F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

F I D E L I T Y N A T I O N

A L F I N A N C I A L , I N C ., a Delaware corporation; F I D E L I T Y E X P R

E S S N E T W

O R K , I N C ., a California corporation,

Plaintiffs-Appellants
,

v

.

C O L I N H. F R I E D M A N , individually and as trustee of F riedman F amily trust UDT Dated 7/23/87; H E D Y K R A M E R F R

I E D M A N , individually and as trustee of F riedman F amily trust UDT Dated 7/23/87; F A R I D M E S H K A T A I , an individual; A N I T A K R A M E R M E S H K

A T A I , individually and as trustee of Anita Kramer L iving Trust Dated 7/23/87,

Defendants-Appellees. N o. 17-15913

D.C. No. CV 15-2288 DJ H

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Ariz o na Diane J . Humetewa, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted October 12, 2018 San F rancisco, California

F iled Aug ust 22, 2019F I D E L I T Y N A T ’ L F I N

. V

. F R I E D M A N 2

B e fore: A. W a llace Tashima and Mary H. Murg uia, Circuit J udg es, and Robert N. Chatig ny , * District J u dg e.

Opinion by

J u dg e Tashima

SUMMARY * *

Registration of

Judgm ents

The p anel reversed the district co urt’s order vacating a reg istered judg ment and remanded.

Plaintiffs obtained a civil fraud judg ment in California federal court a

nd r eg istered this California judg ment in the District o f Ariz ona pu r suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1 963. Plaintiffs l a t e r attempted to renew the Ariz ona judg ment, but the district court ruled that the renewal or re-reg istration was void

as unti m e l y

. Plaintiffs nex t reg istered the California judg ment in W ashing ton federal court and then reg istered the newly -obtained W ashing ton judg ment in the D i s trict o f Ariz ona. The district court g r anted defendants’ motion under F ed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to vacate the newly -reg istered second Ariz ona judg ment as void. I n a prior appeal, th e c o urt o f
app e als reversed, holding that reg istering the California judg ment i n W ashing ton created a “new” W ashing ton judg ment that could be re-reg i s t e red in another state under

* T h e Ho n o rab le Ro b ert N. Ch atig n y , Un i ted States District J u d g e f or th e District o f

Co n n ecticu t, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.F I D E L I T Y N A T ’ L F I N

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. F R I E D M A N 3

§ 1963. On remand, the d istrict cour t ag ain g r anted relief under Rule 60(b) o n the g round t h a t the W ashing ton judg ment was void because t h e W estern District o f W a shing ton lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants at the time of reg istration.

The p anel reverse d
, holding that a court need not have
person a l jurisdiction over a judg ment debtor in o rder to “merely r eg ister” a previously obtained judg ment pursuant to § 1963. The panel held that § 1963 itself does not require that the c ourt have personal jurisdiction. F urther, the Due Process Clause does not re q u ire that a court in which a judg ment creditor registers a pre-ex isting federal judg ment have personal jurisdiction over judg ment d ebtors a t t h e time o f
reg istration. The panel held that once a f e deral court o f competent jurisdiction has d e t e r m i n e d t h e p a r ties’ substantive rig hts a nd entered a judg ment follow i n g a proceeding that comports with due process, that federal j udg ment should be enforceable in any other f ederal district by way of the federal judg ment reg istration statute.

COUNSEL

Thomas H. Case (arg

ued) and Michael G. King
, Hennelly & Grossfeld L L P, Marina del Rey
, Californ ia, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

David M. B a ss (arg

ue d )
, D a vid M. B ass & Associates I n c., L os Ang eles, California; Dominica J

. Minore, The L aw Offices of Dominica J

. Minore P.C., Scottsdale Ariz ona; for Defendants-Appellees.F I D E L I T Y N A T ’ L F I N

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. F R I E D M A N 4

OP INION

TASHI MA, Circuit J udg e:

I n order to facilitate the enforcement of federal judg ments, 28 U.S.C. § 1963 provides that a judg ment entered in a federal court m a y be reg istered in any other federal d istrict by “ filing a certified copy of the judg ment” in th a t district. I n this case we address, as a matter o f first impression in our Circuit, whether personal jurisdiction over the judg ment debtors in the district of reg istration is r equired for such reg istration of a judg ment. W e h o l d that it is not, b e c ause neither § 1963 nor due process imposes such a personal jur i s diction requirement. W e therefore reverse the order and judg ment of the district court, and remand.

