U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

73–681 PDF 2012

S. Hrg. 112–615 

CONTRACTORS: HOW MUCH ARE THEY COSTING 

THE GOVERNMENT? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING 

OVERSIGHT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 29, 2012 

Available via http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

NICHOLAS A. ROSSI, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

JOYCE WARD, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Chairman 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

MARGARET DAUM, Staff Director 

BRIAN CALLANAN, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 1 

Senator Portman .............................................................................................. 3 

Senator Tester .................................................................................................. 5 

Prepared statement: 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 23 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 2012 

Jay D. Aronowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Force Management, Manpower 

and Resources, U.S. Army ................................................................................... 7 

Debra M. Tomchek, Executive Director, Balanced Workforce Program Management Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ................................. 9 

Charels D. Grimes, III, Chief Operating Officer, U.S. Office of Personnel 

Management ......................................................................................................... 10 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Aronowitz, Jay D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 27 

Grimes, Charles D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

Tomchek, Debra M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44 

APPENDIX 

Chart referenced by Senator McCaskill ................................................................. 51 

Chart referenced by Mr. Aronowitz ........................................................................ 52 

Statements submitted for the Record: 

American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and Heritage Foundation .................. 53 

American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) ............................. 60 

The Coalition for Government Procurement (CGP) ....................................... 81 

National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) ............................................... 88 

Project on Government Oversight (POGO) with attachment ....................... 93 

Professional Services Council (PSC) ............................................................... 158 

Questions and Responses for the Record from: 

Mr. Aronowitz ................................................................................................... 167 

Ms. Tomchek ..................................................................................................... 176 

Mr. Grimes ........................................................................................................ 183 

Letter submitted by OMB ....................................................................................... 185 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

(1) 

CONTRACTORS: HOW MUCH ARE THEY 

COSTING THE GOVERNMENT? 

THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 2012 

U.S. SENATE,

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in 

Room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claire 

McCaskill, Chairwoman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators McCaskill, Tester, and Portman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. This hearing will come to order. The Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight (SCO) is having a hearing 

today about contractors, and the question of the hearing is, how 

much are contractors costing the government? 

As we have discussed many times in this Subcommittee, and also 

in the Armed Services Committee where I chair the Readiness Subcommittee, government agencies are increasingly reliant on contractors to perform services, and today we are talking about service 

contracts, not buying things, contracts to actually ask people to 

work at a service on behalf of the government. 

Contractors now perform many of the duties which most Americans would assume are done by government employees, from managing and overseeing contracts and programs to developing policies 

and writing regulations. Contractors sit side-by-side with Federal 

employees and perform many of the same tasks. 

Spending on service contractors has outpaced spending on Federal employees. The cost of service contracts has increased by 79 

percent over the last 10 years from $181 billion to $324 billion, 

while in the same time period, spending on Federal employees has 

only increased by 34 percent, $170 billion to $229 billion. 

As with any expense of taxpayer dollars, we have to ask whether 

the government is getting the most effective use out of these dollars. It would seem intuitive that when deciding whether to contract out a function, the government would figure out how much it 

will cost, and whether it would be cheaper for Federal employees 

to do it instead. 

For too many years now, the Federal Government has relied on 

assumptions and flawed studies to support those assumptions. 

Without good data about the cost of using contractors instead of 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

2 

Federal employees, the government simply does not have the information it needs to make smart choices. 

For those of us who track these issues closely, we have seen 

many studies over the years that compare the costs of Federal employees to the private sector and conclude that the private sector 

is more efficient. However, contractors are not quite comparable to 

the private sector. Contractors do work for the government, and 

some of that work does not exist in the private sector. 

The overhead cost for contractors may not be the same as in the 

private sector, and this includes situations where contractor employees work alongside Federal employees using government provided equipment and infrastructure. If we are going to honestly assess whether contractors are more or less expensive for the Federal 

Government than using Federal employees, then we need to look 

at the cost of contractors, not just the cost within the private sector. 

A report issued by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) 

in September 2011 was the first study I am aware of to actually 

attempt to compare the cost of Federal employees versus Federal 

contractors. It found that in some instances, contractors may be 

paid, on average, more than 1.83 times what Federal employees are 

paid to perform the same work. I think this report was a worthwhile and needed effort, but as the authors of the report concede, 

it is hampered by inadequate and inaccurate data. 

For the government to make smart contracting decisions, it 

needs more than assumptions. If the government is going to have 

the best and most efficient mix of Federal employees and contractors to perform its work, it needs to be able to assess the true cost 

of both outsourcing and insourcing. This analysis should include 

overhead costs, how contractor compensation should be reimbursed, 

and when some government functions are inherently governmental 

or critically impact an agency’s core mission. 

I am concerned that one agency charged with management in the 

Federal Government does not seem to be providing enough guidance on this issue. The Subcommittee did extend an invitation to 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to be here today, but 

unfortunately, OMB declined to attend. 

They did not have Senate-confirmed personnel to testify today 

since Jeffrey Zients has been elevated to Acting Director of OMB, 

and the Director of OMB, as my Ranking Member is well-aware, 

had a long-standing policy that they do not testify in front of subcommittees. And it is a long-standing policy that agencies only 

send Senate-confirmed personnel to testify at these hearings. 

It would seem that OMB is in the best position to provide governmentwide guidance on how agencies should look at cost and, 

most importantly, how agencies can gather the data to do that 

analysis. I understand that OMB is planning to issue some cost 

guidance within the next 60 days. If this is the case, I look forward 

to seeing it and hope it will take into account the issues we discuss 

today. We will be directing a number of questions to OMB for the 

record and those will be available to the public in connection with 

this hearing. 

I want to say that two of the agencies represented here today, 

the Army and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), are 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

3 

making strides on cost and data issues. The work that the Army 

has done on contractor inventory is setting a standard for the rest 

of the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Balanced Workforce Strategy tool is a promising approach to making contracting decisions. I think both of 

these efforts deserve further discussion by both Congress and the 

Administration. 

Today’s hearing is an opportunity to discuss these efforts and to 

consider other possible tools that the government can use to make 

smart, cost-effective contracting decisions. We need to develop a 

best practices model to help determine when contracting will save 

taxpayer dollars. We also need to start collecting data that will 

help us make those determinations. Assuming that contractors cost 

less and that the Federal employees cost more does not help this 

discussion because, frankly, we do not have any idea whether that 

assumption is true or false. Assumptions are especially costly in 

our current budget climate and could undermine efforts to save 

taxpayer dollars. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today and look forward to 

their testimony. I would just add as a note to my opening remarks 

that as we have spent a lot of time in Congress talking about freezing the number of Federal employees and freezing the pay of Federal employees, there has not been enough talk about freezing the 

size of the contracting force and freezing the pay of contractors. 

And, frankly, if people understand that we are spending more 

money on service-related contractors in many agencies than we are 

spending on Federal employees, that is why I have been frustrated 

with these efforts, because it is like saying, you have a problem, 

but we are going to shut one eye and only look at part of it. 

This is an attempt today, this hearing, to make sure that the efforts to freeze the size of Federal employees does not go on without 

us taking a hard look at this contracting workforce, its efficiencies, 

and whether or not the taxpayers are getting a bang for their buck 

in this regard. I will now turn to my colleague, Senator Portman, 

for his opening remarks. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR PORTMAN 

Senator PORTMAN. I thank you, Madam Chairman, and it is good 

to have the witnesses here with some expertise from some agencies 

and departments that actually are making some progress in this 

area. It is also good to have your grandsons watching over us here. 

After all, they are the ones who are going to have to solve these 

problems in the future, so it is good they are hearing it now. 

And it is an important hearing. It is about an important challenge I think the Chair has laid out well. And, frankly, I think we 

need a lot of work right now on how to be sure that we do have 

the ability to evaluate the cost effectiveness of using private contractors. I appreciate, again, the fact we are going to have some 

folks here who can give us some examples of how that can be done 

better than it is being done governmentwide. 

We spend about $320 billion a year now on service contracts and 

about $200 billion to compensate Federal employees. Both of those 

are major expenditures and both have to be looked at in this ongoH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

4 

ing effort to strike the right balance between the Federal workforce 

and government contractors. 

Evaluating the cost effectiveness of insourcing versus contracting 

sounds like a very technical discussion and it is, as we will hear 

from these witnesses, but is an extremely important process to go 

through because it has huge consequences, multi-billion dollar consequences. So simply put, I think what we are examining here 

today is how agencies should evaluate which option, public option 

or the privately contracted option, makes the most sense for taxpayers. Where can we get the best value for the dollar? 

Those who have followed this insourcing versus out-sourcing debate know that sometimes this issue has been politicized. In fact, 

during this political campaign, we will probably hear more about 

it. We have to be careful that it does not become political because 

at a time of $15 trillion debts and trillion dollar deficits, Federal 

agencies are going to be under a lot of pressure, as we are all 

spending, and we need to be sure that we are adhering to a neutral 

and an analytically sound cost comparison methodology. 

The decision to insource or contract out any government activity, 

existing, new, or expanded, should be data-driven. And, frankly, I 

think we do not have the methods and data available right now to 

do that. We need to be sure that we do not end up producing cost 

savings projections that need to be reworked. 

This all starts with a fundamental threshold question. Chair 

McCaskill just talked about it. It is the question, is this job suitable for contractors to perform or is it inherently a governmental 

or a critical function that should remain in-house? OMB and individual agencies have provided guidance on that question over the 

years, including the current Administration’s 2009 OMB Memorandum entitled, Managing the Multi-Sector Workforce. 

Once it is determined whether it is public or private, the decision 

where to place the work, again, should be primarily cost-driven, in 

my view. We get a better value as taxpayers when commercial activities are paid for by the Federal Government are the subject of 

competition. This is an interesting point because just by having 

competition, we are going to see savings. 

As the Center for Strategic and International Studies reported 

last year, research demonstrates that 65 percent of savings 

achieved from public-private competition is derived from the competition itself, not any intrinsic advantage of public versus private. 

So competition does work and that should be part of the analysis. 

In-sourcing or contracting decisions based on costs depend on the 

ability, of course, to accurately project these comparative costs, and 

guesswork does not work, it will not suffice, and that is one of the 

overriding concerns for me, is that there is an apparent lack of uniform guidance on cost comparison methodologies. I will be interested to hear from our witnesses on that and see what they think. 

But from 1996 to 2009, of course, you had the OMB guidance 

document, Circular A–76, which every OMB employee is very familiar with, and that basically governed contracting out of commercial activities in various forms. Congress told agencies to stop conducting Circular A–76 competitions, and that is a mistake. I think 

whatever its strengths and weaknesses, A–76 provided detailed 

guidance that is needed on cost comparison. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

5 

Since A–76 was suspended, it appears that agencies have been 

left largely on their own with little oversight or guidance. The current Administration has stated that agencies faced with sourcing 

decisions should still, quote, perform a cost analysis that addresses 

the full cost of government and private sector performance. That is 

fine, but again, OMB has provided little if no guidance on how to 

perform that analysis. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently found that 

OMB’s new policies have created, and I quote, confusion as to when 

a cost analysis is needed and the appropriate procedures to conduct 

one. As Chair McCaskill said, we need to hear from OMB on this. 

When I was OMB Director, I thought that Subcommittee rule made 

a lot of sense. I am now wondering. But seriously, we do need to 

hear directly from OMB, although we appreciate the agency input 

today and their view of it. 

But this lack of guidance is problematic for a lot of agencies because the apples-to-apples comparisons between contract work and 

in-house functions are often very complex, and the guidance is 

needed and needs to be uniform. 

On the government side, the analysis is particularly difficult and 

requires a fine grained analysis. An agency has to evaluate the 

fully burdened cost of using or adding Federal employees, overhead 

costs, equipment use, other expenses. Multiple reports have indicated we are not getting that right. The contractor side is generally 

easier to price out with the exception of cost-plus contracts, which 

are difficult. 

An important dimension of this problem that agencies appear to 

be overlooking is that insourcing can reduce flexibility, and as a result, increase long-term costs. And this is, again, something that 

ought to be considered. The point is, it is difficult to eliminate or 

downsize an agency program. 

GAO, the Center for Strategic International Studies, and others 

have looked at this problem and have noted that terminating a contract is far easier than adjusting the size of the Federal workforce. 

Again, agencies have no guidance on how to evaluate that cost of 

lost flexibility. Whoever is doing the government work, Job 1, of 

course, is ensuring that American taxpayers get the best possible 

value and that is what this hearing is all about. 

Informed sourcing decisions are key to achieving that goal. And 

again, with that, Madam Chairman, appreciate you holding this 

hearing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on this complex but important issue. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Portman. Would you 

like a minute, Senator Tester. 

Senator TESTER. Yes, I would. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR TESTER 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, 

Ranking Member Portman, and thank you to the witnesses who 

are here today. I look forward to your testimony. I think we can 

all say there is probably a lot of contractors out there that are 

doing a job and doing it well. I think we can also acknowledge that 

I think there are a number of contractors who are out there that 

are overeating at the taxpayer trough. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

6 

I think that I appreciate this hearing, it has been one of many 

that Chairman McCaskill has done, because there are certain 

things that, since I have been in the U.S. Senate, have been 

brought to my attention that is somewhat disturbing. The concept 

of no-bid contracts is an amazing concept to me. 

The concepts of the Federal Government using somebody else as 

basically their contractor to contract is something that is pretty 

amazing to me. And with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 

number of contractors we are utilizing in those, and I have been 

over there. I have been protected by some of those contractors and 

I will tell you that they did a good job because I made it back here 

in one piece. 

But the amount of money that we are paying for those contractors versus what we are paying our active military and if we are 

actually getting, as Senator Portman said, the taxpayers’ best 

value really brings a lot of what is going on here into question. 

I do not want to take a lot more time, but I just want to state 

that I do not know if there was a move some time ago to say we 

are going to downsize government and we are going to replace 

those with contractors so we can try to dupe the American taxpayer, or if there was a real effort that somebody thought this was 

really going to save money. But I can tell you that when we talk about $60 billion being gone up in air—and $60 billion is a lot of change, I mean, that is a lot 

of Montana budgets for a lot of years—we are doing something 

wrong and it is unacceptable. I look forward to your statements. I 

look forward to hearing what you have seen. 

In the meantime, in my notes here for my opening statement, it 

says, Tell them you are confident that the Federal Government can 

bring accountability to the process. I cannot say that. I have not 

seen that. And when we are talking about deficits—by the way, 

this is inappropriate at any time, but especially when we are talking about deficits like we have now—we have to get our arms 

around this situation. I want to thank the Chairman once again. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Tester. Let me introduce our witnesses. Jay Aronowitz—am I saying it correctly? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. Is Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Force Management, Manpower and Resources for the U.S. Army. 

In this position, he advises the Army’s Assistant Secretary of Manpower and Reserve Affairs on all matters pertaining to total force 

structure and associated military, civilian, and contractor manpower in the active and reserve components, program objective 

memorandum resources for programs under Manpower and Reserve Affairs oversight, and all manpower and personnel issues associated with force structure requirements of new weapons systems. Mr. Aronowitz also provides direct oversight for the U.S.A. 

Manpower Analysis Agency. 

Debra Tomchek is the Executive Director of the Balanced Workforce Program Management Office in the Office of Chief Human 

Capital Officer at the Department of Homeland Security. Ms. 

Tomchek began her government career as a civilian Army intern. 

Since then, she has held several executive positions including Director for Human Resources at the Department of Commerce and 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

7 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Aronowitz appears in the appendix on page 27. 

the Department of Justice (DOJ), Deputy Director for Program 

Support at the Department of Defense, and as Associate Director 

for Workforce Solutions at the United States Mint. 

Chuck Grimes is the Chief Operating Officer at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), where he is responsible for managing 

OPM’s human, financial, and other resources. He is also responsible for improving the agency’s performance and achieving the 

agency’s goals through strategic planning, measurement, analysis, 

and progress assessment. Prior to joining OPM, Mr. Grimes served 

as the Assistant Director of Compensation Policy in the Strategic 

Human Resources Division at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 

and as Director of the Wage and Salary Division for the Department of Defense’s Civilian Personnel Management Service. 

Thank you all for being here. It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear all witnesses, so if you do not mind, I would 

ask you to stand. 

Do you swear that the testimony that you will give before this 

Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. I do. 

Ms. TOMCHEK. I do. 

Mr. GRIMES. I do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you all very much. We will begin 

your testimony, Mr. Aronowitz. 

TESTIMONY OF JAY D. ARONOWITZ,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, FORCE MANAGEMENT, MANPOWER AND RESOURCES, U.S. ARMY 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member 

Portman, distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored to 

have the opportunity to discuss the Army’s contractor inventory 

and how we use this information for the strategic human capital 

planning for our total force, military, civilian, and contractors. 

To serve as effective stewards of public funds, the Army must ensure that we are managing our workforce in the most effective and 

cost-efficient manner possible. To that end, we developed our Contractor Manpower Reporting Application tool (CMRA), in January 

2005 to increase the visibility of the Army’s contract workforce, 

both in terms of labor, hours, and costs. 

As part of the development process and in order to gain approval 

under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), we met with over 50 

corporations and worked with them in designing a system that 

would minimize the reporting burden on them and the cost to the 

government. 

The reporting process is so streamlined that most contractors do 

not even separately bill the government for reporting this data. 

Today we have over 20,000 contractors entering data into CMRA. 

CMRA was developed at a cost of approximately $1 million using 

commercial off-the-shelf software and it is government owned. 

A staff of five individuals manage the program for the entire 

Army, providing help desk capability, interpreting policies, running 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

8 

reports, and coordinating actions across our acquisition, manpower, 

and financial management staffs. The Army uses CMRA to collect 

the direct labor hours and labor dollars associated with each service contract, as well as the function, location of performance, requiring activity, funding source, and type of contract vehicle. 

In fiscal year (FY) 2001, we began collecting data on other direct 

non-labor costs which includes supply cost and travel expenses, as 

well as a variety of other expenses charged directly to the government. By collecting this data, the Army can now see direct labor 

and direct non-labor costs, and thus, infer overhead costs, though 

we have just begun to analyze these overhead costs. 

The inventory compiled in the CMRA today is primarily used to 

fulfill the statutory requirement to identify inherently governmental functions and closely associated with inherently governmental functions, authorized personal service contracts, and functions appropriate for contract performance. 

Beginning in fiscal year 2011, the Department of Defense was required to submit a budget exhibit of service contract manpower and 

costs. The Department of Defense Comptroller recently issued guidance that the services inventory of contract services would be used 

to inform the budget process, and we have started to work with the 

Army Comptroller to ensure Congress will have the most accurate 

data on contract services in the future, and that our program and 

budget for fiscal year 2014 for contract services is built on data 

from CMRA. 

CMRA, our inventory of contract services, has helped us to improve management of our total force by identifying inappropriately 

contracted functions and by collecting cost information to help us 

make informed decisions on the most appropriate workforce mix. 

In addition to service contract data, CMRA allows us the ability 

to ensure adequate oversight of service contacts by our organic 

workforce, a statutory requirement, and ensure there are no 

redundancies between the contracted functions and the organic 

government workforce. 

In December 2011, in response to the House Armed Services 

Committee concerns over lack of visibility as to what DOD spends 

on contract services, Secretary of Defense responded that he was, 

quote, committed to enable the efforts of the rest of the Department of Defense to quickly implement the Army’s Contract and 

Manpower Reporting Application tool this fiscal year, while also 

leveraging Army processes, lessons learned, and best practices to 

comply with the law in the most cost-efficient and effective manner. 

In closing, we believe that the Army’s contractor inventory process has potential benefits, not only for the rest of the Department 

of Defense, but also for governmentwide application. Chairman 

McCaskill and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your 

support and I look forward to your questions. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much, Mr. Aronowitz. Ms. 

Tomchek. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

9 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Tomchek appears in the appendix on page 44. 

TESTIMONY OF DEBRA M. TOMCHEK,1 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

BALANCED WORKFORCE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. TOMCHEK. Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Portman, 

and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the 

opportunity to speak to you today about the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to balance our Federal and contractor workforce. 

During the Department’s stand-up in 2003, contractors played a 

significant role as leadership worked quickly to obtain the capabilities necessary to accomplish our mission. By 2007, concerns surfaced about possible over-reliance on contractors at DHS. At the request of Congress, the Government Accountability Office recommended that DHS take action to improve its ability to manage 

risk and to ensure governmental control and accountability. 

To comply with GAO’s recommendations, statutory requirements, 

guidance from the President and the Office of Management and 

Budget Policy, DHS established our balanced workforce strategy in 

mid–2010. The strategy has three aims. 

First, to ensure compliance with applicable statutes, regulations, 

and policies through a repeatable, documented, decisionmaking 

process. Second, to determine the proper balance of Federal and 

contractor employees for programs and functions. And third, reduce 

mission risk and, as practicable, reduce or control cost. 

The Balanced Workforce Program Management Office was established within the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer with 

an understanding that rebalancing the workforce would have to 

rely on sound workforce planning. Given the complexity of decisions related to properly sourcing programs and functions, we simultaneously created a departmental working group with senior 

representatives from the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, the 

Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, and the Office of the General Counsel. 

The departmental working group uses its multidisciplinary expertise to oversee the execution of the balanced workforce strategy 

by components. We also created the Balanced Workforce Executive 

Steering Group comprised of representatives from components to 

provide input and direction concerning the strategy. 

In 2010, DHS components began reviewing current service contracts using the three-step balanced workforce strategy process. 

The first step, identify the work, involves looking at a service contract’s statement of work (SOW) to isolate and accurately describe 

each discrete function that should be analyzed. 

The second step, analyze the work, relies on an electronic questionnaire entitled, The Balanced Workforce Strategy Tool. The tool 

leads components through a series of questions about a function to 

ensure compliance with law, regulations, and relevant policy. 

The tool also includes a method for assessing sufficient internal 

or Federal capability and uses questions such as, What is the relationship of a function to the Department’s core mission? What is 

the risk to a function if all contractors were to leave suddenly? And 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

10 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Grimes appears in the appendix on page 48. 

what is the likelihood that a function might evolve into one that 

is inherently governmental? 

The Balanced Workforce Strategy Tool produces a suggested 

ratio of Federal to contractor employees for components to use in 

considering mission control and the sourcing of a function. If concerns about mission control are identified, components may seek to 

rebalance the workforce for a function. However, components may 

alternatively provide a risk mitigation strategy such as enhancing 

contract oversight or increasing reporting requirements. 

If a component’s responses to the questionnaire indicate that a 

function can be performed by either the public or private sector, 

the component must then consider the cost to DHS. The DHS Balanced Workforce Strategy guidance mandates that components perform cost comparison analysis to determine the most efficient 

sourcing solution. 

First, components calculate the cost of Federal workers using the 

OMB-approved, DHS Modular Cost Model. This model incorporates 

a variety of factors to describe the fully loaded cost for Federal employee to DHS. On the contract side, the cost of the current contract is used, including the cost of contract oversight. If a new requirement is being reviewed, an independent government cost estimate serves as the basis for comparison. 

The third step in the Balanced Workforce Strategy process is to 

implement the sourcing decision. If the workforce for a function requires rebalancing, numerous stakeholders must collaborate to 

make the change. The Department’s workforce is responsible for 

executing our complex and important Homeland Security mission 

to protect the American public and the American homeland. 

To meet our mission objectives, we need the expertise of both 

Federal workers and contractor employees. The Balanced Workforce Strategy contributes to DHS mission readiness through its 

focus on mission control, accountability, and oversight for business 

decisions and cost containment. 

I look forward to answering any questions you might have. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you so much, Ms. Tomchek. Mr. 

Grimes. 

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES D. GRIMES III,1 CHIEF OPERATING 

OFFICER, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 

Mr. GRIMES. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman, and 

Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify before you today on contracting and the multi-sector workforce. The U.S. Office of Personnel Management is the central 

human resources agency for the Federal Government, providing 

leadership and guidance to Federal agencies on governmentwide 

policies for strategic management of the Federal workforce. 

The American people expect and deserve a high-performing government that can efficiently and effectively carry out its missions, 

such as defending our homeland, providing care to our veterans, 

and ensuring the safety of our air and water. Performing this highly challenging and complex work depends on an engaged and wellH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

11 

prepared workforce with the right mix of knowledge, skills, and 

abilities. 

One of OPM’s roles is to set standards for effective management 

of human capital and to assist agencies in meeting those standards. 

OPM evaluates agency performance in meeting those standards 

through an annual reporting, evaluation, and feedback process. 

One of these standards is strategic management alignment, that is, 

having a human capital strategy aligned with mission goals and organizational objectives. 

