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73–127PDF 2012

NSF MAJOR RESEARCH EQUIPMENT 

AND FACILITIES MANAGEMENT: 

ENSURING FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 

ACCOUNTABILITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND SCIENCE 

EDUCATION 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2012 

Serial No. 112–69 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

VACANCY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND SCIENCE EDUCATION

HON. MO BROOKS, Alabama, Chair 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Thursday, March 8, 2012 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Mo Brooks, Chairman, Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................... 17 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 18 

Statement by Representative Daniel Lipinski, Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .................................... 18 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 20 

Witnesses: 

Dr. Cora Marrett, Deputy Director, National Science Foundation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 22 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 24 

Dr. Jose ́-Marie Griffiths, Chairman, Subcommittee on Facilities, National 

Science Board; Vice President of Academic Affairs, Bryant University 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 34 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 36 

Mr. James H. Yeck, IceCube Project Director, University of Wisconsin-Madison 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 43 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 45 

Dr. Tony Beasley, COO/Project Manager, Neon, Inc. 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 58 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 60 

Dr. Tim Cowles, Vice President and Director, Ocean Observing, Consortium 

for Ocean Leadership 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 67 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 69 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Dr. Cora Marrett, Deputy Director, National Science Foundation ...................... 88 

Dr. Jose ́-Marie Griffiths, Chairman, Subcommittee on Facilities, National 

Science Board; Vice President of Academic Affairs, Bryant University .......... 98 

Mr. James H. Yeck, IceCube Project Director, University of Wisconsin-Madison ......................................................................................................................... 102 

Dr. Tony Beasley, COO/Project Manager, Neon, Inc. ........................................... 103 

Dr. Tim Cowles, Vice President and Director, Ocean Observing, Consortium 

for Ocean Leadership ........................................................................................... 104 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Dr. Cora Marrett, Deputy Director, National Science Foundation ...................... 106 

(1) 

NSF MAJOR RESEARCH EQUIPMENT AND 

FACILITIES MANAGEMENT: 

ENSURING FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY 

AND ACCOUNTABILITY 

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND SCIENCE EDUCATION, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mo Brooks 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
2 

RALPH M. HALL, TEXAS 

CHAIRMAN 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, TEXAS 

RANKING MEMBER 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

2321 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6301 

(202) 225-6371 

www.seience.hoIJse.gov 

Subcommittee on Research & Science Education Hearing 

NSF Major Research Equipment and Facilities Management: 

Ensuring Fiscal Responsibility and Accountability 

Thursday, March 8, 2012 

10:00 a,m. to 12:00 p,m, 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

Dr. Cora Marrett, Deputy Director, National Science FoUndation 

Dr. Jose-Marie Griffiths, Chairman, Subcommittee on Facilities, National Sciencce 

Board; Vice President of Academic Affairs, Bryant University 

Mr. James H. Yeck, IceCube Project Director, University of Wisconsin-Madison 

Dr. Tony Beasley, COOiProject Manager, Neon, Inc. 

Dr. Tim Cowles, Vice President and Director, Ocean Observing, Consortium for Oce~ 

Leadership 
3 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 

HEARING CHARTER 

NSF Major Research Equipment and Facilities Management: Ensuring Fiscal Responsibility and 

Accountability 

1. Purpose 

Thursday, March 8, 2012 

10;00 a.m. - 12;00 p.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

On Thursday, March 8, 2012, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology Subcommittee 

on Research and Science Education will hold a hearing to examine the management and 

operations of Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC) projects at the 

National Science Foundation. 

2. Witnesses 

Dr. Cora Marrett, Deputy Director, National Science Foundation 

Dr. Jose-Marie Griffiths, Chairman, Subcommittee on Facilities, National Science Board; Vice 

President of Academic Affairs, Bryant University 

Mr. James H. Yeck, IceCube Project Director, University of Wisconsin-Madison 

Dr. Tony Beasley, COOlProject Manager, Neon, Inc. 

Dr. Tim Cowles, Vice President and Director, Ocean Observing, Consortium for Ocean 

Leadership 

3. Overview 

• Providing support for major research equipment and facilities is a component of support for 

basic research. 

• The National Science Foundation (NSF) supports basic scientific research in a number of 

ways, including through agency-wide capital investments in "major science and engineering 

infrastructure projects that cost more than one program's budget could support."l 

I Congressional Research Service, u.s. National Science Foundation: Major Research Equipment and Facility 

Construction, p. 2. 
4 

• According to the most recent NSF strategic plan for 2011 through 2016, "The Foundation 

aims to develop and maintain infrastructure that enhances researchers' and educators' 

capabilities and productivity through management that accounts for and demonstrates best 

practices.,,2 . 

• NSF funds large research infrastructure projects through the Major Research Equipment and 

Facilities Construction (MREFC) account. " ... [T]he facility projects supported through the 

MREFC account are highly visible because of their large project budgets, their potential to 

shape the course of future research in one or more fields, their potential economic benefits 

for particular regions, their effects on international cooperation researeh, and their 

prominence in an increasing number of research fields. ,,) 

• The Fiscal Year 2013 (FYI3) NSF budget request highlights six MREFC projects: 

~ The Advanced Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (AdvLIGO) is an 

upgrade of the existing Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) 

that will allow the Observatory to approach the ground-based limit of gravitational-wave 

detection. 

~ The Atacama Large Millimeter Array (ALMA) is an aperture-synthesis radio telescope. 

~ The Advanced Technology Solar Telescope (ATST) will enable the study of magnetohydrodynamic phenomena in the solar photosphere, chromospheres, and corona. 

~ The lceCube Neutrino Observatory (IceCube) is the world's first high-energy neutrino 

observatory. 

~ The National Ecological Observatory Network (NEON) will result in an integrated 

research platform consisting of geographically distributed field and lab infrastructure. 

~ The Ocean Observatories Initiative (001) will be an integrated network of ocean 

observatories. 

4. Background 

In order to conduct basic research in every field of science and engineering, students, teachers 

and researchers must have access to powerful, cutting-edge infrastructure, infrastructure that has 

a major impact on broad segments of scientific and engineering disciplines. Large and up-todate research equipment and facilities are essential to the fundamental process of basic research. 

These equipment and facilities may consist of multi-user facilities, large-scale computational 

infrastructures, or networked instrumentation and equipment. "Many fields of scientific inquiry 

require capital intensive investments in major research infrastructure to maintain or advance their 

capabilities to explore the frontiers of their respective disciplines.,,4 Telescopes, particle 

accelerators, gravitational wave observatories, and research vessels are only a handful of 

examples of major research infrastructure projects. 

Major Research Infrastructure and the National Science Foundation (NSF) 

As the primary federal agency supporting basic scientific research, the National Science 

Foundation (NSF) plays a key role in the construction and operation of major research equipment 

2 NSF Strategic Plan FY21111-2016, p. 9. 

3 The National Academy of Sciences, Setting Priorities for Large Research Facility Projects Supported fy the 

National Science Foundation, p. 9. 

4 National Science Foundation, 2008 Facility Plan, p. 40. 

2 
5 

and facilities. NSF funds a variety oflarge research projects, from multi-user research facilities 

to tools for research and education and distributed instrumentation networks. Funding support 

for these types of projects is coordinated with other agencies, organizations and countries to 

ensure projects are integrated and complementary. 

Major Multi-User Research Facilities Fundini 

(dollars in millions) 

FYll FYI2 FYI3 

Actual Estimate Roouest 

Total, Research and Related Activities 913.54 909.7( 923/3~ 

Operations and Maintenance (O&M) of EXisting Facilities 673.63 655.3 647.3 

Federally Funded R&D Centers 195.25 195.8 191.71 

O&M of Facilities under Construction 17.49 44.7. 72.4S 

R&RA Planning and Concept Devcelopment 27.17 13.7 11.7 

Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction 125.37 197.0t 196.1 

Total, Major Multi-User Research Facilities 1038.91 1106.7t 1119.4 

ChangeOver 

FY12 Estimate 

Amoun Percen 

13. 1. 

-8.0 -I. 

-4.1 -2.1 

27.7 62.1 

-2.0 -14. 

-0.8 -0. 

12.71 1.1 

In 1995, NSF created an agency-wide budgetary account to promote effective planning and 

management in the Foundation's support for large investments in major research equipment and 

facilities. The Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC) account 

supports the acquisition, construction, and commissioning of major research facilities and 

equipment. "The MREFC account was created to separate the construction funding for a large 

facility - which can rise and fall dramatically over the course of a few years - from the more 

continuous funding of facility operations and individual-investigator research.,,6 

In order to be considered for MREFC funding, NSF requires that the project not only represent 

an exceptional opportunity to enable research and education, but also "should be transformative 

in nature, with the potential to shift the paradigm in scientific understanding.,,7 

In the early 2000s, Congress and the scientific community raised concerns over planning, 

management, and oversight issues within the MREFC account. In response, the NSF worked to 

establish practices and create additional guidelines for MREFC projects, including the creation 

of the role of Deputy Director for Large Facilities. The Deputy Director and the Large Facilities 

Office are "the NSF's primary resource for all policy or process issues related to the 

development, implementation, and oversight ofMREFC projects, and are NSF-wide resource on 

project management.,,8 

In 2004, the National Academies released a report, Setting Prioritiesfor Large Research Facility 

Projects Supported by the National Science Foundation. This report made recommendations 

about establishing a long term roadmap for major research infrastructure projects and involving 

the National Science Board (NSB) in the NSF process for identifying and approving the 

construction and maintenance of these projects. In 2005, the NSB and NSF responded to the 

5 NSF FY13 Budget Request - Facilities, p. 1. 

6 The National Academy of Sciences, Setting Prioritiesfor Large Research Facility Projects Supportedfj; the 

National Science Foundation, p. 8. 

7 NSF FYl2 Budget Request- MREFC p. I. 

8 http://www.nsf.govlbfallfolindex.jsp 

3 
6 

National Academies report through a complementary joint NSB NSF management report 

identically titled, Setting Priorities/or Large Research Facility Projects Supported by the 

National Science Foundation. The NSB NSF report highlighted the creation of a roadmap 

through a regularly reported Facility Plan, which would include details on major facilities under 

construction, the science and objectives that provide the need for the project, and a process for 

large facility project development. The Facility Plan would be updated regularly and made 

public. 

Today, the evolution ofthe processes is evident in the dynamic and clearly identified MREFC 

process: 

MREFC-funded construction projects proceed through a progressive sequence of 

increasingly detailed development and assessment steps prior to approval for 

construction funding. Initially, NSF reacts to opportunities articulated and 

advocated by the research community during the earliest stage of consideration. 

These ideas are subjected to external merit review, and those ideas or concepts of 

exceptional merit are further developed into conceptual designs that define the 

key research questions the proposed facility is intended to address.9 

(See Appendix A for a visual representation of the NSF MREFC process.) 

Since the creation of the MREFC account, NSF has funded 17 projects. In the FY13 budget 

request, NSF is requesting funding for four facilities: Advanced Laser Interferometer 

Gravitational-Wave Observatory (AdvLIGO); Advanced Technology Solar Telescope (ATST); 

National Ecological Observatory Network (NEON); and Ocean Observatories Initiative (001). 

Two other facilities, Atacama Large Millimeter Array (ALMA) and IceCube Neutrino 

Observatory (IceCube) are transitioning from the MREFC account to the appropriate research 

directorates for operations and maintenance. At this time, there are no new proposed facilities. 

The FY13 budget request for the MREFC account is $196.17 million. 

MREFC Account Funding RequeslO (dollars in millions) 

FYII FY!2 

MREFC Pro·.<t Actual 

AdvLlGO 23.58 

ALMA 13.92 3. 

ATST 5.00 10. 

k.Cube 5.29 

NF.ON 12.58 

001 65.00 

9 National Science FOUlldation, 2008 Facility Pial!, p. 40. 

to NSF FY13 Budget Request - MREFC, p. l. 

4 

FYI6 

Estimate 

FYI? FYIS 

Estimate 
7 

Major Research Infrastructure Process at NSF 

Funding for projects within the MREFC account ranges from tens of millions to hundreds of 

millions of dollars. "A research facility is considered 'major' if its total cost of construction 

andlor acquisition constitutes an investment that is more than 10 percent of the annual budget of 

the sponsoring directorate or office."]] Due to the significant costs associated with MREFC 

projects NSF has established a detailed multi-stage process for each project to complete. 

The genesis for an MREFC project begins with Horizon Planning, where the relevant research 

community presents a compelling case for a scientific tool or facility. Part of this process 

includes identifying the way in which a potential project is aligned with NSF's strategic plan and 

its compatibility with the existing MREFC portfolio. The Foundation informs the NSB of 

projects in the Horizon Planning stage. 

In the Conceptual Design stage, project proponents identify specific requirements and risks and 

begin to define a schedule for the project. At this stage, they draft initial cost estimates, 

including costs to operate the program once construction is complete. "Early in the Conceptual 

Design stage, NSF andlor other institutions begin to invest research and development funds in 

conceptual development and design, and in efforts that promote community building and 

planning. Investments in fundamental research activities, community building, and initial 

planning activities may occur over many years.,,]2 Projects progress from Conceptual Design to 

Preliminary Design after completing a Conceptual Design Review (CDR). At this stage, the 

NSF Director approves the continued movement of the project and officially notifies the NSB. 

Horizon Planning and Conceptual Design stages are supported by NSF program offices from the 

Research and Related Activities (RRA) account with design and development I:,'fants. 

During the Preliminary Design stage, the major elements of the project are more defined and 

detailed, including identifying risk, schedule, partnerships and cost estimates. During 

Preliminary Design, cost estimates are risk-adjusted total cost estimates. Budget estimates 

resulting at this stage must be accurate to present to the NSF Director, the NSB, the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress. The goal ofthe Preliminary Design stage is to 

determine project readiness and produce a project baseline. After a Preliminary Design Review 

(PDR), a project may be approved by the NSB to move forward to Final Design and 

Construction. It is at this stage that the project can appear as a line-item in the President's Fiscal 

Year Budget Request. 

The Final Desil:,'ll stage is used to advance the project to construction. At this time, project 

managers are refining cost estimates based on vendor quotes, putting construction teams in place, 

and finalizing details necessary to begin construction. A Final Design Review (FDR) includes a 

construction-ready design, the technologies and tools necessary for construction, a project 

management plan, and an updated budget and contingency. 

The Construction stage begins after Congress appropriates the funding and NSF is able to award 

the contract for construction. Contract awardees are required to provide periodic financial and 

technical reports to NSF, the terms of which are established by cooperative agreements. During 

II Congressional Research Service, u.s. National Science Foundation: Major Research Equipment and Facility 

Construction, p. 2. 

12 National Science Foundation Large Facilities Manual, March 31, 2011, p. 11. 

5 
8 

the Construction stage, the project manager must adhere to the project baseline. If the baseline is 

not being met, a project may need to be re-baselined or have its seope readjusted. 

The life-cycle of a MREFC project takes into account the steps from Horizon Planning to 

construction and beyond. The completion of construction does not mean that NSF has 

completed the scientific endeavor. The Foundation accounts for the operations and maintenance 

(O&M) of the equipment or facility from project inception. A program officer from the 

appropriate RRA Directorate is assigned to carry through the life of the project. In the 2002 NSF 

Authorization Act, Congress codified that this program manager must be a permanent NSF 

employee. Maintaining a permanent science based program officer helps to smooth the 

transition from inception of the project through construction and to post-construction O&M. 

Often the operations of the project begin before construction is complete. Like the preconstruction activities, post-construction O&M are funded through the RRA or the Education 

and Human Resources (EHR) accounts. 

Contingencies 

In an effort to keep MREFC project costs from escalating during construction, NSF has instituted 

a "no cost overrun policy" on any new MREFC-funded construction projects. "This policy 

requires that the total project cost estimate developed at the Preliminary Design Stage have 

adequate contingency to cover all forseeable risks, and that any cost increases not covered by 

contingency be accommodated by reductions in scope.,,13 

The use of contingency funding relative to MREFC projects has recently been under review by 

the NSF Inspector General (IG). In the September 2010, March 2011 and September 2011 

Seminanual Reports to Congress, the IG highlighted audits ofMREFC projects focused on 

"unallowable contingency costs." "The audit did not find any controls or technical barriers to 

prevent the organization from drawing down contingency funds and spending them without NSF 

approval.,,14 According to NSF, the construction contingency policies are consistent with the 

GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and the OMB Capital Programming Guide and are 

part of the budget to be maintained by the project manager. 

The FY12 Commerce, Justice, and Science Appropriations Conference Report addressed the 

contingency issue: 

The conferees remain concerned about how NSF and its grantees are defining, 

estimating and managing construction funding, particularly contingency funds. 

Stronger management and oversight of these funds could result in improved 

project efficiencies and, ultimately, cost savings. NSF is directed to report to the 

Committees on Appropriations on the steps it is taking to impose tighter controls 

on the drawdown and use of contingencies, as well as steps intended to 

incentivize grantees to complete construction under budget, for projects managed 

through the MREFC appropriation and for other large facility projects. 15 

13 Ibid, p. 18. 

l4 NSF DIG Semiannual Reporllo Congress, September 2010, p. 5. 

15 Conference Report 112-284 to accompany H.R. 2112, p. 264. 

6 
9 

IceCube Neutrino Observatory (IceCube/6 

The IceCube Neutrino Observatory (IceCube) is the world's first high-energy neutrino 

observatory, located deep within the ice cap under the South Pole in Antarctica. It provides 

unique data on the engines that power active galactic nuclei, the origin of high energy cosmic 

rays, the nature of gamma ray bursters, the activities surrounding supermassive black holes, and 

other violent and energetic astrophysical processes. 

NSF requested construction funding for IceCube in the FY04 budget request, and the total cost of 

the project (including start-up activities) was estimated to be $271.77 million at that time, 

$242.07 from NSF and the balance from the international partners. IceCube construction was 

carried out by the IceCube Collaboration, led by the University of Wisconsin and consisting of 

II other U.S. institutions and institutions in Belgium, Germany, and Sweden. NSF's foreign 

partners are contributing approximately $37.40 million to the project, as well as a pro rata share 

of IceCube operations and maintenance costs based on the number of PhD-level researchers 

involved. 

Oversight responsibility for IceCube construction was the responsibility of the Office of Polar 

Programs (OPP). Support for operations and maintenance, research, education, and outreach will 

be shared by OPP and the Directorate for Mathematical and Physical Sciences (MPS), as well as 

other organizations and international partners. NSF expects to support evaluation and 

measurement-based education and outreach programs under separate RRA grants to universities 

and other organizations that are selected following standard NSF merit review. 

IceCube construction was successfully completed at the South Pole on December 18, 20 I O. The 

Observatory consists of 5, 160 optical sensors installed at a depth between 1.5 and 2.5 kilometers 

on 86 cables and 324 optical sensors placed in 162 surface tanks. All cables are routed into the 

IceCube laboratory located in the center of the surface array. 

O&M in support of scientific research began in FY07 and cost approximately $5 million per 

year. Full science operations began in FY 11. The associated costs are and will continue to be 

shared by the partner funding agencies - U.S. (NSF) and non-U.S. - proportional to the number 

of PhD researchers involved (currently about 55:45). Starting in FYI2, the U.S. share of full 

science operations and maintenance is $6.90 million annually. In FYI2, the U.S. share of data 

analysis and modeling costs is estimated at $5.50 million. The expected operational lifespan of 

this project is 25 years beginning in FYI I. 

The FY13 MREFC budget request does not include funding for IceCube as the program will 

close out all construction activities in 2012. 

The National Ecological Observatory Network (NEON/ 7 

In 2004, the National Research Council (NRC) evaluated the original National Ecological 

Observatory Network (NEON) design ofloosely confederated observatories and recommended 

that it be reshaped into a single integrated platform for regional to continental scale ecological 

16 NSF FY 12 Budget Request - MREFC p. 23-27. 

17 NSF FY13 Budget Request - MREFC, p. 18-24. 

7 
10 

research. Congress originally appropriated a total of $7 million for NEON in FY07 and FY08, $4 

million of which was rescinded in FY08. A PDR was completed in June 2009 and a FDR was 

completed in November 2009. In November 2009, the final design, scope, schedule, and riskadjusted costs were reviewed and the project's baseline scope, budget, and schedule were found 

to be credible. The review panel endorsed the pre-construction planning activities in 2011 that 

enabled the project to commence construction in FY II. Contingency was increased to cover 

known risks per panel recommendations. 

NEON will consist of geographically distributed field and lab infrastructure networked via 

cybertechnology into an integrated research platform for regional to continental scale ecological 

research. Cutting-edge sensor networks, instrumentation, experimental infrastructure, natural 

history archive facilities, and remote sensing will be linked via the internet to computational, 

analytical, and modeling capabilities to create NEON's integrated infrastructure. 

NEON is funded through cooperative agreements with NEON, Inc., a non-profit, membershipgoverned consortium established to oversee the design, construction, management, and operation 

of NEON for the scientific community. NSF and NEON, Inc. coordinate with other federal 

agencies (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Department of Energy, U.S. 

Department of Agriculture, U.S. Geological Survey, Environmental Protection Agency, and the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) through the NEON Federal Agency 

Coordinating Committee. Areas of coordination include planning, design, construction, 

deployment, environmental assessment, data management, geospatial data exchange, 

cyberinfrastructure, research, and modeling. 

The NEON program is managed through the Directorate for Biological Sciences (BIO) as part of 

Emerging Frontiers. BIO provides overall policy guidance and oversight. The NEON program is 

managed by a dedicated program officer. An NSFfNEON project manager was added in FYII 

to oversee construction and participate in planning, development, and oversight of management 

and operations. 

The projected length of the project is six fiscal years, with a six-month schedule contingency. 

The risk-adjusted cost of$433.72 million includes a contingency budget of 19 percent. The first 

NEON Airborne Observatory platform is expected to be completed, fully instrumented, and 

flight-tested in preparation for delivery to Observatory operations in FYI4. 

The FY13 budget request for NEON is $91 million, which represents the third year of the sixyear construction project. The FY13 request also includes $30.39 million from the RRA account 

for O&M of the five domains commissioned, including related management and technical 

support, seasonal biological sampling, and domain facilities costs. The current request 

incorporates a three year initial operations request to allow NEON to gain operational experience 

and explore opportunities for schedule and cost efficiencies. For the out years, the costs are held 

constant at the projected operations ceiling reviewed at both the PDR and FDR. After gaining 

operational experience, NEON, Inc. will submit a plan for the remaining five years. 

8 
11 

Ocean Observatories Initiative (001/8 

The Ocean Observatories Initiative (001) will provide the oceanographic research and education 

communities with continuous, interactive access to the ocean through an integrated network of 

observatories. Deployed in critical parts of the global and U.S. coastal ocean, 001's 2417 

telepresence will capture climate, carbon, ecosystem, and geodynamic changes on the time scales 

at which they occur. Data streams from the air-sea interface through the water column to the 

seafloor will be openly available to educators and researchers in any discipline, making 

oceanography available to citizens and scholars who might never go to sea. 

oor has three elements: 1) deep-sea buoys with designs capable of deployment in harsh 

environments such as the Southern Ocean; 2) regional cabled nodes on the seafloor spanning 

several geological and oceanographic features and processes; and 3) an expanded network of 

coastal observatories. A cutting-edge, user-enabling cyberinfrastructure will link the three 

components of 001 and facilitate experimentation using assets from the entire network. Data 

from the network will be made publicly available via the Internet. 

NSF first requested construction funding for oor through the MREFC account in FY07 and 

received an initial appropriation of$5.12 million in that year. The 001 has undergone a series of 

technical reviews, with the FDR conducted in November 2008. 

The project is managed and overseen by a program director in the Division of Ocean Sciences 

(OCE) in the Directorate for Geosciences (GEO). NSF established an Ocean Observing Science 

Committee (OOSC) via the University National Oceanographic Laboratory System (UNOLS). 

The Committee is made up of ocean science community representatives and is charged with 

providing guidance on decisions and plans from the science perspective related to all NSF 

observing systems. 

NSF established a cooperative agreement with the Consortium for Ocean Leadership for the 

construction and initial operation of the oor in September 2009. NSF conducts a weekly 

meeting, attends weekly calls, convenes exterual panels, and reviews monthly Earned Value 

Management reports from the project team. NSF attends internal project reviews, critical design 

reviews, and conducts vendor site visits as required. 

The FY13 budget request for 001 is $65 million, which represents the fourth year of a six-year 

construction project totaling $386.42 million. The project is currently in year three of the 

construction and transition to O&M efforts. Major construction milestones were achieved on 

time and within budget. 001 transition to O&M was funded in FYII and FYI2. The request for 

O&M funding for FYI3 is $40.1 million. Full O&M is planned for FY15. The expected 

operational lifespan of this project is 25 years. 

Advanced Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (AdvLIGO) 

The Advanced Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (AdvLIGO) is the planned 

upgrade of the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) that will allow 

LIGO to approach the ground-based limit of gravitational-wave detection. LIGO consists of the 

"NSF FYI3 Budget Request-MREFC, p. 25-29. 

9 
12 

world's most sophisticated optical interferometers, operating at two sites 3,000 km apart: 

Hanford, W A and Livingston, LA. The interferometers measure minute changes in arm lengths 

resulting from the passing of wave-like distortions of spacetime called gravitational waves, 

caused by cataclysmic processes in the universe such as the coalescence of two black holes or 

neutron stars. LIGO is sensitive to changes as small as one one-thousandth the diameter of a 

proton over the 4-km arm length; AdvLIGO is expected to be at least 10 times more sensitive. 

NSF first requested FY08 construction funds for AdvLIGO through the MREFC account in the 

FY06 budget request to Congress. The original proposal, received in 2003, estimated a total 

construction cost of $184.35 million. A baseline review in June 2006 established the project cost 

at $205.12 million, based upon known budget inflators at the time and a presumed start date of 

January 1, 2008. A second baseline review held in June 2007 confirmed this cost, subject to 

changes in inflators. An FDR in November 2007 recommended that construction begin in FY08. 

The NSB approved the project at a cost of$205.12 million in March 2008, and the project began 

in April 2008. 

NSF oversight is coordinated intemally by a dedicated LIGO program director in the Division of 

Physics (PHY) in the Directorate for Mathematics and Physical Sciences (MPS). LIGO is 

managed by the California Institute of Technology under a cooperative agreement with NSF. An 

Executive Director has overall responsibility for the LIGO Laboratory. Substantial connections 

with industry have been required for the construction and measurements involved in the LIGO 

projects. 

On October 20, 2010, the final LIGO science run ended and the facility was turned over to the 

AdvLIGO project for the installation of the advanced components. The project has pushed back 

completion of installation at Livingston and at Hanford by three months due to procurement 

difficulties, but no effect on the project completion date is expected. The removal of initial LIGO 

instruments is nearing completion with the end of a highly successful quantum-squeezing 

experiment and the decommissioning of the final initial LIGO interferometer. The major current 

project activity is the assembly and installation oflarge subsystem components, testing of which 

will begin this year. The current project performance is consistent with ending on time and on 

budget. Total project contingency usage as of November 2011 is $23 million of an initial $39.1 

million, or 59 percent of initial contingency for 64 percent of the project completed. 

The FY13 budget request for AdvLIGO is $15.17 million, which represents the sixth year ofa 

seven-year project totaling an estimated $205.12 million. The projected length of the project is 

seven years, with an II-month schedule contingency. The risk-adjusted cost of$205.12 million 

included a contingency budget of 23.7 percent at the time of the award. Future O&M costs will 

be approximately $39 million per year funded through PHY. 