BACK G ROUND

I n 2002, Plaintiffs-Appellants F idelity Na t i o n a l F i n a

n cial, I nc., and F idelity Ex press Network, I nc. (colle c t ively
, “F idelity ”), obtained a multimillion dollar civil fr a u d judg ment ( the “California J udg ment”) ag ainst Def e n d antsAppellees the F riedmans and Meshkatai s (collectively
,
“ Defendants”) in the U.S. District Court for the Centr al District of California. This jud gm e nt became final on May 15, 2003, after this Court dismissed D efendants’ appeal from the judg ment.

W h ile Defendants’ appeal in the orig inal case was pending
, F idelity reg istered the California J udg ment in the District of Ariz ona pursuant to the federal reg istration statute, 28 U

. S

. C

. § 1963. I n 2007, F idelity a ttempted to renew the Ariz ona judg ment. H owever, o n March 2, 2012, the District Court o f Ariz ona ruled that F idelity ’s 2007 renewal or re-F I D E L I T Y N A T ’ L F I N

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reg istration of the Ariz ona reg istered judg ment were void as untimely
, b ecause the judg ment h ad already e x pired under Ariz ona’s f

ive-y ear statute of limitations for the enforcement of judg ments.

Unable to enforce the Ariz o na reg istered judg ment or rereg ister the orig inal California J u dg ment in Ariz ona, F idelity

came up wi t h a creative alternative. F idelity reg istered the California J udg ment in the W e s t ern District o f W ashing ton (the “W ashing ton J udg ment”) Fi d e l ity then reg istered the newly -obtained W ashing ton J udg ment i n the District o f Ariz ona (the “Second Ariz ona J udg ment”).

Several mont h s later, Defendants moved the A riz o na District Court under F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to vacate the newly -reg istered Second Ariz ona J udg ment a s void, arg u ing that § 1963 did not allow successive reg istration of f ederal judg ments. That is, Defendan t s arg ued that
reg istering the California J udg ment in W a shing ton did not create a new W ashing ton judg ment tha t c o u l d then be
reg istered in Ariz ona under § 1963. Defendants also a rg u ed that, in any case, the W a shing ton J u d gm e n t w as invalid for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendants. The A riz o na district court g ranted Defendants’ motion a n d v acated the Second Ariz ona J udg ment, holding that § 1963 did n ot allow successive reg istration of judg ments—in other words, that only an orig inal judg ment, such a s the California J u dg ment in this case, may be reg istered in another district under § 1963. See Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc. v. F riedman
, 939 F

. Supp. 2d 9 7 4
, 979–87 (D. Ariz

. 2 013). The district court did n ot reach Defendants’ second arg ument reg a rding lack of due p r o c e ss and personal jurisdiction. Id. a t 986–87.F I D E L I T Y N A T ’ L F I N

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. F R I E D M A N 6

F idelit y appealed, and this Court reversed. Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc. v. Friedman
, 803 F

. 3d 9 9 9 (9th Cir. 2 015) (“ Fidelity I

”). W e h eld that r e g istering the California J udg ment in W ashing ton created a “new” W ash i n gton judg ment that, like any other W ashing ton judg ment, could be
re-reg istered in another state under the plain terms of § 1963. Id. at 1003. W e r emanded the c a se to the Ariz ona d i s t r i ct court on that basis, without reaching Defendants’ a lternative
arg ument that the W ashing ton J udg ment was void for lack o f jurisdiction over Defendants. See id. a t 1003 n.3.

