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75–229 PDF 2012

MITIGATING INTER–ETHNIC CONFLICT IN OSCE

REGION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 4, 2010

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

[CSCE 111–2–5]

(

Available via http://www.csce.gov 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

HOUSE SENATE

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida,

Co-Chairman 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,

New York 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland,

Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

ROBERT F. WICKER, Mississippi

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

Michael H. Posner, Department of State 

Alexander Vershbow, Department of Defense 

Michael C. Camun ̃ ez, Department of Commerce 

(II) 

MITIGATING INTER–ETHNIC CONFLICT IN 

OSCE REGION 

MAY 4, 2010

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .............................................. 1

WITNESSES 

Heidi Tagliavini, Head of the European Union Investigation 

of the 2008 Russia-Georgia Conflict ....................................... 3

Peter Semneby, Special Representative for the South 

Caucasus, European Union ..................................................... 9

Soren Jessen-Petersen, Former Special Representative for 

Kosovo, United Nations .......................................................... 14

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin .................... 23

Prepared statement of Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Co-Chairman, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ........... 25

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Ranking 

Member, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ........................................................................................... 26

Prepared statement of Heidi Tagliavini .................................... 27

Prepared statement of Peter Semneby ...................................... 36

(III) 

(1)

MITIGATING INTER–ETHNIC CONFLICT IN 

OSCE REGION 

May 4, 2010

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC

The hearing was held at 10 a.m. in room SVC 208/209 Capitol 

Visitor Center, Washington, DC, Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioner present: Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: Heidi Tagliavini, Head of the European Union 

Investigation of the 2008 Russia-Georgia Conflict; Peter Semneby, 

Special Representative for the South Caucasus, European Union; 

and Soren Jessen-Petersen, Former Special Representative for 

Kosovo, United Nations. 

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, good morning. The Helsinki Commission will 

come to order and let me thank particularly our witnesses. I know 

they traveled a long distance to be with us and we thank them 

very much for appearing before the Helsinki Commission. 

I can’t think of a more important, fundamental role for the creation of the Helsinki process, for the U.S.-Helsinki Commission and 

for the OSCE today than the issue of trying to mitigate inter-ethnic 

conflicts in the OSCE region. When the organization was originally 

created, this was one of its primary functions. We had been 

through wars, we had been through ethnic episodes, and I think 

our hope was that by signing onto the fundamental principles within OSCE related to human rights, security, and economic issues 

that we would ease the ethnic problems in the region. 

And in fact, I believe OSCE has been responsible for mitigating 

problems around the region and has been used as an example 

throughout the universe. So I think it has had its impact. But 

clearly, we are still being challenged today. And that is why we 

want to have regular hearings to bring us up to date as to what 

is happening as far as inter-ethnic conflict within the OSCE region. 

And that’s why I’m particularly pleased that our three witnesses 

could be with us today. They are truly experts in the area that we 

examine today. 

The witnesses’ full bios are available outside the hearing room 

but, briefly, Ambassador Tagliavini led the European Union’s inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:52 Nov 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\050410.TXT KATIE
2

vestigation into the causes of the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008 

and prepared an excellent report which we have found to be extremely helpful. Ambassador Semneby is presently the E.U. Special 

Representative on the South Caucasus and has served as OSCE 

Head of Mission in Croatia. Ambassador Jessen-Petersen is a distinguished international diplomat with extensive experience in the 

Balkans. So we really do have with us today three individuals who 

can, I hope, help us understand the current status within the 

OSCE on this issue. 

I do want to note that we did invite the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to participate in this hearing and, 

while that was not possible, I did have the opportunity to meet 

with the High Commissioner when he visited Washington in 

March. Among other issues, we discussed the ‘‘Recommendations 

on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations,’’ prepared under 

the auspices of the High Commissioner. These 19 guidelines provided greater clarity on how states can pursue their interests with 

regards to minorities without jeopardizing peace and good neighborly relations. They constitute yet another outstanding contribution of the High Commissioner’s Office to the work of the OSCE 

and should serve as a foundation for the OSCE’s efforts in this 

area. 

Ethnic conflicts continue to break out within the OSCE region at 

great cost to the affected countries and populations. In this connection, we are closely watching developments in Kyrgyzstan, where 

amidst the turmoil and ouster of a government in the last few 

weeks, land grabs and following attacks were directed against Russians, Kazakhs, and other minorities. 

Ethnic conflicts, combined with territorial disputes, have erupted 

in the Caucasus as well, causing many thousands of casualties with 

hundreds of thousands of civilians remaining displaced and unable 

to return to their homes. As a result, security within the region is 

seriously undermined, while economic development is stymied by 

the insecurity and unsettled legal issues, particularly where the 

conflicts are interstate in character. 

The Crimea region of the Ukraine still bears the wounds of the 

1944 mass deportation of thousands of Crimean Tatars and other 

ethnic minorities in Ukraine by Joseph Stalin. The Government of 

Ukraine and the affected population in Crimea continue to be challenged with finding mutually acceptable settlements on property 

rights, as well as the exercise of educational and language rights 

of the Ukrainians, Russians, Tatars, and other minorities in the region. 

This July, we will commemorate the genocide which occurred at 

Srebrenica in Bosnia 15 years ago, the senseless slaughter of 8,000 

Bosniak men and boys trapped by Serb militants in what the U.N. 

declared safe haven. This horrific event should be kept in mind as 

we proceed with today’s hearing. 

Srebrenica demonstrates, in our own time, the degree to which 

even relatively small ethnic differences can generate fears and prejudices that, in turn, can lead dangerously to hatred, violence and 

aggression, quite literally against innocent neighbors. Perhaps the 

most important lesson of Srebrenica, however, is that it made eviVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:52 Nov 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\050410.TXT KATIE
3

dent the folly of blaming ethnic differences themselves for the 

crime. 

There was absolutely nothing inevitable about Srebrenica and 

the ethnic cleansing that occurred in Bosnia. It was orchestrated 

by individuals, not history, and was therefore preventable—had 

there been the political will to act. 

While we insist, and do, on bringing those responsible like Ratko 

Mladic to justice, we must also acknowledge our own burden of 

having failed to intervene to stop him and his murderous minions. 

If we do not learn from this mistake, human rights violations, ethnic conflicts, and possibly even genocide will continue to occur. 

These are only some of the very good reasons for conducting today’s 

hearing. 

With that, we are going to turn to our witnesses and I look forward to a discussion. I can assure our witnesses that your entire 

statements will be made part of the record of the Commission and 

you may proceed as you would like. We’ll start out with Ambassador Tagliavini. 

HEIDI TAGLIAVINI, HEAD OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 

INVESTIGATION OF THE 2008 RUSSIA–GEORGIA CONFLICT 

Amb. TAGLIAVINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, 

members of the Helsinki Commission, ladies and gentlemen, let me 

take this opportunity to express my gratitude for having been invited to address this eminent body on a topic which, contrary to 

many expectations, continues to be of top actuality whenever we 

talk about security and the current challenges to peace and stability in Europe. 

I am honored to have this opportunity today to share with you 

some concentrations and findings which emanate from the report 

on the conflict in Georgia in August 2008. As you well know, the 

report which I will introduce today has been submitted to the 

Council of the European Union more than half a year ago. On the 

same occasion, the report has also been handed over to the parties 

to the conflict—the Georgia and the Russian Federations—to the 

OSCE and the U.N., as stipulated in the mission’s mandate. The 

report has also been given to the conflicting parties, South Ossetia 

and Abkhazia. For a number of reasons, not the least to avoid 

misquotations and misinterpretation, the report has been made 

publicly available on the Internet immediately after its release. 

The report has found wide international attention. The reaction 

in the press and in the public have almost always been positive or 

factual and neutral. The conflicting parties reacted in the overwhelming majority in a moderate way although we unfortunately 

could observe some rather selective reading. I mean, each party 

presenting those parts of the report which were to their liking. 

Allow me to briefly record the origin and mandate of the report: 

By its decision of 2 December 2008, the E.U. Council commissioned 

an independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the 

August 2008 conflict in Georgia. The council appointed me as the 

head of the fact-finding mission, leaving to me all decisions as to 

its working methods and proceedings. The mandate’s terms of reference request the commission to investigate the origins and the 

causes of the conflict of August 2008 in Georgia. 

4

So the mandate was a threefold mandate: investigate the origins 

and the causes and the course of the August 2008 conflict in Georgia, including with regard to international law, including the Helsinki Final Act with regard to humanitarian law and human 

rights, and the accusations made in that context, including allegations of war crimes. 

The geographical scope and the time span was to be sufficiently 

broad to determine all possible causes of the conflict—a very extensive task, for which the mission was assigned a relative timeframe 

of just about 9 months. 

The report contains over 1,000 pages. This seems to be fairly voluminous. However, the main results of the report are summarized 

on some 25 pages at its very beginning under the heading of ‘‘The 

Conflict in Georgia in August 2008.’’ This summary includes the 

main events that occurred and their underlying reasons in terms 

of their political, historical, military, and legal relevance—and the 

latter both in the context of international law and international humanitarian law as well as human rights law. They include the 

most substantial elements, facts and findings of the report, followed by a dozen of the most important observations—sort of lessons learned—which have emerged in the course of the work. 

Preceding this summary, there is also a short introduction explaining the context, the methods, and the purpose of the mission’s 

work. The summary is followed by an acknowledgment of the efforts of all those who contributed to the mission’s work. These 

chapters together with a few additional pages of a more technical 

context, such as maps and a list of the mission’s visit and meetings, represent most of volume one of the report, then followed by 

two additional volumes—two and three. 

Volume two includes about 450 pages of expert opinions and 

analysis which were among the most important, but not the only 

foundations for the report’s facts and conclusions. These 450 pages 

contain all the relevant information which in one way or another 

has to do with the conflict in Georgia. 

Volume three with around 650 pages contains mainly the unabridged and unaltered statements and answers to the mission’s 

questions as received from the different sides to the conflict and 

other sources. Hence, the total report comprises around 1,150 pages 

divided into three volumes, as just explained. 

Let me point out some further elements related to the mission’s 

work and its report. First, among these is the political context. It 

needs to be recalled that the European Union played an important 

role in stopping the fighting in Georgia in August 2008, and in negotiating the agreements necessary for a cease-fire. This was largely due to the persistent efforts of the then-French E.U. presidency 

led by President Sarkozy. 

Even now, the European Union continues to be actively engaged 

in stabilizing efforts such as the E.U. monitoring mission and in 

the Geneva talks. We understand that our mission was also part 

of this overall European Union policy which aims at securing a 

peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia. 

Another important point I would like to stress that our fact-finding mission was the first fact-finding mission of its kind in the history of the European Union. Our aim was to prepare a fair and 

5

nonpartisan presentation of the events and an equally balanced 

evaluation in terms of international and humanitarian role. 

Our hope was that the report will make a valid contribution to 

a negotiated solution of the conflict. Yet, it’s not enough to approach this conflict in terms of its political, legal, and military aspects. It’s even more so a matter of minds. 

Those who were involved in the conflict are usually focusing only 

on their own truths. They were hardly ever sufficiently prepared to 

look at the truth of the others. It must be understood, however, 

that no solution to the conflict is possible unless it comes from the 

principals themselves and unless it reflects not only their own perceptions, but those of the other side as well. The report wishes to 

encourage this process of reorientation. 

In this context, it needs to be underlined that the fact-finding 

mission was not leading an investigation relevant to judicial proceedings of any sort. It was a strictly fact-finding mission. In keeping with the mandate conferred by the E.U. Council, this report 

should not be seen as a tribunal and it was not preparing any legal 

action in favor or against any side or anyone. 

The mission’s task was to establish to the best of its knowledge, 

the facts and their relevance under international and humanitarian 

law. There is hardly any chance for a future peace without the 

facts being presented in a sober and impartial manner. This was 

the main purpose of the report. 

Indeed, the objective, unbiased, and nonpartisan approach has 

been one of the most basic and most important guidelines of the 

mission’s work. The impact of the mission’s report and, with it, the 

contribution it can make toward peace and stability largely depends on its acceptance by the sides to the conflict. And this, again, 

is contingent upon the report’s fairness. This is what the mission 

has tried to achieve. 

If there is any basic message of the report apart from drawing 

attention to the human dimension of the conflict and all the tragedy of the events, then it is in the form of a renewed call upon all 

conflicting sides to comply with the basic rules of international law, 

such as the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the 

nonuse of force or the threat of force, as these principles are enshrined in the charter of the United Nations. 

At the same level, there is a similar need for uncompromising observance of the guidelines for international interaction and behavior which is linked in a European context to the OSCE and its 

landmark documents, beginning with the Helsinki Final Act of 

1975 through to the Charter for the European Security, as well as 

all of the relevant documents of the Council of Europe and, of 

course, the U.N. Charter. All of these have suffered as a result of 

the August 2008 fighting in Georgia, and all sides to the conflict 

must do their utmost to give these political and legal instruments 

their rightful places of decisiveness in international relations 

again. 

At the same time, it derives from these observations that this 

conflict has not only a local or regional relevance, but that it has 

a direct bearing on the security architecture of Europe. While fairness and nonpartisan and even-handed approach are the pivots of 

the mission’s working methods, a similar effort has been made to 

6

provide clear-cut answers when it comes to the results of the mission’s work. 

