Opinion issued December 2 8 , 2023

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 22
- 00701
- CV

——————————— R.S. , Appella nt V. D.R.T. , Appel l e e
On Appeal from the 280th D i s trict Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 2 021
- 49103

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant R. S. 1 appeals a protective order entered in favor of appellee
D. R.T. I n two issues, R.S. argu es that the (1) trial court abused its discretion in issuing a p rotect iv e orde r that tried to supersede any further order s from a different

1 T o protect the mi nor ’ s identity , we re fer to the part ies by initials

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 9.8 c mt; T EX . F AM . C ODE § 109.002(d).2

trial court and (2) evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the protective order.
We affirm

. Background
O n August 13, 20 21, D.R.T. filed a firs t a mended app lication for protectiv e order , a ssert ing that she and R. S. ar e currently separated and are parents to a minor
child , D.R.S. 2 D.R.T. alleged that R.S. engaged in family violence under section
71.004 of th e Texas Family Code , and alt e rna tively arg ued that R.S. committed acts under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Crim inal Procedure. D.R.T. included an affidavit in support o f her reque st , detailing family v iolence a nd sexual assault against herself and D.R.S

. R.S. answere d t he su i t wi t h a general denial.
At a protective

- order hearing in October 2021 , D.R.T. tes tifie d that she is
married to R.S. , they have a four

- year
- old d aughter , D.R.S. , and D.R.S. had complained that R.S. had touch ed her privat e parts. Specifica lly, D.R.S. had used the bathroom and complained that her “ private was hurting

. ” Upon D.R.T. ’ s question ing , D.R.S. sai d that R.S. had given her a bath at her grandmother ’ s house
and after going to the bedroom , R.S

. d id not put on her clothing and started touching her private part

.

2 D.R.T. ’ s appl ication noti fied the trial co urt that D

. R.S. was subject to c ont inuing jurisdiction of a court un der th e Texas Family Code due to a pending suit affecting the parent

- ch ild relationship in the 257th Di strict Court.3

D.R.T. also testified about various incidents invo lving R.S. and D.R. S. In
November 2018 , she asked R.S. to b athe D .R.S

. When she check ed on D.R.S. , R.S. was n aked with a “ full e rec tion , ” whi le holding D .R.S. In March 2019 , R.S. changed D.R.S. ’ s dia

per and D.R.T noticed she had inflammation or redness in he r
vag i na. During a bath i n December 2020 , D.R.S

. put her finger on her an us and said she was massaging he rself

. D.R.T. a sked her about it , and D.R.S. responded that
R.S. h ad taught her ho w and that “ it was going to be soft, that it was not going to
hurt and that it was j ust a m a ssage. ” At bed t ime, D.R.S. explained that R.S. would apply diaper rash cream on h er private a rea and would use b aby diapers. D.R.T.
testi fi ed that at the time, D.R.S. was not usin g diapers anymore “ [ s ] o there was no

reason t o apply diaper ras h cream s during the day because she has no rashes and
she didn ’ t use pampers or dia pers. ” D.R.S. t old D.R.T. that she did not want to go
ba ck wit h R.S.
D.R.T. also testified about domestic viole nce during their marriage. In August 200 3, R.S. grabb ed her by th e neck

. She further recalled an October 2016
inci dent in whi ch R.S. thr ew he r on the bed , and she slapped him. R.S. started to
choke her while hi s other hand punch ed her legs. When she tried to call the police,
R.S. re minded her that she had an immi grat ion issue.4

O n cros s
- examination, D.R.T. testified that she a nd R. S. separated in A p ril
2019. Regarding a January 2021 incident in which it was alleged that R.S. was touching D.R.S. ’ s private parts , D.R.T. agreed t hat she contacted a pediatrician and
Chi ld Protective Services ( CPS ) investigated b u t fo u nd “ no cause. ” She also agreed that a doctor was unable to note any abuse from a February 2021 foren sic
medica l evaluation.
S .B. , R.S. ’ s ex
- wife, testified that they ha ve a child who is now 15 years old

. S .B. testified that she ha d no concerns about R .S. ’ s conduct with th eir child , who
R.S . had been s eeing since the ir divorce when the child was two years old

