DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND 

SECURITY

Oversight and 

Coordination of 

Research and 

Development Should 

Be Strengthened

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2012

GAO-12-837

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-837, a report to 

congressional requesters

September 2012

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Oversight And Coordination of Research and 

Development Should Be Strengthened

Why GAO Did This Study

Conducting R&D on technologies for 

detecting, preventing, and mitigating 

terrorist threats is vital to enhancing 

the security of the nation. Since its 

creation, DHS has spent billions of 

dollars researching and developing 

technologies used to support its 

missions including securing the border, 

detecting nuclear devices, and 

screening airline passengers and 

baggage for explosives, among others. 

Within DHS, S&T conducts R&D and is 

the component responsible for 

coordinating R&D across the 

department, but other components, 

such as the Coast Guard and DNDO, 

also conduct R&D to support their 

respective missions. GAO was asked 

to identify (1) how much DHS invests 

in R&D and the extent to which DHS 

has policies and guidance for defining 

R&D and overseeing R&D resources 

and efforts across the department, and 

(2) the extent to which R&D is 

coordinated within DHS to prevent 

overlap, fragmentation, or unnecessary 

duplication. GAO reviewed information 

on DHS R&D budgets, contracts, and 

DHS spending on R&D at DOE 

national laboratories for fiscal years 

2010 through 2012. GAO also 

reviewed DHS R&D plans and project 

documentation, and interviewed DHS 

headquarters and component officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS develop 

policies and guidance for defining, 

reporting and coordinating R&D 

activities across the department; and 

that DHS establish a mechanism to 

track R&D projects. DHS concurred

with GAO’s recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not know the total amount its 

components invest in research and development (R&D) and does not have 

policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources across 

the department. According to DHS, its Science & Technology Directorate (S&T), 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and U. S. Coast Guard are the only 

components that conduct R&D and, according to GAO’s analysis, these are the 

only components that report budget authority, obligations, or outlays for R&D 

activities to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as part of the budget 

process. However, GAO identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations 

by other DHS components. For example, S&T reported receiving $50 million in 

reimbursements from other DHS components to conduct R&D. Further, 10 

components obligated $55 million for R&D contracts to third parties and $151 

million to Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories for R&D-related 

projects, but these were not reported as R&D to OMB. According to DHS, it is 

difficult to identify all R&D investments across the department because DHS 

does not have a department wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing 

components how to report all R&D spending and activities. As a result, it is 

difficult for DHS to oversee components’ R&D efforts and align them with agency 

wide R&D goals and priorities. Developing specific policies and guidance could 

assist DHS components in better understanding how to report R&D activities, 

and better position DHS to determine how much the agency invests in R&D to 

effectively oversee these investments.

S&T has taken some steps to coordinate R&D efforts across DHS, but the 

department's R&D efforts are fragmented and overlapping, which increases the 

risk of unnecessary duplication. R&D at DHS is inherently fragmented because 

S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO were each given R&D responsibilities in law, 

and other DHS components may pursue and conduct their own R&D efforts as 

long as those activities are coordinated through S&T. S&T uses various 

mechanisms to coordinate its R&D efforts including component liaisons, 

component R&D agreements, joint R&D strategies, and integrated R&D product 

teams composed of S&T and component officials. However, GAO identified 35 

instances of overlap among contracts that DHS components awarded for R&D 

projects. For example, S&T and the Transportation Security Administration both 

awarded overlapping contracts to different vendors to develop advanced 

algorithms to detect the same type of explosive. While GAO did not identify 

instances of unnecessary duplication among these contracts, DHS has not 

developed a policy defining who is responsible for coordinating R&D and what 

processes should be used to coordinate it, and does not have mechanisms to 

track all R&D activities at DHS that could help prevent overlap, fragmentation, or 

unnecessary duplication. For example, S&T did not track homeland securityrelated R&D activities that DHS components contracted through DOE national 

laboratories from fiscal year 2010 through 2013; thus, it could not provide 

information on those contracts. Developing a policy defining the roles and 

responsibilities for coordinating R&D, and establishing coordination processes 

and a mechanism to track all R&D projects could help DHS mitigate existing 

fragmentation and overlap, and reduce the risk of unnecessary duplication.

View GAO-12-837. For more information, 

contact David C.Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or 

maurerd@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

Letter 1 

Background 6

DHS Does Not Know Its Total Investment in R&D, and Policies and 

Guidance Could Help Define and Oversee R&D Efforts 10

S&T Coordinates Some R&D at DHS, but DHS R&D Is Fragmented 

and Overlapping, Increasing the Risk of Unnecessary 

Duplication 18

Conclusions 29

Recommendations for Executive Action 30

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 30

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 32

Appendix II Federal Government Definitions of Research and Development 36

Appendix III Department of Homeland Security Research and Development 

Obligations, Fiscal Year 2011 37

Appendix IV Role of Research and Development in Supporting the Department of 

Homeland Security Acquisition Life Cycle 38

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 39

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 42

Figures

Figure 1: DHS R&D Budget Authority and Outlays, Fiscal Years 

2010 through 2013 12

Figure 2: DHS R&D Obligations, Fiscal Year 2011 14

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

Figure 3: Avenues for Components to Engage in Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) Research and Development 

(R&D) Activities 26

Abbreviations

ASOA Acquisition Support and Operations Analysis

ATD Advanced Technology Development

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CFO Chief Financial Officer

C-TPAT Customs Trade Partners Against Terrorism

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy 

FAR Federal Acquisitions Regulation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FFAS Federal Financial Accounting Standards

FMR Financial Management Regulation

FPDS-NG Federal Procurement Data System Next Generation 

FRG First Responder Group 

HSARPA Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IPT Integrated Product Team

NAPA National Academy of Public Administration

NASA National Aeronautical and Space Administration

NPPD National Protection and Programs Directorate

NSF National Science Foundation

OHA Office of Health Affairs

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

ONL Office of National Laboratories

OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy

PARM Program Accountability and Risk Management

R&D research and development 

RDT&E Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation

S&T Science and Technology Directorate

SDD System Development and Demonstration

STICs Science and Technology Investment Councils

STORE Science and Technology Operational Research and 

 Enhancement

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TTA technology transition agreements

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Page iii GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

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Page 1 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

September 12, 2012

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Chairman

The Honorable Susan Collins

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security 

 and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel Akaka

Chairman

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 

 Management, the Federal Workforce, 

 and the District of Columbia

Committee on Homeland Security 

 and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Conducting research and development (R&D) on technologies for 

detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing 

the security of the nation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

conducts research, development, testing, and evaluation of new 

technologies that are intended to strengthen the United States’ ability to 

prevent and respond to nuclear, biological, explosive, and other types of 

attacks within the United States. The department’s Science and

Technology (S&T) Directorate conducts research, development, 

demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities and also has 

responsibility for coordinating and integrating all such activities of the 

department, as provided by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.1

 

1

Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 302,116 Stat. 2135, 2163-64 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 

182).

Although S&T conducts R&D and has responsibility for coordinating R&D, 

other DHS components, including the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

(DNDO) and the U. S. Coast Guard, conduct R&D in support of their 

respective missions.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

Since it began operations in 2003, DHS, through both S&T and other 

components, has spent billions of dollars researching and developing 

technologies used to support a wide range of missions, including securing 

the border, detecting nuclear devices, and screening airline passengers 

and baggage for explosives, among others. In May 2004, we reported 

that DHS had not completed a strategic plan to identify priorities, goals, 

objectives, and policies for the R&D of homeland security technologies, 

and gaps remained in its efforts to coordinate with other federal agencies 

that conduct homeland security R&D.2 We recommended that DHS 

complete a strategic R&D plan and ensure that the plan was integrated 

with homeland security R&D conducted by other federal agencies. DHS 

agreed with our recommendation but has not yet implemented it. In June 

2009, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) reported on 

S&T’s structure, processes, and the execution of its cross-government 

leadership role.3 NAPA reported that although S&T was charged by 

statute to provide a leading role in guiding homeland-security related

research, S&T has no authority over other federal agencies that conduct 

homeland-security related research, and was in a relatively weak position 

to carry out its leadership role. NAPA further reported that the 

weaknesses in S&T’s strategic planning increased the risk for duplication 

of efforts and recommended, among other things, that S&T follow the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and GAO guidance in 

formulating a strategic plan to guide its work. In July 2012, S&T provided 

a draft strategy that identifies the roles and responsibilities for 

coordinating homeland security science and technology related functions 

across the U.S. government to the White House’s Office of Science & 

Technology Policy for review, but the White House had not yet approved 

that draft.4

In November 2011, we reported that while S&T developed a 5-year R&D 

plan in 2008 to guide its efforts and was finalizing a new strategic plan to 

align its own R&D investments and goals, DHS had not yet completed a 

 

2

GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE’s Laboratories for 

Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies, 

GAO-04-653 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2004). 

