drove south to al-Khaii. He claimed

"that there had been no air attack:' when

in fact an attack had taken place against

the Iraqi column.11' But primarily the

Saudi impatience arose from differing

priorities. The Americans viewed the

Iraqi occupation of al-Khafji as a minor

inconvenience that would soon be rectified, but for the Saudi kingdom it was an

assault on their own sacred soil.

Saudi impatience could explain the

perception of lack of air support, as well

as inexperience in modern air-ground cooperation that the battle required. However, the Marines working alongside Joint

Forces Command-East also supported

the Saudi belief. As Captain Braden later

wrote: "Little air support was available to

the [Joint Forces Command-Easti forces

as the priority of effort was with the

Marines to the west in repulsing the attack of the Iraqi 1st Mechanized Division

and elements of the 3dArrnored Division.

The Marine fight had preceded the JFCE

fight by a couple of hours and would remain the focus of effort throughout the

night"'2

The fight at Observation Post 4 attracted the attention of Coalition aircraft

right away. A later Air Force study found:

"Marine and Air Force CAS [Close Air

Support] began to arrive in front of OP-4

by 2130 local time. By 2300, three AC-130

gunships, two F-l5Es, two ... F-l6Cs, and

four A-lOs had joined the battle at OP4:" Despite the rapid response to the

fighting at Observation Post 4, all sources

agree that the tactical air control center

did not respond promptly to the initial

Iraqi attacks. By most accounts, it was not

until Brigadier General Buster C. Glosson, the director of campaign plans, entered the center on a routine check of

current operations that someone thought

to wake up Lieutenant General Charles A.

Homer, the Joint Force Air Component

Commander. Prior to that time, although

the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing had responded to Marine calls for air support

with alacrity, the tactical air control center remained focused on the evening's

strikes into Iraq. Once awakened, General Homer realized that this was a major

Iraqi offensive, and a wonderful opportunity to strike at Iraqi forces while they

were on the move and vulnerable. He refocused the Coalition air effort into

Kuwait accordingly."4

Much of the Marine air support for alKhafji fell on the Cobras of Marine Light

Attack Helicopter Squadron 369, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michael

M. Kurth, and Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367, commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Terry J. Frerker."5 Because the arrangement with Joint Forces

Air Component Command left Marine

helicopters totally in support of the Marine air-ground task force, the Cobras

were able to respond rapidly to the Iraqi

offensive. Eight AH-1W Cobras responded to initial calls from the air-naval

gunfire liaison Marines, ensuring that the

Iraqi advance into al-Khaiji was not unopposed. Not long after 0100 on the 30th,

a flight of four Cobras from Kurth's

squadron, led by Major Michael L. Steele,

engaged in a gun duel with six Iraqi armored personnel carriers on the coast

road, reportedly pitting the helicopters'

20mm Gatling guns and 2.75mm rockets

against the armored personnel carriers'

73mm main guns."6

Two AH-lWs from Frerker's

squadron, led by Major Gary D. Shaw,

had an even more hair-raising experience.

Launching from al-Mishab to provide air

support at Observation Post 4, they found

themselves circling and waiting for a forward air controller to provide them with

targets. Eager to support the Marines on

the ground, they over stayed their fuel

limits and attempted to reach the logistics

base at Kibrit, only to find themselves flying over an Iraqi armored column which

fired on them. They then attempted to divert back to al-Mishab, but their navigation equipment malfunctioned and they

landed instead at the al-Khafji oil refinery.

This was a stroke of luck. They refueled

their aircraft from the refinery's supplies

as the Iraqis marched into the city. The

unidentified fuel worked well and they

were able to return to base."7

Another flight of Cobras, led by Captain Randal W. Hammond, destroyed

four T-62 tanks. When nine Iraqi soldiers

waved white flags and indicated they

wished to surrender, they used their helicopters to "round 'em up like cattle" until

Marines on the ground could secure the

prisoners. Iraqi artillery fire forced the

section to withdraw, but not before one

Cobra destroyed a final T-62 with a wireguided missile. The explosion caused "its

turret to flip upside down and land on the

open hole like a tiddlywinks," Captain

Hammond later recalled."8

A little after noon on the 29th, the

Iraqis also dispatched 15 fast patrol boats

from Ras al-Qulayah, as a U.S. Marine

raiding force was taking Maradim Island.

