GENERAL AVIATION 

SAFETY

Additional FAA 

Efforts Could Help 

Identify and Mitigate 

Safety Risks

Report to Congressional Committees

October 2012

GAO-13-36

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-36, a report to 

congressional committees

October 2012

GENERAL AVIATION SAFETY

Additional FAA Efforts Could Help Identify and 

Mitigate Safety Risks

Why GAO Did This Study

Although the U.S. aviation system is 

one of the safest in the world, 

hundreds of fatalities occur each year 

in general aviation—which includes all 

forms of aviation except commercial 

and military. The general aviation 

industry is composed of a diverse fleet 

of over 220,000 aircraft that conduct a 

wide variety of operations—from 

personal pleasure flights in small, 

piston aircraft to worldwide 

professionally piloted corporate flights 

in turbine-powered aircraft. According 

to 2011 National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) data, 92 percent of that 

year’s fatal accidents occurred in 

general aviation. The majority of

general aviation accidents are 

attributed to pilot error. 

GAO was asked to examine the (1) 

characteristics of and trends in general 

aviation accidents from 1999 through 

2011 and (2) recent actions taken by 

FAA to improve general aviation 

safety. GAO analyzed NTSB accident 

data, reviewed government and 

industry studies and other documents, 

and interviewed FAA and NTSB 

officials and industry stakeholders.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other 

things, that FAA require the collection 

of general aviation aircraft flight-hour 

data in ways that minimize the impact 

on the general aviation community, set 

safety improvement goals for individual 

general aviation industry segments, 

and develop performance measures 

for the significant activities underlying

the 5-year strategy. Department of 

Transportation officials agreed to 

consider GAO’s recommendations and 

provided technical comments, which 

GAO incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

The number of nonfatal and fatal general aviation accidents decreased from

1999 through 2011; more than 200 fatal accidents occurred in each of those 

years. Airplanes—particularly single-engine piston airplanes—flying personal 

operations were most often involved in accidents. Most general aviation 

accidents are attributed to pilot error and involved a loss of aircraft control. Some

segments of the industry experienced accidents disproportionately to their total

estimated annual flight hours. For example, among the airplane categories we 

reviewed, experimental amateur-built airplanes were involved in 21 percent of the

fatal accidents but accounted for only 4 percent of the estimated annual flight 

hours. In another example, corporate operations were involved in about 1 

percent of fatal accidents while accounting for 14 percent of estimated annual

flight hours. We can draw some conclusions about general aviation accident 

characteristics, but limitations in flight activity and other data preclude a confident 

assessment of general aviation safety. The Federal Aviation Administration’s

(FAA) survey of general aviation operators, on which the agency bases its annual 

flight-hour estimates, continues to suffer from methodological and conceptual 

limitations, even with FAA’s efforts to improve it over the years. To obtain more 

reliable data, FAA has discussed requiring that flight-hour data be reported, such 

as during annual aircraft maintenance inspections. FAA has set a goal to reduce 

the fatal general aviation accident rate per 100,000 flight hours by 10 percent 

from 2009 to 2018. However, given the diversity of the industry and shortcomings 

in the flight activity data, this goal is not sufficient for achieving reductions in 

fatality rates among the riskier segments of general aviation. Further, achieving 

the goal could mask continuing safety issues in segments of the community. 

FAA has embarked on several initiatives to meet its goal of reducing the fatal 

general aviation accident rate by 2018. These include the renewal of the General 

Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) with a data-driven approach and the 

implementation of the Flight Standards Service’s 5-year strategy. The GAJSC, a 

government-industry partnership, focuses on analyzing general aviation accident 

data to develop effective intervention strategies. The 5-year strategy involves 

numerous initiatives under four focus areas: (1) risk management, (2) outreach 

and engagement, (3) training, and (4) safety promotion. The FAA Safety Team, 

which is composed of FAA staff and industry volunteers, will be responsible for 

carrying out significant portions of the strategy. While the GAJSC’s efforts are 

modeled on an approach deemed successful in contributing to a reduction in fatal 

commercial aviation accidents, the 5-year strategy has shortcomings that 

jeopardize its potential for success. For example, the strategy lacks performance 

measures for the significant activities that comprise it. Without a strong 

performance management structure, FAA will not be able to determine the 

success or failure of the significant activities that underlie the 5-year strategy. 

View GAO-13-36. For more information, 

contact Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. at (202) 

512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

Letter 1 

Background 3

General Aviation Accidents Decreased, but Some Segments Had 

Disproportionate Shares of Accidents 8

FAA Has Key Initiatives Under Way to Improve General Aviation 

Safety, but One Has Several Shortcomings 24

Conclusions 33

Recommendations for Executive Action 35

Agency Comments 36

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 37

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 39

Tables

Table 1: Estimated Active Airplane Pilots and Selected 

Requirements and Limitations for U.S. Pilot Certificates 6

Table 2: Summary of General Aviation Accident Characteristics 8

Table 3: Percentage of Fatal Accidents and Estimated Flight Hours 

by Airplane Category and Operation (1999 to 2010) 14

Table 4: Aviation Industry Organizations Interviewed for This 

Study 38

Figures

Figure 1: Types of General Aviation Aircraft 3

Figure 2: General Aviation Accidents (1999 to 2011) 9

Figure 3: Type of Operation Flown by Airplanes in General 

Aviation Accidents (1999 to 2011) 10

Figure 4: Fatal General Aviation Accident Rates per 100,000 Flight 

Hours (2000 to 2010) 23

Contents
Page ii GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

ABBREVIATIONS

ABS American Bonanza Society 

AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 

CAST Commercial Aviation Safety Team

CGAR Center for General Aviation Research

DOT Department of Transportation

EAA Experimental Aircraft Association

E-AB Experimental amateur built aircraft

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAASTeam FAA Safety Team

GAJSC General Aviation Joint Steering Committee

GAMA General Aviation Manufacturers Association

IG inspector general

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NBAA National Business Aviation Association

NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

SAFE Society of Aviation and Flight Educators

SAT safety analysis team

SMS safety management system

VFR visual flight rules 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

October 4, 2012

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV

Chairman

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison

Ranking Member

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

United States Senate

The Honorable John L. Mica

Chairman

The Honorable Nick J. Rahall, II

Ranking Member

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

The Honorable Thomas E. Petri

Chairman

The Honorable Jerry F. Costello

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Aviation

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

The U.S. aviation system is one of the safest in the world and a significant 

contributor to the nation’s economy. However, hundreds of fatalities occur 

each year in the sector known as general aviation, which includes all 

forms of aviation except commercial and military. According to National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) data, 92 percent of all fatal aviation 

accidents1

 

1

An aviation accident, as defined by 49 C.F.R. § 830.2, occurs when in the course of the 

operation of an aircraft—between the time anyone boards with the intention of flight and

until the last person disembarks—any person suffers death or serious injury or the aircraft 

receives substantial damage. With certain exceptions, substantial damage means damage 

or failure that adversely affects the structural strength, performance, or flight 

characteristics of the aircraft, and that would normally require major repair or replacement 

of the affected component. 

in 2011 occurred in general aviation. Each fatal general 

aviation accident typically involves a small number of casualties because 

of the smaller aircraft that are usually flown in general aviation. 

Nevertheless, these accidents can profoundly affect communities—as 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

with the November 23, 2011, crash near Apache Junction, Arizona, that 

killed six people, including a father and his three children who were going 

to the father’s home for Thanksgiving—and the nation—as with the 

August 9, 2010, crash near Aleknagik, Alaska, in which former Senator 

Ted Stevens and four others perished and several others were seriously 

injured. According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) data, 

the majority of general aviation accidents occurs because of an error on 

the part of the pilot and often involves causes similar to or the same as 

those identified in prior accidents. In June 2011, NTSB added “improve 

general aviation safety” to its most wanted list of 10 critical changes 

needed to reduce transportation accidents and save lives.

You asked us to examine general aviation safety in the U.S. This report 

discusses the (1) characteristics of and trends in general aviation 

accidents2 from 1999 through 2011 and (2) recent actions taken by the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to improve general aviation safety. 

To address our objectives, we analyzed NTSB accident data, consulted 

our prior work on general aviation safety trends as well as other related 

work,3 reviewed other government and industry documents, and 

interviewed FAA and NTSB officials and industry stakeholders. We 

conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to October 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for more 

information about our scope and methodology.

 

2

We did not include incidents—defined as occurrences other than accidents associated 

with the operation of aircraft which could have affected operational safety—in this study 

because reporting of nonserious incidents is not mandatory. As such, there is not a 

reliably comprehensive database of incidents to analyze. 

3

See GAO, General Aviation: Status of the Industry, Related Infrastructure, and Safety 

Issues, GAO-01-916 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2001); Initial Pilot Training: Better 

Management Controls Are Needed to Improve FAA Oversight, GAO-12-117 (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 4, 2011); and Aviation Safety: FAA Is Taking Steps to Improve Data, but 

Challenges for Managing Safety Risks Remain, GAO-12-660T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 

25, 2012).
 

Page 3 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

General aviation is characterized by a diverse fleet of aircraft flown for a 

variety of purposes. In 2010, FAA estimated that there were more than 

220,000 aircraft in the active general aviation fleet, comprising more than 

90 percent of the U.S. civil aircraft fleet. Included among these aircraft are 

airplanes, balloons, unmanned aircraft systems, gliders, and helicopters. 

(See fig. 1.) Airplanes comprise the vast majority—almost 80 percent—of 

the general aviation fleet. According to a 2009 FAA study, general 

aviation airplanes have an average age of 40 years.4

Figure 1: Types of General Aviation Aircraft

In addition, most are 

single-engine piston, such as the Beechcraft Bonanza, Cessna 172, and 

Piper Archer. 