Effective workforce planning is critical to meeting the strategic 

alignment standard. Workforce planning is the systematic process 

to identify and document mission-critical occupations and associated current or anticipated competency gaps, then to address those 

gaps using strategies and techniques such as restructuring, recruitment, redeployment, retraining, retention, or technology solutions. 

OPM, however, does not get involved in specific agency workforce 

planning decisions, nor does it get involved in agency-specific decisions such as whether or not to competitively source or contract 

particular functions. OPM does analyze non-Federal and Federal 

pay for the purposes of comparisons required for setting Federal 

employee pay under the General Schedule pay system, but it does 

not determine whether Federal employees or private contractors 

are more cost-effective in the performance of government operations. 

Agencies have that responsibility in their specific areas of operation. For instance, as agencies consider the appropriate size and 

composition of the workforce necessary to carry out their missions, 

the determination on whether to use private sector contractors is 

best informed by application of sound planning principles, such as 

the level of specialization needed for a specific task, the duration 

of need for that specialization, and cost comparisons. Other considerations include the availability of expertise, the time needed to 

train new employees thoroughly, the urgency of the need, the resultant opportunity costs, and the need for institutional memory. 

It is worth emphasizing that a simple comparison of labor costs 

alone is not likely to answer the question of which sector would be 

more cost-effective and efficient in performing a given task in a 

specific circumstance. For example, a cost comparison to consider 

in-house performance as an alternative to continued contract performance might be beneficial if requirements tend to be managed 

best through an employer-employee relationship, the agency has 

experience in performing the work in-house, the ability to recruit 

for the skill is high, and the government has historically had challenges with contractor performance. 

By contrast, the benefit of a cost comparison may be lower if the 

agency is looking to meet a short-term surge that would be costly 

to address through long-term hiring, the agency currently lacks an 

in-house capability to do the work, and the agency has had considerable success in getting good performance at a reasonable cost 

from its contractors. 

All of these factors have a role in determining when a cost comparison is likely to be most effective in achieving best value for the 

taxpayer. OPM provides guidance and training to assist agencies in 

identifying workforce requirements and conducting training sesH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

12 

1The chart referenced by Senator McCaskill appears in the appendix on page 51. 

sions on multi-sector workforce planning. OPM has focused on the 

way our human capital management standards apply to multi-sector planning. 

OPM has not delivered training on how agencies should appropriately compare the cost of a contracted versus employed workforce. Agencies may refer to OMB publications such as Memorandum M–09–26, which requires agencies to begin the process of 

developing and implementing policies, practices, and tools for managing the multi-sector workforce for guidance in making such comparisons. 

Additionally, on September 12, 2011, OMB’s Office of Federal 

Procurement Policy published a policy letter, Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, in order to provide 

guidance to agencies on governmental and critical function management. 

OPM is also co-chairing an interagency working group with the 

Department of Defense to implement the Administration’s CrossAgency Priority Goal to close skill gaps to more effectively achieve 

agency missions, an important workforce planning effort that will 

require agencies to look at recruitment, training, and business 

processes, as well as the use of technology and contractor support. 

OPM’s support and coordination of effective management practice sharing among agencies will be essential to achieving this goal. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify before you and I 

look forward to any questions you may have. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much, Mr. Grimes. I would 

like to start by looking at the chart,1 Mr. Aronowitz, the total force 

mix, military, civilian, and contractor, and I wish we had it large, 

but we do not. But you can see, looking at this chart, that the civilian personnel has stayed very stable and really has not changed; 

military personnel, while we have had a slow growth, but really the 

real growth has been in this contractor category. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The Department has called these contracts 

increasingly unaffordable and says savings are here. And I fundamentally believe that, as somebody who has had really a 50-yard 

line seat on contracting for 5 years in the Department of Defense. 

Anybody, including my friends I work with to bring down the cost 

of Federal Government, anybody who believes we cannot find savings in the Department of Defense around contracting does not 

know the issue. 

And so, everyone who says we cannot cut one dime from the Department of Defense and that, in fact, we need to continue to grow 

that budget is really not taking the time to understand how contracting has gone wild. And I do think the Army is working very 

hard to get a handle on this, but I find it astonishing that agencies 

do not consider whether it is cheaper to use contractors or Federal 

employees before deciding whether to award a contract. 

Ms. Tomchek, if DHS developed a similar graph, do you think 

the results would be the same? 

Ms. TOMCHEK. Well, first, our active duty military is pretty small 

because it is in the—— 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

13 

Senator MCCASKILL. I mean the comparison between civilian and 

contractors. 

Ms. TOMCHEK. I do not have specific information, but I tend to 

doubt that it would be as stark as this. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I would bet that if—it may be coming 

down now, but when I got here, I will never forget speaking to Secretary Chertoff in one of the very first hearings I had in the Committee, and when I asked the question, How many contractors 

work at the Department of Homeland Security, it was like I was 

speaking a different language. No one had any idea. 

And I think people are envisioning contractors differently out 

there than what we know they are. If I go to the Department of 

Homeland Security, as you well know, and I go down carrels, everybody is doing the same function, everyone having the same job, 

it is likely to be employee, contractor, contractor, employee, contractor, contractor, contractor, employee, employee, contractor. Is 

that not accurate? 

Ms. TOMCHEK. I do believe that when GAO did its report in 2007, 

that was probably very likely accurate. Since that time, we have 

been working diligently to address issues of mission risk that were 

raised by GAO, along those same lines, as to why we had so many 

contractors in place to accomplish the mission of the Department. 

The primary purpose of the Balanced Workforce Strategy is first 

to comply with the law. But second, it is to ensure that we have 

control of our mission. And I believe that GAO pointed out that 

given that situation, as you described it, which I believe was definitely the case in 2007, that we have tried very hard to make 

progress to reduce that as a result of the Balanced Workforce 

Strategy. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me also ask DHS, you have identified 

3,500 contractor positions for insourcing and at least 2,600 Federal 

positions were filled as of the end of 2011. How much as the Department saved by converting contractors to government positions? 

Ms. TOMCHEK. That effort was the very first effort that we had 

underway. It was done prior to the Balanced Workforce Strategy. 

We did a data call last year and we are getting ready to implement 

our second data call to determine what savings there might have 

been. But information from our components as of the data call last 

year was approximately $28 million. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So by converting contractor positions to 

Federal employees, you saved $28 million? 

Ms. TOMCHEK. That is what our components reported to us, yes, 

ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What methodology, including assumptions, 

have you all used to come up with those numbers? How are you 

doing that? 

Ms. TOMCHEK. When we sent the data call last year, we asked 

the components to use the same costing methodology that I previously described, which is, what was the total cost of the contract, 

and then what is the total cost of the Federal workers that have 

been hired, using the OMB-approved DHS modular cost model. It 

is our understanding that this was applied in that fashion and 

those were the savings that were documented. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

14 

1The chart referenced by Mr. Aronowitz appears in the appendix on page 52. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Aronowitz, in the past several years, 

both the Administration and the Secretary of Defense have announced initiatives to reduce on the amount spent on contractors. 

Do you know to what extent the Army has reduced the total 

amount spent on contracts over the last 2 years? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Yes, ma’am. I can give you a figure and then I 

can tell you some of the challenges that we have and how I think 

that we can address those going forward. For base budget contracts 

in fiscal year 2009, we spent $32 billion, in fiscal year 2010 $36 billion, and in fiscal year 2011 $40 billion. If you want, I can also give 

you the figure for the civilian pay. For civilians in fiscal year 2010, 

it was $20 billion as compared to the $32 billion spent on service 

contracts. 

In fiscal year 2010, it was $22 billion for civilian pay—and when I say pay, it is really the fully burdened pay of civilians—$22 billion in relation to $36 billion spent on service contracts. And in fiscal year 2011, $24 billion on civilian pay and $40 billion on service 

contracts. 

The real challenge that we have, ma’am, in terms of managing 

service contracts is that we do not have it very well integrated into 

our program and budget. They tend to be executed in the year of 

execution of the budget, and so it is kind of a rear-looking event 

in terms of how much have we executed last year. 

In my written testimony, there is a chart1 that shows service 

contract dollars going down significantly in the period of fiscal year 

to 2008 to 2009, and then starting to go back up. And interestingly 

enough, that period of 2008 to 2009 was when we first implemented our inventory of contract services where we had—requiring 

activities having to fill out a checklist that tracked back to statute 

in law to ensure that they were not going to implement a service 

contract involving inherently government work or an unauthorized 

personal service contract, and whether or not if it was closely associated, that one, that there was enough organic government capability to oversee the execution and performance of that contract, 

and enough contracting officers representatives (CORs), and that 

the workforce was adequately trained and capable to oversee the 

performance of the contractors. 

That was a period when this was totally voluntary. The Secretary of the Army sent out a memo and said that the first general 

officer, or the Senior Executive Service (SES), in the chain of command would have to certify the checklist so that, again, we were 

not having contractors to perform inherently governmental functions. 

And during that period, we saw service contract dollars go down 

significantly. It went from $51 billion in 2008 down to $32 billion 

in 2009. It was the first time that the Department seriously 

looked—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is $20 billion. That is some significant 

change. 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So what happened? Why did it start going 

back up again? 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

15 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Well, the challenges were, again, we do not program and budget for the service contracts. They are not integrated 

into our budget and there are year of execution issues that we see. 

And so, the Army’s intent going forward is to ensure that we integrate these service contracts in our program and budget. 

The Army acquisition executive, following DOD guidance, has set 

up a governance structure and a portfolio of management structure 

for service contracts, six portfolios. We have mapped our inventory 

of contract services to these portfolios. And we are trying to integrate both our inventory and the portfolios into the budget process. 

And I think if we can achieve that, then we will have much better 

control over the budgets for service contracts. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. Senator Portman. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. If I may followup a little with DOD because it is an interesting story. In 2009, 

you guys started an insourcing initiative and the goal, as I understand it, was to replace 30,000 contractors with DOD civilians between 2010 and 2015. And DOD planned at the time to achieve 

budgetary savings equal to 40 percent of the cost of the contracts 

replaced. 

More recent DOD statements have claimed the savings could be 

not 40 percent, but 25 percent. In 2010, August, before he left, Secretary Gates said in a speech that Defense agencies, quote, were 

not seeing the savings we had hoped for from insourcing, and DOD 

shifted the policy to try to eliminate unnecessary jobs rather than 

trying to simply trade contract workers for Federal employees. 

It is my understanding that the Army suspended insourcing altogether in late 2010. What happened? What are the lessons that you 

learned from your insourcing initiative? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Sir, if I can go back to again the period of 2008 

to 2009 when we saw the initial drop, it was a voluntary insourcing 

program that had no undue outside controls or influence pressurizing another component of our total force. As you mentioned, Secretary Gates directed to the Army a savings of $400 million with 

the assumption that we could save 40 percent if we insourced. 

That money was taken off of the Army’s top line and so we were 

driven to insource approximately 9,000 to 10,000 contractor manyear equivalence without really having done the due diligence, 

workload analysis up-front. And so, you have—— 

Senator PORTMAN. Projections really were not based on a thorough analysis. The projections were more of a budget decision and 

then you tried to achieve those budget savings. 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Yes, sir, absolutely. In this case, we had the 

budget trying to drive workforce mix decisions. Our experience at 

the Army is that 40 percent was a very aggressive goal to meet. 

We had two instances over different periods of time where we 

achieved anywhere from about 16 to 30 percent savings. And really, the percentage savings are really dependent upon the function 

that is being insourced and the location of where that is occurring. 

Senator PORTMAN. Well, let me just say, as a general matter as 

we are going through the current downsizing because of the cuts 

and the Budget Control Act and now the potential sequestration at 

the end of the year, I have some of the same concerns that you are, 

establishing budget numbers without backing them up with good 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

16 

analysis. And certainly that goes to what we talked about today in 

general, which is that we do not have the kind of data-driven analysis that we need to be able to make these decisions wisely. 

I talked earlier about this Circular A–76, which is the longstanding circular people relied on for years through Administrations, Republican and Democrat alike. That is now being used since 

2009, really because of Congress. And I just—I am very concerned 

that we do not have the kinds of careful analysis being done because the guidance is not there. 

The Administration has maintained that for jobs that can be 

done by contractors, agencies should, and I quote, evaluate the full 

cost and perform like comparisons. The trouble is that unlike A– 

76 it does not say how you do that. And there is not much guidance 

on how to implement this revised approach. 

GAO has found this new policy has created confusion and noted 

that OMB’s criteria do not specify the procedures for conducting a 

cost analysis or define what constitutes the full cost of performance. So I guess to all of you, and, Mr. Grimes, you talked a little 

about this, with OMB issuing guidance governing everything from 

the quality of science that has to be used by your agencies to the 

cost/benefit analysis of regulations, do you believe that OMB 

should step in here and take a more central role in creating a uniform and a consistent credible cost comparison methodology for 

making these insourcing and outsourcing decisions? 

Mr. GRIMES. I think OMB would be the central management 

agency that would be best positioned to do that. I would just like 

to point out that there are a number of difficulties with cost comparisons that would have to be sort of addressed and taken into account. 

As you know, we compare Federal salaries against private sector 

salaries in setting pay for General Schedule employees, and we find 

one thing with the way that we do it and others find different answers when they study that issue using other assumptions. So to 

the extent that those assumptions could be laid out and followed 

and considered appropriately, then I do agree OMB is the right 

place to go. 

Senator PORTMAN. And you think there is a need for it, to have 

a uniform standard that is established to provide additional guidance? 

Mr. GRIMES. I think if you have a need—if you are going to make 

these comparisons across agencies, then uniform standards would 

be helpful. 

Senator PORTMAN. Do you agree, Ms. Tomchek? 

Ms. TOMCHEK. Yes, sir. The Department of Homeland Security 

would definitely welcome additional guidance on this issue. We try 

very hard to ensure that all of our work adheres to the guidance 

issued by the Congress and by OMB, and this would be extremely 

helpful for us. 

Senator PORTMAN. Mr. Aronowitz. 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Sir, in DOD, there is a directive-type memorandum (DTM), which is entitled, Estimating the Cost of Military 

and Civilian Manpower and Service Contracts. So within DOD, we 

basically have a cost/benefit analysis tool to ensure we have the 

fully burdened cost of our workforce. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

17 

I would say that before I signed up to a one-size-fits-all for the 

government, that there are some nuances to DOD that would have 

to be considered going forward. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Portman. Senator Tester. 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I think we will 

approach this from two different ways, looking backward and looking forward. First of all, I do want to say thank you all for being 

here. I appreciate your testimony. I appreciate what I have heard 

today. 

Mr. Aronowitz, you said that in 2009 there was a 40 percent savings when it went from contractors to civilians. And you also had 

said there was some elimination of unnecessary jobs—I do not 

want to paraphrase, if that is not what you said, tell me—that 

helped contribute to that 40 percent. 

And I guess it brings up an interesting point to me in that when 

the military, I think, has more control, I think it would be fair to 

say and you can correct me if I am wrong, that they have more control with the civilian workforce than they do the contractors. Would 

you agree with that? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Yes, sir. 

Senator TESTER. I think it gives them an opportunity to get rid 

of some of the driftwood that was in the staff. As you guys make 

your assessments and your evaluations and make your transfers, 

the ones that are appropriate, what kind of—I mean, are you seeing some potential savings from folks who really have no function, 

but just kind of were along for the ride for whatever reason? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Sir, I would not subscribe to that writ large. 

First of all, when the Army again did the insourcing in 2008 and 

2009, we achieved about a 30 percent cost savings. When DOD directed and took $400 million out of our budget, their assumption 

was that there would be a 40 percent savings, and this was in 

about the fiscal year timeframe. 

Senator TESTER. Thirty percent is not chump change. I mean, 

that is pretty incredible. 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. I would agree, sir. 

Senator TESTER. And you need to be applauded for that and I 

would hope that you would move forward. And by the way, when 

I am critical of the contractors, I am not critical of the active military. I just want to make that very clear. You guys do an incredible 

job and I want to thank you for your service. I have never been 

around a more professional workforce than I am when I was in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Ms. Tomchek, I remember when Madam Chairman asked a question about contractors at Homeland Security. And correct me if I 

am wrong, Claire, but I do not believe that they could answer the 

question as to how many contractors they had. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And I do not think the Department of Defense thinks they can get us that number until 2016 at the earliest, 

I believe, is the date we have been given. Is that correct, Mr. 

Aronowitz? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Well, ma’am, I cannot speak for DOD. I can 

speak for the Army. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

18 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. That is right. I am sorry. 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. During or through our inventory process, the 

Army is very confident in the number of contractors or contract 

man-year equivalence that we capture, which is about 217,000 

today. 

Senator TESTER. In this day of computers that basically can run 

processes that are incredible, I think it is amazing that—everybody 

should be able to tell us that number just like that. I mean, I think 

that if they cannot, it tells me that the system is broken. OK? I just want to move on just a little bit. There were $60 billion 

that was lost to waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan 

for the entire contracting process. This was done by the Commission on Wartime Contracting. Occasionally I get to sit on the floor 

and do some presiding, and I hear folks continually get up and talk 

about Solandra 500 and $35 billion wasted, and by the way, that 

is totally unacceptable. We are talking about $60 billion here. 

Can any of you answer the question as to, if there is any possibility of recouping that money and what percentage of that money 

might possibly be recouped? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Sir, since I believe that is a DOD figure, I would 

like to take that for the record and get it back to the Subcommittee. 

Senator TESTER. I would love to see what is going on. I mean, 

it is an amazing figure for me. I recently joined Senator McCaskill 

on legislation that would implement many of the recommendations 

for the Commission on Wartime Contracting. Your perspective, Mr. 

Aronowitz, or any of you for that matter. Do you think the recommendations would have a positive effect on the way that the 

Army, Department of Defense—I know you cannot speak for both, 

but maybe you can—would do business with contractors? Or would 

it hurt your ability to achieve a savings? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. I know that the legislation is now being reviewed back in the Pentagon and we will get a response back 

through DOD on that. The Secretary of the Army takes this very 

serious and he has directed the Army’s staff to basically expedite 

the hiring initiative we had to grow the acquisition workforce and 

also to increase the military by about 1,000 soldiers in the acquisition field to build an expeditionary acquisition capability. 

And again, I know this is reaction to the Commission on Wartime Contracting, but again, we take it very serious in the Department. 

Senator TESTER. One last question, and I would direct it to Mr. 

Aronowitz, but any of you can answer the question because I think 

it applies to the government across the board, whether it is DOD, 

Department of State, or Homeland or any others as far as that 

goes. I know that in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have awarded and 

re-awarded non-compete contracts. Can you give me any idea to 

what extent this still happens, that folks are awarded non-compete 

government contracts? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Again, sir, I would have to take that for the 

record and get you a better fidelity on the numbers and get back 

to the Subcommittee. 

Senator TESTER. We would love to get that. Would you two want 

to respond to that at all? 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

19 

Ms. TOMCHEK. I do not have those numbers, but would be happy, 

also, to get them for you. I would add that the law that we follow, 

which is Section 736 of the Fiscal Year Appropriations Act, specifically asked us to look at sole source non-competed contracts when 

we do these reviews, and it is something that is captured on our 

questionnaire, to make sure that we could sort those out and look 

at those separately if we needed to do so. 

Senator TESTER. And have you? 

Ms. TOMCHEK. Our questionnaire process has a database in the 

back and we have not yet derived much information from it. 

Senator TESTER. Chuck. 

Mr. GRIMES. I know that we do look at that, but to give you specific figures, I would have to get back to you for the record. 

INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD

OPM does award non-competitive contracts, on an exception basis. In FY 2011, 

25 percent of the total dollars awarded by OPM were through non-competitive actions. These awards are merit-based, justified in accordance with long-standing statutes that authorize the use of non-competitive contracting in certain prescribed situations, such as urgency, the availability of only one responsible source, or the protection of national security. Justifications must be approved. 

Senator TESTER. I would like that. And thanks for the latitude, 

Madam Chairman. I would just say that I think everybody in this 

room gets it and I know you guys get it. When you have non-compete contracts, you are not getting best value. I would say I dare 

somebody to show me how you get best value out of a non-compete 

contract. And when the average taxpayer looks at that, they are 

saying to themselves, What is going on? 

When I go buy a car, I do not walk into the auto dealer and look 

at the list price and say, Write up the papers. You go to several 

auto dealers and then you negotiate on the price. And it is the 

same thought process, for my mind anyway. So I really think it is 

a non-starter. And I know a lot of these contracts come out and 

they are so doggone big that you might only get one person to bid 

on it, and that is another problem, by the way. We need to break 

those down so that they are available to be bid on companies, because quite honestly, if you get more bidders, you are going to get 

better value for your dollar. 

So I want to thank the Chair for holding this hearing and I want 

to thank the people who have testified today. I appreciate your 

straight-forwardness. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Tester. One of the 

things that has happened a lot, and frankly, it has been a headscratcher for me, is that there have been people beaten up on people who work for the government. And all of you are great examples and I have been blessed to be surrounded by, and for many 

years, people who have decided government service is honorable 

work. 

And I have never met anybody who has gone into a government 

job looking for big money. I think most people who take government jobs know that while it does offer stability, I do not think 

that most people who seek public sector employment are looking for 

a big payday. It just has not been my experience. 

And so, I have been disappointed at some of my colleagues who 

think that they can get to a leaner, meaner Federal Government 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

20 

just by beating up on the level of pay of Federal employees, and 

that brings me to contractor compensation. I have never seen anyone give a speech on the floor that we need to do something about 

the high rate of salaries with contractors. 

And as you may well know, there have been attempts to put in 

legislation, to put a cap on contractor salaries. I think most Americans would be shocked to know that we have one now and it is 

$693,000 a year. So right now, the Federal Government can pay 

contractors up to almost 700 grand a year. 

And my colleagues, Senators Boxer and Grassley, have proposed changing this cap to $400,000 a year for all contractor and subcontractor employees. Others have even proposed lowering the cap 

even further. And for civilian contracts, the cap only applies to senior executives. I believe the cap should be extended to all contractor 

and subcontractor employees. 

I understand the Department of Defense has conducted a survey 

of its nine top contractors and found that changing the cap from 

$693,000 to $400,000 could save the agency $421 million. That is 

a big number. Let me ask you, do you at the Army, Mr. Aronowitz, 

or you, Ms. Tomchek, have any idea how much money you could 

save by lowering the cap that we would pay in terms of contractor 

salaries? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Ma’am, my office does not track that information, but again, I would like to have the opportunity to come back 

to the Subcommittee with that information. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Ms. Tomchek. 

Ms. TOMCHEK. I would say something similar. I am in the Chief 

of Human Capital Office and I would be happy to coordinate with 

my colleagues as we have our interdisciplinary group and try to see 

if I could answer that question for you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And, Mr. Grimes, is there any data available through your office that would get to this issue of how many 

very well-paid executives are we paying for on some of these service contracts? 

Mr. GRIMES. We do not collect that information, so we would not 

have any idea really what people make in the service contracts. I 

am sorry. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think that is something—I will tell you 

this. I am not voting for—I do not support anymore freezing of the 

salaries for Federal workers until we freeze some salaries for contractors, particularly at that high level. I think—and by the way, 

we are not telling private companies what they can pay their people. 

They can pay them whatever they want. If they want to pay 

them more, they are welcome to do so. This is not about the government telling private companies how much people should make. 

It is about telling private companies how much the government 

will pay. And there is a big difference there. If they want to supplement someone’s salaries with revenue streams from other sources, 

that certainly is up to them. And this is not, I think, a matter of 

government getting in the way of the private sector. 

But if you are going to do business with the Federal Government, 

I think it is reasonable that you would assume that we are not 

going to pay somebody 700 grand a year. I just think that is reaH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

21 

sonable and I hope that we can get that cap in place and realize 

those savings. 

The same thing with overhead costs. Looking at the data that 

the Army collected in 2011, there are a few figures that jumped out 

at me that I would like to look at a little closely. If you look at the 

portfolio Knowledge-Based Services Contracts, the total invoices 

were for $13 million. 

Overhead costs accounted for $6.7 million of that, almost 50 percent of the overall costs. In that same portfolio, Federal workspace 

was provided for 82 percent of the contracts, and 71 percent of 

them had government issued equipment. So I am trying to reconcile those numbers. You have a $13 million contract. More than 

half of it, or just at half of it, is overhead, but we are providing 

workspace for 82 percent of them and we are issuing our equipment for 71 percent of them. 

Is that the kind of thing that would jump out at you, Mr. 

