Air University

AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

The Next-Generation 

Expeditionary Air Force

Jeffrey Hukill — Team Leader

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired

Kristal Alfonso

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Scott Johnson

Colonel, USAF, Retired

John Conway

Colonel, USAF, Retired

Research Paper 2012-2

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112–6026

February 2012
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Force Research Institute, Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government 

agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

Air Force Research Institute papers and other scholarly 

Air University studies provide independent analysis 

and constructive discussion on issues important to Air 

Force commanders, staffs, and other decision makers. 

Each paper can also be a valuable tool for defining further research. These studies are available electronically 

or in print via the AU Press website at http://aupress

.au.af.mil/papers.asp.
iii

Contents

Memorandum from the Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force to AFRI v

About the Authors vii

Executive Summary ix

Introduction 1

Organize-Train-Equip 7

Force Presentation Model 15

Force Generation and Presentation 21

Training, Education, and Strategic Communication 25

Conclusion 31

Notes 32

List of Acronyms 33

v
vi
vii

About the Authors

Lt Col Kristal Alfonso, USAF, is currently assigned to the 

National Security Agency–Colorado as the deputy of customer 

relations. She is a graduate of the School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies and has served as an aircraft maintenance officer and KC-135 aircraft commander. Her publications include 

“Femme Fatale 2010” in the Air and Space Power Journal, 

which was selected as the journal’s second-best article for 2010 

and was published in the Spanish, Portuguese, and Chinese 

editions of ASPJ, as well as other articles in the Wright Stuff

and the Journal of Military History.

Col John L. Conway III, USAF, retired, is a military defense analyst for the Air Force Research Agency (AFRI). He is a 

distinguished military graduate of the Air Force ROTC program 

at the University of Alabama, where he earned bachelor’s and 

master’s degrees in history. He served in many intelligence assignments during his Air Force career. After 9/11, he was a 

civilian advisor to the commander, Gordon Regional Security 

Operations Center at Ft. Gordon, Georgia, and he has also 

worked on the U-2 program at Robins AFB, Georgia.

Lt Col Jeffrey B. Hukill, USAF, retired, is a military defense analyst for AFRI. He served in operational, command, 

and education positions, including assignments as an installation commander, the Air Command and Staff College dean, and 

a B-52G electronic warfare officer. His work has been published 

in such periodicals as the Armed Forces Journal, Joint Force 

Quarterly, and Defense Analysis and in various Air University 

Press titles.

Col David “Scott” Johnson, USAF, retired, is a military 

defense analyst for AFRI. He has served as an RF-4C weapon 

systems officer, a squadron and wing commander, a NATO 

plans officer, a MAJCOM supply director, and an Air War College department chair. His work has appeared in the Air and 

Space Power Journal (Chinese edition); AFDD 1-1, Leadership 

and Force Development; and various AFRI publications.

ix

Executive Summary

On 20 November 2008, the CSAF tasked the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) to determine if the current expeditionary air and space forces (EAF) construct is engineered to deal 

with current and future challenges facing the Air Force.* Specific elements for research were the need to meet the demands 

across the range of military operations, presentation of forces 

to combatant commanders (CCDR), appropriate flexibility and 

sustainability, continuity of leadership, and teaming of deployed forces. 

In this study, we discuss five issues for change, and our recommendations provide the framework needed to produce the 

project’s desired end state of a measurable and sustainable expeditionary process that meets combatant commanders’ requirements across the range of military operations.

Interviews were conducted with the Air Staff, Air Combat 

Command, Air Mobility Command, Air Force Personnel Center, 

Air Force Reserve Command, and Air National Guard. Detailed, 

tactical-level data of their air and space expeditionary force (AEF) 

processes were assimilated into a strategic-level analysis. 

Two major issues identified the need for change. First, each 

deployment relies on “custom design” because the present AEF 

construct does not match the operational environment of phase 

IV and irregular warfare (IW) operations. The original design 

did not anticipate the demands placed on expeditionary combat support (ECS) (i.e., continuous surge) and the shift in force 

mix from aviation-related to ECS forces. 

Second, the AEF processes do not provide an effective 

means to measure and communicate deployed-to-employ 

and employed-in-place forces and capabilities. Without this 

measurement, the Air Force cannot clearly articulate its total 

contribution to joint operations and highlight the stress caused 

by constant rotations.

Based on the study’s findings, the CSAF requested the development of an improved 

force presentation methodology comparable to the Army’s brigade combat teams, the 

Navy’s carrier strike groups, and the Marines’ expeditionary forces. This effort created 

the force presentation and generation construct known as AEF Next. AEF Next presents Air Force combat power using 117 airpower teams, generates these teams from 

unit-based deployments, and emphasizes teaming within and across units. The CSAF 

approved the AEF Next construct in November 2010.
x

We make several recommendations to improve presentation 

of USAF capabilities to CCDRs:

•  The Air Force should establish clear lines of authority

and accountability for AEF sourcing by completing the 

transition of Air Combat Command (ACC) as the force 

provider for combat and ECS forces.

•  The Air Force should organize to support the entire range

of military operations by developing a garrison force 

construct. The current practice of mixing operating and 

garrison forces is exceptionally efficient but can create 

an overestimation of combat capability because all of 

these forces are not actually available for deployment. 

The current practice creates competing responsibilities 

for unit commanders and hinders “teaming” of deployed 

ECS forces. 

•  The Air Force should create a force presentation model

to meet requirements across the spectrum of military 

operations. It must include all operational forces and 

capabilities and encompass all forces in support of CCDR 

requirements. To achieve these ends, it must be definable 

and measurable.

•  The Air Force should develop two sourcing constructs for

expeditionary operations: Go-to-War (unit type code [UTC] 

based) and Sustain Operations (Air Force specialty code 

[AFSC] based). 

•  The Air Force should develop a strategic communication

plan to improve USAF-wide understanding of deployment 

processes.

The Air Force continues to support CCDR requirements 

around the globe. However, the stresses in today’s operating 

environment have revealed weaknesses in the way the Air Force 

presents forces and capabilities in support of CCDR needs. The 

challenge is to change current processes so that every deployment is not a custom-made wooden shoe.
1

Introduction

On 20 November 2008, the chief of staff, United States Air 

Force (CSAF) tasked the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) to 

examine the current expeditionary air and space forces (EAF) 

construct to see if it was properly engineered to deal with challenges facing the Air Force today and in the foreseeable future.* 

Specifically, the research effort was to determine if the current 

air and space expeditionary force (AEF) construct was properly 

tailored to provide the flexibility and scalability essential for 

dealing with non–phase III operations. It had to be adaptable 

across all scenarios involving military operations; it had to be 

adequately designed for the unique requirements and limitations of the Air Reserve Component (ARC); and it needed to be 

sufficiently flexible to meet the ever-changing requirements of 

the combatant commanders. Finally, it needed to be the most 

effective vehicle for continuity and stability of leadership in the 

deployed force and needed to avoid confusion among the joint 

teams that assessed USAF capabilities. 