FAA designates a small, but growing, portion of the general aviation fleet 

as “experimental.” These include aircraft used for racing and research as 

well as exhibition aircraft, such as former military aircraft known as 

 

4

FAA, Part 23—Small Airplane Certification Process Study, July 2009.

Background 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

warbirds. The largest group of experimental aircraft—and the fastest 

growing segment of the general aviation fleet, according to FAA—is 

defined by FAA as “experimental-amateur built” (E-AB). Individuals build 

E-AB aircraft either from kits sold by manufacturers or from their own 

designs. E-AB aircraft can contain previously untested systems, including 

engines not designed for aircraft use, and modifications of airframes, 

controls, and instrumentation. The E-AB fleet is diverse, ranging from 

open-framework designs with no cabin structure to small, pressurized 

airplanes able to fly long distances. The majority are simple craft used 

primarily for short personal flights. The expertise of the builders varies, as 

does the experience of the pilots and the availability of training for 

transitioning to the aircraft.5 Following a successful inspection of the 

aircraft and documentation review, FAA issues a special airworthiness 

certificate in the experimental category to the aircraft’s builder and 

assigns operating limitations in two phases specifying how and where the 

aircraft can be flown.6

General aviation aircraft can be used for a wide variety of operations, 

although about 78 percent of general aviation operations fall under one of 

four types:

Phase I is the required flight test period, in which 

the builder determines the aircraft’s airspeed and altitude capabilities and 

develops a flight manual. Phase II refers to normal operations after the 

flight testing is completed.

• personal (e.g., a pilot taking his family on a sightseeing trip); 

• business (e.g., a pilot flying herself to a meeting); 

• corporate (e.g., a professionally-piloted aircraft transporting corporate 

employees around the globe); and

• instructional (e.g., a student flying with a certified flight instructor). 

 

5

In order to qualify for an experimental certificate for an amateur-built aircraft, the builder 

must fabricate and assemble a major portion—or 51 percent—of it. The builder can hire 

others to complete the remainder of the tasks.

6

In addition to those granted to experimental aircraft, there are several other categories of 

“special” airworthiness certificates. (14 C.F.R. § 21.175(b)). Included among these are two 

certificate categories for light sport aircraft, which are simple, small, lightweight (less than 

1,320 pounds for land-based aircraft), low-performance aircraft. The experimental light 

sport aircraft category includes kit-built versions and special light-sport aircraft that are recertificated as experimental. The special light-sport aircraft category is for light sport 

aircraft manufactured according to an industry consensus standard rather than a type 

certificate. 14 C.F.R. § 1.1.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

These operations are conducted from the more than 2,950 public use 

general aviation airports (which primarily serve general aviation aircraft) 

as well as from thousands of other airports (including those that support 

commercial air service) and landing facilities (e.g., heliports). General 

aviation flights operate under various federal aviation regulations.7

Pilots, including those flying general aviation operations, earn one or 

more of the six basic types of pilot certification—(1) student, (2) sport, (3) 

recreational, (4) private, (5) commercial, and (6) airline transport. To 

obtain any of these certificates, individuals must typically successfully 

complete pilot training at any of the approximately 3,400 collegiate, flightinstructor, or vocational pilot schools

For 

purposes of this report, our definition of general aviation includes flights 

operated under part 91 general operation and flight rules. 

8 and pass an FAA knowledge test 

as well as a practical test, which consists of a flight test and an oral 

examination. These tests are typically administered by designated pilot 

examiners, who are individuals authorized to conduct various pilotcertification-related activities on behalf of FAA. Pilots may also earn 

additional authorizations—referred to as ratings—that define the 

conditions or specific aircraft in which a pilot certificate may be used. In 

addition, FAA, to further define conditions or specific aircraft not covered 

by ratings, may issue endorsements. To be considered active, a pilot 

must also hold a valid medical certificate.9 FAA estimated that as of 

December 31, 2011, there were approximately 580,800 active pilots 

holding one of those six airplane pilot certificates.10

 

7

Federal Aviation Regulations under which general aviation operations are flown include 

14 C.F.R. part 91 (general operating and flight rules), part 125 (privately operated aircraft

with seating capacity of 20 or more or maximum payload capacity of 6,000 lbs. or more), 

part 133 (rotorcraft external load operations), and part 137 (agricultural operations). FAA 

includes some part 135 operations (on-demand) as well as parts 133 and137 and public 

aircraft in its tracking of the general aviation fatal accident rate. 

Table 1 provides 

8

GAO-12-117. Our definition of flight-instructor based schools includes individual flight 

instructors.

9

Medical certificates are issued by FAA-designated aviation medical examiners following a 

physical examination of the applicant. The class of medical certificate required and the 

length of validity depend on the operation that pilot is flying and the age of the pilot. For 

pilots exercising sport pilot privileges, a valid U.S. driver’s license is required in place of a 

medical certificate. 

10There are separate certifications for rotorcraft (helicopter) and glider pilots. These 

certifications are not included in this estimate.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

more information about the estimated number of active airplane pilots and 

selected pilot certificate requirements and limitations.

Table 1: Estimated Active Airplane Pilots and Selected Requirements and Limitations for U.S. Pilot Certificates 

Certificate 

type

Estimated 

number of 

active pilots as 

of December

31, 2011a

Selected requirements Selected limitations

Minimum 

age

Minimum total 

prerequisite 

flight hours Prior certifications

Allowed to carry 

passengers?

Allowed to carry 

property for 

compensation 

or hire?

Student 118,657 16 b 0 None No No

Sport 4,066 17c 20 Student certificate Yes d No

Recreational

227 17 30

Student or sport 

certificate

Yes d No

Private 

194,441 17c 40

Student, sport, or 

recreational 

certificate

 Yes No

Commercial 120,865 18 250 Private certificate Yes Yes

Airline 

transport pilot

142,511 23 1,500

Commercial 

certificate with an 

instrument rating

Yes Yes

Sources: FAA and 14 C.F.R. part 61.

a

Pilots with rotorcraft-only certificates are excluded.

b

Student pilots must be at least 14 to operate a glider or balloon.

c

Private and sport pilots seeking certificates to fly a glider or balloon are eligible to do so at age 16.

d

Recreational and sport pilots may carry no more than one passenger.

Various offices within FAA are responsible for ensuring general aviation 

safety, most notably the Flight Standards Service, Aircraft Certification 

Service, Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention, and Office of 

Runway Safety. According to FAA, the agency’s fiscal year 2011 budget 

submission included nearly $203 million for activities within the Aviation 

Safety organization related to the top priority of reducing the general 

aviation fatal accident rate. FAA’s responsibilities include administering 

aircraft and pilot certification, conducting safety oversight of pilot training 

and general aviation operations, and taking enforcement actions against 

pilots and others who violate federal aviation regulations and safety 

standards. FAA also collects general aviation fleet and flight activity data 

through an annual survey and supports the NTSB by gathering 

information about general aviation accidents. According to NTSB officials, 

FAA collects information on the vast majority of general aviation 

accidents.
 

Page 7 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

NTSB is responsible for all aviation accident investigations—using the 

information gathered by FAA and its own investigators—and for 

determining the probable cause of accidents. NTSB uses a coding 

system of aircraft accident categories and associated phases of flight that 

are useful in describing the characteristics and circumstances of aviation 

accidents. For ease of interpretation and to categorize similar events, 

NTSB identifies one event as the “defining event” of the accident, which 

generally describes the type of accident that occurred—hard landing, 

midair collision, or fuel exhaustion, for example. In addition, NTSB 

identifies the causes of an accident and the contributing factors, which 

describe situations or circumstances central to the accident cause. Just 

as accidents often include a series of events, the reason those events led 

to an accident may reflect a combination of multiple causes and 

contributing factors. For this reason, a single accident report can include 

multiple cause and contributing factor codes. NTSB also collects 

descriptive information about the environmental conditions, aircraft, and 

people involved in aviation accidents. It captures its findings and 

descriptive information in its Aviation Accident Database. NTSB 

calculates general aviation accident and fatality rates, which it does using 

its own accident data and FAA’s annual estimates of general aviation 

flight activity. NTSB may also recommend regulatory and other changes 

to FAA and the aviation industry based on the results of its investigations 

and any studies it conducts.

The U.S. general aviation industry includes a number of trade groups, 

“type clubs,”11

 

11Type clubs are organizations formed around a particular type of aircraft. Type clubs may 

host discussion forums, publish magazines, and keep libraries of technical information.

Some type clubs have also developed specialized training courses and voluntary 

inspection programs for various systems or entire aircraft types. 

and other organizations that actively promote the 

importance of safety and, in many cases, offer educational opportunities 

to pilots. Many of the groups also work with FAA on advisory and 

rulemaking committees. Prominent trade organizations include the 

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), the Experimental Aircraft 

Association (EAA), the General Aviation Manufacturers Association 

(GAMA), and the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA). The 

Society of Aviation and Flight Educators (SAFE) and the National 

Association of Flight Instructors represent certified flight instructors and 

other aviation educators. The American Bonanza Society (ABS), the 

Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association, and the Lancair Owners and 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

Builders Organization are examples of the several general aviation type 

clubs. 

Our analysis of NTSB accident data showed that the annual number of 

general aviation accidents generally decreased for 1999 through 2011. 

We also identified several characteristics of accidents with respect to the 

types of operations and the causes of the accidents. These 

characteristics were largely consistent with observations made during our 

last review of general aviation safety in 2001.12

Table 2: Summary of General Aviation Accident Characteristics

To better understand 

these characteristics, where possible, we sought to measure their 

occurrence in numbers of accidents in relation to their overall occurrence 

in, for instance, total flight hours or pilot certifications as estimated by 

FAA. In doing so, we identified some accident characteristics that, based 

on our analysis, appear to occur disproportionately. However, we also 

identified methodological and conceptual limitations with the activity 

data—particularly the General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Survey that 

FAA uses to estimate annual flight hours and the number of active 

aircraft—that we discuss later in this section. See table 2 for a summary 

of the characteristics of general aviation accidents according to our 

analysis of the NTSB accident data.

