[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-11617

____________________

JAMES RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, 

a foreign corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

RICH BON CORP., 

a Florida corporation

d.b.a. The Mint Lounge,

MARQUELL SHELLMAN, 

an individual,

DAINA HILBERT, 

as Personal Representative of the Estate of

David Hilbert,

Defendants-Appellees.

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 1 of 19
2 Opinion of the Court 20-11617

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-20273-JEM

____________________

Before BRANCH, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

GRANT, Circuit Judge:

Ordinarily, federal courts have no margin for error on 

questions of our jurisdiction. But Declaratory Judgment Act cases 

are different, because that statute vests courts with discretion to say

whether declaratory relief is appropriate in the underlying conflict. 

Here that meant deciding whether the federal suit would interfere 

with a pending state action.

The district court chose to dismiss the federal case, 

concluding that it overlapped significantly with the one in state 

court. But in the process the court overstepped the bounds of its 

discretion because it fully assessed only one of the claims for 

declaratory relief, rather than both of them. We therefore vacate 

and remand.

I. 

Late one Miami summer night at the Mint Lounge, an 

argument between acquaintances escalated into a shootout. A

guest at the nightclub, Marquell Shellman, was shot. So was club 

employee David Hilbert, who tragically died from his injuries.

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 2 of 19
20-11617 Opinion of the Court 3

The nightclub was insured by James River Insurance 

Company under a general liability policy, which covered “bodily 

injury and property damage liability.” The policy contained 

several restrictions on that coverage. To start, it excluded both 

worker’s compensation liability and employee-injury liability. The 

policy also imposed limits on coverage for bodily injuries “arising 

out of, resulting from, or in connection with” assault or battery. 

The limit per occurrence was $25,000, and the aggregate assaultand-battery limit was $50,000.

A few months after the shooting Shellman sued the 

nightclub in Florida state court, alleging that it was negligent for 

failing to provide adequate security; a lawsuit from Hilbert’s estate 

was expected too. So to determine the full extent of its liability 

under the policy, James River filed a federal declaratory judgment 

action against Mint, Shellman, and Hilbert’s estate.

The insurer raised two claims in its complaint. First, it 

contended that because the nightclub shooting was an assault and

battery, the policy limited recovery for any and all injuries to

$50,000. Second, it argued that the worker’s compensation and 

employee-injury exclusions barred Hilbert from recovery because 

he was an employee of the nightclub. The district court stayed the

case pending resolution of Shellman’s state court suit. Soon after, 

James River settled the state suit on the nightclub’s behalf for 

$50,000 minus claim expenses and costs—the total amount 

available under the assault and battery cap.

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 3 of 19
4 Opinion of the Court 20-11617

Ten months later, Hilbert’s estate sued the nightclub in 

Florida state court. One wrinkle for the estate was that the Florida 

worker’s compensation statute generally prohibits employeesfrom 

bringing tort claims against their employers. See Fla. Stat. 

§ 440.11(1). To get around that problem, the estate argued that the 

nightclub’s actions triggered a statutory exception for intentional 

torts. It alleged that the nightclub had engaged in conduct that it 

“knew”—based on similar incidents in the past—“was virtually 

certain to result in injury or death to the employee.” See id.

§ 440.11(1)(b).

Both the estate’s tort action and James River’s federal 

declaratory judgment action thus required a decision on whether 

the Florida worker’s compensation statute applied to Hilbert. The 

tort suit, however, did not raise any questions about the insurance 

policy or its assault and battery limit. In fact, Florida law barred 

adding James River to that suit. See id. § 627.4136.

While its state court suit proceeded, Hilbert’s estate moved 

the federal district court to lift its stay of the declaratory action so 

that it could dismiss the case altogether. The court lifted the stay, 

but did not immediately dismiss the case. Meanwhile, James River 

amended its federal complaint to ask the court to declare not only 

that the $50,000 assault and battery limit applied, but also that the 

Shellman settlement had exhausted that coverage. In response, the 

estate again asked the court to exercise its discretion and dismiss 

the case in deference to the concurrent state court suit.

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 4 of 19
20-11617 Opinion of the Court 5

The district court considered whether to exercise 

jurisdiction in two steps. It first asked whether the two suits were 

parallel enough to compare at all, concluding they were for two 

reasons: the claims in both cases involved Florida’s worker’s 

compensation law, and the defendants in the federal suit were also 

parties in the state action. It then moved on to consider whether 

the federalism and comity concerns generated by the declaratory 

action outweighed the efficiency gains of resolving the claims in 

federal court, applying the guideposts this Court provided in 

Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co. v. Roach, 411 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 

2005). Relying primarily on the conflict between one of the federal 

claims and the state case, the district court dismissed the case. 

