United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

Comptroller General

of the United States

 

Decision

Matter of: ERC Inc.

File: B-407297; B-407297.2

Date: November 19, 2012

Robert J. Symon, Esq., Lewis P. Rhodes, Esq., and Aron C. Beezley, Esq., Bradley 

Arant Boult Cummings LLP, for the protester.

James H. Roberts, III, Esq., Van Scoyoc Kelly & Roberts PLLC, for Barrios 

Technology, Ltd., an intervenor.

Alexander T. Bakos, Esq., and Bernard J. Roan, Esq., National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration, for the agency.

Tania Calhoun, Esq., and Edward Goldstein, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, 

GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

Protest that source selection authority’s (SSA) selection decision was improper is 

denied where the record shows the SSA conducted an extensive examination of the 

qualitative merits of proposals in finding them essentially equal under two evaluation 

factors, and reasonably relied on a key discriminator under the third evaluation 

factor to make the selection decision.

DECISION

ERC, Inc., of Huntsville, Alabama, protests the award of a contract to Barrios 

Technology, Ltd., of Houston, Texas, under request for proposals (RFP) No. 

NNJ11401774R, issued by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) to obtain mission and program integration services for the International 

Space Station Program. ERC challenges the source selection decision.

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND

The International Space Station (ISS) Program is a cooperative international 

program formed to build, operate, and utilize a permanently human-tended space 

station in low Earth orbit. Contracting Officer’s (CO) Statement at ¶ 1.1. The ISS 

hosts an average of 14 visiting vehicles per year involving various types of 

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

The decision issued on the date below was subject to 

a GAO Protective Order. This redacted version has 

been approved for public release.
Page 2 B-407297, B-407297.2 

launchers and vehicles. These vehicles ferry up to 2.5 tons of supplies to the ISS 

each trip. Many also carry replacement crew members to ISS, which remains a 

very risk-laden environment. Legal Memorandum at 3. The United States and its 

international partners collaborate to crew, operate and sustain the ISS as a 

space-based laboratory under a U.S. Program Manager. CO’s Statement at ¶ 1.1.

This Mission and Program Integration (MAPI) procurement is part of a NASA 

strategy to change the way the ISS Program does business due to two 

developments. First, the ISS Program is expanding the use of commercial and 

international partners to provide for crew and cargo services now that the Space 

Shuttle has been retired. These changes and associated risks directly impact how 

NASA manages the ISS Program and its related logistics, including re-supply 

transportation and integration services. Id. at ¶ 3.1. Second, the government has 

designated ISS as a National Laboratory, which places operational demands on 

NASA to make ISS available to scientific researchers. As a result, the Program has 

sought to redefine and realign the contracts that are essential to ISS mission safety 

and success. The statement of work (SOW) combines requirements from multiple 

predecessor contracts. Under two of these contracts, NASA acquired support from 

Barrios and a firm proposed as its subcontractor here. Legal Memorandum at 3-4. 

The solicitation, issued February 8, 2012 as a small business set-aside, 

contemplated award of a cost-plus-award-fee/incentive-fee contract that included an 

indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity feature with a not-to-exceed limit, as well as a 

fixed-price phase-in period. RFP §§ B.2, B.3, L.3. The period of performance 

consists of a 45-day phase-in period and a two-year base period, with up to three 

two-year option periods. RFP §§ F.2, F.3, F.6.

The MAPI contractor will provide products and services to support mission and 

program integration and necessary infrastructure operations functions for the ISS. 

The SOW advises prospective offerors that thorough knowledge and expertise of 

the ISS will be necessary to perform this contract. RFP SOW at C-7. Services are 

to be performed in such areas as program management and administration; 

business management; configuration management/data management and 

integration; systems engineering and integration; mission planning; operations; 

safety and mission assurance/program risk; and program research. 