Let me start with the answer to the question which in the past 

has been asked most frequently. In the mission’s view, it was Georgia which triggered off the war when it attacked Tskhinvali with 

heavy artillery on the night of 7–8 August 2008. 

None of the explanations given by the Georgian authorities in 

order to provide some form of legal justification for the attack 

lended [sic] to valid explanation. In particular, to the best of our 

knowledge, there was no massive Russian military invasion on the 

way which had to be stopped by Georgian military forces shelling 

Tskhinvali. 

This said, it needs to be stressed that the Georgian attack 

against Tskhinvali on 7–8 August 2008, was by no means an isolated event. It was but the culminating point of months and years 

of mounting tension, of armed incidents and a steadily deteriorating situation. All sides to the conflict bear responsibility for 

these ever-more-serious developments. Indeed, the conflict has deep 

roots in the history of the region, in people’s national traditions 

and aspirations as well as in age-old perceptions, or rather 

misperceptions, of each other which were never mended and sometimes exploited. 

The report on the conflict in Georgia has shown that any explanation of the origins of the conflict cannot focus solely on the artillery attack on Tskhinvali in the night of 7–8 August and on what 

then developed into a Georgian offensive against South Ossetia and 

the ensuing Russian military response. Such an evaluation needs 

always to take into account the run-up to the open hostilities during the years before and the mounting tension in the months and 

weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities. 

It must also, as stressed earlier, take into consideration years of 

provocations, mutual accusations, military and political threats, 

and acts of violence both inside and outside the conflict zones. It 

has to consider, too, the impact of a great power’s politics and diplomacy against a small and insubordinate neighbor, together with 

the small neighbor’s penchant for acting in the heat of the moment 

without careful consideration of the final outcome; not to mention 

its fear that it might permanently lose an important part of its territory through what it used to call a creeping annexation. 

While the onus of having actually triggered the war lies with the 

Georgian side, the Russian side, too, carries the blame for a substantial number of violations of international law. These include—

even prior to the armed conflict—the mass conferral of Russian 

citizenship to a majority of the population living in South Ossetia 

and Abkhazia. It also includes, in terms of an additional violation 

of international law, the military action by the Russian armed 

forces on Georgian territory far beyond the needs of a proportionate 

defense of Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinvali who had come under 

Georgian attack. 

In addition, the Russian recognition of both South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia as independent states must be considered as being not 

valid in the context of international law and as a violation of Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. 

7

As far as the contentious issues under international humanitarian law and human rights law are concerned, it is among the 

main conclusions of the fact-finding mission that Russian and 

Ossetian allegations claiming that Georgia was carrying out a 

genocide against the South Ossetian population are not substantiated. 

On the other side, there are serious indications that ethnic 

cleansing did take place in many instances against ethnic Georgians and their religious settlements in South Ossetia as well as 

other violations of international humanitarian law which have been 

attributed to all sides. 

Furthermore, there are serious question marks behind the attitude of the Russian armed forces who would not or could not stop 

atrocities committed by armed groups or even individual fighting 

on the South Ossetian side against the civilian population in those 

territories which were controlled by the Russian armed forces. 

In our report, we noted with regret an erosion of the respect of 

established principles of international law such as territorial integrity, and at the same time, an increased willingness on all sides to 

accept the use of force as a means to reach one’s political goals, and 

to act unilaterally instead of seeking a negotiated solution, as difficult and cumbersome as such a negotiation might be. 

And finally, we have seen the long trail of human suffering and 

misery in the wake of armed action. 

As our mission was created as a fact-finding mission and not as 

a political consultative body, the mission has abstained from laying 

out a political roadmap on how to handle and possibly to resolve 

the still-ongoing conflict. 

While describing the events and their causes, the mission has 

noted, however, a number of elements which contributed to the 

steady escalation of tension and, finally, to the armed conflict of 

August 2008. The mission has tried to identify these elements in 

the report’s chapter on observations, and it has added brief suggestions to each of them. 

No. 1, first and foremost, I would recommend abstaining from assigning an overall responsibility for what has happened in Georgia 

in 2008. The conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia are rooted in 

a profusion of causes comprising different layers in time and actions combined. While it is possible to identify the authorship of 

some important events and decisions marking its course, there is 

no way to assign an overall responsibility for the conflict to one 

side alone. All parties to the conflict have failed, and it should be 

their responsibility to make good for it. 

Second, in the 2008 conflict in Georgia, preventive diplomacy and 

international conflict management was not successful, partly because of what I would call a gradual erosion of previously negotiated and agreed common parameters as well as an increasing disrespect of international commitment. In order to keep peace or 

even just the effectiveness of a cease-fire agreement, we don’t need 

any new agreements or treaties apart from those existing already. 

Another important point are the existing provisions when it 

comes to the supply of arms and military equipment as well as 

military training in a conflict region. Even when done within the 

limits established by international law or by commitments of a 

8

nonbinding nature such as the relevant OSCE and U.N. principles 

of the [inaudible] arrangements, military support should stay within the limits set by common sense and due diligence. Upmost care 

should be taken by providers of military aid to refrain from giving 

their support even unintentionally to any actions or developments 

detrimental to the stability in the region. 

Another point is the virtually passive and non-innovative approach to the peace processes adopted by the international community present in the area. I mean the OSCE in South Ossetia, and 

the U.N. in Abkhazia. They did not help to bring about a peaceful 

settlement of the conflict. When, in early spring 2008, the international community eventually realized the seriousness of the situation and deployed intense, high-diplomacy with U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice, E.U. High Representative Javier Solana, 

and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier presenting 

one diplomatic initiative after the other, it was too late and not 

enough to prevent the forthcoming crisis. 

The international context in which the August 2008 events were 

unfolding was, without any doubt, complicated by decisions on 

Kosovo’s independence and its international recognition. Together 

with the Bucharest NATO summit of April 2008, with its promise 

of Georgia’s future NATO membership, these events complicated 

the international context in which the events were unfolding. 

The decision by the Russian Federation to withdraw the 1996 

CIS restrictions on Abkhazia and to authorize direct relations with 

the Abkhaz and the South Ossetian sides in a number of fields in 

spring 2008 added another dimension to an already-complex situation in the area. This added to the lack of timely and sufficiently 

determined action by the international community; and as already 

mentioned, to some degree, the non-innovative approach to the 

peace process in Abkhazia and South Ossetia adopted by the international organizations contributed to the unfolding of the crisis. 

There is another important and a favorite topic of mine which I 

have experienced in many years of work in conflict zones. It concerns the arrangements made to end an open conflict. It is my deep 

belief that any cease-fire agreement as unsatisfactory as it may be 

for all sides is still better than a war or open hostilities. 

However, it needs also to be said that all cease-fire arrangements 

sooner or later are worn out or overtaken by events. As in the case 

of the U.N. in Abkhazia or the OSCE in South Ossetia, mandates 

become inadequate or even instrumental in cementing uncompromising positions. What may have been an effective tool for ending 

the hostilities in, in our case, the conflict in the early ’90s, may 

turn out to be obsolete 15 years later and even lead directly to open 

hostilities. 

Finally, it must be noted that there are no winners in this conflict. Everyone has lost, if not in terms of life and property alone, 

at least in the fields of hopes and prospects for the future. This is 

true not only of the relations between Tbilisi on one side and 

Sukhumi and Tskhinvali on the other side where the August 2008 

conflict has not settled any of the contentious issues. 

The situation in the conflict region continues to remain tense. 

Relations between Georgia and Russia have come to an all-time 

low. And the international community is among the losers, too. 

9

The political culture of cooperativeness that have developed in 

Europe since the 1970s on the basis of already-mentioned landmark documents of the CSCE and the OSCE has suffered. The 

threats and use of force have now returned to European politics. 

Established principles of international law such as the respect for 

sovereignty and territorial integrity of states were ignored. Violations of international humanitarian and human rights law such as 

ethnic cleansing have resurfaced as elements of political reality. 

And last but not least, the relations between the Western powers 

and Russia have suffered. 

The international community as well as other regional or non-regional actors involved in the conflict should make every conceivable 

effort not only to bring the sides to the negotiating table but also 

to address the urgent political question on how to overcome the gap 

that was created by the conflict in Georgia in August 2008. The 

successful outcome of such negotiations should also do much to 

mend the relations between Western powers and Russia. 

There is little hope, however—and here I’m quoting the conclusion of our report: ‘‘There is little hope, however, for a peaceful future in the conflict region unless the two main contenders, Russia 

and Georgia, make bilateral efforts themselves to solve their disputes. This needs to be done now.’’

It is our sincere hope that the report may contribute to a better 

understanding and, most importantly, to a sober assessment of the 

situation by the conflicting sides and, through that, to be instrumental in creating peace and stability in the conflict region and beyond. I thank you for your attention. 

Mr. CARDIN. Ambassador Tagliavini, first of all, thank you very 

much for that detailed explanation of the Russian-Georgia issues. 

I don’t think anyone has as much experience on this than you do, 

so we very much appreciate the personal presentation. 

Ambassador Semneby? 

PETER SEMNEBY, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE 

SOUTH CAUCASUS, EUROPEAN UNION 

Amb. SEMNEBY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ladies 

and gentlemen, I very much appreciate this opportunity to testify 

before the U.S. Helsinki Commission on this very timely topic. 

I would like to start where my colleague Ambassador Tagliavini 

finished. And that is with the Russian-Georgian war. There was 

undoubtedly a war between two states, but where the foundations—the deeper foundations—lay in the fraught inter-ethnic relations between Georgians on the one hand and Abkhaz and South 

Ossetians on the other hand, which was a result of the wars of the 

1990s. These inter-ethnic conflicts gradually became hijacked as 

part of a larger inter-state conflict, and I would even say, to some 

extent, a geostrategic conflict. 

The European Union, as Ambassador Tagliavini mentioned, responded to this challenge in August 2008 by brokering the ceasefire between Russia and Georgia by deploying a monitoring mission, launching talks between the parties, hosting a donor’s conference and then sponsoring the independent commission that Ambassador Tagliavini led. 

10

The European Union also responded at the more strategic level 

by launching the so-called Eastern Partnership in the spring of 

2009. The purpose of this initiative, which covers not only the three 

countries in the South Caucasus but also Belarus, Moldova, and 

Ukraine, is to promote a prosperous and stable neighborhood to be 

able to better respond to specific concerns and aspirations of the 

Eastern neighbors through E.U. approximation, stronger political 

relationships, free trade, liberalization of travel and so on. And also 

as part of this relationship, promoting rule of law, human rights, 

good governance, which includes also minority rights that are the 

topic of our hearing today. 

The war demonstrated that the status quo that we had seen 

emerge in the Caucasus was a dangerous one. A status quo can always delude policymakers outside a region like this, especially if 

it’s a far-away region, to conclude that all is fine and attention can 

be paid elsewhere. If there was any lesson of the Russian-Georgia 

war, though, it was that frozen does not mean safe. 

I would also mention another factor here and that is the closed 

borders of the South Caucasus that we have seen as a consequence 

of this status quo. There are obviously consequences of the conflict, 

but they are increasingly also becoming sources of conflict, as many 

of them have now been closed for more than a decade. People on 

each side of these borders are, at best, growing up in ignorance 

about each other, but at worst, with reinforced enemy images. 

The new generation on each side of these borders, or, administrative boundaries, as they sometimes may be as well, will not only 

be divided by ethnicity, but also by a lack of knowledge about each 

other and often not even sharing a common language anymore. 

I believe that the European Union and other partners of the 

countries in the region have a huge role to play in contributing to 

a culture of dialogue in the region, promoting regional cooperation 

and development opportunities across these borders and boundaries. 

Let me mention a few words on each one of the conflicts that we 

are facing in the region. I would start briefly with the Turkey-Armenia conflict. The E.U. as well as the United States and Switzerland as well—in particular, Switzerland, I would mention as the 

mediator in this longstanding conflict—have focused a good deal of 

political and diplomatic attention on the rapprochement between 

Turkey and Armenia. 

This is a conflict that has a long and difficult history. It is obviously much more than an inter-state conflict. It has strong historical roots going back to the very tragic history of the late Ottoman 

Empire. As I said, it is more than an inter-state conflict, but it also 

doesn’t fall in the classical kin-state pattern. But as anybody here 

in Congress is aware, it very much involves the large Armenian diaspora residing both in the United States and in the European 

Union and elsewhere. 

We find ourselves now at a critical moment in the efforts to normalize relations between the two states and open the common border. The protocols that were signed in October 2009 have been submitted to the Turkish and Armenian Parliaments, but have yet to 

be ratified. Both sides, given the charged background, history, apprehensions, will have to take courageous steps which will be, inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:52 Nov 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\050410.TXT KATIE
11

deed, controversial among parts of their respective constituencies 

in order to move toward the ratification and the implementation of 

the protocol. 

From the beginning here, the reaction of Azerbaijan was predictably negative, with many in Azerbaijan regarding this even as a 

step of betrayal by their brethren and ethnic kin in Turkey. The 

E.U. has made it clear that this process is not—we believe this 

process is not against the interests of Azerbaijan and that ultimately the stability of the region, with open borders, will be to the 

benefit of all, including Azerbaijan. It’s important together with our 

partners including the United States that we continue to work with 

Azerbaijan to reassure the leadership of our continued commitment 

to Azerbaijan—to dialogue with Azerbaijan and our commitment to 

Azerbaijan as a strategically important partner. 

