State of Maryland v. Harry Malik Robertson, No. 40, September Term 2018, Opinion by

Hotten, J.
CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – OPEN DOOR DOCTRINE – STAN DARD OF REVIEW – The Court of Appeals held that the appropriate stan dard of review for the determination of whether a party has opened the doo r to otherwise inadmissible evidence is de novo because the open door doctrine is ultimately a ques tion of law. The Court reviews the separate inquiry of whether a party’s r ebuttal evidence is proportional for an abuse of discretion.

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – OPEN DOOR DOCTRINE – The Court of Appeals applied de novo review in its finding that defense counsel had ope ned the door for the State to introduce rebuttal evidence. Though the State w as entitled to rebut the image of Robertson’s good character, the prosecution’s quest ioning exceeded the scope of the open door doctrine.Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 116111012 Argued: January 8, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 40 September Term, 2018

__________________________________ STATE OF MARYLAND

v. HARRY MALIK ROBERTSON

__________________________________ Barbera, C.J., Greene, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Wilner, Alan M. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)

JJ.

__________________________________ Opinion by Hotten, J. McDonald and Watts, JJ., dissent.

__________________________________ Filed: April 2, 2019Harry Malik Robertson (“Robertson”) was involved in an altercation at a residential

area near Morgan State University. The incident cu lminated in the stabbing death of one of its participants. A jury in the Circuit Court f or Baltimore City found Robertson guilty of accessory after the fact to murder, but acquitte d him of first- and second-degree murder and of carrying a weapon openly with intent to inju re. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court erred in permitti ng the State to question Robertson regarding his participation in a previous, unrelate d incident during which a knife had been brandished (“previous incident”), because the door had not been opened for questioning by the State. The Court of Special Appeals also held that, because the introduction of the previous incident was not harmless error, Robertson ’s conviction for accessory after the fact must be reversed and the case remanded for a n ew trial. On appeal, the State presents the following questions for our review:
1. What is the appropriate standard of review of a tri al court’s ruling that a party has opened the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence?
2. Applying the appropriate standard of review, did th e [Court of Special Appeals] err by substituting its judgment for the t rial court’s determination that [Robertson] had opened the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence? For reasons discussed infra , we find that application of whether particular ev idence may be admitted based on the legal principle of “op ening the door” is reviewed de novo

. We further conclude that defense counsel opened the door, thereby enabling the State to question Robertson regarding the previous incident. However, despite the application of the open door doctrine, the State used the evidence of Robertson’s participation in the prior2

incident in a manner that exceeded the scope of the doctrine. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
BACKGROUND
1. Factual Background On the evening of February 1, 2016, Robertson, then a student at Coppin State University, was involved in an altercation between two groups of men near the Morgan State University campus. The fight concluded after one of the participants, Gerald Williams (“the decedent”), was stabbed and ultimate ly died from his wounds. The impetus for the fight began nearly a week earli er. Daequon Gordon, a Prince George’s Community College student, purchased ten d ollars’ worth of marijuana from Brandon Parker, a Morgan State University student. Gordon purchased the marijuana with a counterfeit fifty-dollar bill and received the ma rijuana and forty dollars in return. When Parker learned that the fifty-dollar bill was counterfeit, he contacted Gordon and demanded his money back. A meeting was arrange d, and both Parker and Gordon showed up to the meeting with friends. Among them was the decedent, who was one of Gordon’s friends, and Robertson, who was one of Par ker’s friends. The subsequent details were in dispute at trial. Gordon, testifying for the State, contended that wh en the two groups met that evening, he told Parker, “I got your money. You’ll have to take it from me. I’m not paying you.” Gordon then punched Parker, provoking a larg er fight among the group. As Robertson and others ran from the area, the deceden t collapsed and Gordon, observing that the decedent was bleeding, called an ambulance.3

Another State witness, Isaiah McClin, who fought as part of the decedent’s group, testified that “all hell broke loose” after the gro ups met, and though he did not recall who was fighting, he heard the decedent yell something during the fight, shortly after which the fight abruptly ended. Thereafter, McClin observed the decedent lying on the ground and “bleeding out.” Although McClin did not see the st abbing, or observe Respondent in possession of a weapon, he recalled Robertson and t he decedent fighting at some point. D’ana Glenn, another witness for the State, testifi ed that she observed the altercation and never saw a large group fighting with each othe r. Rather, Glenn testified, only Robertson and the decedent were fighting. She stat ed that she saw the decedent charge towards Robertson, and Robertson, in an effort to “ push forward toward him,” stabbed the decedent. Upon further examination, Glenn conceded that her view of Robertson was not “that clear” and that she only saw Robertson holdin g a knife after “[he] and the decedent ‘impact[ed].’” Robertson denied stabbing the decedent and further denied having a knife. He contended that he fought two men during the fight: Mathew Agogo and McClin. Robertson also testified that he heard the decedent say “I’m bleeding.” Robertson testified that after the men dispersed, h e told his cousin, Ron, who was also engaged in the fight, that they should leave. Robertson got into Ron’s car along with four of their friends. One of the friends was Abay omi Akinwold. During the drive, Robertson testified that Akinwold was “beating himself up” and had blood on his hand and jacket. At one point, th e car stopped, Akinwold exited, and tossed a knife into a storm drain. The car subsequ ently stopped at a friend’s home, which4

Akinwold entered. When Akinwold returned to the ca r moments later, his hands were clean. Ron drove the friends to their respective h omes, leaving Robertson at his mother’s house. Following his arrest, Robertson was detained at the Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Center. James Alston, who was also detained at the facility on a probation violation, testified that Robertson admitted that he had kille d someone during a fight. Alston denied receiving anything in exchange for his testimony, b ut admitted that his probation violation had been dropped prior to Robertson’s trial.