Award was to be made on a best value basis, considering three evaluation factors: 

mission suitability, past performance, and cost/price. RFP § M.3. The mission 

suitability factor was more important than the past performance factor; both factors, 

when combined, were significantly more important than cost. Id. The evaluation of 

cost/price proposals is not at issue here.

The mission suitability factor, worth 1,000 points, was comprised of three 

subfactors: technical approach (450 points); management approach (450 points), 

and safety and health approach (100 points). RFP § M.3.1. The SEB planned to 
Page 3 B-407297, B-407297.2 

adjectivally rate the subfactors as excellent, very good, good, and so on, and to 

convert those ratings into point scores for use as a source selection guideline. Id.

Each offeror’s past performance record was to be examined for recent and relevant 

past performance to determine its ability to perform the required work. In 

determining relevance, NASA was to consider whether present or past efforts 

involved the same magnitude of effort and complexities as required here.1

 

Performance confidence ratings of “very high level of confidence,” “high level of 

confidence,” and so on were to be assigned to each proposal. RFP § M.3.2. 

NASA received three proposals by the April 18 closing date, including those from 

Barrios and ERC. The third proposal is not at issue here. After an initial evaluation, 

all three proposals were included in the competitive range. Discussions were 

conducted with all offerors, and final proposal revisions were requested. On July 

20, the SEB briefed the source selection authority (SSA), the ISS Program 

Manager, on the final evaluation results. As discussed below, the briefing 

generated extensive discussion concerning the relative qualitative merits of the 

proposals, and resulted in the SSA requesting additional information. On August 3, 

the SSA and SEB reconvened for further discussion of the final evaluation results:

 

ERC Barrios

Mission Capability

Technical Approach

Management Approach

Safety and Health Approach

893 points

Very Good (374 points)

Excellent (428 points)

Excellent (91 points)

873 points

Very Good (401 points)

Very Good (383 points)

Very Good (89 points)

Past Performance Very High Level 

of Confidence

Very High Level 

of Confidence

Proposed/Probable Cost $357.5 M/$358.4 M $368.8 M/$369.9 M

AR, Exh. 18, Aug. 3, 2012, SSA Selection Meeting Presentation, at 5, 24, 69.

The SSA’s source selection statement sets forth a detailed comparative analysis of 

the proposals under each factor, and a cost/technical tradeoff analysis of what the 

SSA termed a “close decision.” AR, Exh. 20, Source Selection Statement, at 9.

The SSA indicated that, during the initial SEB presentation, ERC’s mission 

capability proposal had a modest point advantage overall. He focused on the 

source of this apparent difference and found that it stemmed from ERC’s better 

management approach. The SSA agreed with the SEB’s findings. The SSA stated 

that the SEB rated the technical approach proposals essentially equal, with a slight 

point advantage to Barrios. The SSA described his skepticism about the weight the 

 1 A “very relevant” present/past performance effort involved “essentially the same 

magnitude of effort and complexities this solicitation requires.” RFP § M.3.2(c). 
Page 4 B-407297, B-407297.2 

SEB assigned to several strengths in both proposals here. Finally, the SSA stated 

that he found the proposals essentially equal under the safety and health subfactor. 

The SSA concluded that, as to mission capability overall, in light of his view of some 

technical approach strengths, which effectively offset the modest point advantage 

the SEB had given ERC under the management approach subfactor, he tentatively 

determined that the proposals were essentially equal. However, he thought the 

SEB could provide him more detailed qualitative information, especially under the 

technical approach subfactor, to help him differentiate between proposals and either 

firm up or modify his initial assessment. Id. at 8.

