[Cite as State v. Lambert, 2023-Ohio-1939.]

Atty. Gina DeGenova, Mahoning County Prosecutor, and Atty. Edward A. Czopur, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor, Youngstown, 

Ohio 44503, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Atty. Martin E. Yavorcik, 940 Windham, Suite 7, Boardman, Ohio 44512, for DefendantAppellant.

Dated: June 12, 2023

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MAHONING COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GLENN C. LAMBERT,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 22 MA 0080

Criminal Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio

Case No. 21 CR 10

BEFORE:

David A. D’Apolito, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed.
– 2 –

Case No. 22 MA 0080

D’Apolito, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant, Glenn C. Lambert, appeals from the July 1, 2022 judgment of the 

Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to a total prison term of 16 

years for sexual battery and gross sexual imposition and labeling him a Tier III Sex 

Offender following a guilty plea. On appeal, Appellant asserts his plea was not made in 

a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner because the trial court did not adequately 

explain the difference between consecutive and concurrent sentences. Finding no 

reversible error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} On January 14, 2021, Appellant was indicted by the Mahoning County 

Grand Jury on 13 counts: counts one through three and count 11, rape, felonies of the 

first degree in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B); counts four and five, gross 

sexual imposition, felonies of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) and 

(C)(2); counts six through eight, rape, felonies of the first degree in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(2) and (B); counts nine and ten, gross sexual imposition, felonies of the fourth 

degree in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) and (C)(1); and counts 12 and 13, compelling 

prostitution, felonies of the third degre in violation of R.C. 2907.21(A)(1) and (C).1 

Appellant retained counsel, pled not guilty at his arraignment, and waived his right to a 

speedy trial.

{¶3} Appellant subsequently entered into plea negotiations with Appellee, the 

State of Ohio. A change of plea hearing was held on May 6, 2022. Appellant withdrew 

his former not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea to amended counts one and 11, sexual 

battery, felonies of the second degree in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(1) and (B); and 

count four, gross sexual imposition, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 

2907.05(A)(4) and (C)(2).

1 The charges stem from Appellant’s involvement in sexual activity, sexual contact and/or sexual conduct 

with four victims beginning in 2018: (1) I.L., d.o.b. 1/25/2007; (2) A.W., d.o.b. 12/7/2013; (3) N.L., d.o.b. 

8/2/1991; and (4) T.L., d.o.b. 2/17/1979.
– 3 –

Case No. 22 MA 0080

{¶4} The written plea form, which Appellant went over with his counsel and 

affixed his signature, explained the State would be seeking a total prison term of 20 years. 

(5/10/2022 Plea of Guilty, p. 4). The plea form further explained Appellant could receive 

eight years on each of the two sexual battery counts as well as five years on the gross 

sexual imposition count. (Id. at p. 2).

{¶5} Similarly, during the plea hearing, the trial court informed Appellant as 

follows: that if the court accepted his plea, it could proceed to judgment and sentence; on 

amended counts one and 11 (sexual battery), he could go to prison for up to eight years 

on each count and fined $15,000; and on count four (gross sexual imposition), there is a 

maximum sentence of five years and a maximum fine of $10,000. (5/6/2022 Plea Hearing 

Tr., p. 7). Appellant replied to the trial judge that he understood the explanation of his 

potential maximum sentences. (Id.) The court proceeded again to inform Appellant the 

State would be seeking a total prison term of 20 years. (Id. at p. 7-8). Appellant replied 

he understood that as well as understood his counsel would argue for a lesser sentence. 

(Id.) The judge asked Appellant if he had any questions about the plea. (Id. at p. 9). 

Appellant responded, “No.” (Id.) 

{¶6} The trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea after finding it was made in 

a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner pursuant to Crim.R. 11 and dismissed all of 

the remaining counts. (5/10/2022 Judgment Entry). The court ordered a PSI and deferred 

sentencing. (Id.) 

{¶7} At the sentencing hearing, pursuant to the plea hearing and Crim.R. 11 

agreement, the State again argued for a 20-year sentence. (6/28/2022 Sentencing 

Hearing Tr., p. 4). Defense counsel argued for a lesser, unspecified term and Appellant 

apologized for his actions. (Id. at p. 9-19). The trial judge stated that “consecutive

sentences are necessary to protect the public, to punish [Appellant]; that they are, in fact, 

not disproportionate, and that the harm was so great or unusual that a single term does 

not adequately reflect the seriousness of [Appellant’s] conduct[.]” (Id. at p. 23). 