Atacama Large Millimeter Array (ALMA) 

The origin of the Atacama Large Millimeter Array (ALMA) began as a $26.0 million, three-year 

design and development phase plan for a U.S.-only project, the Millimeter Array. NSF first 

requested funding for design and development of this project in FY98. In June 1999, the U.S. 

entered into a partnership via a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the European 

Southern Observatory (ESO), a consortium of European funding agencies and institutions. The 

MOU committed the partners to construct a 64 element array of 12-meter antennas. NSF 

10 
13 

received $26 million in appropriations between FY98 and FYOO. Because of the expanded 

managerial and technical complexity of the joint US/ESO project, now called ALMA, Congress 

provided $5.99 million in FYOI for an additional year of design and development. In FY02, 

$12.5 million was appropriated to initiate construction. The U.S. total share of the cost was 

estimated to be $344 million. 

The global ALMA project will be an aperture-synthesis radio telescope operating in the 

wavelength range from 3 mm to 0.4 mm. ALMA will be the world's most sensitive, highest 

resolution millimeterwavelength telescope, combining sub-arcsecond angular resolution with the 

sensitivity of a single antenna nearly 100 meters in diameter. The array will provide a testing 

ground for theories of planet formation, star birth and stellar evolution, galaxy formation and 

evolution, and the evolution of the universe itself. The interferometer is under construction at 

5,000 meters altitude near San Pedro de Atacama in the Antofagasta (II) Region of Chile, the 

ALMA host country. 

The ALMA Board initiated rebaselining in the fall of 2004 under the direction and oversight of 

the Joint ALMA Office (JAO) Project Managcr. At that point, the project was sufficiently mature 

that the baseline budget and schedule established in 2002, prior to the formation of the 

partnership, could be refined. The new baseline plan developed by the JAO assumed a 50-

antenna array as opposed to the original number of 64, extended the project schedule by 24 

months, and established a new U.S. total project cost of $499.26 million. The FY09 request was 

increased by $7.50 million relative to the rebaselined profile in order to allow more strategic use 

of project contingency to buy down near-term risk, as recommended by the 2007 annual external 

review. The increase in FY09 was offset by a matching decrease in the FYII budget request. 

Construction continues in FYI2, both at the site in Chile and within the ALMA partner 

countries. In FYII, delivery of North American production antennas continued at the planned 

rate of one every two months, and a total of twenty antennas were accepted or assembled and 

tested in Chile. Following assembly and testing, antennas were transported to the final, highaltitude site. Early science operations began in late FYII and completion of the construction 

project and the start of full science operations are forecast to occur in FY 13. 

Programmatic management is the responsibility ofthe ALMA program manager in the Division 

of Astronomical Sciences (AST). North America and Europe are equal partners in the core 

ALMA instrument. Japan joined ALMA as a third major partner in 2004, and will deliver a 

number of enhancements to thc baseline instrument. The North American side of the project 

(induding Taiwan) is led by the Associated Universities IncorporatedlNational Radio Astronomy 

Observatory (AUIINRAO). 

The current schedule performance is slightly behind plan due to equipment delivery delays, 

specifically delivery of receivers and European antennas. Consequently, the major milestone of 

full-science is forecast to be delayed by nine to twelve months when compared to the baseline 

plan. However, early science commenced in September 2011 as predicted a year ago. Cost 

performance is good at this stage - cost variance is on track with the reference baseline and 

schedule variance is -6 percent relative to the reference - with about 25 percent contingency 

remaining in the uncommitted budget. 

11 
14 

No additional MREFC funds are requested for the Atacama Large Millimeter Array (ALMA) in 

the FY13 budget request. The FY12 appropriation provided $3 million, which represents the 

final amount necessary to complete funding for the eleven-year project, totaling $499.26 million. 

O&M funding will phase-in as initial site construction is completed and antennas are delivered. 

Funds will be used to manage and support site and instrument maintenance, array operations in 

Chile, early- and eventually full-science operations, as well as support ALMA observations by 

the u.s. science community. Full ALMA science operations are forecast to begin in 2013. The 

anticipated operational lifespan ofthis project is at least 30 years. 

Advanced Technology Solar Telescope (ATST) 

To be constructed at the Haleakala High Altitude Observatory on the island of Maui in Hawaii, 

the Advanced Technology Solar Telescope (ATST) will enable the study of magnetohydrodynamic phenomena in the solar photosphere, chromosphere, and corona. Determining the 

role of magnetic fields in the outer regions of the Sun is crucial to understanding the solar 

dynamo, solar variability, and solar activity, including flares and coronal mass ejections. These 

can affect civil life on Earth through the phenomena generally described as "space weather" and 

may have impact on the terrestrial climate. 

The project is a collaboration of scientists and engineers at more than 20 U.S. and international 

organizations. Other potential partners include the Air Force Office of Scientific Research and 

international groups in Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy. 

The current design, cost, schedule, and risk were scrutinized in an NSF-conducted PDR in 

October-November 2006. The FDR held in May 2009 determined that the project was fullyprepared to begin construction. In FY09, $6.67 million was provided through the RRA account. 

Of this total, $3.57 million in regular RRA funds supported design activities to complete a 

construction-ready design, and $3.1 million through the American Recovery and Reinvestment 

Act of 2009 (ARRA) supported risk reduction, prototyping, design feasibility, and cost analyses 

in areas identified at preliminary and systems design reviews. ARRA funding also provided for 

several new positions to complete preparation for the start of construction. Also in FY09, $153 

million was provided through MREFC account to initiate construction. Of these MREFC funds, 

$146 million was appropriated through ARRA. Given the timing of the receipt of budget 

authority and the complexity of project contracting, the entire $153 million was carried over 

from FY09 and subsequently obligated in FYIO. 

Oversight from NSF is handled by a program manager in AST. The project is managed by the 

National Solar Observatory (NSO). NSF funds NSO operation and maintenance and A TST 

design and development via a cooperative agreement with the Association of Universities for 

Research in Astronomy, Inc. (AURA). 

The baseline not-to-exceed cost was established following the FDR. Funding is derived from 

ARRA ($146 million) and annual appropriations in the MREFC account ($151.93 million). In 

order to clearly separate funds from the two sources, the project developed two statements of 

work, dividing their resource-loaded Work Breakdown Structure between large contracts to be 

funded early in the project by ARRA, and smaller procurements and project costs, such as labor 

and rent, to be funded by future annual MREFC appropriations. 

12 
15 

The FY13 budget request for ATST is $25 million. The total project cost to NSF, $297.93 

million, was finalized after a FDR in May 2009. The NSB approved an award for this amount at 

the NSF Director's discretion, contingent upon completion of compliance with relevant 

environmental and culturallhistoric statutes. The environmental compliance requirements were 

completed on November 20, 2009, and the Record of Decision authorizing the construction was 

signed by the NSF Director on December 3, 2009. The Board on Land and Natural Resources 

(BLNR) approved the project's application for a Conservation District Use Permit (CDUP) on 

December 1,2010. After a lengthy challenge to the CDUP by a Native Hawaiian organization, 

a hearing officer overturned the challenge on February 24,2012, clearing the way for site 

preparation and construction to begin. 

The estimated annual operations cost is projected to be $18 million in FYI8, including $2 

million annually for cultural mitigation. Approximately $5-$7 million per year ofNSO costs will 

be recovered from the closure or divestment of redundant facilities. NSO has a preliminary 

transition plan that will be revised and externally reviewed after construction begins. 

13 
APPENDIX A: NSF MREFC Process 

NSF's updated large facility project planning process 

MREFCPanel 

Review 

Conceptual 

Design Review 

(CDR) 

Preliminary 

Design Review 

(PDR) 

Final 

Design Review 

(FDR) 

PDR MREFC Pane Director Board approval for 

Operations 

Review 

Review Approval inclusion in a future 

NSF MREFC Budget 

"Horizon/Conceptual Design MREFC Panel Review 

-Compelling science case, aligned with NSF's strategic plan and compatible with existing facilities p

reasonable development timeline, potentialities for partnership, assessment of any major challenge

-Conceptual Design Stage 

-Requirements, initial estimates of cost (including operations), risk and schedule 

'Preliminary Design ("Readiness") Stage 

-Definition and design of major elements, detailed estimates of cost, risk and schedule, partnership

'Final Design ("Board Approved") Stage 

-Interconnections and fit-ups of functional elements, refined cost estimates based substantially on 

quotes, construction team substantially in place 

14 
17 

Chairman BROOKS. The Subcommittee on Research and Science 

Education will come to order. 

Welcome to today’s hearing entitled ‘‘NSF Major Research Equipment and Facilities Management: Ensuring Fiscal Responsibility 

and Accountability.’’ The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine 

the management and operations of major research equipment and 

facilities’ construction—MREFC is the acronym—projects at the 

National Science Foundation. I now recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

I am pleased to welcome all of our witnesses to discuss the oversight of NSF’s major research equipment and facilities management from basic concept design through post-construction operations and maintenance. I look to my colleague, Mr. Lipinski, and 

my fellow Subcommittee members on both sides of the aisle to 

work with me to continue to ensure the Subcommittee performs its 

legislative, oversight, and investigative duties with due diligence on 

matters within its jurisdiction throughout the 112th Congress and 

appreciate their valued experience and insights. 

Investments in various multi-user research facilities such as vessels, astronomical observatories, particle accelerators, the United 

States Antarctic stations, seismic observatories, and many others 

comprise approximately 15 percent of NSF’s portfolio. Additional 

components of the infrastructure portfolio include large datasets 

based on NSF-supported surveys, the provision of shared-use 

equipment for academic researchers, and interdisciplinary centers. 

Under the Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC) account, large multi-year projects are funded that 

would be too expensive for a specific Directorate to take up on its 

own. MREFC projects focus solely on the construction of major 

equipment and facilities. The science driving the projects and the 

operations and maintenance once construction is completed are 

funded through separate NSF budget accounts. 

Over the past ten years, NSF has worked to establish and refine 

the practices for launching new MREFC projects, overseeing construction, and the transition to managing the operations and maintenance of the equipment and facilities. These practices have lead 

to greater involvement by the National Science Board and a clear 

understanding of how MREFC projects are prioritized in difficult 

economic times. While these major equipment and facilities support 

NSF’s larger goal of ensuring the United States maintains its competitive edge in science by promoting global leadership in advancing research, education, and innovation, it is imperative that appropriate oversight be executed to guarantee the greatest return on 

taxpayer investments. 

I have said this before and will echo the sentiment again today— 

America faces unsustainable budget deficits that constitute our 

greatest economic and national security threat. This leaves absolutely no room for government waste, even within America’s most 

prized programs and facilities. I look forward to learning more 

about what I, and my colleagues on the Research and Science Education Committee, can do to pave a more responsible path for 

America’s future by way of supporting these important endeavors. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lipinski from the great State of 

Illinois for an opening statement. 
18 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MO BROOKS

Good morning and welcome. I am pleased to welcome all of our witnesses to discuss the oversight of NSF’s major research equipment and facilities management 

from basic concept design through post-construction operations and maintenance. 

I look to my colleague, Mr. Lipinski, and my fellow Subcommittee Members on 

both sides of the aisle to work with me to continue to ensure the Subcommittee performs its legislative, oversight, and investigative duties with due diligence on matters within its jurisdiction throughout the 112th Congress and appreciate their valued experience and insights. 

Investments in various multi-user research facilities such as vessels, astronomical 

observatories, particle accelerators, the U.S. Antarctic stations, seismic observatories, and many others comprise approximately 15 percent of NSF’s portfolio. Additional components of the infrastructure portfolio include large datasets based on 

NSF-supported surveys, the provision of shared-use equipment for academic researchers, and interdisciplinary centers. 

Under the Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC) account, large multi-year projects are funded that would be too expensive for a specific 

Directorate to take up on its own. MREFC projects focus solely on the construction 

of major equipment and facilities. The science driving the projects and the operations and maintenance once construction is completed are funded from separate 

NSF budget accounts. 

Over the last ten years NSF has worked to establish and refine the practices for 

launching new MREFC projects, overseeing construction, and the transition to managing the operations and maintenance of the equipment and facilities. These practices have lead to greater involvement by the National Science Board and a clear 

understanding of how MREFC projects are prioritized in difficult economic times. 

While these major equipment and facilities support NSF’s larger goal of ensuring 

the United States maintains its competitive edge in science by promoting global 

leadership in advancing research, education and innovation, it is imperative that 

appropriate oversight be executed to guarantee the greatest return on taxpayer investments. 

I have said this before and will echo the sentiment again today—America faces 

unsustainable budget deficits that constitute our greatest economic and national security threat. This leaves absolutely no room for government waste—even within 

America’s most prized programs and facilities. I look forward to learning more about 

what I, and my colleagues on the Research and Science Education Subcommittee, 

can do to pave a more responsible path for America’s future by way of supporting 

these important endeavors. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Chairman Brooks. Thank you for holding this hearing today. 

Ten years is probably too long a period between hearings on the 

important topic of how NSF manages and oversees its large facilities over their full life cycle, especially given the many changes of 

the MREFC process in that time. So I am pleased that we are having this hearing this morning and grateful to witnesses who are 

taking the time to help us understand where we stand with 

MREFC and what oversight issues remain. 

When I was Subcommittee Chair in the last Congress, we held 

a hearing on the role of NSF in supporting university research infrastructure. That was a somewhat different topic but still part of 

the larger question of how we balance support for research infrastructure with support for research grants. Remaining a global 

leader in scientific R&D requires more than intellectual freedom in 

grant funding. Cutting edge research requires state-of-the-art research facilities and we can no longer take it for granted that the 

best scientists want to live and work in the United States. 

In a 2003 report on science and engineering infrastructure, the 

National Science Board recommended that the share of the NSF 

budget dedicated to research infrastructure should fall in the range 
19 

of 22 to 27 percent but closer to the high end of that range. While 

I am pleased that the fiscal year 2013 budget request restores 

funding to MREFC projects after several years of cuts as a percentage of the budget, funding for it still remains at the bottom end of 

that range. This can at least in part be explained by the blip in 

ARRA funding in 2009 that reduced pressure on out-year budgets 

for MREFC and the fact that there is no new proposals for fiscal 

year 2013. However, this remains an area of concern for me and 

one I will continue to closely—follow closely in my leadership role 

on this Subcommittee. 

Returning to the specific topic of this hearing, major research facilities management, there are a couple of issues I am hoping to 

learn more about. First, I would like to understand how MREFC 

policies have evolved in the last few years, including the role of the 

National Science Board and what instigated these changes. In particular, I would like to know what we have learned from the Deep 

Underground Science and Engineering Laboratory, or DUSEL. 

While I believe that the December 2010 decision by the Board with 

respect to DUSEL was probably right—was the right one for the 

foundation, letting the project advance as far as it did before terminating it was certainly harmful and wasteful. So I would like to 

know what policies have been put in place since then to avoid a repeat of the situation. 

Second, I would like to address the ongoing dispute between the 

Inspector General and NSF management with respect to contingency funds. I will begin by saying that I am comfortable with the 

definition NSF is using for contingency funds and it appears to be 

consistent with the private sector standard for project management 

and with practices at other agencies. As someone trained in systems engineering, I also think that calculating a contingency total 

based on the ensemble mean of all foreseeable risks across all aspects of a project and incorporating that into the total project cost 

is the right approach. But the IG has raised important questions 

regarding whether there are sufficient controls over draw-downs 

from the contingency fund and whether the funds should be held 

at the Agency or with the project. 

I think there are good arguments on both sides of this issue, and 

I worry also that the projects currently underway are caught in 

this dispute between the IG and NSF management. I would like to 

hear how the IG and NSF are working to resolve their differences. 

Finally, as stewards of taxpayer money, it is incumbent upon us 

to ask whether it is appropriate that any funds left over due to outstanding management or just plain luck should be returned to the 

NSF where re-scoping of that particular project can be balanced 

against other agency priorities. I know that NSF and Mr. Yeck are 

proud of how the IceCube Project came in under budget and rightly 

so. Mr. Yeck, from everything I know, from what you did, you did 

an exemplary job with the project under extraordinary conditions. 

I would like to learn more about what IceCube was able to accomplish with those leftover funds, but also ask the broader question 

of whether this is the most appropriate use of NSF dollars given 

that the most important science was already prioritized in the 

original scope and design of IceCube. 
20 

Now, I don’t have answers to these questions, and I hope our witnesses will share their insights. But I do think it is critical that 

we align incentives with prudent project management and outcomes that are most appropriate in terms of both the science and 

the budget. Overall, I am very pleased with how far the Agency has 

come in the last few years in strengthening management and oversight of its large facilities and I look forward to using this hearing 

to explore where issues may remain and what the best way is to 

move forward. 

And I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lipinski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER DANIEL LIPINSKI

Thank you Chairman Brooks. Ten years is probably too long a period between 

hearings on the important topic of how NSF manages and oversees its large facilities over their full lifecycle, especially given the many changes in the MREFC process in that time. So I am pleased we are having this hearing this morning and 

grateful to the witnesses who are taking the time to help us understand where we 

stand with MREFC and what oversight issues remain. 

When I was subcommittee chair in the last Congress, we held a hearing on the 

role of NSF in supporting university research infrastructure. That was a somewhat 

different topic, but still part of the larger question of how we balance support for 

research infrastructure with support for research grants. Remaining a global leader 

in scientific R&D requires more than intellectual freedom and grant funding. Cutting edge research requires state-of-the-art research facilities, and we can no longer 

take it for granted that the best scientists want to live and work in the United 

States. 

In a 2003 report on science and engineering infrastructure, the National Science 

Board recommended that the share of the NSF budget dedicated to research infrastructure should fall in the range of 22-27 percent, but closer to the high-end of that 

range. While I am pleased that the FY 2013 budget request restores funding to 

MREFC projects after several years of cuts, as a percentage of the budget, funding 

for facilities remains at the bottom end of that range. This can at least in part be 

explained by the blip in ARRA funding in 2009 that reduced pressure on outyear 

budgets for MREFC, and the fact that there is no new-start proposed for FY 2013. 

However, this remains an area of concern for me and one I will continue to follow 

closely in my leadership role on this subcommittee. 

Returning to the specific topic of this hearing, major research facilities management, there are a couple of issues I’m hoping to learn more about. 

First, I’d like to understand how MREFC policies have evolved in the last few 

years, including the role of the National Science Board, and what instigated these 

changes. In particular, I would like to know what we learned from the Deep Underground Science and Engineering Laboratory, or DUSEL. While I believe that the 

December 2010 decision by the Board with respect to DUSEL was probably the 

right one for the Foundation, letting the project advance as far is it did before terminating it was harmful and wasteful. So I’d like to know what policies have been put 

in place since then avoid a repeat of this situation. 

Second, I’d like to address the ongoing dispute between the Inspector General and 

NSF management with respect to contingency funds. I’ll begin by saying that I’m 

comfortable with the definition NSF is using for contingency funds, as it appears 

to be consistent with the private sector standard for project management and with 

practices at other agencies. As someone trained in systems engineering, I also think 

that calculating a contingency total based on the ensemble mean of all forseeable 

risks across all aspects of a project and incorporating that into the total project cost 

is the right approach. 

But the IG has raised important questions regarding whether there are sufficient 

controls over drawdowns from the contingency fund and whether the fund should 

be held at the agency or with the project. I think there are good arguments on both 

sides of this issue, and I worry also that the projects currently underway are caught 

in this dispute between the IG and NSF management. I would like to hear how the 

IG and the NSF are working to resolve their differences. 

Finally, as stewards of the taxpayer money, it is incumbent upon us to ask whether it is appropriate that any funds left over due to outstanding management or just 
21 

plain luck should be returned to NSF, where re-scoping of that particular project 

can be balanced against other agency priorities. 

I know that NSF and Mr. Yeck are proud of how the IceCube project came in 

under budget, and rightly so. Mr. Yeck, from everything I know you did an exemplary job with that project under extraordinary conditions. I’d like to learn more 

about what IceCube was able to accomplish with those ‘‘leftover’’ funds, but also ask 

the broader question of whether this is the most appropriate use of NSF dollars 

given that the most important science was already prioritized in the original scope 

and design of IceCube. 

While I don’t have answers to these questions—and I hope our witnesses will 

share their insights —I do think it’s critical that we align incentives with prudent 

project management and outcomes that are the most appropriate in terms of both 

the science and the budget. 

Overall, I am very pleased with how far the agency has come in the last few years 

in strengthening management and oversight of its large facilities, but I look forward 

to using this hearing to explore where issues may remain. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski. 

If there are members who wish to submit additional opening 

statements, your statements will be added to the record at this 

point. 

At this time, I would like to introduce our witnesses for today’s 

hearing. Dr. Cora Marrett is Deputy Director of the National 

Science Foundation. Since January 2009, Dr. Marrett has served as 

NSF’s acting Director, acting Deputy Director and Senior Advisor 

until her confirmation as Deputy Director in May 2011. 

Dr. Jose ́-Marie Griffiths is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Facilities of the National Science Board, NSB. Dr. Griffiths was appointed to the NSB in 2006. She is currently Vice President for 

Academic Affairs and University Professor at Bryant University in 

Smithfield, Rhode Island. 

Mr. James Yeck is Director of the IceCube Neutrino Observatory 

located at the South Pole. That is a pretty good name, IceCube, for 

the South Pole. That is clever. Who came up with that? We will get 

into that in the questions. Mr. Yeck joined the University of Wisconsin-Madison as the IceCube Project Director in 2003. Previously, 

Mr. Yeck served as Deputy Project Director and Assistant Project 

Director for the National Synchrotron Light Source II project and 

as the Federal Project Director for the U.S. Large Hadron Collider 

Construction Project. Now, that is a mouthful. IceCube is easier to 

say. 

Dr. Tony Beasley is the Chief Operating Officer and Project Manager of the National Ecological Observatory Network. Dr. Beasley 

has worked as an astronomer post-doc, staff member, and Senior 

Manager at the U.S. National Radio Astronomy and Project Manager for CARMA and ALMA millimeter telescopes. 

And then finally, we have Dr. Tim Cowles. He is the Project Director and Principal Investigator of the Ocean Observatories Initiative, OOI, and serves as Vice President, Director, Ocean Observing 

activities at the Consortium for Ocean Leadership. Previously, Dr. 

Cowles served as Associate Dean and Interim Dean of the College 

of Oceanic and Atmospheric Sciences at Oregon State and served 

on the Leadership Council of the University National Oceanographic Laboratory System. 

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to 

five minutes each, after which the members of the Committee will 

have five minutes each to ask questions. 
22 

As an aside, we are scheduled to vote today at approximately 

11:15. That is the advanced notice we have. Hopefully, we will be 

able to finish this hearing by then, but if not, as circumstances 

warrant, we will suspend and come back after the votes. 

I now recognize our first witness, Dr. Cora Marrett. Dr. Marrett, 

you are recognized for your five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CORA MARRETT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 

Dr. MARRETT. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Lipinski, and distinguished 

members of the staff, thank you for inviting me to participate in 

this hearing for I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the 

National Science Foundation’s large facilities process with you. 

As you well know, NSF is the primary federal agency supporting 

research at the frontiers of knowledge across all fields of science 

and engineering and all levels of science and engineering education. Its mission, vision, and goals are designed to maintain and 

strengthen the vitality of the U.S. science and engineering enterprise. As I start my remarks, I want to thank Congress on behalf 

of the Foundation for the sustained engagement and support you 

have shown NSF even in difficult economic times. 

Throughout its 60-year history, NSF has contributed to maintaining U.S. leadership in science and engineering research by enabling the creation of advanced instrumentation and world-class, 

multi-user facilities for the science and engineering research community. Each NSF facility is chosen carefully to push technology 

and innovation to a new frontier of scientific discovery. In addition 

to enabling immense scientific return, these facilities serve as platforms to prepare the next generation of scientists and engineers 

and contribute to the need for high technology and services necessary for economic growth and innovation. 

You will hear today about a few of our newest major facilities, 

about, as you have already mentioned, IceCube, the world’s first 

neutrino observatory which has just opened a new window on the 

engines that power galaxies and other astrophysical processes 

throughout the universe. You will hear about the Ocean Observatories Initiatives, or OOI, and the National Ecological Observatory 

Network, NEON. These are our newest facilities under construction. 

OOI and NEON are representative of a new transformational 

class of facilities for the 21st century. These are cyber-enabled distributed observing systems that acquire and stream scientific data 

on vast geographic scales. These are just a few examples of our facility portfolio, a portfolio which spans the gamut of research disciplines from physics and astronomy, engineering and material 

science, to earth and ocean sciences, and polar and biological 

sciences. 

Major facility projects require special funding mechanisms that 

allow for multi-year construction. The Major Research Equipment 

and Facilities Construction account, or MREFC, was established by 

Congress in 1995 to support the acquisition, construction, and commissioning of large-scale facilities projects. Eligibility for MREFC 

funding is made on a case-by-case basis and is not solely dependent 
23 

on cost but on scientific promise. Indeed, NSF requires that each 

MREFC candidate project represent an outstanding opportunity to 

enable breakthrough research and innovation, as well as education 

and broader impacts. 

Mr. Chairman, NSF takes its facility stewardship responsibilities 

very seriously. Implementation of the largest NSF multi-user facilities requires investments of hundreds of millions of dollars to ensure success at this major scale of investment. NSF has strong 

processes in place for overseeing the planning, construction, and 

operation of its facilities and for managing our overall facility portfolio. 

As you will hear shortly from Dr. Griffiths, the National Science 

Board also provides extensive guidance, review, and concurrence on 

NSF decision-making for facilities. NSF also works very closely 

with our Inspector General, the Office of Management and Budget, 

and in partnership with Congress to ensure that we are working 

to the very highest standards. 

My written testimony outlines our processes from start to finish, 

including recent enhancements we have made to our procedures for 

facility planning and oversight. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee to speak to you on this important topic. At 

an appropriate time I will be pleased to answer any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Marrett follows:] 
24 

Introduction 

Testimony of 

Dr. Cora B. Marrett, Deputy Director 

National Science Foundation 

Before the 

u.s. House of Representatives 

Committee on Science, Space, Technology 

Subcommittee on Research and Science Education 

NSF Major Research Equipment and Facilities Management: 

Ensuring Fiscal Responsibility and Accountability 

March 8, 2012 

Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member lipinski, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me to participate in this hearing on "NSF Major Research Equipment and 

Facilities Management: Ensuring Fiscal Responsibility and Accountability". 

I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the National Science Foundation's (NSF) large 

facility process with you. 

As you well know, NSF supports research at the frontiers of knowledge across all fields of 

science and engineering (S&E) and all levels of S&E education. Its mission, vision and goals are 

designed to maintain and strengthen the vitality of the u.s. science and engineering enterprise. 

1 
25 

Throughout its 60 year history, NSF has contributed to maintaining U.S. leadership in science 

and engineering research by enabling the creation of advanced instrumentation and world-class 

multi-user facilities for the science and engineering research community. 

NSF's investments in multi-user facilities are designed to provide unique, transformational 

research capabilities at the frontiers of science and engineering. The NSF multi-user facility 

portfolio spans experimental disciplines from physics and astronomy, engineering, and 

materials science, to earth and ocean sciences, polar sciences and biological sciences. The 

newest facilities comprise distributed sensor arrays, extensive cyber-infrastructure, and 

streaming data networks on continental scales. In addition to enabling immense scientific 

return, multi-user facilities serve as platforms to train the next generation of scientists and 

engineers, and provide the high technology equipment and services necessary for economic 

growth and innovation. 

The Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC) account was established in 

1995 to support the acquisition, construction, and commissioning of large-scale facility projects. 

NSF requires that each MREFC candidate project represent an outstanding opportunity to 

enable breakthrough research and innovation, as well as education and broader impacts. Each 

should offer the possibility of transformative knowledge and the potential to shift existing 

paradigms in scientific understanding, engineering processes and/or infrastructure technology. 

And each must serve an urgent contemporary research need that will persist through the 

process of planning and development. 

NSF takes its facility stewardship responsibilities very seriously. Implementation of the largest 

NSF multi-user facilities requires investments of hundreds of millions of dollars. To ensure 

success at this major scale of investment, NSF has strong processes in place for overseeing the 

planning, construction, and operations of its facilities, and for managing its overall facilities 

portfolio. NSF has recently taken steps to make these processes even stronger. I am pleased to 

describe the large facility process in detail below. 