Aronowitz? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Well, ma’am, let me, if I can, walk you through 

the numbers and I can tell you how the Army is beginning to analyze this data and how we are integrating with the acquisition community. As you mentioned, for the Knowledge-Based portfolio, 

about $13 billion total invoiced amount is what the government 

paid. The direct labor costs, in other words, what was paid or 

charged for direct labor hours, about $4.8 billion. About $1.5 billion for direct non-labor costs, and again, this 

would be for packaging, special equipment, travel, and then the 

amount, the overhead that you mentioned, the $6.7 billion, that is 

overhead and profit. And when we start to talk about comparing 

Federal civilian employees’ benefits versus contractors and whether 

we use A–76 or the Department of Defense’s directive-type memorandum, the health and benefits cost for the contract employees is 

in that $6.7 billion amount, that overhead amount. 

And so again, it is about 50, 51 percent, and again, that includes 

the profit for the contractor as well as expenses that he or she has 

for their employees for their health, benefits, leave, and things of 

that nature, as well as their retirement. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So that was a ‘‘B’’ not an ‘‘M’’ which means 

I really want to get into it. Do we do apples-to-apples on benefits? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Again, within the DOD, by using the DTM, we 

do have a fully burdened cost for our civilian and military manpower. It is a very expensive tool. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Especially because that also includes all the 

pensions for active, right? 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Yes, ma’am. It is pensions, child care costs, all 

the subsidies for groceries; for civilians, it is the unpaid accrued retirement, so for both our military and civilians fully burdened. For 

the contractors, the only figures we use are what is invoiced to the 

government and what we pay. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I would really like to take a look at 

that because I think that this has been the assumption that we 

have been working on without data, which this hearing is all about, 

is how can we get guidance from OMB so that there is governmentwide assistance in the kind of decision tree that you are trying to 

implement, Ms. Tomchek. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

22 

But second, this assumption that if you hire—and I have told 

this story a million times. My dad peeled potatoes in World War 

II. We are never going to have a soldier peel potatoes again in theater, in a contingency. That will never happen. So contracting is 

here to stay. 

So the question is, the assumption has been—and I think this is 

how we got way ahead of ourselves in contracting and contingency, 

especially around the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 

(LOGCAP). The assumption was, our benefits are so significant, 

that our overhead is so high that contractors just intuitively are 

going to be cheaper. And I am not sure that we ever held contractors’ feet to the fire about what they were billing us in that regard. 

So I would love to see, on a typical contract, if you can pull out 

the data for me what the benefit costs are versus the benefit costs 

of our employees, and to make sure that the underlying assumption 

that I think has driven a lot of these decisions without good data, 

is even actually correct, especially if you factor in some of these 

guys are making 600 grand a year, 700 grand a year. That takes 

up a lot of overhead as it relates to benefits. 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Absolutely, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. If the salaries are so much higher, then 

pretty soon you are under water, even considering all the overhead 

that we have as it relates to benefits, pensions, and so forth, health 

care in our system. So if you could do that for me, I would like to 

take a look at that. 

Mr. ARONOWITZ. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But I did not understand until you explained it that also was profit, so that also makes sense. I thought 

it was just overhead. Thank you for walking through the figures. 

We have a number of more questions. There is a vote that is 

being called right now, so I will adjourn this hearing. I want to 

thank all three of you. And by the way, I know in the contracting 

community I am not a popular person because of the work I do in 

this area, but I do understand there are great people that work for 

these companies and that do good work for the Army and do good 

work for the Department of Homeland Security. 

It is not that they are the enemy. It is just that I do not think 

our government has been very good at tracking the costs and making sure that we are making the kind of analysis that taxpayers 

have a right to expect. So I will look forward to OMB’s guidance. 

I will look forward to your input after that guidance comes out. 

If all three of you would make a note that we will be following 

up with you to get your take on the guidance, once it is issued, if 

you think it is workable, if you think it is going to make a difference, and we will direct a number of questions that we have that 

we still have not had answered yet today to you in writing. I thank 

all three of you for being here today and for the hard work you are 

doing on behalf of our government. 

[Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

(23) 

A P P E N D I X 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.001

CONTRACTORS: HOW MUCH ARE THEY COSTING THE GOVERNMENT? 

March 29,2012 

Senator Claire McCaskill 

Opening Statement 

This hearing will now come to order, 

The title of this hearing is "Contractors; How Much Are They Costing the Government?" 

As we've discussed many times in this Committee and also in the Armed Services 

Committee, where I chair the Readiness Subcommittee, government agencies are increasingly 

reliant on contractors to perform services. Contractors now perform many of the duties which 

most Americans would assume are done by government employees, from managing and 

overseeing contracts and programs to developing policies and writing regulations. Contractors 

sit side by side with federal employees and perform many ofthe same tasks. 

Spending on service contractors has outpaced spending on federal employees. The cost 

of service contracts has increased by 79% over the last ten years, from $18! billion to $324 

billion, while in the same time period, spending on federal employees has increased by 34%, 

from $170 billion to $229 billion. 

As with any expense of taxpayer dollars, we have to ask whether the government is 

getting the most effective use out of those dollars. It would seem intuitive then that when 

deciding whether to contract out a function, the government would figure out how much it will 

cost, and whether it might be cheaper for federal employees to do it instead. 

For too many years now, the federal government has relied on assumptions and flawed 

studies to support those assumptions. Without good data about the costs of using contractors 
24 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.002

instead of federal employees, the government simply doesn't have the information it needs to 

make smart choices. 

For those of us who track these issues closely, we've seen many studies over the years 

that compare the costs offederal employees to the private sector and concluded that the private 

sector is more efficient. However, contractors are not quite comparable to the private sector. 

Contractors do work for the government, and some ofthat work does not exist in the private 

sector. The overhead costs for contractors may not be the same as in the private sector, and this 

includes situations where contractor employees work alongside federal employees using 

government-provided equipment. 

Ifwe're are going to honestly assess whether contractors are more or less expensive for 

the federal government than using federal employees, then we need to look at the costs of 

contractors, not just the costs within the private sector. A report issued by the Project on 

Government Oversight in September 20 II was the first study to actually attempt to compare the 

costs of federal employees and contractors. It found that in some instances, contractors may be 

paid, on average, more than 1.83 times what federal employees are paid to perform the same 

work. I think this report was a worthwhile and needed effort, but, as the authors of the report 

concede, it is hampered by inadequate and inaccurate data. 

F or the government to make smart contracting decisions it needs more than assumptions. 

Ifthe government is going to have the best and most efficient mix of federal employees and 

contractors to perform its work, it needs to be able to assess the true costs of both outsourcing 

and insourcing. This analysis should include overhead costs, how contractor compensation 

2 
25 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.003

should be reimbursed, and when some government functions are inherently governmental or 

critically impact an agency's core mission. 

I am concerned that the one agency charged with management in the federal government 

doesn't seem to be providing enough guidance on this issue. The Subcommittee did extend an 

invitation to the Office of Management and Budget to be here today, but unfortunately OMB 

declined to attend. It would seem that OMB is in the best position to provide government-wide 

guidance on how agencies should look at cost and, most importantly, how agencies can gather 

the data to do that analysis. I understand that OMB is planning to issue some cost guidance 

within the next 60 days. If this is the case, I look forward to seeing it and hope that it will take 

into account the issues we discuss today. T also plan to address questions for the record to OMB 

and will make those answers public. 

I want to say that two of the agencies represented here today, the Army and the 

Department of Homeland Security, are making commendable strides on cost and data issues. 

The work that Army has done on its contractor inventory is setting a standard for the rest of the 

Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security's Balanced Workforce 

Strategy tool is a promising approach to making contracting decisions. I think both of these 

efforts deserve further discussion by both Congress and the Administration. 

Today's hearing is an opportunity to discuss these efforts and to consider other possible 

tools that the government can use to make smart, cost-effective contracting decisions. We need 

to develop a best practices model to help determine when contracting will save taxpayer dollars. 

We also need to start collecting the data that will help us make those determinations. Assuming 

that contractors cost less and that federal employees cost more doesn't help this discussion 

because frankly we don't have any idea whether that assumption is true or false. Assumptions 

3 
26 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.004

are especially costly in our current budget climate and could undermine efforts to save taxpayer 

dollars. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today and I look forward to their testimony. 

4 
27 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.005

RECORD VERSION 

STATEMENT BY 

MR. JAY D. ARONOWllZ 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

(FORCE MANAGEMENT. MANPOWER AND RESOURCES) 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

SECOND SESSION. 112Tll CONGRESS 

ON CONTRACTORS: HOW MUCH ARE THEY COSTING THE GOVERNMENT? 

MARCH 29. 2012 

NOT FOR PUBUCATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 
28 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.006

IntroducUon 

Chairwoman McCaskill, Senator Portman, Distinguished Members of this 

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss: 1) the 

Army's contractor inventory and what information the Army maintains regarding the 

costs of contractors to perform different types of services; 2) how the Army is using this 

data to inform the budget process and acquisition planning; 3) how the Army is 

addressing the comparison of the actual cost of contractors with the actual cost of 

federal civilian employees; and 4) proposed govemment-wide solutions for determining 

contractor cost effectiveness. Before moving to those topics, it is important to note at 

the outset that the contractor inventory is one of many efforts to buy smarter and drive 

down contract prices. Implementation of DoD's "BeUer Buying Power" acquisition reform 

initiative is directed towards decreasing the use of high-risk contracts, reducing 

spending on management support services and low-priority acquisitions, increasing use 

of vehicles that leverage the Govemment's buying power through strategic sourcing, 

and increasing small business participation. 

Contractor InventoN 

The Army began collecting contractor cost Information in the Contractor 

Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA) initiative established by the Secretary of the 

Army in January 7, 2005, after obtaining approval of the Department of Defense 

Business Initiatives Council (BIC) on September 13, 2002 and OffIce of Management 

and Budget Approval in a Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) filing on November 24, 2003. 

(The PRA has been renewed on three occasions and is currently effective through 

December, 15,2014.) At that time, the CMRA was sponsored and supported by the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), the Vice Chief of Staff of 

the Army and led by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs), with the stated purpose captured in a memorandum co-signed by these 

sponsors: "The Initiative is the only process that would capture information on funding 

source, contracting vehicle, organization supported, mission and function performed, 

and labor hours and costs for contracted efforts. Existing finanCial management and 

2 
29 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.007

procurement systems do not clearly distinguish between goods and services, nor do 

they identify the organization for which the work is being performed. This initiative will 

enable us to (a) fully understand the composition of the total Army workforce - military, 

civilian, and contractor, and allow for more informed workforce staffing and funding 

decisions; (b) provide better oversight of our workforce. avoid duplication of effort. or 

shifting of in-house reductions to contract; (c) ensure the Army is getting full value from 

our contractor workforce; and (d) better account for and explain our total Army 

workforce." 

The initiative placed the responsibility for reporting the information on the 

"requiring activity," which is the Army organizational customer requesting the work to be 

performed. Reporting was effectuated through a requirement/deliverable in every 

contract statement of work, with a help desk to minimize reporting burdens on 

contractors. The labor hour and labor dollar data associated with contractor 

performance within the prior fiscal year is reported annually to a secure web site. This 

data collected is treated as proprietary when associated with specific contractor names 

and contract vehicles. The web-based reporting was implemented prospectively as 

options were exercised or contracts initiated and included numerous features to 

minimize industry reporting burdens resulting from meetings and input from industry 

representatives (In 2003, over fifty senior executives from large defense contractors and 

small businesses) and informal feedback during help desk sessions with industry users 

throughout the course of implementation of the reporting. These include a bulk-loader 

or Excel drop down feature allowing contractors to upload data from their own internal 

payroll systems in a single spreadsheet rather than making individual entries on the web 

site; as well as various edit features and pop-ups to assist users In completing data 

fields. Reporting burdens were so de minimis that most users did not separately bill for 

reporting once they understood the reporting requirement and how It was collected. 

Subsequently, when the contractor inventory requirement was codified in Titre 10, 

United States Code section 2330a (enacted in the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense 

Authorization Act section 806), the Army has submitted the required reports through the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense to Congress and published the Inventory as required 

by law on a public web site in an electronic format that may be downloaded, screening 

3 
30 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.008

out contract numbers and contractor names to make the data publicly accessible. 

Enforcement of this reporting requirement was strengthened in a Secretary of the Army 

policy Issued in July 10, 2009 and related Army Federal Acquisition Regulation 

Supplement (AFARS) Subpart 5107.503 requirement that required Commanders and 

HQDA Principals to be responsible for ensuring that an accountable senior official 

reviewed the contracted requirement and certifying various issues related to inherently 

governmental functions, personal services, validation of the requirement and its priority, 

appointment of sufficient number of Contracting Office Representatives, and that the 

reporting requirement for CMRA was included in the Statement of Work and contract. 

No Army contracting office may process a contract action from an Army requiring 

activity without this certification. There are no exceptions to this requirement and no 

thresholds that limit its application because ofthe magnitude of contracted services that 

could go unreported if such a threshold were in place. However, the accountable 

Senior Executive Service or General Officer can delegate to a GS-15 or 0-6 the 

certification for contracts valued at $100,000 or less over the life of the contract. 

The Army has reported contracted services cost and labor data by function, 

location, Army command. funding source and types of contract vehicles for Fiscal Year 

2009,2010 and has completed the compilation of Fiscal Year 2011 data. Until Fiscal 

Year 2011, the Army collected the invoiced amount, direct labor costs and direct labor 

hours by function, location where performed, and other data, all of which are linked to 

contract information in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDSNG) and accounting data on funding source through pre-loading of the data base on the 

web site so contractors can look up their contract vehicle after authenticating their 

status. In Fiscal Year 2011, the Army also collected "other direct non-labor costs". 

These are defined as supply costs plus Other Direct Costs (DOCs) for the fiscal year. 

OOCs are charged directly to the Government and Include but are not limited to special 

tooling, travel expenses, relocation expenses, pre-production and start-up costs, 

packaging and transportation cost, royalties, spoilage and rework, computer expenses, 

federal excise taxes and reproduction costs. Direct labor dollars are the total 

unburdened salary/wage (not including goods, overhead, retirement or benefits) dollar 

amount for direct labor performed. The overhead costs are inferred from subtracting the 

4 
31 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.009

direct labor costs and other direct non-labor costs reported by contractors from their 

invoiced amount for the fiscal year. The overhead costs include profit, management 

and administrative support structure within the contractor, the leave, benefits and 

retirement costs of the contracted direct labor hours. The direct labor hours reported 

are converted to a full time equivalent by dividing them by 2,080 or 2.088 hours for a 

forty hour work week for 52 weeks per year. The different factor depends on whether or 

not a leap year is involved. These results are summarized by service portfolio at 

Table 1. 

FY 2011 Army Contrad Services Inventory (Ccria:tr~~~ 

S695,741l,207 $1,562.3113._ 28.103 87.3" 1S1.1I'lIo 

$816.667,112 $1.800,102.941 16.878 47.4'11. 45.5% 

110.-.210.8117 125.010 

.... 0Ifttr1KDlr FT&. - CII:t*Z ubcr HCaIn; ... 2_ (2Ct81 18 u.. nuf"l'lb8' ct CCIITIp8nMble hcJuNi I" F"t' 20UJ 

.... P!iCD'th.t.", .... 4II .... na: to _ paftlCllla IIJtClUp Ind" R&D. quolly a:lntfd, t.tInq, ~cn,. Clp8'1It.Ia1 r:I QOW'wnment ~cd fdar .... 

_d a_/r..oI d~f eI(UIpm.-: 

Table 1 

As this is the first year all this information has been collected, we are just 

beginning to analyze the implications of this data. However. we plan to evaluate it in 

5 
32 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.010

terms of the function, location, type of contract vehicle and the impact of different buying 

practices. 

We also plan to start assessing this data for overlap and duplication with other 

contracted wom, as well as between the contract womforce and organic workforce. At 

this stage, our primary use of the inventory has been to fulfill the statutory requirement 

to identify inherently governmental functions, closely associated with inherently 

governmental functions, ensure that personal services contracts are entered into under 

proper statutory authority, and to evaluate whether sufficient organic capacity exists to 

oversee the contracted womrorce as required by Tille 10 United States Code section 

2330a and 2383. The elernents of section 2383 that we evaluate with the aid of the 

inventory and additional information provided by commands in our Panel for 

Documenting Contractors (POe) process established by the Secretary of the Army in 

July 10, 2009 are as follows: 1) Evaluating the span of control and sufficiency of the 

number of contracting officer representatives; 2) the capacity of the organic workforce to 

make informed and independent judgments of the wom performed; 3) the impact of tiers 

of sub-contractors; and 4) the potential for organizational conflicts of interests when 

looking holistically at the wom provided by contractors to an organization. Our review 

is within the framewom of "Total Force Management: the Title 10 and Department of 

Defense term for multi-sector workforce planning and considers not just the appropriate 

mix between civilian employees and contractors but also evaluated the military, civilian 

and contractor mix. Our review evaluates contracted work both by individual contract 

and task order on a pre-award basis but also on a functional basis in the post award 

review conducted by the PDC. The risk of inherently governmental contractor 

performance of closely associated with inherently governmental functions is more 

visible in the post-award review required by section 2330a because statements of wom 

can be written to avoid expressly mentioning inherently govemmental work. However, 

the realities of actual contract performance may be another matter when one holistically 

evaluates all the contracts performing a function in support of an organization. We are 

working to improve compliance with what we find in the course of these reviews. The 

Secretary of the Army recently issued guidance on February 10, 2012, that will withdraw 

funds by May 2012 from organizations that continue to contract inherently governmental 

6 
33 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.011

functions or unauthorized personal services contracts within a 90 day period (See Table 

2 below). 

Panel Review of Contract Service In"'j!~nt",nl 

Table 2 

The Army has established a steady reporting baseline of around $31 B in invoiced 

amounts in the Generating Force and $7.5B to $9.68 in the Operating Force in this 

inventory as depicted In Table 3 below for Fiscal Year 2009 through 2011. Based on 

the Object Classes/Element of Resources and Product Service Code categories that the 

original SecArmy policy required to be reported, we believe we have covered at least 78 

percent of the contracted services required to be reported in the Generating Force and 

28 percent in the Operating Force. This is a conservative estimate that errs on the low 

side because we are a large organization and we anecdotally leam of particular 

contracts that have not complied with the requirement from time to time. 

7 
34 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.012

FiBcB CMRA ~ CMRA 

Year Tom! SysIEm Report 

h\dJes QJlUabIS" % 

2009 $33.78 $31.58 107% 

2010 $31.98 $35.68 90% 

2011 $31.58 $40.4B 78% 

Contingency Operations 

(SUPP) 

CMRA ~ CMRA 

Total SysfEm Report 

IrMbs alIigablS" %* 

$9.68 $24.48 39% 

$7.58 $28.28 28% 

$8.7B $26.9B 32% 

• Includes al appropriations ellpect niItary personnel (MPA) and mlitary cOl'lltruc1ion (MCA) 

* Includes 81 contract sBfVice elements of resource that were excluded in the PB 2012 contract 

aeMcebudget request {Tabl"4). CMRA reported n baae c:lirila above 90% Hal exclusions In table 

4areappled 

- CMRA reporting shorIfaIJ of condngency operadona colJ1raCtors 18 due 10: 1) Ihllted electronic 

reporting capabllty of contractors In the theater of operation.; and 2) msldentllcadon of oeo foods 

in obligation Inea of accounting 

Table 3 

We derive this estimate by comparing the obligated dollars in the accounting system for 

a fiscal year to the invoiced amounts reported in CMRA, and filtering for Overseas 

Contingency Operations funds from base funded contracted services. There is no 

perfect comparison because an invoiced amount will differ from an obligated amount, 

and while a substantial amount of OCO-funded contracted services can be identified in 

the accounting system, the accounting is not perfect or complete. That said, the 

original metric approved by the BIC and Secretary of the Anny at the time CMRA was 

established recognized that there were no other viable metrics for assessing reporting 

coverage, given the constraints of the accounting and procurement systems. 

8 
35 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.013

Uses of Contractor Inventory In Budget and Acquisition 

The contractor inventory has not yet been fully used in the budget and acquisition 

processes. as it has been primarily used by the Manpower community in its Total Force 

Management reviews to identify inherently governmental, closely associated with 

inherenUy governmental, critical functions and authorized and unauthorized personal 

services contracted functions. Beginning in FY12, the Army Acquisition Executive is 

obtaining Army-wide semi-annual services requirements forecasts and quarterly cost 

reports for services acquisitions valued at $10M and above to provide program 

management and funding visibifity for services acquisitions. This initiative irnplements 

part of the Army's 2011 Services Optimization Implementation Plan to increase 

effectiveness, efficiency and promote cost savings as the Army acquires essential 

services to support our Soldiers and their families. The amount of contracted services 

covered In CMRA that fall below this threshold are about 27% percent or $1 OB of 

services. As mentioned above, the Panel for Documenting Contractors started this 

contractor inventory review in 2009 in the midst of Secretary Gates's in-sourcing 

initiative that was budgeted with an assumed 40 percent savings assumption. During 

the course of this budget-drtven In-sourcing, and long after, the POC evaluated 

command in-sourcing plans developed in response to these budgetary targets, as well 

as Inherently governmental functions on the contractor inventory that had not been 

identified for in-sourcing in the budget. The review found that most of the in-sourcing 

plans were for inherently governmental. closely associated with inherently governmental 

or critical functions, exempt by DoD policy and Title 10, United States Code section 

2463 from cost analysis. The review did find, however, that about 1,091 of the 7,215 

programmed for In-sourcing required cost analysis. Although. the DTM 09-007 fullyburdened costing rules were not promulgated until January 29, 2010 (nine rnonths after 

the budget decisions to in-source were made), the principles in the OTM were 

consistent with the largely cost-based In-sourcing used by the Army In its concept plan 

process in effect prior to Secretary Gates' in-sourcing initiatIve reflected in the budget. 

When the Department of Defense civilian FTE cap was instituted in the January 

2011 budget, this resulted in suspending the in-sourcing of inherently governmental 

acquisition and law enforcement functions that had been identified by the PDC in the 

9 
36 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.014

contractor inventory review process. However, Secretary of the Army policy dated 10 

February 2012 directs Commanders to submit for approval in-sourcing actions for 

inherently governmental functions and unauthorized personal services contracts within 

90 days or lose funding. 

After TItle 10 United States Code section 235 was enacted, the POC started wot1<ing 

with Army commands to project their future contract services requirements based on the 

contractor inventory review. The budget exhibits submitted since the President's 

Budget for Fiscal Year 2012 pursuant to section 235 have not been based on the 

contractor inventory or review process. The Army's contractor inventory includes OCO 

and base funded contracts and included all appropriations except for Military Personnel 

and Construction. The Army's contractor inventory includes more object classes and 

element of resources than Included for these budget exhibits which were also limited to 

the Operations and Maintenance Appropriations. The Table 4 below summarizes the 

differences: 

~SIni:a 

'::~~laj~.#i*~." 

2ii+;·iIf!!J.~.~'II!WI~~~"~/· 

255' RlllleadiMi~c.cB (ROl1E)OrI\' -:;::~~:,·\t\ ... ,.-: .... " 

25l' oaud~~catact 

JIif:;~fi!i~~~:.; .• ;> 

25\ DaIne ~ capIaIFtnI(DWQ') dOltaRlMilI'o RIids 

ZiI!(t~~~;~·· "-

25C TdIII 10-* AnI Ptrd\aMI. USN' 

,:.?~f,~~i~~r~~l[~.~.:> .: 2Il'IE···_:ccmct~iI~1I«lMBCRIIIttf.16··;-··: 

2&!i,~~.'~"':"~'" ." 