Source: GAO analysis of NTSB data.

 

12GAO-01-916. 

General Aviation 

Accidents Decreased, 

but Some Segments 

Had Disproportionate 

Shares of Accidents

Analysis

Result

Fatal accidents Nonfatal accidents

Percentage change in general aviation accidents -24% -29%

Most common operation flown in general aviation 

accidents 

Personal Personal

Most common type of airplane in general aviation 

accidents 

Single-engine piston Single-engine piston

Most common defining event in general aviation 

accidents 

Loss of control in flight Loss of engine power (total 

or partial)

Proportion of pilots in general aviation accidents who 

were a cause of the accident 

70% 59%

Percentage of pilots in general aviation accidents with 

fewer than 100 hours in the accident aircraft make and 

model 

44% 43%
 

Page 9 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

From 1999 through 2011, nonfatal accidents involving general aviation 

airplanes generally decreased, falling 29 percent, from 1,265 in 1999 to 

902 in 2011.13

Figure 2: General Aviation Accidents (1999 to 2011)

Fatal accidents generally decreased as well, falling 24 

percent. Figure 2 indicates the number of fatal and nonfatal accidents for 

each year we reviewed. During this period of time, though the majority 

(approximately 56 percent) of all accidents resulted in no injuries, there 

were more than 200 fatal accidents each year. 

Note: All accidents occurred in the 50 states and involved an airplane flying under Part 91.

 

13As previously mentioned, we limited our data analysis for this report to accidents 

involving airplanes flying under Part 91. These aircraft accounted for 88 percent of all 

general aviation accidents from 1999 through 2011.

General Aviation Accidents

Decreased from 1999 to 

2011
 

Page 10 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

From 1999 through 2011, personal operations accounted for 73 percent 

of airplanes in nonfatal general aviation accidents and 77 percent of 

airplanes in fatal general aviation accidents. (See fig. 3.) This is not a new 

phenomenon. As we reported about accidents occurring in 1998, 

personal operations accounted for more than 75 percent of fatal general 

aviation accidents.

Figure 3: Type of Operation Flown by Airplanes in General Aviation Accidents (1999 

to 2011) 

From 1999 through 2011, airplanes flying instructional operations were 

the second most often involved in accidents. However, instructional 

operations were also the operation with the smallest proportion of fatal 

accidents. According to our analysis, almost 38 percent of accidents that 

occurred during instructional flying involved hard landings or loss of 

control while the aircraft was on the ground. These types of events are 

less likely to cause fatalities than other types of events. It is also possible 

that the presence of a certified flight instructor onboard to share the 

Most General Aviation 

Accidents Involved 

Personal Operations and 

Single-Engine Piston 

Aircraft
 

Page 11 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

management of the cockpit and other tasks may have contributed to the 

lower fatality rate for instructional operations. 

Corporate operations, in which a professional pilot flies an aircraft owned 

by a business or corporation, was the least common type of operation to 

be involved in general aviation accidents. Corporate operations 

accounted for less than 1 percent of fatal general aviation accidents and 

less than 0.5 percent of nonfatal accidents. From 2008 through 2011, 

there were no fatal accidents involving corporate airplanes, giving 

corporate operations an accident record similar to that of commercial air 

carriers. Again, this is not a new phenomenon. As we reported in 2001, 

the low number of accidents involving corporate operations is attributable 

to a number of factors, including the pilot’s training, experience, and 

participation in ongoing training to maintain and improve their skills, as 

well as the safety equipment that is typically installed on corporate 

aircraft. 

According to a representative of the NBAA, an organization representing 

companies that rely on general aviation aircraft to conduct business, most 

corporate operations also benefit from advanced technologies, including 

avionics that provide synthetic vision and terrain displays; auto-throttle, 

which helps maintain airspeed; and fuel gauges that are built to the 

standards required for commercial airliners. Further, airplanes used for 

corporate purposes are often powered by turbine engines and may be 

subject to additional safety requirements.14

Regarding the type of aircraft involved in general aviation accidents, 

single-engine piston airplanes accounted for almost 76 percent of

airplanes in nonfatal general aviation accidents and 60 percent of 

airplanes in fatal accidents.

Flying for corporate purposes 

can also differ from other types of flying. Whereas a pilot flying for fun 

may perform several take-offs and landings and practice maneuvers, a 

corporate flight likely includes a single take off and landing, with the 

majority of time spent en route—one of the phases of flight when the 

fewest fatal accidents occur. 

15

 

14Large and turbine-powered multiengine airplanes have additional equipment and 

operating requirements as described in 14 C.F.R. Pts. 91 Subpart F and 61. 

Single-engine piston airplanes are the most 

common type of aircraft in the general aviation fleet and, according to 

15These numbers exclude single-engine piston airplanes that are classified as E-ABs.
 

Page 12 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

stakeholders, the type of aircraft most commonly flown by pilots holding 

private pilot certifications and flying for personal reasons. According to 

AOPA, mechanical failures cause relatively few accidents, indicating that 

the frequency with which single-engine piston airplanes are in accidents 

is not necessarily a reflection of the safety of the aircraft. 

E-ABs were the second most common airplane involved in general 

aviation accidents. From 1999 through 2011, E-AB aircraft accounted for 

14 percent of airplanes in nonfatal general aviation accidents and 

approximately 21 percent in fatal accidents. According to EAA, the 

organization that represents experimental and amateur-built aircraft 

owners, E-AB airplanes were also the fastest growing type of aircraft in 

the general aviation fleet in recent years. In 2011, there were 

approximately 33,000 registered E-AB aircraft, a 10 percent increase from 

3 years earlier. AOPA’s 2010 Nall Report—an annual safety report that 

provides perspectives on the previous year’s general aviation accidents—

indicated that the physical characteristics and the manner in which these 

aircraft are used expose E-AB aircraft pilots to greater risk and make 

accidents less survivable.16

In 2012, NTSB completed a safety study of E-AB aircraft that included the 

use of an EAA survey of E-AB pilots.

 

17 Among other findings, NTSB 

concluded that the flight test period—the first 50 hours of flight—is 

uniquely challenging for most E-AB pilots because they must learn to 

manage the handling characteristics of an unfamiliar aircraft while also 

managing the challenges of the flight test environment, including 

instrumentation that is not yet calibrated, controls that may need 

adjustments, and possible malfunctions or adverse handling 

characteristics. NTSB added that the E-AB safety record could be 

improved by providing pilots with additional training resources and, 

accordingly, made several recommendations to FAA and EAA regarding 

flight training and testing.

 

16Air Safety Institute, The 2010 Joseph T. Nall Report of Accident Trends and Factors, 

Frederick, MD. As previously noted, most E-ABs are simple aircraft that may incorporate 

previously untested systems and modified airframes and instruments. They are also used 

primarily for short personal flights, which means more take-offs and landings.

17NTSB, The Safety of Experimental Amateur-Built Aircraft, NTSB/SS-12/01, Washington, 

D.C.: May 22, 2012. 
 

Page 13 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

To better understand the above observations about the airplanes involved 

in and the types of operations flown during general aviation accidents, we 

compared the proportions of fatal accidents by airplane category and 

operation type to their shares of FAA estimated flight hours for 1999 

through 2010.18 For this analysis, we considered 5 airplane categories: 

(1) non-E-AB, single-engine piston; (2) non-E-AB, multi-engine piston; (3) 

non-E-AB, turbine engine; (4) E-ABs,19 regardless of engine type; and (5) 

others. As designated, there is no overlap in this categorization. If there 

were no relationship between accidents and airplane category, then we 

would expect each airplane category to be involved in accidents in 

proportion to its share of overall flight activity; for example, we would 

expect an airplane category that comprised 50 percent of general aviation 

flight hours to also comprise 50 percent of accidents. We found this to be 

the case with the single-engine piston airplane. Though the single-engine 

piston airplane is most often involved in fatal general aviation accidents, 

its share of fatal accidents (60 percent) was slightly less than its share of 

general aviation flight hours (65 percent). By comparison, E-ABs 

comprised 21 percent of fatal accidents, but only 4 percent of estimated 

flight hours. With regard to type of operation, we found that 77 percent of 

fatal accidents occurred during personal operations, but only 40 percent 

of the estimated flight hours involved personal operations. (See table 3.)

 

182010 is the most recent year for which estimated flight hours are available.

19We understand that E-ABs are not, strictly speaking, an airplane type but that they 

represent a type of airworthiness certificate.

Some Industry Segments 

Experienced Fatal 

Accidents 

Disproportionately to 

Their Estimated Annual 

Flight Hours
 

Page 14 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

Table 3: Percentage of Fatal Accidents and Estimated Flight Hours by Airplane 

Category and Operation (1999 to 2010)

Percentage of fatal 

accidents

Percentage of flight 

hours

Airplane category 

Single-engine piston 60 65

Multi-engine piston 12 10

Turbine 6 19

E-AB 21 4 

Other 0 2 

Operation 

Personal 77 40

Instructional 7 18

Business 5 14

Corporate 1 14

Other 10 13

Source: GAO analysis of NTSB and FAA data.

Note: For the purpose of this analysis, we used 5 categories of airplanes: (1) non-E-AB, single-engine 

piston; (2) non-E-AB, multi-engine piston; (3) non-E-AB, turbine engine; (4) E-ABs regardless of 

engine type; and (5) others. Given this designation, there is no overlap among the categories. 2010 is 

the most recent year for which estimated flight hours are available. Percentages may not total 100 

percent due to rounding.