. S.B
also testified that R.S. had never been violent with her an d was not a violent
person
. Durin g R.S. ’ s testimony, he den ied D.R.T. ’ s allegations , including phys ical
violence or ina ppro priate touching

. Regarding the Jan uary 2021 in cident , R.S. testified that it never happened. He recalled four CP S investigations , and all t he allegations were ruled out. W hen D.R.S. ha d a swollen v agina , R.S. explained
that , earlier in the day, he had taken D.R.S. to a park where she was playing on a swing

. He further testified that D.R.S. was later seen by a hospital nurse , wh o only
found diaper rash. Regarding t he Nove mber 2018 i ncide nt , R.S. explained that he bathed with
D.R. S. , but he kep t h is underwear on and did not have an erection

. Regarding the5

Decemb er 2020 i ncident , R.S. explained that he had given D.R.S. a ba th and told
her to wash her private parts by herself.
R.S. f urthe r testified that, i n October 2016, D.R.T. had gotten upset, threw picture frames at him , and slapped him . He testifi ed that he was trying to restrain her from getti ng more violent and from hurting herself or him self , but that he did
not choke her

. R .S. t estified t hat he ne v er touched D.R.S. inapprop riately and has
never b een violent with D.R. T

. The trial court questioned R.S. about D.R.S. ’ s vis it to a hospital. When

as k ed i f the forensic nurs e who ex amin ed D.R.S. said she would re po rt the incident
to CP S, R.S. r esponded t ha t the nurse stated , “ there was n othing to report. ” At the end of the hearing, the tr ial court informed the parties that it would appoint an amicus attorney to get more informat ion. The record does not include

a ny other activity i n th e suit unt il Au gust 2, 2022 , when D.R.T. request ed a rendition on her application for a protective ord er
. The trial court held a rendition hearing on August 16, 2022, and explain ed to the part ies that the amicus attorney was unable to do its job be cause of a l angu age barri e r. The trial court then informed the parties of its rendition , and after an entry hearing, signed a n August 29, 2022 protective order under Title 4 of the Family
Code

— findi ng that family violence has occurred and is likely to occur in th e future6

and that R. S. committed an act constituting a felony offense involving family violence against D.R.T. or D.R.S.
The trial court also found reasonabl e groun d s to believe that D.R.T. or D.R.S. w ere victim s of sexual assault and that R.S

. had comm it ted sexual assaul t against D.R. T. or D .R.S under Chapte r 7B of the T e xas Code of Criminal
Procedure

. The trial court made t he protective order permanent for D.R.T. , but it expires for D.R.S. when she turn s 18

. 3
R.S. now appeals

. Superseding Language
I n his fi rs t issue, R.S. arg ues th at the trial court ’ s protective order potentially
conf licts with a n order from a different trial court. Specifically, R. S. ar gues that the protective order states that it “ supersede [s] any oth er con flicting provisions for [ R.S. ’ s] access to o r p osse ssion of the ch ild under Cause Number 2019

- 63709 out
of the 257 th Judicial District Cou rt of Harris County, Texas. ”
R.S. admits th at at the time t his protective order was sig ned, there was no
fina l order in the divorce proceedings

— but “ to the extent that the protective order sough t to supersede any future order, such an act was an abuse of the trial court ’ s

3 The protectiv e orde r provides that R.S. “ shall not have any contac t with [ D. R .S.] , unless recommen ded in writing by a licensed professional child therapist. ” The same provision was made f or access to or possession of D.R.S.7

discretion. ” Specifically, R.S. challenges the following section of th e protective
order:
IT IS O RDERED that, as per Texas Family C ode Section

85.00 9, the terms for access to and possession of the child b y [ R.S. ] as set forth within this order are valid and enforc eable, and supers ede any other confli cting provisions for [ R. S. ’ s] access to or po ssessio n of the child under Cause Numbe r 2019

- 63709 ou t of the 257th Jud icial District Court of Ha rris County, T e xas
. ( E mphasis added).
A. Pr eservation of Complaint
T o preserve a complain t for appellate review, the complaining party must
first present t he compl aint to the trial court by a tim ely request, object ion, or
motion

. T EX

. R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)(1)

. The complaint raised in the trial court must state the grounds for the ruling sought “with sufficient specificity to make the trial
court aware of the c omplaint .” Id

