Affirmed and Opinion Filed October 19, 2016 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-00801-CV 

JAY SANDON COOPER, Appellant 

V. 

JUDGE PAUL MCNULTY, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 219-01611-2015 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Francis, Stoddart, and Schenck 

Opinion by Justice Francis 

Jay Sandon Cooper appeals the trial court’s order declaring him a vexatious litigant and 

issuing a pre-filing order against him. Cooper raises fifteen issues. Having considered his 

issues, we conclude they are without merit and affirm the order. 

Plano Municipal Court Judge Paul McNulty convicted Cooper of speeding. Cooper 

appealed his conviction to the county court at law and filed an affidavit of indigency in 

municipal court to secure a free record on appeal. Judge McNulty set the matter for hearing on 

April 24, 2015 and ordered Cooper to produce (1) his federal tax returns for the years 2013 and 

2104, if available; (2) his bank statements for the twelve months preceding April 1, 2015; and (3) 

evidence of any and all income paid to or received by him for the twelve months preceding April 

1, 2015. 
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Cooper objected to the order and filed a motion to vacate, arguing Judge McNulty 

exceeded his authority. When Judge McNulty did not rule within a week, Cooper filed a request 

for ruling. After he was given written notice that his objections and motions would be addressed 

at the hearing, Cooper filed a motion asking the judge to sever the two issues and consider only 

his objections and motion to vacate on April 24 and to reschedule the indigency hearing. The 

motion was denied. 

 On the day the hearing was set, Cooper filed a petition for writ of mandamus and writ of 

prohibition in the 219th Judicial District Court in Collin County, challenging Judge McNulty’s 

order for him to produce the various financial records. Cooper also filed an affidavit seeking to 

proceed without paying costs. The Collin County District Clerk contested the affidavit and, after 

a hearing, the district court sustained the contest and determined Cooper could not “proceed as a 

pauper or without paying all applicable costs and fees.” The court ordered Cooper to pay “the 

filing fees and all other applicable fees and/or costs of any kind or nature associated with the 

filing, prosecution, and/or appeal of this case.” The May 8, 2015 order further provided that if 

Cooper did not pay within ten days of the order, “the case will be dismissed for costs without 

further notice or order and execution shall issue for the collection thereof.” 

 Six days later, the district court ordered a hearing to determine whether Cooper and his 

wife, Teresa, met the criteria in chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to be 

declared vexatious litigants and, if so, whether a pre-filing order should be issued against them. 

The court ordered the Collin County District Clerk to appear at the hearing and provide the court 

with evidence “material to the issue” of whether the Coopers meet that criteria. The hearing was 

set for June 23, 2015. 

Cooper filed objections to the hearing. A hearing on those objections was held on June 

17. Before the hearing began, Cooper was arrested and handcuffed outside the courtroom on an 
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outstanding warrant.1

 During the hearing, Cooper argued the trial court did not have authority 

under the statute to sua sponte hold a hearing on whether he was a vexatious litigant. He also 

argued the case arose from a criminal matter and therefore was not considered a civil litigation as 

required by the statute. He also objected that the order included his wife, who was not a party to 

the litigation. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled Cooper’s wife need not appear at 

the hearing but overruled all other objections. The trial court then conducted a hearing in an 

unrelated case. Once that was over, Cooper was exiting the courtroom in the custody of Plano 

police and commented, “This is the way you get treated by the Court for a speeding ticket that 

you have on appeal.” The trial court told Cooper he was “disrupting the Court proceeding,” 

found him in contempt, and sentenced him to ninety days in county jail. (According to Cooper’s 

brief, the trial court reduced his confinement to fourteen days.) 

 Six days later, the trial court held the vexatious litigant hearing. The district clerk 

offered, and the trial court admitted, exhibits 1 through 24, which comprised records in twenty 

state, federal, and bankruptcy court cases filed pro se by Cooper since May 14, 2008 and which 

were determined adversely against him. Exhibits 25 and 26, which involved Cooper’s ongoing 

litigation against the City of Plano, were also admitted. 

 Cooper then testified. When asked if he had filed twenty lawsuits in the past seven years, 

he said he did not know. When asked how many he thought he had filed, he said he did not 

know. Cooper ultimately said he had filed “probably about 10” lawsuits but denied any were 

frivolous. He said some were “improperly dismissed” and were on appeal. He also admitted he 

had been sanctioned by a federal court but had appealed that ruling. 

