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IMPROVING THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: 

EXAMINING LEGISLATION TO REFORM THE FED 

AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY 

AND TECHNOLOGY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 8, 2012 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 112–121 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Vice Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

KEVIN McCARTHY, California 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

NAN A. S. HAYWORTH, New York 

JAMES B. RENACCI, Ohio 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

ROBERT J. DOLD, Illinois 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York 

FRANCISCO R. CANSECO, Texas 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts, Ranking 

Member 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

JOE BACA, California 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware 

JAMES H. CLINGER, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY

RON PAUL, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina, Vice 

Chairman 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

NAN A. S. HAYWORTH, New York 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri, Ranking 

Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

May 8, 2012 ....................................................................................................... 1 

Appendix: 

May 8, 2012 ....................................................................................................... 45 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, MAY 8, 2012 

Brady, Hon. Kevin, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas ....... 5 

Frank, Hon. Barney, Ranking Member of the Financial Services Committee, 

and a Representative in Congress from the State of Massachusetts ............... 7 

Galbraith, James K., Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr. Chair in Government/Business 

Relations, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University 

of Texas at Austin ................................................................................................ 27 

Herbener, Jeffrey M., Professor of Economics, Grove City College ..................... 22 

Klein, Peter G., Associate Professor, Applied Social Sciences, and Director, 

McQuinn Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership, University of Missouri ..... 24 

Rivlin, Alice M., Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, Brookings Institution, and 

former Vice Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ......... 29 

Taylor, John B., Mary and Robert Raymond Professor of Economics, Stanford 

University, and George P. Schultz Senior Fellow in Economics, Stanford’s 

Hoover Institution ................................................................................................ 26 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Paul, Hon. Ron (with attachments) ................................................................ 46 

Brady, Hon. Kevin (with attachments) ........................................................... 176 

Galbraith, James K. ......................................................................................... 230 

Herbener, Jeffrey M. ........................................................................................ 240 

Klein, Peter G. .................................................................................................. 256 

Rivlin, Alice M. ................................................................................................. 272 

Taylor, John B. ................................................................................................. 275 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Paul, Hon. Ron: 

Written statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio ........................................................................ 279 

Written statement of Hon. Mike Pence, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Indiana ............................................................................. 293 

(1) 

IMPROVING THE FEDERAL RESERVE 

SYSTEM: EXAMINING LEGISLATION 

TO REFORM THE FED AND 

OTHER ALTERNATIVES 

Tuesday, May 8, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC MONETARY

POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron Paul [chairman of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Paul, Luetkemeyer, Huizenga, 

Hayworth, Schweikert; Clay, Maloney, and Green. 

Also present: Representatives Garrett and Ellison. 

Chairman PAUL. This hearing will come to order. 

Without objection, I ask unanimous consent that those nonsubcommittee members who are present be recognized if they wish to 

give opening statements or ask questions. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening statement. 

First, I want to thank our two colleagues for being here today, 

and they will be recognized shortly. 

But as many Members know, the subject of the Federal Reserve 

(the Fed) and monetary policy is something I have been interested 

in for a long time, believing that it has a great deal of significance 

with regards to a healthy economy. Today, we will be discussing 

the various proposals to address the subject of some of the shortcomings of the monetary system. 

I think what has happened here in these last 5 years is that it 

has been recognized by many that monetary policy and the Federal 

Reserve has a lot to do with the creation of some of our problems 

and their shortcomings when it comes to solving these problems. 

The Federal Reserve has been around for almost 100 years—100 

years next year—and, of course, it has gone generally under the 

radar. Not too many people have talked precisely, because it was 

always said that it should not be interfered with by the Executive 

Branch or the Legislative Branch. 

But lately, there has been more concern. With the help of Congressman Frank, we were able to get some transparency of the 

Fed, and he was obviously quite helpful in moving that along. 

From my viewpoint, we still have more to do on that, but it is very 

clear whether we decide exactly what constitutional money is and 

2 

how it comes about. I don’t think many people reject the idea that 

the Congress does have responsibility of oversight and figuring out 

exactly how to handle that. 

So with the crisis that came about in the last 5 years ago, I think 

an attitude changed dramatically. I think this is the reason that 

we had strong support in the last session for auditing the Fed and 

more information has come out because of the lawsuits. 

But the way I see the monetary policy, and I think it is generally 

neglected, is most people realize how big the economy is and they 

know by supply and demand of all products and goods and services 

and labor—but, generally, they don’t talk a whole lot about the 

other half of the equation, and that is the monetary issue. The 

monetary issues are one half of all the transactions. So to duck the 

issue and pretend it is not important, I think, has been a mistake. 

I personally believe that over these many decades, the Federal 

Reserve has gotten a free pass because if we had good times, if 

they were able to stimulate the economy and have easy credit, and 

we had good times, they got the credit. Then if the predictable 

slumps would arrive and something had to be done, Congress 

would generally act and the Federal Reserve would act, and they 

would get the credit for getting us out of this slump. 

But I think that has changed in the last 5 years because of the 

seriousness of the crisis, how global it is, and how—one of the consequences has been this excessive debt, and then the bailing out 

that occurred. 

And so what the Congress did on the bailouts was significant but 

minor compared to how much the Federal Reserve was able to do. 

For this reason, so many people want to know a lot more about 

what is going on. 

Not only do we want to know about policy—and a lot will be discussed today about the particular policies and how to guide that 

policy—but one thing we should not forget about is the nature of 

money. If we are trying to describe how we manage a monetary 

system, it seems to be most difficult, in my view—you have to be 

able to define money, and define the dollar, which has not been 

done for a long, long time. We use the Federal Reserve note as the 

unit of account, but there is no legal definition of a Federal Reserve 

note, and that is a pledge to pay something. 

So a note being something precise, and then you have to have 

management and it doesn’t work well, then we think, we just need 

more regulations and everything will work out smoothly. I have a 

lot of reservations about that because I think we have a lot of inflation, we have a lot of instability in prices. And even when the reports come out that the prices are rather stable, they seem to ignore the fact that the cost of living for many is going up significantly. The price of energy goes up, the price of medical care goes 

up, the price of education goes up. 

So even when the CPI and the PPI might not be revealing what 

is happening, there still is a lot of destruction of the value of 

money. For this reason, now, we have been in a decade or so where 

the real wages have not been able to keep up, which really is the 

bottom line, I believe—the unemployment factor and keeping up 

with the cost of living and keeping up with real wages. 

3 

So I am very pleased to have the various Members here today, 

as well as the second panel of witnesses to discuss what I consider 

to be a very, very important issue. 

Now, I would like to yield 5 minutes to Mr. Clay. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Chairman Paul, especially for holding this 

hearing on improving the Federal Reserve System and examining 

today six pieces of legislation to reform the Federal Reserve System. One piece to abolish the Federal Reserve, sponsored by our 

chairman, Mr. Paul, and another one, as sponsored by Mr. 

Kucinich, would make the Federal Reserve an arm of the Treasury. 

The other bills would make various changes either to the mandate or to the Federal Open Market Committee’s governance. As 

ranking member of this subcommittee, I want to focus on the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate of maintaining stable prices and full 

employment for monetary policy. 

The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, better 

known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, set four benchmarks for the 

economy: full employment; growth and production; price stability; 

and the balance of trade and budget. 

To monitor progress towards these goals, the Full Employment 

and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 mandated that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System present semiannual reports 

to Congress on the state of the U.S. economy and the Nation’s financial welfare. The Humphrey-Hawkins Act charges the Federal 

Reserve with a dual mandate, both maintaining stable prices and 

full employment. 

Currently, the unemployment rate is 8.1 percent. Since President 

Obama took office in January of 2009, the unemployment rate has 

gone from 7.8 percent around the Inauguration, to 10 percent as 

the impact of the financial crisis spread, to 8.1 percent today. I do 

believe that the U.S. economy is heading in the right direction. 

With the proper nudge, it could probably improve even more. 

As of March, the consumer price index was 2.7 percent over the 

past year, a decline from February of this year of 2.9 percent. During the same period, the energy index had risen 4.6 percent, and 

the food index had increased 3.3 percent. 

Both increases are smaller than last month. In contrast, the year 

change in the index for all items, less food and energy, which was 

2.2 percent in February, edged up to 2.3 percent in March. 

All of these factors play a very important role in getting America 

back to economic growth and prosperity, and I look forward to the 

witnesses’ testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman PAUL. I thank the gentleman. 

Now, I yield 5 minutes to Dr. Hayworth. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is with great pleasure that I anticipate the testimony from our distinguished colleagues, and we have a great challenge before us because obviously 

a central bank—our central bank, the Federal Reserve, has—we 

have cherished its independence in implementing monetary policy 

and yet at the same time, obviously the Congress has to establish 

monetary goals and hold the Federal Reserve responsible, and we 

have obviously, as a Congress, the express power to coin money 

and regulate the value thereof. 

4 

There is this dynamic tension, obviously, between the independence of the Fed and its accountability to us. So it is going to be 

very interesting to hear your proposals as to how we make that— 

reach that balance. 

But in specific, with regard to the dual mandate, Chairman 

Bernanke has said many times that he does not perceive—in effect, 

he said he does not perceive an inherent conflict, if you will, in the 

dual mandate because, as I have understood him, serving the goal 

of price stability clearly works favorably toward having an economy 

that will work and that will enhance the employment prospects for 

all those who need work. 

Yet we see that his warning, which he has expressed very diplomatically regarding our fiscal policy, having implications for monetary policy that it cannot overcome forever and ever by accommodation, we see that his warnings seem to be borne out in the fact 

that several years of accommodating monetary policy have not resulted in the kind of enhancement in our economic statistics that 

we would like to see. 

So I look forward to your testimony and thank you for all the 

work that you have done on this very crucial topic. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman PAUL. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. CLAY. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison, be 

allowed to sit in. 

Chairman PAUL. We already asked for that unanimous consent, 

but without objection, it is so ordered. 

Now, if the gentleman from Minnesota would like to make an 

opening statement, he can do that right now. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you. 

Mr. ELLISON. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your 

chance to make an opening statement and to address this really 

important topic. 

I really don’t have so much of a statement as I have some questions that I would like to just put out on the table for discussion, 

and I hope we can resolve them during the course of our afternoon. 

Is the dual mandate the problem? The fact is, to the degree that 

we have had challenges to monetary policy, has the dual mandate 

been responsible? If not, why the focus? I am curious, if anybody 

could point to an instance in the last 30, 40 years when the dual 

mandate required the Fed to downplay their preferred anti-inflation approach to concern about unemployment? 

It seems to me that these are perfect. The dual mandate has 

been working. If it hasn’t, I would be curious to know when it has 

let us down and when the dual mandate has been the cause of 

flawed monetary policy. 

I am also curious to know, how have we have been doing with 

the dual mandate? Have we really been pursuing both, and to the 

degree that the statute would call for? Has unemployment gotten 

a short shrift? 

I am concerned that we live in a time when we are getting used 

to an unemployment rate of about 8 percent, and that might be all 

we can ever aspire to get down to. I think this is a national disgrace and an outrage, and I think our country needs to do much 

5 

more to pursue both prongs of the dual mandate. I am concerned 

that unemployment has not been getting its full due. 

So these are some questions that I have, some concerns that I 

would like to see addressed. And even though I am not on the subcommittee, I am grateful to be allowed to be on it today, and I hope 

that we can explore these important topics. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman PAUL. I thank the gentleman. 

I now yield time to Mr. Schweikert from Arizona for an opening 

statement. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will try to do this 

very quickly. 

Since being placed on your subcommittee, this has actually become an area of great interest to me. One of the sides you are trying to get your head around—and as we walk through the pieces 

of legislation—is what the Fed does in regard to monetary policy. 

Has this, as part of unintended or intended consequences, allowed 

those of us here in Congress to engage in really bad fiscal policy? 

In many ways, is it an institution through its actions that allows 

us to get away with bad acts? 

And secondly, even though this is one off, but in the discussions—the Fed is heading, their holdings are heading towards 

what, $2.9 trillion? What is the plan? At some point, when do they 

move back to normalization of their portfolio, and what are the potential cascade effects when moving back to a normalized portfolio? 

With that, I yield back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PAUL. I thank the gentleman. Now, I want to move to 

our first panel. First, I want to introduce Representative Kevin 

Brady from Texas, an 8-term Republican Congressman representing the Eighth District. He is the sponsor of H.R. 4180, the 

Sound Dollar Act of 2012. He is also the vice chairman of the Joint 

Economic Committee. 

Also with us today is the ranking member of the Financial Services Committee, Representative Barney Frank, a 16-term Democratic Congressman representing the Fourth District of Massachusetts. He is the sponsor of H.R. 3428. 

I will now recognize Congressman Brady for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KEVIN BRADY, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. BRADY. Thank you, Chairman Paul, Ranking Member Clay, 

and members of the subcommittee. Before discussing the Sound 

Dollar Act, I would like to acknowledge the work that Dr. Paul has 

done on this subcommittee. He is a long-time former member of the 

Joint Economic Committee who has worked to bring sound dollars 

to the forefront of the public debate. 

Inflation has been called many things, a hidden tax, a government-sponsored reduction in workers’ paychecks or, as Dr. Paul 

often says, theft, and more and more Americans understand the absurdity of a monetary policy that ultimately devalues our own currency. 

6 

We agree on three key points: preserving the value of the dollar 

is essential to economic growth and prosperity in America; the Federal Government must not be allowed to monetize its debt; and our 

financial system should serve the interests of all Americans, not 

just the interests of Washington and Wall Street. 

Again, I would like to thank the chairman for your steadfast 

commitment to bringing those issues to the forefront of the public 

debate. 

I am pleased to testify on behalf of the Sound Dollar Act. I want 

to thank the members of this subcommittee who have already cosponsored this important legislation: Mr. Jones; Mr. Lucas; Mr. 

Luetkemeyer; Mr. Huizenga; and Mr. Garrett. 

The problem today is that according to some, the 1800s was the 

British century, the 1900s was the American century, and the 

2000s, the 21st Century, may well be China’s century. Well, not so 

fast. But, for America to continue its preeminence in the global 

economy, it is important that we get the role of the Federal Reserve right. 

As we know, the Federal Reserve veered from the successful 

rules-based policies that brought the great moderation of the 1980s 

and the 1990s and instead, adopted an interventionist approach 

and helped to inflate the unsustainable housing bubble and led ultimately to a global economic crisis during the last decade. This 

interventionist approach, justified by the unemployment half of the 

dual mandate, continues today, and I believe it is a contributing 

factor to this anemic recovery. 

The Federal Reserve’s interventionist policies are felt by the single mom who goes to the grocery store and finds her paycheck 

doesn’t go as far because inflation is robbing her of the value of the 

hard-earned dollar, and she also finds the same thing as she fills 

her gas tank. 

These interventionist policies are also felt by the unemployed. 

The uncertainty generated by the Fed’s unprecedented intervention 

is discouraging business investment in new buildings, equipment, 

and software, which drives job creation in America. 

If you look at the fact of the numbers, government spending is 

where it was before the recession, and consumer spending is where 

it was before the recession, but business investment is not and the 

Fed has played a role in that. 

For America to remain the world’s leading economy in the 21st 

Century, Congress must give the Fed a single mandate for price 

stability, ensure that it is independent from political pressure, and 

hold it accountable for results. 

Critics charge that focusing on a sound dollar implies the Fed 

will ignore the unemployment needs of America. They are wrong. 

America can only maximize our real output in employment with 

long-term price stability. Protecting the purchasing power of the 

dollar over time provides the strongest foundation for lasting economic growth and job creation. 

Critics also react as if a single mandate is a shocking proposal, 

because we know the United States won World War II, enjoyed 3 

decades of prosperity, and put a man on the moon without the dual 

mandate. It is not a fundamental part of our constitutional fabric. 

7 

It is a 1977 policy directive based on discredited Phillips curves 

and Congress can change it. 

While it may be politically appealing, the current dual mandate 

asks the Fed to do something that it simply cannot do. Chairman 

Ben Bernanke has testified before JEC that in the long run, the 

only thing the Fed can control is inflation. In the long run, low inflation is the best thing we can do for growth. In a Federal Open 

Market Committee statement, he said basically the same thing, 

that the maximum level of employment is largely determined by 

nonmonetary factors. Further, using monetary policy as a shortterm tool—the speed growth may actually harm the economy in the 

long term. 

Let me skip to the end and make the point here that among 

other provisions in the Sound Dollar Act, we grant a permanent 

vote to all the regional Federal Reserve bank presidents. Because 

as important as important as New York and Washington are, there 

is much more to America’s economy, and therefore, FMC should 

better reflect our geographic diversity. 

We require the Fed for the first time to articulate this lender of 

last resort policy in order to reduce uncertainty and instance of 

moral hazard and speed the release of the transcripts from 5 years 

to 3 years to create more timely information and transparency, and 

we make sure the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is 

accountable to hardworking Americans by funding it the same way 

as other agencies do during Congress. 

Mr. Chairman, I have included my full testimony for the record 

as well. 

[The prepared statement of Representative Brady can be found 

on page 176 of the appendix.] 

Chairman PAUL. I thank the gentleman. 

Now, Mr. Frank is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARNEY FRANK, RANKING 

MEMBER OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE, AND A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Mr. FRANK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your acknowledgment of the work we did together. It actually was work, 

as you know, that began with one of your Texas colleagues, Mr. 

Gonzalez, who works down with us who was a pioneer in forcing 

the Federal Reserve to be open. He made them release information 

that they claimed didn’t exist. It was kind of a magical feat. 

But one of the things that ought to be noted, in every instance, 

beginning with Mr. Gonzalez and maybe before I was here and the 

work we did, as the information flow has increased, it has been 

beneficial. There have been none of the negative effects on people 

they are worried about. 

At the same time, it ought to be clear that the release of all this 

information has, I think, helped dispel the notion that there were 

nefarious things going on. We have gotten a lot of information out 

under the legislation we have. There will be no transactions the 

Federal Reserve engages in with private companies that won’t, at 

some point, be made public. I think that has reflected well on what 

8 

they have done and again, suggestions that there was something 

untoward going on haven’t been proven true. 

I filed legislation to remove the regional presidents from the voting power that they have. It was pointed out to me that that would 

have a problem of diminishing geographic representation. So I submitted an amended version that would have appointees to the 

board wanted by the President, confirmed by the Senate from the 

various regions. 

The problem you have now is this: The regional Federal bank 

presidents are picked by bankers. It is an extraordinary power that 

the FOMC has, and I think everyone agrees. And I cannot think 

of another element in American government where there is formal, 

binding, legal power given to the representatives of the industry 

that is in question. 

I don’t think the American people are unaware of the undemocratic nature of this, to have bankers pick the regional president, 

who, in turn, picks boards which are primarily from industry and 

with the financial industry dominate them. The statistics show 

that. To have them setting the policy seems to me to be greatly 

mistaken. So I think you can get to a presidential set of appointments without diminishing geographic diversity, and that is what 

we have done. 

Beyond that, I do feel somewhat compelled to come to the defense of the Bush Administration. The single most important economic appointment made by President Bush was, of course, Chairman Bernanke. 

Mr. Bernanke was his economic adviser, chairman, and then he 

became head of the Fed. And frankly, I think people have been unfairly critical of Mr. Bernanke. He obviously has been reappointed 

and reconfirmed by the Senate. 

But once again, there have been predictions that haven’t been 

borne out. The interventions by the Fed to deal with the problems 

that we had from the financial crisis have not led to inflation. Inflation is not at the point where it has become a serious problem 

for people. 

The loans that they have made, the intervention they have made, 

have actually made money for the Federal Government; they have 

not added to the deficit. And as I said, the openness shows they 

haven’t caused problems in terms of any kind of conflict of interest. 

Now, we did make some changes in the legislation that was 

passed. We mandated much more openness. We repealed that part 

of the law which said the Fed could give money whenever it 

thought it was important to do so if they thought they might get 

paid back, and of course, the best example of that was AIG, a unilateral intervention by the Federal Reserve in 2008. We still are 

owed some money. We have replaced that with some other ways to 

go. 

Finally, I think it would be a grave error to repeal the dual mandate. Yes, it is true that in the long run, monetary policy means 

what people have said. But as we know, the fact that something 

means something in the long run does not mean that is the only 

run, that there are not times in the shorter run and the intermediate run when a balance is necessary. 

9 

And I would say this: I can make a procedural point. I have a 

bill dealing with the presidents. I would be content to see that put 

aside because I think we have a central issue here in the bill that 

my colleague from Texas has put forward, and I will agree with 

him on one point, when he said that the dual mandate is not in 

the Constitution. I agree, even with the Federal Reserve. 

We made up, in about 1912—it wasn’t in the Constitution. In 

fact, Alexander Hamilton tried to put it in there, and got his brains 

beat out a couple of time. 

But the question is this: There are very big differences, and to 

some extent, they are partisan. Partisan differences can be carried 

too far and they can become embittering, but they are also at the 

heart of democracy. It is entirely legitimate to have contending 

groups with different views, and there is clearly a major party difference in that those of us on the Democratic side think that unemployment is a very serious problem that deserves being addressed 

explicitly. 

And so I would urge you, Mr. Chairman, let’s take the bill of the 

gentleman from Texas. Let’s put it out there, let’s have a committee markup. Let’s bring it out, and let’s debate that one before 

the election. Let’s have it be a stealth presence to the American 

people to take away the concern with employment after the election. 

Chairman PAUL. I thank the gentleman. 

I thank both Members for their opening statements. 

I ask unanimous consent to include in the record written statements from the sponsors of the legislation being considered by the 

subcommittee today. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

I will now yield myself 5 minutes for questions. The first question I have is for Congressman Brady, and I love the title of your 

bill, the Sound Dollar Act. That is something I think is so important, but it seems to get a sound dollar, we need to have something 

we can define. Do you have a definition in order to give us an idea 

what our goals are, divorced, maybe, from the policy? How do we 

define the unit of account, because it was precisely defined for a 

good many years. 

As a matter of fact, up until 1971 in a relative way it always had 

a precise definition. So do you have, in your own mind, a definition 

for a sound dollar? 

Mr. BRADY. I do, in my mind. We didn’t include it in the legislation. Right now, the Fed has identified a 2 percent inflation, split 

inflation target, which seems reasonable over time. But the truth 

of the matter is we want a rules-based inflation targeting. 

We want the Fed to stop, the go-stop policies, the interventionist 

policies and to focus on staying within the lines, both on inflation 

and deflation. Your point, that is the strongest foundation for economic growth. 

Mr. Frank likes to point out this is an either/or. It is not. The 

Fed does not do and cannot do a good job at job creation, as the 

chairman and the members agree. But over time, in fact, preserving the purchasing power of the dollar does create the strongest economy for the United States, or at least the opportunity for 

it, the strongest job creation so, no, there is not an explicit target 

in the bill itself. 

10 

Chairman PAUL. So in a way, you defined the dollar by achieving 

a price level or price stability? 

Mr. BRADY. We don’t choose a strong dollar or a weak dollar, a 

sound one. 

Chairman PAUL. Consider that there are many free market 

economists who don’t concentrate on that. They, as a matter of fact, 

want a flexible pricing level, not a fixed pricing level. 

For instance, how would this have been interpreted, or how 

would the monetary policy have been altered, say, in the 1920s because a lot of people say that there is no inflation because prices 

are relatively stable because productivity goes up. So if prices are 

relatively stable and due to productivity, but then there still are 

distortions in the stock market, say the stock market that, of 

course, led to the 1930s, can’t you be deceived if you concentrate 

on prices rather than looking at the total picture of the amount of 

investment? 

I know you did mention about not monetizing debt, so how would 

you adjust for the fact that the price level doesn’t give you the information because even today, a lot of prices, in spite of the monetary inflation, some prices are going down like in electronics. At the 

same time, the cost of an education skyrockets. So how would you 

adjust for that? 

Mr. BRADY. Thank you. One, I have, long ago, learned never to 

discuss Fed history with you, Dr. Paul, since you are as knowledgeable as anyone on the planet about it. 

But looking a little closer in history the last 40 years, what we 

saw in the 1970s was a great lesson. We were told we couldn’t have 

high unemployment and high inflation at the same time; it couldn’t 

happen. As we know, not only did it happen, but the Fed’s intervention go-stop, go-stop actually created a very volatile economy 

with very deep and frequent recessions. 

When the Fed focused back on a single mandate of price stability 

in 1979, that changed. And for almost 20 years, we had not only 

strong economic growth, but we had very short, very shallow recessions. So we saw the benefits of that focus on price stability. 

In the 2000s, we saw the Fed keep interest rates too low for too 

long. It helped to inflate a credit-fueled housing bubble and helped 

create a global financial crisis; and, to sort of wrap that up to your 

immediate question, within the Sound Dollar Act, not only do we 

focus on rules-based inflation targeting, but we require the Fed to 

monitor and report back on these potential asset bubbles, to monitor the price of gold, other commodities, equities, bonds, commercial real estate, agriculture, real estate industrial, real estate as 

well—and we don’t force them to act on that because that circumstance will vary. 

But we want to ensure to your point that not just the price index 

of the goods and services, but those potential asset bubbles would 

not only be monitored but reported to you and to me and to the 

public as well. 

Chairman PAUL. I have a question for Mr. Frank, but I am out 

of time. I think there is going to be a second round, so hopefully 

I can get my question asked. I now yield to Mr. Clay. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

11 

Let me ask both witnesses, currently, the unemployment rate, 

according to the Labor Department, is 8.1 percent. What can the 

Federal Reserve and Congress do to put Americans back to work? 

Mr. Brady, do you have any thoughts or views on that? 

Mr. BRADY. I do. One, I think the Fed is trying to do too much. 

They are trying to make up for, I think, some failed economic policies, in my view, from the White House. And I also believe they are 

sort of like the doctor who gives you a pill every 5 minutes and say 

how are you feeling? Take another one. How are you feeling? Take 

another one, as a result of actually creating uncertainty. 

I believe the more the Fed does, the less responsibility Congress 

and the White House are taking for getting the right fiscal decisions, getting the right tax policy, to balance regulations, ensuring 

the right spending levels and entitlement reforms that actually create that uncertainty. 

So I really believe as the Fed does more, Congress is doing less, 

and in the long term, that slows our recovery. 

Mr. CLAY. Don’t you think that Congress could be doing something now as far as passing a transportation bill, which would be 

a job starter? 

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Clay, I think it is 

important, especially long term to get our transportation policy 

right. I think that would be helpful. I also think taking off the 

table this discussion of higher taxes, just a tsunami of regulations 

hitting these businesses. 

The President’s health care plan, in my view, is right now a real 

deterrent to new job creation in America. So, yes, there are a lot 

of things Congress can do right. And there is a reason the Fed said 

in the end, we are not setting an employment target, because in 

the end we can’t control employment. 

Mr. CLAY. Mr. Frank, what do you think the Federal Reserve 

and Congress could do to put Americans— 

Mr. FRANK. The Federal Reserve cannot do a great deal more. I 

think they have been very helpful, and the policy that I think Mr. 

Brady still would prohibit in the future, we would have been worse 

off if it hadn’t have been for them. 

I think the interventions the Fed has taken in two levels have 

been helpful to us, first of all in helping to provide the funding that 

has helped our economy. Secondly, and I think this is a real point 

of difference between the parties, I was surprised by it, I think the 

role of the Federal Government, is the Federal Reserve has been 

working with the European Central Bank, has been helpful in 

avoiding the kind of serious downturns in Europe which will have 

negative effects on us. 

I think the Federal Reserve— 

Chairman PAUL. Check your microphone. 

Mr. FRANK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With the European Central Bank, have been very helpful and to have prevented the Federal Reserve from that kind of cooperation, increasing the chances 

of trouble in Europe would have been, I think, a very grave error. 

Secondly, as far as Congress is concerned, we have the major activity. We should be following a two-step procedure, long-term deficit reduction with some shorter-term stimulus. The fact is that the 

employment rate is higher than it would have been if we had not 

12 

forced, by a variety of fiscal policies, State and local governments 

to fire 600,000-plus teachers and firefighters and public works employees and police officers. 

I think that has been a very, very grave error. They have been 

hurt because many of them are financed primarily by property 

taxes. Property values went down. I think forcing those reductions 

by inappropriate Federal policy is a great mistake. Yes, it is important for us to reduce a deficit long term. 

Unlike many of my Republican colleagues who think the President wants to get out of Afghanistan too quickly, I think he wants 

to stay there too long. I think there is a great deal of room for reduction in the military budget. 

I think that we should be—and we will be fighting about this in 

the budget. Do we cut the military or restrain the military or do 

we cut our Medicare and Medicaid? So I would be for a short-term 

increase in spending and stimulus at the Federal level here, including primarily to the States. You give money to the States, and they 

are going to hire some people who, in turn, will be spending money. 

As for taxes, I heard the argument that higher taxes were going 

to kill the economy in 1993 when I voted for the tax proposal put 

forward by President Clinton. And in the years afterward, we had 

a very good economy. I don’t have to claim that the higher taxes, 

and marginal rate increase, a fairly small amount, caused that 

good economy, but it clearly didn’t interfere with it. 

I think if you talk about people who are making more than a million dollars a year, that for every thousand dollars they make over 

that, tax them $56, it is inconceivable to me, and I think it has 

been proven by economic history, that it has no negative effect and 

it allows us to do a long-term deficit reduction with some shortterm help for the economy. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you so much. 

Chairman PAUL. I yield 5 minutes to Mr. Schweikert from Arizona. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Chairman, would you like me to yield you 

a couple of minutes to finish your previous question? 

Chairman PAUL. Pardon me? 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Would you like me to yield you a couple of minutes to finish where you are at? 

Chairman PAUL. Oh, thank you, yes, absolutely, thank you very 

much. 

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Chairman, I would rather be grilled by Mr. 

Schweikert than yourself, if that is okay. 

Chairman PAUL. No, I saved this one for the ranking member. 

Mr. BRADY. Okay, go ahead. 

Chairman PAUL. The big argument is, dual mandate or one mandate. I am pretty much of a skeptic on what we get from the Fed, 

and I think they generally can find an excuse to do whatever they 

want to do, so I know that is an important argument, and it is 

going to go on for a while. But I am not hopeful that, in itself, will 

solve the problem, because I think they are rather independent in 

what they do. 

And I want to ask—I asked you a question, Mr. Frank, about the 

appointees, whether they are approved by the Senate or not, because a lot of people that I talked to are very interested in this subVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Nov 29, 2012 Jkt 075727 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\75727.TXT TERRI
13 

ject. They are very concerned about the fact that this isn’t a government operation. This is a private operation and they don’t like 

the private. 

Now, do you think you fully answer that, or do you partially answer the questions by saying people have to be approved by the 

Senate? Does this become less private and less sinister? Or how 

would you, frankly— 

Mr. FRANK. Actually, I wouldn’t say that, sir. I wouldn’t say ‘‘sinister.’’ I don’t think the people on the Federal Reserve regional 

boards who are predominantly from the financial industry in terms 

of influence, when they pick a president, who in turn picks the new 

people, it is not sinister. They are people of good will, but it has 

an obvious bias. 

Yes, I diminish the sector, which is the private sector, by not 

having a vote. 

There is another thing we can do, Mr. Chairman. You were absent—understandably, you had a couple of other things on your 

mind when we voted here during the reconciliation markup on 

whether or not to subject the Federal Reserve to the appropriations 

process, not monetary policy. 

But there was a proposal, as you know, to subject the Consumer 

Financial Protection Bureau to the appropriations process. It would 

seem to be another step that could be taken. I am not for it myself, 

but for those who are worried, I would think consistency would say, 

why not subject the Federal Reserve, including the regional entities 

to the appropriations process? 

So I think that if you said that—now, there is an alternative in 

terms of the regional presidents, which would have them Senateconfirmed, I think that might be worse. So, yes, I think I partially—I diminish the private sector element. I think except for 

people who are concerned about it more than me, would subject 

them to appropriations. 

Chairman PAUL. I am sorry, I don’t want to use all of Congressman Schweikert’s time. I yield back my time to David. 

Mr. FRANK. You aren’t going to comment on the appropriations 

process, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman PAUL. Tomorrow. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. He is just sorry he wasn’t here. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

One of the things I have been trying to get my head around is 

with the dual mandate, and this is for both of our honored Members here, does it ultimately, do you think, because—okay, here we 

are chasing inflation, here we are chasing unemployment, but 

through the back door, does that also allow us, as Members of Congress, often to avoid tough decisions, whether they be on, particularly on fiscal policy? 

Mr. FRANK. I don’t see how it does. First of all, I reject the notion 

that we, as elected officials, should be blaming the Fed, oh, it is 

the Fed’s fault. No, it is our fault if we don’t step up. 

To be honest, I don’t think, in fairness to us, that we are avoiding those. The problem is we have very different views about how 

to do it. That is democracy. Some people want to raise taxes on the 

wealthy and restrain the military and make some domestic restraints. Others want to do other things. I literally don’t know anyVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Nov 29, 2012 Jkt 075727 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\75727.TXT TERRI
14 

body who doesn’t have views on this. But, no, I don’t see the fact 

that there is a responsibility somewhere else in any way allows us 

to avoid anything. Our responsibility is the same. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Ranking Member Frank, thank you. I did say 

one truism and that is ultimately, it is our responsibility. 

Mr. FRANK. Yes. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. And in my, what, 16 months here, I find policywise, we do lots of trying to push it off to regulators and others. 

You do the work and that way we have sort of this plausible 

deniability. 

Mr. FRANK. But let me just say, I think that is especially the 

case with regard to military activity. In my 32 years here, when 

I have seen, I said, get involved in military activity without congressional authorization, it has been not been so much executive 

overreach as congressional ducking. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Okay. I am going actually agree with you on 

that one. 

Mr. BRADY. The answer is yes, absolutely. As the Fed tries to do 

more, Congress, frankly, is using that and the White House as an 

excuse not to take the key steps necessary to create the business 

climate for recovery. 

If, in fact, the dual mandate is the right answer, and the Fed is 

in charge of the economy, it is certainly not doing a good job—the 

weakest recovery since the Great Depression, lowest number of 

workers in the workforce, we, despite the stimulus, the bailouts, 

auto bailout, housing bailout, stimulus to Cash for Clunkers, there 

are actually fewer Americans working today than when President 

Obama took office. At the end of the day, it is our responsibility. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Chairman, thank you for yielding back to 

me. 

Chairman PAUL. I thank the gentleman. 

I now yield 5 minutes to Congresswoman Maloney from New 

York. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you very much, and thank you for calling 

this hearing. 

I would like to ask Mr. Brady to respond to a statement from 

Alan Blinder and Mark Zandi. In their paper of 2010, they argued 

that the Federal Reserve’s actions in the area of monetary policy 

during the economic crisis were more powerful and effective than 

anything that Congress did fiscally through the stimulus, and I 

would argue that the Fed’s pursuit of the dual mandate contributed 

to avoiding an all-out economic collapse and helped fuel our economy. 

So I would specifically like to ask my colleague, can you cite any 

example of how the dual mandate in any way hindered the recovery? Most economists believe that it was helpful in the recovery. 

Mr. BRADY. I think that there are a couple of key issues here. 

One, the Fed’s actions in the mid-2000s, keeping interest rates too 

low for too long helped bring about the crisis in which they later 

intervened. 

Secondly, I do think— 

Mrs. MALONEY. But that happened during Chairman Greenspan’s days. 

15 

Mr. BRADY. We are talking the Fed as it is today and its actions 

over the last 4 decades, truly. 

Secondly, I think the Fed— 

Mrs. MALONEY. But we are discussing it, just because I want to 

make sure you are answering the question. On this point, if I could 

make it clear, what we are looking at now is the recovery, the actions that took place by Chairman Bernanke and others in response, and you were saying the interest rates were too low. Would 

keeping interest rates high to avoid inflation have been a sensible 

policy during the crisis when we were looking for recovery in 2008 

and 2009? 

That is the time that we are looking at, how the dual mandate 

responded to the economic crisis, and I would argue that it was 

helpful. 

But my question specifically— 

Mr. BRADY. I actually wanted to give you a ‘‘yes’’ answer to your 

question. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Oh, really. 

Mr. BRADY. During the financial crisis, I think the Fed frankly 

helped fuel it. Some of the actions they took during the financial 

crisis truly did calm those waters, but stop there and look at the 

economic recovery since. In my view, you were pursuing the dual 

mandate, in some ways for the first time, identifying it as a way 

to not only intervene, for example, in the housing market and then 

continuing to intervene as well rather than allowing exiting of that 

market, continuing to allocate credit around the United States, creating this uncertainty on what will the Fed do next has actually, 

in my view, hindered the recovery. 

So if you look at three points: Did they help fuel the financial crisis? Yes. Were they helpful during it? Yes. Is the recovery on in 

truth? No. 

In my view, we are not at the job levels we should be, in part, 

because it is Congress’ role to set the fiscal policy to create the 

business climate so recovery can occur. 

Mrs. MALONEY. If the Fed had been constrained because they did 

not have the dual mandate in moderating inflation only, and would 

the recovery be what we are experiencing now, they were able to 

keep the—if all they had to do was look at inflation, they would 

have been raising interest rates. 

They lowered them in 2008 and 2009, which was very important 

because they had the dual mandate. And if they were constrained 

and moderating only inflation, if that was the only thing they could 

have looked at, then they wouldn’t have been lowering the rates. 

Having the dual mandate, most economists are arguing, gave them 

the flexibility to react quickly to the marketplace. 

I would also like to hear from the ranking member, Mr. Frank. 

Mr. BRADY. At some point, I would like to respond to that, because I think I can shed a little light on it. 

Mr. FRANK. First, I want to talk about the comment about the 

Fed’s role in inflating things during the Greenspan years. I agree, 

but not by keeping interest rates in general down, but by explicitly 

refusing to follow the mandate this Congress gave the Federal Reserve in 1994 in the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act. 

16 

And in subsequent efforts, many of us did believe that loans were 

being made imprudently to people who couldn’t pay them back. 

There were two ways to deal with that. One was, some argued, 

to deflate the economy as a whole. I think that would have been 

a mistake. There was an option. It was to use the authority the 

Fed was given to ban imprudent loans to people who couldn’t afford 

them, and Mr. Greenspan flatly refused to do that, and lately acknowledged that was an error in front of Mr. Waxman’s committee. 

And then in that period, in 2004 and 2005, some of us on this committee—myself, Mr. Watt, and Mr. Miller—tried to re-legislate 

that. 

So, yes, I do think that there was a problem from the Fed, but 

it wasn’t for not causing a deflation in the economy or less economic activity in general. It was refusing to use a specific tool they 

were given to stop the bad loans from being made. 

Mrs. MALONEY. My time has expired. Thank you. 

Chairman PAUL. I thank the gentlewoman. 

I now recognize Mr. Luetkemeyer from Missouri for his 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Congressman Brady, thank you for your efforts on this Sound 

Dollar Act. I really like some of the things that you have in there. 

I am just kind of curious, do you believe that we need the Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort? Do we need a lender like 

that, some entity that can be the entity that puts the finger in the 

dike when something starts to happen? 

Mr. BRADY. The answer is yes, and your question, in some regards, addresses Mrs. Maloney’s question, which is under a single 

mandate, focused on the purchase power of the dollar, could the 

Fed intervene in times of emergency? The answer is absolutely yes. 

They would still be the lender of last resort, still provide liquidity 

to those banks that just have a liquidity problem but are solvent. 

And, of course, they have the ability to increase or decrease the interest rates to tighten or loosen the money supply. 

So they would still be under a single mandate, and have the ability to intervene in very unusual and exigent situations. What they 

would not be allowed to do is to continue to intervene far beyond 

that financial crisis which, again, is contributing to the uncertainty 

today. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. It would seem that, looking at the last 20, 30 

years, their ability to impact our economy is greatly exaggerated on 

both ends. It would seem to me that they can nibble around the 

edges on these things, but if they actually had the ability to control 

unemployment, we wouldn’t have the situation we have today. 

If they control inflation, I don’t think that we would have had 

some of those situations we have had over the last several years. 

As long as we have an economy that is rolling along very stable, 

it seemed like they can tweak it around the edges, but it doesn’t 

appear they can do much more than that. So I really liked your approach here. 

One of the questions that I had with regards to title 4 of your 

bill, with regard to exchange rate responsibility, can you explain 

just a little bit about that section and why you put it in here and 

what you want to try to accomplish with that? 

17 

Mr. BRADY. Is this dealing with the special drawing rights ending that that slush fund? 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Yes, the exchange rate policy, bringing in the 

exchange, to exchange stabilization fund. 

Mr. BRADY. We have, unfortunately, over time created, in effect, 

a slush fund within the Federal Reserve, both from historical— 

about $100 billion in there, half of that about from historical dollars here and the other half, more recent. And unfortunately, Mr. 

Luetkemeyer, what has happened is that both Republican and 

Democrat Administrations related to the Fed have used that, in effect, to circumvent the power of Congress. 

The Clinton Administration used those dollars to provide a bailout to Mexico after Congress rejected it. The current Fed uses the 

guaranteed money market funds. Those may have been the appropriate efforts, but those decisions should have been made by Congress, not by the Federal Reserve. So under this bill, we end that as a slush fund. We apply the $50 

billion to reduce the deficit and we, in effect, return the Fed to 

what the Fed should do and retain for Congress, our constitutional 

role, to act in those matters of emergency. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. So what you are trying to do is rein them in 

and go back to establish principles or mission of what they originally should have been and get it more in line with what most people think the Fed’s mission should be? 

Mr. BRADY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. Congressman Frank, just quickly 

with regard to the bill that you have, why do you believe that it 

is important to have—I am kind of curious, all of the Fed members, 

the appointees versus the Fed regional president is going to replace 

those with appointees. Why do you think that is important? 

Mr. FRANK. First, let me just say one thing in response to your 

previous question, the biggest power the Federal Reserve had to intervene freely with Section 13.3 of the Federal Reserve Act, which 

actually came from the early 1930s under the Hoover Administration, and we repealed that in the financial reform bill. So they can 

no longer do what they did with AIG on an entity-by-entity basis. 

Secondly, the chairman asked me did I think it should be less 

privatized? Yes. I understand the importance of geographical representation. I think we should have people who live in the regions 

be the appointees, but I can’t think of a comparable case of formal 

governmental power, the right to set interest rates, and the impact 

they can have on regulation where the entity primarily concerned 

picks its own people. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Yes, but you are assuming from your comment there that this is a government entity when it really is a 

quasi-government— 

Mr. FRANK. Oh, I think it should be a government entity. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. —and has a lot of private implications from 

its independence. Don’t you think it should be more independent in 

its structure as well? 

Mr. FRANK. Independence, independence from the—I think you 

get independence with 7-year terms and 14-year terms, but I don’t 

think that the financial industry, which really dominates the selection of the regional presidents, should be independent from the 

18 

whole society in setting the policy which governs it. And, no, I 

think when you talk about setting interest rates, that is a governmental function, yes. 

And I didn’t say, by the way, that they don’t exist to the extent 

that they have some local economic functions; they would still be 

there. I specifically say they shouldn’t be voting to set interest 

rates to the Federal Open Market Committee, and I would be very 

surprised if someone thought that was not a governmental function. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. I see my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PAUL. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Ellison from 

Minnesota for his 5 minutes. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Congressman Frank, could you describe—and you already have 

alluded to it a little bit—but could you elaborate further on what 

benefit you see from ensuring greater representation of people of 

diverse experience on the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee? 

Mr. FRANK. I have a fundamental belief in the electorate ultimately making the decisions, and it is very anomalous. There is 

nothing comparable. 

As a matter of fact, today, with there being some vacancies on 

the Board of Governors, half the votes, I think, on the Open Market Committee are cast by people, and we did a check of who are 

the members of the boards? It is a kind of a closed system. 

The board members are selected to—with a great input from the 

presidents—they, in turn, pick the regional presidents, and it is 

private sector governance of an important part of what we do. And, 

again, I am not talking about what they do in their regions and 

their economic activity. 

The bill says they should not vote on monetary policy, and I just 

don’t understand what the rationale is for letting private sector 

people with the financial industry generally, not in every case, 

being the predominant influence, pick the people who come to 

Washington and vote on one of the most important governmental 

policies. That has been the whole premise of much of what we have 

been talking about. 

Mr. ELLISON. Congressman Frank? 

Mr. FRANK. Yes. 

Mr. ELLISON. I have some information on the board, by profession. 

Mr. FRANK. The regional boards? 

Mr. ELLISON. Yes. One person from labor. You have four academics, you have 41 people from banks, and 47 people from other 

for-profit corporations. 

Mr. FRANK. I think that is just a mistake, and it is not that 

bankers are bad people or others. It is that we generally don’t say 

it is kind of a corporatism. It is kind of let the profession govern 

itself, and I think that is a mistake when you have a large number 

from the financial industry, and they tend to be very influential in 

all of this. There ought to be a broader representation. 

Again, in voting on monetary policy, not what is done in terms 

of regional economic activity. These people come to Washington. 

19 

Now I understand people want some geographic diversity. We 

should do that, but it is very surprising to me, we don’t do that for 

any other Federal agency. 

We don’t say that the people in the energy industry, or we don’t 

say that votes on labor policy are set by boards where unions are 

the predominant influence. The President appoints people to the 

NLRB. A Republican President will appoint people differently than 

a Democratic President, but they are Presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation. 

And I have picked—half the notes on the NLRB don’t come from 

groups that are dominated by labor unions. That is the analog to 

the FOMC votes from the presidents. 

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Frank, I have a little time left. 

On this issue of more diversity on the board, you just talked 

about professional diversity, but also, it seems like there has been 

some lack of ethnic and racial diversity too. 

Do you think that including more voices from consumers who are 

from urban areas, rural areas, people who have dealt with hardhit neighbors, neighborhoods with foreclosure, do you think some, 

these kinds of experiences are— 

Mr. FRANK. I think that would be good on the boards. But even 

with that, even if I picked the boards personally, I wouldn’t want 

them voting on Federal Government policy. I do not think that private citizens should pick other private citizens with no intervention 

from any electoral process. There is no appointment by someone 

who was elected. There is no confirmation by the Senate. It is really, as I said, anomalous for people who believe in democratic selfgovernance. And, yes, I would like to have more—better representation on these local boards, but even with that, I would not want 

them—and by the way, they tend to be sort of self-selected. I 

wouldn’t want them, again, voting to set important national policy. 

Everybody acknowledges the monetary policy is very important. 

Some people think it has been too loose. I don’t understand the justification for that. 

I would say, and I would say again to the chairman, I know he 

wasn’t here when we were voting on it, but you also have this situation about whether or not they should be subject to appropriation. 

I think if you had all Presidential appointees and Senate confirmation, that would be okay. But I think others might say, well, 

gee, shouldn’t they be subjected to the appropriations process? But 

in any case, as I said, I cannot think of a comparable situation 

where the people in the industry most affected by public policy get 

to pick a significant number of the formal official policymakers 

with no intervention by anybody who is elected to anything. 

Mr. ELLISON. I yield back 

Chairman PAUL. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Garrett. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, and I will just run down a series of 

questions. Start at the very beginning. 

Mr. Brady, the question I’m not sure I heard the answer to, in 

my mind, your definition under the bill—I am the cosponsor—of a 

sound dollar, is that just the language of saying that if we hit our 

2 percent inflationary, as opposed to anything else? 

20 

Mr. BRADY. It doesn’t set an explicit target of 2 percent. It does 

not. 

Mr. GARRETT. Is that something that should be looked at and 

clarified in the bill before it goes forward? 

Mr. BRADY. I am very open to that. I would like to see Congress 

set that type of target in a rules-based system. 

Mr. GARRETT. Does the ranking member have a comment on that 

point by any chance? 

Mr. FRANK. No. You mean to define what is the sound—I don’t 

know how—I would be concerned about how you would do that 

statutorily. We are in a world where the dollar has several roles. 

It has a domestic role and an international role. The international 

role of the dollar is very significant, especially since we are confronting competitors in the world, the People’s Republic of China 

primarily, who use the currency. 

Mr. GARRETT. For other purposes. 

Mr. FRANK. And I would not want to disable ourselves from dealing with that aspect. 

Mr. GARRETT. So that goes to the next question, I guess, for both 

of you. If you did pass legislation similar to this, how do we know 

whether they are meeting the standard if we don’t set a standard? 

And then, secondly, is there a consequence of not meeting the 

standard we haven’t set? 

Mr. FRANK. That is a very good question and proves why we 

shouldn’t pass the bill. 

Mr. GARRETT. Now, the rest of the story. 

Mr. BRADY. Yes, for the rest of the story. I think setting a clear 

mandate, whether we set the explicit target or not and it is certainly open to that and then holding them accountable to that, I 

think, is key. 

And, Mr. Garrett, one point I would like to make, that going forward, and I think it is a terrible mistake to require all of the Federal Reserve Bank presidents to be appointed and confirmed by the 

Senate. One, it will further politicize the Federal Reserve Board, 

including leading to vacancies as we have today, and it will concentrate more power on Wall Street and Washington. 

I think it will be less independent as a Fed, because as you 

know, the regional bank presidents have an independent staff so 

they can actually not rely just on the chairman’s staff, but on their 

own to assess economic policy. 

And then, as you know, finally, the Board of Governors actually 

approves these regional reserve bank presidents. So we already 

have accountability within the system. 

Mr. GARRETT. I guess I could sit here and wonder, maybe as the 

chairman does, what our role is under either one of your scenarios. 

You are saying the reason you don’t have that appointment—under 

the ranking member’s position, it would go through Presidential 

appointment. I can see some benefit to that. But then I can also 

see we in Congress if that is all up in the Senate as far as monetary policy, we are sort of left out, except to hear the chairman occasionally come and testify and say, this is what they are doing 

and we have no standing— 

21 

Mr. FRANK. I understand that, but I assume that is what you 

wanted when you voted not to subject them to the appropriations 

process—may I respond? 

Mr. GARRETT. Reclaiming my time. On that, I just wanted to 

delve into a little bit more than what we just did in the few minutes that we had there. 

Mr. FRANK. I did offer an amendment—which I wasn’t for because I wasn’t concerned, but you voted against subjecting it to the 

appropriations process that would seemingly to have dealt with the 

issue you just raised— 

Mr. GARRETT. I am open to the idea. 

Mr. FRANK. Open to the idea in the sense that the roof is off. I 

mean, open to the idea, I think there is going to be very much 

openness for a very long time. 

Mr. GARRETT. We are just trying to do things a little bit differently from the last session where we moved hundreds of pages 

at a time of a piece of legislation— 

Mr. FRANK. I move, Mr. Chairman— 

Mr. GARRETT. Reclaiming my time, Ranking Member Frank, you 

did raise one other question that I thought the chairman would 

raise in here. You said with regard to the process, and that is the 

constitutionality of it. And you had made, I think, a good point saying that it would make it perhaps more constitutional if we had the 

Presidential appointment here that it becomes not in the private 

sector but more public sector. But it raises the fundamental question that I thought the chairman would raise, which is where is the 

constitutionality for either one of the proposals that are before 

here? 

Mr. FRANK. First, Mr. Garrett, the suggestion that we rushed 

things through 2 years ago, I think we had dozens of roll calls, a 

lot of meetings. I gather you have some concerns about your own 

vote. But I don’t think you should ever be concerned about the 

process. 

Mr. GARRETT. I was never concerned about my own vote, but 

rather I was concerned about legislation being dropped in at 3 a.m. 

in a conference committee that we obviously did not have any hearings on. That is not the debate we are having here— 

Mr. FRANK. I understand you don’t want to talk about your vote 

against subjecting it to appropriations. Let me say this to the constitutionality— 

Mr. GARRETT. I only want to discuss what we are supposed to be 

discussing here and not the way that things were held in the past. 

That is part of the reason why we are here today. 

Mr. FRANK. I will answer your question. The constitutionality of 

my provision is what it says in the Constitution, that important 

government officers should be appointed by the President, subject 

to confirmation by the Senate. And I think that voting on monetary 

policy is indisputably an important public policy and ought to be 

executed by public officers in the constitutional manner. 

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Brady, for the last word, do you care to chime 

in? 

Mr. BRADY. Congress holds the constitutional responsibility for 

monetary policy. We have, through history, contracted that out to 

the Federal Reserve Bank with a clear mandate, now, lately, a 

22 

more muddled mandate. And to make the point, first, I don’t think 

we want to envision a day where 535 Members of Congress are setting monetary policy in America. Second, America is really an 

outlier here. Of the 47 central banks and monetary authorities 

around the world, only two give equal weight to unemployment, 

only two have, in effect, a muddled mandate. The others have set 

price stability as either the primary or the hierarchically the single 

mandate for their central authority. 

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, may I have one sentence? 

I thought my Republican colleagues were in favor of American 

exceptionalism. 

Mr. BRADY. And I wish we would have dealt with that on Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac years ago. And I do thank Chairman Garrett 

for his efforts to actually solve the problem— 

Mr. FRANK. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. BRADY. To this crisis— 

Mr. FRANK. If the gentleman would yield— 

Mr. BRADY. —in history— 

Mr. FRANK. The Republicans have been in power since January 

2011 and have done zero on Fannie and Freddie. What is holding 

you back? 

Chairman PAUL. I would like to reclaim the Chair’s time. 

Mr. BRADY. You have been in power. 

Mr. GARRETT. I wish that you wouldn’t. 

Chairman PAUL. But I do. This will conclude the first panel, and 

I do want to thank our two colleagues for a lively discussion. I appreciate you very much for being here. I now ask the second panel 

to be seated. 

I would like to introduce the witnesses on our second panel: Dr. 

Jeffrey Herbener is the chairman of the Department of Economics 

at Grove City College; Dr. Peter Klein is associate professor of applied social sciences, and director of the McQuinn Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership at the University of Missouri; Dr. John Taylor is the Mary and Robert Raymond Professor of Economics at 

Stanford University, and the George P. Schultz Senior Fellow in 

Economics at the Hoover Institution; Dr. James Galbraith is the 

Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr. Chair in Government/Business Relations, 

and professor of government at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of 

Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin; and Dr. Alice 

Rivlin is the senior fellow in economic studies at the Brookings Institution and is a former Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve Board 

of Governors. 

Without objection, your written statements will be made a part 

of the record. You will now each be recognized for a 5-minute summary of your testimony. 

And we will begin with Dr. Herbener. 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY M. HERBENER, PROFESSOR OF 

ECONOMICS, GROVE CITY COLLEGE 

Mr. HERBENER. Chairman Paul, Ranking Member Clay, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear 

before you. 

Left to the market, the production of all goods, including money, 

passes the profit and loss test of socially beneficial production. Like 

23 

all private enterprises, a gold mining company produces if the revenue from the sale of its output exceeds the cost of buying its inputs. Its production is socially beneficial because the value of inputs in producing the output to satisfy its customers exceeds the 

value of those inputs in producing other goods to satisfy other customers. 

In the market, money production is regulated by profit and loss. 

Changes in demands bring forth more production. If the demand 

for money increases, making the value of gold coins rise, then minting companies would increase production to capture the profit. As 

the supply of gold coins increase, their value would decline, and as 

the demands for resources increase, their prices would rise. The 

profit would dissipate and resource allocation into and production 

of money would be optimal for society at large. 

The production of fiat paper money and fiduciary media cannot 

be regulated by profit and loss. It is always profitable for a central 

bank to produce more fiat paper money since larger denomination 

bills have the same production cost as smaller denomination bills. 

It is always profitable for a commercial bank to issue more fiduciary media through credit creation since the interest it earns on 

the loan made always exceeds the nominal cost of issuing fiduciary 

media. Although the production of fiat money and fiduciary media 

cannot be justified by passing the market test of optimal production, it is claimed that an elastic currency will render an outcome 

superior to that of a monetary system of commodity money and 100 

percent reserve money substitutes. 

Let me address three such claims for an elastic currency. First, 

that it can keep the price level stable. There is no social benefit 

from a stable price level. Entrepreneurs earn profits and avoid 

losses by anticipating changes in prices of all goods, including 

money, and elastic currency makes the entrepreneurial task more 

difficult by adding another dimension of uncertainty to the purchasing power of money. 

Second, it is claimed that an elastic currency can prevent price 

deflation. There is no social benefit from preventing price deflation. 

Faced with lower prices for their outputs, entrepreneurs reduce 

their demands for inputs, and their prices fall also. This leaves 

profit production and real incomes intact. 

Looking at the evidence across 17 countries over 100 years, Andrew Atkinson and Patrick Kehoe in a 2004 American Economic 

Review article demonstrated that there is no correlation between 

price deflation and economic downturns. 

The third claim for an elastic currency is that it can accelerate 

economic growth. There is no social benefit from attempting to accelerate economic growth beyond the rate people prefer. Instead of 

building up the capital structure of the economy more fully, monetary inflation through credit expansion generates the boom-bust 

cycle. In the research on the performance of the Fed published in 

Cato Working Papers in 2010, George Selgin, William Lastrapes, 

and Lawrence White concluded that under the Fed, the economy 

has suffered more instability than in the decades before the Fed’s 

establishment, and that even its post-World War II performance 

has not clearly surpassed that of its predecessor, the National 

Banking System. Economic theory and historical evidence demVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Nov 29, 2012 Jkt 075727 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\75727.TXT TERRI
24 

onstrate that an elastic currency system confers no benefit on society at large. Instead, it causes financial instability and business cycles. 

The Fed should be abolished, and a market monetary system of 

commodity money and money certificates should be established. A 

direct route to achieve this end is to convert Federal Reserve Notes 

into redemption claims for gold with a 100 percent reserve of gold 

and to redeem the portion of reserve deposits banks hold at the Fed 

into cash so that banks hold 100 percent cash reserves against 

their checkable deposits. At that point, production of money and 

money substitutes should be done by private enterprises under the 

general laws of commerce. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Herbener can be found on page 

240 of the appendix.] 

Chairman PAUL. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize Dr. Klein for his 5-minute opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF PETER G. KLEIN, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCES, AND DIRECTOR, MCQUINN CENTER FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL LEADERSHIP, UNIVERSITY OF 

MISSOURI 

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss such an important topic. 

My testimony analyzes the Fed and the reforms considered today 

from the perspective of an organizational economist. How does the 

Federal Reserve system measure up as an organization? Are its objectives, as mandated by current law, achievable and appropriate 

for a government agency? Are these objectives consistent with a 

healthy and growing economy? Is the Fed effectively structured, 

managed, and governed? Do key decisionmakers have the information and the incentives to make good decisions? Are they penalized 

for making mistakes? 

My answers to these questions are very strongly negative. The 

Fed has been given a task, managing and stabilizing the U.S. economy, that is impossible for any government planning board. The 

Fed has vast authority and very little accountability. The Fed can 

take actions that do enormous harm to the U.S. economy. 

Since 2008, the Fed has done exactly that. It has pumped money 

into the financial system at unprecedented rates. It has kept interest rates near zero, thus discouraging prudent behavior among consumers, entrepreneurs, and government actors, while encouraging 

reckless spending and the accumulation of vast public and private 

debts. 

The Fed has done everything it can to prevent the market adjustments needed for recovery from the financial crisis. All of this has 

happened without oversight, without external checks and balances, 

and without public discussion and debate. This kind of set-up is a 

recipe for disaster. 

Everything we know about organizations with vast authority and 

without external checks and balances tells us that they cannot possibly work well. 

Industrial planning fails because planners cannot, and should 

not, pick winners and losers among firms and industries. Likewise, 

monetary planners lack the incentives and information to make efVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Nov 29, 2012 Jkt 075727 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\75727.TXT TERRI
25 

ficient decisions about open market operations, the discount rate, 

and reserve requirements. The Fed simply does not know the optimal supply of money or the optimal intervention in the banking 

system. No one does. 

Add the problems facing any public bureaucracy—inefficiency, 

waste, mission creep—and it is increasingly hard to justify giving 

so much discretion to a single unaccountable independent entity. 

Mismanagement of the money supply not only affects the general 

price level, it also distorts the relative prices of goods and services. 

This makes it more difficult for entrepreneurs to weigh the costs 

and benefits of alternative actions, encouraging them to invest in 

the wrong activities, that is, to make investments that are not consistent with what consumers are willing and able to buy. 

Devaluing the currency and raising prices by injecting liquidity 

into the financial system rewards debtors while punishing savers, 

just as artificially low interest rates reward some market participants at the expense of others. Instead of winner-picking, we 

should allow market forces to determine the value of money, the 

price of loans, the levels of borrowing and saving, and the direction 

of investment. 

I do support eliminating the dual mandate, getting the Fed out 

of the full employment business. But I would drop the price stability requirement also. 

The belief that we need a central bank to fight inflation is based 

on a misunderstanding of the nature and causes of inflation. Price 

levels rise because the central bank has created too much money, 

not because the economy is somehow overheating, needing the government to cool it off. Central banks don’t fight inflation; they create it. 

Nor do we need a lender of last resort, which protects not momand-pop savers and investors but incompetent bank executives and 

their financial partners. 

I agree with Mr. Brady that a discretionary bailout policy encourages moral hazard. But an explicit, transparent, and evenhanded 

lender-of-last-resort policy has the same result. If you know the 

government stands ready to bail you out, you will take risks you 

should not take. Instead, we should allow banks to compete with 

each other and succeed or fail based on their ability to satisfy their 

customers. 

Reforms such as increasing the number of Fed Governors, shortening their terms, or changing how they are selected are fine but 

do not get at the root of the problem. Instead, we should replace 

the old-fashioned central bank with a modern, progressive, marketbased alternative, such as a commodity standard or competition 

among currencies. A market-based system would free entrepreneurs from the unpredictable and seemingly arbitrary whims of 

government planners, unleashing entrepreneurs to invest, innovate, and grow the economy, not only in the long run, but now 

when we so desperately need it. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Klein can be found on page 256 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman PAUL. Thank you. 

I recognize Dr. Taylor for 5 minutes. 

26 

STATEMENT OF JOHN B. TAYLOR, MARY AND ROBERT RAYMOND PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 

AND GEORGE P. SCHULTZ SENIOR FELLOW IN ECONOMICS, 

STANFORD’S HOOVER INSTITUTION 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 

Clay for the opportunity and thanks for bringing these important 

issues for public discussion. 

In your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned that we 

have nearly 100 years of Federal Reserve history to learn from, and 

it seems to me the lesson is very clear. Highly discretionary policy 

leads to problems and poor performance. More systematic, rulesbased policies, steady-as-you-go policy, leads to far superior performance. 

In the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve cut the growth rate 

of the money supply. That raised unemployment to unprecedented 

levels. 

In the 1970s, a discretionary go-stop policy led to double-digit unemployment, eventually double-digit inflation, low economic 

growth, and double-digit interest rates. 

In the 1980s and 1990s, a more focused policy, more systematic, 

more rules-based, in my view, led to long expansions, low inflation, 

declining unemployment, and eventually, higher economic growth. 

And, unfortunately, more recently, we have moved back to a 

more interventionist, discretionary policy, much less systematic, 

and the results have been a major financial crisis, a major recession and now an abysmally low-growth recovery. 

So you can look at the details, but it seems to me the evidence 

is pretty clear that we need to improve the degree to which monetary policy is rules-based rather than discretion. 

I think the legislation to change the dual mandate and focus on 

price stability, which is in Congressman Brady’s bill, and also in 

Congressman Pence’s bill, would help in this regard. So many of 

these interventions have been based on an effort to address unemployment, and the result has been exactly the opposite. It created 

these discretionary actions, which has been harmful. 

So for those who are worried that removing the dual mandate 

will actually increase unemployment, I think the historical evidence is exactly the opposite. You can look at the 1970s: This highly interventionist policy, very little systematic behavior, led to very 

high unemployment. 

You looked at the period in the 1980s and 1990s was less interventions, less focus, and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, at 

that point Paul Volcker, explicitly tried to interpret the dual mandate in a way that focused more on price stability. The results were 

dramatically better unemployment. 

And of course, now you have the Federal Reserve citing the dual 

mandate more than it has ever had before to justify these interventions. 

So I think the evidence is clear, and the idea is this unemployment rate is unacceptable. It is way too high, and I think part of 

the reason for that is monetary policy. 

Now I agree, Mr. Chairman, that the dual mandate is not the 

whole answer. So I would also encourage the Congress to require 

that the Federal Reserve go back to the reporting requirements 

27 

that were removed in 2000. There were requirements that the Fed 

had explicitly to report its goals for money growth and credit 

growth. And those were removed for whatever reason. But things 

like that could be replaced, a requirement that the Federal Reserve 

explicitly report its strategy for setting the instruments of policy, 

whether it is money growth or interest rates, whatever they want 

to do. 

It is their job to determine that strategy, of course, not yours. 

And in fact, if there is an emergency, and they want to deviate 

from it, that is their business. But they need to explain why. They 

need to come back here and say why we deviated from the strategy 

which we told you we would follow earlier. 

There seem to be these kinds of changes in addition to the restrictions that the Federal Reserve not purchase vast quantities of 

private securities, or the idea that we balance the voting responsibility among all the presidents, not just give special voting responsibility to some of the presidents, I think those reforms in Congressman Brady’s bill would also help a lot. 

And in general, it seems to me these kinds of reforms go a long 

way to having the Congress exercise its responsibility for oversight 

of an independent agency and at the same time not get involved 

in the day-to-day operations, micromanaging that agency. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Taylor can be found on page 275 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman PAUL. I thank you. 

And I now recognize Dr. Galbraith for his statement. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES K. GALBRAITH, LLOYD M. BENTSEN, 

JR. CHAIR IN GOVERNMENT/BUSINESS RELATIONS, LYNDON 

B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE UNIVERSITY 

OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 

Mr. GALBRAITH. Chairman Paul, Ranking Member Clay, it is an 

honor to be here, especially given that I am a former member of 

the staff of this committee and I served on the team who drafted 

the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment and Balanced Growth 

Act. 

I wish to speak mainly today in defense of the dual mandate, the 

plural mandate, the flexible and practical language of present law. 

That law was drafted at a time of acute theoretical conflict in economics. 

And on the staff. I was a young full employment liberal. One of 

our colleagues, James Pierce, former Federal Reserve Research Director, was a mainstream Keynesian at the time. Two other colleagues, Robert Auerbach and Robert Weintraub, were Chicago 

monetarists trained by Milton Friedman. 

We compromised on language that gave clear reporting transparency and accountability requirements to the Federal Reserve in 

the presence of ultimate objectives but that did not impose anyone’s theoretical views. Had we done so, I fear the oversight process would have failed long ago, perhaps when mainstream economics adopted the concept of a natural rate of unemployment in the 

early 1980s, perhaps when classical monetarism and the relationship between money and prices fell apart shortly after that. 

28 

Instead, being flexible, the process has survived for over 35 

years, even though the theories come and go. 

Now price stability is written into current law as an objective of 

monetary policy. It is the presence of the maximum employment 

objective, alongside price stability, in my view, that gives the Federal Reserve leeway to pursue inflation targeting at some rate 

other than zero if it chooses to do that. 

Similarly, if in some alternate universe, the Federal Reserve 

were to pursue a full employment strategy at all costs, the presence 

of the price stability language would give you legitimate cause to 

question its policy and the reasoning behind it. 

Having price stability alone in the charter would put the Federal 

Reserve in the position presently occupied by the European Central 

Bank, a very difficult position, obliged to pretend to ignore unemployment, even as that issue becomes increasingly important in the 

politics of the region that it is responsible for; obliged to pretend 

to respect its charter when circumstances dictate that, in fact, it 

deviate from it; and it would put the Federal Reserve in a perpetually difficult, I think false, position before Congress, really make 

it very difficult for the Federal Reserve to report forthrightly on 

what it is doing; and I think it would equally put the Congress in 

an extremely difficult position as, unlike the European Central 

Bank, which is an independent entity, the Federal Reserve is not 

and cannot be independent of Congress. It is a creature of Congress 

under the Constitution. 

I think also that creating a single rigid price stability mandate 

would bring back the technical difficulties that we experienced in 

the 1970s and 1980s over the definition of money. The definition 

of price stability would become similarly problematic. If one looked 

at the notional definitions of inflation presently in use, I think you 

would find that the Federal Reserve did not, in fact, violate its 

price stability mandate in the run up to the great crisis. It would 

be very hard to know before the fact when it was doing something 

that was not consonant with that mandate. 

Finally, this is a time of ferment in economics, once again, as the 

1970s were. The profession fell into complacency before the great 

crisis, and the crisis delivered a shock from which economics has 

not recovered. Issues of the cost of resources, of the as yet I think 

unfinished project of financial reform, remain unresolved. Unemployment is not going away as many prominent forecasters believed 

it would have by now. And there are limits to what the Federal Reserve can achieve. 

Reasonable price stability, which was the language in the Humphrey-Hawkins preamble, as I recall, is an important objective, but 

so is full or maximum employment. And I think Congress would be 

well advised not to commit to either one at the sacrifice of the 

other. 

I do urge Congress to continue to pursue the goals of oversight, 

accountability, and to probe deeply what the Federal Reserve is 

doing but within the framework of present law. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Galbraith can be found on page 

230 of the appendix.] 

Chairman PAUL. I thank you. 

29 

Now, I recognize Dr. Rivlin. 

STATEMENT OF ALICE M. RIVLIN, SENIOR FELLOW, ECONOMIC STUDIES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, AND FORMER 

VICE CHAIR, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 

Ms. RIVLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am happy to have this opportunity to testify before this subcommittee as you consider the diverse set of bills about the Federal 

Reserve. 

I will concentrate my remarks on the dual mandate. I believe 

that the dual mandate has served the United States well and that 

it would be a mistake to restrict the Fed’s policy actions to fostering stable prices alone. 

I would like to make clear at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that I 

believe in a strong, independent central bank. Without a strong, 

independent central bank functioning to mitigate economic and financial instability, I believe the United States would have a weaker, far more chaotic economy, and would lose its leadership position 

in the global economy. 

The objective of economic policy, including monetary policy, 

should be a rising standard of living for most people over the long 

run. Controlling inflation is a crucial element of the larger objective 

because high and especially rising inflation is a serious threat to 

sustained growth. 

I believe the dual mandate is simply a reflection of what average 

citizens ought to expect their central bank to do: Let the economy 

create as many jobs as possible, but don’t let inflation interfere 

with that job growth. 

Economists translate that commonsense exhortation into a monetary policy aimed at keeping the economy as close as possible to its 

long-run potential growth without seriously overshooting in either 

direction. This concept is enshrined in Professor Taylor’s famous 

rule. 

The problem for the Federal Reserve decisionmakers is that the 

potential growth is not observable because it depends on trends 

and productivity growth, which can shift unexpectedly. In the stagflation of the 1970s, hindsight indicates that monetary policymakers overestimated potential growth and did not tighten soon 

enough to avoid the acceleration of inflation at the end of the decade. 

In the 1990s, when I was at the Fed, we faced a happier version 

of the same uncertainty. We had unemployment that was very low 

but no inflation. We held off tightening the presumption, which 

proved correct, that accelerating productivity growth had raised potential growth and reduced the risk of inflation. 

Partly thanks to the Fed, we had a very good decade in the 

1990s. We also balanced the budget. The sooner we get back to 

those conditions, the better. 

But the late 1990s also illustrated the inadequacy of the Fed’s 

tool kit in response to asset price bubbles. The dot-com bubble, if 

the Fed had raised interest rates to deal with the dot-com bubble, 

I think it would have tipped the economy into recession, punishing 

workers and companies across the country for no good reason. 

30 

Influencing the Federal funds rate through open market operations is simply not an effective way of calming an asset price bubble. We learned that lesson again in the early 2000s. 

While we should not have needed a catastrophe to learn this lesson, the Dodd-Frank Act gives the Fed and the Financial Stability 

Oversight Council responsibility for financial stability and new 

tools with which to help achieve it. 

The dual mandate is not inconsistent with strong emphasis on 

controlling inflation when appropriate and even with an explicit 

target for inflation. Indeed, last January, the Fed confirmed a longrun inflation goal of 2 percent. 

Operating under the dual mandate, the Fed has successfully controlled inflation for 3 decades. To change the language of the law 

to imply that the Fed’s only concern should be inflation would send 

a misleading signal to a public rightly concerned with jobs and 

growth as well as inflation. It would imply that inflation is a serious current threat to American prosperity, which seems to me unwarranted. 

What we need now is a continuation of accommodative monetary 

policy plus fiscal policy that combines additional investment in 

long-run growth in jobs with credible long-run action to stabilize 

the debt. 

In short, monetary policy, as executed by the Fed under the dual 

mandate, has a positive track record and is currently appropriate. 

I would urge the Congress not to tamper with legislative language 

that has served us well. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Rivlin can be found on page 272 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman PAUL. I thank the panel, and I now yield myself 5 

minutes for questioning. 

First off, I would like to address my question to Dr. Herbener 

and Dr. Klein. 

Today, with our previous panel and this panel, we have heard a 

lot about the dual mandate, and it seems like that is what we have 

spent most of our time on today. 

Could you put that in perspective? How crucial is that? How 

much difference would it make? I know you have a different opinion about the overall picture and the monetary system, but if we 

are—we are not on the verge of having a commodity standard and 

restraint on the authorities, but how crucial do you think this debate is, and how much difference does it make whether there is a 

single or a dual mandate? 

Dr. Herbener? 

Mr. HERBENER. I don’t see too much evidence— 

Chairman PAUL. Make sure I can hear you. 

Mr. HERBENER. I don’t see too much evidence that in the performance of the Fed, the concentration on one wing of the mandate 

or another has changed their actual performance. So the Fed was 

in the 1980s concentrating on price stability more than the unemployment mandate, and yet they inflated to the extent of creating 

the bubble, the stock market bubble of 1987 that burst and gave 

us a recession in 1990, 1991. 

In other eras where they have concentrated more on unemployment, their performance likewise has not been spectacular. It has 

31 

been somewhat similar, I think. And so, I don’t think in practice 

that the dual mandate has been effective in restraining the Fed’s 

monetary policy or improving it one way or the other. 

Chairman PAUL. Dr. Klein, do you have anything to add on that? 

Mr. KLEIN. I agree with that. 

I would add that if you look at the incentives of the central bank, 

the central bank always has a stronger incentive to increase, to be 

accommodative and increase credit rather than to be 

contractionary. So I would be more concerned about an emphasis 

on full employment, which sort of encourages the Fed to go in the 

direction that it wants to go anyway, and I would be less concerned 

about it, relatively speaking, on an emphasis on price stability, 

which would tend to constrain the Fed and go against the direction 

that it naturally wants to go. 

Chairman PAUL. Of course, the argument that it didn’t restrain 

them is precisely the reason they like the mandate because it allows them to expand money at will and of course we see this as 

a problem. 

Quick question for Dr. Taylor, you are emphasizing some of these 

monetary rules, and even more monetary statistics, would you be 

in favor of the Fed once again issuing a report on the size and 

growth of M3? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I would be in favor of the Fed doing that. I think 

the more emphasis on money statistics, the better, in my view. 

They didn’t pay enough attention to that. 

But I would say from the point of view of the Congress, it seems 

to me you want the Fed to report on its strategy, not to dictate exactly what the strategy should be. So that is the Fed’s job. You 

come to this hearing and report the strategy explicitly like they did 

about the M3, which was I think constructive. But it also requires 

the Congress, this committee, to ask the questions about the strategy. I think that dialogue is very important. I wish we would go 

back to that. 

Chairman PAUL. Dr. Galbraith, I tend to agree with you about 

the constitutionality of appointments to the Federal Reserve Board. 

We always have a different opinion about what we should be doing, 

monetary policy and the Federal Reserve. But where does this authority come from, constitutional authority, since you addressed the 

Constitution, the constitutional authority to actually emit the bills 

of credit, which is prohibited by the Constitution, the creation of 

a fiat monetary system. Where does that authority come from exactly? 

Mr. GALBRAITH. I believe, Mr. Chairman, and I would be cautious about tangling with you on this, but the authority for the 

Federal Reserve Act simply comes from the authority given to Congress to coin money and regulate the value thereof and that the 

Federal Reserve Act has been a functional piece of American law 

for over a century now, so it would be a surprise to me if it were, 

per se, unconstitutional on that ground. 

Chairman PAUL. Of course, if there is a prohibition in the Constitution, you can’t change the Constitution by the Federal Reserve 

Act. 

But Dr. Rivlin, I think the removal of the report on M3 came 

after you left the Fed, I am not sure. But why was that dropped? 

32 

What would it have harmed us to know a little bit about the broad 

money supply? It seemed like it emphasizes a point of money 

growth and many believe still that the true price inflation is a consequence of money growth. Is there any reason that we shouldn’t 

have that figure presented to us? Why was it canceled out? 

Ms. RIVLIN. I don’t know. I believe that was after I left. But I 

am always in favor of more information rather than less. 

But the emphasis on the monetary aggregates was declining, for 

a good reason. They weren’t stable with respect to anything, and 

we have had all sorts of different kinds of money created in the last 

few decades, and the idea that it was mostly checking accounts and 

savings accounts has just disappeared. 

Chairman PAUL. I, of course, would like to see more attention 

given to the stableness or the definition or explanation or defining 

what the monetary unit is rather than trying to concentrate on the 

consequences of an unstable currency. But we don’t have much 

time to get into that, so now I am going to yield 5 minutes to Mr. 

Clay. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome back, Dr. Rivlin. 

Dr. Rivlin, at any time during your tenure on the Board of Governors, did the dual mandate interfere with the Board’s ability to 

set monetary policy? 

Ms. RIVLIN. No, I don’t believe it did, Mr. Clay. 

Setting monetary policy is really difficult. And you are always 

weighing different considerations. But we were very focused, when 

I was there, on what was happening to productivity growth, which 

was something of a mystery. We weren’t very worried about inflation because it was falling, and so we continued, I think, thinking 

we were in conjunction with both mandates to keep interest rates 

relatively low. 

Mr. CLAY. And inflation was falling because the economy was robust. It was growing jobs, and that was because the Administration 

was working with Congress to help the economy along. Is that correct? 

Ms. RIVLIN. We had strong growth in the economy. We had a restrictive fiscal policy in that period. We were trying to get back to 

a balanced budget, which sounds like a fantasy now, and we did 

it. So the Fed’s job was easier at that moment because the fiscal 

policy was quite restrictive. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you for that response. 

And Dr. Galbraith, as an architect of the dual mandate, can you 

share with this committee the vision and the need that the two legislative authors had for the dual mandate then, back then, Senator 

Humphrey and Congressman Hawkins? 

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes, Congressman. I had the privilege of working directly with Congressman Hawkins at that time. Of course, an 

economic policy mandate was not a new thing for the United 

States. We had the Full Employment Act of 1945, which stipulated 

maximum employment production and purchasing power as the 

goals of United States economic policy for the whole of the government. 

The Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment and Balanced Growth 

Act sought to modernize and to make a little more ambitious and 

33 

a little clearer the objective, particularly with respect to employment. And it also ended up clarifying what was meant by purchasing power, that is where the reasonable price stability came 

into the preamble. So it was a way of broadly specifying economic 

policy objectives for the entire government. But also with respect 

to the Federal Reserve, this was the moment that codified what we 

had set up through H. Con. Res. 133, in 1975, a process of dialogue 

with the Federal Reserve, regular oversight hearings, which goes 

on. And the Humphrey-Hawkins Act Federal Reserve provisions 

placed those into law and set a regular procedure, and that included, of course, as Professor Taylor said, goals for the growth of 

various monetary aggregates, which over time, as Dr. Rivlin has 

just said, became less useful because the relationship between 

those objectives or those statistics and anything you ultimately 

cared about became much noisier and less reliable. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you for that response. 

Dr. Klein, being from Missouri, my home State, let me ask you 

about something that Americans are concerned about, and that is 

the rise in gasoline prices at the pump, especially the working 

class. 

What measures could the Federal Reserve take to stabilize the 

recent rise in gas prices? Any suggestions? 

Mr. KLEIN. The price of gasoline and the price of oil fall a little 

bit outside the mandate of the monetary authority. So certainly rising energy prices is one manifestation of a monetary policy that is 

overly accommodative. But on the whole, energy prices, especially 

for oil, gas, and so forth are set primarily in global energy markets 

over which U.S. policymakers have relatively little control. There 

are measures about increasing supply and so on that might be 

within the purview of Congress or the Executive Branch, but in my 

view, there is not much that the Federal Reserve System can or 

should be doing about that. 

Mr. CLAY. Thanks for your response. 

I yield back. 

Chairman PAUL. I now recognize the gentlelady from New York, 

Dr. Hayworth. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again 

for holding this hearing and for your leadership on this crucial 

question. 

I would like to ask this question of the panel: Is it fair to say 

that we probably would not have to debate as vigorously and as urgently as we do, and legitimately so, under these circumstances, 

the role of the Fed were it not for the fact that the Fed has, as our 

central bank, had to contend over the decades with an increasingly 

incontinent Federal fisc? To me, it strikes me that we talk about 

the mandates for the Fed and the way in which it operates, and 

again thinking about our conversations with Chairman Bernanke, 

that so much of what the Fed has felt compelled to do, if you will, 

I realize I am using a somewhat loose interpretation, has been in 

response to the fact that we have a Federal Government that fundamentally has continued, and at an accelerating rate over the 

past few years, to mismanage, if you will, large segments of the 

economy. 

Dr. Klein, perhaps you could start with that, please? 

34 

Mr. KLEIN. I certainly think it is the case that the job that is 

given to the Fed becomes more difficult under the circumstances 

that you describe. But I am not sure it is right to think of other 

branches of the Federal Government, the Treasury, Congress and 

so on, and the Fed as being sort of antagonists, competing against 

each other or playing off each other. 

One of the major functions performed by, in open market operations, is, as has already been discussed earlier this morning, monetizing the debt, so the Fed facilitates government expenditures 

and government borrowing that otherwise would not be politically 

feasible if the Fed were not there to monetize the debt. 

I think the Fed and the rest of the Federal Government are 

much more likely to be seen as working hand-in-hand than opposing each other. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. Which actually, is exactly what I meant. The Fed 

has been the government’s enabler to a certain extent, the Federal 

Government’s enabler, and that is part of our problem. It is very 

difficult to use monetary policy to endlessly accommodate what we 

have taken on. 

Mr. KLEIN. Yes, I agree with that. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. Thank you sir. Dr. Herbener? 

Mr. HERBENER. Yes, I agree, as well. It creates a certain type of 

moral hazard to be able to appeal directly to a printing press or 

to some agency that would monetize debts that are issued. I would 

be profligate as well, anyone would, relative to not having that 

kind of accommodation. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. Absolutely. 

Dr. Taylor. Thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. I think, if you hold out your shingle and say 

you are open for business, then people will come. I think that is 

what basically has happened. The Federal Reserve has provided 

what you describe as an alternative to some actions. It bought 77 

percent last fiscal year of the debt issued by the government. That 

is a big, big intervention. 

