Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 35A05-1711-CR-2552 | March 15, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jeremy K. Nix

Huntington, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine Cooper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Janet M. (Davis) Sierra,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 15, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

35A05-1711-CR-2552

Appeal from the Huntington Circuit

Court

The Hon. Thomas M. Hakes, Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 

35C01-1301-FC-5

Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Between July and November of 2011 Appellant-Defendant Janet Sierra (then 

Davis) worked for Huntington Heating and Cooling (“the Company”). On one 

occasion, Sierra forged a customer’s name to a loan application that happened 

to be for far more than the customer believed himself to be borrowing. On 

other occasions, Sierra accepted cash payments from customers that were never 

passed on to the Company. Sierra was convicted of one count of Class C felony 

forgery and four counts of Class D felony theft, and the trial court sentenced her 

to an aggregate term of fifteen years of incarceration, with seven suspended to 

probation. Sierra contends that the consecutive sentences imposed for her theft 

convictions violate limitations on sentencing for crimes arising out of a single 

episode of criminal conduct and that her sentence is inappropriately harsh. 

Because we disagree, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Sierra was employed by the Company between July 30, 2010, and November 9, 

2011, starting in customer service and later working in sales. In October of 

2010, Michael Hall spoke to Sierra about installing a geothermal system and 

completed an application to finance the cost of installation. When Sierra 

informed Hall that he was not approved for financing, he contacted his father to 

cosign the application. Although Sierra initially told Hall that his father had 

not been approved either, she later contacted Hall to report that he had been 

approved and that Hall did not need to sign any additional paperwork. Hall did 
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not sign the credit application that was ultimately submitted to the Company, 

and the application that was submitted by Sierra misspelled Hall’s name and 

misstated both the length of time he had been living at his residence and his 

income. As it happened, the loan application was approved; however, although 

Hall thought that he was borrowing $9500.00, the application submitted was for 

$18,000.00. Hall discovered that there was a problem when the financing 

company called him and told him that he owed approximately $20,000.00. 

[3] Between June of 2011 and November 9, 2011, Sierra met separately with four 

homeowners or sets of homeowners, Nancy and David Rudy, Terry and 

Jennifer Dillingham, James Williams, and Jackie and John Hancock about 

installing geothermal units in their residences. Sierra reached agreements with 

the Rudys, the Dillinghams, Williams, and the Hancocks, and Sierra requested 

that each client pay in cash rather than by check, telling them that they would 

receive a discount thereby. On June 24, 2011, the Rudys made a $2000.00 cash 

payment to Davis. On July 19 and 29, 2011, the Dillinghams made two cash 

payments to Sierra of $7275.00 and $7261.42. On August 22, 2011, Williams 

made a $5000.00 cash payment to Sierra. On October 14 and 25, 2011, the 

Hancocks made two cash payments to Sierra of $7352.50 each. Although 

Sierra collected the cash payments, she never submitted them to the Company. 

When all was said and done, the damages to Sierra’s victims totaled 

$29,135.80. 

[4] On January 4, 2013, the State charged Sierra with one count of Class C felony 

forgery and four counts of Class D felony theft. On August 10, 2017, a jury 
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found Sierra guilty as charged. At sentencing on October 9, 2017, the trial 

court ordered that Sierra pay restitution to Hall, the Rudys, the Dillinghams, 

Williams, and the Hancocks. The trial court found, as mitigating 

circumstances, Sierra’s lack of criminal history and that she has two children 

and an ill mother. The trial court found, as aggravating circumstances, the 

serious harm done to the Company and the violation of the trust that had been 

placed in her. The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances 

outweighed the mitigating and sentenced Sierra to seven years of incarceration 

(with three suspended) for forgery and to two years (with one suspended) for 

each theft conviction, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 

fifteen years with seven suspended to probation. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Single Episode of Criminal Conduct

[5] Sierra contends that her four thefts are all part of a single episode of criminal 

conduct. When Sierra committed her thefts, as a general rule, if crimes were

part of a single episode of criminal conduct, then the consecutive terms of 

imprisonment could not aggregate to an amount higher than that of the 

advisory sentence for the felony one class higher than the most serious crime. 

Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2 (2011). 

[6] We conclude that the four thefts committed by Sierra were not simultaneous or 

contemporaneous in nature as to constitute a single episode of criminal 

conduct, as she alleges. When a full account of a crime can be given without 
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referring to the other offenses, the offenses are not a single “episode of criminal 

conduct.” Tedlock v. State, 656 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). In Smith 

v. State, 770 N.E.2d 290 (Ind. 2002), the Indiana Supreme Court cited the 

Tedlock court’s emphasis on “the ‘simultaneous’ and ‘contemporaneous’ nature 

of the crimes which would constitute a single episode of criminal conduct.” Id. 

at 294 (quoting Tedlock, 656 N.E.2d at 276). 

[7] With Tedlock’s approach in mind, the Smith Court concluded that even where 

the defendant’s six forgeries occurred throughout the same afternoon, because 

they occurred at separate times and places, and with separate amounts of 

money, the conduct was not a single episode of forgery. Id. at 294. We reach 

the same conclusion in this case. The fact that Sierra’s four thefts were similar 

in character does not mean that they, involving different victims and occurring 

at different locations on many separate days with separate amounts of money, 

constituted a single episode of criminal conduct. The trial court properly 

treated the thefts as not being part of a single episode of criminal conduct. We 

conclude that Sierra has failed to establish that her consecutive theft sentences 

run afoul of statutory limitations. 

II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[8] This Court will revise a sentence authorized by statute only “if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). The question is not whether another 
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sentence is more appropriate, but whether Sierra’s sentence is inappropriate. 

King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The “nature of the 

offense” refers to a defendant’s actions in comparison with the elements of the 

offense. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The “character of 

the offender” refers to “general sentencing considerations and the relevant 

aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Douglas v. State, 878 N.E.2d 873, 

881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 

[9] Sierra has the burden of proving that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and her character. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 

1080 (Ind. 2006). “[Deference to trial courts] should prevail unless overcome 

by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense 

(such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the 

defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples 

of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). 

[10] The nature of Sierra’s offenses was that she stole from the customers of the 

company she worked for and which had placed her in a position of trust. The 

damages to her direct victims came to more than $29,000.00. As for the 

Company, Robert Zahm, President of the Company, indicated that the damage 

to its reputation caused by Sierra’s actions was “brutal” and that the company 

suffered losses of $106,437.00 in 2011 and $221,542.00 in 2012 as a result. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 67. Zahm wrote the trial court that the Company 

had lost over 100 good customers, the Company had to borrow $100,000.00 to 

keep operating, and Zahn had to delay his planned retirement by ten years 
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because of Sierra. Sierra’s crimes damaged and seriously inconvenienced her 

direct victims and nearly put the Company out of business. 

[11] As for Sierra’s character, we cannot say that, despite her lack of other criminal 

convictions, it weighs in her favor. Despite the negative impact of her crimes, 

Sierra is unrepentant, characterizing the episode as a “misunderstanding” and a 

“tragic event in [her] life.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III pp. 65, 66. Sierra claimed 

that she “was unaware what I was doing was a criminal offense” and that her 

crimes were “mistakes[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 66. Sierra has yet to 

accept responsibility for her actions or appreciate their negative consequences, 

which does her no credit. The record also indicates that Sierra left the 

jurisdiction during this case (soon after an arrest warrant had been issued for 

her) and remained a fugitive from July of 2013 until March of 2017, when she 

was arrested in Florida. Moreover, as of sentencing in this case, Sierra had 

charges for forgery and theft pending and set for a plea hearing in another 

Indiana county. Given the negative impact of Sierra’s crimes and her negative 

character, she has failed to establish that her fifteen-year sentence, with seven 

years suspended to probation, is inappropriate. 

[12] We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.