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76–698 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–611

ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN LIBYA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 12, 2011

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 2

Steinberg, Hon. James B., Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of 

State, Washington, DC ........................................................................................ 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6

Responses to questions submitted for the record by the following: 

Senator John F. Kerry .............................................................................. 20

Senator Richard G. Lugar ........................................................................ 22

Senator Mike Lee ...................................................................................... 26

(III)

(1)

ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN LIBYA 

THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2011

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:20 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Lugar, 

Corker, Rubio, and Lee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

Thank you for coming this morning. 

We are under the gun on both sides of the aisle here. Senator 

Lugar has to go down to the White House for a meeting of the 

Republicans with the President, and I have to go down there for 

a separate meeting. So we are going to be a little bit compressed. 

If the hearing continues beyond the bewitching hour for both of 

us, then Senator Shaheen will chair, but it may well be that we 

can get where we need to go if we kind of move along here and 

compress everything. 

This is the fourth hearing that we have had on the question of 

Libya since the popular uprising began in February. We are delighted to welcome Secretary Steinberg back. He appeared last year 

on March 31 when we kind of, we thought, had congratulated him 

for becoming the Dean of the Maxwell School at Syracuse University and sent him off into the sunset. But we need to proceed forward here with Secretary Burns’ nomination, which we are going 

to try and do as fast as we can. We now have the papers and the 

minute we can, we will get that hearing done, and I am sure we 

will do it expeditiously. 

The situation in Libya, while it appears sort of significantly 

stalemated, I think is different from the way it appears, to be honest with you. Yesterday we had the privilege of meeting with 

Mahmoud Jibril. I had previously met with him in Cairo and invited him to come here and meet with colleagues, and he had a 

good meeting yesterday with a lot of colleagues in the Senate. And 

I think everybody came away impressed by the seriousness of purpose, the articulate presentation of an agenda, and the commitment to democracy and to values and principles that I think our 

country could willingly and happily support. 

2

In the last hours, some progress has occurred on the ground, 

which is encouraging: the taking of the airport outside of Misrata 

and the liberating of Misrata and the airport, some actions in Tripoli itself. And I think Minister Jibril was, in fact, quite encouraging 

about his sense of what the possibilities are in the days ahead. We 

never know. Obviously there is tension in the stalemate near 

Brega, Jibaya, and central Libya. 

But I am convinced that because of the actions taken by NATO 

and by the GCC, by the Arab League, and the opposition themselves, I believe that the Libyan people have been given a fighting 

chance for a better future, and I think catastrophe was averted in 

Benghazi. Unlike Iraq or Afghanistan, we have been able to 

achieve what has been achieved with broad international support, 

in fact, with other NATO members really carrying the brunt of the 

load. I think there can be no denying that had the international 

community not taken action against Qadhafi, I think the situation 

in Libya would be far worse today. But also I think the message 

across the Arab world, across North Africa and into the Middle 

East, would have been significantly damaging to the aspirations of 

the Arab Spring and to other interests that we have. 

I think the progress that the Transitional National Council has 

made has actually been quite remarkable. In a short 3 months, 

they have organized themselves. They have articulated a roadmap 

forward. Given the vision of a post-Qadhafi Libya that is democratic and inclusive, they have begun to develop institutions that 

can provide basic services for their people. They are thinking about 

how to deal with humanitarian aid and dislocation and challenges. 

And while some institutions are obviously going to have to be rebuilt from scratch over a period of time, I think we are in a position to provide technical and financial assistance, and I applaud 

the initiative announced last week by Secretary Clinton and her 

efforts with the Contact Group in Rome where they decided it was 

important to provide the Council Vice Authority with access to 

financial sources. 

We are working here in the Senate to construct and then pass 

the enabling legislation that will make it possible for Qadhafi’s 

money to support the efforts of the Libyan people, which is what 

it should do in the first place. 

So, Secretary Steinberg, we are delighted to have you here today 

and thanks for taking the time to come in. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing, and I join you in welcoming back Deputy Secretary Steinberg. 

The committee sought a witness from the Defense Department to 

join Secretary Steinberg at this hearing. The administration chose 

not to provide such a witness. This is an inexplicable decision given 

administration pledges to fully consult with Congress and the central role the United States military has played in the Libyan operation. I am hopeful that Defense Department witnesses will be provided at subsequent hearings on Libya when requested. 

3

Since our last Libya hearing more than a month ago, fighting between opposition forces and troops loyal to Muammar Qadhafi has 

continued unabated. The United States is participating in the coalition of nations under NATO leadership that is opposing the 

Qadhafi regime with military force. Among other steps, the Obama 

administration has initiated the process of providing at least $25 

million in nonlethal assistance to the Libyan opposition and it has 

dedicated Predator drones to Libyan airspace. 

One can envision fortunate scenarios under which the fighting 

might come to an end, but a quick resolution of the war is not 

likely. Accordingly, under the War Powers Act, Congress could 

render a judgment on whether to continue U.S. participation in the 

war. At this stage, congressional leaders have not committed to a 

debate, and it is uncertain whether majorities could be assembled 

for any particular resolution. 

The President should have come to Congress seeking authority 

to wage war in Libya, and I believe that Congress and the American people would still benefit from a debate on this matter. 

Irrespective of any debate, however, the Congress and the American people should have answers to some very basic questions that 

the President has not addressed sufficiently. 

First, can other NATO nations fulfill the primary combat mission 

in Libya over an indefinite period, and how will the administration 

respond if allies request greater military involvement by the 

United States? 

Second, what scenarios or emergencies would cause the United 

States to reescalate its military involvement in Libya, and would 

the administration seek a congressional authorization if it expands 

its military role? 

Third, what are the administration’s plans for aiding the Libyan 

opposition economically and militarily, and do we have confidence 

in the people to whom we are providing assistance? 

Fourth, what are civilian and military operations related to 

Libya costing the United States, and how much is the administration prepared to spend over time? 

Fifth, in the aftermath of the current civil war, what responsibility will the United States assume for reconstructing the country? 

There are many other questions that require an answer, but this 

set illustrates the degree to which the United States goals, resources, and strategies related to Libya remain open-ended and 

undefined. 

In addition, Libya operations have not been adequately placed in 

a broader strategic context. Given all that is at stake in Pakistan, 

Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere in the Islamic world, a rational strategic assessment would 

never devote sizable military, diplomatic, economic, and alliance 

resources to a civil war in Libya. When measured against other regional problems, Libya appears as a military conflict in which we 

have let events determine our involvement, instead of our vital interests. It is an expensive diversion that leaves the United States 

and our European allies with fewer assets to respond to other contingencies in the region. 

I look forward to our discussion of the situation in Libya and related administration policies and actions. 

4

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks a lot, Senator Lugar. Appreciate it. 

Secretary Steinberg, you know the routine here. If you want to 

summarize, your full testimony will be placed in the record, and we 

look forward to hearing you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES B. STEINBERG, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator 

Lugar. It is a pleasure, as always, to be back. 

And I will summarize my remarks and just hit on a few of the 

key points that I would like to raise with the committee. 

Since my last appearance before you, we have, I think, made real 

progress in assembling a remarkable international coalition of 

European and Arab partners. 

On the military side, following the adoption of U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 1973, we have undertaken a clear but limited 

mission to protect the Libyan people. The United States offered our 

unique military capabilities early on and then turned over full command and control responsibility to a NATO-led coalition. Of the 

over 6,000 sorties flown in Libya, three-quarters have been flown 

by non-U.S. coalition partners. All 20 ships enforcing the arms embargo are European or Canadian, and the overwhelming majority 

of strike sorties are now being flown by our European allies. 

But the international community’s efforts are not simply military. We continue to work with our partners to pursue three tracks 

on the political and economic front: pressuring and isolating 

Qadhafi, supporting the Libyan people in determining their own 

future, and delivering humanitarian aid. 

On the first, we are working to escalate the pressure, deepen 

Qadhafi’s isolation, and convince those around him that Libya’s future lies elsewhere. The international community is increasingly 

united around a shared insistence that Qadhafi must go. Indeed, 

in last week’s Contact Group meeting, the conclusions pointedly 

noted that in the words of the Contact Group, ‘‘Qadhafi, his family 

and his regime have lost all legitimacy. They must go so that the 

Libyan people can determine their own future.’’ This coalition that 

have called on Qadhafi to go includes countries like Turkey that in 

the past have had close ties to the regime. Nations are joining us 

in expelling Qadhafi’s diplomats and refusing visits from Qadhafi’s 

envoys unless they are defecting or coming to discuss his 

departure. 

The clear message to Qadhafi and those around him is that there 

is no going back to the way things were. Through the U.N. Security 

Council, they now face a no-fly zone, an arms embargo, asset 

freezes, and travel bans. Libya’s National Oil Corporation and central bank are blacklisted. The United States and other countries 

are also taking further unilateral steps to tighten the squeeze on 

regime officials and regime-affiliated banks, businesses, and satellite networks. This week the ICC’s prosecutor announced that he 

intends to apply for arrest warrants for three senior officials in 

Qadhafi’s regime who, in his words, ‘‘bear the greatest criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity.’’

5

These measures are having an effect. We have deprived the regime of funds and assets that could be used to support attacks 

against the Libyan people. Libya used to export 1.3 million barrels 

of oil per day, and that has now stopped, and the regime is having 

difficulty accessing refined petroleum. There are some indications 

that the regime can no longer afford to pay its supporters to attend 

rallies and demonstrations. 