I think monetary policy is itself part of the problem now, given 

what it has done, but fiscal policy obviously is a problem, as is regulatory policy. So there is a whole gamut of policies. I think each 

of those should be addressed separately. Monetary policy can be 

improved and so can fiscal policy and regulatory policy. But the 

idea of working hand-in-hand, I think, leads to the kind of problems we have seen already. That is why I think questions about 

the mandate are important. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. That indeed is why I myself have become a cosponsor of Representative Pence’s bill, because of that moral hazard issue. 

I am eager to hear from Dr. Galbraith and Dr. Rivlin. 

Mr. GALBRAITH. I think many of our problems now are due to a 

disastrous deregulation and desupervision of the financial sector 

which led to a catastrophic meltdown of that industry and of the 

solvency of much of the American middle class, and the consequences, the effects that we see in the Federal budget are largely 

a consequence, not a cause, of that phenomena—tax revenues fall. 

Unemployment payments go up. Other kinds of stabilizing payments go up. We are much better off actually for having a large 

35 

Federal Government, a Federal budget that can stabilize the economy in this situation than we would be if we didn’t have it. 

We didn’t have it in the 1930s, and our output fell by about onethird. The overall decline was much less this time around, and that 

was because incomes were substantially stabilized by the fiscal actions of the government. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. Wow, we have a lot of food for thought there, Dr. 

Galbraith. You have defined the crux of the contrast between the 

two sides of this dais, and I realize we are out of time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I yield back. 

Chairman PAUL. I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, 

Mr. Schweikert. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, forgive me, but this is sort of an esoteric question, and no 

pointing and laughing, particularly for all of you with Ph.D.s. We 

take a look back over the last 30 years at many of the different 

asset bubbles, whether it be real estate or even certain commercial 

bubbles, whether it be the Internet bubble, where it was often large 

amounts of resources going in and inflating value beyond. 

Is it theoretically possible to have a bubble on the Fed’s balance 

sheet by acquiring so much U.S. sovereign paper, so much mortgage backed, MBS? At some point, does it create a type of distortion in the market, either by creating dramatically artificially low 

interest rates over here, and at some point, that is a bond bubble— 

it is a cascade effect—or actually on their own holdings itself? And 

is that just as—right now, we have the discussion about, are we 

heading towards a student loan bubble because we are $1 trillion 

there? We are heading to $3 trillion on the Federal balance sheet. 

It is a little esoteric, and it is not as—but is it one off? 

Dr. Herbener, please, share with me, is my concern just sort of 

unfounded? 

Mr. HERBENER. I think the Fed balance sheet, of course, exhibits 

the source of the bubbles that manifest in the economy. So when 

we see the Fed’s balance sheet, they engage in open market operations, or they buy mortgage-backed securities from the banks and 

so on and generate reserves in the banking system, then it creates 

the possibility of the banks just creating credit on the basis of these 

reserves and channeling this credit into particular lines of activity 

where the bubbles arise. And so this is the very process by which 

the asset-priced bubbles are generated in the economy. We can’t always tell exactly what lines they will be generated in just by looking at the Fed’s balance sheet because the banks, of course, can 

generate credit in different lines. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Dr. Rivlin, I owe you—you will not remember, 

but many years ago, I ran into you walking down the street and 

you were very, very kind to me. You spent literally 10, 15 minutes 

just talking to me on the street about a couple of esoteric issues, 

so I have always been very appreciative of your time. 

Ms. RIVLIN. Thank you. I am glad you have that memory. 

I think asset bubbles are a real problem for the Fed, but not because of the balance sheet effect. Because monetary policy is not 

a good tool for dealing with asset price bubbles. It is a good tool 

for dealing with general price inflation. 

36 

So the Fed needs different tools, credit, specific credit controls 

and controls on excessive leverage to deal with bubbles. And the 

Dodd-Frank Act does put them in that business, and I think that 

is good. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Could current Fed action, and I would like Dr. 

Galbraith’s opinion, could the current Fed sheet balance sheet, the 

mechanics there, could it also be leading to a bond bubble right 

now if we start to move toward more normalized interest rates, 

have we created so much paper that that is in many ways artificial 

rates? Does it create a cascade when we start to move? 

Ms. RIVLIN. I don’t think it has to. I think the Fed can get its 

balance sheet down quickly. It is always much easier for the Fed 

to be less accommodative than more. And I am not worried about 

this astonishing balance sheet. It is very big, but right now, the 

reason to worry would be to, that we had general inflation, and we 

don’t. 

Mr. GALBRAITH. I think it would be very hard for the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates rapidly. And I don’t think it is likely 

to do so. One way to interpret your question is to ask whether 

there is a situation in which the markets might sell off U.S. bonds 

rapidly without that being controllable by monetary policy action. 

I think that is also unlikely under present conditions. 

What the markets have shown us is that in adversity, people 

want to hold U.S. bonds. They want to hold U.S. bonds over practically any other asset because we are the largest, most liquid, and 

completely reliable market in the world for safe liquid asserts. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. I am sorry, but how much more capacity do 

you believe is pragmatic for the Fed to continue to grow at? Do 

they go to $4 trillion, $5 trillion? How big do these balance sheets 

get? 

Mr. GALBRAITH. That is a very interesting question for which, 

Congressman, I have to tell you, I don’t have an answer. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you for yielding to me, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PAUL. We are going to have a brief second round if you 

are able to stay. 

But I have a question for Dr. Rivlin and also for Dr. Klein. I 

don’t want to get into so much on the cause, but I am trying to get 

an assessment of how serious you think the world financial crisis 

is? A lot of us put a lot of blame on monetary policy and the Federal Reserve and the dollar reserve standard and excessive debt 

and these issues. We are not going to resolve that today, who is to 

blame. 

But do you consider the world financial situation to be a mess 

or just something that will be taken care of soon and there is not 

that much to worry about? 

Ms. RIVLIN. I am very worried about Europe. I think the austerity policies are the wrong policies at the moment, that they— 

and they will make the situation worse, and that could be bad for 

us. The long-run debt situation in Europe is serious, but at the moment, I would focus attention on their getting out of the recession. 

For us, I think we have to get out of this recession too, but we 

have to get our long-run debt under control. I think we can, but 

we haven’t. 

37 

Chairman PAUL. Could you follow up, Dr. Klein, give me your assessment? 

Mr. KLEIN. I think it is a huge crisis, both in Europe and in the 

United States, with tremendous consequences, not only the crisis 

itself but in my view, the response to the crisis by the monetary 

authority. The hugely accommodative policy, the zero interest rates 

and so on have taken a bad situation and sown the seeds for making that situation much, much worse. Of course, we haven’t seen 

substantial rises in the overall price level since 2008. But if you 

look at the amount of money that has been pumped into the system, the increase in bank reserves and so on, there is simply no 

theoretical model of which I am aware, no empirical study that I 

can cite, in which those kinds of actions do not have very serious, 

long-run consequences on price inflation. So I think we haven’t 

seen the worst of the results that our current policy is bringing 

about. 

Chairman PAUL. Thank you, and I yield to Mr. Clay. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to start with 

a panel-wide question. Perhaps you can briefly try to answer it, 

starting with Dr. Herbener, do you think the Federal Reserve’s 

monetary policy execution would be more effective if it set explicit 

inflation targets and was held accountable to those targets? 

Mr. HERBENER. Not really. I think when the Fed engages in any 

kind of expansionary monetary policy, they always generate the 

same ill effect in the economy. They always generate some kind of 

credit expansion, which leads to a pattern of malinvestments, even 

when they keep overall price levels stable. They generate asset 

price inflation within the general price level, and these lines of 

malinvestment is the sort of thing that we saw in the 1920s, very 

similarly also in the 1980s. 

So even if there were stable price-level targets that the Fed could 

hit, they would still generate the same kind of financial instability 

and patterns of malinvestments and then the necessary liquidation 

that we see in the bus. 

Mr. CLAY. How about, Dr. Klein, your opinion? 

Mr. KLEIN. Yes, sir, I think posing the problem as a trade-off between, say, inflation targeting as opposed to targeting nominal income is sort of a false dichotomy. Something that Representative 

Paul mentioned in the first round was the idea of increased productivity resulting in decreases in prices as, of course, we see in many 

industries, computers, information technology and so on. 

There is no reason that we should expect or desire, ‘‘stable price 

level’’ of 2 percent a year or whatever. In a growing economy, we 

might easily expect the price level to fall. That is exactly what happened during the 19th Century in the United States, which is the 

period of the strongest sustained economic growth in U.S. history, 

that increased growth, which was driven by productivity improvements resulted in a decreasing, and decreasing average price levels. There is no reason for policy to try to prevent that. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Dr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. We already have an inflation target that is announced, 2 percent. But in the meantime we continue to do this 

highly interventionist policy, so it seems to me that is not enough, 

and that is why people are talking about the dual mandate. That 

38 

is why I am talking about returning to reporting about the strategy 

of the Fed. So I think you need more than that to get out of the 

terrible situation we are in now. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you. Dr. Galbraith? 

Mr. GALBRAITH. I think explicit targets can be useful. In the 

Humphrey-Hawkins law, there was an interim target for 4 percent 

unemployment, 3 percent inflation to be achieved after 4 years. It 

took 22 years until Alice Rivlin was running things and it actually 

happened. But the difficulty, I think, was in setting too ambitious 

a target and allowing too long a timeframe for there to be real accountability. 

If you are going to set targets, it should be on an interactive 

basis and something where you can come back in a year and say, 

look, how did you do in relation to those targets, and what have 

you learned about the world from your experience? That would 

make a useful contribution, it seems to me. 

Mr. CLAY. Dr. Rivlin, your opinion? 

Ms. RIVLIN. I would agree with that. I think that the 2 percent 

target is about right. I wasn’t a big enthusiast of setting an explicit 

target, but 2 percent is about right as long as you don’t take it too 

seriously, because there might be reasons to deviate in one direction or another. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman PAUL. I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona for 

a follow-up. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you. We were sort of heading on the 

question, I was going to start with Dr. Taylor and then move to Dr. 

Klein. How big can the balance sheet get? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I already think it is too big. I think the quantitative 

easings, QE-1 and QE-2, are not appropriate, and that is why the 

balance sheet is as big as it is. If we had just done the interventions during the panic period, the balance sheet would already be 

back to normal. 

I don’t think see any evidence that those have been helpful, I 

have done research on QE-1, and I think that it is already too big. 

I do worry about the size of it already because it has to be pulled 

out, or there will be a bubble. In fact, right now we are already 

running the risk of a bubble because of the commitment to hold 

rates so low for so long. 

I think, when you talk about bubbles, and we talk about the 

Fed’s efforts to stop bubbles, I think the problem really is more is 

the Fed causing bubbles rather than the responsibility to deal with 

them. 

So that, I see that concern in the housing bubble, I see some 

other bubbles in the past, and when you think about bubbles, let’s 

not forget the fact that the Fed itself can and, in fact, has in the 

past caused bubbles and it may be doing that again right now. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Dr. Klein? 

Mr. KLEIN. Yes. I agree strongly with what Dr. Taylor has said 

about the Fed being the cause of bubbles and the idea that the Fed 

needs additional tools to be able to pop bubbles when they emerge 

is taking the wrong view of the nature and sources of those bubbles. But as to your question about the balance sheet, I agree with 

39 

Dr. Taylor, but would add that it isn’t just the overall size of the 

balance sheet that matters, it is the composition of the balance 

sheet. 

And my concern, as a microeconomist in looking at quantitative 

easing and other interventions by the Fed, is not so much their effect on the Fed’s overall balance sheet, but the effect on particular 

firms and industries. The winner picking, preventing 

restructurings that are needed to get the economy back on the 

right track is just as important as looking at the overall size of the 

balance sheet. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Dr. Galbraith, and then we are going to bounce 

back. Do you have a comment on, first, how big the balance sheets 

can get, and second, does the mix or the size or both create a distortive effect on the allocation of capital? 

Mr. GALBRAITH. As I said earlier, I don’t have a clear view on 

how big the balance sheet might get. I do think that as one looks 

at the composition of the balance sheet, what is in the portfolio, 

one has to evaluate the quality of the assets. And that is a process 

which has ramifications for the financial structure going forward. 

There comes a point when you do need to address those questions. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Okay. Dr. Herbener? 

Mr. HERBENER. I would just add one thing. I think most of us 

would agree that the real problem is how exactly is the Fed going 

to unwind the balance sheet, not how big is it going to get, but 

what will be the process by which they take these assets off of their 

books, and what will the repercussions be in the markets when 

they begin this process seriously of unwinding things? 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. There goes my bond bubble concern. That is, 

what do I know. Dr. Rivlin, you also have been outspoken both on 

fiscal policy and that has always been appreciated to have other 

voices out there saying we are—we have some great difficulties. 

Has the fact that the Fed has been able to grow its balance 

sheets to such extraordinary levels, has, in many ways, has that 

been a way to help Congress avoid fiscal policy? 

Ms. RIVLIN. I don’t think so. I think the Congress has not wanted 

to face up to the hard choices. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. It is the same thing. 

Ms. RIVLIN. And the Fed’s buying bonds is a small part of the 

whole world buying bonds. As Dr. Galbraith said, counter to reality, the world believes that we are a very safe investment. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. But in U.S. sovereign debt issues over the last 

24 months, hasn’t the Fed represented close to half? 

Ms. RIVLIN. I don’t know exactly what the figure is, but right 

now, we can’t have a rapid reduction in our national borrowing because it would derail the recovery. 

So I don’t think the Fed has much of a choice. I would be cautious about increasing the balance sheet much further. I don’t 

think there is an answer to your very good question about how big 

can it get, but right now, I think we need a double kind of fiscal 

policy. 

It shouldn’t be too severe in the short run, but we have to get 

the long run debt under control. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Chairman, thank you so kindly. 

Chairman PAUL. I now recognize Mr. Green from Texas. 

40 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the 

ranking member for calling this hearing today, and I thank the 

witnesses for being in attendance. 

Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank you because I am one of the 

Members who signed the letter requesting such a hearing, and I 

thank you for honoring the request to the witnesses. 

Let’s start with something very basic. 

The bills that we have range from tweaking to the abolishing of 

the Fed, and I am curious as to how many of you are of the opinion 

that we should totally eliminate the Fed? Is there anyone who 

thinks that it should be abolished, one, two persons think we 

should abolish the Fed. And, if you could, just give me a quick, if 

you can, summary of why you think the Fed should be abolished. 

And then I would like to hear from your colleagues as to why you 

think we should maintain it, just quickly, because obviously time 

is of the essence. 

And I will start with you, Dr. Herbener. 

Mr. HERBENER. The Fed should be abolished because the conduct 

of monetary policy under the Fed can bring no benefit to society at 

large, as I mentioned in my previous remarks. 

Mr. GREEN. The Fed will make bad decisions every time? There 

will be no good decisions made? It just can’t have the positive impact on the economy? 

Mr. HERBENER. Yes. I would say that there is no other instance 

where the government has completely monopolized the production 

of something on the market to impact society at large. 

Mr. GREEN. All right. I am going to take that as your answer and 

move on to the next person. Dr. Klein? 

Mr. KLEIN. Yes. We can talk about the Federal Reserve System 

per se as an example of the central bank or the institution of central banking more generally. And in my written testimony, I give 

some reasons why the institution of central banking is not only 

unneeded, but is also harmful to a market economy. 

Mr. GREEN. But in your opinion, there should not be a central 

bank in the United States of America? 

Mr. KLEIN. Yes, sir, we don’t have a central automobile manufacturer or a central dairy or a central computer company. 

Mr. GREEN. How do you juxtapose that with the central banks 

around the world, where major countries in the world all have central banks? 

Mr. KLEIN. What I am expounding is certainly not the majority 

view among policymakers, but that hardly makes it incorrect. 

Mr. GREEN. I think that is a fair statement. Dr. Taylor? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Continuing, I think we should reform the Fed. I 

think the evidence, especially in the last few years, is that the policy is not working. I look back in history, and I see the 1980s and 

1990s, a part of the time where Alice Rivlin was on the Fed and 

things worked pretty well. 

They had—it wasn’t intervening like it is doing now. It had a 

more steady-as-you-go policy. It had a lot of focus on the overall 

stance of policy, and it worked. 

So I think we need to get back to that. I call it a rules-based policy, not a more systematic policy, and I think some of the reforms 

we are discussing today will help us get back to that. 

41 

Mr. GREEN. Dr. Galbraith? 

Mr. GALBRAITH. I think on the whole, Congressman, that the 

20th Century was better than the 19th Century, and that having 

a central bank was a modest, useful part of the institutional structure that gave us a very successful century. 

I am very cautious about taking radical institutional steps when 

there is very little going on in the world that would give us confidence that they would be stabilizing rather than destabilizing. 

Mr. GREEN. Dr. Rivlin? 

Ms. RIVLIN. I feel strongly that we need a strong and independent central bank. I think the evidence of the 19th Century is 

not as encouraging as some would think, and the idea that the 

world’s greatest economy could make due without a central bank, 

without a lender of last resort, without a monetary policy seems to 

me quite bizarre. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. Let me go back now in reverse order. I 

will start with you, Dr. Rivlin, first. 

The question is, would we be at a disadvantage if we had no central bank and other major economic powers have central banks? 

Ms. RIVLIN. I think we would be, and I think we would lose our 

preeminence as a great— 

Mr. GREEN. Currency supremacy. The dollar, as you know, is a 

fairly well-accepted currency around the world. Would it have an 

impact on the dollar? 

Ms. RIVLIN. Yes. I think it would. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Let me go to the next person please. 

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes, I think it would clearly have an impact. It 

would make the dollar, U.S. Treasury bonds much riskier. 

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Taylor, and then I am going to go quickly because my time is about up. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I don’t recommend abolishing the Fed, I would recommend reforming the Fed. 

Mr. GREEN. Would we be at a disadvantage, sir, Mr. Klein, if we 

had no central bank and other countries did? 

Mr. KLEIN. Of course, it would depend on how such a reform 

would be implemented but, look, right now people are fleeing from 

the dollar and heading toward hard assets, like precious metals. 

Mr. GREEN. Dr. Herbener? 

Mr. HERBENER. If the dollar was backed by gold, I don’t see how 

that could harm our— 

Mr. GREEN. But you would back the dollar with gold? 

Mr. HERBENER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PAUL. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentlelady from New York. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a thought for us as we conclude, and I thank you so much 

for your insights, each of you. It strikes me that the size of the 

Fed’s balance sheet is going to be largely determined given the 

structure of our representative democracy by the will of the American people to take in hand what we have created for ourselves at 

this juncture in our history. 

Is there any sense that it is really going to take a lot of political 

will, if you will, to get our fisc in order for us really to, unless there 

42 

is some significant change in the role of the Fed or the structure 

of the Fed. I think so much of it is going to lie in how we manage 

our Federal budget going forward. 

Dr. Rivlin, since I missed you last time? 

Ms. RIVLIN. I strongly agree with that. I served on the SimpsonBowles Commission and the Domenici-Rivlin Commission and 

there have been other groups that have all come to the conclusion 

that we really need to get our fiscal house in order so that the debt 

is not rising faster than our economy can grow, and that is going 

to take hard decisions, but we have to do it. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. Thank you, Dr. Rivlin. Thank you for your service. It is much appreciated. 

Dr. Klein, I will flip back around. 

Mr. KLEIN. Of course, I agree, this is a tremendous political challenge. Whether it takes a major crisis to bring, call forth the political will to make the necessary changes, I don’t know, but I would 

hope that this body and others would be able to push things in the 

right direction without waiting for the bottom to fall out. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. Right. Now, Dr. Herbener, do you think what we 

are viewing in Europe, we should take as a portent of things to 

come if we don’t do something? 

Mr. HERBENER. I think our situation is perhaps even more precarious than theirs, given what the Fed has done in the wake of 

the crisis to bail out the banking system. So, again, it is going to 

take strong action against some of the political interests that exist 

here to turn things around before. As Dr. Klein said, there is a crisis, and then we have to do something. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. All right. Dr. Taylor, your thoughts? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Fiscal policy is certainly a mess right now, and it 

has to be fixed, or we will be like Europe. But please don’t forget 

about monetary policy. It tends to be arcane, it tends to be too narrow, it is difficult, but it is essential right now to get it right. 

I don’t want to see a future where quantitative easing becomes 

the new monetary policy. When the economy slows down, we do gigantic quantitative easings. We don’t even know their effect. We 

don’t even know how large it should be; it is very dangerous. I 

think it will take some oversight exercise by Congress to prevent 

that in the future. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. In view of what you have said, Dr. Taylor, regarding the Fed’s purchase of Treasuries and the proportion of 

Treasuries that have gone to the Fed, is there a certain crowdingout effect that we might also be witnessing. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Eventually, of course, but in the meantime, actually, the figure is 77 percent. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. Yes. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The amount of debt increase in Fiscal Year 2011, 

77 percent of that was the Fed and that is a gigantic amount. And 

so crowding out, I believe there is crowding out about that, even 

though the economy is weak. Yes, crowding out in a weak economy. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. So there are Federal budget concerns and the 

Federal investments are crowding out the private markets. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Crowding out occurs because of the deficits and the 

borrowing. And even in a weak economy, I believe it occurs, but as 

the economy picks up, it will be even more of a concern. 

43 

Dr. HAYWORTH. And more so artificially, if you will, in a sense 

because of what the Fed is endeavoring to do or artificially making 

the picture for Treasuries look perhaps a bit rosier than it would 

be if we had a real marketplace for them. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Actually, the way I think about what the Fed is 

doing now with respect to oversized balance sheets and effectively 

dictating what the short-term interest rate will be, it doesn’t set it 

in the market. It dictates by telling what the Reserve’s interest 

rates will be on reserves. 

So it is effectively, as the Fed has replaced the entire money 

market with itself, and I tell you, we just don’t know all the implications of that. Nobody on this panel knows the implications of 

that. 

So the sooner we get back to normal where the supply and demand for money is dependent to determine that interest rate, and 

the interest rate is set according to reasonable methodology and reported to the Congress, the strategy for doing that, the better off 

we will be. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. It is not really a central bank, it becomes an 

uber bank in a sense. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. 

Dr. HAYWORTH. Thank you. Thank you all. Thank you again, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman PAUL. Thank you very much. I want to thank the 

panel today for your time and your testimony. I found the hearing 

very fascinating because even though we might not agree on the 

cause and exactly what we have to do, it seemed like there was a 

general consensus that we do have a problem and we have to deal 

with it. It is not just the United States; it is worldwide. 

And my guess is that someday we will seriously not only look at 

the management of a central bank or whether or not we really 

need a central bank, but ultimately I think what we will have to 

do is talk about the nature of money, the definition of money, because it is pretty hard to manage something you can’t even define. 

But, once again, thank you very much for coming today. 

The Chair notes that some Members may have additional questions for this panel, which they may wish to submit in writing. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 30 days 

for Members to submit written questions to these witnesses and to 

place their responses in the record. 

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(45) 

A P P E N D I X 

May 8, 2012 

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United States House of Representatives 

Committee on Financial Services 

Subcommittee on Domestic Monctary Policy & Technology 

May 8, 2012 

Congressman Ron Paul 

Statement for the Record 

Although it has taken nearly a century, it seems that the entire spectrum of the American 

political establishment has finally realized the destructive power of the Federal Reserve System. 

Whether left, right, or libertarian, politicians are lining up to attack Ben Bernanke and the Fed's 

destructive monetary policy. Where there is disagreement or lack of understanding, however, is on why 

the Fed's monetary policy is destructive, how it harms the economy, and what should be done about it. 

Today's hearing will examine the various proposals that have been put forth both to mend and to end 

the Fed. It is my hope that this hearing will spur a vigorous and long-lasting discussion about the Fed's 

problems, a discussion which will lead to concrete actions once and for all to rein in the Fed. 

Much confusion exists over what the Federal Reserve System actually is. Some people claim 

that is a secret cabal of elite bankers, while others claim that it is part of the federal govemment. In 

reality it is a bit of both. The Federal Reserve Board is a govemment agency, while the Federal 

Reserve Banks are privately-run govemment-chartered institutions, and monetary policy decisions are 

made by the Federal Open Market Committee, which has members from both the Board and the 

Reserve Banks. 

The Federal Reserve System is the epitome of crony capitalism. It exemplifies the collusion 

between big govemment and big business to profit at the expense of the taxpayers. The Fed's bailout of 

large banks during the financial crisis propped up poorly-run corporations that should have gone under, 

giving them an advantage that no other business in the United States would have received. The 

bailouts continue today, as banks maintain $1.5 trillion worth of excess reserves at the Fed, reserves 

which were created through the Fed's purchase of worthless securities from banks. The trillions of 

dollars that the Fed has injected into the system have the goal of forcing down interest rates. But the 

Fed fails to realize that interest rates are a price, the price of money and credit, and that forcing interest 

rates down will only create an even bigger bubble and an enormous economic depression when this 

entire house of cards comes falling down. 

The Federal Reserve is statutorily required to focus on three aims when engaged in monetary 

policy: full employment, stables prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. In practice, only the 

first two have received any attention, the so-called "dual mandate." Some reformers have called for the 

full employment mandate to be repealed, in order to allow the Fed to focus solely on stable prices. But 

these critics ignore the fact that stable prices are not a desirable goal. After all, with increasing 

productivity and technological innovation, the natural trend for most goods is for prices to decrease. 

By calling for the prices of goods to remain stable, the Fed would have to inflate the money supply in 

order to counteract this trend towards price declines, pumping new money into the system and creating 

economic distortions. This is exactly what happened during the I 920s, as the Fed's monetary pumping 

was masked by rising productivity. The result was stable prices, but the malinvestment caused by the 

Fed's loose monetary policy became evident by 1929. There is no reason to expect that focusing on 

stable prices today would have a dissimilar outcome. 

Other reformers have called for changes to the composition of the Federal Open Market 

Committee, the body which sets the Fed's monetary policy objectives. On Constitutional grounds, the 

FOMC is undoubtedly problematic, as govemment appointees and the heads of the private Federal 

Reserve Banks work together to set monetary policy objectives that directly impact the strength of the 

dollar. While all of the members of the FOMC ought to be confirmed by the Senate, debates about the 
47 


75727.002

size of the FOMC or whether Reserve Bank Presidents should make up a majority of the members or 

whether they should even serve at all are largely a sideshow. While the only dissent to monetary policy 

decisions in recent years has COme from Reserve Bank Presidents, there is no reason to think that 

expanding the FOMC to include more Reserve Bank Presidents would lead to any greater dissent or to 

any substantive changes to the conduct of monetary policy. 

Another proposal for reform is for outright nationalization of the Fed or its functions. No 

longer would the Fed create money; that function would be taken up by the Treasury, issuing as much 

money as it sees fit. No longer would the Treasury issue debt to cover fiscal deficits, it would just issue 

new money to cover budget shortfalls. Tf what the Fed does now is bad, allowing the Treasury to print 

and issue money at will would be evcn worse. These types of proposals hearken back to the days of the 

first greenbacks, which the U.S. government began issuing in 1863. A pure fiat paper currency, 

unbacked by silver or gold, the greenbacks were widely reviled. Only once the greenbacks were made 

redeemable in gold wcre they accepted by the American people. The current system of Federal Reservc 

Notes is even worse than the greenback cra in that there is no hope that they will ever be redeemable 

for gold or silver. The only limiting factor is that the Federal Reserve System only creates new money 

when purchasing asscts, normally debt securities. Allowing the federal government to print money 

without at least a nominal check on the amount issued would inevitably lead to a Wcimar-like 

hyperinflation. 

So what then is the solution? The Fed maintains that a paper standard can be adequately 

managed without causing malinvestment, inflation, or other economic distortions. If the Fed were 

omniscient and knew the wishes, desires, and future actions of all Americans, this might be possible. 

But the Fed cannot possibly aggregatc or act on the information necessary to engage in monetary 

policy. The actions of hundreds of millions of individuals, all seeking to better thcir position in life, 

acting purposefully towards that aim, cannot possibly be compiled into aggregates or calculated 

through mathematical equations or econometric models. Neither a single person, nor the members and 

staff of the FOMC, nor millions of people with millions of computers working in a new Goskomtsen 

",ill ever be able to accumulate, analyze, and act upon the information required to create a centrally 

planned monetary system. Centrally planned fiat paper standards such as the one currently in place in 

this country are doomed to failure. 

This brings us to the question of the gold standard. The era of the classical gold standard was 

undoubtedly one of the greatest eras in human history. For a period of several decades in the late 19th 

century, largely uninterrupted by war, the West made enormous advances. Economic productivity 

incrcased, art and culture flourished, and living standards rose so that even the poorest citizens lived a 

life their forebears could have only dreamed of. 

But the problem with the gold standard is that it was run by the government, which exercised a 

monopoly over monetary affairs. The temptation to suspend gold redemption, so often resorted to by 

governments throughout history, reared its head again with the outbreak of World War 1. Once the tie 

to gold was severed and fiscal restraint thrown to the wind, undoing the damage would have required 

great fiscal austerity on the part of governments. Emancipated from the shackles of the gold standard, 

the Western world proceeded to set up a gold-exchange standard which lasted not even a decade before 

the easy money policies it enabled led to the Great Depression. While returning to the gold standard 

would certainly be far better than maintaining the current fiat paper system, as long as the government 

retains the power to go off gold we may end up repeating the same mistakes that occurred from 1934 to 

1971 as the government went first off the gold coin standard and finally off the gold bullion exchange 

standard. 

The only viable solution for monetary stability is to get government out of the money business 

permanently. The way to bring this about is through currency competition: allowing parallel currencies 

to circulate without anyone currency receiving any special recognition or favor from the government. 

Fiat paper monetary standards throughout history have always collapsed due to their inflationary 
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nature, and our current fiat paper standard will be no different. The Federal Reserve is currently 

sowing the seeds of its own destruction through its loose and reckless monetary policy. The day of 

reckoning may still be many years in the future, but given the lack of understanding on the part of the 

Federal Reserve's decision makers, it is quickly coming upon us. 

It is imperative that the American people be educated on the dangers of the Fed and the 

importance of restoring sound money. Now that nearly 50 years have elapsed since silver was removed 

from circulation, fewer and fewer Americans have firsthand familiarity 'With real money. The laying of 

the groundwork must begin today, so that the American people will be prepared for the day when the 

mirage the Fed has created evaporates completely. 
49 


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Excerpts from the Minority Report of the United States Gold Commission 

Chapter 2: A History of Money and Banking in the United States before the Twentieth Century 

Chapter 3: A History of Money and Banking in the United States during the Twentieth Century 
50 


75727.005

II. A History of Money and Banking in 

the United States Before the 20th 

Century 

As an outpost of Great Britain, colonial America of course used British 

pounds, pence, and shillings as its money. Great Britain was officially 

on a silver standard, with the shilling defined as equal to 86 pure Troy 

grains of silver, and with silver as so defmed legal tender for all debts 

(i.e., creditors were compelled to accept silver at that rate). However, 

Britain also coined gold and maintained a bimetallic standard by fixing 

the gold guinea, weighing 129.4 grains of gold, as equal in value to a 

certain weight of silver. In that way, gold became, in effect, legal tender 

as well. Unfortunately, by establishing bimetallism, Britain became 

perpetually subject to the evils known as Gresham's Law, which states 

that when government compulsorilyovervalues one money and undervalues another, the undervalued money will leave the country or disappear into hoards, while the overvalued money will flood into circulation. Hence, the popular catchphrase of Gresham's Law: "Bad money 

drives out good." But the important point to note is that the triumph 

of "bad" money is the result, not of perverse free-market competition, but of government using the compulsory legal tender power to 

privilege one money above another. 

In 17th-and 18th-century Britain, the government maintained a mint 

ratio between gold and silver that consistently overvalued gold and 

undervalued silver in relation to world market prices, with the resultant 

disappearance and outflow of full-bodied silver coins, and an influx of 

gold, and the maintenance in circulation of only eroded and "lightweight" silver coins. Attempts to rectify the fixed bimetallic ratios were 

always too little and too late. l 

In the sparsely settled American colonies, money, as it always does, 

arose in the market as a useful and scarce commodity and began to 

serve as a general medium of exchange. Thus, beaver fur and wampum 

'In the late 17th and early 18th centuries, the British maintained fixed mint ratios of 

from 15.1:1 of silver grains in relation to gold grains, to about 15.5:1. Yet the world market 

ratio of weight, set by forces of supply and demand, was about 14.9:1. Thus, silver was 

consistently undervalued and gold overvalued. In the 18th century, the problem got even 

worse, for increasing gold production in Brazil and declining silver production in Peru 

brought the market ratio down to 14.1:1 while the mint ratios fixed by the British government continued to be the same. 

17 
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were used as money in the North for exchanges with the Indians, and 

fish and com also served as money. Rice was used as money in South 

Carolina, and the most widespread use of commodity money was 

tobacco, which served as money in Virginia. The pound-of-tobacco was 

the currency unit in Virginia, with warehouse receipts in tobacco circulating as money backed 100 percent by the tobacco in the warehouse. 

While commodity money continued to serve satisfactorily in rural 

areas, as the colonial economy grew, Americans imported gold and 

silver coins to serve as monetary media in urban centers and in foreign 

trade. English coins were imported, but so too were gold and silver 

coins from other European countries. Among the gold coins circulating 

in America were the French guinea, the Portuguese "joe," the Spanish 

doubloon, and Brazilian coins, while silver coins included French crowns 

and livres. 

It is important to realize that gold and silver are international commodities, and that therefore, when not prohibited by government decree, 

foreign coins are perfectly capable of serving as standard moneys. There 

is no need to have a national government monopolize the coinage, and 

indeed foreign gold and silver coins constituted much of the coinage 

in the United States until Congress outlawed the use of foreign coins 

in 1857. Thus, if a free market is allowed to prevail in a country, foreign 

coins will circulate naturally. Silver and gold coins will tend to be valued 

in proportion to their respective weights, and the ratio between silver 

and gold will be set by the market in accordance with their relative 

supply and demand. 

Shilling/Dollar Manipulations 

By far the leading specie coin circulating in America was the Spanish 

silver dollar, defined as consisting of 387 grains of pure silver. The 

dollar was divided into "pieces of eight," or "bits," each consisting of 

one-eighth of a dollar. Spanish dollars came into the North American 

colonies through the lucrative trade with the West Indies. The Spanish 

silver dollar had been the world's outstanding coin since the early 16th 

century, and was spread partially by dint of the vast silver output of 

the Spanish colonies in Latin America. More important, however, was 

the fact that the Spanish dollar, from the 16th to the 19th century, was 

relatively the most stable and least debased coin in the Western world.2 

'The name "dollar" came from the "thaler," the name given to the coin of similar 

weight, the "Joachimsthaler" or "schlicken thaler," issued since the early 16th century by 

the Count of Schlick in JoachimstbaI in Bohemia. The Joachlmsthalers weigh 451 Troy 

grains of silver. So successful were these coins that similar !halers were minted in Bur18 
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Since the Spanish silver dollar consisted of 387 grains, and the English 

shilling consisted of 86 grains of silver, this meant the natural, freemarket ratio between the two coins would be 4 shillings 6 pence per 

dollar. 3 

Constant complaints, both by contemporaries and by some later 

historians, arose about an alleged "scarcity of money," especially of 

specie, in the colonies, allegedly justifying numerous colonial paper 

money schemes to remedy that "shortage." In reality, there was no 

such shortage. It is true that England, in a mercantilist attempt to hoard 

specie, kept minting for its own prerogative and outlawed minting in 

the colonies; it also prohibited the export of English coin to America. 

But this did not keep specie from America, for, as we have seen, 

Americans were able to import Spanish and other foreign coin, including English, from other countries. Indeed, as we shall see, it was 

precisely paper money issues that led, by Gresham's Law, to outflows 

and disappearance of specie from the colonies. 

In their own mercantilism, the colonial governments early tried to 

hoard their own specie by debasing their shilling standards in terms of 

Spanish dollars. Whereas their natural weights dictated a ratio of 4 

shillings per 6 pence to the dollar, Massachusetts, in 1642, began a 

general colonial process of competitive debasement of shillings. Massachusetts arbitrarily decreed that the Spanish dollar be valued at 5 

shillings; the idea was to attract an inflow of Spanish silver dollars into 

that colony, and to subsidize Massachusetts exports by making their 

prices cheaper in terms of dollars. Soon, Connecticut and other colonies 

followed suit, each persistently upping the ante of debasement. The 

result was to increase the supply of nominal units of account by debasing the shilling, inflating domestic prices and thereby bringing the 

temporary export stimulus to a rapid end. Finally, the English government brought a halt to this futile and inflationary practice in 1707. 

But the colonial governments had already found another, and far 

more inflationary, arrow for their bow: the invention of government 

fiat paper money. 

gundy, Holland, France; most successful of these was the Maria Theresa thaler, which 

began being minted in 1751, and formed a considerable portion of American currency 

after that date.The Spanish "pieces of eight" adopted the name "dollar" after 1690. 

'Since 20 shillings make £1, this meant that the natural ratio between the two currencies 

was £1 = $4.44. 

19 
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Government Paper Money 

Apart from medieval China, which invented both paper and printing 

centuries before the West, the world had never seen government paper 

money until the colonial government of Massachusetts emitted a fiat 

paper issue in 1690.4

,5 Massachusetts was accustomed to launching 

plunder expeditions against the prosperous French colony in Quebec. 

Generally, the expeditions were successful, and would return to Boston, sell their booty, and payoff the soldiers with the proceeds. This 

time, however, the expedition was beaten back decisively, ahd the 

soldiers returned to Boston in ill-humor, grumbling for their pay. Discontented soldiers are ripe for mutiny, so the Massachusetts government looked around in concern for a way to pay the soldiers. It tried 

to borrow 3-4,000 pounds from Boston merchants, but evidently the 

Massachusetts credit rating was not the best. Finally, Massachusetts 

decided in December 1690 to print £ 7,000 in paper notes and to use 

them to pay the soldiers. Suspecting that the public would not accept 

irredeemable paper, the government made a twofold pledge when it 

issued the notes: that it would redeem them in gold or silver out of tax 

revenue in a few years and that absolutely no further paper notes would 

be issued. Characteristically, however, both parts of the pledge went 

quickly by the board: The issue limit disappeared in a few months, and 

all the bills continued unredeemed for nearly 40 years. As early as 

February 1691, the Massachusetts government proclaimed that its issue 

had fallen "far short" and so it proceeded to emit £ 40,000 of new 

money to repay all of its outstanding debt, again pledging falsely that 

this would be the absolutely final note issue. 

But Massachusetts found that the increase in the supply of money, 

coupled with a fall in the demand for paper because of growing lack of 

confidence in future redemption in specie, led to a rapid depreciation 

of new money in relation to specie. Indeed, in a year after the initial 

issue, the new paper pound had depreciated on the market by 40 

percent against specie. 

'Govemment paper redeemable in gold began in the early 9th century, and after three 

centuries the government escalated to irredeemable fiat paper, with the usual consequence 

of boom-bust cycles, and runaway inflation. See Gordon Tullock, "Paper Money-A Cycle 

in Cathay," Economic History Review, vol. IX, no. 3 (1957), pp. 393-396. 

'The only exception was a curious fonn of paper money issued five years earlier in 

Quebec, to become known as Card Money. The governing intendant of Quebec, Monsieur 

Mueles, divided some playing cards into quarters, marked them with various monetary 

denominations, and then issued them to pay for wages and materials sold to the government. He ordered the public to accept the cards as legal tender, and this particular issue 

was later redeemed in specie sent from France. 

20 
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By 1692, the government moved against this market evaluation by 

use of force, making the paper money compulsory legal tender for all 

debts at par with specie, and by granting a premium of five percent on 

all payment of debts to the government made in paper notes. This legal 

tender law had the unwanted effect of Gresham's Law; the disappearance of specie circulation in the colony. In addition, the expanding 

paper issues drove up prices and hampered exports from the colony. 

In this way, the specie "shortage" became the creature rather than the 

cause of the fiat paper issues. Thus, in 1690, before the orgy of paper 

issues began, £ 200,000 of silver money was available in New England; 

by 1711 however, with Connecticut and Rhode Island having followed 

suit in paper money issue, £ 240,000 of paper money had been issued 

in New England but the silver had almost disappeared from circu1ation. 

Ironically, then, Massachusetts' and her sister colonies' issue of paper 

created rather than solved any "scarcity of money." The new paper 

drove out the old specie. The consequent driving up of prices and 

depreciation of paper scarcely relieved any alleged money scarcity 

among the public. But since the paper was issued to fmance government expenditures and pay public debts, the government, not the public, 

benefited from the fiat issue. 

After Massachusetts had emitted another huge issue of £ 500,000 in 

1711 to pay for another failed expedition against Quebec, not only was 

the remainder of the silver driven from circulation, but despite the legal 

tender law, the paper pound depreciated 30 percent against silver. 

Massachusetts pounds, officially seven shillings to the silver ounce, 

had now fallen on the market to nine shillings per ounce. Depreciation 

proceeded in this and other colonies despite fierce governmental attempts 

to outlaw it, backed by fines, imprisonment, and total confiscation of 

property for the high crime of not accepting the paper at par. 

Faced with a further "shortage of money" due to the money issues, 

Massachusetts decided to press on; in 1n6, it formed a government 

"land bank" and issued £ 100,000 in notes to be loaned on real estate 

in the various counties of the province. 

Prices rose so drainatically that the tide of opinion in Massachusetts 

began to tum against paper, as writers pointed out that the result of 

the issues was a doubling of prices in the past 20 years, depreciation 

of paper, and the disappearance of Spanish silver through the operation 

of Gresham's Law. From then on, Massachusetts, pressured by the 

Crown, tried intermittently to reduce the bills in circu1ation and return 

to a specie currency, but was hampered by its assumed obligations to 

honor the paper notes at par of its sister New England colonies. 

21 
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In 1744, another losing expedition against the French led Massachusetts to issue an enormous amount of paper money over the next several 

years. From 1744 to 1748, paper money in circulation expanded from 

£ 300,000 to £ 2.5 million, and the depreciation of Massachusetts was 

such that silver had risen on the market to 60 shillings an ounce, 10 

times the price at the beginning of an era of paper money in 1690. 

By 1740, every colony but Virginia had followed suit in fiat paper 

money issues, and Virginia succumbed in the late 1750s in trying to 

finance part of the French and Indian War against the French. Similar 

consequences-dramatic inflation, shortage of specie, massive depreciation despite compulsory par laws-ensued in each colony. Thus, 

along with Massachusetts' depreciation of 11:1 of its notes against 

specie compared to the original par, Connecticut's notes had sunk to 

9:1 and the Carolinas' at 10:1 in 1740, and the paper of virulently 

inflationist Rhode Island had sunk to 23:1 against specie. Even the 

least-inflated paper, that of Pennsylvania, had suffered an appreciation 

of specie to 80 percent over par. 

A detailed study of the effects of paper money in New Jersey shows 

how it creatd a boom-bust economy over the colonial period. When 

new paper money was injected into the economy, an inflationary boom 

would result, to be followed by a deflationary depression when the 

paper money supply contracted. 6 

At the end of King George's War with France in 1748, Parliament 

began to pressure the colonies to retire the mass of paper money and 

return to a specie currency. In 1751, Great Britain prohibited all further 

issues oflegal tender paper in New England and ordered a move toward 

redemption of existing issues in specie. Finally, in 1764, Parliament 

extended the prohibition of new issues to the remainder of the colonies 

and required the gradual retirement of outstanding notes. 

Following the lead of Parliament, the new England colonies, apart 

from Rhode Island, decided to resume specie payment and retire their 

paper notes rapidly at the current depreciated market rate. The panicky 

opponents of specie resumption and monetary contraction made the 

usual predictions in such a situation: that the result would be a virtual 

absence of money in New England and the consequent ruination of all 

trade. Instead, however, after a brief adjustment, the resumption and 

retirement led to a far more prosperous trade and production-the 

harder money and lower prices attracting an inflow of specie. In fact, 

~Donald L. Kemmerer, "Paper Money in New Jersey, 1668--1775," New Jersey Historical 

Society, Proceedings 74 (April 1956): 107-144. 

22 
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75727.011

with Massachusetts on specie and Rhode Island still on depreciated 

paper, the result was that Newport, which had been a flourishing center 

for West Indian imports for Western Massachusetts, lost its trade to 

Boston and languished in the doldrumsY 

In fact, as one student of colonial Massachusetts has pointed out, 

the return to specie occasioned remarkably little dislocation, recession, 

or price deflation. Indeed, wheat prices fell by less in Boston than in 

Philadelphia, which saw no such return to specie in the early 175Os. 

Foreign exchange rates, after the resumption of specie, were highly 

stable, and "the restored specie system operated after 1750 with 

remarkable stability during the Seven Years War and during the dislocation of international payments in the last years before the Revolution."9 

Not being outlawed by government decree, specie remained in circulation throughout the colonial period, even during the operation of 

paper money. Despite the inflation, booms and busts, and shortages 

of specie caused by paper issues, the specie system worked well overall; 

"Here was a silver standard ... in the absence of institutions of the 

central government intervening in the silver market, and in the absence 

of either a public or private central bank adjusting domestic credit or 

managing a reserve of specie or foreign exchange with which to stabilize 

exchange rates. The market ... kept exchange rates remarkably close 

to the legislated par .... What is most remarkable in this context is the 

'Before Massachusetts went back to specie, it was committed to accept the notes of the 

other New England colonies at par. This provided an incentive for Rhode Island to inflate 

its currency wildly, for this small colony, with considerable purchases to make in Massachusetts, could make these purchases in inflated money at par. Thereby Rhode Island 

could export its inflation to the larger colony, but make its purchases with the new money 

before Massachusetts prices could rise in response. In short, Rhode Island could expropriate wealth from Massachusetts and impose the main cost of its inflation on the latter 

colony. 

"If Rhode Island was the most inflationary of the colonies, Maryland'. monetary expansion was the most bizarre. In 1733, Maryland's public land bank issued £ 70,000 of paper 

notes, of which £ 30,000 was given IlWIl!f in a fixed amount to each inhabitant of the 

province. This was done to universalize the circulation of the new notes, and is probably 

the closest approximation in history of Milton Friedman's "helicopter" model, in which a 

magical helicopter lavishes new paper money in fixed amounts of proportions to each 

inhabitant. The result of the measure, of course, was rapid depredation of new notes. 

However, the inflationary impact of the notes was greatly lessened by tobacco still being 

the major money of the new colony. Tobacco was legal tender in Maryland and the paper 

was not receivable for all taxes, 

"Roger W. Weiss, 'The Colonial Monetary Standard of Massachusetts," Econmnic Histury 

Review 27 (November 1974): 589. 

23 
57 


75727.012

continuity of the specie system through the seventeenth and eighteenth 

centuries. "10 

Private Bank Notes 

In contrast to government paper, private bank notes and deposits, 

redeemable in specie, had begun in Western Europe in Venice in the 

14th century. Firms granting credit to consumers and businesses had 

existed in the ancient world and in medieval Europe, but these were 

"money lenders" who loaned out their own savings. "Banking" in the 

sense of lending out the savings of others only began in England with 

the "scriveners" of the early 17th century. The scriveners were clerks 

who wrote contracts and bonds and were therefore in a position to 

learn of mercantile transactions and engage in money lending and 

borrowing. 11 

There were, however, no banks of deposit in England until the Civil 

War in the mid-17th century. Merchants had been in the habit of storing 

their surplus gold in the King's Mint for safekeeping. The habit proved 

to be unfortunate, for when Charles I needed money in 1638, shortly 

before the outbreak of the Civil War, he confiscated the huge sum of 

£200,000 of gold, calling it a "loan" from the owners. Although the 

merchants finally got their gold back, they were understandably shaken 

by the experience, and foresook the Mint, depositing their gold instead 

in the coffers of private goldsmiths, who, like the Mint, were accustomed to storing the valuable metal. The warehouse receipts of the 

goldsmiths soon came to be used as a surrogate for the gold itself. By 

the end of the Civil War, in the 166Os, the goldsmiths fell prey to the 

temptation to print pseudo-warehouse receipts not covered by gold 

and lend them out; in this way fractional-reserve banking came to 

England. 12 

"'Ibid., p. 591. 

!lOuring the 16th century, before the rise of the scriveners, most English money-lending 

was not even conducted by specialized finns, but by wealthy merchants in the clothing 

and woollen industries, as outlets for their surplus-capital. See J. Milnes Holden, TIre 

History of Negotiable InstTUments in English lAw (London: The Athlone Press, 1955), pp. 

205-206. 

"Once again, ancient Orina pioneered in deposit banking, as well as in fractionalreserve banking. Deposit banking per se began in the 8th century A.D., when shops would 

accept valuables, in return for warehouse receipts, and receive a fee for keeping them 

safe. After a while, the deposit receipts of these shops began to circulate as money. Finally, 

after two centuries, the shops began to issue and lend out more receipts than they had 

on deposit; they had caught on to fractional reserve banking. (Tullock, "Paper Money," 

p.396-) 

24 
58 


75727.013

Very few private banks existed in colonial America, and they were 

shortlived. Most prominent was the Massachusetts Land Bank of 1740, 

issuing notes and lending them out on real estate. The Land Bank was 

launched as an inflationary alternative to government paper, which the 

royal governor was attempting to restrict. The land bank issued frankly 

irredeemable notes, and fear of its unsound issue generated a competing private silver Bank, which emitted notes redeemable in silver. The 

Land Bank promptly issued over £ 49,000 in irredeemable notes, which 

depreciated very rapidly. In six months' time the public was almost 

universally refusing to accept the bank's notes and Land Bank sympathizers vainly accepting the notes. The final blow came in 1741, when 

Parliament, acting at the request of several Massachusetts merchants 

and the royal governor, outlawed both the law and the silver banks. 

One intriguing aspect of both the Massachusetts Land Bank and 

other inflationary colonial schemes is that they were advocated and 

lobbied for by some of the wealthiest merchants and land speculators 

in the respective colonies. Debtors benefit from inflation and creditors 

lose; realizing this fact, older historians assumed that debtors were 

largely poor agrarians and creditors were wealthy merchants and that 

therefore the former were the main sponsors of inflationary nostrums. 

But, of course, there are no rigid "classes" of debtors and creditors; 

indeed, wealthy merchants and land speculators are often the heaviest 

debtors. Later historians have demonstrated that members of the latter 

group were the major sponsors of inflationary paper money in the 

colonies.13,H 

UOn the Massachusetts Land Bank, see the illuminating study by George Athan Billias, 

'The Massachusetts Land Bankers of 1740." University of MlIine Bulletin LXI (April 1959}. 

On merchant enthusiasm for inflationary banking in Massachusetts, see Herman J. Belz, 

"Paper Money in Colonial Massachusetts," Essex Institute, Histuriall Colledimrs 101 (April 

1965): 146-163; and Belz, "Currency Refonn in Colonial Massachusetts, 1749-1750." Essex 

Institute, Historiall Collections 103 Uanuary 1967}: 66-84. On the forces favoring colonial 

inflation in general, see Bray Hammond, Banks and PoliHcs in America (Princeton University 

Press, 1957), Chap. 1; Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1606-

1865 (New York: Viking Press, 1946), p. 142. 

"For an excellent bibliographical essay on colonial money and banking, see Jeffrey 

Rogers Hummel, "The Monetary History of America to 1789: A Historiographical Essay," 

!oumJll of Libertarilln Studies 2 (Winter 1978): 373-389. For a summary of colonial monetary 

experience, see Murray N. Rothbard, Conceivtd in Liberty, Vol. II, Snlutllry Neglect, The 

Amerialn Colcmies in the First Half of the 18th Century (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 

1975), pp. 123-140. A particularly illuminating analysis is in the classic work by Charles 

Jesse Bullock, Essays on the Monetary History of the United SlJ1.tes (1900, New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 1-59. Up-to-date data on the period is in Roger W. Weiss, 'The 

Issue of Paper Money in the American Colonies, 1720-1774," Journnl of Economic History 

30 (December 1970): 770-784. 

25 
59 


75727.014

Revolutionary War Finance 

To finance the Revolutionary War, which broke out in 1775, the 

Continental Congress early hit on the device of issuing fiat paper 

money. The leader in the drive for paper money was Gouverneur 

Morris, the highly conservative young scion of the New York landed 

aristocracy. There was no pledge to redeem the paper, even in the 

future, but it was supposed to be retired in seven years by taxes levied 

pro rata by the separate states. Thus, a heavy future tax burden was 

supposed to be added to the inflation brought about the new paper 

money. The retirement pledge, however, was soon forgotten, as Congress, enchanted by this new, seemingly costless form of revenue, 

escalated its emissions of fiat paper. As a historian has phrased it, 

"such was the beginning of the 'federal trough: one of America's most 

imperishable institutions."IS 

The total money supply of the United States at the beginning of the 

Revolution has been estimated at $12 million. Congress launched its 

first paper issue of $2 million in late June 1775, and before the notes 

were printed it had already concluded that another $1 million was 

needed. Before the end of the year, a full $6 million in paper issues 

were issued or authorized, a dramatic increase of 50 percent in the 

money supply in one year. 

The issue of this fiat "continental" paper rapidly escalated over the 

next few years. Congress issued $6 million in 1775, $19 million in 1776, 

$13 million in 1777, $64 million in 1778, and $125 million in 1779. This 

was a total issue of over $225 million in five years superimposed upon 

preexisting money supply of $12 million. The result was, as could be 

expected, a rapid price inflation in terms of the paper notes, and a 

corollary accelerating depreciation of the paper in terms of specie. Thus, 

by the end of 1776, the Continentals were worth $1 to $1.25 in specie; 

by the fall of the following year, its value had fallen to 3 to 1; by 

December 1778 the value was 6.8 to 1; and by December 1779 to the 

negligible 42 to 1. By the spring of 1781, the Continentals were virtually 

worthless, exchanging on the market at 168 paper dollars to one dollar 

in specie. This collapse of the Continental currency gave rise to the 

phrase, "not worth a Continental." 

To top this calamity, the several states issued their own paper money, 

and each depreciated at varying rates. Virginia and the Carolinas led 

"Edmund Cody Bumett, The Continental Congress (New York: W.W. Norton, 1964), p. 

83. 

26 
60 


75727.015

the inflationary move, and by the end of the war, state issues added a 

total of 210 million depreciated dollars to the nation's currency. 

In an attempt to stem the inflation and depredation, various states 

levied maximum price controls and compulsory par laws. The result 

was only to create shortages and impose hardships on large sections 

of the public: Thus, soldiers were paid in Continentals, but farmers 

understandably refused to accept payment in paper money despite 

legal coercion. The Continental Army then moved to "impress" food 

and other supplies, seizing the supplies and forcing the farmers and 

shopkeepers to accept depreciated paper in return. By 1779, with Continental paper virtually worthless, the Continental Army stepped up 

its impressments, "paying" for them in newly issued paper tickets or 

"certificates" issued by the army quartermaster and commissary 

departments. The states followed suit with their own massive certificate 

issues. It understandably took little time for these certificates, federal 

and state, to depreciate in value to nothing; by the end of the war, 

federal certificate issues alone totalled $200 million. 

The one redeeming feature of this monetary calamity was that the 

federal and state governments at least allowed these paper issues to 

sink into worthlessness without insisting that taxpayers shoulder another 

grave burden by being forced to redeem these issues spede at par, or 

even to redeem them at all. 16 Continentals were not redeemed at all, 

and state paper was only redeemed at depreciating rates, some at the 

greatly depreciated market value. 17 By the end of the war, all the 

wartime state paper had been withdrawn from drculation. 

Unfortunately, the same policy was not applied to another important 

device that Congress turned to after its Continental paper had become 

almost worthless in 1779: loan certificates. Technically I loan certificates 

were public debt, but they were scarcely genuine loans. They were 

simply notes issued by the government to pay for supplies and accepted 

by the merchants because the government would not pay anything 

else. Hence, the loan certificates became a form of currency, and rapidly 

depreciated. As early as the end of 1779, they had depreciated to 24 to 

16As one historian explained, "Currency and certificates were the 'common debt' of the 

Revolution, most of which at war's end had been sunk at its depreciated value. Public 

opinion ... tended to grade claims against the government according to their real validity. 

Paper money had the least status .... " E. James Ferguson, TIre Power of the Purse; A History 

of American Public Finance, 1776-1790 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina 

Press, 1961), p. 68. 

''In Virginia and Georgia, the state paper was redeemed at the highly depreciated 

market rate of 1,000 to 1 in specie. 

27 
61 


75727.016

1 in specie. By the end of the war, $600 million of loan certificates had 

been issued. Some of the later loan certificate issues were liquidated at 

a depreciated rate, but the bulk remained after the war to become the 

substantial core of the permament, peacetime federal debt. 

The mass of federal and state debt could have depreciated and passed 

out of existence by the end of the war, but the process was stopped 

and reversed by Robert Morris, wealthy Philadelphia merchant and 

virtual economic and financial czar of the Continental Congress in the 

last years of the war. Morris, leader of the nationalist forces in American 

politics, moved to make the depreciated federal debt ultimately redeemable in par and also agitated for federal assumption of the various state 

debts. The reason was twofold: (a) to confer a vast subsidy on speculators who had purchased the public debt at highly depreciated values, 

by paying interest and principal at par in specie;lB and (b) to build up 

the agitation for taxing power in the Congress, which the Articles of 

Confederation refused to allow to the federal government. The decentralist policy of the states' raising taxes or issuing new paper money to 

payoff the pro rata federal debt as well as their own was thwarted by 

the adoption of the Constitution, which brought about the victory of 

the nationalist program, led by Morris's youthful disciple and former 

aide, Alexander Hamilton. 

The Bank of North America 

Robert Morris's nationalist vision was not confined to a strong central 

government, the power of the federal government to tax, and a massive 

public debt fastened permanently upon the taxpayers. Shortly after he 

assumed total economic power in Congress in the spring of 1781, Morris 

introduced a bill to create the first commercial bank, as well as the first 

central bank, in the history of the new Republic. This bank, headed by 

Morris himself, the Bank of North America, was not only the first 

fractional-reserve commercial bank in the U.S.; it was to be a privately 

owned central bank, modelled after the Bank of England. The money 

system was to be grounded upon specie, but with a controlled monetary 

inflation pyramiding an expansion of money and credit upon a reserve 

of specie. 

The Bank of North America, which quickly received a federal charter 

and opened its doors at the beginning of 1782, received the privilege 

18 As Morris candidly put it, this windfall to the public debt ~peculators at the expense 

of the taxpayers would cause wealth to flow "into those hands which could render it most 

productive." (Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 124). 

28 
62 


75727.017

from the government of its notes being receivable in all duties and 

taxes to all governments, at par with specie. In addition, no other banks 

were to be permitted to operate in the country. In return for its monopoly license to issue paper money, the bank would graciously lend most 

of its newly created money to the federal government to purchase 

public debt and be reimbursed by the hapless taxpayer. The Bank of 

North America was made the depository for all congressional funds. 

The flrst central bank in America rapidly loaned $1.2 million to the 

Congress, headed also by Robert Morris.19 

Despite Robert Morris's power and influence, and the monopoly 

privileges conferred upon his bank, it was perceived in the market that 

the Bank's notes were being inflated compared with specie. Despite 

the nominal redeemability of the Bank of North America's notes in 

specie, the market's lack of confidence in the inflated notes led to their 

depreciation outside its home base in Philadelphia. The Bank even tried 

to shore up the value of its notes by hiring people to urge redeemers 

of its notes not to ruin everything by insisting upon specie-a move 

scarcely calculated to improve ultimate confidence in the Bank. 

After a year of operation, however, Morris, his political power slipping after the end of the war, moved quickly to end his Bank's role as 

a central bank and to shift it to the status of a private commercial bank 

chartered by the state of Pennsylvania. By the end of 1783, all of the 

federal government's stock in the Bank of North America, which had 

the previous year amounted to 5/8 of its capital, had been sold by 

Morris into private hands, and all the U.S. government debt to the 

bank had been repaid. The first experiment with a central bank in the 

United States had ended.2Il 

At the end of the Revolutionary War, the contraction of the swollen 

mass of paper money, combined with the resumption of imports from 

Great Britain, combined to cut prices by more than half in a few years. 

"'When Morris failed to raise the legally required sperle capital to launch the Bank of 

North America, Morris, in an act tantamount to embezzlement, simply appropriated specie 

loaned to the U.S. by France and invested it for the government in his own Bank. In this 

way, the bulk of sperle capital for his Bank was appropriated by Morris out of government 

funds. A multiple of these funds was then borrowed back from Morris's bank by Morris 

as government financier for the pecuniary benefit of Morris as banker; and finally, Morris 

channeled most of the money into war contracts for his friends and business associates. 

Murray N. Rothbard, Concrived in Uberty, Vol. IV, The Revol"tionary War, 1775-1784 (New 

Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1979), p. 392. 

"'See Rothbard, The Revolutionary War, pp. 409--410. On the Bank of North America and 

on Revolutionary War finance generally, see Curtis P. Netteis, The Emngence of a National 

Economy, 1775-1815 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1%2), pp. 23-34. 

29 
63 


75727.018

Vain attempts by seven state governments, in the mid-1780s, to cure 

the "shortage of money" and reinflate prices were a complete failure. 

Part of the reason for the state paper issues was a frantic attempt to 

pay the wartime public debt, state and pro rata federal, without resorting 

to crippling burdens of taxation. The increased paper issues merely 

added to the "shortage" by stimulating the export of specie and the 

import of commodities from abroad. Once again, Gresham's Law was 

at work. State paper issues-despite compulsory par laws-merely 

depreciated rapidly, and aggravated the shortage of specie. A historian 

discusses what happened to the paper issues of North Carolina: 

In 1787-1788 the specie value of the paper had shrunk by more than 

50 percent. Coin vanished, and since the paper had practically no 

value outside the state, merchants could not use it to pay debts they 

owed abroad; hence they suffered severe losses when they had to 

accept it at inflated values in the settlement of local debts. North 

Carolina's perfonnance warned merchants anew of the menace of 

depreciating paper money which they were forced to receive at par 

from their debtors but which they could not pass on to their creditors. 21 

Neither was the situation helped by the expansion of banking following the launching of the Bank of North America in 1782. The Bank of 

New York and the Massachusetts Bank (Boston) followed two years 

later, with each institution enjoying a monopoly of banking in its 

region. 22 Their expansion of bank notes and deposits helped to drive 

out specie, and in the following year the expansion was succeeded by 

a contraction of credit, which aggravated the problems of recession.23 

The United States: Bimetallic Coinage 

Since the Spanish silver dollar was the major coin circulating in North 

America during the colonial and Confederation periods, it was generally agreed that the "dollar" would be the basic currency unit of the 

new United States of America. 24 Article I, section 8 of the new Constitution gave to Congress the power "to coin money, regulate the value 

thereof, and of foreign coin"; the power was exdusi ve because the state 

nNettels, National Economy, p. 82. 

ilSee Hammond, Banks and Politics, pp. 67, 87-88. 

"Nettels, National Economy, pp. 61~2. Also see ibid; pp. 77-80, 85. 

"'As Jefferson put it at the time: "The unit or dollar is a known coin, and the most 

familiar of all to the mind of the public. It is already adopted from South to North, has 

identified our currency, and therefore happily offers itself a unit already introduced." 

Cited in J. Laurence Laughlin, The History of Bimetallism in the United Slrltes, 4th ed. (New 

York: D. Appleton and Co., 19(1), p. 11n. 

30 
64 


75727.019

governments were prohibited, in Article I, section 10, from coining 

money, emitting paper money, or making anything but gold and silver 

coin legal tender in payment of debts. (Evidently the Founding Fathers 

were mindful of the bleak record of colonial and revolutionary paper 

issues and provincial juggling of the weights and denominations of 

coin. ) In accordance with this power, Congress passed the Coinage Act 

of 1792 on the recommendation of Secretary of Treasury Alexander 

Hamilton's Report on the Establishment of a Mint of the year before. 25 

The Coinage Act established a bimetallic dollar standard for the 

United States. The dollar was defined as both a weight of 371.25 grains 

of pure silver and/or a weight of 24.75 grains of pure gold-a fixed ratio 

of 15 grains of silver to 1 grain of gold. 26 Anyone could bring gold and 

silver bullion to the Mint to be coined, and silver and gold coins were 

both to be legal tender at this fixed ratio of 15:1. The basic silver coin 

was to be the silver dollar, and the basic gold coin the lO-dollar eagle, 

containing 247.5 grains of pure gold.27 

The 15:1 fixed bimetallic ratio almost precisely corresponded to the 

market gold/silver ration of the early 1790s,2B but of course the tragedy 

of any bimetallic standard is that the fixed mint ratio must always come 

a cropper against inevitably changing market ratios, and that Gresham's Law will then come inexorably into effect. Thus, Hamilton's 

express desire to keep both metals in circulation in order to increase 

the supply of money was doomed to failure. 29 

Unfortunately for the bimetallic goal, the 1780s saw the beginning of 

a steady decline in the ratio of the market values of silver to gold, 

largely due to the massive increases over the next three decades of 

silver production from the mines of Mexico. The result was that the 

market ratio fell to 15.5:1 by the 17905, and after 1805 fell to approximately 15.75:1. The latter figure was enough of a gap between the 

market and mint ratios to set Gresham's Law into operation so that by 

"'The text of the Coinage Act of 1792 may be found in Laughlin, History of Bimetallism, 

pp. 300-301. Also see ibid; pp. 21-23; Hepburn, History of Currnrcy, pp. 43-45. 

26'fhe current Spanish silver dollars in use were lighter than the earlier dollars weighing 

387 grains. See Laughlin, History of Bimetallism, pp. 16-18. 

"'Golden 1!aIf-eagIes (worth $5) and quarter-eagIes (worth $2.50) were also to be coined, 

of corresponding proportional weights, and, for silver coins, half-dollars, quarter-dollars, 

dimes, and half-dimes of corresponding weights. 

28Silver had declined in market value from the 14.1:1 ratio of 1760, largely due to the 

declining production of gold from Russian mines in this period and therefore the rising 

relative value of gold. 

"See Laughlin, History of Bimetallism, p. 14. 

31 
65 


75727.020

1810 gold coins began to disappear from the United States and silver 

coins to flood in. The fixed government ratio now significantly overvalued silver and undervalued gold, and so it paid people to bring in 

silver to exchange for gold, melt the gold coins into bullion and ship it 

abroad. From 1810 until 1834, only silver coin, domestic and foreign, 

circulated in the United States.3() 

Originally, Congress in 1793 provided that all foreign coins circulating in the United States be legal tender. Indeed, foreign coins have 

been estimated to form 80 percent of American domestic specie circulation in 1800. Most of the foreign coins were Spanish silver, and while 

the legal tender privilege was progressively cancelled for various foreign coins by 1827, Spanish silver coins continued as legal tender and 

to predominate in circulation.3! Spanish dollars however, soon began 

to be heavier in weight by one to five percent over their American 

equivalents, even though they circulated at face value here, and so the 

American mint ratio overvalued American more than Spanish dollars. 

As a result, the Spanish silver dollars were re-exported, leaving American silver dollars in circulation. On the other hand, fractional Spanish 

silver coins--half-dollars, quarter-dollars, dimes, and half dimes--were 

considerably over-valued in the U.S., since they circulated at face value 

and yet were far lighter weight. Gresham's Law again came into play, 

and the result was that American silver fractional coins were exported 

and disappeared, leaving Spanish silver fractional coins as the major 

currency. To make matters still more complicated, American silver 

dollars, though lighter weight than the Spanish, circulated equally by 

name in the West Indies. As a result, American silver dollars were 

exported to the Caribbean. Thus, by the complex workingS of Gresham's Law, the United States was left, especially after 1820, with no 

gold coins and only Spanish fractional silver coin in circulation.32 

"'For a lucid explanation of the changing silver/gold ratios and how Gresham's Law 

operated in this period, see Laughlin, History of Bimetallism, pp. 10-51. Also see Laughlin, 

A Nw Exposifiun of MOney, Credit and Prices (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 

pp.93-111. 

"These "Spanish" coins were almost exclusively minted in the Spanish colonies of 

Latin America. After the Latin American nations achieved independence in the 18205, the 

coins cin:ulated freely in the United States without being legal tender. 

'"On the complex worldngs of fractional as against dollar coins in this period, see the 

excellent article by David A. Martin, "Bimetallism in the United States before 1850," 

Journal of Political Erorwmy 76 (May-June 1968): 42S-434. 

32 
66 


75727.021

The First Bank of the United States 1791-1811 

A linchpin of the Hamiltonian financial program was a central bank, 

the First Bank of the United States, replacing the abortive Bank of North 

America experiment. Hamilton's Report on a National Bank of December 

1790 urged such a bank, to be owned privately with the government 

owning one-fifth of the shares. Hamilton argued that the alleged "scarcity" of specie currency needed to be overcome by infusions of paper, 

and the new Bank was to issue such paper, to be invested in the 

assumed federal debt and in subsidy to manufacturers. The Bank notes 

were to be legally redeemable in specie on demand, and its notes were 

to be kept at par with specie by the federal government's accepting its 

notes in taxes-giving it a quasi~legal tender status. Also, the federal 

government would confer upon the Bank the prestige of being depository for its public funds. 

In accordance with Hamilton's wishes, Congress quickly established 

the First Bank of the United States in February 1791. The charter of the 

Bank was for 20 years, and it was assured a monopoly of the privilege 

of having a national charter during that period. In a significant gesture 

of continuity with the Bank of North America, the latter's long-time 

president and former partner of Robert Morris, Thomas Willing of 

Philadelphia, was made president of the new Bank of the United States. 

The Bank of the United States promptly fulfilled its inflationary 

potential by issuing millions of dollars in paper money and demand 

deposits, pyramiding on top of $2 million in specie. The Bank of the 

United States invested heavily in loans to the United States government. In addition to $2 million invested in the assumption of preexisting 

long-term debt assumed by the new federal government, the Bank of 

the United States engaged in massive temporary lending to the gov~ 

emment, which reached $6.2 million by 1796.33 The result of the outpouring of credit and paper money by the new Bank of the United 

States was an inflationary rise in prices. Thus, wholesale prices rose 

from an index of 85 in 1791 to a peak of 146 in 1796, an increase of 72 

"Schultz and Caine are severely aitical of these operations: '1n indebting itself heavily 

to the Bank of the United States, the Federal Government was obviously misusing its 

privileges and seriously endangering the Bank's stability." They also charged that "the 

Federalists had saddled the government with a military and interest budget that threatened 

to topple the structure of federal finances. Despite the addition of tax after tax to the 

revenue system, the Federal Government's receipts through the decade of the 90's were 

barely able to cling to the skirts of its expenditures." William J. Schultz and M.R Caine, 

"Federalist Finance," in C.R. Taylor, ed. Hamilton and the National Debt (Boston: D.C. 

Heath and Co., 1950), pp. 6-7. 

33 
67 


75727.022

percent. 34 In addition, speculation boomed in government securities 

and real estate values were driven upward,3S Pyramiding on top of the 

Bank of the United States expansion and aggravating the paper money 

expansion and the inflation was a flood of newly created commercial 

banks. Whereas there were only three commercial banks before the 

founding of the United States, and only four by the establishment of 

the Bank of the United States, eight new banks were founded shortly 

thereafter, in 1791 and 1792, and 10 more by 1796. Thus, the Bank of 

the United States and its monetary expansion spurred the creation of 

18 new banks in five years. 36 

The establishment of the Bank of the United States precipitated a 

grave constitutional argument, the Jeffersonians arguing that the Constitution gave the federal government no power to establish a bank. 

Hamilton, in turn, paved the way for virtually unlimited expansion of 

federal power by maintaining that the Constitution "implied" a grant 

of power for carrying out vague national goals. The Hamiltonian interpretation won out officially in the decision of Supreme Court Justice 

John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819),37 

Despite the Jeffersonian hostility to commercia1 and central banks, 

the Democratic-Republicans, under the control of quasi-Federalist moderates rather than militant Old Republicans, made no move to repeal 

the charter of the Bank of the United States before its expiration in 1811 

and happily multiplied the number of state banks and bank credit in 

the next two decades. J8 Thus, in 1800 there were 28 state banks; by 

1811, the number had escalated to 117, a fourfold increase. In 1804, 

there were 64 state banks, of which we have data on 13, or 20 percent 

"Similar movements OCCUlTed in wholesale prices in Philadelphia, Charleston, and 

the Ohio River Valley. U.S. Department of Commen:e, Historical SlJItistics of the United 

States. Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19(0), pp. 

116, 119-121. 

"Nettels, National Economy, pp. 121-122. 

36J. Van Fenstennaker, "The Statistics of American Commercial Banking, 1782-1818," 

Jounull of Economic History (September, 1965), p. 401.; Van Fenstermaker, The Deuelopmen! 

of Americlln Commercial Banking 178Z-1837 (Kent. Ohio: Kent State University, 1965), pp. 

111-183; William M. Gouge, A Short History of Paper Money and Banking in the United States 

(1833, New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1968), p. 42. 

"Marshall, a disciple of Hamilton. repeated some of Hamilton's arguments virtually 

word for word in the decision. See Gerald T. Dunne, Monetary Decisions of the Supreme 

Court (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1960), p. 30. 

'"On the quasi-Federalists as opposed to the Old Republicans. on banking and on 

other issues, see Richard E. Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young 

Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 277 and passim. 

34 
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75727.023

of the banks. These reporting banks had $0.98 million in specie, as 

against notes and demand deposits outstanding of $2.82 million, a 

reserve ratio of .35 (or, a notes + deposits pyramiding on top of specie 

of 2.88:1). By 1811, 26 percent of the 117 banks reported a total of $2.57 

million; but the two-and-a-half fold increase in specie was more than 

matched by an emission of $10.95 million of notes and depOSits, a 

nearly fourfold increase. This constituted a pyramiding of 4.26:1 on top 

of specie, or a reserve ratio of these banks of .23.39 

As for the Bank of the United States, which acted in conjunction with 

the federal government and with the state banks, in January 1811 it 

had specie assets of $5.01 million, and notes and deposits outstanding 

of $12.87 million, a pyramid ratio of 2.57:1, or a reserve ratio of .39.40 

Finally, when the time for rechartering the Bank of the United States 

came in 1811, the recharter bill was defeated by one vote each in the 

House and Senate. Recharter was fought for by the Madison administration aided by nearly all the Federalists in Congress, but was narrowly 

defeated by the bulk of the Democratic-Republicans, including the 

hard-money Old Republican forces. In view of the widely held misconception among historians that Central Banks serve, and are looked 

upon, as restraints upon state or private bank inflation, it is instructive 

to note that the major forces in favor of recharter were merchants, 

chambers of commerce, and most of the state banks. Merchants found 

that the Bank had expended credit at cheap rates and had eased the 

eternal complaint about a "scarcity of money." Even more suggestive 

is the support of the state banks, which hailed the Bank as "advantageous" and worried about the contraction of credit if the Bank were 

forced to liquidate. The Bank of New York, which had been founded 

by Alexander Hamilton, in fact lauded the Bank of the United States 

because it had been able "in case of any sudden pressure upon the 

"'Van Fenstennaker notes that there has been a tendency of historians to believe tha t 

virtually all bank emissions were in the fonn of notes, but that actually a large portion 

was in the fonn of demand deposits. Thus, in 1804, bank liabilities were $1.70 million in 

notes and $1.12 million in deposits; in 1811 they were $5.68 million and $5.27 respectively. 

He points out that deposits exceeded notes in the large cities such as Boston and Philadelphia, some times by two or threefold, whereas bank notes were used far more widely 

in rural areas for hand-to-hand transactions. Van Fenstennaker, "Statistics," pp. 406-411. 

"'Of Bank of the United States liabilities, bank notes totalled $5.04 million and demand 

deposits $7.83 million. John Jay Knox, A History of Banking in the United States (New York: 

Bradford Rhodes 8< Co., 19(0), p. 39. There are no other reports for the Bank of the United 

States extant except for 1809. The others were destroyed by fire. John Thorn Holdsworth, 

The First Bank of the United Stales (Washington, D.C.: National Monetary Commission. 

1910). pp. ll1ff., 138-144. 

35 
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merchants to step forward to their aid in a degree which the state 

institutions were unable to do."41 

The War of 1812 and Its Aftermath 

War has generally had grave and fateful consequences for the American monetary and fmancial system. We have seen that the Revolutionary War occasioned a mass of depreciated fiat paper, worthless Continentals, a huge public debt, and the beginnings of central banking in 

the Bank of North America. The Hamiltonian financial system, and 

even the Constitution itself, was in large part shaped by the Federalist 

desire to fund the federal and state public debt via federal taxation, and 

a major reason for the establishment of the First Bank of the United 

States was to contribute to the funding of the newly assumed federal 

debt. The Constitutional prohibition against state paper money, and 

the implicit rebuff to all fiat paper were certainly influenced by the 

Revolutionary War experience. 

The War of 1812-15 had momentous consequences for the monetary 

system. An enormous expansion in the number of banks and in bank 

notes and deposits was spurred by the dictates of war finance. New 

England banks were more conservative than in other regions, and the 

region was strongly opposed to the war with England, so little public 

debt was purchased in New England. Yet imported goods, textile manufactures, and munitions had to be purchased in that region by the 

federal government. The government therefore encouraged the formation of new and recklessly inflationary banks in the Mid-Atlantic, 

Southern, and Western states, which printed huge quantities of new 

notes to purchase government bonds. The federal government thereupon used these notes to purchase manufactured goods in New 

England. 

Thus, from 1811 to 1815 the number of banks in the country increased 

from 117 to 212; in addition, there had sprung up 35 private unincorporated banks, which were illegal in most states but were allowed to 

function under war conditions. Specie in the 30 reporting banks, 26 

percent of the total number of 1811, amounted to $2.57 million in 1811; 

"Holdsworth, First Bank, p. 83. Also see ibid., pp. 83-90. Holdsworth, the premier 

historian of the First Bank of the United States, saw the overwhelming support by the 

state banks, but still inconsistently clung to the myth that the Bank of the United States 

functioned as a restraint on their expansion: 'The state banks, though their note issues and 

discounts had been kept in check tTy the superior resources lind power of the Bank of the United 

States, favored the extension of the c:harter, and memorialized Congress to that effect:' 

(italics added) Ibid., p. 90. 

36 
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this figure had risen to $5.40 million in the 98 reporting banks in 1815, 

or 40 percent of the total. Notes and deposits, on the other hand, were 

$10.95 million in 1811 and had increased to $31.6 million in 1815 among 

the reporting banks. 

If we make the heroic assumption that we can estimate the money 

supply for the country by multiplying by the proportion of unreported 

banks and we then add in the BUS totals for 1811, specie in all banks 

would total $14.9 million in 1811 and $13.5 million in 1815, or a 9.4 

percent decrease. On the other hand, total bank notes and deposits 

aggregated to $42.2 million in 1811, and $79.0 million four years later, 

so that an increase of 87.2 percent, pyramided on top of a 9.4 percent 

decline in specie. If we factor in the Bank of the United States, then, 

the bank pyramid ratio was 3.70:1 and the reserve ratio .27 in 1811; 

while the pyramid ratio four years later was 5.85:1 and the reserve ratio 

.17. 

But the aggregates scarcely tell the whole story since, as we have 

seen, the expansion took place solely outside of New England, while 

New England banks continued on their relatively sound basis and did 

not inflate their credit. The record expansion of the number of banks 

was in Pennsylvania, which incorporated no less than 41 new banks 

in the month of March 1814, contrasting to only four banks which had 

existed in that state-all in Philadelphia-until that date. It is instructive to compare the pyramid ratios of banks in various reporting states 

in 1815: only 1.96:1 in Massachusetts, 2.7:1 in New Hampshire, and 

2.42:1 in Rhode Island, as contrasted to 19.2:1 in Pennsylvania, 18.46:1 

in South Carolina, and 18.73:1 in Virginia.42 

This monetary situation meant that the United States government 

was paying for New England manufactured goods with a mass of 

inflated bank paper outside the region. Soon, as the New England 

banks called upon the other banks to redeem their notes in specie, the 

mass of inflating banks faced imminent insolvency. 

It was at this point that a fateful decision was made by the U.S. 

government and concurred in by the governments of the states outside 

New England. As the banks all faced failure, the governments, in 

August 1814, permitted all of them to suspend specie payments-that 

is to stop all redemption of notes and deposits in gold or silver-and 

"Van Fenstermaker, "Statistics," pp. 401-409. For the list of individual incorporated 

banks, see Van Fenstermaker, "Development," pp. 112-183, with Pennsylvania on pp. 

169-173. 

37 
71 


75727.026

yet to continue in operation. In short, in one of the most flagrant 

violations of property rights in American history, the banks were permitted to waive their contractual obligations to pay in specie while they 

themselves could expand their loans and operations and force their 

own debtors to repay their loans as usual. 

Indeed, the number of banks, and bank credit, expanded rapidly 

during 1815 as a result of this governmental carte blanche. It was 

precisely during 1815 when virtually all the private banks sprang up, 

the number of banks increasing in one year from 208 to 246. Reporting 

banks increased their pyramid ratios from 3.17:1 in 1814 to 5.85:1 the 

following year, a drop of reserve ratios from .32 to .17. Thus, if we 

measure bank expansion by pyramiding and reserve ratios, we see that 

a major inflationary impetus during the War of 1812 came during the 

year 1815 after specie payments had been suspended throughout the 

country by government action. 

Historians dedicated to the notion that central banks restrain state 

or private bank inflation have placed the blame for the multiplicity of 

banks and bank credit inflation during the War of 1812 on the absence 

of a central bank. But as we have seen, both the number of banks and 

bank credit grew apace during the period of the First BUS, pyramiding 

on top of the latter's expansion, and would continue to do so under 

the Second Bank, and, for that matter, the Federal Reserve System in 

later years. And the federal government, not the state banks themselves, is largely to blame for encouraging new, inflated banks to monetize the war debt. Then, in particular, it allowed them to suspend specie 

payment in August 1814, and to continue that suspension for two years 

after the war was over, until February 1817. Thus, for two and a half 

years banks were permitted to operate and expand while issuing what 

was tantamount to fiat paper and bank deposits. 

Another neglected responsi~)ility of the U.S. government for the 

wartime inflation was its massive issue of treasury notes to help finance 

the war effort. While this treasury paper was interest-bearing and was 

redeemable in specie in one year, the cumulative amount outstanding 

functioned as money, as they were used in transactions among the 

public and were also employed as reserves or "high-powered money" 

by the expanding banks. The fact that the government received the 

treasury notes for all debts and taxes gave the notes a quaSi-legal tender 

status. Most of the treasury notes were issued in 1814 and 1815, when 

their ou tstanding total reached $10.65 million and $15.46 million respectively. Not only did the treasury notes fuel the bank inflation, but their 

quasi-legal tender status brought Gresham's Law into operation and 

38 
72 


75727.027

specie flowed out of the banks and public circulation outside of New 

England, and into New England and out of the country.43 

The expansion of bank money and treasury notes during the war 

drove up prices in the United States. Wholesale price increases from 

1811 to 1815 averaged 35 percent, with different cities experiencing a 

price inflation ranging from 28 percent to 55 percent. Since foreign 

trade was cut off by the war, prices of imported commodities rose far 

more, averaging 70 percent.44 But more important than this inflation, 

and at least as important as the wreckage of the monetary system during 

and after the war, was the precedent that the two-and-a-half year-long 

suspension of specie payment set for the banking system for the future. 