The NSF large facility process from initial planning to operation 

NSF enables and oversees the creation and operation of major multi-user facilities through a 

defined set of funding mechanisms, stewardship policies, and management processes. A 

2 
26 

number of National Academies of Science reports on federal science facility project 

development' provided the foundations for NSF's current process. 

As illustrated in the figure below, large facility projects under consideration for MREFC funding 

undergo a multi-stage development, review and approval process. This process is fully defined 

in NSF's guideline document, the Large Facilities Manual". Note that MREFC funds support only 

the Construction Stage of an approved facility project; preconstruction planning and design of a 

potential facility project and post-construction operations and maintenance of the facility are 

funded through the Research and Related Activities (R&RA) budget of the sponsoring 

Directorate or Office. 

MREFCPanel 

Review 

conceptual 

Design Review 

(CDR) 

Preliminary 

Design Review 

(PDR) 

Final 

Design Review 

(FOR) 

PDR 

~ 

MREFC Pane Director Board approval for 

Operations 

Review 

Review Approval inclusion in a future 

NSF MREFC Budget 

NSF Large Facilities (MREFC) process 

Horizon Planning Stage: Ideas for potential large facilities originate in the scientific community 

and typically evolve conceptually over many years. Initially, NSF responds to opportunities 

articulated by the research community. These ideas are subjected to external merit review, 

and may receive funding by the cognizant Science and Engineering Directorate or Offices for 

further early- (pre-conceptual design) stage refinement. In parallel, the relevant scientific 

community may coalesce around a preferred concept or a prioritization of competing potential 

projects, and these preferences will be communicated to NSF via workshops, advisory 

committees, and authoritative reports from professional societies and the National Academies. 

I Se1ting Priorities for Large Research Facility Projects Supported by the National Science Foundation, NRC 2004 

(and see NSF-NSB responding report of the same title, 2004); Improving Project Management in the Department of 

Energy, NRC, 1999 (and see succeeding publications in this series through 2005). 

The NSF Large Facility Manual is available online at W."C!LQ'i.lgQ'iilluQLIf£J.LQD5LQ,.~j;J __ :ilIJl1Jllj"!2LC)(j;C_~_"Y'CL[!ll. 

3 
27 

The sponsoring NSF Directorate or Office may determine that a proposed horizon stage facility 

addresses high priority science goals and deserves investment in conceptual design and 

development according to the guidelines of NSF's large facility planning process. As illustrated 

in the figure above, the Directorate or Office may at this point request internal NSF review of 

the proposed project by the senior-level MREFC Panel3

, which in turn makes a recommendation 

to the NSF Director who may approve or decline the project's advancement to the Conceptual 

Design Stage. Key criteria are: the demonstration of a strong science case and readiness to 

undertake conceptual design activities defined by NSF guidelines. Approval only allows 

initiation of the first stage of formal preconstruction planning; it does not constitute a 

commitment by NSF to develop the project further. 

Preconstruction Planning Stages: NSF preconstruction planning for potential NSF large facility 

projects comprises three stages: Conceptual Design, Preliminary Design and Final Design. The 

objective of preconstruction planning activities is to shepherd a project from the conceptual 

stage to construction readiness and approval. Activities include project planning and design by 

NSF awardees, and internal planning and oversight by NSF program management, NSF 

administrative units and NSF senior management. The sponsoring NSF program also 

establishes a strategy for supporting long-term facility operations, including sun setting, based 

on the operations plans and associated cost estimates developed by the project team. 

As illustrated in the above figure, each preconstruction planning stage concludes with a 

corresponding formal review conducted by NSF utilizing an external independent panel of 

experts selected and charged by the responsible NSF Program Officer, in consultation with the 

NSF Large Facilities Office. The expert panel evaluates the scientific, technical, business, and 

post-construction operations plans, and the associated cost estimates for these according to 

NSF guidelines, and advises the Program Officer as to whether the project is ready to advance 

to next stage. The corresponding decision milestones comprise evaluation by the sponsoring 

Directorate or Office, review and recommendation by the MREFC Panel, and decision by the 

NSF Director to advance the project. The National Science Board also reviews and may endorse 

the Director's advancement decisions, as noted further below. The decision milestones also 

constitute "off ramps" for terminating the project if progress is not deemed satisfactory or 

NSF's plans or priorities change. 

Conceptual DeSign Stage: NSF requires the project team to develop conceptual designs that 

include the definition of science goals and objectives the proposed facility will address, and the 

respective science, technical and functional requirements that are essential to achieve the 

3 NSF's senior-level MREFC Panel is composed of the NSF Deputy Director, Directorate Assistant Directors and 

Office Heads, and also includes the heads of the Large Facilities Office and Budget Division. More details on the 

Panel's role and responsibilities can be found in the NSF Large Facilities Manual. 

4 
28 

research objectives. The project team must also develop an initial top-down budget estimate; 

an assessment of major risks; an analysis of potential partnerships for facility development, 

construction and/or operation; and an initial estimate of the future budget needed to operate 

the proposed facility. The sponsoring NSF program also develops an Internal Management Plan 

that defines its stewardship strategy - including plans for oversight during the later moreintensive stages of pre-construction planning, funding the design activity and defining off-ramp 

criteria should project development not progress as planned. 

At the appropriate time, NSF conducts a Conceptual Design Review (CDR) to determine if the 

project is ready to advance to the Preliminary Design Stage. Note again that the NSF Director's 

approval only allows investment in preliminary design activities; it does not constitute a 

commitment by NSF to develop the project further. 

Preliminary Design Stage (also, Readiness Stage): If approved by the Director and the Board, 

and funds have been requested by NSF and appropriated by Congress, the sponsoring Program 

may fund the project team to develop a preliminary design, which comprises development of a 

detailed scope of work - via a technical design and development activities, development of a 

detailed Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), a resource-loaded project execution schedule, 

identification of risks and a comprehensive risk management plan, and a bottom-up "risk 

adjusted" cost estimate composed of the baseline estimate and a contingency budget added to 

the estimate for changes that experiences shows will likely be required, taking those risks into 

account. 

At the appropriate time, NSF conducts a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) to determine if the 

project is ready to advance to the Final Design Stage. The review comprises evaluation of the 

technical and management plans and cost estimate; the credibility of the proposed project 

team and institutional partners to carry out the project; and the proponent's projection of 

future operating plans and associated cost estimates. The outcome of the PDR process 

establishes the project's baseline, which is used as the basis for the request to Congress for 

MREFC funds. 

Advancement entails a request by the Director to the National Science Board to include the 

facility project in a future NSF Budget Request for MREFC Funds. Board approval effectively 

constitutes a commitment by NSF that it intends to fund the facility project. Following Board 

approval, the project is proposed to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for inclusion 

in a future NSF Budget Request to Congress, and is advanced to the Final Design Stage. Should 

OMB concur, NSF subsequently presents the project - including the overall plan, total cost, 

requested multi-year MREFC funding profile, and estimated out-year operations funding profile 

- in the President's NSF BudgetRequest to Congress. 

5 
29 

Final Design Stage (also. Board Approved Stage): The period between Preliminary Design 

Review and appropriation of funds typically requires at least two years. During the Final Design 

Stage, the project team is funded to continue to refine cost estimates, recruit additional 

construction staff, finalize partnership commitments, and complete other preparatory work 

that must be accomplished prior to commencing construction. During this time, NSF conducts 

annual cost update reviews to ensure that the assumptions underlying the baseline definition 

continue to be valid. 

Around the time appropriated funds become available, NSF conducts a Final Design Review 

(FDR) to verify that the project is fully prepared to undertake construction activity, and that the 

project cost estimate continues to be valid. if the review is successful, NSF requests approval 

from the National Science Board to obligate funds to commence construction. 

Construction Stage: During this stage, NSF receives monthly technical and financial status 

reports, and performs comprehensive reviews and site visits of the project at least annually. 

NSF requires projects to report their project cost and schedule performance using earned value 

methodology, and to report all changes to the project baseline, including budget, schedule, and 

scope changes. NSF also approves requested changes and/or calls on budget contingency that 

exceed pre-determined thresholds. The National Science Board is notified if any requested 

changes exceed ten percent of the total project cost. If the project is judged not to be 

performing satisfactorily, NSF may require its project awardee to implement a Corrective Action 

Plan or perform rebaselining, or NSF may take other actions including termination. 

Operations stage: Facility operational activity begins following construction and commissioning 

of the new facilities, or in many cases concurrently with the completion of those activities. 

Generally, the entity responsible for constructing and commissioning the facility also has 

responsibility for initial operation. NSF continually reviews facilities as they develop and during 

full operations to ensure that the activities comprising the operational stage fulfill scientific 

goals within the available funding. NSF also requires operating facilities to develop annual work 

plans that set annual performance goals, to measure their performance against those goals, 

and report the results to NSF each year. in keeping with National Science Board guidance, NSF 

also promotes excellence and efficiency in faCility operation by encouraging full and open 

recompetition of the subsequent award for continued operation and maintenance. 

NSF's capacity to support ongoing operation and research utilization of its facilities - including 

investments in advanced R&D to maintain the vitality of facilities - are the pacing factors in the 

ability of NSF to support new research infrastructure. NSF and the National Science Board 

continually assess current infrastructure to determine what should be maintained and where 

redirection towards new opportunities is appropriate. Blue Ribbon Panels, Advisory 

6 
30 

Committees, commissioning of external studies, and periodic facility reviews are all part of this 

process. 

NSF staff roles in large facility stewardship: For each facility, a designated Program Officer 

within the sponsoring Directorate or Office executes stewardship responsibilities and serves as 

the NSF principal point of contact throughout the facility's life cycle. The Large Facilities Office, 

located within the Chief Financial Officer's front office and headed by the Deputy Director for 

Large Facility Projects, develops NSF's large facility process guidelines and assists program staff 

and senior management in project and facility portfolio planning and oversight. The Budget 

Division and Grants and Agreements Specialists in the CFO's organization engage in budget 

development, and in pre-award planning and post-award oversight, respectively. 

Role of the National Science Board4

: The National Science Board provides oversight throughout 

the entire life-cycle process for planning, constructing, operating, and eventually terminating 

NSF support for large facilities. It prioritizes among competing projects in preconstruction 

planning and relative to other opportunities, endorses project advancement from one 

preconstruction planning stage to the next, approves NSF's request to OMB to include a 

request for construction funding within a future NSF Budget Request to Congress, and approves 

the obligation of funds to commence construction following a Congressional appropriation. The 

Board conducts annual portfolio reviews of all NSF major multi-user facility projects at postConceptual Design Review stages of planning and those in construction and operation, offering 

guidance to NSF on the balance between investments in research infrastructure and support for 

other activities. 

Recent modifications to the large facilities process 

With the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Justification, NSF implemented a "no cost overrun policy" 

designed to increase rigor in the planning and execution of projects within approved cost 

estimates. As stated in the FY 2013 Budget Justification, this policy requires that "(1) the total 

cost estimate for each project at the preliminary design stage include adequate contingency to 

cover all foreseeable risks, and (2) any total project cost increases not covered by contingency 

be accommodated by reductions in scope, provided that the actual enacted funding levels have 

been consistent with the established project profiles .... If the total cost for a project is revised 

during construction for reasons other than inadequate funding, NSF will identify mechanisms 

for offsetting any cost increases in accordance with the no overrun policy." 

4 Please refer to the testimony of Dr. Jose-Marie Griffiths at this Hearing for further details concerning the Board's 

role. 

7 
31 

In FY 2011, NSF implemented additional changes to its large facility process to improve handling 

of early-stage projects. The main objectives were to (1) clarify the distinction between 

"horizon" projects and projects in the formal "Conceptual Design Stage", (2) enhance the 

agency-wide strategy for enabling interdisciplinary planning at the early stage, and (3) fully align 

the facility planning and budget planning processes. 

Previously, NSF did not make a strong distinction between what it called "horizon projects" and 

those in the defined preconstruction planning stages. While this practice maximized Directorate 

and Office flexibility to exploit facility opportunities in various stages of maturity, it was 

challenging for the agency to monitor the programmatic status of these early-stage concepts, 

and communicate these uniformly to stakeholders and potential partners. 

As shown in the earlier figure, NSF now defines a "Horizon stage" prior to the "Conceptual 

Design Stage". Horizon projects are those priority activities under consideration within 

Directorates/Offices, but which are not yet ready for advancement through the MREFC 

preconstruction planning process. Projects in the Conceptual Design Stage follow large 

Facilities Manual guidelines, and receive R&RA funding specific to developing the Conceptual 

Design of a potential future MREFC project. 

Second, NSF now defines an agency-level transition milestone between the "Horizon Stage" and 

"Conceptual Design Stage", that is, an explicit entry point to the initial MREFC preconstruction 

planning stage that mirrors the transition review/approval process for all other stages. This 

comprises two steps: first, a formal review by the MREFC Panel of requests by Directorates or 

Offices to advance horizon projects to the Conceptual Design Stage; and second, a decision by 

the NSF Director - supported by the Panel's recommendation - on whether (and how) the 

project should advance. The Panel's review is conducted according to an established procedure 

and set of evaluation criteria. 

These modifications enhance the roles of the Director and senior agency management in 

reviewing and advancing early-stage projects, and serve to ensure that adequate resources are 

invested at this early planning stage. In making these changes, NSF has also incorporated a 

requirement that sponsoring Directorates and Offices demonstrate increased early-stage 

planning and timeline development in order to strengthen alignment with the budget process; 

and engagement with the OMS and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) as 

appropriate, particularly for interagency partnered projects. 

It is important to emphasize again that this approval for advancement of a horizon project into 

the Conceptual Design Stage of planning does not imply NSF commitment to implement the 

project beyond that stage. As mentioned earlier, such NSF commitment does not come until 

8 
32 

after the successful conclusion of the Preliminary Design Stage and approval by the National 

Science Board. 

Impacts on approved projects of underfunding of the MREFC construction account 

NSF strives to make best use of the funds entrusted to it. To this end, NSF gives all projects in 

construction a higher priority than those proposed for future construction. NSF also develops 

multi-year project construction budgets that are "technically limited", that is, budgeted 

according to the optimum rate that work can be performed in order to obtain the lowest total 

project cost. The MREFC account has increased and decreased from year to year as a 

consequence of budgeting to meet project needs rather than planning the project activities 

according to a predetermined budget. 

The success of this budgeting practice assumes that NSF will receive all of the MREFC funds 

requested from Congress for an approved project in a given year. When this does not happen, 

a project's plans must be adjusted accordingly, potentially leading to increased costs and 

reduced project scope and science capability. 

If MREFC funding is less than requested, NSF gives highest priority to funding those projects 

farthest along in construction while deferring work on projects just getting underway, in order 

to avoid the added costs of suspending and restarting work in progress. NSF executed this 

policy in FY2011 when the enacted MREFC budget ($117 million) was less than requested ($165 

million). 

Selected Lessons Learned 

Over many years of sponsoring the creation and operation of major multi-user research 

facilities, NSF has gained substantial insight into facility development best practices, and 

endeavors to adopt these uniformly as they are recognized. Here I note several "take-away" 

lessons that stand out in particular and that influence NSF's planning, investment, and oversight 

of major facility projects. 

Experience at NSF and across the federal science facility enterprise confirms that adequate 

investment in preconstruction planning is essential to achieving a project's intended scope 

within its estimated budget. NSF experience is consistent with observations at other agencies 

that an amount equal to 10 to 25 percent of the total capital cost must be invested in 

preconstruction planning in order to assure that the project is well planned, risks are effectively 

9 
33 

understood and planned for, and that a credible project team is assembled and able to 

implement the proposed project. 

Exceptional projects demand exceptional individuals in key positions of responsibility. Advisory 

and external review committees are very valuable as means to vet management capabilities. In 

addition, major projects must adequately invest in modern management tools. In particular, 

Project Management Control Systems are essential for determining the project's technically 

limited construction schedule and the associated funding profile, and so that, once in 

construction, the project manager can effectively ascertain technical and financial status, 

obtain a detailed picture of risks and contingency usage, and provide the necessary 

transparency to the agency needed to carry out an effective oversight role. 

Finally, large facility projects often expend two-thirds, or more, of their total budget as 

subawards and subcontracts to other parties. Consequently, it is extremely important that 

during planning the project team develop effective plans for subawardee and subcontract 

monitoring and oversight, including Quality Assurance and Safety. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, the world-class equipment and facilities that NSF supports are essential to the 

task of discovery, and are vital to NSF accomplishing its mission of supporting fundamental u.S. 

science and engineering research. NSF will continue to enhance its policies and practices for 

stewardship of major research facilities and other infrastructure in concert with the evolving 

needs of the scientific community for these unique assets and capabilities. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee to speak to you on this 

important topiC. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have. 

10 
34 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Dr. Marrett. 

Next, the Chair recognizes Dr. Griffiths for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOSE ́ -MARIE GRIFFITHS, 

CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FACILITIES, 

NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, VICE PRESIDENT OF 

ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, BRYANT UNIVERSITY 

Dr. GRIFFITHS. Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Lipinski, and 

distinguished members of the staff, I appreciate this opportunity to 

testify before you today regarding the role of the National Science 

Board in guidance and oversight of facility investments at the National Science Foundation. 

Projects being considered for funding under the Major Research 

Equipments and Facility Construction account are high-profile, 

high-cost activities for unique, cutting-edge facilities. They require 

considerable research and development in the design stage. And 

since these types of projects require significant taxpayer funds, the 

Board and the Foundation invest substantial efforts to review scientific needs, construction costs, and operations and maintenance 

costs for projects in or being considered for inclusion under the 

MREFC account. 

In my time on the Board, the Agency has made great strides in 

overseeing both the design and the construction of these critical facilities. The Board’s role in oversight of the MREFC account includes approval of NSF-proposed projects for funding in future 

budgets, the funding priority list for previously-approved-but-notyet-funded MREFC projects, and approval for the release of Congressionally appropriated MREFC funds to NSF awardees. 

Current policy is for the Board to concur on the readiness of 

projects to proceed to the final design stage in the MREFC account. 

The most recent enhancement to this policy approved by the Board 

in February 2010 is the timeline for the Board’s MREFC process, 

which the Board now receives in association with its annual facilities portfolio review. 

The Board established the Subcommittee on Facilities in 2009 to 

oversee the Foundation’s portfolio of facilities projects. The Subcommittee provides guidance to the Board on strategic planning for 

the NSF-funded research equipment and facilities portfolio. This 

guidance includes an annual review of existing MREFC and R&RA 

(research and related activities), large and mid-sized research facilities and infrastructure, and their impact on long-term budgets 

within the Foundation. The Subcommittee on Facilities reviews all 

phases of its facility design, development, construction, operations, 

and retirement. 

As part of its review, the Board conducts a joint Committee on 

Programs and Plans and Committee on Strategy and Budget meeting in February to hear details of the NSF facilities plans for 

projects anticipated in the upcoming year. The plan contains information about the planning and budgeting process for facilities 

under construction, including a brief status report on those projects 

already funded under the MREFC account. 

After the facility plan discussion, the Board conducts an annual 

portfolio review of projects at its May meeting. The objectives of 

this review are to examine the interrelationships between the pro-
35 

posed facility development and other activities across the Foundation to help guide the appropriate balance of investment in infrastructure and research. The review also examines the budgetary 

consequences, operations costs, and future liabilities of further development and guides NSF in managing risk and also in being able 

to respond to opportunities. It also can guide policies and recommend specific action for the coordination and optimization of 

partnerships between NSF and other agencies, private foundations, 

and foreign entities in support of major facilities. 

NSF’s major multi-user facilities and its MREFC program are integral to the NSF investment portfolio. Selecting the best projects, 

providing adequate program management, and oversight for the operation of such facilities are all substantial challenges. These challenges must be met while ensuring that we continue to provide 

adequate balanced support for the individual research or proposals 

for potentially transformative research. 

On behalf of the National Science Board and the science and engineering research and education communities, I would like to 

thank the members of the Subcommittee for your long-term recognition of and commitment to support for the National Science 

Foundation and we look forward to continuing our productive working relationship with you and service to the Nation. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffiths follows:] 
36 

Statement of Dr. Jose-Marie Griffiths 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Facilities 

Committee on Strategy and Budget 

National Science Board 

to the 

Subcommittee on Research and Science Education 

Committee on Science, Space and Technology 

United States House of Representatives 

on 

NSF Major Research Equipment and Facilities Management: 

Ensuring Fiscal Responsibility and Accountability 

March 8, 2012 

10:00 a.m. 

Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Lipinski, and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the 

opportunity to testify before you today regarding the role of the National Science Board in 

guidance and oversight of facility investments at the National Science Foundation (NSF). I am 

Jose-Marie Griffiths, a member of the National Science Board (Board), and Chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Facilities (SCF). I am also Vice President for Academic Affairs and University 

Professor at Bryant University in Smithfield, Rhode Island. In 2006, I was nominated to the Board 

by President Bush and confirmed by the Senate. 

In my experience on the Board during these past six years, I have been consistently impressed 

with the quality of research supported, the long reach of NSF activities, and by the dedication 

and expertise of the agency's staff. In addition, the working relationship that has developed 

between the Board and NSF management during this time has been especially rewarding. This 

collaborative relationship has served the Nation well. 
37 

Introduction 

On behalf of the entire Board, I would like to thank the Members of this Subcommittee for your 

long-standing commitment the NSF and its investments in a broad portfolio of research and 

education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). NSF is the primary 

funding source for academic basic research across non-biomedical science and engineering (S&E) 

disciplines. NSF funds cutting-edge research at the frontiers of knowledge, and also supports 

scientific facilities and activities in STEM education. Over its history, NSF's broad portfolio of 

investments has underwritten a wealth of research that has directly and indirectly benefitted the 

American economy and the general public. 

When Congress established NSF in 1950, it defined dual responsibilities for the National Science 

Board. First, the Board was to oversee the activities of, and establish the policies for, the 

National Science Foundation. Second, the Board was to serve as an advisory body to the 

President and Congress on national policy issues related to science and engineering and 

education in science and engineering. For today's testimony, I'd like to focus on our first 

responsibility, that of oversight of NSF, and more specifically, the Board's role in management of 

the facilities portfolio. 

Leading-edge research infrastructure, including facilities and instrumentation, is essential to 

researchers working at the frontier of science and engineering, and is critical to maintaining U.S. 

leadership in science and engineering. Entire fields of research now depend upon access to new 

generations of research facilities, most of which are large and complex with a significant 

information technology component. 

Board MREFC Review 

The Board's oversight of the Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC) 

account involves approval of NSF-proposed projects for inclusion in future budget requests to 

Congress, approval of the funding priority list for previously approved MREFC projects that have 

not yet been funded by Congress, and approval for release of congressionally-appropriated 

MREFC funds to an NSF awardee. Each of the three projects that are testifying with us today, 

2 
38 

the Ocean Observatories Initiative, the National Ecological Observatory Network, and IceCube all 

received Board scrutiny and approval. 

MREFC projects are high profile, high cost activities that are unique, meaning that they require 

considerable research and development in the design stage. In my time on the Board, the 

agency has made great strides in overseeing both the design and construction of these critical 

facilities. Since these types of projects often require significant taxpayer funds, the Board and 

the Foundation invest substantial efforts to review scientific needs, construction costs, and 

operations and maintenance costs in the MREFC process. 

While construction of major facilities is supported through NSF's MREFC appropriations account, 

NSF funds the pre-construction design and operational activities predominantly from its Research 

and Related Activities account (R&RA). Pre-construction planning and design phases for 

developing MREFC projects usually require significant levels of funding from the R&RA account. 

This R&RA commitment helps to ensure community involvement in and support for the proposed 

facility. 

As part of congressional guidance to NSF to strengthen its management of facility activities, in 

2002 Congress requested Board oversight for the MREFC appropriations account. NSF was also 

instructed to limit its use of the MREFC account is to the acquisition, construction, and 

commissioning of large scale research facilities. Planning, design, operations, and maintenance 

costs were to be funded from the R&RA appropriations account. 

Subsequent reports from the National Academy of Sciences and the National Science Board in 

2004 and 2005 respectively provided guidance to NSF on prioritization of facility projects after 

Congress became concerned about a backlog of Board-approved MREFC projects that had not 

received funding. The Board's report in particular committed NSF and the Board to specific 

criteria for approving and prioritizing large facility projects. 

3 
39 

Additional policies for funding MREFC projects were approved by the Board in 2005. Those 

policies specify that the Board is to concur on the readiness of projects to proceed to the final 

design phase. As a matter of practice, the Board had often been provided with information on 

the status of candidate MREFC projects during their planning and pre-construction design phase. 

The most recent enhancement to this policy is the timeline for the Board's MREFC Process, which 

was approved by the Board in February 2010. As the part of this timeline, the Board now 

receives this information in association with its annual facilities portfolio review. 

Also feeding into the current oversight process was a 2008 Board report to Congress required by 

the 2007 America COMPETES Act. COMPETES directed the Board to evaluate the 

appropriateness of NSF's policies for preconstruction funding and maintenance and operations 

costs for major research equipment and facilities. The report concluded that the Board should 

be more formally engaged in reviewing all post initial proposal stages for MREFC projects. 

Overview of Board Involvement in Facilities 

Board oversight offacilities supported by NSF continues to evolve. For individual projects that 

will be funded through the MREFC, Board review and approval is mandated by statute. The 

Board's Committee on Program and Plans (CPP) has jurisdiction over these individual project 

awards. In order to ensure balance across the Foundation, the Board has recently instituted an 

annual facilities portfolio review which is conducted each May. This function, which reviews 

both MREFC projects and smaller multi-user facilities, is part of the responsibilities of the 

Committee on Strategy and Budget's Subcommittee on Facilities (SCF). 

When considering a facility project for approval, the Board reviews the need for such a facility, 

the research that will be enabled, the readiness of plans for construction and operation, 

construction budget estimates, and operations budget estimates. Prior to formal Board 

consideration, however, NSF supports substantial planning efforts by the scientific community. 

These potential facilities are often subject to years of research and development planning and 

preparation before they are ready for inclusion in a funding request to Congress. 

4 
40 

Outline of NSF Process for MREFC 

For MREFC projects, NSF designates four project evolution phases of this planning and 

preparation: (1) conceptual design, (2) preliminary design, (3) final design (readiness), and (4) 

construction. As previously mentioned, Board involvement in each ofthese phases has evolved 

over the past several years. It now includes approval of each individual project at the final design 

phase and reviewing the facilities portfolio as a whole. 

The conceptual design phase involves the formulation of science questions, defining 

requirements, and identifying enabling technologies and high risk factors. During the conceptual 

design phase, NSF may award funds to academic institutions to organize one or more workshops 

to solicit essential input from the user community and other stakeholders. Top down cost, 

contingency, and risk analyses are included in this phase, which concludes with an initial proposal 

submission to NSF. 

Budgeting for contingency includes planning, risk identification, analYSiS, response planning and 

monitoring and control of project resources, including contingency funds. Currently, NSF senior 

management and the agency's Office of the Inspector General are working closely on resolving 

differing interpretations of contingency cost standards. The Board, through its Audit and 

Oversight Committee, receives updates on these negotiations at each meeting and we are 

pleased with the progress made to date. 

The subsequent phases for MREFC projects, preliminary deSign, final design, and construction, 

also involve NSF awards for the preparation of the more detailed designs. Multiple design 

awards may be made, particularly in the preliminary design phase, so that competing approaches 

can be evaluated through NSF's Merit Review process. After NSF has identified projects that 

warrant progression from the preliminary design phase to the final design phase, the Board 

approves the project before it is included in a future budget request. This is done initially by CPP 

and then the full Board in the late spring of each year. The Board's Committee on Strategy and 

Budget (CSB) then meets in the summer to review and approve NSF's budget submission to OMB. 

