COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

KENNETH ALLEN GREEN, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2209-94-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 JANUARY 23, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

William R. Shelton, Judge 

 Anthony G. Spencer (Morchower, Luxton & Whaley, 

 on briefs), for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

 brief), for appellee. 

 Kenneth Allen Green, Jr. (appellant) appeals his conviction 

for reckless driving in violation of Code § 46.2-852. Appellant 

contends that he was entitled to a trial by jury, and the trial 

court erred in ruling he waived this right. Because the trial 

court did not ensure appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently waived his right to a trial by jury, we reverse his 

conviction. 

 On July 18, 1994, the General District Court of Chesterfield 

County convicted appellant of reckless driving. Appellant 

appealed his conviction to the circuit court. On October 5, 

1994, appellant appeared in circuit court without an attorney and 

requested his case be continued so that his counsel could be 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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present. The circuit court continued the case for two days, 

until October 7, 1994. On October 6, 1994, appellant, by 

counsel, filed a motion requesting another continuance and a 

trial by jury. On October 7, 1994, the circuit court denied 

appellant's motion for a continuance and found, "the defendant 

waived his right to a trial by jury on October 5, 1994, as he 

failed to request that his case be heard by a jury." (Emphasis 

added.) The circuit court then heard evidence and found 

appellant guilty of reckless driving and imposed a $150 fine. On 

appeal, appellant contends, and the Commonwealth concedes, that 

he had a right to a trial by jury. See Code §§ 46.2-868 and 

18.2-11; McCormick v. City of Virginia Beach, 5 Va. App. 369, 

372, 363 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1987). Well-settled principles guide 

our analysis of whether the trial court erred in ruling that 

appellant waived this right. While "[a]n accused may waive his 

right to a jury in the trial court," federal and state 

constitutional law dictate that "before waiver of a trial by jury 

can be effective, the accused must give his express and 

intelligent consent." Id. (citing Patton v. United States, 281 

U.S. 276, 312 (1930), rev'd on other grounds; Williams v. 

Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)). Rule 3A:13(b) sets forth the 

required procedure to validate a defendant's consent and to 

effect a jury waiver in a trial court: 

 If an accused who has pleaded not guilty in a 

circuit court consents to a trial without a jury, the 

court may, with the concurrence of the Commonwealth's 

attorney, try the case without a jury. The court shall 
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determine before trial that the accused's consent was 

voluntarily and intelligently given, and his consent 

and the concurrence of the court and the Commonwealth's 

attorney shall be entered of record. 

(Emphasis added.) In this case, the trial court's order 

specifically states, "the defendant waived his right to a trial 

by jury on October 5, 1994, as he failed to request that his case 

be heard by a jury." 

 We reject the Commonwealth's assertion that the record does 

not provide this Court with the facts necessary to determine 

whether appellant did or did not waive his right to a jury trial. 

 Although the record contains no transcript or statement of 

facts, the trial court, in its order, clearly stated the reason 

for its holding that appellant waived his right to a jury trial. 

 A court speaks through its written orders. Guba v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 114, 118, 383 S.E.2d 764, 767 (1989). 

Any court subsequently required to review an order of another 

court must presume that it is the final pronouncement on the 

subject addressed therein. See Kern v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 

84, 88, 341 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1986). Here, the trial court's 

order revealed that it erroneously failed to inquire whether 

appellant voluntarily and intelligently consented to waive his 

right to a trial by jury. Furthermore, appellant specifically 

requested a trial by jury on October 6, 1994 and the record does 

not show that appellant thereafter waived this right. See Rule 

3A:13(b). 

 Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand for 
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further proceedings if the Commonwealth be so advised. 

Reversed and remanded.