3

National Academy of Public Administration, Department of Homeland Security Science 

and Technology Directorate: Developing Technology to Protect America (Washington 

D.C.: June 2009). 

4

We did not review this draft strategy as part of our work on DHS R&D efforts.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

strategic plan to align all R&D efforts across the department, as we 

previously recommended in 2004.5 We also reported that S&T had 

undertaken a series of efforts related to its organizational structure and 

underwent a new strategic planning process, developed new strategic 

goals, and conducted a reorganization intended to better achieve its 

strategic goals as a result of the NAPA study. We also reported that these 

efforts had only recently been initiated, so it was too early to assess their 

effectiveness.6

Not having a department-wide strategy for managing R&D has raised 

questions about the extent to which R&D investments and efforts are 

being overseen and coordinated effectively across DHS. As a result, you 

requested that we conduct a review to determine how DHS oversees 

R&D resources and coordinates R&D efforts across the department. 

Specifically, this report addresses the following two questions:

1. How much does DHS invest in R&D and to what extent does it have

policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D 

resources and efforts across the department?

2. To what extent is R&D coordinated within DHS to prevent overlap, 

fragmentation, and unnecessary duplication across the department?7

To determine how much DHS invests in R&D and the extent to which it 

has policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D 

resources, we reviewed DHS’s budget and congressional budget 

justifications to identify R&D investments reported from fiscal years 2011 

through 2013. To identify DHS’s reported R&D budget authority, we 

analyzed R&D budget authority included in budget submissions to OMB 

 

5

GAO, DHS Research and Development: Science and Technology Directorate’s Test and 

Evaluation and Reorganization Efforts, GAO-12-239T, (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2011).

6

We did not assess the effectiveness of S&T’s strategic planning process or 

reorganization as part of this review.

7

Fragmentation occurs when more than one federal agency (or more than one 

organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad area of national interest. 

Overlap occurs when programs have similar goals, devise similar strategies and activities 

to achieve those goals, or target similar users. Duplication occurs when two or more 

agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities or provide the same services to 

the same beneficiaries.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

from fiscal years 2010 through 2013.8 We also analyzed S&T, DNDO, 

and Coast Guard budgets to identify budget authority for R&D activities in

non-R&D budget accounts. Further, we analyzed data from the Federal 

Procurement Data System Next Generation (FPDS-NG) to identify DHS 

R&D-related contracts for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. We also 

obtained data from the Department of Energy’s (DOE) national 

laboratories from fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to identify how much 

DHS components obligated for R&D-related work at the national 

laboratories. We assessed the reliability of the data we used by 

reconciling it with published data, and interviewing officials responsible for 

overseeing the relevant data systems about, among other things,

applicable quality control procedures to maintain the integrity of the data. 

We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 

of this report. Further, we interviewed S&T, Coast Guard, and DNDO 

budget officials to determine what portions of their budgets would 

appropriately capture total R&D activities, as well as DHS budget officials 

to discuss R&D spending, how DHS oversees R&D funding, and DHS’s 

policies and guidance related to defining, overseeing, and coordinating 

R&D efforts. We also interviewed other DHS component officials to 

discuss the extent to which components conducted R&D, captured R&D 

activities in their budgets, and coordinated with S&T. We compared DHS 

efforts to develop policies and guidance with GAO’s Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government.

9

To determine the extent to which R&D is coordinated within DHS to 

prevent overlap, fragmentation, and unnecessary duplication, we 

reviewed data on about 15,000 federal procurement contract actions 

coded as R&D in FPDS-NG made by DHS components from fiscal years 

2007 through 2011 to identify contracts that were overlapping or 

duplicative of other contracts issued by different components.

 

10

 

8

Budget authority is authority provided by federal law to enter into financial obligations that 

will result in immediate or future outlays involving federal government funds. 

We 

selected 50 R&D contracts that appeared to contain overlap and 

interviewed the officials of the six components that issued them to discuss 

the nature of those contracts. We could not determine the full extent of 

9

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999). 

10This was the total number of DHS contract actions taken from fiscal years 2007 through 

2011. 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

duplication or overlap occurring in the department, because, among other 

things, the FPDS-NG data system captures only a portion of the total 

R&D activities occurring at DHS. We also used our past work on 

fragmentation, overlap, and duplication across the federal government,11

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,

12 and our prior 

work related to federal collaboration to assess DHS’s coordination of R&D 

across the department.13

We conducted this performance audit from September 2011 through 

September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We also interviewed S&T leadership, technical 

division directors, and DHS component officials to discuss S&T and 

DHS’s R&D coordination processes. More details on our scope and 

methodology can be found in appendix I.

 

11 GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); Follow-up on 2011 Report: Status of Actions Taken to Reduce 

Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, 

GAO-12-453SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); Employment for People with 

Disabilities: Little Is Known about the Effectiveness of Fragmented and Overlapping 

Programs, GAO-12-677 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012); and Justice Grant Programs: 

DOJ Should Do More to Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance 

Program Assessment, GAO-12-517 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012).

12GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

13GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); 

Cybersecurity: Key Challenges Need to Be Addressed to Improve Research and 

Development, GAO-10-466 (Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2010) and Homeland Security:

DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE’s Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, 

and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies, GAO-04-653 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 24, 2004). 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

OMB requires agencies to submit data on R&D programs as part of their 

annual budget submissions. Specifically, agencies are to provide data on 

investments for basic research, applied research, development, R&D 

facilities construction, and major equipment for R&D. OMB provides one 

definition of R&D that all federal agencies are to use to prepare budget 

estimates (see app. II for a list of federal R&D definitions). According to 

OMB, R&D activities comprise creative work undertaken on a systematic 

basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of 

man, culture, and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to 

devise new applications.14 R&D is further broken down into the following 

three stages, as defined by OMB.15

• Basic research is a systematic study directed toward a fuller 

knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of 

phenomena and of observable facts without specific applications 

towards processes or products in mind.

• Applied research is a systematic study to gain knowledge or 

understanding to determine the means by which a recognized and 

specific need may be met.

• Development is a systematic application of knowledge or 

understanding, directed toward the production of useful materials, 

devices, and systems or methods, including design, development, and 

improvement of prototypes and new processes to meet specific 

requirements.

 

14OMB Circular No. A-11 Section 84.4. This definition includes administrative expenses 

for R&D, but excludes physical assets for R&D (such as R&D equipment and facilities), 

routine testing, quality control mapping, collection of general-purpose statistics, 

experimental production, routine monitoring and evaluation of an operational program and 

the training of scientific and technical personnel.

15OMB Circular No. A-11 Section 84 Character Classification (Schedule C) (2011). OMB 

has used these or similar categories in its collection of R&D data since 1949 (OMB, Fiscal 

Year 2013 Analytical Perspectives, 2013 Budget of the U.S. Government, pg. 368).

Background 

Definition of R&D in the 

Federal Government
 

Page 7 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

There are several mechanisms by which agencies such as DHS are 

required to report their investments in R&D, and investments can be 

described in the following ways:

• Budget authority is the legal authorization to obligate funds.

• Obligations are binding agreements for the government to make a 

payment (outlay) for goods and services ordered or received.

• Outlays are payments to liquidate obligations and represent the 

amount actually expended.

For R&D activities, OMB directs agencies to submit information on budget 

authority and outlays for each year. Because the executive branch and 

Congress generally make budget decisions in terms of budget authority, 

budget authority can provide insight into relative priorities within the 

annual budget process and changes in budget policies.16 Agencies report 

obligation data to OMB by object classification. Object classes are 

categories that present obligations for items or services purchased 

according to their initial purpose. For R&D-related obligations, OMB has a 

separate category for R&D contracts (object class 25.5). OMB also 

includes some advisory and assistance services for R&D in a separate 

object class category (object class 25.1).17

DHS is one of nine federal agencies that reported a total of $5 billion in 

budget authority in fiscal year 2011 for homeland security R&D.18

 

16GAO, Budget Account Structure: A Descriptive Overview, 

According to DHS, S&T, DNDO, and the Coast Guard are the three 

components that conduct R&D within the department, with S&T by far 

GAO/AIMD-95-179 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept 18, 1995). 

17GAO has reported in the past that using object class data is not reliable because the 

categories are not mutually exclusive. GAO, Budget Object Classification: Origins and 

Recent Trends, GAO/AIMD-94-147 (Washington, D.C.: Sept 13, 1994). Although OMB 

defines a separate category for R&D contracts (25.5), there is some overlap with the 

Advisory Services category (25.1). OMB object class 25.1 for advisory and assistance 

services is not exclusive to R&D and can be used for other types of services. 

18The other agencies conducting homeland security R&D included the Departments of 

Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, and Health and Human Services; the National 

Aeronautical and Space Administration; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the 

National Science Foundation. 