Apparently intending to land commandos at al-Khalji in support of 5th Mechanized Division, the Iraqi boats were

intercepted by Royal Air Force SEPECAT

GR-1A Jaguar aircraft and Royal Navy

Westland HMA.8 Lynx helicopters from

HMS Brazen, Cardfl and Gloucester.

Other Coalition aircraft then continued

the attack, destroying or severely damaging all of the Iraqi boats and landing

forces."9

At Observation Post 7, Captain Kleinsmith continued to call for fire while

forming a defensive perimeter with the

U.S. Army Special Forces and Marine 3d

Force Reconnaissance teams. An OV-10

Bronco arrived over the battlefield and

worked with Captain Kleinsmith as the

airborne forward air controller. He found

it difficult to control airstrikes because the

location of friendly forces was unclear.

Looking north of the border, Captain

Kleinsmith directed Intruder and Harrier

sections in a strike against Iraqi artillery

positions, while a flight of Cobras circled

above. He thought the Cobras would prevent his team from being overrun as Observation Post 8 had been, and he was

"trusting that their sheer intimidation

would keep the enemy away from his position' But as the Cobras circled overhead, the soldiers and Marines listened as

Iraqi vehicles moved in the darkness

around their position.'2°

Captain Kleinsmith had been kept informed as the other air-naval gunfire

teams withdrew through al-Khalji. When

the Cobras circling above his position

were forced to return to base due to low

fuel, Captain Kleinsmith and the leaders

of the other two teams at Observation

Post 7 decided there was little reason to

remain in place. The Special Forces team

had two escape and evasion routes

planned: one east to the coastal highway

and then south to al-Khafi; the other

traveling west to Observation Post 2 and

then south across the desert. Both routes

appeared to be cut off by Iraqi forces, so

Captain Kleinsmith led the teams'

humvees south, directly into the sabkhas.

He hoped the heavier Iraqi armor would

The Battle of al-Khafji 23
not follow them into the salt marsh.'2'

The teams departed at 0230 as Iraqi artillery fire briefly pursued them. They suffered no casualties. Kleinsmith's group

remained in radio contact with the OV10, which was now free to call in airstrikes

around the observation post. As it drove

south it discovered "the remnants of the

SANG [Saudi Arabian National Guard]

screening force camps, complete with

boiling tea on the fires just outside their

tents?"22 At approximately 0330, Kleinsmith ordered a halt, worried that the

teams might come under friendly fire if

they attempted to join up with a Saudi

unit in the darkness. They remained deep

in the salt marshes until daybreak.'23

At 1800 on 29 January, General Salah

Aboud shifted from his main headquarters to his mobile headquarters so he

could better control the upcoming battle.

Despite Coalition air attacks, as night fell

on the 29th the Iraqi offensive was progressing according to plan. At 2000, the

various brigades of the 5th Mechanized,

1st Mechanized, and 3d Armored Divisions crossed their lines of departure and

began the attack. As General Salah Aboud

later observed: "The troops faced some

difficulties executing these missions. The

territory of one mission faced the road,

which was hard for all the mechanized

equipments to use, and for that reason,

this mechanized brigade didn't have another choice, except to occupy their targets by walking. Still, all the troops

reached the targets on time. And this actually deceived the enemy."24

In particular, the 15th Mechanized and

26th Mechanized Brigades of the 5th

Mechanized Division passed through Ragawa at 2000. At this point, the Iraqi artillery began firing flares that they could

use to navigate through the desert. While

moving into position they observed the

withdrawal of Coalition forces from the

border observation posts.'25 Although the

Iraqi mechanized forces had difficulties in

the sabkhas, they reached their objectives

on time. A convoy from the 22d Mechanized Brigade met no resistance at Saudi

border stations, and its arrival along the

beach completed the encirclement of alKhafji. The 26th Mechanized Brigade, encountering no resistance, returned to its

positions in Kuwait after its role of defending the Western flank of the 15th

Mechanized Brigade was complete. 126

General Salah Aboud kept his promise, delivering the city of al-Khafji at 0200

on the 30th as a present to Saddam Hussein. The supporting attacks had all run

into heavy resistance and been stopped

with high loss of life, but al-Khafji was in

Iraqi hands. Now the Iraqis had to decide

how long they needed to hold the city in

order to accomplish their objective of

provoking a major ground war.