.• : ·2iBi·.ciftrP~'l!~~.~~'·;:·· 

2578 TIIII1JIRYSbt9I 

.{~~~~~r!~~x 

2S\B ~ 1laiEnaR:e 

..... 2!i!K:M$C9tir.~ 

•. ,~':~.:.~.-~'.~~~~-~. ;~ ;":., ~')~jl.;~'~~~ < 

25E Tda! hlIIIIaI fIIId p.m-. 00Ir 25tA COil RainbIJIsabte PIrc'-

~,/;.~~;~'~~~cc.:;:. . ..... 2SFa;~~I'IiI~ ..... " ... ;, 

:(;~:;;.r.~~~~FtnI) &X.tb1Mnrrr~ 

10 
37 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.015

EORs In RED excluded for the PB 2012 Contract Selvices Budget Request 

Table 4 

Reliability of Civilian Cost Data and Comparing Costs of Government Workforce 

to Contractors 

Under the revised Office of Management Budget Circular A-76 (2003-2009), the 

Department of Defense reported completing 107 public-private competitions 

encompassing 12,117 positions (military and civilian). Of these completed 

competitions, 64 competitions (5,757 positions) favored government performance and 

43 competitions (6,360 positions) favored contract performance. Public-private 

competitions conducted between 1997 and 2003 (under the previous Circular) are 

reported by the Department of Defense to have reduced the annual operating cost of 

commercial activities by $1B during the period from Fiscal Year 1997 to Fiscal Year 

2009. Combined with competitions conducted under the revised Circular (those 

competitions conducted between 2005 and 2009). a total of more than $9B in 

cumulative cost reductions were reported by the Department of Defense, compared to 

the pre-competition operating costs of these same activities. In 2009, Congress began 

limiting the Federal government's use of the pUblic-private competition process under A76 through appropriation and authorization language. The Department Is prohibited 

from using the A-76 process pursuant to Public Law 111-84, National Defense 

AuthOrization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. Section 325. so competitive sourcing cannot be 

done at this time. Three recurring issues pertaining to A-76 competitions within the 

Army included: (1) the growth of requirements after the competition and savings were 

computed resulting in questions whether the pressures to compete captured the real 

requirement. whether the government or contractor won the bid; (2) the Panel for 

Documenting Contractors subsequently identified issues with the adequacy of 

government oversight of contracted work because of the inclusion of ·closely associated 

with inherently governmental" function within the Performance Work Statements; and 

11 
38 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.016

(3) the failure to account for the full costs of military when military end strength was not 

adjusted from competitions because of reapplication of the military structure to other 

requirements within the Army. 

When the Department started in-sourcing pursuant to Title 10, United States Code 

Section 2463, it developed fully-burdened costing rules (similar to A-76 costing rules) 

which were eventually issued as Defense Technical Memorandum 09-007 by the 

Director for Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation on January 29, 2010, with further 

revisions issued on September 2,2011. In fiscal years 2008-2009, the Army insourced 921 positions with an average reported savings of 30 percent, with caveats that 

savings in a specific in-sourcing action cannot be extrapolated to other situations 

without performing appropriate cost analysiS. Most of the in-sourcing actions resulting 

from Secretary Gates's in-sourcing (initiated in April 2009 within the Army) involved 

critical or closely associated with inherently governmental functions that are exempt by 

law and policy from cost analysis when necessary to mitigate the risks of contract 

performance of such functions. with insufficient government oversight. Nonetheless, 

Secretary Gates's in-sourcing Initiative realigned $400M in savings from contract 

spending in Fiscal Year 2010 to other priorities in the budget. In the four in-sourcing 

actions approved involving cost analyses since the imposition of the civilian full time 

equivalent cap in January 2011. the estimated cost savings have been 16.5 percent. 

However, these were for critical or closely associated with inherently governmental 

functions where risk considerations exempted them from being based on cost alone 

pursuant to Tille 10 United States Code section 2463. During the much smaller period 

from Fiscal Year 2008 to 2010 when the Department instituted an active in-sourcing 

program in conjunction with its service contract pre-award approval process and 

contractor inventory review process, contract services obligations not identified to 

Overseas Contingency Operations funding decreased from $518 in Fiscal Year 2008 to 

$368 in Fiscal Year 2010. However, spending has increased to $4OB in Fiscal Year 

2011, as depicted in the Chart 1 below. 

12 
39 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.017

SIll .. " . 

... .;.-,---= 

510 

10 

FYIIO FV01 fYD2 FY03 ""'" FV05 FVIl<l FV07 FVIl<l FV08 ""'0 """ 

Chart 1 

Through the histOly of public-private competitions and in-sourcing, there is broad 

consensus on the nead for making "apples to apples· comparisons. Cost comparisons 

are made of "functions' in a public-private competition, whereas in-sourcing actions may 

Involve comparing the costs of individual positions when in-sourcing Inappropriately 

contracted personal services. Cost comparisons of a function include the cost of the 

military performing the function and not just the civilian employee workforce when 

comparing the costs to contract performance. Some earlier A-76 competitions did not 

property account for the cost of military performance when a military component did not 

adjust its end strength based on an A-76 competition. but instead reapplied the military 

to higher priority force structure. Likewise, when in-sourcing a function. the term is not 

simply limited to converting from contractor to civilian employee performance but also 

must account for the costs of military performance when this occurs as well. 

Accordingly, the DTM 09-{)07 is consistent with the Total Force Management principles 

that apply to the Department in Title 10, United Stales Code Section 129a which 

13 
40 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.018

requires the Department to holistically consider both the costs and risks of military, 

civilian employee and contractor performance, rather than simply making a comparison 

of contractor to civilian employee performance. 

Because there has been some confusion regarding the costs to be considered under 

the DTM 09-007, Table 4 below summarizes the various costs included for both civilian 

employees and military to ensure a fully burdened "apples to apples· comparison. 

Within the Army, these cost factors have been developed specific to location, 

occupational series for civilian and military occupational specialty and grade level in the 

Army Manpower Cost System (AMCOS) model. The results of a valid cost comparison 

are very sensitive to the grade level, skill set and local labor market used for 

comparison, as well as the number of manpower requirements validated for govemment 

performance. Just as occurred in the context of A-76 competitions, a key issue often 

exists as to whether the same requirement is being compared between the function 

described in a statement of work and the position description of the govemment 

workforce. 

14 
41 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.019

CIvIII. Cool Foet ... ~ G ..... S ..... 1Id ~ 

m o I740_Iy.-

IIaIic P.,ruaIIy Pay/TIIt 38 8pecIaI s*y _ 

llIIt38 Medi:aI_ Pay 

~f'IIII 

-~- --

SacIII9ocutIy& M ..... tE~ 0CII1IJbIicn) 

Spo<IIIf f'IIII (o.g._> _ GnmIoo (OCONL6 oNrl 

CIiId~ 1IBt..-_ 

_cao.~ IIInFetflp) 

"....,. T.-PC8 

_ EmPorItIln>4> Lh -..... (FEGU) 

r......,..-8_ 

watan~_PII-* 

E_ AsIIIIn:I 

S_Pay/lllpnlal_ 

- -lEn'*""" CGI\IbdIonI FodonI_ TIIIII __ poymords (lSP_1qI 

s...... 

~_~(F1./TAI __ 

TOII'*'II 

~ AdnrIIsIng, EIc. 

~CMaI_(C8F1SoNr) 

~ __ ((IGiIonIIIIIfi_FEIIlP) 

-.. Lie _ (OowoInnerls_ FEGU) 

Con\rII:IarCoeI F_ 

rn=2II!IIhalnIY_(N:III:_It_InO'llllloslnatln 

_ 1_haIn 

()oeqI C<IrfIacI COols fir Ite 8pdIc CalJIct ColI 111 __ .. CoIIInI:I 

IlIIIIary Coel FlO'", ~ _ .. 81111 .. d '-'Ion 

-Pay 

I11III: ~_Ior -. (IIIoH)/IorSoDlolonce (BAS) 

Spa:Ioj Pay. _~I_I IoUI-V_1 011. 

AIc>a1C8- _ ~/OCON8 -*111 CtH.B aiLA IFIIIIiIy ~ 

0Iwf'llll"'_ -Fin! 5o.CIoillln:e1 AoqlIImI __ 

-SocuIy&_tE 

_ en \AD and AD FII) 

.... ~ 

E_AIIII_ "....,. T....wPCS 

1lIccut_ 

CIiId~(Iloyenfa:illloo) 

Faniy So.p19aov1cas T ___ ~ 

-Pay""""'" 

Sopor-. Pay 

000II1_ ~-

--

_ en (RET rod R£T FM c Mj 

-.. en AcauII (IIER1C9 

_o..{T_Aa_~P_(fAMP» 

-",o..r~ _o.._"'-'{QQ'l) 

1lIccut_ 

SepaatJcn T_ 

ew:--.:e(t.g .• pcrtlClnclGlBlll) 

TIlIirIrO 

_ ............... Elc. 

0IIId_ 

~M ___ 

Cl!ta'_~ 

0Ita Coots 

0iId EduI:aIko1 (Inpoct AIII/ 

~T'""*'Il 

-. Ta _(N:n-T_ R:Imoj 

Ca<tIrwt RacaiIU 

V"""-'CIIsIIIh1Qn:I 

Table 5 

15 
42 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.020

Conclusion I Potential for Government-Wide Solution 

The "multi-sector workforce" for DoD and the Army is called Total Force 

Management in Title 10 and is a more complex issue than simply comparisons of costs 

between civilian employees and contractors. It Includes the costs of military across all 

three components (Active, Guard and Reserve). It requires an assessment of 

operational risk associated with the use of contractors in the operating force which our 

DCS, G-3, G-4 and Joint Staff are reviewing, taking into account the recommendations 

of the War Time Commission on Contracting. It requires an assessment of the impact 

on readiness and the viability of the all volunteer force if Soldiers are pulled from units to 

replace contractors or civilian employees in the generating force. 

The Army initiated its contractor inventory reporting because it could not wait for 

the "perfect" solution for managing this growing percentage of our obligation authority, 

which has increased from $198 in FY2000 to $678 in FY2011. The Department of 

Defense and Full Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Public Law 112-10, section 

8108 directed "leveraging the Army's Contractor Manpower Reporting Applicatfon" to 

meet the contractor inventory statutory requirements In TItle 10, United States Code 

sections 235 and 233Oa. In a December 20,2011 communication to the House Armed 

Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense stated that he was ·committed to making 

the Department's information technology and business enterprise systems available to 

support and enable the efforts of the rest of the Department to quickly implement the 

Army's 'Contractor Manpower Reporting Application' tool this fiscal year, while also 

leveraging the Army processes, lessons learned, and best practices to comply with the 

law in the most cost efficient and effective manner." Within the Army, the web-based 

reporting application and data base was designed for less than $1 million and is 

currently maintained by a five person cell that performs help desk, data base 

administration, software design updates, policy oversight and Panel for Documenting 

Contractors functional reviews for the entire Army. The brendlng of policy with data 

management, analysis and help desk functions helps Improve data quality, reduce 

burdens on Industry reporting, and make the system responsive to needed changes to 

accommodate users. The Army's inventory has helped us to improve Total Force 

16 
43 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.021

Management by identifying functions at risk of inherently governmental performance, 

and collected cost information that we plan to use to assess our buying practices for 

contracted services, particularly when we examine the issues of overhead costs and 

potential redundancies between contracted functions and the organic workforce. 

Successful implementation of what the Army has done so far over the past few years 

can be more quickly implemented in smaller, less complex organizations, but will take 

longer in larger executive agencies. As occurred within the Army, cooperation across 

functional stovepipes of manpower (or personnel in other agencies), finanCial 

management, and acquisition is critical. While the budget process currently is not yet 

informed by information compiled in the contractor inventory and related analysis, we 

fully intend to expeditiously move in that direction to fully comply with statutory 

mandates to do so. As stewards of public monies, we are obligated to do no less. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

17 
44 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.022

TESTIMONY OF 

Debra M. Tomchek 

Executive Director 

Balanced Workforce Program Management Office 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Before the 

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight 

March 29, 2012 

Dirksen Senate Office Building 
45 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.023

Chairwoman McCaskill, Ranking Member Portman, and Members of the Subcommittee, 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you about the Department of Homeland Security's 

(DHS) efforts to appropriately balance its federal and contractor workforce. DHS has devoted 

significant attention to achieving the correct mix of public and private sector resources, and I 

look forward to providing details on the approach and implementation of our Balanced 

Workforce Program. 

The Balanced Workforce Strategy (BWS) 

In response to GAO recommendations and language in the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 

DHS formulated the formal Balanced Workforce Strategy (BWS or the Strategy) in mid-20lO to 

ensure that the Department could achieve three goals: 

Comply with applicable statutes, regulations, and policies, through a repeatable, documented 

decision-making process; 

Determine the proper balance of federal employees and contractors for programs and 

functions; and 

Reduce mission risk while, as practicable, reducing or controlling cost. 

The Balanced Workforce Program Management Office was established within the Office of the 

Chief Human Capital Officer, with an understanding that any effort to balance the workforce 

would need to be anchored in strategic workforce planning practices. However, recognizing that 

we would need expertise from other disciplines, we established the Departmental Working 

Group consisting of representatives from Finance, Human Capital, Procurement, and the Office 

of the General Counsel to oversee Components' execution of the Strategy. 

To launch the Strategy, DHS Components began reviewing current service contract work (that is, 

contracts already in place) using the following three-step process. 

The first step, IdentifY the Work, involves looking at a service contract's Statement of Work to 

isolate and accurately describe each discrete function that will be analyzed. 

The second step, Analyze the Work, relies on an electronic questionnaire entitled the B WS Tool. 

The Department selected the questionnaire method to ensure contract reviews were consistent 

and repeatable, and an electronic format was chosen to make it easier for Components to respond 

and to create a central database for future analysis. Six hundred seventy-six contracts or contract 

actions have been analyzed using the electronic BWS Tool. In FY 2013 the BWS Tool will be 

upgraded in order to be more user-friendly and add the following new functions: routing of 

analyses for review, improved user interface, and increased data management capability. 

The BWS Tool leads the respondent through a series ofitems to ensure compliance with law, 

regulations, and relevant policy. Questions directly address the issue of inherently governmental 

and follow section 736 of the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, covering whether a function is 

closely associated with inherently governmental work. The respondent then completes a test to 
46 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.024

determine if the Component possesses "Sufficient Internal Capability," by answering questions 

related to issues such as: 

The relationship of a function to the Department's core missions; 

The risk to a function if all contractors were to leave suddenly; and 

The likelihood that a function might evolve into one that is inherently governmental. 

The BWS Tool produces a suggested ratio of federal workers to contract workers. This 

information is used by Components to consider the issue of mission control. Frequently, 

Components will seek to rebalance the workforce for a function if concerns about mission 

control are identified; however, Components may alternatively provide a risk mitigation strategy 

such as substantially enhanced oversight, absorption of work by existing federal employees, or 

increased reporting requirements to ensure mission control while contracting for the function. 

As prescribed in section 736, if a function can be performed by either the public or private 

sector, Components move to a Cost Comparison Analysis. 

The final step of the BWS process, Implement the Sourcing Decision, requires the full 

involvement of finance, human capital, procurement, and the other management 

lines-of- business. If the determination is made to rebalance the workforce by adding federal 

employees to attain better control of the mission, a contract must be permitted to expire or the 

work must be de-scoped while the federal workforce is hired. 

All Departmental components have implemented the Balanced Workforce Strategy to assess 

contracts in place as of2010. We have also recently launched a pilot to apply the Balanced 

Workforce Strategy to pending contract requirements, for a limited number of special interest 

functions. To date, 44 positions have been insourced via the Balanced Workforce initiative and 

an additional 241 positions have been identified for insourcing in the remainder ofFY 2012 and 

FY 2013. 

Cost Comparison Analysis 

While adhering to law and regulation and minimizing potential risk to DHS mission 

requirements are the Department's paramount considerations, cost is an important element when 

analyzing work that can be performed by either the public or private sector. 

When a Component determines that either federal employees or contractors would be suitable to 

perform a function, they must consider and compare the costs of each, which informs the final 

decision on the most cost-effective and efficient source of support. 

Within the BWS guidance, Components first calculate the cost offederal workers using the 

OMB-approved DHS Modular Cost Model, the same tool utilized in formulating annual budget 

requests and expenditure plans. This method incorporates a variety of factors to describe the 

fully-loaded cost for a federal worker, including one-time and recurring costs associated with 

establishing new positions. On the contract side, the cost of the current contract is used; if a 

new requirement is being procured, an Independent Government Cost Estimate serves as the 
47 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.025

basis for the comparison. When applicable, we also include other costs related to the contract, 

such as the cost for contract oversight and the cost of space and similar administrative factors. 

Although cost is not the primary driver of the Balanced Workforce Program, the Department has 

identified an estimated $2.3 million in savings as a result of BWS implementation, as of January 

2012. 

It is important to note that concurrent with all ofthese efforts, the Department continues to make 

great strides to buy smarter and drive down what we pay for our contracted services. As part of 

Secretary Napolitano's Efficiency Review Initiative to improve performance and efficiency by 

working to reduce costs, streamline processes, eliminate duplication, and improve customer 

service, DHS has placed a renewed emphasis on guarding against inefficiency and waste and 

improving its ability to obtain high quality services from contractors on time and within budget. 

For example, between FY 2010 and 2011, information in the Federal Procurement Data System 

(FPDS) shows that the Department reduced its spending on management support services by 

roughly 6.5 percent, or approximately $160 million. This category of spending includes services 

where spending has grown significantly across the government since 2000, including at DHS, 

and where agencies have become over-reliant on contractors. In short, we have achieved, and 

will continue to maintain greater fiscal responsibility in our contract spending. 

Conclusion 

We will continue to work to have a federal workforce that allows maximum flexibility to 

accomplish our homeland security mission. Again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before you today, and I welcome your questions on the Department's Balanced Workforce 

Program. 
48 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.026

UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 

STATEMENT OF 

CHARLES D. GRIMES III 

CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER 

U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 

before the 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

on 

CONTRACTORS: HOW MUCH ARE THEY COSTING THE GOVERNMENT? 

MARCH 29, 2012 

Chairwoman McCaskill, Ranking Member Portman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on contracting and the multi-sector 

workforce. 

The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is the central human resources agency for the 

Federal Government, providing leadership and guidance to Federal agencies on governmentwide policies for strategic management of the Federal workforce. The American people expect 

and deserve a high-performing government that can efficiently and effectively carry out its 

missions, such as defending our homeland, providing care to our veterans, and ensuring the 

safety of our air and water. Performing this highly challenging and complex work depends on an 

engaged and well-prepared workforce with the right mix of knowledge, skills, and abilities. 

One ofOPM's roles is to set standards for effective management of human capital, and to assist 

agencies in meeting those standards. OPM evaluates agency performance in meeting the 

standards through an annual reporting, evaluation and feedback process. One of these standards 

is Strategic Alignment - having a human capital strategy aligned with mission, goals, and 

organizational objectives. 

Effective workforce planning is critical to meeting the Strategic Alignment standard. Workforce 

planning is the systematic process to identify and document mission-critical occupations and 

Congressional and Legislative Affairs' 1900 E Street. N. W .• Room 5H30 • Washington. DC 20415 • 202-606-1300 
49 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.027

Statement of Charles D. Grimes III 

Chief Operating Officer 

U.S. Office of Personnel Management 

March 29, 2012 

associated current or anticipated competency gaps, then to address those gaps using strategies 

and techniques such as restructuring, recruitment, redeployment, retraining, retention, or 

technology solutions. 

OPM, however, does not get involved in specific agency workforce planning decisions, nor does 

it get involved in agency-specific decisions such as whether or not to competitively source or 

contract particular functions. OPM does analyze non-Federal and Federal sector pay for the 

purposes of comparisons required for setting Federal employee pay under the General Schedule 

pay system, but it does not determine whether Federal employees or private contractors are 

more cost-effective in the performance of government operations. Agencies have that 

responsibility in their specific areas of operation. For instance, as agencies consider the 

appropriate size and composition of the workforce necessary to carry out their missions, the 

determination on whether to use private sector contractors is best informed by application of 

sound planning principles, such as the level of specialization needed for specific tasks, the 

duration of need for that specialization, and cost comparisons. Other considerations include the 

availability of expertise, the time needed to train new employees thoroughly, the urgency of the 

need, the resultant opportunity costs, and the need for institutional memory. 

It is worth emphasizing that a simple comparison of labor costs alone is not likely to answer the 

question of which sector would be more cost-effective and efficient in performing a given task in 

a specific circumstance. For example, a cost comparison to consider in-house performance as 

an alternative to continued contract performance might be beneficial if requirements tend to be 

managed best through an employer-employee relationship, the agency has experience performing 

the work in-house, the ability to recruit for the skill is high, and the government has historically 

had challenges with contractor performance. By contrast, the benefit of a cost comparison may 

be lower if the agency is looking to meet a surge, short term, capacity that would be costly to 

address through a long-term hiring, the agency currently lacks an in-house capability to perform 

the work, and the agency has had considerable success in getting good performance at a 

reasonable cost from its contractors. All of these factors may have a role in determining when a 

cost comparison is likely to be most effective in achieving best value for the taxpayer. 

OPM provides guidance and training to assist agencies in identifying workforce requirements. 

For example, we have provided such guidance on forecasting and determining the workforce 

agencies will need, and as well as assistance in identifying agencies' staffing and competency 

gaps. Additionally, agencies should be mindful in their workforce planning to ensure their longterm needs are being considered and that institutional knowledge is appropriately valued. 

In conducting training sessions on multi-sector workforce planning, OPM has focused on the 

way our human capital management standards apply to multi-sector planning. OPM has not 

delivered training on how agencies should appropriately compare the costs of a contracted versus 

employed workforce. This analysis falls under the purview of individual agencies. Agencies 

may refer to OMB publications such as Memorandum M-09-26, July 29,2009, which requires 

agencies to begin the process of developing and implementing policies, practices, and tools for 

managing the multi-sector workforce, for guidance in making such comparisons. Additionally, 

on September 12,2011, OMB's Office of Federal Procurement Policy published a policy letter, 
50 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.028

Statement of Charles D. Grimes III 

Chief Operating Officer 

U.S. Office of Personnel Management 

March 29, 2012 

"Perfonnance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions," in order to provide guidance 

to agencies on governmental and critical function management. 

OPM has provided technical assistance and training to agencies regarding human capital 

planning concerns associated with potential recruiting and hiring needs. For example, during 

FY -10 and FY -11, OPM provided one-on-one technical guidance to assist agencies on the 

fundamental principles of the Human Capital Accountability and Assessment Framework 

(HCAAF) and how the HCAAF supports sound workforce planning. During FY-II and FY-12, 

OPM continued to provide extensive agency-specific technical guidance on how to implement 

strategic workforce planning. OPM will continue to assist and support agencies in this capacity. 

OPM is also co-chairing an interagency working group with the Department of Defense to 

implement the Administration's Cross-Agency Priority Goal to close skill gaps to more 

effectively achieve agency missions, an important workforce planning effort that will require 

agencies to look at recruitment, training, and business processes, as well as the use of technology 

and contractor support. OPM's support and coordination of effective management practicesharing among agencies will be essential to achieving the goal. 

Conclusion 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today to discuss this important issue with you. 

will be happy to respond to any questions you may have. 

UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMFNT Page 3 of3 
51 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.029

Contractor 

-

-

$$ 

73681.030H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

5,541.496,412 

Communication SSlVices . 2,279,606,794 

I 

Medical Services 59,310.7791 $ 8,444,247 $ 300,890,894 2,353 

62,043,944 18,365,042 ; $ 69,937,l86 : 8741 64B% I 47.8

$ 2,089,402,528 $ 695.749,207 $ 1.562,363,604 I 28,103 87,3%: 61.9

PSC No! Assigned to < fl: 11,)! ¢: "I AQ()1fY}{Mi 1 1&:: !r:m i 117 ! 45,5
53 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.031

A~ 

I 1 American Enterprise Institute 

for Public Policy Research 

Statement before the United States Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight 

Contractors: How Much Are They Costing the Government? 

Andrew G. Biggs, Ph.D. 

Resident Scholar 

American Enterprise Institute 

Jason Richwine, Ph.D. 

Senior Policy Analyst 

The Heritage Foundation 

March 13, 2012 

The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent 

those of the American Enterprise Institute. 

llPage 
54 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.032

Chairwoman McCaskill, Ranking Member Portman, and Members ofthe Committee: 

Thank you forthe opportunity to submit written testimony regarding the compensation of 

federal employees and contractors. Please note that the views we express in this testimony are our own, 

and should not be construed as representing any official position of The American Enterprise Institute or 

The Heritage Foundation. 

In our testimony we will restrict ourselves, as requested, to the more limited question of the 

costs of federal employees relative to the costs of equivalent private sector workers. We have written 

extensively on public-sector compensation in the past and will use this opportunity to review recent 

research in the area. Tight budgets and a perception that public employees have more favorable 

salaries, benefits, or job security have prompted research regarding compensation for public sector 

workers at the federal, state, and local levels. Considerable research on federal employee compensation 

has been conducted since the mid-1970s, with a resurgence of such work in the past several years. 

Comparing Federal Salaries 

Public-private pay comparisons are generally conducted using what is known as the "human 

capital model," which uses regression analysis to compare pay in government and the private sector, 

while controlling for differences in worker characteristics that influence earnings, such as education, 

experience, and a range of other factors. In the human capital model, differences in individual worker 

productivity are the primary drivers for differences in compensation. Characteristics of the job itself 

enter the model principally to the degree that they create "compensating differentials" for nonfinancial 

characteristics of the job that make it particularly desirable or undesirable, such as physical risk, 

unpleasantness of the work involved, differing levels of job security, and so on. The human capital 

model is the dominant method by which labor economists analyze public-sector pay. 