 1

Although the reason for the warrant was not stated at the hearing, the record contains a capias pro fine, issued the day before, ordering 

Cooper’s arrest for failure to pay the fine on his speeding conviction. 
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 After considering the evidence, the trial court declared Cooper a vexatious litigant and 

issued a pre-filing order prohibiting him from filing pro se any new litigation in state or federal 

court until and unless he had written permission from the appropriate local administrative judge. 

Cooper filed this appeal. 

 Before turning to the merits of Cooper’s appeal, we begin by addressing issues related to 

his brief. In general, a brief must state concisely all issues for review and reveal the legal 

questions we are called upon to decide. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f); Bolling v. Farmers Branch 

Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 896 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). The appellate rules 

also require a brief to contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made with 

appropriate citations to authorities and the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). We have no right or 

obligation to search through the record to find facts or research relevant law that might support 

an appellant’s position because doing so would impermissibly transform this Court from neutral 

adjudicators to advocates. Lau v. Reeder, 05-14-01459-CV, 2016 WL 4371813, at *2 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas Aug. 16, 2016, no pet. h.). 

 Cooper’s brief is seventy-one pages in length. The brief identifies fifteen specific issues, 

but does not denote where each of these fifteen issues is discussed. Rather, the Table of 

Contents indicates the argument for all issues is located on page 25 with the conclusion found on 

page 70. Moreover, many of the headings that precede his arguments in the body of the brief do 

not correspond to the stated issues. We have attempted to discern each of Cooper’s arguments 

and, where properly briefed, will address each in turn. 

 Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code addresses vexatious litigants 

––persons who abuse the legal system by filing numerous, frivolous lawsuits. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.001–.104 (West 2002 & Supp. 2016); In re Douglas, 333 

S.W.3d 273, 282 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). As relevant here, under 
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this chapter, the court may find a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant if the defendant shows (1) there 

is not a reasonable probability the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation; and (2) the plaintiff, 

acting pro se, has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained at least five litigations, other than in 

small claims court, that have been finally determined adversely to him within the seven-yearperiod preceding the motion. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.054(1)(A) (West Supp. 

2016). 

We review a trial court’s declaration that a litigant is vexatious for an abuse of discretion. 

Harris v. Rose, 204 S.W.3d 903, 905 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); Amar-Sharif v. Quick 

Trip Corp., 416 S.W.3d 914, 919 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). Under this standard, we are 

not free to substitute our own judgment for the trial court’s judgment. Harris, 204 S.W.3d at 

905. We can only find an abuse of discretion if the trial court acts in an arbitrary or capricious 

manner without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id. The court's decision must be so 

arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Id. 

In issues one, two, four, five, and ten, Cooper makes several arguments related to the 

construction of the statute and whether the order in this case meets the statutory requirements. 

He generally contends the trial court erred by (1) ordering a hearing on its own motion when the 

statute requires a “moving defendant,” (2) applying the vexatious litigant statute to a criminal 

case, and (3) considering appellant a “plaintiff” when he was a “relator.” 

 Beginning with the first argument, Cooper argues the plain language of the statute does 

not permit a motion by the court. Rather, he contends, “only a moving defendant can initiate the 

process for a court to find a plaintiff to be vexatious” and the statute limits the court’s power to 

issuing a pre-filing order sua sponte. We disagree. 

Section 11.101 of the statute under which Cooper was declared a vexatious litigant 

provides: 
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(a) A court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party, enter an order 

prohibiting a person from filing, pro se, a new litigation in a court to which the 

order applies under this section without permission of the appropriate local 

administrative judge described by Section 11.102(a) to file the litigation if the 

court finds, after notice and hearing as provided by Subchapter B [section 11.051 

et seq.], that the person is a vexatious litigant. 

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.101(a) (emphasis added). 

Our sister court in In re Douglas has addressed the issue raised by Cooper here and, after 

analyzing the statute as a whole, concluded such an interpretation is “directly contrary to the 

explicit language and plain meaning of section 11.101(a).” In re Douglas, 333 S.W.3d at 285–

86. Specifically, the statute authorizes a court “on its own motion” to raise the vexatious litigant 

issue, and a contrary interpretation “not only defeats the clear intent of the Legislature but denies 

the trial court not only the statutory but the inherent right to control its own docket, including the 

inherent right to protect judicial resources from waste in frivolous and vexatious litigation, 

defeating the object of the statute.” Id. We agree with the analysis in Douglas and conclude the 

trial court could raise the issue sua sponte. 