The SSA stated that he initially found the past performance proposals essentially 

equal. However, as the discussion drilled down into the details of the relevancy, 

complexity, and size of each offerors’ past contracts, the conversation turned to risk, 

especially in the area of logistics. The SSA said he recognized that “ISS logistics,” 

which represents about 30 percent of the MAPI work, should not be weighted as 

just generic logistics. He considered ISS logistics to consist of transportation of upmass to the ISS; expenditure of extremely limited crew time for receiving, 

accounting for, replacing or repairing elements, components and systems; and the 

optimal management of very limited on-orbit stowage. He indicated that space is an 

unforgiving environment for humans and the systems their lives depend on. In this 

regard, the SSA explained that ISS logistics are subject to much more severe 

constraints than typical logistics requirements and systems, with more severe 

adverse consequences. The SSA said he needed more detailed qualitative 

information to help him differentiate between the very close proposals in light of this 

perspective on the relevance of past performance. Id. at 8-9.

The SSA said Barrios had the high probable cost by a “very slight amount, so slight 

as to render the proposals essentially equal” under the cost/price factor. Id. at 9.

The SSA directed the SEB to provide more detailed qualitative information on the 

mission capability proposals, and to consider how constraints associated with ISS 

logistics might affect the weighting of relevance under the past performance factor. 

To avoid giving undue weight to incumbency, he asked the SEB to consider 

constraints of all kinds that might have arisen during the offerors’ prior performance 

in addition to the spaceflight environment. Id. The SSA states that the information 

he received from the SEB concerning mission capability solidified his initial 

determination that the proposals were essentially equal.2

 2 In revalidating its findings and ensuring their internal consistency, the SEB found 

that one Barrios weakness was not rated consistently for reasons NASA describes. 

The SEB slightly raised Barrios’ point score while retaining the same weakness and 

rating. The SEB looked for similar inconsistencies with other proposals but found 

none. CO’s Statement at ¶ 12.3. ERC’s generalized argument that NASA treated 

 With no discernible 

(continued...)
Page 5 B-407297, B-407297.2 

benefits to use as discriminators under the mission capability factor, the SSA turned 

to the past performance factor.

The SSA stated that the additional detail the SEB provided on ERC’s prior contracts 

led him to conclude that they were not subject to the sort of challenging 

environment and constraints as are present in human spaceflight or its equivalents. 

He found that the Barrios team experience in such environments gave it a 

meaningful advantage. In addition, he found that ERC’s experience in another key 

area, integrated system performance analysis, did not measure up to that of the 

Barrios team; this was also a meaningful advantage in Barrios’ favor. Id. at 10.

The SSA explained that the non-cost differences came down to the following 

comparative risk consideration:

• With Barrios and its modest advantage I had found in Technical 

Approach, the risk was that, while I could be sure the work 

(especially logistics and integrated system performance analysis) 

would be done well and not miss anything critical, it may not be 

accomplished with maximum management efficiency. 

• With ERC and its modest advantage I had found in Management

Approach, the risk was that, while I could be sure the work 

(especially logistics and integrated system performance analysis) 

would be done very efficiently, it may not be accomplished (at least 

initially) with the degree of completeness or effectiveness 

demanded by the tightly constrained and high-risk environment of 

the operating ISS. 

Id. 

The SSA stated that the risks involved in this contract affect the lives and safety of 

people and the ISS’s optimal functioning. He found that the effectiveness of the 

work was significantly more important than how efficiently or at what cost that work 

was carried out. While he did not doubt that ERC could, “after a reasonable period 

of time,” learn to discern, assess and address the risks, the SSA thought its learning 

curve period was likely to be longer than it would have been if the firm had at least 

some experience managing equivalent risks and challenges in some very 

challenging and high-risk environment. The SSA also stated that the Barrios team 

provided a demonstrated experience base in performing integrated system 

performance analysis in a complex and changing environment. Weighing the ERC 

 

(...continued)

offerors disparately because it did not adjust ERC’s point score is unsupported by 

substantive argument.
Page 6 B-407297, B-407297.2 

proposal’s slightly lower cost against its disadvantage of moderately higher non-cost 

risks as compared to the Barrios proposal, the SSA found that the Barrios proposal 

represented the best value to the government. Id. at 10-11.