From then on, every time there was a banking crisis brought on by 

inflationary expansion and demands for redemption in specie, state 

and federal governments looked the other way and permitted general 

suspension of specie payments while bank operations continued to 

flourish. It thus became clear to the banks that in a general crisis they 

would not be required to meet the ordinary obligations of contract law 

or of respect for property rights, so their inflationary expansion was 

permanently encouraged by this massive failure of government to fulfill 

its obligation to enforce contracts and defend the rights of property. 

Suspensions of specie payments infonnally or officially penneated 

the economy outside of New England during the Panic of 1819, occurred 

everywhere outside of New England in 1837, and in all states south 

and west of New Jersey in 1839. A general suspension of specie payments occurred throughout the country once again in the panic of 

1857.45 

It is important to realize, then, in evaluating the American banking 

system before the Civil War, that even in the later years when there 

was no central bank, the system was not "free" in any proper economic 

sense. "Free" banking can only refer to a system in which banks are 

treated as any other business, and that therefore failure to obey contractual obligations-in this case, prompt redemption of notes and 

"For a pen:eptive discussion of the nature and consequences of treasury note issue in 

this period, see Richard H. Timberlake, Jr., The Origins of Central Ban/cing in the United 

States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 13--18. The Gresham Law effect 

probably accounts for the startling decline of specie held by the reporting banks, from 

$9.3 million to $5.4 million, from 1814 to 1815. Van Fenstennaker, "Statistics," p. 405. 

"Historiad Statistics, pp. 1lS-124; Murray N. Rothbard, The Panic of 1819: Readions and 

Policies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1%2), p. 4 . 

.son the suspensions of specie payments, and on their importance before the Gvil War, 

see Vera C. Smith, The &tio7UIle of Central Banking (London: P.S. King &: Son, 1936), pp. 

38-46. Also see Dunne, Monetary Decisions, p. 26. 

39 
73 


75727.028

deposits in specie-must incur immediate insolvency and liquidation. 

Burdened by the tradition of allowing general suspensions that arose 

in the United States in 1814, the pre-Civil War banking system, despite 

strong elements of competition when not saddled with a central bank, 

must rather be tenned in the phrase of one economist, as "Decentralization without Freedom."46 

From the 1814-17 experience on, the notes of state banks circulated 

at varying rates of depreciation, depending on public expectations of 

how long they would be able to keep redeeming their obligations in 

specie. These expectations, in turn, were heavily influenced by the 

amount of notes and deposits issued by the bank as compared with 

the amount of specie held in its vaults. 

In that era of poor communications and high transportation cost, the 

tendency for a bank note was to depreciate in proportion to its distance 

from the home office. One effective, if time-consuming, method of 

enforcing redemption on nominally specie-paying banks was the emergence of a class of professional "money brokers." These brokers would 

buy up a mass of depreciated notes of nominally specie-paying banks, 

and then travel to the home office of the bank to demand redemption 

in specie. Merchants, money brokers, bankers, and the general public 

were aided in evaluating the various state bank notes by the development of monthly journals known as "bank note detectors." These 

"detectors" were published by money brokers and periodically evaluated the market rate of various bank notes in relation to specieY 

"Smith, RatiUllllle, p. 36. Smith properly defines "free banking" as "a regime where 

note-issuing banks are allowed to set up in the same way as any other type of business 

enterprise, so long as they comply with the general company law. The requirement for 

their establishment is not special conditional authorization from a government authority, 

but the ability to raise sufficient capital, and public confidence, to gain acceptance for their 

notes and ensure the profitability of the undertaking. Under such a system all banks 

would not only be allowed the same rights, but would also be subjected to the same 

responsibilities as other business enterprises. If they failed to meet their obligations they 

would be declared bankrupt and put into liquidation, and their asset. used to meet the 

claims of their creditors, in which case the shareholders would lose the whole or part of 

their capital, and the penalty for failure would be paid, at least for the most part, by those 

responsible for the policy of the bank. Notes issued under this system would be 'promises 

to pay,' and such obligations must be met on demand in the generally accepted medium 

which we will assume to be gold. No bank would have the right to call on the government 

or on any other institution for special help in time of need .... A general abandonment 

of the gold standard is inconceivable under these conditions, and with a strict interpretation of the bankruptcy laws any bank suspending payments would at once be put into 

the hands of a receiver." Ibid., pp. 148-149. 

"See Richard H. Timberlake, Jr., Money,Banking and Central Banking (New York: Harper 

&: Row, 1%5), p. 94. 

40 
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75727.029

''Wildcat'' banks were so named because in that age of poor transportation, banks hoping to inflate and not worry about redemption 

attempted to locate in "wildcat" country where money brokers would 

find it difficult to travel. It shold be noted that if it were not for periodic 

suspension, there would have been no room for wildcat banks or for 

varying degrees of lack of confidence in the genuineness of specie 

redemption at any given time. 

It can be imagined that the advent of the money broker was not 

precisely welcomed in the town of an errant bank, and it was easy for 

the townspeople to blame the resulting collapse of bank credit on the 

sinister stranger rather than on the friendly neighborhood banker. 

During the panic of 1819, when banks collapsed after an inflationary 

boom lasting until 1817, obstacles and intimidation were often the lot 

of those who attempted to press the banks to fulfill their contractual 

obligation to pay in specie. 

Thus, Maryland and Pennsylvania, during the panic of 1819, engaged 

in almost bizarre inconsistency in this area. Maryland, on February 15, 

1819, enacted a law "to compel ... banks to pay specie for their notes, 

or forfeit their charters." Yet two days after this seemingly tough action, 

it passed another law relieving banks of any obligation to redeem notes 

held by money brokers, "the major force ensuring the people of this 

state from the evil arising from the demands made on the banks of this 

state for gold and silver by brokers." Pennsylvania followed suit a 

month later. In this way, these states could claim to maintain the virtue 

of enforcing contract and property rights while moving to prevent the 

most effective method of ensuring such enforcement. 

Ouring the 1814-1817 general suspension, noteholders who sued for 

specie payment seldom gained satisfaction in the courts. Thus, Isaac 

Bronson, a prominent Connecticut banker in a specie-paying region, 

sued various New York banks for payment of notes in specie. He failed 

to get satisfaction, and for his pains received only abuse in the New 

York press as an agent of "misery and ruin."4Il 

The banks south of Virginia largely went off specie payment during 

the panic of 1819, and in Georgia at least general suspension continued 

almost continuously down to the 1830s. One customer complained 

-Hammond, Banks and Politics, p. 179-160. Even before the suspension, in 1808, a 

Bostonian named Hireh Durkee who attempted to demand specie for 59,000 in notes of 

the state-owned Vermont State Bank, was met by an indictment for an attempt by this 

"eviI-disposed person" to "realize a filthy gain" at the expense of the resources of the 

state of Vermont and the ability of "good citizens thereof to obtain money." Ibid., p. 179. 

Also see Gouge, Short History,p. 84. 

41 
75 


75727.030

during 1819 that in order to collect in specie from the largely stateowned Bank of Darien, Georgia, he was forced to swear before a justice 

of the peace in the bank that each and every note he presented to the 

bank was his own and that he was not a money broker or an agent for 

anyone else; he was forced to swear to the oath in the presence of at 

least five bank directors and the bank's cashier; and he was forced to 

pay a fee of $1.36 on each note in order to acquire specie on demand, 

Two years later, when a noteholder demanded $30,000 in specie at the 

Planters' Bank of Georgia, he was told he would be paid in pennies 

only, while another customer was forced to accept pennies handed out 

to him at the rate of $60 a day.49 

During the panic, North Carolina and Maryland in particular moved 

against the money brokers in a vain attempt to prop up the depreciated 

notes of their states' banks. In North Carolina, banks were not penalized by the legislature for suspending specie payments to "brokers," 

while maintaining them to others. Backed by government, the three 

leading banks of the state met and agreed, in June 1819, not to pay 

specie to brokers or their agents. Their notes immediately fell to a 15 

percent discount outside the state. However, the banks continued to 

require-ignoring the inconsistency-that their own debtors pay them 

at par in specie. Maryland, during the same year, moved to require a 

license of $500 per year for money brokers, in addition to an enormous 

$20,000 bond to establish the business. 

Maryland tried to bolster the defense of banks and the attack on 

brokers by passing a compulsory par law in 1819, prohibiting the exchange 

of specie for Maryland bank notes at less than par. The law was readily 

evaded, however, the penalty merely adding to the discount as compensation for the added risk. Specie furthermore was driven out of the 

state by the operation of Gresham's Law, 50 

In Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, stay laws were passed requiring creditors to accept depreciated and inconvertible bank paper in 

payment of debts, else suffer a stay of execution of the debt. 1n this 

way, quasi-legal tender status was conferred on the paper.51 Many 

states permitted banks to suspend specie payment, and four Western 

"Gouge, Short History, pp. 141-142. Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford, a 

Georgia politician, tried in vain to save the Bank of Darien from failure by depositing 

Treasury funds there during the panic. Rothbard, The Panic of 1819, p. 62. 

"'Rothbard, Panic of 1819, pp. ~. Other compulsory par laws were passed by Ohio 

and Delaware. 

"The most extreme proposal was that of Tennessee politician Felix Grundy's scheme, 

never adopted, to compel creditors to accept bank notes of the state bank or forfeit the 

42 
76 


75727.031

states-Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and lllinois---established stateowned banks to try to overcome the depression by issuing large issues 

of inconvertible paper money. In all states trying to prop up inconvertible bank paper, a quasi-legal status was also conferred on the paper 

by agreeing to receive the notes in taxes or debts due to the state. The 

result of all the inconvertible paper schemes was rapid and massive 

depreciation, disappearance of specie, succeeded by speedy liquidation 

of the new state-owned banks.52 

An amusing footnote on the problem of banks being protected against 

their contractual obligations to pay in specie occurred in the course of 

correspondence between one of the earliest economists in America, the 

young Philadelphia State' Senator Condy Raguet, and the eminent 

English economist David Ricardo. Ricardo had evidently been bewildered by Raguet's statement that banks technically required to pay in 

specie were often not called upon to do so. On April 18, 1821, Raguet 

replied, explaining the power of banks in the United States: 

You state in your letter that you fmd it difficult to comprehend, why 

persons who had a right to demand coin from the Banks in payment 

of their notes, so long forebore to exercise it. This no doubt appears 

paradoxical to one who resides in a country where an act of parliament 

was necessary to protect a bank, but the difficulty is easily solved. 

The whole of our population are either stockholders of banks or in 

debt to them. It is not the interest of the first to press the banks and 

the rest are afraid. This is the whole secret. An independent man who 

was neither a stockholder or debtor, who would have ventured to 

compel the banks to do justice, would have been persecuted as an 

enemy of society ... ."" 

The Second Bank of the United States, 1816-1833 

The United States emerged from the War of 1812 in a chaotic monetary state, with banks multiplying and inflating ad lib, checked only by 

debt: that would have conferred full legal tender status on the bank. Rothbard, Panic of 

1819, p. 91; Joseph H. Parks, "Felix Grundy and the Depression of 1819 in Tennessee," 

PubliOltions of the East Tennessee Historical Society X (1938): 22. 

"Only New England, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, Mississippi, and Louisiana were 

comparatively untouched by the inconvertible paper contagion, either in the fonn of 

suspended specie banks continuing in operation or new state-owned banks emitting more 

paper. For an analysis of the events and controversies in each state, see Rothbard, Panic 

of 1819, pp. 57-111. 

"Rague to Ricardo, April 18, 1821, in David Ricardo, Minor Papers on the Currency 

Question, 1809-23, J. Hollander, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1932), pp. 199-201; 

Rothbard, Panic of 1819, pp. 10-11. Also see Hammond, Banks and Politics, p. 242. 

43 
77 


75727.032

the varying rates of depreciation of their notes. With banks freed from 

redeeming their obligations in specie, the number of incorporated banks 

increased during 1816, from 212 to 232.54 Clearly, the nation could not 

continue indefinitely with the issue of fiat money in the hands of 

discordant sets of individual banks. It was apparent that there were 

two ways out of the problem: one was the hard-money path, advocated 

by the Old Republicans and, for their own purposes, the Federalists. 

The federal and state governments would have sternly compelled the 

rollicking banks to redeem promptly in specie, and, when most of the 

banks outside of New England could not, to force them to liquidate. In 

that way, the mass of depredated and inflated notes and deposits 

would have been swiftly liquidated, and specie would have poured 

back out of hoards and into the country to supply a circulating medium. 

The inflationary experience would have been over. 

Instead, the Democratic-Republican establishment in 1816 turned to 

the old Federalist path: a new central bank, a Second Bank of the United 

States. Modelled closely after the First Bank, the Second Bank, a private 

corporation with one-fifth of the shares owned by the federal government, was to create a national paper currency, purchase a large chunk 

of the public debt, and receive deposits of Treasury funds. The BUS 

notes and deposits were to be redeemable in specie, and they were 

given quasi-legal tender status by the federal government's receiving 

them in payment of taxes. 

That the purpose of establishing the BUS was to support the state 

banks in their inflationary course rather than crack down on them is 

seen by the shameful deal that the BUS made with the state banks as 

soon as it opened its doors in January 1817. At the same time it was 

establishing the BUS in April 1816, Congress passed the resolution of 

Daniel Webster, at that time a Federalist champion of hard money, 

requiring that after February 20, 1817, the United States should accept 

in payments for debts or taxes only specie, Treasury notes, BUS notes, 

or state bank notes redeemable in specie on demand. In short, no 

irredeemable state bank notes would be accepted after that date. Instead 

of using the opportunity to compel the banks to redeem, however, the 

BUS, in a meeting with representatives from the leading urban banks, 

excluding Boston, agreed to issue $6 million worth of credit in New 

York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Virginia before insisting on specie 

"New note issue series by banks reached a heavy peak in 1815 and 1816 in New York 

and Pennsylvania. D.C. Wismar, Pennsylvania Descriptive List of Obsolete Sfllte Bank Notes, 

1782-1866 (Frederick, Md.: J. W. Stovell Printing Co., 1933); and idem, New York Descriptive 

List of Obsolde Paper Money (Frederick, Md.: J.W. Stovell Printing Co., 1931). 

44 
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75727.033

payments from debts due to it from the state banks. In return for that 

agreed-upon massive inflation, the state banks graciously consented to 

resume specie payments. 55 Moreover, the BUS and the state banks 

agreed to mutually support each other in any emergency, which of 

course meant in practice that the far stronger BUS was committed to 

the propping up of the weaker state banks. 

The BUS was pushed through Congress by the Madison administration and particularly by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander J. Dallas, 

whose appointment was lobbied for, for that purpose. Dallas, a wealthy 

Philadelphia lawyer, was a dose friend, counsel, and financial associate 

of Philadelphia merchant and banker Stephen Girard, reputedly one 

of the two wealthiest men in the country. Toward the end of its term, 

Girard was the largest stockholder of the first BUS, and during the War 

of 1812 Girard became a very heavy investor in the war debt of the 

federal government. Both as a prospective large stockholder and as a 

way to unload his public debt, Girard began to agitate for a new BUS. 

Dallas's appointment as Secretary of Treasury in 1814 was successfully 

engineered by Dallas and his close friend, wealthy New York merchant 

and fur trader John Jacob Astor, also a heavy investor in the war debt. 

When the BUS was established, Stephen Girard purchased the $3 million of the $28 million that remained unsubscribed, and he and Dallas 

managed to secure for the post of president of the new bank their good 

friend William Jones, former Philadelphia merchant. 56 

Much of the opposition to the founding of the BUS seems keenly 

prophetic. Thus, Senator William H. Wells, Federalist from Delaware, 

in arguing against the Bank bill, said that it was "ostenSibly for the 

purpose of correcting the diseased state of our paper currency by 

restraining and curtailing the overissue of bank paper, and yet it came 

prepared to inflict upon us the same evil, being itself nothing more 

than simply a paper-making machine."S1 In fact, the result of the deal 

"On the establishment of the BUS and on the deal with the state banks, see Ralph C.H. 

Catterall, TIre 5eamd Bank of tlu! United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902), 

pp. 9-26, 479-490. Also see Hammond, Banks and Politics, pp. 230-248; David R. Dewey, 

TIre Second United States Bank (Washington, D.C.: National Monetary Commission, 1910), 

pp. 148-176. 

"On the Girard-Dallas connection, see Hammond, Banks and Politics, pp. 231-246, 252; 

Philip H. Burch, Jr., Elites in American Hiswry, Vol. I TIre Federalist Years to llu! Civil War 

(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981), pp. 88, 97, 110...117, 119-121; Kenneth L. Brown, 

"Stephen Girard, Promoter of the Second Bank of the United States." Journal of Economic 

History, November 1942, pp. 12>-132. 

51 Annals of Congress, 14 Cong., 1 sess., Aprill, 1816, pp. 267-270. Also see ibid., pp. 

1066, 1091, 1110££. Cited in Murray N. Rothbard, TIre Case tor II 100 Percent Gold Dollar 

45 
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75727.034

with the state banks was that their resumption of specie payments after 

1817 was more nominal than real, thereby setting the stage for the 

widespread suspensions of the 1819-21 depression. As Bray Hammond 

writes: 

. . . specie payments were resumed, with substantial shortcomings. 

Apparently the situation was better than it had been, and a pretense 

was maintained of its being better than it was. But redemption was 

not certain and universal; there was still a premium on specie and still 

a discount on bank notes, with considerable variation in both from 

place to place. Three years later, February 1820, Secretary [of the 

Treasury] Crawford reported to Congress that during the greater part 

of the time that had elapsed since the resumption of specie payments, 

the convertibility of bank notes into specie had been nominal rather 

than real in the largest portion of the Union. 58 

One problem is that the BUS lacked the courage to insist on payment 

of its notes from the state banks. As a result, state banks had large 

balances piled up against them at the BUS, totalling over $2.4 million 

during 1817 and 1818, remaining on the books as virtual interest-free 

loans. As Catterall points out, "so many influential people were interested in the [state banks} as stockholders that it was not advisable to 

give offense by demanding payment in specie, and borrowers were 

anxious to keep the banks in the humor to lend." When the BUS did 

try to collect on state bank notes in specie, President Jones reported, 

"the banks, our debtors, plead inability, require unreasonable indulgence, or treat our reiterated claims and expostulations with settled 

indifference."59 

From its inception, the Second BUS launched a spectacular inflation 

of money and credit. Lax about insisting on the required payment of 

its capital in specie, the Bank failed to raise the $7 million legally 

supposed to have been subscribed in specie; instead, during 1817 and 

1818, its specie held never rose above $2.5 million. At the peak of its 

initial expansion, in July 1818, BUS specie totalled $2.36 million, and 

its aggregate notes and deposits totalled $21.8 million. Thus, in a scant 

(Washington, D. c.: libertarian Review Press, 1974), p. IBn. Also see Gouge, Short History, 

pp.79~. 

56Jiammond, Banks and Politics, p. 248. Also see Condy Raguet, A Treatise on Currency 

and Banking (2nd ed., 1840, New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1967), pp. 302-303; Catterall, 

Second Bank, pp. 37-39; Walter Buckingham Smith, EcoMmic Aspects of the Second Btmk of 

the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 104. 

"Catterall, Second Bank, p. 36. 

46 
80 


75727.035

year-and-a-half of operation, the BUS had added a net of $19.2 million 

to the nation's money supply, for a pyramid ratio of 9.24, or a reserve 

ratio of .11. 

Outright fraud abounded at the BUS, especially at the Philadelphia 

and Baltimore branches, particularly the latter. It is no accident that 

three-fifths of all of the BUS loans were made at these two branches/") 

Also, the BUS attempt to provide a uniform currency throughout the 

nation floundered on the fact that the western and southern branches 

could inflate credit and bank notes and that the inflated notes would 

wend their way to the more conservative branches in New York and 

Boston, which would be obligated to redeem the inflated notes at par. 

In this way, the conservative branches were stripped of specie while 

the western branches could continue to inflate unchecked. 61 

The expansionary operations of the BUS, coupled with its laxity 

toward insisting on specie payment by the state banks, impelled a 

further inflationary expansion of state banks on top of the spectacular 

enlargement of the central bank. Thus, the number of incorporated 

state banks rose from 232 in 1816 to 338 in 1818. Kentucky alone chartered 40 new banks in the 1817-18 legislative session. The estimated 

total money supply in the nation rose from $67.3 million in 1816 to 

$94.7 million in 1818, a rise of 40.7% in two years. Most of this increase 

was supplied by the BUS. 62 

The huge expansion of money and credit impelled a full-scale inflationary boom throughout the country. Import prices had fallen in 1815, 

with the renewal of foreign trade after the war, but domestic prices 

were another story. Thus, the index of export staples in Charleston 

rose from 102 in 1815 to 160 in 1818; the prices of Louisiana staples at 

"'On the expansion and fraud at the BUS, see Catterall, Seamd Bank, pp. 28-50, 503. 

The main culprits were James A. Buchanan, president of the Baltimore mercantile firm of 

Smith & Buchanan, and the Baltimore BUS cashier James W. McCulloch, who was simply 

an impoverished clerk at the mercantile house. Smith, an ex-Federalist, was a senator 

from Maryland and a powerful member of the national Democrat-Republican establishment . 

• , As a result of the contractionary influence on the Boston branch of the BUS, the notes 

of the Massachusetts banks actually declined in this period, from $1 million in June 1815 

to $850,000 in June 1818. See Rothbard, Panic of 1819, p. 8. 

"Total notes and deposits of 39 percent of the nation's reporting state banks was $26.3 

million in 1816, while 38 percent of the banks had total notes and deposits of$27.7 million 

two years later. Converting this pro rata to 100 percent of the banks gives an estimated 

$67.3 million in 1816, and $72.9 million in lE1J8. Add to the latter figure $21.8 million for 

BUS notes and deposits, and this yields $94.7 million in 1818, or a 40.7 percent increase. 

Adapted from tables in Van Fenstennaker, "Statistics," pp. 401, 405, 406. 

47 
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75727.036

New Orleans rose from 178 to 224 in the same period. Other parts of 

the economy boomed; exports rose from $81 million in 1815 to a peak 

of $116 million in 1818. Prices rose greatly in real estate, land, farm 

improvement projects, and slaves, much of it fueled by the use of bank 

credit for speculation in urban and rural real estate. There was a boom 

in turnpike construction, furthered by vast federal expenditures on 

turnpikes. Freight rates rose on steamboats, and shipbuilding shared 

in the general prosperity. Also, general boom conditions expanded 

stock trading so rapidly that traders, who had been buying and selling 

stocks on the curbs on Wall Street for nearly a century, found it necessary to open the first indoor stock exchange in the country, the New 

York Stock Exchange, in March 1817. Also, investment banking began 

in the United States during this boom period. 63 

Starting in July 1818, the government and the BUS began to see what 

dire straits they were in; the enormous inflation of money and credit, 

aggravated by the massive fraud, had put the BUS in real danger of 

going under and illegally failing to sustain spede payments. Over the 

next year, the BUS began a series of heroic contractions, forced curtailment of loans, contractions of credit in the south and west, refusal 

to provide uniform national currency by redeeming its shaky branch 

notes at par, and seriously enforcing the requirement that its debtor 

banks redeem in spede. In addition, it purchased millions of dollars of 

spede from abroad. These heroic actions, along with the ouster of 

President William Jones, managed to save the BUS, but the massive 

contraction of money and credit swiftly brought the United States its 

fIrst widespread economic and finandal depression. The fIrst nationwide "boom-bust" cycle had arrived in the United States, impelled by 

rapid and massive inflation, quickly succeeded by contraction of money 

and credit. Banks failed, and private banks curtailed their credits and 

liabilities and suspended specie payments in most parts of the country. 

Contraction of money and credit by the BUS was almost unbelievable, 

total notes and deposits falling from $21. 9 million in June 1818 to $11.5 

million only a year later. The money supply contributed by the BUS 

was thereby contracted by no less than 47.2 percent in one year. The 

number of incorporated banks at first remained the same, and then fell 

rapidly from 1819 to 1822, falling from 341 in mid-1819 to 267 three 

years later. Total notes and deposits of state banks fell from an estiMRothbard, Panic of 1819, pp. 6-10; Historical Sllltistics, pp. 120, 122, 563. Also see George 

Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New York: Rinehart &: Co., 1951), 

pp. 334-336. 

48 
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75727.037

mated $72.0 million in mid-1818 to $62.7 million a year later, a drop of 

14.0 percent in one year. If we add in the fact that the U.S. Treasury 

contracted total treasury notes from $8.81 million to zero during this 

period, we get the following estimated total money supply: in 1818, 

$103.5 million; in 1819, $74.2 million, a contraction in one year of 28.3 

percent. 64 

The result of the contraction was a massive rash of defaults, bankruptcies of business and manufacturers, and liquidation of unsound 

investments during the boom. There was a vast drop in real estate 

values and rents and in the prices of freight rates and of slaves. Public 

land sales dropped greatly as a result of the contraction, declining from 

$13.6 million in 1818 to $1.7 million to 1820.65 Prices in general plummeted: The index of export staples fell from 158 in November 1818 to 

77 in June 1819, an annualized drop of 87.9 percent during those seven 

months. South Carolina export staples dropped from 160 to 96 from 

1818 to 1819, and commodity prices in New Orleans dropped from 200 

in 1818 to 119 two years later. 

Falling money incomes led to a precipitous drop in imports, which 

fell from $122 million in 1818 to $87 million the year later. Imports from 

Great Britain fell from $43 million in IB18 to $14 million in 1820, and 

cotton and woolen imports from Britain fell from over $14 million each 

in the former year to about $5 million in the latter. 

The great fall in prices aggravated the burden of money debts, reinforced by the contraction of credit. Bankruptcies abounded, and one 

observer estimated that $100 million of mercantile debts to Europe were 

liquidated by bankruptcy during the crisis. Western areas, shorn of 

money by the collapse of the previously swollen paper and debt, often 

returned to barter conditions, and grain and whiskey were used as 

media of exchange.66 

In the dramatic summing up of the hard-money economist and historian William Gouge, by its precipitous and dramatic contraction "the 

Bank was saved, and the people were ruined."67 

"'These estimates are adapted (n)m the tables in Van Fenstermaker, "Statistics," pp. 

401--406; Van Fenstermaker, Development, pp. 66--68. The data for 38 percent of incorpo· 

rated banks in 1818, and for 54 percent in 1819, are converted pro rata to 100 percent 

figures. BUS figures are in Catterall, Second Bank, p. 502. On the contraction by the BUS 

see ibid., pp. 51-72. 

"'On Treasury note contraction in this period, see Timberlake, Origins, pp. 21-26. 

"See Rothbard, Panic uf 1819, pp. 11-16. 

"Gouge, Short Histury, p. 110. 

49 
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75727.038

The Jacksonian Movement and the Bank War 

Out of the bitter experiences of the Panic of 1819 emerged the beginnings of the Jacksonian movement, dedicated to hard money, the eradication of fractional-reserve banking in general, and of the Bank of the 

United States in particular. Andrew Jackson himself, Senator Thomas 

Hart ("Old Bullion") Benton of Missouri, future President James K. 

Polk of Tennessee, and Jacksonian economists Amos Kendall of Kentucky and Condy Raguet of Philadelphia, were all converted to hard 

money and 100 percent reserve banking by the experience of the Panic 

of 1819. 68 The Jacksonians adopted, or in some cases pioneered in, the 

Currency School analysis, which pinned the blame for boom-bust cycles 

on inflationary expansions followed by contractions of bank credit. Far 

from being the ignorant bumpkins that most historians have depicted, 

the Jacksonians were steeped in the knowledge of sound economics, 

particularly of the Ricardian Currency School. 

Indeed, no movement in American politics has been as flagrantly 

misunderstood by historians as the Jacksonians. They were emphatically not, as historians until recently have depicted, either "ignorant 

anti-capitalist agrarians," or "representatives of the rising entrepreneurial class/' or "tools of the inflationary state banks," or embodiments 

of an early proletarian anti-capitalist movement or a non-ideological 

power group or" electoral machine." The Jacksonians were libertarians, 

plain and simple. Their program and ideology were libertarian; they 

strongly favored free enterprise and free markets, but they just as 

strongly opposed special subsidies and monopoly privileges conveyed 

by government to business or to any other group. They favored absolutely minimal government, certainly at the federal level, but also at 

the state level. They believed that government should be confined to 

upholding the rights of private property. In the monetary sphere, this 

meant the separation of government from the banking system and a 

shift from inflationary paper money and fractional-reserve banking to 

pure specie and banks confined to 100 percent reserves. 

In order to put this program into effect, however, the Jacksonians 

faced the grueling task of creating a new party out of what had become 

a one-party system after the War of 1812, in which the DemocratRepublicans had ended up adopting the Federalist program, including 

the reestablishing of the Bank of the United States. The new party, the 

Democratic Party, was largely forged in the mid-1820s by New York 

political leader, Martin VanBuren, newly converted by the aging Thomas 

"'Rothbard, Panic of 1819, p. 188. 

50 
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75727.039

Jefferson to the laissez-faire cause. Van Buren cemented an alliance 

with Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri and the Old Republicans of 

Virginia, but he needed a charismatic leader to take the Presidency 

away from Adams and what was becoming known as the National 

Republican Party. He found that leader in Andrew Jackson, who was 

elected President under the new Democratic banner in 1828. 

The Jacksonians eventually managed to put into effect various parts 

of their free-market and minimal-government economic program, 

including a drastic lowering of tariffs, and for the first and probably 

the last time in American history, paying off the federal debt. But their 

major concentration was on the issue of money and banking. Here 

they had a coherent program, which they proceeded to install in rapidly 

succeeding stages. 

The ftrst important step was to abolish central banking, in the Jacksonian view the major inflationary culprit. The object was not to eliminate the BUS in order to free the state banks for inflationary expansion, 

but, on the contrary, to eliminate the major source of inflation before 

proceeding, on the state level, to get rid of fractional reserve banking. 

The BUS charter was up for renewal in 1836, but Jackson denounced 

the Bank in his first annual message, in 1829. The imperious Nicholas 

Biddle,69 head of the BUS, decided to precipitate a showdown with 

Jackson before his reelection effort, so Biddle filed for renewal early, 

in 1831. The host of National Republicans and non-Jacksonian Democrats proceeded to pass the recharter bill, but Jackson, in a dramatic 

message, vetoed the bill, and Congress failed to pass it over his veto. 

Triumphantly reelected on the Bank issue in 1832, President Jackson 

lost no time in disestablishing the BUS as a central bank. The critical 

action came in 1833, when Jackson removed the public Treasury deposits from the BUS and placed them in a number of state banks (soon 

labelled as "pet banks") throughout the country. The original number 

of pet banks was seven, but the Jacksonians were not interested in 

creating a privileged bank oligarchy to replace the previous monopoly; 

so the number of pet banks had increased to 91 by the end of 1836.70 

In that year, Biddle managed to secure a Pennsylvania charter for his 

bank, and the new United States Bank of Pennsylvania functioned as 

a much reduced but still influential state bank for a few years thereafter. 

6'lJ3iddJe continued the chain of control over both BUSs by the Philadelphia financial 

elite, from Robert Morris and William Bingham, to Stephen Girard and William Jones. 

See Burch, Elites, p. 147. Also see Thomas P. Govan, Nicholas Biddle: Nationalist and Public 

Banker, 1786-1844 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 45, 74-75, 79. 

"'Hammond, Banks and Politics, p. 420. 

51 
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Orthodox historians have long maintained that by his reckless act of 

destroying the BUS and shifting government funds to the numerous 

pet banks, Andrew Jackson freed the state banks from the restraints 

imposed on them by a central bank. Thus, the banks were supposedly 

allowed to pyramid notes and deposits rashly on top of existing specie 

and precipitate a wild inflation that was later succeeded by two bank 

panics and a disastrous deflation. 

Recent historians, however, have totally reversed this conventional 

picture.71 In the first place, the record of bank inflation under the regime 

of the BUS was scarcely ideal. From the depth of the post-1819 depression in January 1820 to January 1823, under the regime of the conservative Langdon Cheves, the BUS increased its notes and deposits at an 

annual rate of 5.9 percent. The nation's total money supply remained 

about the same in that period. Under the far more inflationist regime 

of Nicholas Biddle, however, BUS notes and deposits rose, after January 1823, from $12 million to $42.1 million, an annual rate increase of 

27.9 percent. As a consequence of this base of the banking pyramid 

inflating so sharply, the total money supply during this period vaulted 

from $81 million to $155 million, an annual increase of 10.2 percent. It 

is clear that the driving force for monetary expansion was the BUS, 

which acted as an inflationary rather than restraining force upon the 

state banks. Looking at the figures another way, the 1823 data represented a pyramid ratio of money liabilities to specie of 3.86:1 on the 

part of the BUS and 4:1 of the banking system as a whole, or respective 

reserve ratios of .26 and .25. By 1832, in contrast, the BUS reserve ratio 

had fallen to .17 and the country as a whole to .15. Both sets of institutions had inflated almost precisely proportionately on top of specie. n 

The fact that wholesale prices remained about the same over this 

period is no indication that the monetary inflation was not improper 

and dangerous. As "Austrian" business cycle theory has pointed out, 

any bank credit inflation sets up conditions for boom-and-bust; there 

is no need for prices actually to rise. The reason that prices did not rise 

was that the increased production of goods and services sufficed to 

offset the monetary expansion during this period. But similar conditions of the 1920s precipitated the great crash of 1929, an event which 

71For an excellent bibliographical essay and critique of historical interpretations of Jacksonism and the Bank War, see Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, "The Jacksonians, Banking, and 

Economic Theory: A Reinterpretation," Journal of Libertarian StIldies 2 (Summer 1978): 151-

165. 

"For the BUS data, see Catterall, Second Bank, p. 503; for total money supply, see Peter 

Temin, The Jaclrsonilln Economy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1%9), p. 71. 

52 
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75727.041

shocked most economists, who had adopted the proto-monetarist position of Irving Fisher and other economists of the day that a stable 

wholesale price level cannot, by definition, be inflationary. In reality, 

the unhampered free-market economy will usually increase the supply 

of goods and services and thereby bring about a gently falling price 

level, as happened in most of the 19th century except during wartime. 

What, then, of the consequences of Jackson's removal of the deposits? What of the fact that wholesale prices rose from 84 in April 1934, 

to 131 in February 1837, a remarkable increase of 52 percent in a little 

less than three years? Wasn't that boom due to the abolition of central 

banking? 

An excellent reversal of the orthodox explanation of the boom of the 

1830s, and indeed of the ensuing panic, has been provided by Professor 

Temin.73 First, he points out that the price inflation really began earlier, 

when wholesale prices reached a trough of 82 in July 1930 and then 

rose by 20.7 percent in three years to reach 99 in the fall of 1833. The 

reason for the price rise is simple: The total money supply had risen 

from $109 million in 1830 to $159 million in 1833, an increase of 45.9 

percent or an annual rise of 15.3 percent. Breaking the figures down 

further, the total money supply had risen from $109 million in 1830 to 

$155 million a year and a half later, a spectacular expansion of 35 

percent. Unquestionably, this monetary expansion was spurred by the 

still flourishing BUS, which increased its notes and deposits from January 1830 to January 1832, from a total of $29 million to $42.1 million, 

a rise of 45.2 percent. 

Thus, the price and money inflation in the first few years of the 18305 

were again sparked by the expansion of the still dominant central bank. 

But what of the notable inflation after 1833? There is no doubt that the 

cause of the price inflation was the remarkable monetary inflation 

during the same period. For the total money supply rose from $150 

million at the beginning of 1833 to $267 million at the beginning of 

1837, an astonishing rise of 84 percent, or 21 percent per annum. 

But as Temin points out, this monetary inflation was not caused by 

the liberated state banks expanding to a fare-thee-well. If it were true 

that the state banks used their freedom and their new federal government deposits to pyramid wildly on the top of specie, then their pyramid ratio would have risen a great deal, or, conversely, their reserve 

"Temin, Jacksonian Economy, passim. Also see Hugh Rockoff, "Money, Prices, and Banks 

in the Jacksonian Em/' in R. Fogel and S. Engerman, eds., The Reinterpretation of Amerioln 

Eco1lOlllic History (New York: Harper &: Row, 1971), pp. 44&-458. 

53 
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75727.042

ratio of specie to notes and deposits would have fallen sharply. Yet the 

banks' reserve ratio was .16 at the beginning of 1837. Ouring the intervening years, the reserve ratio was never below this figure. But this 

means that the state banks did no more pyramiding after the demise 

of the BUS as a central bank than they had done before. 74 

Conventional historians, believing that the BUS must have restrained 

the expansion of state banks, naturally assumed that they were hostile 

to the central bank. But now Jean Wilburn has discovered that the state 

banks overwhelmingly supported the BUS: 

We have found that Nicholas Biddle was correct when he said, "state 

banks in the main are friendly." Specifically, only in Georgia, Connecticut, and New York was there positive evidence of hostility. A 

majority of state banks in some states of the South, such as North 

Carolina and Alabama, gave strong support to the Bank as did both 

the Southwest states of Louisiana and Mississippi. Since Virginia gave 

some support, we can claim that state banks in the South and Southwest for the most part supported the Bank. New England, contrary 

to expectations, showed the banks of Vennont and New Hampshire 

behind the Bank, but support of Massachusetts was both qualitatively 

and quantitatively weak. The banks of the Middle states all supported 

the Second Bank except for those of New York." 

What, then, was the cause of the enormous monetary expansion of 

the 1830s? It was a tremendous and unusual expansion of the stock of 

specie in the nation's banks. The supply of specie in the country had 

remained virtually constant at about $32 million, from the beginning 

of 1823 until the beginning of 1833. But the proportion of specie to bank 

notes, held by the public as money, dropped during this period from 

23 percent to 5 percent, so that more specie flowed from the public into 

the banks to fuel the relatively moderate monetary expansion of the 

1820s. But starting at the beginning of 1833, the total specie in the 

country rose Swiftly from $31 million to $73 million at the beginning of 

1837, for a rise of 141.9 percent or 35.5 percent per annum. Hence, 

even though increasing distrust of banks led the public to withdraw 

some specie from them, so that the public now held 13 percent of its 

money in specie instead of 5 percent, the banks were able to increase 

their notes and deposits at precisely the same rate as the expansion of 

specie flowing into their coffers. 

"Temin, Jacksonian Economy, pp. 68--74. 

"Jean Alexander Wilburn, Biddle's Bank: The Crucial Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 118-119, Quoted in Hummel, "Jacksonians," p. 155. 

54 
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75727.043

Thus, the Jackson administration is absolved from blame for the 

1833-37 inflation. In a sense, the state banks are as well; certainly, they 

scarcely acted as if being "freed" by the demise of the BUS. Instead, 

they simply increased their money issues proportionately with the huge 

increase of specie. Of course, the basic fractional reserve banking system is scarcely absolved from responsibility, since otherwise the monetary expansion in absolute terms would not have been as great.76 

The enormous increase in specie was the result of two factors: first 

and foremost, a large influx of silver coin from Mexico, and secondly, 

the sharp cut in the usual export of silver to the Orient. The latter was 

due to the substantial increases in China's purchase of opium instead 

of silver from abroad. The influx of silver was the result of paper money 

inflation by the Mexican government, which drove Mexican silver coins 

into the United States, where they circulated as legal tender. The influx 

of Mexican coin has been attributed to a possible increase in the productivity of the Mexican mines, but this makes little sense, since the 

inflow stopped permanently as soon as 1837. The actual cause was an 

inflation of the Mexican currency by the Santa Anna regime, which 

financed its deficits during this period by minting highly debased copper coins. Since the debased copper grossly overvalued copper and 

undervalued gold and silver, both of the later metals proceeded to flow 

rapidly out of Mexico until they virtually disappeared. Silver, of course, 

and not gold, was flowing into the United States during this period. 

Indeed, the Mexican government was forced to rescind its actions in 

1837 by shifting the copper coinage to its proper ratio. The influx of 

Mexican silver into the U.S. promptIyceased. 77 

A bank credit inflation of the magnitude of the 1830s is bound to run 

into shoals that cause the banks to stop the expansion and begin to 

contract. As the banks expand, and prices rise, specie is bound to flow 

out of the country and into the hands of the domestic public, and the 

pressure on the banks to redeem in specie will intensify, forcing cessation of the boom and even monetary contraction. In a sense, the 

immediate precipitating cause is of minor importance. Even so, the 

Jackson administration has been unfairly blamed for precipitating the 

Panic of 1837 by issuing the Specie Circular in 1836. 

7fMoreover. if the Jacksonians had been able to move more rapidly in Ntuming the 

banking system to a 100 percent specie basis, they could have used the increase in specie 

to ease the monetary contraction requiNd by a return to a pure specie money. 

"Mexico was pinpointed as the source of the inflow of specie by Temin, Jacksonian 

Eccmomy, p. SO, while the disclosure of the cause in Mexican copper inflation came in 

Rockoff, "Money, Prices, and Banks," p. 454. 

55 
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75727.044

In 1836 the Jackson administration decided to stop the enormous 

speculation in Western public lands that had been fueled during the 

past two years by the inflation of bank credit. Hence, Jackson decreed 

that public land payments would have to be made in specie. This had 

the healthy effect of stopping public land speculation, but recent studies 

have shown that the Specie Circular had very little impact in putting 

pressure on the banks to pay specie. 18 From the point of view of the 

Jacksonian program, however, it was as important as moving toward 

putting the U.S. government finances on a purely specie basis. 

Another measure advancing the Jacksonian program was also taken 

in 1836. Jackson, embarrassed at the government having amassed a 

huge budget surplus during his eight years in office, ordered the Trea~ 

sury to distribute the surplus proportionately to the states. The distribution was made in notes presumably payable in specie. But again, 

Temin has shown that the distribution had little impact on movements 

of specie between banks and therefore in exerting contractionist pres~ 

Sure upon them.19 

What, then, was the precipitating factor in triggering the Panic of 

1837? Temin plausibly argues that the Bank of England, worried about 

inflation in Britain, and the consequent outflow of gold, tightened the 

money supply and raised interest rates in the latter half of 1836. As a 

result, credit contraction severely restricted the American cotton export 

trade in London, exports declined, cotton prices fell, capital flowed 

into England, and contractionist pressure was put upon American trade 

and the American banks. Banks throughout the United States-including the BUS-promptly suspended specie payments in May 1837, their 

notes depreciated at varying rates, and interregional trade within the 

country was crippled. 

While banks were able to evade specie payments and continue operations, they were still obliged to contract credit in order to go back on 

specie eventually, since they could not hope to be creating fiat money 

78public land sales by the federal government, which had been going steadily at approximately $4-6 million per year, suddenly spurted upward in 1835 and 1836, to $16.2 million 

and $24.9 million respectively. The latter was the largest sale of public lands in American 

history, and the 1835 figure was the second largest. Ternin, Jacksonian Economy, p. 124. 

The first demonstration of the negligible impact of the Specie Circular on the position of 

the banks was Richard H. Timberlake, Jr" "The Specie Circular and Distribution of the 

Surplus," Journal of Political Economy 68 (April 1960): 109-117, reprinted in Timberlake, 

Origins, pp. 5Q....62. Timberlake defended his thesis in idem, "The Specie Circular and the 

Sale of Public Lands: A Comment," Journal of Economic History 25 (September 1965): 414-

416. 

"'Temin, ]acksonwn Economy, pp. 128--136. 

56 
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75727.045

indefmitely and be allowed to remain in business. Finally, the New 

York banks were compelled by law to resume paying their contractual 

obligations, and the other banks followed in the fall of 1838. During 

the year 1837, the money supply fell from $276 million to $232 million, 

a large drop of 15.6 percent in one year. Total specie in the country 

continued to increase in 1837, up to $88 million, but increased public 

distrust of the banks (reflected in an increased proportion of money 

held as specie from 13 to 23 percent) put enough pressure upon the 

banks to force the contraction. The banks' reserve ratio rose from .16 

to .20. In response to the monetary contraction, wholesale prices fell 

precipitately, by over 30 percent in seven months, declining from 131 

in February 1837 to 98 in September of that year. 

In 1838 the economy revived. Britain resumed easy credit that year, 

cotton prices rose, and a short-lived boomlet began. Public confidence 

in the banks unwisely returned as they resumed specie payment, and 

as a result, the money supply rose slightly during the year, and prices 

rose by 25 percent, increasing from 98 in September 1837 to 125 in 

February 1839. 

Leading the boom of 1838 were state governments, who, finding 

themselves with the unexpected windfall of a distributed surplus from 

the federal government, proceeded to spend the money wildly and 

borrow even more extravagantly on public works and other uneconomic forms of "investment." But the state governments engaged in 

rashly optimistic plans that their public works would be financed heavily 

from Britain and other countries, and the cotton boom on which these 

hopes depended again collapsed in 1839. The states had to abandon 

their projects en maSse. Cotton prices declined, and severe contractionist pressure was put on trade. Furthermore, the Philadelphia-based 

BUS had heavily invested in cotton speculation, and the falling price 

of cotton forced the BUS, once again, to suspend payments in October 

1839. This touched off a Wave of general bank suspensions in the South 

and West, but this time the banks of New York and New England 

continued to redeem their obligations in specie. Finally, the Bank of 

the United States, having for the last time played a leading role in 

generating a recession and monetary crisis, was forced to close its doors 

two years later. 

With the crisis of 1839 there ensued four years of massive monetary 

and price deflation. Unsound banks were finally eliminated; unsound 

investments generated in the boom were liquidated. The number of 

banks during these four years fell by 23 percent. The money supply 

fell from $240 million at the beginning of 1839 to $158 million in 1843, 

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a seemingly cataclysmic drop of 34 percent, or 8.5 percent per annum. 

Prices fell even further, from 125 in February 1839 to 67 in March 1843, 

a tremendous drop of 42 percent or 10.5 percent per year. 

During the boom, as we have indicated, state governments went 

heavily into debt, issuing bonds to pay for wasteful public works. In 

1820, the total indebtedness of American states was a modest $12.8 

million; by 1830, it rose to $26.5 million. But then it started to escalate, 

reaching $66.5 million in 1835 and skyrocketing to $170 million by 1839. 

The collapse of money, credit banking, and prices after 1839 brought 

these state debts into jeopardy. At this point, the Whigs, taking a leaf 

from their forebearers, the Federalists, agitated for the federal government to bail out the states and assume their debts.1IO After the crisis of 

1839 arrived, some of the southern and western states were clearly in 

danger of default, their plight made worse by the fact that the bulk of 

the debt was held by British and Dutch capitalists and that specie would 

have to be sent abroad to meet the heavy interest payments. The Whigs 

pressed further for federal assumption of the debt, with the federal 

government to issue $200 million worth of bonds in payment. Furthermore, British bankers put severe pressure on the United States to 

assume the state debts if it expected to float further loans abroad. 

The American people, however, spurned federal aid, including even 

the citizens of the states in difficulty, and the advent of the Polk administration ended any prospects for federal assumption. The British noted 

in wonder that the average American was far more concerned about 

his personal debts to other individuals and banks than about the debts 

of his state. In fact, the people were quite willing to have the states 

repudiate their debts outright. Demonstrating an astute perception of 

the reckless course the states had taken, the typical American response 

to the problem: "Suppose foreign capitalists did not lend any more to 

the states?" was the sharp retort: "Well who cares if they don't? We 

are now as a community heels over head in debt and can scarcely pay 

the interest."81 The implication was that the disappearance of foreign 

credit to the states would have the healthy effect of cutting off their 

wasteful spending-as well as avoiding the imposition of a crippling 

tax burden to pay for the interest and principal. There was in this 

response an awareness by the public that they and their government 

!!OSee Reginald C. MLCrane, Foreign Bondholders and American State Debts (New York: 

Maanillan, 1935), pp. 6--7, 24ff. 

81MLCrane, Foreign Bondholders, pp. 39-40. 

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were separate and sometimes even hostile entities rather than one and 

the same organism.82 

By 1847, four western and southern states (MiSSissippi, Arkansas, 

Michigan, and Florida) had repudiated all or part of their debts. Six 

other states (Maryland, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Arkansas, and 

Pennsylvania) had defaulted from three to six years before resuming 

payment. 

It is evident, then, that the 1839-43 contraction was healthful for the 

economy in liquidating unsound investments, debts and banks, including the pernicious Bank of the United States. But didn't the massive 

deflation have catastrophic effects-on production, trade, and employment, as we have been led to believe? In a fascinating analysis and 

comparison with the deflation of 1929-33 a century later, Professor 

Temin shows that the percentage of deflation over the comparable four 

years (1839-43, and 1929-33) was almost the same.83 Yet the effects on 

real production of the two deflations were very different. Whereas in 

1929-33 real gross investment fell catastrophically by 91 percent, real 

consumption by 19 percent, and real GNP by 30 percent; in 1839-43, 

investment fell by 23 percent, but real consumption increased by 21 

percent and real GNP also rose by 16 percent. The interesting problem 

is to account for the enormous fall in production and consumption in 

the 1930s, as contrasted to the rise in production and consumption in 

the 184Os. It seems that only the initial months of the contraction 

worked a hardship on the American public and that most of the earlier 

deflation was a period of economic growth. Temin properly suggests 

that the reason can be found in the downward flexibility of prices in 

the 19th century, so that massive monetary contraction would lower 

prices but not particularly cripple the world of real production or standards of living. In contrast, in the 1930s government placed massive 

roadblocks on the downward fall of prices and wage rates and hence 

brought about severe and continuing depression of production and 

living standards. 

"'The Americans also pointed out that the banks, including the Bank of the United 

States, who were presuming to denounce repudiation of state debt, had already suspended 

specie payments and were largely responsible for the contraction. "Let the bondholders 

look to the United States Bank and to the other banks for their payment declared the 

people." McGrane, Foreign &nkholders, p. 48. 

"'From 1839-43, the money supply, as we have seen, fell by 34 percent, wholesale prices 

by 42 percent, and the number of banks by 23 percent. In 1929-33, the money supply fell 

by 27 percent, prices by 31 percent, and the number of banks by 42 percent. Temin, 

Jacksonian Economy, pp. 155fE. 

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The Jacksonians had no intention of leaving a permanent system of 

pet banks, and so after the retirement of Jackson, his successor, Martin 

Van Buren, fought to establish the Independent Treasury System, in 

which the federal government conferred no special privilege or inflationary prop on any bank; instead of a central bank or pet banks, the 

government was to keep its funds purely in specie, in its own treasury 

vaults-or its "subtreasury" branches-and simply take in and spend 

funds from there. Van Buren finally managed to establish the Independent Treasury System, which would last until the Civil War. At long 

last, the Jacksonians had achieved their dream of severing the federal 

government totally from the banking system and placing its finances 

on a purely hard-money, specie basis. 

The Jacksonians and the Coinage Legislation of 1834 

We have seen that the Coinage Act of 1792 established a bimetallic 

system in which the dollar was defined as equaling both 371.25 grains 

of pure silver and 24.75 grains of pure gold-a fixed weight ratio of 15 

grains of silver to 1 grain of gold. But bimetallism foundered on Gresham's Law. After 1805, the world market value of silver fell to approximately 15.75 to 1, so that the U.S. fixed mint ratio greatly undervalued 

gold and overvalued silver. As a result gold flowed out of the country 

and silver flowed in, so that after 1810 only silver coin, largely overvalued Spanish-American fractional silver coin, circulated within the 

United States. The rest of the currency was inflated bank paper in 

various stages of depreciation. 

The Jacksonians, as we have seen, were determined to eliminate 

inflationary paper money and substitute a hard money consisting of 

spede-or, at the most-of paper 100 percent-backed by gold or silver. 

On the federal level, this meant abolishing the Bank of the United 

States and establishing the Independent Treasury. The rest of the fight 

would have to be conducted, during the 1840s and later, at the state 

level where the banks were chartered. But one thing the federal government could do was readjust the specie coinage. In particular, the 

Jacksonians were anxious to eliminate small denomination bank notes 

($20 and under) and substitute gold and silver coins for them. They 

reasoned that the average American largely used these coins, and they 

were the ones bilked by inflated paper money. For a standard to be 

really gold and silver, it was vital that gold or silver coins circulate and 

be used as a medium of exchange by the average American. 

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To accomplish this goal, the Jacksonians set about to establish a 

comprehensive program. As one vital step, one of the Coinage Acts of 

1834 readjusted the old mint ratio of 15:1 that had undervalued gold 

and driven it out of circulation. The Coinage Act devalued the definition 

of the gold dollar from the original 24. 75 grains to 23.2 grains, a debasement of gold by 6.26 percent. The silver dollar was left at the old weight 

of 371.25 grains, so that the mint ratio between silver and gold was 

now fixed at a ratio of 16:1, replacing the old 15:1. It was unfortunate 

that the Jacksonians did not appreciate silver (to 396 grains) instead of 

debasing gold, for this set a precedent for debasement that was to 

plague America in 1933 and after.S< 

The new ratio of 16:1, however, now undervalued silver and overvalued gold, since the world market ratio had been approximately 

15.79:1 in the years before 1834. Until recently, historians have assumed 

that the Jacksonians deliberately tried to bring in gold and expel silver 

and establish a monometallic gold standard by the back door. Recent 

study has shown, however, that the Jacksonians only wanted to give 

gold inflow a little push through a slight undervaluation and that they 

anticipated a full coin circulation of both gold and silver. 85 In 1833, for 

example, the world market ratio was as high as 15.93:1. Indeed, it turns 

out that for two decades the Jacksonians were right, and that the slight 

one percent premium of silver over gold was not enough to drive the 

former coins out of circulation.86 Both silver and gold were imported 

from then on, and silver and gold coins both circulated successfully 

side-by-side until the early 18505. Lightweight Spanish fractional silver 

remained overvalued even at the mint ratio, so it flourished in circulation, replacing depreciated small notes. Even American silver dollars 

were now retained in circulation since they were "shielded" and kept 

"Probably the J acksonians did so in order to preserve the illusion that the original silver 

dollar, the "dollar of our fathers" and the standard currency of the day, remained fixed 

in value. Laughlin, History of Bimetallism, p. 70. 

"For the illuminating discovery that the Jacksonians were interested in purging small 

bank notes by bringing in gold, see Paul M. O'leary, "The Coinage Legislation of 1834," 

Journal of Political E.a:momy 45 (February 1937): ~94. For the development of this insight 

by Martin, who shows that the Jacksonians anticipated a coinage of both gold and silver, 

and reveals the comprehensive Jacksonian coinage program, see David A. Martin, "Metall· 

ism, Small Notes, and Jackson's War with the B.U.S.," Explorations in Economic History, 11 

(Spring 1974): 227-247. 

"For the next 16 years, from 1835-1850, the market ratio averaged 15.8:1, a silver 

premium of only 1 percent over the 16:1 mint ratio. For the data, see Laughlin, History of 

Bim£tallism, p. 291. 

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circulating by the presence of new, heavyweight Mexican silver dollars, 

which were exported instead.87 

In order to stimulate the circulation of both gold and silver coin 

instead of paper notes, the Jacksonians also passed two companion 

Coinage Acts in 1834. The Jacksonians were not monetary nationalists; 

specie was specie, and they saw that there was no reason that foreign 

gold or silver coins should not circulate with the same full privileges 

as American-minted coins. Hence, the Jacksonians, in two separate 

measures, legalized the circulation of all foreign silver and gold coins, 

and they flourished in circulation until the 185Os.88,89 

A third plank in the Jacksonian coinage platform was to establish 

branch U.S. mints so as to coin the gold found in newly-discovered 

mines in Georgia and North Carolina. The Jackson administration finally 

succeeded in getting Congress to do so in 1835 when it set up branch 

mints to coin gold in North Carolina and Georgia, and silver and gold 

at New Orleans. 90 

Finally, on the federal level, the Iacksonians sought to levy a tax on 

small bank notes and to prevent the federal government from keeping 

its deposits in state banks, issuing small notes, or from accepting small 

bank notes in taxes. They were not successful, but the Independent 

Treasury eliminated public deposit in state banks and the Specie Circular, as we have seen, stopped the receipt of bank notes for public 

land sales. From 1840 on, the hard-money battle would be waged at 

the state level. 

"'Martin, "Bimetallism," pp. 435-437. Spanish fractional silver coins were from 5 to 15 

percent underweight, and so their circulation in the U.S. at par by name (or "tale") meant 

that they were still considerably overvalued. 

MAs Jackson's Secretary of the Treasury Levi Woodbury explained the purpose of this 

broad legalization of foreign coins: "to provide a full supply and variety of coins, instead 

of bills below five and ten dollars," for this would be "particularly conducive to the 

security of the poor and middling classes, who, as they own but little in, and profit but 

little by, banks, should be subjected to as small risk as practicable by their bills." Quoted 

in Martin, "Metallism," p.242. 

"'In 1837 another Coinage Act m~de a very slight adjustment in the mint ratios. In order 

to raise the alloy composition of gold coins to have them similar to silver, the definition 

of the gold dollar was raised slightly from 23.2 to 23.22 grains. With the weight of the 

silver doUar remaining the same, the silver/gold ratio was now very slightly lowered from 

16.002:1 to 15.998:1. Further slight adjustments in valuations of foreign coins in another 

Coinage Act of 1843 resulted in the undervaluation of many foreign coins and their gradual 

disappearance. The major ones-Spanish fractional silver-continued, however, to cir· 

culate widely. Martin, "BimetaUism," p. 436. 

9!lMartin, "Metallism," p. 240. 

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In the early 185Os, Gresham's Law finally caught up with the bimetallist idyll that the Jacksonians had forged in the 1830s, replacing the 

earlier de facto silver monometallism. The sudden discovery of extensive gold mines in California, Russia, and Australia greatly increased 

gold production, reaching a peak in the early 1850s. From the 1720s 

through the 1830s, annual world gold production averaged $12.8 million, never straying very far from that nonn. Then, world gold production increased to an annual average of $38.2 million in the 1840s, 

and spurted upward to a peak of $155 million in 1853. World gold 

production then fell steadily from that peak to an annual average of 

$139.9 million in the 1850s and to $114.7 million hom 1876-1890. It was 

not to surpass this peak until the 1890s. 91 

The consequence of the burst in gold production was, of course, a 

fall in the price of gold relative to silver in the world market. The silveri 

gold ratio declined from 15.97 in January 1849 to an average of 15.70 in 

1850 to 15.46 in 1851 and to an average of 15.32:1 in the eight years 

hom 1853 to 1860.92 As a result, the market premium of American silver 

dollars over gold quickly rose above the one-percent margin, which 

was the estimated cost of shipping silver coin abroad. That premium, 

which had hovered around one percent since the mid-1830s, suddenly 

rose to 4.5 percent at the beginning of 1851, and after falling back to 

about 2 percent at the tum of 1852, bounced back up and remained at 

the 4-5 percent level. 

The result was a rapid disappearance of silver hom the country, the 

heaviest and therefore most undervalued coins vanishing first. Spanish-milled dollars, which contained 1 percent to 5 percent more silver 

than American dollars, commanded a premium of 7 percent and went 

first. Then went the full-weight American silver dollars and after that, 

American fractional silver coins, which were commanding a 4 percent 

premium by the fall of 1852. The last coins left were the worn Spanish 

and Mexican fractions, which were depredated by 10 to 15 percent. By 

the beginning of 1851, however, even these worn foreign silver hactions had gone to a one-percent premium, and were beginning to go. 

lt was clear that America was undergoing a severe small coin crisis. 

Gold coins were flowing into the country, but they were too valuable 

9JOn gold production, see Laughlin, Hislury of Bimetallism, pp. 283-286; David A. Martin, 

"1853: The End of BimetaUism in the United States," ]OUr7IfI/ of Econumic Histury 33 (December 1973): 830. 

92The silver/gold mtio began to slide sharply in October and November 1850. Laughlin, 

Histury of Bimetallism, pp. 194, 291. 

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to be technically usable for small denomination coins. The Democratic 

Pierce administration saw with horror a flood of millions of dollars of 

unauthorized private small notes flood into circulation in early 1853 for 

the first time since the 1830s. The Jacksonians were in grave danger of 

losing the fight for hard-money coinage, at least for the smaller and 

medium denominations. Something had to be done quickly.93 

The ultimate breakdown of bimetallism had never been clearer. If 

bimetallism is in the long run not viable, this leaves two free-market, 

hard-money alternatives: (a) silver monometallism with the dollar defmed 

as a weight of silver only, and gold circulating freely by weight at freelyfluctuating market rates; or (b) gold monometallism with the dollar 

defined only as a weight of gold, with silver circulating by weight. Each 

of these is an example of what has been called "parallel standards" or 

"free metallism," in which two or more metal coins are allowed to 

fluctuate freely within the same area and exchange at free-market prices. 

As we have seen, colonial America was an example of such parallel 

standards, since foreign gold and silver coins circulated freely and at 

fluctuating market prices.94 

The United States could have taken this opportunity of monetary 

crisis to go on either version of a parallel standard. 95 Apparently, how-

"Martin, "Metallism," p. 240 

"For an account of how parallel standards worked in Europe from the medieval period 

through the 18th century, see Luigi Einaudi, "The Theory of Imaginary Money from 

Charlemagne to the French Revolution:~ in F. Lane and J. Riemersma, eds., Enterprise and 

Secular Change (Homewood, m.: Irwin, 1953), pp. 229-261. Robert Lopez contrasts the 

ways in which Florence and Genoa each returned to gold coinage in the mid-13th century, 

after a gap of haH a millenium: "Florence, like most medieval states, made bimetallism 

and trimetallism a base of its monetary policy ... it committed the government to the 

Sysiphean labor of readjusting the relations between different coins as the ratio between 

the different metals changes, or as one or another coin was debased ... Genoa on the 

contrary, in conformity with the principle of restricting state intervention as much I/S possible 

[italics ours], did not try to enforce a fIXed relation between coins of different metals ... 

Basically, the gold coinage of Genoa was not meant to integrate the silver and bullion 

coinages but to form an independent system." Robert Sabatino Lopez, "Back to Gold, 

1252:' Erorwmic Hislory Review, April 1956, p.224. Also see James Rolph Edwards, "Monopoly and Competition in Money," Journal of Libertarian Studies IV (Winter 1980): 116. For an 

analysis of parallel standards, see Ludwig von Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit 3rd 

ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Oassics, 1980), pp. 87, 89-91, 205-207. 

''Given parallel standards, the ultimate, admittedly remote solution would be to eliminate the term "dollar" altogether, and simply have both gold and silver coins circulate 

by regular units of weight: "Grain:' "Ounce:' or "Gram." If that were done, all problems 

of bimetallism, debasement, Gresham's Law, etc., would at last disappear. While such a 

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ever, few thought of doing so. Another viable though inferior solution 

to the problem of bimetallism was to establish a monometallic system, 

either de facto or de jure, with the other metal circulating in the form 

of lightweight, and therefore overvalued, or "token" coinage. Silver 

monometallism was immediately unfeasible since it was rapidly flowing out of the country, and because gold, being far more valuable than 

silver, could not technically function easily as a lightweight, subsidiary 

coin. The only feasible solution, then, within a monometallic framework, was to make gold the basic standard and let highly overvalued, 

essentially token, silver coins function as subsidiary small coinage. 

Certainly if a parallel standard was not to be adopted, the latter solution 

would be far better than allowing depreciated paper notes to function 

as small currency. 

Under pressure of the crisis, Congress decided, in February 1853, to 

keep the de jure bimetallic standard but to adopt a de facto gold monometallic standard, with fractional silver coins circulating as a deliberately overvalued subsidiary coinage, legal tender up to a maximum of 

only five dollars. The fractional silver coins were debased by 6.91 

percent. With silver commanding about a 4 percent market premium 

over gold, this meant that fractional silver was debased 3 percent below 

gold. At that depreciated rate, fractional silver was not overvalued in 

relation to gold, and remained in circulation. By April, the new subsidiary quarter dollars proved to be popular and by early 1854 the problem 

of the shortage of small coins in America was over. 

In rejecting proposals either to go over completely to de jure gold 

monometaliism, or to keep the existing bimetallic system, Congress 

was choosing a gold standard temporarily, but keeping its options 

open. The fact that it continued the old full-bodied silver dollar, the 

"dollar of our fathers," demonstrates that an eventual return to de facto 

bimetallism was by no means being ruled out-albeit Gresham'S Law 

could not then maintain the American silver dollar in circulation. 96 

pure free-market solution seems remote today, the late 19th century saw a series of 

important international monetary conferences trying to move toward a universal gold or 

silver gram, with each national currency beginning as a simple multiple of each other, 

and eventually only units of weight being used. Before the conferences foundered on the 

gold/silver problem, such a result was not as remote or Utopian as we might now believe. 

See the fasdnating account of these conferences in Henry B. Russell, r1ltmllllionalMonetary 

Conferenas (New York: Harper & Bros., 1898). 

"For an excellent portrayal of the congressional choice in 1853, see Martin, "1853," pp. 

825-844. 

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In 1857, an important part of the Jacksonian coinage program was 

repealed, as Congress, in an exercise of monetary nationalism, eliminated all legal tender power of foreign coins. 97 

Decentralized Banking from the 18308 to the Civil War 

After the central bank was eliminated in the 1830s, the battle for hard 

money largely shifted to the state governmental arena. During the 

183Os, the major thrust was to prohibit the issue of small notes, which 

was accomplished for notes under five dollars in 10 states by 1832, and 

subsequently, five others restricted or prohibited such notes.96 

The Democratic Party became ardently hard-money in the various 

states after the shock of the financial crisis of 1837 and 1839. The 

Democratic drive was toward the outlawry of all fractional reserve bank 

paper. Battles were fought, also, in the late 1840s, at constitutional 

conventions of many states, particularly in the West. In some western 

states the Jacksonians won temporary success, but soon the Whigs 

would return and repeal the bank prohibition. The Whigs, trying to 

find some way to overcome the general revulsion against banks after 

the crisis of the late 1830s, adopted the concept of "free" banking, 

which had been enacted by New York and Michigan in the late 1830s. 

From New York, the idea spread outward to the rest of the country 

and triumphed in 15 states by the early 185Os. On the eve of the Civil 

War, 18 out of the 33 states in the Union had adopted "free" banking 

laws. 99 

It must be realized that "free" banking, as it came to be known in 

the United States before the Civil War, was unrelated to the philosophic 

concept of free banking analyzed by economists. As we have seen 

earlier, genuine free banking is a system where entry into banking is 

totally free, the banks are neither subsidized nor regulated, and at the 

first sign of failure to redeem in specie payments, the bank is forced to 

declare insolvency and dose its doors. 

"Free" banking before the Civil War, on the other hand, was very 

different.loo As we have pointed out, the government allowed periodic 

910nly Spanish-American fractional silver coins were to remain legal tender, and they 

were to be received quicldy at government offices and immediately reminted into American 

coins. Hepburn, History of Cummcy, pp. 66--67. 

'"'See Martin, "MetaIlism," pp. 242-243. 

""Hugh Rockoff, The Free Banking Era: A Re-Examination (New York: Arno Press, 1975), 

pp.3--4. 

''''Rockoff goes SO far as to call free banking the "antithesis of laissez-faire banking laws." 

Hugh Rockoff, "Varieties of Banking and Regional Economic Development in the United 

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general suspensions of specie payments whenever the banks overexpanded and got into trouble-the latest episode was in the Panic of 

1857. It is true that bank incorporation was now more liberal since any 

bank which met the legal regulations could become incorporated automatically without lobbying for special legislative charters, as had been 

the case before. But the banks were not subject to a myriad of regulations, including edicts by state banking commissioners and high minimum capital requirements which greatly restricted entry into the banking business. But the most pernicious aspect of "free" banking was 

that the expansion of bank notes and deposits was directly tied to the 

amount of state government securities which the bank had invested in 

and posted as bond with the state. In effect, then, state government 

bonds became the reserve base upon which the banks were allowed to 

pyramid a multiple expansion of bank notes and deposits. Not only 

did this system provide explicitly or implicitly for fractional reserve 

banking; but the pyramid was tied rigidly to the amount of government 

bonds purchased by the banks. This provision deliberately tied banks 

and bank credit expansion to the public debt; it meant that the more 

public debt the banks purchased, the more they could create and lend 

out new money. Banks, in short, were encouraged to monetize the 

public debt, state governments were thereby encouraged to go into 

debt, and hence, government and bank inflation were intimately linked. 

In addition to allowing periodic suspension of specie payments, 

federal and state governments conferred upon the banks the privilege 

of their notes being accepted in taxes. Moreover, the general prohibition 

of interstate branch banking-and often of intrastate branches as wellgreatly inhibited the speed by which one bank could demand payment 

from other banks in specie. In addition, state usury laws, pushed by 

the Whigs and opposed by the Democrats, made credit excessively 

cheap for the riskiest borrowers and encouraged inflation and speculative expansion of bank lending. 

Furthermore, the desire of state governments to finance internal 

improvements was an important factor in subsidizing and propelling 

expansion of bank credit. As Hammond admits: 'The wild-cats lent no 

money to farmers and served no farmer interest. They arose to meet 

the credit demands not of farmers (who were too economically astute 

States, 1840-1860," juumal of EC(lnomic History 35 (March 1975): 162. Quoted in Hummel, 

"Jadcsonians," p. 157. 

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to accept wildcat money) but of states engaged in public improvemen ts. "101 

Despite the flaws and problems, the decentralized nature of the preOvil War banking system meant that banks were free to experiment 

on their own with improving the banking system. The most successful 

such device was the creation of the Suffolk system. 

A Free-Market "Central Bank" 

It is a fact, almost never recalled, that there once existed an American 

private bank that brought order and convenience to a myriad of privately issued banknotes. Further, the Suffolk Bank restrained the overissuance of these notes. In short, it was a private central bank that kept 

the other banks honest. As such, it made New England an island of 

monetary stability in an America contending with currency chaos. 

Chaos was, in fact, that condition in which New England found 

herself just before the Suffolk Bank was established. There were a 

myriad of banknotes circulating in the area's largest financial center, 

Boston. Some were issued by Boston banks which all in Boston knew 

to be solvent. But others were issued by state-chartered banks. These 

could be quite far away, and in those days such distance impeded both 

general knowledge about their solvency and easy access in bringing 

the banks' notes in for redemption into gold or silver. Thus, while at 

the beginning these country notes were accepted in Boston at par value, 

this just encouraged some far-away banks to issue far more notes than 

they had gold to back them. So country bank notes began to be generally 

traded at discounts to par, of from 1 percent to 5 percent. 

City banks finally refused to accept country bank notes altogether. 

This gave rise to the money brokers mentioned earlier in this chapter. 

But it also caused hardship for Boston merchants, who had to accept 

country notes whose real value they could not be certain of. When they 

exchanged the notes with the brokers, they ended up assuming the 

full cost of discounting the bills they had accepted at par. 

A False Start 

Matters began to change in 1814. The New England Bank of Boston 

announced it too would go into the money broker business, accepting 

''''Hammond, Banks Ilnd Politics, p. 627. On free banlcing, see Hummel, "Jacksonians," 

pp. 154-160; Smith, Rationale, pp. 44--45; and Hugh Rockoff, "American Free Banking 

Before the Civil War: A Reexamination," Journal of Ecorwmic History 32 (March 1972): 417-

420. On the effect of usury laws, see William Graham Sumner, A History of American 

Currency (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1876), p. 125. On the Jacksonians versus their 

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country notes from holders and turning them over to the issuing bank 

for redemption. The note holders, though, still had to pay the cost. In 

1818, a group of prominent merchants fonned the Suffolk Bank to do 

the same thing. This enlarged competition brought the basic rate of 

country note discount down from three percent in 1814 to one percent 

in 1818 and finally to a bare one-half of one percent in 1820. But this 

did not necessarily mean that country banks were behaving more 

responsibly in their note creation. By the end of 1820 the business had 

become clearly unprofitable, and both banks stopped competing with 

the private money brokers. The Suffolk became just another Boston 

bank. 

Operation Begins 

During the next several years city banks found their notes representing an ever smaller part of the total New England money supply. 

Country banks were simply issuing far more notes in proportion to 

their capital (Le., gold and silver) than were the Boston banks. 

Concerned about this influx of paper money of lesser worth, both 

Suffolk and New England Bank began again in 1824 to purchase country 

notes. But this time they did so not to make a profit on redemption, 

but simply to reduce the number of country notes in circulation in 

Boston. They had the foolish hope that this would increase the use of 

their (better) notes, thus increasing their own loans and profits. 

But the more they purchased country notes, the more notes of even 

worse quality (particularly from far-away Maine banks) would replace 

them. Buying these latter involved more risk, so the Suffolk proposed 

to six other city banks a joint fund to purchase and send these notes 

back to the issuing bank for redemption. These seven banks, known 

as the Associated Banks, raised $300,000 for this purpose. With the 

Suffolk acting as agent and buying country notes from the other six, 

operations began March 24, 1824. The volume of country notes bought 

in this way increased greatly, to $2 million per month by the end of 

1825. By then, Suffolk felt strong enough to go it alone. Further, it now 

had the leverage to pressure country banks into depositing gold and 

opponents on the state level after 1839, see William G. Shade, Banks or No Banks: The Manry 

Issue in Weslern Politics, 1832-1865 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, ]972); Herbert 

Ershkowilz and William Shade, "Consensus or Conflict? Political Behavior in the State 

Legislatures During the Jacksonian Era," Journal of AmeriClIn History 58 (December 1971): 

591-621; and James Roger Sharp, Tacksonians versus the Banks: Politics in the Stales After lhe 

Panic of 1837 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). 

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silver with the Suffolk, to make note redemption easier. By 1838, almost 

every bank in New England did so, and were redeeming their notes 

through the Suffolk Bank. 

The Suffolk ground rules from beginning (1825) to end (1858) were 

as follows: Each country bank had to maintain a pennanent deposit of 

specie of at least $2,000 for the smallest bank, plus enough to redeem 

all its notes that Suffolk received. These gold and silver deposits did 

not have to be at Suffolk, so long as they were at some place convenient 

to Suffolk, so that the notes would not have to be sent home for 

redemption. But in practice, nearly all reserves were at Suffolk. (City 

banks had only to deposit a fixed amount, which decreased to $5,000 

by 1835.) No interest was paid on any of these deposits. But, in exchange, 

the Suffolk began performing an invaluable service: It agreed to accept 

at par all the notes it received as deposits from other New England 

banks in the system, and credit the depositor banks' accounts on the 

following day. 

With the Suffolk acting as a "clearing bank," accepting, sorting, and 

crediting bank notes, it was now possible for any New England bank 

to accept the notes of any other bank, however far away, and at face 

value. This drastically cut down on the time and inconvenience of 

applying to each bank separately for specie redemption. Moreover, the 

certainty spread that the notes of the Suffolk member banks would be 

valued at par: It spread at first among other bankers and then to the 

general public. 

The Country Banks Resist 

How did the inflationist country banks react to this? Not very well, 

for as one can see the Suffolk system put limits on the amount of notes 

they could issue. They resented par redemption and detested systematic specie redemption because that forced them to stay honest. But 

the country banks knew that any bank that did not play by the rules 

would be shunned by the banks that did (or at least see their notes 

accepted only at discount, and not in a very wide area, at that). All 

legal means to stop Suffolk failed: The Massachusetts Supreme Court 

upheld in 1827 Suffolk's right to demand gold or silver for country 

bank notes, and the state legislature refused to charter a clearing bank 

run by country banks; probably rightly assuming that these banks 

would run much less strict operations. Stung by these setbacks, the 

country banks played by the rules, bided their time, and awaited their 

revenge. 

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Suffolk's Stabilizing Effects 

Even though Suffolk's initial objective had been to increase the circulation of city banks, this did not happen. In fact, by having their 

notes redeemed at par, country banks gained a new respectability. This 

came, naturally, at the expense of the number of notes issued by the 

worst former inflationists. But at least in Massachusetts, the percentage 

of city bank notes in circulation fell from 48.5 percent in 1826 to 35.8 

percent in 1833. 

Circulation of the Notes of Massachusetts Banks (in Thousands) 

Date All Banks Boston Banks Boston Percentage 

1823 $3,129 $1,354 43.3 

1824 3,843 1,797 46.8 

1825 4,091 1,918 46.9 

1826 4,550 2,206 48.5 

1827 4,936 2,103 42.6 

1828 4,885 2,067 42.3 

1829 4,748 2,078 43.8 

1830 5,124 2,171 42.3 

1831 7,139 3,464 44.8 

1832 7,123 3,060 43.0 

1833 7,889 2,824 35.8 

Source: Wilfred S. Lake, The End of the Suffolk System, p. 188. 

The biggest, most powerful weapon Suffolk had to keep stability was 

the power to grant membership into the system. It accepted only banks 

whose notes were sound. While Suffolk could not prevent a bad bank 

from inflating, denying it membership ensured that the notes would 

not enjoy wide circulation. And the member banks which were mismanaged could be stricken from the list of Suffolk-approved New 

England banks in good standing. This caused the offending banks' 

notes to trade at a discount at once, even though the bank itself might 

be still redeeming its notes in specie. 

In another way, Suffolk exercised a stabilizing influence on the New 

England economy. It controlled the use of overdrafts in the system. 

When a member bank needed money, it could apply for an overdraft, 

that is, a portion of the excess reserves in the banking system. If Suffolk 

decided that a member bank's loan policy was not conservative enough, 

it could refuse to sanction that bank's application to borrow reserves 

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at Suffolk. The denial of overdrafts to profligate banks thus forced 

those banks to keep their assets more liquid. (Few government central 

banks today have succeeded in that.) This is all the more remarkable 

when one considers that Suffolk-or any central bank--could have 

earned extra interest income by issuing overdrafts irresponsibly. 

But Dr. George Trivoli, whose excellent monograph, The Suffolk Bank, 

we rely on in this study, states that by providing stability to the New 

England banking system "it should not be inferred that the Suffolk 

bank was operating purely as public benefactor." Suffolk, in fact, made 

handsome profits. At its peak in 1858, the last year of existence, it was 

redeeming $400 million in notes, with a total annual salary cost of only 

$40,000. The healthy profits were derived primarily from loaning out 

those reserve deposits which Suffolk itself, remember, did not pay 

interest on. These amounted to over $1 million in 1858. The interest 

charged on overdrafts augmented that. Not surprisingly, Suffolk stock 

was the highest priced bank stock in Boston, and by 1850, regular 

dividends were 10 percent. 

The Suffolk Difference 

That the Suffolk system was able to provide note redemption much 

more cheaply than the U.S. government was stated by a U.S. Comptroller of the Currency. John Jay Knox compared the two systems from 

a vantage point of half a century: " ... in 1857 the redemption of notes 

by the Suffolk Bank was almost $400,000,000 as against $137,697,6% in 

1875, the highest amount ever reported under the National Banking 

system. The redemptions in 1898 were only $66,683,476 at a cost of 

$1.29 per thousand. The cost of redemption under the Suffolk system 

was ten cents per $1,000, which does not appear to include transportation. If this item is deducted from the cost of redeeming National 

Bank notes, it would reduce it to about ninety-four cents. This difference is accounted for by the relatively small amount of redemptions by 

the Treasury, and the increased expense incident to the necessity of 

official checks by the Government, and by the higher salaries paid. But 

allowing for these differences, the fact is established that private enterprise could be entrusted with the work of redeeming the circulating 

notes of the banks, and it could thus be done as safely and much more 

economically than the same services can be performed by the Govemment:'l02 

""John Jay Knox, A History of Banking in the United Slates (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 

1969 (1900)), pp. 368-69. 

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The volume of redemptions was much larger under Suffolk than 

under the National Banking system. During Suffolk's existence (1825-

57) they averaged $229 million per year. The average of the National 

system from its start in 1863 to about 1898 is put by Mr. Knox at only 

$54 million. Further, at its peak in 1858, $400 million was redeemed. 

But the New England money supply was only $40 million. This meant 

that, astoundingly, the average note was redeemed 10 times per year, 

or once every five weeks. 

Bank capital, note circulation, and deposits, considered together as 

"banking power," grew in New England on a per capita basis much 

faster than in any other region of the country from 1803 to 1850. And 

there is some evidence that New England banks were not as susceptible 

to disaster during the several banking panics during that time. In the 

Panic of 1837 not one Connecticut bank failed, nor did any suspend 

specie payments. All remained in the Suffolk system. And when in 

1857 specie payment was suspended in Maine, all but three banks 

remained in business. As the Bank Commission of Maine stated, "The 

Suffolk system, though not recognized in banking law, has proved to 

be a great safeguard to the public; whatever objections may exist to the 

system in theory, its practical operation is to keep the circulation of our 

banks within the bounds of safety." 

The Suffolk's Demise 

The extraordinary profits-and power-that the Suffolk had by 1858 

attained spawned competitors. The only one to become established 

was a Bank for Mutual Redemption in 1858. This bank was partially a 

response to the somewhat arrogant behavior of the Suffolk by this time, 

after 35 years of unprecedented success. But further, and more importantly, the balance of power in the state legislature had shifted outside 

of Boston, to the country bank areas. The politicians were more amenable to the desires of the overexpanding country banks. Still, it must 

be said that Suffolk acted toward the Bank of Mutual Redemption with 

spite where conciliation would have helped. Trying to force Mutual 

Redemption out of business, Suffolk, starting October 9, 1858, refused 

to honor notes of banks having deposits in the newcomer. Further, 

Suffolk in effect threatened any bank withdrawing deposits from it. 

But country banks rallied to the newcomer, and on October 16, Suffolk 

announced that it would stop clearing any country bank notes, thus 

becoming just another bank. 

Only the Bank for Mutual Redemption was left, and though it soon 

had half the New England banks as members, it was much more lax 

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toward overissuance by country banks. Perhaps the Suffolk would have 

returned amid dissatisfaction with its successor, but in 1861, just over 

two years after Suffolk stopped clearing, the Civil War began and all 

specie payments were stopped. As a final nail in the coffin, the National 

Banking System Act of 1863 forbade the issuance of any state bank 

notes, giving a monopoly to the government that has continued ever 

since. 

While it lasted, though, the Suffolk banking system showed that it 

is possible in a free-market system to have private banks competing to 

establish themselves as efficient, safe, and inexpensive clearing houses 

limiting overissue of paper money. 

The Civil War 

The Civil War exerted an even more fateful impact on the American 

monetary and banking system than had the War of 1812. It set the 

United States, for the first time except for 1814-17, on an irredeemable 

fiat currency that lasted for two decades and led to reckless inflation of 

prices. This "greenback" currency set a momentous precedent for the 

post-1933 United States, and even more particularly for the post-1971 

experiment in fiat money. 