. “The reason for the requ irement that a litigant preserve a trial predicate for complaint on appeal is that one should not be permitted to waive, consent to, or neglect to complain about an error at trial and
then sur prise his opponent on appeal by stating his complaint for t he fi rst time.” Pirtle v. Gregory , 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 ( Tex. 1982). 4 If a party f ails to do this, the complaint cannot be considered on appeal

. See Bushell v. Dean , 803 S.W.2d 711,

4 See also Valdez v. Valdez , 930 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) ( because pa r ty never complained t o trial court, he never gave trial court opportunity to correct alleg ed error).8

712 (Tex. 1991)

. 5 M oreover, a party ’ s complain t on appeal m ust comport wi th th e objection it made in the trial court. See Benson v. Chalk , 536 S.W.3d 886, 895 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
B. Anal ysis Here, a t the August 16, 2022 rendition hearin g, after the trial court informed
th e parties of its ruling o n the protective or der, R.S. informed the trial court that they had the divorce trial and the 257th District Court ruled that visi t ation would
be at a neutral location. R.S. further state d that the child had been exami ned by
CPS , police, and a pediatricia n and n o on e found abuse. The trial court state d,

“ Well I did not have anyone testify from CPS or a doctor ’ s off ice or anything like
that. And I heard the testimony of the applicant and the affidavit wa s admitted and
I am able to judge the credibility of t he witnesses and the evidence and this was my
decision. So I stand by my ruling. ” The following exchang e then occurred: [ D.R.T. ]: The clarification of the parties, g iven just the nature of

the case, woul d the Court like the re to be languag e in the f inal protective order that indicates that it supersedes any conflicting orders as it relates to a ccess of t he child? [Court]: Yes.

5 See a lso Humble Surgical Hosp., LLC v. Davis , 542 S.W.3d 1 2, 21 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (“Rule 33.1 requires the appealing p arty to adequately ra ise issues before the trial court to give the trial court notice of [the party’s] complai nt.”).9

[R.S.]: I would just object to that. One court

— they ’ re both district cour ts and its not like this is appellate c ourt, so
. [D .R.T.]: Well the family court does indicate that if there are

conflicting orders

—

if Title IV orders co nflict with Title V orders, th at Title IV order supersede. Th at is a part of the protective order c ode. I thought it w ould be best to include it , so it was clear to the parties.
Wit hout ruling on R.S. ’ s objecti on, t he trial court stated th at entry would

occur on August 29 , 2022

. During the A ugust 29 entry hearing , the following
exch ange occurred: [D.R.T.]: Your Honor, at the close of the rendit ion l ast week, I

believe it was, I inquired

— well I brought to the Court ’ s attention that t he parties had obtained orders from another proceeding that were in conf lict with the orders that t he Court had ordered in the renditio n, and i nquired as to whet her o r not we should include language indicating that the terms of the protective order su perseded the terms of that order. In drafting the proposed final protect ive order, I included that l anguage as per the Texas Family Cod e 85.009 , and I indicated t he c ause of the other Court order and the Court. We sent that to [R.S.] for his review and his objection was that the Court did not indicate, in their rendition t hat was emailed to us, to i nclude the cause number, but i t is our posit ion that for ease of e nforcement for law enforcement and for the ability of the parties to know what they are and are not supposed to do and for enforceability purposes, it would n ot make sense, for lack of a better word, for that order to no t be iden tified. So that i s why we are here this morning, Your Honor.

. . . [R.S.]: Yes, Judge. And there hasn ’ t been another order entered

in the other case at this time. Your order says this order supersedes

— or y our rendition says this order supers edes10 an y other ord er

— any o ther order type language. That ’ s what your rendition is. And basically the order they sub mitted, they ’ re attempting to change the rendition. [Court]: In what way , shape or form? Just becau se they ’ re adding

some language? H ow is th at

— I mean, I ’ m not und e rstanding. [R.S.]: Well that ’ s not what your rendition was. I mean so

— [Court]: Okay. [Counsel]

— [R.S.]: So can I add language too or what? [Court]: [Counsel] , come on. Come on. This is