In this study, we discuss five issues and make recommendations to frame the debate. All are needed to produce the project’s desired end state of a measurable and sustainable expeditionary process that meets combatant commanders’ requirements 

across the range of military operations. 

Research Methodology

A literature review and personal interviews provided the core 

research methodology for this study. A literature review identified current AEF policy and attendant problems. Interviews were 

conducted with representatives from the Air Staff, Air Combat 

Command, Air Mobility Command, Air Force Personnel Center, 

Air Force Reserve Command, and Air National Guard. Detailed, 

Based on the study’s findings, the CSAF requested the development of an improved 

force presentation methodology comparable to the Army’s brigade combat teams, the 

Navy’s carrier strike groups, and the Marines’ expeditionary forces. This effort created 

the force presentation and generation construct known as AEF Next. AEF Next presents Air Force combat power using 117 airpower teams, generates these teams from 

unit-based deployments, and emphasizes teaming within and across units. The CSAF 

approved the AEF Next construct in November 2010.
2

tactical-level data of their AEF processes were assimilated into 

a strategic-level analysis.

Why the Need for Change?

We identified several recurring issues driving the need for 

change during the research effort. These primary factors set 

the context for the five observations and recommendations discussed later in the paper.

The AEF process satisfies combatant commanders’ (CCDR) 

requirements. However, a large amount of custom design work 

is required to provide the requested forces and capabilities. 

Several Air Force members referred to the sourcing process as 

the “art” of the AEF. Other USAF members equated sourcing 

and posturing Air Force deployments with designing and building handcrafted wooden shoes. While any process requires 

some custom design, the AEF process has moved from a process with some “art” to one that requires mostly custom work. 

It is time to remove the reliance on “art” and build a construct 

that is applicable to present and future requirements.

The current operating environment is defined by phase IV/

irregular warfare (IW) operations. The present AEF process 

does not effectively meet the demands of the current operational 

environment and thus requires extensive custom design work. 

Aviation assets traditionally made up the majority of the Air 

Force’s deployed operational capability. Consequently, the original 

construct focused on the deployment of those assets. While 

expeditionary combat support (ECS) was considered during the 

initial development of the construct, the original design did not 

take into account the demands placed on ECS during phase 

IV/IW operations. Consequently, ECS integration into the post–

9/11 AEF construct has been accomplished with incremental 

fixes. Phase IV/IW operations require a different mix of deployed Air Force capabilities. There is now a strong need for 

deployed ECS forces and capabilities. Future operations will most 

likely continue to demand these assets. Any future rendition of 

the AEF will need to prepare adequately for this requirement. 

The change in the makeup of USAF deployed forces is captured in figure 1. The figure compares the number of deployed 

ECS forces to the number of aviation (AVI) forces. The intent 
3

of the original AEF construct was twofold: balance the rotational demands of Northern and Southern Watch and provide 

a force presentation methodology to meet emerging crises. 

Prior to 9/11, Northern and Southern Watch were the primary rotational operations requiring USAF deployed forces. 

These rotational operations did not require a constant surge 

in capability. The mix of forces required for these operations 

was about 50 percent aviation-related assets and 50 percent 

combat support.

After 11 September 2001 until the summer of 2003, the operating environment was primarily defined by major combat 

operations (MCO) in support of Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). An MCO environment requires a surge in capability and usually allows for the 

mobilization of the Air Reserve Component. The AEF process 

was designed to support this type of surge for a limited time 

frame. The duration was generally defined as 6–12 months, 

and the concept assumed that the Air Force would return to a 

Figure 1. Requirements shift: comparison of deployed ECS forces to 

aviation forces. (Data provided by AFPC/DPWPA, 13 July 2011.)

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

ECS vs. AVI Deployed Personnel

Requirements Shift: Pre 9/11 to May 2011

ECS AVI

54

45

68

74

63

66 70 71 75 76 75 71

80 78

75

78

74 73

75

73 72

85

72 69

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Percent ECS

As of: 13 Jul 11

Pre 9/11

OEF/OIF

AEF 1 / 2

May 2011

AEF 3 / 4

Jan 2005
4

baseline of deployed operations that did not require either ARC 

mobilization or a significant impact on normal home station 

operations. The surges for the individual MCO portions of OEF 

and OIF were within this time frame. While all USAF capability 

surged, the majority of the deployed assets consisted of aviation, aircrews, aircraft maintenance, and a tailored ECS force 

required to support combat air operations. 

As the Air Force transitioned from an MCO operating environment back to rotational operations in support of phase IV 

and irregular warfare operations, the force mix changed, and 

the demand for Air Force ECS forces to provide host base support for non–Air Force entities grew. Since the end of MCO, a 

larger number of ECS forces are now deployed. As a result, the 

number of ECS personnel deployed is more than double the 

number of aviation-related assets. The current AEF process was 

not originally designed for an ECS-centric deployed force mix. 

In addition, many of the ECS force specialties (civil engineering, explosive ordnance disposal, security forces, special investigations, etc.) have been in a surge state for over eight years, 

again a situation the current AEF process was not designed to 

support. These two issues, ECS-heavy requirements and constant surge rate requirements, cause the need for extensive 

custom design work when it comes to Air Force deployments. 

Finally, according to many of the practitioners of the system, 

the AEF processes do not provide the Air Force with an effective 

means to measure and communicate its deployed-to-employ and 

employed-in-place forces and capabilities. Without effective means 

to measure these forces and capabilities, it is hard for the Air 

Force to articulate its contribution to joint operations and the 

stress to the force caused by constant rotations. 

The Air Force has learned much about conducting expeditionary operations since the implementation of the AEF process in October 1999. Certain aspects of the AEF construct 

have been improved because of challenges it has faced. However, in light of the new challenges facing the Air Force in fighting phase IV and IW operations, it is evident that the AEF must 

evolve to meet these new challenges.
5

Observations and Recommendations Framework

Given these drivers for change, the stage is set to discuss 

specific observations along with problem-solving recommendations. The diagram in figure 2 is the conceptual framework 

used to present these observations and recommendations. 

This framework describes from a macro perspective the 

phases the Air Force goes through to present its capabilities to 

support CCDR requirements, with the training, education, and 

strategic communication aspects vital to and encompassing all 

the phases. This macro perspective helps to emphasize the holistic and interconnected nature of the USAF expeditionary 

phases. Recommended changes within a phase should not be 

made in isolation. Any change must be made with the understanding of potential cascading effects on the other phases. 

Therefore, we make the following observations and accompanying recommendations with this holistic perspective in mind.

Figure 2. USAF macro expeditionary phases. (Based on figures from HAF 

A5/XW and HAF A8/XS.)

