FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARJORIE KONDA LOLONG, 

Petitioner, No. 03-72384

v. Agency No.  A77-427-355 ALBERTO GONZALES,* Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

November 5, 2004—San Francisco, California

Filed March 18, 2005

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, John T. Noonan, and

Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Betty Binns Fletcher

*Alberto Gonzales is substituted for his predecessor, John Ashcroft, as

Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P.

43(c)(2). 

3343
COUNSEL

Hilari Allred, Law Office of Robert B. Jobe, San Francisco,

California, for the petitioner-appellant. 

Lyle D. Jentzer, United States Department of Justice, Civil

Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, for the

respondent-appellee.

LOLONG v. GONZALES 3345
OPINION

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 

Marjorie Konda Lolong seeks asylum. Immigration Judge

(“IJ”) Miriam Hayward granted relief, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed. We grant the petition for

review because compelling evidence establishes that Lolong

has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of

her Chinese ethnicity were she returned to Indonesia. Specifically, Lolong has demonstrated that Indonesians of Chinese

ethnicity are a significantly disfavored group and that she is

particularly at risk because she is also a Christian and a

woman. 

I.

Lolong has provided a voluminous record that documents

ongoing discrimination and violence against the ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia. We commented in detail on the

long history of ethnic Chinese-Indonesian persecution in a

similar case, Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2004).

In Sael, we noted that there is a “cycle of waxing and waning

violence” against ethnic Chinese-Indonesians. Id. at 929. During periods of heightened social, economic, or political unrest,

anti-Chinese sentiment erupts into wide-scale, severe violence, but even during periods of “relative calm,” ethnic

Chinese-Indonesians suffer discrimination and harassment, as

well as violent attacks. Id. at 925-26, 929. When anti-Chinese

violence erupted in May 1998, over a thousand ethnic

Chinese-Indonesians were killed. Id. at 925-26. 

Although the Indonesian government has made some overtures to the ethnic Chinese community, official anti-Chinese

discrimination persists, and various forms of anti-Chinese violence continue to occur. Numerous signs of economic, social,

and political instability indicate that more severe anti-Chinese

violence is likely to erupt again in the future. There is also

3346 LOLONG v. GONZALES
evidence that rogue elements within the armed forces continue to provide support to the nongovernmental forces that

are responsible for ethnic and religious persecution. 

While all ethnic Chinese who remain in Indonesia face

some risk of future persecution, two sub-groups are particularly at risk: ethnic Chinese women and Christians. Even during periods of relative calm, ethnic Chinese women can

expect to be subjected to racial and sexual harassment whenever they leave their homes. During the 1998 riots, at least

dozens, possibly hundreds, of ethnic Chinese women were

systematically raped. None of the perpetrators have been

prosecuted. Should anti-Chinese sentiment erupt into more

severe outbreaks of violence again, women will most likely be

targeted again. Meanwhile, an Islamic fundamentalist movement continues to gain strength in Indonesia, and interreligious conflict has been increasing. Not surprisingly, the

combination of religious intolerance and ethnic prejudice has

caused violent forces to target churches and homes in ethnic

Chinese communities. 

Lolong left Indonesia after completing high school, because

quotas limit the number of ethnic Chinese who are admitted

to universities there. She was studying in the United States in

May 1998, when the worst anti-Chinese rioting in Indonesia’s

history occurred. After learning that one of her friends had

been raped and her uncle had been severely beaten, Lolong

decided to apply for asylum. In December 1998, Lolong filed

a timely application. On November 16, 2000, after conducting

an extensive hearing, Judge Hayward held that Lolong was

eligible for asylum. She found Lolong to be fully credible and

Lolong’s fear of future persecution on account of her ethnicity

to be both subjectively and objectively reasonable. Subsequently, in a divided opinion (2-1) the BIA sustained the Service’s appeal and vacated the petitioner’s application for

asylum. Lolong timely petitioned for review. 

We have jurisdiction over Lolong’s petition pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a). Because the BIA issued a reasoned opinion

LOLONG v. GONZALES 3347
after conducting its own review of the record, we review the

BIA’s decision for substantial evidence. Andriasian v. INS,

180 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999). In doing so, we accept

Lolong’s testimony as true. Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 652

n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Where the BIA does not make an

explicit adverse credibility finding, we must assume that the

applicant’s factual contentions are true.”). 