— you know, I

— you know, some days

— some day s I often wonder ho w ou r profession has gotten off track, honestly, and I don ’ t mean that to be flippant or an ything like that. But when you all were here, [D.R.T.] specifically ask ed of this Court whether or not the Court wanted that language in the re and I said yes. This Court has the ability and has jurisdiction, within 30 days, to sign or change or modif y or alter any portion of that order, whether it ’ s by motion or whether it ’ s sua sponte. The fac t that there is another order, eithe r it ’ s b eing signed or it w ill b e signed, makes absolutely no sense not to include it. In fact, it wo uld be kind of r idiculous not to include it, because that way when law enforcement or an y other lawyer comes upon this order, it will make their job e asier to be able to look u p the case or to be able to refer to that order. It just makes sense. So why we n eeded t o have an approach and a hearing on this doesn ’ t make sense to me. When this is just pure common s ense lawyering 101. So I ’ m going to order tha t the language be in th ere and that the cause number be in there and it doesn ’ t affect the true substance of the underlying order, as far as what this Court has ordered. So as long as it doesn ’ t affect the true substance, then the Court will gran t it. So yes. [D .R. T.], i t is granted.11

[R.S.] : I don ’ t th ink that ’ s legal, but you know, that ’ s another

argument. [C ourt]: Well [R.S.] , here ’ s your remedy. You can mandamus the

appellate court or you can file an a ppeal once the order ’ s been signed. And I h ave no issue with e ither one of them. You are free to do that and if the appellate court says otherwise, then I will abide by it or anyone coming after me will do so. Okay? So that ’ s your remedy. And it ’ s a very good remedy. So let ’ s use th at inste ad o f fussing abou t whe ther or not a cause number should go into a court case.
R.S. g enerally ob

jected ab out the order at the August 16 rendition hearing;
but , significantly, the trial court did not rule on the objection. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 33 .1. At the August 2 9 entry hear ing, R.S. a ppear s to have objected that the protective order was not consistent with i ts rendition because it referred to the pending suit by the name of the trial court

— t he 257th Distri c t Court

— and its cause
number. A f

ter the trial court informed R.S. th at the othe r suit would be included,
R.S. objected only that he did not thin k the tria l court ’ s a ction was legal.
R.S. now argues on appeal that “to the extent that the protec tive orde r sought to supersede any future order , such an act was an abuse of th e trial cou rt’s
discretion

. ” According to R. S., “the trial court had no jurisdiction to render an order that purpor ts t o supersede a future order of anothe r cou rt when th e language
of the Cod e does no t state that it allows thi s ” , D.R.T. should have filed her applica tion in the 257th District Court, and the 257th District Cour t had aut hority to supersede the protective order

.12

R.S. ’ s appellate complaint s were not pres ented to the t ria l court with sufficient specific ity durin g any of the hearings below and they w ere not raised in any post

- trial motions. See T EX

. R. A PP . P. 33.1. Becaus e R.S. ’ s appellate complaints do not comport with the general objections that he made in the trial court, they are not preserved for us to cons ider on appeal

. 6 See id

. We ov errule R.S. ’ s fir st i ssu e
.

Sufficiency of Protective Order In his second issue, R.S. contends that the trial court ’ s protective order is not supported by legally or factually suffic i ent evidence . Specifically, R.S. argues that no evidence or factually in suffic ient evidence exists that he committed fa mily
viol enc e or that family vio lence would occur in the future

. We disagree.
A. Standard of R eview and Applicable L aw “When the trial court acts as a fact

- finder, we review it s findings under the legal and f

actu a l sufficiency standards. ” Boyd v. Palmore , 425 S.W.3d 425, 429 ( Tex

. App.

— H ouston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (citing I n re Doe , 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000)). When a part y who does not have the burden of proof at tri al

6 To the extent that R .S. contests the trial court ’ s subject

- matter juri sdiction, we h ave previously held that the 280th Distri ct Court h a s subject

- matter juri sdiction over an a pplica tion for a protective order. See Pru neda v. Granad os , No. 01

- 20

- 00043

- CV, 2021 WL 2231267, at * 11 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] June 3, 2021, no pet. ) (mem. op.) ; see also Philli ps v. Phillips , 651 S .W.3d 112, 117 (Tex. App.