On rema n d
, the district court a g ain g ranted Defendants’ Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judg ment, a fter allowing supplemental briefing on Defendants’ contention that the W a shing ton J udg ment w as void because the W estern District of W ashing ton lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendants
at the time of reg istration. See Fi d. Nat’l Fin. Inc. v

. Friedman
, No. CV-15-2288-PHX-DJ H, 2017 W L 6049376 ( D

. Ariz

. May 1, 2 017). The district court held that
reg istration of a judg ment p ursuant to § 1963 requires that the
court of reg istration h ave personal juri s d i ct ion over the judg ment debtors. See id. a t * 6

– 7

. I n reaching this conclusion, the district c ourt first noted that a judg ment is void if the court that “rendered” the judg ment lacked jurisdiction over the parties. Id. at *5. I t then reasoned that because we sug g ested in Fidelity I that reg istering a judg ment under § 1 963 creates a “n e w ” j udg ment, the court o f
reg istration ca n b e said to have “rendered” a judg ment such that the normal jurisdictional requ i r em e nts apply

. See id. at *5–7. B ecause Defendants had n o assets or other contacts in W a shing ton, the district court c oncluded that the W ashing ton court lacked personal jurisdiction over D efendants;

co n s e q u ently
, that the W ashing ton J udg ment was void a nd could not have been validly reg istered in Ariz ona. Id. at *4,F I D E L I T Y N A T ’ L F I N

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*7. As a result, the district court vacated the Second A riz o na J udg ment. F idelity

ag ain appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court “review[ s] de novo

. . . a d istrict court’s ruling
upon a Rule 60(b)(4) motion . . . because the question of the validity of a judg ment is a leg al one.” Export G rp. v. Reef Indus., Inc.
, 5 4 F

. 3d 1 466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1995); s e e a lso Fidelity I , 803 F .3d at 1001.

D ISCUSSION

On a ppeal
, F idelity asserts that the district court improperly g ranted relief from judg ment because a court need
not have personal jurisdiction over a judg ment debtor in order
to “merely reg ister” a previously obtained judg ment pursuant to § 1963. F or the reasons ex p lained below, we ag ree.

F irst, neither the relevant statute’s plain lang uag e nor its
purpose supports a personal jurisdiction requ i rement for
reg istration of a judg ment. Section 1963 provides:

A judg ment in an a ction for the rec o v e r y o f
money or prop e rt y entered in a ny c ourt o f appeals, d istrict court, bankruptcy court, o r in the Court of I nternati o n a l Trade may be

re g istered by f

iling a certified copy of the judg ment in a ny other district

. . . when the judg ment has become final b y appeal o r

ex p iration of the time for appeal or when ordered by the court that e n tered the judg ment for g ood cause shown.

. . . A j u d gment so reg istered shall hav e the same effect as aF I D E L I T Y N A T ’ L F I N

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. F R I E D M A N 8

judg ment of the d istrict court of the district where reg istered and may be enforced in like

manner.

28 U.S.C. § 1963. Nothing in this p rovision limits the district
courts in which a judg ment may be reg istered to only t h ose that can assert personal jurisdiction over the judg ment debtors. I nstea d
, the provision’s tex t is ex tremely broad, allowing a judg ment entered in “any . . . district court” to be
reg istered “in any other d istrict.” Id. F urth ermore, the fact that r eg istering a judg ment in another district simply requires “fil i n g a certified copy of the judg ment” sug g e sts that the
reg istration process is intended to b e simple, essentially an administrative task that d o e s not require a ny additional judicial action. See id.