The Iraqi Army Chief of Staff then

contacted General Salah Aboud and

asked for his predictions and recommendations. The general replied that "when

the enemy discovers the size of my force,

he will focus his air effort on it," but that

"the time we have until morning will not

be enough to pull back from al-Khafji."

General Salah recommended that his

troops pull back the next night, the

evening of the 30-3 1 January, "after this

great victory we achieved without any

damage." He noted "the first night was

passed without any specific operations

from the enemy side?"27

Although the Iraqis occupied alKha!i, they were not alone. The 3d

24 The Battle of al-Khafji

Photo courtesy of LtCol Douglas R. Kleinsmith

Capt Douglas R. Kleinsmith poses with his air-ground liaison team. Capt Kleinsmith is on the left, and to the right are Cpl John D.

Calhoun, Cpl Steve F Foss, and Cpl Edward E. Simons, Jr. On the night of 29-30 January 1991 Kleinsmith team was cut offfrom Coalition forces by the Iraqi advance. They evaded the enemy by maneuvering through the sabkhas and returned to Coalition lines.
Marines had a pair of reconnaissance

teams in the city on 29 January; they had

not left with the air-naval gunfire and special operations forces. They were in contact with their platoon commander,

Captain Daniel K. Baczkowski, at 3d

Marines' headquarters, who had informed the 3d Marines commander,

Colonel John Admire, of the teams' locations. Colonel Admire ordered the teams

to remain in place.'28

Corporal Lawrence M. Lentz commanded a seven-man team comprising

Corporals Scott A. Uskoski, Scott A. Wagner, Lance Corporals Marcus C. Slavenas,

Alan L. Cooper, Jr., Jude A. Woodarek,

and Hospital Mate Carlos Dayrit. Corporal Charles H. Ingraham III commanded

a six-man team consisting of Corporal

Jeffery D. Brown, Lance Corporals Harold

S. Boling, David S. McNamee, Patrick A.

Sterling, and Hospital Mate 1st Class

Kevin Callahan. The teams were part of

3d Platoon, Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. Company A had been attached to 1st Reconnaissance Battalion

for Operations Desert Shield and

Storm.'29

The intent of the 3d Marines' staff was

that these teams, hidden within the town,

would provide a valuable view of the city

during a counterattack. However, in practice they were a liability, as Captain Molofsky later explained. Their presence

affected the "ability to conduct the

counter-attack, because we're not even

sure where they're at," he said. "They did

not even have restricted fire areas around

them. Well, maybe they did, maybe they

didn't. But that wasn't translated to us, so

that when we want to do this counter attack and want to prep it with artillery; we

don't know where the Recon teams are"3°

The teams were not aware of these issues. They carefully prepared their observation posts, set out claymore mines in

case the Iraqis discovered their positions,

and attempted to call artillery fire and

airstrikes on the Iraqi forces they observed. They were not always successful;

artillery support was sometimes refused

because the teams did not know where

Saudi or air-naval gunfire units were, and

air support was still being sent primarily

to the fight at Observation Post 413

By the morning of the 3 0th, the fierce

battles of the night before had ended. It

became clear that the Iraqis had halted,

and while the fighting had been intense

for those at the front, for the I Marine Expeditionary Force staff the Iraqi offensive

left a feeling of bemusement. At the

morning briefing on the 30th, General

Boomer observed: "Other than our losses,

I am not unhappy with last night. It proceeded as it should.... My only concern is

that we get something out to kifi [the Iraqi

force] before it gets back up into

Kuwait:"32 "I believe that my feeling:' he

said later, "was that if they're trying that

now, they're going to play right into our

hands.... Then as it became clear that they

were trying to do something of significance we began to react. I think by that

point the MEF staff was at the point where

it could handle this kind of thing without

it being some huge crisis:"33

General Khaled had a less sanguine

view of the invasion. The Saudis understood how easily Saddam could turn even

a battlefield disaster into a propaganda

victory. They simply could not accept the

loss of Saudi territory, even for a short

while. When he received the news of the

attack he "felt a great deal of anxiety:"34

King Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia was often in contact. "King Fahd

wanted quick results, and rightly so. He

wanted the enemy force expelled at once.

He wished to deny Saddam the chance of

showing the world that he could invade

Saudi Arabia and get away with it. He

telephoned me a number of times, calling

for action:"35 Faced with such pressure

General Khaled did not consider al-KhafJi

a minor skirmish.

As dawn broke in the sabkha west of alKhafji, Captain Kleinsmith's small caravan

spotted unidentified tanks in the distance.

