The Honor able John G. Koeltl, United States District Court for the Southern District of 1 New Y ork, sitting by

desig nation. 1 07

- 36 36

- cr U SA v. G r ay 1 2 3 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 4 5 F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT 6 7 8 9 August Term, 2007 10 11 (Argued: J une 17, 2008 De cided: Jul y 25, 2008 12 Amended: August 4, 2008) 13 14 15 Docke t No. 07-3636-c r 16 17 18 U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA , 19 20 Appellee , 21 22 –v.– 23 24 C H RI STO PH ER G R AY , 25 26 Defendant- Appellant

. 27 28 29 30 Be fore : W ES L EY and H A LL , Circuit Judges , and K OE L TL , District Judge

. 1 31 32 Appea l from an August 16, 2007 judgment of the United States District Court for the 33 Southe rn

Di str ic t of

Ne w Y or k ( Jone s, J.), fo llo wi nga

no n- jur y tr ia l, a nd se nte nc ingAp pe lla

nt t o 34 46 months ’ i mpr iso nme nt a nd thr e e y e ars ’ s up e rv ise d r e le a se . We ho ld t hat r e c kle ss 35 endang erme nt, in violation of N.Y. Penal L aw § 120.25, is not a “ crime of violence” under 36 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a )(2) . There fore , we a ffirm the judg ment of convic tion but vacate the sentenc e 3 7 an d

re m an d th e c as e t o th e d i s tri ctco urtfo r r es en t en ci n g. 382 1 C o n v i ct i o nAF FI R M E D, s en t en ce VA C AT E D, an d ca s e R E M AN DE D f

o r r es en t en ci n g. 2 3 4 5 R EE D M I CH A EL B ROD SK Y , Assistant United States Attorney (Jesse M. Furman, 6 Assistant United States Attorney , on the brief ), for Michae l J . Gar cia, United 7 States Attorney for the Souther

n District of Ne w York, N ew Yor k, NY. 8 9 B ROOKE E. C AREY (Patrick J. S mith, C orey E. Dela ney , on the brief

), Thac her 10 Proffitt & Wood L L P, New Yor k, NY, for Defendant-Appe llant

. 11 12 13 14 W ES L EY , Circuit Judge : 15 Def

endant- Appellant Christopher Gr ay appea ls from an August 16, 2007 judgment of the 16 United States District Court for the Southern D istrict of NewYork (Jones, J .), followinga non17 jury

trial, and sente ncingGra y to 46 months’ imprisonm ent on ea ch count, to be se rved 18 concur

rently , and thre e y ear s’ supervise d rele ase. I n a sepa rate summary

order filed today , we 19 re je c t App e lla

nt’ s c ha lle ng e to t

he jud g me nt o f c onvic tio n. In a dd iti on , G ra y c ha lle ng e s h is 20 se nte nc e by

arguin gthat th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in fi nd ingthat hi s p ri or

c onvic tio n f

or re c kle ss 21 endang erme nt, in violation of N.Y. Penal L aw § 120.25, wa s a “c rime of violenc e,” unde r 22 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a )(2) . We hold, pursuant to Begay v. United States , 128 S. Ct . 1581 (2008), 23 decide d afte r the sente ncingin this case, that re ckless enda ng erme nt does not fall within the 2 4 d e f

i n i t i o no f “ c r i m e o f

v i o l e n c e ” b e c a

u s e i td o e s n o ti n v o l v e p ur p o s e f u l c o n d u c ta s r e qu i r e d

b y § 25 4B1.2( a)( 2). Ther efor e, we aff irm the judg ment of convic tion but vacate the sentenc e and 2 6 re m an d

th e c as e t o th e d i s tri ctco urtfo r r es en t en ci n g. 273 1 Bac kgr ound 2 On

June 8, 20 05 , G ra

y wa s in dic te d o n c ha

rg e s o f k no wi ng ly po sse ssi ngmul tip le 3 firea

rms and ammunition after havingbeen c onvicted of a felony , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4 92 2( g )( 1) . T he fi re arm s and ammunit ion

at is su e ha d b e e n r e c ov e re d d ur inga se arc h o f h is 5 apar

tment. On J uly

19, 2005, Gra

y filed a motion to suppress the phy sical evide nce se ized from 6 his a

pa rtme nt. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e mot ion

to s up pr e ss a

nd the c a se the n p ro c e e de d to 7 tr ia l be fo re the c ourt on sti pu late d f

a c ts. On Ap ri l 25 , 2 00 6, Gr ay

wa s c onvic te d o f b oth

c ounts 8 in t

he ind ic tme nt. 9 Duringthe sentenc ing he aring , the district court found that Gray ’s prior c onviction for 10 re c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt i n th e fi rs t de g re e , in vio latio n o f N .Y . Pe na l L aw § 12 0. 25 , w a s a “ c ri me 11 of violence ,” as de fined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a )(2) . As a re sult, the district court applied 12 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)( 3), ca rry ing a base of fense level of 22. The district court imposed a two13 level re duction for a cce ptance of re sponsibili ty and a two- level enha