On a positive note on the protocols, I would say that even in this 

difficult situation we’re facing now, they may already have contributed positively to improved relations between Turks and Armenians. Although the border does remain closed, we have observed 

a dismantling of what I would call mental barriers, including an 

increasing number of visits in both directions by civil society representatives, journalists, together with an intensified exchange of 

ideas and opinions, something that makes me cautiously positive as 

to the future. 

On Nagorno-Karabakh, this conflict is perhaps the most fraught 

in terms of inter-ethnic antagonism in the region. The war in the 

early 1990s was an exceptionally bloody one that left deep and 

painful wounds with many dead and hundreds of thousands driven 

from their homes. This conflict is also a classical example of the 

difficulty of reconciling the principles of the Helsinki Final Act with 

each other—in particular, territorial integrity with the right of selfdetermination. 

The E.U. does not have a direct role in the peace talks under the 

OSCE Minsk Group, but the increasing engagement of the European Union bilaterally with the countries in the region and collectively also with the E.U.’s eastern partners suggests that the E.U. 

could indeed play a larger and more assertive role. I believe that 

we can make important practical and political contributions in support of the resolution of the conflict and in support of the efforts 

of the Minsk Group. 

There’s a particular need here to work with the populations of 

the two countries, and this includes also Nagorno-Karabakh. There 

is a disconnect today between the highest levels—those conducting 

the negotiations—and the wider populations, which are still very 

much entrenched in their positions, relying on old stereotypes of 

the enemy. Without the shift in perspectives in these societies, it 

will be very difficult for the respective leaders to sell an eventual 

peace to their respective electorates. And the more time passes, the 

more difficult this will become. 

As to the Georgia conflict, this needs to be analyzed, as I mentioned, at two levels: the inter-state conflict between Georgia and 

Russia and the inter-ethnic and inter-communal conflict between 

the Georgians and the Abkhaz. I will not go into any detail here. 

I believe you have received as good a presentation as one can get 

from Ambassador Tagliavini. 

12

But I would just like to recall that Russia’s recognition of 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states and the continued presence of significant Russian forces in Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia in areas where such forces were not present to August 

2008, and which remain there in violation of the six-point ceasefire agreement, that all of this means that the prospect of normalization in the near and medium term between Russia and Georgia 

is unlikely. 

I would also recall that the recognition by Russia of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia followed upon a long history of increasing tensions, as has been described, including the 

controversial granting of citizenship to the populations of these—

Russian citizenship to the populations of these regions. 

There have, at the same time, been some positive steps between 

Russia and Georgia, notably the opening of a border crossing point 

in March of this year. This is now the only legal crossing point between the two countries, since other roads and the now-defunct rail 

link all run through either Abkhazia or South Ossetia. The opening 

of this border could have positive implications, not only for the 

Russian-Georgian relationship, but also regionally, beyond Georgia’s borders, notably for Armenia. 

As for the inter-community conflict, this conflict naturally was in 

the background—has been in the background since the RussianGeorgian war. But it needs to be recalled that, from the point of 

view of the population of the breakaway regions, there are serious 

concerns regarding, in particular, security in the broadest sense, 

including for language and culture. From the point of view of the 

Georgian side, the main issue is the right of return of the displaced 

Georgian population, and in particular, after the war, also the 

rights of the remaining Georgian population in the conflict regions, 

including their freedom of movement across the administrative 

boundary lines. 

At the end of last year, the European Union adopted a policy visa-vis Georgia’s breakaway regions based on two principles of nonrecognition and engagement. And indeed, we consider these two 

principles to be indispensable parts of one integral policy. While it’s 

imperative to remain unequivocally committed to the [inaudible] 

principle—the respect for Georgian integrity—it’s also essential to 

be flexible and pragmatic in practice, for example by promoting 

contacts with the population of the breakaway regions. 

It’s only through engagement and establishing a footprint in the 

breakaway regions that the European Union can provide an alternative perspective for Abkhazia—could provide a perspective for 

the populations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that is similar to 

the vision shared by the Georgians, and how the European Union 

in this way, also, can ensure that its soft power can function. All 

of this also requires that Georgia reaches out, and we are working 

closely with the Georgian Government in order to encourage such 

an approach, including through support for a state strategy—the 

implementation of a state strategy that was adopted to this effect 

some time ago. 

I spent 3 years—more than 3 years also in the Balkans, as you 

mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in the beginning. And in conclusion, this 

leads me to make some reflections on parallels between the South 

13

Caucasus and the Balkans. The conflicts in these two areas were 

both caused by the collapse of multiethnic super-states with a 

dominating metropolis. 

Both the Soviet Union and the old Yugoslavia acknowledged and 

even supported ethnic identities as a kind of safety valve, but at 

the same time, they tried to keep the ethnic groups in check by 

carefully balancing their interests and suppressing any expression 

of ethnic interests that threaten the legitimacy of the super-state. 

In both cases, there were also attempts to artificially develop a 

common, non-ethnic and fairly ideological identity on the top of and 

as an eventual alternative to the ethnic identities—that is, the Soviet and Yugoslav identities. 

These strategies ultimately imploded, and both in the Soviet 

Union and in the former Yugoslavia, the inter-ethnic conflicts were 

then hijacked as part of interstate conflicts between the countries 

that emerged—conflicts that were more about dividing up resources, revising maps and projecting power than anything else. 

Most of the conflicts in the Balkans were put to rest fairly rapidly 

because this region was located in the heart of Europe and was the 

subject of intensive attention from the European Union, NATO, 

United States and others. 

The European accession agenda that was launched at the European Union summit at Thessaloniki in 2003 gave the countries in 

this region a vision to strive for, while it also underlined the attention of the European Union and its member states to this region 

and its problems, including the inter-ethnic conflicts. It paved the 

way for the re-establishment of economic relations and trade, cooperation on war crimes and symbolic acts of reconciliation. 

The countries of the South Caucasus do not have a membership 

perspective, but it’s also important to notice that the Eastern Partnership does not exclude the possibility of a membership perspective at some future—at some time in the future. The—I have focused this presentation on conflict management, but both regions 

contain further conflict potential, which makes prevention an indispensable priority, alongside the handling of the existing protracted 

conflicts. 

There are many potential hotspots in the South Caucasus, in 

particular, that I’m dealing with at the moment—the Azerian and 

Armenian minorities in Georgia, where unemployment and social 

problems could acquire an ethnic conflict dimension if not handled 

correctly; some areas of Azerbaijan, where religious revival, both 

Sunni and Shiite, is creating concerns; the dangerous spillover 

from the increasingly precarious situation in the economically depressed and ethnically diverse Russian North Caucasus. 

Many European Union programs are geared toward regional development in depressed minority areas, and we’re also working on 

legislation, institution-building, education and other rights issues, 

together with the OSCE, including the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Council of Europe. So in the longer run, 

how can we overcome these inter-ethnic divisions and avoid that 

they become instruments, again, in larger conflicts? 

I would highlight two concepts here: shared identity and common 

interests. Ethnicity is very much about identity, and one of the visions closest at hand would therefore be to try to adjust the identiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:52 Nov 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\050410.TXT KATIE
14

ties that have pitched people in these two regions against each 

other. As the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia waned, the superficial 

Soviet and Yugoslav identities rapidly disappeared, but only to be 

replaced by narrow and exclusive national, and I would even say 

nationalist, identities in the successor states. 

Only with the gradually increasing role of the European Union 

has the prospect of a new, larger identity emerged that could ultimately contribute to a common purpose and become a compliment 

to the national identities, softening them and adding a layer to 

them, but without replacing them. We’ve already seen this in the 

Balkans, and I’m confident that this transformation will also take 

place, ultimately, in the South Caucasus, as long as the European 

Union has the will to deliver relevant benefits to the countries and 

engage with the conflict regions. 

The other concept here would be to nurture common interests between the countries and areas populated by different ethnicities. 

This requires, first and foremost, open borders, not least since both 

the Balkans and the South Caucasus are located right on strategic 

communications roads for goods, energy and peoples. All the South 

Caucasus conflicts, in fact—Abkhazia, South Ossetia and NagornoKarabakh—are almost literally roadblocks sitting on and preventing traffic on important strategic communications routes. 

With a renewed paradigm for the South Caucasus of—and I 

would say this paradigm would be a region of intersecting, strategic communications routes—it may be possible for the states in 

the region to focus on the benefits of cooperation as an alternative 

to the continuing practice of instrumentalizing differences among 

the inter-ethnic and holding these hostages to wider conflicts. 

This paradigm would be similar to the rationale behind the functional integration that led to the decision, 50 years ago, to pool Europe’s strategic resources to prevent further conflict—a momentous 

decision that soon led to the emergence of the European Communities, and later, to the European Union. Thank you very much for 

your attention. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I particularly appreciated your observations on prevention. Once the conflicts become 

frozen or active, it’s very difficult to deal with the displacements 

and all the problems that come with it. So thank you very much 

for that. We’ll now turn to Mr. Jessen-Petersen. 

SOREN JESSEN-PETERSEN, FORMER SPECIAL 

REPRESENTATIVE FOR KOSOVO, UNITED NATIONS 

Mr. JESSEN-PETERSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

very much for convening this meeting. This is my third opportunity 

to appear before this Commission. I did it in 1996, when I was a 

Special Envoy of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees in what 

was then called the former Yugoslavia; then again in 2005, when 

I was the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General and 

Administrator of Kosovo. 

And now, I’m delighted to be back. I know the role that this 

Commission has been playing, is playing in its constant focus on 

not-the-least, the human dimensions of conflicts, which, over the 

last 7 or 8 years, we have tended, very often, to ignore or forget 

in our pursuit of what we call state security. 

15

There were seven conflicts in the Western Balkans from 1991—

excuse me—to 2001. They had, as their objective, the forcible displacement of other groups, be they political, ethnic, social, religious, or a community, or what we also call the ethnic cleansing 

of other groups. When the first of these conflicts erupted in 1991, 

there was the by-now-infamous statement by the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, then-chair of the E.U., that the hour of Europe is 

now. We know today that, that hour never came. 

We know that, unfortunately, Europe failed to prevent and stop 

the conflicts that was done thanks to an initial hesitant involvement on the part of the United States, and then NATO leadership, 

also. And the role of the E.U. during the conflict was mainly relegated to humanitarian assistance, which, at the time, as a senior 

official in UNHCR, I, of course, appreciated, although, as many, 

were concerned that the humanitarian efforts during the war became a substitute for decisive political action. 

Now, in the post-conflict rebuilding, Europe has, as it should indeed, taken the lead, and working very closely with the not only 

European Union and European Commission, but with the OSCE 

and the U.N. have played prominent roles in reverting the goals of 

what those seven conflicts were all about. That means focusing on 

rebuilding the physical and human scars of the destruction during 

the war, working on reverting the displacement by helping refugees 

displaced to return, or to relocate elsewhere, and then third, working on trying to heal the divisions through coexistence, reconciliation and judicial measures. 

We have come a long way, over the last 10 years. I have always 

been convinced that the best way to address inter-ethnic tensions 

in that region has been by addressing the past through a forwardlooking strategy by locking all the countries of the western Balkans 

into a future, larger Europe. As Ambassador Semneby just mentioned, that policy was confirmed at the summit of the European 

Union in Thessaloniki, Greece, in 2003, when the E.U. confirmed 

the European perspective of countries of the Western Balkans. 

That means, in normal language, confirming that they will all 1 

day be members of the European Union. Since then, Slovenia 

moved in, as we know, in 2004. Croatia is now in the final stages 

of its accession process. Macedonia has embarked on this process, 

but is being delayed by the continued dispute with Greece over the 

name issue. And the other countries in the region—Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia—are in various stages—rather early stages—of the accession process. But there must be no 

doubt, there is no doubt, that they will all 1 day be members of 

the European Union. 

There are three major, outstanding issues in the way of progress. 

The first is the continued constitutional mess in BosniaHerzegovina that hampers progress and still leaves worrying questions of whether the forces of integration or the forces of separation 

in that country will prevail. 

The second outstanding issue is Serbia’s continued objections to 

the independence of Kosovo—an independence which is a reality, 

recognized, now, by 67 of the U.N. member states, but still not recognized by five member states of the European Union. Serbia, of 

course has a right to object to the independence of Kosovo, but in 

16

my view, the European Union should not move forward with Serbia’s progress into the European Union as long as there is this unresolved bilateral issue between Serbia and Kosovo, because that 

would risk E.U. unity, Western Balkan states’ cooperation. 

And as we have seen already, having made the mistake in the 

past inviting in countries involved in bilateral conflicts—for example, Cyprus, or the name issue over Macedonia and, until recently, 

also a bilateral issue between Slovenia and Croatia—these are all 

detrimental to the main focus on integrating the countries of Europe into E.U. And it delays the accession process. So E.U., I hope, 

would not make that mistake again. 

Third, the third, last, I believe major outstanding issue is based 

on a very positive development. Over the last couple of years, E.U. 

has finally moved to liberalize visa procedures, allowing citizens 

from the countries of the Western Balkans to travel freely also into 

and around Europe. That is important because they need to see 

and learn and take back exactly what an E.U. perspective means. 

So it’s a very welcome development. 

Unfortunately, the citizens of Bosnia and Kosovo are still not 

benefiting from the visa liberalization. Those two countries are not 

considered ready. One could say that is quite strange, in view of 

the fact that we have a very heavy European Union involvement 

exactly in those two countries. And it is a pity, because leaving two 

countries behind in the very welcome liberalization of the visas 

does, to a certain extent, defeat the purpose, because if there are 

gaps in the areas of the freedom of movement, we will still fail in 

bringing states of the region together, and also together with the 

E.U. 