2. Procedural Background Proceeding in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City At the beginning of the trial, Robertson faced char ges of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and carrying a dangerous weap on openly with intent to injure. At the end of Robertson’s case, at the suggestion of t he court and with agreement from counsel, an accessory after the fact charge was add ed. The jury subsequently found Robertson guilty of accessory after the fact to mur der, but acquitted him of the remaining charges. At trial, the following colloquy occurred between R obertson and his counsel during direct examination: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now did you ever get into any t rouble as a juvenile? [ROBERTSON]: No. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ever just stopped for some mino r issue?5

[THE STATE]: Again Your Honor, I’m going to object to the leading nature of his questions. THE COURT: Okay, I’m going to overrule that one. G o ahead. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you. Any kind of trouble when you were a juvenile? [ROBERTSON]: No. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: How about as an adult, when yo u turned 18? [ROBERTSON]: No. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ever even arrested for anythin g? [ROBERTSON]: Never been arrested. This is my firs t time being arrested. During cross-examination, the State inquired about Robertson’s participation in a previous, unrelated incident. 1 Defense counsel objected, and a bench conference ensued. 2

1 The previous incident was a fight which occurred a year before the incident at issue. Robertson, who was then attending Morgan Sta te University, was punched by one of the university’s football players while on campu s. Robertson struck back, prompting his friends and other football players to join. Ca rlos Mars, one of Robertson’s friends, noted that Robertson was being beaten to the ground . Mars stood over Robertson, brandishing a knife to keep the football players aw ay. Mars was charged, State of Maryland v. Carlos Mars , Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case No. 115103 008. Robertson was suspended from Morgan State, but no c harges were brought against him. Robertson claims he opted to transfer to Coppin Sta te during the time of his suspension so that he could resume his studies. (“I refused to m iss a year of college. So I transferred to Coppin State.”).

2 At the bench conference, defense counsel asserted that there was a Motion in limine for excluding Robertson’s involvement in the previ ous incident. The record contains a motion to suppress statements that Rober tson may have made to law enforcement officials and a proffer agreement betwe en Robertson, his counsel, and the State. However, the record does not contain a form al, written Motion in limine

. The trial transcript reveals that the hearing judge acknowledged the existence of a Motion in limine ( see exchange provided below) and also acknowledged that defense counsel and6

Based on defense counsel’s questioning during Rober tson’s direct examination, the trial judge asserted that defense counsel had opened the door to enable the State to inquire about the previous incident. Proceeding before the Court of Special Appeals Robertson raised two issues on appeal: [1.] Whether the trial court erred in permitting the Sta te to question him about his participation in an earlier fight during which a knife had been brandished. [2.] Whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for accessory after the fact to murder. The Court of Special Appeals held that defense coun sel had not opened the door for the State to introduce the previous knife incident because defense counsel had limited his questioning to Robertson’s criminal and juvenile re cord. Because defense counsel’s questioning was limited in scope, Robertson had “op ened the door, at most, to being crossexamined . . . as to his claim that he had never be en previously involved with the justice

the State had previously agreed that Robertson’s in volvement in the previous incident would not be mentioned at trial. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, this is outrageous . We have a Motion [ in limine ] that was - - THE COURT: Well I know, I know . But his testimony was - - [THE STATE]: He opened the door. THE COURT: --yeah, he opened th e door. [THE STATE]: He said he had no tr ouble whatsoever. That’s why it was my first question. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, but we talked about the k nife incident that was not coming in at all. THE COURT: I understand that . If -- you put your witness on and he testified. You asked him and he testified, he’s never been in trouble, he’s a good boy.7

system, as either an adult or juvenile[.]” Robertson v. State of Maryland , No. 2731, slip op. at 8 (Md. App. June 6, 2018). The Court held t hat, because the introduction of the previous incident was not harmless error, Robertson ’s conviction for accessory after the fact must be vacated and remanded for a new trial ( “Given the similarity of the earlier incident . . . we cannot say, beyond a reasonable d oubt, that the decision to permit inquiry about the previous incident was harmless error.”). Id. at 11. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that Rob ertson had not preserved his insufficiency claim and declined to review the issu e for plain error.
STANDARD OF REVIEW A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evid ence is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hopkins v. State , 352 Md. 146, 158, 721 A.2d 231, 237 (1998). Errors of law and purely legal questions are reviewed de novo and this Court affords no deference to the decision of the court below. Schisler v. State , 394 Md. 519, 535, 907 A.2d 175, 184 (2006). The discussion provided in Section III.A. below con cludes that this Court should review the trial court’s ruling that defense counse l opened the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence de novo

. DISCUSSION The open door doctrine is based on principles of fa irness and serves to “balance any unfair prejudice one party may have suffered.” Little v. Schneider , 434 Md. 150, 163, 73 A.3d 1074, 1081 n.6 (2013). It authorizes parties to “‘meet fire with fire,’ as they introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence [henceforth, “rebut tal evidence”] in response to evidence8

put forth by the opposing side.” Id . at 157, 73 A.3d at 1078 (citing Terry v. State , 332 Md. 329, 337, 631 A.2d 424, 428 (1993)). The doctrine manifests the claim of, “[m]y opponent has injected an issue into the case, and I ought to be able to introduce evidence on that issue.” Clark v. State, 332 Md. 77, 85, 629 A.2d 1239, 1243 (1993).
A. The issue of whether defense counsel opened the doo r for the State to crossexamine Robertson about the previous incident is a legal question that we review de novo.
1. Questions of relevance, including the open door doc trine, are questions of law that are reviewed de novo