DHS R&D Investment
 

Page 8 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

being the largest R&D entity. DHS reported $512 million in budget 

authority and $752 million in outlays for R&D in fiscal year 2011.19

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established S&T within DHS and 

provided it with responsibility for, among other things:

• conducting basic and applied research, development, demonstration, 

and testing and evaluation activities relevant to any or all elements of 

DHS;

• establishing and administering the primary R&D activities of the 

department, including the long-term research and development needs 

and capabilities for all elements of the department; and

• coordinating and integrating all research, development, 

demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities of the department.20

S&T has six technical divisions responsible for managing S&T’s R&D 

portfolio and coordinating with other DHS components to identify R&D 

priorities and needs.21

 

19Because outlays are payments to liquidate obligations, they may not occur in the same 

fiscal year as the budget authority under which the obligation was made. As a result, 

outlays generally do not equal budget authority in any given fiscal year. In addition, for the 

purpose of this report, we do not include outlays or budget authority for R&D facilities.

As of September 2012, S&T had approximately 79

active R&D projects. Most of S&T’s R&D portfolio consists of applied and 

development R&D projects for its DHS customers. It also conducts other 

projects for additional customers, including other federal agencies, first 

responders, and industry, among others.

20Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 302, 116 Stat. 2135, 2163-64 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. 

§ 182). 

21These divisions are the Borders and Maritime Division, Chemical/Biological Defense 

Division, Cyber Security Division, Explosives Division, Human Factors/ Behavioral 

Sciences Division, and the Infrastructure Protection and Disaster Management Division. 

In addition, S&T’s First Responder Group (FRG) identifies, validates, and facilitates the 

fulfillment of first responder requirements through the use of existing and emerging 

technologies, knowledge products, and the development of technical standards, according 

to S&T FRG officials. 

R&D Roles and 

Responsibilities at DHS
 

Page 9 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

In addition to S&T, DNDO and the Coast Guard conduct R&D activities.22

After its establishment in 2005, DNDO assumed responsibility from S&T 

for certain nuclear and radiological R&D activities. DNDO is the primary 

federal organization responsible for developing, acquiring, and supporting 

the deployment of an enhanced domestic system to detect and report on 

attempts to import, possess, store, transport, develop, or use an 

unauthorized nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or radiological 

material in the United States.23 As of August 2012, DNDO officials 

estimated that they have 30 R&D projects and plan to obligate $75.9 

million for R&D in fiscal year 2012. According to Coast Guard officials, the 

Coast Guard R&D Center conducts R&D projects to support the Coast 

Guard’s priorities, primarily focusing on maritime safety-related projects. 

As of August 2012, Coast Guard officials estimated that they have 60-70 

applied research projects and have spent about $30 million on R&D in 

fiscal year 2012 so far.

In 2010, Congress directed us to identify programs, agencies, offices, and 

initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within departments and 

government-wide and report annually to Congress.24 In March 2011 and 

February 2012, we issued our first two annual reports to Congress in 

response to this requirement.25

 

22DNDO was established by National Security Presidential Directive 43 - Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 14 and the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 

2006 (SAFE Port Act). Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 501(a), 120 Stat. 1884, 1932 (codified at 6 

U.S.C. § 591). When the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred Coast Guard to the 

newly established DHS, it provided that the Coast Guard is to be maintained as a distinct 

entity within the department and that the authorities, functions, and capabilities of the 

Coast Guard to perform its missions are to be maintained intact. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 

888, 116 Stat. 2135, 2249 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 468). 

The annual reports describe areas in 

which we found evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication among 

federal programs. Using the framework established in our prior work on 

addressing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, we use the following 

definitions for the purpose of assessing DHS’s R&D efforts:

23Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 501(a), 120 Stat. 1884, 1932 (2006) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 592). 

24Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 21, 124 Stat. 29 (2010), 31 U.S.C. § 712 Note. 

25See GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, 

Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: March 1, 

2011) and GAO-12-342SP. 

Our Work on 

Fragmentation, Overlap, 

and Duplication
 

Page 10 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

• Fragmentation occurs when more than one federal agency (or more 

than one organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad 

area of national interest.

• Overlap occurs when multiple programs have similar goals, engage in 

similar activities or strategies to achieve those goals, or target similar 

beneficiaries. Overlap may result from statutory or other limitations 

beyond the agency’s control.

• Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are 

engaging in the same activities or providing the same services to the 

same beneficiaries.

DHS does not know how much all of its components invest in R&D, 

making it difficult to oversee R&D efforts across the department. 

According to DHS budget officials, S&T, DNDO, and the Coast Guard are 

the only components that conduct R&D and, according to our analysis, 

they are the only components that report budget authority, obligations, or 

outlays for R&D activities to OMB as part of the budget process. 

However, we identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations by 

other DHS components. Further, we found that DNDO did not report 

certain R&D budget data to OMB, and R&D budget accounts include a 

mix of R&D and non-R&D spending, further complicating DHS’s ability to 

identify its total investment in R&D.

Our analysis of the data that DHS submitted to OMB found that DHS’s 

R&D obligations were underreported because other DHS components

obligated money for R&D contracts that were not reported to OMB as 

R&D. Specifically, for fiscal year 2011, our analysis identified $255 million 

in obligations for R&D that DHS did not report as R&D contracts in the 

object classification tables. These obligations included DHS components 

DHS Does Not Know 

Its Total Investment in 

R&D, and Policies and 

Guidance Could Help 

Define and Oversee 

R&D Efforts

DHS Does Not Know Its 

Total Investment in R&D

R&D Obligations Not Reported 

as R&D
 

Page 11 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

providing S&T with funding to conduct R&D on their behalf and 

components obligating funds through contracts directly to industry, 

universities, or with DOE’s national laboratories for R&D. Specifically:

• S&T reported receiving $50 million in reimbursements from other DHS 

components, such as U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the 

Secret Service, the Office of Health Affairs, Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), and the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) to conduct R&D projects.26

• Our analysis identified 10 components, including CBP, TSA, U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), that obligated 

approximately $55 million for R&D contracts that were not reported as 

R&D.

These obligations were not 

identified as R&D in these components’ budgets.

27

• Our analysis identified that DHS components, outside of S&T, DNDO, 

and the Coast Guard, obligated $151 million to DOE national 

laboratories for R&D-related projects (44 percent of total DHS 

spending at the national laboratories in fiscal year 2011).28

Our analysis of the data that DHS submitted to OMB also showed that 

DHS’s R&D budget authority and outlays were underreported because 

DNDO did not properly report its R&D budget authority and outlays to 

OMB for fiscal years 2010 through 2013. Specifically, for fiscal years 

2010 through 2013, DHS underreported its total R&D budget authority by 

at least $293 million and outlays for R&D by at least $282 million because 

DNDO did not accurately report the data.

For 

example, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) 

obligated $83 million to DOE national laboratories in fiscal year 2011 

(see app. III for R&D obligations by component). 

29

 

26This figure excludes reimbursements from DNDO and the Coast Guard to S&T. 

In fiscal year 2011, S&T and 

27We analyzed and identified DHS R&D contracts in FPDS-NG categorized as basic 

research, applied research and exploratory development, and advanced development.

28DHS provided data on obligations to DOE national laboratories.

29DNDO budget officials told us that they accounted for their R&D spending in the object 

class codes of Schedule O of MAX A-11, but did not enter it into Schedule C of MAX. 

OMB reports the R&D budget authority and outlays from Schedule C. 

R&D Outlays and Budget 

Authority
 

Page 12 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

the Coast Guard reported $512 million in R&D budget authority and $752 

million in outlays, but DNDO did not report $56 million in R&D budget 

authority or $80 million in outlays.30

Figure 1: DHS R&D Budget Authority and Outlays, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2013

DNDO officials gave us the data for 

the missing years as depicted in figure 1 along with S&T and Coast 

Guard data.

Notes:

Figures do not include spending on R&D facilities.

Outlays are actual expenditure of funds and may occur many years after the funds were authorized 

and obligated.

DNDO budget officials told us that they are aware of the omission and 

confirmed that the OMB submission will be corrected in fiscal year 2013. 

DHS budget officials agreed that DHS underreported its R&D spending 

 

30DNDO’s R&D budget authority for fiscal year 2011 does not include the funding for the 

DNDO Transformational and Applied Research (TAR) Programs because the TAR 

program had been proposed to be transferred to S&T, but the Department has since 

reexamined that position and TAR has remained in DNDO, as reflected in the fiscal year 

2012 and 2013 budgets.
 

Page 13 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

and when asked, could not provide a reason why the omission was not 

flagged by DHS review.

In addition, within S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO, it is difficult to 

identify all R&D funding because their R&D budget accounts fund both 

R&D and non-R&D investments. For fiscal year 2011, we estimated that 

78 percent of S&T’s Research, Development, Acquisition, & Operations 

account, 51 percent of DNDO’s “Research, Development, & Operations” 

account, and 43 percent of the Coast Guard’s R&D budget account fund 

R&D activities. Figure 2 provides the various S&T, DNDO, and Coast 

Guard budget accounts and budget activities and what percentage of 

each account was obligated for R&D in fiscal year 2011.
 