Our own work begins with an analysis of salaries using the Census Bureau's Current Population 

Survey.' Using the standard approach found in the economic literature, we found that federal 

employees receive salaries about 14 percent higher than those of private sector workers with similar 

earnings-related characteristics. Consistent with other studies, we found that federal salaries were most 

generous (relative to private sector levels) for employees with lower levels of education and greater job 

tenure. 

1 See Andrew G. Biggs and Jason Richwine, "Comparing Federal and Private Sector Compensation." American 

Enterprise fnstitute Working Paper 2011-2, June 2011. 

21Page 
55 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.033

The Congressional Budget Office recently released an analysis of federal compensation that 

found that federal employees receive salaries on average 2 percent higher than those of similar private 

sector workers.'Uke us, the CBO utilized the human capital model in assessing federal salaries. But the 

CBO used a different statistical method that generated a smaller federal salary premium. Our approach 

is consistent with several decades of academic research, but the CBO's approach utilizes new methods 

designed to address shortcomings in the past literature. 

But regardless of whether the federal salary premium is small or large, what is important here is 

that both our research and that of the CBO strongly contradict the President's Pay Agent, a bureaucratic 

body charged with conducting official federal-private salary comparisons each year. The Pay Agent 

concludes that federal jobs (not workers) pay on average 26 percent lower salaries than similar private 

sector jobs. This raises a key question: Why do the Pay Agent and the CBO disagree so strongly? 

The Pay Agent's methodology starts with data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). As part 

of the National Compensation Survey, the BLS assigns General Schedule (GS) grade levels to occupations 

in the private sector and in state and local government. The BlS does not assign GS grade levels to 

federal jobs based upon its analysis of the job's work requirements, but instead relies upon the existing 

GS level assigned by the Office of the Personnel Management (OPM). Using these grade level 

assignments, and the salaries received by different occupations, the Pay Agent compares federal 

employee pay to that of supposedly comparable private sector positions. In other words, an actual GS-9 

in the federal government is compared to a private-sector job deemed to be equivalent to a GS-9. Based 

on such comparisons, the Pay Agent concludes that federal jobs pay salaries significantly lower than 

comparable private sector positions. 

There are several reasons to doubt this conclusion, however. Remember that the BLS relies on 

existing GS grades for federal positions. It is not uncommon for federal jobs to be "overgraded," 

meaning assigned a GS level higher than the work requirements of the job merit.' A 1995 Government 

Accountability Office study of 1,358 federal positions found that only 230 were correctly graded. Of the 

remainder, a federal job was over twice as likely to be overgraded than to be undergraded. Moreover, 

overgrading was significantly more likely at higher GS levels. Overgrading effectively means that federal 

, Justin Falk, "Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Employees," Congressional Budget 

Office, January 2012. 

3 Government Accountability Office, "Comparison of Job Content With Grades Assigned in Selected Occupations," 

GGD-96-20, Nov 6, 1995. 

31Page 
56 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.034

jobs would be compared to private sector jobs with greater workloads or responsibilities, thus creating 

or embellishing a federal pay penalty. 

Similarly, both the CBO and academic research have found that federal government employees 

have less education and experience than private sector workers who are performing similar job duties.' 

This could be due in part to the overgrading of federal jobs, but it could also happen independently of it. 

Putting less experienced or educated workers in federal jobs explains how the human capital model 

might find that a federal worker is "overpaid" even as the Pay Agent concludes that the job itself is 

"underpaid." Of course, the government should pay workers for their actual skills, not merely the skills 

that their job would normally require. 

The Pay Agent's approach is further undermined by a recent analysis in the Journal of Economic 

Perspectives written by two BLS economists.' The paper compared salaries for state and local 

government positions to those of private sector positions with similar job requirements, as measured by 

the GS grade level that BLS had assigned. The authors found that state governments paid salaries about 

even with private sector levels, while local governments paid salaries around 9 percent above the 

private sector. 

It is difficult to reconcile what the BLS data say about state and local government salaries with 

the Pay Agent's conclusions regarding federal salaries, for the simple reason that virtually all studies 

shaw that federal government workers are better paid than public employees at the state and local 

level. For instance, our analysis of Current Population Survey data found that federal employees receive 

salaries 29 percent higher than state and local government workers with similar education and 

experience. 

In summary, the Pay Agent's salary results are inconsistent with academic research and with 

analyses published by other federal agencies. The Pay Agent's methodology is flawed because federal 

government jobs are overgraded, and federal employees have less experience and education than 

private sector workers who hold similar positions. 

, Congressional Budget Office, "Reducing Grades of the General Schedule Workforce," September, 1984; Melissa 

Famulari, "Maintaining a labor Force Under Wage Controls: The Case of the Federal Government," Working paper, 

University of Texas at Austin, 1997. 

'This paper is not an official BlS analysis, but its scholarly contribution comes from applying BlS data. Maury 

Gittleman and Brooks Pierce, "Compensation for State and local Government Workers," Journal of Economic 

Perspectives, Vol. 26, No.1 (Winter 2011), pp. 217-242. 

41Page 
57 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.035

Fringe Benefits 

The Pay Agent's analysis of federal employee compensation critically omits fringe benefits. 

Table 1. Average benefits by type and sector, as 

percent of average wages. (Source: CBO) 

Federal Private 

government sector 

Retirement Income 

Defined benefit 16.2 4.2 

Defined contribution 4.5 3.6 

Health insurance 

Current c;overage 8.3 11.4 

Coverage in retirement 6.5 2.2 

Paid leave 17.8 12.3 

Legally mandated benefits 10.5 10.2 

Total benefits 63.9 43.9 

Benefits can have a significant effect on pay 

comparisons, since public employee benefits 

tend to be more generous than those paid to 

similar workers in the private sector. Table 1 

summarizes the results of the CBO's recent 

analysis, showing that federal benefits are 

considerably greater than in the private 

sector. Based on our own work, the CBO's 

figures are, if anything, an underestimate of 

federal benefits: 

Because ofthe Pay Agent's inaccurate comparison of salaries and total exclusion of benefits, 

Congress should not be guided by the Pay Agent's work as it re-evaluates federal employee 

compensation. The CBO's analysis is a much more useful starting point. 

Implications for Federal Government Contracting 

In comparing federal and private-sector compensation, we have considered only direct 

employees of the federal government, not independent contractors hired by the government, for whom 

'The CBO did not include a subsidy to the Thrift Savings Plan's G Fund that allows it to pay interest rates about 

0.77 percentage points higher than similar government bonds available to private investors. Given the $129 billion 

size of the G Fund, this subsidy to federal employees totals almost $2.2 billion annually, equal to roughly 2 percent 

of federal salaries. 

We also used a lower discount rate to value future retirement benefits paid to federal employees, which include 

both DB pensions and retiree health coverage. The interest rate used to value a future benefit amount depends 

upon the risk of the benefit itself; if the benefit is secure a low interest rate should be used, while if it is risky a 

higher rate is appropriate, Consistent with the academic literature regarding state and local government penSions, 

we assumed that accrued federal retirement benefits are effectively guaranteed. This does not mean that 

Congress could not change the terms under which future benefits are earned, or even fundamentally change 

benefits for newly hired federal workers. But it does assume that benefits which have already been earned will in 

fact be paid. The CBO assumed that federal retirement benefits have approximately the same risk as defined 

benefit pensions in the private sector and thus utilized a higher discount rate. This is not an unreasonable 

assumption, but we believe it overstates the true risk of accrued federal pension benefits. If our assumptions 

regarding the risk of accrued federal pension benefits prove to be more accurate, then the true benefits premium 

received by federal employees is even larger than estimated by the CBO. 

SIPage 
58 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.036

much less data exist. However, we can discuss in qualitative terms some of the issues regarding the 

costs of contracting. 

In analyzing the costs of contracting versus the costs of direct federal work, one cannot simply 

compare the prices contractors charge with the costs of salaries and benefits for federal workers. For 

one thing, contractors must include the cost of their overhead-say, their purchase of heavy 

equipment-into the prices they charge the government, but federal overhead is not fully reflected in 

the salaries and benefits paid to federal employees. 

Second, contractors are not guaranteed permanent jobs. Once a federal em ployee passes 

through the first several years of service, his probability of dismissal is so low that he has what amounts 

to a "job for Iife."7 In contrast, an individual federal contractor might be dismissed for poor performance 

at any time, and the composition of the broad contractor workforce can be shifted as the needs of the 

federal government change over time. This "option value" for federal managers is difficult to quantify, 

but we can safely conclude that a federal manager would be willing to pay more in exchange for the 

option to quickly alter the composition of his workforce as needs change.' 

Third, federal regulations can prevent the government from selecting the lowest-bidding 

contractor in the first place. We are not experts in contract law, but documents from the Office of 

Management and Budget describe a federal mandate that potential contractors not receive an 

advantage in bidding for government work by offering health or retirement benefits that are less costly 

than those offered to full-time federal employees.' It is not clear to us how this regulation is 

implemented but, as the CBO federal pay report shows, combined federal health and retirement 

benefits are much higher than those paid to Similarly-skilled individuals working at large private sector 

firms. 

We do not believe that any definitive analysis offederal contractor compensation has so far 

been conducted, especially in light of the three cautionary notes we described above. Lawmakers should 

consider additional data-gathering and analysis of federal contractors to facilitate higher quality 

comparisons. 

7 See Biggs and Richwine, "Comparing Federal and Private Sector Compensation." 

'See Foote, D.A. and T.B. Folta (2002). "Temporary workers as real options." Human Resource 

Management Review, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 579·597. 

9 See "Competitive Sourcing Requirements in Division 0 of Public Law 110-16 Memorandum For Heads of Executive 

Departments And Agencies From Paul A. Denett, Administrator, Office of Management and Budget," February 20, 

2008. 

61Page 
59 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.037

Data and technical issues aside, federal contractors certainly could be overcompensated, just as 

federal employees are right now. After all, the federal government makes compensation decisions for 

both classes of workers. The more useful distinction from a policy point of view may not be whether 

certain tasks and duties should be performed by federal employees versus federal contractors, but 

whether those functions should be overseen by the federal government at all. In the private sector, 

competition helps to ensure that workers are paid no more and no less than fair market compensation. 

Those market forces are much weaker in the public sector, making excessive labor costs likely to persist 

even with our best efforts to avoid them. 

71Page 
60 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.038

AFGE 

Con~ressional 

Testimony 

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 

BY 

JOHN GAGE 

NATIONAL PRESIDENT 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO 

BEFORE 

THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT 

ON 

CONTRACTORS: HOW MUCH ARE THEY COSTING THE GOVERNMENT? 

MARCH 29, 2012 

American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CiO 

80 F Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20001 * (202) 737-8700 * ~.afge.org 

~~ ~\ ,,,;;. '\> _, _~. ,1: 
61 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.039

Chairwoman McCaskill and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the American Federation of 

Government Employees, AFL-CIO, which represents more than 650,000 federal employees who are 

proud to serve the American people across the nation and around the world, I thank you, Chairwoman 

McCaskill, for the opportunity to submit testimony in writing forthe March 29, 2012, hearing being held 

by the Subcommittee on Government Contracting entitled "Contractors: How Much Are They Costing 

the Government?" 

Since the latter part of the Clinton Administration, AFGE has worked with Democratic and Republican 

lawmakers alike to remake the sourcing process into one that is more accountable to taxpayers and less 

unfair to federal employees. We are pleased by the landmark laws that have been enacted: 

1. Requirements that any work last performed by federal employees be subjected to formal cost 

comparisons which determine that conversions to contractor performance can at least be 

guesstimated to benefit taxpayers before such conversions may take place; 

2. Fundamental reforms to the public-private competition process which ensure that any 

"guesstimated" outsourcing savings can't be attributable to the provision by contractors of 

inferior health care and retirement benefits; 

3. Prohibitions on the use of the OMS Circular A-76 privatization process until problems 

documented by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Defense 

(DoD) Inspector General (IG), among others, can be fixed; 

4. Requirements that agencies develop inventories of their service contracts in order to identify 

which ones should be corrected, divested, or insourced, and to better identify and control the 

costs of service contracts; and 

s. Requirements that agencies give "special consideration" towards insourcing functions that cost 

too much, are poorly performed, or include functions too important or sensitive to privatize. 

Ultimately, except perhaps for some contractors, I think we can all agree that inherently governmental 

functions ought to be performed by federal employees; that functions closely associated with inherently 

governmental functions (e.g., overseeing contractors, developing regulations, preparing budgets) should 

be performed by federal employees "to the maximum extent practical"; that critical functions usually 

should be performed by federal employees; that performance decisions with respect to other functions 

should be based on law, cost, policy, and risk; and that agencies should have the same visibility and 

control over the costs of service contracts that they already have with respect to federal employee 

costs. 

The good news is that there is an adequate statutory structure to ensure that this common-sense vision 

can become a reality. The bad news is that this Administration, like its predecessors, is unwilling to 

enforce the relevant sourcing and workforce management laws. As a result, too many sourcing 

{00303905DOC - } 
62 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.040

decisions continue to be made on the basis of the wrong criteria, particularly arbitrary constraints on 

the size of the federal workforce. 

I offer six recommendations for promoting the interests of taxpayers and all Americans who rely on the 

federal government for important services. 

1. ENFORCE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST DIRECT CONVERSIONS 

Despite the extensive use of the Office of Management and Budget (OM B) Circular A-76 privatization 

process (and the resulting proof of the superiority of in-house workforces-federal employees won 80% 

of the time during the Bush Administration, despite a process that independent observers agree is 

biased against them), much work last performed by federal employees is still being given to contractors 

without any proof that such conversions benefit taxpayers. 

The Congress, on a bipartisan basis, has, repeatedly, prohibited agencies from perpetrating "direct 

conversions" -the term used to describe instances in which agencies give work last performed by 

federal employees to contractors without first conducting statutory cost comparisons. These 

prohibitions apply regardless of the number of positions or amount of work involved. 

The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) has embarked on a massive campaign of "mythbusting" in order to make the procurement process less problematic for contractors. On the other 

hand, OFPP refuses to even issue guidance-let alone mount a public relations effort-to ensure 

agencies finally comply with longstanding prohibitions against giving work last performed by federal 

employees to contractors without first complying with statutory cost comparison requirements. Most 

managers don't know these prohibitions exist and those who do know believe that there are exceptions 

which in fact don't exist. As a result, agencies regularly contract out work last performed by federal 

employees without any consideration of taxpayer interests. And because of caps, freezes, cuts, and 

other arbitrary constraints, which are invariably imposed on in-house workforces but not on contractors, 

much work last performed by federal employees is regularly contracted out based on individual federal 

employees' retirement decisions, rather than whether such conversions make sense for taxpayers. 

In December 2011, the Department of Defense (000), the largest department in the federal 

government, issued guidance to its managers to guard against direct conversions. This guidance was not 

issued to protect federal employees, but because of concern "that the Department not become overly 

reliant on contracted services." As downsizing goes forward, DoD's guidance warns that "we must be 

particularly vigilant to prevent the inappropriate conversion of work to contract." 

Given the budgetary situation, other agencies are also likely to experience significant downsizing. 

Nevertheless, OFPP refuses to issue guidance "to prevent the inappropriate conversion of work to 

contract" in non-DoD agencies. According to AFGE's own survey of eight agencies, OFPP told none of 

them anything about direct conversions. In fact, an official at the Department of Veterans Affairs (OVA), 

which regularly violates the prohibitions against direct conversions, told AFGE: "We don't know what 

the policy is on direct conversions." 

(00)03905 DOC - } 2 
63 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.041

DoD should be commended for its sincere attempt to safeguard taxpayer interests by actually issuing 

guidance to enforce prohibitions against direct conversions. However, it should be noted that officials 

responsible for enforcing the law and the guidance can only use their powers of persuasion, and that 

direct conversions continue to occur, in large part, because of the arbitrary and arguably illegal 

imposition of a cap on the civilian workforce, which reduces in-house staffing to FYlO levels. When 

commanders and managers are required, on the one hand, to comply with prohibitions against direct 

conversions, and, on the other hand, a ruthlessly enforced Pentagon edict to arbitrarily slash the civilian 

workforce, even if substituting contractors would be more expensive, it's pretty obvious which path they 

will choose. 

Here's an example of how DoD is ultimately unable to police itself. Some installations are directly. 

converting work last performed by civilian personnel who are ultimately paid through non-appropriated 

funds (NAF). There are, of course, no exceptions in law or the department's guidance for NAF 

employees. There is, however, a longstanding prejudice against NAF employees-that they are often 

military spouses who are considered not to have career ambitions-which renders them second-class 

employees in the eyes of some managers. It makes no sense to try to carve out an exception to the law 

based on how employees are paid-let alone where they live or how they vote. The law is to protect 

taxpayers from arbitrary conversions to contractor performance, period. 

The only support that these installations can claim for discriminating against NAF employees is a bizarre 

GAO bid protest decision that strained to incorporate a definition of "civilian employees" from the OMB 

Circular A-76, one which does not include NAF employees. However, as anyone familiar with the 

legislative history behind 10 USC 2461 would know, the whole point of the law was not to duplicate A76, but rather to require that a particular cost comparison process always be used-in orderto make up 

forthe A-76 process' many loopholes which had allowed too much work to be contracted out without 

any cost comparisons. Far from codifying the A-76 circular, the cost comparison process established by 

10 USC 2461 makes only one reference to the A-76 circular (which is limited to the type of most efficient 

organization that must be used). 

In some instances, commanders and managers may feel compelled to convert work performed by 

civilian employees to performance by military personnel, a workforce sometimes referred to as 

"Borrowed Military Manpower". Because of their deservedly superior compensation packages, military 

personnel are usually considered to be twice as expensive as civilian employees. Nevertheless, the 

"EffiCiency Initiative", with its cap on the civilian workforce, encourages managers to substitute military 

personnel for civilian personnel, regardless of cost or adverse impact on readiness. 

There are no legal requirements to conduct cost comparisons before making civilian-to-military 

conversions. However, DTM 09-007, "Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian and Military 

Manpower and Contract Support", provides a methodology for conducting such costs comparisons. The 

Army attempted to rationalize civilian-to-military conversions with the issuance of gUidance in October 

2011. However, there are now indications that the Air Force and the Marine Corps are undertaking 

wasteful civilian-to-military conversions. DoD issued helpful department-wide guidance earlier this 

month. Elimination of the cap on the civilian workforce would in turn eliminate much ofthe 

bureaucratic coercion to undertake such conversions. Ultimately, Congress should require DoD to use 

the DTM before converting work from civilian or contractor performance to military performance. 

{OOJ03905 DOC - } 3 
64 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.042

The issuance of guidance on civilian-to-contractor conversions and civilian-to-military conversions 

constitutes both good news and bad news. On the one hand, the department acknowledges it has a 

problem and is attempting to satisfactorily resolve it. On the other hand, the consensus necessary to 

issue such guidance would only be achieved if instances of direct conversions, whether to contractors or 

military personnel, were numerous or even rampant. And, ultimately, the perverse incentives that 

cause these direct conversions can only be eliminated if supervisors are allowed to manage federal 

employees by budgets and workloads, rather than by arbitrary caps, freezes, cuts, or other constraints. 

2. MANAGE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES BY BUDGETS AND WORKLOADS, NOT ARBITRARY 

CONSTRAINTS 

With the implementation of the "Efficiency Initiative", 000 has reverted to its traditional approach of 

managing its overall workforce at the expense of the civilian workforce. The imposition of an arbitrary 

FYlO cap on the civilian workforce is contrary to the law and completely inconsistent with the 

imperative to manage civilian personnel by budgets and workloads. If there is work to be done and 

money to pay for that work to be done, 000 managers should not be prevented from using civilian 

employees simply because they are civilian employees. Instead, performance decisions should be made 

on the basis of law, policy, risk, and cost. 000 claims that exceptions are allowed to the cap, mitigating 

against its intrinsically arbitrary nature. However, the process by which exceptions are sought and 

reviewed is as cumbersome as it is forbidding. 

Two factors complicate the imposition of the cap. Workload reductions have not been commensurate 

with reductions in civilian personnel. Activities are attempting to muddle through with salami-slice 

tactics, whereby they struggle to do the same with less. In few instances, particularly with respect to 

the Army and the Air Force, have workload analyses been conducted prior to the imposition of 

reductions in civilian personnel. What functions are being divested and downsized because of these 

reductions? All too often, there are no answers to these questions. Doing more with less, i.e., not 

making the tough decisions about what the department will no longer perform, is a self-defeating 

management approach in the context of downsizing on the scale being contemplated for 000. As non000 agencies begin to downsize, the 000 model is one to discard. 

Worse, no comparable constraints are being imposed on 000 service contract spending. From FY01 

through FYlO, civilian personnel funding grew from $41 billion to $69 billion, while service contract 

spending grew from $73 billion to $181 billion. Even though civilian employees are cheaper and less 

numerous than their contractor counterparts, the "Efficiency Initiative" imposes far greater sacrifices on 

civilian employees. The inevitable result of the civilian personnel reductions, particularly in the absence 

of workload analysis, is that work that is now or could be performed more efficiently or more 

appropriately by civilian personnel is being outsourced or remaining outsourced. This can't help but 

increase costs to taxpayers and increase the amount of work performed by contractors that is actually 

inherently governmental, closely associated with inherently governmental functions, or critical. 

(OOJOJ905.DOC - ) 4 
65 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.043

Section 808 of the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act caps DoD's spending on service contracts for 

FY12 and FY13 (excluding Overseas Contingency Operation spending) at the level of the President's 

budget request in FYlO. This cap, which originated in the Senate bill, was imposed because of the 

Senate Armed Services Committee's (SASe) concern that "(e)xpected savings from the reduction in staff 

augmentation services and the civilian workforce freeze could be easily lost if other categories of service 

contracts are permitted to grow without limitation so that spending can shift to these contracts". 

Moreover, as the SASC noted, "Over the last decade, 000 spending for contract services has more than 

doubled, from $72 billion in fiscal year LOOO to more than $150 billion, not including spending for OCO, 

while the size of the department's civilian employee workforce has remained essentially unchanged." 

The SASC also reported that a senior 000 official testified in September LOlO: "(T)he low-hanging fruit 

really is (in contract services). There's a lot of money. There has been a very, very high rate of growth 

over the last decade, in services. They have grown faster than everything else .. .! think great savings can 

be had there, across the Services. It's essential that we look there ... because that's half the money". 

Unfortunately, 000 is not interested in complying with this law. In fact, 000 is already in violation of 

the law by failing to even issue the required guidance necessary to implement the law. Failure to 

comply with the means that 000 will continue to impose budget sacrifices disproportionately on the 

smaller and cheaper civilian workforce. Moreover, under Section 808, 000 can lift the contractor cap to 

the extent it lifts the self-imposed cap on the civilian workforce. Therefore, if 000 does not actually 

comply with Section 808, it will have no incentive to lift the civilian personnel cap, which is widely 

regarded as skewing sourcing decisions in favor of contractors (because the size of the civilian workforce 

is constrained while spending on contractors is not, absent compliance with Section 808). 

It makes no sense to always cut the cheapest and most efficient of the department's three workforces. 

As Representatives Buck McKeon (R-CA) and Adam Smith (D-WA), the Chair and Ranking Member of the 

House Armed Services Committee, pointed out last year: "The Department now spends a greater 

portion of its budget purchasing services than it does purchasing weapons systems, hardware, and other 

products. In fact, the Department spends more on contracted services than it does on pay for military 

and civilian personnel combined." 

We are seeing variations of the 000 "Efficiency Initiative" in other agencies. Whether they are called 

freezes, caps, or cuts, they invariably are being imposed in one-sided fashion-on the in-house 

workforce, not on the contractors. This can't help but skew sourcing decisions in favor of contractors 

and make it significantly less likely that such decisions will be made on the basis of acceptable criterialaw, cost, policy, and risk. Chairman Richard Durbin (D-IL) included a section in the FY12 Financial 

Services Appropriations Bill that would have taken the 000 requirement that the civilian workforce be 

managed by budgets and workloads and apply it to the non-DoD agencies. It is unfortunate that it is 

necessary to codify what should be common-sense. However, as downsizing proceeds, it is imperative 

that Congress take action to prevent the application of arbitrary constraints on the federal workforce 

that will prevent managers from assigning work to federal employees simply because they are federal 

employees. 