And I hope that the leaving out of Bosnia and Kosovo will be rectified in the very early future. Let me just, then, sum up by addressing the need to mitigate those ethnic tensions that still remain. But I want to underline, I think we have come a considerable 

way in addressing those tensions. And also, I would like to agree 

with you, Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks, that those ethnic tensions have mostly been those fed by the political leadership 

and not really cultivated by the citizens of the region. 

The first point that we need to continue paying very important 

attention to is the need for accountability for the crimes committed 

during the war. We have to continue doing it through the International Criminal Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia and through 

local judicial institutions. We know that a lot of work has been 

done very good; unfortunately, on three of the principal actors responsible for the crimes, we never got the sentencing of President 

Milosevic, Ratko Mladic, as you said, Mr. Chairman, is still at 

large, and the process of Mr. Karadzic is just underway. I think to 

complete that process, to send a clear message, it is very important 

that the work continues. 

Second, in order to address still-remaining interethnic tensions, 

we need to focus much more on economic opportunities and jobs on 

the ground. We need to do that to move the people from an understandable focus that they still have on the past and, as Ambassador Semneby mentioned, to bring them together around common 

economic interest—not just shared identity, but shared, common 

interests in building the future. Too little attention has been paid 

17

to the importance of economic development in interethnic reconciliation and coexistence. 

The third point is, we need to continue promoting and consolidating all the key aspects of a modern democracy. That is the good 

governance, the rule of law, freedom of expression, freedom of 

media, continue in combating organized crime and corruption, respect for minorities, respect for human rights. These are all, or 

mostly all, the things that OSCE has been focusing on from the period during the conflicts. 

And I have personally worked very closely with OSCE, both in 

Bosnia and as Administrator of Kosovo, and seen the work on the 

ground. This is why the role of the OSCE in mitigating and addressing these still-remaining tensions are absolutely crucial, not 

only in consolidating the still-fractured peace in certain areas, but 

turning that fragile peace into sustainable peace and prosperity in 

the region. 

I believe we are moving in the right direction. There are still a 

few concerns there, but if we continue maintaining our focus and 

our attention on the region, working and locking all these formerly 

conflicting states into Europe, I believe that we may not have to 

need this again 5 years from now, and I may not need to be invited 

back, although, once again, I enjoy being here. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, thank you. I can assure you we will invite you 

back to celebrate all of the problems being solved. So you’re—you’ll 

get an invitation, in either case. We hope it’s one to report 

progress. Let me tell you just how, I think, helpful all of your testimonies have been to the work of our Commission, and to the work 

of OSCE. I must tell you, I don’t see a conflict between principle 

four, dealing with territorial integrity and the principle that deals 

with self-determination. To me, they’re very compatible. 

And I think the point made about the shared purpose and the 

shared identity is critically important. Georgia, in territorial integrity, should be maintained. But it’s the responsibility of government leaders to instill a shared identity and pride in the country. 

I would add another point to that. To me, there’s also a responsibility to protect the human rights and the ability to protect your 

ethnic identity within the state. And that has not been as strong 

as it needs to be. 

We saw that not just in what happened between Russia and 

Georgia, but also in Bosnia. And it continues to this day. I mean, 

there’s a real risk, in Bosnia, as to whether the state will succeed 

in its integration into Europe. And to me, the key is going to be 

whether there is this pride and a shared identity and a shared purpose, understanding the ethnic differences of the population, which 

is, to me, part of the richness of Bosnia, part of the richness of the 

United States. 

So I think these are struggles that we’re going to have to continue to figure out how to deal with. I want to talk about, I guess, 

one political side to OSCE, and then one substantive question on 

a policy that seems to be moving forward. Russia is obviously a 

critical player in many of these issues. Russia has been pretty open 

about its concern that OSCE seems to concentrate more on the 

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viet Union, than it does on the other members states of OSCE. 

That’s certainly been its concern on election monitoring, on human 

rights issues. 

But yet, most of the ethnic conflicts are taking place in countries 

of the former Soviet Union. So it would seem to me that Russia, 

which has a lot of minorities in these populations, has to be very 

interested in this issue. Does this present an opportunity, using the 

OSCE framework, to get Russia more engaged in dealing with the 

protection of minorities, or not? Or do they just see it as the conflict with Georgia, and therefore, can’t get beyond that? That’s the 

political question; I’ll get on to substantive ones. Who wants to take 

a shot at that—the politics of Russia? You volunteered. [Laughter.] 

Ambassador Semneby? 

Amb. SEMNEBY. Senator, I thank you very much. Well, as I mentioned in my testimony, unfortunately, the ethnic conflicts have 

been hijacked as part of other conflicts, including interstate conflicts. And I think we need to address the conflicts at all levels at 

the same time. 

I think it’s only natural—and I hope that this is a message, also, 

that will be—that is understood in Moscow—that, given the fact 

that we have had a momentous change happening in the former 

Soviet Union, as the republics of the Soviet Union became independent, had a momentous change that changed, also, the relationships between ethnic majority, ethnic minority. Many former minorities became majorities and vice versa. 

And it’s only natural that it is in this area, as you say, that we 

have most of the ethnic issues, ethnic conflicts taking place, because of the need to redefine relationships. Indeed, Russia has 

many issues of this kind, also, in its own territory, and some of 

which I believe that Russia itself is very concerned about. 

I mentioned the North Caucasus, which is a case in point here. 

And we have seen some measures taken from Moscow that indicate 

a greater degree of awareness of the challenges, of the issues that 

Russia is facing in this area with obvious, also, spillover effects and 

mutual influences between the North and the South. And I do indeed believe that there could be considerable opportunities here to 

work. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, it will be a challenge, but I think it is a—we’re 

looking for ways of getting a more effective participation of Russia 

within the OSCE. We thought the Corfu process, which came about 

at their request, would be an avenue to move forward, but to date, 

it’s still—the jury’s out, as to whether that process will be effective. 

I guess a related question is whether the Corfu process can work, 

in regards to mitigating the ethnic conflicts in regions using this 

type of effort. Any thought as to Russia—what the best strategy is? 

Ambassador? 

Amb. TAGLIAVINI. Well, it’s very difficult to compare this Corfu 

process, which is sort of a new approach, which has been, actually, 

convened by an initiative by one of the Presidents of these OSCE 

member states. I think the minority conflict and the ethnic tensions in the region—in the Southern Caucasus, but also in the 

Northern Caucasus—lay well beyond that layer. 

The difficulty to tackle them is really this combination of factors 

that need to be taken into account—these wrong perceptions of hisVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:52 Nov 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\050410.TXT KATIE
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tory, these mythologies of my own history and it’s incompatible 

with all the proposals that can be made from outside. And that, of 

course, embedded, first of all, in the country, and then in the OSCE 

or in any structure, makes it extremely difficult to get even cooperation from those who should cooperate, and that would be the 

conflicting parties. 

We see these many layers of obstacles, and so I don’t think that 

process will be able to tackle these things. Rather, I would turn it 

around, that I believe there is some homework to be done on the 

ground, and there, I think E.U. engagement—not recognition, but 

engagement at the civil society level, at any level that may not cutoff these minorities from the political course of the developments 

is very important. 

As we have seen, there is a combination of—it’s almost a fatal 

combination of simply lack of willingness to come to a solution 

which is not in line with what one ethnic group, ethnic minority 

wishes for itself, and where it has become totally fixed in an idea 

that this is independence, and nothing less than independence. 

And that was, I think, one of the weak points of all the peace 

processes, peace initiatives, negotiation processes—that the parties 

that were negotiating did not really look at the possibility of a solution, but only at the aim of the fulfilling of their requests, be it 

independence, be it sovereignty, be it a request for a particular territory. And what was complicated this request was looking for outside support. 

That was true for Abkhazia and the South Ossetians looking for 

Russian support for their strife for secession and for their strife for 

independence, and getting the support. The same goes with Georgia. Tbilisi also hoped that the outside world, not least NATO, 

Western Europe and the United States, would be in its support. 

And there, we get into this very, very complicated, complex game 

where you don’t really distinguish where is actually the platform 

on which you can operate. It’s always mixed. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, thank you for that. I want to—Mr. Jessen-Petersen, I’d like to ask you a question. I think your point about the 

ability to transition into Europe—into the E.U., perhaps NATO—

is the carrot that is the—gives us the opportunity to really bring 

about change. You mentioned it in regards to Serbia. I could mention it also in regards to Bosnia—and not just the constitutional reform that’s needed in that country, but the political leadership 

that’s needed in that country to really represent a functioning 

state. It’s certainly going to be critically important, I know, in the 

NATO discussions, that you have a state that there’s confidence in 

that can speak for the integrity of the entire geographical area. 

I want to talk about a development—if a country becomes a 

member of the E.U., of course, it gives them certain rights within 

all the E.U. states. There seems to be a trend, though, in many of 

these developing countries, to grant citizenship to ethnic communities outside of their territorial state. And I’m curious whether you 

know whether—how that is—is that a growing trend? Is Russia 

doing that, as far as ethnic minorities in other parts of Eastern Europe? And does that present an issue that, perhaps, could complicate full integration into Europe for some of the former states of 

the Soviet Union or the former Yugoslavia? 

20

Mr. JESSEN-PETERSEN. I’m not aware that it applies to any of the 

states in the former Yugoslavia. And as to the former Soviet Union, 

I will sort of think Ambassador Tagliavini is in a better position. 

Mr. CARDIN. Ambassador? 

Amb. TAGLIAVINI. I think this is indeed a worrying—a worrisome 

tendency. And I’m very glad that in our report, we had a very detailed description of this practice of conferring citizenship to people 

living in another country. After the dissolution of the Soviet 

Union—being considered similar citizens of the Soviet Union, but 

the Soviet Union did not exist anymore. A similar example may be 

Crimea. And I don’t have any figures about the situation in Crimea, but my guess is that the case of the—what we call the passport-ization issue in Georgia and the disastrous effects that it had 

has probably put the brake on this practice. We don’t hear many 

more such distributions in Crimea, nor in Transnistria. 

Another worrying tendency, I believe, for the European Union is, 

of course the massive distribution of Romanian passports to citizens of Moldova and Ukraine. And this goes exactly in this direction, and I think this is also a challenge for the European Union 

on how to handle such disrespect of international law. We have 

clearly said, in the case of Georgia, that the massive conferral of 

Russian citizenship to citizens in another country was a violation 

of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. 

So this applies, also, to these countries that are, by now, members of the European Union. I believe it is a very dangerous tendency, and it has the potential of creating many more conflicts on 

that kind of basis—creating liabilities for partners that actually do 

not want to be liable. Who wants to go to war in Moldova on Romanian passport to fight for Romanian citizens? It’s certainly not the 

European Union’s aims to be engaged in such a situation. So these 

are dangerous trends, and I believe utmost care should be taken 

to prevent such a thing. 

Mr. CARDIN. It’s an interesting development, and there are reasons for this to be done by countries, but it can cause the additional burdens or additional obstacles that you have mentioned toward ethnic harmony. I want to bring you in on this, Mr. JessenPetersen, but also, we’ll just make an observation. 

I was in Montenegro last year, was also in Bosnia and Croatia. 

And there’s a great deal of interest in Croatia and Montenegro for 

Bosnia to work out its problems, because every time problems develop, there’s more people who flee and go into Croatia [laughter] 

and Montenegro. And we talk about—and I like the way you put 

it—the forced displacement. 

I think you’re absolutely right. That’s part of the ethnic conflict, 

is to cleanse. And yes, it may be through murder. But more likely, 

it’s going to be through displacement, which not only is a human 

result in and of itself, but then causes another country or another 

state to have a burden that can lead to other types of human rights 

problems and instability in a country. 

And Montenegro, which is a very young country, very small country—a few thousand people coming in from Bosnia can have a 

major impact on its economy, can have a major impact on its political system. So it’s a major concern toward their integration and 

development. So I think the whole dimension here needs to be unVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:52 Nov 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\050410.TXT KATIE
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derstood because prevention is clearly our chief objective. So I 

guess my question to you—and you can certainly respond more to 

the last question, if you like, is, are we seeing an impact among 

Montenegro and the other countries in the region, as a result of 

Bosnia being still unsettled? 

Mr. JESSEN-PETERSEN. Well, I certainly think we are seeing an 

impact, because the very fact that, as I mentioned in my remarks, 

because of the constitutional situation—I called it a constitutional 

mess—in Bosnia, I think that there are still very worrying signs 

that what I call the forces of separation in Bosnia may prevail. And 

that is a risk that is very often reinforced by irresponsible statements from some of the neighboring states. 

It has certainly also been linked to the independence of Kosovo 

in that, that has been used by both politicians inside Bosnia, or 

Republica Srpska, but also in some of the neighboring states, to 

sort of issue threats that they could go in the same direction. We 

know that during the war, or wars, rather, in the region, but also 

in the situation right after, and also during and after the very brief 

war in Macedonia, which was the seventh and last war—but there, 

we had finally learned our lessons and the E.U., NATO, United 

States intervened immediately to stop it and the war lasted only 

30 days. 

But both during the other conflicts and the war, in particular, in 

Macedonia and after, there was a lot of talk about greater Serbia 

and greater Albania. That, I think, is another reason why it’s so 

important to lock these countries into a larger European Union. 

