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TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

State of California 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN 

Attorney General 

______________________________________

OPINION :

: No. 98-501

of :

: July 16, 1998

DANIEL E. LUNGREN :

Attorney General :

:

ANTHONY Da VIGO :

Deputy Attorney General :

:

______________________________________________________________________

 THE HONORABLE JAN GOLDSMITH, MEMBER OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY,

has requested an opinion on the following question:

 May a city prohibit the making of turns onto designated public streets in either business or

residential areas within its jurisdiction during selected hours when no traffic safety issue is involved? 

CONCLUSION

 A city may prohibit the making of turns onto designated public streets in either business or

residential areas within its jurisdiction during selected hours when no traffic safety issue is involved. 

ANALYSIS

 A city possesses and may exercise only such powers as are granted to it by the Constitution

or by state statutes, together with those powers that arise by necessary implication from those expressly

granted. (Myers v. City Council of Pismo Beach (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 237, 240; 76 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 289,

291 (1993).) In A&B Cattle Co. v. City of Escondido (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1038, the court

summarized the following principles of municipal powers that we find to be applicable to the question

presented:

 "'Under the police power granted by the Constitution, counties and cities have plenary

authority to govern, subject only to the limitation that they exercise this power within their

territorial limits and subordinate to state law.' [Citation.] More specifically, article XI, section 7

of the California Constitution provides: 'A county or city may make and enforce within its limits

all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.'

Where local legislation conflicts with general law, it is void. [Citations.] 'Apart from this

limitation, the "police power [of a county or city] under this provision . . . is as broad as the

police power exercisable by the Legislature itself."' [Citations.]
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police power exercisable by the Legislature itself. [Citations.]

 "A local legislative enactment will be invalidated when it duplicates, contradicts, or

infringes upon an area completely occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative

implication. Moreover, where the subject matter of the local legislation has been entirely

occupied by state general law, supplementary or complementary legislation, even pertaining to

matters otherwise properly characterized as municipal in character, is prohibited. [Citations.]"

These legal principles have been applied in a variety of contexts. (See Candid Enterprises, Inc. v. Grossmont

Union High School District (1985) 39 Cal.3d 878, 885; Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129,

140; 78 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 171, 172 (1995); 76 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 289, 291 (1993).)

 We are asked whether a city may prohibit the making of turns onto designated public streets

in either business or residential areas during selected hours where no traffic safety issue is involved. Footnote

No. 1 This inquiry presents two essential issues of law. First, would the ordinance prohibiting the making of

turns onto designated streets for other than traffic safety considerations be in conflict with any state law?

Second, would such an ordinance fall within a city's police power?

 1. Consistency With State Law

 Section 21 of the Vehicle Code Footnote No. 2 provides:

 "Except as otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this code are applicable

and uniform throughout the state and in all counties and municipalities therein, and no local

authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code unless

expressly authorized therein."

In section 21 the Legislature has expressed its plenary power over the regulation and control of traffic on all

highways and streets in the state, including those under the jurisdiction of local authorities. (Rumford v. City

of Berkeley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 545, 551; Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 371; City of Lafayette v.

County of Contra Costa (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 749, 755, 756.) In Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitley

Heights Civic Assn. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 812, 820, the court observed:

 "As noted by the Attorney General: 'Regulating the use of the public roads and

highways by whatever means is outside the "municipal affairs" constitutional grant of authority

to chartered cities.' (68 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 101, 102, fn. 2 (1985).) Moreover, citing section 21,

Rumford, and Lafayette, among others, the Attorney General stated: 'Since the state has

preempted the entire field of traffic control, any right of a local authority to interfere with the

free flow of traffic . . . must be derived from an express delegation of authority from the

Legislature.' . . . (75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 80, 81 (1992).) We agree."

Accordingly, a city may regulate traffic only if it is so expressly authorized. (78 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 65, 67

(1995); 68 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 101, 102 (1985).) We thus must determine here whether a city has "express

delegation of authority from the Legislature" to regulate the making of turns onto designated public streets

during selected hours for purposes other than traffic safety.