Second, we are supporting legitimate democratic aspirations of 

the Libyan people. The last time I testified before you, you all 

raised many questions about the makeup and intentions of the Libyan opposition. Our envoy in Benghazi, Chris Stevens, has now 

been on the ground for several weeks and meets regularly with a 

wide range of Libyan opposition members. Secretary Clinton herself has met three times with Libyan opposition leaders and urged 

others to do the same. And as you noted, Senator Kerry, Mahmoud 

Jibril, who is a senior member of the TNC, has been in Washington 

consulting with Congress and will be meeting with us as well. 

We have continued to stress the importance of the TNC 

distancing itself from extremists who could seek to hijack the popular movement, and we have been pleased by the clear view of the 

TNC leadership that you yourselves heard rejecting extremism and 

calling for tolerant democracy. We welcome the TNC’s roadmap to 

convene a national assembly and draft a constitution for postQadhafi Libya, and we have been encouraged by efforts on the TNC 

to strength their organization on the civilian and military side. 

As we have gotten to know the Libyan opposition, we have 

stepped up our support. As we notified Congress, we are providing 

up to $25 million for the provision of nonlethal items to the TNC, 

including medical supplies, boots, tents, rations, and personal protective gear. 

The Treasury Department has published new rules to remove 

sanctions on oil sales that will benefit the TNC, and the Libya Contact Group has created a new mechanism to provide transparent 

financial assistance to the opposition, to which Kuwait has already 

donated $180 million. 

And as Secretary Clinton said in Rome, and as you mentioned, 

Mr. Chairman, we also look forward to working with you to begin 

a targeted unfreezing of Libyan Government assets to meet pressing humanitarian needs. 

Third, we are providing more than $53 million in humanitarian 

assistance and continue to look for additional ways to support 

humanitarian operations. The international community as a whole 

has already contributed, committed $245 million. 

Mr. Chairman, I understand the desire for quick and decisive 

results, and of course, we in the administration share that goal. 

However, I think it is important to recall how much has been 

accomplished in less than 2 months in preventing a humanitarian 

catastrophe, in rallying a remarkable political and military coalition, in mobilizing pressure on the Qadhafi regime, and working 

with emerging democratic forces in Libya. 

History teaches us that patience and persistence can pay off. We 

have already seen the international pressure change the calculation of some of Qadhafi’s advisers. It is impossible to predict which 

single step will tip the balance. We recognize that the way forward 

6

is not easy, and so we are using as many tools and levers as we 

can to bring about our ultimate objective: the end of Qadhafi’s rule 

and a new beginning for a peaceful, democratic Libya. 

In all this, we recognize and appreciate the critical role that Congress plays. Even before the President directed U.S. forces to participate in coalition operations, he and his senior advisers reached 

out to leading Members of the Congress, including this committee, 

and those consultations have continued both informally and in 

appearances before Congress, including my own. 

By April 5, the United States had successfully set the stage and 

transferred to our allies and partners the lead for enforcing the nofly zone and protecting civilians on the ground pursuant to the 

U.N. Security Council resolution. As this operation has moved forward, our role has evolved to primarily a supporting one, especially 

as our allied partners have taken the lead. 

As we come closer to the second month of operations, we are actively reviewing our role going forward. Throughout, the President 

has been mindful of the provisions of the War Powers resolution 

and has acted in a manner consistent with it. He will continue to 

do so, and we look forward to continuing to consult with Congress 

on our role in the coming days and we welcome your support. 

May I just add one final point in closing? Senator Lugar, you 

raise many important questions, but I especially want to touch on 

the last, which is our strategic stakes in this effort. 

In addition to the very compelling humanitarian crisis that we 

faced, as I mentioned the last time we appeared, this operation—

Senator Kerry has said as well—has implications not just for 

Libya, for the broader region. Qadhafi’s efforts to repress and 

attack his own people could have enormous consequences for the 

transitions in Tunisia and Egypt which are incredibly important to 

the United States and to our long-term interests. And they send a 

signal to the rest of the world that we are able to work especially 

when called upon by the Arab countries in the region to take steps 

to try to protect the populations there and to make sure these 

kinds of efforts will not succeed. 

So I think as important as the stakes directly in Libya are, even 

more broadly, they do have profound consequences for the United 

States, which fully justifies the role that we have taken in this 

case. 

Thank you all, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Steinberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES B. STEINBERG

I thank the Chairman and Senator Lugar for inviting me today. I appreciate this 

chance to update the committee on our efforts and answer your questions. 

During my last appearance, I reviewed for the committee the developments that 

led up to the international community’s engagement in Libya. Colonel Qadhafi met 

the peaceful protests of his own people with violence. When the U.N. Security Council, the Arab League, and the United States all demanded that atrocities must end, 

Qadhafi responded with a promise to show ‘‘no mercy and no pity.’’

We quickly reached two important conclusions. First, we would not stand by as 

Qadhafi brutalized his own people. Second, Qadhafi had lost the legitimacy to lead, 

and he had to go to allow the Libyan people to reclaim their own future. 

And so we assembled an international coalition of European and Arab allies with 

a clear, limited mission to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 

and protect the Libyan people. We offered our unique military capabilities early on 

and then turned over full command and control responsibility to a NATO-led coaliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:20 Nov 26, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~2\2011IS~1\051211-R.TXT BETTY
7

tion. Three-quarters of the over 6,000 sorties flown in Libya have now been by nonU.S. coalition partners, a share that has increased. All 20 ships enforcing the arms 

embargo are European or Canadian. And the overwhelming majority of strike sorties are now being flown by our European allies. We are proud of our continuing 

contribution and grateful as our allies increasingly carry the burden. 

As the coalition continues to carry out its best efforts to protect Libya’s civilian 

population, we continue to pursue three tracks on the political and economic front: 

pressuring and isolating Qadhafi; supporting the Libyan people in determining their 

own future; and delivering humanitarian aid. 

First, we are working to escalate the pressure, deepen Qadhafi’s isolation and convince those around him that Libya’s future lies elsewhere. 

The international community is increasingly united around a shared insistence 

that Qadhafi must go. Last week’s Contact Group—with the participation of 22 nations and representatives from the U.N., Arab League, NATO, EU, OIC and GCC—

issued its most forceful statement yet, including that ‘‘Qadhafi, his family and his 

regime have lost all legitimacy. They must go so that the Libyan people can determine their own future.’’ Turkey, once an important partner to Qadhafi’s Libya, has 

now joined the chorus of nations demanding that he leave immediately. The British, 

Italians, and French are expelling Qadhafi’s diplomats, as we did in March. And we 

are urging other nations to refuse their visits unless Qadhafi’s envoys are either 

defecting or coming to discuss his departure. 

We are taking a wide range of steps to send a clear, forceful message to Qadhafi 

and those around him that there is no going back to the way things were. They now 

face a no-fly zone, an arms embargo, asset freezes, and travel bans. Libya’s National 

Oil Corporation and central bank are blacklisted. The United States and other countries are also taking further unilateral steps to tighten the squeeze on regime officials and regime-affiliated banks, businesses, and satellite networks. This week, the 

Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court announced that he intends to apply 

for arrest warrants for three senior officials in Qadhafi’s regime ‘‘who bear the 

greatest criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity.’’

These measures are having an effect. We have deprived the regime of funds and 

assets that could be used to support attacks against the Libyan people. Libya used 

to export 1.3 million barrels of oil per day. That has stopped, and the regime is having difficulty accessing refined petroleum. There are some indications that the regime can no longer afford to pay supporters to attend rallies and demonstrations. 

The longer international sanctions stay in place, the more the pressure will mount. 

Second, we are supporting the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people, who 

deserve a successful transition to democracy just as much as their neighbors in 

Egypt and Tunisia. 

Last time I testified, there were a great many questions about the makeup and 

intentions of the Libyan opposition. Our envoy, Chris Stevens, has been in Benghazi 

for several weeks now and has held meetings with a wide range of Libyan opposition members, including but not limited to the Transitional National Council (TNC). 

Secretary Clinton has met three times with Libyan opposition leaders and urged 

others to do the same. Several of you met with TNC leader Mahmoud Jibirl, including Chairman Kerry, yesterday. I will host him and his delegation at the State 

Department on Friday and he will meet National Security Adviser Tom Donilon at 

the White House Friday afternoon as well. Though it will be important to ensure 

that words are matched by actions, we have been encouraged by the TNC’s public 

statements on democracy, treatment of prisoners, human rights and terrorism. We 

have continued to stress the importance of the TNC distancing itself from extremists who could seek to hijack the popular movement, and we have been pleased by 

the clear view of the TNC leadership rejecting extremism and calling for tolerant 

democracy. 

As we have gotten to know the Libyan opposition, we have stepped up our political, financial, and nonlethal military support. As we notified Congress, we are 

providing up to $25 million for the provision of nonlethal items to the TNC. The 

carefully chosen list includes medical supplies, boots, tents, rations, and personal 

protective gear. The first shipment, 10,000 MREs, arrived on Tuesday. 

The TNC has also requested urgent financial assistance. The Treasury Department has published new rules to remove sanctions on oil sales that will benefit the 

TNC. In Rome, the Libya Contact Group created a Temporary Financial Mechanism 

to provide transparent financial assistance to the opposition. Kuwait has already 

committed to contribute $180 million. 

As Secretary Clinton said in Rome, we hope to work quickly with Congress to 

begin unfreezing Libyan Government assets to meet pressing humanitarian needs. 

On Wednesday, we continued our consultations with Congress and shared our proposal. The bill authorizes the President to vest Libyan Government property within 

8

the jurisdiction of the United States and use it for costs related to humanitarian 

relief to and for the benefit of the Libyan people. We see this legislation as addressing unique circumstances in Libya for limited, humanitarian purposes. This money 

belongs to the Libyan people, and it should serve the Libyan people. 