Because the moment that they are part of a larger community of 

states, of interests, then, in my view, all this talk about greater Albania—it doesn’t really matter whether you are a Macedonian Albanian, whether you are Kosovar Albanian, or an Albanian in Albania. 

The moment you are part of a larger community, the borders 

come down and you move. That’s the whole idea. You move freely 

around. So—and the same—we have Serb populations, certainly a 

fairly large on in Bosnia, as you know, in Montenegro—I mean, 

Serb descent—in Kosovo, a very important minority and all that—

again, bringing them into a larger community would, in my view, 

do away with this focus on bringing various groups together in a 

larger—be it Serbia, Albania, whatever. 

And if you speak to the people—because all this, as I said, is fed 

by irresponsible political leadership—but if you speak, as I know 

you have been doing, Mr. Chairman, in your travels, with citizens 

on the ground, what they want is, as they could do when Yugoslavia existed, travel around freely, get together again with people 

now in another country and in the larger Europe. That’s what they 

want to do, and that’s why it’s so important that not only this European perspective is confirmed, but that Europe moves forward on 

it. 

It’s obvious that states need to be ready. There are, of course, 

many, many requirements to be met. But sometime, I would wish 

that one could maybe jump over a few of the obstacles, because the 

only safe way to address the risks in Bosnia, in my view, is to lock 

Bosnia into a larger European community. So a little bit risky, courageous policymaking, but at the same time, I recognize that there 

22

are conditions to be met, there are requirements. But after all, 

that’s how the European community started, with the European 

Coal and Steel Community. 

That was to lock two countries that had been conflicting and in 

war many times over the last 100, 200 years—lock them into a 

larger community. We need that for Western Balkans. That’s what 

the people want. You speak to citizens of Serbia—in particular, the 

young population—they are, frankly, not that interested in Kosovo. 

The political leadership of Serbia certainly is. They want to be European citizens. So I believe that is the best response to these concerns, and the concerns do exist. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, we strongly support that. We want to see Serbia part of the E.U.; we want to see Bosnia part of the E.U.; we 

want to see Kosovo recognized and its geographic territory respected. And we—our delegation met with students in Bosnia from 

all ethnic communities, and you would not have known what ethnic 

community they were from. I mean, that’s—they have pride. And 

it takes political leadership. And yes, they need constitutional reform, as I’ve said before. 

It’s critical, I mean, considering the way it’s currently organized, 

to have a functioning state. But they need political leadership, and 

that’s something that I think the people are going to demand, and 

ultimately will be there, and we will see the full integration. To 

me, having a state that reflects what you’re suggesting—that common identity—but still respects the individualities of the ethnic 

communities and the right to protect their identity is critical for 

mitigating the ethnic conflicts, in not only the OSCE region, but in 

the world. 

And that’s what we’re going to work for, and that’s what we’re 

going to continue to do. This hearing has been extremely helpful 

in us filling in a lot of the blanks, particularly an update on what’s 

happening in Georgia and what’s happening in Bosnia. We very 

much appreciate that. I hope we’re getting reliable information in 

Georgia without the mission being there. 

We are concerned that we may not be getting the type of objective information on the condition of the populations, and we’re—to 

the extent that we can get reliable information, feel free to continue to supply us with that. It’s helpful to our Commission. Congressman Hastings, the Co-Chair of the Commission, has asked 

that his statement be made part of the record, and Congressman 

Smith, the Ranking Republican Member, has also asked for that. 

And those requests will be granted. And with that, the hearing will 

stand adjourned. Thank you all very much. 

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

23

APPENDICES

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION 

IN EUROPE 

Let me first welcome all of you and our witnesses, two of whom 

flew in from Europe for today’s hearing. We are fortunate to have 

with us three European experts, each of whom has extensive experience working on inter-ethnic and minority issues in various multilateral institutions. The witnesses’ full bios are available outside 

the hearing room, but briefly, Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini led the 

European Union’s investigation into the causes of the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008 and prepared an excellent report which we 

have found to be extremely insightful. Ambassador Peter Semneby 

is presently the EU’s Special Representative on the South 

Caucasus, and also served as OSCE Head of Mission in Croatia. 

Ambassador Jessen-Petersen is a distinguished international diplomat with extensive experience in the Balkans. 

I do want to note that we did invite the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities [Knut Vollebaek] to participate in 

this hearing and, while that was not possible, I did have the opportunity to meet with the High Commissioner when he visited Washington in March. Among other issues, we discussed the ‘‘Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations’’ prepared under the auspices of the High Commissioner. These 19 

guidelines provide greater clarity on how states can pursue their 

interests with regard to minorities without jeopardizing peace and 

good neighborly relations. They constitute yet another outstanding 

contribution of the High Commissioner’s office to the work of the 

OSCE and should serve as a foundation for the OSCE’s efforts in 

this area. 

Ethnic conflict continues to break out within the OSCE region, 

at great cost to the affected countries and populations. In this connection, we are closely watching developments in Kyrgyzstan, 

where amidst the turmoil and ouster of the government in the last 

few weeks, land grabs and violent attacks were directed against 

Russians, Kazakhs, and other minorities. 

Ethnic conflicts which have melded with territorial disputes have 

erupted in the Caucasus as well, causing many thousands of casualties. The loss of lives cannot be measured, and hundreds of 

thousands of civilians remain displaced and unable to return to 

their homes. As a result, security within the region is seriously undermined, while economic development is stymied by the insecurity 

and unsettled legal issues, particularly where the conflicts are 

inter-state in character. 

The Crimea region of Ukraine still bears the wounds of the 1944 

mass deportation of thousands of Crimean Tatars and other ethnic 

minorities in Ukraine by Joseph Stalin. The Government of 

Ukraine and the affected populations in Crimea continue to be 

challenged with finding mutually acceptable settlements on property rights, as well as the exercise of educational and language 

24

rights of Ukrainians, Russians, Tatars, and other minorities in the 

region. 

This July, we will commemorate the genocide which occurred at 

Srebrenica in Bosnia 15 years ago, the senseless slaughter of 8,000 

Bosniak men and boys trapped by Serb militants in what was a 

UN-declared safe haven. That horrific event should be kept in mind 

as we proceed today with this hearing. 

Srebrenica demonstrates, in our own time, the degree to which 

even relatively small ethnic differences can generate fears and prejudices that, in turn, can lead dangerously to hatred, violence and 

aggression quite literally against an innocent neighbor. Perhaps 

the most important lesson of Srebrenica, however, is that it made 

evident the folly of blaming ethnic differences themselves for the 

crime. There was absolutely nothing inevitable about Srebrenica 

and the ethnic cleansing that occurred in Bosnia. It was orchestrated by individuals, not history, and was therefore preventable—

had there been the political will to act. While we insist, and I do, 

on bringing those responsible like Ratko Mladic to justice, we must 

also acknowledge our own burden of having failed to intervene to 

stop him and his murderous minions. If we do not learn from this 

mistake, human rights violations, ethnic conflicts and possibly even 

acts of genocide will continue to occur. These are only some of the 

very good reasons for having this hearing today.

25

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, COCHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION 

IN EUROPE 

I would also like to welcome our eminent witnesses to today’s 

hearing. I am extremely pleased that we are able to have this distinguished panel of experts addressing such a timely and pressing 

subject. This is an extremely complex topic and I will be listening 

with an open mind. 

The issue we’re addressing today is of tremendous salience, really, throughout the OSCE region. Unfortunately, it is not possible 

in the course of a few hours to do justice to each and every country 

or region where inter-ethnic relations are of interest. I want to pay 

homage to the breadth of geographical expertise represented by our 

witnesses. At the same time, let’s be clear that there are countries 

or minority groups or inter-ethnic issues we cannot cover today, 

simply for lack of time. Nevertheless, we are interested in how this 

issue plays out throughout the whole OSCE region—whether we 

manage to talk about every nook and cranny today or not. 

I do want to flag one particular concern which, I believe, exacerbates tensions within, between and among participating States: the 

practice of one country extending its citizenship to citizens of another country. I hope this will be discussed in the course of our 

hearing today, especially considering that the leadership of the 

newly elected Hungarian government has suggested it may seek to 

extend Hungarian citizenship to hundreds of thousands of citizens 

of other countries. We recall that some other OSCE participating 

States have gone down this path—sometimes leading to or at least 

contributing violent outcomes. 

The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 had many 

causes, proximate and longstanding, including ethnic tensions 

However, the mass issuance of Russian citizenship to Georgian citizens exacerbated the tenuous relations between the two countries, 

as Ambassador Tagliavini makes clear in her report. . The High 

Commissioner on National Minorities has cautioned against the 

conferral of citizenship upon groups within another state, stressing 

that exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction over populations in another state violates the principle of sovereignty. 

The unresolved conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as 

well as the Transnistria region of Moldova, also continue to be fed 

by ethnic tensions. There is still pervasive fear and the threat of 

ethnically-based violent incidents in Kosovo and BosniaHerzegovina. While there is no uniform means of resolving these 

situations, a genuine commitment to OSCE principles and the exercise of political will on the part of the stakeholders would further 

efforts toward an acceptable resolution to each conflict. 

I look forward to hearing your views on these issues and your 

perspectives as to whether the ongoing Corfu Security Dialogue in 

Vienna has affected progress toward resolving inter-ethnic conflict 

in the region. I would also appreciate your views on whether the 

OSCE field mission in Georgia could have done more to mitigate 

the 2008 conflict. Thank you.

26

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our witnesses this 

morning. 

Having traveled to both Vukovar, during the 1991 Serbian assault on that city, and the Caucasus, in the weeks following the 

2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, I have seen the terrible burden 

borne by people caught in these conflicts. In Georgia other members and I visited an IDP camp and met people who had lost all 

of their possessions and had been separated from their families. 

Thousands of these people still live in precarious conditions, unable 

to return to their homes due to a lack of adequate security or the 

fact that their residences were sacked and burned to the ground. 

Sadly, this is an ongoing problem throughout the OSCE region—

people, targeted because of their faith or ethnicity, have been 

forced to flee their homes and villages, and live as internally displaced persons or international refugees for months and even 

years. 

While ethnic tensions played a role in the origins of these conflicts, Russia, whose actions are in clear violation of the UN Charter and OSCE principles, has been a big part of the problem, stoking conflict throughout the OSCE region—throughout the former 

Yugoslavia, in Georgia and in other regions of the Caucasus, in the 

breakaway region of Moldova and the Baltic states. 

And although the OSCE, the US, and the European Union have 

been actively engaged in seeking a peaceful resolution of these conflicts, the disastrous outcome of so many of them, above all the 

genocide at Srebrenica, and the failure to resolve other conflicts, 

such as in Moldova and over the future constitutional status of 

Bosnia, forces us to ask whether a new approach to conflict mitigation is necessary thirty-five years after the Helsinki Final Act. 

Through the Corfu Security dialogue, the OSCE is engaged in a assessment of its comprehensive security concept and the tools available to address conflict. 

Thank you once again, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to 

hearing our witness’s views on these critical concerns and their recommendations as to resolving the many protracted conflicts that 

destroy or threaten the lives of so many people living in OSCE 

states.

27

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HEIDI TAGLIAVINI, HEAD OF THE 

EUROPEAN UNION INVESTIGATION OF THE 2008 RUSSIA–

GEORGIA CONFLICT 

Mr. Chairman, 

Members of the Helsinki Commission, 

Ladies and gentlemen, 

Let me take this opportunity to express my gratitude for having 

been invited to address this eminent body on a topic which, contrary to many expectations, continues to be of top actuality whenever we talk about security and the current challenges to peace and 

stability in the Europe. I am honored to have this opportunity 

today to share with you some considerations and findings which 

emanate from the Report on the Conflict of August 2008 in Georgia. 

As you well know, the Report which I will introduce today has 

been submitted to the Council of the European Union more than 

half a year ago. On the same occasion, the Report has also been 

handed over to the parties to the conflict, i.e. Georgia and the Russian Federation, to the OSCE and the UN as stipulated in the mission’s mandate. The Report has also been given to the conflicting 

parties South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For a number of reasons, not 

the least to avoid misquotations and misinterpretations, the Report 

has been made publicly available on internet immediately after its 

release. 

The Report has found wide international attention. The reactions 

in the press and in public have almost always been positive or factual and neutral. The conflicting parties reacted in the overwhelming majority in a moderate way, although we unfortunately 

could observe some rather selective reading, i.e. each party presenting those parts of the Report which were to their liking. 

Allow me to briefly recall the origins and the mandate of the Report. By its decision of 2 December 2008 the EU Council commissioned an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to investigate the August 2008 conflict in Georgia. The Council appointed 

me as the Head of the Fact-Finding Mission, leaving to me all decisions as to its working methods and proceedings. 

The mandate’s terms of reference requested the mission to: 

• Investigate the origins and the causes of the August 2008 conflict in Georgia 

• Including with regard to international law (including the Helsinki Final Act), humanitarian law and human rights, and the accusations made in this context (including allegations of war crimes) 

• The geographical scope and time span was to be sufficiently 

broad to determine all possible causes of the conflict 

A very extensive task for which the mission was assigned a relatively short timeframe of just about nine months! 

The Report contains over 1000 pages. This seems to be fairly voluminous. However, the main results of the Report are summarized 

on some 25 pages at its very beginning under the heading of ‘‘The 

Conflict in Georgia in August 2008’’. These include the most substantial elements, facts and findings of the Report followed by a 

dozen of the most important observations, sort of lessons learned 

which have emerged in the course of our work. 