{00303905 DOC - } 5 
66 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.044

3. COMPILE INVENTORIES OF CONTRACTS 

Because the federal government's service contract workforce is larger and more expensive than its civil 

service workforce, any effort to achieve savings in how agencies provide services necessarily requires 

subjecting service contractors to severe scrutiny. In order to allow for such scrutiny, a law was enacted 

in 2009 that required non-DoD agencies to develop inventories of service contracts, which copied a 2007 

law that required 000 to establish an inventory of service contracts. 

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin was the first to identify compliance with the 

inventory requirement and integration into the budget process as necessary if downsizing is to be done 

intelligently: "In the past, we've found that proposed cuts to contract services are nearly impossible to 

enforce because expenditures for service contracting are invisible in the department's budget." 

As House Armed Services Committee Chairman McKeon and Ranking Member Smith recently noted, 

sagely, "A credible inventory that is fully integrated into the budget submission is necessary to identify 

and control contract costs, particularly in this time of fiscal constraints." Despite bipartisan and 

bicameral support for compliance with the 000 contractor inventory, OFPP is holding up the process at 

the request of contractors, refusing to grant the department the necessary exemption from the 

Paperwork Reduction Act, an exemption OFPP has already granted to the Army for its own contractor 

inventory even though the Army's methodology for its inventory is the basis for the methodology 000 

uses for its own inventory. 

Moreover, OFPP has been slow to implement the inventories of service contracts for non-DoD agencies 

and has failed to integrate those inventories into budget and management processes. In fact, OFPP has 

gone out of its way to oppose efforts to ensure that the contract inventories are comprehensive and 

reliable. The most recent example of this occurred in relation to the Senate's version of the FY12 

Financial Services Appropriations Bill. OFPP objected to this language in Section 741: the service 

contractor inventories for non-DoD agencies should be based on "direct labor hours and associated cost 

data collected from contractors". This language--lifted directly from 10 USC 2330a, the contractor 

inventory requirement for DoD-was enacted pursuant to the FYll NOAA. Why would OFPP accept this 

language for DoD's contractor inventory but not for the contractor inventories for the non-DoD 

agencies? 

The contractor inventory law for non-DoD agencies already requires the collection of information 

related to direct labor hours. The new language would simply have clarified that contractors would 

supply this information in order to ensure its accuracy. The Army is already collecting this information 

from contractors, and its inventory is considered by Congress to be the model for the entire federal 

government. 

Nevertheless, OFPP declared that "The proposed requirement to collect cost data would be 

unnecessarily burdensome on contractors without commensurate benefit." However, less than two 

weeks later, 000, alreadY under the law, came to the opposite conclusion when its Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics as well as Personnel and Readiness offices unambiguously endorsed, on behalf 

(OOJOJ905.DOC - ) 6 
67 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.045

of the Pentagon, the Army methodology of collecting from contractors labor hours and associated cost 

data "to the maximum extent possible", stipulating that "(alfter five years of reporting" (i.e., collecting 

from contractors labor hours and cost data), "the Army has found that costs and administrative burden 

on the private sector have been minimal as well as the associated costs to Army organizations." 

Reliable and comprehensive contractor inventories are indispensable if agencies are ever to have the 

same visibility into, and control over, contractor costs as they have now over federal employee costs. 

The absence of reliable and comprehensive contractor inventories explains why agencies are now 

focusing downsizing efforts disproportionately on federal employees, even though federal employees 

are usually fewer and cheaper than contractors. At a time when the federal government is striving to 

reduce its costs, why would OFPP want to prevent non-DoD agencies from receiving the same cost 

information from contractors that 000 collects from its contractors? Why would OFPP reject as 

"burdensome on contractors" a methodology that 000 has embraced to the "maximum extent possible" 

because of its "minimal" impact on contractors? 

4. USE INSOURCING TO REDUCE COSTS 

All agencies are now required to develop insourcing policies for new work and outsourced work, in 

particular outsourced work that is inherently governmental and wrongly contracted out, work 

contracted out without competition and presumably more expensive than it should be, and work 

contracted out that is poorly performed. Nevertheless, insourcing in non-DoD agencies is proceeding 

slowly. In fact, OFPP has failed to issue guidance that would allow agencies to use insourcing to save 

money for the taxpayers by bringing in-house functions solely for cost reasons. 

Given the results ofthe recent study by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), which compared 

the costs of fe~eral employees and contractors, taxpayers may well wonder why OFPP would want to 

shield from scrutiny the army of contractors who are responsible for so much documented waste, fraud, 

and abuse. According to POGO's study-Bad Business: Billions a/Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring 

Contractors-"on average, contractors charge the government almost twice as much as the annual 

compensation of comparable federal employees. Of the 35 types of jobs that POGO looked at in its new 

report-the first report to compare contractor billing rates to the salaries and benefits of federal 

workers-it was cheaper to hire federal workers in all but just 2 cases." 

The last OFPP administrator praised this study to POGO's chief executive. So why would OFPP ignore 

the "special consideration" law and not ensure that agencies can systematically consider whether to 

substitute federal employees for contractors? Agency officials tell us that they would like to insource for 

cost reasons because they think significant savings are possible. However, they won't do so until OFPP 

provides "political cover," i.e., issues the necessary gUidance. Some agencies may become so desperate 

to insource that they will devise their own costing methodologies. Most of those agency-specific 

methodologies will be accurate and reliable. OFPP bears responsibility for those that are not because of 

its failure-now going on four years-to issue the necessary guidance. 

After sixteen years of indiscriminate privatization, 000 attempted to rebalance its workforce through 

targeted insourcing during parts of 2009 and 2010, both of functions which are inappropriate for 

contractor performance and functions which can be performed more efficiently in-house. DoD 

{00303905.DOC - I 7 
68 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.046

reported that in FY10 insourcing generated significant savings, $900 million, and brought in-house work 

performed by thousands of contractors that was actually too important or sensitive to privatize. 

Ultimately, 17,000 civilian personnel were added to handle insourced work. Insourcing continued in 

FYll; according to unofficial estimates, even with the Army not yet having reported, 000 added 9,100 

positions through insourcing, with nearly 4,500 hiring actions executed against those and another 1,700 

in process. 

Contractors and their Congressional cronies took another shot last year at ending 000 insourcing in 

order to protect contractors at the expense of taxpayers and warfighters. However, on a bipartisan 

basis, Congress upheld the insourcing process in the FY12 NOM. A House provision that would have 

allowed contractors to perform inherently governmental work was defeated. Another House provision 

that would have allowed insourcing determinations for closely associated with inherently governmental, 

acquisition, and critical functions to be made on the basis of cost, rather than the traditional legal and 

regulatory basis of risk, was also defeated. Still another House provision which would have narrowly 

defined critical functions was also defeated. A minimum cost differential (i.e., the 10%/$10 million rule, 

which already applies when 000 tries to contract out work performed by civilian employees) was 

imposed on 000 before it can insource contractor work for cost reasons. Civilian employees must be 

shown to be marginally more efficient than contractors before contractor-to-civilian conversions can 

take place. Please note that this minimum cost differential does not apply when a large contractor 

insources work from a smaller contractor or when 000 wants to shift from one contractor to another 

contractor. Now, that the insourcing rules are settled-with DoD's insourcing methodology being 

codified for each of the last two years-DoD should aggressively insource for cost reasons in order to 

generate substantial savings. 

Contractors are now trying to use the appeal of small businesses to undermine insourcing. Earlier this 

month, the House Small Business Committee marked up three bills that included anti-insourcing 

provisions. 

Two of the bills introduced would require that all agencies allow officials to advocate on behalf of small 

business contractors in insourcing decisions, while a third would give contractors legal standing to 

oppose agencies' insourcing decisions. 

Under H.R. 3980, agencies would be required to allow small business advocates to "participate in any 

session or planning process and review any documents with respect to a decision to convert an activity 

performed by a small business concern to an activity performed by a Federal employee". 

Under H.R. 3851, agencies' small business advocates "shall review and advise such agency on any 

decision to convert an activity performed by a small business concern to an activity performed by a 

Federal employee". 

And under H.R. 3893, contractors would be given legal standing to challenge insourcing decisions before 

GAO and the Court of Federal Claims. It would also prohibit insourcing from occurring until agencies had 

"made publicly available, after providing notice and an opportunity for public comment, the procedures 

of the agency with respect to decisions to convert a function being performed by a small business 

concern by a Federal em ployee" and until those procedures are reviewed by officials who advocate for 

small business contractors. 

(00303905.DOC - I 8 
69 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.047

H.R. 3980 and H.R. 3851 would provide officials advocating for small business contractors 

unprecedented ability to influence insourcing decisions. Politicizing sourcing decisions, whether in favor 

of small businesses or unions, is wrong, period. Federal employees have no comparable advocates on 

their behalf when their jobs are being reviewed for outsourcing. Proponents claim that the legislation is 

based on a recent OMB policy letter, which requires that "The agency should involve its small business 

advocate if considering the insourcing of work currently being performed by small businesses." 

Obviously, the legislation and the policy letter are fundamentally different with respect to the degree of 

involvement of the small business advocates. Moreover, this flawed argument does nothing to address 

our concern about the one-sidedness of these provisions. 

H.R. 3893 is also one-sided. It gives legal standing to contractors in the insourcing context, but not to 

federal employees. Contractors have long had legal standing in the outsourcing context before GAO and 

the Court of Federal Claims. Not until recently were federal employees given limited legal standing 

before the GAO in the outsourcing context. Moreover, this legislation is unprecedented in that it gives 

contractors the ability to file bid protests even when agencies are attempting to insource work that is 

inherently governmental, closely associated with inherently governmental, or critical. Finally, agencies 

are not required to publish for comment their outsourcing plans, let alone run them past federal 

employee advocates. 

It is not responsive for opponents of insourcing to ritualistically invoke OMB Circular A-76. The 

executive branch used A-76 indiscriminately in DoD during the Clinton Administration and in all agencies 

during the Bush Administration. A-76 aficionados-a collection of sad, misguided souls and 

unreconstructed federal employee haters-had their way for 16 years. And what do they have to show 

for the havoc and the disruption, besides enriching consultants (i.e., Beltway Bandits)? Nothing. 

According to GAO, there is no proof all of this activity resulted in any savings. 

"We have previously reported that other federal agencies-the Department of Defense 

(000) and the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Forest Service, in particular-did not 

develop comprehensive estimates for the costs associated with competitive sourcing. 

This report identifies similar issues at the Department of Labor (DoL). Without a better 

system to assess performance and comprehensively trock al/ the costs associated with 

competitive sourcing, DoL cannot reliably assess whether competitive sourcing truly 

provides the best deal for the taxpayer ... '" 

If A-76 had been a weapons program, it would have been killed a long time ago. Moreover, the A-76 

process has been generally and specifically prohibited by Congress because of documented flaws in the 

process that have been identified by GAO and the DoD IG and acknowledged by OMB. Whether A-76 

can be reformed and the prohibitions lifted are questions completely divorced from insourcing. 

According to GAO and the DoD IG, the A-76 privatization process 

1. failed to keep track of costs and savings, 

000 IG: "000 hod not effectively implemented a system to track and assess the cost of 

the performance of functions under the competitive sourcing program ... The overoll costs 

and the estimated savings of the competitive saurcing program may be either averstated 

ar understated. In addition, legislators and Government officials were not receiving 

{0030J905DOC - } 9 
70 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.048

reliable information to determine the costs and benefits of the competitive sourcing 

pragram and whether it is achieving the desired objectives and outcomes... ," 

GAO: "[The Deportment of Lobar's (DoL)] savings reports ... exclude many of the costs 

associated with competitive sourcing and are unrelioble ... (O)ur analysis shows that these 

costs can be substantial and that excluding them overstates savings achieved by 

competitive sourcing ... DoL competition savings reports are unreliable and do not provide 

on accurate measure of competitive sourcing sovings ... Finolly, the cost baseline used by 

DoL to estimate savings was inaccurate and misrepresented savings in some cases, such 

as when preexisting, budgeted personnel vacancies increased the savings attributed to 

completed competitions ... "; 

2. resulted in the actual costs of conducting the privatization studies exceeding the guesstimated 

savings, and 

GAO: "For fiscol years 2004 through 2006, we found that the Forest Service locked 

sufficiently complete and reliable cost data to ... occurotely report competitive sourcing 

savings to Congress ... (W)e found that the Forest Service did not consider certain 

substantial costs in its savings calculations, and thus Congress may not have on accurate 

measure of the savings produced by the Forest Service's competitive sourcing 

competitions ... Some of the costs the Forest Service did not include in the calculations 

substantially reduce or even exceed the savings reported to Congress.";v 

3. included fundamental biases against the in-house workforce. 

DoDIG: " ... In this OMB Circular A-76 public/private competition-even though (000) fully 

complied with OMB and 000 guidance on the use of the overhead factor-the use of the 

12 percent (in-house) overhead foetor affected the results of the cost comparison and 

(000) managers were not empowered to make a sound and justifiable business 

decision ... In the competitive sourcing process, all significant in-house costs are researched, 

identified, and supported except for overhead. There is absolutely no data to support 12 

percent as a realistic cost rate. As a result, multimillion-dollar decisions are based, in part, 

on a foetor not supported by doto ... Unless DoD develops a supportable rate or on 

alternative method to colculote a fair and reasonable rate, the results of future 

competitions will be questionable ... ,N 

Until the implementation of the reforms listed below, AFGE strongly believes that the temporary 

suspensions on new A-76 privatization studies should be continued: 

1. The establishment of a reliable system to track costs and savings from the A-76 process that 

has been implemented, tested, and determined to be accurate and reliable, over the longterm as well as the short-term. 

2. Consistent with the law, the establishment of contract inventories so that agencies can track 

specific contracts as well as contracts generally. 

{OOJOJ905 DOC } 10 
71 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.049

3. Consistent with the law, the development and implementation of plans to actively insource 

new and outsourced work, particularly functions that are closely associated with inherently 

governmental functions, that were contracted out without competition, cost too much, and 

are being poorly performed. 

4. Consistent with the law, the enforcement of government-wide prohibitions against direct 

conversions. 

S. The development and implementation of a formal internal reengineering process that could 

be used instead ofthe costly and controversial A-76 process. 

6. Revision of the rules governing the A-76 process to make it more consistent with agencies' 

missions, more accountable to taxpayers, and more fair to federal employees. 

a. Increase the minimum cost differential to finally take into account the often 

significant costs of conducting A-76 studies, including preliminary planning costs, 

consultants costs, costs of federal employees diverted from their actual jobs to work 

on privatization studies, transition costs, post-competition review costs, and 

proportional costs for agencies' privatization bureaucracies (both in-house and outhouse). 

b. Double the minimum cost differential for studies that last longer than 24 monthsfrom the beginning of preliminary planning until the award decision. 

c. Eliminate the arbitrary 12% overhead charge on in-house bids. 

5. CAP CONTRACTOR COMPENSATION 

OMB has imposed a two-year freeze on the pay offederal employees who, among other things, care for 

our veterans and patrol our borders. With respect to contractors, however, OFPP can only call for 

capping at $200,000 the taxpayer-subsidized compensation of each contractor's five most lavishly 

rewarded employees, while allowing thousands of contractors to charge taxpayers for compensation 

that far exceeds $200,000 per employee, costing taxpayers tens of billions of dollars. In fact, OFPP is 

poised to significantly raise the current cap on taxpayer reimbursement of each contractor's five most 

lavishly compensated employees from almost $700,000 annually to take into account an overdue hike 

from 2011 and an upcoming hike in 2012. That contrasts with the position taken by many 

Congressional Republicans who want to extend the freeze on federal employee pay for an additional 

three years without asking millionaire contractors to make any sacrifices. 

Why do OMB and the Congress insist on imposing significant sacrifices on even the most modestly-paid 

federal employees, while allowing almost every single upper-income contractor to make no sacrifice 

whatsoever? The federal government employs hundreds of thousands of talented doctors, scientists, 

100JOJ905 DOC· } 11 
72 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.050

and other award-winning professionals who are the most qualified in their fields. Why is it necessary for 

taxpayers to spend tens of billions of dollars on overpaid contractors instead of on reliable, experienced, 

and inexpensive federal employees? 

Now, it is time for the richest contractors to make modest sacrifices. Currently, contractors can charge 

taxpayers up to $693,000 annually for the compensation of a single employee. Since 1998, the 

compensation cap applicable to government contracts has more than doubled, from an egregious 

$340,650 in 1998 to an unconscionable $693,951 in 2010. From 1998 to 2010 the benchmark has grown 

53 percent faster than the rate of inflation! Of course, contractors often make millions of dollars per 

year because their firms richly supplement the already generous compensation provided by taxpayers 

with fees and profits earned on federal contracts. AFGE is not proposing to limit contractor incomes; 

rather, we propose capping how much taxpayers must contribute towards contractor compensation. A 

former senior DCAA executive estimates that a cap of $200,000 for all contractors would save $50 billion 

over ten years. 

Special praise should be given to Senators Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Charles Grassley (R-IA) for 

successfully offering an amendment to the Senate version of the FY12 National Defense Authorization 

Act to cap taxpayer reimbursement for contractors at $400,000 annually. (The cosponsorship of 

Chairwoman McCaskill and Senator Tester of this amendment is much appreciated by AFGE.) Although 

their dollar cap disappeared in the subsequent House-Senate conference, the two Senators were at least 

ultimately successful in subjecting all DoD contractors to the current $693,000 cap. Previously, only the 

top five most lavishly compensated employees at each contractor were subject to the cap. Senators 

Boxer and Grassley recently introduced legislation IS. 2198) to cap compensation for all contractors at 

$400,000. Representative Paul Tonko (D-NY) also deserves praise for introducing legislation (H.R. 2980) 

to cap compensation for all contractors at $200,000. 

6. ABOLISH OFPP 

OFPP should be abolished and its responsibilities transferred to OMB's resource management offices 

(RMO's). It's not that what OFPP does isn't important. In fact, what OFPP does is of the utmost 

importance. That's why procurement and sourcing decisions shouldn't be made by an understaffed and 

increasingly isolated bureaucracy that has been all but taken over by the industry it is supposed to be 

regulating. Contractors are OFPP's one consistent constituency. Even the most independent-minded 

career staff would be beaten down by the relentless lobbying of a notoriously self-interested industry. 

If procurement and sourcing decisions were made in the context of OMB's larger budget and 

management responsibilities, instead of in isolation, there is no question that the ability of contractors 

to influence those decisions would be greatly reduced, and that as a result those decisions would 

promote better management and take into account their impact on the budget. Of course, 

specialization is a virtue. However, in this instance, that specialization has been commandeered so that 

it is being consistently used to promote private interests at the expense of the public good. AFGE is not 

advocating that OMB stop making procurement and sourcing policy. However, it is clear that the public 

interest would be better served if those decisions were integrated into OMB's overall budget and 

management responsibilities. 

(OOJOJ905.DOC· ) 12 
73 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.051

Why should the contractor-controlled OFPP be allowed to make decisions about the inventories of 

service contracts? The federal government spends hundreds of billions of dollars annually on service 

contracts, but we can't identify and control those costs, let alone systematically identify contracts that 

cost too much or include inappropriate functions. These inventories would allow agencies, for the first 

time, to control and rationalize huge parts of their budgets. At a time of downsizing, such newfound 

capabilities would be almost heaven-sent. We know why contractors oppose these inventories-with 

increased visibility inevitably comes increased accountability. But why should OFPP identify with 

contractors instead of ta~payers? OFPP opposes DoD's attempt to establish a department-wide 

inventory because ofthe "burden" imposed on contractors. Apparently it's a "burden" for contractors 

to provide ta~payers with cost data for the contracts they pay for, even though the provision of such 

information is required by law. Even contractors who provide services to the Army, whose inventory 

methodology is the basis for DoD's own inventory methodology, scoff at that nonsense. And what of 

the non-DoD contract inventories? They have become little more than painfully incomplete, check-thebo~ inventories that are divorced from their agencies' budget and management agendae. The Army is 

using its inventory to eliminate wasteful and duplicative contracts and identify those contracts that 

include inappropriate functions. How can that happen in the non-DoD agencies with OFPP calling the 

shots? Does anyone believe agencies would not have been much closer towards establishing reliable 

and comprehensive inventories that would have been integrated into their management processes if 

this policy had not been driven-i.e., derailed-by OFPP? 

Why should OFPP be responsible for defining inherently governmental, "closely associated", and 

critical? Only contractors were pleased by OFPP's belated reaffirmation of the inadequate status quo 

that has left contractors supervising other contractors and contractors making policy, preparing 

budgets, and writing regulations. Is it any wonder that OFPP's definitions focused almost e~clusively on 

acquisition and information technology functions, because of their parochial relation to the office's 

mission, while ignoring the myriad other functions that have been undermined by over-reliance on 

contractors? And look at what's happened after the definitions were promulgated? Virtually nothing. 

Has OFPP set deadlines for agencies to end their reliance on contractors for inherently governmental 

functions or to review contracts that include "closely associated" or critical functions to see if they 

should be corrected or insourced? Of course not. That would not be in the interests of OFPP's clients. 

Why has no gUidance been issued that would make it easy for agencies to substitute federal employees 

when they'd be cheaper than contractors? At a time when dollars are few, but service contracting 

consumes a huge part of discretionary spending, it is almost unimaginable that cost-based insourcing 

guidance has not been issued, especially when an independent study has shown that contractors usually 

cost almost twice as much as federal employees. Why does OFPP invest inordinate resources in "mythbusting" in order to create an even more rela~ed and informal procurement environment for 

contractors, but never bother to uphold taxpayer interests by issuing guidance to enforce statutory 

prohibitions against direct conversions? Does anyone reasonably believe that, in both instances, 

ta~payers would not have fared better had such decisions been made by OMB's RMO's, which have to 

take into account broader interests than OFPP? 

{OOJOJ905 DOC - I 13 
74 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.052

Does anyone really think that OFPP's handling of contractor compensation is a model of good 

government and sound economy? It is one thing to carry out a bad law, but another to lobby against 

efforts to reform that law, as OFPP did last year in fighting back against the Boxer-Grassley amendment 

to cap contractor compensation at a more reasonable $400,000 per annum. If policy on contractor 

compensation were not made in a contractor-controlled bureaucratic citadel like OFPP, is it not more 

likely that the executive branch would have proposed significant reform on its own a long time ago? 

Would the budget side of OMB really have left $50 billion in unnecessarily lavish contractor 

compensation on the table the way OFPP has? 

OFPP's credibility is further strained by claims of taxpayer savings from its procurement reforms. OFPP 

has touted an initiative to reduce service contract spending by 15% per year. However, OFPP's claims 

are based on a very small reduction in a sliver of service contracting dollars. The 15% "savings" is based 

on a claim of a $6 billion reduction in "targeted" product and services codes (P5Cs) that amount to only 

$40 billion in overall service contract spending, and the $40 billion baseline represents only 12% of all 

service contract spending! So, the actual savings in service contract spending--if any is to be claimed at 

all-is less than 2%. In terms of overall federal contract spending, it is only about 1%. Changes in 

"contracting policy" have little to no impact on such a remarkably small change in spending. Much more 

relevant to these changes are factors such as appropriations availability, programmatic requirements, 

agency mission changes, and any number of factors that determine an agency's need for contracted 

services. 

No discussion of OFPP's work on behalf of contractor interests would be complete without some 

mention of OFPP's monumental role in helping to diminish and undermine the work of the Cost 

Accounting Standards (CAS) Board. The CAS Board, which was originally chaired by the Comptroller 

General, was responsible for issuing accounting principles applicable to larger government contracts. 

During the past ten to fifteen years, unless prompted by specific Congressional action, the sole interest 

that OFPP has shown in the work of the CAS Board seems to be centered around limiting CAS 

applicability to the most narrow set of contracts and contractors possible, thus potentially costing 

taxpayers billions of dollars in improperly allocated costs. OFPP has openly flouted the CAS Board 

statute by appointing "accounting" industry members who were little more than shills for contractor 

interests. OFPP has sought to ignore the basic statutory appointment process by making appointments 

that do not even conform to the term requirements contained in the statute (4 years term 

appointments). The previous administrator justified ignoring the statutory requirements by claiming 

that he wanted to "stagger" the CAS Board member terms, which although perhaps a laudable goal, was 

done in manner contrary to the statutory requirements. Under the notorious leadership of a former 

administrator, who is currently serving a sentence in a federal penitentiary, OFPP allowed the CAS Board 

to function with "members" who had not been duly appointed at the time of their initial meetings. As 

an auditor, Chairwoman McCaskill, you may be surprised and disappointed by the mockery that OFPP 

has made of this once proud accounting standards setting entity. 