Third, protecting civilians remains at the core of our mission. We are engaged in 

robust humanitarian efforts to help those in need inside Libya and those who have 

fled the violence. Our government is providing more than $53 million in humanitarian assistance, which helps to evacuate and repatriate third-country nationals, 

care for refugees on Libya’s borders and deliver food and medicine. The international community has already contributed, committed, or pledged $245 million. 

We continue to look for additional ways to support humanitarian operations in response to the Libyan crisis. 

Unfortunately, the Qadhafi regime has tried to block the delivery of desperately 

needed humanitarian assistance. The brave people of Misrata have withstood a 

month-long siege as well as repeated incursions, assaults, and atrocities. Qadhafi 

has blocked water, gas, and electricity. And this week, his regime laid antiship 

mines in Misrata’s harbor in a failed attempt to block humanitarian aid and medical 

evacuations. What has happened in Misrata is an outrage. Despite Qadhafi’s best 

efforts, we have now established a safe route for assistance to reach Misrata and 

its people. 

We salute the determination and resilience of the Libyan people in and around 

Misrata. We are inspired by the way they have stepped forward to protect and care 

for their neighbors who managed to escape from areas under attack. We are also 

proud that NGOs we fund have provided much-needed medical personnel and supplies to these cities, despite Qadhafi’s attacks. 

Qadhafi knows what he needs to do. The violence must end and the threats must 

stop. His troops must withdraw from the cities they have entered. Humanitarian 

goods must be allowed to move freely and vital services must be restored. Qadhafi 

must go to allow the people of Libya to chart their own future. 

Our approach is one that has succeeded before. In Kosovo, we built an international coalition around a narrow civilian protection mission. Even after Milosevic 

withdrew his forces and the bombing stopped, the political and economic pressure 

continued. Within 2 years, Milosevic was thrown out of office and turned over to 

The Hague. 

I understand the desire for quick results, and of course I share it. But history 

teaches us that patience and persistence can pay off. We have already seen international pressure change the calculations of some of Qadhafi’s closest advisers, who 

have defected. It is impossible to predict which step will tip the balance. 

The way forward is not easy. It will take sustained effort. And it will take continued close consultation with Congress. 

We know what needs to happen. And so we are using as many tools and levers 

as we can to bring about our ultimate objective: the end of Qadhafi’s rule and a new 

beginning for a peaceful, democratic Libya.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thanks very much, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate the testimony. 

Let me ask you, can you speak to sort of how effective you think 

the sanctions and the international diplomatic pressure right now 

is and whether there are signs of fissures or additional defections 

potentially within the Qadhafi circle? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, Senator, I think it is always difficult in 

these circumstances to know, especially given the closed the nature 

of the Qadhafi regime, but we do see real signs that in terms of 

the ability to conduct business as usual, particularly the lifeblood 

of the regime, the oil sales and financial transactions, that we have 

been very successful in mobilizing the international community. We 

see no signs of oil exports from the Libyan regime itself, although 

we are working with the TNC to see whether they can do this. 

Their access to the financial system has been badly damaged, and 

so we do see signs that this is creating real pressure there. It all 

goes hand in hand with trying to bring together the political, the 

economic, and the military together to make the regime recognize 

9

that there are direct consequences and that we have sustainable 

power here. 

The CHAIRMAN. What impact do you think the International 

Criminal Court arrest warrants might have, if any, in calculations? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think as we said from the beginning that it is 

essential that both Colonel Qadhafi and all those around him understand that there are consequences for what they are doing and 

that they will be held accountable, and that the individuals who 

are making the decisions and supporting Qadhafi need to know 

that as they continue to undertake operations which violate 

humanitarian law, that they will have consequences for this. I 

think it dramatically increases the pressure on the individuals in 

the regime. 

And I think the important experience that we had in the context 

of Kosovo is, as I mentioned in my last testimony, I think is a real 

indication, not just for those who are indicted, but for others 

around them, that this can make them understand that they face 

clearer choices and that the longer they hang on, the greater risk 

to themselves. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is important, as we go down this road, 

to remember that after we intervened in the Balkans and bombed 

quite significantly Serbia, Milosevic was there for another year, a 

whole year, and ultimately left not because we drove them out but 

because the people did at the ballot box fundamentally. There is 

not going to be a ballot box here. 

But from what I understand from a number of sources in conversations I had recently abroad, the pressures are building on 

Qadhafi. The calculations are beginning to shift among some of his 

folks who are aware that the opposition is getting more organized, 

the opposition is getting more support, the opposition is gaining on 

the ground. And so I think we are sort of back closer—not yet at 

the same point, but closer to where we were in the initial week or 

so when this swept the whole country. 

The indications I have are that is broadly within the population, 

even people within the areas of Qadhafi control, they do not want 

him to stay and that there is a very broad-based Libyan people 

opposition to his presence. 

Can you speak to sort of what insights you and the Secretary 

and the others get in your conversations with our allies and how 

you may be viewing the end game here, the longer run? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, I think again we have to be careful in speculating, obviously. We see some signs that there may be some interest of people around Qadhafi to find a way out, but these are 

the kinds of things that until it actually happens, you do not want 

to bank on them. That is why we have to keep the pressure on. 

I think the most significant feature is the quite strong consensus 

in the international community to not look for half-measures, not 

to look for ways to let him stay or try to begin to cut back on our 

basic demands for what needs to happen. This most recent, the 

third Contact Group meeting was a real affirmation of the fact that 

there is a complete consensus in the international community that 

there is no future here that involves Qadhafi in power or as part 

of the solution. And I think that that is similar to what happened 

in the Balkans, a recognition that this may not happen today or 

10

tomorrow but there is simply no long-term future for Qadhafi. And 

I think more than anything else that that is what helped shaped 

the environment and makes it clear to others who may want to be 

part of a future that they have to find an alternative. And I think 

that is what we are driving home. 

As I mentioned, I think that the efforts by countries like Turkey, 

which in the past had been more equivocal about this, closing their 

mission in Tripoli, making stronger statements about this, continues their drum beat that has to be having an impact among the 

regime about the fact that there is no kind of halfway option that 

they might be able to hold on here and kind of negotiate their way 

out of it. 

The CHAIRMAN. The final question for me. We are nearing the 

60-day mark with respect to the operation’s start. Can you just 

speak to the type of operations we are engaged in and how the administration views the authority for U.S. military participation in 

Operation Unified Protector at this point? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, in terms of the specifics, as you will understand, Mr. Chairman, I would prefer my colleagues on the military 

side to speak to that. 

But I think we can say that as we have said from the beginning, 

that the very substantial majority of the operations are being conducted by the coalition partners, that we have reduced our role to 

primarily a supporting role, and in cases where we have some 

unique assets that we made available. Mindful of the passage of 

time, including the end of the 2-month period, we are in the process of reviewing our role, and we will and the President will be 

making decisions going forward in terms of what he sees is appropriate for us to do, as I say, with his commitment to act consistently with the War Powers resolution. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

I am going to be leaving momentarily for the meeting I have to 

go to, but Senator Lugar will continue and I think Senator 

Shaheen will be here at some point. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

As I mentioned, Secretary Steinberg, in my opening statement, 

the President did not seek authorization from Congress to use military force in Libya prior to the beginning of our military’s involvement there. And while there have been constitutional debates in 

our country about the authority of the President and the War Powers Act ever since the act was passed, there has not been much discussion regarding the War Powers Act and the authority the President may have specifically with regard to using our military assets 

to intervene in the Libyan civil war. 

But leaving that aside, there has also not been really a search 

for precisely what the President of the United States ought to be 

seeking authority for in this particular situation. Now, in fairness, 

the President, in response to questions that I raised directly to him 

on two occasions, said that the United States would not be placing 

boots on the ground. He has indicated that this is clearly a humanitarian operation in which we will work with our NATO allies. We 

will be behind them. We will push them forward both through our 

11

actions and through our rhetoric, the latter of which has consisted 

of very clear statements that Qadhafi must go and that there is 

clearly an end game here, although one does not know the timeframe in which this may occur. 

I am disturbed not only by our ongoing involvement in Libya 

itself, but also that it will very likely set a precedent that could be 

drawn upon by President Obama or a future President in the case 

of a situation in which there is a perceived need to use military 

force in other countries. Now, in the case of the Balkans a while 

back, we did attempt to help our European allies because they said 

the nature of the force required there was too much for them to 

execute on their own. But during that time, we were not in a situation analogous to the Arab Spring in which several authoritarian 

regimes were simultaneously combating internal dissent in an 

especially brutal fashion. And so it seems to me that this is clearly 

a time in which the proper authority ought to be sought by the 

President. There ought to be a proper debate in the Congress. 

And before you even get to that, we are now in a situation in 

which we are taking authority to reach into Libyan resources. The 

rationale is that these are resources that were commandeered by 

Colonel Qadhafi in one form or another, and therefore they should 

be taken from him and used in a humanitarian way for the Libyan 

people. This seems to me, once again, to be a very big reach. Now, 

granted, Senator Kerry has indicated that he has been working 

with the administration on enabling legislation for this. So we may, 

therefore, have a congressional debate on that authority. 

But even then, granted the dislike we have for Qadhafi or various other people, reaching in and taking those resources and then 

distributing them in an uncertain way, unless the United States is 

going to take special precautions to closely monitor the disbursement of this assistance—a task we are finding to be very difficult 

to do in Pakistan, for example, with much greater cooperation—

seems to me to be a stretch. 