nceme nt for thre e or more 14 firea

rms, which re sulted in a sentenc ing r ang e of 46- 57 months’ imprisonment. The district court 15 considere d the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) f actor s and re

jected G ray ’s ar g uments for a varia nce f rom the 16 Guidelines ra

ng e. The district court then sente nced G ray to 46 months’ imprisonm ent on ea ch 17 count, to be ser

ved conc urre ntly , and thre e y ear s’ supervise d rele ase. 18 On

a pp e a l, G ra

y c ha lle ng e s b oth

his c onvic tio n a

nd his se nte nc e . We dis po se of his 19 challeng es to the convic tion by an ac company

ing summar

y order . Wit h respe ct to his sentence , 20 Gra

y relies on Begay

v. United States , 128 S. Ct . 1581, to argue that re ckless enda ng erme nt does 21 not fall within the definition of “c rime of violenc e” be cause the offe nse does not re quire aThe phra se “othe rwise involves c onduct that pre sents a ser ious potential risk of phy sical 2 injury to another” is refe rre d to as the re sidual clause. See, e .g. , Un ite d S tates v . B ro wn , 514 F.3d 256, 268 (2d Cir. 2008). 4 1 showing of purpose ful, violent, or ag g ressive be havior. In response , the Gover nment contends 2 that th e c ri me of

re c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt i s a “ c ri me of

vio le nc e ” be c a

us e it i s si mil ar i n k ind

to 3 the e nume rate d o ff e ns e s o f b ur g lary , a

rs on , e xtor

tio n, and c ri me s invo lvi ngthe us e of e xplos ive s. 4 Discussion 5 This Court “revie w[s] a sente ncingcourt’s inter pretation and application of the 6 Gu ide lin e s de novo .” United States v. Kilkenny , 493 F.3d 122, 125 ( 2d Cir. 2007). In the 7 afte rmath of United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we must review the district c ourt’s 8 sentenc e under

an abuse of discre tion standard. See G all v. United States , 128 S. Ct . 586, 597 9 (2007). The first step of this revie w is to “ensure that the district court c ommitt ed no sig nificant 10 proce dural e rror , such as f ailing to c alculate (or imprope rly calc ulating) the Guidelines ra ng e.” 11 Id. I f the sente ncingdecision wa s proce durally sound, we must then deter mine whether

the 12 sentenc e wa s substantively rea sonable. See id. 13 In analy

zing the def

inition of “crime of

violence,” we have looked to ca ses examining the 14 statutory

definition of “violent fe lony ,”as f ound in the Armed Car eer Criminal Act (“A CCA”), 15 beca

use the ope rative la

ng uag e of U .S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2) a nd the statute is identical. See U nited 16 Sta te

s v . B ro wn , 514 F.3d 256, 268 ( 2d Cir. 2008). A “c rime of violenc e” unde r the Guide lines 17 includes any

offe nse that “is burg lary

of a dw elling, a

rson, or e x tortion, involves use of 18 explos ives, or oth e rwi seinv olv es c on du c t th at p re se nts a s e rio us po te nti al r isk of p hy sic al i nju ry 19 to another .” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a )(2) (empha sis added). Similarly , a “violent f elony” includes 25 1 any

offe nse that “is burg lary , arson, or extorti on, involves use of e x plosives, or oth e rwi se 2 involves c onduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another .” 18 U. S.C. 3 § 924(e) (2)( B) (ii) (e mphasis added) . In Brown , this Court di scussed the similarities and de clar ed 4 that “ wh e re the langua g e of tw o . . . pr ov isi on s is ide nti c a l, w e c ann ot c on c lud e that th os e 5 pr ov isi on s h ave dis pa rate a pp lic a bil ity to a ty pe of c on du c t th at inhe re ntl y

inv olv e s th e ri sk 6 specifie d in both provisions.” Brown , 514 F.3d at 268. Thus, we ar e har d presse d to rejec t the 7 views of the Supre me Court’s most rece nt decision explaining the scope of the de finition of 8 “violent fe lony ” in under standing the re ach of the term “ crime of

violence.” The Gove rnment 9 and def

endant sha

re that view. 10 In Begay

v. United States , the Supreme Court re asoned that Congre ss list ed the of fense s 11 of burg lary , arson, e x tortion, and crimes involvingthe use of e x plosives in order to limit the 12 scope of

the statute’s de finition of “violent felony .” See B egay , 128 S. Ct . at 1585. The Court 13 noted that althoug h the re sidual clause inc ludes any offe nse that otherw ise involves conduct that 14 prese nts a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another, the statute does not cove r all cr imes 15 that prese nt a serious potential risk of phy sical injury

. See id. The Court indicate d that the 16 pr e se nc e of

the lis te d c ri me s si g na le d th at th e statut e c ov e rs on ly “ c ri me s th at are ro ug hly 17 simil ar, in kind

a s w e ll a s in d

e gr e e of r isk posed , to the examples themselves.” Id. (empha ses 18 added)