7

Organize-Train-Equip: 

Observations and Recommendations

Figure 3. Phase 1: Organize, train, and equip. (Based on figures from HAF 

A5/XW and HAF A8/XS.)

Observation: Clear lines of authority and 

accountability are lacking for AEF sourcing.

A recurring question heard during the majority of the research 

interviews was “Who really controls the AEF processes?” There 

are multiple organizations involved in the sourcing process. 

These organizations include Headquarters Air Force (HAF), force 

providers (FP), major commands (MAJCOM), Air Force Personnel 

Center (AFPC), and supported CCDRs’ Air Force components. 

No one argues the need for all these organizations to be involved. 

However, it is not clear who has the final say once a decision has 

to be made. Even when a clear policy is provided, at times it is 

ignored. One air staff member put this issue into perspective. He 

equated the AEF sourcing process to business at the United Nations (UN): “It seems like there is a UN organization model when 

it comes to AEF policy enforcement and the sourcing process—

too many people have a say without a clear final decision maker 

to make hard decisions once all inputs are in.” While there is no 
8

doubt the CSAF is the final decision maker, elevating issues to 

this level should be the exception rather than the rule.

Research also highlighted an apparent power struggle between the organizations involved in AEF sourcing. This struggle 

is most prevalent when dealing with the ECS forces and capabilities category. Air Force sourcing solution recommendations 

for ECS forces are the responsibility of HAF, Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Directorate of AEF Operations (AFPC/

DPW) at AFPC. Historically, this struggle was manageable in 

the pre-sustainment OEF/OIF environment with current AEF 

processes because of the relatively large pool of ECS assets (Active Component and mobilized Air Reserve Component) in comparison to the overall ECS requirement. However, because of 

the increased demand for deployed ECS capability to support 

the current operating environment and the decrease in mobilized ARC forces, this struggle must be addressed. 

An example of this power struggle occurred during a recent 

presidential support request. In April 2009 the Air Force nearly 

failed to provide the capability needed for the president’s trip to 

Mexico. A unit commander from one MAJCOM did not want to 

give up the capability after ACC determined that his unit was 

the best global sourcing solution. The commander provided a 

rationale for his concerns when his unit was initially asked. 

However, when those concerns were matched against Air Force–

wide issues, the unit was still considered the best sourcing 

solution. This struggle turned into an ACC versus MAJCOM 

fight rather than an FP recommendation to a MAJCOM. While 

this is only one incident, it is a fair representation of similar 

examples and a fair description of the problem. 

Recommendation: Create a central authority with clear 

lines of authority and accountability for AEF sourcing. 

There is good news and bad news about this recommendation. The good news is the Air Force has already started down 

the path to create a central authority. The secretary of defense 

implemented the Global Force Management (GFM) construct 

in 2005. GFM designates the commander, United States Joint 

Forces Command (USJFCOM) as the primary joint force provider (JFP) for conventional forces. In this role the USJFCOM 
9

commander identifies and recommends sourcing solutions, in coordination with the military departments and other combatant 

commands, from all forces and capabilities (except designated 

forces sourced by US Special Operations Command [USSOCOM], 

US Strategic Command [USSTRATCOM], and US Transportation 

Command [USTRANSCOM] as addressed in the Unified Command Plan [UCP]) to the chairman. ACC is the assigned service 

force provider to USJFCOM to provide the Air Force’s input into 

global sourcing solutions for combat and ECS capabilities and 

forces to support combatant command requirements. HQ USAF 

Program Action Directive (PAD) 07-13, Implementation of the Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force Direction to Transform and Consolidate 

Headquarters Management Functions, contains the implementation guidance to transfer several AEF sourcing processes from HQ 

Air Force Operations Group (AFOG) to ACC. PAD 07-13 directs 

ACC to have initial operating capability by 1 October 2009 and 

full operating capability by 1 October 2010. 

The bad news is that ACC is not currently manned, trained, 

or equipped to accomplish its full role as both an Air Force major command and the Air Force’s FP for combat and ECS forces 

and capabilities. There is time to rectify this problem, but immediate action is needed to complete the transition no later 

than the deadline for full operating capability. While many of 

the Air Staff sourcing responsibilities will move to ACC, there 

are currently no additional manning resources identified to 

move to ACC. Senior leaders must continue to focus on the issue to insure that ACC is organized, trained, and equipped to 

accomplish its new assigned task. 

Also, ACC has the responsibility to provide sourcing recommendations to USJFCOM for both combat and ECS forces and 

capabilities. Currently, ACC develops the sourcing solution for 

combat forces and capabilities only. AFPC/DPW is actually the 

lead agency for ECS sourcing solutions, with ACC providing 

minimal oversight. Current working relations are strong between ACC and AFPC/DPW. These relations became more formal on 1 October 2009 when AFPC became a supporting command to ACC for ECS sourcing. While this supporting command 

relationship helps clarify organizational responsibilities, the 

lines of authority remain divided between the two commands. 

Having two organizations involved in the same process creates 
10

a unity of command seam. ACC is responsible for ECS sourcing; 

it should be resourced to carry out that responsibility. Unifying 

these organizations under the same command would create a 

single entity focused purely on Air Force combat aviation and 

ECS sourcing. 

In addition to resource and organizational issues, an Air 

Force cultural issue needs attention. In ACC’s role as the force 

provider for combat and ECS forces and capabilities, it is required to make sourcing recommendations for the entire Air 

Force, not just ACC. Non-ACC organizations must accept this 

authority. Senior leader engagement is needed to impress upon 

all organizations that ACC speaks for the Air Force when it 

comes to sourcing recommendations for combat and ECS forces 

and their respective capabilities. Not only does ACC need the 

authority, it needs others to recognize and respect that responsibility and authority as the FP.

One option to help the Air Force accept ACC’s FP role would 

be to change the name of the command. Changing the name of 

the command to Air Force Forces Command or Theater Air 

Forces Command would better communicate the command’s 

role. As one person interviewed said, the command does not do 

combat; it provides trained and equipped forces to combatant 

commanders, who will employ the provided capability in combat. A name change would help break the legacy MAJCOM 

mind-set of the Tactical Air Command (TAC) days. 

If a complete name change is not possible, then another option would be to create a new management headquarters at 

Langley AFB. This headquarters could be called Air Force 

Forces Command or Theater Forces Command, with the commander, ACC dual-hatted as the commander. The majority of 

the personnel for this command would come from existing ACC 

personnel involved with AEF operations. This dual command 

structure, while suboptimal compared to the first option, would 

separate FP responsibilities from other ACC issues.

In either option described above, DPW should be realigned 

under the new command, while remaining at AFPC to allow for 

effective integration with other personnel processes. The realignment would unify sourcing processes.

Creating a command focused on force presentation would provide a more centralized approach to combat and ECS sourcing. A 
11

centralized approach is warranted to manage scarce resources 

against competing combatant commanders’ requirements. 