His men mounted up and proceeded

Cpl Charles H. Ingraham's reconnaissance team used this building in al-Khafji throughout the battle as their observation post. Although

the team was not discovered by the Iraqis, the building was hit by fire from Iraqis and Saudis during the night engagements, as well as

shrapnelfrom American air and artillery strikes. Photo courtesy of Cpl Charles H. Ingraham III

The Battle of al-Khafji 25
Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom, 1991, Modified byw Stephen Hill

south to Saudi Arabian lines. At this

point, the Special Forces and 3d Force Reconnaissance teams departed for alMishab, while Captain Kleinsmith and his

Marines moved to the 2d Saudi Arabian

National Guard Brigade headquarters,

joining the main body of 1st ANGLICO.136

Meanwhile, other 1st ANGLICO teams

were spread among the Saudi and Qatari

forces that were preparing to retake the

city and push the Iraqis back into Kuwait.

Captain Mark S. Gentil's Supporting Arms

Liaison Team 5, First Lieutenant Bruce D.

Mcllvried's Fire Control Team 13, and

First Lieutenant Kurtis E. Lang's Fire Control Team 9 were assigned to the Qatari

Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Ali Saeed. Each of the fire control

teams joined with one of the brigade's battalions, while the supporting arms liaison

team acted as the fire support coordinator.

Each battalion had a company of AMX-30

tanks attached as well.'37

Captain James R. Braden's Supporting

Liaison Team 6 was attached to Colonel

Turki al-Firmi's 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade. Captain Braden's

team acted as a central clearing house for

all supporting fire and allowed Colonel

Turki to use the Marine communications

net to keep track of his battalions, Fire

Control Team 12, commanded by Captain

John C. Bley II, was assigned to the 8th

Battalion, 2d Saudi National Guard

Brigade, along with Captain Mark V. Diilard's team from Supporting Arms Liaison

Team 2. Dillard's team originally was assigned to a Moroccan unit south of alMishab but was called forward to assist in

the battle.'38

Responsible for the defense of alKhai and the coastal region, Saudi

26 The Battle of al-Khaf)i
Major General Sultan 'Adi al-Matiri's initial plan of action was to cut off the Iraqi

forces in al-Khaiji and convince them to

surrender. His intention was to avoid a

potentially costly battle within the city. 139

To this end he dispatched the 5th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard

Brigade, north of al-Khafji as a blocking

force, supported by a company from the

8th Ministry of Defense and Aviation

Brigade, equipped with M60 Patton

tanks. He placed the Qatari Brigade, supported by the 7th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade, in positions

to block the road south from al-Khaiji.'4°

Once established just south of the city,

the Qatari Brigade began to engage targets of opportunity within the city. A platoon of Iraqi T-55 tanks emerged and

engaged the Qatari AMX-30s, resulting in

the destruction of three T-55s and the

capture of a fourth. Iraqi prisoners revealed that there was close to an enemy

"brigade in the city and another brigade

was to join it"4' In response, General SWtan bolstered the northern blocking force

by committing the balance of the 8th

Ministry of Defense and Aviation

Brigade's armored battalion. The southern force was reinforced with the 8th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard,

in addition to M113 armored personnel

carriers equipped with antitank missile

launchers from the 8th Ministry of Aviation and Defense Brigade.'42

At 1152 on 30 January, 1st Battalion,

12th Marines, the Marine artillery battalion assigned to support the Saudi attack

on al-KhaIji, reported it had already expended 136 rounds of dual purpose improved conventional munitions and eight

rounds of high explosive munitions.'43

The Cobra attack helicopters of Marine

Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367

continued to support the Marines along

the frontier and in al-Khafji. For the same

period, the squadron reported one tank,

seven armored personnel carriers, one

jeep, and one truck destroyed.'44

At noon, Colonel Turki al-Firmi met

with Colonel Admire. Colonel Turki was

in command of the Saudi force specifically tasked with retaking al-Khafi. Captain Braden, the 1st ANGLICO officer

assigned to Colonel Turki's brigade, observed the meeting. Colonel Admire told

Colonel Turki that Marine reconnaissance teams were still in al-Khafji and

briefed him on the 3d Marine plan to remove them from the city. Captain Braden

recalled that "Col Turki stated that the

city was his and that he had a tasking

from 'Riyadh' to rescue the Marine Recon

teams.... Col Turki asked if the Marines

lacked trust in the Saudi abilities to perform their mission of defending their sector? The question of sector defense

seemed moot at this point as the Iraqis

were in control of al-Khafi, but the matter of trust between Coalition partners

was in question." "s Admire agreed and

offered support.