Chairwoman McCaskill, thanks very much for inviting AFGE to provide our views about the important 

issues raised by this hearing. In choosing not to participate, OMB has missed a very significant 

opportunity to work with you to make sourcing decisions more accountable to taxpayers. 

(0030J905DOC - ) 14 
75 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.053

APPENDIX: AFGE REVIEW OF GAO CRITIQUE OF DOD A-76 REPORT (GAO-1l-923R) 

In Section 325 of the FY10 National Defense Authorization Act (NOAA), the use of the OMB Circular A-76 

privatization process was suspended in 000 until the department finally complied with an FY08 NOAA 

requirement to inventory its service contracts and submitted a report to Congress on how it would 

address longstanding problems in the A-76 privatization process that have been identified by the 000 

IG, GAO, and others. In that same law, GAO was charged with assessing DoD's report. 

According to GAO, 000 acknowledges it has not complied with the inventory requirement: "000 officials 

told us that the accuracy of the service contracts inventory is improving, but it is not ready to be 

certified." (Page 11) As Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) noted: "In the 

past, we've found that praposed cuts to contract services are nearly impossible to enforce because 

expenditures for service contracting are invisible in the deportment's budget. For this reason, (the FYOB 

NOAA) required that the the budget justification documents clearly and separately identify the amounts 

requested in each budget account for procurement of services. The department has not yet complied 

with that requirement." 

While acknowledging that 000 had submitted its A-76 report in June 2011, thus complying with the 

report requirement, GAO did express remaining concern about two very longstanding problems with the 

A-76 process, specifically the tracking of costs and savings as well as the calculation of in-house 

overhead costs. Unfortunately, GAO, on too many occasions, failed to critically examine DoD's excuses 

and rationales for not reforming the A-76 process. 

Here are five of the more significant problems in the A-76 process that 000 was supposed to address in 

its report. 

1. Failure to enforce prohibitions against direct conversions (i.e., giving work to contractors 

without first complying with the requirements of a formal cost comparison process): 

000: "(T)he Department has not had an opportunity to 'comply' with the changes directed by Sec 321" 

because of the prohibitions imposed against the use of A-76. (Page 5) 

GAO: "Should the current moratorium on competitions be lifted, DoD's report states the department will 

not have any issues implementing and complying with the report." (Page 7) 

AFGE: Prohibitions against direct conversions in 000 were first imposed in the Defense Appropriations 

Bill, through annual general provisions, starting in FY04; the FY06 NOAA included a prohibition in Title 

10. These laws prohibited 000 from giving work to contractors without first complying with the 

requirements of a formal cost comparison process for functions with more than 10 employees. In the 

FYlO NOAA and Defense Appropriations Act, the exceptions for functions involving 10 or fewer 

employees were eliminated. 

(003039()S.DOC· l 15 
76 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.054

It is very surprising that GAO would let pass DoD's fundamentally wrong assertion that it "has not had 

an opportunity to 'comply"'. The danger of direct conversions exists whether A-76 studies are being 

undertaken or the process has been prohibited. Indeed, that is why the Army, on its own, issued 

guidance against direct conversions in May 2011, i.e., while the A-76 prohibition is still in effect, 

helpfully pointing out that, "(I)t is imperative that that as the Army implements the results of its 

organizational assessments, we must be particularly vigilant in complying with statute and prevent any 

inappropriate canversion of work to can tract performance"." Unfortunately, this well-intentioned effort 

has not succeeded in eliminating direct conversions within the Army. Even 000 knew-unlike GAO, 

apparently-it had an "oppartunity to comply". Unfortunately, it wasn't until December 2011 that 

department-wide guidance was issued, i.e., again while the A-76 moratorium is still in effect. Worse, 

this gUidance appears to have little effect. In order to comply with the arbitrary and arguably illegal 

FYlO cap on the civilian workforce, work performed by civilian employees is not just being illegally 

directly converted to contractor performance but also directly converted to military performance as 

well. That's not AFGE propaganda. The issuance of department wide guidance in the case of contractor 

direct conversions and military direct conversions is an implicit acknowledgement that these practices 

are widespread. 

Conclusion: Should 000 comply with the law that prohibits giving work to contractors without first 

conducting formal cost comparisons? Even though such prohibitions have been in effect since 2004, 

both before and during the current A-76 moratorium, 000 claimed it hasn't had the opportunity to 

comply. GAO Simply restates DoD's position. AFGE thinks responsible lawmakers will hold 000 to a 

higher standard. 

2. Failure to tracking costs and savings: 

000: We believe "that the Department af Defense Commercial Activities Management Infarmation 

System (DCAM/S) is a camprehensive and reliable system for the Department to track the cost and 

quality of the performance af functions in public-private competitions". (Page 11) 

GAO: "(C)oncerns remain ... For example, the 000 report stated that upgrades to the current system used 

to track data on public-private competitions have been made, but because of the moratorium, 000 has 

not reviewed whether data reliability and accuracy actually has improved." (Page 2) 

AFGE: Concern about DoD's inability to track costs and savings is not a recent phenomenon: "000 hod 

not effectively implemented a system to track and assess the cost of the performance of functions under 

the competitive sourcing program .. .'N" That 000 can do nothing more but serve up the same blithe 

assurances that they have finally fixed the problems-at the same time the rest of the department's 

accounting problems have achieved such notoriety-is, obviously, troubling. 

However, GAO failed to remind readers of the concerns it had expressed as recently as 2008 that the A76 process is systemically flawed because it fails to take into account significant costs of conducting 

privatization studies: 

100303905 DOC - } 16 
77 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.055

"OMB does not require agencies to report these costs (the time in-house stoff spent on 

competition activities, precompetition planning, certain tronsition costs, and 

pastcompetition review activities) because they reflect what would be incurred as port of on 

agency's typical management responsibilities. 

However, our analysis shows that these costs can be substantial and that excluding them 

overstates savings achieved by competitive sourcing. For example, we found that including 

in-house stoff time spent on competition activities would have doubled the costs reported 

for one competition ... 

"We have previously reported that other federal agencies-the Deportment of Defense 

(DoD) and the Deportment of Agriculture's (USDA) Forest Service, in particular-did not 

develop comprehensive estimates for the costs associated with competitive sourcing. This 

report identifies similar issues at the Deportment of Lobar. Without a better system to 

assess performance and comprehensively track aI/ the costs associated with competitive 

sourcing, DoL cannot reliably assess whether competitive sourcing truly provides the best 

deal/or the taxpayer.""''; (Emphasis added) 

Conclusion: Should 000 finally be required to track the costs and savings from conducting A-76 

privatization studies? 000, without proof, says all's well. GAO expresses concern about the reliability of 

DoD's assurances. However, GAO never discussed the findings it had reported earlier about systemic 

problems in the A-76 process that leave significant costs of conducting privatization studies 

unaccounted for. As OMB would acknowledge, these systemic problems have not been corrected, 

which may explain why OMB has not called for repeal of the government-wide A-76 prohibition. 

3. Inability to ensure that actual costs of carrying out A-76 studies don't exceed guesstimated 

savings: 

000: "QUSD(P&R) does not find a need for any significant changes at this time to the conversion 

differential ... " (Page 13) 

GAO: "DoD's report states that the cost differential currently in effect is on appropriate methodology. 

The Commercial Activities Panel also viewed the differential as a reasonable way to toke into account the 

costs of the disruption and risk of converting from the public to the private sector." (Page 9) 

AFGE: 000 incurs significant costs in conducting A-76 studies. Some of those costs are non-quantifiable 

(e.g., "disruption and decreased productivity", per A-76) and some are quantifiable (e.g., hiring outside 

consultants, diverting employees from their usual work to staff the studies). By its very definition, the A76 cost differential includes only non-quantifiable costs: "The conversion differential precludes 

conversions based on marginal estimated savings, and captures non-quantifiable costs related to a 

conversion, such as disruption and decreased productivity." In order to actually "preclude conversions 

based on marginal estimated savings", i.e., ensure that guesstimated savings are not offset or exceeded 

by real costs, many believe, including AFGE, it is necessary that the minimum cost differential be 

increased in order to also take into account quantifiable costs. 

{OOJOJ905 DOC - 1 17 
78 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.056

GAO never even addresses this point, although it has earlier raised concerns, as discussed above, that 

the A-76 process fails to take into account significant quantitative costs, which can exceed guesstimated 

savings. GAO's invocation of the Commercial Activities Panel is as troubling as it is misleading. This 

Panel was deliberately stacked with contractors and Bush Administration officials, leaving pro-federal 

employee representatives outnumbered, 8-4. Nevertheless, the minimum cost differential as it is 

currently formulated to capture only non-quantitative costs was not included in the principles adopted 

unanimously by the panel. Moreover, the endorsement of the minimum cost differential by the procontractor majority acknowledged that it did not take into account quantitative costs: " ... the Panel views 

that differential as a reasonable way, consistent with the principles, to take into account the disruption 

and risk entailed in converting between the public and private sectors.";' (Emphasis added) 

Conclusion: Should we prevent the actual quantitative costs of conducting privatization studies from 

exceeding the guesstimated savings? DoD says no. GAO, although it has acknowledged earlier that 

quantitative costs can exceed guesstimated savings, evidently doesn't care. AFGE thinks responsible 

lawmakers will feel otherwise. 

4. Failing to prevent federal employees from being put at a competitive disadvantage through 

the imposition of excessive overhead charges: 

DoD: "Clear definitions for overhead, general and administrative costs, operations overhead, indirect 

cost, and indirect labor now exist for costing in 000 public-private competitions." (Page 13) 

GAO: "(U)ntil actuol overhead costs are used to develop a more meaningful standard overhead rate, the 

magnitude of savings expected from public-private competitions will be imprecise and competition 

decisions could continue to be controversial. We recommended that OMB and 000 develop a 

methodology to determine appropriate overhead rates. The agencies did not agree with our 

recommendation." (Page 9) 

AFGE: In 2003, the IG reported that an A-76 study involving more than 600 civilian employees had been 

wrongly decided because tens of millions of dollars in nonexistent overhead costs had been added to 

the in-house bid. DoD was required to add such costs because of an A-76 rule that automatically 

charges all in-house bids in all agencies with overhead costs that equal 12% of in-house personnel costs. 

Based on that scandal, the IG recommended that DoD either concoct a formula for overhead costs that 

is empirically based or specifically calculate in-house overhead for each A-76 study: 

As a result, multimillion-dollar decisions are based, in part, on a factor not supported by 

data ... Unless 000 develops a supportable rate or an olternative method to colculate a fair 

and reasonable rote, the results of future competitions will be questionoble ... "x 

DoD dismissed those recommendations then, and, now, eight years later, it is still dismissing them. 

Instead of judging DoD on its report, as required by the law, GAO allows DoD to, in effect, take the test 

over again by noting that DoD, after submitting its A-76 report in June, had begun in August a review of 

"procedures used to estimate and compare costs of service contracts". (Page 9) Why had DoD begun 

this review after submitting its A-76 report? Given that the overhead rate is an integral part of the OMB 

{OOJOJ905 DOC - } 18 
79 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.057

Circular A-76, which is, obviously, overseen by OMB, how can 000 unilaterally change it? Surprisingly, 

GAO never bothers to ask such questions. 

Conclusion: Should federal employees be charged for their actual overhead costs? GAO and the IG have 

reported that federal employees can be overcharged for their actual overhead costs under A-76. 

Officially, 000 says there is no need for reform. Off the record and after submitting its A-76 report, 000 

tells GAO it will look into the matter-ll years after the IG made its recommendation. 000 has to win 

back our trust, so shouldn't the order be reversed-Le., make reforms and comply with the law before 

being given permission to crank up the broken A-76 machinery? Of course, 000 cannot change the 

overhead rate because it is part ofthe OMB Circular A-76, not the 000 Circular A-76. 

5. Failing to comply with the prohibition against automatically recompeting in-house workforces: 

000: "Current 000 policies ore odequate to implement the" prohibition against automotic 

recompetitions ... "(D)ue to the moratoriums, and decreosed emphasis on pUblic-private competitions 

under the current Administration, the draft revision of the Department's public-private competition 

policy further clarifying this policy has been suspended." (Page 14) 

GAO: "000'5 report recommended that the deportment issue clarifying guidance regarding the statutory 

limitations on recompetitions and how to correctly apply them ... " (Page 10) 

AFGE: Under the OMB Circular A-76 process, 000 is required to recompete under A-76 all in-house 

activities within five years of their previous winning A-76 bids except in very limited circumstances. 

Needless to say, this automatic recompetition rule does not apply to contractors who win A-76 studies. 

Contractor cheerleaders invariably attempt to justify this obvious inequity by claiming that contractors 

would have to compete against other contractors, even if they are spared having to compete against 

civilian employees. However, as reported by GAO and the IG, contractors frequently win contracts on a 

sole-source basis or with limited competition. Congress prohibited automatic recompetition of in-house 

activities because of concern over the inequity as well as the wastefulness." 

000 acknowledges that it has failed to implement the prohibitions against automatic recompetitions, 

but blames Congress for enacting prohibitions against undertaking new A-76 studies. This excuse is as 

perverse as it is disingenuous. The prohibition against automatic A-76 recompetitions in 000, which 

was included in the FY08 NOAA, was enacted on January 28, 2008. The government-wide prohibition 

against undertaking new A-76 studies, which was included in the FY09 Omnibus Appropriations Act, was 

enacted on March 11,2009. (The DoD-specific prohibition against undertaking new A-76 studies, which 

was included in the FYlO NOAA, was enacted on October 28, 2009.) 000 had more than one year to 

implement the automatic recompetition prohibition. Indeed, DoD's failure to implement that law was 

considered by lawmakers to be yet another reason to impose the government-wide and DoD-specific A76 suspensions. It is unfortunate that GAO chose not to point this out. 

(OOJOJ905DOC - ) 19 
80 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.058

GAO also failed to pOint out that the automatic recompetition rule is part of the OMB Circular A-76, 

which is something DoD can't change on its own, even if so inclined. It is surprising that neither DoD in 

its report nor GAO in its critique of that report ever acknowledged the obvious inequity of A-76 

automatically recompeting federal employees but not contractors. As Chairman Levin has declared: 

"This rule is fundamentally unfair". 

Conclusion: Should DoD actually implement the prohibition against automatically recompeting DoD inhouse workforces under A-76? DoD has had four years to issue guidance on its own. However, it 

apparently refuses to do so until after the A-76 suspension has been repealed. DoD has to win back our 

trust, so shouldn't the order be reversed-i.e., make reforms and comply with the law before being 

given permission to crank up the A-76 machinery? And should federal employees, but not contractors, 

be automatically recompeted under A-76? DoD and GAO can't be bothered to ask this question, let 

alone answer it satisfactorily. AFGE believes responsible lawmakers will think otherwise. 

'Government Accountability Office, Department of Labor: Better Cost Assessments and Departmentwide Performance Tracking Are Needed to 

Manage Competitive Sourcing Program (GAO~09~14). 

" Department of Defense Inspector Generat 000 Reporting System for the Competitive Sourcing program (O·2006·028). 

"I Government Accountability Office, Department of Labor: Better Cost Assessments and Departmentwide Perlormance Tracking Are Needed to 

Manage Competitive Sourcing Program (GAO~09~14) . 

. y Government Accountability Office, Forest Service: Better Planning, Guidance, and Data are Needed to Improve Management (GAO~08-195). 

~ Department of Defense Inspector General, Public/Private Competition for the Defense Finance and Accounting SeIVice Military Retired and 

Annuitant Pay Functions (D'2003-0S6) . 

... U.S. Army, Update on Converting Certain Functions to Contractor Performance (April 22, 2011). 

y" Department of Defense Inspector Genera!, DoD Reporting System for the Competitive Sourcing Program (D-2006-028). 

viii Government AccountabHiW Office, Department of Labor: Better Cost Assessments and Departmentwide Performance Tracking Are Needed to 

Manage Competitive Sourcing Program (GAO-09-14). 

ox Commercial Activities Panel, Improving the Sourcing Decisions oj the Government, p. 39. 

, D-2003-056 . 

• 1 Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) spoke eloquently in support of the prohibition when it was considered on the floor, on October 1, 2007: "1 wish to 

focus on one provision of the amendment which addresses a fundamental element of fairness in competition between the private and public 

sectors. OMB circular A~76, which governs public-private competitions, establlshes rules for what happens after one side or the other wins a 

competition. If the private sector wins a competition, the work stays in the private sector forever. Jf the pubJic sector wins, however, the work 

must be subject to a new competition within 5 years. Attachment B to OMB circular A-76 specifically states that if the public sector competltor 

wins a competition, "an agency shall complete another ... competitlon of the activity by the end of the last performance period" in the 

performance agreement. This rule is fundamentally unfair. It also undermines the morale of Federal civilian employees by contributing to the 

view of clvi/servants as second~class citizens. At a time when the Department of Defense should be recruiting thousands of new civilian 

employees to address a human capital crisiS, the rule ls dearly contrary to the Department's own interests. The Kennedy-Mikulski amendment 

would address this problem by stating that OMB may not require the Department of Defense to conduct a new public~private competition 

within any specified period of time after the public sector win'S a competition. That is the right answer. DOD's human capital poliCies should be 

driven by the Department's human capita! needs--not by arbitrary policies established by the Office of Management and Budget. So I hope our 

colleagues will support the Kennedy-Mikulski amendment." 

{OOJ03905DOC - } 20 
81 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.059

Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight 

Committee on Homeland Security & Government Affairs 

"Contractors: How Much Are They Costing the Government?" 

March 29, 2012 

Written Testimony 

Roger D. Waldron, President 

The Coalition for Government Procurement 
82 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.060

Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting The Coalition for Government Procurement (the "Coalition") to 

provide written testimony. It is our privilege to assist you in the important task of 

assessing and improving the use of data to develop best practices around decisions to 

utilize contractors. Your efforts today continue a tradition in the subcommittee of 

seeking to improve the workings of government contracts. In this regard, the Coalition 

commends the leadership and members of the Committee on Homeland Security & 

Government Affairs for their contributions to government acquisition, specifically with 

regard to enhancing competition under the GSA Multiple-Award Schedule contracts. 

The Coalition for Government Procurement is a non-profit association of 

approximately 300 firms selling commercial services and products to the Federal 

Government. Our members collectively account for approximately 70% of the sales 

generated through the GSA Multiple Award Schedules (MAS) program and about half 

of the commercial item solutions purchased annually by the Federal Government. 

Coalition members include small, medium, and large business concerns, and we are 

proud to have worked with Government officials over the past 30 years towards the 

mutual goal of common sense acquisition. 

I. Accounting for and Analyzing the Costs of Contractors vs. Federal 

Employees 

With regard to how the Government accounts for and analyzes the cost of contractors 

versus that of federal employees, the Coalition believes that improved cost analysis 

ultimately leads to better value for the Government, industry, and the American 

taxpayer. 

Each agency has its own unique mission along with its own distinct 

requirements. It is not surprising, then, that the composition of each agency's workforce 

is inherently varied and unique. An agency will consider outsourcing when it does not 

believe it has the required capability in-house, but the question concerning government 

insourcing versus outsourcing is, indeed, nuanced and complex. When making 

sourcing decisions, an agency must understand its unique mission requirements and 

strategically determine which factors are important in meeting that mission. In other 

words, sourcing decisions are mission-driven. 

The Acquisition Advisory Panel was authorized by Section 1423 of the Services 

Acquisition Reform Act of 2003 and enacted as part of the National Defense 

1 
83 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.061

Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2004. Known as the "SARA Pane!," it published its 

report in January 2007. On this subject, it notes, 

Private sector companies spend significant amounts of time and resources 

developing business cases for services acquisition. They get the 

stakeholders involved and use highly qualified personnel to develop the 

business cases. Business case development helps to prevent false tradeoffs. Cost reduction is just one component of the business cases. They have 

found that too much focus on cost reduction can lead to missed 

opportunities and, in some cases, reduce service quality in other areas of 

the organization. Stated differently, total cost of service acquisition does 

not equal total value captured through sourcing. (SARA Panel Report, 

2007, p. 88) 

Likewise, agencies should employ detailed and robust business case analysis when 

making sourcing decisions. Business case analysis that weighs value and not only cost, 

is vital to all agencies in determining how to meet their individual missions. 

With the exception of inherently governmental functions, which understandably 

should be performed by federal employees, the Government should weigh a variety of 

factors when either outsourcing or insourcing. As stated, important factors for agency 

missions vary. In 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on 

Warfighter Support: A Cost Comparison of Using State Department Employees versus 

Contractors for Security Services in Iraq stated that, 

There are other factors that may playa role in the decision of whether to perform 

security services with federal employees or contractors. For example, it generally 

takes more time to hire and train enough federal employees than to acquire 

contractors. Additionally, the government could potentially be faced with having 

to take actions to reduce the number of government personnel hired if they are 

no longer needed. In contrast, if the need for the contract no longer existed, the 

Government could terminate the contract. (GAO-lO-266R, Warfighter Support, 

p.ll) 

For some agencies, flexibility and agility is paramount, and for others it is not. Each 

agency should carefully weigh these unique factors through business case analysis 

when making sourcing determinations. 

2 
84 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.062

In addition to utilizing business case analysis to understand the variety of factors 

at play when making sourcing decisions, the Government should make an effort to 

increase the effectiveness of its workforce, specifically its program managers. As noted 

in former Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy Dan Gordon's May 2010 

testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Government Management, it is 

critical that "Federal employees possess the appropriate training, experience, and 

expertise to understand the agency's requirements, formulate alternatives, [and] 

manage the work product." Management that has an intricate understanding of the 

needs of the agency and the capacity to make sound business decisions through 

effective analysis generally will benefit the federal procurement process. A well-trained 

and effective program manager that understands the necessary requirements will 

determine how a function should be sourced better than one that lacks these abilities. 

Along these lines, as much as possible, acquisition professionals should be 

aligned and committed to programs during their performance life. The benefit of this 

alignment and commitment to programs may seem somewhat intangible, but it is vital 

to performance. A stable team develops a working dynamic that enhances program 

performance. Equally as important, the presence of professionals over the long-term 

assures the development of a program's institutional memory, allowing contract 

performance issues to be identified and addressed quickly on the basis of program 

precedent. 

II. Controlling the Cost of Contracting 

A. Improved Requirements Development 

Essential to controlling the cost of contracting is the development of sound 

requirements that communicate clearly and effecJively the needs of the agency. 

Improved requirements development enhances competition, which, in turn, will 

provide the best value to the Government. The SARA Panel stressed that, 

Commercial organizations invest the time and resources necessary to understand 

and define their requirements. They use multidisciplinary teams to plan their 

procurements, conduct competitions for award, and monitor contract 

performance. They rely on well-defined requirements and competitive awards to 

reduce prices and to obtain innovative, high quality goods and services. 

3 
85 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.063

Procurements with clear requirements are far more likely to meet customer 

needs and be successful in execution. (SARA Panel, 2007, p. 87) 

Similar to the practices in the commercial marketplace, the Government should 

endeavor to produce quality requirements for vendors in order to bolster competition 

and control costs. 

There is a positive correlation between the quality of requirements development 

and the value of the service or good being procured. Clear, well-crafted requirements 

lead to robust vendor competition, high-quality proposals, low costs and high value to 

the Government. In order to achieve this level of effectiveness, the Coalition 

recommends implementing the SARA Panel's recommendation that agencies support 

requirements by establishing centers of expertise in requirements analysis and 

development. In addition, as the SARA Panel recommended, program managers 

and/ or users should be required to sign off on complex requirements before an 

acquisition moves forward. 

If the government wishes to control the cost of contracting, it needs to strengthen 

its requirements development by enhancing the applicable expertise available and 

focusing its efforts. The government has taken steps to improve requirements 

development. In particular, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy's "Myth-Busters" 

initiative to improve government-industry communications, particularly during the 

requirements development phase of an acquisition, has the potential for improving 

contracting and delivering greater value for government and the taxpayer. 

B. Reducing Contract Duplication 

The Coalition believes that the Federal Government has a significant opportunity 

to control costs associated with contracting by reducing unnecessary contract 

duplication. This opportunity is consistent with Congress' current objective to reduce 

program duplication across agencies in order to achieve greater efficiencies of 

operations. As highlighted in GAO's February 2012 report on Opportunities to Reduce 

Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Reduce Revenue, duplicative 

efforts and programs across Government lead to redundant inefficiencies. In the case of 

the federal acquisition system, these inefficiencies lead to increased Government and 

industry costs, costs that are ultimately borne by the taxpayer. 

4 
86 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.064

Contract duplication refers to the prevalence of contracts that offer the same or 

similar services and products across the Federal Government. Duplicative contracts 

increase bid and proposal costs and contract administrative costs for both Government 

and industry, costs that could be avoided through greater use of interagency contracts. 