28

Preceding this summary, there is also a short introduction explaining the context, the methods and the purpose of the Mission’s 

work. The summary is followed by an acknowledgement of the efforts of all those who contributed to the Mission’s work. These 

chapters, together with a few additional pages of a more technical 

content such as maps and a list of the Mission’s main visits and 

meetings, represent most of Volume I of the Report, then followed 

by two additional Volumes II and III. 

Volume II includes about 450 pages of expert opinions and analyses which were among the most important, but not the only foundations for the Report’s facts and conclusions. These 450 pages contain all the relevant information which in one way or another has 

to do with the conflicts in Georgia. There is a chapter on the very 

important historical and political context and background of the 

conflicts and on related legal problems (such as the claim for secession and the ‘‘passportisation’’). There is a part on the different 

peace processes in Georgia and the reasons why they eventually 

failed. There is a description of the military events around the August 2008 military conflict which is followed by a chapter on the 

use of force, but not less important in the count-down to the conflict, the threat of use of force. And there is an important part on 

humanitarian law and human rights in which many of the early 

findings of the Council of Europe as well as of other international 

and regional organizations and well respected international nongovernmental organizations have been taken as a basis and first 

hand source for the fact-finding conducted by the mission. The Reports ends with a chapter describing the situation after the two 

ceasefire agreements of 12 August and 8 September 2008 when the 

main developments were no longer taking place in the military 

sphere, but returned back to diplomacy. I therefore consider Volume II of the Report as a kind of reference book on all aspects relevant in the context of the August 2008 conflict in Georgia. 

Volume III with around 650 pages contains mainly the unabridged and unaltered statements and answers to the Mission’s 

questions, as received from the different sides to the conflict and 

other sources. Hence the total Report comprises around 1150 pages, 

divided into the three Volumes, as just explained. 

Let me point out some further elements related to the Mission’s 

work and its Report: 

First among these is the political context. It needs to be recalled 

that the EU played an important role in stopping the fighting in 

Georgia in August 2008 and in negotiating the agreements necessary for a ceasefire. This was largely due to the persistent efforts 

of the then French EU Presidency, led by President Sarkozy. Even 

now, the EU continues to be actively engaged in stabilizing efforts 

such as the EU Monitoring Mission and in the Geneva talks. We 

understand that our Mission was also part of this overall European 

Union policy which aims at securing a peaceful and lasting solution 

to the conflicts in Georgia. 

While the overall situation in the conflict region is still fragile 

and unsettled, the Report must be seen as part of the European 

Union’s policy endeavoring to bring stability to the situation in the 

region, and the conflicts gradually nearer to a negotiated settlement. 

29

Another important point: I would like to stress that our FactFinding Mission was the first fact-finding mission of its kind in the 

history of the EU. Our aim was to prepare a fair and non-partisan 

presentation of the events and an equally balanced evaluation in 

terms of international and humanitarian law. Our hope was that 

the Report will make a valid contribution to a negotiated solution 

of the conflict. Yet it is not enough to approach this conflict in 

terms of its political, legal and military aspects. It is even more so 

a matter of minds. Those who were involved in the conflict were 

usually focusing only on their own truth. They were hardly ever 

sufficiently prepared to look at the truth of the others. 

It must be understood, however, that no solution to the conflict 

is possible unless it comes from the principals themselves and unless it reflects not only their own perceptions, but those of the other 

sides as well. The Report wishes to encourage this process of reorientation. 

In this context it needs to be underlined that the IIFFMCG was 

not leading an investigation relevant to judicial proceedings of any 

sort. It was a strictly fact-finding mission. In keeping with the 

mandate conferred by the EU Council, this Report should not be 

seen as a Tribunal and it is not preparing any legal actions in favor 

of, or against any side or anyone. The Mission’s task was to establish to the best of its knowledge facts and their relevance under 

international and humanitarian law. There is hardly any chance 

for future peace without the facts being presented in a sober and 

impartial manner. This is the main purpose of the Report. 

Indeed, an objective, unbiased and non-partisan approach has 

been one of the most basic and important guidelines of the Mission’s work. The impact of the Mission’s Report, and with it the 

contribution it can make towards peace and stability, largely depend on its acceptance by the sides to the conflict, and this again 

is contingent upon the Report’s fairness. This is what the Mission 

has tried to achieve. 

If there is any basic message of the Report, apart from drawing 

attention to the human dimension of the conflict and all the tragedy of the events, then it is in the form of a renewed call upon all 

conflicting sides to comply with the basic rules of international law, 

such as the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the 

non-use of force or the threat of force, as these principles are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. 

At the same level there is a similar need for uncompromising observance of the guidelines for international interaction and behavior, which is linked in a European context to the OSCE and its 

landmark documents, beginning with the Helsinki Final Act of 

1975 through to the Charter for European Security adopted in 

Istanbul in 1999 as well as all the relevant documents of the Council of Europe and of course the UN Charter. All these have suffered 

as a result of the August 2008 fighting in Georgia, and all sides 

to the conflict must do their utmost to give these political and legal 

instruments their rightful places of decisiveness in international 

relations again. 

At the same time, it derives from these observations, that this 

conflict has not only a local or regional relevance, but that it has 

a direct bearing on the security architecture of all Europe. 

30

As was already mentioned, the Report is summarized and condensed in about 25 pages under the heading ‘‘The Conflict in Georgia in August 2008’’, which immediately follows the Introduction at 

the beginning of Volume I. This summary includes the main events 

that occurred and their underlying reasons in terms of their political, historical, military and legal relevance, and the latter both in 

the contexts of international law and international humanitarian 

law as well as human rights law. 

The crux of the Report is, however, not of a political, military or 

legal nature, but it is the human suffering and tragedy that is always and inevitably the result of armed confrontation. As a very 

first step in approaching its objectives, the Mission wishes with 

this Report to voice its deep sympathy to all those who have suffered losses in terms of human lives among their families and 

friends, with those who were injured, beaten and humiliated, and 

the thousands who lost their homes. While much of the political 

and military action that took place has been critically reviewed in 

the Report, nothing will touch upon the Mission’s respect for either 

individual fates or the aspirations of the peoples of the region, 

large or small. 

While fairness, a non-partisan and even-handed approach are the 

pivots of the Mission’s work methods, a similar effort has been 

made to provide clear-cut answers when it comes to the results of 

the Mission’s work. Let me start with the answer to the question 

which in the past has been asked most frequently: In the Mission’s 

view, it was Georgia which triggered off the war when it attacked 

Tskhinvali with heavy artillery on the night of 7 to 8 August 2008. 

None of the explanations given by the Georgian authorities in order 

to provide some form of legal justification for the attack lend it a 

valid explanation. In particular, there was no massive Russian 

military invasion under way, which had to be stopped by Georgian 

military forces shelling Tskhinvali. 

This said, it needs to be stressed that the Georgian attack 

against Tskhinvali on 7 to 8 August 2008, was by no means an isolated event. It was but the culminating point of months and years 

of mounting tensions, of armed incidents and a steadily deteriorating situation. All sides to the conflict bear responsibility for 

these ever more serious developments. 

Indeed, the conflict has deep roots in the history of the region, 

in people’s national traditions and aspirations as well as in age-old 

perceptions or rather misperceptions of each other which were 

never mended and sometimes exploited. While the region had also 

known a long tradition of peaceful cohabitation of different nations 

and ethnic groups, there were among its smaller nations underlying feelings of frustration and of having been relegated to an inferior status. Soviet federalism deepened latent antagonisms, and the 

chaotic period that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union further added to mutual mistrust and even hostility in the region. The 

wave of newly-found self-consciousness that followed political 

changes in Georgia since the end of 2003 clashed with another 

wave of assertiveness emanating from the Russian Federation, 

which tried to establish a privileged zone of interest in its ‘‘near 

abroad’’, where developments and events thought to be detrimental 

to Russia’s interests were not easily accepted. At the same time, 

31

the peacekeeping arrangements that were established with the 

help of the international community were increasingly outrun by 

new and more threatening developments in the political and military situation. They had been set up in the 1990s after the armed 

clashes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the wake of Georgian 

independence and since then had remained more or less unchanged. Without the adjustments and political support that they 

would have needed, they finally lost their grip and were no longer 

effective. 

The Report on the conflict in Georgia has shown that any explanation of the origins of the conflict cannot focus solely on the artillery attack on Tskhinvali in the night of 7/8 August and on what 

then developed into a Georgian offensive against South Ossetia and 

the ensuing Russian military response. Such an evaluation needs 

always to take into account the run-up to the open hostilities during the years before and the mounting tensions in the months and 

weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities. It must 

also, as stressed earlier, also take into consideration years of provocations, mutual accusations, military and political threats and acts 

of violence both inside and outside the conflict zones. It has to consider, too, the impact of a great power’s politics and diplomacy 

against a small and insubordinate neighbour, together with the 

small neighbour’s penchant for acting in the heat of the moment 

without careful consideration of the final outcome, not to mention 

its fear that it might permanently lose important parts of its territory through what it used to call a creeping annexation. 

While the onus of having actually triggered off the war lies with 

the Georgian side, the Russian side, too, carries the blame for a 

substantial number of violations of international law. These include, even prior to the armed conflict, the mass conferral of Russian citizenship to a majority of the population living in South 

Ossetia and in Abkhazia. It also includes, in terms of a an additional violation of international law, the military action by the Russian Armed Forces on Georgian territory, far beyond the needs of 

a proportionate defense of Russian Peace Keepers in Tskhinvali 

who had come under the Georgian attack. 

In addition, the Russian recognition of both South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia as independent States must be considered as being not 

valid in the context of international law, and as violations of Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. 

As far as the contentious issues under International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law are concerned, it is among the 

main conclusions of the IIFFMCG, that Russian and Ossetian allegations claiming that Georgia was carrying out a genocide against 

the South Ossetian population are not substantiated. On the other 

side, there are serious indications that ethnic cleansing did take 

place in many instances against ethnic Georgians and their villages 

and settlements in South Ossetia, as well as other violations of 

International Humanitarian Law which must be attributed to all 

sides. 

Furthermore there are serious question marks behind the attitude of the Russian Armed Forces who would not or could not stop 

atrocities committed by armed groups or even individuals fighting 

32

on the South Ossetian side against the civilian population in those 

territories which were controlled by the Russian Armed Forces. 

In our Report we noticed with regret an erosion of the respect of 

established principles of international law such as territorial integrity, and at the same time an increased willingness on all sides to 

accept the use of force as a means to reach one’s political goals and 

to act unilaterally instead of seeking a negotiated solution, as difficult and cumbersome as such a negotiation process might be. And 

finally, we have seen the long trail of human suffering and misery 

in the wake of armed action. 

As the IIFFMCG was created as a fact-finding Mission and not 

as a political consultative body, the Mission has abstained from 

laying out a political road map on how to handle and possibly to 

resolve the still ongoing conflict. While describing the events and 

their causes, the Mission has noted, however, a number of elements 

which contributed to the steady escalation of tension and finally to 

the armed conflict of August 2008. The Mission has tried to identify these elements in the Report’s chapter on observations, and it 

has added brief suggestions to each of them. 

1. First and foremost, I would recommend abstaining from 

assigning an overall responsibility for what has happened in 

Georgia in 2008. The conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 

are rooted in a profusion of causes comprising different layers 

in time and actions combined. While it is possible to identify 

the authorship of some important events and decisions marking its course, there is no way to assign an overall responsibility for the conflict to one side alone. All parties to the conflict have failed, and it should be their responsibility to make 

good for it. 

2. In the 2008 conflict in Georgia preventive diplomacy and 

international conflict management was not successful, partly 

because of what I would call a gradual erosion of previously negotiated and agreed common parameters as well as an increasing disrespect of international commitments. In order to keep 

peace or even just the effectiveness of a ceasefire agreement, 

we don’t need any new agreements or provisions apart from 

those existing already. They need just to be respected. We 

seem to have forgotten the provisions of the UN Charter and 

the Helsinki Final Act. UN Charter’s Article 2, Para 3 and 4 

are the most relevant ones. Para 4 clearly states that all States 

should refrain from the use of force, but also from the threat 

of force. Para 3 states that all disputes should be settled exclusively by peaceful means. In the conflict in Georgia, all parties 

to the conflict, not only Georgians and Russians, but also 

South Ossetians and Abkhaz, all of them have violated the 

principles laid out in these provisions. The outbreak of hostilities was preceded by years of threat of force, biased and incendiary media reports and by verbal attacks intended to 

frighten and dissuade the other party to the conflict. This created an atmosphere of animosity and growing frustration and 

eventually the lack of readiness to address the conflict in a 

constructive way and search for a solution acceptable to all 

parties involved. Take Art. 51 of the UN Charter on legitimate 

self-defence: In the August 2008 conflict in Georgia all sides 

33

have invoked this article to justify their action, but our inquiry 

has shown numerous inconsistencies of such declarations. Most 

of the military actions were far from ‘‘legitimate self-defence’’ 

and thus contrary to international law. 

As for the Helsinki Final Act, Principle 1 gives a clear understanding about those principles that need to be respected in 

order to achieve a respectful and peaceful international environment. The 10 subheadings of Principle 1 lay out the rules 

for peaceful cohabitation and coexistence of the international 

community: these principles speak about refraining from the 

threat or use of force, (the) inviolability of frontiers, territorial 

integrity of States, peaceful settlements of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, equal rights and self-determination 

of peoples and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under 

international, etc. 