Finally, establishing clear lines of authority and accountability 

would assist ACC in sourcing ARC assets. GFM guidance requires a sourcing plan two years prior to implementation. The 

goal is to source forces during planning rather than during execution, in contrast to the current process used for ECS. A twoyear look is especially challenging for the ARC because it fills 

most of its requirements with volunteers. Since the volunteer 

rate can fluctuate month to month, let alone year to year, it is 

hard to provide an accurate estimate of how many expeditionary 

requirements the ARC forces can fill. In the case of the Air Force 

Reserves, they are merely committing to what they had supported in previous years. ACC will have to use its FP authority to 

monitor and update the ARC “buy” if volunteers increase. 

Observation: USAF mixes operating 

and garrison forces.

The Air Force, unlike its sister services, has chosen to draw its 

expeditionary force from the same forces expected to maintain 

and support garrison or home station operations. Thus, in contrast to the Army and Navy, the Air Force mixes its operating 

and garrison forces. For the purposes of this paper, garrison 

forces are defined as all units assigned to a base or area for defense, development, operation, and maintenance of facilities.1

Garrison forces are nondeployable. Operating forces are defined 

as those forces whose primary missions are to participate in 

combat and the integral supporting elements thereof.2 Operating forces are deployed-to-employ or employed-in-place. 

The mixing of operating and garrison forces is exceptionally 

efficient but can create an overestimation of combat capability 

under certain conditions. It is very efficient for peacetime operations or for a unit conducting operations solely from its permanent base. However, if the operating environment requires a 

constant surge of deployed ECS capabilities, then this peacetime or limited surge construct becomes very inefficient and 

leads to constant custom-built deployments. Phase IV and IW 

operations require high deployment rates consisting primarily 

of ECS forces and capabilities. The use of both garrison and 
12

operating forces at the unit level erodes the ability of the supporting commander to keep pace with force development, upgrade 

training, and operational evaluation requirements essential to 

ensuring that the Air Force continues to provide combat-ready 

forces to a CCDR. Therefore, the mixing of operating and garrison forces hinders USAF support to CCDRs.

This mixed force construct also makes teaming of deployed ECS 

forces difficult. There are two levels of teaming. The first level is 

teaming within a unit. The second level is matching unit leaders 

with their assigned forces. Combat aviation usually deploys as a 

unit with home-station assigned leaders and associated homestation aviation support elements. However, this is not done with 

ECS forces because the home base must continue operating. 

The Air Force establishes expeditionary ECS units with semipermanent leadership and ad hoc groupings of unit type codes 

(UTC) from various organizations filling the unit manpower requirements. For example, rather than “breaking the base” by 

taking the majority of a civil engineering unit from one base to 

build an expeditionary squadron, personnel deploy from multiple bases. It is a continual challenge to build a team from 

scratch in a deployed location only to have the team dissolve 

after 120 or 179 days. Also, commanders lose responsibility for 

the deployed ECS forces since they do not deploy with their 

units. The USAF stresses building teamwork and effective leadership at the garrison location. Why then has the USAF not created a construct to replicate this in the deployed location?

The mixed force construct also causes competing responsibilities for unit commanders: support of garrison operations versus 

deployed operations. This organizational construct creates a paradox. On one hand, the USAF stresses the importance of supporting CCDR needs, but on the other hand, the USAF has an organizational structure that emphasizes success at the home unit. 

Mission objectives and evaluation systems must align. Unfortunately, within the USAF they do not. Home station commanders 

are graded and rewarded for garrison success through the use of 

operational readiness inspections, unit compliance expectations, 

and aircrew standard evaluation visits rather than how well their 

unit members or assets perform while deployed. So rather than 

overly stressing the garrison operations they are graded on, some 

unit commanders may do whatever is “legal” to limit the stress at 
13

their home base. Current AFI 10-403, Deployment Planning and 

Execution, execution grade, Air Force specialty code (AFSC), and 

skill-level substitution rules allow supporting commanders to send 

personnel who may not meet the CCDRs’ exact requirements. 

One Air Staff member explained the issue this way: “The 

home base must ‘suck it up’ when UTCs deploy, and war fighting is a ‘tax’ to the garrison or home station command. Bottom 

line, the AEF is an elaborate tax system and the HAF, ACC, and 

AFPC/DPW are the IRS. Everyone in the USAF knows that they 

need to pay taxes, but they will take steps to do whatever is 

‘legal’ while maximizing their net income.”

Posture coding (P-coding) is a methodology developed to help 

manage these competing responsibilities. P-coding is primarily 

a MAJCOM-derived decision governing which UTCs are available to deploy. There is distrust at all levels in the AEF process 

regarding P-coding. There have been numerous accusations 

between units and MAJCOMS that, while some units are “all 

in,” others are not and use P-coding to game the system. Since 

there is no Air Force standard on the number and types of 

forces needed to keep a base running, each unit and MAJCOM 

determine their own requirements. 

While every commander understands the importance of deployed operations, the Air Force must do its part and create an 

organizational structure that supports this understanding. 

Recommendation: Organize the USAF to support 

the entire range of military operations by developing 

garrison forces.

The Air Force must develop garrison forces to support home 

station operations without hindering deployed operation capabilities. A garrison force construct would separate the personnel responsible for an organization’s permanent support functions from forces responsible for deployed operations. The 

garrison force would primarily be made up of civilians and contractors along with some military supervisors and leadership. 

The garrison force would be responsible for the day-to-day operations of a base and would not deploy. This construct would 

better organize the Air Force for expeditionary operations. While 

it may not be the most effective construct for peacetime efficien-
14

cies, it would more effectively posture the Air Force to deal with 

the entire range of military operations. The USAF would no longer have to worry about breaking the base when deployments 

are required. Teamwork would improve because large portions 

of units along with their leaders would deploy together. 

In addition, removing a unit commander’s competing responsibilities of taking care of the home mission and supporting the 

deployed mission eliminates the P-coding concern. Those who 

remain behind to care for the infrastructure and provide needed 

family services and support to personnel at the home station 

would alleviate the competing demands placed upon unit leaders. If unit commanders were allowed to deploy with their personnel, inspections and evaluations could be conducted in the 

deployed environment to provide an accurate assessment of 

the performance of individual units. However, a formal manpower study should be used to determine the requirements for 

operating a base and how that force can be managed by an installation management command. Current P-coding can be the 

baseline for this study.

This construct is similar to Army and Navy organizational 

designs. Challenged with lengthy deployments, both services 

have effectively established clear delineations between the operators who go forward and those who remain behind to take 

care of the home front. The creation of a garrison force would 

allow the Air Force’s war-fighting capability to focus on its mission to support CCDR needs without sacrificing the important 

aspects of caring for those who remain behind to support the 

war fighters from the home front.

