IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-31070

Summary Calendar

IDELLA CORLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION,

OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT; WHITMAN J. KLING, JR., individually

and in his official capacity as Division of Administration Appointing Authority;

BARBARA GOODSON, individually and in her official capacity as Appointing

Authority; ANNE GRAHAM, individually and in her official capacity as Human

Resource Director; JULIAN S. THOMPSON, JR., individually and in his official

capacity as State Risk Director; PATRICIA H. REED, individually and in her

official capacity as State Risk Assistant Director,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:06-CV-882

Before WIENER, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The district court granted partial summary judgment against Idella Corley

(“Corley”) dismissing her race discrimination, hostile work environment, and

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 29, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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state intentional infliction of emotional distress and retaliation claims, against

the Defendants in connection with her employment with, and termination from,

the Division of Administration, Office of Risk Management for the State of

Louisiana (“DOA-ORM”). Only Corley’s federal retaliation claims pursuant to

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42

U.S.C. § 1981, survived. A jury reached a verdict against her on those remaining

claims. Proceeding pro se, Corley timely appealed on all claims. We AFFIRM. 

We review a district court’s grant of partial summary judgment de novo. 

Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 991–92 (5th Cir. 2005). 

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

We analyze Corley’s race discrimination claims under the burden shifting

framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

802–04 (1973). To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, a plaintiff

must show that: (1) she was a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified

for the position at issue; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)

she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside of her

protected group. McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Adverse employment actions are limited to ultimate employment decisions,

which include hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating. 

Id. at 559–60. If a prima facie case is made, then the burden shifts to the

defendant to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

questioned employment action.” Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 137 (5th

Cir. 2003). If such a reason is given, then the plaintiff is left with the burden of

showing that the stated reason was pretextual. Id.

Summary judgment was proper as to Corley’s race discrimination claims

because she failed to carry her burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 

We agree with the district court that the “ultimate employment decisions” at

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issue are Corley’s: (1) reduction in pay equal to a one-day suspension in March

2006, (2) denial of the staff officer’s position in May 2006, and (3) termination in

December 2006. As explained by the district court, Corley failed to show a

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prima facie case with regard to the first two actions because, inter alia, she did

not present evidence that similarly situated non-black employees were treated

more favorably. As for the third action, Corley met her prima facie burden. The

Defendants then presented evidence that Corley was terminated for legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons—namely, her insubordinate behavior and

inappropriate communications. Corley failed to raise a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether these reasons were pretextual. 

Summary judgment as to Corley’s race-based hostile work environment

claim was also proper. To prevail, a plaintiff must show: “(1) she belongs to a

protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the

harassment complained of was based on race; (4) the harassment complained of

affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; (5) the employer knew or

should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt

remedial action.” Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002). As

noted by the district court, although Corley presented numerous acts showing

hostility between her and her coworkers, she failed to show that this hostility

was related to her race.

Corley’s state intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim also fails. 

To prevail, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that the conduct of the defendant was

extreme and outrageous, (2) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff

was severe, and (3) that the defendant desired to inflict severe emotional distress

In addition to these three actions, Corley asserted a long list of other alleged adverse 1

employment actions pertaining to salary, promotions, and accommodation. Many of those

actions were not “ultimate employment decisions” under McCoy. 492 F.3d at 556. Even

assuming arguendo that they were ultimate employment decisions, for the reasons stated in

the district court’s order, Corley failed to show a prima facie case with respect to those actions. 

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or knew that severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain

to result from his conduct.” White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (La.

1991). As explained by the district court, Corley failed to raise a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether any of the Defendants’ acts were extreme or

outrageous. 

Moreover, Corley cannot prevail on her state retaliation claims. 

Retaliation based on race does not fall within the scope of Louisiana

Employment Discrimination Law. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:301. Corley also

failed to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding her

Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act claim. § 23:1361(B). 

Further, Corley failed to show that any of the alleged retaliatory acts were an

actual violation of Louisiana law, which is a requirement to recover under

Louisiana Whistleblower Statute. § 23:967. 2

The evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict against Corley on

her remaining federal retaliation claims. Corley’s appeal of the jury verdict is

reviewed for plain error because she failed to move for judgment as a matter of

law at the close of all the evidence. See McKenzie v. Lee, 259 F.3d 372, 374 (5th

Cir. 2001). Accordingly, our review is limited to determining “whether there was

any evidence to support the jury verdict.” Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs.

Inc., 247 F.3d 228, 238 (5th Cir. 2001). The record shows that the Defendants

presented evidence of a legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons—namely, Corley’s

insubordinate behavior and inappropriate communications—for each of the

allegedly retaliatory acts. Therefore, Corley cannot show that there was no

evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the partial summary judgment of

The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Whitman 2

J. “Whit” Kling, Jr. (“Kling”), on all retaliation claims. Summary judgment in favor of Kling

was proper because all viable aspects of Corley’s retaliation claims occurred after Kling’s

tenure as appointing authority for DOA-ORM ended in March 2005.

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the district court and the judgment based on the jury’s verdict. 

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