 Section 22101, subdivision (a) provides:

 "The Department of Transportation or local authorities in respect to highways under

their respective jurisdictions, may cause official traffic control devices to be placed or erected

within or adjacent to intersections to regulate or prohibit turning movements at such

intersections."

The Vehicle Code defines the terms used by the Legislature in section 22101. "'Local authorities' means the
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The Vehicle Code defines the terms used by the Legislature in section 22101. Local authorities means the

legislative body of every county or municipality having authority to adopt local police regulations." (§ 385.)

"'Highway' is a way or place of whatever nature, publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for

purposes of vehicular travel. Highway includes street." (§ 360.) "An 'official traffic control device' is any

sign, signal, marking, or device . . . placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having

jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic . . . ." (§ 440.)

 It is readily apparent from these statutory definitions that the Legislature has expressly

authorized cities to prohibit the making of turns onto designated public streets in either business or residential

areas during selected hours when no traffic safety issue is involved. We find nothing in subdivision (a) of

section 22101 that would limit the exercise of such authority to traffic safety concerns to the exclusion of all

other considerations. (See also §§ 22113, 21351.)

 2. Scope of Municipal Police Power

 As noted above, a city's constitutionally based police power is, while subordinate to general

law, "as broad as the police power exercisable by the Legislature itself." (See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley,

supra, 17 Cal.3d at 140.) The police power is not limited to safety concerns. (75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 239, 241

(1992).) In People v. K. Sakai Co. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 531, 535, the court explained:

 "The police power has long been described as the inherent power of a body politic to

enact and enforce laws for the promotion of the general welfare. [Citations.] It has been said that

an 'attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless.' [Citation.] The scope of the

police power changes with changing social and economic conditions. It is 'not a circumscribed

prerogative, . . . but is elastic and . . . capable of expansion to meet existing conditions of modern

life and thereby keep pace with the social, economic, moral, and intellectual evolution of the

human race. . . .'"

In Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 485, the Supreme Court further observed:

 "In its inception the police power was closely concerned with the preservation of the

public peace, safety, morals, and health without specific regard for 'the general welfare.' The

increasing complexity of our civilization and institutions later gave rise to cases wherein the

promotion of the public welfare was held by the courts to be a legitimate object for the exercise

of the police power. As our civic life has developed so has the definition of 'public welfare' until

it has been held to embrace regulations 'to promote the economic welfare, public convenience

and general prosperity of the community.'"

 Accordingly, we have stated that "[t]he police power is the inherent authority of the state to enact

and enforce laws for the promotion of the general welfare, including the economic welfare, public

convenience and general prosperity of the community." (65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 267, 273 (1982).) Any such

purpose, including for example the alleviation of noise or air pollution within a business area or residential

community during certain periods of the day, would support the exercise by a city of its police power

authority in regulating the making of turns onto designated public streets without regard to any specified

traffic safety objectives.

 We conclude that a city may prohibit the making of turns onto designated public streets in

either business or residential areas within its jurisdiction during selected hours when no traffic safety issue is

involved. 

* * * * *

Footnote No 1
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Footnote No. 1

The question as presented assumes that the making of a turn would be prohibited by the city for reasons other than traffic

safety. It is noted, however, that even if the municipal power to regulate turns at intersections were limited to safety

concerns, it may not be contended in defense to a charge of making a prohibited turn that the prohibition was motivated by

other than safety concerns. Based on the separation of powers doctrine expressly stated in section 3 of article III of the

Constitution, the judiciary will confine its evaluation of a statute to the terms of the legislation itself and will not inquire

into the mental processes or motivations of those who enacted it. (Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1995) 32

Cal.App.4th 1616, 1623; see also, City of Fairfield v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 768, 777 [review of city council

denial of application for development permit]; State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 257-258 [review

of quasi-judicial determination].) Accordingly, unless the court finds that the regulation on its face is irrationally conceived

for such purpose (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board, etc. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 547) or patently unreasonable (70

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 292, 295 (1987)) or oppressive (66 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 367, 368 (1983)) so as to violate the

constitutional guarantee of substantive due process (cf. 69 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 191, 197 (1986); 62 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 351,

352 (1979)), the validity of the statute will be sustained.

Footnote No. 2

All references herein to the Vehicle Code are by section number only.