Giving e ffect to this broad statutory lang uag e also accords with the provision’s purpose, which i s “to simplify a nd facilitate collection on v alid judg ments.” Fidelity I
, 803 F .3d
at 1003 (citation omitted). Section 1963 a i m s to spare creditors and d ebtors “ the additional cost and harassment o f further litig ation which would otherwise be required by way of an action on the judg ment in a district court o ther than that where the judg ment was orig inally obtained. ” S. Rep. No. 83-1917 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3142; see also Stanford v. Utley
, 341 F

. 2 d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1 965) (“[ T] he purposes of § 1963 were to simplify and facilitate the enforcemen t o f federal judg ments,

. . . to eliminate the necessity an d e x p e nse of a second lawsuit, and to avoid the impediments, such as diversity of citiz enship, which new a nd distinct federal litig ation mig ht otherwise encoun t er.”). Adhering to the statutory

tex t’s ex pansive license to reg isterF I D E L I T Y N A T ’ L F I N

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judg ments in other districts effectua t e s those purposes; 1

r e a ding a non-ex istent jurisdictional requirement into t h e statute would contravene Cong re s s ’ intent by placing limits

on reg istration that would make the process more onerous a nd
p o t e n t i a l l y r e q u i r e a d d i t i o n a l l i t i g a t i o n r e g a r d i n g jurisdiction. 2 Thus
, w e h o l d that § 1963 itself does not

1 Def en d an ts p o in t o u t th at Fid elity ’ s reg istrat i o n o f th e C alif o rn ia J u d g m en t i n W ash in g to n w as n ot f o r th e p u rp o se o f en f

o rcin g th e j u d g m en t in W ash in g to n , b u t rath er f o r th e p u rp o se o f creatin g a n ew j u d g m en t th at co u l d su

b seq u e n tly b e reg istered in A rizo n a an d th u s p ro v id e an en d

- ru n aro u n d A riz o n a ’s s tatu te o f lim itatio n s o n th e

en f o rcem en t o f j u d g m en t s. Def en d an ts’ arg u m en t th at im p o s in g a j u risd ictio n al req u irem en t f o r reg istratio n u n d er § 1 9 6 3 is ap p r o p riate sim p ly b ecau se, as ap p lied to th e f acts o f t h is ca s e , su ch a req u irem en t

w o u ld n o t co n trav en e th e statu te’ s u n d erly i n g p u rp o se o f f acilitatin g

en f o rce m e n t in t

h e state o f reg istratio n an d w o u l d clo se a seem in g lo o p h o le, is u n

p ersu asiv e. In Fid

elity I
, th i s Co u rt rej ected Def

en d an ts’ in v itatio n to “ refu s e to g iv e ef f ect to Co n g ress’ ch o sen w o rd s” s im p ly b ecau se d o i n g so “ p o ten tially allo w s p lain t if f s t o reg ister a j u d g m en t th at h as p rev io u sly ex p ired u n d er a state’ s s tatu te o f lim itatio n s ,” n o tin g th at

su ch an ef f ect is “ irrelev an t in v i ew o f th e p lain lan g u ag e o f § 1 9 6 3 .” 8 0 3 F.3 d at 1 0 0 3.

2 Fo r ex am

p l e, a p erso n al j u

risd ictio n re q u i r e m en t co u ld h am p er a j u d g m en t cred ito r’ s ab ility to reg ister an d en fo rce a j u d g m en t w h en a j u d g m en t d eb t o r h as n o co n tacts w ith a state b ey o n d a s s ets th at are

co n tro lled b y a t

h ird p arty in th e s t a t e

. Cf. U.S .I. Pro p s. Co rp

. v. M.D. Co n s t. Co

. , 2 3 0 F.3 d 4 8 9
, 4 9 7 (1 st Cir. 2 0 0 0 ). In f act, th e Su

p rem e Co u rt h a s e x p licitly reco g n ized th at in so m e cases, th e “ p resen ce o f th e d ef en d an t ’ s p ro p erty in a state