Battery C, and later Battery A, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, provided artillery

fire, and a combined antiarmor team

from 3d Marines moved to the gas station

four kilometers south of al-Khalji.'46 Despite Saudi desires to fight the battle on

their own, Marine air-naval gunfire liaison teams provided critical communications to the Saudis and coordinated

artillery and air support. In addition, U.S.

Army advisors from the Office of Program Manager for Modernization of the

Saudi Arabian National Guard and civilian advisors from the Vinnell Corporation fought throughout the battle

alongside their assigned Saudi units.

Colonel Admire said that acting as the

supporting force was "one of the most difficult decisions I've ever had to make."47

The decision to have the Saudis lead the

attack to free al-Khafi shaped the rest of

the battle. Marines would observe and

aid their Coalition partners, but the

Saudis and Qataris did the heavy fighting

from this point on.'48

As plans were being made to liberate

al-Khaiji, another strange event in the

battle occurred. Two U.S. Army tractortrailer heavy equipment transporters

from the 233d Transportation Company

drove into the city. The drivers were lost,

unaware that they were in al-Khaiji, and

that an Iraqi offensive had occurred. One

of the reconnaissance teams watched in

horror as the two tractor-trailers drove

into town, only to be met by a hail of fire

from the Iraqis. The first of the two

trucks was disabled and crashed, Iraqi fire

having wounded its driver and assistant

driver as well as disabling the steering.

The second truck performed "the fastest

U-turn in history, like he was a VW bug"

and fled.'49 The Iraqis quickly overwhelmed and captured the two wounded

soldiers, Specialist David Lockett and

Specialist Melissa Rathbun-Nealy, whom

were quickly transported back to Kuwait.

Specialist Rathbun-Nealy was the first

American female soldier captured since

World War II. The two were not freed

until after the war)5°

Soon after the Army trucks disappeared into al-KhaIJi, Major Craig S.

Huddleston was informed of their disappearance. On Colonel Admire's orders,

3d Battalion, 3d Marines, established an

outpost, Check Point 67, south of the city

to coordinate with the Saudis. Major

Huddleston, the battalion's executive officer, was given command of the outpost.

The Battle of al-Khafji 27

The Saudi National Guard battalions, which freed al-Khafji from the Iraqis, employed

Cadillac Gage V-150 Commando light armored vehicles, some of which were equipped

with a M220 launcher for the BGM-71 TOW antitank missile.

DVIC DF-ST-91-04523
Photo courtesy of Capt Charles G. Grow

The water tower in southern al-Khafji was

heavily damaged during the battle. It was

a favorite target for both Iraqi and Saudi

troops, and was strafed at least once by US.

Marine Cobra helicopters.

He quickly formed a patrol to enter the

town and recover the two soldiers; every

one of the 128 Marines at the outpost volunteered to go, but he only took about 30

Marines. Huddleston mounted the patrol

in humvees, including antitank missile

and heavy machine gun vehicles, and

headed for the city)5'

Al-Kha!Ji was still in a state of confusion. As the patrol raced into the town,

they encountered some Iraqis but had no

major fire fights. The Marines found the

disabled tractor-trailer, but not the missing soldiers despite shouts of "U.S.

Marines, U.S. Marines!" There was a

short engagement with Iraqi armored

personnel carriers, which Major Huddleston directed a pair of Cobras against.

The patrol also found a destroyed Qatari

AMX-30 tank and its dead crew. Disappointed, the Marines returned to the outpost. "We wanted to get them [the

missing soldiers] pretty bad:' Major Huddieston later said.'52

Journalists, prevented by the prevailing press system and Saudi prohibitions

against observing the battle in al-KhafJi,

began to congregate south of the town.