It will take time and funding of additional personnel to create 

an Air Force garrison force. This is not a simple task in the current environment of budget constraints. However, the decision 

to implement this idea should be based on requirements, not 

near-term budget constraints. The envisioned future IW operating environment will require large numbers of deployed Air 

Force ECS personnel. As described earlier, a garrison force 

construct will allow the Air Force to support expeditionary requirements more effectively. It is in the Air Force’s best interest 

to establish the garrison force requirements and to begin the 

competition for future funding. A garrison force construct 

should be an Air Force long-term strategic goal. 
15

Force Presentation Model: 

Observation and Recommendation

Figure 4. Phase 2: Force presentation model. (Based on figures from HAF 

A5/XW and HAF A8/XS.)

The next phase of expeditionary operations deals with the 

organization of USAF operating forces to enable effective measurement of Air Force capability. As in the previous section, the 

term operating force is defined according to JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

Observation: USAF does not have a 

defined force presentation model.

There is a gap between the organize, train, and equip phase 

and the force generation phase. The Air Force does not have an 

effective way to describe in quantifiable terms its total operating 

force capability or the amount committed in support of CCDR 

needs. The Air Force does not have an effective force presentation model (FPM), defined as a standard grouping of operating 

force capability available to support CCDR requirements, deployed or nondeployed. 

During its early design stages, the AEF concept was to be both 

a force scheduling process and an FPM. The Air Force attempted 
16

to equate a numbered AEF to other FPMs such as a carrier 

strike group (CSG). However, this goal was never realized. The 

AEF process is currently just a rotation methodology. It is not 

a way of defining or measuring USAF combat power like other 

services do through their constructs of brigade combat teams 

(BCT), Marine expeditionary units (MEU), and CSGs. Numbered AEFs do not describe a standard grouping of operating 

force capability. When the question is asked “What is in a numbered AEF?” the usual answer is “Whatever you want to be in 

it.” The situation did not improve as the Air Force’s expeditionary structure evolved into air and space expeditionary task 

forces (AETF). AETFs are made up of capability from numbered 

AEFs and enablers. When you ask what is in an AETF, you get 

the same answer as you get with AEFs: “Whatever you want.” 

The FPM void creates several problems in relation to the AEF. 

First, the void contributes to excessive deployment flexibility 

leading to a breakdown in force generation processes. The FPM 

should be the initial step in establishing boundaries for acceptable flexibility by describing a specific unit of measurement of 

operating force capability. One of the strengths of the current 

AEF system is its flexibility. However, without a specific unit of 

measurement, the flexibility stops being appropriate and becomes excessive. Appropriate flexibility allows forces to adjust 

within appropriate rule sets to meet CCDR requirements while 

also supporting appropriate force generation. Excessive flexibility leads to the breakdown of the deployment process. 

According to the majority of the people interviewed, the current AEF process suffers from extreme flexibility. Without a 

definable FPM in the current operational environment, UTCs 

have broken down into less of a description of capability and 

more of a description of AFSCs. UTCs are five-digit identifiers 

describing a type of capability that can be tagged for CCDR 

support. This capability is made up of people, equipment, or 

both. Since the current FPM unit of measurement is “the deploying force can be any size that you want it to be,” force generation processes such as the use of UTCs begin to lose their 

meaning. Figure 5 shows this phenomenon (reliable data prior 

to July 2003 was not available). As of June 2009, 52 percent of 

standard UTCs with personnel consist of five or fewer people, 

32 percent of two or fewer, and 21 percent of one person. Thus, 
17

since July 2003, UTCs with five or fewer have grown by 12 percent; those with two or fewer have grown by 10 percent; and 

those with only one person have grown by 10 percent.

Figure 5 shows the growth of single-person UTCs. A specific 

example outlining the UTC problem is also useful. The USAF 

has 12 air mobility squadrons (AMS), to which there are approximately 44 logistics readiness officers (LRO) assigned. Currently the unit of measurement tracked is 44 LROs as opposed 

to the larger capability contained in each air mobility squadron.3 Without maintaining and tracking the larger AMS UTC, 

the Air Force lacks clarity about the greater impact on AMS 

capabilities caused by the LRO “cherry picking.” The singleLRO UTC is a description of a personnel requirement, not a 

capability available to support CCDR requirements. 

There is also a culture issue regarding UTCs and the total 

force. Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) flying units routinely deploy partial UTCs in response to AEF tasking rather than the entire UTC’s primary 

aircraft authorization (PAA). For example, the normal C-130 

squadron PAA is eight aircraft; Air Force Reserve deployments 

are usually for six aircraft instead of eight. (This is also true for 

tanker taskings.) This allows some residual capability at the 

home station. This is particularly important for the ANG because of possible homeland security taskings from the governor. However, “breaking” the aviation UTC confuses the issue 

regarding inclusion of support UTCs, for example, intelligence. 

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

40% 49% 47%

52%

32%

27% 21%

16%

29%

17%

22%

11%

Jul-03 Dec-05 Dec-06 Jun-09

Percentage of UTCs

with 1 person

Percentage of UTCs

with 2 people or fewer

Percentage of UTCs

with 5 people or fewer

Figure 5. Growth of UTCs consisting of a small number of personnel. 

(Data provided by HAF A5/XW and AFPC/DPW, 24 June 2009.)
18

If six aircraft deploy, it is difficult to determine what percentage 

of the aviation support UTCs should deploy with them.

The second problem created by the FPM void is the difficulty in 

assessing operating force capabilities without a definable unit of 

measurement. Currently the Air Force cannot effectively measure 

and explain how much of its capabilities are committed in support 

of CCDR requirements. Other services talk in FPMs of BCTs, MEUs, 

or CSGs. These constructs all have broad, quantifiable capability 

descriptions associated with them. The Air Force, on the other 

hand, describes its capabilities with a list of tail numbers or AFSCs 

since AEFs and AETFs have no specific meaning. This difficulty 

makes it hard to explain to the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD), Congress, the joint force, and the American public just how 

much of the Air Force’s capabilities support CCDR needs.

Additionally, the lack of an effective FPM makes it difficult 

for the Air Force to explain request for forces (RFF) shortfalls. A 

recent example highlights this situation. The Air Force wanted 

to shortfall a portion of a requested capability increase of a specific type of aircraft. The Air Force had a hard time explaining 

its reason for the shortfall without an FPM because the unit of 

measurement that USJFCOM used was the entire amount of 

tail numbers in the Air Force’s inventory for this capability. 

When the unit of measurement for a capability is, in this case, 

in the thousands, it is hard to explain why the Air Force has to 

shortfall an RFF that is asking for fewer than 20 airframes. In 

the absence of a quantifiable FPM, the Air Force struggled to 

communicate how its forces were committed and what the risk 

would be to fill the RFF.