Perhaps an even more important consequence of the Civil War was 

the permanent change wrought in the American banking system. The 

federal government in effect outlawed the issue of state bank notes, 

and created a new, quasi-centralized, fractional reserve national banking system which paved the way for the return of outright central 

banking in the Federal Reserve System. The Civil War, in short, ended 

the separation of the federal government from banking, and brought 

the two institutions together in an increasingly close and permanent 

symbiosis. In that way, the Republican Party, which inherited the Whig 

admiration for paper money and governmental control and sponsorship of inflationary banking, was able to implant the soft-money tradition permanently in the American system. 

Greenbacks 

The Civil War led to an enormous ballooning of federal expenditures, 

which skyrocketed from $66 million in 1861 to $1.30 billion four years 

later. To pay for these swollen expenditures, the Treasury initially 

attempted, in the fall of 1861, to float a massive $150 million bond issue, 

to be purchased by the nation's leading banks. However, Secretary of 

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the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, a former Jacksonian, tried to require 

the banks to pay for the loan in specie that they did not have. This 

massive pressure on their specie, as well as an increased public demand 

for specie due to a well-deserved lack of confidence in the banks, 

brought about a general suspension of specie payments a few months 

later, at the end of December 1861. This suspension was followed 

swiftly by the Treasury itself, which suspended specie payments on its 

Treasury notes. 

The U.s. government quickly took advantage of being on an inconvertible fiat standard. In the Legal Tender Act of February 1862, Congress authorized the printing of $150 million in new "United States 

Notes" (soon to be known as "greenbacks") to pay for the growing 

war deficits. The greenbacks were made legal tender for all debts, public 

and private, except that the Treasury continued its legal obligation of 

paying the interest on its outstanding public debt in specie. 1OJ The 

greenbacks were also made convertible at par into U.S. bonds, which 

remained a generally unused option for the public, and was repealed 

a year later. 

In creating greenbacks in February, Congress resolved that this would 

be the first and last emergency issue. But printing money is a heady 

wine, and a second $150 million issue was authorized in July, and still 

a third $150 million in early 1863. Greenbacks outstanding reached a 

peak in 1864 of $415.1 million. 

Greenbacks began to depreciate in terms of specie almost as soon as 

they were issued. In an attempt to drive up the price of government 

bonds, Secretary Chase eliminated the convertibility of greenbacks in 

July 1863, an act which simply drove down their value further. Chase 

and the Treasury officials, instead of acknowledging their own premier 

responsibility for the continued depreciation of the greenbacks, conveniently placed the blame on anonymous "gold speculators." In March 

1863, Chase began a determined campaign, which would last until he 

was driven from office, to stop the depreciation by controlling, assaulting, and eventually eliminating the gold market. In early March, he 

had Congress levy a stamp tax on gold sales and to forbid loans on a 

'"'To be able to keep paying interest in specie, Congress provided that customs duties, 

at least, had to be paid in gold or silver. For a comprehensive account and analysis of the 

issue of greenbacks in the Ovil War, see Wesley Clair Mitchell, A History of the Greenbacks 

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19(3). for a summary, see Paul Studenski and 

Hennan E. Kross, FirumciaI History vf the United States (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), pp. 

141-149. 

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collateral of coin above its par value. This restriction on the gold market 

had little effect, and when depreciation resumed its march at the end 

of the year, Chase decided to de facto repeal the requirement that 

customs duties be paid in gold. In late March 1864, Chase declared that 

importers would be allowed to deposit greenbacks at the Treasury and 

receive gold in return at a premium below the market. Importers could 

then use the gold to pay the customs duties. This was supposed to 

reduce greatly the necessity for importers to buy gold coin on the 

market and therefore to reduce the depreciation. The outcome, however, was that the greenback, at 59 cents in gold when Chase began 

the experiment, had fallen to 57 cents by mid-April. Chase was then 

forced to repeal his customs duties scheme. 

With the failure of this attempt to regulate the gold market, Chase 

promptly escalated his intervention. In mid-April, he sold the massive 

amoun t of $11 million in gold in order to drive down the gold premium 

of greenbacks. But the impact was trifling, and the Treasury could not 

continue this policy indefinitely, because it had to keep enough gold 

in its vaults to pay interest on its bonds. At the end of the month, the 

greenback was lower than ever, having sunk to below 56 cents in gold. 

Indefatigably, Chase tried yet again. In mid-May 1864, he sold foreign 

exchange in London at below-market rates in order to drive down 

pounds in relation to dollars, and, more specifically, to replace some 

of the U.S. export demand for gold in England. But this, too, was a 

failure, and Chase ended this experiment before the end of the month. 

Finally, Secretary Chase decided to take off the gloves. He had failed 

to regulate the gold market; he would therefore end the depreciation 

of greenbacks by destroying the gold market completely. By mid-June, 

he had driven through Congress a truly despotic measure to prohibit 

under pain of severe penalties all futures contracts in gold, as well as 

all sales of gold by a broker outside his own office. 

The result was disaster. The gold market was in chaos, with wide 

ranges of prices due to the absence of an organized market. Businessmen clamored for repeal of the "gold bill," and, worst of all, the object 

of the law-to lower the depreciation of the paper dollar-had scarcely 

been achieved. Instead, public confidence in the greenback plummeted, and its depreciation in terms of gold got far worse. At the 

beginning of June, the greenback dollar was worth over 52 cents in 

gold. Apprehensions about the emerging gold bill drove the greenback 

down slightly to 51 cents in mid-June. Then, after the passage of the 

bill, the greenback plummeted, reaching 40 cents at the end of the 

month. 

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The disastrous gold bill was hastily repealed at the end of June, and 

perhaps not COincidentally, Secretary Chase was ousted from office at 

the same time. The war against the speculators was over.IOUOS 

As soon as greenbacks depreciated to less than 97 cents in gold, 

fractional silver coins became undervalued and so were exported to be 

exchanged for gold. By July 1862, in consequence, no coin higher than 

the copper/nickel penny remained in circulation. The U.S. government 

then leaped in to fill the gap with small tickets, first issuing postage 

stamps for the purpose, then bits of unglued paper, and finally, after 

the spring of 1863, fractional paper notes.I06 A total of $28 million in 

postage currency and fractional notes was issued by the middle of 1864. 

Even the nickel/copper pennies began to disappear from circulation, as 

greenbacks depreciated, and the nickel/copper coin began to move 

toward being undervalued. The expectation and finally the reality of 

undervaluation drove the coins into hoards and then into exports. 

Postage and fractional notes did not help matters, because their lowest 

denominations were 5 cents and 3 cents respectively. The penny shortage was finally alleviated when a debased and lighter weight penny 

was issued in the spring of 1864, consisting of bronze instead of nickel 

and copper. 107 

As soon as the nation's banks and the Treasury itself suspended 

specie payments at the end of 1861, Gresham's Law went into operation 

and gold coin virtually disappeared from circulation, except for the 

government's interest payments and importers' customs duties. The 

''''Chase and the administration should have heeded the advice of Sen. Jacob Collamer 

(R-Vt.): "Gold does not fluctuate in price ... because they gamble in it; but they gamble 

in it because it fluctuates . . • . But the fluctuation is not in the gold; the fluctuation is in 

the currency, and it is a fluctuation utterly beyond the control of individuals." Mitchell, 

History of Greenbacks, pp. 229-230. 

'OSOn the war against the gold speculators, see Mitchell, History of Greenbacks, pp. 223-

235. The greenbacks fell further to 35 cents in mid-July on news of military defeats for the 

North. Militaty victories, and consequently rising prospects of possible future gold 

redemption of the greenbacks, caused a rise in greenbacks in terms of gold, partiruIarly 

after the beginning of 1865. At war's end the greenback dollar was worth 69 cents in gold. 

Ibid., pp. 232-238, 423-428. 

l"'Some of the greenbacks had been decorated with portraits of President Lincoln ($5) 

and Secretary Chase ($1). However, when Spencer Oark, chief clerk of the Treasury's 

National Currency Division, put his own portrait on S-cent fractional notes, the indignant 

Rep. Martin R. Thayer (R-Pa.) put through a law, still in force, making it illegal to put the 

picture of any living American on any coin or paper money_ See Gary North, "Greenback 

Dollars and Federal Sovereignty, 1861-1865," in H. Sennholz, ed., Gold Is Money (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 124, 150. 

100See Mitchell, History of Greenbacks, pp. 156--163. 

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swift issuance of legal tender greenbacks, which the government forced 

creditors to accept at par, insured the continued disappearance of gold 

from then on. 

The fascinating exception was California. There were very few banks 

during this period west of Nebraska, and in California the absence of 

banks was insured by the fact that note-issuing banks, at least, were 

prohibited by the California constitution of 1849.'08 The California gold 

discoveries of the late 1840s insured a plentiful supply for coinage. 

Used to a currency of gold coin only, with no intrusion of bank notes, 

California businessmen took steps to maintain gold circulation and 

avoid coerced payment in greenbacks. At fIrst, the merchants of San 

Francisco, in November 1862, jointly agreed to refrain from accepting 

or paying out greenbacks at any but the (depreciated) market value, 

and to keep gold as the monetary standard. Any fIrms that refused to 

abide by the agreement would be blacklisted and required to pay gold 

in cash for any goods which they might purchase in the future. 

Voluntary efforts did not suffice to overthrow the federal power 

standing behind legal tender, however, and so California merchants 

obtained the passage in the California legislature of a "specifIc contracts 

act" at the end of April 1863. The specific contract provided that contracts for the payment of specific kinds of money would be enforceable 

in the courts. After passage of that law, California businessmen were 

able to protect themselves against tenders of greenbacks by inserting 

gold coin payment clauses in all their contracts. Would that the other 

states, and even the federal government, had done the sameP09 Furthermore, the private banks of deposit in California refused to accept 

greenbacks on deposit, newspapers used their influence to warn citizens about the dangers of greenbacks, and the state government refused 

to accept greenbacks in payment of taxes. In that way, all the major 

institutions in California joined in refusing to accept or give their imprimatur to federal inconvertible paper. 

Judicial institutions also helped maintain the gold standard and repel 

the depreciated U.S. paper. Not only did the California courts uphold 

""Banks of deposit existed in California, but of course they could not supply the public's 

demand for cash. See John Jay Knox, A History of Banking in the United States (New York: 

Bradford Rhodes & Co., 19(0), pp. 843--845. 

'09J'his experience illustrates a continuing problem in contract law: It is not sufficient for 

government to allow contracts to be made in gold or gold coin. It is necessary for government to enforce specific performance of the contracts so that debtors must pay in the weight 

or value of the gold (or anything else) required in the contract, and not in some paper 

dollar equivalent decided by law or the courts. 

78 
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75727.067

the constitutionality of the specific contracts act, but the California 

Supreme Court ruled in 1862 that greenbacks could not be accepted in 

state or county taxes, since the state constitution prohibited any acceptance of paper money for taxes. 

The state of Oregon was quick to follow California's lead. Oregon's 

constitution had also outlawed banks of issue, and gold had for years 

been the exclusive currency. Two weeks after the agreement of the San 

Francisco merchants, the merchants of Salem, Oregon, unanimously 

backed gold as the monetary standard and refused to accept greenbacks 

at par. Two months later, the leading merchants of Portland agreed to 

accept greenbacks only at rates current in San Francisco; the merchants 

in the rest of the state were quick to follow suit. The Portland merchants 

issued a circular warning of a blacklist of all customers who insisted on 

settling their debts in greenbacks, and they would be quickly boycotted, 

and dealings with them would only be in cash. 

Oregon deposit banks also refused to accept greenbacks, and the 

Oregon legislature followed California a year and a half later in passing 

a specific performance law. Oregon, too, refused to accept greenbacks 

in taxes and strengthened the law in 1864 by requiring that "all taxes 

levied by state, counties, or municipal corporations therein, shall be 

collected and paid in gold and silver coin of the United States and not 

otherwise. "110 

In the same year, the Oregon Supreme Court followed California in 

ruling that greenbacks could not constitutionally be received in payment of taxes. 

The banking story during the Civil War is greatly complicated by the 

advent of the national banking system in the latter part of the war. But 

it is clear that the state banks, being able to suspend specie and to 

pyramid money and credit on top of the federal greenbacks, profited 

greatly by being able to expand during this period. Thus, total state 

bank notes and deposits were $510 million in 1860, and by 1863 the 

amount rose to $743 million, an increase in state bank demand liabilities 

in those three years of 15.2 percent per year. 111 

ll"Cited in Richard A. Lester, Monetary E:rperiments (1939, London: David & Charles 

Reprints, 1970), p. 166. On the California and Oregon maintenance of the gold standard 

during this period, see ibid., pp. 161-171. On California, see Bernard Moses, "Legal 

Tender Notes in California," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (October 1892): 1-25; Mitchell, 

Hislory of Greenbacks, pp. 142-144. On Oregon, see James H. Gilbert, Trade and Currency 

in Early Oregon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1907), pp. 101-122. 

"'Historical Statistics, pp. 625, 648-649. 

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It is no wonder, then, that contrary to older historical opinion, many 

state banks were enthusiastic about the greenbacks, which provided 

them with legal tender that could function as a reserve base upon which 

they could expand. As Hammond puts it, "Instead of being curbed (as 

some people supposed later), the powers of the banks were augmented 

by the legal tender issues. As the issues increased, the deposits of the 

banks would increase."1l2lndeed, Sen. Sherman (R-Ohio) noted that 

the state banks favored greenbacks. And the principal author of the 

greenback legislation, Rep. Elbridge G. Spaulding (R-N.Y.), the chairman of the House Ways and Means subcommittee that introduced the 

bill, was himself a Buffalo banker. 

The total money supply of the country (including gold coin, state 

bank notes, subsidiary silver, U.s. currency including fractional and 

greenbacks) amounted to $745.4 million in 1860. By 1863, the money 

supply had skyrocketed to $1.435 billion, an increase of 92.5 percent in 

three years, or 30.8 percent per annum. By the end of the war, the 

money supply, which now included national bank notes and deposits, 

totalled $1.773 billion, an increase in two years of 23.6 percent or 11.8 

percent per year. Over the entire war, the money supply rose from 

$45.4 million to $1.773 billion, an increase of 137.9 percent, or 27.69 

percent per annum.ll3 

The response to this severe monetary inflation was a massive inflation of prices. It is no wonder that the greenbacks, depreciating rapidly 

in terms of gold, depreciated in terms of goods as well. Wholesale 

prices rose from 100 in 1860, to 210.9 at the end of the war, a rise of 

110.9 percent or 22.2 percent per year.1l4 

The Republican administration argued that their issue of greenbacks 

was required by stern wartime "necessity." The spuriousness of this 

argument is seen by the fact that greenbacks were virtually not issued 

after the middle of 1863. There were three alternatives to the issuance 

of legal tender fiat money. 1) The government could have issued paper 

'I2Bray Hammond, Sovereignty and an Empty Purse: Bunks and Politics in the Civil War 

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 246, 249-250. Also see North, "Greenback Dollars," pp. 143--148. 

1tJHistorical Statistics. pp. 625, 648--649. In a careful analysis North estimates the total 

money supply at approximately $2 billion. and also points out that counterfeit notes in 

the Civil War have been estimated to amount to no less than one-third of the total currency 

in circulation. North, "Greenback Dollars," p. 134. The counterfeiting estimates are in 

William P. Donlon, United States fArge Size Paper Money, 1861 to 1923, 2nd ed. (lola, Wis.: 

Krause, 1970), p. 15. 

I1<Ralph Andreano, ed., TIu! Economic Impact of the American Civil War (Cambridge, Mass: 

Schenckman, 1961), p. 178. 

80 
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money but not made it legal tender; it would have depreciated even 

more rapidly. At any rate, they would have had quasi-legal tender 

status by being receivable in federal dues and taxes. 2) It could have 

increased taxes to pay for the war expenditures. 3) It could have issued 

bonds and other securities and sold the debt to banks and non-bank 

institutions. In fact, the government employed both the latter alternatives, and after 1863 stopped issuing greenbacks and relied on them 

excluSively, especially a rise in the public debt. The accumulated deficit 

piled up during the war was $2.614 billion, of which the printing of 

greenbacks only financed $431.7 million. Of the federal deficits during 

the war, greenbacks financed 22.8 percent in fiscal 1862, 48.5 percent 

in 1863, 6.3 percent in 1864, and none in 1865.115 This is particularly 

striking if we consider that the peak deficit came in 1865, totalling 

$963.8 million. All the rest was financed by increased public debt. Taxes 

also increased greatly, revenues rising from $52 million in 1862 to $333.7 

million in 1865. Tax revenues as a percentage of the budget rose from 

the miniscule 10.7 percent in fiscal 1862 to over 26 percent in 1864 and 

1865. 

It is dear, then, that the argument from "necessity" in the printing 

of greenbacks was specious, and indeed the greenback advocates conceded that it was perfectly possible to issue public debt, provided that 

the administration was willing to see the prices of its bonds rise and 

its interest payments rise conSiderably. At least for most of the war, 

they were not willing to take their chances in the competitive bond 

market.1l6 

Il5The Confederacy, on the other hand, financed virtually all of its expenditures through 

mammoth printing of fiat paper, the Southern version of the greenback. Confederate 

notes. which were first issued in June 1861 to a sum of $1.1 million, skyrocketed until the 

total supply of confederate notes in January 1864 was no less than $826.8 million, an 

increase of 750.6 percent for three and a half years, or 214.5 percent per year. Bank notes 

and deposits in the Confederacy rose from $119.3 million to $268.1 million in this period, 

so that the total money supply rose from $120.4 million to $1.095 billion, or an increase of 

1,060 percent-302.9 percent per year. Prices in the Eastern Confederacy rose from 100 in 

early 1861 to no less than over 4,000 in 1864, and 9,211 at the end of the war in April 1865. 

Thus, in four year, prices rose by 9,100 percent or an average of 2.275 percent per annum. 

See Eugene M. Lerner, "Inflation in the Confederacy, 1862-$," in M. Friedman. ed., 

Studies in the Qwmtity Theury of Money (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 

163-175; Lerner, "Money, Prices and Wages in the Confederacy, 1861-65," in Andreano, 

Economic Impact, pp. 11-40. 

II'Mitchell, History of the Greenbacks, pp. 61-74; 119£., 128-131. Also see Don C. Barrett. 

The Greenbacks and Resumption of Specie Payments, 1862-1879 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931). pp. 25-57. 

81 
115 


75727.070

The Public Debt and the National Banking System 

The public debt of the Civil War brought into American financial 

history the important advent of one Jay Cooke. The Ohio-born Cooke 

had joined the moderately successful Philadelphia investment banking 

finn of Clark and Dodge as a clerk at the age of 18. In a few years, 

Cooke worked himself up to the status of junior partner, and, in 1857, 

he left the firm to branch out on his own in canal and railroad promotion 

and other business ventures. There he doubtless would have remained, 

except for the lucky fact that he and his brother Henry, editor of the 

leading Republican newspaper in Ohio, the Ohio State Journal, were 

close friends of U.S. Sen. Salmon P. Chase. Chase, a veteran leader of 

the anti-slavery movement, fought for and lost the Republican Presidential nomination in 1860 to Abraham Lincoln. At that point, the 

Cookes determined that they would feather their nest by lobbying to 

make Salmon Chase Secretary of the Treasury. After heavy lobbying 

by the Cookes, the Chase appointment was secured, so Jay Cooke 

quickly set up his own investment banking house of Jay Cooke & Co. 

Everything was in place; it now remained to seize the opportunity. 

As the Cooke's father wrote of Henry: "I took up my pen principally 

to say that H.s.'s [Henry's) plan in getting Chase into the Cabinet and 

Uohnl Shennan into the Senate is accomplished, and that now is the 

time for making money, by honest contracts out of the government. 11m 

Now indeed was their time for making money, and Cooke lost no 

time in doing so. It did not take much persuasion, including wining 

and dining, for Cooke to induce his friend Chase to take an unprecedented step in the fall of 1862: granting the House of Cooke a monopoly 

on the underwriting of the public debt. With enormous energy, Cooke 

hurled himself into the task of persuading the mass of public to buy 

U.S. government bonds. In doing so, Cooke perhaps invented the art 

of public relations and of mass propaganda; certainly, he did so in the 

realm of selling bonds. As Kirkland writes: 

With characteristic optimism, he {Cooke 1 flung himself into a bond 

crusade. He recruited a small ann y of 2,500 subagents among bankers, 

insurance men, and community leaders and kept them inspired and 

infonned by mail and telegraph. He taught the American people to 

buy bonds, using lavish advertising in newspapers, broadsides, and 

mIn Henrietta Larson, Jay Cooke, Private Banker (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 

1936), p. 103. Also see Edward C. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age; Business, LAuor and Puu/ic 

Policy, 1860-1897 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 20. 

82 
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75727.071

posters. God, destiny, duty, courage, patriotism-all summoned 

"Fanners, Mechanics, and Capitalists" to invest in loans .. .u' 

-loans which of course they had to purchase from Jay Cooke. 

And purchase the loans they did, for Cooke's bond sales soon reached 

the enormous figure of one to two million dollars a day. Perhaps $2 

billion in bonds were bought and underwritten by Jay Cooke during 

the war. Cooke lost his monopoly in 1864, under pressure of rival 

bankers; but a year later he was reappointed to keep that highly lucrative post until the House of Cooke crashed in the Panic of 1873. 

In the Civil War, Jay Cooke began as a moderately successful promoter; he emerged at war's end a millionaire, a man who had spawned 

the popular motto, "as rich as Jay Cooke. " Surely he must ha ve counted 

the $100,000 he had poured into Salmon Chase's political fortunes by 

1864 one of the most lucrative investments he had ever made. 

It is not surprising that Jay Cooke acquired enormous political influence in the Republican administration of the Civil War and after. Hugh 

McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury from 1865 to 1869, was a close 

friend of Cooke's and when McCulloch left office he assumed the post 

of head of Cooke's London office. The Cooke brothers were also good 

friends of General Grant, so they wielded great influence during the 

Grant administration. 

No sooner had Cooke secured the monopoly of government bond 

underwriting than he teamed up with his associates, Secretary of the 

Treasury Chase and Ohio's Senator John Sherman, to drive through a 

measure which was destined to have far more fateful effects than 

greenbacks on the American monetary system: the National Banking 

Acts. The National Banking Acts destroyed the previously decentralized and fairly successful state banking system, and substituted a new, 

centralized, and far more inflationary banking system under the aegis 

of Washington and a handful of Wall Street banks. Whereas the effects 

of the greenbacks were finally eliminated by the resumption of specie 

payments in 1879, the effects of the National Banking System are still 

with us. Not only was this system in place until 1913, but it paved the 

way for the Federal Reserve System by instituting a quasi-central banking type of monetary system. The "inner contradictions" of the National 

Banking System were such that the nation was driven either to go 

onward to a frankly central bank or else to scrap centralized banking 

altogether and go back to decentralized state banking. Given the inner 

1!8Kirkland, Industry, pp. 20-21. 

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75727.072

dynamic of state intervention to keep intensifying, coupled with the 

almost universal adoption of statist ideology after the tum of the 20th 

century, which course the nation would take was unfortunately inevitable. 

Chase and Shennan drove the new system through under cover of 

war necessity, but it was designed to alter the banking system permanently. The wartime ground was to set up national banks, which were 

so structured as to necessarily purchase large amounts of U.S. government bonds. Patterned after the "free" banking systems, this tied in 

the nation's banks with the federal government and the public debt in 

a close symbiotic relationship. The Jacksonian embarrassment of the 

independent treasury was de facto swept away, and the Treasury 

would now keep its deposits in a new series of "pets": the national 

banks, chartered directly by the federal government. In this way, the 

Republican Party was able to use the wartime emergency to fulfill the 

Whig-Republican dream of a federally-controlled centralized banking 

system able to inflate the supply of money and credit in a uniform 

manner. Meshing with this was a profound political goal: As Sherman 

expressly pointed out, a vital object of the National Banking System 

was to eradicate the embarrassing doctrine of state's rights and to 

nationalize American politics. 119 

As established in the Bank Acts of 1863 and 1864, the National 

Banking System provided for the chartering of national banks by the 

Comptroller of the Currency in Washington, D.C. The banks were 

"free" in the sense that any institution meeting the requirements could 

obtain a charter, but the requirements were so high (from $50,000 for 

rural banks to $200,000 in the bigger cities) that small national banks 

were ruled out, particularly in the large cities. 120 

"'In his important work on Northern intellectuals and the Civil War, George Frederickson discusses an influential article by one Samuel Fowler written at the end of the war: 

n 'The Civil War which has changed the current of our ideas, and crowded into a few 

years the emotions of a lifetime: Fowler wrote, 'has in measure given to the preceding 

period of Qur history the character of a remote state of political existence.' Fowler described 

the way in which the war, a triumph of nationalism and a demonstration of 'the universal 

tendency to combination,' had provided the coup de grace for the Jefferson philosophy of 

government with its emphasis on decentralization and the protection of local and individ· 

ualliberties." George Frederickson, The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis 

of the Union (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 184. Also see Merrill D. Peterson, The 

Jeffersonian lmJlge in the American Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 

217-21B. 

''''For a particularly ludd exposition of the structure of the national banking system, see 

John J. Klein, Money and the Economy, 2nd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 

1970), pp. 1~147. 

84 
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The National Banking System created three sets of national banks: 

central reserve city, which was only New York; reserve city, other cities 

with over 500,000 population; and country, which included all other 

national banks. 

Central reserve city banks were required to keep 25 percent of their 

notes and deposits in reserve of vault cash or "lawful money," which 

included gold, silver, and greenbacks. This provision incorporated the 

"reserve requiren:tent" concept which had been a feature of the "free" 

banking system. Reserve city banks, on the other hand, were allowed 

to keep one-half of their required reserves in vault cash, while the other 

half could be kept as demand deposits (checking deposits) in central 

reserve city banks. Finally, country banks only had to keep a minimum 

reserve ratio of 15 percent to their notes and deposits; and only 40 

percent of these reserves had to be in the form of vault cash. The other 

60 percent of the country banks' reserves could be in the form of 

demand deposits either at the reserve city or central reserve city banks. 

The upshot of this system was to replace the individualized structure 

of the pre-Civil War state banking system by an inverted pyramid of 

country banks expanding on top of reserve city banks, which in turn 

expanded on top of New York City banks. Before the Civil War, every 

bank had to keep its own specie reserves, and any pyramiding of notes 

and deposits on top of that was severely limited by calls for redemption 

in specie by other, competing banks as well as by the general public. 

But new, reserve city banks could keep half of their reserves as deposits 

in New York City banks, and country banks could keep most of theirs 

in one or the other, so that as a result, all the national banks in the 

country could pyramid in two layers on top of the relatively small base 

of reserves in the New York banks. And furthermore, those reserves 

could consist of inflated greenbacks as weD as specie. 

A simplified schematic diagram can portray the essence of this revolution in American banking: 

Figure 1 

Notes and 

Deposits 

Specie 

Figure 1 shows state banks in the decentralized system before the Civil 

War. Every bank must stand or fall on its bottom. It can pyramid notes 

85 
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75727.074

and deposits on top of specie, but its room for such inflationary expansion is limited, because any bank's expansion will cause increased 

spending by its clients on the goods or services of other banks. Notes 

or checks on the expanding bank will go into the coffers of other banks, 

which will call on the expanding bank for redemption. This will put 

severe pressure on the expanding bank, which cannot redeem all of its 

liabilities as it is, and whose reserve ratio has declined, and so it will 

be forced to contract its loans and liabilities or else go under. 

Country 

Banks 

Reserve City 

Banks 

New York City 

Banks 

Reserves: Specie 

and Greenbacks 

Figure 2 

Figure 2 depicts the inverted pyramid of the National Banking System. 

New York City banks pyramid notes and deposits on top of specie and 

greenbacks; reserve city banks pyramid their notes and deposits on top 

of specie, greenbacks and deposits at New York City; and country banks 

pyramid on top of both. This means that, for example, if New York 

City banks inflate and expand their notes and deposits, they will not 

be checked by other banks calling upon them for redemption. Instead, 

reserve city banks will be able to expand their own loans and liabilities 

by pyramiding on top of their own increased deposits at New York 

banks. In tum, the country banks will be able to inflate their credit by 

pyramiding on top of their increased deposits at both reserve city and 

New York banks. The whole nation is able to inflate uniformly and 

relatively unchecked by pyramiding on top of a few New York City 

banks. 

The national banks were not compelled to keep part of their reserves 

as deposits in larger banks, but they tended to do so-in the long run, 

so that they could expand uniformly on top of the larger banks, and in 

the short run because of the advantages of having a line of credit with 

86 
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a larger "correspondent" bank as well as earning interest on demand 

deposits at that bank. 121 

Let US illustrate in another way how the National Banking System 

pyramided by centralizing reserves. Let us consider the hypothetical 

balance sheets of the various banks. 122 Suppose that the country banks 

begin with $1 million in vault cash as their reserves. With the National 

Banking System in place, the country banks can now deposit threefifths, or $600,000 of their cash in reserve city banks, in return for 

interest-paying demand deposits at those banks. 

The balance-sheet changes are now as follows: 

Assets 

Reserves 

Vault cash 

Deposits at 

reserve city 

banks 

Assets 

Reserves 

Vault cash 

Banks 

Liabilities + Equity 

-$600,000 

+$600,000 

Reserve Banks 

Liabilities + Equity 

+$600,000 Demand deposits 

due country 

banks +$600,000 

Total reserves for the two sets of banks have not changed. But now 

because the country banks can use as their reserves deposits in reserve 

city banks, the same total reserves can now be used by the banks to 

expand far more of their credit. For now $400,000 in cash supports the 

same total of notes and deposits that the country banks had previously 

backed by $1 million, and the reserve city banks can now expand $2.4 

million on top of the new $600,000 in cash-or rather, $1.8 million in 

addition to the $600,000 due to the city banks. In short, country bank 

IUBanks generally paid interest on demand deposits until the practice was outlawed in 

1934. 

Ii2Adapted from Klein, Money and the Economy, pp. 144-145. 

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75727.076

reserves have remained the same, but reserve city bank reserves have 

increased by $600,000, and they can engage in 4:1 pyramiding of credit 

on top of that. 

But that is not all. For the reserve city banks can deposit half of their 

reserves at the New York banks. When they do that, the balance sheets 

of the respective banks change as follows: 

Assets 

Reserves 

Vault cash 

Deposits at 

central reserve 

city banks 

Assets 

Vault cash 

Reserve Gty Banks 

Liabilities + Equity 

+$300,000 

Demand deposits 

due country 

+ $300,000 banks 

Central Reserve Banks 

+$600,000 

Liabilities + Equity 

+ $300,000 Demand deposits 

due reserve 

city banks +$300,000 

Note that since the reserve city banks are allowed to keep half of 

their reserves in the central reserve city banks, the former can still 

pyramid $2.4 million on top of their new $600,000, and yet deposit 

$300,000 in cash at the New York banks. The latter, then, can expand 

another 4:1 on top of the new cash of $300,000, or increase their total 

notes and deposits to $1.2 million. 

In short, not only did the national banking system allow pyramiding 

of the entire banking structure on top of a few large Wall Street banks, 

the very initiating of the system allowed a multiple expansion of all 

bank liabilities by centralizing a large part of the nation's cash reserves 

from the individual state banks into the hands of the larger, and especially the New York, banks. For the expansion of $1.2 million on top 

of the new $300;000 at New York banks served to expand the liabilities 

going to the smaller banks, which in turn could pyramid on top of their 

increased deposits. But even without that further expansion, $1 million 

which, we will assume, originally supported $6 million in notes and 

depOSits, will now support, in addition to that $6 million, $2.4 million 

88 
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issued by the reserve city banks, and $1.2 million by the New York 

banks-to say nothing of further expansion by the latter two sets of 

banks which will allow country banks to pyramid more liabilities. 

In June 1874, the fundamental structure of the National Banking 

System was changed when Congress, as part of an inflationist move 

after the Panic of 1873, eliminated all reserve requirements on notes, 

keeping them only on deposits. This released over $20 million of lawful 

money from bank reserves, and allowed a further pyramiding of demand 

liabilities. l23 In the long run, it severed the treatment of notes from 

deposits, with notes tied rigidly to bank holdings of government debt, 

and demand deposits pyramiding on top of reserve ratios in specie and 

greenbacks. 

But this centralized inverse pyramiding of bank credit was not all. 

For, in a way modeled by the "free" banking system, every national 

bank's expansion of notes was tied intimately to its ownership of U.S. 

government bonds. Every bank could only issue notes if it deposited 

an equivalent of U.S. securities as collateral at the U.s. Treasury,124 so 

that national banks could only expand their notes to the extent that 

they purchased U.S. government bonds. This provision tied the National 

Banking System intimately to the federal government, and more particularly, to its expansion of public debt. The federal government had 

an assured, built-in market for its debt, and the more the banks purchased that debt, the more the banking system could inflate. Monetizing the public debt was not only inflationary per se, it provided the 

basis-when done by the larger city banks-of other banks pyramiding 

on top of their own monetary expansion. 

The tie-in and the pyramiding process were cemented by several 

other provisions. Every national bank was obliged to redeem the obligations of every other national bank at par. Thus, the severe market 

limitation on the circulation of inflated notes and deposits-depreciation as the distance from the bank increases-was abolished. And while 

the federal government could not exactly make the notes of a private 

bank legal tender, it conferred quasi-legal tender status on every national 

baDk by agreeing to receive all its notes and deposits at par for dues 

and taxes. l25 It is interesting and even heartening to discover that 

1"'See Hepburn, History of Currmt:y, pp. 317-318. 

IlIQriginally, national banks could only issue notes to the value 90 percent of their U.S. 

government bonds. This limitation was changed to 100 percent in 1900. 

'''Except, of course, as we have seen with the greenbacks, for payment of customs 

duties, which had to be paid in gold, to build up a fund to pay interest on the government 

debt in gold. 

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75727.078

despite these enormous advantages conferred by the federal government, national bank notes fell below par with greenbacks in the financial crisis of 1867, and a number of national banks failed the next year. 126 

Genuine redeemability, furthermore, was made very difficult under 

the National Banking System. Laxity was insured by the fact that national 

banks were required to redeem the notes and deposits of every other 

national bank at par, and yet it was made difficult for them to actually 

redeem those liabilities in specie; for one of the problems with the preOvil War state banking system is that interstate or even intrastate 

branches were illegal, thereby hobbling the clearing system for swiftly 

redeeming another bank's notes and deposits. One might think that a 

national banking system would at least eliminate this problem, but on 

the contrary, branch banking continued to be prohibited, and interstate 

branch banking is illegal to this day. A bank would only have to redeem 

its notes at its own counter in its home office. Furthermore, the redemption of notes was crippled by the fact that the federal government 

imposed a maximum limit of $3 million a month by which national 

bank notes could be contracted. 121 

Reserve requirements are now considered a sound and precise way 

to limit bank credit expansion, but the precision can work two ways. 

Just as government safety codes can decrease safety by setting a lower 

limit for safety measures and inducing private firms to reduce safety 

downward to that common level, so reserve requirements can and ordinarily do serve as lowest common denominators for bank reserve ratios. 

Free competition can and generally will result in banks voluntarily 

keeping higher reserve ratios. But a uniform legal requirement will 

tend to push all the banks down to that minimum ratio. And indeed 

we can see this now in the universal propensity of all banks to be "fully 

loaned up," that is, to expand as much as is legally possible up to the 

limits imposed by the legal reserve ratio. Reserve requirements of less 

than 100 percent are more an inflationary than a restrictive monetary 

device. 

The National Banking System was intended to replace the state banks, 

but many state banks continued aloof and refused to join, despite the 

special privileges accorded to the national banks. The reserve and 

capital requirements were more onerous, and at that period, national 

banks were prohibited from making loans on real estate. With the state 

banks refusing to come to heel voluntarily, Congress, in March 1865, 

''"See Smith, RatiOM!", p. 48. 

IVSee Smith, Rationale, p. 132. 

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completed the Civil War revolution of the banking system by placing 

a prohibitive 10 percent tax on aU bank notes-which had the desired 

effect of virtually outlawing all note issues by the state banks. From 

1865 on, the national banks had a legal monopoly on the issue of bank 

notes. 

At fIrst, the state banks contracted and disappeared under the shock, 

and it looked as if the United States would only have national banks. 

The number of state banks fell from 1,466 in 1863 to 297 in 1866, and 

total notes and deposits in state banks fell from $733 million in 1863 to 

only $101 million in 1866. After several years, however, the state banks 

readily took their place as an expanding element in the banking system, 

albeit subOl;dinated to the national banks. In order to survive, the state 

banks had to keep deposit accounts at national banks, from whom they 

could "buy" national bank notes in order to redeem their deposits. In 

short, the state banks now became the fourth layer of the national 

pyramid of money and credit, on top of the country and other banks, 

for the reserves of the state banks became, in addition to vault cash, 

demand deposits at national banks, which they could redeem in cash. 

The multi-layered structure of bank inflation under the National Banking System was intensified. 

In this new structure, the state banks began to flourish. By 1873, the 

total number of state banks had increased to 1,330, and their total 

deposits were $789 million. 12S 

The Cooke-Chase connection with the new National Banking System 

was simple. As Secretary of the Treasury, Chase wanted an assured 

market for the government bonds that were being issued so heavily 

during the Civil War. And as the monopoly underwriter of U.S. government bonds for every year except one from 1862 to 1873, Jay Cooke 

was even more directly interested in an assured and expanding market 

for his bonds. What better method of obtaining such a market than 

creating an entirely new banking system, the expansion of which was 

directly tied to the banks' purchase of government bonds-from Jay 

Cooke? 

The Cooke brothers played a major role in driving the National 

Banking Act of 1863 through a reluctant Congress. The Democrats, 

devoted to hard-money, opposed the legislation almost to a man. Only 

a majority of Republicans could be induced to agree on the bill. After 

John Sherman's decisive speech in the Senate for the measure, Henry 

Cooke-now head of the Washington Office of the House of CookeUJJHistoricai Statistics, pp. 628-629. 

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wrote jubilantly to his brother: "It will be a great triumph, Jay, and one 

to which we have contributed more than any other living man. The 

bank had been repudiated by the House, and was without a sponsor 

in the Senate, and was thus virtually dead and buried when I induced 

Sherman to take hold of it, and we went to work with the newspapers."129 

Going to work with the newspapers meant something more than 

mere persuasion for the Cooke brothers; as monopoly underwriter of 

government bonds, Cooke was paying the newspapers large sums for 

advertising, and so the Cookes thought-as it turned out correctlythat they could induce the newspapers to grant them an enormous 

amount of free space "in which to set forth the merits of the new 

national banking system." Such space meant not only publicity and 

articles, but even more important, the fervent editorial support of most 

of the nation's press. And so the press, implicitly bought for the occasion, kept up a drumfire of propaganda for the new National Banking 

System. As Cooke himself related: "For six weeks or more nearly all 

the newspapers in the country were filled with our editorials {written 

by the Cooke brothers] condemning the state bank system and explaining the great benefits to be derived from the national banking system 

now proposed." And every day the indefatigable Cookes put on the 

desks of every Congressman the relevant editorials from newspapers 

in their respective districts. 130 

While many state bankers, especially the conservative old-line New 

York bankers, opposed the National Banking System, Jay Cooke, once 

the system was in place, plunged in with a will. Not only did he sell 

the national banks their required bonds, he also set up new national 

banks which would have to buy his government securities. His agents 

formed national banks in the smaller towns of the South and West. 

Furthermore, he set up his own two large national banks, the First 

National Bank of Philadelphia and the First National Bank of Washington, D.C. 

But the National Banking System was in great need of a mighty bank 

in New York City to serve as the base of the inflationary pyramid for a 

host of country and reserve city banks. Shortly after the inception of 

the system, three national banks had been organized in New York, but 

none of them was large or prestigious enough to serve as the key 

129Quoted in Robert P. Sharkey, Money, Class and Party: An Economi<: Study of Civil War 

and Reconstruction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 245. 

"·'See Hammond, Sovereignty, pp. 289-290. 

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75727.081

fulcrum of the new banking structure. Jay Cooke, however, was happy 

to oblige, and he quickly established the Fourth National Bank of New 

York, capitalized at a huge $5 million. After the war, Jay Cooke favored 

resumption of specie payments, but only if greenbacks could be replaced 

one-ta-one by new national bank notes. In his unbounded enthusiasm 

for national bank notes and their dependence on the federal debt, 

Cooke urged repeal of the $300 million legal limit on national bank note 

issue. In 1865, he published a pamphlet proclaiming that in less than 

20 years national bank note circulation would total $1 billion. III 

The title of the pamphlet Cooke published is revealing: How Our 

National Debt May Be A National Blessing. The Debt is Public Wealth, Political 

Union, Protection of Industry, Secure Basis for National Currency. U2 

By 1866, it was clear that the National Banking System had replaced 

the state as the center of the monetary system of the United States. 

Only a year earlier, in 1865, state bank notes had totaled $142.9 million; 

by 1866 they had collapsed to $20 million. On the other hand, national 

bank notes grew from a mere $31.2 million in 1864, their fIrst year of 

existence, to $276 million in 1866. And while, as we have seen, the 

number of state banks in existence was falling drastically from 1,466 to 

297, the number of national banks grew from 66 in 1863 to 1,634 three 

years later. 

The Post-Civil War Era: 1865-1879 

The United States ended the war with a depreciated inconvertible 

greenback currency, and a heavy burden of public debt. The first question on the monetary agenda was what to do about the greenbacks. A 

powerful group of industrialists calling for continuation of greenbacks, 

opposing resumption and, of course, any contraction of money to 

prepare for specie resumption, was headed by the Pennsylvania iron 

and steel manufacturers. The Pennsylvania ironmasters, who had been 

in the forefront of the organized protective tariff movement since its 

beginnings in 1820,133 were led here and instructed by their intellectual 

mentor-himself a Pennsylvania ironmaster-the elderly economist 

Henry C. Carey. Carey and his fellow iron manufacturers realized that 

131 Actually, Cooke erred, and national bank notes never reached that total. Instead, it 

was demand deposits that expanded, and reached the billion..<f.ollar mark by 1879. 

IllSee Sharkey, Mtm~, Class, and Party, p. 247. 

l"The leader of the protectionists in Congress in 1820 was Rep. Henry Baldwin, a 

leading iron manufacturer from Pittsburgh. Rothbard, Paille of 1819, pp. 164ff. 

93 
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during an inflation, since the foreign exchange market anticipates further inflation, domestic currency tends to depreciate faster than domestic prices are rising. A falling dollar and rising price of gold, they 

realized, make domestic prices cheaper and imported prices higher, 

and hence functions as a surrogate tariff. A cheap money, inflationist 

policy, then, could not only provide easy credit for manufacturing, it 

could also function as an extra tariff because of the depreciation of the 

dollar and the rise in the gold premium, 

Imbibers of the Carey gospel of high tariffs and soft money were a 

host of attendees at the famous "Carey Vespers" -evenings of discussion of economics and politics. Influential Carey disciples included 

economist and Pennsylvania ironmaster Stephen Colwell; Eber Ward, 

president of the Iron and Steel Association; John A. Williams, editor of 

the Association's journal Iron Age; Rep. Daniel Morrell, Pennsylvania 

iron manufacturer; 1. Smith Homans, Jr., editor of the Bankers' Magazine; 

and the powerful Rep. William D. Kelley of Pennsylvania, whose lifelong devotion to the interest of the ironmasters earned him the proud 

sobriquet of "Old Pig Iron," The Carey circle also dominated the American Industrial League and its successor, the Pennsylvania Industrial 

League, which spread the Carey doctrines of protection and paper 

money. Influential allies in Congress, if not precisely Carey followers, 

were the radical leader Rep. Thaddeus Stevens, himself a Pennsylvania 

iron master, and Rep. John A. Griswold, an ironmaster from New York. 

Also sympathetic to greenbacks were many manufacturers who desired 

cheap credit, gold speculators who were betting on higher gold prices, 

and railroads, who as heavy debtors to their bondholders, realized that 

inflation benefits debtors by cheapening the dollar whereas it also tends 

to expropriate creditors by the same token. One of the influential Carey 

disciples, for example, was the leading railroad promoter, the Pennsylvanian Thomas A. Scott, leading entrepreneur of the Pennsylvania 

and Texas & Pacific Railroads. l34 

1340n the Carey circle and its influence, see Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era: A Social and 

Political Histary of American Finance, 1865-1879 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

1964), pp. 53-59; and Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, Vol. Ill, 

1864-1918 (New York: Viking Press, 1949), pp. 7-8. Dorfman notes that Kelley dedicated 

his collected Speeches, Addresses and Ldters of 1872 to "The Great Master of Economic 

Science, the Profound Thinker, and the Careful Observer of Social Phenomena, My 

Venerable Friend and Teacher, Henry C. Carey." Ibid., p. 8. On the link between high 

tariffs and greenbacks for the Pennsylvania ironmasters, see Sharkey, Manry, Class and 

Party, chap. 4. 

94 
128 


75727.083

One of the most flamboyant advocates of greenback inflation in the 

post-war era was the Wall Street stock speculator Richard Schell. In 

1874, Schell became a member of Congress, where he proposed an 

outrageous pre-Keynesian scheme in the spirit of Keynes' later dictum 

that so long as money is spent, it doesn't matter what the money is 

spent on, be it pyramid-building or digging holes in the ground. l35 

Schell seriously urged the federal government to dig a canal from New 

York to San Francisco, financed wholly by the issue of greenbacks. 

Schell's enthusiasm was perhaps matched only by the notorious railroad speculator and economic adventurer George Francis Train, who 

called repeatedly for immense issues of greenbacks. "Give us greenbacks we say," Train thundered in 1867, "and build cities, plant corn, 

open coal mines, control railways, launch ships, grow cotton, establish 

factories, open gold and silver mines, erect rolling mills .... Carry my 

resolution and there is sunshine in the sky."l36 

The Panic of 1873 was a severe blow to many overbuilt railroads, and 

it was railroad men who led in calling for more greenbacks to stem the 

tide. Thomas Scott, Collis P. Huntington, leader of the Central Pacific 

Railroad, Russel Sage, and other railroad men jOined in the call for 

greenbacks. So strong was their influence that the Louisville CourierJournal, in April 1874, declared: ''The strongest influence at work in 

Washington upon the currency proceeded from the railroads .... The 

great inflationists after aU, are the great trunk railroads."137 

The greenback problem after the Civil War was greatly complicated 

by the massive public debt that layover the heads of the American 

people. A federal debt, which had tallied only $64.7 million in 1860, 

amounted to the huge amount of $2.32 billion in 1866. Many ex-Jacksonian Democrats, led by Sen. George H. Pendleton of Ohio, began to 

agitate for further issue of greenbacks solely for the purpose of redeeming the principal of federal debts contracted in greenbacks during the 

war. 138 In a sense, then, hard-money hostility to both inflation and the 

public debt were now at odds. In a sense, the Pendletonians were 

13'Thus, Keynes wrote; " 'To dig holes in the ground: paid for out of savings will 

increase, not only employment, but the real national dividend of useful goods and services." John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (New 

York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), p. 220. On pyramid·building, see ibid., pp. 220 and 131. 

IJ6Unger, Greenback ira, pp. 4S-48. 

'''Ibid., p. 222. 

ll8'fhe federal government had contracted to redeem the interest on the wartime public 

debt in gold, but nothing was contracted about the repayment of the principal. 

95 
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motivated by a sense of poetic justice, of paying inflated debts in 

inflated paper, but in doing so they lost sight of the broader hard 

money goal.1J9 This program confused the party struggles of the postCivil War period, but ultimately it is safe to say that the Democrats had 

a far greater proportion of congressmen devoted to hard money and 

to resumption than did the Republicans. Thus, Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch's "Loan Bill" of March 1866, which provided for 

contraction of greenbacks in preparation for resumption of specie payments, was passed in the House by a Republican vote of 56-52, and a 

Democratic vote of 27-1. And in April 1874, the "Inflation Bill," admittedly vetoed later by President Grant, which provided for expansion 

of greenbacks and of national bank notes, was passed in the House by 

a Republican vote of 105 to 64, while the Democrats voted against by 

the narrow margin of 35 to 37. 140 

In the meantime, despite repeated resolutions for resumption of 

specie payments in 1865 and 1869, the dominant Republican Party 

continued to do nothing for actual resumption. The Pendleton Plan 

was adopted by the Democrats in their 1868 platform, and the Republican victory in the presidential race that year was generally taken as a 

conclusive defeat for that idea. Finally, however, the Democratic sweep 

in the congressional elections of 1874 forced the Republicans into a 

semblance of unity on monetary matters, and, in the lame-duck 

congressional session led by Sen. John Shennan, they came up with 

the Resumption Act of January 1875. 

Despite the fact that the Resumption Act ultimately resulted in specie 

resumption, it was not considered a hard-money victory by contemporaries. Shennan had forged a compromise between hard and soft 

money forces. It is true that the U.S. government was supposed to buy 

gold with government bonds to prepare for resumption on January 1, 

1879. But this resumption was four years off, and Congress had expressed 

intent to resume several times before. And in the meantime, the softmoney men were appeased by the fact that the bill immediately eliminated the $300 million limit on national bank notes, in a provision 

known as "free banking." The only hard-money compensation was an 

80 percent pro-rata contraction of greenbacks to partially offset any new 

!"Similar motivations had impeDed many hard-money anti-Federalists during the 1780s 

to advocate the issue of state paper money for the sole pw:pose of redeeming swoDen 

wartime public debts. 

""On the McCulloch Loan Bill, see Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, p. 75; on the 

Inflation Bill, see Unger, Greenback Em, p. 410. 

96 
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national bank notes.141 The bulk of the opposition to the Resumption 

Act was by hard-money congressmen, who, in addition to pointing 

out its biased ambiguities, charged that the contracted greenbacks could 

be reissued instead of retired. Hard-money forces throughout the country had an equally scornful view of the Resumption Act. In a few years, 

however, they rallied as resumption drew near. 

That the Republicans were generally less than enthusiastic about 

specie resumption was revealed by the Grant administration's reaction 

to the Supreme Court's decision in the first legal tender case. After the 

end of the war, the question of the constitutionality of legal tender 

came before the courts (we have seen that the California and Oregon 

courts decided irredeemable paper to be unconstitutional). In the large 

number of state court decisions on greenbacks before 1870, every 

Republican judge but one upheld their constitutionality, whereas every 

Democratic judge but two declared them unconstitutional. 142 

The greenback question reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1867, 

and was decided in February 1870, in the case of Hepburn v. Griswold. 

The Court held, by a vote of 5 to 3, with all the Democratic judges 

voting with the majority and the Republicans in the minority. Chief 

Justice Salmon P. Chase, who delivered the decision denouncing his 

own action as Secretary of the Treasury as unnecessary and unconstitutional, had swung back to the Democratic Party and had actually 

been a candidate for the presidential nomination at the 1868 convention. 

The Grant administration was upset by Hepburn v. Griswold, as were 

the railroads, who had accumulated a heavy long-term debt, which 

would now be payable in more valuable gold. As luck would have it, 

however, there were two vacancies on the' Court, one of which was 

created by the retirement of one of the majority judges. Grant appointed 

not only two Republican judges, but two railroad lawyers whose views 

on the subject were already known. l43 The new 54 majority dutifully 

141This political and compromise interpretation of the Resumption Act sucoessfully 

revises the previous hard-money view of this measure. See Unger, Greenbo1ck Era, pp. 249-

263. 

14>See Charles Fairman, "Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court and 

the Legal Tender Cases," Harvard lAw Review (May 1941), p.1131;dtedin Unger, Greenbo1ck 

Era, p. 174. 

l~he first new justice, William Strong of Pennsylvania, had been a top attorney for the 

Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, and a director of the Lebanon Valley Railroad. The 

second jurist, Joseph P. Bradley, was a director of the Camden and Amboy Railroad and 

of the Morris and Essex Railroad, in New Jersey. On the railroad ties of Strong and 

Bradley, see Philip H. Burch, Jr., Elites in American Histary, Vol. II, The Civil War to the N(IIJ 

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and quickly reconsidered the question, and, in May 1871, reversed the 

previous Court in the fateful decision of Knox v. Lee. From then on, 

paper money would be held consonant with the U.S. Constitution. 

The National Banking System was ensconced after the Civil War. 

The number of banks, national bank notes, and deposits all pyramided 

upward, and after 1870 state banks began to boom as deposit-creating 

institutions. With lower requirements and fewer restrictions than the 

national banks, they could pyramid on top of national banks. The 

number of national banks increased from 1,294 in 1865 to 1,968 in 1873, 

while the number of state banks rose from 349 to 1,330 in the same 

period. Total state and national bank notes and deposits rose from $835 

million in 1865 to $1.964 billion in 1873, an increase of 135.2 percent or 

an increase of 16.9 percent per year. The following year, the supply of 

bank money leveled off as the Panic of 1873 struck and caused numerous bankruptcies. 

As a general overview of the national banking period, we can agree 

with Klein that 'The financial panics of 1873,1884,1893, and 1907 were 

in large part an outgrowth of ... reserve pyramiding and excessive 

deposit creation by reserve city and central reserve city banks. These 

panics were triggered by the currency drains that took place in periods 

of relative prosperity when banks were loaned Up.'fl44 And yet it must 

be pointed out that the total money supply, even merely the supply of 

bank money, did not decrease after the Panic, but merely leveled off. 

Orthodox economic historians have long complained about the "Great 

Depression" that is supposed to have struck the United States in the 

Panic of 1873 and lasted for an unprecedented six years in 1879. Much 

of this stagnation is supposed to have been caused by a monetary 

contraction leading to the resumption of specie payments in 1879. Yet 

what sort of "depression" is it which saw an extraordinarily large 

expansion of industry, of railroads, of physical output, of net national 

product, or real per capita income? As Friedman and Schwartz admit, 

the decade 1869 to 1879 saw a 3.0 percent per annum increase in money 

national product, an outstanding real national product growth of 6.8 

percent per year in this period, and a phenomenal rise of 4.5 percent 

per year in real product per capita. Even the alleged "monetary conDeal (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981), pp. 44-45. On the reaction of the Grant administration, see Unger, Greenback Era, pp. 172-178. For a legal analysis of the decisions, see 

Hepburn, History of Currency, pp. ~264; and Henry Mark Holzer, ed., Government's 

Money Monopoly {New York: Books in Focus, 1981), pp. 99-168. 

'''Klein, Money and the Economy, pp. 145-146. 

98 
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traction" never took place, the money supply increasing by 2.7 percent 

per year in this period. From 1873-1878, before another spurt of monetary expansion, the total supply of bank money rose from $1.964 billion 

to $2.221 billion-a rise of 13.1 percent or 2.6 percent per year. In short, 

a modest but definite rise, and scarcely a contraction. 

It should be clear, then, that the Great Depression of the 1870s is 

merely a myth-a myth brought about by the misinterpretation of the 

fact that prices in general fell sharply during the entire period. Indeed 

they fell from the end of the Civil War until 1879. Friedman and Schwartz 

estimated that prices in general fell from 1869 to 1879 by 3.8 percent 

per annum. Unfortunately, most historians and economists are conditioned to believe that steadily and sharply falling prices must result 

in depression: hence their amazement at the obvious prosperity and 

economic growth during this era. For they have overlooked the fact 

that in the natural course of events, when government and the banking 

system do not increase the money supply very rapidly, free-market 

capitalism will result in an increase of production and economic growth 

so great as to swamp the increase of money supply. Prices will faU, and 

the consequences will be not depression or stagnation, but prosperity 

(since costs are falling, too) economic growth, and the spread of the 

increased living standard to all the consumers. 145 

Indeed, recent research has discovered that the analogous "Great 

Depression" in England in this period was also a myth, and due to a 

confusion between a contraction of prices and its alleged inevitable 

effect on a depression of prices and its alleged inevitable effect on a 

depression of business activity. ItO 

It might well be that the major effect of the Panic of 1873 was, not to 

initiate a Great Depression, but to cause bankruptcies in overinflated 

banks and in railroads riding on the tide of vast government subSidy 

and bank speculation. In particular, we may note Jay Cooke, one of 

the creators of the National Banking System and paladin of the public 

debt. In 1866, he favored contraction of the greenbacks and early 

resumption because he feared that inflation would destroy the value 

of government bonds. By the late 1860s, however, the House of Cooke 

was expanding everywhere, and in particular, had gotten control of 

l"For the bemusement of Friedman and Schwartz, see Milton Friedman and Anna 

Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (New York: National 

Bureau of Economic Research, 1%3), pp. 33--44. On totals of bank money, see Historical 

Statistics, pp. 62W25. 

''"S.B. Saul, The Myth of the Greal Depression, 1873-1896 (London: Macmillan, 1969). 
133 


75727.088

the new Northern Pacific Railroad. Northern Pacific had been the recipient of the biggest federal largesse to railroads during the 186Os: a land 

grant of no less than 47 million acres. 

Cooke sold Northern Pacific bonds as he had learned to sell government securities: hiring pamphleteers to write propaganda about the 

alleged Mediterranean climate of the Northwest. Many leading government officials and politicians were on the CookelNorthern Pacific 

payroll, including President Grant's private secretary, Gen. Horace 

Porter. 

In 1869, Cooke expressed his monetary philosophy in keeping with 

his enlarged sphere of activity: "Why," he asked, "should this Grand 

and Glorious Country be stunted and dwarfed-its activities chilled 

and its very life blood curdled by these miserable 'hard coin' theoriesthe musty theories of a bygone age-These men who are urging on 

premature resumption know nothing of the great and growing west 

which would grow twice as fast if it was not cramped for the means 

necessary to build railroads and improve farms and convey the produce 

to market." But in 1873, a remarkable example of poetic justice struck 

Jay Cooke. The overbuilt Northern Pacific was crumbling, and a Cooke 

government bond operation provided a failure. So the mighty House 

of Cooke-"stunted and dwarfed" by the market economy-crashed 

and went bankrupt, touching off the Panic of 1873. 147 

After passing the Resumption Act in 1875, the Republicans finally 

stumbled their way into resumption in 1879, fully 14 years after the 

end of the Civil War. The money supply did not contract in the late 

1870s because the Republicans did not have the will to contract in order 

to pave the way for resumption. Resumption was finally achieved after 

substantial sales of U.S. bonds for gold in Europe by Secretary of the 

Treasury Sherman. 

Return to the gold standard in 1879 was almost blocked, in the last 

three years before resumption, by the emergence of a tremendous 

agitation, heavily in the West but also throughout the country, for the 

free coinage of silver. The United States mint ratios had been undervaluing silver since 1834, and in 1853 de facto gold monometallism was 

established because silver was so far undervalued as to drive fractional 

silver coins out of the country. Since 1853, the United States, while de 

jure on a bimetallic standard at 16:1, with the silver dollar still technically in circulation though nonexistent, was actually on a gold mono-

''''Unger, Greenback Era, pp. 46-47, 221. 

100 
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metallic standard with lightweight subsidiary silver coins for fractional 

use. 

In 1872, it became apparent to a few knowledgeable men at the U.S. 

Treasury that silver, which had held at about 15.5 to 1 since the early 

186Os, was about to suffer a huge decline in value. The major reason 

was the realization that European nations were shifting from a silver 

to a gold standard, thereby decreasing their demand for silver. A 

subsidiary reason was the discovery of silver mines in Nevada and 

other states in the West. Working rapidly, these Treasury men, along 

with Sen. Sherman, slipped through Congress in February 1873 a seemingly innocuous bill which in effect discontinued the minting of any 

further silver dollars. This was followed by an act of June 1874, which 

completed the demonetization of silver by ending the legal tender 

quality of all silver dollars above the sum of $5. The timing was perfect, 

since it was in 1874 that the market value of silver fell to greater than 

16:1 to gold for the first time. From then on, the market price of silver 

fell steadily, declining to nearly 18:1 in 1876, over 18:1 in 1879, and 

reaching the phenomenal level of 32:1 in 1894. 

In short, after 1874 silver was no longer undervalued but overvalued, 

and increasingly so, in terms of gold, at 16:1. Except for the acts of 1873 

and 1874, labeled by the pro-silver forces as "The Crime of 1873," silver 

would have flowed into the United States, and the country would have 

been once again on a de facto monometallic silver standard. The champions of greenbacks, the champions of inflation, saw a "hard-money" 

way to increase greatly the amount of American currency: the remonetization of a flood of new overvalued silver. The agitation was to 

remonetize silver by "the free and unlimited coinage of silver at 16 to 

1." 

It should be recognized that the silverites had a case. The demonetization of silver was a "crime" in the sense that it was done shiftily, 

deceptively, by men who knew that they wanted to demonetize silver 

before it was too late and have silver replace gold. The case for gold 

over silver was a strong one, particularly in an era of rapidly falling 

value of silver, but it should have been made openly and honestly. The 

furtive method of demonetizing silver, the "crime against silver," was 

in part responsible for the vehemence of the silver agitation for the 

remainder of the century.l48 

"aFor the best discussion of the aime against silver, see Allen Weinstein, Prelude to 

Pupulism: Origins of the Silver lsSlU!, 1867-1878 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 

pp. ~2. Also see Paul M. O'Leary, 'The Scene of the Crime of 1873 Revisited: A Note," 

Journal of Politiall Ecooomy 68 (1960): 388-392. 

101 
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Ultimately, the administration was able to secure the resumption of 

payments in gold, but at the expense of submitting to the Bland-Allison 

Act of 1878, which mandated that the Treasury purchase $2-$4 million 

of silver per month from then on. 

lt should be noted that this first silver agitation of the late 1870s, at 

least, cannot be considered an "agrarian" or a particularly Southern 

and Western movement. The silver agitation was broadly based 

throughout the nation, except in New England, and was, moreover, 

an urban movement. As Weinstein points out: 

Silver began as an urban movement, furthermore, not an agrarian 

crusade. Its original strongholds were the large towns and cities of 

the Midwest and middle Atlantic states, not the country's farming 

communities. The first batch of bimetallist leaders were a loosely knit 

collection of hard money newspaper editors, businessmen, academic 

reformers, bankers, and commercial groups. , .. 

With the passage of the Silver Purchase Act of 1878, silver agitation 

died out in America, to spring out again in the 18905. 

The Gold Standard Era with the National Banking System, 

1879-1913 

The record of 1879-1896 is very similar to the first stage of the alleged 

Great Depression from 1873 to 1879. Once again, we have a phenomenal expansion of American industry, production, and real output per 

head. Real reprodUcible, tangible wealth per capita rose at the decadel 

peak in American history in the 1880s, at 3.8 percent per annum. Real 

net national product rose at the rate of 3.7 percent per year from 1879 

to 1897, while per capita net national product increased by 1.5 percent 

per year. 

Once again, orthodox economic historians are bewildered, for there 

should have been a Great Depression, since prices fell at a rate of over 

1 percent per year in this period. Just as in the previous period, the 

money supply grew, but not fast enough to overcome the great increase 

in productivity and the supply of products. The major difference in the 

two periods is that money supply rose more rapidly from 1879-1897, 

by 6 percent per year, compared with the 2.7 percent per year in the 

earlier era. As a result, prices fell by less, by over 1 percent per annum 

as contrasted to 3.8 percent. Total bank money, notes and deposits, 

rose from $2.45 billion to $6.06 billion in this period, a rise of 10.45 

149Weinstein, Prelude to Populism, p. 356. 

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percent per annum-surely enough to satisfy all but the most ardent 

inflationists. ISO 

For those who persist in associating a gold standard with deflation, 

it should be pointed out that price deflation in the gold standard 1879-

1897 period was considerably less than price deflation from 1873 to 

1879, when the United States was still on a fiat greenback standard. 

After specie resumption occurred successfully in 1879, the gold premium to greenbacks fell to par and the appreciated greenback promoted 

confidence in the gold-backed dollar. More foreigners willing to hold 

dollars meant an inflow of gold into the United States and greater 

American exports. Some historians have attributed the boom of 1879-

1882, culminating in a financial crisis in the latter year, to the inflow of 

gold coin in the U.S., which rose from $110.5 million in 1879 to $358.3 

million in 1882. 151 In a sense this is true, but the boom would never 

have taken on considerable proportions without the pyramiding of the 

national banking system, the deposits of which increased from $2.149 

billion in 1879 to $2.777 billion in 1882, a rise of 29.2 percent, or 9.7 

percent per annum. Wholesale prices were driven up from 90 in 1879 

to 108 three years later, a 22.5 percent increase, before resuming their 

long-run downward path. 

A financial panic in 1884, coming during a mild contraction after 

1882, lowered the supply of bank money in 1884. Total bank notes and 

deposits dropped slightly, from $3.19 billion in 1883 to $3.15 billion the 

following year. The panic was triggered by an overflow of gold abroad, 

as foreigners began to lose confidence in the willingness of the United 

States to remain on the gold standard. This understandable loss of 

confidence resulted from the inflationary sop to the pro-silver forces in 

the Bland-Allison Silver Purchase Act of 1878. The shift in Treasury 

balances from gold to silver struck a disquieting note in foreign financial 

circles. 152 

Before examining the critical decade of the 189Os, it is well to point 

out in some detail the excellent record of the first decade after the return 

to gold, 1879-1889. 

America went off the gold standard in 1861 and remained off after 

the war's end. Arguments between hard-money advocates who wanted 

to eliminate unbacked greenbacks and soft-money men who wanted 

""Friedman and Schwartz, Mone/ilry History, pp. 91-93; Historical Statistics, p. 625. 

"'Friedman and Schwartz, Mone/ilry History, pp. 98-99. 

I5'See Rendigs Fels, American Business Cycle, 1865-1897 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University 

of North Carolina Press, 1959), pp. 130--131. 

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to increase them raged through the 1870s until the Grant administration 

decided in 1875 to resume redemption of paper dollars into gold at prewar value on the first day of 1879. At the time (1875) greenbacks were 

trading at a discount of roughly 17 percent against the pre-war gold 

dollar. A combination of outright paper-money deflation and increase 

in official gold holdings enabled a return to gold four years later, which 

set the scene for a decade of tremendous economic growth. 

Economic recordkeeping a century ago was not nearly as well developed as today, but a clear picture comes through nonetheless. The 

Encyclopedia of American Economic History calls the period under review 

"one of the most expansive in American history. Capital investment 

was high; ... there was little unemployment; and the real costs of production declined rapidly." 

Prices, Wages, and Real Wages 

This is shown most graphically with a look at wages and prices during 

the decade before and after convertibility. While prices fell during the 

1870s and 1880s, wages fell only during the greenback period, and rose 

from 1879 to 1889. 

Wholesale Price Index 

(1910-1914=100) 

Year Index % change 

1869 151 

1879 90 -40.4% 

1889 81 10.0% 

Consumer Price Index 

1869 138 

1879 97 -28.8% 

1889 93 - 4.2% 

Wages 

(1900-1914= 100) 

Urban Labor Farm Labor Combined 

1869 77 96 87 

1879 61 61 61 

1889 72 78 75 

These figures tell a remarkable story. Both consumer prices and 

nominal wages fell about 30 percent during the last decade of green104 
138 


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backs. But from 1879-1889, while prices kept falling, wages rose 23 

percent. So real wages, after taking inflation-or the lack of it-into 

effect, soared. 

No decade before or since produced such a sustainable rise in real 

wages. Two possible exceptions are the period from 1909-1919 (when 

the index rose from 99 to 140) and 1929-1939 (134-194). But during the 

first decade real wages plummeted the next year-to 129 in 1920, and 

did not reach 1919's level until 1934. And during the 1930s real wages 

also soared, for those fortunate enough to have jobs. 

In any event, the contrast to this past decade is astonishing. And 

while there are many reasons why real wages increase, three necessary 

conditions must be present. Foremost, an absence of sustained inflation. This contributes to the second condition, a rise in savings and 

capital formation. 

People will not save if they believe their money will be worth less in 

the future. Finally, technological advancement is obviously important. 

But it is not enough. The 1970s saw this third factor present, but the 

absence of the first two caused real wages to fall. 

Interest Rates 

Sidney Homer writes in his monumental History of Interest Rates, 2000 

B.c. to the Present that "during the last two decades of the nineteenth 

century (1880-1900), long-term bond yields in the United States declined 

almost steadily. The nation entered its fIrst period of low long-term 

interest rates" finally experiencing the 3-3% long-term rates which had 

characterized Holland in the 17th century and Britain in the 18th and 

19th: in short, the economic giants of their day. 

To gauge long-term rates of the day, it is best not to use the longterm government bonds we would use today as a measure. The National 

Banking Acts of 1863-1864 stipulated that these bonds had to be used 

to secure bank notes. This created such a demand for them that, as 

Homer says, "by the mid 1870's [it] put government bond prices up to 

levels where their yields were far below acceptable rates of long-term 

interest." But the Commerce Department tracks the unadjusted index 

of yields of American railroad bonds. We list the yields for 1878, the 

year before gold, 1879, and 1889. 

Railroad Bond Yields 

1878 6.45% 

1879 5.98% 

1889 4.43% 

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We stress that with consumer prices about 7 percent lower in 1889 

than they had been the decade before, the real rate of return by decade's 

end was well into double-digit range, a bonanza for savers and lenders. 

Short-term rates during the last century were considerably more 

skittish than long-term rates. But even here the decennial averages of 

annual averages of both three-to six-month commercial paper rates and 

(overnight) call money during the 1880s declined from what it had been 

the previous decades: 

1870-1879 

1880-1889 

A Burst in Productivity 

Commercial 

Paper 

6.46% 

5.14% 

Call 

Money 

5.73% 

3.98% 

By some measures the 1880s was the most productive decade in our 

history. In their A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, Professors Friedman and Schwartz quote R.W. Goldsmith on the subject: 

"'The highest decadal rate [of growth of real reproducible, tangible 

wealth per head from 1805 to 1950) for periods of about ten years was 

apparently reached in the eighties with approximately 3.8%.' " The 

statistics give proof to this outpouring of new wealth. 

Gross National Product 

Decade average 1869-78 

" 1879-88 

1889-98 

(1958 prices) 

Total 

(billions of dollars) 

$23.1 

$42.4 

$49.1 

Per capita 

(in dollars) 

$531 

$774 

$795 

This dollar growth was occuring, remember, in the face of general price 

declines. 

Gross Domestic Product 

(1929 prices in billions of dollars) 

1869-1878 $11.6 (average per year) 

1879-1888 $21.2 (average per year) 

Gross domestic product almost doubled from the decade before, a far 

larger percentage jump decade-on-decade than any time since. 

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Labor Productivity 

Manufacturing Output Per Man-Hour 

(1958=100) 

1869 14.7 

1879 16.2 

1889 20.5 

The 26.5 percent increase here ranks among the best in our history. 

Labor productivity reflects increased capital investment. 

Capital Formation 

From 1869 to 1879 the total number of business establishments barely 

rose, but the next decade saw a 39.4 percent increase. Nor surprisingly, 

a decade of falling prices, rising real income, and lucrative interest 

returns made for tremendous capital investment, insuring future gains 

in productivity. 

Purchase of Structures and Equipment 

(total, in 1958 prices, in billions of dollars) 

1870 $ .4 

1880 $ .4 

1890 $2.0 

This massive 500 percent decade-on-decade increase has never since 

been even closely rivalled. It stands in particular contrast to the virtual 

stagnation witnessed by the 1970s. 

Private and Public Capital Formation 

(total gross, in billions, 1929 prices) 

Average 1872-1876 $2.6 

II 1877-1881 $3.7 

" 1882-1886 $4.5 

" 1887-1891 $5.9 

These five-year averages are not as "clean" as some other figures, 

but still show a rough doubling of total capital formation from the '70s 

to the 'BOs. 

It has repeatedly been alleged that the late 19th century, the "golden 

age of the gold standard" in the United States, was a period especially 

107 
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harmful to farmers. The facts, however, tell a different story. While 

manufacturing in the 1880s grew more rapidly than did agriculture 

("The Census of 1890," report Friedman and Schwartz, "was the first 

in which the net value added by manufacturing exceeded the value of 

agricultural output"), farmers had an excellent decade. 

Number of Farms 

(in thousands) 

1880 4,009 

1890 4,565 

Farm Land 

(in millions of acres) 

1880 536,182 

1890 623,219 

Farm Productivity 

(persons supplied by farm worker) 

1880 5.1 

1890 5.6 

Value of Farm Gross Output and Product 

(1910-1914 dollars, in millions) 

1880 $4,129 

1890 $4,990 

So farms, farmland, productivity, and production all increased in the 

1880s, even while commodities prices were falling. And as we see 

below, farm wage rates, even in nominal terms, rose during this time. 

Farm Wage Rates 

(per month, with board and room, in 1879, 1889 dollars) 

1879 or 1880 $11.50 

1889 or 1890 $13.50 

This phenomenal economic growth during the decade immediately 

after the return to gold convertibility cannot be attributed solely to the 

gold standard. Indeed all during this time there was never a completely 

free-market monetary system. The National Banking Acts of 1863-1864 

had semicartellized the banking system. 

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Only certain banks could issue money, but all other banks had to 

have accounts at these. The financial panics throughout the late 19th 

century were a result of the arbitrary credit-creation powers of the 

banking system. While not as harmful as today's inflation mechanism, 

it was still a stonn in an otherwise fairly healthy economic climate. 

The fateful decade of the 1890s saw the return of the agitation for 

free silver, which had lain donn ant for a decade. The Republican Party 

intensified its longtime flirtation with inflation, by passing the Shennan 

Silver Purchase Act of 1890, which :roughly doubled the Treasury purchase requirement of silver. The Treasury was not mandated to buy 

4.5 million ounces of silver per month. Furthennore, payment was to 

be made in a new issue of redeemable greenback currency, Treasury 

Notes of 1890, which were to be a full legal tender, redeemable in either 

gold or silver at the discretion of the Treasury. Not only was this an 

increased commitment to silver, it was a significant step on the road to 

bimetallism which-at the depreciated market rates-would mean 

inflationary silver monometallism. In the same year, the Republicans 

passed the high McI<in1ey Tariff Act of 1890, which reaffinned their 

commitment to high tariffs and soft money. 

Another unsettling inflationary move made in the same year was 

that the New York Subtreasury altered its longstanding practice of 

settling its clearing house balances in gold coin. Instead, in August 

1890, it began using the old greenbacks and the new Treasury notes of 

1890. As a result, these paper currencies largely replaced gold paid in 

customs receipts in New York. l53 

Uneasiness about the shift from gold to silver and the continuing 

free-silver agitation caused foreigners to lose further confidence in the 

U.S. gold standard, and to cause a drop in <;apital imports and severe 

gold outflows from the country. This loss of confidence exerted contractionist pressure on the American economy and reduced potential 

economic growth during the early 1890s. 

Fears about the American gold standard were intensified in March 

1891, when the Treasury suddenly imposed a stiff fee on the export of 

gold bars taken from its vaults so that most gold exported from then 

on was American gold coin rather than bars. A shock went through 

the financial community, in the U.S. and abroad, when the United 

States Senate passed a free-silver coinage bill in July 1892; the fact that 

the bill went no further was not enough to restore confidence in the 

gold standard. Banks began to insert clauses in loans and mortgages 

''''See Friedman and Schwartz, Mond:ilry History, pp. 106, l06n. 

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requiring payment in gold coin; clearly the dollar was no longer trusted. 

Gold exports intensified in 1892, the Treasury's gold reserve declined, 

and a run ensued on the U.s. Treasury. In February 1893, the Treasury 

persuaded New York banks, which had drawn down $6 million on 

gold from the Treasury by presenting treasury notes for redemption, 

to return the gold and reMacquire the paper. This act of desperation was 

scarcely calculated to restore confidence in the paper dollar. The Treasury was paying the price for specie resumption without bothering to 

contract the paper notes in circulation. The gold standard was therefore 

inherently shaky, resting only on public confidence, and that was 

giving way under the silver agitation and under desperate acts by the 

Treasury. 

Poor Grover Cleveland, a hard-money Democrat, assumed the Presidency in the middle of this monetary crisis. Two months later, the 

stock market collapsed, and a month afterwards, in June 1893, distrust 

of the fractional-reserve banks led to massive bank runs and bank 

failures throughout the country. Once again, however, many banks, 

national and state, especially in the West and South, were allowed to 

suspend specie payments. The Panic of 1893 was on. In a few months, 

Eastern bank suspension occurred, beginning with New York City. The 

total money supply-gOld coin, treasury paper, national bank notes, 

and national and state bank deposits-fell by 6.3 percent in one year, 

from June 1892 to June 1893. Suspension of specie payments resulted 

in deposits-which were no longer immediately redeemable in cashgoing to a discount in relation to currency during the month of August. 

As a result, deposits became less useful, and the public tried its best to 

intensify its exchange of deposits for currency. 

By the end of 1893, the panic was over as foreign confidence rose 

with the Cleveland administration's successful repeal of the Sherman 

Silver Purchase Act in November of that year. Further silver agitation 

of 1895 endangered the Treasury's gold reserve, but heroic acts of the 

Treasury, including buying gold from a syndicate of bankers headed 

by J. P. Morgan and August Belmont, restored confidence in the continuance of the gold standard. 154 The victory of the free-silver Bryanite 

forces at the 1896 Democratic convention caused further problems for 

gold, but the victory of the pro-gold Republicans put an end to the 

problem of domestic and foreign confidence in the gold standard. 

"'On silver agitation, the gold reserves, and the Panic of ]893, see Friedman and 

Schwartz, Monetary History, pp. 1~133, 705. 

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1896: The Transformation of the American Party System 

Orthodox economic historians attribute the triumph of William Jennings Bryan in the Democratic Convention of 1896, and his later renominations for President, as a righteous rising up of the "people" demanding inflation over the "interests" holding out for gold. Friedman and 

Schwartz attribute the rise of Bryanism to the price contraction of the 

last three decades of the 19th century, and the triumph of gold and 

disappearance of the "money" issue to the price rise after 1896.155 

This conventional analysis overlooks several problems. First, if Bryan 

represented the "people" versus the "interests," why did Bryan lose 

and lose soundly, not once but three times? Why did gold triumph 

long before any price inflation became obvious, in fact at the depths of 

price contraction in 1896? 

But the main neglect of the conventional analysis is the disregard of 

the highly illuminating insights provided in the past 15 years by the 

"new political history" of 19th-century American politics and its political culture. The new political history began by going beyond national 

political issues (largely economic) and investigating state and local 

political contests. l56 It also dug into the actual voting records of individual parishes, wards, and counties, and discovered how people voted 

and why they voted the way they did. The work of the new political 

history is truly interdisciplinary, for its methods range from sophisticated techniques for voting analysis to illuminating insights into American ethnic religious history. 

In the following pages, we shall present a summary of the findings 

of the new political history on the American party structure of the late 

19th century and after, and on the transformation of 1896 in particular. 

First, the history of American political parties is one of successive 

"party systems." Each "party system" lasts several decades, with each 

"'Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, pp. 113--119. 

156'fhe locus classicus of the new political history in late 19th-century politics is Paul 

Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A S0ciJ2I Analysis Of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900 (New 

York: The Free Press, 1970). Also see other writings of the prolific K1eppner, especially 

his magnum opus, The Third Electoral System, 1853-1892: Parties, Voters, and Political Cultures 

(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 1979). On the late 19th century, see also 

Richard J. Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1896 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). On the OviJ War period and earlier, see the 

works of Ronald Formisano, Joel Sibley, and William Shade. For Eastern confumation on 

the Kleppner and Jensen findings on the Middle West, see Samuel T. McSeveney, The 

Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893-1896 (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1972). 

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particular party having a certain central character; in many cases, the 

name of the party can remain the same but its essential character can 

drastically change-in the so-called "critical elections." In the 19th 

century the second party system (Whigs v. Democrats), lasting from 

about 1832 to 1854, was succeeded by the third party system (Republicans v. Democrats), lasting from 1854 to 18%. 

Characteristic of both party systems was that each party was com· 

mitted to a distinctive ideology clashing with the other, and these 

conflicting worldviews made for fierce and close contests. Elections 

were particularly hard fought. Interest was high since the parties offered 

a "choice not an echo," and so the turnout rate was remarkably high, 

often reaching 80 to 90 percent of eligible voters. More remarkably I 

candidates did not, as we are used to in the 20th century, fuzz their 

ideology during campaigns in order to appeal to a floating, ideologically 

indifferent, "independent voter." There were very few independent 

voters. The way to win elections, therefore, was to bring out your vote, 

and the way to do that was to intensify and strengthen your ideology 

during campaigns. Any fuzzing over would lead the Republican or 

Democratic constituents to stay home in disgust, and the election would 

be lost. Very rarely would there be a crossover to the other, hated party. 

One problem that strikes anyone interested in 19th-century political 

history is: How come the average person exhibited such great and 

intense interest in such arcane economic topics as banking, gold and 

silver, and tariffs? Thousands of half-literate people wrote embattled 

tracts on these topics, and voters were intensely interested. Attributing 

the answer to inflation or depression, to seemingly evident economic 

interests, as do Marxists and other economic determinists, simply won't 

do. The far greater depressions and inflations of the 20th century have 

not educed nearly as much mass interest in economics as did the milder 

economic crises of the past century. 

Only the findings of the new political historians have cleared up this 

puzzle. It turns out that the mass of the public was not necessarily 

interested in what the elites, or national politicians, were talking about. 

The most intense and direct interest of the voters was applied to local 

and state issues, and on these local levels the two parties waged an 

intense and furious political struggle that lasted from the 1830s to the 

189Os. 

The beginning of this century-long struggle began with the profound 

transformation of American Protestantism in the 1830s. This transformation swept like wildfire across the Northern states, particularly Yankee territory, during the 1830s, leaving the South virtually untouched. 

112 
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The transformation found particular root among Yankee culture, with 

its aggressive and domineering spirit. IS? 

This new Protestantism-called "pietist" -was born in the fires of 

Charles Finney and the great revival movement of the 183Os. Its credo 

was roughly as follows: Each individual is responsible for his own 

salvation, and it must come in an emotional moment of being "born 

again." Each person can achieve salvation; each person must do his 

best to save everyone else. This compulsion to save others was more 

than simple missionary work; it meant that one would go to hell unless 

he did his best to save others. But since each person is alone and facing 

the temptation to sin, this role can only be done by the use of the State. 

The role of the State is to stamp out sin and create a new Jerusalem on Earth. 158,159 

The pietists defined sin very broadly. In particular, the most important politically was "Demon rum," which clouded men's minds and 

therefore robbed them of their theological free will. In the 1830s, the 

evangelical pietists launched a determined and indefatigable prohibitionist crusade on the state and local level which lasted a century. 