This submission also requires full Board approval. 

5 
41 

The technical, cost, and schedule performance of the IceCube MREFC Project was 

consistent with the original project baseline and the NSF funding plan approved in 2004. 

The following chart highlights the cost and schedule plan and performance. 

IceCube Project Baseline (M$) 

Initialln·lce Strings & IceTop Tanks Installe, Jan~2005 

Initial Operational Capability Mar-2007 

Project Completion & Closeout Aug-2012 

S300M Total Project Cost $279.5 

Value of Foreign Contributions $37.4 '),79:: 2795 

NSF Funding $242.1 

Remaining Contingency $0.9 278 

'250M Strings Installed 86 

Performance and Cost through: 

S~OOM 

$150M 

S100M 

$50M 

:n16 

// FULL OPERATIONS 

c L &DATAANALYSISCAPABll1TY 

INITIAL OPERATIONS &'DATh ANALYSIS CAPABIllTY 

l

lFUll SCAl..E.DOM PRODUCTION 

DETERM]NE FULL DEPLOYMENT RATE 

r-~T~m.~'~F"-nd~.7.'U~S7&7.~~n~US~'------' 

" __ Orininal Budget meWS) 

_Current Budget (8eWS) 99,8 % 

_Earned Value (BCWP) 99.8 % 

SOM ~;:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r+-r+-~=A,~,"~,:,c~o.~t(=AC~W~P=I~~~9~'=c2~%~ 

FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FYOS FY09 FYlO FYlI FY12 

FISCAL YEAR 

How and why was IceCube identified and selected as a worthy large facilities 

construction project? 

A series of reviews organized by NSF, DOE, and the National Academy Sciences concluded 

that the proposed lceCube detector would open a new window on the Universe by 

detecting very high energy neutrinos from objects across the Universe. The scientific and 

technical review committees found the science to be well motivated and exciting and the 

detection technique proven. Construction plans matured and eventually committees 

advised that the IceCube MREFC project was ready for construction. 

The process of identifying IceCube as worthy and ready for construction included robust 

peer and management review organized by NSF and eventually an assessment by the 

National Academy. This six-year process started with the submission of a Letter of Intent 

in February 1998 and concluded with approval by the National Science Board in April 

2004. 

-2-
42 

budgetary consequences, operations costs and future liabilities of further development, and 

guides NSF in managing risk and being able to respond to opportunities. It also can guide policies 

and recommend specific action for the coordination and optimization of partnerships between 

NSF and other agencies, private foundations, and foreign entities. 

An important aspect of this review involves recompetition of facilities. In 2008, the Board 

endorsed the principle that all expiring awards are to be recompeted. For major facility awards, 

the Board concluded that after construction is completed and an appropriate time period is 

implemented to bring the facility to sustainable operations, full and open competition of the 

operations award will be required. NSF is working to implement this policy through its Business 

and Operations Advisory Committee and continues to update the Board on the progress. 

Closing Remarks 

NSF's major multi-user facilities and its MREFC program are integral to the NSF investment 

portfolio, enabling access to and construction of facilities to perform research on new frontiers. 

Selecting the best projects, providing adequate program management, as well as oversight for 

the operations of such facilities, are all substantial challenges. However, an equally important 

challenge is that by supporting these essential facilities we not sacrifice our ability also to provide 

adequate support for the individual researcher proposals that for potentially transformative 

research. 

On behalf of the National Science Board and the S&E research and education communities, I 

would like to thank the Members of the Subcommittee for your long-term recognition of and 

commitment to support for the National Science Foundation. We look forward to continuing our 

productive working relationship with you in service to the Nation. 

7 
43 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Dr. Griffiths. 

The Chair next recognizes Mr. Yeck for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES H. YECK, 

ICECUBE PROJECT DIRECTOR, 

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–MADISON 

Mr. YECK. Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Lipinski, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Mr. Jim Yeck, and I am the Project 

Director of IceCube, an NSF MREFC Project that created the 

IceCube Neutrino Observatory. My testimony provides an overview 

of the IceCube project from its beginning and responds to questions 

from the Subcommittee. 

IceCube is a particle detector embedded in a cubic kilometer of 

deep, very transparent South Pole ice that was designed to detect 

high-energy neutrinos from nearby and across the universe. The 

science capability of the observatory greatly exceeds that of previous detectors and those currently under construction, and thus, 

its capacity for transformational discovery is very significant. 

The IceCube MREFC project was proposed in 1999 and final approvals for constructions were given in 2004. Installation of detector instrumentation started in 2005 and concluded in December of 

2010. Final project closeout will be completed this year. The total 

MREFC cost was $279.5 million with NSF providing 242.1 million 

and funding partners in Belgium, Germany, and Sweden providing 

support valued at 37.4 million. 

The bottom line is that the project was completed at cost and on 

schedule and that the detector exceeds its original performance and 

sensitivity goals. A series of peer reviews organized by NSF and 

the National Academy of Sciences concluded that IceCube was a 

worthwhile MREFC investment. Construction plans matured and 

eventually the MREFC project was ready for construction. This sixyear process concluded with approval to begin full-scale construction by the National Science Board in April 2004. 

The primary strengths of the approval process were the quality 

of the external peer review, the close and effective coordination between the NSF’s Office of Polar Programs and the Division of Physics, strong institutional commitment and engagement by the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and the international interest and 

support of the project. The primary weaknesses of the approval 

process were the general environment of uncertainty, the potential 

for discontinuities in financial support, and the fact that both the 

NSF and UW–Madison were still maturing in terms of their large 

project experience and capabilities. 

An approval process that is stretched out or unclear in its outcome creates an environment of uncertainty that is difficult to 

manage at the facility level. Construction and operations are managed under the terms of a cooperative agreement between the NSF 

and UW–Madison. The partnership between NSF and UW–Madison provides the management accountability necessary to ensure 

that resources are used efficiently and that goals are consistently 

achieved. Key management arrangements used to manage IceCube 

include these clear lines of accountability and authority from NSF 

to UW–Madison to IceCube; detailed scope, schedule, and budget 
44 

definition; explicit cost and schedule contingency derived from risk 

assessment; regular reviews by external committees; tracking and 

progress reporting against established milestones, budget, and performance metrics; and routine oversight by NSF, UW–Madison, 

and the foreign funding agencies. 

The essential tool of project management is to define an explicit 

contingency budget within a total project cost baseline. The 

IceCube project performance baseline included a 22 percent contingency budget. In order to create this contingency budget within 

funding constraints, the base cost estimates were squeezed and the 

project scope was reduced creating an incentive for all parties to 

control cost in order to restore the original scope. 

The management flexibility enabled by contingency expenditures 

improved scheduled performance and resulted in cost savings and 

ultimately the restoration of the original project scope. Peer reviews organized by NSF were absolutely essential to IceCube’s success. These reviews were typically on an annual basis and ensured 

transparency, early identification of critical issues, and project 

plans that included input from outside experts. Performance 

metrics were developed to ensure efficient use of American taxpayer dollars. Early operation results are excellent with 98.5 percent of the censors taking data and detector uptime at over 99 percent. 

The biggest challenges with the MREFC projects are often the 

transition phases—R&D and project definition into a construction 

start, the ramp-up into full construction, the efficient ramp-down 

of the construction effort, and the transition into operations. Discontinuities in funding and support can be detrimental as the facility managers strive to maintain a team of talented and motivated 

people, which is essential to the program’s success. 

The stewardship of a large facility requires engagement, problem-solving, and support over decades. Facility stewardship requires an active role by the funding agency and involves joint ownership and partnership with the facility managers. The MREFC 

program has matured significantly over the last decade since 

IceCube was originally proposed. There is excellent sharing of experiences, lessons learned, and the ingredients to success. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yeck follows:] 
45 

Written Testimony of Mr. James H. Yeck, IceCube Project Director 

before the 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and Science 

Education hearing entitled "NSF Major Research Equipment and Facilities Management: 

Ensuring Fiscal Responsibility and Accountability", 

March 08, 2012. 

Chairman Brooks, Ranking member Lipinski, and distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Mr. Jim Yeck and I am 

the Project Director for IceCube, an NSF Major Research Equipment and Facilities (MREFC) 

Project that created the IceCube Neutrino Observatory. My testimony provides an 

overview of the IceCube MREFC Project from its beginning to its successful conclusion last 

year and its operations and responds to the questions from the Subcommittee. 

Overview of IceCube MREFC project, from inception to its operations today. 

IceCube is a particle detector embedded in a cubic kilometer of deep, very transparent 

South Pole ice that was designed to detect high-energy neutrinos from nearby and across 

the Universe. The science capability of this observatory ranges from detecting neutrinos 

from dark matter annihilations that are predicted to take place in the sun to bursts of 

neutrinos from stellar explosions in our galaxy and other nearby galaxies to ultra-high 

energy neutrinos produced by violent astrophysical events at the centers of active galaxies 

across the Universe. The capability of IceCube greatly exceeds that of previous detectors 

and those currently under construction, and thus its capacity for transformational 

discovery is very significant. 

The lceCube MREFC project was proposed in 1999 and final approvals for construction 

were given in April 2004. Detector installation started in January 2005 and was completed 

in December of 2010. A special hot water drill was used to embed the detector 

instrumentation in the South Pole ice (the ice melted was almost three times the volume of 

the Capitol dome). Once the holes were drilled in the ice, deployment specialists carefully 

connected digital optical modules to cables and lowered them into the drill holes to a depth 

of 2.5 kilometers. Each cable has 60 modules attached to it, and there are 86 cables in total. 

IceCube has a surface component called IceTop that serves as a cosmic air shower array. 

The construction effort required almost ten million pounds of cargo and over 30,000 

person-days of work at South Pole. The total MREFC Project cost of IceCube is $279.5 

million. The National Science Foundation provided $242.1 million and funding partners in 

Belgium, Germany, and Sweden provided support valued at $37.4 million. The lceCube 

detector exceeds its original performance and sensitivity goals. 

The lceCube Collaboration of scientists and professionals includes about 250 people from 

39 institutions in 11 countries. 

- 1 -
46 

The technical, cost, and schedule performance of the IceCube MREFC Project was 

consistent with the original project baseline and the NSF funding plan approved in 2004. 

The following chart highlights the cost and schedule plan and performance. 

IceCube Project Baseline (M$) 

Initialln·lce Strings & IceTop Tanks Installe, Jan~2005 

Initial Operational Capability Mar-2007 

Project Completion & Closeout Aug-2012 

S300M Total Project Cost $279.5 

Value of Foreign Contributions $37.4 '),79:: 2795 

NSF Funding $242.1 

Remaining Contingency $0.9 278 

'250M Strings Installed 86 

Performance and Cost through: 

S~OOM 

$150M 

S100M 

$50M 

:n16 

// FULL OPERATIONS 

c L &DATAANALYSISCAPABll1TY 

INITIAL OPERATIONS &'DATh ANALYSIS CAPABIllTY 

l

lFUll SCAl..E.DOM PRODUCTION 

DETERM]NE FULL DEPLOYMENT RATE 

r-~T~m.~'~F"-nd~.7.'U~S7&7.~~n~US~'------' 

" __ Orininal Budget meWS) 

_Current Budget (8eWS) 99,8 % 

_Earned Value (BCWP) 99.8 % 

SOM ~;:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r+-r+-~=A,~,"~,:,c~o.~t(=AC~W~P=I~~~9~'=c2~%~ 

FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FYOS FY09 FYlO FYlI FY12 

FISCAL YEAR 

How and why was IceCube identified and selected as a worthy large facilities 

construction project? 

A series of reviews organized by NSF, DOE, and the National Academy Sciences concluded 

that the proposed lceCube detector would open a new window on the Universe by 

detecting very high energy neutrinos from objects across the Universe. The scientific and 

technical review committees found the science to be well motivated and exciting and the 

detection technique proven. Construction plans matured and eventually committees 

advised that the IceCube MREFC project was ready for construction. 

The process of identifying IceCube as worthy and ready for construction included robust 

peer and management review organized by NSF and eventually an assessment by the 

National Academy. This six-year process started with the submission of a Letter of Intent 

in February 1998 and concluded with approval by the National Science Board in April 

2004. 

-2-
47 

IceCube Scientific and Construction Readiness Review Timeline 

Feb 1998 Letter of Intent submitted to the NSF by Professor Francis Halzen, University of 

Wisconsin-Madison 

May 1999 Astropartic1e Physics with High Energy Neutrinos - Open Meeting for the scientific 

community organized by Francis Halzen 

Nov 1999 IceCube Proposal submitted to the NSF on behalf of the U.S. fceCube Collaboration; 

separate proposals submitted to the German (DESY and Ministry), Sweden, and 

Belgium (Flemish and Walloon) funding agencies 

Early 2000 NSF Peer Review of the IceCube Proposal 

Apr 2000 DOE-NSF Science Advisory Group for Experiments in Non-Accelerator Physics 

(SAGENAP) Review of the lceCube Proposal 

June 2000 NSF Readiness Assessment by a External Panel 

Oct 2000 National Science Board Approval to Submit lceCube in a Future Budget Request. 

Fall 2001 Endorsement of IceCube by the High Energy Physics Advisory Panel's Subpanel on 

the Future of Particle Physics in the U.S 

Oct 2001 NSF Readiness Review by an External Panel 

Nov 2001 NSF Review by an External Panel of the IceCube Enhanced Hot Water Drill Final 

Design 

Sept 2002 International Workshop on Neutrinos and Subterranean Science Community Input 

Sept 2002 NSF Review of lceCube Drilling Plans 

Early 2003 National Academy Neutrino Facilities Assessment Committee Review: Neutrinos and 

Beyond: New Windows on Nature 

Sept 2003 NSF External Panel Annual Review 

Feb 2004 NSF Review by External Committee of the proposed IceCube MREFC Project Baseline 

Apr 2004 NSB Approval to Proceed with IceCube Construction 

A National Academy Sciences study reaffirmed the scientific merit of IceCube in 2003, 

noting that the capability of IceCube greatly exceeds that of previous detectors and those 

currently under construction, and thus its capacity for transformational discovery was very 

significant. 

What were the strengths and weaknesses of the process? 

The primary strengths of the approval process for IceCube were the quality of the external 

review; the close and effective coordination between NSF's Office of Polar Programs and 

the Division of Physics; strong institutional commitment and engagement by the University 

of Wisconsin-Madison; and the international scientific interest and support of the NSF 

approval process. It was extremely valuable to be able to defend scientific goals and 

project plans in front of the highest quality external committees. The breadth and depth of 

the experience of those assembled for these reviews resulted in better implementation 

plans and higher confidence that the IceCube MREFC Project would be successful. The 

-3-
48 

shared commitment to achieving successful approval helped the partners to work 

constructively together during the approval process. NSF's Office of Polar Programs and 

the Division of Physics, working with the Large Facilities Office, interacted constructively 

with UW-Madison and the international partners. 

The primary weaknesses of the IceCube MREFC Project approval process were the general 

environment of uncertainty, the potential for discontinuities in financial support, and the 

fact that both NSF and UW-Madison were still maturing in terms of their large project 

processes and general capabilities. 

The most cost effective projects are those where there is an early commitment to move the 

project forward on a schedule that is only limited by the ability to make technical progress. 

An approval process that is stretched out or unclear in its outcome creates an environment 

of uncertainty that is extremely difficult to manage at the facility level where day-to-day 

activities include hiring, placing contracts, and paying bills. The most influential factor in 

the ability of a project to succeed is acquiring experienced and capable staff. 

Discontinuities in funding and uncertainty can make this challenging, if not impossible. 

UW-Madison became heavily vested in the success of Ice Cube and used local resources to 

bridge funding delays and gaps. This was manageable but not desirable. 

NSF large facilities management continues to improve and the guidance and rules are 

stabilizing. Around 2000, when IceCube was getting started, the NSF large facility guidance 

was still evolving; e.g., when IceCube was approved it was not permissible to include 

Education & Outreach in an MREFC Project, now it is. As NSF builds a history of successful 

MREFC projects there is higher confidence in its management practices. The situation at 

UW-Madison was similar, and the support arrangements for lceCube evolved in the 

beginning from a project initially supported out of the Physics Department to an 

autonomous center within the Graduate School. 

How is lceCube currently managed? 

lceCube is managed through contracts and memoranda of understanding between the 

participating legal entities; partnerships between the stakeholders; and line management 

arrangements that ensures top-to-bottom accountability and open communication. 

Management and Contractual Arrangements 

NSF and the UW-Madjson. The lceCube Construction Project and the Maintenance and 

Operations (M&O) Program of the lceCube Neutrino Observatory are managed under the 

terms of Cooperative Agreements between the NSF and UW-Madison. A Project 

Management Plan details the management arrangements for the Construction Project and 

an Operations Plan covers the M&O Program. UW-Madison executes subawards to U.S. 

universities and laboratories for both the Construction Project and Operations Program. 

- 4-
49 

IceCube Collaboration. The group of scientists motivated by the IceCube scientific goals 

and their institutions form the IceCube Collaboration. The Collaboration Governance 

Document describes the organizational matters of the collaboration including the election 

procedure for the Spokesperson [icecube.wisc.edu/collaboration/governance.phpj. As 

described in the Cooperative Agreements and in the Collaboration Governance Document, 

UW-Madison executes a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that defines the 

institutional responsibilities for all constituent institutions. The Construction Project 

MOUs defined each institution's construction "deliverables" and the Maintenance & 

Operations MOU addresses the responsibilities of each institution in support of successful 

operations. 

Antarctic Support. The Office of Polar Programs (OPP) has lead responsibility for the 

IceCube program within NSF. OPP tasks their Antarctic support contractor, Raytheon Polar 

Services Company (RPSC), and the Air National Guard, to provide the logistics and field 

support required for IceCube construction and operations. During the construction phase 

UW-Madison defined the IceCube construction project support requirements and OPP 

provided IceCube MREFC funding to RPSC via their contracts. This three-party 

arrangement was initially challenging but worked well as the project matured. 

International Oversight and Finance Group (IOFG). NSF and representatives of the foreign 

funding agencies typically meet on an annual basis to review IceCube progress. The foreign 

funding agencies made significant contributions to the construction project and operations 

program. The foreign collaborating institutions are accountable to their respective funding 

agencies to deliver on their construction project and operations support commitments. In 

addition to in-kind contributions of hardware and labor there is a cash contribution to a 

"common fund" to support the computing and software necessary for the large IceCube 

data volumes. 

Management Partnerships 

lceCube Collaboration and UW-Madison. lceCube management is based on effective 

partnerships between stakeholders that share ownership in the success of the entire 

IceCube program. There is close partnership between the IceCube Collaboration (over 250 

scientists and professionals from 39 institutions and 11 countries) and UW-Madison, 

which serves as both a collaborating institution and as host institution for both the 

construction project and the operations program. The Ice Cube Collaboration worked on 

every aspect of the detector. A remarkable aspect of the construction phase was the wide 

distribution of the hardware development across the collaboration. Production and testing 

of digital optical modules was completed in Sweden, Germany, and the U.S. (UW-Madison). 

NSF and UW-Madison. The partnership between NSF and UW-Madison provides the 

management accountability necessary to ensure that resources are used efficiently and that 

construction and operations goals are consistently achieved. NSF is the primary funding 

agency for Ice Cube having provided about 85% of the construction project funding and 

providing 63% of the annual M&O support. Over 80% of the NSF MREFC funding was 

allocated directly to, and managed by UW-Madison, with the remainder allocated to RPSC 

and the Air National Guard. 

- 5-
50 

NSF/UW-Madison and Foreign Funding Agencies. The direct engagement of the NSF 

program managers and the UW-Madison lceCube leadership with the primary foreign 

funding agencies is a partnership demanded by the international nature of the support for 

the scientific collaboration. Representatives of the foreign funding agencies are invited to 

review project plans, participate in external reviews, evaluate reports, and provide general 

oversight to the lceCube program. 

Key Management Arrangements 

The key management arrangements used to manage Ice Cube include: 1) clear lines of 

accountability and authority from NSF to UW-Madison and to the lceCube construction 

project and operations program, 2) detailed scope, schedule, and budget definition, 3) 

explicit cost and schedule contingency derived from risk assessment, 4) regular reviews by 

external committees, 5) tracking and progress reporting against established milestones, 

budgets, and performance metrics, and 6) routine oversight by NSF, UW-Madison, and 

foreign funding agencies. It is important to emphasize the IceCube approach used for 

contingency management, external reviews, and project oversight. 

Contingency Management. An essential tool of project management is to define an explicit 

contingency budget within the total project cost baseline that is derived from an 

assessment of risk. The IceCube MREFC project performance baseline was approved in 

April 2004 and included a 22% contingency budget. In order to create this contingency 

budget the project scope was reduced from 80 deep ice cables to 70. The built-in incentive 

for all parties was to control costs in order to restore the original project scope. The 

management flexibility enabled by the project contingency budget allowed significant 

efficiencies to be gained in the deep ice drilling and instrumentation production and testing 

program. Schedule performance made possible by contingency expenditures resulted in 

cost savings and full scope restoration to 80 cables plus an additional six cables made 

possible by additional foreign contributions. 

External Reviews. Peer reviews organized by NSF were absolutely essential to IceCube 

success. These reviews were typically carried out on an annual basis beginning after the 

submission of the initial proposal and continuing throughout the duration of the MREFC 

Project. The review committee membership was tailored to the needs of the project and 

the committee recommendations and advice were always constructive and helpful. It is a 

great strength of the scientific community that its members embrace the opportunity to 

help each other through service work on these types of committees. The UW-Madison 

lceCube Project Office established a standing Project Advisory Panel, Science Advisory 

Committee, and Software & Computing Advisory Panel. These advisory bodies met 

annually and provided input directly to the project. The combination of the NSF organized 

reviews and the IceCube project advisory bodies ensured that critical issues were 

identified early and that project plans included input from experts. 

Project Oversight. NSF provided effective oversight of IceCube. The NSF Program Manager 

during the approval and construction phase was a senior and experienced NSF program 

manager. There was a high level of engagement with UW-Madison and the IceCube Project 

- 6-
51 

Office. IceCube, like all large complex projects, encountered significant challenges during 

each project phase and the NSF Program Manager coordinated input within NSF and 

provided clear guidance to the lceCube Project Director. The NSF Program Manager and 

the lceCube Project Director had an open approach to communicating project information 

while respecting their distinct roles. The UW-Madison IceCube Leadership Team, chaired 

by the UW-Madison Chancellor, met on a quarterly basis and provided consistent oversight 

of the lceCube MREFC Project. This maintained a high level of institutional commitment 

throughout the construction project and the transition into operations. 

Construction and Transition to Operations Strategies 

The main project strategy was to maximize the installation of instrumentation each South 

Pole summer by ensuring that installation was not limited by the availability of 

instrumentation. This placed a priority on the critical activity-safely drilling holes in the 

South Pole ice sheet. Major constraints included the limited construction season of three 

months during the Antarctic summer, limited transport flights for cargo and fuel, and 

available bed space at the McMurdo and South Pole stations for people. The U.s. Antarctic 

Program infrastructure, including the bases, supply chain, and experience, was critical to 

project success. 

What are the roles and responsibilities of the facility staff and the roles and 

responsibilities of NSF in the management and oversight of IceCube? 

As noted earlier in this testimony there was a close partnership between the NSF and UWMadison. One of the main reasons that this partnership worked extremely well was the 

clear and common understanding of the distinct roles and responsibilities of the two 

parties and an environment of mutual respect and trust. Respect and trust developed 

during the startup phase of this relationship enabled effective management of critical 

challenges as the two parties worked efficiently together. 

NSF Roles and Responsibilities 

The NSF is responsible for seeing that the lceCube MREFC Project meets its baseline 

requirements of cost, schedule, scope, and technical performance. The NSF has a special 

role in lceCube because of its responsibilities in managing operation of the Amundsen-Scott 

South Pole Station. These responsibilities include: safety; physical qualification of project 

staff; environmental protection; transport of personnel, fuel and equipment; and the 

provision of housing, food service, support personnel, logistical support, IT support, and 

general infrastructure support. 

Within the NSF the Office of Polar Programs (OPP) is the lead organizational unit 

responsible for the conduct of scientific, technical, cost, schedule and management reviews, 

general progress reviews, and agency guidance regarding the lceCube Project. OPP 

designates a Program Officer (PO) who provides continuous oversight and guidance 

through direct communication with the UW-Madison Ice Cube Project Director and site 

-7-
52 

visits to UW and other project sites, including the South Pole Station. The IceCube Program 

Officer is the Project Director's point of contact at the NSF. 

UW-Madison Roles and Responsibilities 

The UW-Madison is the host institution for the IceCube Project Office and the home 

university of the Principal Investigator. The responsibilities of the host institution include: 

Providing internal oversight for the project. 

• Appointing the Project Director (subject to concurrence by the NSF, and the IceCube 

Collaboration Board). 

Ensuring that the Project Office has adequate staff and support. 

Ensuring that an adequate management structure is established for managing the 

project and monitoring progress. 

Ensuring that accurate and timely reports are provided to the NSF, IOFG, and the 

IceCube Collaboration. 

Developing subawards with other U.S. collaborating institutions and providing 

appropriate funding. 

Establishing MOUs between the UW and non-U.S. collaborators defining the non-U.S. 

collaborators' deliverables. 

IceCube Principailnvestigator 

The Principal Investigator is responsible to the Vice Chancellor for Research and the NSF 

for the overall scientific direction of the IceCube Project. The Principal Investigator is CoSpokesperson for the IceCube Collaboration during the construction phase and an exofficio member of the IceCube Collaboration Board. The Principal Investigator 

communicates to the Project Director the scientific goals established by the IceCube 

Collaboration and concurs on the project implementation plan established by the Project 

Director. 

Project Director 

The IceCube Project Director (PO) is appointed by the Vice Chancellor for Research, subject 

to concurrence by the lceCube Collaboration Board and the NSF. The UW holds the Project 

Director (PO) responsible for execution of the construction project. The PO serves as the 

primary point of contact for the IceCube Collaboration and the NSF on all construction 

matters. The PO establishes the detailed Project Execution Plan that supports the IceCube 

scientific goals as described in the lceCube Proposal and in the Cooperative Agreement. 

The PO executes and controls project activities to ensure that project objectives, including 

cost and schedule baselines are met. The PO also serves as Co-Principal Investigator on the 

Project, and advises the Principal Investigator and the Collaboration Spokesperson on all 

issues that affect the IceCube scientific goals. 

Other responsibilities of the Project Director include: 

Development of project scope and integrated cost and schedule baseline plans that 

are consistent with funding plans. 

Approval of annual budgets and funding allocations for institutions receiving NSF 

funding and MOUs with non-U.S. collaborating institutions. 

-8-
53 

Ensuring that adequate project management control and reporting systems are 

implemented. 

Establishment of the IceCube Change Control Board and approval of baseline 

changes at Change Control Levell. 

Chairing monthly project status reviews involving the Level 2 managers and 

selected Project Office staff. 

How do you work with NSF to ensure that the American taxpayer is getting a return on 

this investment? 

The IceCube MREFC investment is carefully managed as addressed earlier in this 

testimony. Performance metrics were developed for the Operations Program that help to 

ensure that this continuing investment is also an efficient use of American taxpayer. Over 

5,000 digital optical modules (DOMs) instrument one billion tons of ice (cubic kilometer) a 

mile and a half below the South Pole surface. 

Early operational results with the IceCube instrumentation are good: 

A total of 98.5% of the 5,484 DOMs installed and frozen into the deep ice at the 

South Pole are currently taking data and reliability analysis indicates that 98.0% of 

these DOMs will still be taking data in ten years. 

Detector uptime is approximately 99.0%. 

Every hour the IceCube Neutrino Observatory detects over 10 million downwardgoing cosmic particles and about 5 upward-going neutrinos. 