Several spoke with Major Huddleston and

others from the patrol, which led to a

misunderstanding. The Coalition explained in press conferences that Saudi

and Qatari forces were freeing al-Khafji,

but the journalists who spoke with Major

Huddleston mistook his brief patrol for a

major Marine assault. They concluded

that the Marines were doing the major

fighting at al-KhalJi, but that the Coalition was, for political reasons, giving

credit for the battle to the Saudis. This

myth was to persist; the belief that the

military had lied to the press concerning

al-Khaf5i would sour military-media relations long after the Gulf War ended.'53

Meanwhile, General Khaled arrived at

the Joint Forces Command-East headquarters south of al-Khafi. He was agitated, since King Fahd was pressuring

him to liberate the city as quickly as possible. He also was upset about what he

considered a lack of promised air from

the Marine Corps. He contacted General

Homer. "I told him I wanted air support

as well as strikes by B-52s to break up

Iraqi concentrations and prevent reinforcements reaching al-Khafi, even if it

meant diverting air assets from the air

campaign against strategic targets inside

Iraq. Minimize raids on strategic targets

and maximize them at al-Khafi, I urged

him"54

General Homer saw the developing

battle as an opportunity to inflict maximum losses on the Iraqis, but he did not

consider the B-52 to be the proper

weapon to use in this situation. He told

General Khaled the same thing he routinely told ground commanders: "Don't

tell me how to do the job. Tell me what

you want done"55

Unsatisfied, General Khaled phoned

Brigadier General Ahmad al-Sudairy,

Saudi Director of Air Operations, an hour

after he spoke to General Homer. "Forget

about the Joint Forces. If the U.S. Air

Force or the Marines don't come at once,

I want you to take our air assets out of the

Coalition and send them all to me! I need

the Tornados, the F-5s, everything you've

got!"56 A few moments later the air assets General Homer had already designated for al-Khai began to arrive.

General Khaled was convinced his threat

had worked and as General Boomer later

said: "Ultimately, it was our air support

that turned the tide for them."57

In addition to his distress over the lack

of air, the two Marine teams in the city

also presented General Khaled with a

problem. "I was extremely worried that

Schwartzkopf might use American

troops, either U.S. Marines in an amphibious attack or a heliborne U.S. Army

unit, to free my town in my sector. The

shame would have been difficult to bear."

Consequently, he ordered Major General

Sultan's plan to talk the Iraqi's into surrendering be abandoned, and an immediate assault launched against the city.'58

Given orders from General Khaled to

attack at once, General Sultan passed the

order to Colonel Turki, who in turn assigned the task of assaulting al-Khafji to

Lieutenant Colonel Hamid Matar's 7th

Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National

Guard Brigade, supported by two Qatari

tank companies.'59

Captain Molofsky, the 3d Marines liaison officer, observed the Saudi preparations for battle. "Matar's Battalion is just

really lined up on the road, you know —

out into the desert a little bit, into Check

Point 67. It's a beehive.... And, Matar's

orders are to attack. And, that's it, you

know—nothing else. Attack." Matar's

battalion had received the order to attack

at 1600, but it was not in position until

2000. Captain Molofsky observed that

Matar was "really nervous; smoking cigarettes, pacing back and forth."6°

There was a 15 minute preparatory fire

by 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, and then

the 7th Battalion literally charged forward

against al-Kha!ji. "Out of nowhere, vehicles start up and people start driving forward:' observed Captain Molofsky, who

joined the 7th Battalion for the attack.

The Saudi battalion drove straight up the

middle of the road, but the Qatari tanks

pulled to the side as the force approached

al-KhaIji. As the first couple Saudi vehicles entered under the arches of the city,

"the whole place lights up:' Molofsky said.

"I mean a whole lot of directed fire,

straight down the road ... just a firestorm

of tracers, and tank main gun. And I notice a V-150 blow up, or it looked like it

blew up, about 30 meters off to the side of

the road."6'