. The State contends that this Court should apply a b ifurcated standard of review to the open door doctrine that first, reviews for clea r error a trial court’s decision that a party has opened the door as to a new issue, and second, applies an abuse of discretion standard as to whether an opposing party’s rebuttal evidence is proportionate to the evidence presented. The State conflates the question of whe ther the open door doctrine applies with whether the rebuttal evidence is proportionate. Th ese are two separate inquiries. The open door doctrine “authorizes admitting eviden ce which otherwise would have been irrelevant in order to respond to . . . admis sible evidence which generates an issue.” Clark , 332 Md. at 84, 629 A.2d at 1242. In short, the d octrine “makes relevant what was irrelevant[.]” Conyers v. State , 345 Md. 525, 546, 693 A.2d 781, 790 (1997). Give n the doctrine’s ability to enlarge the universe of relev ant evidence at trial, the open door doctrine is a “rule of expanded relevancy[.]” Clark , 332 Md. at 84, 629 A.2d at 1242. Relevant evidence is evidence that makes a fact in issue more or less probable. Md. Rule 5-401. Evidence that is not relevant is inadm issible. Md. Rule 5-402. The9

determination of evidentiary relevance is a legal q uestion that is reviewed de novo

. Perry v. Asphalt & Concrete Services, Inc. , 447 Md. 31, 48, 133 A.3d 1143, 1153 (2016). “Although trial judges have wide discretion ‘in wei ghing relevancy in light of unfairness or efficiency considerations, trial judges do not h ave discretion to admit irrelevant evidence.’” Id. (quoting State v. Simms , 420 Md. 705, 724, 25 A.3d 144, 155 (2011)). Given that the open door doctrine is a matter of re levancy, which is a legal issue, this Court reviews the question of whether a party opened the door to introduce rebuttal evidence de

novo . 2. The State’s citations to cases that use bifurcated review are inapposite to the

case at bar. Though this Court has not waivered on the principle that legal issues are reviewed de novo , the State relies on two cases in its brief to sug gest that the “articulated [ ] two-part standard of review of certain trial court decisions . . . should likewise apply here.” The State points to this Court’s decisions in Kusi v. State , 438 Md. 362, 91 A.3d 1192 (2014), and Grimm v. State , 458 Md. 602, 183 A.3d 167 (2018), to support its contention that the bifurcated standard of review used in those cases i s appropriate in the case at bar. However, the State neglects to consider that both Kusi and Grimm involved questions that were heavily reliant upon intensive fact-finding and cre dibility assessments—issues of fact that we review with deference.
In Kusi , this Court held that the trial court did not comm it clear error when it found that the defendant, a Ghanaian native whose native language was Ashanti, could comprehend English. 438 Md. at 384, 91 A.3d at 120 4. Further, this Court held that the10

trial court acted within its discretion when it den ied an interpreter for the defendant at trial. Id. at 386, 91 A.3d at 1205. The State contends that Kusi established precedent for a twotiered standard of review that applies “a clearly e rroneous standard to the judge’s factual findings before reviewing a judge’s legal determina tion under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. at 383, 91 A.3d at 1203 (internal citations omitte d). However, the case at bar is distinct from Kusi . In Kusi , former Maryland Rule 16-819 provided express procedures for a trial judge’s determination of whe ther an interpreter was needed at trial. Id. at 366, 91 A.3d at 1194. The rule required the tr ial judge to render factual findings about the defendant’s ability to understand and com municate in English, as well as the defendant’s ability to assist in his defense. 3 Id. at 366-67, 91 A.3d at 1194. After a detailed

3 Former Md. Rule 16-819 provided the procedures to d etermine whether an interpreter was needed. Former Rule 16-819 stated, in pertinent part: (c) Procedures to determine the need for interpreters. * * * (2) Spoken language interpreter. (A) Examination o f party or witness. To determine whether a spoken language interpreter is needed, the court, on request or on its own initiative, shall examine a party or witness on the record. The court shall appoint a spoken language interpreter if the court determines that: (i) the party does not understand English well enou gh to participate fully in the proceedings and to assist counsel, or (ii) the party or a witness does not speak English well enough to be understood by counsel, the court, and the jury. (B) Scope of examination. The court’s examination of the party or witness should include questions relating to: (i) identification; (ii) active vocabulary in vernacular English; and (iii) the court proceedings. Kusi , 438 Md. at 366-67, 91 A.3d at 1193.11

exchange with the defendant, the trial judge conclu ded that Kusi could effectively understand and communicate in English. Id. at 378, 91 A.3d at 1200-01. On appeal, this Court reviewed the trial judge’s fa ctual findings concerning the defendant’s ability to speak and understand English for clear error. Id. at 383, 91 A.3d at 1203. In commenting on the application of clear er ror review, this Court noted that “[t]he trial judge had an opportunity firsthand to hear [t he defendant] speak English during the lengthy process[.]” Id . at 384, 91 A.3d at 1204. This Court further note d that application of the clear error standard was appropriate because “the trial judge in this case, as required by Rule 16-819, first made factual findings concern ing [the defendant’s] ability to use the English language[.]” Id. at 383, 91 A.3d at 1203. Given the extensive fact-finding, it was appropriat e to review the trial judge’s determination regarding the defendant’s English cap acity for clear error. As opposed to the trial judge in Kusi , who engaged in fact-finding pursuant to former Ru le 16-819, the trial judge in the instant case did not need to eng age in exhaustive fact-finding to determine whether the open door doctrine applied. In the cas e at bar, reviewing the trial transcript is sufficient for ascertaining whether the doctrine ap plied based on defense counsel’s questioning. Unlike Kusi , there was no fact-intensive inquiry that the tria l judge engaged in that necessitates clear error review in the case at bar.
In Kusi , this Court reviewed the trial court’s final deter mination, about whether an interpreter was needed, for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 367, 91 A.3d at 1195. In contrast to the open door doctrine, which is a legal issue, the trial judge’s final determination of whether to appoint an interpreter for Kusi was a di scretionary determination based on the12

fact-finding that the judge had engaged in previous ly. See id. at 384, 91 A.3d at 1204 (stating that “where a trial court makes a discreti onary ruling, such as the determination of whether or not to appoint an interpreter, we apply an abuse of discretion standard of review.”). Therefore, the final determination by t he judge in Kusi was discretionary, as opposed to the legal determination that the open do or doctrine necessitates in the case at bar.
In Grimm v. State, this Court reviewed a trial court’s determination t hat probable cause existed based on a dog’s alert to search Grim m’s car during a traffic stop. 458 Md. at 635, 183 A.3d at 186-87. This Court held that t he issue of the dog’s reliability was reviewed for clear error, but that the ultimate leg al issue for determining whether probable cause existed was reviewed de novo