{¶8} On July 1, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to eight years on 

amended count one (sexual battery) and eight years on amended count 11 (sexual 

battery), to be served consecutively, and five years on count four (gross sexual 

imposition), to be served concurrently, for a total prison term of 16 years, with 530 days 
– 4 –

Case No. 22 MA 0080

of jail-time credit. The court stated, pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), that “consecutive 

sentences are necessary in order to protect the public, to punish [Appellant], that 

consecutive sentences are not disproportionate, and that the harm was so great or 

unusual that a single term does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the conduct.” 

(7/1/2022 Sentencing Entry, p. 2). The court labeled Appellant a Tier III Sex Offender

and subjected him to five years of mandatory post-release control. 

{¶9} Appellant filed a timely appeal and raises one assignment of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN THE 

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONSECUTIVE AND CONCURRENT 

SENTENCES RESULTED IN APPELLANT NOT ENTERING A 

KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA IN 

VIOLATION OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AND 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND SECTION SIXTEEN, ARTICLE ONE OF THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION.

{¶10} In his sole assignment of error, Appellant argues his guilty plea was not 

made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner because the trial court did not 

adequately explain the difference between consecutive and concurrent sentences. 

{¶11} Guilty pleas are governed by Crim.R. 11(C), which states in part:

(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea 

of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first 

addressing the defendant personally either in-person or by remote 

contemporaneous video in conformity with Crim.R. 43(A) and doing all of 

the following:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty 
– 5 –

Case No. 22 MA 0080

involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or 

for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, 

upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands 

that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront 

witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining 

witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the 

defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(c).

{¶12} The notice requirements for constitutional rights, outlined within Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(c), are reviewed for strict compliance. See State v. Howell, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 

17 MO 0018, 2019-Ohio-1806, ¶ 6; State v. Daviduk, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0167, 

2019-Ohio-1132, ¶ 14.

{¶13} The notice requirements for non-constitutional rights, outlined within 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(b), are reviewed for substantial compliance. Howell at ¶ 7. 

Regarding these non-constitutional rights, “scrupulous adherence to Crim.R. 11(C) is not 

required; instead, the trial court must substantially comply with its mandates.” State v. 

Root, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 07 MA 32, 2007-Ohio-7202, ¶ 14, citing State v.

Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108. “Substantial compliance means that under the 

totality of the circumstances, the defendant subjectively understands the implications of 

his plea and the rights he is waiving.” Id. “Furthermore, a defendant who challenges his 

guilty plea on the basis that it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made must 

show a prejudicial effect.” Nero at 108. “The test is whether the plea would have 

otherwise been made.” Id. 
– 6 –

Case No. 22 MA 0080

{¶14} In this case, the record reveals the trial court strictly complied with the 

constitutional notice provisions as well as substantially complied with the nonconstitutional notice provisions under Crim.R. 11.

{¶15} Regarding the constitutional provisions, pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), 

Appellant was informed that by entering a guilty plea he was waiving the right to a trial by 

jury, the right to confront witnesses against him, the right to subpoena witnesses to testify 

on his behalf, and the right to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. (5/6/2022 Plea Hearing Tr., p. 4-6). Appellant was also advised that if he chose to 

go to trial he could not be compelled to testify and if he chose not to testify, his choice 

could not be commented on. (Id. at p. 6).

{¶16} Regarding the non-constitutional provisions, pursuant to Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(a)-(b), Appellant was additionally informed of the charges against him to which 

he was pleading guilty and indicated he understood the nature of the charges. (Id. at p. 

5). The trial court informed Appellant that on counts one and 11, he could go to prison 

for up to eight years on each count and a maximum fine of $15,000. (Id. at p. 7). The 

court informed Appellant that on count four, there is a maximum sentence of five years 

with a maximum fine of $10,000. (Id.) Thus, the court was clear as to the maximum 

sentences on each count and Appellant revealed his understanding of the potential 

sentences he faced. (Id.) Appellant was then informed he was not eligible for probation. 