And I raise this and I am grateful for this hearing because we 

are moving rapidly in a situation in which we have not declared 

war. The War Powers Act has not been observed. We have no particular authority for any of this aside from the President’s assertion 

that we needed to save lives. 

We have already launched missiles into Libya at considerable 

expense. The meter is still running on our expenditures of our 

defense budget without much accounting for how much can be 

attributed to Libya or how far we plan to go in this operation, not 

to mention any responsibility we plan to take for rehabilitation 

efforts after hostilities cease. 

What is your own judgment as to what the administration is 

likely to do with regard to war powers or with regard to reaching 

into the coffers of Qadhafi? What sort of authorities do you believe 

are there or are required under these circumstances? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, thank you, Senator. 

On the issue of getting access to the Libyan assets, we do want 

congressional authorization. We do believe that under these circumstances we are not seeking to do this under any existing 

authorities, but rather, we think because this is a unique case and 

that these assets were frozen pursuant to a U.N. Security Council 

12

resolution, which complemented our own domestic law that allowed 

us to freeze these assets, we thought it was important to work with 

you to craft this to precisely address the questions that you raise 

in terms of the purpose, which we think should be limited to the 

humanitarian purpose, in terms of oversight and making sure that 

those things do serve that purpose. And in our discussions with you 

and the chairman and others, we want to make sure that we craft 

that legislation in a way that does address the issues that you have 

raised. 

We think this is a narrow set of authorities that we would like 

to be able to have to deal with the circumstance. But we do think 

under these circumstances that given the humanitarian needs of 

the Libyan people, that it is appropriate that these things that are 

largely derived from their own resources should be able to be put 

in a controlled way to their benefit. But again, we look forward to 

working with the Congress to establish that authority and the 

terms under which it would be used. 

With respect to the war powers, as I said, the President has been 

committed from the beginning to act consistent with the War Powers resolution. We have provided a notification to Congress, consistent with the War Powers resolution, at the outset of the operations. And as we continue to move forward, the President is 

committed to do that as well. And as I said, we will be looking at 

our own role and our activities as we move through the next period 

of time, and again, we will do this in consultation with you as we 

look to what we think we can and cannot do. We will be engaged 

in close consultation with Congress on this issue. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, this is a debate we may have. I just raise 

the question of authorities not just with regard to Libya, but generally as to our ability to, in a civil war, begin to allocate resources 

of one party or another in a situation where we have not declared 

war and really have not declared our intentions. I think this is a 

very serious set of questions that lie before us. 

Finally, I would just comment that certain allies are already indicating that there are limits to the extent of their involvement in 

NATO operations in Libya. Their Parliaments already are blowing 

the whistle on how many months they can participate. Perhaps 

your response will be, well, after all, there are a lot of NATO nations, and therefore some will remain willing to commit their military forces. 

But what is the limit in terms of contributions from our NATO 

allies, given that they have been constricting their defense budgets 

for a long time, much to our regret? And finally, where are we left 

as they depart the scene, even though we keep shoving them forward and indicating that we are not the leader? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, Senator, I do think that what has been 

remarkable is the persistence and the commitment of the NATO 

allies and the others who are participating. We have not seen any 

flagging of commitment. I think that we are mindful that we need 

to sustain this to make sure that humanitarian objectives are 

achieved, but I think that we do not want to set any kind of artificial deadline on this to sort of somehow allow the regime to wait 

us out. But I think there is clear determination. There will be 

important meetings coming up in NATO in early June, I believe is 

13

the next ministerials. And so that is an opportunity to look at the 

resources and the way forward. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Steinberg, it is always nice to have you before our committee. Thank you very much for your service. 

Obviously, the situation in Libya is fluid. It changes. And one of 

the areas that has me greatly concerned deals with the issues concerning migrants. In fact, the principal reason for international 

intervention in Libya is to provide safety for the people in the country. The numbers that I have is that the number of migrants 

exiting Libya as of the beginning of this month was in excess of 

700,000, and over one-third were foreign nationals. 

I bring that up because reports from those fleeing Libya entering 

Italy—there have been reports that there have been hundreds lost 

at sea by boats that have capsized leaving Tripoli. 

My question to you, I think, is twofold as it relates to the migrants. If this conflict becomes protracted, the number of migrants 

will increase and will cause increasing problems in the surrounding 

countries. We know that they have migrated to Tunisia, Egypt, 

Niger, Algeria, Chad, and Sudan. Is there a strategy within the 

international coalition to first deal with the safety of those fleeing 

Libya, and second, having a game plan, depending in part by the 

length of this conflict insofar as time, as to what we are going to 

do with the migrants? We do not want to create another circumstance similar to what happened in Iraq where we have had 

permanent issues that are going to be difficult to deal with because 

of the number of displaced individuals and migrants. So do we 

have a game plan as it relates to the migrant population? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Senator. Obviously, this is an important issue and clearly was one of the main reasons for our initial 

engagement, both to deal with the humanitarian situation in 

Libya, but also the prospect of it destabilizing the neighboring 

countries. 

I had a chance to review some of these issues with the experts 

in the Department yesterday on this, and I am going to give you 

some ballpark numbers from my memory, but if you will allow me 

for the record, I can make sure I get it exactly accurate. 

Senator CARDIN. Sure. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think first that actually the response of the 

United States and the international community to the problem of 

migrants, both displaced Libyans and third-country nationals who 

were driven out of the country, has really been remarkable. If you 

look at the situation both in Tunisia and Egypt today compared to 

where it was several weeks ago, the numbers are down. There are 

relatively small numbers in camps. Through the generosity of people, especially in Tunisia, a number of people are living with families in Tunisia supporting that effort. And so we do not have the 

hundreds of thousands in desperate circumstances that we saw in 

the early days. There has been especially, I think, a very effective 

international effort to help move the third-country nationals back 

to their homes. 

14

So that is one aspect of the problem. It is not completely over. 

People do continue to leave the country, but we have, I think, in 

terms of both a game plan and a strategy to try to reduce the pressure on the borders and on Tunisia and Egypt, that we have had 

some real successes. We are not being complacent about it, but I 

do think there has been some success there. 

The second is clearly to the extent that we are successful in protecting Benghazi and its surrounding area, that we are able to create a more stable situation in Misrata and elsewhere, that also 

reduces the pressure on people to leave and the impending fear of 

disaster that would force increased numbers. So the humanitarian 

intervention here has a very significant prospect for dealing with 

that forward. 

But ultimately, as you mentioned as in the case of Iraq, the longterm success depends on a political change in Libya that will create 

an environment for those who have been fearful of being able to 

stay and have left to come back. And that is among the reasons 

why we are so committed to this political change and why we do 

not believe that some kind of compromise or half-measures with 

Qadhafi will be a solution to this problem, either in terms of a sustainable democracy in Libya or bringing an end to this humanitarian and migration problem. 

So it is something we have attached great importance to, we 

have devoted significant resources to, and I do think we have a 

game, but at heart, that game plan is a part of the broader strategy for bringing about political change in Libya. 

Senator CARDIN. I think you are absolutely right. I guess my 

main point on this is that, look, we all want to see a regime change 

and stability in the country as quickly as possible. But it seems to 

me that the international community needs to have a game plan 

as it relates to the migrants. Yes, if this matter is resolved quickly 

within a matter of weeks, it is one set of circumstances as it relates 

to displaced individuals, but if this becomes a conflict that goes on 

for a longer period of time, there needs to be a different strategy 

as it relates to the migrant population. 

I am pleased to see that foreign nationals have been able to get 

back to their host countries and that there are accommodations for 

those who have left out of fear who hope one day to return to 

Libya. 

I would ask that you investigate the released reports about those 

fleeing Tripoli by small boats and their safety as to whether there 

is a need for international attention toward their safety. There 

have been reports that there have been those lost at sea. If you 

could look into that, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Absolutely. 

Senator CARDIN. And one last point, if I might, and that deals 

with the war crimes issues. There have been some reports that the 

International Criminal Court is active in this area looking at war 

crimes committed by officials in Libya. Can you either update us 

as to what is happening as it relates to potential war crimes and 

what the United States is doing in order to pursue those types of 

accountabilities for those responsible for mass murders and other 

actions within Libya? 

15

Mr. STEINBERG. Yes, Senator. This past week the ICC prosecutor 

announced that he does intend to apply for arrest warrants for 

three senior officials in Qadhafi’s regime. So this process is going 

forward and we are supporting these efforts in terms of collecting 

information as in others. And we do think this is an important part 

of both the pressure and the accountability that can have an impact not just on Qadhafi himself but those around him in terms of 

forcing the choices that we would like to see made sooner rather 

than later. 

Senator CARDIN. Of course, we believe that Colonel Qadhafi 

should be a target of this investigation. But I would very much 

urge the United States to be actively engaged in pursuing these 

issues. I think it is important to the international community. 

Mr. STEINBERG. We share that too, Senator. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your service. I respect the work you do and appreciate your coming up here. 

I will tell you, you know, you use the word ‘‘consultation,’’ but 

there really is not any consultation. It is a nice word to use. I know 

we have written a letter asking about the assets that we have engaged militarily and have gotten a stiff arm now for several weeks. 

I know that today we asked for somebody from the military to be 

here and you declined. And I think someone asked you earlier what 

assets we did have engaged, and you said you defer to the military. 

So I would like to ask why, in the name of consultation, the 

administration has been so remiss in letting us know actually what 

we are doing as it relates to our military assets and engagements 

in Libya. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Senator, there are obviously a number of forums 

in which there are opportunities to explore these issues, and I 

think we need to explore how we can best get the information to 

you that you need. 