James River appeals.

II. 

When a district court dismisses a declaratory judgment 

action, we review for abuse of discretion. Ameritas, 411 F.3d at

1330. A district court abuses its discretion (1) when it fails to 

consider a relevant and significant factor; (2) when it gives 

significant weight to an improper factor; or (3) when it “commits a 

clear error of judgment” in weighing the proper factors. Id.

(quotation omitted). A district court also abuses its discretion 

when it applies “the wrong legal standard.” Id.

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 5 of 19
6 Opinion of the Court 20-11617

III. 

A. 

When district courts decide whether to proceed with 

declaratory judgment actions that raise issues also disputed in state 

court proceedings, they are called to balance conflicting interests—

to foster efficient dispute resolution while still preserving the 

States’ interests in resolving issues of state law in their own courts. 

Discerning “the propriety of declaratory relief” requires “a 

circumspect sense” of the whole affair. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 

515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995) (quotation omitted).

On one hand, a declaratory judgment action is often quite 

efficient, eliminating delays and uncertainty. It may enable, for 

example, a prospective defendant to ask the court to declare its 

“rights and other legal relations,” including whether it is liable to a 

prospective plaintiff for prior or planned future acts. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2201(a). Without the chance to seek a declaratory judgment, a 

prospective defendant would often be stuck, waiting out statutes 

of limitations while watching for lawsuits. See 10B Charles Alan 

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2751 

(4th ed. 2021). That waiting game can impose serious costs, 

whether financial or personal.

Declaratory actions are especially helpful for third parties—

insurance companies in particular. See, e.g., Travelers Prop. Cas. 

Co. of Am. v. Moore, 763 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014); 

Ameritas, 411 F.3d at 1329–30; Admiral Ins. Co. v. Feit Mgmt. Co., 

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 6 of 19
20-11617 Opinion of the Court 7

321 F.3d 1326, 1327 (11th Cir. 2003). That is because a tort suit 

against an insured often generates distinct issues beyond whether 

the insured is liable for the tort, say, whether the insurer has a duty 

to defend, or whether the insured’s policy covers the liability 

alleged in the complaint. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil 

Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); Advanced Sys., Inc. v. Gotham Ins. 

Co., 272 So. 3d 523, 527 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (an insurer’s duty 

to defend “is not determined by the insured’s actual liability”). 

When the policy does not cover the liability even if all the facts 

alleged in the complaint are true, declaratory relief enables the 

insurance company to avoid the tort suit completely. Cf. National 

Trust Ins. Co. v. S. Heating & Cooling, Inc., 12 F.4th 1278, 1290 

(11th Cir. 2021). And even when the policy does apply, a 

declaratory suit allows the insurance company to resolve its 

liability without waiting for every individual injured party to sue 

the insured. Declaratory judgments thus play a valuable role in this 

context, clarifying insurance companies’ liability quickly and 

directly.

On the other side of the scale are federalism and comity 

concerns animated by our system of dual sovereignty. Competing 

state and federal actions are common. See, e.g., Wilton, 515 U.S. 

at 280; Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 492–94

(1942); Ameritas, 411 F.3d at 1329–30. After all, while the 

Declaratory Judgment Act enables a prospective defendant to sue

in federal court, it does not prevent the party sued from initiating 

a concurrent state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Nor 

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 7 of 19
8 Opinion of the Court 20-11617

does anything in the Act prevent a state court defendant from 

bringing a federal declaratory judgment suit.

What’s more, when the issues and parties match, each 

plaintiff competes to be first to the finish, because whichever case 

is decided earliest will have preclusive effect on common questions 

in the other. See Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. J. Transp., Inc., 

880 F.2d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that declaratory 

judgments trigger collateral estoppel).

Of central concern in this federalism analysis are cases 

competing to resolve state law issues that “are not foreclosed under 

the applicable substantive law.” Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495. When a

federal court decides an unresolved question of state law, issue 

preclusion prevents the creation of state court precedent on that 

issue in the companion case. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 

354 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977). That, in turn, delays the final 

resolution of the question as applied to future suits because state 

supreme courts are the ultimate authority on questions of state 

law. See Pincus v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 986 F.3d 1305, 1310–11 

(11th Cir. 2021). So declaratory judgments have the potential to

leave important questions of state law unanswered by state 

authorities and impede a State’s general authority to dispose of 

state law issues.