. Id. at 650, 183 A.3d at 195. The Grimm Court cited Miller v. Fenton , 474 U.S. 104 (1985), stating that “where an issue falls somewhere between a clear legal issue and a simple historical fact, the determination of the nature of the issue turns on an analysis of which judicial ac tor is better positioned to decide the question.” Id. at 609, 183 A.3d at 171. This Court determined that : An issue as to a drug detection dog’s reliability r equires a trial court to assess the credibility of lay and expert witnesses; to wat ch, when available, a recording of a drug detection dog’s scan; to weigh and determine the weight to be given documentary evidence, such as the drug detection dog’s training records, field reports, and certifications; to cons ider the qualifications of any experts, and their opinions about the evidence; and to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the drug d etection dog is reliable; and whether the drug detection dog’s alert indicated th at drugs were present. As such, a trial court is better positioned than an ap pellate court to determine a drug detection dog’s reliability.13

Id. The nature of the fact-finding at the trial level therefore warranted clear error review as to the dog’s reliability. In contrast, the tria l judge in the instant case was no better positioned to decide the question of whether the op en door doctrine applied: issues of reliability and credibility do not need to be consi dered for determining whether defense counsel’s questioning opened the door for the State ’s introduction of the previous incident.
In Grimm , this Court utilized a second standard of review f or the ultimate issue of whether probable cause existed. Id. at 650, 183 A.3d at 195. The Grimm Court was guided by the Supreme Court’s ruling that “the ultimate qu estions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause are to be reviewed de novo .” Id. at 640, 183 A.3d at 189 (citing Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 691, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1659 (1996)). Importantly, this Court noted that, even when an issue involves a legal que stion, underlying facts may play a role. Id. at 651, 183 A.3d at 196 (citing Miller v. Fenton , 474 U.S. 104, 112, 106 S.Ct. 445, 450 (1985)). Regardless, the legal question is reviewe d de novo by appellate courts. Id. at 607, 183 A.3d at 170. In the instant case, the open door doctrine is a legal issue; however, the factual analysis required in Kusi and Grimm is absent. Therefore, we do not apply the dual standard that the State advocates to review the ope n door doctrine.
3. An abuse of discretion analysis is applicable to th e inquiry of proportionality, which is a separate question from whether the open door doctrine applies. The State cites to a third case, Little v. Schneider , 434 Md. 150, 73 A.3d 1074 (2013), to support its contention that de novo review is inapplicable to the open door doctrine. In Little , we held that the trial court had not abused its d iscretion when it allowed rebuttal evidence that inquired about the defendant -physician’s lack of board certification.14

Id. at 163, 73 A.3d at 1081. During the malpractice tr ial, defense counsel represented defendant as a model surgeon and expressed the defe ndant’s qualifications and achievements in detail. Id. at 158, 73 A.3d at 1078-79. Despite the trial judg e’s warning that such “unnecessary bolstering” might cause him to revisit the Motion in limine to exclude the doctor’s lack of board certification, d efense counsel delved into the defendant’s accomplishments in detail during direct examination

. Id. at 158-60, 73 A.3d at 1079-80. Due to the bolstering of the defendant’s accomplish ments, the trial judge permitted plaintiff’s counsel to ask the defendant about boar d certification on redirect examination. The judge explained his rationale for permitting th e plaintiff’s rebuttal evidence, stating that “there is a balance here. So if you are going to puff up, they get to puff down.” Id. at 161, 73 A.3d at 1080. On review, we held that: The doctrine of opening the door has limitations. It allows for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence, bu t only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice that might have ensued from the original evidence. In this regard, [the defendant] argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing [the plaintiff] t o improperly use the lack of board certification as evidence of negligence. Spe cifically, [the defendant] draws our attention to [the plaintiff’s] use of the board certification evidence on re-direct examination and in closing argument. We review both for abuse of discretion.
Id. at 163-64, 73 A.3d at 1082 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Our review of the open door doctrine in Little did not contemplate whether the door had been opened for rebuttal evidence, but rather, we review ed the proportionality of the rebuttal evidence permitted by the trial judge once the door had already been opened . This is a15

separate inquiry that does not pertain to our stand ard of review for the preliminary question of whether the door has been opened for rebuttal ev idence. As stated, this initial inquiry is a question of law that is reviewed by this Court de novo . The secondary question of proportionality is one in which this Court provides deference to a trial judge. In Little , we determined that once the door had been opened , it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to permit the plaintiff to inquire abou t the defendant’s lack of board certification. Id. at 163, 73 A.3d at 1081. Given that the issue before us seeks to resolve th e standard of review for the open door doctrine, the State’s reference to Little is inapposite. We apply de novo review to questions of law, and the open door doctrine is a q uestion of law that we review without deference to the trial judge.
B. In applying de novo review, we find that the door was open for the Sta te to provide rebuttal evidence, but the State’s subseque nt use of the evidence, reviewed for an abuse of discretion, exceeded the s cope of the doctrine. At trial, the following colloquy occurred between R obertson and his counsel on direct examination (also produced in Section I.2, supra ): [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now did you ever get into any trouble as a juvenile? [ROBERTSON]: No. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ever just stopped for some mino r issue? [THE STATE]: Again Your Honor, I’m going to object to the leading nature of his questions. THE COURT: Okay, I’m going to overrule that one. G o ahead. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you. Any kind of trouble when you were a juvenile?16

