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“By far, however, the gravest concern for the regime has 

always been the emergence of 

a “Benghazi scenario” where 

the uprising supported by a 

group of breakaway army units 

or deserters are able to establish a foothold somewhere.”

October 25, 2011

Syrian Uprising: Looking In, 

Looking Out

Summary

•	 The Syrian regime was initially able to count on its neighbors in two key areas: ensuring that 

their territories do not become a safe haven for Syrian dissidents and continuing to receive 

their support on the regional and international level.

•	 This support has since eroded as a result of the regime’s inability to contain the ever-escalating 

level of violence being perpetrated against the protesters.

•	 The gravest concern for the regime is the emergence of a Benghazi scenario in a city like 

Aleppo as a result of Turkish military intervention.

•	 The Syrian regime now finds itself in an ever-increasing cycle of isolation and increased 

internal repression.

Continuing Protests and Narrowing Options

With protests in Syria entering their seventh consecutive month, options for the Assad regime appear to be narrowing by the day, as the opposition grows bolder. The strategy of the Assad regime 

has been focused on systematic military and security operations with sporadic efforts at engaging 

in so called national dialogue. Throughout, the opposition has been maintaining pressure on the 

regime internally through sustained, almost daily street protests and other forms of civil disobedience while externally trying to mobilize the international community to isolate and apply punitive 

sanctions against it. Both sides, however, are also acutely aware of the increasingly important role 

that Syria’s neighbors are able to play as events within Syria unfold.

The Syrian Regime’s Regional Perspective

For the Syrian regime, the most important neighbors in this ongoing conflict with its people in 

order of priority are Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan. Israel’s impact in matters relating to the 

uprising is considered to be negligible. There are two key expectations that the regime has of its 

neighbors: ensuring that their territories do not become a safe haven for Syrian dissidents and continuing to receive their political support on the regional and international level. During the early 

weeks and months of this conflict, the regime seemed to be able to hold its neighbors to these key 

roles, primarily out of concern that these states have over the Syrian regime’s capacity for retribution against them. They also fear that its collapse would prompt a takeover by radical Islamists, civil 

war, and fragmentation—likely outcomes with serious consequences for Syria’s neighbours. 

Amr al-Azm

E-mail: aalazm@shawnee.edu

Phone: 740.464.6900

peaceBrieF110
© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

Syrian Uprising: Looking In, Looking Out

page 2 • PB 110 • October 25, 2011

When events in Dera’a first broke out in March less than 3 miles from the Jordanian border, 

many of the inhabitants attempted to seek refuge there. The Jordanian authorities however, 

quickly sealed the border and pursued those who had made it across. Similarly, when dissidents 

started to take refuge in Lebanon and use its numerous Internet cafes to organize their cyberrevolution, they began to be harassed by supporters of the regime and the Lebanese authorities. When some Syrian conscript soldiers deserted during the operation around Tal Kalakh, the 

Lebanese army reportedly handed them back, much to the satisfaction of the Syrian regime. The 

Lebanese government also obligingly assisted the Syrian regime internationally by blocking the 

last efforts by the international community to move to a vote condemning the regime’s actions at 

the U.N. Security Council, of which Lebanon is a member.

Turkey was also willing to hold back on criticizing the Assad regime even as Syrian security 

forces repressed protests in Jisr Al-Shoughour and Idlib. This is in no small part due to the 

fact that Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was still convinced then that he could 

persuade Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to institute reforms and avert further violence that 

might ultimately destabilize the country. Even Iraq, which had long been critical of the Syrian 

regime’s involvement in allowing insurgent fighters to cross its borders, remained deafeningly 

silent, most likely at the behest of Tehran, which is actively supporting the regime. More recently, 

however, there appears to be a shift in the attitude of most of the neighboring countries. While 

Jordan and Lebanon have yet to make an official statement, there is increasing disaffection 

among their populations with their governments’ lack of support for the Syrian uprising. Turkey 

and Iraq, on the other hand, have become increasingly critical of the Syrian regime with the 

most dramatic public shift coming from Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, who in August went on 

record calling Assad a liar who must step down and that there would be no further engagement 

with Syria. In short, it appears that while the regime succeeded initially in restricting support for 

the uprising from its neighbors, this effort has eroded due to the regime’s reluctance to contain 

the level of violence against protesters on the Syrian street.

By far, however, the gravest concern for the regime has always been the emergence of a 

Benghazi scenario, where a breakaway army is able to establish a foothold. The most vulnerable 

areas are the border regions with Turkey and Iraq. The Iraqi borders in that region are notoriously porous (as seen during the Iraqi insurgency) and the concern for the regime is that the 

Iraqi tribes will begin to send support to their Syrian brethren while providing them with safe 

havens from the regime. As a result, the Syrian response in these areas has been particularly 

swift and brutal with widespread destruction of property. The crackdown is not just to suppress 

and intimidate the local population, but to send an unequivocal message to the greatest prize of 

them all, the northern city of Aleppo.

It is no coincidence that Aleppo has remained relatively calm during the uprising. The Assad 

regime is acutely aware that the city of Aleppo—in addition to being Syria’s most populous city, 

has the greatest potential for becoming Syria’s Benghazi. Were Aleppo to rise up and reach critical 

mass in its anti-regime protests, the Syrian regime would then be obliged to carry out a punitive 

reprisal campaign against the city in a manner similar to that seen in Homs, Deraa, Deir Al-Zor, 

and elsewhere. Otherwise, the uprising would surely spread to Damascus and all would be lost. 