Loss of control in flight—the unintended departure of an aircraft from 

controlled flight, airspeed, or altitude—was the most common defining 

event in fatal general aviation accidents. Loss of control can occur 

because of aircraft malfunction, human performance, and other causes. 

During the period we examined, 1,036 fatal accidents (31 percent) were 

categorized as loss of control in flight. This was the most common event 

in a fatal accident for 3 of the 4 types of general aviation operations—

personal, instructional, and business operations—and for all types of 

airplanes. FAA and the industry recently completed a review of a 

subgroup of fatal loss of control accidents and will be developing detailed 

implementation plans for the intervention strategies. 

Loss of Control Was the 

Most Common Type of 

Fatal General Aviation 

Accident
 

Page 15 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

According to our analysis of NTSB data, the pilot was a cause in more 

than 60 percent of the general aviation accidents from 2008 through 

2010.20

Many of the pilots involved in general aviation accidents had low levels of 

experience in the accident airplane make and model, which some 

stakeholders and experts with whom we spoke believed can contribute to 

pilot error. In its review of general aviation accidents from 2005, NTSB 

found that 40 percent involved pilots with 100 hours or less in the 

accident airplane make and model. In its review of general aviation 

accidents from 2007 through 2009, NTSB also found that, for pilots in 

accidents who were flying personal operations, a relatively small portion 

of their total hours flown had been in the type of airplane involved in the 

accident. Our analysis found that, in the accidents where flight hours were 

available, many pilots had a low number of hours flying in the accident 

airplane make and model.

 The pilot’s actions, decision making, or cockpit management was 

a cause for 70 percent of the airplanes in fatal accidents and 59 percent 

in nonfatal accidents. NTSB and other experts view aviation accidents as 

a sequence of events with multiple causes and contributing factors. Of the 

2,801 general aviation accidents that occurred from 2008 through 2010 

for which a causal determination was made, 71 percent were determined 

to have multiple causes. In approximately 34 percent of fatal accidents 

involving airplanes, the cause was a combination of the pilot’s actions and 

the failure to properly attain or maintain a performance parameter—e.g., 

airspeed and altitude. 

21

 

20In 2007, NTSB undertook an effort to align its categories of accident causes with 

internationally recognized standards. As such, in 2008 NTSB created a new organizational 

structure for this information within its database. According to an expert at NTSB, it would 

be inappropriate to try to apply the new cause coding to accidents investigated before the 

changes were made. As a result, our analysis of the accident causes only includes those 

that are classified under the new structure. 

Approximately 43 percent of pilots in nonfatal

accidents had fewer than 100 hours as the pilot in that make and model 

of airplane; for fatal accidents that figure was approximately 44 percent of 

pilots. However, without comparable information on flying hours or 

habits—such as how many different types of airplanes the pilot has 

flown—of pilots who are not in accidents, we cannot draw conclusions 

about the effect of pilot flight hours on accidents. For example, if about 40 

21In some instances, there was more than one pilot associated with an airplane. Since we 

were unable to determine from the data which pilot was in control of the aircraft at the time 

of the incident, we included data on all pilots involved in the accident in this and 

subsequent analyses regarding pilot characteristics or experience.

Pilot Error Was a Cause of 

Most Accidents, but 

Targeting Mitigations Is 

Difficult because of a Lack 

of Pilot Data
 

Page 16 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

percent of all pilots had fewer than 100 hours in any given airplane make 

and model, then we could expect the results of the above analysis even if 

pilot flight hours in the airplane make and model had no relation to 

accidents. We discuss the implications of the lack of this and other data 

later in this section.

To further explore the relationship between pilot flight hours and 

accidents, we looked at the portion of pilots with fewer than 100 hours in 

the accident airplane make and model where the pilot was determined to 

be a cause of the accident and compared it to the portion of pilots with 

more than 100 hours in the accident airplane make and model. We then 

did the same using pilot certification levels. Our analysis of accidents from 

2008 through 2010 found that private pilots with fewer than 100 hours of 

experience in the accident airplane make and model were a cause of fatal 

and nonfatal general aviation accidents at similar rates as pilots with more 

than 100 hours of experience and with higher pilot certifications. For fatal 

accidents, 73 percent of pilots with fewer than 100 hours of experience in 

the accident airplane make and model were a cause as compared to 76 

percent of pilots with more than 100 hours of experience. In nonfatal

accidents, those portions were 63 and 64 percent, respectively. With 

regard to pilot certification levels, we found that in nonfatal accidents, 

private pilots were a cause more often (68 percent) than other types of 

pilots (percentages ranging from 52 to 58 percent); but in fatal accidents, 

similar proportions of private and commercial pilots were found to be a 

cause (75 percent and 80 percent, respectively).22

Although some experts may believe that lack of experience can contribute 

to pilot error and accidents, the above suggests that this might not 

necessarily be the case. However, we do not have enough information to 

draw any real conclusions because FAA lacks certain key information 

about pilots that could help identify the root causes of accidents and, 

thus, risk mitigation opportunities. First, FAA’s estimate of the number of 

active pilots is an imperfect measure because, according to FAA’s 

definition, an active pilot is a certificated pilot who holds a valid medical 

certificate. However, depending on the type of operation the pilot is flying 

and the pilot’s certification level, age, and health condition, the medical 

certificate is valid for between 6 and 60 months. The designation as 

 

 

22Forty-three percent of pilots with airline transport pilot certificates that were involved in 

fatal accidents were determined to be a cause of the accident.
 

Page 17 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

active is also not an indication of whether the pilot has actually flown in 

the previous year. Second, though pilots report total flight hours as part of 

their medical certificate application, a pilot’s experience in different makes 

and models of aircraft—which is not collected—is also relevant as there 

are risks associated with operating an unfamiliar airplane. As described 

above, this information would be necessary to draw conclusions about the 

effect of pilot flight hours on accidents. Third, though pilot flight hours are 

to be reported as part of the accident report, investigators are not always 

able to obtain this information for accident pilots as the logbooks in which 

it is recorded are sometimes destroyed in accidents. Of the 3,257 pilots 

involved in an accident from 2008 through 2010, pilot flight hours in the 

accident airplane make and model was missing for 514, or 16 percent of 

them. Missing data can compromise the validity of analyses that seek to 

examine the relationship between pilot experience and the causes of 

general aviation accidents. 

In addition, FAA does not maintain information about where pilots were 

trained or whether noncommercial pilots participate in any recurrent 

training programs other than its WINGS pilot proficiency program23—

information that would facilitate analyses of the relationship between pilot 

training and the causes of general aviation accidents and that could help

identify shortcomings in current pilot training programs. Private pilots are 

not required to participate in recurrent training, though they must 

successfully complete a biennial review of their skills and knowledge by a 

designated pilot examiner or a certified flight instructor. In recent years, 

as pilot training has been identified as a contributing factor in high profile 

accidents,24 there has been a renewed focus on the sources and amount 

of pilot training and on altering the training paradigm.25

 

23The WINGS pilot proficiency program is an internet-based program open to any active 

pilot; it focuses on activities and tasks that address the causal factors of accidents. 

FAA has been 

24The investigation of the February 2009 Colgan Air crash near Buffalo, New York, 

identified aspects of training as safety issues associated with the crash.

25We and others, including SAFE, have previously found that the current pilot -training 

paradigm focuses on rote memorization and on the execution of stick and rudder skills 

and does not emphasize the importance of cockpit management, which can prevent 

accidents, according to stakeholders. For instance, according to FAA and other 

stakeholders, the regulations regarding ground school and flight training, as well as the 

test standards for a commercial pilot certificate, generally emphasize the mastery of 

maneuvers and individual tasks to determine competence. The emphasis is on the 

development of motor skills to satisfactorily accomplish individual maneuvers—whereas 

only limited emphasis is placed on aeronautical decision making. 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

required to take steps to maintain qualification and performance data on 

airline pilots,26 but there has been no decision about whether recurrent 

training will be included in the database, and no such effort has been 

undertaken with regard to the remaining pilot population. Without more 

information about the training of general aviation pilots—and not just 

those who are in accidents—FAA’s efforts to identify and target risk areas 

and populations is impeded. 

FAA estimates of general aviation annual flight hours—a measure key to 

NTSB’s calculation of general aviation accident and fatality rates and 

NTSB’s and FAA’s assessments of the safety of general aviation—may 

not be reliable because of methodological and conceptual limitations with 

the survey used to gather flight activity data. Since 1978, FAA has used a 

survey of aircraft owners to estimate annual general aviation flight hours. 

The survey was redesigned in 1999, and FAA has modified it since then, 

on its own volition and in response to NTSB recommendations, to 

improve the survey’s ability to capture activity trends. Changes include 

sampling 100 percent of certain subpopulations of general aviation 

aircraft owners who were previously underrepresented in the random 

sample response—such as owners of turbine engine, rotorcraft, and 

Alaska-based aircraft—and revising the process for collecting information 

from owners of multiple aircraft. FAA and NTSB believe these changes 

have improved the reliability of the survey’s estimates, but some 

conceptual and methodological limitations persist.

First, as with all surveys that rely on self-reported data, there is the risk 

that respondents will not be able to accurately recall and report 

information, introducing error and perhaps bias into the survey’s 

estimates. The general aviation survey, which is usually open from March 

through August each year, asks respondents to estimate the number of 

 

26The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 

No. 111–216, § 203, 124 Stat. 2348, 2352 (2010)) required that FAA develop a centralized 

pilot records database that air carriers must access to review pilot qualifications and past 

performance data before hiring pilots. According to the Department of Transportation 

Inspector General (IG), FAA met the act’s initial milestone in developing a centralized 

electronic pilot-records database that will include records previously maintained by air 

carriers. However, the IG indicated that FAA needs to address the level of detail that 

should be captured from air carrier pilot-training records—such as determining whether 

recurrent flight training will be included, how to transition from the current practices to the 

new database without disrupting information flow, and how to ensure the reliability of data. 