Recommendation: Create a USAF force presentation 

model based on five themes:

• Enable the USAF to meet all requirements across the

range of military operations

•  Include all operational forces and capabilities

• Capture all forces in support of combatant commander

needs

• Make the FPM definable

• Make the FPM measurable
19

The Air Force must fill the FPM void. Flexibility is the key to 

airpower operations, but in relation to force management, excessive flexibility contributes to the breakdown of processes 

designed to support CCDR needs. There are a variety of models 

that can be used to create the FPM. The prevalent models are 

unit based, force module based, or a hybrid of the two. Each 

model has its strengths and weaknesses. These models are 

currently being researched and discussed within the Air Staff. 

For the scope of this project, the goal was not to recommend a 

specific model but rather to provide themes that can guide the 

development of the final construct. 

First, the FPM must pertain to all requirements across the 

range of military operations. The current AEF process is best 

suited to address an MCO or an aviation-centric operation. 

While the AEF process has been adapted to accomplish other 

missions across the range of military operations, those adaptations were ad hoc. The Air Force’s expeditionary structure and 

processes must evolve so they can effectively support phase IV 

and IW operations. In the current ECS-centric operating environment, the ad hoc processes lead to numerous customdesigned sourcing solutions, causing the force generation processes to break down. The FPM must be sized to support 

varying types of operations.

Second, the FPM must include all operating force capabilities 

such as aircrews, maintenance, and ECS personnel. This will 

address a major weakness of the current system that the tempo 

banding system has somewhat addressed but not completely 

corrected. The stress of the current ECS-centric operational 

environment has overwhelmed the attempted fixes of this weakness. A new FPM that includes ECS from the start will go a long 

way toward eliminating the “art” of the AEF. 

Third, the FPM must capture all operating forces supporting 

CCDR requirements. This includes deployed-to-employ as well 

as employed-in-place operating forces. This will fix a problem 

with the current AEF construct, which captures only forces 

that deploy-to-employ. Garrison forces would not be included 

since the FPM is a standard grouping of operating force capabilities, not the forces needed to run a permanent base. 

Fourth, the FPM must be definable. A definable FPM will put 

boundaries on what defines our operating force. These bound-
20

aries will provide a description of a set grouping of operational 

capabilities available to support CCDR requirements, whether 

deployed or nondeployed. This definable unit of measurement 

will reduce the current model’s problem of excessive flexibility. 

The units of measurement will be tailorable, but having a set 

standard and rule sets guiding how changes are made will force 

planners to document changes. The documentation allows 

planners to measure and then explain the impact of tailoring. 

Fifth, the FPM must be measurable. Effective measures are 

critical if the USAF is to understand and explain its contribution to CCDR requirements and stresses on its operating force. 

The defined set grouping of operational capabilities mentioned 

above will provide a baseline for measurement. Tailoring of capability within this baseline unit of measurement is expected to 

meet the specific needs of CCDRs. When tailoring does occur, 

the baseline unit of measurement must not change. What needs 

to be tracked is the deviation between the baseline and the actual tailored package. This would prevent what has occurred 

with the current UTC system. Currently, tailored UTCs are rewritten to express the new tailored capability. This has continued to the point that, as of June 2009, 52 percent of Air Force 

UTCs consist of five people or fewer. One-person UTC readiness 

is easy to measure, but that does not provide a useful means to 

describe USAF operation capability.
21

Force Generation and Presentation: 

Observation and Recommendation

Figure 6. Phase 3 and 4: Force generation and presentation. (Based on 

figures from HAF A5/XW and HAF A8/XS.)

Observation: The AEF process has evolved beyond 

its original framework and is now expected to do 

things it was not designed to do. This has resulted 

in a breakdown of the UTC system.

The demands of the Phase IV and IW operating environments 

created the need for the AEF process to do things it was never 

designed to do. The AEF process was designed to support CCDR 

requirements by presenting force capabilities through UTCs. 

UTCs described capabilities designed to support expeditionary 

operations. UTCs were not created to man permanent or enduring requirements. However, that is exactly how they are being used. Deployed locations have become more like permanent 

bases. The Air Force does not have an alternate way to man 

permanent/enduring deployed locations, so it uses UTCs. Using UTCs as an alternate personnel system drives UTCs down to 
22

the AFSC level rather than to the capability level. This issue, 

along with the FPM gap described earlier, has led to the majority 

of UTCs becoming a meaningless description of capability. The 

cost of the UTC breakdown is in future war plans and deployments. The current sustainment UTCs are not effective for the 

planning and deployment of forces and capabilities required for 

a future MCO. The USAF cannot build effective war plans with 

single-person UTCs. 

Furthermore, in a steady-state environment with requirements 

defined well in advance of deployment dates, the total force 

functions reasonably well with a constant pool of volunteers. 

However, given the new long lead time (two years) for requirements engendered by GFM, it will be difficult to forecast accurate numbers of volunteers from the citizen-Airman cadre that 

far in advance. Civilian careers, changes in the job market, and 

even changes in personal situations (e.g., marriage, pregnancy, 

death, etc.) could affect the size of the available cohort. This is 

particularly true for limited supply, high demand (LS/HD) career fields. Even a moderate increase in demand will strain the 

capability of the Guard and Reserve to increase their volunteer 

numbers, probably resulting in an increase in involuntary mobilizations, creating a ripple effect of further manpower disruptions. The more predictable requirements are, the easier it is 

for Guard and Reserve assets to fill them. It should also be 

noted that near the end of the manpower spectrum, prior to the 

drastic step of reinstituting the draft, is the Air Force’s mobilization of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). While other services, most notably the Army and the Marine Corps, have routinely called up these individuals, the Air Force has not. 

Estimates from AFRC officials indicate that IRR spin-up periods of up to two years (depending on AFSC) would be required 

to make this cohort combat ready.

The long-term ramifications of continuous call-up of the 

Guard and Reserves require further research and evaluation. 

Several of those interviewed expressed concern over what will 

happen when the volunteer system either dries up or runs out 

of money to pay for man days. This will not only affect the 

Guard and Reserve units at the local level but may also affect 

the capability to support CCDR requirements.
23

Recommendation: The Air Force should develop two 

sourcing constructs for expeditionary operations: 

Go-to-War (UTC) and Sustain Operations (AFSC).

The Air Force should develop two sourcing constructs for expeditionary operations: Go-to-War and Sustain Operations. 

The Go-to-War construct would be UTC based. Specific UTCs 

should be created for expected contingencies across the range 

of military operations. These UTCs would be large enough to 

describe actual capability. When required to deploy capability 

to support CCDR requirements, the appropriate UTCs would 

be selected and tailored. Tailoring would be made within the 

boundaries and in accordance with the rule sets of the new 

FPM. In addition, the new garrison force construct would lessen 

the need to cherry-pick capability from established UTCs because of improved teaming. Without the concern for breaking 

the home base, larger portions of ECS units could be deployed 

if needed. This would improve teaming within a unit and the 

pairing of unit leadership with its deployed personnel.