Second was any activity on Sunday except going to church, which led 

to a drive for Sabbatarian blue laws. Drinking on Sunday was of course 

a double sin, and hence particularly heinous. Another vital thrust of 

the new Yankee pietism was to try to extirpate Roman Catholicism, 

which robs communicants of their theological free win by subjecting 

them to the dictates of priests who are agents of the Vatican. H Roman 

Catholics could not be prohibited per 5e, their immigration could be 

slowed down or stopped. And since their adults were irrevocably 

steeped in sin, it became vital for crusading pietists to try to establish 

public schools as compulsory forces for Protestantizing society or, as 

the pietists liked to put it, to "Christianize the Catholics." If the adults 

15""Yankees" originated in rural New England and then emigrated westward in the 

early 19th century, settling in upstate (particularly western) New York, northern Ohio, 

northern Indiana, and northern lllinois. 

""'These pietists have been called "evangelical pietists" to contrast them with the new 

Southern pietists, called "salvational pietists," who did not include the compulsion to 

save everyone else in their doctrine. 

''''These pietists are distinguished from contemporary "fundamentalists" because the 

former were "post-millenialists" who believe that the world must be shaped up and 

Christianized for a millenium before Jesus will return. In contrast, contemporary fundamentalists are "pre-millenia Is" who believe that the Second Coming of Jesus will usher 

in the millenium. Obviously, if everyone must be shaped up before Jesus can return, there 

is a much greater incentive to wield State power to stamp out sin. 

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are hopeless, the children must be saved by the public school and 

compulsory attendance laws. 

Such was the political program of Yankee pietism. Not all immigrants 

were scorned. British, Norwegian, or other immigrants who belonged 

to pietist churches (whether nominally Calvinist or Lutheran or not) 

were welcomed as "true Americans." The Northern pietists found their 

home, almost to a man, first in the Whig Party, and then in the Republican Party. And they did so, too, among the Greenback and Populist 

parties, as we shall see further below. 

There came to this country during the century an increasing number 

of Catholic and Lutheran immigrants, especially from Ireland and Germany. The Catholics and High Lutherans, who have been called "ritualists" or "liturgicals," had a very different kind of religious culture. 

Each person is not responsible for his own salvation directly; if he is to 

be saved, he joins the church and obeys its liturgy and sacraments. In 

a profound sense, then, the church is responsible for one's salvation, 

and there is no need for the State to stamp out temptation. These 

churches, then, especially the Lutheran, had a laissez-faire attitude 

toward the State and morality. Furthermore, their definitions of "sin" 

were not nearly as broad as the pietists. Liquor is fine in moderation; 

drinking beer with the family in beer parlors on Sunday after church 

was a cherished German (Catholic and Lutheran) tradition; and parochial schools were vital in transmitting religious values to their children 

in a country where they were in a minority. 

Virtually to a man, Catholics and High Lutheransl60 found their home 

during the 19th century in the Democratic Party. It is no wonder that 

the Republicans gloried in calling themselves throughout this p'eriod 

"the party of great moral ideas," while the Democrats declared themselves to be "the party of personal liberty." For nearly a century, the 

bemused liturgical Democrats fought a defensive struggle against people whom they considered "pietist-fanatics" constantly swooping down 

trying to outlaw their liquor, their Sunday beer parlors, and their 

parochial schools. 

How did all this relate to the economic issues of the day? Simply that 

the leaders of each party went to their voting constituents and "raised 

their consciousness" to get them vitally interested in national economic 

""'Lutherans, then as now, were split into many different synods, some highly liturgical, 

others highly pietist, and still others in between. Paul Kleppner has shown a one-te-one 

correlation between the degree of liturgicalness and the percentage of Democratic Party 

votes among the different synods. 

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questions. Thus, the Republican leaders would go to their rank-andflle and say: "Just as we need Big Paternalistic Government on the local 

and state level to stamp out sin and compel morality, so we need Big 

Government on the national level to increase everyone's purchasing 

power through inflation, keeping out cheap foreign goods (tariffs), or 

keeping out cheap foreign labor (immigration restrictions)." 

And for their part, the Democratic leaders would go to their constituents and say: "Just as the Republican fanatics are trying to take away 

your liquor, your beer parlors, and your parochial schools, so the same 

people are trying to keep out cheap foreign goods (tariffs), and trying 

to destroy the value of your savings through inflation. Paternalistic 

government on the federal level is just as evil as it is at home." 

So statism and libertarianism were expanded to other issues and 

other levels. Each side infused its economic issues with a moral fervor 

and passion stemming from their deeply held religious values. The 

mystery of the passionate interest of Americans in economic issues in 

the epoch is solved. 

Both in the second party and third party systems, however, the 

Whigs and then the Republicans had a grave problem. Partly because 

of demographics-greater immigration and higher birth rates-the 

DemocraticJliturgicals were slowly but surely becoming the majority 

party in the country. The Democrats were split asunder by the slavery 

question in the 1840s and '50s. But now, by 1890, the Republicans saw 

the handwriting on the wall. The Democratic victory in the congressional races in 1890, followed by the unprecedented landslide victory 

of Grover Cleveland carrying both houses of Congress in 1892, indicated 

to the Republicans that they were becoming doomed to be a permanent 

minority. 

To remedy the problem, the Republicans, in the early 1890s, led by 

Ohio Republicans William McKinley and Marc Hanna, launched a 

shrewd campaign of reconstruction. In particular, in state after state, 

they ditched the prohibitionists, who were becoming an embarrassment and losing the Republicans large numbers of German Lutheran 

votes. Also, they modified their hostility to immigration. By the mid1890s, the Republicans had moved rapidly toward the center, toward 

fuzzing over their political pietism. 

In the meanwhile, an upheaval was beginning to occur in the Democratic Party. The South, by now a one-party Democratic region, was 

having its own pietism transformed by the 1890s. Quiet pietists were 

now becoming evangelical, and Southern Protestant organizations began 

to call for prohibition. Then the new, sparsely settled Mountain states, 

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many of them with silver mines, were also largely pietist. Moreover, a 

power vacuum, which would ordinarily have been temporary, had 

been created in the national Democratic Party. Poor Grover Cleveland, 

a hard-money laissez-faire Democrat, was blamed for the Panic of 1893, 

and many leading Cleveland Democrats lost their gubernatorial and 

senatorial posts in the 1894 elections. The Cleveland Democrats were 

temporarily weak, and the Southern-Mountain coalition was ready to 

hand. Seizing his opportunity, William Jennings Bryan and his pietist 

coalition seized control of the Democratic Party at the momentous 

convention of 1896. The Democratic Party was never to be the same 

again. 161 

The Catholics, Lutherans, and the laissez-faire Cleveland Democrats 

were in mortal shock. The "party of our fathers" was lost. The Republicans, who had been moderating their stance anyway, saw the opportunity of a lifetime. At the Republican convention, Rep. Henry Cabot 

Lodge, representing the Morgans and the pro-gold standard Boston 

financial interests, told McKinley and Hanna: Pledge yourself to the 

gold standard-the basic Cleveland economic issue-and drop your 

silverite and greenback tendencies, and we will all back you. Refuse, 

and we will support Bryan or a third party. McKinley struck the deal, 

and from then on, the Republicans, in 19th-century terms, were a 

centrist party. Their principles were now high tariffs and the gold 

standard, and prohibition was quietly forgotten. 

What would the poor liturgicals do? Many of them stayed home in 

droves, and indeed the election of 1896 marks the beginning of the 

great slide downward in voter turnout rates that continues to the 

present day. Some of them, in anguish at the pietist, inflationist, and 

prohibitionist Bryanites, actually conquered their anguish and voted 

Republican for the first time in their lives. The Republicans, after all, 

had dropped the hated prohibitionists and adopted gold. 

The election of 1896 inaugurated the fourth party system in America. 

From a third party system of closely fought, seesawing races between 

a pietististatist Republican vs. a liturgicalllibertarian Democratic Party, 

the fourth party system consisted of a majority centrist Republican 

party as against a minority pietist Democratic party. After a few years, 

the Democrats lost their pietist nature, and they too became a centrist, 

though usually minority party, with a moderately statist ideology scarcely 

16IGrover Oeveland himself, of course, was neither a Roman Catholic nor a Lutheran. 

But he was a Calvinist Presbyterian who detested the takeover of the Presbyterian Church 

by the pietists. 

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distinguishable from the Republicans. So the fourth party system went 

until 1932. 

A charming anecdote, told us by Richard Jensen, sums up much of 

the 18% election. The heavily German city of Milwaukee had been 

mainly Democratic for years. The German Lutherans and Catholics in 

America were devoted, in particular, to the gold standard and were 

bitter enemies of inflation. The Democratic nomination for Congress in 

Milwaukee had been obtained by a Populist-Democrat, Richard Schilling. Sounding for all the world like modem monetarists or Keynesians, 

Schilling tried to explain to the assembled Germans of Milwaukee in a 

campaign speech that it didn't really matter what commodity was 

chosen as money, that "gold, silver, copper, paper, sauerkraut or 

sausages" would do equally well as money. At that point, the German 

masses of Milwaukee laughed Schilling off the stage, and the shrewdly 

opportunistic Republicans adopted as their campaign slogan "Schilling 

and Sauerkraut" and swept Milwaukee. l6Z 

The Greenbackers and later the pro-silver, inflatiOnist, Bryanite Populist 

Party were not "agrarian parties"; they were collections of pietists 

aiming to stamp out personal and political sin. Thus, as Kleppner points 

out, "The Greenback Party was less an amalgamation of economic 

pressure groups than an ad hoc coalition of 'True Believers,' 'ideologues,' who launched their party as a 'quasi-religious' movement that 

bore the indelible hallmark of 'a transfiguring faith.'" The Greenbackers 

perceived their movement as the "religion of the Master in motion 

among men." And the Populists described their 1890 free-silver contest 

in Kansas not as a "political campaign," but as "a religious revival, a 

crusade, a pentecost of politics in which a tongue of flame sat upon 

every man, and each spake as the spirit gave him utterance .... " The 

people had "heard the word and could preach the gospel of Populism." 

It was no accident, we see now, that the Greenbackers almost invariably 

endorsed prohibition, compulsory public schooling, and crushing of 

parochial schools. Or that Populists in many states "declared unequivocally for prohibition" or entered various forms of fusion with the 

Prohibition Party. 163 

The Transformation of 1896 and the death of the third party system 

meant the end of America's great laissez-faire, hard-money libertarian 

1~ intense was the German-American devotion to gold and hard money that even 

German communist-anarchist Johann Most, leader of a movement that sought the abolition of money itseU, actually came out for the gold standard during the 1896 campaign! 

See Jensen, Winning of the Midwest, pp. 293-295. 

l"'I<Jeppner, Third Electoral System, pp. 291-296. 

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party. The Democratic Party was no longer the party of Jefferson, 

Jackson, and Cleveland. With no further political embodiment for laissez-faire in existence, and with both parties offering an echo not a 

choice, public interest in politics steadily declined. A power vacuum 

was left in American politics for the new corporate statist ideology of 

progressivism, which swept both parties (and created a short-lived 

Progressive Party) in America after 1900. The Progressive Era of 1900-

1918 fastened a welfare-warfare state on America which has set the 

mold for the rest of the 20th century. Statism arrived after 1900 not 

because of inflation or deflation, but because a unique set of conditions 

had destroyed the Democrats as a laissez-faire party and left a power 

vacuum for the triumph of the new ideology of compulsory cartellization through a partnership of big government, business, unions, technocrats, and intellectuals. 

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III. Money and Banking in the United 

Sta tes in the 20th Century 

After 1896 and 1900, then, America entered a progressive and predominantly Republican era. Compulsory cartellization in the name of 

"progressivism" began to invade every aspect of American economic 

life. The railroads had begun the parade with the formation of the ICC 

in the 1880s, but now field after field was being centralized and cartellized in the narne of "efficiency," "stability," "progress," and the general welfare. Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson were each in his 

way progressives, and each advanced the cause of cartellization, with 

the process culminating in the Presidency of Woodrow Wilson. In 

particular, various big business groups, led by the J. P. Morgan interests 

often gathered in the National Civic Federation and other think tanks 

and pressure organizations, saw that the voluntary cartels and the 

industrial merger movements of the late 1890s had failed to achieve 

monopoly prices in industry. Therefore, they decided to tum to governments, state and federal, to curb the winds of cornpetition and to 

establish forms of cornpulsory cartels, in the name, of course, of "curbing big business rnonopoly" and advancing the general welfare. 1 

America's bankers had long chafed to cartellize the banking industry 

still further. The National Banking System was a long step forward, 

from their point of view, but it was still only quasi-centralized. Bank 

credit and money pyramided on top of New York (and after 1887, also 

Chicago and St. Louis) banks. But this system was, to use a universally 

adopted terrn, "inelastic" -that is, it could not assure the pumping in 

of more money during contractions or runs on banks. "Inelastic" was 

a code word for not enough assured inflation of the money supply.2 

The growing consensus, then, was to redirect the banking system by 

establishing, at long last, a central bank. The central bank would have 

lSee in particular, Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph a/Conseroatism: A Reinterpretlltion of American History, 1900-1916 (Glencoe, III.: The Free Press, 1963.) While in less harsh a form. 

variants of this interpretation have now swept the field in Progressive Era historiography. 

Thus, see the works of Samuel Hays. James Weinstein. Arthur Ekrich. Louis Galambos. 

William Graebner, Jordan Schwarz, Ellis Hawley, Joan Hoff Wilson, and many olhers. 

'National banks also had a particular form of "inelasticity." Their issue of notes was 

limited by their deposit of government bonds at the Treasury. Yet government bonds 

were generally 40 percent over par, which imposed a penalty on further issue. See Robert 

Craig West, Banking Reform and the Federal Reserve. 1863-1923. (Ithaca: Cornell University 

Press, 1977). 

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an absolute monopoly of the note issue, and reserve requirements 

would then ensure a multilayered pyramiding on top of these central 

bank notes, which could bail out banks in trouble, and, moreover, 

could inflate the currency in a smooth, controlled, and uniform manner 

throughout the nation. 

In addition to this chronic problem, the large banks, particularly on 

Wall Street, saw financial control slipping away from them. The state 

banks and other non-national banks began to grow instead and outstrip 

the nationals. Thus, while in the 1870s and the 1880s, most banks were 

national, by 1896 non-national banks comprised 61 percent of the total 

number of banks, and by 1913, 71 percent. By 1896, these non-national 

banks had 54 percent of the total banking resources of the country, and 

57 percent in 1913. The inclusion of Chicago and St. Louis as central 

reserve city banks after 1887 diluted Wall Street's power. With Wall 

Street no longer able to cope, it was time to tum to the United States 

government to do the centralizing, cartellizing, and controlling instead.3 

It often takes a crisis to focus one's mind, and it takes a financial 

crisis or notable event to move men to institutional reform. The Civil 

War was the previous occasion for overhaul of the nation's money and 

banking system. The Panic of 1907 provided the spark for a return to 

central banking. 

The Republicans fulfilled their promise, and, in March 1900, finally 

placed the United States officially on a monometallic gold standard. All 

paper was to be redeemable in gold, and silver continued as a subsidiary 

metal. 

An unusual increase in gold production from discoveries in Soutp. 

Africa and Alaska doubled the world's gold stock from 1890 to 1914, 

causing a rise of U.S. prices of nearly 50 percent from 1897 to 1914, or 

two and one-half percent per year. Until after World War II, this was 

the largest sustained rise in prices in peacetime, but still the rise only 

returned to approximately 1882 levels. In the United States, the gold 

supply rose at a rate of seven and one-half percent per year in this 

period. But despite this impact, the bulk of the increase in the supply 

of money in the period came from bank deposits pyramiding on top of 

the increase in gold. Thus, from June 18% to June 1914, total bank 

deposits rose from $3.43 billion to $14.32 billion, or an increase of 317.5 

percent or an annual rise of 17.6 percent-a substantially greater percentage than the seven and one-half percent per year increase of the 

gold stock. Once again, fractional reserve banking under the National 

"See Kolko, Triumph, p. 140. 

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75727.109

Banking System was far more to blame for price rises than international 

movements in gold. 

There were several mini-panics, averted or stopped by infusions of 

Treasury money, after 1900; but the Panic of 1907 frightened the banks 

into calling for a new central banking system. Wall Street and the 

Morgans could not save the New York banks themselves. There was 

general speculation of specie payment throughout the country, and 

premiums of currency over deposits. Again, the Treasury was called 

upon to intervene. The Wall Street banks now knew that they could 

not cope, and federal government cartellization and support for fractional reserve banking would be necessary.4 

All banks, and both parties, now agreed on some form of central 

banking, and the rest of the story is jockeying for minor advantage. 

The Wilson administration finally established central banking with the 

creation of the Federal Reserve System in 19B-the symbolic end of 

the Jacksonian hard-money heritage in the Democratic Party. From 

1913 until 1933, the United States would be formally under a gold 

standard, but actually governed by a Federal Reserve System designed 

to inflate uniformly and bail out banks in trouble. The banking systems 

would now be pyramiding on the U.S. issue of paper money. 

By establishing the Federal Reserve System, the federal government 

changed the base of the banking pyramid to the Federal Reserve Banks. 

Only the Federal Reserve could now print cash, and all member banks 

could now multiply their deposits on top of Federal Reserve deposits. 

All national banks were required to join the Federal Reserve, and their 

gold and other lawful money reserves had to be transferred to the 

Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve, in turn, could pyramid its deposits by three-to-one on top of gold. This centralization created an enormous potential for inflationary expansion of bank deposits. Not only 

that, reserve requirements for the nation'tbanks were deliberately cut 

in half in the course of establishing the Federal Reserve Sys tern, thereby 

inviting the rapid doubling of the money supply. Average reserve 

requirements for all banks prior to the Federal Reserve Act is estimated 

to be 21 percent. In the original Act of 1913, these were cut to 11.6 

percent and three years later to 9.8 percent. It is clear then that the 

Federal Reserve was designed from the very beginning to be an instrument for a uniform and coordinated inflation of bank money.s 

'See Kolko, Triumph, pp. 153-158; Friedman and Schwartz, Monehlry History, pp. 156ft 

'See the illuminating discussion in C. A. Phillips, T. F. McManus, and R. W. Nelson, 

Banking and the Business Cycle (New York: Macmillan, 1937), pp. ~29. 

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Indeed, total bank deposits were $14.0 billion at the beginning of the 

Federal Reserve System in January 1914; after six years, in January 

1920, total bank deposits had reached $29.4 billion, an enonnous increase 

of 110 percent or 18.3 percent per year. The creation of the Federal 

Reserve had made that expansion possible. 

The Gold-Exchange Standard 

Faced with a global inflation of unprecedented volume and destruction both during World War I and immediately after it, the world 

attempted to restore monetary stability. But while most officials wanted 

gold to re-appear as the monetary anchor, they also wanted to be able 

to keep inflating. Put another way, they wanted to have their cake and 

eat it too. 

Preeminent victims of this delusion were the British; with a burgeoning welfare state in the early 1920s, and especially with rigid wage 

rates, it was difficult politically to end inflation. Further, Britain wanted 

to return to gold, but for reasons of national "prestige" she wanted to 

go back at the pre-war, pre-inflation rate of $4.86 per pound. In effect, 

she wanted to pretend that the inflation had never happened. There 

was only one way Britain could get away with enthroning an artificially 

overvalued pound: by making other countries play along. Other nations 

had to be persuaded (or forced) into either likewise returning to gold 

at an unrealistic rate or inflating their monies so as not to cripple 

Britain's exports (also priced artificially high). 

Britain accomplished this at the Genoa Conference of 1922. Emerging 

from that first post-war economic meeting was not a gold standard, 

but a more slippery "gold-exchange" standard. Here's how it worked: 

Only the United States stayed on the old gold-COin standard, where 

anyone could present notes totalling $20.67 to the Treasury and receive 

an ounce of gold in return. But Britain began redeeming pounds not 

just in gold, but in Federal Reserve notes or dollars. Further, the other 

nations began predominantly using British pounds as their backing. 

And importantly, when they did pay gold they only paid in large 

bullion bars, not coins, so the average citizen was not able to redeem 

his currency. The Genoa Accord made the pound as well as the dollar 

as good as gold, even though sterling was not in fact a sound currency. 

Britain now printed its "gold" with American support-the U.S. agreed 

to inflate enough to keep Britain's reserves of dollars or gold from 

flowing to America. 

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This inflationary charade was played to buttress Britain's fading 

dreams as an imperialist world power. But also involved was the rise 

of the new doctrines of John Maynard Keynes, who by the early 1920s 

had become a foe of the "barbarous relic" gold and extolled instead the 

alleged virtues of a politically managed paper currency. That these 

ideas became so influential so fast in London banking circles was due 

in no small part to the catastrophic loss suffered during World War I 

of truly the fmest minds of a generation. These would have normally 

become leaders during the 1920s. This left a gap which affected Britain 

as it did few other countries. For at the risk of broad-brush painting, 

the British are a people that have always put more stock in practical 

knowledge than the more philosophical French or Germans. But pragmatism depends less on book knowledge than on skills handed down 

orally. The annihilation of a generation thus created a gap in the continuity of knowledge those more bookish nations escaped. So as one 

contemporary observer of London financial circles perceptively explained, 

by the mid-1920s, there would be few remaining grandfathers who 

remembered the virtues of sound money. And there would be their 

grandsons "miseducated by Keynes." Between them was a gap, which 

created such "a barrier in ideas that it was not easy for tradition and 

practical knowledge to pass."6 

American Inflation 1922-28 

With the "discovery" of open-market operations around 1922, the 

Federal Reserve thought it had found a way to smooth out business 

cycles. In practice, it caused a substantial six-year bank credit inflation 

by buying securities on the open market and printing the money to 

pay for them. This money-bank reserves-was pyramided severalfold by means of the fractional reserve banking system. This policy of 

stabilizing the price level was deliberately engineered by the leader of 

the Federal Reserve System, Benjamin Strong, to follow the protomonetarist theory of Yale economist Irving Fisher. 

The 1920s are not often seen as an inflationary period because prices 

did not rise. But the money supply can rise even without prices rising 

in absolute tenos. The 1920s saw such a burst of American technological 

advancement and cheaper ways of producing things that the natural 

tendency was for prices to fall (i.e., more goods chasing the same 

number of dollars). But the inflation caused prices to rise relative to 

'Benjamin Anderson, Economics lind the Public Wei/Me (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), 

p.174. 

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what they would have done. So a "stable" price level was masking the 

fact that inflation was going on and creating distortions throughout the 

economy. 

Between mid-1922 and April 1928, bank credit expanded by over 

twice as much as it did to help finance World War 1. As with all 

inflations, this caused speculative excess; in this case, new money 

poured into the stock market and real estate. The cooling of this speculative fever in 1928 by officials who tightened the money supply 

because they were finally afraid of the overheated economy led to the 

Depression, which in turn led to the world's abandonment of the gold 

standard. We would do well to examine this period closer. 

Bailing Out Britain 

Britain during this time used her power to treat the pound like gold, 

as one might expect, keeping interest rates artificially low and inflating 

recklessly, thus piling up billions of pounds at the Bank of France, 

which finally began asking for gold. Panicked, the Bank of England in 

mid-I927 induced the New York Federal Reserve Bank to lower its 

interest rates and step up open-market purchases of securities, thus 

fueling inflation further. (This move to make unnecessary the payment 

of British gold obligations to France and to keep England inflating by 

causing America to inflate was disguised as "helping the fanner." It 

was the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank which first lowered its 

discount rate, the others following.) 

A major reason for the inflationary pro-British policies of the 1920s 

was the close personal connection fonned between Benjamin Strong, 

the dominant leader of the Federal Reserve System, and Montagu 

Norman, head of the Bank of England. In several secret conferences 

with Norman, unknown to the rest of the Federal Reserve or the 

American government, Strong agreed to inflate money and credit in 

order to bailout England. The ties between Norman and Strong were 

not only personal; both were intimately allied with the House of Morgan. Before he became the first leader of the Federal Reserve, Strong 

was head of the Morgan-created Bankers Trust Company in New York. 

He was urged to accept the post by his two closest personal friends, 

Henry P. Davison and Dwight Morrow, both partners at the Morgan 

Bank. The Morgan connection with Britain was very close; J. P. Morgan 

and Company was the fiscal agent for the Bank of England and underwrote the massive sale of British bonds in the United States during 

World War I. Montagu Norman himself had close personal connections 

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with the United States investment banks and had worked in the offices 

of Brown Brothers in New York. Only the death of Strong in 1928 ended 

the inflationary Federal Reserve policy designed to help Britain. 

By April of 1928, the new Governors of both the Federal Reserve 

Board and the New York Federal Reserve Bank, made an effort to hold 

down bank credit expansion. But those efforts were stymied by following two conflicting goals. Federal Reserve officials wanted both to 

reduce credit going into stock market speculation yet at the same time 

not to tighten money either at home or abroad (this latter for fear of 

pulling gold out of Britain). 

And while the anti-inflationist policy predominated, it is not easy to 

reduce inflation in an economy grown accustomed to it, which by 1928 

America had. Further, 1928 was a presidential election year, with great 

pressure to inflate. It therefore took about a year before the money 

supply was under control. But as the tables below show, the long 

money-supply inflation was over by the end of 1928. At mid-1929 

money-supply growth was creeping at an annual rate of only 0.7 percent, a marked deceleration from previous years. The depression caused 

by years of inflation was about to begin, and with it would come the 

end of the American gold standard. 

Total Money Supply of the United States, 1921-29 

(in billions of dollars) 

Total Money Percent Annual Change 

Date Supply From Previous 

1921-June 30 45.30 

I922-June 30 47.16 4.1 

1923-June 30 51.79 9.8 

1923-Dec.31 53.06 4.9 

1924-June 30 54.67 6.1 

1924-Dec.31 57.85 11.6 

1925--June 30 59.86 7.1 

1925-Dec. 31 62.59 9.2 

1926-June 30 63.62 3.3 

1926-Dec.31 64.96 4.2 

1927-June 30 66.91 6.0 

1927-Dec. 31 69.61 8.1 

I92S-June 30 71.12 4.4 

1925-Dec. 31 73.00 5.2 

1929-June 30 73.26 0.7 

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Federal Reserve Bank Credit, 1914-1934 

($ millions) 

Reserve bank credit outstanding 

Through purchase 

Total loans of 

End of Year and securities bills and securities 

1914 11 0 

1915 84 40 

1916 222 184 

1917 1060 395 

1918 2291 526 

1919 3090 874 

1920 3235 547 

1921 1524 379 

1922 1326 708 

1923 1211 489 

1924 1249 927 

1925 1395 749 

1926 1335 696 

1927 1591 1009 

1928 1783 717 

1929 1548 903 

1930 1352 1093 

1931 1825 1156 

1932 2128 1888 

1933 2670 2570 

1934 2457 2436 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial 

Times to 1957, series X 245-254 (1961), p. 642. 

The International Crisis: 1931 

The stock market collapse in late 1929 was only a harbinger of things 

to come. It was not until 1931 that international bank collapses caused 

abandonment of gold. The first to go was Austria. 

Kredit-Anstalt, Austria's largest bank, supported by the Austrian 

government, had for years been making bad loans on a meager reserve 

base. Austria had been part of the "sterling bloc," buttressed by Britain-a development resented by France, heavy with gold claims on 

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Britain. The formation of an Austrian customs union with Germany in 

late March 1931 was feared by France, who saw it as a step to political 

union. The French central bank now insisted upon immediate repayment of her short-term debts from Austria and Germany. Austrian 

banks clearly could not meet their liabilities, and in late May, KreditAnstalt went bankrupt, taking Austria off the gold standard. A run on 

German banks now started. That country had been quickly affected by 

the tightened American credit conditions in mid-1928 and was quite 

vulnerable. Runs continued, and even though President Hoover declared 

on June 20 a moratorium on German debt, France was not immediately 

inclined to go along. She delayed too long; and on July 15 Germany 

declared national bankruptcy by going off the gold standard. 

It must be said that both these nations fought desperately to maintain 

gold redemption, and when the end came, each regarded the act with 

shame. Not so with Britain. The country that had caused the others to 

inflate for her and did more than any other to bring on the crisis went 

off the gold standard without a fight. 

As runs on British gold increased through the summer, Britain refused 

to defend the pound by raising interest rates. Instead, as gold flowed 

out of the banks, the Bank of England created new money to replenish 

the banks' reserves. The Bank of France cooperated loyally and didn't 

present many claims. The French bank held sterling claims worth fully 

seven times its capital, and thus feared for a Britain off the gold standard. Indeed, France joined America in offering massive loans to Britain. But the Bank of England didn't even take full advantage of these 

credit lines, and two days after assuring the Netherlands Bank (with 

all its capital in sterling) that England would not go off the gold standard, that is exactly what happened. The announcement was made on 

September 20, 1931, thus capping 17 years of gradual monetary disintegration. 

Britain had for centuries been the world's premier fmandal power, 

so that announcement left the world stunned. Moreover, other governments had been deliberately deceived. The capita] of the central 

banks of France and Holland had been made worthless in one day. 

Governments could no longer trust each other's fmancial promises, 

and the stage was set for perhaps the most treacherous decade in 

international economic relations, a decade from which we have not yet 

recovered. As Chase economist and contemporary eyewitness Benjamin Anderson recalled, "An immense world asset was destroyed when 

the Bank of England and the British government broke faith with the 

world. Years later after we in the United States had also broken faith 

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with the world, the head of the national bank of one of the Scandinavian 

countries said, 'I have lost money in sterling. I have lost money in 

dollars. I have never lost money by holding gold."'? 

America Breaks Faith 

If sterling was not good, the world asked itself, what was? It looked 

nervously at America, and had presented claims for $728 million of our 

gold by the end of October 1931. But Americans thought any such fears 

were silly. After all, we had continued to pay gold to foreigners even 

in the crisis of 1895, with a low point of only $41 million of gold in the 

Treasury. Alone among belligerents, we had not gone off gold in World 

War I, although we had stopped the export of gold. Certainly few 

Americans cashed in notes for gold in late 1931. They may have doubted 

the solvency of some banks, but few if any doubted the good faith of 

the American government's promise to redeem notes for gold. The 

platforms of both parties in 1932 contained vows that the gold standard 

would be maintained. The Democratic platform was largely written by 

Sen. Carter Glass of Virginia and Cordell Hull, later secretary of state. 

As events proved, both these men were sincere. 

The first sign of shakiness in the American position was a foolish 

and false statement by President Hoover one month before the November election. He charged that the Federal Reserve had been within two 

weeks of going off the gold standard earlier that year. The statement 

was soon proved untrue, but it aroused doubts for the first time in 

people's minds. 

These grew into rumors beginning in late December that Presidentelect Roosevelt was going to take the country off the gold standard. 

Roosevelt would not deny them, and American hoarding of gold started 

for the flrst time on a grand scale. 

The feelings of disquietude were made worse by a paralyzed government. The new President was not to take offlce until March 4 (the old 

Inauguration date) and a lame-duck Congress had many members due 

to retire. In the cabinet departments, anyone whose job was not protected by civil-service rules was preparing to fmd a new job in the midst 

of a terrible depreSSion. 

Runs on banks by depositors anxious to get cash, and runs on the 

Federal Reserve Banks by cash holders eager to turn their paper into 

gold, accelerated. It should not have come as a surprise when on 

February 14 Michigan became the first state to declare a bank "holiday," 

'Anderson, Economics and the Public Welfare, p. 254. 

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i.e., to close the banks to depositors. Michigan had been the home of 

some of the more reckless lending by banks during the boom. Nine 

days later Indiana followed, and then a score of states in a cluster. Late 

on the night of March 3, the big New York banks reluctantly agreed to 

close; though they were not in trouble, smaller upstate banks were. 

Roosevelt became President the next day with almost every bank in 

America closed. He kept them all closed until March 13, when the 

Federal Reserve banks opened, with others a day or two later. The 

public, assuaged by FOR's promise that the reopened banks would be 

good, poured both gold and cash back into the banks. But on March 9 

Congress passed, at Roosevelt's request, a bill "to provide relief in the 

existing national emergency in banking, and other purposes." It gave 

him the power to do all he pleased regarding money and banking, 

including authority to seize the American people's gold coins, bullion, 

and gold certificates. 

America Off the Gold Standard 

Within a month this power was used. On April 5, it became illegal 

to own or hold any form of monetary gold, either coins, bullion, or 

certificates. (Industrial users of gold were not affected.) The banking 

aisis had been brought on by past inflation. But that crisis, ironically, 

was made the excuse to abandon the gold standard. 

At first, it was stressed that these measures were temporary, only to 

be used as long as the aisis lasted. But on May 12 a law was passed 

(the Thomas Amendment to the Agriculture Adjustment Act) which 

gave the President the ability to increase vastly the money supply and 

to reduce by up to half the weight of gold dollar. Democratic Senator 

Glass called it "dishonor .... This great government, strong in gold, 

is breaking its promises to pay gold to widows and orphans to whom 

it has sold government bonds with a pledge to pay gold coin of the 

present standard value. It is breaking its promise to redeem its paper 

money in gold coin of the present standard of value. It's dishonor, 

sir."8 Another Democratic Senator, Thomas Gore of Oklahoma, was 

asked by the President for his opinion about another law (signed on 

June 5) abolishing the gold clause in all past debt obligations: "Why, 

that's just plain stealing, isn't it, Mr. President?" Later in Senate debate, 

Gore also added that "Henry Vill approached total depravity but the 

vilest thing he ever did was to debase the coin of the realm."9 

8Ibid., p. 315. 

"Ibid., p. 317. 

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One final step remained. Using the Gold Reserve Act of January 3D, 

1934, President Roosevelt arbitrarily reduced the weight of gold that 

would define each dollar. The "old" dollar had been defined as 25.8 

grains of gold, nine-tenths fine. The new devalued dollar would only 

be worth 1551z1 grains, nine-tenths fine. So even the act of abandoning 

gold was done with the implicit admission that the dollar was still 

defined in terms of it. 

The London Conference 

Just as he had taken America off gold, Roosevelt took steps to ensure 

that there would be no international return to gold. The Gold Bloc of 

remaining gold standard nations, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Holland, and Italy, had called the London Conference for June 1933 to 

persuade Great Britain and the United States that "gold should be 

reestablished as the international measure of exchange value"-and 

that non-gold countries should agree that their ultimate objective was 

to restore the gold standard. Even the official American delegation, 

which included Secretary of State Cordell Hull, approved this declaration, and all were shocked when Roosevelt's reply rejected the proposals. Said he, "The sound internal economic system of a nation is a 

greater factor in its prosperity than the price of its currency in changing 

terms of other nations." He thus missed the point of a gold standard, 

which defines all currencies as an unchanging weight of gold. Incredibly, the President stated that the new order would mean currency 

stability: "Let me be frank in saying that the United States seeks the 

kind of dollar which a generation hence will have the same purchasing 

and debt-paying power as the dollar value we hope to maintain in the 

near future." Seven months later, the dollar was devalued by 40.9 

percent. And we of "a generation hence" know what has happened to 

the purchase power of the dollar. 

Gold Remains the World's Money 

Finding no support, all the remaining Gold Block countries stopped 

redeeming their paper for gold, Holland and Switzerland being the last 

in 1936. But gold was far from banished. The deteriorating European 

political situation after 1936 caused everyone from homeless Jews to 

central bankers to trust gold over any paper currency and to transfer 

gold to the United States, the safest haven. Further, the stabilization 

funds set up by governments to stabilize now floating currencies settled 

their differences in gold. Remembering British and American actions 

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to change arbitrarily the value of their currencies, no one would trust 

anything else. 

Nor was there reason to. Beggar-thy-neighborpolicies were the order 

of the day. International economic peace was shattered during the 1930s 

by economic nationalism, competitive devaluation, high tariffs, and 

exchange controls. Moreover, this poisoned atmosphere played its part 

in causing World War II. 

The Coming of Bretton Woods 

Try as they might, countries just before World War n were unable 

to carry on unsound currency and fiscal policies without seeing their 

currencies depreciate in terms of gold, their capital flee, or their credit 

markets crippled. The only pre-war exception was Nazi Germany, 

which achieved those goals at the cost of a complete and unprecedented 

economic regimentation. With the coming of war, other nations as well 

achieved far-reaching control over internal and foreign exchange. The 

end of war found government officials wishing they could retain those 

controls, which allowed them to inflate and run budget deficits as they 

pleased while still having access to easy credit, stable foreign exchange 

ra tes, and an absence of international "flight capital." 

This was the root idea behind the international monetary conference 

in mid-1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, which set up the 

monetary order that would break down 25 years later. For while the 

new Bretton Woods system was supposed to restore the currency 

stability of the gold standard, it was designed to do so without gold. 

The system placed its trust, not in the workings of the marketplace, 

but in the judicious restraint of the American government. It therefore 

contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction. 

The Rules of the Game 

While the dollar would be convertible into gold at $35 an ounce, it 

would be so only to foreigners, and after 1962 only to foreign governments. All other currencies were defined in terms of the dollar, which 

itself was defined as %5 of an ounce of gold. But the upshot of the 

arrangement gave America the power to have the dollar treated as 

gold. The Bretton Woods rules called for stable currency values: No 

currency was allowed to either rise or fall more than one percent. The 

Swiss franc, for example, was, at the time of the agreement (1944), 

fixed at 22.9 cents; it could go no lower than 22.7 cents and no higher 

than 23.1 cents. If the franc threatened to break these limits, the Swiss 

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central bank was obliged to enter the exchange market and either buy 

or sell francs to hold its currency within the narrOW margin. As the 

franc was usually bumping against the upper limits of this margin, 

Swiss authorities were usually selling francs and buying dollars. Most 

other governments were doing the same, especially those whose currencies were not inflating as much as the dollar was. But all of these 

nations were soothed with the promise that the dollar was indeed "as 

good as gold," and that any foreign holder of dollars, individual or 

government, could present American currency to the U.S. Treasury at 

any time to collect one ounce of gold for 35 of their paper dollars. Many, 

of course, took advantage of this opportunity. The U.S. government 

continued inflating the dollar, and our gold supply plummeted from a 

peak of 701 million ounces in 1949 to 2% million ounces in March 1968. 

No government in history had held the kind of power handed to the 

United States in 1944: having its paper money treated like gold. But 

this action overlooked the stark reality that paper is not gold, that gold 

cannot be printed wildly, as paper can. Another effect of the Bretton 

Woods regime was to subsidize American consumers at the expense of 

foreigners. For a long time, America prospered at the expense of her 

trading partners. For years, the dollar's value was artificially high, and 

therefor actually bought more than it should have been able to buy. 

This meant tha t foreign products were available to Americans at bargain 

prices. This left foreign consumers less to enjoy. Moreover, the foreigners had to pay more for their own goods, thanks to American 

"exporting" of inflation by, in effect, forcing foreign central banks to 

print more of their own currency to absorb the unwanted, overvalued 

dollars they accepted. 

Predictably, those nations who had managed their own monetary 

affairs most conservatively were the ones hardest hit by the American 

action. Switzerland, that paragon of monetary restraint, now madly 

printed francs to pay for all dollars shunned by Swiss commercial 

banks. Switzerland's money supply soared 22 percent in 1971 alone. 

(IrOnically, Switzerland had never signed the Bretton Woods agreement, but chose nevertheless to continue to adhere to the stricturesto its own great detriment-long after the system's founder and chief 

beneficiary, the United States, had broken its commitment.) Switzerland could not be expected to continue this suicidal policy forever; as 

we will see later, it was Swiss action which finally brought the injustice 

of the post-war system to an abrupt end. 

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The London Gold Pool 

Dollars flooded the world through the 195Os, and few worried about 

the gold reserves leaving the U.S. Treasury. But sometime in the early 

1960s the market price of gold threatened to rise above the official $35 

per ounce figure. For many years, the $35 figure was above the market 

price, making holding dollars attractive. In response to this rise in gold's 

price, the West's major central banks in 1961 established the London 

Gold Pool. With the U.S. in the lead, the banks agreed to sell gold 

whenever the price threatened to rise above $35. But this was successful 

only as long as world inflation fears abated. However, by the late 1 %Os 

the world had paused to assess the effects of a massive dollar inflation 

to pay for both the Great Society programs and the Vietnam War. The 

U.S. dollar had now clearly become overvalued, gold's price undervalued. 

Britain was the first major nation to violate the fixed-exchange regime 

by devaluing in November of 1967. This caused a massive flight into 

gold, the first of the post-war era. Billions of dollars were spent by 

central banks in the next four months trying to force the market gold 

price down. Finally in March, governments threw in the towel and 

gave up suppressing the market's wishes. 

The Approaching Crisis 

From March 1968 to August 1971, during the period of the "twotier" gold market, the political world pretended that the dollar was still 

convertible, and for most of that time, the monetary scene was placid. 

This was due in part to the moderate lessening of American inflation 

during the recession of 1969-1970. But after that brief respite, the 

printing presses again went into high gear; The results were predictable. By early 1971, astute financial observers began to sense the imminent collapse of the dollar. One of the signs they saw was the lowering 

of American interest rates compared with European ones. When any 

nation inflates, money usually becomes cheaper, if only in the beginning, and therefore easier to borrow. The interest rate charged by banks 

to borrowers of money declines, and the interest rate paid by banks to 

depositors of money also declines. Money then flows out of those lowinterest rate countries into countries where it can enjoy higher returns. 

Ouring the beginning months of 1971, the outflow of funds from New 

York to European money markets accelerated. This forced most European currencies hard against their upper ceiling. Because Germany in 

particular had maintained a very tight credit stance-a low inflation 

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rate-the mark was besieged with an unprecedented flood of buyers. 

Events now began to move swiftly. 

In early May, on the heels of a joint report by major Gennan economic 

institutes that the mark should be inflated or revalued upward, massive 

speculation hit that currency. Dollars poured into Germany and the 

Bundesbank was forced to buy them in mounting volume-more than 

$1 billion on May 3-4 and a further $1 billion during the first 40 minutes 

of trading on May 5. At that point, the German central bank gave up 

the struggle, withdrew from the market, and let the mark float. Neighboring countries, afraid of seeing now-homeless dollars careen across 

their own borders, were quick to join Germany. 

The following weekend the central banks of the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, and Austria likewise ceased support operations and 

set their currencies afloat. In the cases of Austria and Switzerland, 

revaluations of 5 to 7 percent were also realized. Not surprisingly, the 

newly-floated currencies continued appreciating, most of them rather 

sharply. There were rumblings inside the Nixon administration-espedally in the Treasury Department-that the gold "window" ought to 

be slammed unequivocally shut. 

It is important to realize that while other governments theoretically 

could redeem their dollars for gold, most handled the U.S. Treasury 

with kid gloves: Only a golden trickle left Washington. Some nations, 

such as Germany, did this because they were obliquely threatened with 

U.S. troop pullbacks, but there were others who sincerely believed that 

their sacrifices were going toward the maintenance of the world monetary order. 

As in any unnatural economic imbalance, speculators had jumped 

into the fray and began betting against the dollar. The reasons for their 

position were justified by every piece of economic news emerging from 

the United States by rnid-1971. Each monthly figure was worse than 

its predecessor; the nation had slipped into severe trade and payments 

deficits. But the allies were patient; only a relatively paltry $300 million 

in gold left the U.S. from January to early August 1971. Rumors spread 

among foreign central banks that the gold window was about to be 

shut. Rumblings from the Bank of England suggested that they were 

preparing to turn in dollars for gold in huge amounts. As Treasury 

Secretary Connally said (privately) at the time, "We're completely 

exposed. Anybody can topple us anytime they want to." 

On August 6, a congressional subcommittee report concluded that 

the dollar had become overvalued and called outright for an exchange 

rate realignment. That same day more than $1 billion in gold or other 

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reserve assets were drained from the Treasury, and over that next week 

almost $4 billion fled the country. 

During the week ending Friday, August 13, the U.S. Treasury borrowed almost $3 billion in foreign currency to try to halt the dollar's 

decline (by buying dollars with that currency). But it soon became 

obvious that the anti-dollar forces had too much strength. 

President Nixon responded by declaring international bankruptcy. 

In a televised address on Sunday, August 15,1971, he announced that 

no more gold would be given in exchange for dollars. There were now 

absolutely no checks on the ability of the United States to inflate. 

Nixon's speech to the world that night was a cunning attempt to lay 

the burden of guilt for this assault upon the shoulders of America's 

trading partners, who had maintained, Nixon astonishingly asserted, 

"unfair exchange rates." The cause of the problem had indeed been 

inequitable exchange rates, but not in the way that Nixon meant. The 

injustice of this statement is unsettling even 10 years after it was made. 

"Unfair" Japan 

It is interesting to trace the immediate reactions of one of those 

"unfair" partners, Japan. Unlike Western Europe, whose exchanges 

were closed when news of the announcement came, it was Monday 

morning in the Far East. Trading was already underway when Nixon 

stepped before the cameras. Paralyzed by the news, the Japanese nevertheless kept their foreign exchange market open-not only for the rest 

of the day, but for two weeks afterward. As the European markets had 

sensibly remained closed, Tokyo became the dumping ground for anyone who wanted to get rid of dollars. During those two weeks the Bank 

of Japan absorbed $4.5 billion. Finally, on August 28, they threw in the 

towel and joined the other currencies in floating. 

The European markets had remained closed, stunned and confused 

by the president's action. But they could not remain shut forever, and 

after efforts to decide upon a common course of action failed, they 

opened on August 23 on an uncoordinated basis. Even though they ?ll 

continued to adhere officially to their pre-August 15 parities witl) the 

dollar, virtually all of them stopped defending the upper limits of their 

exchange rates. 

In the months that followed, the spotlight turned on the United 

States as other nations waited for an American move. Their view was 

the understandable one that since the United States had thrown the 

monetary system out of kilter, it was up to America to make the fIrst 

move. 

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American officials finally revealed a plan whereby most other currencies would be revalued upward against the dollar; no mention at all 

was made of the United States devaluing its dollar by raising the official 

price of gold. This overture naturally struck America's trading partners 

as still one more affront. When the director of the IMF, Pierre-Paul 

Scheitzer, suggested that the United States might share in this realignment by a minor increase in the gold price, he was immediately moved 

onto the "most wanted" column of the Nixon administration's enemy 

list. But the Europeans were intransigent; the American plan made no 

headway. 

The "Greatest Agreement" 

Massive runs continued on the dollar, belying Nixon's August 15 

claim that a dollar cut from gold would "never again be subject to 

international speculation." By mid-December-four months later-the 

dollar had declined by 12.5 percent against the mark, 12.3 percent 

against the yen, and had even lost ground to the lire and the pound, 

falling by 5.4 percent and 4.1 percent respectively. The world monetary 

situation not only continued in disarray, it seemed to be getting worse. 

On December 18, 1971, the Smithsonian agreement was announced. 

For the first time in the post-war era, the dollar was devalued by raising 

the official gold price from $35 to $38 an ounce (8.6 percent). But gold 

convertibility was not restored, so the devaluation meant little. 

Nixon's aim was to recreate an international order with fixed exchange 

rates-but without gold. He referred to this as "the greatest monetary 

agreement in the history of the world," but it was clear that no system 

would break down faster than a system of fixed rates fixed to nothing, 

neither to gold nor to anything else. 

Nixon's "greatest monetary agreement" was smashed on the shoals 

of economic reality barely 14 months later, because the dollar and 

pound sterling continued to be drastically overvalued in terms of the 

other industrialized nations' currencies and, most importantly, in tenns 

of gold. The lack of confidence in the dollar sent gold prices soaring to 

$90 an ounce, almost tripling the formerly sacred $35 figure. There 

continued to be periodic flights from the dollar. 

Finally, on January 24, 1973, the Swiss government stopped supporting the dollar. Other governments quickly followed: They had all 

had enough. One month later, the entire ftxed-rate order collapsed. 

The actual story of how it happened would be a dreary repetition of 

the tales recounted about billions of unwanted dollars reluctantly bought; 

another frantic but fundamentally ineffective dollar devaluation in an 

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unsuccessful attempt to restore tranquility and, ultimately, a closure of 

the world exchange markets. When those markets reopened, they did 

so without fixed rates. And the absence of fixed rates meant, logically, 

de facto floating rates. Floating rates had not really been adopted; 

rather, fixed rates had been abandoned. 

Floating and Sinking 

Since 1973 we haven't had the former condition of "public crises" 

where inflationist governments would be forced to spend millions in 

the foreign exchange markets defending their currencies until finally 

giving up and devaluing their currencies. For all its messiness, that 

system at least called people's attention to the fact that offending governments were in effect publicly confessing their sins. What we have 

had since is rather a quiet but constant withering away of values of 

those currencies, which are inflated more than others, and a large drop 

in the value of all currencies in terms of gold. While the dollar-and 

even the Swiss franc-is not today what it was in 1973, an ounce of 

gold remains an ounce of gold. 

Even under the flawed Bretton Woods fixed rates, there were limits 

to how far governments could inflate. Granted, it took a quarter-century, but the United States eventually inflated to such a degree it lost 

too much gold. 

The floating rate system has given, however, complete control of the 

value of each currency to the respective governments. They need not 

worry about gold flowing into other central banks. There are thus no 

institutional limits to inflate, and it should come as no surprise that the 

past decade has seen a marked jumped in average annual world inflation. 

The only effect of internal inflation now is a drop in the currency 

exchange rate, a currency falling in value. But in each country there 

are special interests who desire just that. These include domestic businessmen who can't compete with the better-made or lower-cost products of other lands. If these inefficient firms' goods are priced in a 

currency becoming cheaper, consumers of stronger-currency countries 

can more easily buy those goods. But the reverse of this is that goods 

from those stronger currency countries, priced as they are in currencies 

rising in value, become more expensive for the consumers of the nation 

whose currency is falling. Their living standards thus fall as they are 

in effect forced to subsidize inefficient domestic producers. Also, gainers in a depreciating currency country are all export firms, inefficient 

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or otherwise. They can exert powerful pressure in favor of international 

inflation. 

But as one can guess, this system does not exactly promote international harmony. Temptations are great for the "competitive" devaluations which so upset world economic peace in the 1930s. As we enter 

the 1980s, unpleasant rumblings in favor of protectionism and high 

tariff barriers are being heard on a grand scale for the first time in half 

a century. The world economy is being pulled apart. It is no coincidence 

that world trade wars are threatened more now than at any time since 

the last regime of floating exchange rates, during the depression-ridden 

1930s. 

Islands of Calm in a Churning Sea 

There have been attempts to operate localized fixed rate systems 

amidst the generalized floating. Foremost among these attempts have 

been the two efforts of that most cohesive and interdependent group 

of countries, the European Common Market. 

Being linked by culture, geography, and the need for trade, they 

realize more than America does what havoc floating rates have wreaked, 

and it is a hopeful sign that these nations are more and more including 

gold in their dealings. 

The first of these stabilizing attempts was the Common Market 

"snake," so-called because all the currencies moving up or down within 

predetermined limits called to mind the undulations of a moving snake. 

Begun in 1972, it was over by 1976 simply because several different 

governments, each with its own inflation rate, from the start moved 

away from each other, flinging accusations of bad faith at each other 

while they did. 

Having more flexible limits, Western Europe tried again and in March 

1979 inaugurated the European Monetary System (EMS). While the 

EMS enables countries to revalue more easily, each time a member 

does, it strains the very cohesion the system was meant to foster. It 

was nonetheless successful during its first two and a half years of 

operation. Traditionally strong currencies like the German mark weakened while perpetually weak ones like the French franc and Italian lira 

were strong. 

There was therefore only one major realignment until October 1981. 

Since then, though, there have been two (the most recent on February 

21,1982) and signs point to European currencies falling back into their 

usual patterns. But while EMS is likely in for a hard time, in the 

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background of this latest attempt at monetary union has been a gradual 

but clear remonetization of gold, the only stable unifying force among 

currencies. 

Even before EMS's 1979 birth, both Italy and Portugal borrowed 

billions of dollars from other European nations and used as collateral 

part of their gold holdings. But in those cases in the mid-70s, the gold 

was valued at around 20 percent below the prevailing free-market price. 

With EMS's founding, things took a turn. In exchange for member 

gold deposits, nations received a new currency called the European 

Currency Unit (ECU). The hope is that one day ECU will be the European currency. This currency not only represents deposits in gold, but 

the gold is vcilued at the free-market rate. Further, under EMS rules, 

gold can act as a means of settlement between members. So gold now 

fulfills in the EMS two of three functions of money: It is both a reserve 

instrument and an instrument of payment. Gold only lacks the final 

prerequisite for money, a standard of value. This is so because current 

lMF rules (effective Aprill, 1978) forbid all reference to gold in defining 

currency values. This has led to the absurd situation where currency 

A is defined in terms of B, C, and D; B in terms of A, C, and D, and so 

on. Each currency is thus defined in terms of others which themselves 

depend for definition upon it. 

The market has not been fooled by any of this. It knows how to value 

currencies-in terms of gold. And that valuation has been since 1971 

embarrassing for every currency. One-tenth of an ounce of gold will 

today buy as many dollars as one ounce did 10 years ago. 

The market has delivered its verdict on the battle between gold and 

the dollar waged throughout the 1970s by the American govemment; 

first the 1971 suspension of any remaining convertibility, and then two 

devaluations in rapid succession. At the Jamaica Conference of 1976, 

the IMF approved the U.s. wish to demonetize gold by abolishing the 

official price and selling over 600 tons, one-sixth of all IMF holdings 

(returning another one-sixth to member nations). The U.S. Treasury 

itself announced in January 1978 that it would sell gold beginning that 

May. But all during the time of the sales (which totalled about 500 tons) 

gold's price rose. Finally realizing it was throwing away a precious 

resource, Treasury ceased its gold sales after November 1979. The 

Treasury thus implicitly backed up the enhanced roles which Europeans had given gold earlier that year. 

Indeed, as pointed out by Yves Laulan, chief economist of Societe 

Generale (one of France's largest banks), the U.S. Treasury, in an 

attempt to demonetize gold, authorized its sale to end circulation among 

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individual Americans. Paradoxically, that act caused people to value it 

even more. 

This subjective revaluation of gold has since spread to the Treasury, 

which now realizes that it holds far more gold reserves than any other 

country. Those who wish to reestablish American dominance in the 

world are not blind to the fact that gold is a powerful weapon. It is thus 

unlikely that Washington will wage last decade's war on gold again. 

Conclusion 

Our historical experience illustrates the overwhelmingly superior 

case for the gold standard as against any form of paper standard. There 

has never, in peacetime American history, been any sustained rate of 

inflation to match the inflation since 1941. The same, in fact, is true of 

wartime, which at least has never lasted more than a few years. And 

it is not an accident that the highest, most accelerated rate of inflation 

has taken place since 1971, when the United States went off the international aspects of the gold standard and went over completely to fiat 

paper. 

The same conclusion is true if we consider price stability. Even deflation has been more acute under the fiat standard than under gold, as 

happened in the fiat standard war of 1873-79 as contrasted to the gold 

standard period from 1879-18%. 

Bimetallism doesn't work either, as America learned painfully from 

a century's experience. Gresham's Law, driving out undervalued moneys, works there as it does whenever the government overvalues one 

money and undervalues another. The dollar must be defined once again 

as a fixed weight of gold, with coinage and paper dollars always 

redeemable one into another at that weight. Ideally, full-bodied silver 

would fluctuate freely alongside the gold dollar; short of that, fractional, 

subsidiary silver, as well as other metals such as copper, would circulate 

in minor capacity along with gold. 

The dollar must be redefined as a unit of weight of gold again, and 

gold coins should be encouraged to actually circulate among the public, 

to be used not simply as long-range investment but as a medium of 

exchange functioning as money. As Mises' "regression theorem" showed 

in 1912, new currency units cannot be imposed de novo from above, by 

politicians or economists.10 They must emerge out of the experience 

and the valuations of the public on the market. The public is now long 

"'See Ludwig Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit (Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: 

The Foundation for Economic Education, 1971). 

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used to the "dollar" as the money unit, and therefore the "gold gram" 

or "gold ounce" cannot be simply adopted by the public as a money 

out of the dear blue sky. The eventual adoption of a gold gram or gold 

ounce is basically a two-phase process: First, the "dollar," now of 

course the common currency unit, must be firmly and permanently 

tied to gold at a fixed weight; the public must become accustomed to 

this concept; and then finally, the currency unit can become that fixed 

weight directly. 

What weight we choose to define the dollar is a matter of convenience, since any initial definition is arbitrary, and we can pick the most 

useful one. This is no more "fixing the price of gold" and violating the 

free market than defining that two nickels as equal to one dime "fixes 

the prices" of these two entities, or any more than defining that one 

pound as equal to 16 ounces "fixes the price" of ounces and pounds. 

What the definition should he depends on the preferred use and what 

the remainder of the monetary and banking system will look like. 

Eventually, too, we must abolish the central government's monopoly 

of the minting business. Surely the idea that the sovereignty of the king 

must be expressed through stamping his face on a coin can now be 

discarded as a relic of a bygone age. There is no reason why private 

firms cannot mint coins as well, or better, than the national mint. Free 

competition should come, at long last, to the minting business. The 

cost would be far cheaper and the quality of the coins much improved. 

From our historical analysis, it becomes clear that the problems of 

money and the business cycle under the gold standard, of inflation and 

contraction in the 1818-36 era, of World War I inflation, of the boom 

of the 19205 and the disasters of the Great Depression of 1929-33, 

stemmed not from the gold standard but from the inflationary fractional-reserve banking system within it. This inflationary banking system was made possible by the government's imposition of a central 

bank: the Federal Reserve, the Bank of the United States, or by the 

quasi-centralized system of the national banking era after the Civil War. 

These booms and busts would not have occurred under "free banking," 

i.e., the system in which banks are decentralized, able to issue either 

notes or deposits, cannot be bailed out by a leader of last resort, and 

are forced to close their doors permanently if they fail to redeem their 

liabilities in specie. The quasi-free banking period from the 1830s to the 

CiVil War was far sounder and more stable than any period before or 

since in American history-as historians are now coming to recognize. 

It would have been far better but for the periodic suspensions of specie 

payment that governments continued to permit. The legalization of 

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branch banking would have made it far easier to call upon banks for 

redemption. 

Once again, it was the intervention of government that caused the 

difficulty, not the market. Laissez faile has not been consistently applied 

to banking. The historical evidence shows that monetary freedom does 

not fail, intervention by the government does. 

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Testimony of Rep. Kevin Brady, Vice Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee 

Before the Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology Subcommittee 

of the Committee on Financial Services 

10 a.m. Tuesday, May 8, 2012 

Thank you, Chairman Paul, Ranking Member Clay, and Members of the Subcommittee. 

Before discussing the Sound Dollar Act, I would like to acknowledge the work that Dr. Paul has 

done on this subcommittee and as a long-serving former Member of the Joint Economie 

Committee to bring sound money to the forefront of the public debate. Int1ation has been called 

many things-a hidden tax, a government-sponsored reduction in workers' paychecks, or "theft" 

as Dr. Paul often says. The American people understand the absurdity of a monctary policy that 

is designed to debase our currency. 

We agree on three key points: 

• Preserving the value of the dollar is essential to economic growth and prosperity; 

The federal government must not bc allowed to monetize its debts; and 

• Our financial system should serve the interests of all Americans, not just the interests of 

Washington and Wall Street. 

Again, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your steadfast commitment to bringing these 

issues to the forefront of the public debate. Your voice will be missed. 

I am pleased to testify on behalf of the Sound Dollar Act, H.R.4180, and want to thank the 

Members of this Subcommittee who have already cosponsored this important legislation: Mr. 

Jones, Mr. Lucas, Mr. Luetkemeyer, and Mr. Huizenga. 

When it comes to the global economy, some have characterized the 1800's as the British century, 

the 1900's as the American century and the current one as China's century. I reject that 

prediction. 

It is clear though, that to ensure the 21 st century is another American century we must renew our 

commitment to what works well--{)ur free market system-and reform what does not--{)ur 

inefficient federal government. 

Looking to our economic future, our goal should be clear: ensuring that America has the world's 

strongest economy throughout the 21 $( century. To do that, we have to get our monetary policy 

right and our fiscal policy right so that our free market system can flourish. 

A sound dollar is the sure and strong foundation for long-term economic growth. A sound dollar 

creates certainty and facilitates new business investment and long-term job creation. I believe 

the focused role ofthe Federal Reserve should be to protect the purchasing power of the dollar 

by maintaining long-term price stability. 

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Are there many other actions that Congress and the President must take to retain America's 

economic preeminence for the next 100 years? Of course-we must: 

• Make our tax system simpler and more internationally competitive by lowering marginal 

tax rates and eliminating distortions that pick winners and losers; 

• Reform important entitlement programs-including Social Security, Medicare, and 

Medicaid-to make them sustainably solvent so that they can continue to serve those 

Americans dependent upon them; 

Transform our regulatory system so that we can achieve our cornmon goals-including a 

clean environment and safe workplaces-in more efficient, balanced, and less destructive 

ways; and 

• Aggressively pursue trade agreements to open foreign markets to sell more American 

goods and services to the 95 percent of the world's population that lives outside of our 

borders. 

However, these reforms by themselves will be insufficient if the Federal Reserve fails to 

maintain the purchasing power of the dollar over time. You only need look to the Great 

Depression of the 1930's and the Great Inflation of the 1970's to see that price deflation and price 

inflation are twin evils that reduce real output and employment. 

Learning from the past and looking to the future, Congress must select the right monetary policy 

mandate, maintain a Fed independent of political pressure, and hold the Fed accountable for the 

results. 

So let us examine what monetary policy should be going forward. 

In 1977, Congress mandated that the Federal Reserve pursue monetary policy "so as to promote 

effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest 

rates."] Since inflationary expectations affect long-term interest rates, the goals of stable prices 

and moderate long-term interest rates are interrelated. This is why the Federal Reserve is 

described as having a dual mandatc for both price stability and full employment. 

The employment half of the dual mandate reflects the Employment Act of 1946, which required 

the federal government to pursue economic policies that "promote maximum employment, 

production, and purchasing power.,,2 The price stability half of the dual mandate reflects the 

rising public concerns about price inflation in the 1970's. 

Given the experiences of the past forty years and the unprecedented Fed actions of the past four, 

it is time for Congress and policy-makers to have a thoughtful, constructive debate about the dual 

mandate and the role of the Fed in our economic future. 

I The Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977, Pub.L. 95-188, 91 Stat. 1387, enacted November 16, 1977 as modified 

by the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub.L. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887, enacted October 27, 1978. 

2 Pub.L. 79-304, ch. 33, Sec. 2, 60 Stat. 23, enacted February 20, 1946. 

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Nobel Laureate economist Robert Mundell observed: "To achieve a policy outcome, you must 

use the right policy lever." 

In the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) statement of January 25th of this 

year, Chainnan Ben Bernanke and the other members recognized that monetary policy is the 

right lever to maintain the purchasing power of the dollar by declaring, "The inflation rate over 

the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy." 

In contrast, the FOMC acknowledged that monetary policy is the wrong lever to promote job 

creation by declaring "The maximum level of employment is largely detennined by nonmonetary 

factors." The FOMC is right on both counts: inflation is influenced by monetary policy and 

long-tenn employment is not. 

While the dual mandate may be politically appealing, it makes no sense for Congress to charge 

the Federal Reserve with controlling what it cannot. Except in the very short tenn, monetary 

policy cannot boost real output and job creation. 

Instead, using monetary policy as a short-tenn tool to speed growth may actually harm the 

economy in the long run. As Richard Fisher, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 

recently warned, the U.S. economy does not need any more "monetary morphine" that 

temporarily eases pain but does nothing to cure the underlying disease. 

His point - and I agree - is that the President and Congress, not the Federal Reserve, can and 

should control the budget, tax, regulatory, and trade policies that create the business climate 

which drives sustainable economic growth and job creation. 

Our global competitors already recognize this. Since Congress gave a dual mandate to the Fed, 

governments in many other countries have revised the charters of their central banks to focus 

either on a single mandate for price stability or a primary mandate for price stability with other 

goals clearly subordinated. Among the 47 central banks and monetary authorities in major 

countries surveyed by the Bank for International Settlements, only the Bank of Canada and the 

Federal Reserve have organizational laws that give other goals equal weight to price stability. 3 

Getting the mandate right is only half the job. How the Federal Reserve pursues its mandate is 

equally important. 

According to Stanford University economist John Taylor, the key choice is between a 

discretionary regime and a rules-based regime. A discretionary regime generates uncertainty 

because it relies upon the subjective assessments of central bank policymakers. By contrast, a 

rules-based regime reduces uncertainty because it follows well-established rules, based on 

observable economic data, with a clear focus on a long-tenn goal. 

30rtiz, Guillermo and Yam, Joseph (Chairs of the Central Bank Governance Group), Issues in the Governance of 

Central Banks, Bank of International Settlements (May 2009). 

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Inflation-targeting is a rules-based regime under which a central bank establishes a target 

inflation rate exprcssed in tenns of a broad-based price index of goods and services. A central 

bank tightcns monetary policy when the actual inflation rate rises above its target and loosens 

monetary policy when the actual inflation rate falls below its target. 

Thc last four decades of U.S. monetary policy demonstrate the advantages ofa rules-based 

regime over a discretionary one. During the 1970's, the Federal Reserve had "go-stop" policies, 

in which monetary policy quickly swung from ease to tightness and back again. This 

incoherence produced a highly volatile real economy and a rising int1ation rate. 

A sea change occurred with the appointment of Paul Voleker as Fed Chainnan in 1979. Under 

Voleker the FOMC aggressively tackled price inflation by controlling the growth of the money 

supply. This successful strategy was a significant step forward toward a rules-based monetary 

policy. While the economy did suffcr back-to-back recessions,4 int1ation dropped from 13.3 

percent in 1979, the year Voleker became Chainnan, to 3.8 percent in 1982.5 

Between 1983 and 2000-the period known as the Great Moderation-the Federal Reserve 

continued to pursue price stability through an increasingly rules-based monetary policy, 

effectively ignoring the second half of its dual mandate. Two long economic booms resulted, 

with very low inflation. The booms were only interrupted by a short, shallow recession relatcd 

to the tirst Persian Gulf War. 

Unfortunately, between 2002 and 2005, the FOMC deviated from this successful rules-based 

regime, moving to a discretionary regime by keeping interest rates too low for too long. This 

loose monetary policy contributed to the int1ation of an unsustainable housing bubble that 

eventually triggered a global financial crisis. 

Since the height of the financial crisis in the fall of 2008, Washington has increasingly become 

dependcnt on the Federal Reserve to take unusual, interventionist actions-such as tripling the 

size of its balance sheet under QE I and QE2 by purchasing the debt and residential mortgagebacked securities (RMBS) issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as Treasuries. Indeed, 

the FOMC justified these extraordinary actions by invoking-for the first time ever in late 

2008-the employment half of the Federal Reserve's dual mandate. 

Ultimately the FOMC took these actions, in part, to compensate for President Obama's failure to 

establish a strong, sustainable recovery. And just as low borrowing costs continue to mask the 

true pain of our nation's historically high federal budget deficits, the Federal Reserve's monetary 

experimentation has allowed the White House and Congress to shirk their responsibility to enact 

fiscal policies that create a competitive business climate which unleashes investment and spurs 

job creation. 

4 The back-lo-back recessions were January 1980 to June 1980 and July 1981 to November 1982. 

5 The annual inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index. 

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The Federal Reserve's monetary experimentation of the last decade must end. Congress should 

give the Federal Reserve a single mandate for price stability, and the Federal Reserve should 

return to a rules-based system of inflation targeting to achieve that mandate. 

To provide a foundation for long-term economic growth, I recently introduced the Sound Dollar 

Act, H.RAI80, in the House of Representatives. Senator Mike Lee of Utah, an articulate and 

studious member of the Joint Economic Committee, has introduced a companion bill, S.2247, in 

the Senate. The measure was introduced after many months of vetting with interested 

economists, current and former Fed staff as well as current and former members of the Federal 

Reserve Board of Governors including discussions with Chairman Bernanke. 

The Sound Dollar Act seeks to reform the Federal Reserve in several important 

ways. Specifically, the Sound Dollar Act replaces the dual mandate with a single mandate for 

long-term price stability; increases the Federal Reserve's accountability and openness; diversifies 

the FOMe; ensures credit neutrality for future FOMC purchases; and institutes congressional 

oversight of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 

As expected, critics have quickly charged that focusing on a sound dollar implies the Federal 

Reserve will ignore the employment needs of Americans. They are wrong. America can 

only maximize its real output with long-term price stability. Protecting the purchasing power of 

the dollar over time provides the strongest foundation for lasting economic growth and job 

creation. 

Others have reacted as if a single mandate is a shocking proposal-an affront to all that is right 

and good. But as we know, the United States won World War II, enjoyed three decades of 

prosperity, and put a man on the moon without a dual mandate. It is not a fundamental part of 

our constitutional fabric or carved in granite-it is a 1977 policy directive based on the 

discredited "Phillips Curve" that Congress can and should change to ensure the future prosperity 

of our nation. 

A mandate for price stability gives the Federal Reserve the right goal. Moving away from a 

discretionary regime and back toward a rules-based regime will help ensure the Fed achieves 

price stability. 

In January 2012, the FOMC announced an inflation target of2 percent defined in terms of the 

price index for personal consumption expenditures. I strongly applaud Chairman Bernanke and 

the other members of the FOMC for this step toward a rules-based, inflation-targeting regime. 

However, this is merely a policy statement that could be reversed. Therefore, the Sound Dollar 

Act mandates that the FOMC continue inflation targeting over the long term. 

Accurately measuring inflation is not easy. In the last decade, we clearly saw that price indices 

of goods and services do not always record all of the price movements in our economy, allowing 

asset bubbles to inflate undetected. The FOMC's current inflation target relies only upon the 

price index for personal consumption expenditures. 

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This index is the primary indicator that the Federal Reserve uses for measuring 

inflation. However, to identifY incipicnt asset bubbles beforc they inflate to dangerous levels, 

the Sound Dollar Act also requires that the FOMC monitor and report to Congress on: (I) the 

prices of, and returns on, broad classes of assets including equities, corporate bonds, state and 

local government bonds and agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential real estate; (2) 

the price of gold; and (3) the foreign exchange value of the U,S. dollar. 

To be clear, the Sound Dollar Act does not prescribe any specific action that the Federal Reserve 

must take if it detects an asset bubble, The appropriate responses are highly dependent upon 

circumstances. They might include a tightening of monetary policy, supervisory suasion, or 

regulatory actions to reduce the flow of credit to fund purchases of the bubbling asset. 

Discretion with respect to the best response should be left to the FOMe. However, identifying 

potential asset price bubbles earlier may help to avoid the overinvestment and the malinvestment 

that must eventually be liquidated at a heavy cost in terms of lower real output and lost jobs. 

Some supporters of the Sound Dollar Act concept express a concern that the FOMC could 

misinterpret monitoring asset prices as a mandate to control asset prices. To address that 

concern, we have made the legislative language clear and will make it clearer if need be. To 

quote the bill's language, the FOMC will merely observe asset prices to determine whether such 

price indices "are comprehensively reflecting price movements in the economy; and whether any 

price movements not captured by the price indices of goods and services are causing a significant 

misallocation of capital in the United States economy." 

Simply put, monitoring asset prices is intended as a check against inflation slipping through the 

cracks. 

Another reform broadens input and geographic diversity in FOMC decision-making. The Sound 

Dollar Act grants a permanent vote on the FOMC to the presidents of each regional Federal 

Reserve Bank. As important as New York and Washington are, there is much more to America's 

economy and the FOMC should better reflect that. 

Today-as a result of a decision seventy years ago--only the Federal Reserve Governors and the 

President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York have permanent votes. While all of the 

regional Federal Reserve Banks participate in the discussions, just four of the remaining eleven 

presidents vote at anyone meeting-rotating on and off the FOMC. 

There may be other ways to achieve this diversity-and I am open to them-but I am secking 

change that will provide Main Street with a greater voice in determining monetary policy. 

I am firmly committed to the independence of the Federal Reserve in conducting monetary 

policy. Expanding the voting membership of the FOMC is one method the Sound Dollar Act 

uses to insulate the Fed from political forces. But, I am particularly troubled by the FOMC 

decision in September 2011 to reinvest the proceeds from maturing federal agency debt and 

RMBS into new federal agency RMBS-instead of allowing these holdings to decline as 

originally intended. This policy reversal occurred amid intense pressure from special interest 

groups for federal actions to support the ailing housing market. 

Page 6 of8 
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75727.137

When the FOMC deals in securities other than Treasuries, repurchase agreements, and reverse 

repurchase agreements for the System Open Market Account, the Federal Reserve is allocating 

credit among different sectors of our economy. Credit allocation exposes the Federal Reserve to 

political interference. And in Washington, D.C. subsidies die hard. 

To maintain the independence ofthe Federal Reserve, the Sound Dollar Act requires the FOMC 

to deal only in Treasuries, repos, and reverse repos for the System Open Market Account unless 

the FOMC finds by a 2/3 vote that "unusual and exigent circumstances" exist. The FOMC could 

then purchase other securities for the account so long as they are liquidated within five years 

after the end of the emergency. 

Next, the Sound Dollar Act requires the Federal Reserve to publish its lender-of-Iast-resort 

policy. In nearly a century of existence, the Federal Reserve has never articulated this critical 

policy. 

Dr. Allan Meltzer, author of A History of the Federal Reserve, describes the problems this void 

creates: 

The absence of a [lender-of-last-resort] policy has three unfortunate 

consequences. First, uncertainty increases. No one can know what will be 

done. Second, troubledfirms have a stronger incentive to seek a political 

solution. They ask Congress or the administration for support or to pressure 

the Federal Reserve or other agencies to save themfromfailure. Third, 

repeated rescues encourage banks to take greater risk and increase 

leverage. This is the well-known moral hazard problem. 6 

Each of these problems became manifest in 2008. And while some believe the Dodd-Frank 

legislation provided the solution to the next crisis, I do not believe that is the case. 

To be reasonable, the bill does not call for a precise tactical plan. As President Dwight D. 

Eisenhower observed re~arding the complicated engagements of war: "Plans are worthless, but 

planning is everything." Similarly, while the Federal Reserve cannot anticipate every nuance of 

the next financial crisis, publishing a lender-of-Iast-rcsort policy has merit and could help reduce 

market uncertainty. 

Next, I applaud Chairman Bemanke for his steps to increase transparency in monetary policy 

decision-making, but there is an additional step that the Federal Reserve should take. The Sound 

Dollar Act speeds the release of transcripts ofFOMC meetings from five years to three 

years. Currently, if a President nominates a Fed Chairman for a second four-year term, Senators 

cannot review any of the FOMC transcripts during his or her tenure. 

6 Ciorciari, John D. and Taylor, John B. (Eds.), The Road Aheadfor the Fed, Hoover Institution (November 2009). 

7 Dwight David Eisenhower, Remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference, November 14, 1957. 

For complete context, see the full text of the speech, third paragraph, in Public Papers of the Presidents 

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=J 0951 &st=&stl =#axzz 1 nuPphFqo. 

Page 70f8 
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75727.138

Some have expressed concerns that this would inhibit free discussion at FOMC meetings. But in 

a time when information flows globally in the blink of an eye, three years is an eternity. 

Given the quality ofthe individuals serving on the FOMC, I am not concerned about legacy 

building in FOMC meetings. What I am concerned about is a future Senate being asked to 

confirm a second term for the Fed Chairman with no real insight into the critical decisionmaking of that Chairman in FOMC deliberations. Results matter, and so does the thought 

process behind them. 

The Sound Dollar Act also eliminates a slush fund that has been misused by Secretaries of the 

Treasury in both Democratic and Republican administrations. In 1934, Congress placed the 

profits from the nationalization of privately owned gold and the subsequent devaluation of the 

U.S. dollar in the Exchange Stabilization Fund and authorized its use to intervene in foreign 

exchange markets. 8 In 1968, Congress placed the special drawing rights (SDRs) issued by the 

International Monetary Fund into the Exchange Stabili7~tion Fund.9 After the Bretton Woods 

system of pegged exchange rates collapsed in 1971, the Treasury has used the non-SDR assets in 

the Exchange Stabilization Fund for purposes that Congress never intended, such as bailing out 

Mexico in 1995 and guaranteeing money market mutual funds in 2008. To prevent misuse in the 

future, the Sound Dollar Act transforms the Exchange Stabilization Fund into a Special Drawing 

Rights Fund; liquidates all of the $50 billion of non-SDR assets over three years; and uses the 

proceeds to reduce federal debt. 

Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act funded the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) by 

diverting Federal Reserve prolits, which would otherwise be paid to the Treasury, to the CFPB. 

This is a dangerous precedent, leaving the CFPB unaccountable to Congress and ultimately 

hardworking American taxpayers. Nothing other than the operating costs of the Federal Reserve 

should be paid out of its revenue. Thus, the Sound Dollar Act ends this diversion and requires 

that the CFPB seek annual appropriations from Congress-just as other federal agencies do. 

In summary, the Sound Dollar Act helps the United States retain its economic preeminence by 

preserving the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar, charging the Federal Reserve to pursue a 

single mandate for price stability and strengthening the Federal Reserve's independence even as 

the Act increases the Federal Reserve's accountability. 

, Gold Reserve Act of 1935, PUb.L. 73-87, 48 Stat. 337, enacted January 30,1934. 

'Special Drawing Rights Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-349, 82 Stat. 188, enacted June 19, 1968. 

Page 8 of8 
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75727.139

Joint Econolnic Committee 

R epub lz-c'ans' R,p"'~",tati" K,,'" Un,,'y " fl{C (lhllrf!l(!JJ 

REPUBLICAN STAFF COMMENTARY 

UNITED STATES MONETARY HISTORY IN BRIEF 

PART 1: THE FIRST & SECOND BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES-RISE AND FALL 

:28,2012 

CENTRAL BANKS: DEFINITION & CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION 

Central banks are chartered by national governments to have a legal 

monopoly over a nation's currency and bank reserves. To manage a nation's 

rnoney supply, they use monetary policy tools, such as open market 

operations (e.g., huying/selling gold, silver, government deht securities, 

etc); setting reserve requirements (I.e., deposits of cnrrency, gold or silver 

that must be held at the central bank) for commercial hanks and financial 

institutions; and acting as lender of last resort for solvent but illiquid 

commercial banks and financial institutions during a financial crisis, Central 

hanks also supervise commercial banks and financial institutions, 

The United States Constitution provides the legal foundation for a central 

hank in Article I, Section H, Clauses 5 and 6, which give Congress the power 

"to coin money [and] regulate the value thereof," and Clause 18 to make Jaws 

"necessary and proper for carrying [out1 the foregoing powers," America's 

first central bank was established in 1791 by the 1st Congress. 

FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 

Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton issued his "Report on a 

Nationaillank" on December 11, 1790, and in 1791--based on his reportCongress chartered the First Bank of the United States (1791-1811JCongressional debate over the First Bank foreshadowed the cataclysmic 

event to envelope the nation 70 years later with a general north-south 

divide and fierce exchanges over the role of federal and state govcruments. 

Echoes of the early opposition to the First Bank have run throughout our 

nation's history, even down to some ofthe populist arguments of the present 

day. Nevertheless, America's need far a central bank was acute, as the 

country had to manage the significant Revolutionary War debt incurred by 

the states; and the country needed a stable currency to facilitate commerce 

and trade within the fledgling United States and with countries ahroad. 

Yet as economist Richard Timberlake argues, the First Bank was not meant 

to be a modern central bank. Rather, the bank Hamilton envisioned would 

be a public bank to help the federal government secure loans, "aid in the 

sales afpllblic lands .. , and eventually provide a uniform paper currency."} 

(Continued on the next page ",) 

The United States 

Constitution provides the 

foundation for a central 

bank in Article I, Section 8, 

Clauses 5 and 6, which give 

Congress the power "to 

coin money [and} regulate 

the value thereot" and 

Clause 18 to make laws 

"necessary and proper for 

carrying [out} the 

foregOing powers," 

America's first central 

bank was established in 

1791 by the 1st Congress. 

Echoes of the early 

opposition to the First 

Bank have run throughout 

our nation's history, even 

down to some of the 

populist arguments of the 

present day, 

Page 1 
185 


75727.140

Joint Economic Committee Republicans! Staff Commentary 

Congress's adoption of the 

Coinage Act of 1792 placed 

the United States on a 

"bimetallic standard" of 

gold and silver. 

Alexander Hamilton's 

economic policies had the 

effect of transforming the 

U.s. government debt from 

a liability into a highly 

valued asset and a 

powerful financial tool for 

the u.s. government to 

finance its national 

defense and meet other 

needs. 

jec.senate.gov jrepublicans 

After supporters of the First Bank won the debate, the next major 

development in U.S. monetary policy was Congress's adoption of the 

Coinage Act of 1792, which placed the United States on a "bimetallic 

standard" of gold and silver (see Appendix for a discussion of the gold 

standard, the silver standard, and bimetallic standard and how they 

operated). Confusing as such a bimetallic standard may be in the 21st 

century, it made sense in the Jate 18th century when the United Kingdomthe world's dominant economic power-operated on a gold standard, while 

France-America's Revolutionary War ally-operated on a silver standard. 

The Coinage Act fixed the mint prices of gold and silver at a ratio of 15:1 (i.e" 

$19.39 per troy ounce for gold, $1.29 for silver) so that, relative to their 

prevailing market values, gold was slightly overvalued and silver was 

slightly undervalued. These mint prices encouraged the importation of gold 

for coinage and accumulation of gold reserves at the First Bank. Beyond the 

political considerations of Hamilton (favoring relations with Britain) and 

Thomas Jefferson (favoring relations with France), the accumulation of gold 

was important since foreign creditors required payment of interest and 

principal of U.S. government debt in gold. 

Hamilton's economic policies had the effect of transforming the U.S. 

government debt from a liability into a highly valued asset in domestic and 

foreign financial markets. Thus, Hamilton created a powerful financial tool 

for the U.s, government to finance its national defense and meet other needs. 

During its 20 years of operation, the First Bank was a hybrid centralcommercial bank, modeled on the Bank of England. It was a public-private 

partnership, in which private investors owned 80% of its stock while the 

federal government owned the rest, with the Treasury conducting regular 

examinations of the Bank for safety and soundness. In addition to issuing a 

uniform currency in the form of First Bank notes (bank notes are paper 

currency), the First Bank served as the depository and fiscal agent of the 

federal government; supported the credit of the federal government; and 

regulated state-chartered banks through the First Bank's acceptance of state 

bank notes or demanding their redemption in specie (Le., gold or silver coins 

and bullion). Consequently, as noted by Timberlake, the First Bank began to 

exercise modern central~banking functions: 

through its currency transactions with other banks. If it felt that credit 

restraint was called for, it presented the notes of other banks for 

redemption in specie, lfit felt that credit ease was in orderJ it expanded its 

own credit availability to businesses and to other banks and generally 

treated the notes of other bonks with 'forbearance. '1 

Although the First Bank was careful not to exert too heavy a hand and 

generally received favorable reviews for fulfilling its purpose, congressional 

critics in Jefferson's party continued to question the Bank's constitutionality. 