Senator CORKER. Well, you know, I have written a letter several 

weeks ago and again I have gotten a stiff arm from the administration. Name the forum and I will be there. I am not busy after 1 

o’clock today, and I will be around on Monday. So could you arrange to set that up and let us know exactly what is happening? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I commit to get back to you on what we can do. 

Senator CORKER. I do not understand. I really do not. People are 

concerned about mission creep. And I do not understand. I mean, 

it is not as if there is some huge rift happening here. I do hope you 

will get back, and I hope the Secretary and the Secretary of 

Defense will get back very quickly and just let us know. 

I mean, this use of the word ‘‘consultation’’ is bogus, and people 

like myself who have cooperated with you in many ways candidly 

are getting a little impatient with the fact that basically you are 

waiting until this conflict is mostly over possibly to even let us 

know what is happening. I do not consider that consultation, nor 

do I consider that something that creates good will, nor do I consider that something that is going to cause us to be able to work 

16

well together in the future. So I do hope you will get back very, 

very quickly. You know how to reach me. 

Let me ask you this. What have we told the rebels, if you will? 

And by the way, one of their leaders was in yesterday, and for 

what it is worth, publicly I will state, a pretty impressive guy. I 

was impressed with what he said and the things that he talked 

about were happening on the ground. 

As a matter of fact, he mentioned that the fact that we have not 

come in in a more forceful way has allowed them over time to be 

in a state of unification, meaning in the beginning they were not, 

that because they have had to do this themselves, they have become far more unified than they would have been otherwise. I wonder if you might speak to that for a moment. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, thank you, Senator. I think we are all 

pleased that Mr. Jibril had a chance to meet with you all and has 

a chance to really engage because understanding—and it was very 

clear from the last time I was up here—the importance that you 

all attach understandably to understanding what this movement is 

and who these people are. 

And I do think it is a challenge. This is putting together under 

very difficult circumstances an effective set of operating procedures 

and institutions to meet both the civilian and the military requirements that they are facing is a challenge. It is a very disparate 

group of people, but they are motivated, I think, by a common set 

of objectives. 

And we have seen over time the strengthening of their cooperation in their institutions. We have learned just in the last day or 

so that they expect to announce a new Defense Minister to help 

organize their military activities. We have seen on the civilian side 

a strengthening of the financial structures and the way in which 

they are coordinating their efforts. 

There is a much more substantial international presence now in 

Benghazi that is interacting with them, sharing expertise, and 

trying to help them strengthen that capacity. And so while they 

started from a difficult set of challenges and a low base, I do think 

in the course of what has been less than 2 months’ time, that there 

has been a really tremendous set of achievements. We need to help 

them do that. We can provide advice and counsel. 

But what is important, as you said, is that this is homegrown. 

This is indigenous. It is not being opposed by the outside. These 

are people there. And I also think it is important that the leadership in eastern Libya is reaching out to other tribes and other 

actors from other parts of Libya too. They have made this commitment to an inclusive process so that it is not just the self-appointed 

group. And I do think given all the difficulties they face, we should 

be impressed and appreciative of what they have done, and I know 

they value the advice that they are getting from you and others. 

Senator CORKER. So that leads me to the next question. What is 

it that we are telling them—what are you telling them—that we 

are going to do in regards to support, should they be successful? 

I think their time horizon for when they think Qadhafi is out of 

there is maybe shorter than it really is. Who knows whether they 

are right or not? But what is it that you are telling them we as 

a country are going to do to support their efforts post-Qadhafi? 

17

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, I think if there is one especially hopeful 

point in the future here it is that this is a country with great natural resources and potentially great access not only to the existing 

resources that have been blocked by us and so many others, but 

also an ongoing set of resources. So one would hope, going forward, 

that significant aspects of what will be a financial challenge can be 

generated by the Libyan people themselves. 

I think the place where we can be most helpful generally is providing advice and guidance and counsel in terms of how to build 

the democratic structures. We have a lot of experience with that in 

other contexts. We have also worked with others. 

There have been some remarkable conferences in recent weeks 

with leaders from Central and Eastern Europe sharing their experiences in the post-Communist period to the leadership of the TNC. 

I know the Polish Foreign Minister, for example, has been working 

on that and people from civil society in Central and Eastern 

Europe. I think that is the place where the outside world is going 

to have the greatest to offer, working with our NGO’s, as well as 

our Government and other partners, to help build the structures 

for a civil society. 

Senator CORKER. So you see it as one of advice. You do not see 

us engaged in the kind of nation-building, state-building that is 

occurring in Afghanistan in any way. You do not see us doing any 

of that. They will have their own resources. We will provide advice 

and they will take it and run. That is what you see happening. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I do not want to say, Senator, that there are targeted places in which reasonably modest amounts of assistance 

would support that technical advice. But I do believe that our 

approach here is that there is a capacity within Libya to take this 

on and we want to support that. 

Senator CORKER. Let me just close. I know my time is up. We 

have a hearing on Afghanistan next week. Secretary Clinton has 

declined to come. There are no administration witnesses. Again, I 

think most of the folks on this panel realize that partisanship stops 

at our shoreline. We have all worked together to do a lot of good 

things together. I will say to you right now you all are not exhibiting the kind of relationship that we have had in the past, and to 

me you are seeding the germination, if you will, of some really bad 

will by the way you are handling this conflict and your lack of 

transparency that this administration has been built upon. I hope 

that will change very quickly. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Senator, I know the Secretary is deeply committed to this, as you know. She takes especially seriously her relations with the Congress, given her own background. And she, I 

think, works very hard both in formal and informal settings to be 

in touch with you to have both individual conversations and with 

the committee as a whole. But I will take back your concerns. 

Senator CORKER. She has been off the air for a while. 

Mr. STEINBERG. She has been, as you know, traveling also and 

working very hard on these issues. But I know she takes this seriously, and I will take back your concerns. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

18

Mr. Secretary, yesterday I met with Mr. Jibril and he indicated 

that once a new government is formed, it would be willing to cooperate with the United States on a new investigation into the Pan 

Am 103 bombing. Given the additional information that would be 

available from a compliant Libyan partner, is the administration 

open to a new investigation into the Pan Am bombing and would 

it commence legal action on U.S. soil against all persons responsible for planning, authorizing, or carrying out that attack? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, Senator, I think like you we have been 

very struck by this attitude that the TNC leadership has had and 

a recognition that going forward, that part of a long-term relationship with the United States and the international community 

would be increased transparency about the past and really living 

up to those international principles. 

On the specific question, obviously, this is an issue for the Justice Department in terms of how they would proceed there, but I 

would be happy to forward your concerns. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But you all interface with the Justice Department in the context of what our future relationship is going to 

be with a future Libyan Government and recommendations. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Right. We certainly welcome the offer that he 

made. We think it would be important in terms of long-term relations between the United States and a democratic government in 

Libya that they be supportive and cooperative. The only thing I 

cannot specifically speak to is whether we would open a new criminal investigation. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Has the State Department raised this question with Mr. Jibril and the TNC? 

Mr. STEINBERG. In general terms, yes. And I will be meeting with 

him myself and will have an opportunity to discuss this as well. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I hope you would get him to verify to 

you what he said to me. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I would look forward to that. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Second, to your knowledge, have members

of the TNC and Mr. Moussa Koussa been interviewed by the Department of Justice, the FBI, or the State Department about their 

knowledge, planning, and authorization of the Pan Am 103 

bombing? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Senator, as I told you the last time we talked 

about this, we have made clear to the British authorities that we 

believe it is important for us to have appropriate access there. 

Because this is an ongoing criminal investigation, in terms of the 

specifics, I have to defer to the Justice Department in terms of 

what is taking place. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Has the State Department raised, outside of 

the Justice Department, questions of that nature with Mr. Moussa 

Koussa? Have you had access to Mr. Moussa Koussa yet? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I do not know that the State Department has 

had access. I would have to check, but I do not believe so. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Would you get back to me and let me know? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Yes, I can get back to you, but I do not believe 

the State Department——

Senator MENENDEZ. Would the State Department condition a 

recognition of a future Libyan Government on a commitment to a 

19

new investigation, cooperation on Pan Am 103 and access to Mr. 

al-Megrahi? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Again, Senator, it is something I think we 

should raise with the TNC in terms of what they are prepared to 

do and make clear the importance that we attach to that. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I hear you but I do not understand what the 

State Department is going to recommend to the President of the 

United States, along with the NSC, as to the position we should 

take with the TNC and under what conditions. It seems to me that 

it is perfectly reasonable to expect that Americans whose families 

were killed at the orders of Mr. Qadhafi should be able to derive 

from a new Libyan Government a commitment to democracy, 

human rights, and the rule of law, as a condition precedent extract 

that as a commitment. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I guess what I would say, Senator, is that I 

think we share the importance that you attach to it. 

I think what has been important and what you heard is the first 

best case is for them to offer to do this without our making it a 

condition rather than looking like somehow this is being imposed 

on them, for them to willingly assume that. So I would encourage 

them and we would hope that they would do that. And I think that 

is what we would hope is that what Mr. Jibril told you would be 

what they did. And rather than because we imposed the commitment, it is because they understood, in terms of their own democratic development——

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate their, at least on this point, 

willingness to suggest they would be helpful and cooperative. With 

Mr. Qadhafi, we created conditions precedent. Right? He had to renounce terrorism. He had to get rid of his weapons. Those were 

conditions. I see no reason why the United States Government cannot insist, in the process of pursuing a relationship with the TNC, 

that they be committed to what, in essence, is the fulfillment of the 

rule of law and justice. 

So this Senator and my colleagues, Senator Lautenberg, Senator 

Schumer, Senator Gillibrand, who have all shown interest on this, 

will be very concerned about what the State Department does in 

that regard. 