II.

[1] In order to be eligible for asylum, Lolong must establish

that she is a refugee—a person unable or unwilling to return

to Indonesia “because of persecution or a well-founded fear

of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Sael,

386 F.3d at 924; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The source of the

persecution must be the government or forces that the government is unwilling or unable to control. Mashiri v. Ashcroft,

383 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004). 

To be “well-founded,” an asylum applicant’s “fear of persecution must be both subjectively genuine and objectively

reasonable.” Sael, 386 F.3d at 924. “An applicant satisfies the

subjective component by credibly testifying that she genuinely fears persecution.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Lolong satisfied this requirement with her

credible testimony that she fears being hurt, raped, or killed

in Indonesia. 

An asylum applicant “generally satisfies the objective component in one of two ways: either by establishing that she has

suffered persecution in the past or by showing that she has a

good reason to fear future persecution.” Id. While a wellfounded fear must be objectively reasonable, it “does not

require certainty of persecution or even a probability of persecution.” Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir.

2003). “Even a ten percent chance that the applicant will be

persecuted in the future is enough to establish a well-founded

3348 LOLONG v. GONZALES
fear.” Sael, 386 F.3d at 925 (quoting Knezevic v. Ashcroft,

367 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

[2] If not relying on a showing of past persecution, an asylum applicant’s fear of future persecution may be based on

either individualized or group-based risk of persecution.1See,

e.g., Hoxha, 319 F.3d at 1182-83. Where an applicant establishes that she is a member of a mistreated group, the level of

individualized targeting that she must show is inversely

related to the degree of persecution directed toward that group

generally. Id. Accordingly, if an applicant demonstrates that

she is a member of a group against which there is “a pattern

or practice” of persecution, she need not further prove that she

would be singled out for persecution. 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.13(b)(2)(iii); Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 852-53 (9th

Cir. 1994). If the applicant demonstrates that she is a member

of a “disfavored group,” but the group persecution does not

rise to the level of a pattern or practice of persecution, then

the applicant must also demonstrate that she is more likely to

be targeted as a member of that group. Sael, 386 F.3d at 925

(collecting cases). 

A.

[3] In Sael, we found that the long history of anti-Chinese

discrimination, harassment, threats, and violence in Indonesia

established that ethnic Chinese-Indonesians are “at least a disfavored group.” 386 F.3d at 929. We stopped short of finding

a “pattern or practice of persecution” against ethnic ChineseIndonesians because of two statements in the record — “one

that the Indonesian government officially promotes ethnic tolerance and a second that racially motivated attacks against

ethnic Chinese dropped sharply in 1999.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted). We nonetheless concluded that these statements had

1The IJ found that Lolong experienced harassment and discrimination

but concluded that these past experiences did not amount to past persecution. Lolong does not challenge this finding. 

LOLONG v. GONZALES 3349
little relevance to Sael’s asylum claim when compared to the

voluminous evidence of continuing official discrimination and

a centuries-old pattern in which anti-Chinese sentiment erupts

into severe violence during periods of social, political or economic unrest. Id.

Lolong has provided substantial evidence that the Indonesian government, despite its official position on ethnic tolerance, continues to discriminate against ethnic ChineseIndonesians. For example, the Indonesian government continues to enforce quotas limiting the number of ethnic Chinese

that can be admitted into universities; Chinese culture remains

excluded from school curriculums; and “[e]thnic Chinese continue to face discrimination, particularly when they deal with

the bureaucracy.” Although the government has begun turning

a “blind eye” to the distribution of Chinese language media,

the discriminatory laws prohibiting it remain in place. 

The record further establishes that anti-Chinese attacks and

rioting are not only continuing to occur frequently but also are

spreading to areas where anti-Chinese violence has been historically rare. Indeed, the Indonesian government’s decision

to permit Chinese language press and cultural displays has

caused heightened resentment and acts of retaliation. Dr. Sylvia Tiwon, a professor of Southeast Asian Studies at the University of California at Berkeley whose research focuses on

Indonesia,2 testified as an expert witness at Lolong’s hearing;

she observed that there have been numerous attacks on Chinese and Christian cemeteries and explained that “retaliation

against the . . . Chinese-Indonesian and the Christians hasn’t

just taken place at . . . official and publicly seen levels.” Similarly, Lolong testified to receiving reports that a Chinese New

Year celebration in Solo, Central Java, was attacked. At the

time of Lolong’s immigration hearing, an ethnic Chinese

2Dr. Tiwon has also conducted training sessions to acquaint asylum

officers in the San Francisco office with conditions in Indonesia. 