Page 14 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

Figure 2: DHS R&D Obligations, Fiscal Year 2011

Notes:

Percentages might not be exact due to rounding.

For budget activities that officials told us were solely for R&D, such as S&T’s Research, Development 

and Innovation and University Programs and DNDO’s Transformational R&D, we counted the total 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

obligations from the activity as R&D obligations. For budget activities with both R&D and non-R&D 

obligations, we analyzed object classification tables, specifically object class 25.5 R&D contracts, to 

identify obligations for R&D from each budget activity.

A portion of Coast Guard’s obligations for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) is 

made for personnel compensation and benefits. Obligations for this purpose are identified in the 

object classification tables in the budget justification. For FY2011, Coast Guard obligated $11.4 

million for personnel compensation and benefits. Subtracting this from total obligations for the RDT&E 

budget account gives us the total obligations for Coast Guard mission R&D activities, $9 million.

DHS’s budget director recognized that spending in areas that cut across 

the department, like R&D, are difficult to manage and told us that DHS 

does not have oversight of R&D across the department. DHS is taking 

some steps to address this, including identifying R&D as a budget line in 

DHS’s proposed unified account structure, which was submitted to 

Congress in the fiscal year 2013 budget for approval.

In 2007, we reported that appropriators rely on budget exhibits to inform 

the decision to authorize and appropriate funds for many programs; thus, 

accurate classifications of program and projects by budget activity are 

needed for decision makers to readily understand how projects are 

progressing and how money is being spent.31 Specifically regarding R&D, 

we reported that decision makers use the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) budget reports, which detail a project’s stage of development, to 

assess how much is being invested in fundamental science and 

technology and to determine the future capabilities of U.S. military forces.

DHS does not have a departmentwide policy defining R&D or guidance 

directing components how to report R&D activities. As a result, it is 

difficult to identify the department’s total investment in R&D, which limits 

DHS’s ability to oversee components’ R&D efforts and align them with 

agencywide R&D goals and priorities. DHS officials told us that DHS uses 

OMB’s definition of R&D, but the definition is broad and its application 

may not be uniform across components, and thus, R&D investments may 

not always be identified as R&D. For example, DHS officials told us that 

test and evaluation is generally not considered R&D because the purpose 

is to test how an existing technology fits into an operational environment. 

However, S&T’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) told us that S&T reports 

test and evaluation activities as part of its R&D budget authority.

 

31GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Research and Development Budget Requests to 

Congress Do Not Provide Consistent, Complete, and Clear Information. GAO-07-1058 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2007). 

Policies and Guidance for 

Defining and Reporting 

R&D Could Improve 

Oversight
 

Page 16 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

Further, DHS officials told us that there is no distinct line between capital 

investments and the R&D for technology development. For example, 

NPPD officials told us they consider its cybersecurity system to be a 

capital investment, and not R&D, but they consider R&D of new 

technologies as an important aspect of this system. The variation in R&D 

definitions may contribute to the unreliability of the reporting mechanisms 

for R&D investments in budget development and execution, as discussed 

above. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state 

that policies and mechanisms are needed to enforce management’s 

directives, such as the process of adhering to requirements for budget 

development and execution and to ensure the reliability of those and 

other reports for internal and external use.32 Additionally, we previously 

reported that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts 

by defining and articulating a common outcome and establishing 

compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across 

agency boundaries.33

Other agencies that have conducted R&D longer than DHS, like DOD and 

the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA), have 

recognized the need to develop policies to better define what efforts 

constitute R&D and manage their R&D activities. For example, DOD’s 

Financial Management Regulation defines seven stages of technological 

maturity for R&D activities and links them to the budget process to 

increase transparency and oversight of R&D throughout the department.

Such definitions could help DHS better identify its 

R&D investment.

34

Similarly, NASA has a directive that outlines its “cohesive management 

process” for its R&D activities, which illustrates program and project life 

cycles and defines the roles and responsibilities of key management 

personnel.35

 

32

DHS officials stated that the Chief Financial Officer’s (CFO) 

office has oversight of R&D across the department through monthly 

reports submitted by components. For example, S&T provides monthly 

reports on R&D obligations to the CFO that detail obligations by individual 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

33GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).

34DOD FMR, DoD 7000.14-R, Volume 2B, Chapter 5.

35NASA Procedural Requirements: NASA Research and Technology Program and Project 

Management Requirements. NPR 7120.8 (Effective Date February, 05, 2008).
 

Page 17 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

appropriation accounts for R&D activities. However, those reports include 

R&D that is reported as R&D obligations in the budget process and do not 

provide financial details for the R&D investments made by components 

other than S&T, DNDO, and the Coast Guard, as described earlier in this 

report.

The challenges DHS faces in managing its R&D efforts are similar to the 

challenges the department has faced in managing its acquisitions. In 

September 2008, we reported that DHS had not integrated the acquisition 

function across the department and did not have adequate oversight of all 

of its acquisition programs.36 DHS officials agreed with our findings and 

the agency has taken steps to implement policies and guidance to ensure 

that components follow consistent acquisition practices and that a 

process exists to oversee acquisition programs, as outlined in Acquisition 

Management Directive 102-01 (AMD 102-01).37 Officials at DHS’s 

Program Accountability and Risk Management office (PARM) agreed the 

department has not developed policies or guidance on how components 

should define and oversee R&D investments and efforts. They stated that 

they are in the process of updating AMD 102-01 to include additional 

sections pertaining to nonacquisition investments and that such R&D 

policy and guidance could be incorporated into such updates in the future. 

(See App. IV for an illustration of how R&D supports all four phases of 

DHS’s Acquisition Life Cycle as defined by AMD 102-01). Such an update 

could establish policy and guidance for defining R&D consistently across 

the department and outline the processes and procedures for overseeing 

R&D, which would provide more oversight into the R&D investments 

across the department.

 

36GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress and Continuing Concerns with 

Acquisition Management, GAO-08-1164T, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2008), and 

Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions, 

GAO-10-588SP (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010).

37AMD 102 defines policy and provides guidance for managing and tracking DHS’s 

acquisition programs. 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

S&T has coordinated R&D efforts across DHS to some extent, but the 

department’s R&D efforts are fragmented and overlapping, which 

increases the risk of unnecessary duplication. We identified 35 instances 

of overlap among contracts that DHS components awarded for R&D 

projects, but did not identify instances of duplication among these 

contracts. Additionally, DHS has not developed a policy defining who is 

responsible for coordinating R&D and what processes should be used to 

coordinate it, and S&T does not have mechanisms to track all R&D 

activities at DHS. Developing a policy defining the roles and 

responsibilities for coordinating R&D, and establishing coordination 

processes and a mechanism to track all R&D projects could help DHS 

mitigate existing fragmentation and overlap, and reduce the risk of 

unnecessary duplication.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, among other things, requires that 

S&T coordinate and integrate all research, development, demonstration, 

testing, and evaluation activities within DHS and establish and administer 

the primary R&D activities of the department.38

S&T officials stated that one of the primary ways that S&T mitigates the 

risk of overlap and duplication is through component liaisons staffed at 

S&T and S&T officials staffed at component agencies. Component 

liaisons became a primary coordination mechanism under the former 

Under Secretary who requested a Coast Guard official to work at S&T as 

a deputy division director. According to S&T officials, these component 

liaisons have been integral to S&T’s coordination efforts. As of July 2012, 

S&T had eight liaisons from TSA, CBP, ICE, NPPD, the Secret Service, 

and the Coast Guard. In addition, S&T had seven employees detailed to 

other components, including CBP, the Secret Service, DHS’s Office of 

Policy, DHS’s Tactical Communications Program Office, DNDO, and 

TSA, as well as two liaisons at FEMA and DHS’s Office of the Chief 

Financial Officer. According to S&T, liaisons help S&T maintain 

To carry out these 

responsibilities, S&T developed coordination practices that fall into four 

general categories: (1) S&T component liaisons, (2) R&D agreements 

between component heads and S&T, (3) joint R&D strategies between 

S&T and components, and (4) various R&D coordination teams made up 

of S&T and component project managers.

 

386 U.S.C. § 182.

S&T Coordinates 

Some R&D at DHS, 

but DHS R&D Is 

Fragmented and 

Overlapping, 

Increasing the Risk of 

Unnecessary 

Duplication 

S&T Has Taken Some 

Actions to Coordinate 

R&D across DHS

S&T Component Liaisons
 

Page 19 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

communication with components on R&D needs and related activities. 

For example, CBP requested an S&T liaison to provide technical 

expertise to its acquisition division. However, S&T does not have liaisons 

with every component.