Thank you. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Menendez. 

Thank you especially, Secretary Steinberg, for accommodating all 

of the schedules of Senators who have the meetings at the White 

House that we all seem to have very shortly. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, I am glad to see that Senators are being 

called down to the White House in the spirit of consultation that 

we think is so important. 

Senator LUGAR. Excellent. We will do our best. 

Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, sir. 

[Whereupon, at 10:15 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

20

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES B. STEINBERG TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. What is the financial viability of the Transitional National Council? 

What financial support are other nations providing to the Council?

Answer. One of the primary functions of the Transitional National Council (TNC) 

is to serve as an administrative body on behalf of the Libyan people, providing essential services, such as security, health care, water, and electricity, to those citizens located in areas outside of regime control. In pursuing these efforts, the TNC 

faces significant financial challenges, including an estimated $2 billion budget shortfall over the next 6 months, and has requested the assistance of the international 

community to meet these needs until a political transition can take place and the 

Libyan people again have access to the considerable regime assets currently blocked 

under sanctions. In response, the Libya Contact Group has been developing a Temporary Financing Mechanism (TFM) to facilitate contributions to the TNC and ensure that they are made in a transparent and accountable way. Kuwait has already 

pledged $180 million to the TFM and others have also expressed interest in making 

donations. The Contact Group is also working to create a Libya Information 

Exchange Mechanism (LIEM) to coordinate the provision of in-kind assistance to the 

TNC. Italy has agreed to administer the LIEM. 

In addition to working with the Contact Group to facilitate assistance to the TNC, 

the United States is also providing up to $25 million in nonlethal military assistance directly to the TNC. The President is also discussing proposed legislation with 

Congress that would authorize vesting of approximately $200 million in blocked regime assets to be used for humanitarian and civilian purposes in Libya. We are 

reaching out to our international partners to encourage them to take similar steps 

to aid the TNC.

Question. The TNC has put forward a rather commendable roadmap for a democratic transition after Qadhafi is gone. But Qadhafi has for decades destroyed his 

country’s democratic institutions, so the task ahead will be a daunting one. What 

will be the biggest challenges in the post-Qadhafi reconstruction of Libya? What 

specific resources will the United States and the international community have at 

their disposal to support Libya’s democratic transition? What planning is the administration doing for the post-conflict transition period in Libya?

Answer. As we continue to deepen our engagement with the Libyan opposition, 

we are encouraged by their commitment to democratic principles and their roadmap 

for a political transition following the departure of Qadhafi from power. It will ultimately be up to the Libyan people to choose their own leaders and government 

structures, and to address the reconciliation of a Libya marred by 40 years of dictatorship and the regime’s use of brutal force against civilians. Any transition will 

have to look at creating institutions that respect the integrity and sovereignty of a 

united Libya and that reflect the Libyan people’s genuine aspirations for freedom 

and democracy. We believe that the U.N. should have the lead role in coordinating 

international support for a political transition in Libya. We are working very closely 

with our international partners and U.N. planning teams to explore the goals and 

priorities in a post-Qadhafi Libya, and understand the most effective ways in which 

the international community can contribute. As the TNC has pointed out, Libya is 

an oil-rich country and will be well positioned to bear many of the costs of a postQadhafi transition.

Question. What role have Libya’s neighbors played in the conflict? How has 

Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces responded to the continuing unrest? 

What is your view of TNC criticism of Algeria’s role to date? What is you view of 

concerns expressed by Algeria and Chad about regional security? How would you 

characterize levels of support for NATO operations across the broader Middle East 

as the conflict wears on?

Answer. We expect that Arab support for the Libya Contact Group and the 

NATO-led operation will persist, as evidenced by Arab governments’ cooperation on 

the effort in both fora. Morocco, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates participate 

in the NATO-led operation and planning meetings, while the Arab League has followed its initial support for international intervention with efforts to terminate the 

satellite broadcast of Libyan state television stations. The Libya Contact Group and 

the United States appreciate the Arab League’s position on this issue, and we believe that this solidarity is a strong indicator that the coalition’s actions continue 

to be widely supported. 

21

Tunisia has been very helpful in managing the flow of migrants and conflict victims fleeing the violence in Libya. The Tunisian military has facilitated border 

crossings and evacuations for a multitude of the third-country nationals leaving 

Libya en route home, as well as roughly 80,000 Libyan refugees. For those not 

staying in UNHCR-administered camps, the Tunisian Government has permitted 

Libyan refugees to avail themselves of the Tunisian health care system and permitted their children to attend public schools. Unfortunately, cross-border shelling 

into Tunisia is causing increasing concern. 

The Egyptian Government has worked with us as a strong partner throughout the 

Libyan crisis, and we will continue to work with the Egyptian Government to ensure that shelter arrangements can meet the full range of refugee needs on the 

Egypt-Libya border. We continue to work with Egypt to ensure that equipment—

such as generators—arrive in a timely way to provide vital, lifesaving humanitarian 

assistance. 

We are working closely with the Government of Algeria to ensure that United 

Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which Algeria has committed to supporting through the Arab League, is fully implemented. Algeria shares our desire 

to see an end to the bloodshed and violence in Libya and has long been a strong 

bilateral partner and a regional leader in counterterrorism efforts. 

The United States understands the fears expressed by many countries in the region, including Algeria and Chad, that the unrest in Libya could result in flows of 

weapons and fighters who could potentially destabilize neighboring states and harm 

regional security. But it is the our belief, and the belief of our coalition partners, 

that long-term stability in the region will be achievable only after Qadhafi leaves 

power and Libyans embark on a transition to a democratic system of governance 

that respects the fundamental rights and freedoms of its citizens. A stable and 

democratic Libya will promote regional security.

Question. Tens of thousands of refugees have fled across the Libyan border into 

Egypt or Tunisia while still others remain trapped inside the country. As fighting 

in Libya has raged on, there have been increasing concerns about the well-being of 

Libyans and other nationals who have fled to neighboring countries. Please provide 

details on U.S. support for these displaced persons.

Answer. Since the beginning of the conflict in late February, more than 840,000 

people have departed Libya, crossing its borders to neighboring countries or fleeing 

by sea to Italy. A large number of these departures are Libyans conducting business 

or seeking medical care in neighboring countries, and most have already returned 

or plan to return to Libya. Of greater concern are: 

1. Libyans and third-country nationals (TCNs) displaced and/or stranded inside 

Libya. The U.N. estimates roughly 460,000 Libyans are internally displaced. IOM 

estimates there could be thousands of TCNs still stranded in places such as Tripoli, 

Misratah, and the Western Mountain area. 

2. Libyan refugees who have fled to Tunisia (around 70,000) and Egypt (around 

20,000). 

3. TCNs who also fled, primarily to Tunisia and Egypt (around 275,000). Most 

TCNs have now been repatriated to their countries of origin but some 6,000 persons 

of concern to UNHCR remain in Tunisia and Egypt and cannot be returned home 

due to ongoing conflict and fear of reprisals upon return. 

Because of ongoing support from the U.S. Government to organizations such as 

the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International 

Organization for Migration (IOM), and the International Committee of the Red 

Cross (ICRC), these organizations were well placed to respond when the crisis erupted and were able to immediately dispatch emergency staff to the region. As the crisis has evolved, the USG has provided $53.5 million in earmarked humanitarian 

assistance for Libya and those fleeing Libya. Key contributions include:

• $19.5 million to IOM from the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM); • $7 million to UNHCR from State/PRM; • $7 million to ICRC from State/PRM; • $10 million to World Food Programme from USAID’s Office of Food for Peace; • $10 million to nongovernmental organizations and international organizations 

from USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

Our support to these organizations has facilitated the evacuation and repatriation 

of more than 138,000 TCNs, provided life-saving assistance at the border for those 

fleeing the conflict, and has expanded the humanitarian presence inside Libya to 

provide food, water, medical care and other life-saving services. Organizations such 

as ICRC and IOM have also been at the forefront of efforts to rescue migrants and 

wounded Libyans from the besieged city of Misratah. 

22

In addition to financial support to these organizations, we are working closely 

with UNHCR and other countries to find durable solutions for TCNs who cannot 

return home. We anticipate considering for U.S. resettlement several hundred TCNs 

(from places such as Somalia and Eritrea) who qualify for refugee status. 

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES B. STEINBERG TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Questions #s 1-6.

• 1. What is the current nature and extent of our military role in Libya? In particular, 

a. What personnel and assets are involved? 

b. How many airstrikes have U.S. forces conducted? 

c. What targets have U.S. forces struck? 

d. What damage has resulted from U.S. strikes? 

e. What has been the cost associated with U.S. operations in Libya to date?

• 2. Has the United States diverted military resources, including surveillance

assets or drones from the conflict in Afghanistan, or counterterror operations in 

Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere, to support the operations in Libya? What 

assessment have our military commanders made as to the impact of any such 

diversions?

• 3. What military role does the administration intend the United States to play 

in Libya in the period after 60 days from the commencement of U.S. military 

operations in Libya? In particular, does the administration intend that U.S. 

forces or assets will carry out strikes or other uses of force in Libya in this 

period?

• 4. Can our NATO allies fulfill the primary combat mission in Libya over an indefinite period, and how will the administration respond if allies request greater 

military involvement by the United States?

• 5. What impact will the prolonged devotion of military resources to Libya by 

NATO allies have on NATO’s ability to contribute to operations in Afghanistan?

• 6. What scenarios or emergencies would cause the United States to reescalate 

its military involvement in Libya, and would the administration seek a congressional authorization if it expands its military role?