These concerns and others need to be balanced with the 

obvious benefits of declaratory judgments. The Declaratory 

Judgment Act thus is not a license to supplant state court litigation

in every case. If it were, the byproducts—waste, delay, and 

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 8 of 19
20-11617 Opinion of the Court 9

needless competition—would mean the Act sometimes did more 

harm than good. As the Supreme Court cautioned in Brillhart,

“[g]ratuitous interference with the orderly and comprehensive 

disposition of a state court litigation should be avoided.” 316 U.S. 

at 495. Nor can the benefits of a declaratory judgment suit be 

ignored—it is “a remedial arrow in the district court’s quiver,” 

fashioned by Congress to provide “a new form of relief” when the 

need arises. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288.

That is where the Act’s unusual jurisdictional provision 

comes in. It vests district courts with discretion to dismiss 

declaratory suits when, in their best judgment, the costs outweigh 

the benefits. Its language is spare, but direct: federal courts “may

declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party 

seeking such declaration.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added). 

The Act thus makes an explicit “textual commitment to 

discretion.” Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286. So while federal courts 

normally have an “unflagging obligation” to exercise our 

jurisdiction, where declaratory judgments are concerned this

imperative “yields to considerations of practicality and wise judicial 

administration.” Id. at 284, 288 (quotation omitted).

Over time, precedents have developed to aid district courts 

in balancing the interests at stake. In Ameritas, this Court provided 

non-exclusive “guideposts” for district courts to consider when 

deciding whether to dismiss a federal declaratory judgment action 

that overlaps with a state case. 411 F.3d at 1331. These factors are 

intentionally broad, but still offer substantive guidance:

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 9 of 19
10 Opinion of the Court 20-11617

(1) the strength of the state’s interest in having the 

issues raised in the federal declaratory action decided 

in the state courts;

(2) whether the judgment in the federal declaratory 

action would settle the controversy;

(3) whether the federal declaratory action would 

serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations 

at issue;

(4) whether the declaratory remedy is being used 

merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing”—that 

is, to provide an arena for a race for res judicata or to 

achieve a federal hearing in a case otherwise not 

removable;

(5) whether the use of a declaratory action would 

increase the friction between our federal and state 

courts and improperly encroach on state jurisdiction;

(6) whether there is an alternative remedy that is 

better or more effective;

(7) whether the underlying factual issues are 

important to an informed resolution of the case;

(8) whether the state trial court is in a better position 

to evaluate those factual issues than is the federal 

court; and

(9) whether there is a close nexus between the 

underlying factual and legal issues and state law 

and/or public policy, or whether federal common or 

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 10 of 19
20-11617 Opinion of the Court 11

statutory law dictates a resolution of the declaratory 

judgment action.

Id.

As a whole these guideposts account for the federalism and 

comity concerns generated by competing cases, as well as the 

comparative utility of the declaratory judgment action. To be sure, 

courts are not restricted to this set of factors—the list is not 

“absolute,” and no single factor is controlling. Id. Indeed, we have 

characterized the inquiry as a “totality-of-the-circumstances 

analysis.” National Trust, 12 F.4th at 1285. So whatever the district 

court decides to do, it must capture the breadth of the competing 

interests; without a complete understanding of those interests, it 

cannot properly balance them.

The question here is whether the court below appropriately 

followed this process. James River argues that the district court not 

only weighed the Ameritas guideposts incorrectly, but that because 

the state and federal cases were not truly parallel it never should 

have applied the guideposts in the first place.

We agree that the district court erred, but not for those

reasons. For one, the district court was wrong to assess whether 

the federal and state cases were “parallel” as a prerequisite to 

considering the Ameritas guideposts. To be fair, that was less clear 

before our recent decision in National Trust. But the court did err 

in its application of the Ameritas factors too. It should not have 

focused on one of the federal claims almost to the exclusion of the 

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 11 of 19
12 Opinion of the Court 20-11617

other—in doing so it failed to properly consider the totality of the

circumstances.

B. 

To begin, “the existence of a parallel proceeding is not a 

prerequisite to a district court’s refusal to entertain an action under 

§ 2201(a),” the Declaratory Judgment Act. National Trust, 12 F.4th 

at 1284. Courts possess “unique and substantial discretion” under 

the Act. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286 (contrasting this discretion with 

Colorado River abstention). And neither our precedents nor the 

Act itself give specific guidance on what constitutes a “parallel” 

case—whether the parties must be identical, for example, or 

whether the claims must overlap completely. That uncertain 

inquiry finds no home in the analysis.