DISCUSSION

ERC’s protest centers on the SSA’s source selection decision. ERC challenges the 

SSA’s finding that the proposals were essentially equal under the mission capability 

and cost/price factors. ERC also challenges the SSA’s use of “ISS logistics,” under 

the past performance factor, as a discriminator for the award decision. ERC 

ultimately argues that, based on adjectival ratings and point scores, as well as its 

lowest cost/price, it should have received award.

In reviewing an agency’s evaluation of proposals and source selection decision, it is 

not our role to reevaluate submissions; rather, we examine the supporting record to 

determine whether the decision was reasonable, consistent with the stated 

evaluation criteria, and adequately documented. Trofholz Techs., Inc., B-404101, 

Jan. 5, 2011, 2011 CPD ¶ 144 at 3; Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., B-289942, 

B-289942.2, May 24, 2002, 2002 CPD ¶ 88 at 6. A protester’s disagreement with 

the agency’s evaluation judgments, or with the agency’s determination as to the 

relative merits of competing proposals, does not establish that the evaluation or the 

source selection decision was unreasonable. Smiths Detection, Inc.; Am. Sci. and 

Eng'g, Inc., B-402168.4 et al., Feb. 9, 2011, 2011 CPD ¶ 39 at 6-7; ITW Military 

GSE, B-403866.3, Dec. 7, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 282 at 5.

Source selection officials have broad discretion to determine the manner and extent 

to which they will make use of evaluation results, and must use their own judgment 

to determine what the underlying differences between proposals might mean to 

successful performance of the contract. Applied Physical Sciences Corp., 

B-406167, Feb. 23, 2012, 2012 CPD ¶ 102 at 6; Information Network Sys., Inc., 

B-284854, B-284854.2, June 12, 2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 104 at 12. Source selection 

officials are not bound by the recommendations of lower-level evaluators. All Points 

Int’l Distribs., Inc., B-402993, B-402993.2, Sept. 3, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 209 at 3. 

In a best value procurement, it is the function of the source selection official to 

perform a cost/technical tradeoff, that is, to determine whether one proposal’s 

technical superiority is worth the higher cost. ITW Military GSE, supra. Ratings, 

whether numerical, color, or adjectival, are merely guides to assist agencies in 

evaluating proposals; the qualitative information underlying those ratings is the type 

of information that source selection officials should consider, in addition to ratings, 

to enable them to determine whether and to what extent meaningful differences 

exist between proposals. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., B-310372, Dec. 27, 2007, 2008 

CPD ¶ 2 at 6. Proposals with the same adjectival ratings are not necessarily of 

equal quality, and a proposal with a higher point-score is not necessarily superior to 

a proposal with a lower point-score. An agency may properly consider specific 
Page 7 B-407297, B-407297.2 

advantages that make one proposal of higher quality than another. Id. at 6-7. It is 

well settled that a single evaluation factor--even a lower-weighted factor--may 

properly be relied upon as a key discriminator for purposes of a source selection 

decision. Smiths Detection, Inc.; American Science and Eng’g, Inc., supra at 16. 

In the case at hand, our review of the record shows that the SSA properly looked 

behind the adjectival ratings and point scores to identify any qualitative differences 

that existed between the proposals. His conclusion that the proposals were 

essentially equal under the mission capability and cost/price factors is reasonable 

and well documented, and his use of “ISS logistics,” under the past performance 

factor, as a discriminator was reasonable, consistent with the solicitation’s 

evaluation criteria, and well documented. Recognizing the wide discretion afforded 

agencies in making their tradeoff decisions, ERC has given us no basis to find the 

SSA’s decision here unreasonable or otherwise improper.3 

We first review ERC’s challenges to the SSA’s findings that the proposals were 

essentially equal under the mission capability factor and cost factors.

