NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Rocael Camargo-Gomez,

Petitioner,

v.

Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 21-1022

Agency No. A071-607-068

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Department of Homeland Security

Submitted April 18, 2023**

San Francisco, California

Before: VANDYKE and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and VRATIL,*** District 

Judge.

Petitioner Rocael Camargo-Gomez (Camargo-Gomez), a native and 

citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of the Department of Homeland Security’s

(DHS) decision to reinstate an order of removal against him pursuant to Section 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, United States District Judge for 

the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 20 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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241(a)(5) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 

of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 2009-508 (codified as 

amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(1). See Ixcot v. Holder, 646 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We 

have jurisdiction to review final agency orders of removal, including 

reinstatement orders . . . .”). Reviewing de novo, see id., we deny the petition. 

DHS’s predecessor agency issued the underlying removal order against 

Camargo-Gomez in 1992, approximately five years before the IIRIRA took 

effect in 1997. See IIRIRA, § 309(a), 110 Stat. 3009–625. Camargo-Gomez

applied for adjustment of status in 1996 based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. 

DHS denied his application in 2005 because Camargo-Gomez had been 

convicted of distributing more than 30 grams of marijuana, making him 

statutorily ineligible for admission to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Camargo-Gomez divorced his U.S.-citizen spouse in 

2007.

In 2018, a California court vacated Camargo-Gomez’s marijuana 

conviction. He then re-applied for adjustment of status, this time based on his 

relationship with his U.S.-citizen daughter who had just turned twenty-one. See

8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). DHS denied his application for adjustment of 

status in 2021 because he reentered the United States without authorization 

before the consent-to-reapply period had elapsed. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(a); 47 

Fed. Reg. 44233, 44233 (1982). He does not challenge the merits of that 
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decision. 

Camargo-Gomez argues that DHS’s reinstatement of the removal order is 

an impermissibly retroactive application of the IIRIRA because he applied for 

discretionary relief prior to its effective date. See Ixcot, 646 F.3d at 1204. 

“[W]e analyze retroactivity claims by assessing whether the application would 

(1) create ‘new consequences [for] past acts’ or (2) ‘cancel[] vested rights.’” 

Ortega v. Holder, 747 F.3d 1133, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) 

(quoting Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 44 n.10 (2006)). The 

IIRIRA did not impose new duties or increase Camargo-Gomez’s liability for 

past conduct. See Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 44. The only question is

whether the IIRIRA took away or impaired “vested rights” Camargo-Gomez

acquired before its enactment. See id. at 37. 

DHS’s reinstatement of the removal order did not impair CamargoGomez’s pre-IIRIRA rights. DHS denied Camargo-Gomez’s 1996 application 

for adjustment of status because his criminal conviction made him ineligible. 

That fact distinguishes Ixcot, where we held that DHS could not reinstate a 

removal order without adjudicating a pending, pre-IIRIRA asylum application. 

See Ixcot, 646 F.3d at 1205, 1213 n.15. Camargo-Gomez’s second, 2018 

application for adjustment was not based on any pre-IIRIRA vested right. 

Unlike his 1996 application, which was based on his relationship with his wife, 

his 2018 application was based on his relationship with his daughter. His 

relationship with his daughter did not make him eligible to apply for adjustment 
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of status until she turned twenty-one in 2018. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 

Camargo-Gomez’s second application was thus based on rights that vested long 

after the IIRIRA took effect.

PETITION DENIED.1

1 Petitioner’s motion for a stay of removal, is denied as moot. The temporary

stay of removal remains in effect until issuance of the mandate.