They would have their hour when the Bank came up for renewal at the end 

of its 20-year charter. 

STORM CLOUDS GATHER OVER THE FIRST BANK 

When the First Bank's charter came up for renewal in 1811, one of the 

Bank's harshest 1791 congressional critics and opponents, James Madison, 

Page 2 
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75727.141

Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Commentary 

had become president. Yet, the dynamics had changed in the intervening 20 

years as Madison's concerns had been allayed through witnessing the value 

and necessity of the Bank. 

However, politics being what they were, Madison was afraid of being seen as 

ideologically inconsistent (Le., "flip-flopping" on the Bank question), and he 

wanted to show deference to his mentor, President Jefferson, who opposed 

the First Bank. So, Madison did not publicly declare support for renewing 

the First Bank's charter, though he directed Secretary of the Treasury Albert 

Gallatin to seek renewal ofthe First Bank's charter from Congress. 

The House of Representatives renewed the charter, but the Senate failed to 

pass it due to a combination of constitutional questions and fears and 

allegations that British stockbolders were dominating the Bank. How the 

Bank was defeated in the Senate was especially ironic as Madison's Vice 

President, George Clinton-who had been elected after the 12th Amendment 

to the Constitution, which aimed to ensure the President and Vice President 

would not be ideological opponents-cast the tie~breakjng vote against his 

own administration's bill to renew the Bank. So, with the bill's defeat, the 

United States was Jeft without a central bank, while on the brink of war. 

WAR OF 1812 & LIFE WITHOUT A CENTRAL BANK 

The Madison administration's failure to renew the First Bank's charter 

proved consequential in the interregnum period (1811-1816) when the 

United States did not have a central bank. Notably, Madison had an 

especially difficult time financing the War of 1812; Secretary of the Treasury 

Gallatin could raise only $38 million out of an authorization for $61 million 

in bonds. Furthermore, in this period, the number of state banks grew from 

86 to 246, and total bank notes grew from $28 million to $68 million, 

resulting in a cumulative 34% increase in prices. Had the First Bank 

continued to operate, many of these difficulties could have been avoided. 

SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 

Out of the interregnum experience arose the Second Bank of the United 

States (1816-1836). Speaker of the House Henry Clay worked with the 

Madison administration to charter the Second Bank on the same basis as the 

First Bank. However, Madison pressed the Board of Directors of the Second 

Bank to name as its president his Secretary of the Navy, William Jones. This 

decision proved disastrous. Through both corruption and incompetence, the 

Second Bank came close to failing as Jones augmented, rather than 

restrained, a speculative bubble in western lands. In 1819, Jones was forced 

to resign, and the board chose former House Speaker Langdon Cheves to 

replace him as the Second Bank's President. 

Meanwhile, the Treasury-now under the leadership of Secretary William 

Crawford-acted like a central bank, while the Second Bank "proved to be 

nothing more than a convenient buffer for the unpalatable but 'necessary' 

policies of the Treasury Department" to contract the money supply and 

bring inflation under controL Under Cheves, total bank notes were reduced 

to $45 million by 1819. This saved the Second Bank but at the price of much 

economic pain including: the financial Panic of 1819 and resulting 

recession (the first presidential-induced recession); a 27% decline in prices 

j ec.s e n ate, gOY I republicans 

The Senate failed to renew 

the First Bank's charter in 

1811 due to a combination 

of constitutional questions 

and fears and aIlegations 

that British stockholders 

were dominating the Bank. 

Absent a central bank, 

President Madison had an 

especiaIly difficult time 

financing the War of 1812. 

In 1816, Speaker of the 

House Henry Clay worked 

with the Madison 

administration to charter 

the Second Bank on the 

same basis as the First 

Bank. 

Page 3 
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75727.142

joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Commentary 

America's economy has 

prospered with an 

independent central bank, 

managed by competent 

individuals; America's 

economy has not fared as 

well absent a central bank 

or when a central bank 

endures interference from 

politicians, 

The capricious monetary 

policies of President 

Andrew Jackson were a 

major cause of the Panic of 

1837, 

jccsena te.gov I republica ns 

through 1824; and a growing populist sentiment against the Second Bank. 

Notably, the Second Bank-rather than President James Monroe's 

administration, which was reaBy the guilty party in the fiasco-drew the ire 

of presidential aspirant, General Andrew Jackson. 

In 1822, Nicholas Biddle succeeded Cheves as president of the Second Bank. 

Biddle, who proved especially competent, returned the Second Bank to the 

First Bank's central banking function of regulating the state banks through 

its acceptance of state bank notes or its demand for their redemption in 

species. Under Biddle's leadership, this central banking function was used to 

stabilize the U.S. economy and prevent financial panics. 

Again though, the storm clouds gathered over the Bank with the 1828 

election of President Andrew Jackson. In 1832, Jackson vetoed Sen. Henry 

Clay's bill to renew the Second Bank's charter. Nonetheless, there was 

dissent even within Jackson's cabinet over the issue of the Second Bank. 

jackson fired two Secretaries of the Treasury, wbo refused to remove 

government deposits from Second Bank (the Bank's charter, which ran to 

1836, had not yet expired) and place them in Jackson-favored state banks. 

Finally, in 1833 jackson's acting Secretary of the Treasury Roger B. Taney 

complied with the demand, and there is speculation that Taney's reward for 

this action was a subsequent appointment as Chief Justice of the United 

States. 3 

BAD MONETARY POLICY & ECONOMIC COLLAPSE 

Through the Coinage Act of 1834, Jackson devalued the U.S. dollar by 6.6% 

to $20.67 per troy ounce in terms of gold, but not in terms of silver, thus 

increasing the gold-to-silver mint price ratio from 1S:1 to 16:1, which by 

slightly overvaluing gold and undervaluing silver relative to prevailing 

market prices again caused an inflow of gold. This led to a 42% increase of 

bank deposits and a 36% increase in prices from 1834 to 1836. 

Distribution of the Surplus and Specie Circular were disastrous policies. 

The populist reaction against the Second Bank and the ensuing policies 

caused a 36% drop in the money supply in 1836-37. One such policy came 

from Jackson signing an 1836 bill that distributed the federal surplus of $28 

million to the states. To pay the states, the Treasury withdrew $28 million 

in federal deposits from Jackson-favored state banks in species. This 

triggered an immediate contraction in loans and bank notes from the banks 

that lost their deposits. Of these funds, states deposited $23 million into 

other state banks and retained $5 million in species. This conversion into 

species reduced the aggregate reserves available to support loans and bank 

notes nationwide. Moreover, banks that eventually received deposits from 

the states took time to expand their loans and bank notes. (In the 1800's, 

there were no wire transfers. Rather, specie and notes had to be transferred 

by wagons, often over uncertain roads.) Finally, Jackson's 1836 Specie 

Circular, which required payment in gold or silver for the purchase of 

federal lands, increased the demand for gold and silver coins, compounding 

the contractionary effects of the distribution of the surplus. 

Thus, Jackson left office as the U.S. began to suffer from the Panic of 1837 

and the ensuing depression. This policy-induced depression was the second 

longest and second deepest depression in U.S. history, only superseded by 

Page4 
188 


75727.143

Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Commentary 

the Great Depression of the 1930's, and as Milton Friedman noted, the great 

depression stemming from the Panic of 1837, "is the only depression on 

record comparable in severity and scope to the Great Depression of the 

1930's."4 

Bad policies continued to prevail, induding the "Independent Treasury," 

under which President Martin Van Buren consolidated federal deposits from 

state banks at the Treasury. Ultimately, the U.S. economy did not recover 

from the Jackson-induced depression until 1843-two years after the defeat 

of Jackson successor and one-term President Van Buren. 

CENTRAL BANKING FROM THE TREASURY 

Though the Whig party won the control of both Congress and the presidency 

in 1840 on a platform that included a pledge to create a Third Bank of the 

United States, President John Tyler, who succeeded William Henry Harrison 

after his brief tenure, vetoed a bill to charter a Third Bank in 184l. 

Consequently, the Treasury assumed a limited central~banking role in the 

years preceding the Civil War. Tariff revenues were highly elastic, while 

federal outlays were relatively constant. This alJowed the Treasury to act as 

an 'automatic stabilizer-issuing U.S. government debt securities (i.e .• 

Treasuries) when tariff revenue was low and redeeming them when revenue 

was high. 

CURRENCY PROBLEMS & TECHNOLOGY PRECEDING THE CIVIL WAR 

Generally, from 1836-when the Second Bank ceased its interstate 

operations-until the Civil War, the United States did not have a national 

currency. Historians have called this the free banking era (even though the 

United States never actually had free banking as defined by economists). 

With many states liberalizing their laws about chartering banks, the quality 

of supervision and regulation varied widely, creating many problems. Some 

states, especialJy in the south and west, suffered from numerous wildcat 

banks that opened with insufficient capital. The wildcat banks would make 

loans and issue bank notes, only to fail in a matter of months. As a result, 

bank notes did not trade at par (face) value with each other. Instead, the 

value of notes from different banks fluctuated daily (much as national 

currencies do today in foreign exchange markets). 

In this environment, economic development suffered from the bad monetary 

policy of the period. The fluctuating value of state bank notes and losses on 

notes from failed wildcat banks were costly, taking a toll on the growth of 

interstate commerce. Yet, technological advances like the steamboat, 

railroad, and telegraph were forging a single national economy out of the 

previously separate local economies, highlighting the need for a single 

national currency-even absent a central bank. 

With this as background, one of the sub-issues of the 1860 campaign was the 

question of a national currency. The newly formed Republican Party, in the 

tradition of the Federalist and Whig Parties, favored the creation of a single 

national currency to replace state bank notes, while the Democrat Party 

supported the status quo. Regardless, changes would be afoot as the nation 

was driven into its most devastating war, again, absent a central bank 

j cc.se na te.g ov I republicans 

As Milton Friedman noted, 

the great depression 

stemming from the Panic 

of1837, "is the only 

depression on record 

comparable in severity 

and scope to the Great 

Depression of the 1930's," 

Even when the U.s. has 

been absent a central 

bank, the Treasury has 

conducted central banking 

activities-with mixed 

results. 

Technological advances 

like the steamboat, 

railroad, and telegraph 

were forging a single 

national economy out of 

the previously separate 

local economies, 

highlighting the need for a 

single national currencyeven absent a central 

bank. 

Page 5 
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75727.144

Joint Economic Committee Republicans! Staff Commentary 

A classical gold standard 

may not provide long-term 

price stability. 

A bimetallic standard is 

actually an alternative 

metallic standard. 

APPENDIX: DISCUSSION OF STANDARDS 

Gold Standard Classical gold standard: There are two versions of a classical gold standard-gold 

coin standard and gold bullion standard. Under a gold coin standard, a country 

defines its unit of account in terms of a tlxed weight of gold (Le., mint price), The 

mint will freely coin gold at the mint price, gold coins are in circulation, and the 

central bank (or commercial banks in the absence of a central bank) will freely 

convert bank notes into gold coins at the mint price. Under a gold bullion standard, 

a country defines its unit of account in terms of a fixed weight of gold (Le., par 

value), However, the mint will not freely coin gold and gold coins are not in wide 

circulation. Instead, the central bank will freely buy or sell gold in large quantities, 

known as bullion, at par value, Exchange rates among the currencies of all countries 

operating under a classical gold standard are effectively fixed. A classical gold 

standard is largely self-regulating through domestic and international gold flows. 

The protitability of the gold mining industry-which is affected by the size and 

frequency of new gold finds, mining and processing costs, and technological 

progress-effectivc!y determines the monetary base and the price level in all 

countries operating under a classical gold standard. Therefore, a classical gold 

standard may not provide long-term price stability. Indeed, decade-long periods of 

both price inflation and price deflation occurred under the classical gold standard. 

Gold exchange standard: Under a gold exchange standard, a country defines its 

unit of account in terms of another country's currency (Le. anchor currency) that is 

freely convertible into gold at par value. The central bank will freely exchange its 

bank notes for the anchor currency at the fixed exchange rate. 

Like a classical gold standard, the exchange rates among countries operating under 

a gold exchange standard are fixed to the anchor currency and to each other. Unlike 

a classical gold standard, however, a gold exchange standard is not self-regulating. 

It is dependent on the behavior of the central bank in the anchor country. 

Silver Standard 

A silver standard is similar to a gold standard except silver is the metal used. 

Bimetallic Gold and Silver Standard Under a bimetallic gold and silver coin standard, a country defines its unit of 

account in terms of a fixed weight of gold and a fixed weight of silver, known as mint 

prices. The mint will freely coin both gold and silver at their respective mint prices. 

In theory, both gold and silver coin should be in circulation, and the central bank (or 

commercial banks in the absence of a central bank) will freely convert bank notes 

into either gold or silver coins at their respective mint prices. In practice, however, 

a bimetallic standard is actually an alternative metallic standard. When one 

monetary metal becomes "dearer" (Le., its market price rises relative to its mint 

price), coins in the "dearer" monetary metal will go out of circulation, and 

individuals and firms will drain tbe dearer monetary metal out of the central bank 

by exchanging bank notes for coins or bullion in the "dearer" monetary metal. The 

"cheaper" monetary metal, whose market price falls relative to its mint price, will 

effectively become the sale monetary metaL This process will reverse as market 

prices of gold and silver fluctuate relative to their respective mint prices. 

t Timberlake, Richard H., Monetary Policy in the United States; An Intellectual and Institutional History, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, p.s. 

zlbid.,p.10 

'For background on Taney's appointments,see Abraham, Henry J.,justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History afthe U.s. Supreme CourtAppointmentsfrom 

Washington to Clinton, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., New York, 1999, pp. 74-76. 

~ Friedman, MHton,A ProgramforMonetaryStabiliey, Fordham University Press, New York, 1951:1, p.10. 

For reference and further reading, see, Timberlake, Richard H., Monetary Policy in the United States: An Intellectual and Institutional History, The University of 

Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993. 

jee.senate.gov (republicans Page 6 
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75727.145

Joint Economic Committee 

Re'nub Iz'cans R,p"'"~<n'''';Y' ",yh, Bn.dy y -' il<'C(fuurman 

REPUBLICAN STAFF COMMENTARY 

UNITED STATES MONETARY HISTORY IN BRIEF 

PART2: EXPERIENCE WITHOUT A CENTRAL BANK-CIVIL WAR TO CREATION OF THE FED 

Fcbnldry 29, 201 

SETTING THE STAGE 

Pari' 1 of this series covered the founding of a central bank in the United 

States by theP Congress in 1791; the rise and fall of the First and Second 

Banks of the United States; and life in America with and without a central 

bank from 1791-1860, Generally, America's economy prospered with an 

independent central bank, managed by competent individuals, and 

America's economy did not fare as well absent a central bcmk or when a 

central bank endured interference from politicians. The period closed 

without a central bank-except for the Treasury taking on some central 

banking functions. Meanwhile, advances in technology were forging a single 

national economy as the nation headed into the Civil War. 

CIVIL WAR: FROM A GOLD & SILVER STANDARD TO A FIAT CURRENCY 

In 1860, the US money snpply consisted of $500 million in both currency 

and bank deposits, With the opening of Civil War, the public began to hoard 

gold in anticipation of inflation, and hy the war's end four years later, 

prices-including that of gold-had doubled, 

To combat the hoarding and help finance the Civil War, in December 1861, 

President Abraham Lincoln suspended the redemption of bank notes for 

gold or silver at their mint prices, $20,67 and $1,29 per troy ounce, 

respectively. Thus, Americans could no longer demand gold or silver from 

banks in exchange for dollars, and the effect was to move the u.s. from a 

bimetallic gold and silver standard to a fiat currency. Fiat money derives its 

value from government declaration rather than from the value of a metal such 

os gold, 

The supply of money was then increased in February 1862 hy the 37th 

Congress through the Legal Tender Act. This law authorized the issuance 

of $150 million in U.S. notes-known as "greenbacks"-and the circulation 

of tbese greenbacks was increased to $400 million by war's end. Also, 

Congress authorized the issuance of 3% Treasury notes, which were like 

savings bonds hut could be used as either currency or bank reserves. 

Next, the Congress passed the National Ilank Act of 1863 (with significant 

amendments in 1864 and 1865), which established the Office of the 

(Continued on the next page ",) 

With the apening aJthe 

Civil War, the public began 

ta haard gald in 

anticipatian aJinflation, 

and by the war's endJour 

years later, pricesincluding that oJgoldhad doubled, 

In December 1861, 

President Abraham 

Lincoln suspended the 

redemption oJ bank notes 

Jor specie, effectively 

taking the u.s, off the 

bimetallic gold and silver 

standard and establishing 

a fiat currency, 
191 


75727.146

Joint Economic Committee Republicans! Staff Commentary 

The National Bank Act 

recreated a national 

currency in 1863, the first 

national currency since 

1836. 

The Coinage Act of1873 

demonetized silver and 

replaced the bimetallic 

standard with a de facto 

gold standard. However, 

slower gold production 

from the 1870's to 1890's, 

combined with booming 

real GDP growth in the U.s. 

and many other countries, 

led to global price 

deflation and inflamed 

political disputes about 

u.s. monetary policy. 

jec.senate,gov jrepubUcans 

Comptroller of the Currency to charter, supervise, and regulate national 

banks. National banks could issue up to $300 million of national bank notes, 

but unlike pre-war state bank notes, national bank notes traded at par with 

each other and U.S. notes, thus restoring a national currency. 

National bank notes were fully collateralized by U.S. government debt 

securities (Le., Treasuries). In other words the notes were fully backed, 

which increased their demand because the public was protected from losses 

on notes when a national bank failed. Further, the National Bank Act 

instituted a punitive 10% tax on state bank notes, which was intended to 

drive state banks out of business. Nevertheless, state banks survived 

because of the rapid growth of checkable deposits after the Civil War. 

RESUMPTION OF THE GOLD STANDARD 

The U.S. faced difficult challenges following the Civil War, including whether 

and how to resume the gold standard so that Americans could freely convert 

dollars to gold. As European countries that had been on either a silver 

standard or a bimetallic standard were switching to a gold standard during 

this period, U.S. policymakers did not consider returning to the pre-war 

bimetallic standard. Four monetary policy options were considered: (1) 

Contract the money stock, causing a rapid price deflation, reducing the 

market price of gold to the pre-war mint price of $20.67 per troy ounce; (2) 

Freeze the money stock, which (combined with real GDP growth) would 

cause a gradual price deflation, reducing the market price of gold to the prewar mint price; (3) Devalue the US. dollar by raising the mint price of gold 

to its market price with convertibility at the new parity; and (4) Abandon 

the gold standard and have a fiat currency. 

During Reconstruction, a combination of the first and second monetary 

policy options were implemented. From 1865 to 1868, Secretary of the 

Treasury Hugh McCulloch used federal budget surpluses to retire about 

$250 million in greenbacks and 3% T -notes, causing prices to decline by 

20%. Then, Congress froze the supply of greenbacks at $356 million in 

1868, though the Civil War era legislation had authorized up to $400 million, 

creating a reserve of$44 million at the Treasury. 

President Ulysses S. Grant signed an act into law on July 12, 1870, which 

increased national bank notes by $54 million and decreased 3% T -notes by 

$45 million with most of the new national bank notes allocated to banks in 

southern and western states. Yet prices did not fall much and movement 

toward resumption of the gold standard was minimal during Grant's first 

term. So, early in his second term, Grant signed the Coinage Act of 1873, 

which demonetized silver and replaced the bimetallic standard with a de 

facto gold standard. 

To those who wanted silver in circulation! this Coinage Act was referred to 

as the "Crime of 73"-especially following new silver finds in Colorado, 

which greatly increased the supply of silver and depressed its price. 

Moreover, gold production slowed beginning in mid-1870's and did not 

increase until mid-1890's, while real GDP growth boomed in the U.S. and 

many other countries. Over the next two decades, this combination 

produced persistent global price deflation and inflamed political disputes 

about U.S. monetary policy. 

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Joint Economic Commjttee Republicans j Staff Commentary 

PANIC OF 1873 & THE FORM-SEASONAL ELASTICITY PROBLEM 

During the second half of 19th century, a troubling new policy-induced 

phenomenon became commonplace-seasonal financial panics. Such was 

the case with the Panic of 1873. 

Though technological advances before and during the Civil War helped to 

forge a single national economy, how individuals operated within the 

economy varied greatly. For instance, most businesses and urban 

households used checks to make payments, whereas most farmers and rural 

households still used cash. As these preferences collided in the national 

banking system, completely avoidable crises would beset the U.S. economy. 

The form-seasonal elasticity problem would begin late in the summer as 

cash would flow out of banks to pay farmers for crops, and then the cash 

would flow back into banks as farmers paid their bills. Ideally, a monetary 

system should be sufficiently flexible to allow for seasonal conversions from 

deposits to cash and back without affecting money supply, prices, or interest 

rates. However, two principal rigidities in the national banking system of 

this period limited the form-seasonal elasticity of the U.S. money supply: 

(1) There were federally-established limits on the issuance of U.S. and 

national bank notes, even though there was rapid population and 

real GDP growth; and 

(2) Treasuries, which were used as collateral for issuing national bank 

notes, were in short supply because of the federal budget surpluses 

of this period, forcing national banks to pay large premiums to 

secure Treasuries in the fall. 

When cash flowed out the banking system each fall, uational banks could not 

easily expand the supply of national bank notes. To meet the demand for 

cash, national banks had to build large reserves in the winter and spring. If 

these reserves proved insufficient, national banks would demand immediate 

repayment on many of their outstanding loans to generate cash. The 

ensuing impact on the economy could be devastating. Frequently during the 

fall, short-term interest rates spiked from less than 2% to more than 30% 

annualized rates; and asset fire-sales to generate cash resulted in depressed 

asset prices. Consequently, the U.S. economy was extremely vulnerable to 

shocks during the months of September and October. This is why panics 

during this era, such as the Panic of1873, usually occurred in the fall. 

FALLOUT FROM THE PANIC OF 1873 

The form-seasonal elasticity induced panic of 1873 had national 

consequences. Treasury receipts dipped below federal outlays in November 

and December and the Secretary of the Treasury-taking on the role of a 

central banker-was forced to reissue $26 million of the $44 million 

greenbacks in reserve. The political uproar and populist accusations 

stemming from this action-the Treasury serving as lender of last resortflowed freely and in some ways are still echoed in the early 21" century (Le., 

Washington favors New York). The resulting political and economic climate 

for the 1874 election swung control of Congress to the Democrats for the 

first time since the Civil War. 

jec.senate.gov /republicans 

Economic panics, such as 

the Panic of 1873, were 

unnecessary and policyinduced through the 

inelasticity of the US, 

money supply relative to 

the seasonal fluctuations 

in the demandforcurrency 

and bank deposits. 

Populist outcry over the 

Panic of1873 remained 

acute, but it was more 

targeted at the panic's 

effects rather than its 

cause: the form-seasonal 

elasticity problem, 

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Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Commentary 

Resumption of the 

conversion of dollars to 

gold, at the pre-war mint 

price, occurred without 

incident on January 1, 

1879. 

The Sherman Silver 

Purchase Act backfired as 

people turned in the new 

notes-which could be 

redeemed for either silver 

or gold-for gold, thus 

depleting the Treasury's 

gold reserves and 

contributing to the Panic 

of1893. 

j ec.senate .gov J repu b !ica ns 

Populist outcry over the Panic of 1873 remained acute, but it was more 

targeted at the panic's effects rather than its cause. As a result of the 1874 

elections, the outgoing Republican-controlled Congress passed the Specie 

Payment Resumption Act ill January 1875 that required the Treasury to 

resume the convertibility of dollars to gold at the pre-war mint price of 

$20.67 per troy ounce by January I, 1879. 

FREE SILVER CONTROVERSY 

Between 1873 and 1896, the United States and major European countries 

experienced rapid GDP growth while tbere were no new major find of gold. 

As a result, long-term price deflation occurred. Consequently, in the U.S., 

farmers-particularly in the south and west-suffered as the real debt 

burden ofthe mortgages on their farmland grew. 

So, in opposition to resumption of the gold standard, the free-silver/cheapmoney movement emerged. Rep. Richard "Silver Dick" Bland (D-MO) and 

Democratic presidential nominee William Jennings Bryan became 

champions of "free silver." In response, a divided Congress (a Republicancontrolled Senate and a Democratic-controlled House) enacted the BlandAllison Act in 1878 after overriding the veto of President Rutherford B. 

Hayes. This Act was a compromise that required the Treasury to purchase 

between $2 million to $4 million per month of silver and mint it into silver 

dollars. However, Treasury had discretion about circulating these silver 

dollars since the federal government was running surpluses. Secretary of 

the Treasury John Sherman did not circulate the silver dollars, and gradual 

price deflation continued. Furthermore, through the Bland-Allison Act, 

Congress froze U.S. notes (greenbacks) at $346.7 million, which though it 

prevented a legally mandated reduction of the cap, still maintained a cap, 

which was again one of the causes of the form-seasonal elasticity problem. 

Under Sherman, Treasury accumulated gold reserves of $135 million to back 

the greenbacks, and resumption at the pre-war mint price of $20.67 per troy 

ounce occurred without incident on January 1, 1879. 

Nonetheless, free silver advocates were dissatisfied with the 

implementation of the Bland-Allison Act. In the Republican-controlled 51st 

Congress, Rep. William McKinley (R-OH) and Sen. John Sherman (R-OH) 

engineered a legislative compromise between different factions of 

Republicans. In exchange for the support of pro~silver RepUblicans from 

western states for the McKinley Tariff Act, Republicans from the 

northeastern and midwestern states agreed to support the Sherman Silver 

Purchase Act. President Benjamin Harrison signed the Sherman Silver 

Purchase Act into law on July 14, 1890. This act required the Treasury to 

purchase an additional 45 million ounces of silver bullion every month with 

a special issue of U.S. notes that could be redeemed for either silver or gold. 

However, the plan backfired as people turned in the new notes for gold, thus 

depleting the Treasury's gold reserves. Simultaneously the McKinley tariff 

increased the average tariff rate to 48%, reducing gold payments to the 

Treasury. 

PANIC OF 1893 

In his second non-consecutive term, President Grover Cleveland presided 

over the Panic of 1893 and the subsequent depression-the third worst in 

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Joint Economic Committee Republicans! Staff Commentary 

u.s. history-which lasted until 1897. The gold drain from the Treasury 

following the Sherman SHver Purchase Act and the form~seasonal elasticity 

problem were the prj mary causes of this panic, though there were other 

non-monetary dynamics at work. Among the other things, Cleveland blamed 

the depression on high tariffs and the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. The 

Democratic-controlled 53rd Congress repealed the Sherman Silver Purchase 

Act in 1893 and then enacted the Gorman-Wilson Tariff Act in 1894, which 

reduced tariff rates and imposed a 2% federal income tax on income over 

$4,000. However, this income tax was ruled unconstitutional in the 1895 

Supreme Court Case Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company. 

THE GOLD STANDARD 

During the second half of the 1890's, global gold production doubled after 

major finds of gold are in South Africa and Alaska, and the invention of new 

processing technology that increased the yield of pure gold from gold are. 

The rapid increase in global gold supply relative to global GOP growth led to 

mild global price inflation through 1913. In 1900, President William 

McKinley signed the Currency Act-the Gold Standard Act-that made the 

gold standard, which had been the de facto standard, the official standard for 

the United States, marking the high water mark for the classical gold 

standard. 

COMBATTING THE SEASONAL PANICS 

At the dawn of the 20th century, despite three decades of policy-induced 

economic panics, the root cause of the form-seasonal elasticity problem had 

still not been addressed. Not until President Theodore Roosevelt appointed 

Leslie Shaw to serve as Secretary of the Treasury were the first real strides 

made toward addressing the problem. Shaw was a skilled banker who, as 

Secretary, engaged in central banking to counter the form-seasonal elasticity 

problem through: (1) seasonal transfers of federal deposits between the 

Treasury and national banks; (2) acceptance of other bonds for collateral for 

federal deposits, freeing Treasuries to coUateralize national bank notes; (3) 

abolishing reserve requirements for federal deposits; and (4) allowing gold 

importers to use gold interest-free from its purchase abroad until it was 

delivered to the Treasury. While Shaw served as Secretary from the spring 

of 1902 to the spring of 1907, the United States was spared from the 

seasonal panics. 

PANIC OF 1907 

Still, something more permanent was necessary than mere reliance on the 

skills of a talented Secretary of the Treasury like Shaw. This again became 

apparent in the fall of 1907 when Shaw's successor at the Treasury, George 

Cortelyou-despite trying to follow Shaw's policies-was unable to finesse 

the situation like Shaw, resulting in yet another panic. 

During the Panic of 1907, Roosevelt worked with banker J.P. Morgan to 

secure lines of credit from foreign banks and organize national banks to 

make loans to other solvent, but illiquid banks. Roosevelt sent Cortelyou to 

Wall Street, depositing $68 million in national banks in New York City and 

issuing $50 million of Panama bonds and $100 million of Treasuries to 

provide additional collateral for national bank notes. In essence, Roosevelt 

jec .. 5'enate,gov Jrepublicans 

In 1900, President 

McKinley signed the 

Currency Act, officially 

putting the U.s. on the 

classical gold standard. 

President Theodore 

Roosevelt's Secretary of 

the Treasury Leslie Shaw 

engaged in central 

banking from the Treasury 

to counter the formseasonal elasticity 

problem. However, Shaw's 

successor lacked his skills 

to prevent the Panic of 

1907. This panic-and the 

need for a more 

pennanent solution to 

avoid panics-provided 

the final impetus for the 

foundation of a new 

central bank. 

PageS 
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Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Commentary 

The framework of the 

modern Federal Reserve 

central bank, which came 

Jrom the National 

Monetary Commission, 

grew out of the American 

experience oJpanics and 

economic hardships 

springing from the formseasonal elasticity 

problem. 

In a financial crisis, 

Bagehot's lender-oJ-lastresort principles hold that 

a central bank should lend 

freely to solvent, but 

illiquid commercial banks 

and other financial 

institutions based on 

collateral that would be 

good in normal times at a 

penalty rate of interest. 

The 1913 Federal Reserve 

Act created the 12 regional 

Federal Reserve Banks; 

created the Federal 

Reserve Board of Directors 

in Washington, DC; 

required all national 

banks to join the Federal 

Reserve System; and 

authorized Federal 

Reserve notes to replace 

U.S. and national bank 

notes. 

jec.senate.gov!republicans 

asked Morgan to perform the lender-of-Iast-resort function of a central bank 

on an ad hoc basis, while Cortelyou supplied additional liquidity. 

In response to the Panic of 1907, the following year, the Republicancontrolled 60th Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, which 

established a National Monetary Commission. In 1910, the Commission 

recommended: (1) Creating the National Reserve Association (NRA)-a 

central bank that would hold the reserves of all commercial banks; (2) Using 

the NRA's discount rate to regulate the money supply in the context of the 

gold standard (the discount rate is the interest rate that a central bank 

charges for fully collateralized loans to commercial banks); (3) Making the 

NRA the monopoly issuer of bank notes; and (4) Adhering to 'Bagehot 

principles' related to being a lender oflast resort. 

Walter Bagehot was an English businessman and editor-in-chief of The 

Economist. In 1873, he published Lombard Street, which outlined the 

principles for lender-of-Iast-resort operations during financial crises. 

Central bankers and economists still hold Bagehot's principles in high regard 

today. In a financial crisis, Bagehot advised, the Bank of England should lend 

freely to solvent, but illiquid commercial banks and other financial 

institutions based on collateral that would be good in normal times at a 

penalty rate of interest 1 

CREATION OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 

President Woodrow Wilson, elected in 1912, generally agreed with the 

recommendations of the National Monetary Commission to create a central 

bank, though with changes to increase federal oversight. 

However, Wilson's support for a central bank faced strong opposition, even 

from within his own cabinet In particnlar, Wilson was presented with a 

challenging dilemma when his Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, 

threatened to walk out on him and lead congressional opposition to the 

central bank. By acquiescing to Bryan, Wilson would have lost support for 

reform from bankers and business leaders; by pushing forward in 

opposition to Bryan, Wilson would have risked a divide within the 

Democratic Party and a loss of his entire domestic agenda. 

Wilson's solution was to work with Rep. Carter Glass (D-VA) and Sen. Robert 

Owen (D-OK) to find a middle way-the Federal Reserve Act-which was 

enacted in 1913. This act created a Federal Reserve System with: 

A monetary policy mandate to provide an "elastic currency" within 

the context of a gold standard to combat the form-seasonal elasticity 

problem; 

12 regional Federal Reserve Banks, each headed by a Governor; 

A Federal Reserve Board of Directors based in Washington, DC and 

composed of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller of the 

Currency and five other members to supervise the Reserve Banks; 

A requirement that an national banks join the Federal Reserve 

System by purchasing stock in their respective regional Reserve 

Bank and an option for state-chartered banks to join; and 

Federal Reserve notes-to replace U.S. and national bank notes--

which would be U.S. government obligations.z 

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Joint Economic Committee Republicans! Staff Commentary 

The Federal Reserve Act was thus crafted with multiple contradictory 

provisions, which allowed both advocates and opponents of the central bank 

to claim victory. On one hand, Bryan Democrats correctly claimed that 

Board would assure the federal government, not private bankers, would 

determine monetary policy. However, Bryan Democrats incorrectly assured 

their constituents that the Federal Reserve was not a central bank because 

each regional Reserve Bank would conduct an independent monetary policy. 

On the other hand, northeastern Democrats and Republicans correctly 

asserted that the Federal Reserve Act had created a central bank. Yet, 

because of nominal private ownership of the stock in the regional Reserve 

Banks, northeastern Democrats and Republicans incorrectly assured their 

constituents that private bankers, not the federal government, would 

determine monetary policy. 

These contradictory provisions would later ignite a destructive power 

struggle within the Federal Reserve in 1928, at the front-end of the Great 

Depression. Further complicating the birth of the Federal Reserve, World 

War I began before the central bank became operational in 1915, thus 

requiring Treasury Secretary William McAdoo to once again intervene to 

prevent a panic in the fall of 1914 by issuing $363 million in currency under 

the provisions ofthe Aldrich-Vreeland Act 

Life in America without a central bank was at an end. The age of seasonal 

panics-and the recessions and depressions stemming from them-was 

past. In the coming decades, the country would experience the best and the 

worst of central banking with the Federal Reserve gradually growing from 

these experiences into the modern central hank ofthe 21 st century. 

The Federal Reserve Act 

was crafted with multiple 

contradictory provisions, 

which allowed both 

advocates and opponents 

of the central bank to 

claim victory, These 

contradictory prOvisions 

would later ignite a 

destructive power struggle 

within the Federal Reserve 

in 1928, at the front end of 

the Great Depression. 

1 For further diSCUSSion of Bagehot principles, see Joint Economic Committee Report, An International Lender of Last Resort the IMF and the 

Federal Reserve, 1999. 

Availab!e at http://www.house.govllec/imf/lolr.pdf 

1 In 1913, the Federal Reserve was required to hold gold equal to 40% of the outstanding currency, and 35% of commercial bank reserves. 

For reference and further reading, see, Timberlake, Richard H., Monetary Policy in the United States: An Intellectual and Institutionaf History, The 

University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993. 

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Joint Economic Committee 

Re.nublz·cans R""·,~,,,tatiy, K,yin Un,dy '1-'" , ,I /(c (hmJ'm,m 

REPUBLICAN STAFF COMMENTARY 

UNITED STATES MONETARY HISTORY IN BRIEF 

PART 3: THE FEDERAL RESERVE-A CENTRAL BANK'S GROWTH THROUGH TRIAL & ERROR 

fv1arch 1, 201:~ 

SETTING THE STAGE 

Part 1 [1791-1860) and Part 2 (1861-1911) of this 3-part series explored 

the monetary and economic history of the United States. The US did not 

have a central bank from 1836 to the creation of the Federal Reserve in 

1913, and in the absence of a bank, the nation suffered from frequent 

seasonal financial panics, recessions and depressions. The Panic of 1907, in 

which New York banker JP Morgan acted as a lender of last resort and the 

Treasury provided additional liquidity, finally spurred the Congress toward 

enactment of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which reinstituted a central 

hank in the United States. 

THE FEDERAL RESERVE OPENS ITS DOORS 

With the creation of the Federal Reserve, the seasonal panics that had 

dominated the American economy since the 1870's ceased as the Fed 

effectively used the tools of monetary policy to provide greater elasticity to 

the U.s. money supply. Meanwhile, the Great War-World War I-raged as 

the Federal Reserve officially opened its doors for operations. 

The now debunked real bills doctrine, which originated with Adam Smith, 

guided the Federal Reserve during World War l. The essence of the real bills 

doctrine held tbat sbort~term bank loans extended to businesses, based 

upon anticipated profitability of sales of goods produced, were not 

inflationary, while other loans were. So, as might be expected, the real bills 

doctrine tended to be pro-cyclical monetary policy: When the economy was 

doing well and sales of goods were expected to be strong, the central bank 

would loosen monetary policy-though lending restraint was in order; 

conversely, when the economy was doing poorly and sales were expected to 

lag, the central bank tightened monetary policy-though more liquidity was 

in order. 

As the early Fed was guided by the real bills doctrine, loans were expanded 

to member banks during the war-related boom, and prices soared by 119% 

hetween 1913 and 1919. Learning from this experience the Fed's Board of 

Directors began to move away from the real bills doctrine, though the 

doctrine still held sway with the regional Federal Reserve Banks! other than 

the district of New York. 

(Continued on the next poge .. .) 

With the creation of the 

Fed, the seasonal panics 

that hod dominated the 

American economy since 

the 1870's ceased as the 

Fed effectively used the 

tools of monetary policy to 

provide greater elasticity 

to the U.S. money supply. 

As the early Fed was 

guided by the real bills 

doctrine$ loans were 

expanded to member 

banks during the warrelated boom, and prices 

soared by 119% between 

1913 and 1919. 

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Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Commentary 

World War I transJormed 

the world, but the U.s. 

Jailed to accept its new 

economic responsibilities 

as the world's emerging 

economic superpower. 

Winston Churchill 

resumed convertibility oJ 

the British pound into gold 

at its pre-war parity 

(instead oJ at the market 

price), and this lit the long 

fuse leading to the Great 

Depression. 

j e c.s enate.gov / rcpu b Ii cans 

THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AFTER THE GREAT WAR 

World War I transformed the world, but perhaps because of the same 

isolationist tendencies that delayed U.S. entrance into the war, the United 

States failed to accept its new economic responsibilities as the world's 

emerging economic superpower. 

Examples of the change in America's status abound. The nation's 

international position had gone from being a net debtor of$2.2 billion (6.4% 

of GOP) with the rest of the world in 1914 to being a net creditor of $6.4 

billion (8.4% of GOP). Tbe publicly held federal debt rose from $1.118 

billion (33% of GOP) in June 1914 to $24.485 billion (34.9% of GOP) in June 

1919. New York had effectively displaced London as the center of 

international finance, and the Federal Reserve had replaced the Bank of 

England as the global guardian of the gold standard. 

Meanwhile! as the international economic system deteriorated, the U.S. 

government refused to forgive its ames their war debts, stemming from 

$10.4 billion in u.s. loans during the war.1 America's refusal to forgive these 

debts contributed to the allies' refusal to forgive $16 billion of German war 

reparations, which were being relied upon to repay the U.S. To make these 

reparations payments, Germany had to run large trade surpluses. However, 

this could only happen if the U.S. and its allies reduced their tariffs and 

removed trade barriers against German imports. 

Regrettably, neither the U.S. nor its allies would allow German imports to 

displace import-competing domestic industries and their workers. This 

made Germany dependent on loans from U.S. commercial banks to pay 

reparations. When Belgium and France invaded the Rubr in January 1923, 

because Germany was behind on its reparations payments, U.S. commercial 

banks stopped making loans to Germany, and German workers launched a 

general strike with the resulting loss of tax revenue exasperating 

inflationary pressures leading to hyperinflation, Tbe following year, the 

allies agreed to the Dawes plan in an attempt to stabilize the situation, This 

plan reduced German reparations payments to $250 million in year one with 

gradual increases to $650 million in year five. In exchange, u.s. commercial 

banks resumed lending to Germany.2 

In 1925, Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill resumed 

convertibility of the British pound into gold at its pre-war parity. but this 

was a mistake. World War I had destroyed much of Britain's wealth and 

potential future workforce and output (through lives lost at the front); hence 

the U,K. was much poorer after the war. Assigning a value to the British 

pound in terms of gold greater than the amount of gold a pound could buy 

on the market after the war overvalued the currency, causing prices to be 

too low for British imports and too high for British exports, leading to a 

chronic current account deficit. Ultimately, Britain's return to the gold 

standard at pre-war parity lit the long fuse leading to the Great Depression. 

THE STRONG FED: THE FEDERAL RESERVE IN THE 1920's 

The Fed initially began open market operations' in the 1920's to provide 

income to the regional Federal Reserve Banks. By the end of the decade, 

open market operations became the Fed's primary monetary policy tooL 

Page 2 
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joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Commentary 

Also, in the early part of the decade, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates 

and contracted the money supply to reverse the inflation that had occurred 

during the war. This action caused a brief, but deep, recession from January 

1920 through July 1921. Afterward, Benjamin Strong, who was the first 

Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, emerged as the de facto 

CEO of the Federal Reserve-largely through the force of his personality. 

Strong had a close friendship with the Governor of the Bank of England 

Montagu Norman, and to help the Bank of England maintain convertibility 

without devaluing the British pound, the Federal Reserve lowered interest 

rates in 1927 and 1928-even though an accommodative monetary policy 

was inappropriate for the booming U.S, economy. This action helped to 

inflate the U.S. stock market bubble of the late 1920's. 

THE FED'S GREATEST FAILURE: THE GREAT CONTRACTION 

Strong's death in 1928, at the beginning of the Great Depression, triggered a 

three-way power struggle within the Fed-involving the Governor of the 

Federal Reserve Bank of New York [George Harrison), the Federal Reserve 

Board in Washington, and the Governors of the other Federal Reserve Banks. 

The Board and the other regional Federal Reserve Banks-either because 

they believed that prices were too high and wanted to reduce prices back to 

pre~war levels, or because they resented Strong's support for Britainpushed for a contractionary monetary policy in 1929, repeatedly blocking 

Harrison from taking the actions needed to counteract the contraction of the 

money supply. Thus, the Great Contraction began in August 1929 and 

continued until March 1933. 

During the Great Contraction, the Fed failed to perform its lender-of-Iastresort function of providing loans to otherwise solvent, but temporarily 

illiquid, commercial banks.' This meant that many solvent banks that could 

have survived ended up failing. Also, the Fed reduced its holdings of 

Treasuries through open market operations; and despite massive gold 

inflows in 1930 and 1931-the Federal Reserve effectivelywentto sleep on 

the world's gold reserves by allowing its reserve ratio to increase to a peak 

of 83.4%. Had the Fed not existed, commercial banks would have had $1.05 

billion of reserves to expand deposits and loans at this critical moment.s 

The adverse economic consequences of the Fed's contractionary monetary 

policy were both global and monumental. These included: massive price 

deflation [25%); unemployment [1 in 4 Americans); intensifying waves of 

bank failures; and fire sales of assets, which undermined net worth. 

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: MONETARY CONFUSION 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office on March 4, 1933, and his 

confused and contradictory views on monetary policy prolonged the Great 

Depression in the United States, While some urged "reflation,"6 which 

would have been the correct policy, other forces conspired against them. 

On April 5, 1933, private households and firms were mandated by an 

Executive Order to sell gold to the Fed at a price of $20.67 per ounce; on 

April 17, 1933, gold exports were forbidden; on June 5, 1933, "gold clauses" 

(contracts providing the creditor with the option of demanding payment in 

jec.senate.gov jrepublicans 

The Federal Reserve 

lowered interest rates in 

19Z7 and 19Z8-even 

though an accommodative 

monetary policy was 

inappropriate for the 

booming U.S. economy. 

This action helped to 

inflate the U.S. stock 

market bubble of the late 

1920's. 

The adverse economic 

consequences of the Fed's 

contractionary monetary 

policy were both global 

and monumental. These 

included: massive price 

deflation (Z5%); 

unemployment (1 in 4 

Americans); intensifying 

waves of bank failures; 

and fire sales of assets, 

which undermined net 

worth. 

FDR's confused and 

contradictory views on 

monetary policy prolonged 

the Great Depression in the 

United States. 

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Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Commentary 

Necessary price reflation 

began to occur, but FDR 

short-circuited it by 

appointing Marriner 

Eccles as Chairman of the 

Federal Reserve Board. 

The Federal Reserve finally 

began to increase the 

money supply in 1939 to 

finance war-related 

spending, and by 1943 

prices finally exceeded 

their 1929 level-showing 

that reflation worked, 

when it was tried. 

i ec.sen a te ,gov / repu b Ii ca ns 

gold) were abrogated; on June 12. 1933, the London Conference was 

convened to discuss restoring the gold standard after devaluation; and on 

July 3, 1933, the London Conference collapsed after FDR sent conflicting 

instructions to U.S. delegates. In late December, FDR required the Federal 

Reserve to sell its gold to the Treasury at $20.67 per ounce. Then on january 

31,1934, FDR signed the Gold Reserve Act, which devalued the U.S. dollar 

by 59% by increasing the gold price from $20.67 to $35.00 per ounce. 

THE ECCLES FED: THE 1937 RECESSION AND A RECORD OF FAILURE 

Necessary price reflation began to occur, but FOR short-circuited it by 

appointing Marriner Eccles (November 15, 1934 - February 3, 1948) as 

Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. Eccles was a proto-Keynesian, and 

he opposed devaluation and reflation; blamed the Great Depression on overinvestment by firms and under-consumption by households; favored income 

redistribution; and thought monetary policy was ineffective, and 

consequently the Federal Reserve did not expand the money supply. 

The Federal Reserve was reorganized into its present structure under the 

Banking Act of 1935. The Act was meant to end confusion at the Fed and to 

centralize deciSion-making powers in Washington. The Board of Governors 

of the Federal Reserve System replaced the Board of Directors; the Secretary 

of the Treasury and Comptroller of the Currency were removed from the 

Board; the terms of Board members were increased from 10 to 14 years; 

Governors of regional Federal Reserve Banks were renamed as PreSidents; 

the Board of Governors was placed in charge of the Federal Reserve System; 

the Chairman of the Board of Governors was given an executive role; and the 

Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was created. The FOMC was 

designed to be a balanced body, composed of regional Federal Reserve Bank 

presidents and members of the Federal Reserve Board, though the FOMC 

quickly came to be dominated by the Chairman. 7 

Meanwhile, cautious bankers who survived the Great Contraction wanted to 

keep large excess reserves in case of future bank runs, but Eccles thought 

such reserves would cause inflation. So, from August 1936 to May 1937, the 

Federal Reserve doubJed the required level of reserves that commercial 

banks were required to keep at the Fed. Banks responded by contracting 

their loans and deposits to build new excess reserves above the now higher 

level of required reserves. This caused another severe recession from May 

1937 to June 1938, shOWing Eccles's experiment to be an economic failure. 

Finally, the Federal Reserve began to increase the money supply in 1939 to 

finance war-related spending, and by 1943 prices finally exceeded their 

1929 level-showing that reflation worked, when itwas tried. 

WORLD WAR II, KOREAN CONFLICT, AND "THE ACCORD" 

Through World War II, the Federal Reserve assumed a role subservient to 

the Treasury. To help the Treasury finance the war, the Fed targeted the 

long-term Treasury bond rate, keeping it at 2.5%. However, this built 

inflationary pressure during wartime, though price controls and rationing 

disguised it. Nonetheless, inflation exploded after the war when the price 

controls were lifted. 

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Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Commentary 

The Bretton Woods system was instituted after the war. This system 

created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (and 

eventually the World Trade Organization (WTO)).8 The Bretton Woods 

system required the United States to exchange gold for U.S. dollars at a fixed 

price of $35.00 per ounce, but only with foreign governments of their 

central banks-not US households or firms. Simultaneously, Bretton 

Woods required other countries to maintain a pegged exchange rate with 

the U.S. dollar.9 This arrangement is sometimes referred to as the gold 

exchange standard. 

Because of Eccles's opposition to monetizing the federal debt, President 

Harry S Truman replaced Eccles with Thomas B. McCabe (April 1948 to April 

1951) as Chairman. As the Korean conflict began, inflation soared, and the 

Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) challenged the Treasury's interest 

rate policy. This led to the Accord between Chairman McCabe and 

Secretary of the Treasury John W. Synder, which was brokered by Assistant 

Secretary of the Treasury William McChesney Martin, Jr. on March 4, 1951. 

This Accord provided for the Federal Reserve to conduct open market 

operations in Treasury "bills only," allowing the market to determine longterm Treasury bond rates; and it began the Fed's operational independence. 

Truman then appointed Martin to succeed McCabe as Chairman, believing 

Martin would allow the Treasury to recapture the Federal Reserve. Instead, 

Martin supported the Federal Reserve's newly won independence. 

THE MARTIN FED: UNNECESSARY VOLATILITY 

During the Martin era (April 2, 1951- February 1, 1970), monetary policy 

decisions were largely based on Martin's "feel of the market." In practice, 

Martin targeted interest rates and acted in a pro-cyclical fashion, whereby 

the Federal Reserve would add reserves to hold down interest rates when 

output rose and subtract reserves to maintain interest rates when output 

fell. This contributed to the short business cycles in the 1950's. 

The Federal Reserve's "bills only" approach was dropped during the 

Kennedy Administration and replaced with Operation Twist In Operation 

Twist, the FOMC bought Treasury bonds to lower long-term interest rates 

and spur domestic investment, while simultaneously selling Treasury bills to 

increase short-term interest rates. The goal was to attract foreign portfolio 

investment, support the U.S. dollar, and reduce gold outf1ows. However, 

Operation Twist is now regarded as a failure. Eventually, economists Milton 

Friedman, Karl Brunner, and Allan Meltzer became leading critics of Martin. 

THE BURNS FED: THE GREAT INFLATOR; GUNNING THE MONEY SUPPLY 

Succeeding Martin as Chairman of the Fed was Arthur Burns (February 1, 

1970 - March 8, 1978), who became known as the Great Inflator. 

In the early 1970's, attempts were made to save the Bretton Woods system 

of fixed exchange rates tied to the dollar. On August 15, 1971, President 

Richard Nixon announced his New Economic Plan. This plan imposed a 90-

day price freeze followed by comprehensive price controls; a 10% tariff on 

imports, and effectively ended the gold exchange standard, thus removing 

the last vestiges of a link from the U.S. dollar to gold. 

jcc.senate.gov jrepub!icans 

The Bretton Woods system 

created the IMP, World 

Bank (and eventually the 

WTO). It put the u.s, on a 

gold exchange standard, 

whereby the United States 

was required to exchange 

gold for U.s, dollars, but 

only with foreign 

governments or their 

central banks. 

In 1950, the FOMC 

challenged the Treasury's 

interest rate policy, 

resulting in the Accord, 

which began the Fed's 

operational independence. 

On August 15,1971, 

President Richard Nixon 

effectively ended the gold 

exchange standard, thus 

removing the last vestiges 

ofa linkfrom the u.s, 

dollar to gold, 

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Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Commentary 

Chairman Burns followed 

ago-stop approach with 

unpredictable swings from 

loose to tight monetary 

policy_ Stagflation 

resulted. 

Until 1982, Volcker 

fOllowed a pseudomonetarism, allowing high 

nominal and real interest 

rates to arrest price 

inflation. 

j ec.s e na te.gov I repu b! i cans 

In reaction to the New Economic Plan, Treasury Secretary John Connolly 

negotiated the Smithsonian Agreement with other G~ 10 countries. This 

agreement provided for a devaluation of the U.S. dollar from $35.00 per 

ounce of gold to $42.22 in exchange for the resumption of the Bretton 

Woods system. However, this agreement quickly fell apart. By March 1973, 

the era of freely floating exchange rates, not tied to gold, began. 

Chairman Burns succumbed to Nixon's pressure to "gun the money supply" 

while price controls were in place to make the economy appear better than 

it was when Nixon ran for reelection in 1972. Under Burns, the Fed followed 

a go-stop approach with unpredictable swings from loose to tight monetary 

policy, and stagflation resulted. 

Briefly succeeding Burns as Chairman in 1978 was G. William Miller, who 

was appointed by President Jimmy Carter. Miller was a Keynesian who 

opposed higher interest rates to check inflation and blamed inflation on 

"real" factors such as oil shortages and labor contracts with cost-of~1ivjng 

wage adjustments. MiHer continued Burns's misguided policies. Price 

inflation soared; and the foreign exchange value of the U.s. dollar collapsed. 

Carter appointed Miller as Treasury Secretary to remove him from the Fed. 

THE VOLCKER FED: BREAKING THE BACK OF INFLATION 

President Carter next appointed Paul A. Voleker (August 6, 1979 August 

11, 1987) as Chairman. Until 1982, Voleker followed a pseudomonetarism, under which the Federal Reserve stopped targeting the 

federal funds rate and claimed that it was targeting monetary aggregates. 

This allowed high nominal and real interest rates to arrest price inflation; 

but it was mainly a ruse, designed to shield the Federal Reserve from the 

blame for the resulting recessions. (Under true monetarism, a central bank 

would focus on the growth rate of money aggregates to achieve price 

stability. Monetarism assumes that the velocity of money is stable.) 

Volcker overreacted to President Reagan's tax cuts as being inflationary-an 

error that contributed to the severity of the August 1981 to November 1982 

recession. Afterward, Volcker adopted a variety rules~based approaches at 

different times, and the FOMC abandoned targeting monetary aggregates. 

In 1985, Voleker concurred with the Plaza Accord, which committed the 

United States to a depreciation of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. 

dollar. Then, just two years later in 1987, Voleker concurred with the 

I.ouvre Accord, which committed the United States to stop the depreciation 

of the foreign exchange value of the U.s. dollar. The monetary flip-flop from 

accelerating money supply growth in 1985 to decelerating money supply 

growth in 1987 to meet U.S. commitments in these accords contributed to 

the "Black Monday" stock market crash on October 19, 1987. 

THE EARLY GREENSPAN FED: RULES·BASED POLICY WORKS 

President Reagan appointed Alan Greenspan (August 11, 1987 - January 31, 

2006) to follow Voleker as Federal Reserve Chairman. Greenspan had 

established strong credibility early in his tenure on "Black Monday" as he 

issued a statement that affirmed the Fed's "readiness to serve as a source of 

liquidity to support the economic and financial system," and he exerted 

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Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Commentary 

behind~the~scenes pressure on commercial banks to provide credit to 

independent investment banks. These actions prevented a wider financial 

crisis, and Greenspan's credibility grew even stronger as he helped to nip 

inflation during the July 1990 to March 1991 recession. 

Greenspan also received high marks for increasing the Fed's transparency. 

In 1994, he began announcing federal funds rate targets publicly after FOMC 

meetings; and in 1998, he began releasing even more details. During the 

great boom of the 1990's, Greenspan tightened monetary policy, increasing 

U.S, interest rates and the foreign exchange value of dollar. 

The era under Volcker and Greenspan is generally referred to as the Great 

Moderation [1983-2000), during which the Fed pursued price stability 

through rules-based monetary policy, much along the lines of the Taylor 

rule, devised by Stanford economist John Taylor. Generally, the Taylor rule 

holds that the Fed should increase the federal funds rate as inflationary 

forces increase and lower it as they decrease, This approach resulted in two 

long economic booms, low inflation, and lower unemployment rates. 

CONCLUSION 

Covering more recent events at the Fed and U.S. monetary policy 

prescriptions for the future is beyond the reach of this history series. Those 

subjects will be covered in future JEC Republican papers. 

In sum, the monetary history experience in America has been: 

Economic freedom and prosperity with an independent central bank, 

managed by competent individuals [e.g. the First Bank, the Second Bank 

from 1822-1828, and the Federal Reserve during the Great Moderation); 

Challenges absent a central bank [e.g. 1811-1816, 1836-1915); and 

Recessions, depressions and stagflation when the central bank endures 

interference from politicians [e.g. the Second Bank from 1816-1822 and 

1828-1836, the Eccles Fed, and the Burns Fed.) 

The American experience is that economic freedom and prosperity are best 

served by monetary policy that is rules~based and non-interventionist 

1 The $10.4 billion in U.S. World War t loans induded $4.8 billion to the U.K. and $3.4 billion to France. 

The era under Volcker and 

Greenspan is generally 

referred to as the Great 

Moderation (198Z-Z000), 

during which the Fed 

pursued price stability 

through rules-based 

monetary policy, The 

results of this approach 

were two long economic 

booms, low inflation, and 

lower unemployment 

rates. 

The American experience 

is that economic freedom 

and prosperity are best 

served by monetary policy 

that is rules-based and 

non-interventionist 

2 Felzenberg, Alvin Stephen, The Leaders We Deserved (And a Few We Didn'f), Basic Books, New York, 2008, p.207. 

3 As noted in Part 1 of this series, open market operations include buying and selling of gold, silver, and government debt securities. 

4 During the Great Contraction, the Fed actually reduced its loans to banks from $1.29 billion in 1928 to $0.12 billion in 1933. 

S Timberlake, Richard H., Monetary Policy in the United States: An Intellectual ond Institutional History, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 

1993, p.266. 

6 Notably George Warren, Irving Fisher, and john R. Commons urged reflation. 

7 Currently, the FOMe is composed of 12 members: seven members from the Board of Governors; the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 

New York; and four of the remaining 11 regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents, (The seven other regional bank presidents currently do not 

vote.) 

8 The World Trade Organization was finally created in 1995. 

9 The U.s. dollar was fixed at $35.00 per ounce of gold, but only foreign central banks could demand gold for U.S. dollars. This was not a gold 

standard, but a gold exchange standard. 

For reference and further reading, see, Timberlake, Richard H' I Monetary Policy in the United States: An IntefJectual and Institutional History, The 

University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993. 

jecsenate.gov /republicans Page 7 
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Joint Econolnic Committee 

Re'nublz'can C' ~,,,,,~,,,'atiy, K,,'" amd, y j,,~ lr({'{ilmrmull 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

UNITED STATES MONETARY POLICY GOING FOWARD 

A Single Mandate for Price Stability Will Help Maximize Job Creation and Economic Growth 

j'vtln:h 2, ~~O 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

In recent years, the Federal Reserve has shifted away from wellestablished norms for monetary policy. These policy deviationswhich include holding interest rates too low for too long from 2002 to 

2005 (Figure 1) and intervening into the market during and after the 

financial crisis of 200S (Figure 2 on reverse) -have harmed the U.S. 

economy. The Federal Reserve's actions contributed to the inflation 

of an unsustainable housing bubble; a glohal financial crisis; and 

increased market uncertainty, which has inhibited a robust recovery. 

Avoiding these policy deviations may well bave mitigated the 

economic harm and caused fewer Americans to lose their jobs. 

figure 1. Actual Federal Funds Rate vs. the Rate Prescribed 

by Taylor Rule, using peE Deflator since 1986 

)0 

·2 

1986 1989 1992 1995 1998- 2001 20001 2007 2010 

This era of monetary policy experimentation should end; history has 

demonstrated what works and what doesn't. During the 1970's, th,' 

Federal Reserve produced destructive stagflation-the combination 

of high unemployment and high inflation-by pursuing a "go-stop" 

monetary policy oscillating between a focus on inflation and a focus 

on employment. 

jec.S('llJte.gllV/rqlllbliGlllS 

In the period from 2002 to 

2005, the Federal Reserve 

held interest rates too low 

Jor too long, This policy 

deviation contributed to 

the housing bubble, 
205 


75727.160

Tile Federal Reserve's 

balance slleet Ilas over 

tripled since tile financial 

crisis, Its policy stance 

risks Ilarmful price 

inflation going forward, 

111 order to ellSure a 

prosperous America in tile 

21st century, tile Federal 

Reserve sllould implement 

a rilles-based, inflationtargeting monetary policy 

going forward in order to 

promote long-term price 

stability, economic growtll 

and job creation. 

EconOnltC Committee 

Figure 2. Massive Expansion of the Federal Reserve 

Balance Sheet since 2006 (millions $) 

$2,000,000 

$1,500,000 

$1,000,000 

:$500,000 

10 Mny-1007 jon-20GB S~p-200i! M"y_20Q9 Jq,~·201D S~p_101Q "'ay·2011 jnn-2(}12 

Conversely, during the period from 1983 to 2000-known by 

economists as the "Great Moderation"-the Federal Reserve 

implemented a rules-based monetary policy that focused on 

containing inflation. The predictability of monetary policy in that era 

allowed businesses to confidently engage in long-term planning and 

investment. As a result, our economy flourished. Two robust 

economic expansions occurred-the November 1982 to July 1990 

economic expansion, which lasted 31 quarters, and the March 1991 to 

March 2001 expansion, which lasted 40 quarters. Not surprisingly, 

the unemployment rate trended down over the same period. 

In order to ensure a prosperous America in the 21" century, the 

Federal Reserve should refocus its efforts on what works. It should 

implement a rules-based monetary policy going forward in order to 

promote long-term price stability, economic growth and job creation. 

This study provides four policy recommendations to achieve rulcsbased poliCies going forward: 

1. Create a single mandate for the Federal Reserve to maintain 

long-term price stability; 

2. Require the Federal Reserve to monitor asset prices for signs 

of incipient asset price bubbles; 

3. Restrict open market operations to U.S. Treasuries, repurchase 

agreements, and reverse repurchase agreements during 

normal times; and 

4. Require the Federal Reserve to clearly articulate a lender-oflast-resort policy. 
206 


75727.161

Joint Economic Committee 

Repub lz'cans' R,p",~,'otatiH" K,,;n IImd, " ,11«'(hun"m(Ul 

UNITED STATES MONETARY POLICY GOING FORWARD 

A Single Mandate for Price Stability Will Help Maximize job Creation and Economic Growth 

March 2012 

INTRODUCTION 

In recent years, the Federal Reserve has shifted away from wellestablished norms for monetary policy. These policy deviations 

contributed to the inflation of an unsustainable housing bubble, a 

global financial crisis, and increased market uncertainty, which has 

inhibited a robust recovery. Avoiding these policy deviations may 

well have mitigated the ensuing negative fallout. Therefore, the 

Federal Reserve should implement a rules-based monetary policy 

going forward in order to promote long-term price stability, economic 

growth and job creation. 

The Federal Reserve deviated from norms for monetary policy in the 

period from 2002 to 2005 by holding its target rate for federal funds 

too low for too long. This deviation contributed to the inflation of an 

unsustainable housing bubble and, once the Federal Reserve raised 

interest rates, a dramatic decline in home prices after they peaked in 

the summer of 2006. When the housing bubble burst, the severe 

correction in home prices lead to an unprecedented increase in 

residential foreclosure rates. 

During the past decade, the proliferation of mispriced derivative 

financbl instruments in the financial services sector resulted in a 

systemic vulnerability to defaults in home loans. The unexpectedly 

high default rates occurred because many widely-held derivatives had 

as reference assets either (1) residential mortgage loans, (2) 

securities containing residential mortgage loans, or (3) securities of 

companies engaged in residential mortgage securitization. As a result, 

disruptions in the housing market cascaded throughout the financial 

system, and a global financial crisis ensued. Had monetary policy 

followed its previous policy route, the severity of the crisis and the 

subsequent recession likely would have been mitigated. 

During and after the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve engaged in 

several additional unconventional policy actions. Some of these 

jecscnatc.gov jrcpubl irans 

In recelltyears, the Federal 

Reserve has deviated from 

weI/-establish norms for 

monetary policy. 

These policy deviations 

contributed to the 

unsustainable housing 

bubble, the bursting of 

which cascaded through 

the financial system and 

created a global financial 

crisis. 
207 


75727.162

So far, policymakers have 

paid insufficient attention 

the macroeconomic causes 

of the crisis, especially the 

Federal Reserve's 

monetary policy in the 

lead-up to, during, and 

after the crisis, 

After discussing some 

historical context, this 

study provides four policy 

recommendations: 

(I) Create a single 

mandate for longterm price stability; 

(Z) Requiring the Fed to 

monitor asset 

prices; 

(3) Restrict open 

market operations 

to U,S, Treasuries, 

repos, and reverse 

repos during 

normal times; and 

(4) Require the Fed to 

articulate its lenderof-last-resort policy, 

i e c.senate ,gOY I rep ubI lea ns 

Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Study 

actions-such as providing emergency liquidity to the market during 

the height of the financial crisis-were in keeping with the Federal 

Reserve's role as the lender of last resort and its emergency authority. 

Other actions-such as the Federal Reserve's controversial 

intervention into the housing market -are more questionable 

because they occurred after the acute effects of the crisis had passed. 

Significantly, these post-crisis actions have sustained the Federal 

Reserve's balance sheet at unprecedented levels-triple its pre-crisis 

size-thereby risking the possibility of harmful future price inflation. 

In light of the housing bubble, the global financial crisis, and the 

subsequent anemic economic recovery, federal policymakers are 

reconsidering the oversight and regulation of U.S. financial 

institutions and markets. So far, federal policymakers have focused 

on perceived microeconomic causes of the crisis, including: (1) 

federal housing policies that sought to increase the rate of home 

ownership; (2) possible market failures; (3) shortcomings in federal 

oversight and regulatory regimes for financial institutions and 

markets; and (4) wrongdoing by certain firms and individuals1 

However, the financial crisis had both macroeconomic and 

microeconomic causes. Federal policymakers have paid insufficient 

attention to the macroeconomic causes of the crisis-especially the 

Federal Reserve's monetary policy in the lead-up to, during, and after 

the crisis. 

This study begins witb a brief discussion of the advantages of rulesbased monetary policy over discretionary monetary policies. It then 

reviews the Federal Reserve's implementation of monetary policy in 

light of the rules-versus-discretion dichotomy and finds that 

discretionary actions by the Federal Reserve have contributed to past 

economic disruptions and pose a threat to the economy going 

forward. It concludes by commenting on the Federal Reserve's recent 

adoption of an explicit inflation target guiding its monetary policy 

decisions and by providing four policy recommendations for 

implementing a rules-based monetary policy going forward: (1) 

creating a single mandate for the Federal Reserve to maintain longterm price stability; (2) requiring the Federal Reserve to monitor 

asset prices for signs of incipient asset price bubbles; (3) restricting 

open market operations to U.S. Treasuries, repurchase agreements, 

and reverse repurchase agreements during normal times; and (4) 

requiring the Federal Reserve to clearly articulate a lender-of-Iastresort policy. 

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Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Study 

DESIGNING MONETARY POLICY 

Well-reasoned, stable and predictable monetary policy reduces 

economic volatility and promotes long-term economic growth and job 

creation. Generally, "rules-based" policies reduce uncertainties and 

facilitate long-term planning and investment. Rules-based policies are 

most successful when they are designed "with a clear focus on the 

longer term, and with allowance for future contingencies.'" 

Policymakers should set the rules of the game and make a credible 

commitment to abide by them; but, inflexible or overly prescriptive 

policies can prevent essential emergency actions during times of 

crisis. 

Conversely, activist, interventionist, and discretionary monetary 

policies have been historically associated with increased economic 

volatility and subpar economic performance. Reasons for this are 

numerous and, in large part, practical. First, it is difficult for 

policymakers to identify in real time the economic inflection points 

that mark the beginning of financial crises and recessions; this is due 

to the extraordinary complexities and dynamism of the economy. 

Forecasts based on economic models are generally unreliable in 

identifying such inflection points. Hence, it is very difficult for 

policymakers to establish a proper baseline from which monetary 

policy adjustment, should be made. 

Second, even when economic circumstances are both known and well 

understood, implementing the appropriate monetary policy response 

is rife with difficulties. One well-known implementation problem, 

identified by Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, is the long and variable 

lag between a monetary policy action and its effects on the economy. 

Another problem is the "time inconsistency problem," a theory for 

which Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott won the 2004 Nobel Prize 

in Economic Sciences.3 The time inconsistency problem refers to the 

difficulties created by the time lapse between the announcement of a 

policy and its implementation. During this time lapse, the optimal 

policy response may change, and such changes induce policymakers 

to shift course over time. Taken together, these shortcomings mean 

discretionary policies are a drag on the economy because they are 

unpredictable, may be ill-timed, and inappropriate. 

These two conclusions about the rules-versus-discretion dichotomy 

are quite logical, given that private businesses and households make 

plans based on expectations of future economic conditions. 

Unpredictable monetary policy creates uncertainty in markets and 

increases risk premia, thus boosting the cost of capital for business. 

An investment must yield a higher expected return to induce a 

jec.senate,gov /republicans 

Well-reasoned, stable and 

predictable monetary 

policy reduces economic 

volatility and promotes 

long-term economic 

growth and job creation. 

Activist, interventionist, 

and discretionary 

monetary policies have 

been historically 

associated with increased 

economic volatility and 

subpar economic 

performance. 

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75727.164

During the 1970's, the 

Federal Reserve 

implemented "a pattern of 

'go-stop' poliCies, in which 

swings in policy from ease 

to tightness contributed to 

a highly volatile real 

economy as well as a 

highly variable inflation 

rate." 

Rules based monetary 

policy, which was 

implemented under 

Chairman Volcker and 

Greenspan, focused on 

price stability led to the 

Great Moderation of the 

1980's and 1990's. 

j ec.se na tc.gov I repu b Ii cans 

Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Study 

business to invest in it. Consequently, unpredictable monetary policy 

lowers aggregate investment. This relationship between 

discretionary policy and reduced investment is particularly acute in 

illiquid assets, such as buildings, equipment, and software, which are 

key drivers of long-term job creation. 4 Similarly, households are less 

likely to make large purchases, including homes and automobiles as 

economic uncertainty increases. 

RECENT MONETARY POLICY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 

THE TURBULENT 1970'S AND THE GREAT MODERATION OF THE 

1980'S AND 1990'S 

The distinct impact of discretionary and rules-based policy is readily 

apparent when viewed within the context of u.s. monetary policy over 

the past 40 years. During the 1970'5, the Federal Reserve 

implemented "a pattern of 'go-stop' poliCies, in which swings in policy 

from ease to tightness contributed to a highly volatile real economy as 

well as a highly variable inflation rate."5 These unpredictable and 

disruptive policies were guided, in part, by a misplaced belief in a 

simple version of the "Phillips Curve," a widely discredited economic 

theory that found an inverse relationship between the unemployment 

rate and the inflation rate. Under the Phillips Curve, the destructive 

phenomenon of stagflation, which is the combination of stagnant 

growth, persistent high unemployment, and high inflation, could not 

occur. However, the Federal Reserve, using the Phillips Curve to 

guide its monetary policy actions during the 1970's, produced 

stagflation through its unpredictable policy actions. 

A sea change in monetary policy occurred with the appointment of 

Paul Valeker as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal 

Reserve System in 1979. His mandate was to break the back of 

inflation. In order to accomplish this goal, he raised the federal funds 

target rate from 11% in August of 1979 to a range of 18 to 20% by 

mid-1981 before lowering it incrementally to 8% in mid-198S. The 

economy suffered back-to-back recessions (January 1980 to June 

1980 and July 1981 to November 1982). However, inflation 

(measured by the consumer price index) dropped from 13.3% in 

1979, the year Voleker joined the Federal Reserve, to 3.8% in 1982, 

and thereafter averaged 3.0% over the next 20 years as Chairman 

Voleker and, later, Chairman Alan Greenspan implemented, with some 

exceptions, a transition toward a more rules-based monetary policy. 

Comparing other economic indicators under the "go-stop" monetary 

policy of the 1970's and the relatively predictable monetary policy 

climate associated with the 1980's to 1990's (i.e., the "Great 

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Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Study 

Moderation") highlights the performance advantages of rules-based 

monetary policy. Most notably, macroeconomic volatility decreased 

during the 20 years after the 1970's, with quarterly output volatility 

(measured by standard deviation) falling in half and quarterly 

inflation volatility falling by two thirds. Moreover, two robust 

economic expansions occurred during the same period-the 

November 1982 to July 1990 economic expansion, which lasted 31 

quarters, and the March 1991 to March 2001 expansion, which lasted 

40 quarters. Unsurprisingly, the unemployment rate trended down 

over the same period. By contrast, the longest economic expansion of 

the 1970's was only 10 quarters long. 6 

THE TAYLOR RULE AND A MAJOR POLICY DEVIATION IN THE 2 ODD'S 

Many economic researchers and commentators have suggested that, 

after a nearly 20 year period of relative predictability, the Federal 

Reserve deviated from a rules-based monetary policy during the 

2002-2005 period by holding the target federal funds rate too low for 

too long. However, this critique requires a framework for analysis, 

and it begs the question: from what did the target rate deviate? One 

particularly useful method for assessing policy deviations is to 

compare the historical target federal funds rate to the rate prescribed 

by the "Taylor rule.'" The Taylor rule, devised by Stanford economist 

John Taylor, is a monetary policy rule that derives a recommended 

federal funds rate based on the level of inflation relative to the Federal 

Reserve's target intlation rate and the level of real output relative to 

potential output.s Generally speaking, implementing the Taylor rule 

would result in the Federal Reserve increasing the federal funds rate 

as inflationary forces increase and lowering the federal funds rate as 

inflationary forces decrease. The Taylor rule is both descriptive and 

prescriptive: 

One such rule, the original Taylor rule, fit the data 

particularly well during the late 1980's and early 1990's, a 

period of generally favorable economic performance. 

Because this rule also performed well in a variety of 

macroeconomic models, keeping the volatility of inflation 

and output relatively low, the rule over time became viewed 

as a normative prescription for how policy should be set, 

conditional on afew economic indicators.' 

The Taylor rule is also robust with respect to speCification, meaning a 

variety of formulations of the rule itself result in similar prescriptions. 

These theoretical and practical advantages led to a de-facto 

institutionalization of Taylor rule guidance in the Federal Open 

Market Committee's (FOMe's) decision-making process after its initial 

jec.senate.gov jrepubllca tiS 

After a nearly 20 year 

period of relative 

predictability, the Federal 

Reserve deviated from socalled "rules-based" 

monetary policy during the 

period from 2002 to 2005 

by holding the target 

federal funds rate too low 

for too long. 

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Stanford economist john 

Taylor has argued that the 

cumulative effect of this 

monetary ease from 2002 

to 2005 contributed to the 

housing bubble and 

thereby increased the 

magnitude of the dec/ine in 

residential real estate 

prices on the back end. 

wcscnatl' ,gov I rcpuhllCclnS 

release in 1993. The FOMC is composed of 12 voting members and 

directs the Federal Reserve's open market operations, which 

effectuate the purchase and sale of Treasuries and other securities La 

influence the federal funds interest rate.lO Members of the Committee 

often referenced various Taylor rule specifications during the 

Committee's regular meetings, and utilized it as a baseline for 

conducting monetary policy actions. The past effectiveness of the 

Taylor rule establishes it as a reliable tool for assessing Federal 

Reserve policy discretion. 

During much of the period from 1986-2002 following the initial 

taming of inflationary forces, the target federal funds rate tracked 

closely the rate prescribed by the Taylor rule, with the exception that 

the actual federal funds rate was above the Taylor rule prescription 

for a period during the mid-to-Iate 1990's when the economy was 

experiencing explosive productivity growth (Figure I). 

Figure 1. Actual Federal Funds Rate vs. the Rate Prescribed 

by Taylor Rule, using peE Deflator since 1986 

10 

:J'. 

Q 

" .! 

0 a 

'" -2 

-4 

1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 

The bursting tech stock bubble in early 2000, the economic shock of 

the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the 2001 recession 

precipitated possible deflation concerns among some members of the 

FOMe. However, subsequent analysis of the economic indicators 

suggests that such concerns did not have a strong foundation. For 

example, headline consumer prices never experienced a year-overyear decline during the period from 2001-2005. In fact, the CPI 

averaged 2.5% year-aver-year growth during that period, and 

experienced a low average of 1.6% year-aver-year growth in 2002. 

Contemporaneous analysis of innationary data is difficult; however, 

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Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Study 

this analysis certainly refutes the contention that the economy needed 

aggressive monetary stimulus. 

Nevertheless, the FOMC voted to reduce target rates from 6.5% in 

December of 2000 to 1.82% by December of 2001. It then held the 

target rate below that level for nearly three years before 

incrementally raising it back to 5.25% by June of 2006. During that 

period, the target federal funds rate averaged 2.17 percentage points 

below the level prescribed by the Taylor rule (using quarterly data). 

Professor Taylor has argued that the cumulative effect of this 

monetary ease contributed to the housing bubble and thereby 

increased the magnitude ofthe decline in residential real estate prices 

on the back end of the bursting bubble. ll There is growing, but not 

universal, agreement among economists about Taylor's findings.12 

For example, a study by Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City vice 

president George Kahn found that "[ w]hen the Taylor rule deviations 

are excluded from [my] forecasting equation, the bubble in housing 

prices looks more like a bump."13 

Of course, Federal Reserve monetary policy from 2002 to 2005 was 

not the sole cause of the housing bubble. Microeconomic factors, 

including the housing policies of President Bill Clinton and George W. 

Bush to expand homeowners hip among historically disadvantaged 

and low-income households; pressure from federal regulators to 

lower credit standards for extending residential mortgage loans; the 

panoply of federal tax preferences for housing; market-distorting 

housing finance government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac); inaccurate ratings reports; and opaque derivatives 

markets, among others, contributed to the financial imbalances in the 

U.S. housing market. Other macroeconomic factors, including, most 

notably, massive capital inflows to the United States from abroad also 

contributed to the housing bubble." However, the Federal Reserve's 

monetary policy in the 2002 to 2005 period were undeniably a 

contributing factor-one that was wholly avoidable had the FOMC 

simply followed well-established and stable monetary policy norms 

rather than engage in discretionary policies. 

FINANCIAL CRISIS MONETARY POLICY 

The Federal Reserve responded to the bursting housing bubble and 

the financial crisis of 2008 by taking a series of unconventional 

actions (see Appendix A). Some of these actions clearly were in 

keeping with the Federal Reserve's role as "lender of last resort," and 

were initiated pursuant to the Federal Reserve's emergency authority 

under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. In times of crisis, 

jccsenate.gov /republicans 

"[W]hen the Taylor rule 

deviations are excluded 

from [my] forecasting 

equation, the bubble in 

housing prices looks more 

like a bump." 

The Federal Reserve 

responded to the bursting 

housing bubble and the 

financial crisis of Z008 by 

taking a series of 

unconventional actions. 

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jec.senate.gov jrepublicans 

Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Study 

depositors and other creditors cannot distinguish between healthy 

and unhealthy banks and other financial institutions. As a result, the 

flow of credit freezes, and all borrowers are penalized. A lender of 

last resort "ensure[s] that healthy financial institutions have access to 

sufficient short-term credit, particularly during [such] times of 

financial stress."15 By addressing the liquidity problems of solvent, 

but temporarily illiquid banks and other financial institutions during a 

financial crisis, a lender of last resort can prevent unnecessary failures 

that could cause a financial crisis to spread to non-financial sectors of 

the economy and escalate into a depression. 

Other Federal Reserve actions-including those preceding and during 

the crisis, both as general policy and directed to specific individual 

firms-addressed solvency problems, or selectively allocated credit to 

markets pre- and post-crisis. Insolvency reflects a fundamental 

weakness in the balance sheet of a firm because its liabilities are 

greater than its assets. However, addressing solvency problems in 

this way can induce firms to take undue risk under the assumption 

that they will later be "bailed out" if the risks don't pan out. 

Selectively allocating credit to favored markets can also distort 

financial decision making and lead to future asset bubbles. Thus, it is 

unclear whether this second category of actions was necessary, 

proper, or even helpful. The sum total of the Federal Reserve's actions 

over the past four years has been an unprecedented expansion of the 

Federal Reserve's balance sheet, which remains a risk to the 

sustainability of the economic recovery because it increases the 

danger of accelerating price inflation as the economy strengthens. 

The impact of the bursting housing bubble spread throughout the 

financial system and credit markets deteriorated well before the 

market crash in the fall of 2008. Within the bounds of traditional 

monetary policy, the Federal Reserve began lowering the target 

federal funds rate from 5.25% in August of 2007 to a range of 0 -

0.125% by January 2009. However, it also simultaneously 

implemented several discretionary policies in the year leading up to 

the crisis, including creating specialized lending facilities aimed at 

supporting financial firms with deteriorating balance sheets. Among 

these lending facilities were the Term Auction Facility (TAF), the 

Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), and the Primary Dealer 

Credit Facility (PDCF). The TAF was essentially a repackaging of 

existing Federal Reserve lending capabilities aimed at alleviating the 

stigma associated with borrowing from the traditional discount 

window, while the TSLF and the PDCF represented new lending to 

unconventional non-commercial bank borrowers. During this same 

period, the Federal Reserve engaged in the first iteration of an onPage B 
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75727.169

again, off-again bailout policy hy facilitating the sale of the investment 

bank Bear Stearns to IP Morgan-Chase with a loan of almost $30 

billion,lh It also extended currency swaps to foreign central banks to 

enable them to stabilize dollar-based markets under their jurisdiction. 

Initially, these pre-crisis actions did not increase the size of the 

Federal Reserve's balance sheet because the Federal Reserve 

"sterilized" (or offset) their effects hy selling over $:lO() billion of its 

U.S. Treasury holdings during the first several months of 2008. Then, 

when credit market deterioration accelerated in September 2008, the 

Federal Reserve expanded its existing crisis lending facilities and 

introduced new ones. Between September and November 2008, the 

Federal Reserve introduced the Asset-backed Commercial Paper 

Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF], the Commercial Paper 

Funding Facility (CPFF], and the Term Asset-backed Loan Facility 

(TALF]. Each facility sought to stabilize the financial system by 

providing liquidity to key credit markets outside of the traditional 

banking system. The Federal Reserve also bailed out American 

International Group (AIG], a large global insurer after allowing the 

investment hank Lehman Brothers to me for bankruptcy. 

Leading into the fall, the Federal Reserve halted its sterilization efforts 

because it was concerned about disrupting the Treasury market by 

flooding it with additional supply. Therefore, as firms began drawing 

heavily upon the myriad lending facilities, the Federal Reserve's 

balance sheet expanded maSSively-doubling to $2.2 trillion in just six 

weeks (see Figure 2 on the following page]. The Fed's halance sheet 

remained at this elevated level through the end of 2008. 

Figure 2. Massive Expansion of the Federal Reserve 

Bolance Sheet since 2006 (millions $) 

$3,000,000 

$2,500,000 

$2,000,000 

51,500,000 

$1,000,000 

$500,000 

$0 

May·2007 km-200S Sap-200S Moy-2009 JO]'l~2010 Sep·'2010 Moy·2011 )of'i·2012 

Leading into the fall [of 

20081, the Federal Reserve 

halted its sterilization 

efforts . .. [and] the 

Federal Reserve's balance 

sheet expanded 

massively-doubling to 

$2.z trillion in just six 

weeks. 
215 


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The most acute effects of 

the financial crisis had 

begun to recede by January 

2009, but the Federal 

Reserve took additional 

discretionary actions to 

maintain and even expand 

the size of its balance 

sheet. 