The international IceCube Collaboration carries out the scientific program and shares 

responsibility for the M&O program including service work by research groups to manage 

the large data volumes and direct financial support. The details of these contributions are 

managed and tracked at a very detailed level. 

lceCube M&O SUIl port for Fiscal Year 2011 ($'000) 

Total Required NSF M&O Core U.S. Base Grant U.S. Institutional Non-U.S. 

M&O Support Support Support Support Support 

15,888 6,900 1,512 1,628 5,847 

100% 43% 10% 10% 37% 

100% U.S. -63% Non-U.S. = 37% 

The return on the lceCube investment is primarily measured by the quality of the scientific 

output. This is measured by the scientific publications [icecube.wisc.edu/pubs] and regular 

peer review of lceCube research proposals routinely submitted by Principal Investigators 

from the collaborating institutions. IceCube is unique in its discovery potential given the 

large instrumented detector volume in the Southern Hemisphere. The merit of the 

investment in lceCube is broadly acknowledged and there are plans to construct a detector 

of similar scale (KM3NET) in the Mediterranean Sea. This is largely a European initiative 

and would result in a Northern Hemisphere neutrino observatory that is complementary to 

IceCube. 

- 9-
54 

How was the entire life cycle of the project, including management and operations 

after construction, taken into account in the management and oversight of IceCube? 

The biggest challenges with MREFC projects are often the transition phases: 1) R&D, 

project definition and planning, and the transition into a construction start, 2) ramp up into 

full construction, 3) efficient ramp down of the construction effort, and 4) the transition 

into operations. MREFC funding does not cover R&D, operations, or research and therefore 

these transitions and the full program of support require multiple proposals and an 

integrated funding plan by the NSF. These transition phases were also difficult for IceCube 

but managed successfully by the collaborating parties. Discontinuities in funding and 

support can be detrimental as the facility managers strive to maintain a team of talented 

and motivated people, which is essential to the program's success. The NSF MREFC 

program has matured over the last decade and there is now substantial institutional 

experience that benefits the current generation of MREFC projects. 

IceCube R&D and Construction Start 

NSF and other parties supported AMANDA, essentially a prototype of the IceCube detector. 

AMANDA operated prior to and then concurrently with the initiallceCube construction and 

provided valuable experience regarding relevant hardware, software, and data 

management and helped to develop the scientific, engineering, and institutional experience 

within the IceCube Collaboration needed to propose lceCube. The IceCube proposal was 

based on the success of AMANDA, although the scale-up to lceCube was significant. 

Transition to Operations 

The initial Ice Cube proposal and the reviews that followed provided opportunities to 

present and critique the life cycle requirements of the facility. For example, the IceCube 

proposal submitted in 1999 included an estimate ofthe annual operating requirements; the 

project baseline reviews in 2004 assessed the plan for transitioning into operations; the 

NSF and foreign funding agencies began meeting to discuss operations plans in 2005; and, 

initial operations funding was provided in 2007. 

Research 

The development of the IceCube scientific goals and exploitation of the scientific potential 

of the facility requires continuing support to the collaborating groups. Collaborating 

university groups in the u.s submit proposals to the NSF on a three-year cycle and these 

proposals undergo peer review. This foundation of research support enables the return on 

the MREFC investment. 

What have been the biggest challenges you have faced with the project thus far and 

how were they rectified? 

The biggest challenges encountered include the scale-up from AMANDA to IceCube; 

establishing management capability and support arrangements at UW-Madison; ensuring 

the safety of the deep ice drilling operation; and, the limited NSF experience in the 

-10 -
55 

stewardship of large facilities during the late 1990's. A major challenge was a potential 

hold on IceCube when a policy of no new construction starts was imposed following a 

change in administration. This uncertainty was resolved once it was clarified that the 

National Science Board had already approved IceCube for inclusion in future NSF budget 

requests, thus building on the ongoing success of the AMANDA project. 

The success of the AMANDA detector was essential but still not sufficient to move forward 

with IceCube. The scientific collaboration needed to grow in depth and capability. Deep ice 

drilling and instrumentation fabrication needed to transform from R&D scale into largescale production. A substantial engineering effort was made to design detector systems for 

high reliability since the sensors, once frozen in the ice, are not physically accessible and 

cannot be repaired. The design was also optimized for ease of maintenance and operation. 

For example automatic calibration systems were a design goal to limit ongoing operations 

efforts at the South Pole. The time between the IceCube proposal submission and the start 

of construction in 2004 allowed the transformation and the scale-up that was needed. 

Establishing an effective Project Office at UW-Madison required the active engagement of 

the university leadership. The business, administrative, and human resource systems that 

are effective for typical university business are not well suited for a schedule driven large 

project like lceCube. UW-Madison moved to establish Ice Cube as a center within the 

Graduate School with direct control over support personnel and resources. Experienced 

managers and engineers were hired from outside the university and the dialogue between 

the project personnel and the university leadership was focused on what was needed to 

succeed and the actions to be taken for that success. 

The lceCube production drilling operation required the drill to operate 24 hours a day for 7 

or more continuous days. This required three shifts that needed to operate in a seamless 

manner with each new shift picking up where the last shift left off. In the first year of 

IceCube deep ice drilling there was a serious accident requiring immediate medical 

evacuation from the South Pole and recovery in New Zealand. This accident provided a 

serious wake up call to all the parties and many improvements in training, staffing, and 

equipment were implemented before the second drilling season. Examples of 

improvements include retention of experienced drillers and additional shifts. An additional 

85 holes were drilled over the next five years without another serious injury and with an 

exemplary safety record. 

The stewardship of a large facility requires engagement, problem solving, and support over 

decades. The needs of a large facility are quite different than those of a research grant. 

Facility stewardship requires an active role by the funding agency that goes beyond the 

mantra of "NSF responds to proposals" and is more of a joint ownership and partnership. 

The MREFC program has matured significantly over the last decade since lceCube was 

originally proposed. There is excellent sharing of experience, lessons-learned, and 

ingredients to success. A brief distillation of these points is provided below. 

-11-
56 

Lessons Learned from the IceCube MREFC Project Experience 

Set realistic goals for the MREFC Project baseline 

Scope reduced to 70 cables (86 final total) 

Operations ramp up when detector ready to start science program 

NSF support and oversight 

NSF collaborated with UW-Madison to best support the project 

o Dedicated and experienced IceCube Project Officer 

o Annual peer reviews of project performance and recommendation tracking 

MREFC Project funding secure and predictable 

Start-up, operations, and research funding requires advance planning 

UW-Madison commitment and support 

University leadership involvement critical at key junctures 

Recruiting experienced personnel essential to project success 

Establishing expert advisory committees to inform project plans 

Project management 

Create partnerships-share information, integrate efforts, and jointly share 

successes and failures 

Integrate the physics and engineering efforts; creating a single line of accountability 

promotes teaming and shared ownership of results 

Recruit production expertise-achieves higher quality and lower production costs 

Openly communicate issues and ensure transparency-shifts approach from ignore 

and hope to open responsibility and action (no surprises) 

Invest in safety-goal is shared responsibility and excellence 

• Automate project tracking tools-reduces the time and effort from performance 

measurement to corrective responses 

Overarching goal is to eliminate uncertainty and risk-resolution is better than 

perfection 

Facility management of the contingency budget with full transparency on decisions 

Ingredients to lceCube and MREFC Program Success 

Funding agency (NSF and European Partners) commitment with clear roles 

Strong facility/host role (UW-Madison) as an equal partner with NSF 

Project organization populated with high quality people - recruit experience 

Project & Collaboration leaders 

o Made timely decisions 

o Served as an umbrella for the distributed team so they could do their jobs 

o Managed expectations and communicated plans and results 

Understood the project including characteristics that were common to other large 

projects and those that were unique, e.g., Antarctic support and environment 

Established realistic project goals, developing a track record of success 

Maintained credibility with stakeholders 

Sought collective ownership of problems and solutions 

-12 -
57 

IceCube Lab 

1450 

IceTop 

_ ~: ___ 812s::~g:'c1,a;r~~~~ detector tanks 

- 2 optical sensors per tank 

/ 

324 optical sensors 

IceCube Array 

86 strings including 8 DeepCore strings 60 optical senSQrs on each string 

5160 optical sensors 

December, 2010: Project completed, 86 strings 

Amanda II Array 

(ptecurser to IceCube) 

DeepCore 

strings-spacing optimized for lower energies 

optical sensors 

M$ leeCube Construction and M&O • NSF Budget Profile (M$) 

"~----------------.------.------------~--------------------~ 

,. 

25 

20 

15 

1. 

1 

NWllber of Strings 

c::a new M&O &-Year Award 

c::a M&O Initial Award 

c::a Construction Budget 

FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 

·13 -
58 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Yeck. 

The Chair next recognizes Dr. Beasley for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF TONY BEASLEY, 

CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER/PROJECT MANAGER, NEON, INC. 

Dr. BEASLEY. Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Lipinski, and 

distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

My name is Dr. Tony Beasley and I am the Project Manager for 

the National Ecological Observatory Network and Chief Operating 

Officer of NEON, Inc. I appreciate the opportunity to provide you 

an overview of the NEON project today. My testimony will also address questions about the NSF MREFC program directed to me by 

the Committee. 

I would like to begin with a scientific motivation for NEON. Living systems on this plant are experiencing some of the greatest 

rates of change in history. The basic scientific knowledge needed to 

understand these changes on human scales—that is regional to 

continental scales—calls for standardized physical and biological 

measurements on meter to multiple-kilometer scales. Creating a 

national observatory to gather that information is the goal of 

NEON. 

In 1998, the National Science Board’s Taskforce on the Environment identified NEON as a potential major facility, and after public hearings and discussions with the research community, the NSB 

qualified NEON as a potential MREFC project in August of 1999. 

Four years later, a National Academy of Sciences study also recommended the establishment of a national ecological observatory. 

Following these recommendations, the NEON project team began 

design and development efforts and passed through the MREFC 

process and reviews during 2006 to 2009. In May of 2010, the National Science Board approved NEON construction and the NSF 

fully funded NEON construction in August of 2011 after authorization by Congress. From concept to start of construction was approximately 12 years, and we are recently underway. 

The MREFC process reviews all aspects of facility projects, including design, risk, cost estimates, and organizational capabilities. 

It examines whether the project will meet the scientific objectives 

of the facility in a safe, cost-effective and low-risk manner, and includes off-ramps where projects can be halted. Between late 2006 

and early 2010, more than 16 major reviews of NEON construction 

and operation plans took place involving more than 100 scientists, 

engineers, project managers and administrators from the research 

and other communities. 

NEON’s goals and implementation complement efforts in other 

organizations and we have worked extensively with state and federal partners to ensure our plans are understood and to identify 

new opportunities to use NEON data for resource management and 

other relevant purposes. At the project level, we have a continuous 

dialogue underway with the NSF reporting progress, issues, opportunities to guide facility construction and to allow project performance monitoring. Annual reviews of the project by external experts 

ensure that resources are being effectively used and progress is on 

track. 
59 

Over the past decade, the MREFC process has become a well defined framework within which a facility can be conceived, designed, 

planned, reviewed, and constructed. The process is constituent with 

those used by the Department of Energy, NASA, and other large 

organizations to construct major facilities and experiments. In my 

opinion, it is a reasonable framework, but I note that individual 

outcomes in the process will vary as projects are subject to different risks and sensitivities to external circumstances. 

There are areas for development. The MREFC process currently 

focuses on domestic facilities like those represented here today, but 

the scale of scientific research has grown rapidly over the past two 

decades, and large international facilities may be needed to address 

the important scientific issues of tomorrow. The NSF Large Facilities Office has recently spearheaded efforts to improve community 

understanding of the challenges of international partnership and 

over time I would expect that the MREFC processes will be expanded to include interfaces to the international analogs. 

In summary, the field of ecology includes many complex scientific 

problems that increasingly can be addressed by new technologies, 

networking, and research collaboration styles, and NEON’s goal is 

to facilitate this new path. The MREFC process provides an objective and effective management framework for facility construction 

and its rigor has undoubtedly improved NEON’s project definition 

and performance. 

We look forward to continuing work with the Large Facilities Office, the National Science Foundation, and Congress to make a national ecological observatory a reality. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you 

once again for the opportunity to testify and I would be happy to 

discuss any issues the Committee may wish to explore. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Beasley follows:] 
60 

Written Testimony of Dr. Anthony Beasley, Chief Operating Officer and Project Manager, National 

Ecological Observatory Network (NEON), Inc. before the UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES Subcommittee on Research and Science Education hearing entitled "NSF Major 

Research Equipment and Facilities Management: Ensuring Fiscal Responsibility and 

Accountability", March 08, 2012. 

Chairman Brooks, Ranking member lipinski, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Dr. Tony Beasley, and I am Project Manager for the 

National Ecological Observatory Network (NEON), and Chief Operating Officer of NEON, Inc. I appreciate 

the opportunity to provide you an overview of the NEON MREFC Project from its inception to the 

construction underway today. My written testimony specifically addresses questions about NEON and 

the National Science Foundation Major Research Equipment and Facilities program directed to me by 

the committee, with a few general observations on the issues included. 

I would like to begin with an introduction to the scientific motivation for NEON. living systems are 

experiencing some of the greatest rates of change in the history of life on Earth. A suite of human-driven 

processes (climate and land use change, invasive species) are collectively affecting living systems by 

altering the fundamental relationships between life and the non-living environment that sustains it. Our 

current understanding of these changes is based on knowledge obtained either from small plot (less 

than 1 hectare) research, operational monitoring and assessments, or from satellite-scale remote 

sensing. The basic scientific knowledge needed to understand the biosphere at human scales (regional 

to continental scales), to quantify the strong and weak forces regulating the biosphere, and to predict 

the consequences of climate and land use change on living systems cannot be extrapolated from studies 

at these extreme scales. 

NEON was designed by the ecological research community to address this gap in hypothesis-driven 

research capability - functioning as a fully integrated, multi-scale sensor to detect, understand, and 

forecast changes in the biosphere at regional to continental scales. The scientific and technical 

requirements that led to the Observatory's design were specifically derived to address these 

fundamental hypothesis driven questions about the forces driving biosphere change while concurrently 

assessing the biosphere responses and feedbacks. The NEON experimental design calls for in-situ 

infrastructure that will measure drivers and biological responses at the meter scale, couple these to 

simultaneous biological/physical measurements at the meter to kilometer scale (i.e., airborne remote 

sensing), and join these estimates to biological/physical measurements at multiple kilometer scale (i.e., 

satellite remote sensing). It is the coupling across scales that provides the unique capability required to 

understand the multi-scale processes driving living systems and evaluate the fundamental theories of 

how living systems operate, respond, and adapt. The sensitivity and ability of the Observatory to 

address the fundamental theories derives from the scientific and statistical underpinnings of the 

infrastructure deployment and integration via cyberinfrastructure into a single in situ sensor of the 

biosphere. Testing these theories about the biosphere cannot be accomplished by only integrating data 

from existing monitoring networks, infrastructure, assessments, or remote sensing. 

Page 1 mrefc-a 
61 

I will now specifically address the following questions received from the Subcommittee: 

How and why was NEON identified and selected as a worthy large facilities construction project? 

All NSF large facilities projects arise initially from analysis and collaboration in the research community 

to identify important scientific opportunities that might best be addressed by a new large-scale facility. 

The overarching scientific motivation for NEON is discussed above; in 1998, the National Science Board's 

Task Force on the Environment (TFE) identified NEON as a potential large-infrastructure project. 

Subsequently, there were NSF-funded workshops organized by the research community to further 

explore the needs of such an infrastructure. In addition, the NSB TFE held a public hearing, a 

symposium, and a town hall at various locations throughout the country. These community engagement 

activities informed the NSB's decision to qualify NEON as a potential MREFC project in August 1999. In 

2003, a National Academy of Sciences study "NEON: Addressing the Nation's Environmental Challenges" 

was completed, recommending the establishment of a national observatory. 

Following these recommendations, proposals for design and development efforts were requested and 

awarded by NSF, and work began in the research community and at NSF to define the facility. In 2006, a 

Conceptual Design Review for NEON took place, followed by a Preliminary Design Review in mid 2009 

and Final Design Review in late 2010. All these reviews were successful and indicated a facility ready for 

consideration. Subsequently, the National Science Board approved NEON Construction in May 2010, and 

upon enactment of the requisite appropriations and concurrence by Congress, NSF awarded 

construction funding in August 2011. 

What was the MREFC approval process experience for NEON? 

The approval process included mandatory NSF-organized reviews as required by the NSF large Facilities 

Office Manual for MREFC projects (NSF 07-38), including Conceptual, Preliminary and Final Design 

Reviews. In addition, a NSF-led Blue Ribbon Science Review of NEON was held in February 2009. Based 

on the recommendations from NSF review panels and significant input from the research community, 

NEON identified areas of risk that required an active risk-retirement strategy and conducted its own 

prototyping and reviews, and in some cases, commissioned external expert groups to address identified 

risks. In total, between late 2006 and early 2010, more than sixteen separate major reviews of NEON 

deSign, project structure and planning took place, involving more than a hundred scientists, engineers, 

project managers and administrators from the research and facility communities in assessing NEON's 

plans. The result of this input was to improve and refine the design of the facility, to reinforce and guide 

best practices in project management and planning, and to ensure NEON was being implemented as an 

engineering-oriented initiative which would be built on the basis of measurable and incremental 

Page 2 mn-;fc-a 
62 

progress. This process engendered an outcome and deliverable-oriented culture that aligned with the 

major approval stages required of any such large project. 

The design/development and MREFC approval efforts were significant and important. Producing a 

facility design which would meet the science requirements that initiated the program, and a project plan 

including a credible budget and schedule for construction in a safe and cost-effective way, was an 

important requirement for both the NSF and NEON, Inc. 

How do you work with NSF to ensure that the American taxpayer is getting a return on this 

investment? 

At the program level, NSF is cognizant of the need to establish a clear linkage between fundamental 

research and societal needs and has reinforced that attitude with the NEON development team. To this 

end, NSF has established formal relationships with other Federal agencies via Memoranda of 

Understanding that include stipulations on potential collaborative activities based on NEON. Two 

examples are highlighted: an MOU between NSF and the United States Geological Survey and another 

between NSF and the United States Environmental Protection Agency. NEON utilizes these relationships 

established by NSF as a framework for structuring our interactions with executive and middle-level 

Federal science managers. We do this in order to identify opportunities for using NEON data and 

information for resource management and other relevant purposes. These types of interactions are also 

facilitated by NSF's interagency forums that highlight NEON's complementarity with initiatives 

undertaken by other Federal agencies. Avoiding duplication of effort or waste by coordinating efforts 

with other agencies has been a priority during NEON design and development. 

At the project level, daily-weekly interactions with the NSF reporting progress, issues and opportunities 

are used to guide development, and formal monthly reporting allows performance monitoring. Annual 

reviews of project progress by external experts are mandated; during these reviews, performance of the 

project is examined to ensure that resources are being used effectively, progress is on track, risks are 

being monitored, etc. During facility design, appropriate design practices to minimize cost and 

environmental impact were followed, and some consideration of the life-cycle costs were undertaken, 

e.g., designing the facility to lower long-term operating costs. 

What were the strengths and weaknesses of the process? 

The NSF MREFC process has become a well-defined framework within which a project can be conceived, 

designed, planned, reviewed and constructed. The general approach used is highly consistent with 

similar processes used by the Department of Energy, NASA and other large organizations to construct 

major facilities and experiments. The documentation and other data deliverables required as part of the 

process provide key stakeholders (e.g., the design/development team, the NSF, Congress and taxpayers) 

with objective information about the facility's plans and progress, and there are many evaluation points 

Page 3 mrefc-a 
63 

and gates for the program to pass through before construction funding is awarded. This is done to 

ensure the best possible scientific return for the research dollars invested, and provide opportunities for 

oversight to ensure that cost-effective progress is being made. Both at the project level and at the NSF, 

regular evaluations of the processes are conducted to seek improvements. 

I have some familiarity with the management processes that are used by similar science organizations in 

other countries (e.g., CSIRO in Australia and the STFC in the United Kingdom), and it is my opinion that 

the MREFC process in use by NSF is typically more rigorous and more effective (in an administrative 

sense) than the processes used for facility construction in those countries. It has engendered a 

professional project management mindset in the scientific community which was less obvious before 

the NSF Large Facilities Office began the early 2000s. 

I cannot identify major intrinsic weaknesses in the process; it is a reasonable framework, in my opinion. 

Individual outcomes in the process will vary; facility projects sit differently inside the framework, and are 

subject to different risks and sensitivities to external circumstances. It could be that further 

development of the MREFC process to address project-to-project differences could provide better 

interface performance between NSF and the projects, addressing issues more readily. It is generally the 

case that funding a project more slowly than originally planned over a series of years will lead to 

"marching army" and other increases in the total cost of a project, and careful planning and negotiation 

between the project, NSF and Congress is required to avoid these issues. 

The scale of scientific research (and therefore the facilities to address the burning issues) has grown 

rapidly over the past two decades, and it is increasingly apparent that large international facilities may 

be the only way to address the important scientific issues of tomorrow. Successfully merging national 

facility development processes like the MREFC framework with those used by foreign partners to 

produce effective international collaborations has been, and will continue to be, a challenge. The Large 

Facilities Office has recently spearheaded an effort to improve community understanding of those 

challenges and gather input on how to address them; over time, I expect that the MREFC processes will 

be expanded and refined to include clear interfaces to international analogs. 

What have been the biggest challenges you have faced with the project thus far and how were they 

rectified? 

During my time with NEON, the initial challenge faced was to help our scientists understand the formal 

project management techniques needed to produce a facility design and operations model on the scale 

being conSidered, and understand the importance of a systems engineering approach to development. 

Formal and informal training helped address this concern, including attendance at the "Large Facilities" 

and "Project Science" Workshops supported by the NSF. 

As an ecological observatory with multiple sites, environmental review and permitting were significant 

challenges identified as a risk to the development schedule during our early reviews. We responded by 

Page 4 
64 

significantly increasing staff in this area, and expanding our outreach and coordination efforts both with 

the land owners (including federal agencies) and the research community. 

How is NEON currently managed? 

The NEON construction project is managed by NEON, Inc. under a cooperative agreement with the NSF. 

NEON, Inc. is a non-profit SOl(c)(3) company established to undertake the deSign, development and 

construction of the NEON facility. NEON, Inc. is a membership organization, comprised of more than 55 

university and commercial partners interested in the facility. A Board of Directors elected from the 

member institutions and from the broader community provides oversight. The Chief Executive Officer of 

NEON, Inc. is the Principal Investigator on the NSF NEON award. A NEON Project Director and Project 

Manager (reporting to the NEON, Inc. CEO) manage the day-to-day operations of the construction 

project. In the next year, a NEON Observatory Director will be hired to oversee the facility operations. 

What are the roles and responsibilities af the facility staff and the roles and responsibilities of NSF in 

the management and oversight of NEON? 

Organization of the NEON construction project under the Project Director and Project Manager includes 

a team of senior managers responsible for key deliverables to the facility (for example, Civil 

Construction, Computing, Science, Systems Engineering, Safety). NEON, Inc. managers and staff are 

responsible for the safe, cost effective, timely and high-quality completion of tasks and deliverables 

associated with the construction and operations of the facility. NEON managers oversee progress, and 

quantitatively report progress and issues to the Project Manager, who integrates the information and 

reports to the NEON Project Director, NEON, Inc. Board and the National Science Foundation on a 

regular basis. I personally aim at a "no surprises, keep informed" relationship with NSF. 

Under the cooperative agreement in place with the NSF, significant reporting and change request 

requirements are in place and being followed. Progress reporting and issue management takes place 

between the project and key NSF officials (including the BIO Directorate Program Officer and the Large 

Facilities Office) on a daily-weekly basis, with monthly formal reporting. NEON has a clear responsibility 

to communicate fully with and request approval from NSF in a wide variety of circumstances. NSF 

reviews NEON planning, monitors NEON progress, and continuously assesses and advises on 

management practices and interactions with the research community. 

How is the entire life cycle of the project, including management and operations after canstruction, 

taken into account in the management and aversight of NEON? 

An important deliverable of the MREFC-process Preliminary Design Review is an Operations Plan for the 

facility under consideration. This plan includes information and estimates concerning the facility 

PageS mrefc-a 
65 

research objectives and products, management structure, planning assumptions, staffing and annual 

operating costs, risks and interfaces to the research community,. The Operations Plan is reviewed in 

detail at both the Preliminary and Final Design Reviews, and the maturity of planning and the cost 

estimate for operations are an important consideration for both the National Science Board and the NSF 

when approving the facility to move forward into the MREFC queue. In addition to these constructionlevel reviews, an independent NSF-led Operations Review is mandated to carefully examine the facility 

operations definition, and ensure safe, cost-effective and high-quality scientific operation of the facility. 

One important area examined by the MREFC process is the transition between construction and 

operations. The nature of this transition varies widely between facilities (e.g. a telescope which is 

ultimately fully assembled and begins observation at a given time versus a distributed infrastructure like 

NEON which has substantial components in full operation while other components are still under 

construction). Minimizing the costs associated with the transition is a particular area of focus in the 

MREFC process. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you once again for the opportunity to testify 

about the National Ecological Observatory Network. I would be happy discuss any issues the 

Subcommittee may wish to explore with respect to the NSF MREFC process and NEON. 

II 

Page 6 mrefc-a 
66 

Page 7 

SUMMARY 

The National Ecological Observatory Network (NEON) construction project began in 2011, as 

part of the National Science Foundation (NSF) Major Research Equipment & Facilities 

Construction (MREFC) program. The scientific motivation for NEON arose from the research 

community in the late 1990s, and the specific design for NEON and plans for operation of the 

facility were developed in collaboration with the community over the past several years. 

During 2006-2011 NEON followed all required MREFC processes, refining and improving the 

definition of the program. Expert reviews of all aspects of NEON planning and documentation 

provided important information to assessment of the facility plans. 

Important challenges faced by NEON include leading the exploration of new technologies and 

collaboration styles to the ecological community, and the permitting of the field infrastructure 

sites. 

NEON management is focused on safe and cost-effective execution of the construction program, 

and providing the NSF and all stakeholders with the information needed to understand project 

status in a timely and effective manner. NEON management works closely with NSF to stay 

informed about related activities in other Federal agencies to maximize the utility of the 

planned infrastructure. 

A detailed Operations Plan is reviewed at both the mandated Preliminary and Final Design 

reviews. Maturity of planning and the cost estimate for operations are important 

considerations for both the National Science Board and the NSF when approving the facility to 

move forward into the MREFC queue. 

Future improvement of the MREFC process may involve consideration of international 

collaboration complexities and interfaces. 

mrefc-a 
67 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Dr. Beasley. 

The Chair next recognizes Dr. Cowles for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF TIM COWLES, 

VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, 

OCEAN OBSERVING, CONSORTIUM FOR OCEAN LEADERSHIP 

Dr. COWLES. Thank you, Chairman Brooks, and Ranking Member Lipinski, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee and 

staff. Thank you for this opportunity to expand upon the comments 

already made and describe the Ocean Observatory’s initiative and 

how it fits within the family of MREFC projects and has adjusted 

to and adapted to the processes now in place. 

I think a good starting point for our—my testimony is to refer 

to the two quotations that are behind you on the wall, which both 

refer to vision. Observatories provide the opportunity for us to open 

new windows onto the natural world. It is only through the opportunity for scientists to open new windows on scales previously unavailable to them that we can see further into the future and use 

the observatories as leverage to ask compelling new questions for 

science. So it is within that context that all of us at the table here 

are trying to push forward with observing science. 