The Saudi attack was disorganized and

undisciplined; they expended massive

amounts of ammunition fired wildly into

the city, as 1st ANGLICO reported afterwards. At one point, Qatari tanks fired

on their Saudi allies although quick action by Captains Dillard and Gentil

28 The Battle of al-Khaf)i
ended the fire before any casualties were

taken. Still, the undisciplined fire and

scattered assault was suspected to have

caused two Saudi deaths. 162

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Taylor

was the U.S. Army advisor to the 7th Battalion and he aided Lieutenant Colonel

Matar throughout the battle.163 Throughout the night Saudi and Qatari soldiers

fought against the Iraqi forces, suffering

fire so heavy that Taylor, a Vietnam War

veteran, described it as "flabbergasting?"TM

But the Saudis and Qataris did not hesitate to return fire, as Captain Molofsky

noted: "Qatari tanks came back up the

road and were shooting up from behind

and, at one point, the volume of fire got

so heavy that we all got out of the truck

and took cover in a ditch and you know

the Saudis were shooting TOW missiles

up in the air. Once they started shooting,

they were shooting. I mean everybody

was shooting at the max rate.'165

Despite their efforts, the 7th Battalion

was not able to retake al-Khaf5i nor was it

able to relieve the reconnaissance teams

still trapped within the city.'66 Captain

Molofsky later recalled the engagement's

surreal conclusion: "We pulled back into

defilade in a small depression, just south

of the city; and they [the Saudis] got out of

the vehicles and they put their cloaks on,

built fires and brewed up coffee, and then

they prayed. I think my sense then was

that the team couldn't have been much

different than if they were riding with

Lawrence except that they were mechanized vehicles instead of horses. Really

extraordinary. "167

At nightfall, Lieutenant Colonel Naif's

5th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National

Guard Brigade, moved into position to

block Iraqi movement in and out of alKhafJi from the north. The battalion was

soon reinforced by a battalion of the 8th

Ministry of Defense and Aviation

Brigade, companies of which drifted

north throughout the night. Iraqi forces

attempted several times to reinforce alKha1i, but Coalition air support was now

available in copious amounts, and the airnaval gunfire teams attached to the 5th

Battalion were able to call F/A-18s, AV8s, and A-lOs down on the Iraqi forces,

inflicting a large number of casualties and

forcing an even larger number of Iraqi

troops to surrender to the Saudis.'68 The

Saudis claimed 5 Iraqi vehicles destroyed,

6 captured, and 116 prisoners taken.169

The engagements were not without

problems. The lack of joint training between the Saudi Arabian National Guard

and Ministry of Defense and Aviation

forces led the 8th Ministry of Defense and

Aviation Battalion's commander to fear

that the two Saudi forces might fire on

each other, so in the morning he pulled

back to refuel and rearm. This kept the

Saudis from completely sealing al-Khal5i

at the end of the first night of battle, allowing a few Iraqi units to escape back

into Kuwait.17°

Coalition airpower was now focused

on the al-Kha!ji area, taking advantage of

the Iraqi offensive to strike at their forces

which had previously remained hidden.

The E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target

Acquisition Radar System aircraft were

used to track Iraqi movements in Kuwait.

"The new JSTARS system proved a vital

asset in beating back the Iraqi attacks," an

Air Force study noted. "An airborne radar

that could monitor enemy vehicle traffic

at night with impressive clarity, JSTARS

was an indispensable element in ensuring

the efficient and effective use of Coalition

aircraft?"7' The tactical air control center

was focusing aircraft on al-Khaii and inMarines of 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, prepare an M198 155mm howitzer. The battalion fired numerous missions in support of Saudi

and US. Marine forces during the Battle of al-Khafji. History Division Photo

The Battle of al-Khaf)i 29
terdiction missions in southern Kuwait.

But the success of the air interdiction

was not without loss. A U.S. Air Force

AC-130, call sign "Spirit Zero Three:' remained over its targets as the sun came up

despite the policy that AC-130s only be

employed at night. An Iraqi surface-toair missile struck the aircraft, killing its

14-man crew.172

The massive effort had an effect on the

Iraqi forces. General Salah Aboud had already begun requesting permission to

withdraw. Although the offensive was

termed "The Mother of Battles" by Saddam, General Salah radioed that "The

mother was killing her children."173

Early in the morning on 31 January,

Batteries A and C, 1st Battalion, 12th

Marines, attached to the 3d Marines, fired

an improved conventional munitions

mission into al-Khai under the control

of the Marine reconnaissance teams inside the town.'74 Corporals Ingraham

and Lentz, the team leaders, requested the

artillery strike on a large Iraqi column between their positions at 0645. Initially,

clearance was denied by 3d Marines fire

support control center, but the mission

was approved at 0701. At 0705, Batteries

A and C responded to the call for fire. At

0740, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, was

told by the fire support control center that

all future fire missions had to be approved

by the air-naval gunfire teams attached to

the Saudi forces.'75

The barrage was a success from the

perspective of the Marines inside alKhafji, as it landed a solid blow against

the Iraqis and essentially eliminated the

Iraqi column. But it was placed dangerously close to their positions; Corporal

Jeffrey Brown received a wound from the

shrapnel.'76

Ministry of Defense, United Kingdon, 1991, Modified by W. Slephen Hill

30 The Battle of al-Khafji