Despite the Federal 

Reserve's extraordinary 

efforts in 2009, the 

summer of2010 brought a 

marked slowdown in the 

already anemic economic 

recovery. 

j eLse na te ,goy / repu b! I cans 

JOint Economic Comn~ttee Republicans I Staff Study 

The most acute effects of the financial crisis had begun to recede by 

January 2009. Consequently, borrowing through the Federal 

Reserve's crisis lending facilities declined sharply, as the Federal 

Reserve's balance sheet fell by $300 billion in the first four weeks of 

the year. The size of the crisis lending facilities continued to taper off 

into the summer months, and, by the end of 2009, the great bulk of the 

related borrowing had ceased. 

If all else remained equal, the size of the Federal Reserve's balance 

sheet would have tapered down to pre-crisis levels as well. However, 

the Federal Reserve instead took additional discretionary actions to 

maintain and even expand the size of its balance sheet. 

In early 2009, the Federal Reserve announced a program of largescale asset purchases, dubbed "quantitative easing I" (QEl). The 

mechanical effect of the program was simply to sustain the size of the 

central bank's balance sheet as the emergency liquidity facilities 

tapered off; however, the policy implications of the program were 

Significant. Most importantly, the Federal Reserve began to actively 

support the housing market by purchasing over $1.25 trillion of 

residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and $172 billion of 

debt securities issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae.J7 

In essence, the Federal Reserve was attempting to manipulate the 

economy by subsidizing the housing market. It hoped lower home 

mortgage interest rates would encourage refinancing activity, thereby 

increasing consumers' disposable income. 

Despite the Federal Reserve's extraordinary efforts in 2009, the 

summer of 2010 brought a marked slowdown in the already anemic 

economic recovery: job creation sputtered, economic growth slowed 

and a manufacturing sector recovery melted away. The 2010 midterm elections drastically changed the composition of Congress, and 

federal policymakers were unlikely to implement fiscal stimulus 

programs in an attempt to spur the economy. Within that context, 

Chairman Bernanke announced in August a second round of 

quantitative easing (QE2), in which the Federal Reserve would 

purchase $600 billion of U.S. Treasury securities over eight months 

beginning in November 2010. The purchases brought the Federal 

Reserve's balance sheet to nearly $3 trillion-more than triple its precrisis size. 

More recently, in August and September 2011, the Federal Reserve 

took two additional unconventional policy actions. First, the Federal 

Reserve announced in its August FOMC statement that economic 

conditions warranted "exceptionally low levels for the federal funds 

rate at least through mid-2013."lB Federal Reserve policymakers 

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)o_int Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Study 

hoped this so-called "communications channel" would spur economic 

activity where large-scale asset purchases have fallen flat because it 

effectively commits the central bank to a highly accommodative 

monetary policy in the medium-term,19 

Second, the Federal Reserve announced in mid-September that it 

would implement another unconventional bond-buying program, 

known as "Operation Twist," running through the end of June 2012, 

The program is modeled after the Federal Reserve's previous 

"Operation Twist" in the 1960's, which was considered a failure by 

most economists because it only lowered long-term interest rates by 

10 to 20 basis points at most,20 The effect of this program is to extend 

the average duration of the Federal Reserve's Treasury holdings by 

selling $400 billion of U,S, Treasuries with maturities of three years or 

less and using the proceeds to purchase $400 billion of U,S, Treasuries 

with maturities of six to 30 years,21 Like quantitative easing, which 

reduces long-term interest rates, the program seeks to stimulate 

borrowing in order to finance consumer purchases of durable goods 

and housing and business investment in buildings, equipment, and 

software, However, unlike quantitative easing, the program will not 

increase the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet 

In addition to Operation Twist, the Federal Reserve has committed to 

reinvesting the principal payments from its holdings of federal agency 

debt and RMBS into agency RMBS, This change is a major policy 

reversaL Previously, the Federal Reserve had said that its massive 

intervention into housing finance was temporary and that it would 

allow its portfolio of federal agency debt and RMBS to decline 

gradually as principal was repaid, Now, the Federal Reserve has 

indicated that its portfolio of federal agency debt and RMBS is more or 

less permanent, Thus, the Federal Reserve will continue to allocate 

credit selectively toward politically favored borrowers, 

Analyzing the impact and appropriateness of the Federal Reserve's 

policy over the past four years is challenging, It is difficult to 

differentiate between the concepts of liquidity and solvency, which 

are often interconnected, Moreover, dynamic and complex markets 

are ill-suited to clean, post-hoc dissection and explanation, A lack of 

consensus among economists about the ultimate effect of the Federal 

Reserve's discretionary actions reinforces this view, 

However, three observations about the Federal Reserve's recent 

actions are worth mentioning: 

(1) The Federal Reserve's actions have increased market 

uncertainty, During the height of the crisis, the Federal 

jec.senate.gov /repubUcans 

The Federal Reserve's 

actions have increased 

market uncertainty, 

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However, the Federal 

Reserve needs to articulate 

its inflation target with 

more specificity. 

The Federal Reserve is an 

outlier-only two central 

banks outof47 surveyed 

by the Bank of 

International Settlements 

have an equally weighted 

mandate in additional to 

price stability. 

j ec.sena te .gov I repu b Ii cans 

Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Study 

executed monetary policy by using an explicit target for the price 

inflation rate. 23 The benefits of these targets are three-fold: (1) they 

increase accountability for monetary policy at the central bank; (2) 

they increase transparency of central bank monetary policy 

formation; and (3) they increase the independence of the central bank 

relative to elected policymakers. 

However, there exist unknowns related to the Federal Reserve's 

implementation of its new target. A primary question relates to the 

Federal Reserve's tolerance for short- to medium-term inflation, 

which can also be damaging to economic growth and job creation. 

Does the new 2% long-term inflation target allow for 5% inflation, or 

perhaps more, over a short-term time horizon? If so, the current 

articulation would be insufficiently restrictive. What is the highest 

tolerable rate of inflation over 5 years? 10 years? The answers to 

these questions go to the heart of the Federal Reserve's commitment 

to price stability. A related question focuses on the 2% inflation 

target itself. Is the 2% inflation rate a middle point, a lower bound, or 

an upper bound? Again, this kind of clarification is important to 

revealing the Federal Reserve's true intention with its new policy. 

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 

The Federal Reserve's monetary policy deviations in the period 

between 2002-2005 contributed to a destructive housing bubble; and 

new discretionary policies in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 

have increased uncertainty in the market and risk higher inflation in 

the future. These recent decisions represent a distinct shift away 

from the rules-based policies that characterized the Great Moderation 

of tbe 1980's and 1990's. Since it is well understood that predictable, 

rules-based policies create macroeconomic certainty and spur longterm economic growth and job creation, it would behoove federal 

policy makers to return to such a rules-based approach. Thus, the 

Federal Reserve should implement a rules-based monetary policy 

going forward. This study makes four recommendations that 

policymakers should adopt, either individually or jointly, in order to 

increase the likelihood of a more stable monetary policy: 

(1) Create A Single Mandate For Long-Term Price Stability 

The Federal Reserve's dual mandate-stable prices and 

maximum employment-has been in place since 1977. 

However, in practice, most central bankers have focused their 

efforts on achieving long-term price stability. In fact, among 

the 47 central banks and monetary authorities surveyed by the 

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JOint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Study 

Bank if International Settlements in 2009, only the Bank of 

Canada and the Federal Reserve have additional mandates that 

are equal to the weight of price stability.24 This is because a 

consensus exists among economists that monetary policy only 

affects real output and employment levels in the short term, 

whereas fundamental market factors (e.g., productivity growth 

and innovation, which are largely driven by budget, tax, and 

regulatory policies) affect real output and employment levels 

in the long term. Because an environment of price stability is 

conducive to long-run economic growth, achieving long-term 

price stability necessarily maximizes the sustainable positive 

effect that monetary policy can have on long-term employment 

levels. 

A recent study by the vice president of the Federal Reserve 

Bank of St. Louis, Daniel Thornton, echoes this analysis and 

provides an additional perspective through a historical 

analysis of the FOMC's statement of policy objectives.25 

Interestingly, until December 2008, the Federal Reserve had 

never mentioned the maximum employment prong of the dual 

mandate in its statement of policy objectives (which is found 

within the policy directive the FOMC votes on every six 

weeks)-a period covering almost 30 years since the dual 

mandate was created. This first mention occurred just before 

the Federal Reserve began its first large-scale asset purchase 

program (QE1). Again, in November of 2010, as the second 

program (QE2) program was initiated, "[rJeference to the 

objective of maximum employment was more prominent."26 

Although it is unclear whether these references indicate a 

substantive change in Federal Reserve policy, they do suggest 

that Federal Reserve governors might be using the maximum 

employment prong of the dual mandate as a "cover" for 

engaging in unconventional and discretionary poliCies. 

The best way to achieve maximum real output and 

employment through monetary policy is, in fact, to achieve 

stable prices; and given the Federal Reserve's possible use of 

the dual mandate as a basis for engaging in disruptive, 

discretionary policies, policymakers may want to consider 

simplifying the Federal Reserve's mandate to include only 

stable prices. 27 

jec.senate.gov jrepub!icans 

The dual mandate opens 

the door to more discretion 

at the Federal Reserve. 

Shifting to a single 

mandate for long-term 

price stability wi/1 focus 

the Federal Reserve on 

what it can control and 

strengthen its 

independence. 

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Conventional measures of 

inflation, including the CPI, 

missed the last asset 

bubble. 

As a result, the Federal 

Reserve should monitor 

asset prices for signs of 

incipient inflation. 

Political allocation of 

capital will undermine the 

Federal Reserve 

independence. 

jec.senate.gov /republicans 

Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Study 

(Z) Require the Federal Reserve to Monitor Asset Prices for 

Signs ofincipient Asset Price Bubbles 

The Federal Reserve should monitor whether or not its 

selected price index fully captures price movements in the 

economy. In measuring inflation, the Federal Reserve should 

consider the effects of monetary policy on asset prices and the 

potential misallocation of capital. While an easy monetary 

policy usually flows evenly into the prices of goods and 

services, an easy monetary policy sometimes flows 

disproportionately into the prices of certain assets. In such 

cases, broad-based goods and services price indices (e.g., the 

consumer price index (CPI), the personal consumption 

expenditure (PCE) deflator) will not fully capture the price 

inflation occurring in the economy. As a result, the 

disproportionate impact of monetary ease on asset prices may 

cause unsustainable price bubbles in certain assets without 

broad-based goods and services price indices registering 

significant price inflation. 

The Federal Reserve's response to potential asset price 

bubbles would vary depending upon the circumstances. No 

consensus exists as to whether a central bank should simply 

"lean against" asset price bubbles (i.e., factor them into the mix 

of indicators signaling inflationary or deflationary forces) or 

take more aggressive actions to "prick" asset bubbles'>" The 

policy response might involve monetary policy tightening. 

supervisory suasion, or regulatory action to reduce the 

excessive flow of credit to fund speculation in the asset class. 

Of course, the correct course of action might require a 

combination of actions. However. regardless of the outcome of 

the current debate, the impact of monetary policy on 

individual asset classes should be considered within the 

context of monetary policymaking. 

(3) Restrict Open Market Operations to U.S. Treasury 

Securities, repurchase agreements, and reverse 

repurchase agreements during Norma) Times 

The Federal Reserve's post-crisis purchase of over $1.25 

trillion of residential mortgage-backed securities has been one 

of its most controversial actions in recent years, and with good 

reason. By moving beyond the confines of the U.S. Treasury 

market (induding most repurchase agreements and reverse 

repurchase agreements, which are collateralized by U.S. 

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Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Study 

Treasuries), the Federal Reserve began allocating credit to 

selected markets, such as the residential mortgage market, 

which now features artificially low mortgage rates dampened 

by the Federal Reserve's purchase program. 

The Federal Reserve faces a fundamental threat to its ability to 

independently conduct u.s. monetary policy when it begins 

allocating credit outside of the U.S. Treasury market-therein 

politicizing its actions. Initially, the Federal Reserve's RMBS 

portfolio was set to run off over time, as mortgages were 

refinanced, homes were sold, or principal was repaid over 

time. However, in September 2011, the Federal Reserve 

reversed this policy and announced that it would begin 

reinvesting the principal payments from its holdings of federal 

agency RMBS-thereby holding constant its position in the 

market-instead of allowing it to taper off as originally 

proposed. It mayor may not be coincidental that the Fed's 

policy reversal coincided with intense political pressure to 

support the ailing housing market in order to spur a more 

robust recovery. Regardless, what is clear is that the Federal 

Reserve should not insert itself into political debates unless it 

is absolutely necessary under circumstances similar to those 

required for the Federal Reserve to invoke its 13(3) authority 

to extend em ergency loans. 

(4) Require the Federal Reserve to Articulate a Clear Lenderof-Last-Resort Policy to Govern Future Crises 

In the wake of the financial crisis, Chairman Bernanke justified 

the extraordinary steps taken by the Federal Reserve to bail 

out several firms that were previously outside its regulatory 

purview by noting, "Because the United States has no wellspecified set of rules for dealing with the potential failure of 

systemically critical non-depository financial institutions, we 

believed that the best of the bad options available was to work 

with the Treasury to take the actions we did to avoid those 

collapses."" To be sure, in its nearly 100 year history, the 

Federal Reserve has never clearly articulated its lender-of-last 

resort strategy.30 Well-known economist and Federal Reserve 

historian Allan Meltzer clearly describes the problems this 

policy void creates: 

The absence of a [lender-o}last-resortj policy has 

three unfortunate consequences. First, uncertainty 

increases. No one can know what will be done. 

jecsenate .gov / repu b Heans 

In its nearly 100 year 

history, the Federal 

Reserve has never clearly 

articulated its lender-oJlast resort strategy. 

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The lack aJ a lender-aJlast-resart policy increases 

uncertainty ... encourages 

political maneuvering by 

troubled firms, and creates 

moral hazard. 

Articulating a lender-aJlast-resort policy will 

mitigate these negative 

consequences. 

jec.senate,gov jrepuhlicans 

Joint Economic Committee Republicans 1 Staff Study 

Second, troubled firms have a stronger incentive to 

seek a political solution. They ask Congress or the 

administration Jar support or to pressure the Federal 

Reserve or other agencies to save them Jrom failure. 

Third, repeated rescues encourage banks to take 

greater risk and increase leverage. This is the wellknown moral hazard problem. 3l 

Requiring the Federal Reserve to clearly establish a 

lender-of-Iast resort policy-or at a minimum, a 

framework or set of gUidelines-will decrease 

uncertainty in the market during a future crisis and 

mitigate the moral hazards created by the legacy of the 

recent "too-big-too-fail" bailouts. A clear lender-of-Iast 

resort policy will also provide policymakers a 

benchmark against which oversight can be conducted. 

CONCLUSION 

This study suggests four possible Federal Reserve reforms that 

policymakers may want to consider to ensure a stable 

monetary policy going forward. 

(1) Creating a single mandate for price stability; 

(2) Requiring the Federal Reserve to monitor asset prices for 

signs of incipient asset price bubbles; 

(3) Restricting open market operations to U.S. Treasury 

securities, repurchase agreements, and reverse repurchase 

agreements during normal times; and 

(4) Requiring a clear lender-of-Iast-resort policy. 

Each reform seeks stability through increased transparency 

and predictability. Concurrent with policymakers' 

consideration of these reforms, the Federal Reserve itself 

should outline a clear exit strategy from today's discretionary 

climate and begin fostering a climate characterized by flexible, 

rules-based policies. 

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---- APPENDIX A: UNCONVENTIONAL LENDING FACILITIES AND BAILOUTS 

Federal Reserve Start Date Description 

Action 

Term Auction 12/12/2007 The TAF auctioned funds to depository institutions under terms similar to the 

Facility (TAF) Federal Reserve's discount window. The TAF initially auctioned up to $20 

billion every two weeks, but this amount was increased on severa] occasions 

to as much as $150 billion every two weeks. 

[nternational 12/12/2007 The Federal Reserve provided dollars temporarily to foreign central banks in 

Swap Lines exchange for foreign currency collateral and interest, enabling them to 

stabilize dollar· based markets within their ju!isdiction. 

Term SeCUrities 3/11/2008 The TSLF allowed primary dealers (e.g., investment banks) to post collateral 

Lending Facility and temporarily swap illiquid assets for highly liquid assets such as U.S. 

(TSLF) Treasuries in order to increase liquidity in financial markets. 

Federal Reserve 3/14/2008 The Federal Reserve facilitated the sale of the investment bank Bear Stearns 

bails out Bear to JP Morgan through a nearly $30 billion loan-the first financing of a nonStearns commercial bank institution in four decades. 

Primary Dealer 3/16/2008 The PDCF sought to improve broker deale~s' access to liqUidity in the 

Credit Facility 

I (PDCF) 

overnight loan market banks use to meet their reserve requirements. 

Federal Reserve 9/16/2008 Just days after allowing the investment bank Lehman Brothers to fail, the 

bails outAlG after Federal government effectively nationalized the insurer American 

allowing Lehman International Group and the Federal Reserve lent the firm $85 billion. 

Brothers to rail 

Asset-backed 9/19/2008 The AMLF made non-recourse loans to banks to purchase asset-backed 

Commercial commercial paper. The AMLF would soon be superseded in importance by 

Paper Money the creation oFthe Commercial Paper Funding Facility, 

Market Fund 

Liquidity Facility 

(AMLFJ 

Commercial 10/7/2008 The CPFF was used to purchase highly rated secured and unsecured 

Paper Funding commercial paper from issuers. It was the first Federal Reserve Facility in 

Facility (CPFF) modern times with an ongoing commitment to purchase assets, as opposed to 

lending against assets, and the first time in SO years that the Federal Reserve 

! provided financial assistance to non~financial firms. 

Money Market 10/21/2008 The MMIFF was created to I~nd up to $540 billion to private sector special 

Investor Funding purpose vehicles that invest in commercial paper, but the facility expired at 

Facility (MMlFF) the end of October 2009 without ever being used. 

Term Asset- I 11/25/2008 The TALF addressed problems in the market for asset-backed securities I 

backed Loan (ABS). Using this facility, the Federal Reserve made non·recourse loans to 

Facility (TAL F) private U.S. companies that had a relationship with a primary dealer to 

purchase recently issued, highly rated ABS. 

Federal Reserve 1/16/2009 The Federal Reserve worked jointly with the U,S. Treasury and the Federal 

bails out Deposit Insurance Company to provide a package of guarantees, liqUidity 

Citigroup access and capital to Citigroup. 

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Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Study 

1 Initial investigation into these areas culminated in the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 

Protection Act. PL 111·203 (July 21, 2010). 

2 See Chapter 3, "Design of Fiscal, Monetary, and Financial Policies~JI Economic Report a/the President together with the Annual 

Report afthe Council of Economic Advisors (1990). 

3 See Kydland, Finn E. and Prescott, Edward c., "Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of 

Political Economy 85/3 (1977); Barro, RobertJ. and Gordon, David B., "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of 

Monetary Policy," NBER Working Paper No. 1079 (1983); see also Dennis, Richard, "Time-Inconsistent MonetaI)' Policies: 

Recent Research," Federal Reserve Bank a/San Francisco Economic Letter (2003). 

4 See Greenspan, Alan, "Activism," Council on Foreign Relations (March 3, 2011). 

S "The Great Moderation," Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke at the meetings of the Eastern Economic Association (2004). 

6 Blanchard, Olivier and Simon, John, "The Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility," Brookings Papers on Economic 

Activity 32/1 (2001). 

7 For a historical overview of the development of the Taylor rule, see Also, Pier Francesco, Kahn, George and Leeson, Robert, 

"The Taylor Rule and the Transformation of Monetary Policy,'" Federal Reserve Bank a/Kansas City Research Working Papers 

RWP 07·11 (2007). 

IJ The general formulation of the Taylor rule is as follows: it:::; rr· + Tft + (J(Tft - 1[*) + Y(yt - y~}; where it is the recommended policy 

rate; rr· is the equilibrium real interest rate (assumed to be 2% in the oTigina/formulation o/the Taylor rule}i (Tft - rr*) is the 

difference between the inflation rate and its long~run target (with rr· assumed to be 2% in the original version); and (yt- y*) is 

the output gap, or the difference between real GDP and potentiai GOP; and p and yare both set to O.S in the original version. 

See Kahn, George A., "Taylor Rule Deviations and Financial Imbalances," Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2010). 

9 Ibid, at 65. 

10 The 12 voting members consist of "the seven members of the Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System; the 

president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; and four ofthe remaining eleven Reserve Bank preSidents, who serve one~ 

year terms on a rotating basis. The rotating seats arc filled from the following four groups of Banks, one Bank president from 

each group: Boston, Philadelphia, and Richmond; Cleveland and Chicago; Atlanta, St. Louis, and Dallas; and Minneapolis, 

Kansas City, and San Francisco. The seven non~voting Reserve Bank preSidents "attend the meetings of the Committee, 

participate in the discussions, and contribute to the Committee's assessment of the economy and policy options." Board of 

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Federal Open Market Committee," available at 

http·IIINWw'[ederalreserve.govlmonetarypolicy/fornc.htm 

11 Taylor, John, "Housing and Monetary Policy," Presentation for the Policy Panel at the Symposium on Housing, Housing 

Finance, and Monetary Policy, hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in Jackson Hole, Wyoming (2007). 

12 See, e.g., Kahn, George, "Taylor Rule Deviations and Financial Imbalances," Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2010); 

Jarocinski, Marek and Smet.') Frank, "House Prices and the Stance of Monetary Policy," European Central Bank (2008); Ahrend, 

R., Cournede, B, and Price, R, "Monetary Policy, Market Excesses and Financial Turmoil," DEeD Economics Department Working 

Papers No. 597 (2008), An alternative theory, posited by Chairman Ben Bernanke, holds thal a "global savings glut," which 

resulted in significant international capital flows into the U.S. economy, was a primary factor in causing the housing bubble, 

Bernanke, Ben, "International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United States," Financial Stability Review No. 

15, Banque de France (2011). 

13 Kahn, George, "Taylor Rule Deviations and Financial Imbalances," Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2010). 

jec.senate.gov /republicans Page 20 
226 


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Joint Economic Committee Republicans I Staff Study 

14- Bernanke, Ben, "International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United States 2003-2007," Financial 

Stability Review No.1S, Banque de France (2011). 

15 Carlson, John et ai, "Credit Easing: A Policy for a Time of Financial Crisis," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2009). 

16 "Maiden Lane Transactions," Federal Reserve Bank of N ew York, available at 

httn: Ilwww.newvorkfed.org/markets/maidenlilllcl!.tml. 

17 Federal Housing Finance Agency, "Data as of October 1, 2010 on Treasury and Federal Reserve Purchase Programs for GSE 

and Mortgage-Related Securities," available atVo!1Nw.fhfa.gov lwebfiles 117990/TreasFED10012010.pdf. 

18 Press Release, Federal Open Market Committee Statement (August 9, 2011). 

19 Historical evldence demonstrates that clear and credible Federal Reserve communications about forthcoming monetary 

policy actions can influence the policy's effectiveness. See, "Central Bank Talk and Monetary Policy," Remarks by Governor Ben 

S. Bernanke at the Japan Society Corporate Luncheon (2004). 

20 See, Bernanke, Ben, Reinhart, Vince, and Sack, Brian, "Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical 

Assessment," Federal Reserve Board (2004). 

21 Press Release, Federal Open Market Committee Statement (September 21, 2011). 

22 Press release, Federal Open Market Committee Statement (January 25, 2012). 

23 Cobham, David (Ed.), "Twenty Years oflnflation Targeting: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects," Cambridge University 

Press (2010). 

24 Ortiz, Guillermo and Yam, Joseph (Chairs of the Central Bank Governance Group), "Issues in the Governance of Central 

Banks," Bank of International Settlements (May 2009). 

25 Thornton, Daniel, "What Does the Change in the FaMC Statement of Objectives Mean?" Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 

Economic Synopses No.1 (2011). 

26 Ibid. 

27 See Thornton, Daniel, "The Case for 'Inflation First' Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve of St. Louis Economic Synopses No. 47 

(2009). 

28 For an example of an analysis suggesting "asset prices are relevant only to the extent they may signal potential inflationary 

or deflationary forces," see, Bernanke, Ben and Gertler, Mark, "Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility," NBER Working 

Paper No. 7559 (200). 

29 "Federal Reserve Policies to Ease Credit and Their Implications for the Fed's Balance Sheet," Remarks by Chairman Ben S. 

Bemanke at the National Press Club Luncheon, National Press Club, Washington D.C. (2009). 

30 See Meltzer, Allan H., "Policy Principles: Lessons from the Fed's Past," in The Road Aheadfor the Fed, Hoover Institute (2009). 

31 Ibid. at 22. 

j ec.senate.gov / republica ns Page 21 
227 


75727.182

THE WAIL STREET JOURNAL. ------------ " 

Q!'lf'!lQN March 28. 2012 

The Dangers of an Interventionist Fed 

of expcriclH'c shows thai rules lead to jJl'Osperily 

By John B. Taylor 

America has now had nearly a century of decision-making experience under the Federal Reserve Act. first passed ill 

1913. Thanks to careful empirical research hy Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz and Allan Meltzer. we have plenty or 

evidence that rules-based monetary policies work and unpredictahle discretionary policies don't. Now is the time to act 

on that evidence. 

rhe Fed's mistake of slowing money growth at the onset of tIll' Great Depression is '.vell-known. And from the mid1960s through the '70s, the Fed intervened with discretionary go-stop changes in money growth that led to fn:qucnt 

rcccssions_ high unemployment, low economic growth. and high inflntioTl. 

A a.tiP<" lor !nll.tlcn? ~~~OtIll$;~"$IbJ_",,~m~r 

- In contrast, through much of the 19805 and '90s and into the past 

decade the Fed ran a morc predictable, rules-based policy v'lith a 

clear price-stahility goal. This eventually led to lower 

unemployment, lower interest ralcs, longer expansions, and 

stronger economic growth. 

Unfortunately the Fed has returned to its discretionary, 

unpredictable ways, and the results are not good. Starting in 2003-

05, it held interest rates too low for too long and thereby 

encouraged excessive risk-taking and the hOllsing boom. It then 

overshot the needed increase in interest rates, which worsened the 

bust. Now, with inflation and the economy picking up, the Fed is 

again veering into "too low for too long" tenitory. Policy 

indicators suggest the need for higher interest rates, while the Fed signals a zero rate through 2014. 

It is difficult to nvcrstate the extraordinary nature of the recent interventions, even if you ignore actions during the 

2008 panic, including the Bear Stearns and AIG bailouts, and consider only the subsequent two rounds of "quantitative 

easing H (QF I and QF2)--··the large-scale purchases of mortgage-backed securities and longer-term TreaslII},s. 

The Fed's discretion is now virtually unlimited. To pay for mortgages and other large-scale securities purchases. all it 

has to do is credit banks \,v1th electronic deposits--{;alicd reserve balances or hank money. The result is the explosion 

of hank money (as shown in the nearhy chat1), which now dwarfs the Fed's emergency response to the 9111 attacks. 

Before thc 2008 panic. reserve balance" were about $10 billion. By the end 01"2011 they were about $1.600 billion. If 

the Fed hHcl stopped with the emergency responses of the 2008 panic, instead of embarking on QE 1 and QE2. reserve 

balances would !lOW he nnnnai. 

This large expansion of bank money creates risks. If it is not undone. then the bank money ·will eventually pour out 

Into the economy, causing inflation. If it is undone too quickly. banks may find it hard to adjust and pull back on loans. 

The very existence of quantitative easing as a policy tool creates unpredictahility, as tr(lders speculate \-vhethel' and 

whell the Fed \-vilI intervene again. That the Fed can, if it chooses, intervene without limi1 ill any credit markct~not 

Page lof2 
228 


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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. WSJ,_ 

only mortgage-backed securities but also securities backed by automobile loans or student loans---creates morc 

uncertainty and raises questions about why an independent agency of government should have such power. 

The combination of the prolonged zero interest rate and the bloated supply of bank money is potentially lethaL The 

Fed has effectively replaced the entire interbank money market and large segments of other markets with itself-i.e., 

the Fed detennines the interest rate by declaring what it will pay on bank deposits at the Fed without regard for the 

supply and demand for money. By replacing large decentralized markets with centralized control by a few government 

otlicials, the Fed is distorting incentives and interfering with price discovery with unintended consequences throughout 

the economy. 

For all these reasons, the Federal Reserve should move to a less interventionist and more rules-based policy oftbe kind 

that has worked in the past. With due deliberation, it should make plans to raise the interest rate and develop a credible 

strategy to reduce its outsized portfolio of Treasurys and mortgage-backed securities. 

History shows that refonn of the Federal Reserve Aet is also needed to incentivize rules-based policy and prevent a 

return to excessive discretion. The Sound Dollar Act of2012, a subject of hearings at the Joint Economic Committee 

this week, has a number of useful provisions. It removes the confusing dual mandate of tlmaximum employment" and 

listable prices," whieh was put into the Federal Reserve Act during the interventionist wave of the 1970s. Instead it 

gives the Federal Reserve a single goal of "long-run price stability," 

The term nlong~run" clarities that the goal does not require the Fed to overreact to the short-run ups and downs in 

inDation. The single goal wouldn't stop the Fed from providing liquidity when money markets freeze UP. or serving as 

lender of last resort to banks during a panic, or reducing the interest rate in a recession. 

Some worry that a focus on the goal of price stability would lead to more unemployment. History shows the opposite. 

One reason the Fed kept its interest rate too low for too long in 2003-05 was concern that raising the interest rate 

would increase unemployment in the short run. However, an unintended effect was the great recession and very high 

unemployment. A single mandate would help the Fed avoid such mistakes, Since 2008, the Fed has explicitly cited the 

dual mandate to justify its extraordinary interventions, induding quantitative easing. Removing 1he dual mandate will 

remove that excuse, 

A single goal oflong-run price stability should be supplemented with a requirement that the Fed establish and report 

its strategy for setting the interest rate or the money supply to achieve that goaL If the Fed deviates from its strategy, it 

should provide a written explanation and testify in Congress. To further limit discretion, restraints on the composition 

ofthe Federal Reserve's portfolio are also appropriate, as called for in the Sound Dollar Act 

Giving all Federal Reserve district bank presidents-not only the New York Fed president~voting rights at every 

Federal Open Market Committee meeting, as does the Sound Dollar Act, would ensure that the entire Federal Reserve 

system is involved in designing and implementing the strategy. It would oITset any tendency for decisions to favor 

certain sectors or groups in the economy. 

Such refonns would lead to a more predictable policy centered on maintaining the purchasing power of the dollar. 

They would provide an appropriate degree of oversight by the political authorities without interfering in the Fed's dayto~day operations. 

My, Taylor is a professor of economics at Stanford and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, This op-ed is adapted 

from his testimony this week before the Joint Economic Committee, which drew on his book "First Principles: Five 

Keys to Restoring America's Prosperity, " (W. w: Norton, 2012), 

A version of this article appeared Mar, 29, 2012, on page AI9 in some U,S, editions of The Wall Street Journal, with 

the headline: The Dangers of an Interventionist Fed, 

Page 2 of2 

75727.184

THE WALL STREET ,JOUlt'iAL. 

i By George Melloan 

The FedJs near-zero interest 

rate policy has punished 

savers without producing 

a. slrong recovery. Two 

hills in Congress would rein in the central bank. 

OPINION 

Congress Finally Takes on the Fed 
230 


75727.185

Statement by Professor James K. Galbraith, Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr. Chair in Government/ 

Business Relations, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at 

Austin and President, Association for Evolutionary Economics, to the Subcommittee on Domestic 

Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives. 

May 8,2012, Rayburn House Office Building. 

Chairman Paul, Ranking Member Clay, Members of the Subcommittee, it is always an honor as a 

former member of the Banking Committee staff to appear before you. Today I feel particularly 

privileged as I was on the staff from 1975 through 1980 and on the team that drafted the HumphreyHawkins Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978.1 drafted the Federal Reserve oversight 

sections of that act, and it was my responsibility to organize the hearings on the Conduct of Monetary 

Policy in those years, beginning with the enactment ofB. Con. Res. 133 in 1975. 

Let me join in the frustration that underlies the bills before you. The Constitution gives to Congress the 

right "to coin money, regulate the value thereof." Thc Congress correctly delegates the exercise of that 

power, but it also maintains its authority to set goals and to supervise the execution of policy. It has 

been a long struggle to establish the right relationship between Congress and the Federal Reserve, and 

to bring the right degree of openness, responsiveness and accountability to that relationship. 

I endorse B.R. 3428, which would remove the Presidents of the District Fcderal Reserve Banks from 

voting status on the Open Market Committee. The Presidents are not duly constituted "Officers of the 

United States" under the appointments clause of the Constitution. Their status as monetary policymakers is anomalous, and as the Supreme Court ultimately declined to grant certiorari when the issue 

was litigated by Chairman Reuss and Senator Riegle many years ago, the only remedy is legislation. 

HR. 3428 would take a useful step along the path to a better central bank.' 

That said, we cannot escape the need for a central bank. The United States before the Federal Reserve 

Act suffered from chronic deflation and financial panics; for this reason the period from 1873 to 1896 

was known as the Great Depression, until the 1930s got that title. In the past century only the 

communist countries dispensed with central banks and private banking firms, and this arrangement did 

not serve them well." For this reason, I cannot join in supporting bills that would repeal the Federal 

Reserve Act or bar lending by commcrcial banks.'" 

The key issue on which I would like to comment today is not whether to have a central bank or who 

should vote on policy. It is what mandate Congress should give to the central bank. This is an issue 

fraught with politics and ideology - and worse, with economic theory. 

When I served on this staff, my colleagues included the Chicago monetarists Robert Weintraub and 

Robert Auerbach. We worked together under Chairman Reuss to develop the "dual mandate," which 

was expressed as "to promote full employment, production, and real income, balanced growth, 

adequate productivity growth, proper attention to national priorities, and reasonable price stability" in 

the preamble of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act and as "maximum employment, stable prices and 

moderate long-term interest rates" in the Federal Reserve Act. 

My staff colleagues were committed monetarists. They believed that the Federal Reserve should pursue 

a policy of monetary control, to contain inflation. But they did not try to dictate that to the Federal 

Reserve. Nor would I have tried to dictate the pursuit of full employment over all other policy goals. 

Writing economic theory into law is dangerous and we stcered clear of it as best we could. 
231 


75727.186

The purposc of the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act in this area was instead to open a 

sustained dialog between the Fcdcral Reserve and Congress, with honest and forthright reporting on 

economic conditions, on the outlook and on the goals and instruments of policy at any given time. We 

understood that conditions change. We realized that economic idcas flow in and out of fashion. We felt 

that the goals of Congress were best served by stressing the element of dialog and oversight, within a 

broad framework of agreed objectives. 

The Humphrey-Hawkins Act did require the Federal Reserve to specify the range of growth rates of the 

major monetary aggrcgates that it believed consistent with its cconomic goals and objectives. This 

provision was not intcndcd to impose a strategy of monetary control on the Federal Reserve. The intent 

was to permit the Banking Committees to monitor the Federal Reservc's forecasting and modeling. Wc 

fclt that to allow the Federal Reserve to report in terms of economic forecasts alonc would make it too 

easy to evade discussion of what might and should be done under differing conditions. 

To stipulate an intermediate target range in tcrms of intercst rates would, at that time, have been highly 

controversial. Money-growth target ranges were something conservatives could accept, because of 

monetarism, and that the Federal Reserve could tolerate because they were not the operational tool of 

open market policy. Then in the mid-1980s the relationship between money growth and prices 

collapsed and so did the idea that target ranges for money growth were a useful indicator of Federal 

Reserve policy. However, becausc the law had been drafted to be intellectually flexible, the 

congressional oversight procedurcs survived this statistical and academic upheaval. 

This system has been in place for 37 years since H. Con. Res 133; 34 years since Humphrey-Hawkins. 

It has been used effectively on some occasions, less so on others. But it has stood the test of time. It 

has withstood changes in the wording ofthe law governing the hearings and reporting process. It is a 

robust procedurc because it serves the interests of Congress, ofthe central bank, and of the public. 

Two bills before you would now strike the employment objective presently found in the Federal 

Reservc Act, leaving only "price stability" and (in the case of HR 245) "moderate long-term interest 

rates" as statutory goals. In this they would emulate the model of the European Central Bank, whose 

charter stipulates price stability as the predominant mandate for that institution. HR. 4180 would be 

less flexible than thc charter of the ECB, which permits the pursuit of other goals so long as the 

primary objectivc of price stability is met. 

The presence of "price stability" among monetary policy objectives is established law; the question is 

whether it should be (apart from "moderate long-term interest rates") the sole stated objective. The case 

that this is so rests on a technical hypothesis, known as the "natural rate of uncmployment" or "nonaccelerating inflation rate ofunemploymenC' (NAIRU). This hypothesis was advanced by Milton 

Friedman and by Edmund S. Phelps in 1967, and it has been a staple of textbooks, but also of 

controversy, ever since. 

In a nutshell, the Friedman-Phelps natural rate hypothesis held that the labor market would settle the 

rate of employment and output, that money is "neutral" in the long run, and that any effort to create 

jobs with expansionary monetary policy would lead to runaway inflation. (The theory has bells and 

whistlcs, including "adaptive" or "rational" expectations and a "vertical Phillips Curve," but that is the 

essence of it.) From this it follows that the best strategy for monetary policy is to pursue a steady rate 

of inflation; other matters will take care of themselves. And from there one can argue that the best 

steady rate of inflation is a zero rate. It is this that HR 4180 and HR 245 would now write into law. 
232 


75727.187

A variant on this position is called "inflation targeting," which has been supported by Chairman 

Bernanke, at least in academic work. The theoretical target under inflation targeting is a stable rate of 

inflation, not necessarily a zero rate. Advocates argue that inf1ation targeting is consistent with the dual 

mandate, because (in their view) that rate of employment at which inflation is stable is the maximum 

sustainable rate. If that is correct, then the employment part of the dual mandate causes no harm and 

there is no cause to remove it. In a sense, under this view, the presence of "maximum employment" in 

the mandate is what permits non-zero-inflation targeting to be an accepted policy. 

"Price stability" is a stricter standard. To remove "maximum employment" from the mandate would 

seem to imply a directive from Congress to pursue zero inflation at whatever cost 10 jobs. In a world 

where wages normally vary with the changing age structure of the population (they tend to rise as 

workers get older) and where some important prices are set outside the country, this is a mandate to 

generate unemployment, so as to force internal devaluation, in response to practically any form of 

internal change or external stress. 

We can see a policy of this type at work in Europe, where there is a two-percent inflation standard. It is 

producing a relentless debt-deflation, under which unemployment rises, social institutions such as 

education, health care and transport are destroyed, and yet public deficits and the ratios of debt to GDP 

continue to soar. The unemployment rate in Spain today is twenty-five percent. At a meeting in Berlin 

in April, a high official of the European Central Bank stated that the ECB had been "fully faithful" to 

its mandate. Members of Congress might not be happy, should the Federal Reserve say the same thing 

at a moment when twenty-five percent of Americans were out of work. Unlike the ECB, the Federal 

Reserve is a statutory agency for which, ultimately, Congress is responsible. 

HR 4180 makes an explicit commitment to certain ideas, including the NAIRU", the "neutrality"of 

money in the long runV and the accelerationist hypothesis. It makes debatable empirical assertions about 

the efficacy of a price-stability mandate; I attach for the record a book review from Foreign Affairs, 

showing that not even Ben Bemanke and his distinguished co-authors could make this cuse with 

conviction". HR 4180 also admits that the concept of "price stability" is not easily measured; it sets 

out an array of statistical issues that would have to be resolved. This recalls the "definition of money" 

problem that bedeviled us when monetarism was in fa~hion"', calling to mind Goodhart's Law, which 

holds that as soon as an economic statistic is used for policy purposes, the meaning of the statistic will 

change. 

Welcome to Hamelin, in other words. Economists do not know as much as some assert. The recent 

record of the profession, which massively failed to anticipate the great financial crisis, cspecially does 

not inspire confidence. But let me now try to step outside the narrow parsing of terms in statutcs and 

textbook economics, to say a few words about the real world. 

Back in the 1970s, we economists did feel that the Federal Reserve held vast powers over inflation and 

employment. That was a legacy of the post-war American self-image, of our power, wealth and 

influence, combined with the influence of brilliant polemicists such as John Maynard Keynes and 

Milton Friedman on many people. 

Many economists hold a more reserved view now. Given the financial crisis and our deplorably slow 

recovery from it, many recognize that having honest, well-regulated banks is important - and that the 

damage done by catastrophic deregulation and desupervision cannot be repaired easily. So jobs will 

not easily recover, simply because interest rates to banks arc low. To us, the fact that quantitative 

easing has been a disappointment is no surprise. 
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75727.188

Many economists also now recognize that when inflation disappeared in the carly 1980s it was not 

simply because of the powerful personality of Paul Volcker or the fact that Congress started 

transmitting the Federal Reserve's views to the public via the Humphrey-Hawkins hearings. 

Disinflation was global. The high dollar, world debt crisis, collapse of commodity and especially oil 

prices, collapse of the Soviet Union and rise of manufacturing in China were part of the reason. Once 

these causes were set in motion, the Federal Reserve had little conlTOI over the course of events. 

Statements by Federal Rcserve officials in recent decades on their anti-inflation vigilance look silly 

now. Here we had a reverse King Canutc, standing on the beach at low tide, congratulating himself. 

The global economy is a fact. The financial debacle is a fact. We cannot escape from eithcr onc. In 

years ahcad we may well face continuing trouble with resource prices. We surely face a future of fewer 

jobs, especially so long as we do nothing about debts and banks. 

These are matters over which monetary policy, as such, has little influence. They cannot be fixed by 

fiddling with interest rates. 111ey could not be fixed by returning to money-growth targets. We are in a 

realm where the appropriate response of monetary policy is not clear; it will depend, in part, on what 

happens in the world and on the decisions that Congress takes on other matters, such as financial sector 

reform, bank supervision, energy policy and job creation. 

This reality should make us a bit less inclined to play King Canute, even if today there is a risk the tides 

may rise again. It should make us more inclined to study, learn, discuss and review, between Congress 

and the Federal Reserve, both the prevailing situation and the many lines of policy that will bear on the 

outcome. Whether to pay the cost of achieving any particular policy goal including price stability 

should depend on what that cost actually is. And that will depend on circumstances, which, as a point 

of notorious fact, you cannot rely on economists to predict. 

Today in economics our pressing need is for a fresh look at theory, and a thorough revision of 

doctrines that have dominated the subject for decades. In view of this, any law prescribing a single line 

of thought for the Federal Reserve would be a serious step in the wrong direction. 

Were we writing today the preamble of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, or Section 2a of the Federal 

Reserve Act, it's likely that we would choose difl'erent language. But the language that is there, with its 

multiple goals and objectives, is flexible and pragmatic; it permits discussion to continue in times of 

lmcertainty, when learning is needed. It does not lock either side into a rigid formula that it will then 

become necessary to evade. It is serviceable. That is the enduring value of the process now in place. 

I close therefore by reminding you of the words of the immortal American poet, Ogden Nash: 

"If there is one principle to Americans unknown, 

It is: leave well enough alone." 

Thank you for your lime and attention. 
234 


75727.189

HR 1401 would shorten the tenns of the Governors and rearrange the memberships of Presidents on the FOMC; it offers 

improvement over current alTangements but jt does not address the constitutional issue. For this reason I would prefer 

the solution proposed in HR 3428. Another solution would be to vest the entire voting power on monetary policy in the 

Board of Govemors, and constitute the Presidents as a non-voting Advisory Committee. This wou1d solve the 

constitutional question while making the smallest adjustment to present arrangements, since all the Presidents (or their 

representatives) attend the FOMC meetings in any event. In comparison, I can see no compelling reason to create fulltime positions at the Board of Governors for functionaries whose entire job would be to contemplate a short-tenn 

interest rate that may not deviate from zero for years and years. On the history of congressional lawsuits against voting 

participation by the District Bank Presidents on the FOMe, see Robert D. Auerbach: http://tinvurl.coml7bw9Jcs , 

especially this paragraph: " ... during the 19805, four lawsuits were broughl 10 require the presidenls of the twelve 

Federal Reserve Banks to be Constitutional officers: Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. The 

complainants believed that individuals who vote on the nation's money supply -- and also vote on loans to foreign 

governments and warehousingfunds for the Treasury, both bypassing Congress -- should not be internally selected 

without displaying their views and credentials in a public Senate confirmation hearing. The complainants were Hou'ie 

Banking Chairman Hemy Reuss, (Democrat, Wisconsin), Senate Banking Chairman Donald W Riegle.lr. (Democrat, 

Michigan), Senator John Melcher (Democrat, Iowa) and The Committee lor Monetary Reform (President and Chairman 

Randall E. Presley of a coalition of95 corporations and 779 individuals). Two former stiffers on the Democratic staff of 

the House Banking Committee assisted: Grasty Crews argued these cases and I was an expert advisor. The lawsuits 

failed and the use of internally appointed people to make government policies is stilI a contentiou.s issue as is 

exemplified in the 2010 Reform Act's provision for the Inspector General of the new Bureau of Consumer Financial 

Protection." 

ii The case of Hong Kong is celebrated by opponents of monetary discretion, but Hong Kong was a colony before it was 

returned to China in 1997. I also pass over such countries as Panama and Ecuador which have adopted the US dollar. 

and the zone franc countries of West Africa, which rely on Paris. All major industrial countries in the world today have 

central banks and private banking systems; to depart from this nonn would be, at least, a substantial experiment 

iii 1 confess 1 do not yet fully understand the thrust of HR. 2990, which 1 received only this past Friday. The bill accurately 

calls attention to the dire conditions faced by many Americans and calls appropriately for action. But the apparent 

direction of action, to forbid "lending against deposits," seems to overlook the fact that bank loans create deposits in the 

first place. However, I have not had time to study the later sections of this bill in detaiL 

;v See my article, "Time to Ditch the NAIRU" Journal afEconomic Perspectives, Volll, Number I, Winter 1997, 93-108. 

Available at: ht1p:fftinvurl.coml7cf8jer 

v HR 4180 thus denies the possibility of hysteresis, or path dependency, a concept that long-tenn outcomes arc influenced 

by the course of short-tenn decisions. fiysteresis is fundamental to an evolutionary (which is to say scientific) view of 

economic process. It has been widely debated, and substantially accepted by many leading economists in recent years, 

undermining the concept of a long-run equilibrium for employment detennined by non-monetary matters. However, 

these properly remain academic issues; Congress would be wise to avoid interjecting itself into debates of this kind. 

vi "The Inflation Obsession: Flying in the Face of the Facts" a review of Ben S. Bernanke, Thomas Laubach, Frederic S. 

Mishkin and Adam S. Posen, Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience," Foreign Affairs, JanuaryFebnlary 1999, 152-156. 

vii The economist Kenneth Boulding summarized this in verse: "We mllst have a good definition of money/For if we have 

not/Then what have we got/But a Quantity Theory ofno-one-knows-whatT 
235 


75727.190

The Inflation Obsession 

By James K. Galbraith 

James K. Galbraith is Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the 

University of Texas at Austin, as a Senior Scholar of the Jerome Levy Economics Institute. His 

new book is Created Unequal: The Crisis in American Pay. 

Ben S. Bernanke, Thomas Laubach, Frederic S. Mishkin and Adam S. Posen, Inflation 

Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

1999,365 pp., bibliography, $24.95. 

Should a central bank address a broad agenda of economic growth, price stability and 

full employment? Or should it focus single-mindedly on controlling inflation? This debate is 

mounting in Europe, where calls from social democratic governments for lower interest rates 

are growing louder as the continent prepares for a central bank. In the United States, where 

federal law stipulates full employment as a policy goal, Republican proposals to require that 

the Federal Reserve focus only on inflation surface regularly in Congress. 

Ben Bernanke and his colleagues, each a veteran of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 

York research staff, make the case for inflation targeting, in a book that is a manifesto in 

everything but its tone. The tone is, rather, the worried one familiar to followers of the 

recurrent debates over competitiveness, which cater to national vanity in similar terms: 

... the United States has lagged behind other industrial countries in considering 

monetary policy frameworks and institutions that might help ensure good 

economic performance in the long term. 

One might say that we face a frameworks-and-institutions gap. 

Since the early 1980s, a handful of countries have declared formally that low and 

stable inflation should be the overriding objective of monetary policy. These countries, which 

include New Zealand, Canada, the UK and Sweden, are the main focus of this book. Inflation 

Targeting uses them as examples, to argue that inflation targeting would also enhance 

American "economic performance in the long term." 

The authors have a curious view ofthe phrase "economic performance in the long 

term." They do not use it to refer to rising living standards, full employment, declining 

inequality in pay, or similar recent improvements in American well-being. Indeed, they 

explicitly deny that monetary policy should be praised for these blessings, since, they argue, 

such gains of an expansionary monetary policy are temporary and unsustainable. Hence, they 

cannot be counted as among the benefits of monetary policy "in the long term." 

In other words, America's present affair with full employment is sure to end badly, in 

accelerating inflation followed by recession. The right strategy is to keep unemployment high 

enough all the time -- at the natural rate -- to prevent inflation from emerging. A central bank 
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which allows itself to be distracted by the pursuit of economic growth and full cmployment is 

therefore to be condemned. A central bank that achieves price stability but with chronic high 

unemployment -- as in Germany -- has done its highest duty. The European Central Bank, 

charter-bound to price stability whatever the cost, represents the pinnacle of monetary policy 

architecture. Next to it our own federal Reserve -- unmentioned in the Constitution, 

subservient to Congress, obliged to report on unemployment -- seems a pathetic weakling 

among central banks. 

off target? 

The case for inflation targeting, as Bernanke and his colleagues present it, rests on a 

theory that links monetary policy exclusively to inflation control and denies central banks any 

important role in determining economic growth or employment. They favor inflation targeting 

not simply as the better choice among strategies, but as the only strategy consistent with sound 

economics. 

But are their principles correct? Oddly, this book does not provide an answer. 

Bernanke and his colleagues merely tell us that these truths were presented by Milton 

friedman in 1967, refined by Robert Lucas in 1976, and consequently accepted by most 

economists. The theme of consensus crops up time and again. We read that "most 

macro economists agree" that the inflation rate is the only variable that monetary policy can 

affect in long run (because unemployment will tend always to return to the natural rate), that 

there is "by now something of a consensus that even moderate rates of inflation are harmful," 

that there "is a growing belief among economists and central bankers" that low inflation is 

good for efficiency and good for growth. For Bernanke and his colleagues, this case is closed; 

a consensus of economists has settled the issue. 

But in fact, no such consensus exists and none has ever existed. To take just a few 

examples, Robert Eisner, a former President of the American Economics Association and a 

renowned macro economist, has never accepted the Friedman/Lucas view. Neither has James 

Tobin, Paul Samuelson or Robert Solow, or the late William Vickrey, all Nobel Laureates. 

Neither did Ray fair at Yale, James Medoff at Harvard, William Dickens at Brookings. 

Bemanke and his colleagues maintain the illusion of consensus by simple silence about the 

actual debate, which has grown more intense, not less so, in recent years. 

There are two basic reasons why controversy persists. first, while the FriedmanlLucas 

doctrine has enjoyed academic dominance, the theory rests on a very peculiar philosophical 

position, which regards the future as only differing by purely random error from the past. This 

point of view, for instance, would require us to see the Asian financial crisis not as a failure of 

policies but as merely a bad lottery outcome -- tough luck, nothing to be done. Many 

thoughtful economists reject this starting point. Second, the real world has been openly 

contradicting the theory for years now. Three years ago, every advocate of the natural rate of 

unemployment doctrine firmly held that unemployment below six percent would spark 

inflation. Unemployment then fell, but contrary to theory it not only remained below the 

supposed natural rate but failed to produce inflation. The Friedman/Lucas arguments received 

a clear empirical rebuke. 
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Indeed, deflation, not inflation, has reared its head in much of the world this year as 

the financial crisis spun out of controL The adherents of the natural rate theory were never 

able to see this threat. They were still arguing for an anti-inflation policy when the Asian 

crisis broke in 1997, and they were still clinging to it in the summer of 1998, as U.S. financial 

markets began to crack under the strain. As the case for urgent action grew evident to 

everyone else, including Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, the diehard natural raters 

inside the Federal Reserve obstructed forceful action. The concrete result: interest rate 

reductions were at first too slow, and too small, to impress the financial markets or to affect 

the economy itself, and so the crisis deepened. 

Can one have inflation targeting without the natural rate doctrine? Although Bernanke 

and his co-authors make no effort to separate the two, it would be quite possible to base 

inflation predictions on something other than the unemployment rate. An inflation-targeter 

could have argued, at the Fed last August, that the Asian crisis had eliminated inflation risk 

and that large cuts in interest rates were essential to ward off the threat of price deflation. 

Indeed some ofthe old-line supply-siders, such as Jude Wanniski, have taken this very 

position. 

This supply-side view may be an improvement. But it is still much less sensible than 

current practice. Economists opposed to rate cuts would have countered, correctly, that 

deflation outside the United States will probably not produce general price deflation inside the 

country. Most American wages, on which most prices still depend, are unlikely to fall in 

money terms. The serious danger of the Asian crisis is not falling U.S. price levels but falling 

employment, recession, and rising inequality. A doctrine of inflation targeting, even if not tied 

to natural rate dogma, would have weakened the argument for interest rate reductions meant 

to stabilize employment and output, not to mention the financial markets and the banking 

system. 

a case for cuts 

In any case, events have already overtaken our authors. The only potentially effective 

response to the global slump available to the Fed is a sharp drop in U.S. interest rates and 

concomitant depreciation of the dollar. These measures would slow the flight of capital to the 

United Slates, return some confidence to Asian markets, and help to restore the balance sheets 

of otherwise insolvent Japanese banks. Inflation-targeting would have delegitimized these 

policy goals, which were, in fact, partly pursued as the crisis deepened in late 1998. The 

argument for having the Federal Reserve fight inflation exclusively does not just ignore the 

reality of the crisis but assaults the urgent present priorities of the Fed itself. 

What of the claim that inflation-targeting countries have enjoyed superior economic 

performance, even if employment and growth are omitted and inflation alone is considered? A 

fair evaluation of this claim would require a comparative perspective, which the authors do 

not provide. We are left then to review the historical experience and ask, what kind of 

evidence do Bernanke and his colleagues actually present that inflation targeting has 

succeeded? 

This part of Inflation Targeting merits careful reading, for much of the story in detail is 
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interesting and, within the extremely narrow limits that the authors place around their topic, it 

is competently told. But what is striking is that even the authors admit that inflation targeting 

in practice has done little actually to fight inflation. In the case of New Zealand, they write, 

"the decision to announce inflation targets occurred after most of the disinflation ... had 

already taken place." The same is true for Canada, while Britain also embraced inflation 

targets when "it was most likely to meet them." Sweden, "was in deep recession" with 

inflation "down to a historically low rate of3% per year," when its central bank adopted 

inflation targets. 

In other words, the countries in question never introduced inflation targets when 

inflation posed a serious threat, nor did the adoption of targets reduce the cost of any ongoing 

inflation fight. In all cases, the declaration of war came aftcr the fighting was over. 

So why did the central bankers do it? Bernanke and his colleagues are quite honest 

about the reasons. Inflation targeting in all cases coincided with high unemployment, and its 

main effect was to excuse central bankers from addressing that problem. Second, in some 

cases inflation targeting could substitute for the messy practice of money-supply targeting, an 

earlier misguided enthusiasm that Britain had once embraced that Germany is still using 

today. Third, and in sharp contradiction with the first motive, inflation targeting provided in a 

few cases some camouflage for central bankers who were actually planning to ease policy in 

order to fight unemployment. It was a case of saying one thing to placate conservatives, and 

doing another to accommodate the political and economic realities of the hour. 

Central bankers, like generals, are often accused of fighting the last war. But as this 

description of the actual motives behind inflation targeting makes clear, this is different. 

First, inflation targeting amounts to a commitment in principle to the last war -- the war 

against inflation -- as a way of avoiding conscription into the next one, against 

unemployment. Second, it is a way to declare a change of tactics for the last war, even though 

it ended. And third, in some cases inflation targeting permits central bankers to assert that the 

last war is still going on, and to pretend to fight it, while in fact sending a small covert force to 

the actual battle against unemployment. These mechanisms doubtless have their uses from the 

narrow political and public relations perspective of a central banker, but it cannot be said that 

they actualIy related to economic performance, including the pursuit of low inDation. 

What should the United States do? The Federal Reserve is an independent executive 

agency under the authority of Congress. It therefore comes under the Humphrey-Hawkins 

Full Employment and Balanced Grow1h Act of 1978, which rewrote U.S. economic policy 

objectives to specify that they include full employment, balanced growth and reasonable price 

stability. In particular, the act set interim targets of four percent unemployment and three 

percent inflation -- goals that have now, within a few tenths of a percentage point, been 

achieved. 

The authors of Inflation Targeting do not discuss the Humphrey-Hawkins Act. If they 

had the chance, however, they would likely rewrite that statute and direct the Federal Reserve 

to fight inflation alone. They do not say what would then become of the goal of "full 

employment." In principle, perhaps some other agency could address the task of sustaining 
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full employment, for example through jobs programs funded by tax increases or deficit 

spending. But it is unlikely that Bemanke and his colleagues have this in mind. One suspects 

that what they really want is to abandon full employment as a formal objective of American 

policy. 

It is ironic that this book appears just as Alan Greenspan, Alice Rivlin, and the rest of 

the Fed leadership have demonstrated how spurious the natural rate doctrine is by proving that 

full employment, balanced growth and reasonable price stability are not mutually exclusive. 

This is a remarkable accomplishment, and it is due in part to the willingness of Chairman 

Greenspan to override the adherents of the Friedman/Lucas view, and to experiment 

cautiously with continuing reductions in unemployment. In this way, Greenspan and company 

have affirmed the good sense of the framers of the Humphrey-Hawkins law. The fact that the 

unfolding crisis of go-go globalization now threatens this accomplishment does not diminish 

validity or its importance. And in their attempt to stabilize the financial markets and world 

economy as the crisis of 1998 unfolded, the Fed's leadership has shown far more 

sophistication, flexibility and common sense than Bemanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen 

show in this evasive, unpersuasive book. 
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Written Testimony by 

Jeffrey M. Herbener 

Professor of Economics 

Grove City College 

Before the 

Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology 

Committee on Financial Services 

U.S. House of Representatives 

May 8, 2012 
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Production of Money on the Market 

In a seminal article published in 1920, Ludwig von Mises demonstrated that there is only 

one test of whether or not production of something conveys a benefit on society at large. 1 It must 

be shown that resources have greater value when used to produee a good to satisfy the 

preferences of some people than when they are used to produce a different good to satisfy the 

preferences of other people. Production left to the market satisfies the profit and loss test of 

socially beneficial production. For Tim Cook to obtain computer chips, glass screens, labor and 

other resources to produce iPads, he must bid them away from other entrepreneurs who would 

have used them to produce other goods. By incurring the costs of production, Apple Inc. 

compensates the owners of resources for the value of the other goods they could have produced 

to satisfy a different group of consumers. Apple then uses the resources to produce iPads, which 

consumers of its products value more highly as demonstrated by their generating enough revenue 

for Apple Inc. to more than cover its costs. 

The profit and loss test applies to all production in the market, including mining gold and 

minting coins. A gold mining company will produce when the revenues from the sale of its 

output exceed the costs of buying its inputs. The company moves labor, mining equipment, land, 

and other resources away from uses consumers find less valuable into gold mining, which 

consumers find more valuable. A minting company will produce when the revenues from the 

sale of its service in certifYing gold exceed the costs of buying its inputs. The company moves 

labor, minting equipment, land, and other resources away from uses consumers find less valuable 

into minting coins, which consumers find more valuable. 

! This is an implication ofMises's famous argument that central planners cannot economize the usc of resources in 

society. See Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth (Auburn, Ala.: Mises 

Institute, 1990 [I 920]) and Mises, Human Action, scholar's edition (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1998 [1949]), pp. 

685-711. 

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Like the production of all other goods, production of money left to the market is 

regulated by profit and loss. Additional money is produced when demand for money increases or 

demand for other goods produced by the same resources decreases. If the demand for money 

increased, the value of gold coins would rise. Minting companies would increase production to 

capture the profit. As they increased the supply of certification service, its price would decline 

and as they increased their demands for resources to certify gold, resources prices would rise and 

the profit would dissipate. If demand for othcr goods declined, input prices would fall. Minting 

companies would increase production to capture the profit and, by doing so, eliminate profit 

from further production. In this way production of money in the market is socially optimal. 2 

The profit and loss test also applies to the production of money certificates in the 

market. 3 Money certificates are titles of ownership to money issued by banks that serve as 

money substitutes. People may find convenience and safety in using checking account balances 

instead of commodity money when making trades. Banks will produce and maintain checking 

accounts for customers if they are willing to pay fees to banks that generate revenues sufficient 

to cover the costs of managing the accounts. If the demand for checking accounts increased, then 

banks would expand them to capture the profit. As they increased their supply of checking 

account services, the fees would decline. And as they increased their demand for the resources to 

manage checking accounts, their prices would rise. As a consequence, profit would dissipate and 

additional production would cease at the socially optimal point. 

The profit and loss test also applies to financial intermediation. Banks perform a 

middleman function in credit markets by borrowing from savers and lending to investors. They 

2 Mises wrote that making money production conform to profitability and not politics, "is not a defect of the gold 

standard; it is its main excellence," Human Action, p. 471. 

3 On bank production of money certificates and credit intermediation, see Jesus Huerta de Soto, Money, Bank Credit, 

and Economic Cycles, trans. Melinda Stroup (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2006 [1998]), pp. 1-36. 

2 
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provide the services of pooling the savings, checking the credit worthiness of investors, and 

bearing the risk of loan defaults. If customers of banks find these services valuable, they will be 

willing to accept lower interest rates for lending to banks than investors will be willing to pay 

banks to borrow. Banks will provide financial intermediation services, if the revenues earned 

from the interest rate differential are large enough to cover the costs of producing the services. If 

demand for these services increases, banks will increase production of them. Their increased 

demand to borrow from savers and supply to investors will reduce the interest rate differential. 

Their increased demand for the resources will raise their prices. Profit will dissipate and 

additional production will cease at the socially optimal point. 

By subjecting all production, including that of money and banking, to the test of profit 

and loss, the market renders an integrated system of production that economizes the use of all 

resources for society at large. 

Monetary Inflation and Credit Expansion 

An elastic currency breaks the integration of production on the market by being an 

element foreign to the test of profit and loss. An elastic currency has two characteristics: a 

central bank empowered to issue fiat paper money and commercial banks empowered to issue 

fiduciary media: The production of fiat paper money cannot be regulatcd by profit and loss. It is 

always profitable to produce more. In 2011, the average cost of the 5.8 billion Federal Reserve 

Notes produced was $0.091. 5 So a profit of around $4.90 is made by printing and spending a $5 

bill. Ifthe Fed continued order the printing ofFRNs as long as it was profitable, then eventually 

prices of inputs would rise so that it cost more than $5 to print a $5 bill. Then the Fed could order 

the printing of $50 bills instead and so on indefinitely as we have witnessed in hyperinflations 

4 On elastic currency, see Murray Rothbard, The Case against the Fed (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Instirute, 1994). 

5 Bureau of Engraving and Printing. (moneyfactory.gov/uscurrency/annua1productionfigures.html). April 27, 2012. 

3 
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like Zimbabwe's. To avoid destruction in hyperinflation, production of fiat paper money must be 

regulated by policy, by a rule that is arbitrary with respect to economizing production for society 

at large. 

The production of fiduciary media camlot bc rcgulated by profit and loss.6 Fiduciary 

media are redemption claims for moncy which are fractionally backed by a reserve of money. 

Banks issue fiduciary media by creating loans. For example, a customer applies at his local bank 

for an auto loan of$25,000. If the bank agrecs to extend thc loan, it just writes a $25,000 balance 

into the customer's chccking account. The loan generates interest revenue for the bank while the 

cost of issuing fiduciary media is nominal. It is always profitable for the bank to create another 

loan by issuing fiduciary media. If a bank issues morc fiduciary media by crcating credit as long 

as it is profitable, it will become illiquid and insolvent and end in collapse. To avoid such 

destruction, a bank must regulate its issue of fiduciary media via credit creation by policy, by a 

rule that is arbitrary with respect to economizing production for society at large. 

Advocates of an elastic currency realize that its production carmot even be subjected to, 

let alone pass, the profit and loss test. As F.A. Hayek wrote, "There is no justification in history 

for the existing position of a government monopoly of issuing money. It has nevcr been proposed 

on the ground that government will give us better money than anybody else could." 7 Advocates 

of an elastic currency merely assert that it can achieve a desirable outcome that a system of 

commodity money and money certificates cannot. There are three such claims for an elastic 

currency. First that it can keep the price level stable. Second, that it can prevent price deflation. 

And third, that it can accelerate economic growth. 

Maintaining Price Stability 

6 On fiduciary issue and credit creation, see Murray Rothbard, The Mystery 0/ Banking (Auburn, Ala.: Mises 

Institute, 2008 [1983]). 

7 F.A. Hayek, Denationalization a/Money, 2nd edition (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978 [1974]), p. 7. 

4 
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There is no social benefit from keeping the price level stable. The alleged benefit is that 

price stability prevents wealth transfers between creditors and debtors and between workers and 

capitalists. But such transfers assume that entrepreneurs fail to anticipate changes in money's 

purchasing power. Entrepreneurs can earn profits and avoid losses by anticipating these changes 

just as well as changes in prices of other goods. If they anticipate rising prices for goods overall, 

then they will increase their demands for resources today bidding up wages today. Likewise, 

lenders will insist on higher interest rates today. An elastic currency adds another dimension of 

uncertainty to changes in money's purchasing power. It makes the task of entrepreneurs more, 

not less, dif1icult. In extreme cases, an elastic currency can result in wildly unstable prices that 

paralyze entrepreneurial decision making and destroy production on the market. Being regulated 

by profit, production of commodity money responds only to changes in people's demands. If 

money demand rises, the resulting increase in money's purchasing power would bring forth more 

production of money and moderate falling prices. The modest price deflation over time in a 

market economy is integral part of its economizing production. 

Moreover, in practice the advocates of price stability aim at price inflation of around two 

percent per year. But, if entrepreneurs can adjust their expectation to cope with a two percent per 

year price inflation in an elastic currency system, then certainly they can properly anticipate and 

deal with a two percent per year price deflation under a commodity money system. 8 

Finally, two of the periods of most rapid economic growth in U.S. history were from 

1820-1850 and 1865-1900. In each of these periods, the purchasing power of the dollar roughly 

doubled. 9 

8 The annualize rate of increase in the purchasing power of the dollar from 1815-1850 was 2.24 percent and from 

1865-1900 was 1.75 percent. 

9 Murray Rothbard, A History of Money and Banking in the United States (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2002), pp. 

42-179. 

5 
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Preventing Price Deflation 

There is no social benefit from preventing price det1ation. There are two claims to the 

contrary. The first alleged benefit is that if prices begin to fall, then people form expectations that 

they will fall further and they put off spending today which pushes prices down even further 

which re-enforces det1ationary expectations. The collapse of spending discourages production 

and employment. But, the downward spiral of prices is merely the logical implication of 

assumptions about expectations within foruml economic models. If you assume that the agents 

operating in an economic model suffer from expectations that are self-reinforcing, then the 

model will produce a downward spiraL But, people in the real world can only obtain the services 

of goods by buying them. They choose at some point, to buy a good even if they expect its price 

to fall further. This happens every day in markets for consumer electronics as people buy tablet 

computers, cell phones, and so on knowing that prices will be lower and quality higher in the 

future. 

Because there is demand for goods and hence prices, whcther people expect prices to 

increase, decrease, or stay the same, speculation eams profit and avoids loss by accurately 

anticipating the level of future prices. Ifpeople anticipate a significantly lower price for a good 

in the future and withhold their demands for it today, the price quickly falls to the level they 

anticipated and then they buy the good. Speculation moves prices before they would move 

without speculation, but not further than they would move without it. This happens every day in 

financial markets as speculators move prices up and down without generating upward or 

downward spirals. 

The second alleged benefit is that price det1ation pushes down output prices but input 

prices are sticky; therefore, profits evaporate and entrepreneurs cut production and fire workers. 

6 
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But entrepreneurs choose the dcgree of price stickiness that their customers and employees 

prefer. In many cases consumers prefer prices of goods to remain more stable from day to day or 

hour to hour or minute to minute instead of fluctuating with every increase and decrease in 

demands. In other cases, buyers prefer complete flexibility in prices. Entrepreneurs can earn 

profits and avoid losses by catering to these preferences. In many cases, workers prefer to have 

their wages set over a period agreed upon with the entrepreneurs instead of having them move 

daily or hourly with the movements in demand for the goods they help produce. In cases where 

workers desire more flexibility in their compensation, an entrepreneur will make stock in the 

enterprise part of their compensation. When circumstances change, it is in everyone's interest to 

modifY the normal arrangements. Entrepreneurs offer deep discounts of their goods when 

demand permanently falls. They renegotiate contracts with workers and other input suppliers 

when losses accumulate. In this way, the degree of price stickiness in markets can be changed to 

avoid adverse effects. 

Moreover, entrepreneurs earn profits and avoid losses by anticipating these changes. If 

they anticipate falling prices oftheir outputs, they will reduce their demands for inputs today 

pushing their prices down. When output and input prices fall together, profit and production are 

maintained. The symmetric process occurs during price inflation. If entrepreneurs anticipate 

higher output prices, they will increase their demands for inputs today pushing their prices up. 

As a result, output and input prices move up together and profit and production are maintained. 

Even if the prices of inputs entrepreneurs buy remain sticky dowTIward, the effect on thcir 

profit and production is cushioned by the decline in the value of the assets they own. The market 

value of their assets adjusts downward with the decline in the prices of their outputs as investors 

reduce their demands to hold claims to these assets in financial markets. A decline in the value of 

7 
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their assets restores the profitability of production. Entrepreneurs with superior foresight in 

anticipating declines in the prices oftheir output will invest sufficient equity in their enterprises 

to cushion the blow and provide time for adjustments in the prices of their inputs. 

UCLA economist, Andrew Atkinson, and Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank economist, 

Patrick Kehoe, in a 2004 American Economic Review article, have shown that there is no 

correlation between deflation and depression. to Looking at the evidence across 17 countries over 

more than 100 years, they concluded, "A broad historical look finds more periods of deflation 

with reasonable growth than with depression, and many more periods of depression with 

inflation than with deflation. Overall, the data show virtually no link between deflation and 

depression." It Even for the Great Depression, they find that while all 16 countries for which 

there were data experienced deflation only 8 of them had a depression. And the relationship 

between deflation and depression was not statistically significant. For all other periods, 

beginning in 1820 for some countries, 65 of 73 deflation episodes had no depression and 21 of 

29 depressions had no deflation. They wrote, "In a broader historical context, beyond the Great 

Depression, the notion that deflation and depression are linked virtually disappears.,,12 When all 

periods are put together, they found that "a I-percentage-point drop in inflation is associated 

with a drop in the average real growth rate of just 0.08 of a percentage point, say, from 3.08 to 

3.00.',13 Finally, when they break the data into Pre-WW II and Post-WW II, they find a stronger 

correlation between deflation and depression for the early period, but a correlation between 

inflation and depression in the later period. 

10 Andrew Atkinson and Patrick Kehoe, "Deflation and Depression: Is There an Empirical Link," American 

Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 94 (May 2004): 99-103. They define deflation "as a negative average 

inflation rate" and depression "as a negative average real output growth rate." Ibid., p. 99. 

lJ Ibid., p. 102. 

12 Ibid., p. 10 1. 

13 Ibid., p. 102. 

8 
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Stimulating Economic Growth 

There is no social benefit from attempting to accelerate economic growth. The alleged 

benefit is that monetary inflation through credit expansion builds-up the capital structure of the 

economy more fully than otherwise. Monetary inflation and credit expansion generate the boombust cycle, however, not economic grov.1:h. 14 The capital structure of the economy is the stages 

of production from extraction of raw materials to the production of intermediate capital goods to 

the production of consumer goods. Iron is mined out of the ground, then steel is made, then 

fenders for an automobile, then the automobile is assembled. In a market economy, not only is 

cach production process justified by passing the profit and loss test, but the entire capital 

structure satisfies people's inter-temporal, or time, preferences. The degree to which they desire 

to postpone their current consumption by saving and investing to build up capital capacity across 

the capital structure in order to enjoy more and better consnmer goods in the future is satisfied in 

the market. Ifpeople intensely desire present consnmption over future consumption, then the 

premium they place on the present, that is, the interest rate, will be high and the amount of their 

saving and investing will be small and their consumption will be large. Only a small number of 

investment projects will be profitable; therefore, the capital structure will not be built up 

extensively. Ifpeople lower their time preferences, then the interest rate will fall and they will 

save and invest more and consume less in the present. With more resources at their command, 

cntrcpreneurs will build up the capital structure more extensively. The greater productivity of the 

expanded capital structure results in the production of more and better consumer goods. This is 

the process of economic growth. And, as with other aspects of production in a market economy, 

people get the amount of economic growth that they prefer. 

I' On the boom-bust cycle, see Mises, Human Action, pp. 535-583;de Soto, Money, Bank Credit, and Economic 

Cycles, pp. 265-395; F.A. Hayek, Prices and Production and Other Works (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2008 

[1931]); and Murray Rothbard, America's Great Depression (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2000 [1963]). 

9 
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Credit expansion suppresses interest rates below the levels detennined by people's time 

preferences and incrcascs funds for investmcnt beyond the amount detennined by people's 

prefercnces for saving. When the borrowers spend the additional money, they bid up the prices 

of the goods they are buying. Prices ofhouscs and cars, for example, are pushed up by the 

addition demand of consumers made possible by credit creation. Prices of producer goods are 

also bid up by the additional demand of entreprencurs made possible by credit creation. Prices 

for auto factorics, lumber mills, are pushed up and the capital goods across the capital structure 

used to produce goods in the expanding areas, iron mines, timbcr lands, and so on. Monetary 

inflation through crcdit expansion makes it possible for borrowers to demand more assets 

without lenders reducing dcmands for other goods. Therefore, rising asset prices increase the 

profitability of their production while the profitability of other goods nccd not dcclinc. Not 

enough resources are released from the production of other goods to complete all of the projects 

made profitablc by thc crcdit expansion. With a market monetary system, the proper amount of 

resources are made available because an increase in the supply of credit can only be brought 

about by people saving more and consuming less. The additional investment projects made 

profitable by the increase in saving are balanced by the projects no longer profitable because of 

the reduced consumption. But with an elastic currency system, the build-up of capital capacity 

and other investment projects financed with created credit do not wind up satisfying people's 

time preferenccs. The build-up of the capital structure during the boom is unsustainable. It ends 

in the liquidation ofthe build-up in the bust. 

What brings the boom to an end is the re-establishment of people's time preferences and 

preferences for saving. People do this through the disbursement of their incomes. The credit 

created during the boom is spent by the borrowers to buy goods, houses, factories, etc. The 

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entrepreneurs who produce these goods then receive the new money as revcnues for selling the 

goods. They pay producers to buy the resources used to produce the goods. The new money is 

then income for the producers. People disbursc their income to satisfy their preferences, 

including their time preferences. They prefer to save only a fraction of their incomes. Although 

the entire amount of the new money issued starts out increasing the supply of credit, only a 

traction of it winds up as supply of credit. Monetary inflation and credit expansion runs counter 

to people's time preferences and market economies operate to satisfy people's preferences. 

Another factor working against the sustainability of the boom is that the further credit 

expansion extends the risker the projects and the less credit worthy the borrowers become. As 

financial intennediaries, banks economize credit, lending to the highest return, most secure 

projects and the highest interest rate, most credit-worthy borrowers. Additional credit must be 

extended to lower return, less secure projects and lower interest rate, less credit-worthy 

borrowers. If monetary inflation and credit expansion go on far enough, investors refuse to 

accept the additional risk and sell out of the lines of production expanded during the boom. Since 

the prices of assets in the more sound projects have been bid up along with the prices of projects 

in the less sound projects, investors in the more sound projects will also lose wealth if they 

continue to hold their investments. 

Once people restore interest rates and asset prices to the levels that reflect their 

preferences, the particular lines of production in which mal-investments have been made in 

building-up the capital structure during the boom are revealed. The bust consists of reconfiguring 

the malfonned capital structure to best satisfy people's preferences. Mal-invested assets must be 

sold to entrepreneurs in lines of production that will prove to be profitable. Labor must be reallocated away from boom lines into production supported by people's preferences. As with all 

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production decisions, these can be made in the most economizing fashion by entrepreneurs 

earning profits from their superior foresight in satisfying preferences and suffering losses for 

their inferior foresight. 

An elastic currency is the cause of financial crises and eeonomic downturns. Supplant it 

with a market system of eommodity money and money certificates and there would be no crises 

and downturns. The residual business fluctuations would not justify government intervention to 

solve the social problems associated with crises and downturns. 

As the monetary system has become more elastic in American history, booms and busts 

have worsened. George Selgin, William Lastrapes, and Lawrence White conclude, in their 20 I 0 

Cato Working Paper, that recent research demonstrates that the Fed has not lived up to its 

original promise. 

Selgin, Lastrapes, and White summarize their findings on the performance of the Fed in 

these words: "Drawing on a wide range of recent empirical research, we find the following: (I) 

The Fed's full history (1914 to present) has been characterized by morc rather than fewer 

symptoms of monetary and macroeconomic instability than thc decades leading to the Fed's 

establishment. (2) While the Fed's performance has undoubtedly improved since World War II, 

even its postwar performance has not clearly surpassed that of its undoubtedly flawed 

predecessor, the National Banking system, before World War L (3) Some proposed alternative 

arrangements might plausibly do better than the Fed as presently constituted. We conclude that 

the need for a systematic exploration of alternatives to the established monetary system is as 

pressing today as it was a century ago.,,15 

15 George SeJgin, William Lastrapes, Lawrence White, "Has the Fed Been a Failure?," Cato Working Paper Dec. 

2010, p. L 

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I concur with their conclusion. Economic theory and historical evidence demonstrate that 

a central bank confers no benefit on society at large. The Fed should be abolished and a market 

monetary system of commodity money and money certificates should be established. 

Monetary Reform 

The goal of monetary reform is to make money production subject to the profit and loss 

test of socially beneficial production. Money production must become an integral part of the 

market economy. There may be several viable paths of transition to a system of market 

production of money, but any such path must take account of ear! Menger's famous 

demonstration that an item can only arise as money consistently with what people are actually 

using as the most widely traded good.)6 After the transition, a monetary system integrated into 

the market economy eould begin. 17 

Federal Reserve Notes are money in the American economy. Thus, the most direct way to 

establish a market monetary system is to reestablish FRN as redemption claims for commodity 

money. The most widely-recognized commodity money today is gold coins. The primary step in 

monetary reform, then, is to tum FRNs into 100-percent-reserve redemption claims for gold 

coins. 

The other step along this path to a market monetary system is to establish a 100 percent 

reserve of money against bank issued fiduciary media. The Fed's tripling of its balance sheet in 

response to the crisis o£2008 makes this part of the transition easier. Banks now hold reserves 

against their checkable deposits in excess of 100 percent. In early April, banks hcld $1,587 

billion in total reserves against $1,204 billion in total checkable deposits. Fifty billion dollars of 

16 Carl Menger, "On the Origin of Money," Economic Journal 2 (1892): 239-55; Peter G. Klein and George A. 

Selgin, "Menger's Theory of Money: Some Experimental Evidence," in John Smithin, ed., What [s Money? 

(London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 217-34. 

17 On such monetary reform, see Rothbard, Mystery of Banking, pp. 247-268; Salerno, Money, Sound and Unsound, 

pp. 333-363; and de SOlo, Money, Bank Credit. and Economic Cycles, pp. 736-745. 

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their total reserves consisted of vault cash and $1,537 billion reserve balances in accounts with 

the Fed. Therefore, banks would need to build their cash reserves up to 100 percent of their 

checkable deposits of$I,204 by redeeming $1,154 billion of their reserve balances at the Fed for 

cash. The Fed could acquire the cash needed by selling some of the more than $2 trillion in 

assets it built up on its balance sheet during the crisis or by printing more FRNs or some 

combination of the two. Whatevcr the total value ofFRNs was at the point where checkable 

deposits are 100 percent backed by a reserve of cash, the redemption value of all FRNs could be 

set by calculating the ratio ofFRN to the gold holdings ofthe Fed. Ifno change in the stock of 

FRNs outstanding was necessary to accomplish the transition, then the calculation would be as 

follows. The Fed is showing on its balance sheet of April 18, $11.041 billion in gold holding. 

Valued at $42.22 per ounce, this is 261.5 million ounces of gold. On the same balance sheet, the 

Fed shows $1,100,160 million in currency in circulation. Thus, the redemption ratio would be 

$4,207 per ounce of gold. The actual calculation, however, could only be done after an audit of 

the Fed and the process of establishing a 100 percent cash reserve, described above, wcre 

completed. 18 

Once this transition was accomplished, the government should permit private production 

of money and money certificates according to the general laws of commerce. Mining and 

minting companies would produce commodity money that people made profitable by their 

demands. To earn profit, entrepreneurs would produce coins from the metals, in the weights, and 

with the designs people preferred. They would keep their costs down and invest and innovate 

when people's demands made it profitable. Scholars have chronicled many historical episodes of 

private production of coins. Recently, George Selgin, in his book Good Money, has recounted the 

18 Data from Federal Reserve Statistic Releases: H.3 Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions; H.6 Money 

Stock Measures; and H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances. April 19,2012. 

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production of private coinage in England in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. As he shows, 

private coinage thrived until the British goverrunent outlawed it in 1821. 19 

Banks, too, should be put under the general laws of commerce including those relating to 

warehousing money by holding a 100 percent reserve of money against their money substitutes. 

Banks would earn profit by producing the amounts and types of money substitutes that satisfied 

people's demands. To earn profit, they would keep their costs down and invest and innovate 

when people's demands made it profitable. The operation of 100 percent reserve banking is 

described in Jesus Huerta de Soto's book, 1l4oney, Banking, and Economic Cycles. As he 

documents, money warehouse banks thrived in Amsterdam for over a hundred years in the 17'h 

and 18th centuries.20 

Conclusion 

No one can describe today the configuration of commodity money and money 

certificates that entrepreneurs would bring about if permitted to operate private enterprises in 

their production any more than one could have predicted in 1900 the development of the 21 st 

century automobile industry or predicted in 1950 the 21 st century consumer electronics industry. 