The Ocean Observatories Initiative represents a midpoint of the 

three programs at the table today—NEON just getting started, 

IceCube well into the operational mode, the Ocean Observatories 

Initiative is about halfway through the 5–1/2 year construction period. The Ocean Observatories Initiative consists and will consist 

of a very sophisticated cyber-network of ocean instrumentation— 

some of it fixed in place, some of it mobile and robotic—that spans 

multiple locations in the world’s oceans, coastal sites, and seafloor 

capability. The transformative nature of the OOI has direct and 

short-term societal benefits to address aspects of coastal ecosystem 

health, ocean circulation, climate variability, and a range of topics 

around seafloor activity and geodynamics. Those short-term benefits lead later to long-term forecasting improvements over a range 

of ocean processes. 

The MREFC experience for the Ocean Observatories Initiative is 

similar to the points that Mr. Yeck and Dr. Beasley have already 

made. A sequence of intensive peer-reviewed processes from initiation through final approval by the NSF through the National 

Science Board forges a level of rigor in the project team that is essential for both the construction and transition into the operational 

phase. For the OOI, the initial initiation or inception of the idea 

of a major ocean observatory system had its birth in the late 1980s. 

Many community workshops and panels met. There were reports at 

the national level that supported the concept of an extensive ocean 

observing system. In 2000, the NSB recommended that the idea of 

an ocean observatory system was worth further planning. In 2004, 

the National Science Foundation funded the opening of a project office for planning. Beginning in 2006, conceptual network design 

progressed through preliminary design reviews, and then final design reviews in late 2008 and early 2009 resulting in project approval in 2009 and construction initiation under stimulus or ARRA 

funding in September of 2009. 
68 

The project has benefitted extensively from the process imposed 

by the NSF. We work very closely with the NSF on reporting and 

oversight. We implement; the NSF provides the oversight. The 

interaction of the project and the NSF and the external community 

is critical in the success of the observatory. And I would like to 

stress the point that the OOI as a product of the MREFC process 

builds upon a partnership between public, private, industrial, and 

the NSF. That integration of complementary capabilities is a very 

effective use of public funds. 

So I welcome the opportunity once again to discuss the OOI with 

you and I certainly will be available to answer any questions you 

have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cowles follows:] 
69 

March 8, 2012 

Written Testimony of Dr. Timothy Cowles, Program Director, Ocean 

Observatories Initiative (001) 

Vice President and Director, Ocean Observing Activities, Consortium for Ocean Leadership 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Subcommittee on Research and Science Education 

NSF Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction Management: 

Ensuring Fiscal Responsibility and Accountability 

Chairman Brooks, Ranking member Lipinski, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify about the MREFC process. My name is Tim Cowles, I am 

the Program Director and Principal Investigator of the Ocean Observatories Initiative (001). I 

also serve as Vice President and Director of Ocean Observing Activities within the Consortium for 

Ocean Leadership. 

I will begin with an overview of development of the 001 MREFC project from its creative start to 

today's mid-point of project construction. My testimony also will address the questions posed to 

me by the committee. 

Overview of the Ocean Observatories Initiative 

The Vision 

The dream of long-term observatories in the ocean has been explored for more than twenty 

years. It has long been recognized that expeditionary-based ocean research provides essential 

insights into ocean processes occurring during and within the region of the expedition. However, 

such focused research often lacks a temporal and spatial context for interpretation. The 

extensive spatial and temporal variability of ocean processes complicates interpretation of 

focused studies, thus driving the need for sustained measurements across a range of spatial 

scales, from the sea surface to the seafloor. In addition, the critical linkages between physical, 

biological, chemical and geological processes in the ocean require that a wide range of properties 

be measured. 

Sustained observing from the ocean surface to the ocean floor will certainly yield unexpected 

insights into ocean processes, just as satellite remote sensing revolutionized our understanding 

of global surface processes. Occasional 'snapshots' of portions the global surface were replaced 

by 'movies' created by repeated orbits of satellite sensors - these 'movies' provided new, 

dynamic, and unpredicted structures in the images of the surface layer of the ocean. We eagerly 

await the opportunity to replace our 'snapshots' of ocean and seafloor processes with the 

'movies' that the 001 will provide through sustained observations of many ocean properties, 

through the full ocean depth range. 

As early as 1988, the ocean sciences community began discussions about the scientific themes, 

design concepts, and engineering challenges of modern ocean research observatories. These 

early discussions and workshops led to the formation of the International Ocean Network (ION) in 

1993. The first national committee was formed in 1995 with NSF funding, and broadened into the 
70 

MREFC - 001 - Cowles 

Dynamics of Earth and Ocean Systems (DEOS) committee, tasked with providing a focus for 

exploratory planning for an ocean observatory network that built upon the compelling scientific 

themes unable to be addressed through other oceanographic research approaches. 

The first International Conference on Ocean Observing Systems was held in 1999 in San Rafael, 

France, and focused interest on fixed and mobile observing systems. The international Global 

Eulerian Observatory (GEO) committee was formed the same year and later (2003) became 

OceanSITES. 

Momentum for research-oriented ocean observing built further upon two National Research 

Council (NRC) studies in 2000 and 2003 ("Illuminating the Hidden Planet: The Future of Seafloor 

Observatory Science" [2000]; "Enabling Ocean Research in the 21 st Century" [2003]), along with 

a series of community workshops that stressed the scientific and societal benefits of sustained 

observations. Building on this momentum, the 001 was approved by the National Science Board 

(NSB) in 2000 as a potential Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction project for 

inclusion in a future National Science Foundation budget, thus allowing for focused planning 

efforts under NSF financial support. 

Setting the Foundation 

In 2003 and 2004, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission 

issued reports containing recommendations designed to improve society's use and stewardship 

of, and impact on, the coastal and global ocean. These recommendations highlighted key areas 

that require continuous, sustained investigation to enable timely and sound decision-making and 

policy development. Global, regional, and local climate variability and its impacts, coastal 

hazards, ecosystem-based management and the relationship between the ocean and human 

health were among the critical issues noted in the Commissions' recommendations that pOinted 

to the need for a sustained, research-driven, ocean observing capability. 

In response to recommendations from these reports and at the direction of the Administration, in 

2006 the National Science and Technology Council's Joint Subcommittee on Ocean Science and 

Technology developed the Charting the Course for Ocean Science for the United States for the 

Next Decade: An Ocean Research Priorities Plan and Implementation Strategy document 

(ORPP), which provided a framework for research investments to advance current understanding 

of critical ocean processes and interactions that facilitate responsible use of the ocean 

environment. The ORPP identified ocean observing as one of three key areas for research and 

management. 

Early Planning and Conceptual Design 

In 2004, the NSF Division of Ocean Sciences (NSF/OCE) established the 001 Project Office to 

coordinate further 001 planning. In 2005, the 001 Project Office asked for the ocean research 

community's help in developing the 001 network deSign by soliciting Request for Assistance 

(RFA) proposals, using the science themes of ocean observing to structure the request. A total of 

48 proposals were submitted by 549 individually-named proponents representing 137 institutions, 

agencies and industries in 35 states. These proposals were subjected to peer review and formed 

the basis for the initial Conceptual Design of the 001. 

Using the responses from the RFA process and associated review results, the 001 Project Office 

and external Advisory Committees developed an initial Conceptual Network Design (CND) for the 

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MREFC - 001 - Cowles 

001, which then served as the focus of community discussion at the 001 Design and 

Implementation Workshop in March 2006, 

In July 2006, NSF assembled a Science Panel to provide a merit review of whether the CND 

would provide the ocean research community with infrastructure capable of addressing highpriority science questions motivating the 001. This Panel endorsed the 001 as a worthy 

investment that, when implemented, would advance our understanding of the Earth and the 

oceans. In August 2006, NSF convened a Conceptual Design Review (CDR) to assess the 

Project's technical feasibility and budget, the Project's Management Plan, including schedules 

and milestones, and education and outreach plans. The CDR Panel affirmed that the scientific 

and technical basis of the 001, as proposed, would transform oceanographic research in the 

coming decades. 

Formation of the Project Team 

The major partners in the 001 construction process, three of the four 001 Implementing 

Organizations (10), were selected in 2007 by a competitive acquisition process similar to that 

used in large federal acquisitions. Subawards were established with the University of Washington 

as the 10 for the Regional Scale Nodes, the University of California San Diego (UCSD) as the 10 

for the Cyberinfrastructure, and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution with two consortium 

partners, Scripps Institution of Oceanography and Oregon State University, as the 10 for 

the Coastal and Global Scale Nodes. The fourth 10, Rutgers, The State University of New 

Jersey, was selected in 2011 as the 10 for the Education and Public Engagement software 

infrastructure component, with its partners University of Maine and Raytheon Mission Operations 

and Services. 

It is important to note that the 001 project team builds upon the strengths of public, private, and 

non-profit institutions, along with industry partners. This integration of complementary capabilities 

is a powerful recommendation for the MREFC process, and represents an efficient use of public 

funds. 

With three of the Implementing Organizations on-board in 2007, the 001 Project Team worked 

towards generating the Preliminary Network Design (PND). The PND development was guided 

by recommendations and principles established by the advisory structure and the NSF Large 

Facilities Office, taking into consideration long-standing program and design concepts, the 001 

Science User Requirements and the project cost constraints. 

As part of the external review process, NSF convened a second Science Review Panel in 

October 2007 to assess the 001 Network Design and its ability to provide transformative research 

capabilities for the ocean science community. This Panel stated that the 001 would provide 

opportunities to address "broad and compelling interdisciplinary scientific questions that cannot 

be adequately investigated with current methodologies" and offered a series of recommendations 

on design, management, and public engagement. 

Path Toward a Construction Baseline 

The Preliminary Design Review (PDR), convened by NSF in December 2007, assessed the 

current state of planning for the 001. The PDR Panel was very positive about the progress of 

planning for the 001 and about the transformative scientific rationale for the initiative. The 001 

Team responded to the recommendations of the PDR Panel and then underwent the Final Design 

Review (FDR) in November 2008, which scrutinized the technical, programmatic, cost and 

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MREFC - 001 - Cowles 

schedule readiness of the Project. The FOR Panel noted the technical readiness of the Project 

and recommended that the 001 proceed with construction in July 2010. 

After the FOR, extensive discussions were held in early 2009 within NSF to address the need for 

the 001 Network to increase the focus on urgent issues in ocean science research. Given the 

ocean's vital role in the global transfer of heat, carbon and water, it was decided to focus on 

developing facilities to better understand oceanic climate signals as well as the impact of carbon 

cycling on ocean acidification, ocean carbon sequestration and the impact on coastal marine 

ecosystems. As a result, NSF identified a variation on the 001 Network Design using ocean 

infrastructure and sensors deemed to be construction-ready at the FOR. This modified network 

design incorporated enhancements to the Coastal/Global Scale Nodes (elements that had been 

part of earlier design iterations) and reductions to the Regional Scale Nodes. A Review Panel in 

March 2009 expressed support for the infrastructure additions and noted that the intellectual merit 

and the broader impacts of 001 were very high and perhaps unique in the Earth and Ocean 

science communities as a whole. The project baseline that emerged from this review process 

formed the basis for the request to the National Science Board. On May 14, 2009, the National 

Science Board authorized the Director of NSF to award funds for the construction and initial 

operation of the 001. On September 2,2009, NSF and the Consortium for Ocean Leadership 

signed the Cooperative Agreement that initiated the construction phase of the 001. 

The 001 project is now 30 months through the 66-month construction phase. During those 30 

months, the project's accomplishments include the successful installation of 880 kilometers of 

cable (power, communications) across the seafloor off Oregon and Washington, the development 

and release of the first stage of Cyberinfrastructure software, ocean tests of four different mooring 

systems and configurations, the procurement of autonomous vehicles and sensors, as well as the 

successful completion of the NEPA process for the 001. 

It is a pleasure and an honor to work within a project team that possesses the creative vision, 

technical expertise and commitment to complete the full infrastructure of the 001. The short- and 

long-term societal benefits of the 001 more than justify the hard work. 

What was the MREFC approval process experience for 001? 

Early members of the project office (2006-2009) had some government experience with large 

projects (NOAA, DoE), and others involved in the early planning had extensive ocean research 

experience and expertise. That oceanographic perspective is reflected in the recommendations 

included in many of the workshop reports, NRC reports, and review panel reports from the late 

1990s through the mid-2000s. These documents provide a historical record of the early stages of 

moving the 001 from a concept to a tangible infrastructure. 

The approval process (Conceptual Design Review, Preliminary Design Review, Final Design 

Review, NSB approval) can be viewed from at least two perspectives. On the one hand, as a 

project moves into and through the MREFC approval process, the creative leaders of the project 

must move smoothly from a research project viewpoint (their career perspective) to a more 

structured, systems engineering and project management viewpoint. This is widely recognized 

within the large facility community as one of the biggest challenges for a new MREFC project. On 

the other hand, the approval process educates the initial project team about the essential rigors of 

System Engineering, the need for a 'technical baseline,' the importance of vigilant oversight of 

processes and budgets, the requirement to track the performance metrics of earned value 

4 
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MREFC - 001 - Cowles 

management, and the need to search for cost efficiencies and approaches within construction 

that will carry over into Operations and Maintenance. 

A number of overarching science objectives guided the early planning stages of the 001. As 

described in the initial section of this testimony, those science objectives informed the Request 

for Assistance (RFA) process that solicited proposals from the ocean sciences community. The 

integration of the 48 submissions from that process led to the consolidation of many excellent 

research themes and approaches and resulted in an observatory vision that included 10 Global 

sites, 6 Coastal sites, and a seafloor cabled array with 5 sites on the Juan de Fuca plate. The 

experts comprising the Conceptual Design Review panel, in concert with the NSF, acknowledged 

the vision as important and worth pursuing, but requiring a more extensive analysis of scope and 

costs. The identification of Implementing Organizations in March 2007 permitted the Program 

Management Office at the Consortium for Ocean Leadership, as prime awardee, to begin 

integrating system engineering processes across the project while detailed cost analyses were 

conducted on the various envisioned elements of the observatory. The cost analyses led to a 

revision of the conceptual design, with external advisory committees consisting of experienced 

ocean scientists providing input to the team and to the NSF following Conceptual Design Review. 

At the time of Preliminary Design Review (December 2007), the scope of the 001 had been 

identified as 3 Global Sites, 2 Coastal Arrays (Pioneer and Endurance), and 5 major sites on the 

Juan de Fuca tectonic plate that would be connected to the undersea cabled array. This 

extensive consolidation of scope reflected the transition from 'science ideas' to 

'engineering/budget reality.' It was during the interval between Conceptual Design Review and 

Preliminary Design Review that the 001 team also developed the extensive technical 

documentation required by the MREFC process, including, at the top level, a Project Execution 

Plan, Systems Engineering Management Plan, Configuration Management Plan, science to 

design requirements traceability, etc. The distributed team enhanced its understanding of the 

technical needs of an MREFC project during this phase of planning and preparation. 

The interval between Preliminary Design Review and Final Design Review led to further 

refinement of the technical data package (policies, procedures, cost bases, etc). The 

recommendations of the Final Design Review panel in November 2008 included a strong 

recommendation for additional 'risk' to be considered during the construction phase. The panel 

recommendation was incorporated in the next risk estimation for the project in early 2009. 

In summary, the multi-step MREFC approval process forged the distributed implementing 

organizations into a cohesive observatory team, while refining the technical and budgetary 

boundaries of the project. From the point of view of the 001, the MREFC approval process was 

an essential, and positive, experience. 

What were the strengths and weaknesses of the process? 

The MREFC approval process provided the planning team with important external advice and 

guidance, assisting the team in developing documentation and cost estimates for each 

successive level of review. The clear structure of the MREFC process greatly facilitates the 

development of a strong team. For example, one key area of strength of the MREFC process for 

the 001 team was the requirement for incremental incorporation of increased technical and 

budgetary rigor - this discipline was extremely beneficial to the 001 team and built confidence 

across the project during the pre-construction phase. In addition to the benefits to the 001 team, 

the rigor of the process, and its transparency, benefits the sponsoring agency, the ocean 

sciences community, and the public. 

5 
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MREFC - 001 - Cowles 

Another important strength of the process is the opportunity for sophisticated management 

coordination to develop between NSF and the project team. This coordination, and the 

cooperative exchange of ideas and solutions, is vitally important as the project moves from 

approval to construction. This management coordination also assures more efficient use of 

public funds during construction and operations. 

From the point of view of the 001 and our experience to date, there are no obvious weaknesses 

in the MREFC process. It has worked well for us. While each MREFC project has unique 

characteristics and unique technical challenges, it is necessary for the NSF and the large 

Facilities Office to sustain a framework that supports the development and maturation of a project 

team during the early inception and subsequent approval stages. It is also important that the 

MREFC process have sufficient flexibility to adapt if a particular project encounters unusual 

challenges with scope, budget or schedule. 

What have been the biggest challenges you have faced with the project thus far and how 

were they rectified? 

The project began construction in September 2009 with fewer staff than the work plan required. It 

was more difficult than anticipated to reach full staffing levels during the first year of construction. 

We addressed this challenge and reached our staffing targets by involving the institutional 

leadership of each Implementing Organizations in the solution. 

The 001 faced several challenges in environmental assessment during the first year of 

construction, particularly in responding to public comments and for completion of the 

environmental assessment within the project timelines. Through close coordination of 

informational events and public feedback events by the 001 team, NSF, and interested 

stakeholders, the project completed the environmental assessment and NSF signed a Finding of 

No Significant Impact for the 001. 

How is 001 currently managed? 

The 001 has a hierarchical structure, with the Consortium for Ocean leadership (a non-profit) as 

the 'prime' and each Implementing Organization as a 'subawardee.' A Cooperative Agreement 

between Ocean leadership (Ol) and the NSF establishes a set of terms and conditions for the 

project, which flow down to each subawardee. The 001 Program Management Office at Ocean 

leadership is responsible for project compliance to those terms and conditions, including 

reporting of financial status and technical progress against milestones. On a functional basis, the 

program management office monitors and coordinates the work within the milestone-driven 

project schedule through daily interactions between Ocean leadership and each major 

subawardee (via Contracting Organization Technical Representatives (COTRs) and project 

managers). Several teleconferences are conducted each week by the Program Management 

Office to facilitate communications across the geographically-distributed team. 

Discussions and meetings occur with NSF several times each week. The development and 

submission of monthly progress reports by the Program Management Office to the NSF also 

serves as an important management tool for the Program Management Office, as these reports 

involve the monthly integration of Earned Value metrics as well as assessment of monthly project 

progress against schedule milestones. 

The Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of the Consortium for Ocean leadership 

provides project oversight, both through direct interaction with the 001 Program Director and 

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MREFC - 001 - Cowles 

through reports from the 001 Program Advisory Committee (an external panel of non-conflicted 

senior ocean scientists). 

What are the roles and responsibilities of the facility staff and the roles and 

responsibilities of NSF in the management and oversight of 0017 

I serve as the 001 Program Director, coordinating leadership actions with the senior staff at each 

Implementing Organization, and communicating on a regular basis with the NSF. I report to the 

CEO of the Consortium for Ocean Leadership. The 001 Senior Project Manager, reporting to the 

Program Director, has responsibility for overall project management and engineering integration 

for the entire project. The other members of the senior management team of the 001 at Ocean 

Leadership are responsible for numerous areas, including System Engineering, Safety, Quality, 

Science, Communications, and Environmental Compliance. As mentioned in an earlier section, 

the COTRs assigned to each Implementing Organization are responsible for the coordination and 

integration of day-to-day work, and function as the conduit for effective communication to and 

from the Program Management Office. 

The Program Management Office also assures that project activities are governed by the 001 

technical baseline (approved policies and procedures) and are administered via formal 'change 

control' procedures when necessary. All project actions are documented, reported, and 

archived. 

Under the Cooperative Agreement, the Program Management Office has specific reporting and 

procurement compliance responsibilities to the NSF, with the clear distinction that the 001 team 

is responsible for execution and the NSF is responsible for oversight. In addition, prudent project 

management dictates that the 001 team maintains open channels of communication with the 

NSF about all project activities. We therefore have frequent interaction and information exchange 

(often daily). This level of interaction has been extremely beneficial through the approval 

process as well as through this phase of construction. 

How do you work with NSF to ensure that the American taxpayer is getting a return on this 

investment? 

The overarching scientific justification of the 001 project is the sustained delivery of many types 

of ocean data across a range of temporal and spatial scales, from the sea surface to the seafloor. 

This data delivery will have direct, short-term societal and economic benefits (coastal storm 

hazards, linkages between offshore and near-shore processes, improved ocean circulation 

modeling, seasonal ecosystem responses, etc), which will develop into long-term improvements 

in forecasting of ocean conditions. These connections between ocean research and 'broader 

impacts' are at the core of NSF's science objectives. The 001 is therefore perfectly poised to 

provide significant return on the taxpayer's investment. 

To optimize that outcome, NSF and the 001 collaborate to maintain significant connections with 

other projects and other entities involved in ocean observing. The Consortium for Ocean 

Leadership has a Memorandum of Understanding with Ocean Networks Canada, a seafloor 

observing facility off Vancouver Island, British Columbia. The NSF co-chairs an Interagency 

Working Group on Ocean Observing (coordinated at Ocean Leadership) that facilitates the costeffective development of observing capabilities across the federal family. Of particular note is the 

cross-agency and cross-project collaboration between NSF, NOAA, the 001, and the Integrated 

Ocean Observing System (IOOS). The two agencies are co-funding a data management project 

that will assure interoperability between the NSF and NOAA systems. 

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MREFC - 001 - Cowles 

As described earlier in this testimony, the 001 project team builds upon the strengths of public, 

private, and non-profit institutions, along with industry partners. We feel that this integration of 

complementary capabilities is an efficient use of taxpayer funds. 

At a more detailed level, the taxpayer benefits from the cost efficiencies that resulted from the 

several stages of review of the 001 scope of work and the aggressive actions to reduce the costs 

to build and operate that scope. On an annual basis, the 001 project team is mandated by the 

Cooperative Agreement to develop and submit to NSF an Annual Work Plan that describes the 

work to be completed in the coming year, along with the funding request for that work. Only after 

review and approval by NSF, often involving sequential edits and revisions of the Annual Work 

Plan by the 001 team, is funding provided to Ocean Leadership for allocation to the work 

elements of the project, via subawards to the Implementing Organizations. We use monthly 

tracking of expenses and completed work compared the project baseline to generate Earned 

Value metrics, thus giving us valuable performance metrics for each Implementing Organization. 

Every month the project submits a formal report to NSF with extensive data on progress as well 

as challenges. We also work closely with NSF on procurements of capital equipment or major 

services to assure that appropriate acquisition procedures are followed. Each of these steps 

represents a collaboration between the 001 team and NSF to be cost-effective. 

How is the entire life cycle of the project, including management and operations after 

construction, taken into account in the management and oversight of the construction 

project? 

The initial, steady-state phase of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) of the 001 will begin in 

2015 following the completion of Construction. The 001 team initially developed an Operations 

and Maintenance Plan in preparation for Preliminary Design Review. Since that time, the O&M 

Plan has been revised and updated to reflect the maturation of the construction schedule and an 

improved understanding of operational assumptions and expenses. During construction, the O&M 

team is integrated into design reviews and production readiness reviews to assure that 

operational issues (e.g., service costs, replacement costs) have been considered during the 

design and acquisition of subsystems or their components. The technical issues identified during 

construction, for any element, are included within the deliverables that accompany that element in 

its transition from construction to operations. 

This aspect of life cycle considerations has been an active topic of discussion at each of our 

external reviews, and is a priority for the project managers in construction and O&M. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I wish to thank you for this opportunity to 

answer questions about the MREFC process and the Ocean Observatories Initiative. I would be 

happy to discuss any of these topics with you during the hearing. 

8 
77 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Dr. Cowles. 

I want to thank the panel for their testimony. Reminding members that committee rules limit questioning to five minutes, the 

Chair will at this point open the round of questions. The Chair recognizes himself for five minutes. 

My first question is for Dr. Griffiths. The issue of contingency 

continues to be an area of concern not only for the National Science 

Foundation Inspector General but for Congress as well. You testified that the Board receives updates on the discussions between the 

Inspector General and NSF senior management. In that vein, I 

have three questions. 

First, does the Board have an opinion? Second, can you expand 

on the Board’s role, if any, in the ongoing discussions and actions 

around this issue? And third, does the Board plan to take any action on this issue? So first is opinion; second, the Board’s role; and 

third is action. 

Dr. GRIFFITHS. Thank you, Chairman Brooks. The first one, on 

the Board having an opinion, the Board has spent a lot of time, 

particularly the Subcommittee on Facilities and the Committee on 

Programs and Plans, looking at how contingency is defined by the 

Board. And I will say it took a little while for us to understand that 

because of more common uses of—or multiple uses of the term 

‘‘contingency’’ in our other environments. But I think the Board has 

a tendency to agree that the definition that is being used is fine. 

Now, the question is what are the implications of that definition 

going forward? The Board’s role in the discussion, we have been— 

the Committee on Audit and Oversight has been receiving updates 

on the negotiations between NSF management and the Inspector 

General’s office at every one of our meetings. So every meeting we 

have had a report. And we are pleased with the progress made to 

date. So at this point we haven’t weighed into those interactions 

but we are receiving reports. 

Chairman BROOKS. Second question would be for Dr. Marrett 

and Dr. Griffiths. Choose amongst yourselves who wants to take 

first crack at it. For three straight Inspector General semi-annual 

reports, Inspector General Auditors have found unallowable contingency costs for three separate MREFC projects, $76 million for 

NEON, $88 million for OOI, and $62 million for ATST. What is the 

NSF doing to rectify this continuing problem and what steps are 

being taken to prevent similar problems with other projects? 

Dr. MARRETT. Thank you. I will start. Actually, there is a question about whether there are problems. I will say that those audits 

were of the proposals from particular projects, not from the actual 

expenditures once construction has begun. Thus, we are asking— 

and I believe the Inspector General’s office is prepared now—to do 

audits not of the proposals but of the actual expenditures. The consequences are likely to be quite different. 

I would also elaborate a bit more on what Dr. Griffiths just said 

about the very notion of contingency. We know that for any project 

there are known risks and that is what the contingency is to cover, 

the known risks that are there. Thus, this is associated with our 

policy of no cost overrun. So no project is to go above what those 

costs are. The contingency is there to keep it within the bounds, 

then, of the kinds of costs that would be associated. Thus, what we 
78 

are doing in collaboration with the Office of the Inspector General 

is clearing up the understanding that the processes that we use for 

contingency are those that are consistent with other agencies, and 

industry. Because of the very strong relationship we have with the 

wonderful Office of the Inspector General, we are convinced that 

we will be able to resolve—what seemingly are differences, that we 

are not quite sure are as deep as might be implied in the semi-annual reports. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Dr. Marrett. I am going to move 

to Dr. Beasley and Dr. Cowles for a moment. 

Would each of you briefly explain your side of the contingency issue for the $76 million concerning NEON and the $88 million 

concerning OOI? 

Dr. BEASLEY. Mr. Chairman, as Dr. Marrett just indicated, the 

$76 million in contingency that was identified in the IG report is 

all of the contingency of the program at the proposal level. And so 

what you are seeing, as Dr. Marrett described, is not necessarily 

a difference between execution of the program and what we said; 

it is really the fact that our original proposal produced a risk-adjusted estimate, which included a contingency. And so they have 

found all of the contingency to be unallowable. And so that is the 

original of the $76 million number in the IG report. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Dr. Beasley. Dr. Cowles? 

Dr. COWLES. Yes. Really, the answer is essentially the same. So 

when we began examining the construction costs for the OOI, we 

evaluated, using industry practice, the risk-based elements using 

clear formulae for assessing risk for every item in the construction 

and totaled that up and we end up in our proposal with $88 million. That, as Dr. Beasley said, is not the expenditure. It is not a 

number that is automatically expended. It is there to be drawn 

upon by the project through NSF approval process and our own internal controls only when the risk has to be addressed and mitigated through application of contingency funds. From a project 

standpoint, the $88 million for the OOI is an essential part of how 

we must address risk through construction. Independent of how the 

IG looks at it from a practical, pragmatic standpoint, if we didn’t 

have a contingency amount in our project budget, the initial budget 

would have had to have risk included in the construction costs. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Dr. Cowles. I finished my questions before the five minute mark, but with the answers, we blew 

right on by it. 