. . . a lo n e w o u ld n o t su pp o rt

. . . j u risd ictio n ” u

n d er th e m in im

u m co n tacts t est f

o r p erso n al j u risd ictio n

. S h a ffer v. Heitn er , 4 3 3 U.S. 1 8 6
, 2 0 9 (1 9 7 7 ). T h u s, im p o sin g a m in im

u m

co n tacts j u risd ictio n al lim it o n th e reg istratio n o f j u d g m en ts, as Def en d an ts su g g est is req u i red
, risk s allo w in g a j u d g m en t d eb to r to “ av oid
p ay m en t o f h is ob lig atio n s b y th e ex p ed ien t o f rem o v in g h is assets to a p lace w h ere h e is n o t su

b j ect to an in p erso n am su it.” Id

. T h is w ou ld b e d irectly at o d ds w ith § 1 9 6 3’s p u rp o se o f f acilitatin g co llectio n on v alid j u d g m en ts. S

ee Fid elity I

, 8 0 3 F.3 d at 1 0 0 3

.F I D E L I T Y N A T ’ L F I N

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require that a court have p er s o n al jurisdiction over a judg ment debtor in order to reg ister an ex isting judg ment.

W e nex t turn to the due p rocess basis of the district court’s ruling

. The district court noted that under this Court’s ruling in Fidelity I

, reg istering a judg ment in another district pursuant to § 1 963 creates a “new judg ment” that is treated a s if it had been rendered in t h e new district and that “[ a] judg ment is void ‘if the court that rendered the judg ment lacked jurisdiction over the parties

. . . .’” Fid. Nat’l Fin. Inc.
, 2017 W L 6049376, at *5 (quoting In re Ctr. W holesale
, 759 F .2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1985)). This reasoning
, however, is f

l awed b e c ause it incorrectly presumes that constitutional du e p r o c e ss protections in the form o f a personal jurisdict i o n requirement attach based o n the
appearance of a judg ment, rather than base d on the charact e r i s tics of the process that results in that judg ment. W e must therefore ask this crucial constituti onal question: does the Due Process Clause require that a co u r t in which a judg ment creditor r eg isters a pre-ex ist i n g federal judg ment have personal jurisdiction over judg ment debtors at the time of reg istration? W e hold in the neg ative.

A long line of S u p reme Court cases reflects that the personal jurisdiction requirement of due process is g rounded in protecting litig ants from bei n g u n fairly drag g ed into a faraway court to defend a suit. 3 See, e.g. , W orld-W ide

3 A n o t h er f u n ctio n o f th e p erso n al j u risd ictio n req u irem en t is
p reserv i n g th e b alan ce o f p ow ers b etw een co eq u al states. S ee W o r ld -W id e Vo lkswa g en Co rp

. v. W o o d so n , 4 4 4 U.S. 28 6
, 2 9 2 (1 9 8 0 ) (“ [T h e

m in im u m co n tacts test] acts to en su re th at th e S tates th ro u g h th eir co u rts, d o n o t reach ou t b e y o n d t h e lim i ts im p o sed o n th em b y th eir statu s as

co eq u al so v ereig n s i n a f

ed eral sy stem .”). B u t th at issu e is n o t o f co n cernF I D E L I T Y N A T ’ L F I N

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Volkswagen Corp. v. W

oodson
, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980) (“The c oncept of minimum contact s

. . . protects the defendant ag ainst the burdens o f litig ating in a distant o r inconvenient f

orum.”). The c onstitutional standard focuses

on “whether the ‘quality an d nature’ of the defendant’s activity is such that it is ‘reasonable’ and ‘fair’ to require him
to c o nduct his defense in that State,” i.e., whether the defendant h a s sufficient “contacts with the forum state such th a t t h e maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘ traditional notions of f

air play and subs t a n tial justice.’” Kulko v

. Superior Court
, 436 U.S. 8 4, 92 (1978) (quoting I n t ’ l Shoe Co. v. W ashington , 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945)).

A key distinction h e r e, however, is that the process o f
reg istering a federal judg ment in another fe d e ral district pursuant to § 1963 does not involve “maintenance of a suit”

o r “[ conducting a] defense.” See id. I nstead, r eg istrat i o n

s i m p ly requires “filing a certified copy of the judg ment.” 4

h ere, b ecau se w e are d ealin g w ith j u d g m en ts issu ed b y f

ed eral, n o t state,

co u rts.