Flight Activity Data 

Limitations Impede FAA’s 

Ability to Assess General 

Aviation Safety and Target 

Risk Mitigation Efforts 
 

Page 19 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

hours flown during the previous calendar year. Depending on funding 

availability, the survey has opened later or for shorter periods of time. 

This year, because of contracting-related delays in bringing the survey 

consultant on board, aircraft owners did not receive the first request for 

information about 2011 flight hours until August 2012. According to 

NTSB, accuracy depends on the record-keeping habits and memories of 

aircraft owners, and in some cases, the aircraft owners’ ability to obtain 

needed information from pilots who fly their aircraft. Though some portion 

of aircraft owners may record each flight in their logbooks, to which they 

can refer to complete the survey, logging each flight is not mandatory. To 

the extent aircraft owners rely on their recollection of flight hours flown in 

the previous year, long delays such as the one occurring this year are 

likely to further degrade the resulting information. 

Second, the survey has long suffered from low response rates, and this 

shortcoming, combined with limited information about the population, can 

call into question any estimates based on the survey’s results. Since the 

current method for calculating the response rate was implemented in 

2004, the overall response rate has ranged from 43 and 47 percent 

annually through 2010. The primary problem with low response rates is 

that they can lead to biased estimates if survey respondents and 

nonrespondents differ with regard to the variables of interest—in this 

case, annual flight hours. According to guidance from the Office of 

Management and Budget, agencies should plan to conduct item-level 

bias analyses if the expected response rate of the survey is below 70 

percent and to consider the anticipated response rate in the decision to 

proceed with the survey. In 2011, the survey contractor completed a 

nonresponse analysis and concluded that there was no evidence of 

significant bias.27

 

27Most surveys experience some degree of nonresponse, which gives rise to the concern 

that the respondents might differ from nonrespondents in such a way that the results of 

the survey might be biased. When response rates are low, researchers often conduct a 

nonresponse bias analysis, in which respondents and nonrespondents are compared 

using information that is available about the nonrespondents. In this case, little information 

was available about the nonrespondents, and the contractor was only able to compare 

respondents and nonrespondents with respect to aircraft type and aircraft age. Lack of 

information about other characteristics of nonrespondents made it impossible to test for 

other possible differences between the two groups.

However, relatively little is known about the aircraft 

owners who do not respond and, as a result, the contractor and we 

concluded that the sample is not rich enough in information to understand 

the differences between the two groups. For instance, there may be 
 

Page 20 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

certain characteristics of owners that are associated with flying habits, 

such as the owner’s age or certification level.28

An alternative data collection method implemented in 2004 for owners of 

multiple aircraft may also introduce bias to the survey’s flight-hour 

estimates. In an effort to improve response rates among owners of 

multiple aircraft who were less likely to respond because of the burden of 

multiple forms, the survey administrators developed a modified data 

collection procedure for these owners. This includes sending out a form 

and calling these owners to verify receipt of the survey and encouraging 

participation. Survey staff also collect essential data—including the 

number of hours flown—during these phone calls. This alternative method 

accounted for data for approximately 23 percent of the aircraft owners 

responding to the survey that estimated 2010 flight hours. These efforts 

may have improved response rates, but these owners, the aircraft they 

own, and their use of the aircraft likely differ from owners of a single 

aircraft. By encouraging responses from a particular set of owners, survey 

estimates may be biased. 

Though a low response 

rate does not necessarily imply bias, it does raise the possibility for it. 

Further, the ability to detect any such bias is limited by what is known 

about those who do not respond. Given these conditions, bias remains a 

serious concern.

Flight hours account for what stakeholders refer to as “exposure” or how 

often particular types of operations or aircraft are flown. FAA’s flight hour 

estimates can provide a general sense of the relationship between hours 

and accidents. However, the methodological and conceptual limitations 

we have identified call the estimates’ precision into question. As a result, 

these estimates may not be sufficient for drawing conclusions about small 

changes in accident rates over time—including FAA’s progress toward its 

goal to reduce the fatal general aviation accident rate per 100,000 flight 

hours by 10 percent over 10 years. Implementing alternative means of 

collecting flight hour data, such as requiring the reporting of aircraft

engine-revolution or run-time data, could supplement or replace the data 

generated through the survey and add rigor to FAA’s flight-hour 

 

28Hypothetically speaking, perhaps older owners fly more than younger ones and are also 

more likely to respond to the survey. Even if the survey collected information about age, 

there is no corresponding information available for nonrespondents. As a result, the 

survey contractor would have no way of detecting that older owners are responding at a 

higher rate and biasing the flight-hour estimates upward.
 

Page 21 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

estimates. Moreover, more precise flight-hour data could allow FAA to 

better target its safety efforts at subpopulations within the general aviation 

community. This could include reviewing an industry segment’s 

characteristics, such as the number of fatal accidents relative to its 

portion of estimated flight hours and setting a measurable goal for 

improving safety within that segment. Though FAA has attempted to 

address the disproportionate number of fatalities within the E-AB 

community by developing an advisory circular to encourage transition 

training for pilots, it has not set a specific goal for reducing fatal accidents 

in that segment.29

FAA and NTSB, to their credit, have recognized that flight-hour estimates 

derived from the general aviation survey are imperfect. FAA has 

discussed ways to improve its flight-hour data, including requiring general 

aviation owners to report flight hours (in the form of engine-revolution or 

run-time data) directly to FAA during aircraft registration renewals or at 

the annual aircraft maintenance check. However, collecting data from 

these alternative sources has not progressed beyond internal 

discussions. In addition, organizations representing pilots have generally 

been opposed to suggestions for increased data collection, which they 

view as potential impediments to flying. According to these groups, 

general aviation pilots typically would prefer to avoid additional regulation 

or federal involvement.

In 2005, NTSB explored using alternative approaches to determining 

annual general aviation activity, approaches that involved using other 

measures as proxies for hours flown—including the number of active 

pilots and fuel consumption. However, there are shortcomings to each of 

these options. As discussed previously, active pilots are defined as those 

who have current medical certifications; this is not related to whether the 

pilot actually flew in a given year. And while aviation gas consumption 

could be a proxy measure for piston engine aircraft activity, some pistonengine aircraft are used for operations other than general aviation. 

Further, jet fuel consumption cannot reasonably be used as a proxy for 

the general aviation activity of turbine engine aircraft because of the many 

types of operations (e.g., air taxi, air ambulance, etc.) flown by these 

aircraft. 

 

29AC-90-109, Airmen Transition to Experimental or Unfamiliar Airplanes, Mar. 30. 2011. 
 

Page 22 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

In 2008, FAA set a goal to reduce the fatal general aviation accident rate 

by 10 percent—from a baseline of 1.12 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight 

hours to 1 fatal accident per 100,000 flight hours—over 10 years, from 

2009 to 2018.30 This single long-term safety goal may mask problems in 

certain segments of the community. The goal stemmed from FAA’s desire 

to have a target for its general aviation safety improvement efforts that 

accounted for changes in flight activity over time. According to FAA 

officials, they were looking for a goal that was achievable and 

represented an improved level of safety. FAA did not meet the annual 

targets for the goal in 2009 and 2010 and, according to projections of 

flight activity, it does not appear FAA will meet its target in 2011.31

This singular goal is applied to an industry that is diverse in aircraft types 

and operations—some of which experience accidents at a higher rate 

than others. General aviation airplanes differ significantly in size and 

performance, ranging from single-seat E-AB airplanes to large corporate 

jets. The types of flying and pilot experience also vary by segment. Some 

private pilots may only fly a few times each year, while some corporate 

pilots may keep a schedule similar to that of a commercial airline pilot. In 

addition, given the expense of flying and maintaining an airplane, 

downturns in the economy can decrease activity in some segments of 

general aviation. Changes in flight activity in certain segments of the 

industry could mask or minimize problems in others and contribute to a 

rate that does not accurately reflect the trends in the individual segments. 

(See fig. 4.) For instance, total general aviation flight hours have 

decreased since the most recent recession, but some segments have 

declined at a faster rate than others. Personal flying hours in 2010 were 4 

percent lower than they were in 2008; corporate flying hours, by 

comparison, were almost 15 percent lower in 2010 than in 2008. 

Historically, corporate flying has been one of the safest types of general 

aviation operations. From 1999 through 2010, corporate airplane 

operations accounted for just 1 percent of fatal general aviation accidents 

but 14 percent of flight hours. And from 2008 through 2011, there were no 

 

30Prior to 2009, FAA set an annual goal of the number of fatal general aviation accidents 

not to exceed. Critics of this approach noted that this goal did not account for exposure 

and that accident numbers would decrease if general aviation activity decreased. In 

response to these concerns, FAA shifted to a rate-based goal.

31The results of the survey used to estimate general aviation flight hours are generally 

released in the fall for the previous calendar year. The 2011 estimates have not yet been 

released. 

FAA’s Singular Goal to 

Reduce the Fatal Accident 

Rate May Mask Problems 

in Certain Segments of 

General Aviation
 

Page 23 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

fatal accidents involving corporate airplane operations. As a result, 

changes in corporate flight activity could result in changes in the overall 

fatal accident rate that are not necessarily a reflection of changes in 

safety but rather a reflection of the changing composition of general 

aviation flight activity. In addition, as previously discussed, the rate is 

based on estimates of annual general aviation flight hours that may not 

be reliable. 

Figure 4: Fatal General Aviation Accident Rates per 100,000 Flight Hours (2000 to 

2010) 

There has been some discussion within FAA and industry about 

implementing separate goals for each segment of general aviation. 