ERC argues that the SSA improperly attempted to “discredit or neutralize” its 

significant strength under the technical approach subfactor. Comments at 14. In its 

agency report, NASA provided a detailed explanation as to why the SSA thought 

this significant strength--which concerned ERC’s understanding of on-orbit stowage 

and waste management functions--represented less benefit to the program than did 

the SEB. Legal Memorandum at 26-27. NASA’s explanation is fully supported by 

the source selection statement. AR, Exh. 20, Source Selection Statement at 8. 

ERC’s comments in response to the agency report did not address NASA’s 

explanation at all, but merely repeated its unsupported allegation. In the face of the 

SSA’s reasoned explanation for his views, ERC has given us no basis to question 

his judgment. The protester’s allegation that the SSA acted in bad faith by 

exercising that judgment is wholly unsupported.

ERC also argues that the SSA improperly found the proposals to be essentially 

equal under the safety and health subfactor despite the fact that ERC’s proposal 

had the higher adjectival rating. Again, adjectival ratings are merely guides for the 

source selection official, who must use his or her judgment to ascertain actual 

qualitative differences. Applied Physical Sciences Corp., supra. ERC has failed to 

point to any substantive differences between the two proposals under this subfactor, 

and we discern none. We have no basis to question the SSA’s conclusion.

 3 Our decision does not address all of ERC’s arguments, but we have fully 

considered each of them and conclude that the remaining arguments do not provide 

a basis to sustain the protest. 
Page 8 B-407297, B-407297.2 

ERC finally argues that the SSA unreasonably downplayed the cost/price differential 

between the proposals in finding them essentially equal. As discussed above, 

however, in finding the proposals “essentially equal” here, the SSA appreciated the 

actual cost/price difference and considered that Barrios had the higher probable 

cost “by a very slight amount.” AR, Exh. 20, Source Selection Statement, at 9. He 

ultimately concluded that ERC’s “slightly lower cost” did not outweigh its moderately 

higher non-cost risks. Id. at 11. Hence, the SSA did not “downplay” the cost/price 

differential but, instead, considered it in the context of a procurement where the 

non-cost/price factors were significantly more important than cost/price. ERC has 

not shown that the SSA’s judgment was unreasonable.

We turn to ERC’s argument that the SSA improperly used “ISS logistics,” under the 

past performance factor, as a discriminator in making his tradeoff decision. ERC 

primarily argues that “ISS logistics” constitutes an unstated evaluation criterion. 

ERC also argues that the SSA’s assignment of risk to ERC’s past performance 

proposal is otherwise unreasonable. Our review of the record shows that these 

arguments have no merit.

ERC argues that “ISS logistics” constitutes an unstated evaluation criterion because 

“logistics” is not identified as part of the past performance evaluation criteria, and is 

not mentioned in the SOW. ERC’s reading of the RPF is unreasonably narrow.

Although agencies are required to identify in a solicitation all major evaluation 

factors, they are not required to identify all areas of each factor that might be taken 

into account in an evaluation, provided that the unidentified areas are reasonably 

related to or encompassed by the stated factors. Master Lock Company, LLC, 

B-309982.3, Dec. 10, 2008, 2009 CPD ¶ 6 at 5. 

It is true that the SOW does not include a section entitled “logistics” or “ISS 

logistics.” However, as NASA points out, a common definition of “logistics” is “the 

management of the flow of resources, between the point of origin and the point of 

destination, in order to meet some requirements.” Supp. Legal Memorandum at 5. 

NASA explains that numerous sections of the SOW plainly involve logistics, 

including the specific areas identified by the SSA in his source selection statement. 

NASA states that, for example, Section 5.0 of the SOW, Systems Engineering and 

Integration, includes work that enables the efficient transportation of up-mass to the 

ISS by the optimal management of limited stowage capacity on resupply vehicles. 