Consequently, and unlike some abstention doctrines that 

are more prudential in nature, a parallel proceeding is not a 

mandatory prerequisite to applying the Ameritas guideposts.1 On 

this point we have been explicit, albeit after the district court’s 

decision here: the guideposts themselves offer sufficient 

1 Colorado River abstention, for example, first requires asking whether the 

cases involve “substantially the same parties and substantially the same 

issues.” Gold-Fogel v. Fogel, 16 F.4th 790, 800 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation 

omitted). Only then may a court consider several factors to decide whether 

the circumstances are “exceptional” enough to justify dimissing the “federal 

suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise 

judicial administration.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 

States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 12 of 19
20-11617 Opinion of the Court 13

consideration of the challenges relating to concurrent proceedings. 

National Trust, 12 F.4th at 1286. One area of consideration under 

Ameritas, for example, is whether the federal action would resolve 

the parties’ dispute; that requires discerning whether the same 

issues and same parties are present in both cases. Another is 

whether declaratory relief would create friction between the 

federal and the state courts; unless the cases implicate the same 

facts or legal questions, friction is unlikely. Because the guideposts 

themselves account for the interests presented by competing state 

and federal lawsuits, we refuse to impose a duplicative inquiry.

The district court thus erred when it forced James River to 

clear this extra hurdle. It should not have grafted “a discrete, 

parallel-proceeding factor” from abstention doctrine onto the 

Ameritas test. Id. at 1285. While a concurrent state proceeding is 

still significant under Ameritas, it is not dispositive—in either 

direction. Id.

C. 

Once the district court moved on from its parallelism 

analysis, it made another serious misstep: it focused on one of the 

federal claims almost to the exclusion of the other. Every claim 

matters, because Ameritas requires a “totality-of-the-circumstances 

analysis.” National Trust, 12 F.4th at 1285. And a comprehensive

analysis is impossible when a court only considers half of the 

federal claims. Regardless of the guideposts it applies, a district 

court must assess the claims raised in a federal declaratory 

judgment action evenhandedly.

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 13 of 19
14 Opinion of the Court 20-11617

That means a court cannot cherry pick for its Ameritas 

analysis the claims that favor dismissing—or proceeding with—a 

federal action. If the court only considers issues raised in both the 

state and federal cases, it will always underestimate the need to 

resolve the issues unique to the declaratory action. And if it only 

assesses the unique federal claims, the opposite result will follow;

the court will underestimate the federalism concerns raised by the 

overlapping issues. Both approaches are unreasonable. Instead, to 

appropriately assess “the degree of similarity between concurrent 

state and federal proceedings,” a district court needs to look at the 

cases as a whole. See id. at 1282.

Here, the district court addressed each Ameritas guidepost

as it analyzed the employee exclusions claim. It noted the “close 

nexus” between that claim and “Florida public policy” and relied 

on the state court’s better position to resolve the overlapping 

factual issues “given its familiarity with” the state tort suit. The 

policy limits claim, however, largely received the silent treatment. 

The court mentioned that both counts of the federal lawsuit 

concerned “issues of state law,” but said nothing further about the 

policy limits issue. That lopsided analysis was unreasonable.

For example, when discussing the fifth guidepost (potential 

friction between federal and state courts and improper 

encroachment on state jurisdiction), the district court only said that

“[o]verlapping judicial effort is virtually certain to occur.” But that 

is not a complete analysis, at least for this lawsuit. Although the 

claim involving Florida’s worker’s compensation statute overlaps

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 14 of 19
20-11617 Opinion of the Court 15

with the claims in the state case, the policy limits claim can only be 

resolved in the declaratory judgment action. See Fla. Stat. 

§ 627.4136. That’s because the state suit is between Hilbert’s estate

and the nightclub—meaning no insurance policy is directly at issue 

and James River cannot be added to the case. Id. Deciding whether 

James River has paid in full or still owes the nightclub for future 

liabilities thus creates no conflict with the state liability case.

Nor was that the only omission. When the court considered 

the third guidepost (whether the declaratory action would clarify

the legal relations at issue), it failed to account for the fact that

resolving the policy limits claim could clarify the relationship 

between James River and the nightclub. And when discussing the 

fourth and sixth guideposts (whether the declaratory action was 

merely “procedural fencing” and whether a better alternative 

remedy existed), the district court again failed to mention that

James River was not party to the state suit and that the policy limits

claim could only be resolved through the federal declaratory 

action.