According to one stakeholder we interviewed, the types of operations—

even among fixed-wing aircraft—differ enough to warrant such a 

disaggregation. He explained that an hour flown during a corporate 

operation, during which an advanced aircraft flies from point to point with 

a significant portion of the time spent en route, is quite different from a 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

pilot flying for pleasure and practicing maneuvers and take-offs and 

landings—the phase of flight when most accidents occur. However, other 

stakeholders we interviewed maintained that they all fly under the same 

operating rules, so it is proper to consider the safety of general aviation 

as a whole. Given the significant dissimilarities among the various general 

aviation sectors, along with the varied accident and fatality rates, setting 

separate safety improvement goals would allow FAA to take a more riskbased approach and target its resources and safety improvement efforts 

to the unique characteristics of and risks posed by each sector.

FAA has embarked on key initiatives to achieve its goal of a 10-percent 

reduction in the fatal general aviation accident rate per 100,000 flight 

hours by 2018. One is the long-standing General Aviation Joint Steering 

Committee (GAJSC), which is led by the Office of Accident Investigation 

and Prevention. More recently, FAA announced a 5-year strategy to 

improve general aviation safety that was developed by the General 

Aviation and Commercial Division of the Flight Standards Service. 

Although both initiatives work toward the overall goal of reducing general 

aviation fatalities, the GAJSC is using a data-driven approach to identify 

risks in general aviation operations and propose mitigations, while the 5-

year strategy is composed of a wide variety of activities under four focus 

areas.

In January 2011, FAA renewed the GAJSC,32 a joint FAA effort with the 

general aviation industry,33

 

32The GAJSC’s early efforts focused on enhancing aeronautical decision making, 

promoting runway safety, and reducing weather-related accidents, and its work was 

conducted through three subgroups—personal/sport aviation, technically advanced 

aircraft/automation, and turbine aircraft operations. In addition, the General Aviation Data 

Improvement Team oversaw the annual general aviation activity survey and analyzed 

accident data. Early GAJSC work resulted in the development of guidance and training, 

such as the Air Safety Foundation’s WeatherWise Safety Seminar. The GAJSC, according 

to FAA officials, has floundered in the past but still produced good information and 

contributed to enhanced safety; however, its prior efforts were topic driven and based 

more on expert opinion than on data analysis. 

the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA), and NTSB that in 1998 was part of the Safer 

33Industry members of the GAJSC include AOPA, EAA, GAMA, and NBAA.

FAA Has Key 

Initiatives Under Way 

to Improve General 

Aviation Safety, but 

One Has Several 

Shortcomings 

FAA Renewed the GAJSC 

in Early 2011
 

Page 25 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

Skies Initiative.34 Utilizing the model of the Commercial Aviation Safety 

Team (CAST), the GAJSC’s goal is to focus limited government and 

industry resources on data-driven risk reductions and solutions to general 

aviation safety issues.35

The first working group of the renewed GAJSC focused on loss of control 

in approach and landing accidents. This area was selected because, 

according to analyses of NTSB accident data for fatal airplane accidents 

that occurred from 2001 through 2011and for which NTSB had completed 

its investigation,

The GAJSC consists of a steering committee that 

provides, among other things, strategic guidance and membership 

outreach. It also consists of a safety analysis team (SAT), which 

determines future areas of study and charters safety studies, among 

other things. GAJSC officials indicated that they would charter working 

groups as issues for study were identified.

36 loss of control was the number one causal factor. The 

working group divided into three subgroups—reciprocating non-E-AB 

aircraft, turbine engine aircraft, and E-AB aircraft—and agreed upon a 

sample of 30 accidents to be analyzed by each.37

 

34Safer Skies, which FAA announced in 1998, was a major initiative to reduce the number 

of fatal aviation accidents per million flight hours by 2007. 

Despite issues such as 

a lack of data and the consistency of member participation, the working 

group developed 83 intervention strategies. These strategies were used 

to develop the 27 safety enhancements that were presented to the 

GAJSC for approval. The GAJSC approved 23 of the safety 

enhancements. The next steps will include developing detailed 

implementation plans for each of the strategies, with the SAT conducting 

resource/benefit evaluations of each plan. The SAT then will determine 

which are the most effective solutions, draft a master strategic plan, and 

submit the plan to the GAJSC for approval. Implementation is expected to 

begin upon approval. During implementation, the SAT will be responsible 

35CAST is a joint government-industry effort to reduce the commercial aviation fatality risk 

in the United States using an integrated, data-driven strategy. According to CAST, its 

work—along with new aircraft, regulations, and other activities—reduced the commercial 

aviation fatal accident rate by 83 percent from 1998 to 2008 and is an important aspect of 

FAA’s efforts to improve aviation safety by sharing and analyzing data.

36These accident flights were conducted under 14 C.F.R. Pts. 91, 137, and 135 

(unscheduled). The analysis also included public use flights and flights with an unknown 

flight operation code. 

37Because of a lack of accidents, the turbine engine group analyzed 28 accidents and 2 

serious incidents. 
 

Page 26 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

for tracking implementation schedules and levels, tracking the 

effectiveness of the intervention strategies, and recommending areas for 

future study. We believe that with the GAJSC’s renewal and adoption of 

CAST-like methods, it has the potential to contribute to a reduction in 

general aviation accidents and fatalities over the long term. 

In March 2011, FAA announced its 5-year strategy to improve general 

aviation safety. This initiative is a complementary effort to the work of the 

GAJSC. FAA described the strategy as a nonregulatory approach 

conducted in partnership with the general aviation community and 

coordinated across FAA lines of business. The strategy has four focus 

areas—(1) risk management, (2) safety promotion, (3) outreach and 

engagement, and (4) training—and includes a 2-year review and the 

development of validation metrics as each phase of the plan is 

implemented. 

FAA initially planned to concentrate its risk management efforts in three 

areas: (1) the top 10 causes and contributing factors in fatal general 

aviation accidents—initiated in coordination with the GAJSC, (2) E-AB 

aircraft, and (3) agricultural operations, which comprise one segment of 

the general aviation sector.38

For the safety promotion aspect of its 5-year strategy, FAA relies on the 

FAA Safety Team (FAASTeam). Created in September 2004 as the 

education and outreach arm of FAA,

To begin this effort, an FAA team identified 

the top ten causes of fatal general aviation accidents as well as the 

leading contributing factors, and provided the information to the GAJSC. 

The GAJSC, as previously discussed, is using the results of the data 

analysis to focus its efforts on loss-of-control accidents during approach 

and landing. 

39

 

38However, because most of the agricultural accidents reviewed were survivable and two 

industry groups focused on helicopter safety already had strong safety programs in place, 

FAA decided to forgo concentration on the agricultural sector of general aviation.

 the FAASTeam consists of 154 

FAA employees in eight regional field offices, along with 32 groups and 

2,500 individual members from the general aviation industry. In 2011, 

FAA refocused the FAASTeam—from national and international 

activities—to promote general aviation safety and technical proficiency 

39FAA Order 8000.83. 

FAA Launched a 5-Year 

Strategy in 2011 to Help 

Reduce the Fatal General 

Aviation Accident Rate

Risk Management

Safety Promotion
 

Page 27 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

through a host of nationwide seminars and contact with pilots at airports. 

A significant part of the FAASTeam’s new focus is the annual FAA safety 

standdown—a series of nationwide meetings that highlight issues of 

concern for general aviation and include industry and GAJSC member 

participation. The 2012 standdown focused on loss of control, the focus of 

a GAJSC working group, from three different perspectives: (1) preflight 

mistakes, (2) aeronautical decision making, and (3) handling a loss of 

control. In addition, the FAASTeam is conducting workshops for certified 

flight instructors to increase the quality of training offered to general 

aviation pilots. The FAASTeam has also been examining intervention 

strategies by working directly with designated pilot examiners to promote 

its educational opportunities to all applicants for practical tests. 

In its outreach and engagement efforts for the 5-year strategy, FAA has 

briefed aviation associations, type clubs, and flight instructors, and, with 

the assistance of the Aviation Accreditation Board International,40

The training portion of FAA’s 5-year strategy includes chartering an 

aviation rulemaking committee

held a 

symposium on flight training with academia in July 2011. FAA has also 

reached out to major aviation insurance providers. As a result of these 

and other efforts, FAA reports that it has strengthened its links with 

aviation associations while also improving its outreach efforts to type 

clubs. 

41on pilot testing standards and training, 

expanding its focus on certified flight instructors, and revamping the 

WINGS pilot proficiency program. In September 2011, FAA announced 

the establishment of an aviation rulemaking committee to address 

concerns from AOPA, SAFE,42

 

40The Aviation Accreditation Board International is a nonprofit organization that sets 

standards for all aerospace programs taught in colleges and universities worldwide. 

and others about the testing and training 

41An aviation rulemaking committee is an informal committee established through the FAA 

Administrator to allow industry's participation in providing recommendations to the 

rulemaking process. Participants are invited by FAA to the designated rulemaking 

committee. 

42As a result of its May 2011 pilot training reform symposium, SAFE made six broad 

recommendations addressing safety, industry growth, doctrine, standards, curricula, and 

aviation educators. For example, SAFE recommended that FAA doctrine and standards 

be revised to implement scenario-based training, risk management, and other higher order 

pilot skills. 

Outreach and Engagement

Training
 

Page 28 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

standards for pilots.43

To increase its focus on certified flight instructors, FAA is reviewing 

certified flight instructor recurrent training and renewal requirements. FAA 

also updated the advisory circular on flight instructor courses and 

published it in September 2011.

The rulemaking committee focused on the certified 

flight instructor, private pilot, instrument rating, and commercial pilot 

certificates. It made nine recommendations to FAA to enhance the pilottesting and pilot-training processes. The recommendations included 

establishing a stakeholder body to assist in the development of 

knowledge test questions and handbook content as well as transitioning 

to a single testing standard document for the knowledge test. FAA 

concurred with most of the rulemaking committee’s recommendations. 