[ROBERTSON]: No. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: How about as an adult , when you turned 18? [ROBERTSON]: No. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ever even arrested for anythin g? [ROBERTSON]: Never been arrested. This is my firs t time being arrested. (emphasis added). The Court of Special Appeals obs erved that defense counsel’s questioning did not open the door, and if it did, t he questioning was limited to rebuttal evidence pertaining to Robertson’s previous involve ment with the justice system. Robertson , slip op. at 8

. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that defense counsel’s questioning was narrowed by the context of Robertso n’s engagement with the law. Id. at 10. Given the narrowed scope of questioning, had t he door been opened, proportional rebuttal evidence could solely address Robertson’s previous engagement with the criminal justice system. Id. Because the previous incident did not result in any criminal charges, but merely related to Robertson’s suspension from M organ State University, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the trial court abus ed its discretion regarding the proportionality of the State’s rebuttal evidence. Id. at 11.
1. The general nature of defense counsel’s questioning opened the door for the State to rebut evidence of Robertson’s good charact er. We first analyze the issue of whether defense couns el’s questioning opened the door to rebuttal evidence from the State. We find that defense counsel’s questioning was not specific to Robertson’s previous engagement with po lice, but was general in nature. He asked whether Robertson was ever in any kind of trouble as a juvenile. Counsel’s next17

question—“How about as an adult?”—carried over from the previous question, implying the same general questioning regarding Robertson’s character. The use of the term “any” expands defense counsel’s questioning beyond Robert son’s previous engagement with the justice system. The Court of Special Appeals’s sel ective quotations from counsel’s questioning and Robertson’s arguments about the use of legal terminology are unconvincing to limit the State’s rebuttal evidence to Robertson’s criminal history. The State, under the open door doctrine, was permitted to introduce evidence to rebut the image of Robertson as an upstanding individual who had ne ver been in any trouble. See Md. Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A); 4 see also Md. Rule 5-608(b). 5 Such rebuttal evidence was within the ambit of the open door doctrine. We agree with the trial judge’s rationale that the door was

4 Md. Rule 5-404(a)(2)(A) states: Character of Accused. An accused may offer evidenc e of the accused’s pertinent trait of character. If the evidence is a dmitted, the prosecution may offer evidence to rebut it.

5 Beyond utilizing the open door doctrine to neutral ize defense counsel’s image of Robertson’s good character, defense counsel may hav e also opened the door regarding Robertson’s credibility because he did not answer h onestly when counsel inquired about whether he had gotten into “any trouble.” Md. Rule 5-608(b) states: b) Impeachment by Examination Regarding Witness’s O wn Prior Conduct Not Resulting in Convictions. The court may permit any witness to be examined regarding the witness’s own prior co nduct that did not result in a conviction but that the court finds probative of a character trait of untruthfulness. Upon objection, however, the court may permit the inquiry only if the questioner, outside the hearing of the jury, establishes a reasonable factual basis for asserting that the conduct of the witness occurred. The conduct may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.18

open for the State’s rebuttal evidence. At a bench conference, the following colloquy occurred between the trial judge and defense counse l after defense counsel’s objection over the State’s questioning about the previous incident : THE COURT: If - - you put your witness on and he t estified. You asked him and he testified, he’s never been in trouble, h e’s a good boy. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. THE COURT: All right. Now, it seems to me that wo uld open up testimony on number one, credibility, and number two, maybe h e did have trouble in someplace [ sic ]. I think it’s legitimate to bring [the previous incident] in at this point. The door is open. . . . Beyond the issue of credibility, see. n.5, we agree that the general nature of defense counsel’s questioning generated an issue as to Robe rtson’s good character. Robertson attempted to benefit from his good character, which opened the door to the State’s questioning about his previous disciplinary action at Morgan State University.

2. Though defense counsel opened the door for the Stat e to introduce evidence of the previous knife incident, the State’s use of the evidence exceeded the scope of the open door doctrine. Though the State was entitled to question Robertson about the previous knife incident to rebut the assertion that he had never b een in any trouble, the State improperly used the evidence throughout the trial. The State’ s evidence exceeded the scope of the open door doctrine. Rather than simply introducing the previous incident to rebut Robertson’s general good character, the State elici ted details about the incident. See Khan
v. State , 213 Md. App. 554, 575, 74 A.3d 844, 856 (2013) (h olding that, under the open19

door doctrine, a party can use rebuttal evidence of a prior incident, but the rebuttal evidence cannot seek to elicit “ details ” of the prior incident). On cross-examination, the following exchange occurr ed between Robertson and the
State: [THE STATE]: It’s true, you got kicked out of Morg an State, isn’t it? [ROBERTSON]: Well, I didn’t get kicked out. I got an interim - - I don’t know the right complete word - - it’s interim suspe nsion. *** [THE STATE]: Let’s talk about the incident that yo u had where you were involved in a stabbing incident the year before wit h a football player, is that correct? [ROBERTSON]: Yes. [THE STATE]: Okay. And tell us about that. [ROBERTSON]: I could tell you about it vividly, ju st saying that it was kind [ sic ] of jealous of me and my friends, basically becaus e we had their girls. They was just basically hating on us, so - - [THE STATE]: Wasn’t it more like a football player slept with your girlfriend and you got upset? [ROBERTSON]: No. [THE STATE]: Okay. [ROBERTSON]: He didn’t sleep with my girlfriend at all. [THE STATE]: All right, but you pulled a knife out, is that corr ect? On the football player. [ROBERTSON]: I pulled—no.20