3350 LOLONG v. GONZALES
human rights activist had been missing for two weeks; “disappearances” of activists are not uncommon in Indonesia. 

Even rioting that is not initially sparked by ethnic prejudice

usually degenerates into anti-Chinese violence. For example,

in May 2000, on the two-year anniversary of the infamous

anti-Chinese riots that took place in May 1998, a clash

between illegal vendors and police erupted into rioting;

although it does not appear that anti-Chinese sentiment was

the initial cause of the rioting, the mobs quickly turned on

shops owned by ethnic Chinese. Ethnic Chinese women were

attacked, ethnic Chinese-owned businesses were looted and

destroyed. The expert witness explained that general rioting

will continue to “turn into rioting against the Chinese”

because they “have been the traditional scapegoats” and

because the ethnic Chinese “are easily identified.” 

During the pendency of Lolong’s immigration hearing,

both the Service and Lolong introduced numerous articles

describing conditions in Indonesia. The expert witness was

given the opportunity to review and comment upon these

reports. She also provided information that she has gathered

during her own research visits to Indonesia. She explained

how the information in these reports, taken together, demonstrate that economic, social, and political conditions continue

to be highly volatile. She also explained that continued instability increases the probability that more severe outbreaks of

anti-Chinese violence will erupt again in the future. She testified that interviews she conducted with non-ChineseIndonesians in 2000 reveal that ethnic Chinese-Indonesians

continue to be scapegoated for the country’s widespread poverty and other economic problems. 

In Sael, we held that because ethnic Chinese-Indonesians

are “significantly disfavored,” asylum applicants who prove

that they are members of that group must demonstrate a

“comparatively low” level of particularized risk. 386 F.3d at

927. At a minimum, Lolong’s new evidence of ongoing disLOLONG v. GONZALES 3351
crimination and violence, coupled with expert testimony suggesting that larger-scale outbreaks of violence are likely to

occur again in the future, further lowers the level of particularized risk that Lolong must demonstrate in order to prove

that her fear of future persecution is well-founded. Lolong’s

evidence may even be strong enough to support a finding of

a “pattern or practice” of persecution against ethnic Chinese

in Indonesia within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)

(2)(iii) (i.e. a pattern of persecution that negates the need for

Lolong to make an additional showing of particularized risk).3

However, we need not decide whether the pattern of persecution against ethnic Chinese-Indonesians rises to that level

because the record compels us to conclude that Lolong has

demonstrated sufficient particularized risk to support her asylum claim. 

[4] Although an asylum applicant may meet her

particularized-risk burden by proving that she had past experiences that “establish a sufficient personal connection to the

general persecution directed against” the disfavored group of

which she is a member, Sael, 386 F.3d at 929, she may also

meet this burden by proving she is a member of a sub-group

that faces a heightened risk of future persecution. See Kotasz,

31 F.3d at 854 (explaining that the INS erred in construing the

terms “individualized” and “singled out” literally). Even

where members of a 

disfavored group[ ] are not threatened by systematic

persecution of the group’s entire membership, the

fact of group membership nonetheless places them at

3Although the pattern or practice of persecution against ethnic ChineseIndonesians does not appear to rise to the level of systematic ethnic

cleansing, we have never held that only killings or extreme violence constitute “persecution.” Rather, we have repeatedly held that discrimination

and harassment, in combination with lower levels of violence, may also

constitute persecution. See, e.g., Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044

(9th Cir. 1998); Vallecillo-Castillo v. INS, 121 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir.

1996); Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1996). 

3352 LOLONG v. GONZALES
some risk. That risk can rise to the level required for

establishing a well-founded fear of persecution either

as a result of an individual’s activities in support of

the group, or because an individual is a member of

a certain element of the group that is itself at greater

risk of persecution than is the membership of the

group as a whole. 

