intelligence Center 

Detroit and Southeast Michigan Information and Intelligence Center 

Connecticut Intelligence Center Oklahoma Information Fusion Center Houston Regional Information Sharing Center 

Delaware Information Analysis Center Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center Joint Regional Intelligence Center (Los Angeles) Florida Fusion Center Regional Operations Intelligence Center (New Jersey) Kansas City Regional TEW Interagency Analysis Center Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center Rhode Island Fusion Center Miami-Dade Fusion Center Hawaii Pacific Regional Information Clearinghouse 

South Carolina Intelligence and Information Center North Central Texas Fusion Center 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 


Page 38
 
Appendix C 

Fusion Center Map and List of State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 

State Fusion Centers Urban Area Fusion Centers 

Idaho Criminal Intelligence Center South Dakota Fusion Center Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center Statewide Terrorism & Intelligence Center (Illinois) Northern California Regional Intelligence Center Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center Strategic Analysis and Information Center (Ohio) Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center Tennessee Fusion Center Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (California) Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center Terrorism Information Threat Assessment Network Fusion Center (Oregon) San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center Louisiana State Analytic Fusion Exchange Texas Fusion Center Southern Nevada Counterterrorism Center Maine Information and Analysis Center Utah Statewide Information and Analysis Center Southeastern Wisconsin Threat Analysis Center Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center Vermont Fusion Center Southwestern Pennsylvania Region 13 Fusion Center Michigan Intelligence Operations Center Virginia Fusion Center St. Louis Terrorism Early Warning Group Minnesota Joint Analytical Center Washington State Fusion Center Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center Mississippi Analysis and Information Center West Virginia Intelligence Fusion Center Missouri Information Analysis Center Wisconsin Statewide Information Center Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center Wyoming Fusion Center 

*The map and list of state and major urban area Fusion Centers do not include the Puerto Rico National Security State Information Center. 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 


Page 39
 
Appendix D 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Amy Hall, Director 

Adrian Dupree, Audit Manager 

Soraya Vega, Audit Manager 

Douglas Campbell, Program Analyst 

Ryan Hartong, Program Analyst 

Eric Hostelley, Program Analyst 

Brandon Landry, Program Analyst 

Stuart Josephs, Referencer 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 

Page 40 
Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

DHS Audit Liaison (Project Code 11-007-EMO-FEMA) 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Administrator 

Assistant Administrator 

FEMA GAO/OIG Liaison (Project Code 11-007-EMO-FEMA) 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

Relationships Between Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers 


Page 41
 
 

 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202)254-4100, fax your request to (202)254-4305, or e-mail your request to 

our OIG Office of Public Affairs at DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@dhs.gov. For 

additional information, visit our OIG website at www.oig.dhs.gov or follow us on Twitter 

@dhsoig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to Department of Homeland Security programs and 

operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202)254-4292 

• E-mail us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigation - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive SW, Building 410 

Washington, DC 20528 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.