[THE STATE]: Okay. Well, what exactly happened th en? [ROBERTSON]: I was fighting a football player befo re. The whole football team came out of the building and hopped i nto the fight, and it was only my little cousin that came up there and Lose, that previously didn’t go there. . . . But he pulled out a knife, and to keep the football players at bay, from hopping into my fight [ sic ]. And I guess it was like the whole football team, so whatever happened - - I don’t know, I was on the ground. Because it [ sic ] was a video, so you could vividly see that I was getting kicked in the face on the ground. [THE STATE]: You like to fight then right? I mean you’re fighting last year, you’re in this fight. You and your friends l ike to fight. [ROBERTSON]: No. I don’t like to fight at all. I’ d never been - - that was my first fight in school period. *** [THE STATE]: Well, let’s talk about Morgan State pl ayers though. I mean you said that this Morgan State player was coming a fter you and you pulled out a knife right? . . . [ROBERTSON]: No, I said my friend . . . pulled out a knife to keep the football players at bay from hopping into the fight , which they hopped into anyway. *** [ROBERTSON]: I didn’t have a knife in both situati ons. On multiple occasions throughout the exchange, Robe rtson clarified that he did not have a knife during the previous incident, nor was he the individual who pulled a knife during that incident. Regardless of this clarifica tion, the State reiterated that Robertson wielded a knife and attempted to elicit details of the prior incident. In Khan v. State , the Court of Special Appeals described the appropriate rebuttal evidence permitted once the door had been opened to such evidence.21

The testimony elicited from [the witness] during th e State’s redirect examination was narrowly tailored to respond to [th e] testimony during the defense’s cross-examination. As soon as the State [, responding to character evidence introduced by the defense,] atte mpted to elicit testimony regarding the details of the prior complaint, defense counsel’s objections were sustained. [The witness] did not discuss the details of this complaint; [the] testimony was only that a complain t had been made. Similarly, neither [of the other witnesses] testifi ed as to details of the prior complaint. [Khan’s wife] acknowledged that she was aware of the prior complaint against her husband, but she did not know the details of its substance, and that was the end of the State’s inqu iry. 213 Md. App. at 575-76, 74 A.3d at 856 (emphasis in original) (bolding added). Khan demonstrates the limited scope of the open door doc trine. The State was permitted to rebut the evidence of Robertson’s good character by citin g the previous incident. However, the
State was not permitted to elicit details about the incident. Abuse of Discretion Standard “Abuse of discretion [exists] where no reasonable p erson would take the view adopted by the [trial] court, or when the court acts without reference to [ ] guidi ng rules or principles.” Alexis v. State , 437 Md. 457, 478, 87 A.3d 1243, 1254 (2014) (cita tions omitted) (emphasis added). Khan established an important guiding principle regardin g the scope of rebuttal evidence permitted after the door has been opened: a party’s rebuttal evidence cannot elicit details about a previous incident. In the c ase at bar, the circuit court acted without reference to this guiding principle w hen it failed to interject in the State’s repeated inquiries that elicited details about the prior occurrence. As defined, an abuse of discretion occurs “when the court acts without refe rence to [ ] guiding [ ] principles,” Alexis
v. State , supra , the very thing that happened here.22

Importantly, the Court of Special Appeals in Khan held that, because the State did not elicit details regarding the particular inciden t , the trial court had not abused its discretion. 213 Md. App. at 575, 74 A.3d at 856. The Court held that “[w]hile the proverbial door was opened to the disputed testimon y, it remained for the trial court to balance its probative value against its prejudicial nature . . . and here we see no abuse of discretion.” Id. at 575, 74 A.3d at 856. The Khan Court deferred to the trial court’s judgment because the scope of rebuttal evidence was proper; here, it was not. Further guidance regarding the abuse of discretion standard is provided in Nash v. State , 439 Md. 53, 67, 94 A.3d 23, 31 (2014), where we wrote that: [A] certain commonality [exists] in all these defin itions: the notion that a ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standa rd will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have m ade the same ruling. Rather, [a] court’s decision is an abuse of discret ion when it is well removed from any center mark imagined by the review ing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimall y acceptable. . . . that kind of distance [from the center mark] can ar ise in a number of ways. (emphasis added) (quotation marks, original emphasi s, and internal citations omitted). In the case at bar, the circuit court’s “distance from the center mark” arose when it failed to follow guiding principles regarding rebuttal eviden ce. Khan established that details regarding a prior incident should not be permitted in rebuttal evidence. This is not the reality of what occurred in the instant case. Rath er, the State impermissibly expanded the
scope of the open door doctrine and therefore, its use of rebuttal evidence was not a proportional response to the general good character that defense counsel painted. As such, the trial court abused its discretion regarding the proportionality of the response: we do23

not reverse “simply because we would not have made the same ruling[,]” but rather, we find that the trial court’s determination regarding the proportionality of the rebuttal evidence was one of the “number of ways” of distanc ing itself from the “center mark” of acceptable conduct.

3. Defense counsel sufficiently objected to the State’ s use of the previous incident during Robertson’s cross-examination. The State contends that defense counsel had opportu nity to object to prejudicial statements during trial and failed to object to any questions about the previous incident. However, defense counsel adequately objected to the State’s use of the previous incident during cross-examination. The State posed the following question to Robertson on cross-examination, “[n]ow you testified that you’ve never been in trouble bef ore, is that correct?” Defense counsel did not object to this inquiry, as it was a clarifi cation about what Robertson had already testified to on direct examination. The State’s in quiry did not allude to the previous incident and therefore, any objection by defense co unsel was unwarranted at this stage of cross-examination. Further into cross-examination, the State posed the following question, “And now you indicated that you left Morgan State University . That’s not really correct is it? You got kicked out of Morgan State for an incident that happened with a knife the year before.” Defense counsel immediately objected and asked to a pproach the bench. Counsel asserted that there had been an agreement with the State so that “the knife incident was not coming in at all.” See n.2. Despite defense counsel’s potential concurren ce that he had opened the24

door to rebut Robertson’s good character, 6 he objected to the use of the knife fight. Defens e counsel did not need to specify the grounds for obj ection, but was required to make a timely objection to the evidence he sought to exclude. See Md. Rule 4-323(a). 7 Case precedent reveals that a party should object to each question or assert a continuing objection to an entire line of questioning. Ware v. State , 170 Md.App 1, 19, 906 A.2d 969, 980 (2006) (citing Brown v. State , 90 Md. App. 220, 225, 600 A.2d 1126 (1992)); see e.g., Fowlkes v.
State , 117 Md. App. 573, 587, 701 A.2d 862, 869 (1997). However, we have also held that

6 Presumably, defense counsel agreed that he had pai nted an image of Robertson’s good character, as demonstrated by his response to the judge at the ensuing bench conference. THE COURT: If - - you put your witness on and he te stified. You asked him and he testified, he’s never been in trouble, he’s a good boy.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. (emphasis added).