S&T signed agreements with two components—CBP and the Secret 

Service—to help coordinate R&D activities. Under those agreements, 

S&T is working with the components on high-level “Apex projects” that 

are intended to solve components’ strategic operational problems within 2 

years. For example, S&T and the Secret Service have an Apex project 

called the Science and Technology Operational Research and 

Enhancement project that was initiated in June 2010 to provide 

technology solutions for the Secret Service to define, establish, and 

document the near- and long-term R&D strategy for the protection of 

national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, designated 

sites, and national special security events. S&T officials stated that the 

Apex project required development and testing of about seven 

technologies which the Secret Service plans to incorporate into its 

operations. As of July 2012, S&T officials reported that all seven 

technologies were in the developmental stage and will undergo testing in 

late 2012. For the CBP Apex project, S&T is overseeing the development 

and evaluation of new technology and infrastructure to help CBP create 

Secure Transit Corridors.39

Further, S&T provided us with three memorandums of agreement it 

entered into with DHS components as a means to coordinate R&D efforts. 

Specifically, S&T has agreements with CBP to develop a rapid response 

S&T officials stated that, as of July 2012, the 

project was on track to be completed in 1 year. S&T officials stated that it 

can accommodate only three or four Apex projects at any given time 

because of the time and resources required, but that it anticipates starting 

future Apex projects with FEMA and ICE. As a result, these high-level 

partnerships are not intended to address all customer needs at DHS.

 

39The Secure Transit Corridors will allow Customs Trade Partners Against Terrorism (CTPAT) Tier III members with supply chain routes originating in Mexico or Canada. The CTPAT is part of CBP’s approach for overseeing the security of containerized cargo and the 

flow of international goods by developing a voluntary antiterrorism partnership with 

importers; customs brokers; air, sea, and land carriers; and other logistics service

providers such as freight consolidators and nonvessel common carriers. Tier III members 

receive certain program benefits, such as expedited release of cargo in U.S. ports, upon 

validation that members demonstrate sustained commitment to maintaining security 

measures and supply chain security practices. 

Component R&D Agreements
 

Page 20 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

prototype, the Coast Guard to develop a test bed, and TSA to coordinate 

the transition of the Transportation Security Laboratory from TSA to S&T

which, was completed in 2006. S&T is also currently working with TSA on 

an Aviation Security agreement that is to result in S&T supporting TSA in 

various areas (as outlined in the agreement) and providing technology to 

address capability gaps. S&T plans to initiate similar partnerships first 

with CBP, then with ICE and FEMA.

S&T also works with DHS components to ensure that it meets their R&D 

needs by signing technology transition agreements (TTA) to ensure that 

components use the technologies S&T develops. S&T has 42 TTAs with 

DHS components. For example, TSA agreed to integrate automated 

intent detection technologies to better detect unknown threats before they 

enter the country into its behavior detection-screening program once S&T 

successfully demonstrated that the technologies met performance 

requirements. Additionally, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service 

(USCIS) agreed to deploy rapid DNA-based screening technologies to 

determine kinship to use in the refugee and asylum eligibility 

determination process upon S&T demonstrating that the technology 

meets certain performance criteria. According to S&T officials, none of 

these TTAs has yet resulted in a technology being transitioned from S&T 

to a component.

In March 2011, S&T and TSA issued a joint R&D strategy for aviation 

security that identifies TSA’s R&D priorities. That plan was a result of an 

internal planning process that prioritized capability gaps and focused on 

the work between TSA and S&T’s Explosives and Human 

Factors/Behavioral Sciences Divisions. According to TSA officials, the 

joint R&D strategic plan does not represent a TSA-wide R&D strategy 

because it does not include surface transportation security capability 

gaps. Rather, the officials said that TSA uses the National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan and an R&D working group with S&T to identify those 

capability gaps. S&T officials stated that it is currently updating its R&D 

Strategy with TSA. S&T is also planning to work with the Secret Service, 

CBP, ICE, and FEMA to build component-specific R&D strategies that are 

linked to component acquisition programs.40

 

40We did not receive information on when S&T planned to complete those R&D strategies.

Component R&D Strategies
 

Page 21 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

S&T’s previous Under Secretary instituted the Capstone Integrated 

Product Teams (IPT) process to coordinate R&D efforts between S&T 

and components. IPTs served as S&T’s primary mechanism for 

coordinating R&D and consisted of members from S&T and component 

agencies. In S&T’s 5-year R&D plan for fiscal years 2008 through 2013, 

S&T identified 12 IPTs, each of which was focused on a different topic 

and brought together decision makers from DHS components and S&T, 

as well as end users of technologies.41

According to S&T division directors and officials we interviewed, the IPT 

process is no longer in place to coordinate R&D activities at the 

component level, but IPTs are being used by the division directors to 

coordinate R&D activities at the project level.

Additionally, the IPT process 

included teams to coordinate R&D at the project level among S&T and 

components. IPTs solicited input from components to identify and 

address technology gaps and needs and were intended to assist 

operational units in making decisions about technology investments, 

based on S&T’s understanding of technology and the state of applicable 

technology solutions. For example, members of the cargo security IPT 

determined that the capability gap that should be addressed was 

enhancing cargo screening and examination systems through detecting 

or identifying terrorist contraband items, like drugs or illegal firearms. As a 

result, S&T identified CanScan, a nonintrusive inspection system as a 

means for addressing that gap.

42

 

41IPT areas were border security, cargo security, chemical/biological defense, cyber 

security, counter improvised explosive device (IED), transportation security, incident 

management, infrastructure protection, information sharing/management, interoperability, 

maritime security, and people screening.

In July 2011, S&T 

announced the creation of a new process, called Science and Technology 

Investment Councils, which would coordinate R&D activities at the most 

senior levels of each component, rather than at the program manager 

level. However, S&T later decided not to implement the councils and 

instead began implementing two new coordination teams in the fall of 

2011—a cross-functional team composed of S&T personnel focusing on 

strategic priorities and an integral partner team—led by S&T’s newly 

created Acquisition Support and Operations Analysis (ASOA) division to 

42We interviewed directors of divisions responsible for coordinating R&D activities 

throughout the department. These included Borders and Maritime Division, Chemical and 

Biological Division, Cyber Security Division, Explosives Division, Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division, and Infrastructure Protection Division.

R&D Coordination Teams
 

Page 22 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

focus on components’ operational needs.43 According to S&T division 

directors, these new teams are not yet fully implemented and they are still 

using established relationships with components through the IPT process 

to identify components needs and coordinate R&D. Additionally, S&T still 

maintains IPTs with TSA on surface transportation.

R&D at DHS is inherently fragmented because several components within 

DHS—S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO—were each given R&D 

responsibilities in law, and other DHS components may pursue and 

conduct their own R&D efforts as long as those activities are coordinated 

through S&T. Fragmentation among R&D efforts at DHS may be 

advantageous if the department determines that it could gain better or 

faster results by having multiple components engage in R&D activities 

toward a similar goal; however, it can be disadvantageous if those 

activities are uncoordinated or unintentionally overlapping or duplicative.

To illustrate overlap and the potential for unnecessary duplication, we 

reviewed data on about 15,000 federal procurement contract actions 

coded as R&D taken by DHS components from fiscal years 2007 through 

2012.44 See appendix 1 for details on our methodology for identifying 

overlap. Of those, we identified 50 R&D contracts issued by six DHS 

components—S&T, TSA, FEMA, the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), the 

Coast Guard, and CBP—that appeared to have similar activities with 

another contract and interviewed component officials about those R&D 

activities. We obtained 47 of those 50 contracts and reviewed their 

statements of work.45

 

43ASOA works with the Under Secretary for Management to aid the components in 

developing high-fidelity, testable operational requirements for their acquisitions; aid in 

executing an analysis of alternatives to ensure that the most appropriate technical 

approach is taken; and partner with the components throughout an acquisition so that user 

needs are translated into real capabilities that can be validated upon delivery and 

deployed without delay.

On the basis of that analysis and our interviews with 

components, we identified 35 instances of overlap where components 

awarded R&D contracts that overlapped with R&D activities conducted 

44In some cases, contracts were initially awarded prior to 2007 but had contract actions 

taken—whether changes to contracting officials, extended period of performance, 

changes to tasks requested, or other modifications—during fiscal years 2007 through 

2012. These modifications to initial contracts were included in our analysis. 

45The Coast Guard, OHA, and DHS were unable to provide 3 contracts that we requested.

DHS R&D Is Fragmented 

and Overlapping, 

Increasing the Risk of 

Unnecessary Duplication
 

Page 23 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

elsewhere in the department. We also found that DHS did not have 

tracking mechanisms or policies to help ensure that this overlap be 

avoided and better coordinated.46

• S&T awarded four separate contracts to develop methods of detecting 

ammonium nitrate and urea nitrate for the counter-IED program. TSA 

also awarded a contract to a private vendor to investigate the 

detection of ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate-based 

explosives. These contracts were similar in that they all addressed the 

detection of the same chemical.