. 19 Pur su ant t o Begay ’s inv oc atio n w e mus t de te rm ine if the Ne w Y or

k o ff e ns e of re c kle ss 2 0 e n d an g e r

m e n ti s s i m i l ar

t o th e l i s t e d

c r i m e s , i nk i n d

a s w e l l a s i nd e g r e e o f

r i s k p o s e d

. “ In 21 de te rm ini ngwh e the r a g ive n c ri me fi ts w ith in t

he de fi nit ion

of the re le va

nt p re dic ate of

fe ns e s,6 1 we take a ‘c ateg orica l’ approa ch; that is, we g ener ally look only

to the statutory

definition of the 2 prior off

ense of conviction rather than to the unde rlying f acts of that offense .” Brown , 514 F.3d 3 at 265. The pr oper inquiry to determine if r eckle ss endang erme nt is sim ilar to the listed crimes 4 in the deg ree of risk posed, is “whether the conduc t encompasse d by the eleme nts of the offe nse, 5 in the ordinary

case , prese nts a serious potential risk of injury to another.” Jame

s v. United 6 States , 1 27 S. Ct . 1 58 6, 15 97 (2 00 7) . T hat is c e rt a inl y the c a se he re a s th e Ne w Y or k s tatut e in 7 question criminalizes reckle ss conduct occ urring“under circ umstances e vincinga depr aved 8 indiffer ence to human life, . . . which c reates a g rave risk of death to another pe rson.” N.Y . Penal 9 L aw § 120.25. 10 But, a lthough the r isk posed must be simil ar in de g ree , the conduc t must also be simi lar 11 in kind to the lis ted cr imes in order to fa ll within t he re ach of the re sidual clause. See B egay , 128 S. Ct . at 1585. In Begay , the Supreme Court he ld that even thoug h 12 drunk driving , as def ined by New Me x ico law ( 13 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-102), pr ohibited conduct that posed a simil ar de g ree of 14 risk as the listed cr imes, it was differ ent in respe ct to the way the risk was pr oduced. Id. at 1586- 15 87. The Court conc luded that “[t] he listed crimes a ll ty pically involve purposef

ul, ‘violent,’ and 16 ‘ag g ressive’ conduct,” wher eas dr unk driving “is a c rime of ne g lige nce or rec klessness.” Id. at 1 7 1 5 8 6 -8 7 (qu o t i n g United States v. Be gay , 470 F.3d 964, 980 ( 10th Cir. 2006) (McConnell, J ., 18 dis se nti ngin p art )) . A s a re su lt, the Court

loo ke d to the purp os e of

the AC CAin o rd e r t o 19 deter

mine if these diff

ere nces w ere sufficie nt to take drunk drivingoffe nses outside of the sc ope 20 of the statutory

term of “ violent felony .” Id. at 1587. Acc ordingto the Court, the Act wa s 21 int e nd e d to pr e ve nt t he da ng e r c re ate d whe n a

pe rs on wi th a his tor y of vio le nt c ri me po sse sse s aTh e c ri me of re c kle ss t ampe ri ngwi th c on sume r p ro du c ts w a s o ff e re d a s a n e xamp le to 3 illust rate this point

. See B egay , 1 28 S. Ct

. at 1587. A per son is guilty of this offense if he or she , “with re ckless disreg ard f or the risk that a

nother pe rson will be place d in dang er of death or bodily injury and under

circ umstances manif

esting extreme indiffer ence to such risk, tampers with any consumer pr oduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 1365(a)

. 7 1 g un. Id. Ba sed on the purpose of the Ac t, the Court held that drunk drivingwas diff ere nt in kind 2 from the e numerated cr imes beca use it does not nece ssarily involve the ty

pe of “ intentional or 3 purposef

ul conduct . . . [that] show[s] an incr ease d likelihood that the offende r is the kind of 4 person who mig ht deliberately point the gun a

nd pull the trigg er.” Id. 5 Begay place s a strongemphasis on intentional – purposef ul – conduct as a

prer equisite for 6 a c ri me to b e c on sid e re d s imi lar i n k ind to t he lis te d c ri me s. Th e Court wa s c on c e rn e d th at, 7 without this require ment, the statute would apply to a larg e number

of cr imes which pose a

g reat 8 de g re e of

ri sk to o the rs but are fa

r r e mov e d “ fr om t

he de lib e ra

te kin d o f b e havio r a sso c iate d w ith 9 violent criminal use of f irea rms.” Id. 3 10 Reckless e ndang erme nt on its face doe s not criminalize purposeful or de liberate conduct. 11 Despite c oming c lose to crossingthe threshold into purposef ul conduct, the c riminal acts def ined 12 by

the re c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt s tatut e are no t inte nti on a l, a dis tin c tio n s tr e sse d b y

the Sup re me 13 Court in Begay

. See B egay , 128 S. Ct . at 1586-87. Thus, pursua nt to Begay , we c onclude that 14 the dis tr ic t c ourt

pr oc e dura lly

e rr e d in c a lc ulatin gthe a

pp ro pr iate Gu ide lin e s r ang e be c a us e 15 rec kless endang erme nt is not a “crime of violence.” 16 Conclusion 17 Th e jud g me nt o f c onvic tio n o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRM ED , th e se nte nc e is 18 VA CA TED , a

nd the c a se is REMAND ED to the district court for rese ntencing

.