— Hous t o n [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (conclud ing that 280th District Court has jurisdiction over protectiv e order) ; T EX

. C ONST . art. V, § 8; T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE §§ 24.007, 24.112(h ), (i) , 24.951

.13

challenges the legal sufficie ncy o f the evidence, we consi der the evidence in the light most favor abl e to the prevailing party, indulging every reasonab le inference in that party ’ s favor and dis regarding con trary evidence unless a reasonable
factfinder could not. City of Keller v. Wil son , 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex . 2005)

. 7 If more than a scintilla of evidence sup ports the challen ged finding, it is legally sufficient, a nd w e will overrule the issu e. Haggar Clo thing Co. v. Hernandez , 164 S.W.3d 386, 388 (T ex. 2005); City of Hous. v. Hild ebra n dt , 265 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied)

. There is more
than a scintilla of evidence if the evidence rises to a level that would enable
reasonable and fair

- minded peopl e t o reach differin g conclus ions. Ford Mot or Co.

v. Rid g way , 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004). In reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, we examine the entire record. We consider and weigh all the evidence, both i n support of and contrary to the
challen ged f

inding. Ortiz v. Jones , 917 S.W.2d 77 0, 772 ( Tex. 1 996); Boyd , 425
S.W.3d at 429. After considering and weighing all the evidence, we set aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak, or t he finding is so against the great weight and preponderan ce o f the evidence , that it is clearly wron g and u njust

. Cain v.
Bain , 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

7 City of Hous. v. Hildebrandt , 265 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex. A p p.

— Hous ton [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denie d) (citing Assoc. Indem. Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc ., 964 S.W.2d 276, 285

– 86 (Tex. 1998)).14

Moreover, under both types of evidentiary challenges, t he f actfinder, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony , ha s a right to resolve any conflic ts i n t h e evidence and to choose which
testi mony to belie ve. City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 819; see also Boyd , 42 5 S.W.3d
at 431. And w e cannot subs titute our opinion for that of the trier of fact , under any circumstance, o nly becaus e we might reach a dif feren t conclusion. Boyd , 425
S.W.3 d a t 429.
B. Analysis Protective orders may be issued pursuant to provisions in the Family Code
and the Code of Criminal Procedure. 8 See T EX

. F AM

. C ODE § § 81.001 ( stating that
court shall re nder prote ctive orde r if it find s t ha t family viol e nce has o ccurre d and likely to occur in future) , 8 5 .00 1 ( same ); T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. art. 7B.003 ( stating that court shall is sue protective order when reasonable groun d s exist t hat applicant is victim of sexual ass ault )

.

8 Both S ection 81.001 and Section 8 5 .001 were amended effective September 1, 2023 to delete the re quired find ing that f a mily vi ole nce is likely to occur in the future. See Act of May 24, 2023, 88 th Leg., R.S., ch. 688 §§ 1, 2 se cs. 81.001 , 8 5 .001 , 20 2 3 Tex. Gen. Law s

–––– , –––– ( codified at T EX

. F AM

. C ODE §§ 81.001, 8 5 .001 ). Likewise, Chapter 7B was a men ded effective Sept e mber 1, 20 23. Because the trial court rendered the protective order before the effective date of these ame ndments, a ll refer ences are t o the pre

- 20 23 statutes.15

Here, t h e tri al co u rt made findings under both Title 4 of t he T e xas Family
Code and Chapter 7B of t he Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See T EX

. F AM

. C ODE § 8 5.001; T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC . art . 7B.003.
In hi s opening brief, R.S. only argue d that the evidence was insuffic ient t o support the trial court ’ s finding of family v iolence u nder Title 4 of the Texas Family Code. T he t rial court ’ s order , however, found tha t R.S. committed family violence under Title 4 of the Texas Family Code a nd als o found th at reasonable
gro unds exist e d that R.S. committed sexual assault against D.R.T. or D.R.S. u n der Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. S ee Shoemaker v. St ate fo r Protection of C.L ., 493 S.W.3d 710, 715 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no
p et.) (“A p erson can re que st a protective order under eit her the Family Code or the
Code of C riminal Procedure.”).
R.S. has not challenged the Chapter 7B findings in t he protective order, which independently support it. See Straug han v. Girsch , N o. 14

- 20

- 0 076 3

- CV , 2022 WL 29770 49, at * 4 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 14th Dist.] July 28, 2022, no pet. ) (mem. op.). As a result, we must aff irm the p rotective order on the unchallenged Chapter 7B findings. 9