Id. at 853 (emphasis added). Moreover, “the more serious and

widespread the threat to the group in general, the less individualized the threat of persecution needs to be.” Sael, 386 F.3d

at 925 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Lolong has met her burden by proving that she is not only a

member of a significantly disfavored group but also a member

of two sub-groups that are more likely targets for persecution:

she is an ethnic Chinese Christian woman. 

The growth of a militant Islamic movement that has called

for a jihad against Christian Indonesians4 — in a country

where anti-Chinese prejudice is deep-seated and widespread

and many ethnic Chinese are Christian — has led to a particularized pattern of violence against ethnic Chinese Christians.

Although the anti-Chinese riots that occurred in May 1998

garnered much more international media attention, the State

Department reported that there were outbreaks of “serious

anti-Christian and anti-ethnic Chinese violence” as early as

February 1998. United States Dep’t of State, 1999 Country

Reports on Human Rights Practices: Indonesia [hereinafter

“1999 Indonesia Country Report”]. Additional anti-Christian/

anti-ethnic Chinese riots occurred in the months of September

and November, causing many deaths, injuries, and the

destruction of churches, shops, and homes in predominantly

ethnic Chinese communities. 

4Lolong provided both expert testimony and documentary evidence of

a widespread militant Islamic movement that has been gaining strength in

Indonesia, the leaders of which have been calling for a holy war and violence against Christians. 

LOLONG v. GONZALES 3353
Apart from the violent outbreaks of rioting, attacks on ethnic Chinese Christians and Christian houses of worship in ethnic Chinese communities have become increasingly common.

There have also been spates of church burnings coupled with

burnings of Chinese residences. Demonstrations at Chinese

Christian churches, during which violent threats are made

against ethnic Chinese and Christian Indonesians, also occur

frequently. Lolong’s parents decided to attend church less

often after threats of violence were made during demonstrations near their church and after their church received bomb

threats. 

The expert witness testified that ethnic ChineseIndonesians’ risk of persecution increases with the rise of

anti-Christian sentiment and violence. She also explained that

the movement to “Islamisize business” is a movement to

“take it out of the hands of the Chinese.” After describing outbreaks of anti-Christian and anti-Chinese violence, a State

Department report similarly concluded that the link between

anti-Christian and anti-Chinese violence is not coincidental:

“Attacks on churches clearly reflect religious tensions, but

other contributing factors are underlying socioeconomic and

political tensions between poor Muslims and relatively more

affluent ethnic Chinese Christians.” 1999 Indonesia Country

Report. 

The record also establishes that the sub-group of ethnic

Chinese Christian women is subject to a particularized risk of

persecution. During periods of heightened ethnic and religious

violence, there is a pattern of violence against women that

rises to the level of persecution. During the May 1998 riots,

dozens — possibly hundreds — of Chinese women were

“systematically raped.”

5 Mob clashes with police in Jakarta’s

5

It is well-established that rape and other forms of sexual or genderbased violence can constitute persecution on account of a protected

ground. See, e.g., Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2000)

(holding where rape of asylum applicant was motivated at least in part by

applicant’s ethnicity, applicant was persecuted “on account” of ethnicity

as required for asylum eligibility). 

3354 LOLONG v. GONZALES
Chinatown, CNN.com, May 13, 2000; 1999 Indonesia Country Report (noting that “[a]t least 85 instances of violence

against women, including 66 rapes during the 1998 riots were

verified” by a fact-finding team that included both governmental and nongovernmental investigators); Chris McCall,

Ethnic Chinese Find a Voice, South China Morning Post,

May 13, 2000 (reporting that a team of volunteers identified

163 ethnic Chinese rape victims from the 1998 riots and noting that the number of reported rapes may be low because

volunteers found that women stopped coming forward after a

victim who agreed to testify was murdered); Indonesian Chinese Call For Human Rights Investigation, World News Connection, May 12, 2000 (reporting that the Indonesian Ethnic

Chinese Reforms Party collected data that suggested at least

300 ethnic Chinese women were raped during the 1998 riots);

see also 1999 Indonesia Country Report (noting that violence

against women and rapes are believed to be “seriously underreported” in Indonesia). Two of Lolong’s friends from highschool were among the many ethnic Chinese women who

were attacked. Although one friend managed to escape, the

other was raped. Ever since, both young women have been

afraid to leave their homes. 