For example:

• S&T awarded four separate contracts to develop advanced algorithms 

for explosives detection, while TSA also awarded contracts to develop 

algorithms to evaluate images for explosives. We determined that 

these R&D contracts overlapped because both components were 

involved in developing algorithms for explosives detection.

• S&T awarded a contract to a private vendor for support and analysis 

for seismic hazards, while FEMA also awarded a contract to a private 

vendor to develop seismic guidelines for buildings in the event of an 

earthquake. These contracts overlapped because they were both 

similar in scope.

Although the contracts we selected overlapped, we determined that they 

were not duplicative based on our analysis and our interviews with 

component officials. For example, TSA officials stated that all TSA R&D 

contracts we requested were initially awarded when TSA still conducted 

transportation security-related R&D and were managed by the 

Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL), which moved into S&T in 

2006.47

 

46We also examined about 1,000 task orders sent to the national laboratories by DHS 

components, but the data did not include sufficient detail to use for this analysis. 

As a result, TSA did not have oversight into those contracts. 

Additionally, TSA officials stated that some of the contracts may have 

overlapped in the scope of work but were focused on different operational 

missions. S&T officials agreed with TSA, stating that some of this overlap 

occurred during a period of time when TSA was still conducting R&D 

47The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2006 DHS appropriations act 

provided that certain funding was for consolidating all of DHS’s R&D efforts except the 

Coast Guard’s R&D efforts into S&T. H. Rep. No. 109-241, at 82 (2005). That 

consolidation took place in 2006. 
 

Page 24 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

through TSL and during a time when S&T did not have the level of 

contract oversight that it has now. FEMA officials stated that FEMA’s 

research projects are related to earthquake hazards, rather than to 

multiple hazards like S&T’s research projects. They stated that FEMA’s 

coordination with S&T is dependent on prior personal relationships rather 

than through an established coordination process.

According to S&T officials, a process does not exist at DHS or within S&T 

to prevent overlap or unnecessary duplication but that relationships with 

components mitigate that risk. They also stated that S&T has improved 

interactions with components over time. For example, S&T officials stated 

that when CBP requested mobile radios to improve communication 

among its field staff, S&T knew that the Secret Service and ICE were 

already working in that area. To address this technology need, S&T 

provided a senior official to lead the Tactical Communication Team to 

address communication among different operational components and 

better coordinate those efforts.

In conducting this analysis, we recognize that overlapping R&D activities 

across similar areas may not be problematic. However, the existence of 

overlapping R&D activities coupled with the lack of policies and guidance 

defining R&D (as mentioned previously) and coordination processes is an 

indication that not all R&D activities at DHS are coordinated to ensure 

that R&D is not unnecessarily duplicative. As a result, DHS could 

increase oversight of R&D, and improve coordination of R&D activities to 

ensure that any duplication in R&D activities is purposeful rather than 

unnecessary, as discussed later in this draft. Overlap and the associated 

risk of unnecessary duplication occur throughout the government, as we 

have reported previously, and are not isolated to DHS.48 However, when 

coupled with consistent programmatic coordination, the risk of 

unnecessary duplication can be diminished.

 

48GAO-12-342SP. 
 

Page 25 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

DHS and S&T do not have the policies and mechanisms necessary to 

coordinate R&D across the department and reduce the risk of 

unnecessary duplication. First, as noted earlier in this report, DHS does 

not have the policies and guidance necessary to define and oversee R&D 

investments across the department. While S&T has taken steps to 

coordinate R&D, DHS has not developed a policy defining who is 

responsible for coordinating R&D and what processes should be used to 

coordinate it. Specifically, while S&T has R&D agreements with some 

components, S&T officials rely on the former IPT process to coordinate 

with components. For example, S&T division directors cited the IPT 

process and personal relationships as the primary means to coordinate 

R&D activities with components and generally felt that they were 

coordinating effectively.

However, other component officials we interviewed did not view S&T’s 

coordination practices as positively. Specifically, we interviewed six 

components to discuss the extent to which they coordinated with S&T on 

R&D activities. Four components stated that S&T did not have an 

established process that detailed how S&T would work with its customers 

or for coordinating all activities at DHS. For example, one component 

stated that S&T has conducted R&D that it thought would address the 

component’s operational need but, when work was completed, the R&D 

project did not fit into the operational environment to meet the 

component’s needs. In addition, without an established coordination 

process, the risk for unnecessary duplication increases, because 

components can engage in R&D activities without coordinating them 

through S&T (see fig. 3).

Policy and Tracking 

Mechanism Could Improve 

Coordination and Reduce 

Risk of Unnecessary 

Duplication 
 

Page 26 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

Figure 3: Avenues for Components to Engage in Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) Research and Development (R&D) Activities

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that 

policies and procedures ensure that the necessary activities occur at all 

levels and functions of the organization—not just from top-level 

leadership. This ensures that all levels of the organization are 

coordinating effectively and as part of a larger strategy. Additionally, 

internal control standards provide that agencies should communicate 

necessary information effectively by ensuring that they are 

communicating with, and obtaining information from, external 

stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving 

its goals. DHS and S&T could be in a better position to coordinate the 

department’s R&D efforts by implementing a specific policy outlining R&D 

roles and responsibilities and processes for coordinating R&D.

Furthermore, S&T and DHS have not developed a mechanism to track all 

ongoing R&D projects conducted across DHS components. Specifically, 

neither DHS nor S&T tracks all ongoing R&D projects across the 

department, including R&D activities contracted through the national 

laboratories. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS the authority 

to use DOE laboratories to conduct R&D and established S&T’s Office of 

National Laboratories (ONL) to be responsible for coordinating and using 
 

Page 27 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

the DOE national laboratories.49 Additionally, DHS Directive 143 further 

directs ONL to serve as the primary point of contact to recommend 

contracting activity approval for work by the national laboratories, and 

review all statements of work issued from DHS and directed to the 

national laboratories. According to S&T, the purpose of that review is to 

ensure the proposed work is within the scope, and complies with the 

terms and conditions, of the prime contract between DOE and the 

national laboratories. We identified 11 components that reimbursed the 

national laboratories for R&D between fiscal years 2010 and 2013, but 

ONL could not provide us with any information on those activities and told 

us it did not track them.50

We previously reported in 2004 that DHS faced challenges using DOE’s 

laboratories and balancing the immediate needs of users of homeland 

security technologies with the need to conduct R&D on advanced 

technologies for the future.

According to S&T, ONL's ability to provide 

information on activities across the department is limited by components 

inconsistently operating within the DHS Directive 143 process for working 

with the national laboratories. According to the Director of ONL, to identify 

activities not reported through the DHS Directive 143 process, S&T uses 

other means such as relationships with components and S&T, as well as 

reviewing task orders sent to the laboratories from DHS, visiting 

laboratories, and laboratories self-reporting their work to ONL. 

51

 

49Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 309, 116 Stat. 2135, 2172 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 189).

DHS agreed with our recommendation to 

create a strategic R&D plan to identify and develop countermeasures to 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist 

threats and to ensure that it detailed how DHS would work with other 

federal agencies to establish governmentwide priorities, identify research 

gaps, avoid duplication of effort, and leverage resources. DHS noted that 

such a plan was critical to the success of the department, and stated that

S&T would complete a strategic planning process in 2004 that would be 

reviewed and updated annually. To date, DHS has not yet developed a 

departmentwide strategic plan for managing R&D, although S&T has 

developed its own plan.

50We received obligations data for fiscal year 2010 and 2011; funding data for fiscal year 

2012, and projected funding data for fiscal year 2013.

51GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE’s Laboratories for 

Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies, 

GAO-04-653 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2004).
 

Page 28 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that 

controls are needed to provide reasonable assurance that, among other 

things, reliable data are obtained, maintained, and fairly disclosed in 

reports and agencies comply with laws and regulations. In addition, in 

June 2010, we reported that R&D information should be tracked in a 

consolidated database in order to fully coordinate cybersecurity R&D 

activities to provide essential information about ongoing and completed 

R&D.52 We recommended that the Director of the Office of Science and 

Technology Policy (OSTP) direct its subcommittee on Networking and 

Information Technology Research and Development to exercise its 

leadership responsibilities by, among other things, establishing and using 

a mechanism to keep track of federal cybersecurity R&D funding.53 OSTP 

agreed with our recommendation. Additionally, we previously reported 

that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by, 

among other things, agreeing on roles and responsibilities and developing 

mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results.54

DHS officials agreed that such mechanisms to track R&D activities were 

necessary, and said they have faced similar challenges in managing 

investments across the department. DHS has attempted to address those 

challenges by, among other things, creating a database called the 

Decision Support Tool that is intended to improve the flow of information 

from component program offices to the DHS Management Directorate to 

support its governance efforts.55

 

52GAO, Cybersecurity: Key Challenges Need to Be Addressed to Improve Research and 

Development, 

The Decision Support Tool could provide 

an example of how DHS could better track ongoing R&D projects 

GAO-10-466 (Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2010).