However, the last time such an attack occurred against a city close to the Turkish borders was Jisr 

Al-Shoghour, and it sent 10,000 refugees across into Turkey. The population of Jisr Al-Shoghur 

is about 30,000, while Aleppo’s population is about five million. Therefore, any attack on Aleppo 

has the potential for generating a humanitarian catastrophe with an overwhelming number of 

refugees pouring across the borders into Turkey. In turn, the Turkish authorities would be obliged 

to either allow these refugees through their borders or move in and create a safe haven around 
© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

Syrian Uprising: Looking In, Looking Out

page 3 • PB 110 • October 25, 2011

Aleppo, thus paving the way for the potential Benghazi scenario. It is primarily fear of the latter option that has driven the regime to dedicate so much time and resources to Aleppo. These include a 

massive security presence, and intimidation, both direct and indirect, as well as making examples 

of other cities like Deir Al-Zor, Abu Kamal and Al-Rastan. Thus far, these tactics have managed to 

prevent any major protests or upheavals from occurring in Aleppo. 

Finally, the following points should be noted in assessing the regime’s view of its regional 

circumstances. Up to now the north-eastern Kurdish region that shares borders with both Turkey 

and Iraq has not been particularly problematic for the regime because Kurds there have avoided 

becoming fully engaged in the uprising. This, however may well be changing, with large demonstrations now being reported in the city of Qamishli, and more importantly after the assassination 

on October 7 of Masha’al Tammo, a leading Kurdish activist and a member of the Syrian National 

Council. Again, Israel has little or no direct role to play, but it is possible that the regime may 

at some point raise tensions again across the borders as it did a few months ago as a means of 

distraction should the need arise. The Syrian regime also continues to exploit and play on the 

fears of all the neighboring countries that the alternative to it will be an Islamist takeover with a 

Salafi agenda, and aggressively promotes the idea that civil war and sectarian strife will engulf the 

country and threaten to spill over its borders.

The Syrian Opposition’s Regional Perspectives

The Syrian opposition’s primary goal is to bring down the Assad regime and replace it with a 

democratically elected parliament and government. In pursuit of this goal, the opposition has relied in part on a strategy that has attempted to draw one particular neighbor into the fray—Turkey. 

There are three distinct roles that Turkey may find itself increasingly involved in on behalf of the 

opposition. The first is to continue to provide shelter for the increasing number of Syrian refugees, 

particularly the families of army deserters and break away members of the regime. The second 

is to continue providing cover for the opposition to meet and organize. Most recently, the Syrian 

National Council was announced in Istanbul, the latest in a long line of meetings, conferences, and 

councils all hosted on Turkish soil. The third and perhaps most important is the opposition would 

look to Turkey to intervene militarily to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe should a city like 

Aleppo rise up against the Assad regime. The creation of a safe haven by Turkey would then open 

the door to the Benghazi scenario. 

Conclusion

After seven months of ongoing unrest and an ever-mounting casualty rate, it is now clear to the 

neighbors and the region as a whole that the Syrian regime is unlikely to survive in the long term, 

with blowback from the ongoing unrest increasingly likely if the Syrian regime is allowed to persist 

in its current handling of the situation. Consequently, this has led to a rapid erosion of any real or 

tentative support for the Syrian regime; even staunch allies such as Iran may well be beginning to 

reassess the value of their relationship with their long-term ally. 

Yet, so far, the Syrian regime appears incapable of any response other than ever increasing 

repression against the opposition. It exhibits a defiant acceptance of its isolation, coupled with 

an arrogant belief in its own self-righteousness and imminent victory against its enemies. By 

its own playbook, Damascus is following what it believes to be a well perfected “wait and see” 

posture that has worked remarkably well for it time and time again. Back in 2005–2007, faced 

with pressure from the international community over the Hariri assassination, the Assad regime 
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About This Brief

This brief is part of a series examining the regional dimensions of 

Syria’s popular uprising. The Institute 

invited leading experts from the 

U.S. and across the Middle East 

to identify key vectors of influence 

that Syria’s neighbors are bringing 

to bear on the conflict, to forecast 

how the ongoing conflict in Syria 

will affect the delicate and volatile 

regional balance of power, and to 

examine how the Syrian opposition 

and the Syria regime are factoring in 

regional and cross-border dynamics. 

The series was edited by USIP’s 

Steven Heydemann, senior adviser 

for Middle East Initiatives, and Scott 

Lasensky, a senior program officer. 

Through this series, workshops 

and ongoing programs that bring 

together experts, civil society figures 

and officials, the Institute aims to 

provide applied analysis and on-theground conflict management tools 

in support of political transitions 

across the Arab world. 

Amr al-Azm is an active member 

of the Syrian opposition and a 

professor of Middle East history 

and anthropology at Shawnee State 

University. This Peace Brief aims 

to examine the deteriorating 

relationship between the Syrian 

regime and its neighbours and the 

possible emergence of a “Benghazi 

scenario” involving Turkish military 

engagement. 

simply laagered the wagons, hunkered down, and waited for the storm to pass. In managing to 

outlive all its key detractors thus far, the Assad regime has deluded itself that it will continue to do 

so again, no matter the odds.

Syrian Uprising: Looking In, Looking Out

page 4 • PB 110 • October 25, 2011