Answer. The Department of State defers to the Department of Defense for answer 

to questions 1–6 and 10.

Question #7. What are the administration’s plans for aiding the Libyan opposition 

economically and militarily?

Answer. We are assessing and reviewing options for the types of assistance we 

could provide to the Libyan people, and are consulting directly with the opposition 

and our international partners about these matters. The President has directed up 

to $25 million in transfers of nonlethal items from U.S. Government stocks to key 

partners in Libya such as the Transitional National Council (TNC), and the transportation of these items. The list of potential ‘‘nonlethal commodities’’ that have 

been, or will be, provided was developed based on consultations with the TNC and 

our own assessment of what is useful and available, and includes medical supplies, 

boots, tents, personal protective gear, and prepackaged rations. The first shipment, 

including Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) arrived in Benghazi on May 10. The Departments of State and Defense will continue to work closely with our partner nations 

and the Libyan TNC to coordinate on the types of nonlethal assistance to be provided, in an effort to make the assistance as effective as possible and minimize 

duplication of effort. 

In terms of financial assistance, we have been supporting the Libya Contact 

Group’s efforts to establish a Temporary Finance Mechanism (TFM) and a Libyan 

Information Exchange Mechanism (LIEM) that would facilitate much-needed financial contributions and other in-kind assistance to the TNC. We are strongly encouraging our international partners to assist the TNC directly or through one or both 

of these mechanisms. 

The administration is also discussing legislation with Congress that would permit 

the use of a portion of frozen regime assets for broadly humanitarian purposes in 

Libya. Under proposed legislation, humanitarian assistance would include basic lifesaving and life-support help, including commodities and subsidies needed to maintain basic living conditions among the population—for example, access to water, 

sanitation, food, shelter, and health care. This list is necessarily nonexhaustive, as 

circumstances could arise that would make other types of assistance—e.g., utilities 

23

(electricity, fuel), necessary to maintain basic living conditions among the population. This would not include offsetting the cost of our military action in Libya.

Question #8. Secretary of Defense Gates reportedly said on May 12: ‘‘I think most 

of us are pretty cautious when it comes to who—who the opposition is. The truth 

is, my impression is that it’s extraordinarily diverse. We deal with a handful of people in Benghazi, but we forget about those who led the uprisings in cities all over 

Libya when this whole thing started. And who are they? And are they genuinely 

anti-Gadhafi? Are they tribal representatives? Are they—kind of who are they? And 

we have no idea who those people are, but they were the ones that led the major 

uprisings in Tripoli and a variety of the other cities.’’

• Beyond the opposition groups’ shared desire to remove Gaddafi from power, 

what goals or principles unite the opposition? How confident is the administration that the opposition will remain unified once Gaddafi has been removed 

from power?

Answer. We are learning more about the values, principles, and capabilities of the 

Libyan opposition as we deepen our engagement with them. Special Envoy Chris 

Stevens continues to meet with as broad a spectrum as possible of Libyans involved 

in the opposition writ large, including members of the TNC. As an administrative 

body, the TNC is taking steps to organize the opposition around a shared set of values and a genuine desire for a peaceful transition to democracy. For example, it has 

publicly rejected terrorism and extremist influences, committed to abide by the 

Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war, and declared its respect 

for the human rights of all Libyans. The TNC has also announced a roadmap that 

sets out its vision to bring democracy to Libya, including convening an interim national assembly and drafting a constitution after Qadhafi has left power. In so 

doing, the TNC has made clear its dedication to creating an inclusive political process that respects the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Libya, and unites Libyans from all areas of the country.

Question #9. What is the potential for recrimination and bloodletting in the aftermath of this conflict? I note press reports of revenge killings in areas under TNC 

control. What has the TNC told the administration about these killings, and what 

steps are they taking to ensure that this scenario does not play out on a national 

scale when Colonel Qadhafi is removed from power?

Answer. We have seen some media reports regarding revenge killings, but do not 

have any additional information on the incidents, or who may have perpetrated 

them. The TNC has been very outspoken in its dedication to the principles of human 

rights and justice for all Libyans. The TNC has agreed, and publicly emphasized 

its commitment, to treat any captured regime combatants in accordance with the 

Geneva Conventions and, in one instance, returned eight regime fighters to Tripoli 

via the Red Crescent. In addition, the TNC has declared its willingness to forgive 

officials who defect from Qadhafi and work with members of the current regime in 

the future, provided that they were not involved in committing crimes against Libyans. The TNC has consistently emphasized its goal is to pave the way for a peaceful 

political transition that reflects the democratic aspirations of all Libyans.

Question #10. What are civilian and military operations related to Libya currently 

costing the United States, and how much is the administration prepared to spend 

over time?

Answer. The Department of State defers to the Department of Defense for answer 

to questions 1–6 and 10.

Question #11. In the aftermath of the current civil war in Libya, what responsibility will the United States assume for reconstructing the country?

Answer. Along with its partners, the United States has made significant contributions in Libya, addressing urgent humanitarian needs, providing assistance to the 

TNC and committing resources to support the civilian protection mission authorized 

by UNSCR 1973, including the no-fly zone. We continue to support the lead role of 

the United Nations in coordinating international efforts related to any political transition process in Libya. We will continue to review and assess ways in which we 

can help support the genuine democratic aspirations of the Libyan people, but will 

not do so alone. Our partners in the international community, including other countries, NGOs and, most importantly, the Libyan people themselves, will play a large 

role in these efforts.

Question #12. The administration claims that Libyan oil resources will preclude 

the need for significant financial assistance in a post-conflict period. I note that the 

committee was provided similar assurances prior to the conflict in Iraq. What asVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:20 Nov 26, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~2\2011IS~1\051211-R.TXT BETTY
24

sessments have the administration done on the state of the oil infrastructure? What 

is the likelihood that oil production and exports could resume in the context of continuing violence or insecurity in Libya in the post-Qadhafi period? Is Libya’s oil infrastructure being degraded during the conflict?

Answer. We are not aware of any assessments on the state of the oil infrastructure that have been performed since the beginning of Operation Odyssey Dawn. 

There has been one shipment of crude oil from the Transitional National Council 

(TNC) controlled Tubruq, however this shipment was from stocks of previously produced oil. We have seen reports that some of Libya’s oil infrastructure has been 

damaged by the fighting, and the long-term effects of shutting in Libya’s production 

as productive oil fields lie dormant would also need to be considered when resuming 

production. We are working to encourage the TNC to proceed with additional oil 

sales that would comply with current U.S. and U.N. sanctions, and we are in contact with oil companies regarding their business consideration in resuming business 

with Libya via the TNC.

Question #13. Section 203(a)(1)(C) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act provides that ‘‘when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or 

has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals’’ the President may ‘‘confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign 

person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United States; 

and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, 

and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the 

President may designate from time to time . . .’’

• Does the administration believe this authority is presently available to allow 

the President to vest blocked Libyan assets? If not, why not?

Answer. Unlike the general authorities in the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act, the draft legislation is crafted to target this specific, unusual need and 

permits the use of vested assets only for humanitarian relief tied explicitly to the 

purposes of UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973. It is explicit as to the use of the 

funds: providing humanitarian relief to and for the benefit of the Libyan people. 

Further, in vesting the frozen assets, it is important that the Congress and the 

Executive stand together to demonstrate our commitment and send the clear message that these assets may not be used for other purposes, such as for costs of U.S. 

military operations or to pay claims against Libya. By comparison, IEEPA authorizes vested assets to be used broadly for the ‘‘benefit of the United States,’’ and relying on it could be seen as allowing for the use of vested assets beyond humanitarian 

relief purposes and therefore contrary to the objectives set out in UNSCRs 1970 and 

1973 (which expressed the intention to ensure that frozen assets be made available 

to and for the benefit of the Libyan people). Therefore, vesting under IEEPA’s less 

restricted authorities may very well attract criticism from other states as well as 

from the Libyan opposition, which has sought our assistance. 

The more limited legislative approach is preferred, not only because it would confirm Congress’ partnership in this endeavor with the administration, but also because it would present to the public on the face of the legislation a more precisely 

focused rationale for such vesting that will better withstand any possible calls to 

expand the uses of the assets.

Question #14. What precedents is the administration aware of for the vesting of 

blocked assets of foreign states other than in wartime or to satisfy claims of U.S. 

nationals?

Answer. In 1954, the United States confiscated Czech steel mill equipment pursuant to the International Claims Act to pay U.S. claims against Czechoslovakia. In 

2000, the United States vested certain blocked Cuban assets pursuant to the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act to pay judgments against Cuba. In 

2003, the United States vested blocked Iraqi assets pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act to aid in the reconstruction effort, including by 

financing emergency repairs to critical infrastructure and paying Iraqi Government 

workers’ salaries.

Question #15. Why has the Administration sought authority to vest blocked Libyan assets, but not blocked assets of other countries against which the United States 

maintains sanctions programs? What unique considerations exist with regard to 

Libya that do not apply in other countries whose assets we have blocked, such as 

Iran, Syria, Burma, and Sudan?

Answer. The United States is currently providing support to allies and partners 

engaged in protecting the people of Libya from violence perpetrated by the Qaddafi 

25

regime. The humanitarian situation on the ground is of grave concern and we believe that it is essential that humanitarian assistance be provided as soon as possible. The Libyan opposition, through a legitimate and credible Interim Council, has 

asked that blocked assets be made available for the benefit of people in Libya. As 

the President said on March 28, the blocked money ‘‘belongs to the Libyan people.’’ 