A measure needs to be established to determine when operations shift from the Go-to-War construct to the Sustain Operations construct. Several items can factor into this measure, 

such as when rotational operations begin, joint expeditionary 

taskings begin, reconstruction teams are created, status of 

forces agreement is reached, organizations like the Coalition 

Air Force Transition Team are created, or the State Department 

takes the lead. 

After reaching the newly established metric, the Sustain Operations construct begins. This construct would shift to normal 

AFPC processes, thereby preventing the UTCs from breaking 

down into meaningless descriptions of capabilities. This would 

allow the Go-to-War construct to remain meaningful so that 

planners can realistically build war plans and, if necessary, 

deploy forces for another contingency. 

The Air Force should create a deployed unit manning document to define the sustainment needs. These manning positions could be filled through TDY, short tour, or standard tour 

processes. Tour lengths for these positions would depend on 

the demand for capability and the supply the Air Force has of 

that capability. The tempo band concept will still be required to 
24

capture the varying dwell times of career fields. Minimum tour 

lengths of 179 days might be required in this phase for all deployed forces. Longer tour lengths may create tiered readiness 

across USAF capabilities, but that is a proven reality of longduration sustainment operations. 

This is not the first time the Air Force has had to shift from 

an expeditionary footing to a sustainment role. As sustainment 

operations developed in Europe following World War II, after 

the Berlin airlift, and on the Korean peninsula following the 

cease-fire, the Air Force made a conscious shift from an expeditionary mind-set to a sustainment mind-set. Rotations became assignments, which are still controlled by AFPC. This 

recommendation would involve deciding to acknowledge that 

current operations in the area of responsibility are, and will be 

for the foreseeable future, sustainment operations, not expeditionary. By developing manning documents on what each base 

requires to function and establishing a sustainment operation 

that uses AFPC to assign personnel rather than ACC and DPW, 

the Air Force will eliminate the dual assignment system under 

which it is currently operating. AFPC will focus on sustainment 

personnel moves, which will include assignments presently accomplished through the AEF system, and 365-day assignments. ACC and DPW will then be able to focus on deployment 

contingencies that are not in the sustainment phase and will 

truly evolve into the expeditionary force provider.
25

Training, Education, and 

Strategic Communication: 

Observation and Recommendations

Figure 7. Training, education, and strategic communication. (Based on 

figures from HAF A5/XW and HAF A8/XS.)

Observation: Training, education, and strategic 

communication processes must be improved.

There appears to be a lack of understanding about the AEF 

process across the Air Force, from the senior officer level down 

to the unit and individual levels. This stems from challenges in 

education, training, and strategic communication processes. 

These difficulties have been part of the AEF process since its 

inception, as the AEF was intended to mean different things to 

different users. When a process has multiple meanings, misperceptions will inevitably arise, which are compounded by 

poor communication and education. For example, some regarded the AEF process as mainly a means to schedule “iron” 

or combat aircraft. Others marketed the process as a means to 

provide Airmen with “predictability and stability.” For others, it 

was a process to explain capabilities to the CCDR. 
26

Regardless of the original intent or expectations of the process, misperceptions developed as individual or unit experiences filtered into the corporate knowledge or perception of 

how the AEF process should have operated. Poor experiences, 

such as delayed rotations, short-notice deployments, and lack 

of predictability, led many Airmen to assume that the process 

was indeed broken, considering they had been told that the 

AEF system was intended to bring predictability and stability. 

This misperception was often compounded by a failure of firstand mid-level leaders who simply did not understand the process. Their own misperceptions of a failed AEF system led to 

inaccurate assessments of the process, feeding subordinate 

misperceptions. Examples of this lack of knowledge are rampant; the earlier example of the presidential support mission 

shows that some unit commanders simply do not understand 

that ACC is the force provider for the Air Force under GFM. The 

education needs to go beyond AEF to include the driving forces 

behind it. GFM is now the supported concept. Air Force personnel must know how the AEF supports joint, secretary of 

defense, and national military and security objectives.

Moreover, the misperception that the AEF system was broken was often not passed up the chain of command to senior 

leaders to address and correct. For example, while there was a 

recognized need for this research project at the staff level where 

the process functions, some senior leaders indicated surprise 

that the AEF system was a concern. The misperception on the 

part of senior leaders that the system is not having issues derives from the fact that the Air Force continues to support the 

CCDR. However, understanding the evolving AEF process is a 

challenge for the experts who oversee this process daily. Thus, 

senior leaders may not be completely aware of the robust nature of the AEF process and the long-term effects of the stresses 

the process places on the force. 

Recommendations: 

• Develop a robust education and training plan for key

positions responsible for the planning and execution 

of the AEF process.
27

• Develop a coherent Airman education and training

plan. 

• Develop a strategic communication plan for internal

and external recipients.

The Air Force must develop a robust education and training 

plan for key positions responsible for planning and executing 

the AEF process. This plan must encompass all phases of Air 

Force training and education and must become part of a continuing education process that informs Air Force members of 

the new changes to the process. AFPC/DPW has an education 

outreach program. The program provides excellent products 

for those who want to learn. These products include AEF lesson material and education booklets available online. In addition to putting material on the website, AFPC/DPW conducts 

briefings at base installations, commander courses, and functional development team meetings at Randolph AFB, TX. DPW 

also releases policy update articles. While these educational 

initiatives are extremely valuable, they are incorporated into a 

comprehensive Air Force education strategy. 

One group that is critical to the success of the system is the 

functional area managers (FAM). There have been recent gains 

in HAF FAM training and in providing continuing education 

through a best practices forum. However, the system is new and 

will need continuous support from senior leaders across the 

MAJCOMs to ensure that Air Force FAMs are knowledgeable 

about their own communities and their needs, the AEF process, 

and the needs of the Air Force. Furthermore, this education 

process must involve all FAMs and unit deployment monitors 

(UDM). This could be the first step in developing a deliberate and 

coherent officer and enlisted education and training plan. 

Once the FAMs and UDMs have a clear program that provides them with the appropriate tools to support the AEF system, the Air Force can develop programs to educate everyone 

from senior leaders down to the newest Airman. The plan 

should begin with precommissioning and basic training sources 

and continue through career development courses, professional military education, Weighted Airman Promotion System 

testing, and annual recurring training. The education process 

must be coordinated among these programs and be holistic in 
28

nature: it must fully explain how the system works and follow 

an Airman through his or her career to ensure comprehension 

and understanding, not just knowledge. Integral to the success 

of this education piece is training quality instructors in the 

subject matter and training purveyors of the process itself. The 

continuing education required for all Airmen should encompass not only those who plan and implement the AEF process 

but also those who teach others about the process, which will 

ensure that the individuals who deploy under the process fully 

understand the implications and realities of the AEF system. 

