IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William L. Wright, III, :

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 405 M.D. 2019

: Submitted: December 2, 2022

Judge Elizabeth Doyle, :

Judge Hiram A. Carpenter, III, :

Respondents :

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

PER CURIAM

FILED: March 7, 2023

William L. Wright, III (Wright) filed a pro se petition for review (Petition) in 

our original jurisdiction alleging two judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair 

County violated his constitutional rights by failing to enforce an order of the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The judges filed preliminary objections in the nature 

of a demurrer. After review, we sustain the preliminary objections and dismiss 

Wright’s Petition.

I. Background and Procedural History

Wright’s claims arise from his criminal conviction and subsequent postconviction proceedings in his capital case. The full facts and procedural history are 

set forth in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (Supreme Court) opinion 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 78 A.3d 1070 (Pa. 2013). In that case, the 

Commonwealth appealed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County 
2

(trial court) finding Wright incompetent to waive his state post-conviction rights, 

including his right to counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Relying on the above opinion, Wright filed his Petition, titling it an Amended 

Complaint. He asserts the Petition is a “civil rights action” for violations of his 

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, and against cruel and 

unusual punishment. Petition at 1. He names as defendants two judges of the trial 

court, Judge Elizabeth Doyle (Judge Doyle) and Judge Hiram A. Carpenter, III 

(Judge Carpenter) (individually, Judge and collectively, the Judges). Wright states 

the Judges are “sued” individually and in her or his official capacity. Id. ¶ 8. Wright 

alleges the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether 

the Federal Community Defender Office (FCDO) could participate as counsel in the 

role of putative next friends, and if the trial court found such participation 

unauthorized, to preclude it.1Id. ¶ 14. Wright contends neither Judge “held a hearing 

or made a ruling as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ordered.”2 Id. ¶ 15. Wright 

seeks a declaration that the Judges’ acts and omissions violated his constitutional 

rights. Id. ¶ 25. He also seeks compensatory and punitive damages ($250,000 and 

$125,000, respectively) from each Judge. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. 

Wright filed an Application for Appointment of Counsel. This Court denied 

the motion, stating Wright “is not entitled to appointed counsel in this civil action, 

in which he seeks damages for alleged violations of his civil rights in the handling 

of a PCRA[3] motion.” Order, May 9, 2022. 

1The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed FCDO participation in In re 

Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Defender Association of 

Philadelphia,790 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 2015).

2 We acknowledge the Supreme Court order contains contingencies that did not occur, namely, the 

putative next friends did not assert they had standing to litigate on Wright’s behalf, and, therefore, 

the trial court never addressed the issue on remand. 

3 Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. 
3

The Judges filed preliminary objections (POs) in the nature of a demurrer. 

They argued this Court should sustain their POs, asserting: 

Petitioner cannot collaterally attack his criminal sentence and 

proceedings, this Court does not have jurisdiction to enforce an alleged 

Supreme Court directive, the Petition for Review fails to state a claim 

for relief, judicial immunity and sovereign immunity bar the claims, 

and other reasons that may be set forth in Respondents’ brief.

POs ¶ 10. Wright filed an Answer in response to the POs, requesting this Court deny 

them. In support of his request, Wright asserts the suit is for a “due process 

violation,” the trial court “does have jurisdiction to enforce a Supreme Court order,” 

and the Judges do not have immunity for “violating a Supreme Court order.” Answer 

to POs ¶¶ 1, 8, 9. 

II. Analysis

Initially, we must establish this Court has jurisdiction to address the matter. 

This Court has original, exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions or proceedings 

“[a]gainst the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in 

his official capacity.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i). For jurisdictional purposes, a 

common pleas court judge, “when sued in his official capacity, is either the 

‘commonwealth government’ or [an] officer thereof.” Brown v. Taylor, 494 A.2d

29, 31 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). Therefore, in the case of Wright’s civil action against 

two officers of the Commonwealth, we have original, exclusive jurisdiction to 

address the Petition.

Having established jurisdiction, we address the POs in the nature of a 

demurrer. To sustain a demurrer, “[i]t must be clear the law will not permit recovery, 

and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.” Chasan v. Platt, 
4

244 A.3d 73, 80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (citing Key v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 185 A.3d 421

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018)).

The Judges raised judicial immunity as an affirmative defense in their POs.4 

This Court recognizes judicial immunity is not only immunity from damages, but 

also from suit. Chasan, 244 A.3d at 82. As it would serve as a bar to Wright’s civil 

action, we address the affirmative defense of judicial immunity first. 

A judge of the common pleas court is necessarily entitled to absolute 

immunity. See Fischer v. Kassab, 380 A.2d 926 (Pa. 1977). Judges are immune 

from liability for damages when performing judicial acts, even if they err or perform 

an act with malice, provided they do not lack jurisdiction. Chasan, 244 A.3d at 81.

Thus, “[j]udicial immunity requires a two-part analysis: first, whether the judge has 

performed a judicial act; and second, whether the judge has some jurisdiction over 

the subject matter before [him].” Id. (citing Langella v. Cercone, 34 A.3d 835, 838

(Pa. Super. 2011) (alteration in original)).

The first part of the judicial immunity analysis is whether the Judges 

performed a judicial act. When evaluating whether an act is a judicial one, we 

consider “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed 

by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the 

4

“Technically, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit a defendant from raising the 

affirmative defense of immunity through preliminary objections.” Chasan, 244 A.3d at 80. 

Presently, Wright responded to the merits of the Judges’ POs. He did not object that the Judges 

did not raise judicial immunity as a new matter. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028, 1030. Moreover, courts in 

the Commonwealth generally permit a party to raise immunity as a defense by preliminary 

objection when delaying a ruling thereon serves no purpose, or when the defense is clear on the 

face of the complaint. Chasan, 244 A.3d at 80.
5

judge in his judicial capacity.” Petition of Dwyer, 406 A.2d 1355, 1361 (Pa.

1979) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)).

Interpreting an opinion and order from a higher court, and deciding what 

actions to take as a result, are functions normally performed by a judge and are, 

therefore, judicial acts. There is no indication or allegation Wright dealt with the 

Judges in anything other than their official capacity. Accordingly, the first prong of 

the judicial immunity analysis is satisfied. 

The second part of the judicial immunity analysis is whether the Judges had 

subject matter jurisdiction. The Judicial Code5sets forth the subject matter 

jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas. The Judicial Code states: “Except where 

exclusive original jurisdiction of an action or proceeding is by statute or by general 

rule adopted pursuant to section 503 (relating to reassignment of matters) vested in 

another court of this Commonwealth, the courts of common pleas shall have 

unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 931(a). 

Judge Carpenter presided over Wright’s criminal trial and issued the sentencing 

order in the case, and Judge Doyle was the President Judge of the trial court. There 

is no lack of jurisdiction in this case, and the second prong of the judicial immunity 

analysis is satisfied. 

As this PO is determinative, we need not address the others. 

5

Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9913.
6

III. Conclusion

Based on the above, we conclude the Judges are entitled to the affirmative 

defense of judicial immunity. Accordingly, the Judges’ POs in the nature of a 

demurrer are sustained, and Wright’s Petition is dismissed with prejudice.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William L. Wright, III, :

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 405 M.D. 2019

: 

Judge Elizabeth Doyle, :

Judge Hiram A. Carpenter, III, :

Respondents :

PER CURIAM O R D E R 

AND NOW, this 7th day of March 2023, the preliminary 

objections in the nature of a demurrer filed by Judge Elizabeth Doyle and Judge 

Hiram A. Carpenter, III, are SUSTAINED, and the Petition filed by William L

Wright, III, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.