Next, Cooper argues the statute requires a “litigation,” which is defined under the statute 

as a “civil action . . . .” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.001(2). He argues his petition 

for writ of mandamus is not a “civil action” because it arose from a criminal law matter and the 

statute therefore does not apply. We disagree. 

An original proceeding for writ of mandamus initiated in the trial court is a civil action 

subject to trial upon substantive law principles and procedural rules as in any other civil suit. 

Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 792 n.1 (Tex. 1991); In re Davis, No. 12-15-

00238-CR, 2016 WL 1043132, at 1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 16, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. 

op.) It is not a criminal action even if it arises from a criminal proceeding. See Hogan v. 

Turland, 428 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. 1968); In re Davis, 2016 WL 1043132, at *1. The civil 

nature of the action is demonstrated by the fact it is not brought by, nor in the name of, the State, 
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and the officer against whom the writ is requested is not alleged to have committed a crime nor 

violated any penal statue. Hogan, 428 S.W.2d at 317. Because Cooper’s petition for writ of 

mandamus is considered a civil action, this issue is without merit. 

 To the extent he argues the statute does not apply because he is a “relator” and not a 

“plaintiff,” he has offered no authority to support his contention. Regardless, a plaintiff is 

defined as “an individual who commences or maintains a litigation pro se.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 11.001(5). A litigation is defined as “a civil action commenced, maintained, 

or pending in any state or federal court.” Id. § 11.001(2). A petition for writ of mandamus 

initiated in the trial court is a civil action. Thus, a mandamus action is a civil action for which 

the vexatious litigant statute applies. See Retzlaff v. GoAmerica Commc’ns Corp., 356 S.W.3d 

689, 700 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (concluding under statutory definitions, “a person 

who seeks mandamus relief commences a civil action in the appellate court”). We conclude 

Cooper commenced a civil action by filing the petition for writ of mandamus and is a plaintiff as 

contemplated by the statute. We overrule issues one, two, four, five, and ten. 

 In his eighth issue, Cooper contends the vexatious litigant statute is unconstitutional 

because “it purports to limit would-be plaintiffs’ right[s] to file litigation to alter, amend, or 

reform their government.” He argues the statute violates his rights to due process and equal 

protection but has provided no analysis of the statute. 

Five of our sister courts have concluded the statute does not violate the vexatious 

litigant’s constitutional due process and/or equal protection rights. See In re Potts, 357 S.W.3d 

766, 769 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding); Johnson v. Sloan, 320 

S.W.3d 388, 389–90 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied); Clifton v. Walters, 308 S.W.3d 94, 

101–02 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied); In re Johnson, No. 07-07-0245-CV, 2008 

WL 2681314, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jul. 9, 2008, orig. proceeding); Leonard v. Abbott, 
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171 S.W.3d 451, 457–58 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). The purpose of the vexatious 

litigant statute is to restrict frivolous and vexatious litigation. Leonard, 171 S.W.3d at 457. It 

attempts to “strike a balance between Texans’ right of access to their courts and the public 

interest in protecting defendants from those who abuse the Texas court system by systematically 

filing lawsuits with little or no merit.” Retzlaff, 356 S.W.3d at 702 (quoting Sweed v. Nye, 319 

S.W.3d 791, 793 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied)). It does not authorize courts to act 

arbitrarily, but permits them to restrict a plaintiff’s access to the courts only after first making 

specific findings that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant based on factors closely tied to the 

likelihood that the incident litigation is frivolous. Id. 

Cooper has not shown the statute’s restrictions are unreasonable and arbitrary when 

balanced against the purpose and basis of the statute. Rather, he appears to suggest any 

restriction on his right to file lawsuits would be unconstitutional. But there is no constitutional 

right to file frivolous litigation. Id. Contrary to his suggestion otherwise, he has not been 

categorically barred from filing pro se lawsuits. Rather, because of evidence of his past litigation 

history, the order requires him to obtain permission from the local administrative judge before 

filing. When balanced against the significant costs of defending Cooper’s likely frivolous 

lawsuits in the future, these restrictions are not unreasonable. See Leonard, 171 S.W.3d at 458. 

 He also asserts because “other people seeking redress of their grievances” are not 

required to obtain permission first, he is being denied equal protection of the law. The record 

shows Cooper is required to obtain permission because the trial court found he met the statutory 

requirements under chapter 11 to be declared a vexatious litigant, and other litigants who are 

found to meet these standards are likewise subject to the same restrictions. 