Also the education process must develop a clear strategic 

communication plan. The notion of predictability and stability 

needs to be put to rest immediately. To challenge the misperception that the system is broken, the Air Force must also acknowledge that the system has been tasked to do things it was 

never intended to accomplish. Acknowledging the stresses on 

the system that have led to breakdowns will provide credibility 

and academic honesty to leaders who address this challenge 

and will remedy the misperception that the system is broken. 

Additionally, once leaders at all levels are educated on the process, expectations, and realities of the AEF system, they can 

quickly take action to address and correct evolving misperceptions or abuses of the system that contribute to the negative 

perceptions of the AEF system.

Any strategic communication plan must contain clear messages on the AEF process that can be used at all levels of the 

Air Force by leaders in all positions, especially the senior leaders of each command. The strategic communication process 

must go hand in hand with the education and training on the 

AEF system. Also, it cannot be a one-time effort or push. It 

must be a continuous and ongoing process to ensure accurate 

understanding and perception of the AEF system. This threepronged approach to the AEF system—education, training, and 

strategic communication—will certainly provide a holistic 

means to address the challenges of an expeditionary Air Force 

that seeks to support combatant commanders. It will be an inclusive process where comprehension of the system will be the 

focus and help alleviate the misperceptions surrounding the 

AEF system. It will produce Airmen capable of explaining the 

Air Force’s contribution to the joint fight not only to other Air-
29

men but to the other services and civilian leaders as well. Regardless of the form the AEF takes, the education, training, 

and strategic communication processes remain critical to successful implementation and continued performance.

In the event that no action is taken to amend the current 

system, a vigorous education and communication plan must 

still be developed and implemented at all levels. Airmen serving 

today not only need to understand the role that they play in the 

joint fight but also must be able to articulate clearly the contributions the Air Force makes as well. This process must be an 

ongoing effort that begins with basic training and commissioning sources and continues through an Airman’s career. This 

continuing process must include the proper training of instructors. Classroom instruction is only as good as the instructor’s 

knowledge of the subject. Also, continuing education needs to 

encompass the total force and provide a similarly robust and 

effective education plan for Guard, Reserve, and civilian Air 

Force members. This program must expand across all ranks 

and all functions so that when asked how the Air Force supports current operations, anyone associated with the USAF can 

answer with authority and confidence. At present, that is simply not the case.

31

Conclusion

Today’s operating environment has revealed weaknesses in 

the way the Air Force presents forces and capabilities in support of CCDR requirements. The weaknesses include the AEF 

not being designed to support all scenarios involving military 

operations, excessive flexibility of the AEF, unit and leadership 

teaming, and assessment of contributions to joint operations. 

The observations in this paper touch the heart of the problems 

created by these weaknesses. The recommendations are an attempt to provide the framework needed to produce the desired 

end state of a measurable and sustainable expeditionary process that meets combatant commanders’ requirements across 

the range of military operations. 

Completing the transition of ACC to an FP will establish clear 

lines of authority and accountability for the sourcing and coding of combat and ECS forces and capabilities. The creation of 

a garrison force construct will improve unit and leadership 

teaming possibilities at deployed locations. The garrison force 

will also allow the Air Force to better respond with its capabilities throughout the spectrum of conflict by maximizing ECS 

capability for deployment. The shift from operations conducted 

mainly by combat aviation assets to operations conducted increasingly by ECS personnel demands a shift in how the Air 

Force approaches its force construct. 

Furthermore, a new FPM will create the boundaries needed 

for determining acceptable flexibility during force generation. 

In addition, the FPM will provide a structure that can be assessed, giving the Air Force the ability to explain its support of 

CCDR requirements. The FPM will also give the Air Force a construct to evaluate the stress on its forces and capabilities. Creating two sourcing constructs will posture the Air Force to conduct actions across the range of military operations. Eliminating 

the use of UTCs during sustainment of operations will prevent 

them from breaking down into descriptions of AFSCs. Finally, 

education, training, and strategic communications are vital to 

proper employment of the AEF process and provide the bridge 

between the process and individual Airmen. Unless Airmen 

understand how the system works and are able to communi-
32

cate that knowledge effectively, misperceptions that the system 

is broken will persist.

It is important to note that these recommendations do not 

stand alone. The Air Force’s expeditionary process is a complex 

system. The AFRI project conducted a strategic-level crossfunctional review of the entire process to recommend systemwide solutions to problems, not just symptoms. Just as the Air 

Force’s expeditionary processes are interconnected, so are the 

recommendations in this paper. Accepting one without another 

may only address a symptom and not solve the real problem. 

For example, a simple policy decision could be made to stop the 

creation of single-person UTCs. While on the surface this decision may look like a good idea, in reality it is not. Made in isolation, a policy decision such as this does not solve the reason 

why UTCs broke down in the first place. Without addressing 

the FPM and sustainment issues, a policy decree is only a 

band-aid fix. 

There is no doubt that the Air Force is supporting CCDR requirements around the globe. The challenge is whether the Air 

Force can adapt its processes so that every deployment is not a 

custom-made wooden shoe. This study’s “big idea” recommendations are an attempt to provide a framework to solve that 

problem. The recommendations are not the final solution. The 

next stage of research is to flesh out the ideas that are found to 

have merit. 

Notes

1. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms, 12 April 2001 as amended through 19 August 2009, 225.

2. Ibid., 397. 

3. Data provided by HAF A5/XW, 5 June 2009.
33

List of Acronyms

ACC Air Combat Command

AEF air and space expeditionary force

AETF air and space expeditionary task force

AFI Air Force Instruction

AFOG Air Force Operations Group

AFPC Air Force Personnel Center

AFPC/DPW Air Force Personnel Center, Directorate of 

AEF Operations

AFPC/DPWPA Air Force Personnel Center, Directorate of 

AEF Operations Public Affairs

AFRC Air Force Reserve Command

AFRI Air Force Research Institute

AFSC Air Force specialty code

AMC Air Mobility Command

AMS air mobility squadron

ANG Air National Guard

ARC Air Reserve Component

AVI aviation

BCT brigade combat team

CCDR combatant commander

CSAF chief of staff, United States Air Force

CSG carrier strike group

DPW Directorate of AEF Operations

EAF expeditionary air and space forces

ECS expeditionary combat support

FAM functional area manager

FP force provider

FPM force presentation model

GFM Global Force Management

HAF Headquarters Air Force

IRR Individual Ready Reserve

IW irregular warfare

JFP joint force provider

LRO logistics readiness officer

LS/HD limited supply, high demand

MAJCOM major command

MCO major combat operation

MEU Marine expeditionary unit
34

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

O-T-E organize, train, equip

P-coding posture coding

PAA primary aircraft authorization

PAD Program Action Directive

RFF request for forces

TAC Tactical Air Command

UCP Unified Command Plan

UDM unit deployment monitor

UN United Nations

USAF US Air Force

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

UTC unit type code
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Title of Paper: The Next-Generation Expeditionary Air Force

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The Next-Generation Expeditionary Air Force

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