Although the scale of the systematic raping of ethnic Chinese women during the 1998 riots is unmatched in Indonesian

history, there is evidence that those attacks are reflective of a

broader pattern in which Chinese and Christian minority

women are singled out for abuse. For example, informal

reports suggest that ethnic Chinese women were also the victims of rape and/or attempted rape during the riot that took

place in May 2000, on the two-year anniversary of the 1998

riots. Multiple reports confirm that both governmental and

nongovernmental forces often use rape as a means of oppression, but that the crime is rarely prosecuted. Even during periods of relative calm, ethnic Chinese and Christian girls and

women face a very high risk of being subjected to racial and

sexual harassment and abuse, and ethnically and religiously

motivated attacks against women continue to occur. The

LOLONG v. GONZALES 3355
expert witness also testified that ethnic-Chinese women face

a greater risk of being harassed or abused. 

The government argues that Lolong’s fear of future persecution is not reasonable because there is no evidence that

Lolong’s “parents or brothers” have been harmed in any way

in Indonesia on account of their ethnicity or religion. While

the government correctly points out that the experiences of

similarly situated friends or family who remain in the country

are relevant to Lolong’s asylum claim, Hoxha, 319 F.3d at

1184, it conveniently ignores the fact that Lolong’s friends

were attacked and raped, and continue to live in fear — afraid

to even leave their homes. In other words, the experiences of

persons most similarly situated to Lolong — two ethnic Chinese Christian women of Lolong’s age group and from the

same community — support Lolong’s claim. That other members of Lolong’s family have not suffered from similar attacks

is not surprising — Lolong is the only woman of the same age

group in her family.6

Furthermore, contrary to the government’s assertion, many

of Lolong’s family members have experienced at least some

harm on account of their ethnicity or religion. Lolong’s father

was arrested, detained for weeks at a time, and beaten, several

times in the 1960’s, when the Indonesian government

attempted to purge Indonesia of its ethnic Chinese minority

by conducting “anti-communist” pogroms. More recently,

several Indonesian youths attempted to rob Lolong’s uncle,

but even after discovering that he was not carrying any

money, they beat him so severely that he required surgery on

his face. As noted above, the church to which Lolong’s parents belong has received bomb threats. As a result, her parents’ religious freedom has been curtailed. Although it is true

6The “lack of evidence of harm” to one of Lolong’s brothers is irrelevant, for he no longer lives in Indonesia. The other is currently unemployed; he believes that he cannot find employment, at least in part,

because of ethnic discrimination. 

3356 LOLONG v. GONZALES
that Lolong’s mother has never been physically harmed, this

is most likely due to the fact that she rarely leaves home, and

only does so when accompanied. The loss of religious and

personal freedom is a form of harm. Even if that harm does

not rise to the level of persecution, it would be perverse to

deny the reasonableness of Lolong’s fear on the ground that

some of her family members have been able to avoid persecution by giving up those fundamental freedoms. 

B.

In rejecting Lolong’s claim of a well-founded fear of future

persecution, the BIA concedes that discrimination and violence targeting both ethnic Chinese and Christians continues

to occur, yet, inexplicably, it insists that there is no evidence

that the Indonesian government is unwilling or unable to control the perpetrators. This conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence. 

The substantial evidence of ongoing discrimination, harassment, and violence against ethnic Chinese-Indonesians could,

without more, compel us to conclude that the Indonesian government is “unable” to control the perpetrators. But Lolong

did not rest her case on that evidence alone. 

The expert witness explained in detail why the Indonesian

government’s authority is weak, and its ability to prevent ethnic and religious violence is limited, despite its express commitment to promoting freedom of religion and ethnic

tolerance. A State Department report similarly concludes that,

notwithstanding the public positions of tolerance

adopted by senior government officials, lower level

officials frequently were alleged to be reluctant to

facilitate and protect the rights of religious minorities. Minority houses of worship particularly have

been targeted for damage or destruction during riots

. . . Attacks against minority houses of worship and

LOLONG v. GONZALES 3357
the lack of an effective government response to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks led to

allegations of official complicity in some of the incidents or, at a minimum, allowing them to occur with

impunity. 

United States Dep’t of State, Annual Report on Int’l Religious

Freedom for 1999: Indonesia. 