44

The FAASTeam’s voluntary WINGS pilot proficiency program is being 

revamped to encourage more participation.

 

45 An FAA-established industry 

group has been surveying pilots to determine what changes need to be 

made to the WINGS program. Once the survey is completed, the resulting 

data will be analyzed and recommendations for changes will be made by 

the end of fiscal year 2012. FAA officials anticipate implementing changes 

to the program as funding becomes available in fiscal year 2013. 

FAA’s 5-year strategy to improve general aviation safety suffers from 

several shortcomings that hinder its potential for success. First, senior 

FAA officials acknowledged that there are no specific performance goals 

or measures46

 

43We reported on pilot training in November 2011. See 

for the activities under the 5-year strategy. The officials 

said that because the goal of the initiative, as a whole, is to change 

general aviation culture, the strategy’s success will be measured through 

changes in the general aviation fatal accident rate. They also indicated 

that they are developing validation metrics as each phase of the plan is 

GAO-12-117. 

44AC 61-83G, Nationally Scheduled FAA-Approved Industry-Conducted Flight Instructor 

Refresher Course, Sept. 30, 2011. 

45Pilots who participate in and satisfactorily complete a current phase of the WINGS 

program can credit satisfactory completion to meet the biennial flight review requirements 

of 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(e).

46Performance measurement is the ongoing monitoring of accomplishments, particularly 

progress toward established goals. 

The 5-Year Strategy Has 

Significant Shortcomings
 

Page 29 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

implemented. However, successful results-oriented organizations 

measure their performance at each organizational level by developing 

performance measures. Without performance goals or measures for the 

individual initiatives implemented under the 5-year strategy, FAA will not 

be able to evaluate the success or failure of those activities, regardless of 

whether the fatal accident rate is reduced. Further, FAA has yet to meet 

its annual target for the general aviation fatal accident rate goal and may 

not meet the overall goal by 2018. Therefore, it is even more crucial that 

FAA determine whether these activities have been successful. 

Second, the strategy was developed without the initial input of significant 

stakeholders—the GAJSC and the general aviation industry. Successful 

agencies we have studied based their strategic planning, to a large 

extent, on the interests and expectations of their stakeholders, and 

stakeholder involvement is important to ensure that agencies’ efforts and 

resources are targeted at the highest priorities.47

 

47GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act, 

According to officials 

from the GAJSC and the general aviation industry groups we contacted, 

although they were briefed on the strategy, they were not consulted in its 

development and were surprised by the announcement of the strategy. 

General aviation industry trade groups, type clubs, and other 

organizations are active in promoting a safety culture and continuous 

education among their members. For example, AOPA offers numerous 

seminars each year to educate the pilot community, and EAA offers 

advisory programs for experimental aircraft builders and pilots. Further, 

many initiatives are joint efforts of FAA and the industry. Involving 

stakeholders in strategic planning efforts can help create a basic 

understanding among the stakeholders of the competing demands that 

confront most agencies, the limited resources available to them, and how 

those demands and resources require careful and continuous balancing. 

FAA officials have indicated that their initial publication of the strategy 

served as a “straw man” for obtaining industry’s input and that there has 

been industry acceptance of the strategy as demonstrated by various 

industry groups’ development of plans and programs supporting the 

strategy. However, a lack of industry input into the development and 

announcement of the strategy jeopardizes its prospects for acceptance 

and success. This may be indicated in the current perspective of two 

GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996).
 

Page 30 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

industry groups—which is that the best use of industry resources to 

improve general aviation safety is through the work of the GAJSC.

Third, the FAASTeam, which will be the main vehicle for promoting the 5-

year strategy to the industry, lacks the confidence of two significant 

general aviation industry stakeholders we interviewed, and its 

reorganization has not been completed. These industry stakeholders 

indicated that there is inconsistency in the focus of the FAASTeam. One 

stakeholder noted that industry “struggles to understand the role of the 

FAASTeam,” and the other stated that the FAASTeam is “well 

intentioned, but unfocused.” In addition, FAA initially planned to 

reorganize the FAASTeam to reduce the number of volunteers to a strong 

core group and to include a national FAASTeam located in Washington, 

D.C. However, a senior FAA official recently indicated that the 

restructuring of the FAASTeam is in flux and that the plan to reduce the 

number of volunteers to a strong core group does not begin until 2013. 

We believe that until there is a strong performance management 

structure, input and buy-in from industry, and a respected and organized 

FAASTeam, the effectiveness of the 5-year strategy will be in jeopardy. 

• Formed a rulemaking committee to recommend revisions to the small 

airplane airworthiness standards: In August 2011, FAA chartered a 

rulemaking committee to reorganize part 23—which promulgates 

airworthiness standards for small airplanes—according to airplane 

performance and complexity criteria as opposed to the traditional 

criteria of airplane weight and propulsion. The goals of this rulemaking 

committee include increasing safety and decreasing certification 

costs. Co-chaired by the manager of FAA’s Small Airplane 

Directorate, the rulemaking committee includes members 

representing other sections of the Aircraft Certification and Flight 

Standards Services as well as members from industry groups, 

manufacturers, and foreign aviation authorities. The committee is 

expected to complete its work by the summer of 2013.

• Encouraging adoption of a safety management system (SMS): In 

guidance issued in April 2011, FAA encouraged general aviation 

FAA Has Other Initiatives 

Under Way That Could 

Also Contribute to 

Improved General Aviation 

Safety 
 

Page 31 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

business and corporate operators to develop and implement SMS.48

• Providing funding to develop a system for reporting aircraft issues: 

FAA’s Small Airplane Directorate has sponsored a project by Wichita 

State University to develop type club service information-sharing 

systems. The goal of the project is to share information among a 

targeted population of general aviation aircraft owners to prevent 

accidents and improve safety. Wichita State has collaborated with a 

large, well-organized type club, ABS, to develop the first reporting 

system. The ABS system will be accessed through the club’s web 

site, and a moderator will review and approve entries. Once the 

system is in place, ABS will control the data that are generated, and 

FAA will not have direct access to the data. According to Wichita 

State officials, the intent is for aircraft owners to sort through the 

information reported to determine whether their own aircraft have 

similar problems and, if so, report them to the system. There are 

currently no plans to evaluate the results of the system.

FAA has also supported NBAA’s promotion of single-pilot resource 

management, an SMS tool that teaches pilots to manage all available 

resources to ensure a successful flight. However, as we noted 

previously, personal operations continue to comprise the highest 

proportion of general aviation accidents, and as our current analysis 

shows, the majority is caused by pilot error. Therefore, it seems that 

FAA’s focus on business operators is misplaced. A senior FAA official 

admitted that though FAA has incorporated some parts of single-pilot 

resource management into the practical test standards and flight 

reviews, it had not yet focused on SMS for general aviation operators. 

He contended that SMS is a challenge that necessitates a strong 

outreach effort showing that general aviation can benefit from it.

• Funding university research on general aviation issues: FAA’s Center 

for General Aviation Research (CGAR) was formed in 2001 to 

 

48An SMS is a data-driven, risk-based safety approach that involves establishing the 

necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures. We 

published a report in September 2012 on our assessment of FAA’s shift to SMS. See 

Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Enhance Safety Risk Management, 

GAO-12-898 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012).
 

Page 32 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

supplement FAA’s general aviation safety research.49

• Provided new technology to reduce accidents in Alaska: The 

Capstone and Weather Camera programs in Alaska have contributed 

to increased aviation safety in that state because its dependence on 

aviation and unusual weather conditions make it more susceptible to 

fatal aviation accidents than other states. In 1999, FAA, in conjunction 

with the industry and the State of Alaska, established Capstone to 

improve aviation safety and efficiency by putting cost-effective new 

avionics equipment (e.g., Global Positioning System) into aircraft and 

on the ground. Capstone was also intended to demonstrate certain 

capabilities for potential use in the rest of the national airspace 

system. The demonstration areas lacked radar, and most of the air 

carrier operations were limited to visual flight rules (VFR).

Researchers 

from the six universities that comprise CGAR are studying and 

proposing solutions for a variety of general aviation issues—including 

the lack of robust general aviation activity data, flight risk analysis, 

and flight data monitoring. CGAR is awarded funding through a 

biannual process in which FAA offices identify and prioritize a list of 

projects, and the FAA Technical Center awards the projects to CGAR 

or other research entities and conducts project oversight. According to 

FAA officials, CGAR is an attractive choice for research projects 

because it is required to match FAA project awards dollar-for-dollar 

with funds from other sources. CGAR has been awarded about $20 

million since its inception. However, CGAR officials have noted that 

their efforts are hindered by changing leadership within FAA, the 

uncertainty of FAA funding, the need for more FAA sponsors, and the 

matching requirement.

50

 

49The following universities comprise CGAR: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

(administrator), University of Alaska, University of North Dakota, and Wichita State 

University. Florida A&M and Middle Tennessee State Universities are affiliates. FAA 

announced on September 27, 2012, that it had selected a team of universities to lead a 

new Center of Excellence for general aviation since CGAR has nearly completed its 10-

year term. The new group, called the Partnership to Enhance General Aviation Safety, 

Accessibility and Sustainability (PEGASAS), will be led by Purdue, Ohio State, and 

Georgia Tech. The core team will also include the Florida Institute of Technology, Iowa 

State University, and Texas A&M. There are an additional 10 affiliate universities.

Capstone 

began in Southwest and Western Alaska and was successful in 

reducing those areas’ aircraft accidents by 40 percent. Since fiscal 

50Visual flight rules govern the procedures for conducting flight under visual conditions, as 

opposed to instrument flight rules, which govern the procedures for conducting flights 

using instruments. 
 

Page 33 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

year 2007, the Weather Camera Program has funded the 

procurement and installation of 182 weather camera sites in Alaska. 