9 See Hagberg v. City of Pa sadena , 224 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. App.

— Houst on [1st Dist.] 2 0 07, no pet.) (“ [W]hen a judgment or or der may have been based upon grounds not challenged on appeal, a court of appeals must normally affirm.”); Britton v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just

. , 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (“Gen e rally speaking, a n appellant must atta ck all16

E ven if R.S. had prop erly challenged the Chapter 7B findings on s uffi ciency grounds, we conc l ude sufficient evidence sup port s the protective order. In that regard , the trial court found that reasonable grounds exist to believe that D.R.T. or
D. R. S. were victims of sexual assault by R.S. Under the Penal Co de, sexual

as sault occurs if a p erson in t entionally or knowingly: (A) causes the penetration of
th e anus or sexual organ of another person by any means, witho ut that person ’ s

conse nt or if a person causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a ch ild by any me ans
. T EX

. P ENAL C OD E § § 22. 0 11(a)(1)(A) , (2)(A)

. As detailed above, D.R.T. t estifie d that D.R.S. had made an outcry of sexual
assault against R .S. , and D.R.T. ’ s aff i davit also alleged that she had been forced to
have sex with him against her will

. R.S. d i sputed any alleg a tion of inappropriateness wi th D.R.T. and D.R.S. , he provided explanations to counter the allegations , and he tes tified that multipl e investigations did not find inappropr iate
behavior.
The tr ial court thus he ard confl icti ng testimony o n whether reasonab le grounds existed to believ e that D.R.T. or D.R. S. were victims of sexu al assault

. As
the sole t rie r of fact responsible for judg ing the credibility of the witnesses , the trial

court co uld have chosen to be lieve D.R.T. and disbelieve R.S. See Dolgener v.
Do lgener , 651 S.W.3d 242 , 257 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist .] 2021, no pet. ).
independent bases or grounds that fully support a complained

- of ruling or judgment.”).17

And we may not substitute o ur opinion for that of the trier of fact simply because we might reach a different conclusion. Boyd , 425 S.W.3d at 42 9.
Instea d , under the settled leg al sufficiency standard, we must consider all of
the evidence in the l ight most favorable to D.R.T. , ind ulging every reasonable
in ference in her favor and disregarding any contrary evidence unless a reason able
factfinder could not

. C ity of Keller , 168 S .W.3d at 827. In doing so, and as detailed above, we conclude some evidence supports the trial court ’ s fin ding that
there were reasonable grounds to believe D.R.T. or D .R.S. were victims of sexual
assault

. 10 See T EX

. C ODE C R IM

. P ROC . a r t. 7B.003; City of K eller , 168 S.W.3d at
827. Further, after con sidering and wei gh ing all the evidence, we also conclude
that the evidence is not so weak, nor is the fi n ding so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, as to be manifes t ly wrong and unjust. Cain , 709
S.W.2 d at 176.

10 In hi s reply brief, R.S. contends that Chapter 7B requires a finding that violence is likely to occur in t he future. We disagr ee. “No ad ditional sh owings bey ond status as a crime victim are required to obtain [a Chapter 7B protective order ] ,” including any th reat of future harm to the victim. R.M. v. Swearingen , 510 S.W.3d 630, 633 & n.2 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2 016, no pet.) ( explai ning that a pplicant for prot ecti ve order previously “had to also prove reaso nable f ear of furth er harm from the alleged” offender but that “[t]he Legislature abrogated the fear of further harm requirement in 2011”) ; T E X

. C ODE C RIM

. P RO C . art. 7 B .003

. Beca use the evi dence is sufficient t o support the protective order ’ s finding und er C hapter 7B and n o finding of family violence or future family violence is required under Chapter 7B , it is unn ecessary to addres s R.S. ’ s argument in his sec ond issue chal l enging the suffi c i ency of the evidence to support the finding that family violenc e occurred and that family violence was likely to occur in the future under Title 4 , Family Code section 85.001

. See T EX

. R. A PP . P. 47.1.18

We therefore overrule R.S. ’ s second issue.
Con clusion Accordingly, for all of the reasons above, w e affirm the trial c ourt ’ s protective order in all things.

Terry Adams Chief Ju s ti ce

Panel c onsists of Chief Just ice Adams and Justices Landau and Rivas

- Molloy.