7 Md. Rule 4-323(a) states, in relevant part: (a) Objections to Evidence. An objection to the admission of evidence shall be made at the time the evidence is offered o r as soon thereafter as the grounds for objection become apparent. Otherwi se, the objection is waived. In the case at bar, defense counsel timely objected and the objection was not waived. The rule further states: The grounds for the objection need not be stated un less the court, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, so dir ects. In the instant case, neither the court nor the Stat e directed or requested that defense counsel state the grounds for his objection.25

objections need not be reasserted if those objectio ns “would only spotlight for the jury the remarks of the [State].” Johnson v. State , 325 Md. 511, 515, 601 A.2d 1093, 1094 (1992).
In Johnson , we wrote: The objection interrupted the [State] in midsentenc e, and it was perfectly clear what would follow if the objection were not s ustained. We think that the objection went not only to what was said but al so to what was obviously to come. By overruling the objection, the judge de monstrated that he was permitting the [State] to continue along the same l ine. It was apparent that his ruling on further objection would be unfavorabl e to the defense. Persistent objections would only spotlight for the jury the remarks of the [State]. In the circumstances, the absence of a fu rther objection did not constitute a waiver. See Md.Rule 4-323(c). 325 Md. at 514-15, 601 A.2d at 1094. In the case a t bar, defense counsel immediately objected to the State’s inquiry pertaining the prev ious incident. When the trial judge overruled defense counsel’s objection, the State pu rsued a continuing line of questioning about Robertson’s participation in the previous inc ident. Continuing objections would have been futile and would likely “spotlight for th e jury the remarks of the [State].” Id. As such, defense counsel’s initial objection to the State’s continuing line of questioning was sufficient.
CONCLUSION We conclude that the appropriate standard of review for the determination of whether a party has opened the door to otherwise in admissible evidence is de novo because the open door doctrine is ultimately a question of law. A secondary inquiry regarding the proportionality of a party’s rebuttal evidence is a separate issue that we review for abuse of discretion.26

In applying a de novo standard of review, we conclude that defense couns el opened the door for the State to introduce rebuttal eviden ce. Defense counsel’s broad questioning painted an image of Robertson’s good character that enabled an avenue of inquiry previously foreclosed to the State. Though the Sta te was entitled to inquire about Robertson’s suspension from Morgan State University , the scope of the State’s questioning during cross-examination exceeded the scope of the open door doctrine. As such, the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the State to use the rebuttal evidence in the manner presented at trial.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.**Circuit Court for Baltimore City**

**Case No. 116111012 Argued: January 8, 2019**  **IN THE COURT OF APPEALS**
**OF MARYLAND**
**No. 40 September Term, 2018** 

**__________________________________ STATE OF MARYLAND** 

**v. HARRY MALIK ROBERTSON** 

**__________________________________ Barbera, C.J.,**  **Greene, McDonald,**  **Watts, Hotten,**  **Getty, Wilner, Alan M.**  **(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)**

**JJ.**

**__________________________________ Dissenting Opinion by McDonald, J.,**  **which Watts, J., joins.**

**__________________________________ Filed: April 2, 2019** **I agree with most of the reasoning and analysis of the Majority Opinion. However,** 

**near the end it misapplies that reasoning to hold t hat the trial court abused its discretion.**  **Accordingly, I dissent from that holding and the Co urt’s judgment.**  **This appeal concerns application of the “opening th e door” doctrine. Under that**  **doctrine, a party “opens the door” to the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence**  **when the party injects an issue into a case and the opposing party is allowed, as a matter of**  **fairness, to respond with evidence that, although p reviously inadmissible, has thereby**  **become relevant.** Little v. Schneider **, 434 Md. 150, 157 (2013). Before us, the parties contest: (1) how an appella**  **te court should review a trial court’s determination that a party has “opened the**  **door”; (2) whether, in this case, Mr. Robertson’s testimony on direct examination opened**  **the door to cross-examination about a prior incident; and, if so, (3) whether the trial**  **court improperly failed to limit that cross examination.**  **With respect to the first issue, the Majority Opini on thoughtfully analyzes the**  **standard of review and concludes that an appellate court should apply a split standard of**  **review: (a) a** de novo **standard in assessing whether a trial court has cor rectly determined**  **that the doctrine has been triggered and (b) an abu se-of-discretion standard in assessing the**  **trial court’s decision as to what evidence to allow in as a result. Majority slip op. at 7-15.**  **I agree with this reasoning. With respect to the second issue, the Majority Opin**  **ion conducts a** de novo **review of the record and concludes that Mr. Robertson’s te**  **stimony on direct examination that he was (literally) a Boy Scout and had never previousl**  **y been in “any trouble” opened the door 2** 

**to cross-examination about his involvement in a kni fe fight a year earlier that resulted in**  **his suspension from college. Majority slip op. at 15-18. Again, I agree with that analysis.**  **So far, so good. The Majority Opinion then turns to the third questi**  **on – whether the trial court abused its discretion in how it permitted the prose**  **cution to respond to the testimony that “opened the door.” The Majority Opinion concludes**  **that “the State improperly used the evidence [of the prior knife fight] throughout the**  **trial.” Majority slip op. at 18. In fact, the evidence of the prior knife fight appeared late**  **in the trial only during the cross examination of Mr. Robertson, the last witness on t**  **he last day of the trial. That testimony occupies approximately four pages of the trial tran**  **script. At the outset of that testimony, Mr. Robertson’s co**  **unsel objected to any reference to the prior knife fight, calling it “outrageous.”**  **He cited what he referred to as a “motion in limine,” but stated no particular basis for the**  **objection. As the Majority Opinion notes, no motion in limine appears in the record of this c**  **ase, so the basis and scope of this defense objection are not clear – other than that the topic**  **of the prior knife fight should be completely off limits.**  **1 It appears from the colloquy quoted in the Majori**  **ty Opinion that defense counsel eventually conceded – or at least a**  **ccepted the trial court’s ruling – that he**