At this point, I will recognize Mr. Lipinski. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. And Mr. Chairman, it’s your Subcommittee so you 

can go as long as you want I think. 

I just want to thank all of our witnesses for their testimony and 

thank Mr. Yeck, Dr. Beasley, and Dr. Cowles for their—the work 

that they have done. I think what we are—we know we are looking 

at—the work that you are doing is looking at very important scientific questions and what we are trying to do here is to make sure 

that we are getting the most out of the funding and we are doing 

things in the best way possible. 

I want to start out by talking about DUSEL. The NSF’s experience with DUSEL facility clearly indicates that planning and funding problems can affect not only the construction phase of MREFC 
79 

projects but the preliminary design phase as well. And I think the 

NSF made the right choice regarding DUSEL but it is important 

that the lessons learned from this episode are used to improve the 

project evolution process. 

So I wanted to ask Dr. Marrett and Dr. Griffiths, can you discuss 

the steps that have been taken to improve the process for the early 

stages of MREFC projects so that this doesn’t happen again? 

Dr. MARRETT. Yes, there are three things I would say about what 

we have learned from the DUSEL experience. One is that we have 

tightened up what we mean by horizon projects; sums but more importantly perhaps, there is greater engagement early on of the National Science Board; third, we give systematic attention now to operations and management, more than had been the case when we 

first started looking at a number of the projects in this account. 

I would elaborate a bit more on the role of the Board. The Board 

has always had a role with reference to setting priorities. It wasn’t 

as necessarily involved in the very early stages when we were talking about conceptual design, moving from the horizon stage to the 

conceptual design stage. We now have the Board engaged at every 

stage in the process. One of the things that the Board, in the case 

of the DUSEL project, certainly brought to attention was the importance of thinking about the matter of stewardship. As Dr. Griffiths will elaborate I am certain, this came to a question of what 

is the appropriate agency for stewarding a project of this size? We 

remain extremely interested in the science, the engineering that 

could emanate, but the question of the infrastructure itself was the 

one that was central for the Board’s deliberation. I am sure that 

Dr. Griffiths will say more on that. 

Dr. GRIFFITHS. Yes. Mr. Lipinski, we had three big concerns that 

came up with respect to the DUSEL project. One was the role of 

the partners and the stewardship model that wasn’t really clearly 

defined at the stage at which we were looking at moving DUSEL 

forward. The second was the cost and scope of DUSEL as—inconsistent with the roles and responsibilities of NSF and the total 

project. And the third was we were concerned about NSF investment in underground science needed to be placed in the context of 

other international activities. 

But as Dr. Marrett has said, we have redefined the Board’s role 

in the entire MREFC process, so we are in fact actively engaged 

at every stage. In particular, we recognize that moving a project 

from conceptual design through preliminary design is a significant 

investment of taxpayer money. We have focused our efforts particularly at the post-conceptual design stage. We have established the 

Subcommittee on Facilities to conduct an annual portfolio review at 

that point in time. Prior to that, facilities projects were looked at 

as they came in, one at a time, and one at a time you could say 

everything looks good. 

What we decided we had to do was to consider any new facilities 

project in the context of the existing portfolio of projects, how it 

adds, how it maneuvers resources, and in the context of the R&RA 

funding for the planning, the operations and maintenance, and 

most importantly, the research that the new facility would enable 

so that the portfolio review, which is conducted annually is going 

to become a major tool for decision-making for the Board and the 
80 

Foundation. And that occurs for all facilities projects at every stage 

from horizon to decommissioning where we look at the entire portfolio of facilities, not just for the MREFC level of funding but actually all the way down through mid-scale funding as well so that we 

have a much better feel for the total portfolio. And we are currently 

looking at ways to develop key indicators of the health of that portfolio. So it is not just to look at the portfolio as a whole from the 

Foundation management process as a whole; we also look at the 

portfolio from the perspective of the directorates and the different 

divisions and the impact that new facilities will have on their 

available funding. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. I think it is critical that we make sure 

that we are watching, you are watching more closely from the beginning. And we just—especially in these tight budget times make 

sure that we know—especially for the—so the people understand 

that these projects are important and we are doing the best that 

we can to fund them at the—in the appropriate way. 

So thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman BROOKS. Dr. Marrett, is the National Science Foundation requiring more contingency now so that they stay under their 

‘‘no cost overrun’’ policy? 

Dr. MARRETT. If you mean are we requiring more for every 

project to have contingency, we are doing that. But if you mean are 

we requiring more in the contingency, no. What has to be there, 

has got to be specific to each project. What the contingency amount 

will be will vary depending on what the known risks are for any 

given project. Thus, if you are interested, we can provide you later, 

if you would like, how contingency does vary across projects because that is consistent with again what the known risks are for 

a project. 

Chairman BROOKS. Now, Dr. Marrett, another question. In your 

testimony you noted, ‘‘the decision milestones also constitute ‘offramps’ for terminating the project if progress is not deemed satisfactory or NSF’s plans or priorities change.’’ How are these ‘‘offramps’’ identified and by whom? 

Dr. MARRETT. The off-ramps are identified first within the given 

program, next by the Major Research Equipment and Facilities 

Construction panel, and then that panel makes its recommendations to the Director. Each stage in our process offers the possibilities for off-ramps, so there is nothing that says a project that 

makes it through that first stage—from horizon to conceptual design—will actually end up in construction because any number of 

things could lead to the decision that it is not ready. Those, then, 

represent the off-ramps. If a project does not make it through conceptual design review, for example, it doesn’t move to the next 

stage in the process. All of that is handled by, first, the program; 

secondly, by the panel that advises the Director; then finally by the 

Director. 

Chairman BROOKS. How many projects have been terminated for 

failure to meet the milestones? 

Dr. MARRETT. We will get back to you. I am not sure I have the 

exact figures. There have been lots of projects that have come into 

the process. That is why I said in one way we have tightened up 

on the notion of horizon projects because a lot of people interpreted 
81 

horizon as a dream in an eye, and that is not what we meant there. 

There has to be a level of commitment by the sponsoring organization for something to move to the next stage. There are lots of activities that never really reach that stage of moving from horizon. 

There are others, and as I said, we can get to you the information 

on the number and conditions associated with the failure of a 

project; to move from one stage to the next. 

Chairman BROOKS. Offhand, can you recall any projects that 

have been cancelled for failure to meet milestones? 

Dr. MARRETT. Let us see. Yes, although I am trying to remember 

right now what are some of the precise ones. In Rare Symmetry 

Violating Process (RSVP) we have an example of a project that had 

been terminated because it didn’t proceed according to our process. 

Chairman BROOKS. In your judgment, does that threat of termination of the project encourage the meeting of milestones? 

Dr. MARRETT. We certainly hope so. What has to be understood 

from the outset is that nothing again is guaranteed. This is the 

communication we have with the communities. That is one of the 

reasons why these are cooperative agreements when things are finally worked out because they have to be cooperative between the 

National Science Foundation and the proposing project. Thus, we 

make the case all the time that there is nothing that says you will 

automatically move to the next stage. We set forth in the criteria 

what is essential for the kind of transition from one stage to the 

next. So we believe that that really does tighten up on what is 

going to come forth and certainly will tighten up on where allocations have to be made. 

Chairman BROOKS. And are there additional issues that may 

cause a termination not accounted for in the decision milestones? 

Dr. MARRETT. Potentially, there are. I can say a few of the things 

that we do take into account are extremely relevant. In the case 

of multi-user facilities, for example, there has got to be clarity that 

there is a user community, a large user community that wants to 

make use of those facilities. If things change over time and there 

is a strong indication that there isn’t a community that is going to 

be appropriately making—benefitting from that, that is something 

that is important. 

Other kinds of developments—there can be challenges as other 

international projects might come onto the scene that make something less than the cutting edge that we had anticipated when the 

process might have started. Sometimes there are personnel 

changes that make it very difficult for us to anticipate that this is 

something that is going to move in the directions that would be 

there. We think we have identified key developments, key issues, 

but this is a process always under examination, always subject to 

our learning more about what are the conditions that have to be 

considered. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Dr. Marrett. 

The Chair next recognizes Mr. Lipinski for an additional set of 

questions and then we will move to Mr. Hultgren from the great 

State of Illinois. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to continue on a little bit with what the Chairman 

was asking about. We were talking about off-ramps here and as 
82 

these projects move forward and you are examining them and say 

a project should not move forward. Where does Congress come into 

this? Where should Congress come in? What is the relationship— 

what kind of communication goes on with Congress? I mean that 

is a critical role, obviously, that—up here that we face. And I just 

want to know up to this point where—what has that relationship 

been with that communication been on these projects? 

Dr. MARRETT. Well, I can tell you Congress makes an ultimate 

decision about an on-ramp or off-ramp having to do with funding 

because once the project has moved from preliminary to final design, that is the stage at which we can talk about it being included 

in a future budget. When we say this could be included in a future 

budget, as you know, budgets are negotiated, discussed extensively 

with Congress. So that is one of the key stages that Congress is 

clearly involved. 

The other stages, Congress has always had the possibilities of 

pursuing, as this hearing is doing, the stage of particular projects, 

and we are always open to providing information in some cases 

about the portfolio—that is what has been asked— or in other 

cases about particular projects. We stand open [today], then, to 

Congress at any time being very much involved. So it is for the 

final—what happens to a final project. It is also the engagement 

about what happens before something goes into the MREFC account because the funding for that stage comes from the research 

and related accounts. Congress then also oversees what happens in 

the funding of those accounts. So I would say the funding role is 

a critical one. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Well, this isn’t a criticism particularly of anyone or 

anything that has gone on before, but maybe this Committee 

should have—be watching more and not leave it up just to the appropriators to be playing the role in this. I certainly think that is 

an important role for this Committee to be taking. 

I am not sure how much we can get into this in the amount of 

time I have left, but we are talking about contingency funding, and 

I think it is a little fuzzy about what this is. It is certainly not a 

slush fund. My understanding is on average a project—the expectation that a project will be completed at total cost—that is the sum 

of a fixed, predictable amount plus the contingency fund, which 

captures the expected cost of the uncertain portion of the project. 

So my understanding is there is a calculation of how much you expect because you can’t know exactly how much everything is going 

to cost, but you create a contingency fund. Is the expectation, then, 

that you are going to—the spending is going to be the mean of that 

contingency fund? You are going to spend—that half the contingency fund will be spent or where is the expectation of—because, 

you know, I am looking at this as, you know, do you calculate a 

normal curve and say this is what our expectation is for how much 

it is going to cost because there is certain specific uncertainty for 

each portion of the project? So what is the real expectation in 

terms of the contingency fund? It is not—my understanding is it 

not on top of what is—you plan—that you are expected to spend 

but you expect to spend some of that contingency fund? 

Dr. MARRETT. For that, I will give a general response but I think 

the more detailed response would come appropriately from those 
83 

who have had to handle the matter of contingencies. So I would say 

again we go back to that there are given risks. When a budget is 

prepared, it should be that minimal budget, the budget that is 

going to have to be there given that there are always potential 

risks and we can’t come in over what we have included there. That 

is the way, then, the contingency is to be built in. 

I know one of the questions that has come up periodically is, 

don’t you expect, then, the contingency not to be spent and to be 

returned to the Federal Government? If that is the case, we can return. But more frequently it is there because the risks actually do 

come about and we have to have a way for covering those. As I 

said, I think it would be appropriate probably for Mr. Yeck, who 

had to work with this with reference to IceCube. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Before we go to Mr. Yeck, is the expectation, 

though, that contingency—some of it will be spent or is the expectation that it won’t be spent? 

Dr. MARRETT. The expectation is it will be spent, that there will 

be those risks. That is why we have said these are not just some 

kind of speculation. It is the set of known unknowns as sometimes 

they are called. You know that there are going to be the risks and 

there are the estimates of what are the costs associated with those. 

Thus, you do expect to have to pay to cover those risks. So that is 

the way, as I said, I believe I could elaborate on what that has 

meant for IceCube, but that is the kind of expectation from the National Science Foundation. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Yeck, it is up to the Chairman now. Mr. Yeck, 

if you—to add more to—go ahead, Mr. Yeck, if you have more to 

add to that from your experience. 

Chairman BROOKS. Go ahead. 

Mr. YECK. Yes, I can make some comments. The short answer is 

that the expectation is that the contingency will be spent. Project 

management—— 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Wait. Some of the contingency? 

Mr. YECK. All of it. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Or all of it? 

Mr. YECK. All of it. Project management—there is a science to it 

and there is an art, and part of the art is to squeeze base budgets 

so that the responsible managers are in a constant discussion with 

the higher level management about how funds are used, and contingency is one way of having a transparent dialogue on that. Specifically, there are examples— may I respond to the question earlier, Mr. Lipinski, about IceCube. You know, the boundary conditions when IceCube was baselined—this period where you start 

construction, where you are defining the performance baseline 

where you have—are very general to MREFC projects. You have a 

five to ten year project; you do not want to go back for more funding. There is a high level of engagement and oversight by the NSF 

like any MREFC project. Specific to IceCube, we had the recognition that it would be exceedingly expensive to go back and try to 

add instrumentation at a later date given the South Pole logistics 

framework. 

Leading up to project baseline, we did a bottom up cost estimate. 

It came up over $10 million higher than the funding plan, which 

was 242.1 million. And at this point, the partnership between NSF, 
84 

UW–Madison, and the scientific collaboration engaged to look at 

how best to develop the final project baseline, including a contingency. And we de-scoped from 80 to 70 strings in terms of the plan, 

the project plan, and established this 22 percent contingency budget that I mentioned, which we expected to spend on the 70 strings. 

When the project was approved by the Science Board, it was approved to go up to 80 strings, the original baseline, and we had an 

incentive built in to try to save costs—reduce costs, and the best 

way to do that is schedule. So we worked very hard to maximize 

the insulation of strings each year at the South Pole and we 

reached record numbers and saved fuel, which is a big expense for 

IceCube. And so in the end of our total contingency budget, less 

than 25 percent went into the cost of restoring these strings. 

Further comment if I may that this practice is actually modeled 

off another project which DOE and NSF supported—which I was 

involved in which was the LHC—there was a cap contribution to 

the European lab in particle physics. The detectors de-scoped to 

create a 50 percent contingency given the high risks in those 

projects, and in the end, about 50 percent of that contingency went 

to scope restoration. So it is an approach that works very well from 

a project-management standpoint to have that incentive. Typically, 

you would expect to spend the contingency on the baseline scope. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Yeck. 

Thank you, Mr. Lipinski. 

The Chair next recognizes Mr. Hultgren from the great State of 

Illinois. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you. 

Thank you all for being here. Sorry it is a busy day. We have 

got a lot of different committees going on in markups. So I know 

other people would love to be here. We are all kind of running 

around so—but thank you so much for your work. 

Dr. Marrett, I wondered—just a question. Major Research Equipment and Facilities projects often span decades from inception to 

operation. How does the Foundation plan 30 years in advance or 

more if ramp-up is 10 to 15 years and a facility may be in operation for an additional 30 years for the continuous support of these 

projects? 

Dr. MARRETT. We are talking about the MREFC account, which 

is a construction account. The other parts of this that you are asking about will have to do with the research support that is going 

to have to be there. As I have indicated a bit earlier, we are now 

giving a lot of attention at the outset to what will be the operational, the maintenance cost, and what is the likelihood that there 

will be continued demand from the research community. Anticipating what is going to happen from the community is very much 

a part of this process but that is funded not through this account, 

that is funded through the research and related account or the education and human resources account. So we don’t really try to ask 

about funding from MREFC for what will happen for support of the 

advancement of the knowledge over the years. 

Your overarching question suggesting that all of this has to be 

taken into account and the long lead time does have to be consid-
85 

ered very much. There is a long lead time in the actual development of construction projects, and then once there is the construction, there is an anticipation of a certain lifetime for the research 

that would be done. So I hope that comes somewhat close to what 

you were interested in. 

Mr. HULTGREN. I appreciate that. And again I do thank you all 

for being here. And I yield back. 

Chairman BROOKS. Mr. Yeck, one follow-up with you if I might. 

‘‘IceCube is a particle detector imbedded in a cubic kilometer of 

deep, very transparent South Pole ice that was designed to detect 

high-energy neutrinos from nearby and across the universe.’’ And 

this is from your testimony. And then you also add that it ‘‘includes 

about 250 people from 39 institutions in 11 countries.’’ If you could, 

please give the members a primer of sorts on why the South Pole 

was chosen for this particular endeavor and then also what is the 

expected scientific reward for what we are doing. 

Mr. YECK. Thank you. The South Pole provides a unique opportunity to have the large detector volume that is needed. So detectors of this type previous practice would be to build a large tank, 

excavate a cavern to create the volume that is needed. In the case 

of IceCube, that volume exists in the icecap at the South Pole. So 

the challenge, then, is to drill into the ice and install the sensors 

that are needed. And the South Pole is an ideal location because 

not only is that icecap there but the infrastructure is in place 

through the U.S. Antarctic Program. So the logistics chain exists 

and so the instrumentation that was produced around the world 

could be moved efficiently to the South Pole, and then the drilling 

crews and the scientists could be supported at the South Pole to 

carry out that construction. So that was very—it was very cost-effective. If you imagine trying to do this at a location that did not 

have that infrastructure, it would be exceedingly expense. 

IceCube is a detector that is opening up a new avenue to discovery, neutrino astronomy. So it is as likely that the science coming out of IceCube will be something unexpected, as it is the expected science of neutrino detection, high-energy neutrinos outside 

of our galaxy. So this is now underway, the collaboration of institutions, which are about half in the United States and half worldwide 

are actively analyzing data and pursuing their science objectives. 

Thank you. 

Chairman BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Yeck. And I believe Mr. Lipinski has one more round of questions. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a question for Dr. Marrett. The Large Facilities Office is 

responsible for a budget as large as the Office of 

Cyberinfrastructure, which sits in the Office of the Director and 

similar funds critical research infrastructure. Why is the Large Facilities Office within the CFO’s office and not the Director’s office 

like OCI where it would have direct access to the Director and 

more leverage in its relationship with research directorates? 

Dr. MARRETT. Actually, the location of an office or any other entity of NSF does not indicate always the access that is there. The 

Office of the Director has to be concerned with all parts of the 

Foundation. Thus, the offices—the directorates very much report to 

the Director. That is the same case, then, for the Large Facilities 
86 

Office. It does come through Budget & Financial Administration, 

but that is not to indicate that there isn’t the kind of ongoing interaction between that office and the Office of the Director, the way 

that it is for the Office of Cyber Infrastructure. 

One of the things that the Deputy Director for the Large Facilities Office does is to prepare a monthly report on where things 

stand, a report that comes to the Director and to me and that we 

review very carefully. We then spend whatever time is essential 

that might be requested from any number of angles to ensure that 

we are very familiar with what happens in that particular office. 

Thus, as I said, location is not always an indication of oversight or 

engagement in the kinds of concerns that the Foundation has to be 

concerned with. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Well, was there a reason that OCI was put in the 

Director’s office when it was created? 

Dr. MARRETT. Yes, there were a couple of reasons and some of 

those are really being reexamined right now to be perfectly honest. 

There are sometimes reasons for the location of particular offices 

and operations that don’t always hold up over time. So we are reviewing all of the operations that currently report to the Office of 

the Director because, as I said, sometimes that is interpreted as 

giving greater access to the Director than the directorates and 

other offices that are not listed as a part of the Office of the Director. Since that is really not the way it happens, we are just taking 

a look at all of the structure to ensure that there is an understanding of the engagement that has to be there, again, with all 

of the key things the Foundation has to oversee. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Dr. Marrett. 

I yield back. 

Chairman BROOKS. I would like to thank the witnesses for their 

participation in today’s hearing and also thank the members for 

their questions. And most importantly, we were able to finish before the votes start on the House Floor in about 10 to 15 minutes. 

With that, the members of the Subcommittee may have additional questions for the witnesses and we will ask you to respond 

to those in writing should any be forthcoming. The record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments from members. 

The witnesses are excused and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(87) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
88 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. Cora Marrett, Deputy Director, National Science Foundation 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITEE ON RESEARCH AND RESEARCH AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 

Hearing on 

NSF Major Research Equipment and Facilities Management: Ensuring Fiscal Responsibility and 

Accountability 

March 8, 2012 

Dr. Cora Marrett 

Deputy Director 

National Science Foundation 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Mo Brooks and Danielliplnski 

Questions for Or. Marrett 

1. For fiscal years 2009-2011, as a total across all MREFC projects In each of those years, how 

much contingency funding was carried over to the following fiscal year (and beyond)? 

The table below shows this information, further broken down by funding source (ARRA and 

MREFC) and by project. Annual construction budget requests contain sufficient contingency to 

manage risks and uncertainties that may arise during each year. The delayed enactment of the 

FY 2010 budget and the full-year FY 2011 continuing resolution distorted that planning. ARRA 

funds were obligated to each project in its entirety during 2009 and 2010 as the projects 

became construction-ready. 

Page 1 of 10 
89 

MREFC, }ARRA··, 

$67.03 $45.46 

$ 13.46 $ 19.67 $ 8.58 

$ 1.02 $ 16.20 $ 1.17 

ARRV $ 2.33 $ 7.14 $ 24.22 $ 6.44 $ 16.19 

ATST $ 5.12 $ 20.60 $ 2.59 $ 11.40 

IceCube $ 6.85 $ 4.00 $ 2.38 

NEON $ 2.01 

001 $ 24.65 $ 14.90 $ 0.64 $ 3.61 $ 0.62 

2. Contingencies are calculated using widely accepted statistical methods; however, there is 

some discretion involved in these calculations. What factors may influence deciSions about 

individual inputs into contingency calculations? How does or should NSF's no-cost-overrun 

policy influence contingency calculations? How do you avoid incentivizing the projects to 

maximize contingency estimates? How does the no-cost-overrun policy influence the balance 

between maximizing the scientific scope and minimizing the total negotiated project cost of 

any new project? 

What factors may influence decisions about individual inputs into contingency calculations? 

Decisions about how to derive individual inputs to contingency are determined on an element 

by element basis by staff of the project developer based on their professional expertise and 

engineering judgment. NSF policy requires the cost proposed in the agency budget to be a 'risk 

adjusted total project cost' including contingency for cost risks that are algorithmically 

calculated from risk assessments and engineering judgments at the lowest level of the project 

work breakdown structure (WBS). In general, each WBS element requires an assessment that 

combines joint estimates of likelihood and impact on costs that vary from element to element 

due to unique technical, cost, and schedule factors. 

Some cost elements contain vendor supplied materials and services - these elements depend on 

the developer's expertise with contracting and procurement. Other elements contain unique 

internally developed technologies - these depend on engineering and fabrication capabilities. 

Many projects incorporate contributions-in-kind from other sources and rely on judgments 

about their reliability and cost risks. 

Page 2 oflO 
90 

How does or should NSF's no-cost-overrun policy influence contingency calculations? 

The 'no-cost-overrun policy' reinforces the need for a rigorous contingency calculation. Because 

of this policy, the contingency budget has to be high enough to assure NSF that the proposed 

scope can be accomplished with a proposed budget in light of the known risks. 

How do you avoid incentivizing the projects to maximize contingency estimates? 

Cost realism, assurance that the total cost estimate is not inflated, is determined through 

external assessment by experts with experience on comparable projects. 

Project developers are universities or not-for-profit institutions representing a wide research 

community and do not respond to conventional financial incentives. These developers do not 

receive fee or incentive payments and cannot incorporate unused contingency into a fee pool. 

Each uses non-advocacy external reviews by expert panels including engineers, managers, as 

well as scientists from related disciplines who advise NSF on every major cost category of the 

project. Every project developer independently advises NSF as to whether a project's proposed 

scope is consistent with its scientific rationale and whether scope, cost estimates, and cost risks 

are realistic. For example, the "delta-cost" review to examine the rebaselined ALMA total 

project cost was followed by a separate expert panel 'contingency review' in 2006. This panel 

advised that contingency for NSF sponsored work, then at about 18% of the estimated cost of 

the remaining work, was too low and recommended a value closer to 25%. Ultimately, the 

approved rebaselined budget was closer to the panel's recommendation. NSF's approach to 

project management oversight is a continuing safeguard against inflated contingency estimates. 

Comparison with the NASA Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM) cost model suggests that NSF's 

typical project contingency levels are conservative. NSF sponsored facility projects appropriated 

from 2000-2009 were capped at 5 - 29% total aggregated contingency (see table below). The 

cost weighted average value was 19%. NAFCOM imposes a 25% minimum contingency reserve 

for new space hardware that has been through PDR and 35% for "new deSigns within the stateof-the-art" or for which there are vendor "estimates" (maturity levels that approximately 

correspond to the NSF cost cap)'. 

Facility MREFCyear Total Cost Contingency 

$ % 

ATST 2009-17 298 25 

AdvllGO 2008-14 205 23 

NEON 2007-16 434 21-

001 2007-16 386 29 ~ 

ARRV 2007-09 199 21 

ALMA' 2006-12 499 13 

(rebaselined) 1998-12 344 8 

1 SAle, "NASAl Air Force Cost Model", 2002 version 

Page 3 of 10 
91 

.-. 

And initial ALMA 

SODV 2005-07 115 8 

EARTHSCOPE 2003-08 197 5 

ICECUBE 2002-10 242 22 

NEES 2000-04 82 14 '----;--

"ALMA contmgency at rebaselmmg IS shown as a percentage of the cost to complete the project. 

Excluding financial obligations for work in progress, the rebaselined budget contingency was 

-25%. 

How does the no-cost-overrun policy influence the balance between maximizing the scientific 

scope and minimizing the total negotiated project cost of any new project? 

The no-cost-overrun policy is primarily a tool to achieve budget predictability with some 

ancillary benefits but it does place extra burdens on the developer and NSF review panels. 

Credible construction planning requires that the desired project scope be consistent with the 

project execution plan and budget requested. NSF, through its external review processes, 

ensures that the project budget is sufficient to cover the scientific scope with realistic 

contingency to mitigate project risks. The no-cost-overrun policy requires cost realism during 

the early design of a project. It also guards against scope creep, inefficient execution and poor 

contingency management. The developer and NSF review panels must pay careful attention to 

cost estimating in addition to technical design in early construction. The panels must monitor 

cost performance in addition to progress toward achieving science capabilities during 

construction. Cost effective performance protects the scientific scope and can, in some cases, 

allow more scientific scope to be proposed and built. Ultimately, because the developer is 

usually the post-construction facility operator, it has a vested interest in fulfilling the facility's 

antiCipated scientific capabilities. Reducing scope or deferring unfinished work impacts user 

satisfaction and can (and has) resulted in replacement of the operator as a consequence_ 

3. Why does NSF allow projects to expand their scope with any leftover funding rather than 

require them to return such funds to the agency to be weighed against other agency 

priorities? 

NSF de-obligates unexpended funds from the award instrument at the conclusion of 

construction so that they can be available for other agency priorities. NSF believes that its 

expert panel reviews and risk based contingency estimating approach contribute to prodUcing 

an excellent match between scientific scope and the developer's capabilities and resources. NSF 

policy is that a developer can propose to use small amounts of unused contingency before the 

end of construction to (a) restore descoped features or (b) to increase the scientific capability 

that is consistent with the original scientific justification or that enables research that has 

emerged since the facility was originally approved for construction. A proposal of this nature is 

subject to the conventional NSF external review and internal assessment process to ensure 

scientific merit and priority, and require approval as a scope change at the appropriate level. 