Finally, to the extent he argues the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because it 

has “worked to unlawfully prevent” him from “furthering a criminal appeal,” he has not shown 
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the vexatious litigant finding impacted his appeal of his speeding conviction. To the contrary, in 

his brief, Cooper asserts his appeal to the county court was remanded because there was no 

evidence he filed an appeal bond. We overrule the eighth issue. 

In issues three, twelve, and thirteen, Cooper generally complains about Judges Roach and 

Becker who presided over various matters related to the vexatious litigant matter. 

In his third issue, Cooper argues Judge Roach should have recused himself instead of 

deciding his “own motion” to find Cooper to be a vexatious litigant. By not doing so, Cooper 

asserts “the trial” was fundamentally unfair. Our record does not contain a motion to recuse nor 

has Cooper asserted that he filed one. Under these circumstances, we conclude he has failed to 

preserve his complaint. Nairn v. Killeen Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 S.W.3d 229, 250 (Tex. App.—El 

Paso 2012, no pet.). We overrule the third issue. 

In his twelfth issue, Cooper complains he was denied due process and makes a number of 

unsupported assertions regarding Judge Roach and his motivations in the case, as well as other 

county officials. In particular, he speculates Judge Roach had him arrested to “inhibit” his 

ability to respond to the vexatious litigant motion. He said once jailed, he was assigned and 

reassigned to three different pods over the next four days, which apparently prevented him from 

being able to order paper, pen, envelopes, and postage from the jail commissary until the fourth 

day. He said he handwrote an application for writ of habeas corpus, addressed it to the Collin 

County Clerk, and placed it in the mail with proper postage, but the sheriff’s department instead 

placed it in inter-departmental mail, where it was delivered to the district clerk, who then mailed 

it to his home. He asserts the mail was taken from a “locked and labeled mail receptacle,” 

opened, and “likely provided to Judge Roach.” He also complains he was served with the district 

clerk’s evidence on a Friday afternoon, four days before the hearing, and was unable to go to the 

law library because it was closed over the weekend, and he did not have access to his records. 
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 Cooper supports this issue with two sentences of legal authority and no analysis. Under 

these circumstances, we conclude the issue is inadequately briefed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. 

Nevertheless, we have reviewed the record. Most of the above assertions are unsupported in the 

record. The only assertion that is supported involves receiving, on Friday afternoon, the district 

clerk’s documents showing the lawsuits he had filed in the past seven years. But in this instance, 

appellant has not complained he was entitled to a continuance so that he could research a 

response. Nothing in the record suggests Cooper was denied due process. We overrule the 

twelfth issue. 

In his thirteenth issue, Cooper complains (1) Judge Roach “went too far” by jailing him 

for contempt during the time he would otherwise have to prepare his case against a vexatious 

litigant finding and (2) Judge Becker rejected the filing of his objections to the contest of his 

Rule 20 affidavit, based on the vexatious litigant finding. He asks this Court to find that both are 

“disqualified to hear any case in which Cooper is involved.” 

 Only in the rarest circumstances are judicial rulings demonstrative of the degree of 

favoritism or antagonism required to show that a fair and impartial trial is impossible. 

Markowitz v. Markowitz, 118 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. 

denied). Such rulings are generally best brought as grounds for appeal, not as evidence of 

judicial bias. Id. 

Having reviewed the record here, neither of the rulings is evidence of judicial bias. 

Cooper was held in contempt of court for disrupting court proceedings. He could have 

challenged his confinement by writ of habeas corpus2

 but did not. Once he was determined a 

vexatious litigant, Judge Becker disallowed the filing of objections to the clerk’s contest to his 

 2

 Cooper asserts in his brief, without evidentiary support, that he did attempt to mail an application for writ of habeas corpus but the 

sheriff’s office placed in inter-departmental mail. 
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affidavit of indigency for a free record on appeal to this Court. Cooper did not timely challenge 

that ruling. We express no opinion on the correctness of either judge’s actions, but even if error, 

neither demonstrate the degree of antagonism necessary to show impartiality. We overrule the 

thirteenth issue. 

 In his eleventh issue, appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to 

support the trial court’s finding that there is no reasonable probability that he will prevail in the 

instant litigation. 

 In its order, the trial court found two bases for determining no reasonable probability that 

Cooper could prevail in the litigation: (1) the mandamus action was dismissed when Cooper 

failed to pay the applicable filing fee and (2) the relief sought in the mandamus became moot 

once the underlying case had become final. But, on appeal, Cooper addresses only the first basis 

for the trial court’s finding there was no probability he would prevail; he does not challenge the 

second basis. 