**1 Majority slip op. at 5-6 & n.2. The absence of a**  **written motion in limine – or even an oral one – necessarily hampers any effort to asc**  **ertain specifically what the defense wished to exclude. Defense counsel referred to a d**  **iscussion that “the knife incident ... was not coming in at all.”**  Id **. One may speculate that the phantom motion was in stead an oral**  **agreement between counsel not to introduce certain topics into the case – unless, of course,**  **the other side did so first. 3** 

**had opened the door to the topic in his direct exam ination of Mr. Robertson.**  See **Majority slip op. at 18. Defense counsel did not thereafter**  **object to any of the specific questions posed by the State on the topic.**  **In discussing this issue, the Majority Opinion lays out why it would have reached a**  **different outcome than the trial court but that, of course, is not the standard for abuse of**  **discretion.** Nash v. State **, 439 Md. 53, 67 (2014) (“a ruling reviewed under a n abuse of**  **discretion standard will not be reversed simply bec ause the appellate court would not have**  **made the same ruling”). The Majority Opinion’s treatment of the one case it**  **relies upon in support of its conclusion is telling.**  See Khan v. State **, 213 Md. App. 554 (2013). In that case, a securit y**  **guard in a cosmetics store was charged with assault and third-degree sex offenses when he**  **sprayed perfume on two teenage girls in the store a nd then touched various parts of their**  **bodies. One of the issues on appeal concerned the introduction of evidence of prior**  **customer complaints of inappropriate touching by th e security guard. The Court of Special**  **Appeals agreed with the trial court that the door h ad been opened to testimony concerning**  **those complaints when defense counsel elicited posi tive testimony from the security**  **guard’s employer concerning his past work performan ce. When the defense objected to**  **testimony concerning details of the prior complaint s, the trial court excluded that evidence**  **of those details. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed that exercise**  **of discretion by the trial court in response to the defense objection, stating: “Wh**  **ile the proverbial door was opened to the disputed testimony, it remained for the trial court**  **to balance its probative value against its 4** 

**prejudicial nature, and here we see no abuse of dis cretion.” 213 Md. App. at 575. The**  **intermediate appellate court thus made clear that, in applying an abuse-of-discretion**  **standard, it was deferring significantly to the tri al court’s judgment in responding to the**  **defense objection to evidence of the details of the prior incident. Contrary to the suggestion**  **of the Majority Opinion, nothing in** Khan **indicates that it was declaring a one-size-fits-al l**  **approach for trial courts when a party opens the do or to the introduction of certain evidence.**  **The abuse-of-discretion standard inherently involve s a case-by-case assessment.**  **In making that case-by-case assessment, an appellat e court cannot overlook the fact**  **that in this case, unlike** Khan **, there was no objection registered at trial to the testimony**  **concerning the details of the prior incident. 2**  **The Majority Opinion suggests that, in not interrupting and limiting the cross-examination**  sua sponte **, the trial court “failed to follow guiding principles.” Majority slip op. at 22. But**  **a critical guiding principle here is that an objection must be made to evidence when the grounds**  **become apparent, or the objection is waived. Maryland Rule 4-323(a). The purpose of**  **that rule is “to prevent ‘sandbagging’ and to give the trial court the opportunity to corr**  **ect possible mistakes in its rulings.”** Bazzle
v. State **, 426 Md. 541, 562 (2012) (internal citations omitt ed). In ruling on an objection to**  **a question on cross-examination, “a trial court is not required to imagine all reasonable**  **offshoots of the argument actually presented to it. ”**  Peterson v. State **, 444 Md. 105, 148 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omit**  **ted). Here no objection at all was made**

**2 I do not disagree that the defense objection at th**  **e outset of that testimony preserved an objection to whether the door had been opened.**  **But the trial court resolved that question against the defense – and, indeed, the Majority Opi**  **nion agrees with that ruling. 5** 

**to testimony concerning the details of the prior in cident.**  **3 Thus, the Majority Opinion**  **reverses the trial court based on an objection that was never presented to the trial court.**  **It is the view of the Majority Opinion, apparently, that the trial judge abused his**  **discretion when he failed to inject himself into th e cross-examination. This would seem to**  **establish a standard under which a trial court must act as back-up defense counsel (without**  **the benefit of having defense counsel’s knowledge o f where the questions will likely lead),**  **and intervene** sua sponte **in a cross-examination or risk being found to have abused its**  **discretion. I cannot agree that the failure of the trial court**  **to interrupt cross-examination** sua sponte **in these circumstances was, in the oft-quoted desc ription of the abuse-of-discretion**  **standard, “well removed from any center mark ... and beyond the fringe of what [is]**  **minimally acceptable.” 4**  **Judge Watts has advised that she joins this opinion**

**.**

**3 It may be that this was because the evidence consi**  **sted entirely of Mr. Robertson’s version of that incident. Indeed, in referring to**  **the prior incident in her closing argument, the prosecutor largely accepted Mr. Robertson’s ver**  **sion of that incident –** i.e **., that he had not wielded the knife during that fight (rather, a**  **friend had done so). Defense counsel, perhaps understandably, registered no objection to**  **that argument, either while the argument was being made or afterwards.** 

**4** North v. North **, 102 Md. App. 1, 14 (1994) (Wilner, C.J.).**