Section 6.0 of the SOW, “Mission Planning,” concerns planning and preparing for 

the logistical activities required to resupply the ISS and to transport crew members 

to and from the ISS. Section 7.0 of the SOW, Operations, concerns the execution 

of the logistics involved in operating the ISS. Id. at 4-7. The CO has provided a 

detailed calculation showing that the work across the SOW providing ISS logistics 

involves approximately 30 percent of the total workforce used to construct the 

government estimate of resources. Supp. CO’s Statement at 2.
Page 9 B-407297, B-407297.2 

ERC asserts that NASA’s identification of these SOW sections as involving logistics 

is “misleading” but does not explain its belief in this regard. Supp. Comments at 

1-5. Our review of the cited SOW provisions affords us no basis to question 

NASA’s characterization of them as involving logistics associated with the ISS 

program.4 As a result, NASA reasonably considered “ISS logistics” or its equivalent 

in weighing the relevance of offerors’ past performance because it is reasonably 

encompassed in that evaluation factor. 

ERC also challenges NASA’s explanation of the SOW’s logistics tasks arguing that 

the explanation was not contemporaneous. Our Office will not, however, limit its 

review to contemporaneous evidence, but considers all the information provided, 

including a party’s arguments and explanations. See Serco, Inc., B-406683, 

B-406683.2, Aug. 3, 2012, 2012 CPD ¶ 216 at 7. While we generally give little or 

no weight to reevaluations and judgments prepared in the heat of the adversarial 

process, Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support, B-277263.2, B-277263.3, Sept. 29, 

1997, 97-2 CPD ¶ 91 at 15, post-protest explanations that provide a detailed 

rationale for contemporaneous conclusions, and simply fill in previously unrecorded 

details, will generally be considered in our review as long as those explanations are 

credible and consistent with the contemporaneous record. NWT, Inc.; PharmChem 

Labs., Inc., B-280988, B-280988.2, Dec. 17, 1998, 98-2 CPD ¶ 158 at 16. The 

source selection statement clearly describes the SSA’s use of ISS logistics as a 

discriminator, and we view NASA’s current explanation of this term to be precisely 

the type of post-protest explanation that we will consider. 

ERC also argues that, even if “ISS logistics” was not an unstated evaluation 

criterion, the SSA’s conclusion that its proposal presented a risk in this area was 

unreasonable. In this regard, ERC challenges the SSA’s conclusion that there was 

risk associated with its ability to accomplish the work, at least at the outset, with the 

degree of completeness or effectiveness demanded by the ISS environment. ERC 

argues that this conclusion is unreasonable in light of the significant strength the 

SEB identified in its proposal for its ability to provide an effective phase-in. 

There is no dispute that the SEB assigned ERC’s proposal this significant strength 

under the management approach subfactor. As NASA explains, this feature was 

one reason the SSA found ERC’s proposal essentially equal to Barrios’ proposal 

under the mission capability factor overall. Nonetheless, while acknowledging the 

benefits of ERC’s proposed management processes, the SSA remained concerned 

about the likelihood of realizing the beneficial outcomes of those proposed 

 4 To the extent that ERC contends that the “tightly constrained and high risk 

environment of the ISS” referred to by the SSA is an unstated evaluation criterion, 

such an environment would appear to be inherent in an ISS support contract.
Page 10 B-407297, B-407297.2 

management processes given the nature of the contract. Supp. Legal 

Memorandum, at 15, citing AR, Exh. 20, Source Selection Statement, at 10.

NASA states that two learning phases were inherent in the requirements, and ERC 

focused on the first--the 45-day phase-in period. The SEB recognized ERC’s 

significant strength in the phase-in period, described by NASA as a limited 

management and administrative function, but did not address the 180-day transition 

phase and the degree to which ERC could “ride” the technical learning curve from 

the phase-in period through the transition period. Supp. Legal Memorandum, at 15-

16. NASA points out that, in discussing its transition plan, ERC’s own proposal 

expresses concerns about the continuing burden to learn the work sufficiently to 

perform it, “not just without disruption, but well.” Id. at 16. NASA further explains 

that the SSA’s finding of risk was not inconsistent with the SSEB’s evaluation 

because, while the phase-in and transition plans showed how ERC might progress 

along the learning curve, past performance was the key to the likelihood of how fast 

it would progress. Id., citing AR, Exh. 20, Source Selection Statement, at 11. In 

short, according to NASA, the fact that ERC had an exceptional phase-in plan did 

not mean there was no risk in its performance in the initial period of performance.