3. Another important point are the existing provisions when 

it comes to the supply of arms and military equipments as well 

as military training in a conflict region. Even when done within the limits established by international law or by commitments of a non-binding nature, such as the relevant OSCE and 

UN principles or the Wassenaar arrangements, military support should stay within the limits set by common sense and 

due diligence. Utmost care should be taken by providers of 

military aid to refrain from giving their support, even unintentionally or indirectly, to any actions or developments detrimental to the stability the region. 

4. In this context, it seems also important to stress the progressive disregard of one important guiding principle in international relations which I would call the bona fide principle. In 

the many years leading up to the tragic events of last year in 

Georgia, we can observe that this principle of good faith has 

progressively been eroded creating thus mistrust and diffidence 

on all sides. There is therefore a need for uncompromising observance of the guidelines for international interaction and behaviour in bona fide; otherwise the peaceful coexistence becomes more and more challenged. 

5. The virtually passive and non-innovative approach to the 

peace processes adopted by the international community 

present in the area, i.e. the OSCE in South Ossetia and the 

UN in Abkhazia did not help to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflicts. When in early spring 2008 the international community eventually realized the seriousness of the 

situation and deployed intense high-level diplomacy with US 

State’s Secretary Condoleezza Rice, EU High Representative 

Javier Solana and German Foreign Minister Frank Walter 

Steinmeier presenting one diplomatic initiative after the other, 

it was too late and not enough to prevent the forthcoming crisis. Thus a series of misperceptions, missed opportunities and 

mistakes on all sides accumulated to a point where the danger 

of an explosion of violence became real. Unlike in the conflicts 

in Georgia in the early 1990s, what was about to happen in 

August 2008 was no longer a localised conflict in a remote part 

of the world but a short, bitter armed confrontation between 

34

two states, fought in the battlefield but also on live television, 

and carrying major international implications. 

6. The international context in which the August 2008 

events were unfolding was without any doubt complicated by 

decisions on Kosovo’s independence and its international recognition. Together with the Bucharest NATO summit of April 

2008, with its promise of Georgia’s future NATO membership 

these events complicated the international context in which the 

events were unfolding. The decision by the Russian Federation 

to withdraw the 1996 CIS restrictions on Abkhazia (March 

2008) and to authorise direct relations with the Abkhaz and 

South Ossetian sides in a number of fields (April 2008), added 

another dimension to an already complex situation in the area. 

This added to the lack of timely and sufficiently determined action by the international community, and—as already mentioned—to some degree the non-innovative approach to the 

peace process in Abkhazia and South Ossetia adopted by international organisations, contributed to the unfolding crisis. 

7. There is another important point and a favourite topic of 

mine which I have experienced in the many years of work in 

conflict zones. It concerns the arrangements made to end an 

open conflict. It is my deep believes that any ceasefire agreement—as unsatisfactory as it may be for all sides—is still better than a war or open hostilities. However, it needs also to be 

said that all ceasefire arrangements sooner or later are worn 

out or overtaken by events; as in the case of the UN in 

Abkhazia and the OSCE in South Ossetia, mandates become 

inadequate or even instrumental in cementing uncompromising 

positions. What may have been an effective tool for ending the 

hostilities—in our case the conflicts in the early 90ies—may 

turn out to be obsolete 15 years later and even lead directly 

to open hostilities. 

8. Another more personal observation refers to the core of 

any negotiation in order to achieve a peaceful and lasting settlement. What does it mean to achieve a negotiated settlement 

in a conflict? It means arguing, proposing suggesting, discussing, etc. It means hours and hours, days and days of negotiations until all basic issues are addressed in a more or less 

satisfactory way for all parties concerned. And this can only be 

achieved through concessions and compromise. Concessions, 

compromise and negotiations are not a sign of weakness. I 

come from a country where we have been brought up in a culture of compromise as the golden rule successful coexistence 

and cohabitation. Unfortunately, this seems not commonly accepted in war torn regions. 

9. Finally, it must be noted that there are no winners in this 

conflict. Everyone has lost, if not in terms of life and property 

alone, at least in the field of hopes and prospects for the future. This is true not only of the relations between Tbilisi on 

one side and Sukhumi and Tskhinvali on the other where the 

August 2008 conflict has not settled any of the contentious 

issues. The situation in the conflict region continues to remain 

tense. Relations between Georgia and Russia have come to an 

all-time low and the international community s among the losVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:52 Nov 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\050410.TXT KATIE
35

ers, too. The political culture of cooperativeness that developed 

in Europe since the 1970 on the basis of the already mentioned 

landmark documents of the CSCE/OSCE, the Council of Europe has suffered. The threat and use of force have now returned to European politics. Established principles of international law such as the respect for sovereignty and territorial 

integrity of states were ignored. Violations of International Humanitarian and Human rights Law such as ethnic cleansing 

have resurfaced as elements of political reality. And, last but 

not least, the relations between Western powers and Russia 

have suffered. 

The international community as well as other regional or 

non-regional actors involved in the conflict should make every 

conceivable effort not only to bring the sides to the negotiating 

table, but also to address the urgent political question on how 

to overcome the gap that was created by the conflict in Georgia 

in August 2008. The successful outcome of such negotiations 

could also do much to mend the relations between Western 

powers and Russia. There is little hope, however, (and here I 

am quoting the conclusion of our Report), there is little hope 

for a peaceful future in the conflict region unless the two main 

contenders, Russia and Georgia, make bilateral efforts themselves to solve their disputes. This needs to be done now! 

It is our sincere hope that the Report may contribute to a better 

understanding and most importantly to a sober assessment of the 

situation by the conflicting sides, and through this be instrumental 

to peace and stability in the conflict region and beyond.

36

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER SEMNEBY, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE SOUTH CAUCASUS, EUROPEAN 

UNION 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the U.S. Helsinki 

Commission. 

INTRODUCTION 

The topic of this hearing—Mitigating Inter-Ethnic conflicts in the 

OSCE Region—is sadly a pressing one. Although the Balkans wars 

of the 1990s are behind us, inter-ethnic tensions are rife in many 

parts of the OSCE region and the risk of violent conflict between 

different ethnic groups and communities cannot be excluded. We 

see this tension to various degrees from Central Asia, to the South 

Caucasus, and to the Balkans. But we have also found ways of 

mitigating many of the risks. I shall focus my presentation on the 

South Caucasus, given my current capacity as the EU’s Special 

Representative for the South Caucasus, but also refer to the Balkans where I worked as Head of the OSCE Mission to Croatia. 

It is clear that the EU has a fundamental interest in mitigating 

inter-ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus 

region is of strategic importance to us. Since the last enlargement 

of the EU, which brought Bulgaria and Romania into the Union, 

the South Caucasus has become an immediate neighbour. What 

happens there today, in particular when Russia is involved, has a 

direct impact on the EU. 

I think the best testament to the depth of this interest is the 

EU’s decisive action in response to the war in Georgia in August 

2008. The EU played the pivotal role in Georgia in the brokering 

of ceasefire agreements between Russia and Georgia, deploying in 

record time the EUMM, launching talks between the parties, 

hosting a successful donors’ conference, and sponsoring the independent commission on the origins of the war led by Ambassador 

Tagliavini. 

The Russian-Georgian war was undoubtedly a war between 

states, but its foundations lay in the fraught inter-ethnic relations 

between Georgians on the one hand and Abkhaz and South 

Ossetians on the other, as a result from the wars of the early 

1990s. These inter-ethnic conflicts gradually became hijacked as 

part of the larger inter-state conflict and geo-strategic shifts. The 

multi-dimensionality of this conflict has required us to respond at 

many levels to seek its resolution. 

At the strategic level, the EU’s growing interest in a stable, secure, and prosperous Eastern neighbourhood was demonstrated by 

the launching of the Eastern Partnership in the spring of 2009. 

The purpose of this initiative, which covers not only the three 

South Caucasus countries, but also Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, 

was to promote a prosperous and stable region and to better respond to the specific concerns and aspirations of its eastern neighbours through EU approximation, including a stronger political relationship, free trade, and liberalisation of travel. 

EU approximation is therefore a key feature of our strategy for 

the South Caucasus. This process requires all sides to deliver. 

37

Close coordination among international organisations is necessary to effectively deal with inter-ethnic tension and conflict. The 

EU works closely with the OSCE and its various institutions, the 

Council of Europe (notably with the Venice Commission and the 

Human Rights Commissioner), and also with the UN in both the 

South Caucasus and the Balkans. Unfortunately, the roles of the 

OSCE and the UN were significantly weakened after the war in 

Georgia as their missions closed, but the two organisations continue to co-chair the so-called ‘‘Geneva talks’’ together with the EU. 

REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS—THE 

CONFLICTS 

Let me turn to the conflicts. The South Caucasus has a long, 

tragic history of conflict. The conflicts often follow ethnic and national lines, but the conflict lines are also drawn between states of 

the region. We are dealing with a region of inter-state and intrastate conflicts that often overlap and are inter-related. The South 

Caucasus—a region of great, unfulfilled potential—is today in 

many ways a broken region. 

This complex web of unresolved conflicts is the most important 

obstacle to the region’s stability, security and prosperity. The current status quo concerning the conflicts in the region is unacceptable and unsustainable. The war in Georgia demonstrated that unresolved conflicts have the potential to escalate and to negatively 

affect the EU’s own security by spreading instability and negatively 

impacting our energy supplies and trade routes. 

The status quo is dangerous because it may delude policy-makers 

outside the region to conclude that all is fine and that attention 

can be paid elsewhere. We could probably have done more to prevent the war in Georgia if we had invested more political capital, 

at least during the year preceding the war, and if we had been prepared to commit resources to a presence on the ground. If anything, 

the key lesson of the Russia-Georgia war was: frozen does not 

mean safe. 

There is a real risk of precipitous escalation of tensions and a resumption of armed hostilities in the South Caucasus. The Georgia 

war showed that the status quo contains dangers of escalation. 

Also, along the Nagorno-Karabakh line of contact there are recurring deadly incidents, which could easily escalate into a larger 

armed confrontation. 

The protracted conflicts also undermine our efforts to promote 

political reform and economic development in the eastern 

neighbourhood. Closed borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan, 

Armenia and Turkey severely hamper the full potential of the region. They are contributing to a nervous and charged political atmosphere, where the conflicts and their victims, in particular the 

displaced persons, are often instrumentalised in the political struggles. 

The South Caucasus is a region of closed borders. These closed 

borders are not only a consequence of the conflicts, but are increasingly also becoming a source of conflict, as many of them have now 

been closed for more than a decade. People on each side of the borders are at best growing up in ignorance about each other, but at 

worst with reinforced enemy images. The new generation on each 

38

side of the confrontation lines will therefore not only be divided by 

ethnicity, but also by lack of knowledge about each other, and often 

not even sharing a common language any more. The EU has an important role to play in contributing to a culture of dialogue in the 

region and in promoting regional cooperation and development opportunities. 

TURKEY-ARMENIA 

For the past year, the EU as well as the United States have focused a good deal of political and diplomatic attention and on the 

rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. The conflict between 

the Turks and Armenians has a long and difficult history. This history is very much alive today and makes up part of today’s political 

disputes between the two countries. Most recently, the issue was 

in the headlines as Armenians around the world commemorated 

the Armenians who perished in the late Ottoman Empire on April 

24. 

Today we find ourselves at a critical moment in the efforts to 

normalise relations between the two states and open their common 

border. The two protocols, which were signed in October 2009, have 

been submitted to the Turkish and Armenian parliaments, but 

have yet to be ratified. It is clear that both sides will have to take 

courageous steps—which will be controversial among parts of their 

respective constituencies—in order to move toward ratification and 

implementation. 

The EU has supported this historic reconciliation from the outset. We have worked with the sides to ensure that the negotiations 

on the protocols, skilfully mediated by Switzerland, proceeded 

smoothly. The EU’s High Representative at the time, Javier 

Solana, who was actively involved and attended the signing ceremony in Zurich between the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Armenia in October 2009. The EU has also issued supportive statements urging the sides to remain committed to the normalisation. 

The EU has publicly stated that it attaches great importance to 

rapid implementation of the two protocols without preconditions, 

since it is our conviction that the normalisation of relations and the 

opening of borders will result in greater stability and prosperity for 

the region. We continue to support the process politically and stand 

ready to offer any technical support for the implementation, in particular on the rehabilitation of the border crossings and border 

management. Momentum must be maintained despite recent setbacks. 

From the beginning, the reaction in Azerbaijan was predictably 

negative, with many regarding this step as a betrayal by their 

brothers and ethnic kin in Turkey. Baku continues to see the opening of the border between Armenia and Turkey as likely to 

strengthen Yerevan’s hand in the negotiations over the resolution 

of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to reduce incentives for Armenia to leave the occupied territories surrounding the entity. 

President Aliyev has also linked normalisation with the possibility 

of Azerbaijan searching for ‘new strategic options’. 

The EU has made it clear that it believes the process is not 

against the interests of Azerbaijan and that ultimately, the stability of the region with open borders will be to the benefit of all. 

39

It is important that—together with our partners—we continue to 

work with Azerbaijan to reassure the leadership of our continued 

commitment to Azerbaijan as a strategically important partner. 