53The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Subcommittee 

is a multiagency coordination body responsible for providing leadership in coordinating 

cybersecurity R&D.

54GAO-06-15. 

55The Decision Support Tool collects data from existing data systems, including 

information technology, capital investment data and out-year planning and budget data 

from all component agencies’ data systems in order to centralize and standardize the 

management of resources. This includes information technology data from the Next 

Generation Periodic Reporting System, capital investment planning data from the 

Investment Management System, and financial data from the Future Years Homeland 

Security Program. The Future Years Homeland Security Program provides a summary 

and breakdown of DHS program resources over a 5-year period, including resource 

alignment by goals, component appropriations, and component programs, as well as 

program descriptions, milestones, performance measures, and targets. 
 

Page 29 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

occurring in the department. DHS’s PARM officials stated that they 

recently added new data fields to capture more detailed information on 

component activities, such as additional financial data, at a low cost to 

DHS, and that such data fields could be added to collect information and 

track R&D activities across DHS, such as contracts with private 

companies or universities and the associated costs. However, we 

reported in March 2012 that DHS executives were not confident enough 

in the data to use the Decision Support Tool to make acquisition 

decisions, and that DHS’s plans to improve the quality of the data in this 

database were limited.56

Conducting R&D on technologies is a key component of DHS’s efforts to 

detect, prevent, and mitigate terrorist threats and is vital to enhancing the 

security of the nation. Multiple entities across DHS conduct various types 

of R&D in pursuit of their respective missions, but DHS does not have a 

department-wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing components 

how to report R&D activities and investments. As a result, DHS does not 

have the ability to maintain oversight of its total investment in R&D across 

the department, which also limits its ability to oversee components’ R&D 

efforts and align them with agencywide R&D goals and priorities. 

Establishing policies and guidance for defining R&D across the 

department and outlining the processes and procedures for overseeing 

We also reported that DHS had limited plans to 

improve the quality of the data because PARM only planned to check the 

data quality in preparation for key milestone meetings in the acquisition 

process. That could significantly diminish the Decision Support Tool’s 

value, because users cannot confidently identify and take action to 

address problems meeting cost or schedule goals prior to program review 

meetings. As a result, improvements to the Decision Support Tool’s data 

quality before expanding its use could improve the collecting and tracking 

of R&D information and could be used as an example of how to better 

track information occurring across components. DHS is taking actions to 

address the limitations to the Decision Support Tool’s data quality by 

working to validate the Decision Support Tool’s associated acquisition 

data. A policy that defines roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D 

and coordination processes, as well as a mechanism that tracks all DHS 

R&D projects, could better position DHS to mitigate the risk of 

overlapping and unnecessarily duplicative R&D projects.

 

56GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Continued Progress Made Improving and 

Integrating Management Areas, but More Work Remains, GAO-12-365T (Washington, 

D.C. Mar. 1, 2012). 

Conclusions 
 

Page 30 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

R&D would provide more oversight of R&D investments across the 

department. Furthermore, DHS has taken some steps to coordinate R&D 

efforts across the department, but does not have a cohesive policy 

defining roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D and mechanisms 

to track all DHS R&D projects. A policy that defines roles and 

responsibilities for coordinating R&D and coordination processes, as well 

as a mechanism that tracks all DHS R&D projects, could better position 

DHS to mitigate the risk of overlapping and unnecessarily duplicative 

R&D projects.

To help ensure that DHS effectively oversees its R&D investment and 

efforts and reduces fragmentation, overlap, and the risk of unnecessary 

duplication, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

develop and implement policies and guidance for defining and overseeing 

R&D at the department. Such policies and guidance could be included as 

an update to the department’s existing acquisition directive and should 

include the following elements:

• a well-understood definition of R&D that provides reasonable 

assurance that reliable accounting and reporting of R&D resources 

and activities for internal and external use are achieved,

• a description of the department’s process and roles and 

responsibilities for overseeing and coordinating R&D investments and 

efforts, and

• a mechanism to track existing R&D projects and their associated 

costs across the department.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment. 

DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix 

V, and concurred with our recommendation. DHS also described actions 

it plans to take to address the recommendation. Specifically, according to 

DHS, it plans to evaluate the most effective path forward to guide uniform 

treatment of R&D across the department in compliance with OMB rules 

and is considering a management directive, multi component steering 

committee, or new policy guidance to help better oversee and coordinate 

R&D. DHS plans to complete these efforts by May 1, 2013. Such actions

should address the overall intent of our recommendation. However, it will 

be important that whatever DHS chooses to do, its actions address the 

specific elements we outlined in our recommendation, including 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 31 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

developing a definition of R&D, defining roles and responsibilities for 

oversight and coordination, and developing a mechanism to track existing 

R&D projects and investments. 

DHS also provided written technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested 

parties. This report is also available at no charge on GAO’s website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix 

VI.

David C. Maurer

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 32 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

This report answers the following questions:

1. How much does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) invest 

in research and development (R&D) and to what extent does it have 

policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D 

resources and efforts across the department?

2. To what extent is R&D coordinated within DHS to prevent overlap, 

fragmentation, and unnecessary duplication across the department?

To determine how much DHS invests in R&D and the extent that it has 

policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources 

and efforts across the department, we reviewed DHS’s budget and 

congressional budget justifications to identify R&D investments reported 

from fiscal years 2011 through 2013. We analyzed R&D budget authority, 

outlays, and obligations included in budget submissions to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) reported for fiscal years 2010 through 

2013. We also analyzed Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and Coast Guard budgets to 

identify obligations for R&D funded by non-R&D budget activities as 

identified in object class tables that present obligations by the items or 

services purchased (e.g. personnel compensation and benefits, 

contractual services and supplies, acquisition of assets, grants and fixed 

charges). In addition, we assessed DHS’s management and oversight of 

its R&D spending against criteria in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control 

in the Federal Government.

1

We analyzed data from the Federal Procurement Data System Next 

Generation (FPDS-NG) to identify R&D-related contracts across DHS for 

fiscal years 2007 through 2011. We filtered these contracts to include 

only those R&D stages coded as basic research, applied research, and 

exploratory development and advanced development, which align more 

closely with recognized definitions of R&D. We excluded the other four 

stages (engineering development, operational systems development, 

management/support, and commercialization) of R&D because these 

activities are linked more closely to procurements rather than R&D 

activities. We also analyzed data from the Department of Energy’s (DOE) 

national laboratories from fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to identify how 

 

1

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 33 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

much DHS components obligated for R&D-related work at the national 

labs.

To determine the extent that R&D is coordinated within DHS to prevent 

overlap, fragmentation, and unnecessary duplication, we

• Reviewed component R&D plans and project documentation. We also 

reviewed department and S&T division strategic plans.

• Interviewed officials from DHS, DNDO, the Coast Guard, the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Office of Health 

Affairs (OHA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the 

National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), and the Secret 

Service to discuss, among other things, their R&D efforts, R&D 

budgets, and coordination with S&T. We interviewed DHS budget and 

acquisition oversight officials to discuss how DHS oversees and 

manages its R&D resources.

• Interviewed S&T’s budget official and Homeland Security Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) officials, including directors 

from each of the six technical divisions, to discuss how they 

coordinated with components and prioritized R&D resources.

• Used a data-collection instrument to collect information on S&T R&D 

projects, associated costs of R&D projects, and division customers 

from each HSARPA director and interviewed the Director of S&T’s 

Office of National Laboratories, responsible for coordinating S&T and 

DHS’s R&D work conducted at the DOE national laboratories to 

discuss DHS’s spending at and use of these laboratories.

• Compared DHS’s coordination efforts against the relevant legislation 

and criteria, including federal internal control standards as well as 

GAO’s recommended practices for collaboration and coordination to 

identify efforts to meet certain provisions and potential areas for 

improvement.2

To seek examples of potential overlap and duplication, we

 

2

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (11/99) and Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can 

Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 34 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

• Reviewed data on about 15,000 federal procurement contract actions 

coded as R&D in the Federal Procurement Data System Next 

Generation (FPDS-NG) made by DHS components from fiscal years 

2007 through 2012 to identify contracts that were potentially 

overlapping or duplicative of other contracts issued by different 

components. This was the total number of DHS contract actions taken 

from fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

• Established 32 key words based on our knowledge of the likely areas 

of overlapping R&D related to component missions in order to identify 

areas where components may have issued contracts that were similar 

in scope and to eliminate areas where duplicative activities were likely 

to be present but acceptable (e.g., personnel support and 

management services). We searched for the key words in the FPDSNG data set to identify contracts containing the same key words 

issued by more than one component.