Additionally, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1970 and 

1973, which obligate Member States to freeze the assets of certain Libyan entities 

and individuals, authorize measures to be undertaken by Member States to protect 

civilians and civilian populated areas in Libya and affirm the intention to ensure 

that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of Resolution 1970 shall, at a later 

stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit of the Libyan 

people. We believe these are unique circumstances that do not have parallels in 

other sanctions situations such as those pertaining to Iran, Syria, Burma, or Sudan.

Question #16. Were the President given the authority to vest some or all of the 

Libyan assets blocked by the United States, what portion of such assets does the 

administration envision vesting?

Answer. The vesting authority we have proposed is limited to property of the Government of Libya and its related entities, including the Central Bank of Libya. 

Blocked assets include a broader range of properties in which Libya’s interest may 

be more contingent or indirect.

Question #17. Were the President given the authority to vest blocked assets for 

the purpose of benefiting the Libyan people, who would be responsible for making 

decisions about how such resources would be spent? What role would the Libyan 

Transitional National Council have in making any such decisions?

Answer. The President would have the authority to decide precisely how the 

assets would be used, consistent with the legislation. The President might choose 

to delegate this authority. Some of the vested funds may be transferred to the Temporary Financing Mechanism (TFM) for humanitarian relief, when the TFM becomes fully operational. Under the Terms of Reference for the TFM approved by the 

Contact Group on May 5, the TFM’s board would include members of the TNC and 

some donor countries, and would be designed to meet both the needs of the civilian 

population under the control of the TNC and to provide accountability for funds provided. We anticipate that any funds we use will be made available for purposes consistent with the TNC’s goals.

Question #18. Were the President given the authority to vest assets for the purpose of assisting the Libyan people, what mechanisms would be in place to ensure 

that funds were spent for the intended purposes and not wasted or diverted? Does 

the Administration plan to make vested assets available to the Libyan Transitional 

National Council, either directly or via the Temporary Financing Mechanism, as 

agreed by the Contact Group?

Answer. The United States, working through international and nongovernmental 

partners, where appropriate, will use these funds to provide humanitarian aid to 

those in need. We will only disburse assets through partners that meet our legal 

and policy standards, including strong and transparent oversight of the disbursements. Some of the funds may be transferred to the Temporary Financial Mechanism (TFM) for humanitarian relief, when the TFM is fully operational. Under the 

Terms of Reference for the TFM approved by the Contract Group on May 5, the 

TFM’s board would include members of the TNC and some donor countries and 

would be designed to meet both the needs of the civilian population under the control of the TNC and to provide accountability for the funds.

Question #19. What assessment has the administration made of the resources required to meet the assistance needs of the Libyan opposition, and what other resources are available to the opposition for these purposes?

Answer. Our envoy in Benghazi is in regular contact with members of the TNC 

and other groups as we deepen our engagement with the Libyan opposition. Based 

on these consultations, and discussions with members of the international community, we are developing a sense of the opposition’s needs and priorities. The President has directed up to $25 million in nonlethal military assistance to the TNC and 

we are reviewing other types of assistance that we might provide. During its May 

5 meeting in Rome, the Libya Contact Group endorsed the creation of a Temporary 

Finance Mechanism (TFM) to facilitate financial contributions to the TNC, as well 

as the establishment of a Libya Information Exchange Mechanism (LIEM) to coordinate other types of assistance. Kuwait has already pledged $180 million to the TFM 

and we are strongly encouraging other countries to make similar contributions to 

the TNC through either or both of these mechanisms.

26

Question #20. What financial resources have Arab League countries committed to 

assist the Libyan opposition?

Answer. The Arab League was one of the first international bodies to denounce 

the violence in Libya and was vital in supporting the passage of UNSCR 1973. Since 

then, Arab League members have significantly assisted the opposition, through 

financial contributions, humanitarian assistance and the commitment of resources 

to NATO-led operations to implement a no-fly zone and protect civilians. For example, Kuwait has pledged $180 million to support the TNC through the Temporary 

Financial Mechanism and Egypt and Tunisia have worked with NGOs to provide 

humanitarian relief to those fleeing the violence Libya. At the same time, Qatar, 

the U.A.E. and Jordan have all contributed significant military assets to Operation 

Unified Protector. We expect that the Arab League will continue to be a key partner 

in Libya.

Question #21. What outstanding claims is the administration aware of by U.S. nationals against the Government of Libya, and what is the value of such claims? 

What impact would vesting blocked Libyan assets for the purpose of assisting the 

Libyan opposition have on the interests of U.S. claimants?

Answer. In 2008, the United States signed the U.S.-Libya Claims Settlement 

Agreement (‘‘Agreement’’), which provided for the ‘‘full and final settlement’’ of 

claims held by U.S. victims of terrorism against Libya in exchange for a lump sum 

payment of $1.5 billion. These included the Pan Am 103 and La Belle Disco bombing 

settlement claims, as well as claims of other American victims of terrorist incidents 

that occurred prior to June 30, 2006, for which Libya was responsible. In advance 

of the settlement, Congress passed the Libyan Claims Resolution Act (28 U.S.C. 

1605A note), which provided that Libya would enjoy full immunity from litigation 

related to these claims in exchange for the lump sum payment. Pursuant to the 

Agreement, the President also issued Executive Order 13047, which provided for the 

termination of related litigation and espoused and settled those claims held by U.S. 

nationals. The State Department has used the $1.5 billion settlement amount to 

fully pay out the Pan Am 103 and LaBelle settlements, provide comparable compensation for the wrongful death claims of other U.S. victims of Libya-related terrorism, and finance a distribution program for other claims managed by the Justice 

Department’s Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (‘‘FCSC’’). We are not aware 

of other claims of U.S. nationals against Libya falling outside the 2008 Agreement. 

This legislation would allow Government of Libya assets to be used to provide 

humanitarian assistance to Libyan civilians who are still suffering from Colonel 

Qadhafi’s brutal military campaign. It would not affect the Agreement or the 

FCSC’s ongoing work. 

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES B. STEINBERG TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE LEE

Question. Section 5(b) of The War Powers Act states: ‘‘Within sixty calendar days 

after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), 

whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed 

Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such 

sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack 

upon the United States.’’

As of May 17, 2011, United States military will have been involved in combat operations in Libya for 60 days. By that date, President Obama is required by statute 

to withdraw our forces from Libya OR ask Congress to give him a resolution authorizing the use of force.

• Does President Obama plan to ask Congress for such a resolution? 

• If not, please explain the administration’s authority to continue U.S. military 

participation in Libya.

Answer. President Obama wrote to Congress on May 20, 2011, expressing his 

strong support for action in both Houses on S. Res. 194, the bipartisan resolution 

on United States military operations in Libya introduced by Senators McCain, 

Kerry, Lieberman, Levin, Feinstein, Graham, and Chambliss. While the administration has stated that U.S. military operations in Libya are consistent with the War 

Powers Resolution, the President also made clear in his letter that it has always 

been his view that ‘‘it is better to take military action, even in limited actions such 

as this, with congressional engagement, consultation, and support.’’ The resolution 

introduced fully captures the importance of congressional consultations by asking 

27

for an additional report to Congress about U.S. policy objectives in Libya and regular consultations on progress toward meeting them. Moreover, the resolution would 

present the wider world with a formal, unified position of the United States Government, help us continue to enlist the support of other countries in maintaining and 

expanding the coalition, and strengthen our ability to shape the course of events in 

Libya. As Members of Congress consider the resolution, the administration will continue to consult closely with them on any ongoing military operations.

Question. On March 29, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral James 

Stavridis said that he did not have ‘‘detail sufficient to say that there’s a significant al-Qaeda presence or any other terrorist presence in and among the Libyan 

opposition.’’

• Since that time, what additional information have you seen to support the assertion that there is not a significant al-Qaeda or terrorist presence in the 

Libyan Interim Transitional National Council (TNC)?

Answer. Our envoy to Benghazi continues to meet with a broad spectrum of 

Libyans involved in the opposition writ large, including members of the Transitional 

National Council (TNC). Based on the TNC’s statements, actions, and our engagement with them, we believe that the TNC is a legitimate and credible interlocutor 

for the Libyan people that is reaching out to the international community and expressing values and principles we share. For example, it has publicly rejected terrorism and extremist influences, committed to abide by the Geneva Conventions on 

the treatment of prisoners of war, and declared their respect for the human rights 

of all Libyans. Significantly, the TNC has also expressed its dedication to a peaceful 

transition to an inclusive, democratic government. In that regard, it has announced 

a roadmap that includes timelines for convening a national assembly and drafting 

a constitution after Qadhafi has left power. 

We understand that there is the potential that extremist groups could try to take 

advantage of the situation in Libya and we will continue to monitor this issue 

closely. On the other hand, the dangers of Qadhafi returning to terrorism and violent extremism also exist. Our challenge is to help the Libyan people navigate this 

transition in a way that preserves our strategic interest in preventing the spread 

of extremism and supports democratic values and human rights. Continued dialogue 

with the TNC is key to achieving this goal.

Question. From March 19 through early April, pro-Qadhafi forces seemed to take 

a hit and opposition forces advanced westward. However, the opposition was unable 

to hold its gains and stalemate conditions have returned to at least the region near 

Ajdabiya.

• Can Libyan TNC forces prevail against pro-Qadhafi forces without an augmented participation of NATO? 

• Could NATO continue this mission without the participation of the United 

States?

Answer. Opposition forces have been making slow but significant progress in the 

west and near Misrata, and that progress will likely continue as various forms of 

pressure on the regime intensify. NATO will continue to execute its mission as per 

UNSCR 1973 and 1970. 

Without U.S. participation, it is unlikely that NATO could sustain the current 

operational tempo.

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