4 In f act, as d iscu ssed ab o v e, leg islativ e h i sto ry d o cu m en ts sh o w th at § 19 6 3 w as sp ecif

ically in ten d ed to av o id ad d itio n al litig atio n

. T h e rep o rt issu ed b y th e Sen ate J u d iciary

Co m m ittee ex p lain s:

[R]eg i stratio n of j u d g m en t s in o th er d istricts is a

m o d ern leg al d ev i ce. It assists j u d g m en t cred ito rs b y

m ak i n g it p o s sib le f

o r th em to p u rsu e th e p ro p erty o f a d e b t o r in satisf

actio n o f a j u d g m en t by th e o rd in ary p ro cess o f lev y in g ex ecu tio n o n a j u d g m en t in a n y d istrict w h ere th e j u d g m en t is reg istered

. T h e resu l t is th at b o th cred ito rs a n d d eb t o rs are relieved o

f th eF I D E L I T Y N A T ’ L F I N

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. F R I E D M A N 12

See 2 8 U .S.C. § 1 963. Defendants make n o substanti ve arg ument about why
, even in the abse n c e o f the c entral

c o n c e r n a n i m a t i n g t h e d u e

- p r o c e s s

- b a s e d p e r s o n a l jurisdiction requirement, courts must nonetheless h a v e personal jurisdiction to reg ister judg ments under 28 U .S.C. § 1963. Constitutional due process requirements depend on the procedures at i s s u e , not semantics—just because a court mig ht be said to “render ” a “n e w” judg ment pursuant to reg istration d o es not mean t h a t no meaning ful distinction

ex ists between, on the one ha n d
, s u bjecting a person to a lawsuit in which clai m s a r e litig ated in an ong oing proceeding before a court that may determine o r alter substantive rig ht s w h e n it renders a final judg ment, and, on the o ther h and, reg istering a pre-ex isting judg ment, a process

a d d itio n a l co s t a n d h ara ssmen t of fu rth er litig a tio n wh ich wo u l

d oth erwise b e req u ired b y w ay o f an actio n

o n th e j u d g m en t i n a d istrict o th er th an th at w h e r e th e j u d g m en t w as o rig i n ally

o btain ed

.

S. Rep

. No

. 1 9 1 7 (1 9 5 4 ) (em p h asis ad d ed ), a s rep rin ted in 1 9 5 4 U.S.C.C.A .N. 3 1 4 2
, 3 1 4 2 ; see a lso Air Tra nsp o rt Ass’n o f Am. v. Pro

f’l Air Tra ffic Co n tro llers Org

. (P A T C O) ( In re Pro

f ’l Air Tra

ffic C o n t r o llers Org

. (

PATCO) )
, 6 9 9 F.2 d 5 3 9
, 5 4 4 (D.C. C ir. 1 9 8 3 ) (“ Reg istratio n

is a rap id p ro ced u re th at d o es n o t req u i re th e in t erv en tio n

o f a j u d g e. It is m erely a m atter o f h av i n g th e clerk o f th e co u rt i n w h ich th e j u dg m en t is reg i stered en ter th e p ertin en t p ro v isio n s o f th e

. . . sister

co u rt’ s j u d g m en t o n th e j u d g m en t d o ck et.” (in tern al q u o tatio n m ark s an d alteratio n s o m itted )); Oh io Ho ist Mfg