(Id.) The court also informed Appellant that upon acceptance of the plea, it could proceed 

to judgment and sentence. (Id.) The court then accepted Appellant’s guilty plea on the 

basis that it determined the plea was entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 

(Id. at p. 11).

{¶17} Appellant argues the trial court failed to inform him in the plea form and at 

the plea hearing of the maximum aggregate sentence by virtue of not explaining that his 

sentences could be ordered consecutively to one another. This same argument, 

however, was rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court and this court. 

In State v. Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130, 532 N.E.2d 1295 (1988), the Ohio 

Supreme Court considered whether a defendant is required to be informed 

of the aggregate total prison term he or she faces. The Johnson Court 

clarified that when a defendant enters a guilty plea to multiple offenses, 
– 7 –

Case No. 22 MA 0080

“neither the United States Constitution nor the Ohio Constitution requires 

that in order for a guilty plea to be voluntary a defendant must be told the 

maximum total of the sentences h[e] faces(.)” Id. at 133. Further, the Court 

considered whether the failure to inform a defendant of an aggregate total 

prison term violated Crim.R. 11(C). Id. The Johnson Court ultimately 

concluded that a trial court properly complies with Crim.R. 11(C) by 

informing the defendant of the maximum sentence faced for each of the 

individual charged crimes. Johnson, at 134. Specifically, “(f)ailure to inform 

a defendant (* * *) that the court may order him to serve any sentences 

imposed consecutively, rather than concurrently, is not a violation of Crim.R. 

11(C)(2) and does not render the plea involuntary.” Id. at syllabus.

State v. Novoa, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 19 MA 73, 2021-Ohio-3585, ¶ 20.

{¶18} The record establishes the trial court properly advised Appellant of the 

applicable maximum penalties for each crime, i.e., eight years on each of the two second 

degree felony offenses (sexual battery) and five years on the third degree felony offense 

(gross sexual imposition). See R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(b) and (3)(a).

{¶19} As stated, the written plea form explained the State would be seeking a total 

prison term of 20 years. (5/10/2022 Plea of Guilty, p. 4). The plea form further explained 

Appellant could receive eight years on each of the two sexual battery counts as well as 

five years on the gross sexual imposition count. (Id. at p. 2).

{¶20} Likewise, during the plea hearing, the trial court informed Appellant as 

follows: that if the court accepted his plea, it could proceed to judgment and sentence; on 

amended counts one and 11 (sexual battery), he could go to prison for up to eight years 

on each count and fined $15,000; and on count four (gross sexual imposition), there is a 

maximum sentence of five years and a maximum fine of $10,000. (5/6/2022 Plea Hearing 

Tr., p. 7). Appellant replied to the trial judge he understood the explanation of his potential 

maximum sentences. (Id.) The court proceeded again to inform Appellant the State 

would be seeking a total prison term of 20 years. (Id. at p. 7-8). Appellant replied he 

understood that as well as understood his counsel would argue for a lesser sentence. 
– 8 –

Case No. 22 MA 0080

(Id.) The judge asked Appellant if he had any questions about the plea. (Id. at p. 9). 

Appellant responded, “No.” (Id.) 

{¶21} Accordingly, the record reveals Appellant was aware his sentences could 

be ordered consecutively as he acknowledged the State would be seeking a 20-year 

prison term, which could only result from consecutive sentences since the maximum 

penalty for any one offense was eight years. Appellant’s guilty plea was entered 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The trial court strictly complied with the 

constitutional notice provisions as well as substantially complied with the nonconstitutional notice provisions under Crim.R. 11. Appellant fails to establish any resulting 

prejudice. Appellant’s 16-year sentence was authorized by law. See R.C. 2953.08(D);

R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(b) and (3)(a). 

CONCLUSION

{¶22} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s sole assignment of error is not welltaken. The July 1, 2022 judgment of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas 

sentencing Appellant to a total prison term of 16 years for sexual battery and gross sexual 

imposition and labeling him a Tier III Sex Offender following a guilty plea is affirmed. 

Waite, J., concurs.

Robb, J., concurs.
[Cite as State v. Lambert, 2023-Ohio-1939.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error 

is overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.