 As a general proposition, an appellant must attack all independent bases or grounds that 

fully support a complained-of ruling or judgment. Oliphant Fin. LLC v. Angiano, 295 S.W.3d 

422, 423–24 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). If an independent ground fully supports the 

complained-of ruling or judgment, but the appellant assigns no error to that independent ground, 

we must accept the validity of that unchallenged independent ground, and any error in the 

grounds challenged on appeal is harmless because the independent ground fully supports the 

complained-of ruling or judgment. Id. 

 Even if the record supported Cooper’s argument as to the first basis, he has not 

challenged the second basis for the trial court’s finding; consequently, any error is harmless. We 

conclude his eleventh issue is without merit. 
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 In his sixth issue, Cooper asserts the doctrine of res judicata barred the district court from 

considering “what a previous judge had already considered and ruled on.” Specifically, he 

asserts the 95th Judicial District Court in Dallas had previously failed to find he was a vexatious 

litigant, after considering the cases filed through 2009, and the order was made final in January 

2013. Thus, he argues it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to consider any cases he 

filed before January 2013. As evidentiary support, he directs us to exhibit 15, which is the 

docket sheet from the 95th Judicial District Court for a case filed by Cooper in June 2009. While 

the docket sheet shows a vexatious litigant motion was filed and a hearing held, the exhibit does 

not indicate how the court ruled or if it ruled; thus, it does not support Cooper’s argument. 

 Regardless, even if we assumed res judicata could apply (which we do not), Cooper 

cannot show harm. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1. Cooper has not explained why 2013 is the 

operative date, when under his own assertion, the district court considered and ruled on the 

matter in 2009. Of the twenty cases presented, only two were finally resolved against Cooper 

before December 2009. Moreover, the evidence shows that since January 2013, Cooper has 

“commenced, prosecuted, or maintained” at least five litigations as a pro se litigant, other than in 

small claims court, that were determined adversely to him. Thus, even if we exclude the very 

evidence Cooper claims is inadmissible, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the trial 

court’s finding. We overrule the sixth issue. 

In his seventh issue, Cooper contends the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the 

records of other courts. A court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable 

dispute because it (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction or (2) can 

be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned. TEX. R. EVID. 201(b); Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 623 

(Tex. 2012) (per curiam). Judicial notice of such a fact is mandatory if a party requests it and 
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supplies “the necessary information.” TEX. R. EVID. 201(c)(2); Freedom Commc’ns, 372 

S.W.3d at 623. Under this standard, a court will take judicial notice of another court’s records if 

a party provides proof of the records. Id. 

 At the hearing, the district clerk offered documents from the respective courts’ online 

dockets of Cooper’s filings in state and federal courts (exhibits 1 through 24) and asked the court 

to take judicial notice of them. Because the district clerk provided proof of the records, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice. We overrule the seventh issue. 

 In issue nine, Cooper asserts section 24.003 of the Texas Government Code is 

unconstitutional. He does not present any relevant authority or analysis with respect to this 

issue; accordingly, it is waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. 

 In his final issues, Cooper raises complaints regarding the district clerk’s contest to his 

affidavit filed to obtain a free record in this appeal. In his fourteenth issue, he asserts the trial 

court erred by rejecting the filing of his objections to the contest because he did not first obtain 

the administrative judge’s permission. In his fifteenth issue, he complains the trial court erred by 

allowing attorney Robert J. Davis to represent the district clerk at the hearing on the contest. 

 If a trial court sustains a contest, the party claiming indigence may seek review of the 

court’s order by filing a motion challenging the order with the appellate court without advance 

payment of costs. TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1(j)(1). The motion must be filed within ten days after the 

order sustaining the contest is signed, or within ten days after the notice of appeal is filed, 

whichever is later. TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1(j)(2). 

 Here, the order sustaining the clerk’s contest was signed on July 7, 2015, six days after 

Cooper filed his notice of appeal. Thus, Cooper had until July 17 to raise complaints regarding 

the contest to his affidavit of indigency. He did not do so. We therefore conclude his complaints 

are not timely. We overrule the fourteenth and fifteenth issues. 
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 We affirm the trial court’s order declaring Cooper a vexatious litigant. 

 

150801F.P05 

 

/Molly Francis/ 

MOLLY FRANCIS 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

JAY SANDON COOPER, Appellant 

No. 05-15-00801-CV V. 

JUDGE PAUL MCNULTY, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District 

Court, Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 219-01611-2015. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Francis; 

Justices Stoddart and Schenck participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the order of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. 

 

Judgment entered October 19, 2016.