This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 4 ).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15
- 0611 Amber Dawn Manthey, Relator,

vs. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., Respondent, Department of Employment and Economic Development,

Respondent.
Filed December 21, 2015 Affirmed Connolly , Judge Department of Employment and Economic Development

File No. 33119152

- 3

Amber D. Manthey, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se relator) Patrick R. Martin, Stephanie J. Willing, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent ) Lee B. Nelson, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Connolly , Presiding Judge; Smith , Judge; and Minge , Judge

. 

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY , Judge
Rel ator challenges the ruling of the unemployment

- law judge (ULJ) that she was
terminated by respondent for employment misconduct. She argues that the ULJ erroneously failed to consider evidence in the record when finding that she committed
theft . Because the ULJ’s factual finding s that relator stole from her employer are substantially supported by the evidence, we affirm.
FACTS Relator Amber Manthey began working for respondent Dollar Tree Stores Inc. (Dollar Tree) on November 6, 2012. She ackn owledged receipt of Dollar Tree’s employment manual on her first day of employment. The employment manual provides
several bases for termination, including: (1) “unlawful conduct,” (2) “insubordination,” (3) “improper possession of or use of company prope rty,” (4) “failure to record sales accurately,” and (5) “falsification

. ” At the time of her termination, relator was working as an assistant manager. She had the authority to conduct post voids

— a process where an entire transaction is voided from the reg ister , making it appear as though the transaction never occurred. In September 2014, Dollar Tree began to suspect relator of theft, noting that she had issued post voids on several cash

- back transactions. Consequently, Dollar Tree
reviewed its video sur veillance and discovered that relator had post

- voided legitimate transactions and kept the money. Dollar Tree alleged that relator stole $130.3

On November 21, 2014, relator executed two documents: (1) a voluntary admission stating that she had committed the alleged theft , and (2) a promissory note for $130. Relator’s voluntary statement read as follows: “I . . . was doing post voids on my register an[d] also a couple of times on a co

- worker[’]s. . . . I did it for myself, I realize d
that what I was doing was wrong (theft) and stop [p] ed.” Dollar Tree subsequently
notified the St. Paul Police Department, and relator was cited for theft

. 1 On
November 23, 2014, Dollar Tree terminated relator.
The D epartment of E mployment and E conomic D evelopment (DEED) initially
determined relator to be eligible for benefits. Dollar Tree appealed this determination. Following a telephone hearing, a ULJ found that relator had committed theft and
concluded that she was discharged because of employment misconduct a nd was ineli gible for unemployment benefits. In response, r elator requested reconsideration

. The ULJ
affirmed the original decision

. R elator then filed a writ of certiorari, arguing that the ULJ erred in finding that she committed employment misconduct.
D E C I S I O N “Whether the employee committed a particular act is a question of fact.” Peterson
v. Nw. Airlines Inc. , 753 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Minn. App. 2008) (citations omitted), review
denied (Minn. Oct. 1, 2008). “This court views the ULJ’s factual findings in the light
most favorable to the decision. This court also gives deference to the credibility determinations made by the ULJ. As a result, this court will not disturb the ULJ’s factual

1 Criminal

- theft charges against relator have since been dismissed.4

findings when the evidence substantially sustains them.” Id. (citations omitted )

. This court “should not disturb the [ULJ’s] findings as long as there is evidence in the record
that reasonably tends to sustain them.” Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc. , 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011). Here, the evidence in the record substantially sustains the ULJ’s factual findings.
First , relator’s admission of guilt substantially supports them. In her voluntary statement , relator admits to “doing post voids on [her] register, ” an act she categorizes as “theft.”
She also st ates that she “ realized that what [she] wa s doing was wrong.” She also executed a promissory note for the amount Dollar Tree alleged she stole. The voluntary admission and promissory note reasonably sustain the ULJ’s factual finding that relator
committe d theft because they were made against relator’s own interest 2 and were corroborated by the written and oral testimony

. For example , Dollar Tree’s representative testified at the evidentiary hearing that Dollar Tree investigated its suspicion of relator’s theft b y watching video surveillance

. The video revealed relator executing a post void after a valid transaction. Relator’s voluntary statement is thus
corroborated.
Relator challenges the reliability of the admission of guilt and the promissory note, arguing that she signed them under duress and out of fear. But this court does not re

weigh the evidence; it must uphold the ULJ’s factual determinations if the y are

2 The ULJ concluded: “It is unlikely that [relator] would voluntarily admit to criminal activity and sign a binding agreement to repay money if she did not steal the money.”5

reasonable. Id

. Nothing in the record indicates that the ULJ’s factual findings are not
reasonable. Moreover, the ULJ gave relator an opportunity to explain her recantation. Relator
said that she wrote down “ what they wanted [her] to write ” and she felt “ like [she] was pressured into admitting doing something [she] didn’t do [and] that’s w hy [she] never paid the money that [she] promised on the note.” T he ULJ determine d

— as is proper

— the credibility and weight of the evidence , finding that the voluntary admission and the promissory note “provide a more plausible account of the events surrou nding [relator’s] discharge

. ” Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc. , 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006) (noting that this court defers to the ULJ’s conclusions regarding the credibility of evidence). The ULJ’s factual findings, supported by relator’s own confessio n, her promissory note, and other testimony, are reasonably sustained by the evidence. See Stagg , 796
N.W.2d at 315.
Affirmed.