The district court thus overlooked the significant gains in 

efficiency the declaratory judgment action would generate. These 

guideposts as applied to the policy limits claim strongly favor 

allowing the declaratory judgment action to go forward. If the 

district court had addressed that claim, as it must on remand, it 

could have included these efficiency interests in the balance against

the federalism and comity interests that it did consider. The failure 

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 15 of 19
16 Opinion of the Court 20-11617

to do so was a clear error of judgment—and therefore an abuse of 

discretion.

* * *

A totality-of-the-circumstances analysis only works when a 

court considers all of the relevant details. To do otherwise leaves 

weights that should be balanced off the scales, or, if used more 

nefariously, would tip them in favor of a result chosen in advance. 

We do not suggest that any such artifice happened here. But we 

do think that the district court, by failing to consider the policy 

limits claim, missed the efficiency gains that it needed to balance 

against federalism and comity interests before deciding whether to 

proceed with the declaratory judgment action. We therefore 

VACATE the judgment and REMAND the case for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 16 of 19
20-11617 BRASHER, J., Concurring 1

BRASHER, Circuit Judge, Concurring:

I concur in full in the Court’s opinion. As I said in my 

concurring opinion in National Trust Ins. Co. v. S. Heating & 

Cooling, Inc., 12 F.4th 1278 (11th Cir. 2021), insurers reasonably 

expect the federal courts to resolve run-of-the-mill disputes about 

their duties to defend and indemnify against claims made in an 

underlying tort action. In fact, allowing “a declaratory action by an 

insurer to establish nonliability under casualty insurance was one 

of the prime purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act.” W. Cas. 

& Sur. Co. v. Teel, 391 F.2d 764, 766 (10th Cir. 1968).

In deciding whether to decline jurisdiction in a case like this 

one, I don’t think district courts should fixate on whether a related 

action is pending because one almost always is. Whenever a 

liability insurer sues its insured for a declaration of its duties to 

defend and indemnify (or vice versa), there will be a pending or 

threatened related lawsuit—often in state court—between the 

insured and a third party. After all, if a third party had not sued or 

threatened to sue the insured, then the liability insurer would not 

be asking for a declaratory judgment about its duties to defend and 

indemnify against that claim. Accordingly, the mere pendency or 

threat of such a related action is no justification for a district court 

to decline to adjudicate a federal lawsuit between an insurer and its 

insured.

In weighing the Ameritas factors in a dispute between a 

liability insurer and its insured, see Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co. 

v. Roach, 411 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005), I suggest district 

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 17 of 19
2 BRASHER, J., Concurring 20-11617

courts focus on whether there is anything unique or extraordinary 

that differentiates their case from the mine run of liability insurance 

disputes. For example, one could ask: Does the State have a 

stronger interest in deciding this particular state-law issue in state 

court than it normally would in a state-law liability insurance 

dispute? Is there a state-specific public policy at play that is not 

present in most other insurance disputes? Is there some important 

factual dispute in the state litigation that would be unusually 

dispositive in the declaratory judgment action? We answered these 

questions in the affirmative in National Trust, where coverage first 

turned on an open question of state law that had split state courts 

(whether carbon monoxide was a “pollutant” under the policy’s 

pollution exclusion) and then on a difficult fact question that was 

being litigated in the underlying tort action (whether the fire that 

harmed the third parties was burning outside of its intended 

location, potentially triggering a “hostile fire” exception to the 

pollution exclusion).

But, as the Court’s opinion suggests, there is nothing special 

about this case that warrants declining jurisdiction. Farfrom it. The 

district court can resolve this dispute by interpreting the terms of 

the insurance contract—specifically, the policy’s bodily injury 

limits, a worker’s compensation exclusion, and an employer 

liability exclusion, which are all common features of commercial 

insurance policies. Federal courts routinely answer questions like 

these. See, e.g., Endurance Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. United Constr. 

Eng’g, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1280, 1287–88 (S.D. Fla. 2018), 

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 18 of 19
20-11617 BRASHER, J., Concurring 3

aff’d, 786 F. App’x 195 (11th Cir. 2019) (employer’s liability 

exclusion and worker’s compensation exclusion); Scottsdale Ins. 

Co. v. GFM Operations, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1287–88 (S.D. 

Fla. 2011) (same). If the Ameritasfactors weighed against exercising

jurisdiction here, then they would justify that result in almost any 

liability-insurance-related declaratory judgment action. 

Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to 

decline to exercise jurisdiction.

USCA11 Case: 20-11617 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 19 of 19