• Independently analyzed the contract descriptions and identified 50 

R&D contracts issued by six components—S&T, the Coast Guard, 

TSA, CBP, OHA, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA)—that appeared to overlap and interviewed officials from 

those components to discuss the nature of those contracts.3

• Obtained 47 out of 50 contracts and analyzed each contract’s 

statement of work and objectives to determine the type of R&D activity 

and to identify whether each contract was overlapping or duplicative 

of any of the other 46 contracts. Two analysts independently reviewed 

each contract and then came to agreement regarding the presence of 

overlap and duplication.

We could not determine the full extent of duplication or overlap in the 

department, because the FPDS-NG data system captures only a portion 

of the total R&D activities occurring at DHS and we did not review the 

documentation for, or conduct a random sample of, all 15,000 R&D 

contract actions. However, the results from our analysis illustrate overlap 

and the potential for unnecessary duplication. We also used our past 

work on fragmentation, overlap, and duplication across the federal 

government; Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government; 

 

3

We did not interview officials responsible for the one contract in our sample issued by the 

Coast Guard, because they were unable to locate the contract.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 35 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

and our prior reports to assess DHS’s coordination of R&D across the 

department.4

We assessed the reliability of the data we used by reconciling the data 

with published data and applicable quality control procedures to maintain 

the integrity of the data, and interviewing DHS budget and procurement 

officials responsible for overseeing the data systems. In addition, we 

reviewed available FPDS-NG documentation, such as the user manual, 

and OMB guidance to identify related quality control mechanisms. We 

also assessed the reliability of data on DOE’s national laboratory work for 

others by interviewing DOE officials responsible for compiling and 

reporting those data. We concluded that these data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2011 through 

September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 

4

2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, 

Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 

2012); Follow-up on 2011 Report: Status of Actions Taken to Reduce Duplication, 

Overlap, and Fragmentation, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-453SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); Employment for People with Disabilities: Little Is 

Known about the Effectiveness of Fragmented and Overlapping Programs, GAO-12-677 

(Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012); Justice Grant Programs: DOJ Should Do More to 

Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance Program Assessment, 

GAO-12-517 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012); GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (11/99); and 

GAO-06-15. 
Appendix II: Federal Government Definitions of 

Research and Development

Page 36 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

Source: National Science Foundation and the Office of Management and Budget.

Appendix II: Federal Government Definitions 

of Research and Development

Source Basic research Applied research Development

Office of 

Management and 

Budget 

Systematic study directed 

toward fuller knowledge or 

understanding of the 

fundamental aspects of 

phenomena and observable 

facts without specific 

applications toward processes or 

products.

Systematic study to gain knowledge or 

understanding necessary to determine 

the means by which a recognized and 

specific need may be met.

Systematic application of knowledge 

or understanding, directed toward 

the production of useful materials, 

devices, and systems or methods, 

including design, development, and 

improvement of prototypes and new 

processes to meet specific 

requirements.

Federal Financial 

Accounting 

Standards (FFAS) 

Systematic study to gain 

knowledge or understanding of 

the fundamental aspects of 

phenomena and observable 

facts without specific 

applications toward processes or 

products.

Systematic study to gain knowledge or 

understanding necessary for 

determining the means by which a 

recognized and specific need may be 

met.

Systematic use of the knowledge 

and understanding gained from 

research for the production of useful 

materials, devices, systems, or 

methods, including the design and 

development of prototypes and 

processes.

Federal Acquisitions 

Regulation (FAR) 

Research directed toward 

increasing knowledge in science 

with the primary aim being a 

fuller knowledge or 

understanding of the subject 

under study, rather than any 

practical application of that 

knowledge.

The effort that (1) normally follows 

basic research, but may not be 

severable from the related basic 

research; (2) attempts to determine 

and exploit the potential of scientific 

discoveries or improvements in 

technology, materials, processes, 

methods, devices, or techniques; and 

(3) attempts to advance the state of 

the art. 

Systematic use of scientific and 

technical knowledge in the design, 

development, testing, or evaluation 

of a potential new product or service 

(or of an improvement in an existing 

product or service) to meet specific 

performance requirements or 

objectives. 

National Science 

Foundation (NSF) 

Survey of Federal 

Funds for R&D 

Systematic study directed 

toward fuller knowledge or 

understanding of the 

fundamental aspects of 

phenomena and observable 

facts without specific 

applications toward processes or 

products. 

Systematic study to gain knowledge or 

understanding necessary to determine 

the means by which a recognized and 

specific need may be met.

Systematic application of knowledge 

or understanding, directed toward 

the production of useful materials, 

devices, and systems or methods, 

including design, development, and 

improvement of prototypes and new 

processes to meet specific 

requirements.

Department of 

Defense Research, 

Development, 

Testing, and 

Evaluation (RDT&E) 

Budget Activities (1-

7)

(1) Systematic study directed 

toward greater knowledge or 

understanding of the 

fundamental aspects of 

phenomena and of observable 

facts without specific 

applications toward processes or 

precuts in mind. It is farsighted 

high payoff research that 

provides the basis for 

technological progress. 

(2) Systematic study to understand the 

means to meet a recognized and 

specific need. Systematic expansion 

and application of knowledge to 

develop useful materials, devices, and 

systems or methods. May be oriented, 

ultimately, toward the design, 

development, and improvement of 

prototypes and new processes to 

meet general mission area 

requirements. Applied research may 

translate promising basic research into 

solutions for broadly defined military 

needs, short of system development.

DOD divides development into 5 

budget activities:

(3) Advanced Technology 

Development (ATD)

(4) Advanced Component 

Development and Prototypes 

(ACD&P) 

(5) System Development and 

Demonstration (SDD)

(6) RDT&E Management Support

(7) Operational System 

Development

Source: National Science Foundation and the Office of Management and Budget
Appendix III: Department of Homeland Security 

Research and Development Obligations, Fiscal 

Year 2011

Page 37 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

Obligations

DHS R&D components

Reimbursements to 

S&T 

FPDS-NG R&D 

contracts

DOE national 

laboratories

Component total 

R&D obligations

Science and Technology Directorate $78,678,160 $93,427,396 $172,105,556

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office $2,429 28,529,786 95,427,232 123,959,446

United States Coast Guard R&D Center 5,876,014 100,000 5,976,014

Subtotal 2,429 113,083,959 188,954,628 302,041,016

Other DHS components

National Protection and Programs 

Directorate 4,359,000 705,926 82,882,861 87,947,787

Customs and Border Protection 17,593,000 754,979 25,109,607 43,457,585

Federal Emergency Management Agency 450,000 8,732,100 28,895,596 38,077,696

Transportation Security Administration 15,143,000 5,594,421 1,833,858 22,571,279

United States Coast Guard-non R&DCenter 22,046,643 22,046,643

Office of Health Affairs 390,000 1,275,977 9,246,228 10,912,205

U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement 10,534,536 10,534,536

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 7,026,000 7,026,000

Headquarters Operations 4,429,000 4,429,000

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 2,716,215 2,716,215

United States Secret Service 88,000 1,816,506 250,000 2,154,506

Operations Coordination and Planning 2,000,000 2,000,000

Federal Protective Service 850,000 850,000

Intelligence and Operations 380,230 380,230

Subtotal 49,478,000 54,557,532 151,068,150 255,103,682

Total DHS R&D obligations $49,480,429 $167,641,491 $340,022,777 $557,144,698

Sources: GAO analysis of DHS budget documents and the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation.

Notes:

1. Totals may not add up due to rounding.

2. We analyzed DHS contract obligations coded as basic research, applied research and exploratory 

development, and advanced development in the FPDS-NG.

3. DHS conducted a data call to all components for obligations made to the Department of Energy 

National Laboratories.

3. We omitted from U.S. Customs and Border Protection FPDS-NG R&D contracts a deobligation of 

$12 million for the SBInet program.

4. For the analysis of FPDS-NG R&D contract obligations, we isolated contract obligations made from 

the Coast Guard’s R&D Center and the rest of Coast Guard. We were not able to do this for the 

national laboratory or reimbursement data because obligations were identified only at the component 

level.

Appendix III: Department of Homeland 

Security Research and Development 

Obligations, Fiscal Year 2011
Appendix IV: Role of Research and 

Development in Supporting the Department of 

Homeland Security Acquisition Life Cycle

Page 38 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

Appendix IV: Role of Research and 

Development in Supporting the Department 

of Homeland Security Acquisition Life Cycle
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 39 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 40 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 41 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 42 GAO-12-837 DHS Research and Development

David C. Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Chris Currie, Assistant Director, 

and Gary Malavenda, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. 

Emily Gunn and Margaret McKenna made significant contributions to this 

report. Also contributing to this report were Katherine Davis, Michele 

Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, Carol Henn, Richard Hung, Julia Kennon, Tracey 

King, Nate Tranquilli, Katherine Trimble, and Sarah Veale.

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(441009)
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