. Co

. v. LiRo cch i
, 4 9 0 F.2 d 1 05
, 1 0 7 (6 th Cir. 1 9 7 4 ) (“ T h is statu t e h as b een h eld t o h av e b een ad o p ted to p ro tect b o t

h j u d g m en t cred i to rs an d j u d g m en t d eb to rs f ro m th e ad d itio n al

co st an d h arassm en t o f f u rth er litig atio n w

h ich o th e r w i s e w o u ld b e in cid en t to an actio n on th e j u d g m en t in a f o reig n d istrict.”); S ta n

fo rd
, 3 4 1 F. 2d at 27 0 (“ [T ]h e p u rp o ses o f § 1 9 6 3 w ere

. . . to elim in ate th e

n ecessity an d ex p en se o f a seco n d law s u it, an d to av o id th e im p ed im en ts,

su ch as d i v ersity

o f citizen sh ip , w

h ich n ew an d d istin ct f

ed eral litig atio n

m ig h t o th erw i se en co u n ter.”).F I D E L I T Y N A T ’ L F I N

. V

. F R I E D M A N 13

which does n ot require any p arty to appear in court and in which no judicial action is taken. See S haffer
, 433 U.S. at 210 n.36 (holding that, once a j udg ment is validly rendered
ag ainst a debtor, the judg ment creditor may sue to satisfy the debt with property in a state that lacks personal jurisdiction over the judg ment debtor).

Reg istration of a judg me n t pursuant to § 1963 can only

occur after a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered the orig inal judg ment (otherwise there would be no judg ment to reg ister). O f c o u r se, the court that adjudicated the parties’

c l a i ms and issued the orig inal judg ment must of cour s e satisfy d ue process requirements such as ensuring personal jurisdiction. Thus, reg istration will only happen after full d ue process has been provided during the orig inal adjudication on the merits that determined the parties’ substantive rig h ts a nd oblig ations. We see no reason why —based on case law, policy
, or otherwise—why the simple a ct of subsequently
reg istering a judg ment a lters a debtor’s s u b stantive rig hts such that a d u e process r ig ht is trig g ered. 5 To the contrary , reg istration itself does not chang e the amount of money o r property owed; it only

facilitates collection of a pre-ex isting judg ment.

5 Mo reo v er, th e p ractical reality is th at j u d g m e n t d eb to rs m u s t h av e

so m e so rt of p resen ce or p ro p erty in th e state b ef o re j u d g m en t cred i to rs

can attem pt t o en f o rce a j u dg m en t, b ecau se w ith o u t a j u d g m en t d eb to r’ s p r esen ce o r p ro p erty in th e state, th ere is n o t h in g ag ain st w

h ich t h e j u d g m en t can b e “ en f

o rced .” T h e d i strict co u

rt elid ed th is f

act, co n clu d in g th at an y po ten tial d istin ctio n betw een reg istratio n an d en f o r c e m en t w as elim in ated b y th is Co u rt’ s d eterm in atio n in Fid elity I th at reg istratio n of

a j u d g m en t h as th e sam e ef f ect as creatin g a n ew j u d g m en t

. W e see n o b a s is f o r su ch a co n clu sio n

. En f o rcem en t in v o lv es ad d itio n al step s b ey o n d reg istratio n , su ch as m o v in g to ex ecu te o n a j u d g m en t d eb to r’ s assets, an d n o th i n g w e said in Fid elity I ch an g ed th is.F I D E L I T Y N A T ’ L F I N

. V

. F R I E D M A N 14

W e therefore hold that once a federal court of competent jurisdiction has determined the parties’ substantive rig hts a nd entered a judg ment following a p roceeding that accords with due process, that federal ju d g ment should be enforceable in
any other federal distri c t by way of the federal judg ment reg istration statute.

CONCLUSION

F or the foreg oing r easons, we hold that valid reg istration of a federal judg ment under § 1963 does not require that the
court of reg istration h ave pers o n a l jurisdiction over the judg ment debtors. The statute permits a judg ment creditor to reg ister a federal judg ment “in any o ther district.” 28 U .S.C. § 1963 (emphasis added). Because the Due Process Clause does not require that this broad statutory lang uag e be cabined by a ju r i s d ictional limitation, “any

. . . district” includes districts in which personal jurisdiction over judg ment d ebtors
may b e lacking

. As a result, the W ash i n gt o n J udg ment was not void for lack of

jurisdiction, and the district court erred b y vacatingthe Second Ariz ona J u dg ment on that basis.

REVERSED and REMANDED

.