ERC does not specifically address NASA’s argument that the significant strength 

associated with its phase-in plan was not inconsistent with the SSA’s concern. 

Instead, ERC sidesteps NASA’s explanation to argue that the risk would apply 

equally to all non-incumbent offerors, and to raise new arguments associated with 

strengths it was assigned under the management approach factor. As to the 

former, ERC’s argument gives us no basis to question the SSA’s judgment, which 

we find reasonable. As to the latter, ERC’s arguments concerning the evaluation of 

its own proposal, raised for the first time in its comments on the agency’s report, are 

untimely and will not be considered. Bid Protest Regulations, 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(2) 

(2012).

In its comments on the agency report, ERC argued that the SSA treated the offerors 

disparately by considering the risk posed by its proposal at the contract’s inception, 

but not the risk posed by Barrios’ staffing reductions during the same period. ERC’s 

argument relies on a selective reading of the solicitation and a failure to consider 

the evaluation record.

As part of their management approach, offerors were required to define the specific 

labor resources needed to successfully perform the contract in accordance with 

their proposed approach. RFP § L.15.3.4. The solicitation included a government 

resource estimate (GRE) as the government’s estimate of the resources required to 

perform the contract, “without incorporation of any one offeror’s specific 

management or technical approach.” Id. The RFP explained that the GRE was 

based on historical usage factors which “might not correspond to the resources that 

might be required to successfully accomplish future work.” Id. Further, the RFP 

stated that the GRE was not intended to influence the offeror’s proposed estimates, 
Page 11 B-407297, B-407297.2 

but was provided to assist offerors in determining the general magnitude of their 

“unique proposed management and technical approaches.” Id.

ERC argues that it proposed [DELETED] work year estimates (WYE) [DELETED], 

but that Barrios proposed fewer WYEs. ERC argues that Barrios’ proposed staffing 

levels introduce performance risk that was not considered by the SSA. 

Again, the labor estimates in the GRE represented historical estimates, and did not 

reflect changes to the way work might be performed under any offeror’s unique 

approach. NASA explains that Barrios proposed to structure its work based on the 

consolidated and streamlined MAPI approach in the RFP, took credit for the 

innovations and efficiencies it would immediately implement, and, accordingly, 

proposed fewer resources to start. Supp. Legal Memorandum at 8. NASA states 

that ERC structured its work based on the less efficient historical approach, did not 

implement any innovations and efficiencies, and, accordingly, proposed extra staff. 

Id. ERC has not shown that the mere fact that Barrios did not propose labor in 

consonance with the GRE represented a performance risk that NASA failed to 

consider. See AR, Exh. 18, SSA Selection Meeting Presentation, at 56-57 

(discussing weakness in Barrios proposal related to its proposed WYEs). 

In conclusion, after an extensive examination of the qualitative merits of the 

proposals, and a determination of essential equality under the mission capability 

and cost/price factors, the SSA properly focused on the factor in which he found a 

key discriminator, past performance. Although the RFP provided that the mission 

capability factor was more important than the past performance factor, to the extent 

that the SSA properly determined that there was a key discriminator under the past 

performance factor, there is nothing objectionable in the SSA’s reliance upon that 

key discriminator for purposes of his source selection decision. Further, while the 

SSA acknowledged that ERC proposed a lower cost/price, the record reflects that 

ERC’s advantage under the least important evaluation factor was consistently 

referred to as “slight.” AR, Exh. 20, Source Selection Statement, at 6, 9, 10, 11. 

We find that the SSA properly relied upon the key discriminator between the 

proposals in making the selection. 

The protest is denied.

Lynn H. Gibson

General Counsel