The cameras provide near real time video images of sky conditions at 

airports, mountain passes, and strategic VFR locations, such as highuse air routes, to enhance pilots’ situational awareness. According to 

FAA, this new capability is providing measurable reductions in 

weather-related VFR accidents in Alaska. FAA’s goal is to install a 

total of 221 weather camera sites.

According to FAA, new technologies such as inflatable restraints (air 

bags), ballistic parachutes, weather in the cockpit, angle-of-attack 

indicators, and terrain avoidance equipment could significantly reduce 

general aviation fatalities. Angle of attack indicators and inflatable 

restraints have the greatest likelihood of significantly improving safety. 

Angle-of-attack indicators provide the pilot with a visual aid to prevent 

loss of control of the aircraft. Previously, cost and complexity of indicators 

limited their use to the military and commercial aircraft. FAA has 

streamlined the approval of angle-of-attack indicators for general aviation 

aircraft and is working to promote the retrofit of the existing fleet. FAA is 

also streamlining the certification and installation of inflatable restraints 

with the goal of making all general aviation aircraft eligible for 

installation.51 Further, FAA is working with manufacturers to define 

equipage requirements and support the Next Generation Air 

Transportation System (NextGen)—a new satellite-based air traffic 

management system that by 2025 will replace the current radar-based 

system—by streamlining the certification and installation of NextGen 

technologies. Some industry experts told us, however, that there might 

not be future opportunities to significantly improve general aviation safety 

with the aid of technology since most accidents are still attributed to pilot 

error. 

To further reduce the number of fatal general aviation accidents, FAA 

needs to effectively target its accident mitigations, as it is attempting to do 

through the GAJSC. The agency’s ability to do so, however, is limited by 

 

51In a January 2011 report, NTSB concluded that aviation airbags can mitigate occupant 

injuries in severe but survivable crashes in which the principal direction of force is 

longitudinal. NTSB made several recommendations to FAA to enhance the safety of and 

information about airbag use in aircraft. See NTSB, Airbag Performance in General 

Aviation Restraint Systems, NTSB/SS-11/01, Washington, D.C.: Jan. 11, 2011.

Technology and Equipment 

May Also Help Improve 

General Aviation Safety

Conclusions 
 

Page 34 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

a lack of pilot data. For instance, FAA does not maintain certain key 

information about general aviation pilots, including how many are actively 

flying each year and whether they participate in recurrent training other 

than FAA’s own WINGS program. Without this information, FAA cannot 

determine the potential effect of the various sources and types of training 

on pilot behavior, competency, and the likelihood of an accident. The lack 

of pilot data also makes it difficult to identify the root causes of accidents 

attributed to pilot error and determine appropriate risk mitigation 

opportunities. 

The annual survey FAA uses for collecting general aviation flight-activity 

data suffers from significant limitations—limitations that call into question 

the resulting activity estimates FAA produces as well as the accident 

rates calculated by NTSB. Though FAA has improved the survey over the 

years, our concerns remain because the survey continues to experience 

response rates below 50 percent and relies on the record-keeping habits 

and memories of survey respondents who sometimes have to recall 

details that occurred more than 12 months earlier. Further, other methods 

for obtaining general aviation flight-activity data have encountered 

resistance from the industry. Without a more accurate reporting of general 

aviation flight activity, such as requiring the reporting of flight hours at 

certain intervals—e.g., during registration renewals or annual 

maintenance inspections—FAA lacks assurance that it is basing its policy 

decisions on a true measure of general aviation trends, and NTSB lacks 

assurance that its calculations of accident and fatality rates accurately 

represent the state of general aviation safety.

Given the diversity of the general aviation community—illustrated, for 

example by the wide variety of aircraft in the fleet and the varying nonfatal

and fatal accident rates among the general aviation segments, the 

adoption of a singular agency goal–-a 10 percent reduction in the general 

aviation fatal accident rate per 100,000 flight hours by 2018 is not the 

most effective risk-based tool for achieving general aviation safety gains. 

The goal does not take into account the variety of general aviation 

operations or the risks associated with each. For example, one hour flown 

during a personal operation is not the same as one hour flown during a 

corporate operation. Also, economic conditions affect each segment 

differently, making it difficult to discern if a change in the accident rate is 

an indication of a change in the safety of the industry. If the goal is 

reached, the overall success might mask ongoing safety issues in one or 

more segments of the community.
 

Page 35 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

FAA officials have indicated that the success of the 5-year strategy—

which is composed of numerous initiatives—will be measured through 

changes in the general aviation fatal accident rate. However, successful 

results-oriented organizations measure their performance at each 

organizational level by developing performance measures. For this 

reason, we think it is important for FAA to develop performance measures 

for the significant initiatives underlying the 5-year strategy. This is 

important because if FAA does not measure the performance of the 

significant underlying initiatives, it will not be able to determine whether 

the initiatives were effective in their own right. In addition, in order for the 

FAASTeam to be successful in its promotion of the 5-year strategy, it 

must be well respected within the general aviation community. We are not 

making a recommendation regarding the FAASTeam at this time since 

plans for restructuring it are in flux and its volunteer force realignment is 

not scheduled to begin until 2013. 

To enhance FAA’s efforts to improve general aviation safety, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA 

Administrator to take the following four actions:

• To expand the data available for root cause analyses of general 

aviation accidents and other purposes, collect and maintain data on 

each certificated pilot’s recurrent training, and update the data at 

regular intervals. 

• Improve measures of general aviation activity by requiring the 

collection of the number of hours that general aviation aircraft fly over 

a period of time (flight hours). FAA should explore ways to do this that 

minimize the impact on the general aviation community, such as by 

collecting the data at regular events (e.g., during registration renewals 

or at annual maintenance inspections) that are already required. 

• To ensure that ongoing safety issues are addressed, set specific 

general aviation safety improvement goals—such as targets for fatal 

accident reductions—for individual industry segments using a datadriven, risk management approach.

• To determine whether the programs and activities underlying the 5-

year strategy are successful and if additional actions are needed, 

develop performance measures for each significant program and 

activity underlying the 5-year strategy.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 36 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

We provided the Department of Transportation (DOT) with a draft of this 

report for review and comment. DOT officials agreed to consider our 

recommendations and provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of NTSB, and 

interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me on (202) 512-2834 or at dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 

listed in appendix II.

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues 

Agency Comments 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

Our objective was to conduct a comprehensive review of general aviation 

safety. To do so, we addressed the following questions: (1) what are the 

characteristics and trends in general aviation accidents from 1999 to 2011 

and (2) what actions have been taken by the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) to improve general aviation safety?

To identify the characteristics of and trends in general aviation accidents, 

we conducted a data analysis using the National Transportation Safety 

Board’s (NTSB) Aviation Accident Database. We limited our analysis to 

accidents involving airplanes operating under Part 91 of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations that occurred from January 1, 1999, through 

December 31, 2011, in the U.S. We excluded accidents that occurred in 

U.S. territories, possessions, and international waters. To assess the 

reliability of the NTSB data, we reviewed documentation on data 

collection efforts and quality assurance processes, talked to 

knowledgeable NTSB officials about the data, and checked the data for 

completeness and reasonableness. We determined that these data were 

sufficiently reliable for the descriptive and comparative analyses used in 

this report. To supplement our analysis of the NTSB accident data, we 

also analyzed FAA’s general aviation flight-hour estimates for 1999 

through 2010 and estimated active pilot data for 2011. To assess the 

reliability of these data, we reviewed documentation on data collection 

efforts and quality assurance processes and talked to knowledgeable 

FAA officials. In assessing the reliability of the flight-hour estimates, we 

also spoke with the contractors responsible for executing the survey that 

yielded these estimates, the General Aviation and Part 135 Survey. We 

determined that the flight-hour data and the active pilot data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement. Specifically, 

these data elements were sufficiently reliable to provide meaningful 

context for the numbers and characteristics of accidents that we report. 

However, we also determined that because of the methodological 

limitations identified—a low response rate and the potential for 

nonresponse bias—the flight-hour estimates developed from the General 

Aviation and Part 135 Survey may not have the precision necessary to 

measure small changes in the general aviation accident rate over time.

To identify actions FAA and others have taken to improve general 

aviation safety, we reviewed our prior reports as well as documents and 

reports from FAA, NTSB, NASA, and general aviation industry trade and 

other groups, including the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 

(AOPA), the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), and the Society of 

Aviation and Flight Educators (SAFE); FAA orders, notices, advisory 

circulars; and applicable laws and regulations. We also determined the 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

roles and responsibilities of FAA and NTSB in collecting and reporting 

general aviation safety data. In addition to interviewing officials from the 

various FAA offices and divisions responsible for general aviation safety, 

we interviewed aviation experts affiliated with various aviation industry 

organizations. (See table 4.)

Table 4: Aviation Industry Organizations Interviewed for This Study

Aviation technology developer

Garmin

Educational organization

Society of Aviation and Flight Educators (SAFE)

Employee organization

Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS)

Trade groups

Aviation Insurance Association (AIA)

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) 

Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA)

General Aviation Manufacturer’s Association (GAMA)

National Business Aviation Association (NBAA)

Universities

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Wichita State University

Source: GAO.

To obtain additional insight into the general aviation industry, we attended 

the September 2011 AOPA Aviation Summit in Hartford, Connecticut; the 

March 2012 Annual FAA Aviation Forecast Conference in Washington, 

D.C.; the February 2012 Northwest Aviation Conference in Puyallup, 

Washington; and the June 2012 NTSB General Aviation Forum in 

Washington, D.C.
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 39 GAO-13-36 General Aviation Safety

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made 

important contributions to this report: H. Brandon Haller, Assistant 

Director; Pamela Vines; Jessica Wintfeld; Russ Burnett; Bert Japikse; 

Delwen Jones; Josh Ormond; and Jeff Tessin.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(540227)
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