Page4oflO 
92 

4. It seems that many of the science agencies have similar policies with respect to calculating 

and including contingency funding in the total project cost. But with respect to where 

contingency funds are held and what level of permission is required for drawdowns, the NSF 

appears to give more discretion to the non-federal project manager than any other agency. 

What justifies this practice at NSF given that other agencies, such as the DOE Office of Science, 

require a federal official to approve all contingency drawdowns? Why doesn't NSF transfer 

contingency funds to the project on as-needed basis? 

NSF, unlike other agencies, does not directly build or operate faCilities, in accordance with its 

organic act that limits it to an oversight role2

• The overseers are not construction managers but 

usually scientists or engineers with extensive research experience within the disciplinary area 

served by the facility. The project manager is an employee of the awardee organization with 

many years of experience in related projects. As described later, NSF oversees the use of 

contingency through the use of approval thresholds. 

In contrast, at the DOE Office of Science, a Federal Project Director, who is also an experienced 

project manager, is co-located at the project site with the project manager. The DOE Federal 

Project Director usually allocates the contingency to the project, although we understand that 

DOE allows some flexibility on this. Specifically, in the DOE system the project manager has 

authority to utilize contingency below specified thresholds (0.3% represents a typical threshold) 

in consultation with the Federal Project Director. Contingency usage above threshold requires 

formal change control. 

The contingency allocation is for in-scope deliverables. It is included in the baseline budget to 

expeditiously mitigate cost risks and resolve cost estimating omissions and inaccuracy within the 

approved project scope'. Contingency management and as-needed drawdown is a function 

assigned to the project manager to align authority with responsibility, and is an essential tool 

that the project manager must be able to use to accomplish the project. This is a recognized 

best practice in federal, state and local capital asset construction and in industry4. It is intended 

to give maximum flexibility for balancing between scope and budget without 'cost-cutting' that 

reduces quality or impacts the total project outcome. Time-critical decisions on the use of 

contingency are often necessary to avoid delaying project schedule, so it is important that a 

project be able to manage these funds expeditiously. 

NSF is informed of all allocations of budget contingency, and must provide prior approval for 

allocations exceeding thresholds defined in the terms and conditions of the funding instrument 

(Cooperative Agreement) to the awardee. These thresholds are less than 0.1 percent of the total 

project cost. Budget thus flows in and out of the contingency category as risks materialize and 

242 USC 1873(b), which states "The roundation shall not, itself, operate any laboratories or pilot plants". 

3 "GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide", GA009-03SP 

4 See for example discussions in "Cost Estlmating Guide", DOE G 413.3-21, "Elements of Reallstic Project Budgets", The 

Architect's Handbook of Professional Practice, 13th edition, 2007, AlA Sest Practice BP 13.04.03, and Hart, D. A. "Managing the 

Contingency Allowance" AlA Best Practice BP 13.04.05. 

Page 5 of 10 
93 

are mitigated in different areas of the work breakdown structure (WBS) or project work 

packages. In summary, the authority to apply or pull back expenditures thus resides with the 

project manager who has both the responsibility for and day"to"day contact with project 

execution, and with proven expertise; but funding is ultimately approved by NSF. 

5. In the case of IceCube, a significant portion of the contingency fund was leftover for 

reinvestment in the scope of the project. In that case it was about 20 percent. How often does 

NSF expect there to be significant leftover, and what does NSF define as "significant"? 

IceCube began construction with 22 % of the total8-year project cost designated as contingency 

funding (about $44 million). By the time of the referenced "reinvestment," 7 years of 

construction elapsed and all but about $7 million of the contingency (or 3 % of the risk"adjusted 

Total Project Cost) was allocated to manage risks and uncertainties that the project previously 

encountered. 

The initial level of contingency was established through an external baseline review. Project 

proponents originally proposed an 80-string array (the number of instrumented holes in the 

Antarctic icecap) at a total estimated cost of more than $280 million, to be funded by a 

combination of US and foreign contributions. 

NSF directed the project to replan a 70 string array with reduced technical performance and a 

US cost target of less than $250 million, based on a bottom-up estimate of all project costs and 

known risks and uncertainties, including project risks ranging from instrument development, 

delays associated with the long logistics chain, bad weather and extreme environmental 

conditions at the South Pole, and commodity price increases (e.g. fuel). 

The project (University of Wisconsin as lead) produced a technical justification that a 70-string 

array was the minimum viable size detector, along with a proposed budget that included 22.5 % 

contingency (the amount of the budget contingency divided by the base budget), for a total US 

project cost of $243 million. This contingency was estimated as necessary to accomplish a 

minimum 70-string project scope. National Science Board approval included the possibility, if 

contingency was managed appropriately, to build back to the originally intended 80-string array. 

Project contingency was consumed managing these risks through the life of the project. Savings 

realized through operational efficiencies as project personnel gained experience, and 

particularly from savings in fuel consumption as the drilling process was refined, allowed usage 

of some of this contingency to build back the originally planned 80"string array. As the project 

evolved, contingency was managed appropriately toward completion of the approved scope of 

work with annual reassessments of contingency needs and regular decisions by the project 

manager to allocate contingency funds in accord with prior planning. The justification to build 80 

strings was built into the annual project execution plans that were reviewed and approved by 

NSF following annual external review. The only scope change accommodated by contingency 

funds was installation of the Deep Core Array. This was a set of 6 strings that created a denser 

array of detectors in the lower"middle part of the array to allow IceCube's energy sensitivity to 

Page 6oflO 
94 

overlap other large observatories aimed at lower-energy neutrinos (e.g. Super KAMIOKANDE in 

Japan). The amount of IceCube contingency used for the Deep Core Array was about $1.5 

million; this was used for drilling the six holes and installing the strings of in-ice detectors. 

Instrumentation for the Deep Core Array was provided by European partners. In accord with NSF 

policy, a proposal for this change in scope was externally reviewed and the proposed programlevel decision was reviewed by the Director's Review Board and the National Science Board was 

briefed prior to a final approval by the Office of Polar Programs. 

As noted above, NSF expects that the risk-adjusted Total Project Cost (TPC), defined when the 

project is base lined and validated through a robust baselining review, is entirely necessary to 

achieve the project goals. The TPC for IceCube included the baseline contingency and was 

approved by the National Science Board prior to award. As long as the project is managed within 

the framework of the approved scope and budget, there is no expectation of significant leftover 

funding. Any changes in scope, or possible increases in the budget, require additional review 

and approval by the National Science Board prior to NSF's authorization for implementation. 

This practice is in accordance with GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (GA009-03SP)-

a reserve to manage the "known unknowns" in a project is part of the project budget and 

managed by the project manager. A review of eight major multi-user facility projects completed 

during the last five years (six MREFC projects and two slightly smaller projects) supports the 

assertion that total project costs and contingency budgets are conservatively estimated: six 

projects expended substantially all available funds and descoped to stay Within budget, one 

project (lceCube) added contingent scope based on favorable cost performance, and one 

project (now completing) experienced an underrun. The unexpended budget will be retained by 

NSF for other use. 

Page 7 of 10 
95 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITEE ON RESEARCH AND RESEARCH AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 

Hearing on 

NSF Major Research Equipment and Facilities Management: Ensuring Fiscal Responsibility and 

Accountability 

March 8, 2012 

Dr. Cora Marrett 

Deputy Director 

National Science Foundation 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Mo Brooks 

Questions for Dr. Marrett 

1. Aside from the construction and operations and maintenance costs associated with an MREFC, 

can NSF tell how much they are investing in actual research at an operational facility? In other 

words, once a facility is operational, how much additional investment is the US making in 

research at that facility or in using that piece of equipment? If you are not tracking this, why 

not? 

NSF does not systematically track all of the NSF-funded research associated with its facilities. 

NSF funds investigator-driven research and facility operations independently. NSF does not 

generally fund researchers to use specific NSF-supported facilities. Many users of NSF facilities 

do not receive NSF funding. 

NSF does track the total research investment in each scientific field that utilizes these facilities. 

NSF also asseSSeS the scientific productivity of its facilities, and their contributions to the 

accomplishments of the research communities they serve. Their opportunity costs are assessed 

regularly by Divisional and Directorate advisory committees, the National Science Board, and 

occasional National Academies studies. The amount of investment in research is only one of 

many measures that ultimately address the question of the balance between financial support 

for facilities and other uses of NSF funds. 

NSF's facilities differ enormously in character: some (EarthScope, Institutes for Research in 

Seismology, and National Nanotechnology Information Network for example) collect very large 

amounts of data that are analyzed by tens of thousands of researchers who carry out this work 

without additional direct NSF support. In those cases, NSF tracks relevant metrics such as the 

number of times data are accessed, the number of distinct data users, and the number of 

scholarly publications citing this data. In astronomy (National Optical Astronomy Observatories, 

National Radio Astronomy Observatories, Arecibo Observatory, National Solar Observatory) at 

Page 8 of 10 
96 

least 80% of the national facility users have no NSF financial support. For those facilities, NSF 

tracks the number of users and the amount of grant support for those receiving its. Other 

facilities (the Academic Research Fleet, Integrated Ocean Drilling Program, for example) are 

utilized by researchers supported by NSF and by other agencies and foreign countries. (Funds to 

support operating costs are also contributed by NSF's partners.) The number of on-board 

research participants is tracked, but a more indicative measure of productivity is a consequence 

of the fact that samples collected during operations are distributed to thousands of additional 

researchers for analysis, and these researchers do not receive direct NSF support. A few facilities 

(the ATLAS and CMS detector collaborations at CERN's Large Hadron Collider, the laser 

Interferometer Gravitational Wave Observatory, the lceCube Neutrino Observatory at the South 

Pole) are major science experiments, planned and built by the experimenters and their 

international partners, who are now acquiring and analyzing the data to further the 

experiment's goals. NSF tracks the research funding provided to the US participants, but the 

scientific productivity of the experimental activities is a consequence of the much larger 

community of collaborators involved. 

2. How many requests does NSF receive for MREFC projects annually? How many projects begin 

Horizon planning but go no further? How many are currently making it through the process 

from Horizon to Conceptual Design, from Conceptual Design to Preliminary Design, and from 

Preliminary Design to Final? 

NSF receives, at most, a few initiatives each year that may eventually result in a future MREFC 

project. Since inception of the MREFC budget for funding large projects in 1995, about 50 

projects in the Horizon category were discussed at the agency-wide level, and only nine 

emerged to become part of MREFC budget requests. • There is currently one project advancing 

towards a Conceptual Design and one project advancing from Conceptual Design to Preliminary 

Design. There are no projects currently in the Final Design stage. 

3. It is my understanding that the project sub-awardees are managed by the MREFC project, not 

by NSF, is this correct? How are those subawardees managed? Does NSF have any role in that 

relationship? 

50 for instance, in the field of astronomy, over 1500 individuals associated with US institutions are principal investigators (PIs) or 

co-Pis annually, on accepted observing proposals to NSF-funded ground-based astronomy facilities, Most of these lnvestigators 

have no separate research support coming directly from NSF, Those who are supported generally receive awards for 

investigations that involve multiple threads; the typical NSFthree*year astronomy grant may make use of data from NASA 

observatories, private optlcal observatories, foreign observatories, and new observations from NSf facilities, as well as 

fndudingtheoreticai modeling, Because of the complexity involved In assigning fractional values to the different facilities, and 

the separate awards of observing time from the different facilities} award amounts for use of national facilities are not 

specifically tracked. In a typical year, "'30% of Directorate for Physical and Mathematical Sciences/Division of Astronomy 

(MPS!AST) research awardees make use of an MPS/ASTfacility for some portion 01 their work, This indicates an upper limit of 

-$lSM in annual awards associated with use of MPS/AST facilities, compared with -$130M in annual operating costs forth as. 

facilities. 

5 Page 46, FY 2007 NSF Facility Plan, http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2007 /nsf0722/nsfOn2.pdf. 

Page 9 of 10 
97 

That is correct. The financial award instrument used to fund the project explicitly states that the 

MREFC awardee is responsible for subawardee performance. Plans and capabilities to carry out 

subaward oversight are part of the scope of Final Design Review. NSF also approves subawards 

exceeding value thresholds as defined in the Cooperative Agreement. At Final Design Review, 

external assessment of acquisition strategy and the project's plan for subcontract oversight and 

subawardee monitoring is reviewed. Monthly project cost/schedule status reports and periodiC 

external reviews keep NSF informed during construction. 

Page lOaf 10 
98 

Responses by Dr. Jose’-Marie Griffiths, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Facilities, National Science Board; 

Vice President of Academic Affairs, Bryant University 
99 

Questions for the Record 

The Honorable Mo Brooks 

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Research and Science Education 

NSF Major Research Equipment and Facilities Management: Ensuring Fiscal Responsibility and 

Accountability 

Question for Dr. Griffiths: 

Thursday, March 8, 2012 

10:00 A.M. 

Question 1: With regard to recompleting expiring awards, what does the Board consider to be "an 

appropriate time period" to bring a facility to "sustainable major operations" as you testified? Have 

all facilities that have met this threshold been recompeted? 

Answer: The National Science Board issued a resolution establishing a recompetition principle in 2008. 

The principle applies to all NSF awards, not just major facilities. However, operation of large facilities is 

such a special case that it was addressed specifically in the Board resolution (NSB-08-12j, which states: 

" ... all expiring awards are to be recompeted, because rarely will it be in the best interest of U.s. 

science and engineering research and education not to do so. Furthermore, the Board endorsed 

a recompetition policy for major facility awards which is transparent to the research community 

such that after construction of major facilities is completed, followed by an appropriate time 

period to bring the facility to sustainable operations, full and open competition of the 

operations award will be required." 

Following the ad~ption ofthis principle, it has become the Board's practice to include a requirement for 

recompetition at award end when granting authority for new large-facility awards. This enables 

awardees to plan their commitments and investments in a way that will enable recompetition without 

significantly threatening the sustainability of the asset. 

Our modern, large scientific facilities involve multiple institutions and partners that play differing roles, 

contribute key resources and property, impose somewhat confining contracts and agreements, and 

depend on the facility to meet needs that cut across various timeframes. If a facility manager does not 

know in advance that all of these must be in synchrony at some specific point in time so that a 

recompetition can happen, the resulting entanglements make it extremely difficult to impose a date for 

recompetition without threatening the sustainability of the facility or its ability to meet its obligations. 

Thus, the Board handles the question of when recompetition should occur on a case-by-case basis for 

facilities that were already in place when the recompetition principle was approved. Finally, NSF's 

Business and Operations Advisory Committee is developing an implementation policy for recompetition 

of major, multi-user facilities for the Board's consideration. This policy will include lessons learned from 

previous recompetitions that can be applied to future recompetitions, to improve outcomes. The policy 

will help standardize recompetition policies and procedures and make it easier to ensure that 

recompetitions occur in the most fair and sustainable manner possible. 
100 

Questions for the Record 

The Honorable Mo Brooks and the Honorable Daniel Lipinski 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 

NSF Major Research Equipment and Facilities Management: Ensuring Fiscal 

Responsibility and Accountability 

QUESTIONS FOR MR. YECK 

Thursday, March 8, 2012 

10:00 a.m. 

1. Understanding that you were working under a total project cost cap, what 

was the scientific basis for your decision to reduce from 80 to 70 deep ice 

cables when the contract for lceCube was being negotiated several years ago? 

You decide then you could eliminate 10 cables and still have a world class 

facility, so what were you giving up? When it became clear that you had 

sufficient funds left over, why was rescoping lceCube to 80 cables the right 

decision when balanced against other priorities, including funding research 

grants for lceCube users? 

lceCube was designed as a discovery instrument with a wide range of science goals 

spanning a broad energy range, particle flavors and corresponding background 

rejection tools. The decision to define a minimum scope by reducing the Ice Cube 

construction project baseline from the 80 deep ice cables (strings) proposed to 

greater than or equal to 70 strings was informed by sensitivity analysis of the 

expected detector. The figure below 

was produced in 2004 in support of 

1.15 

the decision-making process and 

shows the relative change of 

effective area (muons) and effective Qj' 

d) I §1.1 volume (casca es at typica ! 

energies between 10 and 1000 TeV. .. 1.05 

The effective area is defined as the ~ 

average geometric area for all 

directions. The effective volume is 

defined as the contained volume 

covered by strings. The graph and 

the following table of important 

detector parameters and science 

sensitivity describe the effects of a 

perturbation of ten strings relative 

to the nominal 80-string plan. 

~ ... 

" 

~ 0.95 

... ~ 

~ 0.9 

~ 

0.85 

RelaUve Eff. Area I Relative Elf. Volume I 

• 8 .. ... . 

Number of Strings 
101 

lceCube Detector Parameters and Performance Sensitivity 

Number of strings 80 70 90 

Change [%1 Change [%1 

Detector Parameters 

Effective area 1 -9 +9 

Effective volume 1 -14 +14 

Angular resolution 0.70 -7 +7 

Science Sensitivitv 

Point sources (E·2, 3 years) E2.p s 2.4 .10-9 cm-2s-I

GeV -16 +16 

Diffuse nm (E-2, 3 years) E2.p s 4.2 '10-9 cm-2

s-lsr-1G -12 +12 

GRB V,.,e" .p(500GRB) s 0.2' .pWIB -10 +10 

GRB v,. -12 +12 

WIMPs from sun -20 +20 

Cascades diffuse flux -17 +17 

Tau neutrino identification harder easier 

Supernova sensitivity -6 +6 

The project strategy of reducing the minimum string commitment from 80 to .,70 

was never intended to be a permanent de-scope of the detector and did not require 

a re-optimization of the detector design. Project contingency was increased to 

enhance the probability of achieving a minimum of 70 strings and to create a path 

towards increasing the number of strings to the original goal of 80 strings, possibly 

more. This approach placed clear incentives on all parties to meet schedules, reduce 

costs, and to seek additional international financial support. 

The process of restoring the ten cables to the scope was a gradual process over four 

years and was implemented in incremental steps following an approved baseline 

change control procedure. A minimum of three years is required to move from 

instrumentation procurement and production to a cable installed at the South Pole. 

UW-Madison and the Collaboration worked to restore the ten strings from the very 

beginning of the project with the understanding that this could only realistically be 

achieved while the lceCube MREFC project was actively drilling deep ice holes at 

South Pole. After the lceCube drilling program was completed the IceCube drill 

equipment was transferred to NSF and ultimately to other NSF sponsored projects. 

The lceCube MREFC funding was optimized to deliver the optimum detector for a 

long-term research program. Research proposals submitted by U.S. university 

groups are funded under the NSF Research & Related Activities (R&RA) account and 

cannot be supported under the NSF MREFC account. 
102 

Responses by Mr. James H. Yeck, IceCube Project Director, 

University of Wisconsin-Madison 

Questions for the Record 

The Honorable Mo Brooks and the Honorable Daniel Lipinski 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 

NSF Major Research Equipment and Facilities Management: Ensuring Fiscal 

Responsibility and Accountability 

QUESTIONS FOR MR. YECK 

Thursday, March 8, 2012 

10:00 a.m. 

1. It is my understanding that project sub-awardees are managed by the MREFC 

project, not NSF. How are those sub-awardees managed? Does NSF have any 

role in that relationship? 

IceCube MREFC Project Sub-awardees are managed by the primary awardee, UWMadison, with oversight by the NSF. UW-Madison manages the IceCube MREFC 

Project in accordance with an integrated multi-year construction project baseline 

plan approved by NSF. Priorto each Project Year (April 1- March 31) the UWMadison submits an annual Project Execution Plan (PEP) to the NSF for review and 

approval. The PEP submittals included the list of sub-awardees; and the scope of 

work, budget, schedule, and key personnel for each sub-award. This detailed 

information is taken directly from the integrated construction project baseline plan 

and the performance of each sub-awardee is measured against the approved plan. 

NSF approves significant changes to the plans, including the sub-awardees. 

2. Will the change in Antarctic logistical support contractors from Raytheon to 

Lockheed Martin affect the IceCube closeout processes or operations and 

maintenance? 

We do not expect any adverse impacts from the change in Antarctic logistical 

support contractors. The Raytheon logistic support effort for the IceCube MREFC 

project was completed during the last South Pole season and closeout activities are 

limited to determining the final actual costs and the subsequent validation of costs 

by the NSF. 
103 

Responses by Tony Beasley, COO/Project Manager, Neon, Inc. 

June 12, 2012 

Molly Keaton 

US House of Representatives 

Committee on Science, Space & Techonology 

2321 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington DC 

20515-6301. 

Dear Molly, 

Please find below the NEON response to the question posed by the committee: 

QUESTION FOR DR. BEASLEY: 

1. It is my understanding that project sub-awardees are managed by the MREFC project, not the 

NSF. How are those sub-awardees managed? Does NSF have any role in that relationship? 

Answer: Project sub-awardee management is a direct responsibility of the NEON project office, 

operating under sub-awardee management guidelines stipulated by the NSF in the cooperative 

agreement with NEON, Inc. (including approval thresholds), and following corporate sub-awardee 

monitoring and management guidelines. NSF is not involved in the direct day-to-day management of subawardees, but monitors their progress via reporting required by the MREFC program (e.g. earned value 

reporting) and NEON, Inc. corporate policies. 

Sincerely, 

Dr. Tony Beasley 

NEON Project Manager 
104 

Responses by Dr. Tim Cowles, Vice President and Director, 

Ocean Observing, Consortium for Ocean Leadership 

Cowles - follow-up to MREFC Hearing on March 8, 2012 

(submitted April 15, 2012) 

MREFC and the Ocean Observatories Initiative (001): Management of MREFC 

subawardees by the Consortium for Ocean Leadership 

In response to the question from the Subcommittee: 

How are the project subawardees managed? Does NSF have any role in that 

relationship? 

ANSWER: As outlined in the written testimony for the hearing on March 8, major 

subawards were established in 2007 with the University of Washington, the University of 

California San Diego (UCSD), and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Rutgers, 

The State University of New Jersey, was added in 2011 as another major subawardee. 

The Program Management Office of the 001, within the Consortium for Ocean 

Leadership (COL), directly manages the subawardees under the authority of the 

Cooperative Agreement between COL and NSF. The Cooperative Agreement provides 

NSF with direct access to the subawardees, but principal management responsibility of 

the 001 is held by the awardee (COL). The terms and conditions of the parent 

Cooperative Agreement 'flow down' to each subawardee via the individual subawards. 

Under these terms. the 001 Program Management Office has authority and 

responsibility for the management and performance of the subawardee. and provides 

the NSF with monthly reports about financial and programmatic performance of each 

subawardee. 

The 001 Program Management Office has assigned a Contracting Organization 

Technical Representative (COTR) to each major subaward. The COTR. under the 

supervision of the 001 Senior Project Manager. oversees the execution of work by the 

subawardee, validates that expenditures comply with the terms and conditions of the 

subaward, and checks that work performance is within the scope and schedule of the 

project baseline. The 001 Program Management Office. via the COTR. the Senior 

Project Manager. and the Director, interacts by telephone and/or in person multiple times 

per week with each subawardee. Weekly reports from each COTR are submitted in 

writing to the Senior Project Manager. and form the basis for both near-term and longterm management decisions and approaches. Compliance and performance issues with 

individual subawardees are addressed and resolved by the Program Management 

Office. in consultation with the NSF. In addition to these frequent direct awardeesubawardee interactions. the 001 Program Management Office conducts twice-weekly 

teleconferences that include all the managers from each of the subawardees in order to 

discuss and resolve cross-project issues and concerns. 

The 001 Program Management Office has frequent (multiple times per week) 

teleconferences or in-person meetings with NSF about the progress of the MREFC 

project. These meetings include open discussions of any and all financial and 

programmatic issues or concerns with the 001 subawardees. The 001 Program 

Management Office benefits from a collaborative and transparent interaction with the 

NSF. and applies the resulting advice and guidance to make the management of the 

subawardees as effective and efficient as possible in order to complete the MREFC 

project within the approved budget and schedule. 
(105) 

Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
106 

ADDITIONAL RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD AS SUBMITTED BY

DR. CORA MARRETT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
107 

MREFC Approps Millions of dolla .. 

Total Project BACat 

FI .. t Final COstas project Contingency at Contingency % 

Fadlltv Fiscal Yr Fiscal Yr budgeted starl orolect starl rContlBAC) 

Advanced TechnologySolarTelescope (ATST) 2009 2017 $297.9 $237.7 $60.2 25.3% 

National Ecological Observatory Network 2007 2016 $433.8 $359.6 $74.2 20.6% NEON) 

Ocean Observatories Initiative (001) 2007 2016 $386.4 $298.3 $88.1 29.5% 

Advanced UGO 2008 2014 $205.1 $166.1 $39.1 23.S% 

Atacama Large Multlmlilimeter Arrav (ALMA) 1998 2012 $344.4 $319.1 $25.2 7.9% Initial baseline 

ALMA 2006 rebasellne 1998 2012 $499.3 $442.6 $56.6 12.8% 

IceCube Neutrino Observatory 2002 2010 $242.1 $198.3 $43.8 22.1% 

Alaska Region Research Vessel (ARRV) 2007 2009 $199.5 $165.0 $34.5 20.9% 

EarthScope 2003 2008 $197.4 $188.2 $9.3 4.9% 

Scientific Ocean Drilling Vessel (SODV) 2005 2007 $115.0 $106.1 $8.8 8.3% 

Network for Earthquake Engineering 2000 2004 $81.8 $7l.7 $10.1 14.1% Simulation (NEES) 

Large Hadron COlllder(LHC), NSF contribution 1999 2003 $80.9 $44.5 $36.4 45.0% Including ATlAS and eMS) 

Laser Interferometer Gravitational Wave 1995 1998 $272.5 $216.1 $56.4 26.1% Observatory (UGOI 

2 
108 

lIGO 

IS% 

10% 

0% 

tootingemy as a ptllU!nt of initial 

Budget At Completlon.SAC) 

N£5 ALMA ZOO6r,eb.",nn." 

+ 

:A~I"jll.r + 

soov 

001 

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 199!! :woo ZOOl a002 20Q!1 2OQ4 200s ,006 2007 200a 2000 ZOlO 

vwoffirilt Mlll!FC _oprlatlon 

3 
109 

Æ 

Testimony Insert #2 Page 4S 

As described in Dr. Marrett's testimony, NSF's MREFC process is rigorous and has many entry 

criteria, decision milestones, and "off ramps". Throughout NSF's history - including during the 

MREFC era, many early stage NSF horizon facility concepts have been contemplated; however, 

only a few highly-vetted projects have advanced into and through the MREFC process. Almost 

all of the others were terminated prior to conceptual design and development. Some of the 

scientific objectives were incorporated into othe~rojects that did move forward, and in a few 

cases were implemented on a smaller scale with Research and Related Activities. 

For high priority candidate MREFC projects, NSF invests heavily in preconstruction planning and 

oversight, particularly during the Preliminary and Final Design Stages. Only two NSF MREFC 

projects in those stages have failed to be completed successfully. The DUSEL project was 

terminated in FY 2010 by the Nationai Science Board during the Preliminary Design Stage prior 

to the Preliminary Design Review. As Dr. Marrett stated at the hearing, the Rare Symmetry 

'Violating Processes (RSVP) Project was terminated by NSF during the Final Design Stage prior to 

construction start, in FY 2005. 

NSF policies on termination are stated in the 2005 NSF-NSB report, Setting Priorities for large 

Facility Projects Sponsored by the National Science Foundation, NSB-05-77: "Individual large 

facility projects may be removed from the Readiness List due to insufficient priority over the 

long-term, failure of the plans to reach construction readiness, eclipse by other projects, 

collapse of major international agreements, or any other reason that the Director deems 

appropriate." 

As Dr. Marrett described at the hearing and in her written testimony, NSF's collective 

experience with MREFC projects, including the above cancellations, have contributed to lessons 

learned that drive continual efforts to improve NSF's stewardship processes for large facilities. 

4