What we do know is that their production would be regulated by profit and loss and therefore, 

would result in the satisfaction of people's preferences. The monetary inflation and credit 

expansion of our elastic currency system would be eliminated and with it the booms and busts 

that have plagued our history. 

19 George SeJgin, Good Money: Birmingham Button Makers, the Royal Mint. and the Beginnings of Modern 

Coinage. 1775-1821 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008). 

20 De Solo, Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles, pp. 37-114. 

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TESTIMONY BEFORE 

u.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY AND 

TECHNOLOGY SUBCOMMITTEE 

May 8, 2012 

Peter G. Klein 

Division of Applied Social Sciences 

University of Missouri 

135 Mumford Hall 

Columbia, MO 65211 

573-882-7008 

573-882-3958 (fax) 

kleinp@missouri.edu 

http://web.missouri.edul-kleinp 
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Introduction 

I specialize in the economic thcory of organizations--their nature, emergence, boundaries, 

internal structure, and governance-a field that is increasingly important in economics and was 

recognized with the 2009 Nobel Prize awarded to Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom. (Ronald 

Coase, founder ofthe field, is also a Nobel Laureate). Much of my recent research concerns the 

economics of entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurial character of organizations, both private 

and public. Like business tlrms, public organizations such as legislatures, courts, government 

agcncies, public universities, and government-sponsored enterprises seek to achieve particular 

objectives, and may innovate to achieve those objectives more efficiently. 1 Public organizations, 

like their for-profit counterparts, may act entrepreneurially: They are alert to perceived opportunities for gain, private or social, pecuniary or not. They control productive resources, both public 

and private, and must exercise judgment in deploying these resources in particular combinations 

under conditions of uncertainty. Of course, there are important distinctions between private and 

public organizations--objectives may be complex and ambiguous, performance is difficult to 

measure, and some resources are acquired by coercion, not consent. 

In the remarks below I evaluate the Federal Reserve System-and the institution of central 

banking more generally-from the perspective of an organizational economist. While I strongly 

disagree with many of the key policies of the Federal Reserve Board both before and after the 

Financial Crisis and Great Recession, my argument does not focus on particular actions taken by 

this or that Chair and Board. The problem is not that the Fed has made some mistakes-perhaps 

addressed by restating its statutory mandate, scrutinizing its behavior more carefully, and so 

on-but that the very institution of a central monetary authority is inherently destabilizing and 

harmful to entrepreneurship and economic growth. 

A central bank is a government entity in charge of the monetary system-an entity that "controIs the money supply," in layman's terms-with the task of maintaining "price stability," 

I Peter G. Klein, Anita M. McGahan, Christos N. Pitelis, and Joseph T. Mahoney, "Toward a Theory of Public Entrepreneurship," European Management Review 7 (2010): 1-15. 

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achieving a "full employment" of the economy's resources, and other national economic perf ormance objectives. (The Federal Reserve System is charged explicitly with achieving both price 

stability and full employment, the so-called "dual mandate" now challenged by proposals from 

Representatives Pence and Brady.2) The Fed, like other modem central banks, also serves as a 

"lender of/ast resort" tasked with protecting the financial system from bank runs and other panics by standing ready to make loans to commercial banks, using funds that are created instantly, 

from nothing, at the click of a mouse. 

The central bank's job, in short, is to "manage" the monetary system. As such, it is the most 

important economic planning agency in a modem economy. Money is a universally used good 

and the loan market, through which newly created money enters the economy, is at the heart of 

the investment process. Ironically, though economics clearly teaches the impossibility of efficient resource allocation under centralized economic plarming, as demonstrated (theoretically) in 

the 1920s and 1930s by economists such as Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek,3 and (empirically) by the universally recognized failure of centrally planned economies throughout the twentieth 

century, many people think that the monetary system is an exception to the general principle that 

that free markets are superior to central planning. When it comes to money and banking, in other 

words, it is essential to have a single decision-making body, protected from competition, without 

effective oversight, possessing full authority to take almost any action it deems in the best interest of the nation. The organization should be run by an elite corps of apolitical technocrats with 

only the public interest in mind. 

And yet, everything we know about organizations with that kind of authority, without oversight, or any external check or balance, tells us that they cannot possibly work well. Just as economy-wide central planners lack the incentives and information to direct the allocation of produc2 H.R. 245 and H.R. 4180, respectively. Some observers refer to a "triple mandate" that also requires "moderate 

long-term interest rates." 

3 Ludwig von Mises, "Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth" [1920], in Hayek, ed., Collectivist 

Economic Planning (London: Routledge and Sons, 1935); F. A. Hayek, "Economics and Knowledge," Economica 

NS 4(13): 33-54; Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review 35(4): 519-30. 

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tive resources, monetary planners lack the incentives and information to make efIicient decisions 

about open-market operations, the discount rate, and reserve requirements. The Fed simply does 

not know the "optimal" supply of money or the "optimal" intervention in the banking system; no 

one does. Add the standard problems of bureaucracy-waste, corruption, slack, and other forms 

of inefficiency well known to students of public administration-and it becomes increasingly 

difficult (0 justify control of the monetary system by a single bureaucracy.4 This is especially 

true when the good in question is money, the only good that exchanges against all other goods, 

meaning the good in which all prices are quoted. Mismanagement of the money supply not only 

affects the general price level, but distorts the relative prices of different goods and industries, 

making it more difficult for entrepreneurs to weigh the benefits and costs of various forms of action, leading to malinvestment, waste, and stagnation. Price inflation rewards debtors while punishing savers, just as artificially low interest rates reward homeowners while punishing renters. 

Instead, market forces should determine levels of borrowing and saving, owning and renting, and 

entrepreneurial activity. Put differently, the monetary system is so important that it cannot be entrusted to a government agency---even a scientifically distinguished, nominally independent, 

prestigious organization like the Federal Reserve System. 

Critics of discretionary monetary policy have argued for fixed rules, such as Milton Friedman's famous recommendation ofa fixed rate of money-supply growth, or Professor Taylor's 

more accommodating set of countercyclical rules. 5 Others debate whether inflation targeting or 

nominal-income targeting is a more straightforward and realistic policy for the Fcd. 6 However, 

none of these proposals is as effective as eliminating the monetary authority altogether, and relying on the voluntary decisions of market participants to determine thc money supply and interest 

4 Anthony Downs, Bureaucratic Structure and Decision-making. Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, Calif.: 1966: 

William A. Niskanen, Bureaucroq' in Representative Government. Aldine-Atherton: New York, 1971); PeterG. 

Klein, Joseph T. Mahoney, Anita M. McGahan, and Christos N. Pitelis, "Capabilities and Strategic Entrepreneurship 

in Public Organizations," Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, forthcoming. 

5 Milton Friedman, A Program/or Monetary Stability (New Yark: Fordham University Press, 1960); John B. Taylor, "Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39 (1993): 

195-214. 

6 Christina D. Romer, "Dear Ben: It's Time for Your Voleker Moment," New York Times. October 29,2011. 

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rates. A commodity standard, for example, removes even the possibility of central government 

intervention in the monetary system. If rules are better than discretion, the best policy is to eliminate all discretion, and to achieve a monetary standard that is wholly independent of political or 

technocratic interference. 

The Fed's performance before and after 2008 

My own views on monetary theory and policy derive from the "Austrian school" of Ludwig 

von Mises, F. A. Hayek, Murray N. Rothbard, and other important scholars and analysts. 7 From 

this perspective, the cause of the housing bubble was not irrational exuberance, corporate greed, 

or lack of regulation but the highly expansionist monetary policy ofthe Fed under Chairmen 

Greenspan and 13ernanke. 8 After the dot -com crash the Fed turned on the printing presses, increasing the monetary base by 5.6% in 2001,8.7% in 2002, and 6.3% in 2003, while MZM rose 

by 15.7%,13.0%, and 7.3% during those years. Greenspan slashed the federal funds rate from 

6.5% in January 2001 to 1 % by June 2003, keeping it at 1 % until late 2004, a level not seen since 

1954. This infusion of credit led to overinvestment in housing and other capital-intensive industries, aided by federal government policies designed to increase the rate of home ownership by 

relaxing underwriting standards, 9 

The correct response to the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 16, 2008, and Washington Mutual ten days later, would have been to let these insolvent institutions fail and to encourage a massive de-leveraging of the economy and an increase in savings and investment. An 

7 Ludwig von Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit (New Haven: Yale University Press, [1912]1953); F, A. 

Hayek, Prices and Production (London: Routledge & Sons, 1931); Murray N, Rothbard, America's Great Depression (Princeton, N.J,: D, Van Nostrand, 1963); Douglas W, Diamond and Raghuram G, Rajan, "Illiquidity and Interest Rate Policy," NBER Working Paper No, 15197, July 2009, 

8 The monetary and financial system is one of the most regulated sectors of the US economy, and there hasn't been 

any "deregulation" since the Gramm-Leach-BUley Act of 1999, which if anything mitigated the harm of the financial crisis by allowing acquisitions, such as Bear Steams by IP Morgan Chase and Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, that shielded bondholders from losses, 

9 Marek larocinski and Frank R, Smets, "House Prices and the Stance of Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of 

St, Louis Review (July 2008): 339·66; Stanley l, Liebowitz, "Anatomy ofa Train Wreck: Causes of the Mortgage 

Meltdown," in Randall G, Holcombe and Benjamin Powell, eds" Housing America: Building Out q( a Crisis (Oakland, Calif.: Independent Institute, 2009); lohan Norberg, Financial Fiasco: How America's Infatuation with Home 

Ownership and Easy Money Created the Economic Crisis (Washington, D,C.: Cato Institute, 2009). 

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economic crisis represents a misallocation of productive resources, and the best policy response 

is to allow market participants to redirect resources from lower- to higher-valued uses. In short, 

once investments are revealed to be mistakes, it is critical to let the market liquidate the bad investments as quickly as possible to make them available for other purposes. JO Of course, physical 

and human resources cannot be instantly and costlessly reallocated to alternative uses. However, 

contracting parties should be allowed to renegotiate resource use without central banks getting in 

the way. Existing mechanisms for liquidating existing investments and organizations, such as 

bankruptcy, should be used where appropriate. 

The Fed, working hand-in-hand with the Treasury department under the Bush and Obama 

Administrations, has done precisely the opposite, bailing out insolvent financial institutions and 

industrial concerns, driving interest rates to zero, and injecting trillions of dollars into the financial system-increasing the monetary base, for example, by an average of33.7% per year between 2008 and 2012, a cumulative increase of 198%. In short, the Fed's philosophy has been to 

prevent, as much as possible, entrepreneurs from liquidating any bad investments-indeed, to 

perpetuate those bad investments as long as possible. Insolvent financial institutions, rather than 

go through bankruptcy and reorganization, with poorly performing executives replaced by better 

ones, have received billions of dollars of free money. Incompetent executives remain at the helm. 

The Fed has too much power 

The Fed's defenders acknowledge that its recent actions are controversiaL But, they say, that 

is the nature of the beast. Someone has to be in charge of the monetary system, and during a crisis, leaders have to make tough decisions. Ifnot the Fed ehairman and staff-intelligent, competent, well-trained economists-who else? Who better than the distinguished Princeton maeroeeonomist Ben Bernanke? 

!O Rajshree Agarwal, Jay B. Barney, Nicolai Foss, and Peter G. Klein, "Heterogeneous Resources and the Financial 

Crisis: Implications of Strategic Management Theory," Strategic Organization 7, no. 4 (2009): 467··84. 

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Economist Lawrence Ball produced an interesting paper in February ofthis year on the psychology ofthc chairman. I I Ball traced the evolution of Bemanke's thinking between 2000 and 

2012, arguing that, since 2008, "the Bemanke Fed has eschewed the policies that Bemanke once 

supported." Ball attributes to the change in Bemanke's thinking to groupthink and to the chairman's own personality, which Ball describes as shy, withdrawn, and unassertive. 

Without intending to, Ball makes powerful arguments against discretionary monetary policy 

itself, which relies on a small, elite group of powerful technicians, interest-group representatives, 

and political advisers to design and implement rules and procedures that affect the lives of millions, that reward some (commercial and investment bankers, homeowners) while punishing others (savers, renters), that shape the course of world events. Under central banking, there are no 

rules, only discretion. Do wc really want a system in which one person's personality type has 

such a huge effect on the global economy? 

Yes, the Fed's defenders insist. It is vital, they say, that the Fed not be constrained in any 

way from pursuing whatever policies it deems best. Federal Reserve officials are regarded as 

Plato's philosopher-kings. When a group of distinguished economists expressed skepticism in 

2008 about what became the Troubled Assets Relief Program-the government rescue of iuefficient, badly managed financial firms, Harvard's Gregory Mankiw offered the following response: 

I know Ben Bemanke well. Ben is at least as smart as any of the economists who 

signed that letter or are complaining on blogs and editorial pages about the proposed policy. Moreover, Ben is far better informed than the critics. The Fed staff 

iucludes some of the best policy economists around. In his capacity as Fed chair, 

Beu understands the situation .... If! were a member of Congress, I would sit 

II Lawrence M. Ball, "Ben Bemanke and the Zero Bound," NBER Working Paper No. 17836, February 2012. 

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down with Ben, privately, to get his candid view. [fhe thinks [the bailout] is the 

right thing to do, I would put my qualms aside and follow his advice. 12 

One can hardly imagine a more dangerous perspective on government decision-making. It 

ignores differences in theoretical frameworks between, say, Keynesian, Austrian, monetarist, 

new classical, and other economists. It ignores differences in the interpretation of data, which is a 

matter of judgment, not intelligence. It ignores the possibility that key decision-makers, including Fed and Treasury officials, have private and conflicting interests. And of course it ignores 

normative concerns-some citizens may oppose rewarding incompetent managers with taxpayer 

funds, regardless ofthe efficiency consequences. More generally, Mankiw's argument would 

seemingly apply to any and all forms of government economic planning. Why have markets at 

all, if we can have smart, well-informed planners directing the allocation ofrcsources? 

Sadly, Mankiw is hardly alone in holding to this worldview. 13 It is the implicit philosophy 

underlying the institution of central banking. And, to be sure, "Ben" did exactly the wrong 

things. Contrary to a popular storyline that the Fed and other central banks prevented financial 

catastrophe, and made the Great Recession less harmful than it otherwise would have been, the 

Fed's actions have made a bad situation much worse, by perpetuating the very structural imbalances that brought about the Recession in the first place. The problem with the US economy today is hardly a lack of effective aggregate demand, as Keynesian economists like to say, but a 

structural imbalance brought about by two decades of cheap credit, imbalances the Fed is working hard to make permanent (e.g., keeping the discount rate close to zero, and promising to do so 

through the end o(2014). And needless to say, the issue here is not Chairman Bemanke himself, 

but the impossible situation he faces as Fed chair. 

12 N. Gregory Mankiw, "If I Were a Member of Congress," Greg Mankiw's Blog, September 26,2008 

(http://gregmankiw.blogspot.comI2008/09/if-i-were-member-of-congress.html). 

13 Alan Blinder recently dismissed concerns about inflation resulting from the massive increase in the money supply 

since 2008: "To create the fearsome inflation rates envisioned by the more extreme critics, the Fed would have to be 

incredibly incompetent, which it is not." 

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Fed independence 

In 2009 a group of economists circulated a petition in support of Federal Reserve "independence," and against Congressional attempts to exercise increased oversight and governance. 14 The 

idea that the Fed must be independent of any external constraint and must not be audited, governed, or supervised in a serious manner has become a shibboleth of contemporary macroeconomic policy. But it should be challenged. I declined to sign the petition, for two reasons: 

First, proponents of Fed independence focus exclusively on monetary policy, as if the Fed's 

Congressional critics simply want to know how the Federal Funds Rate is set. But the Fed conducts not only monetary policy but fiscal policy as well, increasingly so since 2008. If the Fed 

can buy and hold any assets illikes, 15 if it works hand-in-hand with the White House and the 

Treasury to coordinate bailouts in the hundreds of billions of dollars, if it facilitates trillion-dollar 

deficits by buying all the treasuries the federal government wants to sell, isn't it reasonable to 

have a bit more oversight? (And don't forget bank supervision. Even the Fed's defenders recognize a need to separate its monetary-policy and bank-supervision roles. But as long as the Fed 

continues as a bank regulator, shouldn't someone should be watching the watchmen?) 

Second, and more generally, the Fed is a national economic planning agency, and it performs 

about as well as every national economic planning agency in history. Have we learned nothing 

from the collapse of centralized economic planning in the Eastern Bloc, its demise in China, and 

its crippling hold on places like North Korea? "Independence," in this context, simply means the 

absence of external constraint. There are no performance incentives and no monitoring or govcrnance. There is no feedback or selection mechanism. There is no outside evaluation. Why 

would we expect an organization operating in that environment to improve overall economic performance? The Fed is run by men, not gods. 

14 "Petition for Fed Independence," Wall Street Journal, July 15,2009 

(http://blogs. wsj .com/economics/2009i07115ipetition-for-fed-independence!). 

15 While the Fed primariJy holds US Treasuries, it is legally pennitted under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 

Act to hold other assets under "unusual and exigent circumstances," a provision liberally exploited under the 

Bemanke Fed. See Christian A. Johnson, "Exigent and Unusual Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the U.S. 

Financial Crisis," European Business Organization Law Review (forthcoming). 

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Supporters of independence argue that Congressional or other oversight will pressure the Fed 

to pursue short-term goals (boosting output) at the expense oflong-term performance (controlling inflation). 16 But these arguments ignore what economists, following Ronald Coase and Harold Demsetz, call "comparative institutional analysis.,,17 Of course, there are potential hazards 

associated with Congressional oversight, but also potential benefits of stronger governance and 

greater transparency. For instance, exposing monetary policy (and the Fed's other controversial 

actions, e.g. bailing out foreign central banks) to Congressional scrutiny could put pressure on 

the Fed to service short-term political goals, but under the present system, the Fed can make trillion-dollar bcts without any monitoring and feedback system. Unfortunately, cost-benefit analysis is usually forgotten where the Fed is concerned. Consider Mark Thoma's defense of in dependence: "The hope is that an independent Fed can overcome the temptation to use monetary 

policy to inl1uence elections, and also overcome the temptation to monetize the debt, and that it 

will do what's best for the cconomy in the long-run rather than adopting the policy that maximizes thc chances of politicians being reelected."J8 

This naive wish is simply that, a hope. Where is the argument or evidence that a wholly unaccountable Fed would, in fact, "do what's best for the economy in the long-run"? What are the 

Fed officials' incentives to do that? What monitoring and governance mechanisms assure that 

Fed officials will pursue the public interest? What if they have private interests? Maybe they are 

influenced by ideology. Suppose they make systematic errors. Maybe they are unduly influenced 

by the banking industry or other special-intcrest groups. To make a case for independence, it is 

not enough to demonstrate the potential hazards of political oversight. You have to show that 

these hazards exceed the hazards of an unaccountable, unrestricted, ungoverned central bank. A 

naive faith in the wisdom of central bankers to do what's right just isn't good enough. 

16 See, for example, Anil K. Kashyap and Frederic S. Mishkin, "The fed Is Already Transparent," Wall Street Journal, November 9, 2009. 

17 Ronald H. Coase, "The Regulated Industries: Discussion," American Economic Review 54 (1964): 194-97; Harold Demsetz, "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal oj Law and Economics 12, no. 1 (April 

1969): 1-22. 

18 Mark Thoma, "Why The Federal Reserve Needs To Be Independent," CBS Monr:ywalch, November 12, 2009 

(http://www.cbsnews.coml8301-505123 162-39740 151Iwhv-the-federal-reserve-needs-to-be-independentD. 

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Do We Need a Central Bank? 

Without a central bank, how can a monctary system work? Don't we need a ccntral bank to 

create bank reserves? Isn't the Fed neccssary to maintain stable prices? Don't we need the government to create and regulate money? Actually, the reverse is true. 

One of the first scientific analyses of the nature and origin of money, Carl Menger's 1892 essay "On the Origin of Money," cxplains how money-a generally accepted medium of exchange-emerges from the trading patterns of individual market participants. 19 Menger was 

challenging the then-dominant "state theory of money," which held that money must be created, 

ex nihilo, by benevolent central planners. Rather, as decades of research in monetary theory and 

history have shown, there is no need whatsoever for govcrnment participation in the monetary 

and financial system. Money-whether a physical commodity like gold or silver or their paper 

equivalents-is essentially a commodity that is selected and "governed," so to speak, by the 

choices of entrepreneurs and consumers in the market. This is as true today, in an era of paper 

currencies and electronic payments, as it was under the international gold standard. There is no 

need for a government agency to increase or decrease the supply of money. Indeed, according to 

the Austrian school, government attempts to control the money supply create distortions in the 

economy by interfering with relative prices and warping the capital structure, encouraging the 

bad investments that manifest themselves over the course of the business cycle. Rather, the value 

of money should be determined on the market, as part of the normal, day-to-day process of exchanges bctwcen money and goods and services. 

How, then, is price stability to be maintained? The answer is that the economy doesn't need 

"stable" prices, just market prices. Some of the proposals discussed at this hearing suggest removing the Federal Reserve Act's language about "maximum employment," keeping just the 

part about "stable prices." Eliminating the dual mandate would be a step in the right direction, as 

19 Carl Menger, "On the Origin of Money," Economic Journal 2 (1892): 239-55; Peter G. Klein and George A. Selgin, "Menger's Theory of Money: Some Experimental Evidence," in John Smithin, ed., What Is Money? (London: 

Routledge. 2000), pp. 217-34. 

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it would reduce the Fed's incentive to increase the money supply when unemployment rates rise 

beyond some arbitrary threshold. But the requirement of price stability should be removed as 

well. The idea that a central bank is need to maintain a stable or modestly rising price level---to 

prevent high levels of inflation, in other words··~is based on a misunderstanding of inflation. In a 

growing economy, with a stable or slightly growing money supply (as under a commodity standard), prices will tend to fall, as in the US during the 19th century, when the US experienced dramalic increases in production and living standards. Price levels rise because the real economy is 

shrinking or-as is almost universally the case in practice-because the money supply is increasing faster than the increase in real production. Inflation is not caused by an "overheated" economy that the government needs to somehow cool off. Inflation, as Milton Friedman famously put 

it, is everywhere and always a monetary phenomenon. Central banks don't fight inflation; they 

create it. 

But isn't it vital that a government agency try to control interest rates, keeping interest rates 

sufficiently low to generate economic growth? Not at all. Interest rates are prices, prices that 

clear the markets between suppliers and demanders ofloans. Increasing the money supply in an 

attempt to lower interest rates can indeed give the economy a short-term "boost," but at the cost 

of channeling resources into areas-housing, for instance-where the market does not want them 

to go. Driving down interest rates below their market-clearing rates does not create real economic growth, but only distortions, by making it more difficult for entrepreneurs to anticipate the future goods and services that consumers will want to purchase, and thus be profitable.2o Credit 

expansion shifts wealth from savers to borrowers (and, in the case of mortgage lending, from 

renters to owners), from less time-sensitive investment projects to more time-sensitive ones; and 

from those who are last to receive the new money to those who are first in line. 21 In short, activist monetary policy always, whether intentionally or not, picks winners and losers, increases un20 In Mises~s teffilinology, credit expansion that Jowers interest rates, increases price levels, and alters relative price 

mtios "falsifies economic calculation." Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (New Haven: 

Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 549 and 553. 

21 Mark Spitznagel, "How the Fed Favors the 1 %," Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2012. 

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certainty, and destroys real wealth?2 We don't want a government agency setting the price of 

tomatoes or shoes or forklifts or computer software; why do we want a government agency setting the price ofloans? 

What about the need for a lender of last resort? Even proponents of central banking recognize 

that the lendcr-of-last-resort function encourages what economists call "moral hazard": banks 

take on more risk than they would if they had to bear the full consequences oftheir portfolio decisions. The presence ofa central bank, armed with an infinite supply of "liquidity," ready to 

supply liquidity to any bank in financial distress, discourages prudent bchavior. 23 Diamond and 

Rajan link the Financial Crisis to "the actions of the Federal Reserve earlier in the decade, not 

only in convincing the market that interest rates would remain low for a sustained period following the dot-com bust because of its fears of deflation, but also in promising to intervene to pick 

up the pieces in case of an asset price collapse-the so-called Greenspan put. 24 

More generally, a dynamic, wealth-creating market economy relies on the power of compctition-what Joseph Schumpeter famously called "creative destruction"-to sort between highvalued and low-valued use of resources, including the displacement of less efficient firms by 

their more efficient rivals. The banking industry is no different. If a bank, like any other business, cannot profitably produce goods and services that its customers demand, it should be liquidated and its assets made available to entrepreneurs who can do a better job. Bailouts, subsidies, 

and other forms of special privilege for particular entrepreneurs hinder the market process of directing productive resources to their highest valued uses. As Luigi Zingales reminds us, the price 

of bailouts is "billions of dollars iIi taxpayer money and, even worse, the violation of the funda22 Robert A. Higgs, "Regime Uncertainty: Why the Great Depression Lasted So Long and Wby Prosperity Resumed 

after the War," Independent Review I, no. 4 (1997): 561-90; Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, 

"Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty," Working paper, Chicago Booth School of Business, 2011. 

23 Indeed, programs such as the Troubled Assets Re!iefPrograrn are forms of corporate welfare that redistribute resources from the more prudent financial institutions" for example, banks that stayed out of the market for mortgagebacked securities-to the more reekless ones. 

24 Diamond and Rajan, p. 33. 

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mental capitalist principle that she who reaps the gains also bears the losses.,,25 Besides explicit 

bailouts, implicit subsidies from "too-big-to-fail" guarantees stymie the entrepreneurial selection 

process, not only by protecting unsuccessful entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial ventures, but also 

by rewarding lobbying and other forms of rent-seeking, directing investment toward subsidized 

activities (at the expense of consumer preferences), and discouraging entry by nascent entrepreneurs who lack political connections. 

These principles apply fully to the banking industry. Of course, financial firms are closely 

linked through complex transactions and instruments such as derivatives and other contracts. The 

failure of a particular financial institution imposes costs on various counterparties, including other financial institutions. But the production of virtually every good and service in a mature industrial economy is characterized by a complex, interlocking web of transactions, mutual obligations, and contractual relationships. Banking is not unique in this regard. Yet we do not worry 

about contagion effects sweeping the computer hardware or retail clothing or dairy industry 

should one or two leading firms go bankrupt. Moreover, the extent to which parties expose themselves to counterparty risks, in banking or any other industry, depends on the protections offered 

by the regulatory system. If a computer hardware company knows that it is Too Big to Fail, or 

that a Computer Industry Resource Provider of Last Resort stands ready to supply labor, machines, and raw materials in case of trouble, that company will engage in all kinds of risky behaviors it would have otherwise avoided. 

Alternatives to Central Banking 

Many scholars and practitioners support the Federal Reserve System, and central banking 

more generally, because they cannot conceive of any alternative. "lfwe got rid of the Fed," they 

ask, "who would control the money supply?" Of course, to ask the question that way is to answer 

it: the market would control the money supply, just as it "controls" the tomato supply, the shoc 

supply, the forklift supply, and the Angry Birds supply. 

25 Luigi Zingales, "Why Paulson is Wrong," VoxEU~ September 21,2008 

(http://www.vQxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1670). 

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Exactly how a market-based monetary system would function, what form it would take, and 

how an economy can transition from government-controlled to market-based money, are interesting and important subjects that have stimulated large and growing academic and practitioner literatures. 26 Most proponents of market-based money favor a commodity standard, though competing paper currencies have been suggested as well. 27 All these schemes have the basic advantage of taking the value of money out of the hands of government planners, allowing it to be 

determined by supply and demand, as with every other good and service in a market economy. 

Another advantage of a commodity standard is that it prevents allowing a central bank to 

monetize the government's debt by purchasing government bonds (and reducing debt payments 

by generating price inflation). In the interest of transparency, it is far better to require that federal 

government spending be financed through taxation or borrowing from the public. Wouldn't this 

constrain the federal government's ability to "stimulate" the economy with increased spending 

during times of recession? Yes, and that's exactly the point-a commodity standard imposes fiscal discipline, something the US economy desperately needs. Such discipline would rescue entrepreneurs from the unpredictable and often arbitrary whims of monetary planners, freeing them 

to invest, innovate, and create economic growth-not just in the long run, but in the short run as 

well. 

Conclusion 

There is an old joke about a central bank official picking up a pizza. (Perhaps it's Chairman 

Bemanke, on his way home after a long day of quantitative easing.) The clerk asks, "Do you 

want it cut in six slices, or eight?" The central banker responds: "I'm feeling extra hungry today; 

better make it eight." 

26 Murray N. Rothbard, "The Case for a 100 Per Cent Gold Dollar," in Leland Yeager, ed., In Search of a Monetary 

Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 94--136; Friedman, A Program for Monetary 

Stability, pp. 4-8; George A. Selgin and Lawrence II. White, "How Would the Invisible Hand Handle Money?" 

Journal of Economic Literature 32, no. 4 (1994): 1718-49; Rothbard, The Case Against the Fed (Aubum, Ala.: 

Ludwig von Mises Institute,1994), pp.146-51. 

27 F. A. Hayek, Denationalization q(Money. London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1974. 

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Of course, dividing the stock of goods and services by a larger quantity of money does not 

create wealth. One of the most important lessons of economic theory is that the only way for a 

society to generate economic growth is to consume less than it produces. The surplus (real savings) can be invested in the production of capital goods (and innovation) that allows for greater 

production in the future. Conversely, one of the oldest economic fallacies is the idea that the 

economy sometimes gets "stuck" with low production and high unemployment due to a shortage 

of money, and that the way to get it unstuck is to print more money to increase "total spending"-to consume more than the economy produces. Some sixty years ago Ludwig von Mises 

ridiculed this as the "spurious grocer philosophy" (the merchant's view that his products aren't 

selling because buyers lack enough currency), noting that this fallacy is essentially the philosophy of Lord Keynes, the twentieth-century apostle of central banking and macroeconomic stabilization policy. 

Keynes was wrong. Cheap credit does not help bring an economy out of recession (particularly when it was cheap credit that caused the recession in the first place). More generally, a 

monetary system controlled by an all-powerful central bank is inherently destabilizing and harmful to economic growth. The mistakes made by the Fed before and after 2008 are not isolated incidents, mistakes that can be corrected by making minor changes to the Fed's charter, structure, 

or independence. They are the predictable result of giving control ofthe monetary and financial 

system to a government agency. The best option is to replace the central bank and let the market 

be in charge of money. 

The position advocated here is often dismissed as radical or extreme, a kind of "market fundamentalism" (to use a derogatory term). But it is a reasonable, pragmatic, realistic view. Economics and management scholarship teach that monopoly providers are inefficient and ineffective, and a government monopoly on money is no different. Markets are not perfect, but neither 

are Fed chairs. It's time to make the supply of money independent of political interference. 

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"The Case for Preserving the Federal Reserve's Dual Mandate" 

Testimony of Alice M. Rivlin 

Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology Subcommittee 

Financial Services Committee 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Tuesday, May 8, 2012 

Chairman Paul and Ranking Member Clay: 

I am happy to have this opportunity to testify before the subcommittee as you consider a 

diverse set of bills designed to alter the role, structure, or functioning of the Federal 

Reservc. I will focus my brief remarks this morning on the importance of preserving the 

Federal Reserve's dual mandate to targct both maximum employment and price stability. I 

believe that the dual mandate has scrved thc United States well, and that it would bc a 

mistake to restrict the Fed's policy actions to fostcring stable prices alone, as proposed by 

Mr. Brady in HR 4180 and Mr. Pence in HR 245. 

I would like to make clear at the outset that I belicve a strong, independent central bank is 

cssential to keeping the United States economy functioning as productively as possible 

without unnecessarily costly swings in economic activity. Market capitalism has proven its 

ability to produce goods and scrvices efficiently and deliver a rising standard of living, but 

it is prone to instability. Monetary policy, along with fiscal policy, can help modcrate 

booms and busts, although it cannot erase the business cycle. Leaning against the economic 

winds, however, often involves unpopular actions, such as raising interest rates as a boom 

gathers excessive steam. There is always huge uncertainty about how the complex 

machinery of the economy is actually working and what results monetary policy can expect 

to achieve. Nevertheless, chanccs of succcssful monetary policy are highest when these 

difficult decisions arc dclcgatcd to a group of qualified, experienced people, who are as 

insulated as possible from political pressures to please the public in the short run. Without 

a strong independent ccntral bank functioning to mitigate economic and financial 

instability, the United States would have a weaker, far more chaotic economy and lose its 

leadership position in thc global economy. 

The objective of economic policy-including monetary policy-should be a rising standard 

of living for most people over thc long run. That means maximizing sustainable economic 

growth and productive employment. Controlling inflation is a crucial element of the larger 

objective because high and, especially, rising inflation is a serious threat to sustained 

growth. The expectation of rising prices distorts both consumer and investor hehavior and 

can even turn into a destructive, self perpetuating hyperinflation. Hence, an essential 
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prerequisite for steadily increasing prosperity is a widespread, firmly anchored expectation 

that reasonably stable prices will prevail in the future. 

Hence, I believe the dual mandate is simply a reflection of what average citizens ought to 

expect their central bank to do: Let the economy create as many jobs as possible, but don't 

let inflation intcrfere with that job growth. Economists translate that common sense 

exhortation into a monetary policy aimed at keeping the economy as close as possible to its 

long-run potential growth, without seriously overshooting in either direction. This idea is 

encapsulated in Pro. John Taylor's famous rule that prescribes easing or tightening when 

observed economic growth appears to be deviating from potential in either direction. 

The problem for the Fed's decision makers is that potential growth is not observable, 

because it depends on trends in productivity growth, which can shift unexpectedly. In the 

stagflation ofthe 1970s, hindsight indicates that monetary policy makers overestimated 

potential growth and did not tighten soon enough to avoid the acceleration of inflation at 

the end ofthe decade. The aggressive tightening ofmonctary policy in 1979-and the deep 

recession of the early 1980s that followed-might have been mitigated if the Fed had acted 

more aggressively sooner. In the 1990s, when I was at the Fed, we faced a happier version 

of the same uncertainty. Unemployment had fallen to levels that past experience indicated 

could trigger inflation, but inflation was actually falling. We held off tightening on the 

presumption, which proved correct, that accelerating productivity growth had raised 

potential growth and reduced the risk of inflation. 

Partly thanks to the Fed, the late 1990s illustrated the benefits of very tight labor markets 

without significant inflation. Marginal workers found jobs, acquired skills, and work 

expcrienec, while firms had strong incentives to retain workers by training them, using 

their skills more effectively, and moving them into better paid jobs. We also had 

appropriately tightening fiscal policy that balanced the budget-a feat far easier to 

accomplish in a strongly growing economy. The sooner we get back to those conditions, the 

better! 

But thc late 1990s also illustrated the inadequacy of the Fed's toolkit in rcsponse to asset 

price bubbles. Some have criticized the Fed for not tightening monetary policy in response 

to "irrational exuberance" in the dotcom stock bubble of the late 1990s. But raising interest 

rates enough to prick that bubble sooner would probably have tipped the economy into 

recession, punishing workers and companies across the country for no good reason. 

Influencing the federal funds rate through open market operations is simply not an 

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effective way of calming an asset price bubble. That lesson had to be learned again in the 

far more dangerous housing price bubble that gathered steam in the 2000's and whose 

bursting precipitated the financial crash of 2008 and the ensuing Great Recession. 

Arguably the Fed kept interest rates too low too long, exacerbating the housing bubble, but 

intcrest rates were not the main cause ofthc catastrophe, nor could monetary policy alone 

have averted it. Among multiple culprits, I fault thc Fed for not using its regulatory 

powers, in conjunction with other regulators, to raise underwriting standards for mortgage 

lenders, punish predatory lending, and rein in excessive financial leverage. While we 

should not have needcd a catastrophe to learn this lesson, the Dodd-Frank Act now gives 

the Fcd and the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) responsibility for financial 

stability and new tools with which to help achieve it. 

The dual mandate is not inconsistent with strong emphasis on controlling inflation when 

appropriate or even with an explicit target for inflation. Indced, last January the Fed 

confirmed a long run inflation goal of two perccnt. Operating under the dual mandate the 

Fed has succcssfully controlled inflation for three decades. To change the language of the 

law to imply that the Fed's ~ concern should be inflation would send a misleading signal 

to a public rightly concerned with jobs and growth, as wcll as inflation. It would imply that 

inflation is serious current thrcat to American prosperity, which seems to me unwarranted. 

Exclusive attention to inflation and firmly announced inflation targets served central banks 

well in the last century, especially in small open economies that could ill afford importing 

inflation through swings in thcir currencies. But it would be ludicrous for the United States 

to put sole emphasis on inflation now, when we have slack labor markets and substantial 

excess capacity in most economic sectors. Some have urged the Fed to try to create more 

inflation in the current situation, but that would he hard to achieve, even if it were 

desirahle. Our economy is far less inflation prone than it was in thc 1970s. It is more 

flexible, less dependent on energy prices, has easy access to more sources of supply in the 

face of domcstic prices increases, no longer has wages dominated by multi-year indexed 

labor contracts, and benefits from expectations that reflcet 30 years of reasonably stable 

prices. That recent oil price shocks have had so little effect on core inflation is evidence of 

lower inflation risk than the 1970s. 

What we need now is a continuation of accommodative monetary policy plus fiscal policy 

that combines additional investment in long rnn growth and jobs with credible long-run 

action to stabilize the debt. In short, monetary policy as executed by the Fed under the dual 

mandate has a positive track record and is currently appropriate. I would urge the 

Congress not to tamper with legislative language that has served us well. 

Thank you for your attention. I would be happy to answer questions. 

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Testimony before the 

Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology of the 

Committee on Financial Services 

U.S. House of Representatives 

"Improving the Federal Reserve System: 

Examining Legislation to Reform the Fed and Other Alternatives" 

May 8, 2012 

John B. Taylorl 

Chairman Paul, Ranking Member Clay, and other mcmbers of the subcommittee, I thank 

you for the opportunity to testifY at this hearing on improving the Federal Reserve System. I 

especially appreciate the efforts of this subcommittce to bring these crucial monetary policy 

issues to a prominent place in the public debate. As you requested, I will first explain why there 

is a need for improvement and then consider whether this need is addressed by six refoon bills: 

• HR. 245 introduced by Rep. Mike Pence, 

HR. 1094 introduced by Rep. Ron Paul, 

• HR. 1401 introduced by Rep. Marcy Kaptur, 

• HR. 2990 introduced by Rep. Dennis Kucinich and John Conyers, 

• HR. 3428 introduced by Rep. Barney Frank, and 

• HR. 4180 introduced by Rep. Kevin Brady and others. 

A Need for Improvement 

Nearly a century of experience under the Federal Reserve Act has provided plenty of 

evidence that more systematic rules-based monetary policies work and more unpredictable 

discretionary policies don't. The Fed's well-known mistake of cutting money growth in the 

Great Depression which led to very high unemployment is now part of a much larger body of 

evidence. From the mid-I 960s through the 1970s, the Fed intervened with discretionary go-stop 

changes in money growth that led to frequent recessions, high unemployment, low economic 

growth, and high inflation. In contrast, through the 1980s and 1990s and until recently the Fed 

ran a more predictable, systematic policy with a clear price stability goal, which eventually led to 

lower unemployment, lower interest rates, longer expansions, and stronger economic growth. 

Recently, however, the Fed has returned to unpredictable discretionary policies with 

disappointing results. Starting in 2003-2005 it departed from the more systematic policies it 

followed in the 1980s and 1990s. It held interest rates too low for too long and thereby 

1 Mary and Robert Raymond Professor of Economics at Stanford University and George P. 

Shultz Senior Fellow in Economics at Stanford's Hoover Institution. Parts of this testimony are 

based on Chapter 4, "Monetary Rules Work and Discretion Doesn't," of my book First 

Principles: Five Key's to Restoring America's Prosperity (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012), and 

my testimony before the Joint Economic Committee on Mareh 27, 2012. 

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encouraged excessive risk-taking and the housing boom. It then overshot the needed increase in 

interest rates which worsened the bust. Since then the interventions have been truly 

extraordinary, even if you ignore actions during the 2008 panic--including the bailouts of the 

creditors of Bear Stearns and AIG-and consider only quantitative easing-the large scale 

purchases of mortgage-backed securities and longer term treasuries in 2009 and later. 

In fact, the Fed's discrction is virtually unlimited. To pay for its large-scale securities 

purchases, it simply credits banks with electronic dcposits--called reserve balances. The result 

has been an explosion of reserve balances. Before the 2008 panic, reserve balances were about 

$10 billion. Now they are $1,493 billion. If the Fed had stopped with the emergency responses 

of the 2008 panic, instead of embarking on quantitative easing, reserve balances would now be 

back to normal levels. This large expansion of reserve balances creates risks. If it is not undone, 

then the bank reserves will eventually pour out into the economy, causing inflation. If it is 

undone too quickly, banks may find it hard to adjust and pull back on loans. 

The very existence of quantitative easing as a policy tool creates unpredictability, as 

traders speculate whether and when the Fed will intervene and guess what the impact will be. 

That the Fed can intervene without limit into any credit market-not only mortgage-backed 

securities but also securities backed by automobile loans or student loans--creates more 

uncertainty and raises questions about why an independent agency of government should 

intervene in these areas at all. In the spirit of the Constitution, they are best left to the Congress 

and the president through the appropriations process. 

Reform Proposals 

For all these reasons, there is a great need for improvement in the degree to which the 

Federal Reserve follows rules rather than discretion. To achieve this end, some argue that we 

should abolish thc Fed, as does H.R. 1094, repeal the Federal Reserve Act, and perhaps replace it 

with a commodity standard. The goal of such legislation is to move American monetary policy 

away from discretion and toward rules. However, a more practical and effective approach, in my 

vicw, is to reform the Federal Reserve and create strong incentives for rule-like behavior. 

The starting place for such a reform is the recognition that a clear wcll-specified goal 

usually results in a consistent and effective strategy for achieving that goal. Too many goals blur 

responsibility and accountability, causing decision makers to choose one goal some times and 

another goal at other times in an effort to chart a middle coursc. In the case of monetary policy, 

multiple goals enable politicians to lean on the central bank to do their bidding and thereby 

dcviate from a sound money strategy. More than one goal can also cause the Federal Reserve to 

exceed the normal bounds of monetary policy-moving into fiscal policy or credit allocation 

policy-as it seeks the additional instruments necessary to achieve multiple goals. 

Despite these obvious pitfalls, a mnltiple mandate for the Fed swept in during the great 

interventionist wave of the 1970s, when Congress passed the Federal Reservc Reform Act of 

1977. This law explicitly gave the Federal Reserve the goals of promoting both "maximum 

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employment" and "stable prices." This was the wrong remedy for the inflationary boom-bust 

economy at the time, and monetary policy worsened for a while. 

Paul Volcker reversed policy when he became ehainnan in August 1979, focusing on 

inflation like a laser beam. Of course he had to interpret the law in a way consistcnt with this 

reversal. To achieve maximum employment, he argued that he had to reduce inflation even if 

that increased unemployment in the short run. While that approach eventually worked well, it 

also set a precedent that the dual mandate was open to interpretation by Fed officials. In recent 

years the dual mandate has been used by the Fed to justity massive interventions on the 

questionable grounds that these will reduce unemployment in the short run. 

Thus, an important step toward a more rule-like policy would be to remove the dual 

mandate and bring focus to a single goal as does H.R. 4180, introduced by Rep. Kevin Brady 

and others, in which the goal is "long-run price stability" or H.R. 245, introduced by Rep. Mike 

Pence, in which the goal is "stable prices." In my view, the adjective "long-run" is useful 

because it clarifies that the mandate does not mean that the Fed should overreact to minor shortrun ups and downs in inflation from month to month or even quarter to quarter. The single 

mandate wouldn't stop the Fed from providing liquidity when money markets freeze up as they 

did after the 9111 terrorist attacks, or serving as lender of last resort to banks during a panic, or 

reducing the interest rate in a recession. 

Some worry that a focus on the goal of price stability would lead to more unemployment. 

But history shows just the opposite. One reason the Fed kept its interest rate too low for too long 

in 2003-05 was the concern that higher rates would increase unemployment, contrary to the dual 

mandate. Ifthe single mandate had prevented the Fed from keeping interest rates too low for too 

long, then it would likely have avoided the boom and bust which led to very high unemployment. 

Recent history shows that a single mandate would help to avoid excessive discretionary 

interventions. Since 2008 the Fed has explicitly cited the dual mandate to justify its unusual 

interventions, including the quantitative easing from 2009 to 20 II. During the 1980s and 1990s, 

Fed officials rarely referred to the dual mandate, even during thc period in the early 1980s when 

unemployment rates were as high as today. When they did so, it was to make the point that 

achieving price stability was the surest way for monetary policy to keep unemployment down. 

In fact, until the recent interventionist period, written policy statements and directives from the 

Fed did not mention the "maximum employment" part ofthc dual mandate in the Federal 

Reserve Act. There was not a single reference from 1979 until late 2008,just as the Fed was 

about to embark on its first bout of quantitative easing. It increased its references to maximum 

employment in the fall of 20 I 0 as it embarked on its second bout of quantitative easing. 

While a single mandate would reduce excessive discrctionary interventions and 

encourage more rule-like policy, it would be wise to supplement the existing legislative 

proposals with additional incentives for the Fed to place greater emphasis on the strategy or rule 

for setting the monetary policy instruments (the interest rate or the monetary aggregates). Until 

the year 2000 the Federal Reserve Act had a specific reporting requirement about the growth of 

the monetary aggregates. It called for the Fed to submit a rcport to Congress and then testify 

about its plans for money growth for the current and next calendar years. 

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The reporting requirement was fully repealed in 2000, because the data on money growth 

had become less reliable as people found alternatives to money-such as credit cards or money 

market mutual funds-to make payments. The Fed thus focused more on the interest rate, but 

the problem was that nothing about reporting on its interest rate policy was put in its place of its 

reporting about money growth. 

In order to further encourage more rule-like monetary policy, the Congress could 

reinstate the reporting requirements. But rather than focus only on money growth, it would also 

focus on the systematic response of the interest rate that changes in money growth bring about. 

In doing so, it would not require that the Fed choose any particular rule for the interest rate, only 

that it establish some rule and report what the rule is. But if the Fed deviates from its chosen 

strategy, it must provide a written explanation and testifY at a public congressional hearing. 

In addition to the change in the mandate and enhanced reporting requirements, overall 

restraints on the composition and the size of the Federal Reserve's portfolio would reduce 

monetary policy uncertainty. It is therefore appropriate, in my view, to limit asset purchases by 

the Fed to U.S. Treasury securities, as called for in H.R. 4180 with exceptions as provided in that 

bill. This would also clarifY that the Fed's responsibility is monetary policy not credit allocation 

policy, and thus strengthen the independence of the Fed. In contrast H.R. 2990, introduced by 

Rep. Kucinich, would effectively reduce the independence of monetary policy decisions by 

creating a new monetary authority under the general oversight of the Secretary of the Treasury. 

Improving the balance of voting rights on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 

would also reduce the likelihood of harmful discretionary actions. Giving all Federal Reserve 

district bank presidents voting rights at every FOMC meeting, as called for in H.R. 4180, would 

better balance voting power across the entire economy and reduce the tendency for policy 

decisions to favor particular regions, sectors, firms, or groups over others. H.R. 1401, 

introduced by Rep. Marcy Kaptur, also improves the balance among the district banks and 

Federal Reserve Board members by having the voting authority of all the presidents rotate on 

and off in the same manner and by reducing the length of terms of the members of the Board of 

Governors. H.R. 3428 introduced by Rep. Barney Frank would worsen the balance, in my view, 

by replacing the district bank presidents who vote on the FOMC with additional Fed Board 

members thereby concentrating more power in Washington and likely incrcasing the 

discretionary power of the Federal Reserve. 

In sum, legislative reforms which clarifY the Fed's mandate, enhance reporting 

rcquirements about its strategy or rule for the monetary instruments, restrict the nature of the its 

purchases of securities, and balance voting rights on the FOMC would allow Congress to 

exercise appropriate political control without becoming involved in day-to-day monetary policy 

operations or otherwise micromanaging the Fed. In my view the reforms would enhance the 

independence of the Fed by adding reassuring accountability appropriate for an independent 

agency of government and clarifYing that its overall responsibility is monetary policy not fiscal 

policy or credit allocation policy. History and basic economics tells us that such reforms would 

greatly improve employment and price stability and would help restore America's prosperity. 

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Statement for the Record of Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich 

Hearing ofthe Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology Subcommittee 

"Improving the Federal Reserve System: Examining Legislation to Reform the Fed and 

Other Alternatives" 

May 8,2012 

'This is a staggering thought. We are completely dcpendent on the commercial 

banks. Someone has to borrow every dollar we have in circulation, cash or crcdit. 

If the banks create ample synthetic money we are prosperous; if not, we starve. 

We are absolutely without a pennanent monetary system. 

When one gets a complete grasp upon this picturc, the tragic absurdity of our 

helpless position is almost incrediblc-but there it is .... 

Our statesmen have consistently dcclined to study this question and provide a 

sound monetary system, an adequate permanent currency, scientifically calculated 

to expand consistently with our increasing population and our increasing ability to 

produce .... 

It is the most important subject intelligent persons can investigate and reflect 

upon. It is so important that our present civilization may collapse unless it is 

widely understood and the defccts remedied very soon. 

It is your problem and mine."] 

Robert H. Hemphill, Former Credit Manager of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 

"I have never yet had anyone who could, through the use of logic and reason, 

justify the Federal Govcrnment borrowing the use of its own money. It is 

absolutely wrong for Government to issue interest-bearing obligations. It is not 

only wrong, it is absolutely unnecessary. I believe the system should be changed. 

The Constitution of the United States does not give !he banks the power to create 

money. The Constitution says that Congress shall have the power to create 

money. I believe the time will come when people will demand that this be 

changed. I believe the time will corne in this country when they will actually 

blame you and me and everyone else connected with this Congress for sitting idly 

by and permitting such an idiotic system to eontinue.,,2 

Congressman John William Wright Patman, Chairman, House Committee on Banking and Currency 

(now the House Committee on Financial Services, whose Committee meeting room is named the 

Wright Patman Room in honor of the long-serving Congressman from Texas) 

J "Foreword by A Banker" in the first (1935) edition of 100% Money: Designed to keep checking banks 

100% liquid; to prevent inflation and deflation; largely to cure or prevent depressions; and to wipe out 

much of the National Debt by Irving Fisher, LL.D., Professor of Economics, Yale University. 

2 September 9,1941, Congressional Record, pages 7582-7583. 
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In the fall of2008 the financial system ofthe United States nearly collapsed. Since then, little 

has changed to prevent the same thing from happening again. I have introduced H.R. 2990, the 

National Emergency Employment Defense Act of2011, which provides America with a 

monetary system fit for the 21 51 Century, and beyond. It enables Congress to promote the gcneral 

welfare by enabling Congress to: 

• Restore Constitutional money 

• Provide a stable currency 

• Provide a stable monetary system 

• Provide a stable economy 

• Create a full employment economy 

• Create a sustainable economy 

• Assure income security for seniors 

• Promote balanced trade 

• Reduce the cost of investment 

• Reduce individual income taxes 

H.R. 2990 was developed by learning the lessons from past experience and applying them to the 

present, with a view to the future. It is clear that tinkering with the present system will not 

produce different results. Structural reform is needed to achieve desirable results. 

Tn short, H.R. 2990 reasserts the constitutional authority granted solely to Congress to originate 

money and regulate its value. It accomplishes this using three structural reforms to our current 

monetary system: 

First, H.R. 2990 calls for dismantling the Federal Reserve System as it exists in its present form. 

It first makes clear that per Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States, issuance 

of money is solely under the authority of Congress. To provide a seamless transition to the new 

structure, important operational functions such as check clearing and settlements would be 

carried on by a bureau within the U.S. Treasury. An independent and autonomous Monetary 

Authority would be responsible for monitoring the monetary system so it is neither inflationary 

nor deflationary. The Monetary Authority would advise Congress as to when new money is 

needed in the economy. Congress would authorize the Treasury to originate money to be spent 

into circulation in ways that promote the general welfare. 

Second, the bill would end "fractional reserve" lending; all past monetized bank credits would be 

convertcd into U.S. money. Banks would then act as intermediaries, accepting savings deposits 

and loaning them out to borrowers. This stabilizes the money system, the payments system, and 

the banking system without bailouts. 

Third, the U.S. Congress would authorize the U.S. Treasury to spend new money into circulation 

as required. This would enable non-tax funding for 21 st century infrastructure, education, and 

health care. Under the bill, 25% of money originated annually is granted to the states to 

supplement their state budgets. 

2 
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This structural refonn can be implemented smoothly. H.R. 2990 provides for an orderly 

transition so that - without disrupting or affecting anybody's day-to-day business our monetary 

system will have these key features: 

1. Issuance of money is solely under the authority of Congress, per Article 1, Section 8, ofthe 

Constitution of the United States. 

2. Many practices which destabilize the economy are ended by ending the privilege given to 

some businesses to create our money supply primarily as interest-bearing debt. 

3. Investment in infrastructure and research and development is made possible without taxing or 

borrowing so we can build on our competitive advantage without burdening future 

generations. 

H.R. 2990 enables America's longstanding prosperity to be preserved, while at the same time 

reducing taxes and paying off the national debt. The following sections provide an overview of 

the problems faced by our economy that result from the current monetary system as well as an 

explanation of how H.R. 2990 refonns this system to solve these problems. 

H.R. 2990 Restores Constitutional Money 

Congress must reassert its Constitutionally-granted authority over creation of money. In doing 

so it will take back the privilege of money-creation that has been given to private financial 

institutions. Constitutional money is money originated by an Act of Congress. This means the 

power to originate money, in any fonn, as Constitutional scholar Robert G. Natelson concludes 

in an article published in the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy: 

"[T)he money thus "coined" did not need to be metallic. Paper or any other 

material that Congress selected would suffice. Because the power to coin paper 

was express, it requires no justification by the incidental powers doctrine of the 

Necessary and Proper Clause d 

Therefore, under the Constitution, Congress has the power to originate money and detennine 

what money is, including its fonn. Whatever is accepted in payment of taxes to government and 

settlement of debts will be money. Money is thus a matter oflaw. 

Today most of our money is digital and is created by banks and some other depository 

institutions whenever they make loans or purchases. Treasury coin and Federal Reserve notes 

can only enter circulation through a withdrawal from a bank account. This means no one in the 

economy can obtain cash or pay for anything unless somebody has first gone into debt to a bank 

or sold something to a bank. Conversely, whenever banks buy bonds, stocks, land, gold, or pay 

their staff and suppliers, they create money to do it. 

Federal Reserve banks also create money when they make loans or purchases. This money is 

only held in banks' accounts at Federal Reserve banks. If a Federal Reserve bank makes a loan 

3 Robert G. Natelson, "Paper Money and the Original Understanding of the Coinage Clause" Harvard 

Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 31 No.3, Summer, 2008, page 1079. 

3 
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or purchase with a bank's customer, the Federal Reserve bank credits the bank's Federal Reserve 

bank account and the bank credits their customer's account. Of course, the bank customer would 

normally not have something to sell unless they had money to pay for it in the first place, so 

again this means somebody would have first had to go into debt to a bank or sold something to a 

bank. 

These arrangements clearly put banks in an extremely privileged and powerful position. They 

get to create the money that everybody else in the economy needs and wants, and can create 

money to pay their expenses. This gives banks an extraordinary advantage over other businesses 

that have to earn their money in some way. To provide a level playing field among all 

businesses, H.R. 2990 ends this extraordinary privilege so that banks have to compete fairly with 

other types of lending institutions which do not create money, such as finance companies. 

Because the economy generally needs more money as population and economic activity 

increases, a source of additional money will still be needed. To avoid privileging any particular 

group in society, the fairest thing to do is have the money created by society as a whole; the 

fairest way to do it is in ways that benefit society as a whole. 

H.R. 2990 does this by enabling Congress to authorize the entry of money into circulation. It 

would not benefit society if the additional money were lent into circulation, as this would put 

society into debt. H.R. 2990 defines money as that which confers upon its bearer an 

unconditional means of payment, by Act of Congress. Because federal spending has to be 

authorized by an Act of Congress, this additional money would be Constitutional money. 

Therefore, H.R. 2990 provides for additional money to be spent into circulation, without adding 

any debt. 

The standard accounting conventions that facilitate this process are contained in the Federal 

Accounting Standards Advisory Board's Handbook, which identifies this type of money 

origination as seigniorage and classifies it as an "other financing source"; 

"Seigniorage is the face value of newly minted coins less the cost of production 

(which includes the cost of the metal, manufacturing, and transportation). It 

results from the sovereign power of the Government to directly create money and, 

although not an inflow of resources from the public, does increase the 

Government's net position in the same manner as an inflow of resources. 

Because it is not demanded, earned, or donated, it is an other financing source 

rather than revenue. It should be recognized as another financing source when 

coins are delivered to the Federal Reserve Banks in return for deposits.,,4 

Note that while this specific section relates to the coins originated by the Bureau of the U.S. 

Mint, the same principles can be applied to any other form of money authorized by Congress. 

H.R. 2990 thus provides for money in the form of currency notes and electronic currency to be 

originated in a similar manner by the relevant agencies. 

4 Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) Handbook: Statement of Federal Financial 

Accounting Standards 7 (SFFAS 7): Accounting for Revenue and Other Financing Sources and Concepts 

for Reconciling Budgetary and Financial Accounting, page 106-107. 

4 
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H.R. 2990 also provides for all of the existing money that had been previously created by banks 

to be accorded the very same legal status as any additional money subsequently originated by an 

Act of Congress, so that all money is treated as Constitutional money and the value of 

everyone's monetary assets arc assured. 

H.R. 2990 Provides a Stable Currency and is Non-Inflationary 

A stable currency is a currency which maintains its purchasing power over time. This can be 

expressed (and measured) as the prices of things valued in that currency staying about the same 

over time. This is called price stability. 

The Federal Reserve System has failed to maintain price stability. Since the cstablishment ofthe 

Federal Reserve, the dollar has lost 96% of its purchasing power. 5 This is because banks have 

been allowed to create as much money as they desire. Because banks create money mainly in the 

form of bank loans for profit, they usually create as much as possible. Banks do this regardless 

of the Federal Reserve's official monetary policy. A recent paper co-authored by a senior 

Federal Reserve Board staff member made this clear when it concluded that "bank loan supply 

does not respond to changes in monetary policy,,6 - i.e., the Federal Reserve's official monetary 

policy is, in effect, ineffective. 

Only a relatively small fraction of the money banks create goes into new production. A much 

greater fraction has gone into the purchase of existing assets like real estate, and to speculation, 

as in the speculation on the price of commodities. Thus money is created without anything new 

being produced. This causes bubbles and asset price inflation in the areas where the money goes, 

which can spill over into general inflation. If new money is being created without new 

production, inflation is a likely result. 

Conventional monetary policy as practiced by the Federal Reserve now is ineffective in its 

attempts to combat inflation. The response of conventional monetary policy to inflation is to 

raise interest rates. But this does not deter more money being created in bubble areas where 

prices are rising at a faster rate than the interest rate. Instead of promoting investment into 

productive areas of the economy, conventional monetary policy actions result in investment in 

areas of the economy where prices are rising at a faster rate than the interest rate. Thus the effect 

of conventional monetary policy is that not only meaningless to stopping asset price inflation, it 

also deters new production and raises the costs of any production that does occur. To cover these 

higher costs, prices have to be raised, and inflation occurs. 

Conventional monetary policy is thus a blunt instrument which hits everything except the thing it 

needs to hit, and can result in the opposite of what it was supposed to achieve. The recession 

that began in late 2007 is a guide: The economy lost millions of jobs due to the effects ofa 

5 Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, at: http://www.bls.gov/data/inflationcalculator.htm 

6 Carpenter, Seth B., and Selva Demiralp (2010), "Money, Reserves, and the Transmission-of Monetary 

Policy: Does the Money Multiplier Exist?", Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Divisions of 

Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C. 

5 
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complete loss of confidence in the housing market. The resulting ma~sive cuts by employers and 

lowering of demand by consumers led to a vicious cycle; banks nationwide failed, businesses no 

longer sought out loans, and the glut of commercial real estate led to sharply restricted 

commercial lending. The Fed's conventional monetary policy response oflowering interest rates 

to ncar zero for a sustained period has been ineffective, because when, as in 2008, financial 

bubbles burst and prices collapsed, no firm seeks to invest in making a loss, no matter how low 

the interest rate of borrowing is. Businesses and consumers loaded up with debt from the 

speculative bubble years predating the crash cannot now be induced into taking on more debt just 

as they are trying to reduce their debt. Furthermore, the costs of servicing debt incurred in times 

of higher interest rates do not reduce, even if prices do. The economy is still in a "debt 

overhang," 

The experience of the 1930s and 1970s also show that both price deflation and price inflation 

deter investment and hamper production and employment. The experience of the 1980s shows 

that sharply raising interest rates to try to curb inflation will plunge the economy into recession 

and lead to high unemploymcnt, while lowering interest rates to near zero to try to avoid 

deflation and induce employment does not work either. 

All of the above indicates that the Federal Reserve System as it is presently constructed cannot 

create conditions conducive to either price stability or maximum employment. 

A New Path Forward 

To change this paradigm of boom and bust cycles which the Federal Reserve is currently 

powerless to stop, there must be a direct relationship between the amount of new money entering 

the economy and the amount of new goods and services being produced. Under H.R. 2990, new 

money will go directly into the creation of new goods and services, while purchases of existing 

assets such as real estate or existing stocks will have to be financed out of savings of pre-existing 

money. This will make bubbles and asset pricc inflation virtually impossible. Thus under H.R. 

2990 it will be a relatively simple matter to maintain a stable currency. 

The governing principle for monetary policy in H.R. 2990 is to maintain a supply of money that 

is neither inflationary nor deflationary. The aggregate price level for a given amount of 

production remains stable, which means it will be a stable currency. In other words, the dollar 

will be able to maintain its purchasing power over time. 

H.R. 2990 Will Promote a Stable Monetary System by Preventing Systemic Failures and 

Making Ordinary Banking Safe Again 

The events of the fall of 2008 revealed just how fragile our present monetary system is; far too 

little has changed since then. If the past is any guide, it is only a matter of time before our 

financial system fails again. When the monetary system crashes, millions of peoples' lives are 

ruined. To prevent this from happening again, H.R. 2990 reforms banking practices so that 

banks no longer hold outsized power in our economic system, while still allowing them to 

continue to compete as profit-making firms. 

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In the wakc of the Great Recession, millions of honest, hard-working Americans lost their jobs, 

their homes, their health insurance and their whole way oflife while the largest banks and 

financial institutions that were the cause of the crash got trillions of dollars in support for their 

troubles. These entities arc now strongcr than ever. This is a recurring problem. 

There have becn 47 depressions or recessions since the country was founded: on averagc onc 

every 5 years. Amcrica has suffered 19 of these depressions or recessions since the Federal 

Reservc System was established (maintaining the average of one every 5 years), with an average 

duration of 1.1 years. That means the system has been down over 20% ofthc time, which is a 

dismal track record. 

When these system failures occur, they creatc a wave of bankruptcies and foreelosures which, 

while they may start with the least creditworthy borrowers, will very often end up bringing down 

large numbers of good borrowers in their wake. These are borrowers who would have been able 

to make their payments under normal conditions. This is unfair to the greater number of 

btL~incsses and homeowners whose lives are ruined. 

Thc common denominator that makes banks so prone to failure is the misplaced creation of 

money. As thc late economist John Kenneth Galbraith said, "[tJhe process by which banks 

create money is so simple that the mind is repelled7 " 

Bank loans and purchases from bank depositors create bank deposits. This means that our 

money supply is primarily created by being loaned along with a burden of interest-bearing debt. 

Conversely, when bank loans are repaid or when banks sell assets to bank depositors, bank 

deposits are destroyed. Banks keep the difference between the amount they create with the loan 

and the larger amount they destroy when the loan is repaid as their profit. This reduces our 

money supply. If the amount of new bank loans being made is less than the amount of old bank 

loans being repaid, the money supply will keep shrinking. 

To maintain our money supply, the economy has to continuously go into debt to banks. 

Otherwise the amount of money available to pay down debt or pay for other things is reduced. 

Thus, the economy is without a permanent money supply. It is impossible to get out of debt 

when the money used to pay old debt is created with new debt. 

At some point, the amount of money that has to go to service debt becomes unbearable, and 

defaults start to rise. This happens on a regular basis. When borrowers default on loans, banks 

take a paper loss on their balance sheets. So when it happens, banks become risk averse and the 

amount of new bank loans starts to drop. This in turn further reduces the amount of moncy 

available for paying down debt and paying for other things, making the situation gets worse and 

worse. 

A rise in defaults not only increases losses on banks' balance sheets, it can also call into question 

the value of banks' loans, securities and other assets. This in tum can call banks' solvency - and 

therefore creditworthiness into question. This can make banks reluctant to lend funds to each 

7 Galbraith, J. K. (1975) Money: Whence it came, where it went, London: Penguin, pp. 18-19. 

7 
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other, as they become less certain that they will be paid back. In the present system, banks rely 

heavily on inter-bank loans to clear and settle the payments they have to make for their 

customers. When banks stop trusting each other and the inter-bank lending markets freeze-up, 

all of their customers' check, credit card, debit card, and other electronic payments may not 

clear, and businesses and individuals may not get paid. This scenario would be an overnight 

disaster for the whole economy; commerce would soon grind to a halt. Imagine what would 

happen if food did not get to market. 

This is what nearly happened in the fall of2008, when inter-bank lending markets camc close to 

freezing-up. Congress was threatened with martial law if the banks did not get a bailout. 

It is outrageous that the welfare of any particular business should be able to threaten the United 

States with martial law. It is ridiculous that the welfare of any particular business should be able 

to threaten our payments system, and thus our entire economy, democracy, freedom, and way of 

life. The present monetary system thus represents an existential threat to America. H.R. 2990 

removes this threat by completely separating our payments system from banks' lending business. 

Banks would not pose a systemic risk to our payments system: no more "Too-Big-To-Fail" 

banks, no more bank bailouts, no more corporate welfare and no more crony capitalism. 

It is clear that present bank regulations do not work. So-called "capital adequacy" rules are 

ineffective because the profits that banks make from their lending and other activities feed into 

and add to their capital. That then allows them to continue fueling speculative bubbles that blow 

up the economy. These rules guarantee that the biggest banks will keep getting bigger and even 

more "Too-Big-To-Fail" as we have seen happen already. Thus the present arrangements and 

rules make the system more risky, not less. This is obviously an unsustainable path and will 

inevitably lead to even bigger failures in the future. 

We know from recent experience that mere regulatory refonu does not work in the long run 

within a system where the big get bigger, because the concentration of wealth and power will be 

used to deregulate the regulations. We then go through the same pathetic process of bustregulate-boom--deregulate-bust all over again. Congress needs to be smarter than that in order 

to properly serve the American people. 

H.R. 2990 ends this cycle and prevents systemic failure in a very simple way. It makes the 

money in people's bank accounts belong to them - the same as the cash in their pockets - instead 

of their bank's promise to pay them money. This means that the money in people's bank 

accounts that they use for making electronic transactions will be their monetary assets; their bank 

will be a custodian of those assets. In legal terms, the money in people's transaction accounts 

will be their bailed property. The depositor will be the owner of the money (not an unsecured 

lender, as they are now), and their bank will act as their custodian and fiduciary agent, instead of 

their credi tor. 

In accounting terms, the money in people's transaction accounts will be their monetary assets, 

and will be treated on their bank's balance sheet as riskless memorandum items, instead of 

liabilities. Transactions will be able to be made directly between bank customers by simple 
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transfers between accounts at the same or different banks, in the same way that transfers between 

customers' accounts at the same bank are made now. 

This simple change means a bank can fail and it will not impact on depositors' money 

whatsoever; they can simply transfer their deposits to another bank. This will greatly improve 

banks' cash flow situation, as their customers' deposits will no longer be a call on the bank's 

own funds that may have to be paid away to other banks at any time on demand or very short 

notice. Banks will then be free to use their own funds for their own purposes, without having to 

worry about what demand their customers may put on their funds. This will make banks' 

business operations much easier and less risky, which should improve their financial stability. 

Going forward, banks will keep all oftheir own funds in the accounts they hold with other banks 

and Federal Reserve banks. They will be able to use these funds to repay all the amounts that 

they had previously borrowed from other banks and other sources in the past. There will be 

sufficient funds available to banks to do this because the funds previously borrowed came from 

the same aggregate amount of funds (reserves) that existed before. 

In consideration for relieving banks of their deposit liabilities payable to their depositor 

customers, an equal amount will instead be payablc into a revolving fund, established by H.R. 

2990, as the principal on pre-existing bank loans are paid by borrowers to the bank. Banks will 

continue to keep the interest and fees from these loan repayments for their income, as they do 

now. This process will enable banks to retire these liabilities from their balance sheets in a way 

that does not impact on their cash flow or profit. The revolving fund will recycle money back 

into circulation as and when required, including loans to banks, to maintain a stable and 

sufficient money supply. 

Bank customers' savings and time deposits will be placed with banks for their bank to lend or 

invest on their behalf, and will be treated as bank customers' financial assets claims on their 

previously-held monetary assets - and recorded as the bank's liability to repay their customer on 

a certain date or after a certain notice period. Bank customers will be able to roll over some or 

all of these amounts so the money can remain on loan. 

Banks will then act as true intermediaries between the lenders and borrowers of funds. This is 

the way most people including many eeonomists - think or assume the system works now, but 

it does not. At present, not a cent of the trillions of dollars of savings and time deposits is ever 

lent to anyone. Instead, banks create brand new deposits every time someone wants to borrow 

money or sell something, including their labor, to a bank. 

Because under the present system deposits are not lent to borrowers, the amounts of deposits in 

savings and time deposits keep building up. This means that banks have to keep finding more 

and more borrowers to make loans to so they can pay their interest bill to depositors and still 

make a profit. Because more bank loans means more deposits, the amount of money banks 

create increases exponentially, along with interest-bearing debt, until it becomes unbearable, 

defaults rise, and the cycle self-corrects. 

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This pattern of money creation destabilizes thc whole economy as it sets-off a chain-reaction that 

leads to boom-bust cycles have nothing to do with real demand in the real economy, which 

would otherwise bc quite stable. The present monetary systcm thus superimposes instability 

over an otherwise stable economy. H.R. 2990 replaces this instability with a much simpler 

system which enables a steady and stablc amount of money to enter circulation into the economy 

in line with the monetary needs of the economy without a build up of debt. 

The Purpose of H.R. 2990 is to Make Monetary Policy Serve the Needs of Job Creation in 

America 

Under the current system, monetary policy cannot support real production or job creation. All it 

can do is support the liquidity and solvency of banks. This is why the banks and other financial 

institutions that caused the recession were the ones that got the trillions of dollars in support, 

while Amcrican businesses and families wcre thrown into bankruptcy and forcclosure. This is 

the way the system designed. If we want a better result, we have to use a bctter system. 

Under H.R. 2990, monetary policy will support the rcal economy and job creation directly, as 

new moncy will go directly into creating real wealth such as improved infrastrueturc. This is 

done without taxing or borrowing. Nobody's money is taken away from other economic 

activities, and there is no debt and interest costs to servicc ycar after year. 

Because H.R. 2990 separates the origination and entry of money into circulation from the 

commercial considerations of banks, it eliminates the conflict of intercst that currently exists 

between what is best for the banks and what is best for the economy as a whole. This removes 

all risk and short-term commercial pressures from the process so that it can be focused solely on 

what is in the best, long-term interests of the economy as a whole. There will then be no reason 

for far too much money being added at some times and far too littlc at other times, which is the 

pattern that has repcatedly occurrcd under the current regime where banks decide how much 

money is created, based on their own short-term commercial considerations. 

Under H.R. 2990, monetary policy and the agencics that carry it out will be accountable to 

Congress and the American people. While the implementation of monetary policy will be 

independent of political pressure, it will not be immune from the democratic process, and will be 

subject to accountability. Thus, our monetary system will at last serve the interests of all 

Amcricans, not just the interests of a few. 

H.R. 2990 thcrcfore enables a smooth, steady, and stable supply of money in the economy that 

will mitigate or even eliminate boom-bust cycles. This can only result in a much more stable 

economy. Our economy will be far less reliant on fiscal policy decisions, because if Congress 

refuses to authorize the origination of any additional money, the Treasury could still maintain the 

money supply by recycling existing money through thc revolving fund. This will create much 

greater certainty and confidence about economic conditions in the future, which will encourage 

more long-term investment. 

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How H.R. 2990 Will Create a Full Employment Economy 

Presently, banks create our money for profit. A large part of it goes into bubbles and speculation 

for quick gains without producing any real wealth. Today, there are nearly 25 million Americans 

who are unemployed or under-employed. As the American Society of Civil Engineers recently 

pointed out, $2.2 trillion is needed over a five-year period to keep our infrastructure safe. These 

two serious deficiencies in our economy call out for corrective action; financial institutions arc 

not driving the repair and replacement of that infrastructure. This is because financial 

institutions are motivated, or even incentivized toward short-term profit activities like 

speculation. 

H.R. 2990 will address thcse serious deficiencies because the government, not the banks, will 

provide the funds for investment in our infrastructure. This will directly and indirectly creatc 

millions of good jobs in the private sector as the money flows through the economy as 

contractors increase their orders to suppliers and both increa~e their demand for high-skilled 

workers. Workers, in tum, will increase their orders for a wide range of new goods and services 

in the economy. This will greatly improve the cash flow of the productive sector and make 

lending to that sector much more attractive. The investments in infrastructure will be distributed 

without taxing or borrowing, on a per-capita equalized basis across the whole country, to avoid 

any political conflict or bias. 

H.R. 2990 provides for 25% of any additional money authorized by Congress to be distributed to 

State governments, who can then augment fedcral infrastructure investment at the State Icvel. 

This will protect, create and induce millions more good jobs in the private sector. H.R.2990 

also provides for the distribution of funds to local governments via a system of interest-free 

loans. This will in tum protect, create and induce the creation of millions of good jobs in the 

private sector. 

H.R. 2990 provides for additional funding for a range of other purposes including the distribution 

of funds to State and local education systems and school districts, and distribution of funds to 

State and local govcrnments to assist them with their health care and rehabilitation programs, 

pensions, housing assistance and federal mandates that are presently unfunded. Again this will 

protect, create and induce the creation of millions of good jobs. 

H.R. 2990 protects the purchasing power of the dollar and stabilizes the economy. It provides the 

certainty needed to foster a positive business climate for investment, which will induce thc 

creation of millions more jobs in the private sector. Furthermore, because H.R. 2990 provides 

funding to relieve budgets and reduce debt servicing charges, taxcs need not rise and may even 

be reduced. This means taxpayers will keep more of their own money in their own pockets, 

which they can spend or invcst. This all adds up to a situation where our millions of high school, 

college and university graduates will have good career opportunities awaiting them, and our 

scrviccmcn and women will have a supportive economy with good job opportunities to come 

home to. 

None of this will cause inflation because the money will be spent on creating new real wealth or 

maintaining the value of existing wealth, instead of bidding-up the prices of existing assets, as so 

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much of the money created by banks does. The overall effect of this will be that America will 

have a full employment economy where everyone has the opportunity to participate and make 

their contribution. 

H.R. 2990 Lays the Foundation for a Sustainable Economy 

Today, the monetary system creates interest-bearing debt when it creates money and requires 

debt to be paid with money created with interest-bearing debt. An artificial and unnecessary 

tension is placed over the whole economy because our money supply is always being pulled out 

of circulation to service the debt it was created with. This then requires more debt to be added if 

that money supply is to be maintained. Thus the whole economy is made to rely on a kind of 

giant Ponzi scheme for its money supply. This is obviously unsustainable and inevitably has to 

break down. The empirical evidence for this is clear as noted above. 

H.R. 2990 avoids this unsustainable situation by providing for our money supply to be supplied 

to the cconomy with no debt attached. It can remain in circulation. instead of being continuously 

pulled out and returned to banks, with interest. Debt will not continue growing exponentially, In 

turn, the money supply will not have to grow exponentially. This means producers and 

consumers will not have to use resources at rates that try to keep up with this exponential growth 

in debt due to the corresponding exponential gro'W1:h in debt servicing costs, which drive more 

production to obtain more income to service more debt. 

The unsustainable nature of the present monetary system is reflected in the economy: 

State and local government budgets are fiscally unsustainable. 

State and local government pensions are financially unsustainable. 

Unemployment levels and income disparities are socially unsustainable 

While the productivity of American workers has risen constantly, in the past few decades the 

share of compensation going to workers has increasingly fallen behind, and wages have been 

declining in real terms. H.R. 2990 provides for a sustainable monetary system which can 

provide the means to address these issues. It provides a monetary system that is compatible with 

the real needs in the economy, which are relatively stable, and the reality of finite resources. 

H.R. 2990 Guarantees Retirement Security for All Americans 

H.R. 2990 provides for a full employment economy. With a full employment economy, payroll 

contributions to Social Security will increase and this will maintain and sustain the solvency and 

cash flow for Social Security and other contributor-funded programs. Because H.R. 2990 

provides for federal government debt to be paid off as it comes due, the redemption of securities 

accumulated by trust funds such as Social Security is assured. 

Finally, Title V ofH.R. 2990 contains a provision that will cover any shortfall in Social Security 

which may arise in the more distant future. 

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H.R. 2990 Promotes Balanced Trade and Reduces the Cost of Long-Term Investment 

Today, the United States has a large trade deficit with foreign countries, such as China. H.R. 

2990 provides for all U.S. Government debt to be retired and no more to be generally issued. 

Other countries will no longer be able to accumulate interest-earning Treasury securities in 

exchange for the funds that accumulate in accounts at Federal Reserve banks due to these trade 

surpluses. Instead, our trading partners will have to find another use for the non-interest-eaming 

dollars that accumulate in their US bank accounts, like buying US products in exchange. Thus, 

H.R. 2990 creates conditions which promote more balanced trade that is also more fair. 

One of the main factors that go into detennining long-tenn interest rates is the expectation of 

inflation. This is why longer-tenn interest rates tend to be higher, and this raises the cost of 

long-tenn capital investments, such as businesses purchases of new machinery. Because H.R. 

2990 provides for a monetary policy and monetary system without inflation, inflation 

expectations will not be factored into long-tenn interest rates. With a stable and sustainable 

economy, default risk will be much lower also. This will reduce interest rates for the financing 

businesses' long-tenn capital investments and if long teml interest rates are lower, short tenn 

interest rates will be lower also. 

This may then make equity a more attractive financing option, and the economy can start to 

transfonn from a debt-based economy to ownership- and perfonnance-based economy, with 

returns based on perfonnance. The overall effect will be that the cost of capital investment for 

both public and private purposes will reduce, which will help in the development of a more 

sustainable and prosperous economy. 

H.R. 2990 Can Reduce Individual Income Taxes 

Congressional Budget Office projections show the net interest cost on the national debt 

increasing 170% in nominal tenns over the next 10 years; 70% relative to GDP. It is not a 

coincidence that individual income taxes are also projected to increase by nearly 150% in 

nominal terms; over 50% relative to GDP. 

H.R. 2990 provides for the national debt to be paid off as it comes due. This means most of the 

interest cost in the federal budget will be gone in 10 years. H.R. 2990 also provides for the 

means to reach a full employment economy. This means most ofthe unemployment cost in the 

federal budget can be gone within a few years. 

These two factors combined mean that a portion ofthe federal budget that equates to a 

significant portion of federal individual income taxes can be removed. This means federal 

individual income taxes can be reduced significantly. A score of the tax-saving potential ofH.R. 

2990 by the Congressional Budget Office would likely provide evidence. 

H.R. 2990 also provides for assistance to state and local governments and school and fire 

districts, enabling their income, sales and property taxes to be reduced also. 

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Conclusion 

H.R. 2990 embodies a methodological approach that has used the lessons of history, including 

the recent past, to determine a course that aims to avoid repeating mistakes. 

The underlying ethos is to put into effect the minimum amount of change necessary to achieve 

this with the minimum amount of interruption to day-to-day business. H.R. 2990 offers real 

choices instead of forced choices by replacing an oppressive system with a just system, which 

can enable genuine democracy and freedom. 

Most importantly, H.R. 2990 provides the means to assure that future generations of Americans 

will be better off. 

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Statement for the Record of Congressman Mike Pence 

Hearing of the Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology Subcommittee 

"Improving the Federal Reserve System: Examining Legislation to Reform the Fed and 

Other Alternatives" 

May 8,2012 

In late 2010, the Federal Reserve entered uncharted territory with a $600 billion purchase of U.S. 

Treasury securities, dubbed "QE2." This action further expanded the Fed's balance sheet in an 

act of money creation second only to the purchase of $1.25 trillion of Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac securities in 2008 and 2009-the first round of quantitative easing. 

The justification for keeping interest rates low through quantitative easing is the dual mandate 

created by the Federal Reserve Refonn Act of 1977, which directs the Fed to support maximum 

employment and stable prices. Yet persistently high unemployment is a testament to the fact that 

the Fed has not achieved its goal. 

Furthennore, monetary stimulus on a large scale is not good for maintaining the long-tenn value 

of the dollar. When the dollar is strong, America is a magnet for investment and growth. When 

the dollar is weak, Americans can afford less and savings drop in value. 

Unfortunately, monetary policies at the Fed are likely to cause more pain with outcomes of high 

inflation and possibly the creation of another credit bubble. Congress should seize the 

opportunity to prevent repeating errors of the last decade. We should simplifY the Fed's 

mandate. 

Short-sighted actions that make the Fed a massive buyer in certain markets risk severe 

unintended consequences, such as global financial instability or restrictions on foreign 

investment by our trade partners. I believe the Federal Reserve is taking these risks in an effort to 

support the "maximum employment" half of its mandate and fill the void of pro-growth fiscal 

policies, which should be the domain of Congress and the Administration. 

I have introduced a straightforward bill (H.R. 245) to give the Fed a single mandate. This 

legislation would eliminate thc dual objectivcs of the Fed, clarifying a more appropriate role for 

our monetary authorities by eliminating the "maximum employment" consideration from the 

Federal Reserve's mandate. Price stability and a strong dollar are imperative to sound job growth 

over the long-tenn. Coupled with the tools of pro-growth fiscal policies such as tax refonn, 

reduced federal spending, and regulatory overhaul, this is a more sustainable path to putting 

Americans back to work. 

The American people know we cannot spend our way back to prosperity and we should avoid 

any perception of monetizing our national debt through currency devaluation. We must refocus 

the Fed and give clarity to the purpose of monetary policy in order to prevent rapid inflation and 

protect the value of the dollar. 

o