In a broader sense, the Protocols might already have positively 

contributed to improved relations between Turks and Armenians. 

Although the border remains closed, we have observed a dismantling of mental barriers, including an increasing number of visits 

in both directions by civil society representatives and journalists, 

together with an intensified exchange of ideas and opinions. The 

EU supports the facilitation of civil society dialogue between two 

countries, which in the longer term might serve to create a more 

positive atmosphere or even public demand for rapprochement. 

NAGORNO-KARABAKH 

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is perhaps the most fraught in 

terms of inter-ethnic antagonism. The war in the early 1990s was 

an exceptionally bloody one that left deep, painful wounds, with 

many dead, and hundreds of thousands driven from their homes. 

Today—more than 15 years after the conflict—we still do not have 

a final settlement. 

Efforts to find a settlement for Nagorno-Karabakh intensified 

during 2009. The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan met faceto-face a number of times last year, as did their Foreign Ministers. 

Russia took an active role, possibly driven by a desire to appear 

constructive after the Russian-Georgian war. 

In July 2009, Presidents Obama, Medvedev, and Sarkozy issued 

a Declaration in L’Aquila setting out the main elements of the 

Basic Principles that the OSCE Minsk Group had been negotiating 

with the sides. These include: 1) return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; 2) an interim 

status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and 

self-governance; 3) a corridor linking Armenia to NagornoKarabakh; 4) future determination of the final legal status of 

Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will; 5) 

the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return 

to their former places of residence; and 6) international security 

guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation. 

Today, however, Turkey’s linkage between Turkish-Armenian 

normalisation and Nagorno-Karabakh has made the quest for a solution more complex. In fact, Turkey’s pressure on Armenia to 

make concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh may have been counterproductive, since Armenia is unlikely to accept any explicit or implicit role for Turkey as arbiter or facilitator in this conflict. It is 

now up to Armenia and Azerbaijan to demonstrate their commitment to the process. 

Although the EU has currently no direct role in the peace talks 

under the OSCE Minsk Group, the EU’s increased engagement in 

the region suggests that the EU could play a more assertive role. 

The EU can make important practical and political contributions in 

support of the resolution of the conflict and the efforts of the OSCE 

Minsk Group. The EU is funding people-to-people contacts, media 

development, and public awareness in Armenia and Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh. These projects build on the EU’s vast 

experience from peace-building in many other parts of the world. 

40

The EU is in a unique position to make a contribution, and could 

do even more, provided that the two sides refrain from 

instrumentalising any offer of support to score points in the negotiations 

There is a particular need to work with the populations of the 

two countries. We see a disconnect today between the highest levels—those conducting the negotiations—and the wider populations, 

which are still very much entrenched in their positions, relying on 

old stereotypes of the enemy. Without a shift in perspectives in 

these societies, it will be exceedingly difficult for the respective 

leaders to sell an eventual peace to their respective electorates. 

And the more time that passes, the more difficult it will become. 

GEORGIA-RUSSIA AND ABKHAZIA/SOUTH OSSETIA 

Let me now turn to Georgia. It is necessary to analyse this conflict at two levels: the inter-state conflict between Georgia and Russia and the inter-ethnic/communal conflict between the Georgians 

and the Abkhaz and South Ossetians. 

Georgia’s relations with Russia remain fraught. Diplomatic relations remain severed and there continue to be tense moments, including accusations by Moscow regarding Tbilisi’s alleged involvement in the North Caucasus and Georgian apprehension about the 

high-profile visits by several opposition leaders to Moscow. 

The continued presence of significant Russian forces in Abkhazia 

and South Ossetia, in particular in Akhalgori, Upper Kodori, and 

Perevi—areas where Russian forces had not been present prior to 

the August 2008 war—means that the prospect of normalisation in 

the near to medium term is unlikely. The EU and international 

community partners will continue—in the ‘‘Geneva talks’’ and elsewhere—to press upon the noncompliant party the importance of 

implementing the commitments made in the Six-Point Plan and 

subsequent implementing modalities. It is important to remain 

firm on compliance because the EU’s credibility depends on it, both 

in Moscow and in Tbilisi. 

At the same time, there have also been some positive steps, notably the opening of a border crossing point between Georgia and 

Russia (Verkhnii Lars—Dariali) in March 2010. This is the only 

legal crossing between the two countries since other roads and a 

now defunct rail link run through Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

The EU welcomed the opening of the border since it would facilitate contacts and have positive implications for regional trade beyond Georgia’s borders, notably for Armenia. 

The EU has also provided practical assistance to support the 

opening of the border, in particular through the EU’s Border Support Team. The Border Support Team in Georgia was established 

as a follow-up to the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation in Georgia when Russia vetoed the continuation of it in 2005. 

The second level of the conflict—the inter-community one—has 

been in the background for some time, not least because the interstate conflict between Russia and Georgia deflected attention and 

interest from the inter-community conflict. From the point of view 

of the population in the breakaway regions, the main concern is security in the broadest sense, including for language and culture. 

From the point of view of the Georgian side, the main issue is the 

41

right of return of the displaced ethnic Georgian population and, 

particularly after the war, the rights of the remaining Georgian 

population in the conflict regions, including their freedom of movement across the administrative boundary lines. 

The EU has sought to increase its engagement in the separatist 

regions while remaining firm on Georgia’s territorial integrity. At 

the end of the last year, the EU adopted a policy vis-a-vis Georgia’s 

breakaway regions based on the two principles of non-recognition 

and engagement. The EU has a strategic interest in engagement 

within the limits of its non-recognition policy. While it is imperative to remain unequivocally committed to the issues of principle—

respect for Georgia’s territorial integrity—it is also essential to be 

flexible and pragmatic in practice, for example by promoting contacts with the population of the breakaway regions. It is only 

through engagement and a footprint in the breakaway regions that 

the EU can provide an alternative perspective for Abkhazia and 

South Ossetia and ensure that its ‘‘soft power’’ can function. 

This is also why the EU and other international actors are working with the Georgian authorities to ensure that the newly adopted 

State Strategy towards the conflict regions is firmly rooted in engagement and cooperation. Only through confidence-building measures between peoples and communities will it be possible to gradually build the foundation for a future settlement of the conflicts. 

The EU is funding several projects with this aim in mind. 

In large part thanks to the EU, the overall security situation in 

Georgia has stabilised significantly since last year, but security remains fragile, especially along the administrative boundary lines. 

Although there have not been any killings since last year, incidents, such as the detention of civilians near the administrative 

boundaries, continue to occur. There is still a danger that a relatively small local incident can rapidly escalate into an armed confrontation. 

The EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia (EUMM) has been operational for nearly 18 months and has played a key part in the 

stabilisation on the ground, especially near the administrative 

boundaries. The EUMM is the only international presence on the 

ground able to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire plan 

and its implementing measures. Yet it remains prevented from fulfilling its entire mandate. The lack of access to Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia remains one of the main challenges to the mission; this 

limits the available information about from the separatist entities, 

especially movement of military forces, and prevents the Mission 

from monitoring the situation of the population on the other side 

of the boundaries and securing the return of IDPs to their homes. 

THE BALKANS—PARALLELS AND DIFFERENCES 

I would like to take advantage of today’s hearing to make some 

reflections on parallels between the South Caucasus and the Balkans and on some lessons from the Balkans that can be applied to 

the South Caucasus. As Head of the OSCE mission to Croatia, I 

spent more than three working years mostly on post-conflict reconciliation issues, in particular between Croats and Serbs. 

The conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Balkans were both 

caused by the collapse of multi-ethnic super-states with a domiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:52 Nov 05, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\050410.TXT KATIE
42

nating metropolis. Both the Soviet Union and the old Yugoslavia 

acknowledged and even supported ethnic identities as a safety 

valve. But at the same time, they tried to keep the ethnic groups 

in check by carefully balancing their interests and suppressing any 

expression of ethnic interests that threatened the legitimacy of the 

super-state. In both cases, there were also attempts to artificially 

develop a common, non-ethnic and fairly ideological identity on top 

of and as eventual alternatives to the ethnic identities, i.e., the Soviet and Yugoslav identities. 

These strategies ultimately imploded. As in the former Soviet 

Union, the inter-ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia were hijacked 

as parts of inter-state conflicts that were more about dividing up 

resources, revising maps and projecting power. The Serb-Croat war 

ended by the restoration of Croatia’s territorial integrity, but the 

military option carried a high price by causing massive displacement and delaying Croatia’s European integration by a decade. By 

contrast, the peaceful reintegration of the Vukovar region—the location of serious atrocities against the Croat population at the outset of the war—still demonstrates the potential for peaceful resolution and reconciliation. 

Most of the conflicts in the Balkans were put to rest fairly rapidly because this region is located in the heart of Europe and was 

the subject of intensive attention from the European Union, NATO 

and the United States. The European accession agenda that was 

launched at the European Union summit in Thessaloniki in 2003, 

gave the countries of the region a vision to strive for, while it also 

underlined the attention of the European Union and its member 

states to the region and its problems, including the inter-ethnic 

conflicts. It has paved the way for the reestablishment of economic 

relations and trade, cooperation on war crimes, and symbolic acts 

of reconciliation. Croatia is soon likely to become the next new 

member of the European Union, showing the way also for the other 

countries in the region. Croatia’s and Albania’s membership of 

NATO has had a similar effect. 

The membership perspective for the Western Balkans stands in 

contrast to the lack of membership perspective for the countries of 

the South Caucasus. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have to 

various degrees stated their commitment to EU approximation and 

eventual membership. But what is on offer from the EU is not 

membership but rather enhanced political relations, within the 

framework of the Eastern Partnership. It is important to note that 

the Eastern Partnership does not exclude the possibility of a membership perspective at some point in the future. 

In the Balkans, many problems remain, such as the constitutional stalemate in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the relative fragility of the 

political setup in FYROM, Serb-Albanian relations, and war crimes 

issues. But the key Serb-Croat relationship, which was the one that 

caused the inter-ethnic tension to slide into war, seems to have developed, not least after two recent meetings between the presidents 

of the two countries, to the point where it can serve as an example 

in the region and perhaps beyond. 

43

CONFLICT PREVENTION 

The focus of this presentation has been conflict management. But 

both regions contain further conflict potential, which makes conflict 

prevention an indispensable priority alongside the handling of the 

existing protracted conflicts. Conflict prevention and mitigation require a human security approach in addition to the political approach of official negotiations and security-related deployments. 

This approach focuses on the role of individuals and requires a different set of instruments by the international community, such as 

support to civil society to allow for a strengthened civic culture and 

community dialogue. 

In particular, there are many potential hotspots and flashpoints 

in the South Caucasus: the Azeri and Armenian minority areas in 

Georgia, where unemployment and social problems could acquire 

an ethnic conflict dimension if not handled correctly; some areas of 

Azerbaijan, where both Sunni and Shiite religious revival is creating concerns; the danger of spill-over from the increasingly precarious situation in the economically depressed and ethnically diverse Russian North Caucasus, etc. Many EU programmes are 

geared toward regional development in depressed minority areas, 

and we are also working on legislation, institution-building, education, and other rights issues together with the OSCE, including 

the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the Council of 

Europe. 

CONCLUSION 

In the longer run, how can we overcome the inter-ethnic divisions and avoid that that they become instruments in larger conflicts? I would focus on two key concepts—shared identity and common interests. 

Since ethnicity is about identity, one of the visions closest at 

hand would be try to change the identities that have pitched peoples in these two regions against each other. As the Soviet Union 

and Yugoslavia waned, the superficial Soviet and Yugoslav identities rapidly disappeared, to be replaced by narrow and exclusive 

national and even nationalist identities in the successor states. 

Only with the gradually increasing role of the European Union 

has the prospect of a new supra-ethnic identity emerged that could 

ultimately contribute to a common purpose and become a complement to the national identities, softening them and adding a 

layer to them without replacing them. We have already seen this 

in the Balkans, and I am confident that this transformation will ultimately also take place in the South Caucasus, as long as the EU 

has the will to deliver relevant benefits to the countries and engage 

with the conflict regions. 

Another concept would be to nurture common interests between 

countries and ethnicities. This requires, first and foremost, open 

borders, not least since both the Balkans and the South Caucasus 

are located on strategic communications routes for goods, energy 

and people. These routes will require cooperation and a joint purpose if they are to function. In the Balkans this is largely taking 

place. By contrast, there are very few developments of this kind in 

the South Caucasus, apart from the recent cautious opening of a 

44

Russian-Georgian border checkpoint. In fact, all the South 

Caucasus conflicts—Abkhazia, South Ossetia and NagornoKarabakh—are almost literally roadblocks preventing traffic on important strategic routes. Also the Turkish-Armenian conflict has 

kept the border between those two countries, with an enormous importance for the whole region, closed for more than 15 years. The 

war in Georgia demonstrated how closed borders make the existing 

communications routes vulnerable, but the sobering impact was 

short-lived. 

With a renewed paradigm for the South Caucasus—a region of 

intersecting strategic communications routes—it may be possible 

for the states in the region to focus on the benefits of cooperation 

as an alternative to the continuing practice of instrumentalising 

inter-ethnic differences and holding inter-community and inter-ethnic relations hostage to wider conflicts. This paradigm is similar to 

the rationale behind the functional integration that led to the decision in the 1950s to pool Europe’s strategic resources to prevent 

further conflict, a momentous decision that soon led to the emergence of the European Communities and later the European Union. 

Thank you for your attention.

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