There is substantial evidence that rogue elements within the

Indonesian military are supporting the nongovernmental

forces behind ethnic and religious persecution throughout the

country. Various observers, including the State Department,

have reported that the military has been supplying numerous

unaccountable militias with arms and instigating political,

religious, and ethnic violence. Government security forces

may even be directly responsible for much of the violence. In

1999, the State Department reported that “[s]ecurity forces

also were responsible for numerous instances of indiscriminate shooting of civilians, torture, rape, beatings and other

abuse” and that “[r]apes by security forces continued to be a

widespread problem . . . .” 1999 Indonesia Country Report. 

During Lolong’s hearing, the Service made much of President Wahid’s statements regarding his commitment to promoting ethnic tolerance, but ignored an August 2000 speech

made by Wahid to the People’s Consultative Assembly, the

highest legislative body in Indonesia, in which he conceded

that the Indonesian economy had been “pulverized,” that

security forces were unable to cope with violent religious conflicts, and that the “rule of law was far from being established.” The Indonesian Minister of Defense has also

announced publicly that “he cannot control various elements

within the army.” 

There has been no prosecution — no arrests, no charges

filed — in any of the rape crimes committed during the 1998

riots and their aftermath, even though a government inquiry

3358 LOLONG v. GONZALES
confirmed reports by human rights groups that at least dozens

of rapes were committed. Lolong testified that when one of

her friends who was attacked during the riots reported the

crime to the police, the police did nothing. Perpetrators

reportedly intimidated surviving victims and witnesses. In the

most extreme case, a rape victim who was willing to testify

was murdered, and her body placed in the center of Jakarta.

Supporters of the victims report that the police have done

nothing to prevent or counteract this campaign of intimidation. 

Not surprisingly, the State Department has also found that

the Indonesian government “did not resolve fully many cases

of attacks on religious facilities and churches that occurred

during riots and, in other cases, did not investigate such incidents at all.” 1999 Indonesia Country Report (internal citation

omitted). 

The Indonesian government has not even followed the recommendations of the fact-finding team that it commissioned

to investigate the May 1998 riots. According to the State

Department, the team “found evidence that some elements of

the military may have been involved in provoking the violence, which included attacks against Sino-Indonesian

women, and urged further investigation in the matter.” 1999

Indonesia Country Report. Instead of prosecuting these elements of the military, the People’s Consultative Assembly

passed a resolution holding that “the army would not be held

culpable for crimes against humanity committed before

1999.” There is also evidence that some military officers who

are alleged to be responsible for instigating and orchestrating

much of the violence are regaining power in Indonesia. 

[5] In its opinion, the BIA suggests that Lolong’s claim

can, despite all of this evidence, be defeated by the mere fact

that senior officials within the Indonesian government have

publicly expressed their commitment to ethnic equality and

religious freedom and instituted some reforms. However, this

LOLONG v. GONZALES 3359
evidence of the government’s willingness to control the perpetrators of ethnic and religious violence in Indonesia fails to

rebut the overwhelming evidence of the government’s inability to control those forces. Cf. Avetova-Elisseva, 213 F.3d

1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2000) (“It does not matter that financial

considerations may account for [the government’s] inability

to stop elements of ethnic persecution. What matters instead

is that the government is unwilling or unable to control those

elements of its society committing the acts of persecution.”

(internal quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis in original)); Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2000)

(finding government “unwilling or unable to control” nongovernmental forces where the government generally

responded quickly to violence yet continued to experience a

“serious law and order problem”). 

[6] In sum, Lolong has established by compelling evidence

that she is a member of a significantly disfavored group, and

that she is a member of sub-groups that are at a substantially

greater risk of persecution than the group as a whole. As a

result, she has met her burden of demonstrating that she faces

a particularized risk of future persecution. The record also

compels the conclusion that the Indonesian government is

either unwilling or unable to control the forces behind ethnic

and religious persecution in Indonesia. Accordingly, we find

that Lolong’s fear of future persecution is well-founded. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for review

and hold that substantial evidence establishes Lolong’s eligibility for asylum. We remand so that the Attorney General

may exercise his discretion to grant asylum.7

PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED.

7We do not address withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture because Lolong has not pursued those claims on

appeal. 

3360 LOLONG v. GONZALES