As such, addressing the redundancies involved in establishing and managing multiple 

contracts for the same or similar services and products would provide Government and 

industry with significant reductions in costs. 

In particular, duplication should be reduced through increased use of existing 

government-wide contract vehicles when there is an opportunity to realize cost savings. 

Government-wide multiple award contracts, such as the GSA Schedules program, 

provide a streamlined competitive ordering process that can save both the public and 

private sectors time and money associated with bid, proposal, and contract 

administration. The use of these pre-negotiated contracts allows the ordering activity to 

focus on requirements development rather than the administrative aspects associated 

with setting up an entirely new contract. Moreover, the Schedules enhance competitive 

contracting opportunities for small businesses. Indeed, with small business sales of over 

30 percent, the Schedules program annually exceeds the government wide goal of 23 

percent for small business contracting and represents the largest small business 

contracting program in government. 

There are tools already available to the Government to reduce significantly 

contract duplication and the unnecessary costs associated with that duplication. A 

regulatory preference already exists for utilizing GSA Federal Supply Schedules in the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR 8.002). Additional guidance reminding 

contracting officers that the Federal Supply Schedules have priority over other 

commercial sources would help to reverse the current trend where agencies are 

developing their own contract vehicles for the same or similar services that are already 

offered under the GSA Schedules. Also, as part of the acquisition planning process, 

contracting officers should be required to document and explain why existing contract 

vehicles do not meet an agency's needs prior to establishing new contracts. This 

explanation should specifically make the case for why a new contract is the best 

procurement method to meet the Government's needs. We believe that both proposals 

are feasible within the current acquisition system and have the potential to result in 

huge cost savings for the Government. 

5 
87 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.065

Ill. Conclusion 

The Coalition believes that thoughtful business case analysis that weighs each 

agency's unique mission requirements when sourcing decisions are made is crucial to 

better accounting for and analyzing the costs associated with the use of contractors 

versus federal employees. We also urge the Government to enhance its requirements 

development process to ensure increased competition and therefore lower costs. In 

short, we believe that these objectives can be achieved by: 

1. Establishing a performance and financial business cases analysis framework. 

2. Establishing program management certification requirements. 

3. Setting clear Statements of Work with measurable outcomes. 

4. Evaluating contract awards based on best value solutions that meet welldeveloped technical requirements. 

5. Avoiding contract duplication by utilizing Federal Supply Schedules per FAR 

8.002 and requiring contracting officers to document why existing contract 

vehicles do not meet an agency's needs prior to establishing new contracts. 

Again, the Coalition thanks the Subcommittee for this opportunity to share our 

thoughts and to work to support the procurement community. We appreciate your 

continued commitment to enhancing the effectiveness of government contracting and 

look forward to continuing to partner with you to provide best value to the American 

taxpayer. Please feel free to contact us if you have any questions or concerns you wish 

to discuss. 

6 
88 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.066

tlNTEU 

Statement of Colleen M. Kelley 

National President 

National Treasury Employees Union 

On 

"Contractors: How Much Are They Costing the 

Government?" 

Submitted to 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight 

March 29, 2012 

1750 H Street, N. W .• Washington, D.C. 20006 • (202) 572-5500 
89 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.067

Chairwoman McCaskill, Ranking Member Portman, and distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for allowing me to provide comments on the costs of 

federal contracting. As President ofthe National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), I have the 

honor of representing over 150,000 federal workers in 31 federal agencies and departments. 

Madam Chairwoman, NTEU believes that in the current fiscal crisis, it is critical that the 

federal government look for ways to achieve cost savings wherever possible and to root out 

waste, fraud and abuse wherever they find it. One way in which NTEU believes that the federal 

government can best accomplish this is to reform the federal contracting process. 

As you know, in recent years there has been an explosion in contract spending. This was 

primarily due to the previous administration's competitive sourcing agenda in which the jobs of 

federal employees were specifically targeted for public-private competition. As part of that 

effort, the rules governing these competitions were overhauled, quotas set for competed jobs, and 

grades given to agencies on their efforts in conducting competitions. The result of those efforts 

has been waste, fraud and widespread abuse in the contracting system and an over-reliance on 

federal contractors that has resulted in contractors performing functions that are clearly 

inherently governmental. 

According to OMB, between 2000 and 2008, spending on Government contracts more 

than doubled, reaching over $500 billion in 20m!. Of greater concern was the amount of money 

spent on contracts awarded with no or inadequate competition during that period. According to 

OMB, total spending on contracts awarded without competition increased significantly from $73 

billion in FY 2000 to $173 billion in FY 2008. Dollars obligated under contracts that were open 

to competition, but generated only one bid, also increased dramatically from $14 billion in FY 

2000 to $ 67 billion in FY 2008. While there has been some fluctuation over the years, the 

percentage of contracts granted on a non-competitive basis has been in the range of 31 to 35 

percent. 

The explosion in contract spending has also resulted in a drastic increase in the size of the 

contract workforce, now estimated to be roughly five times the size of the civil service. With 

agencies so reliant on federal contractors, the in-house capacity of agencies to perform many 

critical functions has been eroded, jeopardizing their ability to accomplish their missions. It has 

also resulted in the outsourcing to contractors of functions that are inherently governmental or 

closely associated to inherently governmental functions. 

One of the most egregious examples of the outsourcing of inherently governmental 

functions was the 2006 IRS private tax collection program. The program, under which private 

collection agencies were paid to collect taxes on a commission basis, was an unmitigated 

disaster. The program resulted in a net loss of almost $5 million to the federal government and 

lead to taxpayer abuse. Further, at one juncture in the program, the IRS had to assign 65 of its 

own employees to oversee the work of just 75 private collection agency employees. Given the 

obvious failures of this undertaking, and in the face of strong opposition by NTEU and a broad 

range of consumer and public interest groups, Congress voted to cut off funding for the program. 

Then, in March 2009, after conducting a month-long, comprehensive review of the program, 

including the cost-effectiveness of the initiative, the IRS announced it was ending the program. 
90 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.068

EFFORTS TO REFORM FEDERAL CONTRACTING 

Madam Chairwoman, after taking office in 2009, President Obama quickly recognized 

that the federal contracting system was rife with waste, fraud and abuse and quickly took steps to 

reform the system. In 2009, the President directed agencies to save $40 billion in contracting 

annually by the end of2011 and apply fiscally responsible acquisition practices that better 

protect taxpayers from waste and cost overruns. The President's mandate has instilled a new 

sense of accountability in agencies, and the results are clear: after over a decade of dramatic 

contract growth that saw annual procurement budgets increase at an average rate of 12% per year 

between FYs 2000 and 2008, and by as much as 22 percent in a single year, the Administration 

has turned the tide and reduced contract spending. 

OMB recently reported that federal agencies spent nearly $80B less in FY 2010 than they 

would have spent had contract spending continued to grow at the same rate it had under the prior 

Administration. At that rate, contract spending would have reached a record $615 billion. And in 

FY 2010, for the first time since 1997, overall contract spending declined from the previous year. 

In FY 2010, spending was $535 billion versus $550 billion in the prior year. 

Agencies have achieved these savings through a combination of strategies including 

ending unnecessary or unaffordable contracts. They have also reduced their reliance on high-risk 

contracts, finding savings by competing contracts that, in the past, were awarded for higher 

prices on a sole-source or "no-bid" basis, as well as moving away from contracts where vendors 

are paid for the amount of time they spend working rather than for what they produce. 

In addition, agencies have been directed to strengthen the acquisition workforce to help 

rebuild the capacity and capability that is needed to achieve and sustain better acquisition 

outcomes and improved government performance. 

While NTEU believes good progress had been made in reforming the contracting 

process, we believe much more can be done. That is why we strongly support continuing the 

current moratorium on new A-76 competitions for federal work until the administration has fully 

implemented its plans to reform the contracting process. The President's budget proposes 

extending the moratorium through FY , I 3 and we would ask congress to support the President's 

request. 

We also ask for your support for S.991, the "Correction of Longstanding Errors in 

Agencies Unsustainable Procurements (CLEAN UP) Act of2011." This critical legislation, 

introduced by Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), would reduce waste, fraud, and abuse in 

government contracting by making substantive and long overdue reforms to the competitive 

sourcing process. These include ensuring that inherently governmental work or work closely 

related to inherently governmental work is actually performed by federal employees and by 

directing agencies to identify where such work is instead being performed by contractors and to 

bring that work back in-house over several years. The bill would also encourage agencies to 

give federal employees opportunities to perform new work and outsourced work that is being 

poorly performed and require agencies to establish contractor inventories to help determine 

which contracts include inherently governmental work, which contracts were awarded without 

competition, and which contracts are being poorly performed. 

2 
91 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.069

This legislation would also bring much needed reform to the discredited OMB Circular 

A-76 competitive sourcing process by ensuring that all costs of conducting competitions are 

considered and by imposing a temporary suspension on the use of A-76 studies until the OMB 

Director and the Inspectors General of the five largest agencies detennine that all of the refonns 

required by this measure have been substantially implemented. 

NTEU strongly believes the "CLEAN UP Act of 20 II" will help refonn and clean up the 

broken competitive sourcing process and ensure that federal sourCing is both fairer to federal 

employees and more accountable to taxpayers and we would ask for your support for this critical 

legislation. 

CAPPING CONTRACTOR SALARIES 

Madam Chairwoman, in addition to obtaining savings by refonning federal contracting 

and focusing on wasteful contract spending, NTEU believes further savings can be achieved by 

capping contractor salary reimbursement rates. Currently government contractors can charge 

taxpayers almost $700,000 for the salaries oftheir top five employees, based on an executive 

compensation benchmark last amended in 1998. Employees of government contractors outside of 

the top five can and do earn taxpayer-funded amounts in excess of the current benchmark. 

Furthennore, according to OMB, unless Congress acts to limit executive compensation, they will 

be forced to raise the compensation level to nearly $750,000 in the near future, in line with the 

congressional mandate to maintain parity with the private sector. 

NTEU strongly believes that at a time when our economy is struggling, millions of 

Americans are unemployed, and our national debt and deficit continue to grow, taxpayers should 

not fund government reimbursements for private contractor salaries that are more than three 

times higher than the pay earned by Cabinet Secretaries. 

Recently, Congress approved the National Defense Authorization Act of2011 which 

extended the current salary reimbursement cap to all defense contractor employees, not just the 

top five employees. While the cap was not lowered and only would apply to defense contractors, 

NTEU believes it is a positive first step in refonning contractor pay. In the Second Session of 

the 112th Congress, NTEU will advocate instituting a cap on salary reimbursement for all 

contractor employees government wide, and lowering that cap to $200,000. Recent studies have 

shown that lowering the cap to $200,000 for all contractor employees would save $50 billion 

over ten years. 

We would note that Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY) has introduced legislation in the House 

H.R. 2980, the "Stop Excessive Payments to Government Contractors Act of2011," that would 

institute a $200,000 cap on salary reimbursement for all contract employees government wide, 

while in the Senate, Sen. Boxer (D-CA) and Sen. Grassley (R-IA) recently introduced bipartisan 

legislation, S.2198, the "Commonsense Contractor Compensation Act of 20 12' which would cap 

salary reimbursements at $400,000, equal to what the President earns. S.2198 was referred to the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs and NTEU strongly urges the 

committee to consider this critical legislation. 

3 
92 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.070

CONCLUSION 

Madam Chairwoman, thank you, again, for the opportunity to submit our views on 

federal contracting. NTEU believes that by continuing to require federal agencies to cut wasteful 

contract spending, reduce overreliance on contractors, and improve oversight and accountability, 

the federal government can better ensure that agencies are able to accomplish their mission and 

provide taxpayers with the best value. 

4 
93 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.071

PROJECT ON 

GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT 

Testimony of POGO's Scott Amcy, General Counsel 

before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on 

Contracting Oversight 

I want to thank Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Portman, and the Subcommittec for 

asking the Project On Government Oversight (POGO)! to submit written testimony about the 

important, but often ignored, issue of service contracting costs. Although therc are many 

initiatives in place to cut federal agency spending and reduce the costs associated with the 

fcderal workforcc, the cost of contractor services has cscaped scrutiny. Such avoidance is 

extremely disturbing because the governmcnt annually spends more taxpayer dollars on 

contractor services than it spends on goods, over $320 billion and $210 billion in FY 2011, 

respeetively. 2 To put that level of spending in perspective, total contract spending was $205 

billion in FY 2000, of which services accounted for $128 billion of the total.) This hearing, titled 

"Contractors: How Much Arc They Costing the Government?" will cast a light on one of the 

most, if not the most, important topics for the government today. 

The Subcommittee will have trouble reaching a definitive answer about whether the hundreds of 

billions of dollars spent on services are being spent wisely. The reason is simple: except in very 

limited circumstances, thc federal government docs not havc accurate data about service 

contracts and the contractors performing thosc services. Moreover, the government docs not have 

a government-wide cost modeling system that compares the life-cyele cost of in-house and 

contractor personnel. As a result, the government often turns to service contractors under the 

misguided assumption that market economies enable contractors to be more cost efficient than 

the government. 

As a matter of introduction, I will strongly encourage this Subcommittee to avoid that trap. A 

POGO study empirically confirmed that, in essence, there arc three labor markets (the private 

sector, the public sector, and the contractor sector) and that salaries, compensation, overhead, 

and profit differ among the three. POGO's findings have been confirmed by isolated cases, 

which we highlight in our report, Bad Business: Billions o.fTaxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring 

Contractors" POGO's report convincingly dispels the myth that private sector market economies 

t Founded in 1981, POGO is a nonpartisan independent watchdog that champions good government reforms. 

POGO's investigations into corruption, misconduct, and conflicts of interest achieve a more effective. accountable, 

open, and ethical federal government. For more information about POGO, please visit www.pogo.org. 

1 USAspending.gov. 

3 USAspending.gov. 

• See Appendix A for a copy of the report, excluding its appendices. POGO Report, Bad Business: Billions (!l 

Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring Contractors, September 13,2011. http://www.pogo.org/pogofiles/reportslcontract-oversightlbad-business/co-gp-20ll0913.html (hereinafter POGO Bad Business report) 
94 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.072

necessarily allow contractors to perform government services at a cost savings to the 

government. The reality is that there are no generalizations that withstand scrutiny as to which 

market sector provides the optimal cost efficiency for any service area, no less all service areas. 

As a result, the federal government must, on a case-by-casc basis, analyze whether it is more 

appropriate and cost efficient to employ government or contractor employees. 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine whether and how cost information is used by 

government agencies to make decisions about whether work should be performed by federal 

employees or contractors. Throughout this testimony, I will expand on the lack of personnel and 

cost data and what needs to be done to improve the system. POGO truly believes that if simple 

fixes are made, the government will save billions of dollars without expanding or reducing the 

size of the total federal workforce, which includes government and contractor employees. 

Today, witnesses will likely testify about two comparative cost models that are currently used to 

determine whether it is less costly to have private contractors perform government services, 

OMB Circular A-76 and the Defense Department's Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-

007, "Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian and Military Manpower and Contract 

Support.,,5 Those models are utilized, however, in only a small percentage of cases where the 

government contracts for services. In a vast majority of those instances, the models demonstrated 

that contractors were unable to accord any savings; indeed, were the government to transfer 

government services to contractors, the government would incur excessive costs. But even these 

models have been the subject of criticism for their failure to provide the government with an 

effective cost modeling system that accurately reflects all the relevant cost factors. 6 Because it 

does not approach the state-of-the-art systems employed by sophisticated business enterprises, 

the government limits its ability to make competent human capital planning decisions. 

I hope that this written testimony provides the Subcommittee with useful information about the 

government's current inability to evaluate service contracting costs. More importantly, I hope 

this testimony will make clear what is missing in the current system and how to begin rectifying 

systematic flaws that cost taxpayers billions of dollars each year. So much is unknown about the 

true size and cost of both the government and contractor workforce. Congress must pass 

legislation that will create an effective government-wide cost modeling system and overhaul 

j Federaflaw requires that the "Secretary of Defense shall use the least costly fonn of personnel consistent with 

military requirements and other needs of the Department," which includes considering converting work from 

military, civilian, or private contract. 10 U.S.C. 129a. http://uscode.house.gov/uscodecgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscvieW+t09tI2+75+1++%28%29%20%20AND%20%28%2810%29%20ADJ%20USC%2 

9%3ACITE%20AND%20%28USC%20w%2F10%20%28 I 29a%29%29%3ACITE 

6 Congressional Research Service, Defense Outsourcing: The OMS Circular A-76 Policy (RL30392), June 30,2005, 

pp. 4-6. http://www.fas.orgisgp/crs/natseclRL30392.pdf (Downloaded April 20, 2011); In addition, a Center for 

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report highlights the inherent problems with government fife-cycle cost 

comparison models and appropriate overhead rates, and proposed a cost-estimating methodology. Although the 

report discusses a comprehensive cost estimation methodology that should be used to create a baseline for making 

more accurate cost comparisons, it is silent on aU the costs the government incurs, above and beyond fixed billing 

rates, associated with the award, administration, and oversight of service contracts. Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, DoD Workforce Cost Realism Asse.<sment, May 2011, pp. 11-19. 

http://csis.orgifiles/publicationI110517 _Berteau_DoDWorkforceCost_ Web.pdf (Downloaded May 18, 2011) 

(hereinafter DoD Workforce Cost Realism Assessment) 

2 
95 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.073

servicc contract inventories. 7 Such legislation will enable decision makers to identify costly 

service contracts and provide agencies with the tools necessary to avoid transferring government 

services to contractors at unjustifiable costs. 

Service Contracting Myths 

POGO has watched federal contract award dollars dramatically increase from just over $200 

billion in FY 2000 to over $530 billion in FY 2011. 8 At the same time, service contract dollars 

have also been escalating at a rapid pace. There is no doubt that the increase in contract spending 

is the direct result of9/11, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and the wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. However, the problem is more long-standing, and is the direct result of multiple 

administrations moving functions from the public to the private sector under the guise of cost 

savings. 

Both political parties have taken issue with the proper size of the federal civilian workforce and 

thc proper balance between government employees and contractor employees.9 Initiatives to 

make the government run like the private sector and shrink the sizc of the federal government 

became very popular in the 1980s and 1990s. Even today, there are calls in Congress to reduce 

the size of government and freeze federal employee salaries. 10 

The first myth of service contracting involves the notion that when the federal government 

outsources work to contractors, contractor employees are not part of "big government," although 

many are retired federal employees, are paid with taxpayer dollars, work inside government 

offices, and/or perform government missions. Because thcy are generally not seen as part of the 

total government workforce, they are spared the wrath of budget hawks calling for personnel 

reductions and cuts in benefits. The number of contractor employees in the federal workforce is 

in excess of 7 million, nearly four times the size of the federal cmployce workforce (which is 

over 2 million).!! The actual number of service contractors is, at best, an estimate,12 although 

7 GAO found differing methodologies among the services and data was not complete. Government Accountability 

Office, De/emse Acquisitions: Observations on the Department 0/ D~fense Service Contract Inventories/or Fiscal 

Year 2008 (GADA 10-350R), January 29, 2010, pp. 1-5. http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/96539.pdf(Downloaded 

March 27, 2012) 

, According to data compiled by POGO from the Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation and 

USAspending.gov for fiscal years 2000 and 2011. http://www.usaspending.gov/ 

9 Ed O'Keefe, "Eye Opener: Homeland Security has more contractors than feds," The Washington Post, February 

24, 20 I O. http://voices.washingtonpost.comlfederal-eyeI2010/02/eye_opener_homeland_security_h.html 

(Downloaded September 27, 2010) 

10 For example, the House Budget Committee is seeking to "[b Joost private-sector employment by slowing the 

growth of the public sector, achieving a I 0 percent reduction over the next three years in the federal workforce 

through attrition, coupled with a pay freeze until 2015 and reforms to government workers' fringe benefits. House 

Budget Committee, The Path to Prosperity: A Blueprint/or American Renewal, March 20, 2012, p. 32. 

http://budget.house.govlUploadedFileslPathtoprosperity20 13.pdf (Downloaded March 26, 2012) 

" U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Federal Employment Statistics, "Historical Federal Workforce Tables: 

Executive Branch Civilian Employment Since 1940." 

http://www.opm.gov/feddatalHistoricaITables/ExecutiveBranchSince I 940.asp (Downloaded March 27, 2012) 

12 When the contractor workforce is combined with civilians, military personnel, U.S. Postal Service employees, and 

grantees, the size of the blended federal workforce was estimated at 14.6 million people in 2005. Paul C. Light, The 

New True Size of Government, New York University, August 2006, p. 8. 

http://wagner.nyu.eduiperformance/files/True_Size.pdf(Downloaded March 27, 2012); Paul C. Light, "The real 

3 
96 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.074

there are efforts underway to improve those estimates. 13 Recent legislation designed to create 

inventories of service contracts and identify the precisc number of contractor employees has 

failed to be implemented in a manner that would achieve its intent. 14 As a result, no one has a 

better understanding of the size of the contractor workforce today than we did before the 

legislation was adopted. Congress should amend the laws creating service contract inventories to 

mandate a full and comprehensive account of precisely how large a contractor workforce each 

federal agency maintains. Further, it must include all tiers of subcontractors, broken out by the 

types of services they provide, the billing rates the government must pay, and the costs it must 

incur to maintain that workforce. 

The second myth is that the private sector is in all ways more cost efficient, more innovative, and 

more flexible than the government. This supposition might be true in certain circumstances, but 

policymakers have been misled about promised across-the-board savings resulting from hiring 

service contractors. In fact, long-tcrm service contracts (which began as short-term quick fixes) 

remove government flexibility and result in cost inefficiencies rather than savings over the 

lifetime of the contract." Consequently, recent GAO reports sought to discuss areas where 

agencies could achieve better cost savings, but not a single report attempted to identify the 

government's over-bloated reliance upon service contracts as an area for eost savings. 16 The 

excessive costs associated with service contracts such as those documented in POGO's Bad 

Business report do not appear on the radar screen of Congress' primary auditing and 

investigative organization. This institutional failure reflects the power of the aforementioned 

myth. Congress must bust this myth and bring focus and attention to maybe the most critical 

sourcc of government waste and administrative inefficiencies. 

crisis in government," The Washington Post, January 12, 20 I 0, p. A 17. http://www.washingtonpost.comlwpdynicontentiarticle/2010/0 1111 / AR20 I 00 III 03255.html (Downloaded March 29, 20 II); Hearing Statement of Paul 

C. Light, New York University/The Brookings Institution, before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia, "An Update on the Bush 

Administration's Competitive Sourcing Initiative," July 24, 2003. 

http://wagner.nyu.edul /facuity/publicationsifiles/lightCompetitiveSourcing.pdf (Downloaded September 27, 20 I 0); 

Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Observations on the Department of Defense Service 

Contract Inventories for Fiscal Year 2008 (GAO-IO-350R), January 29, 2010, pp. 2-4. 

http://www.gao.gov/new-items/dl0350r.pdf(Downloaded March 26, 2012) 

i3 Government Accountability Office, OMB Service Contracts Tnventory Guidance and Tmplementation (GAO-I 1-

538R), May 27,2011, p. 4. hnp://www.gao.gov/new-items/dI1538r.pdf(Downioaded March 26, 2012) 

J4 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Pub. Law 110-181), § 807(a), January 28, 2008; 

Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 20 10 (Pub. Law 111-117), § 743, December 16, 2009. 

15 For instance, the Army logistics support LOGCAP IV contract award to three different contractors has one base 

year and nine option years. U.S. Army Sustainment Command Public Affairs, "ASC selects LOGCAP IV 

contractors," June 28, 2007. http://www.army.mil/article/3836/asc-selects-Iogcap-iv-contractorsl (Downloaded May 

31,2011) 

16 Government Accountability Office, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication. Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue (GAO-12-342SP), February 2012. 

http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588818.pdf (Downloaded March 26, 2012); Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, 

Managing Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues Government Accountability Office, "Department of 

lTomeiand Security: Actions Needed to Reduce Overlap and Potential Unnecessary Duplication, Achieve Cost 

Savings, and Strengthen Mission Functions (GAO-12-464T)," March 8, 2012. 

hnp:llwww.gao.gov/assets/590/589125.pdf(Downloaded March 27, 2012) 

4 
97 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.075

An attempt by a private sector think tank to study the issue of comparative costs was flawed, as 

the report compared public and private sector salary or compensation and projected their findings 

onto the costs of transferring services to the contractor sector without a shred of evidence that 

such projections are valid. Indeed, such projections are both theoretically and factually flawed. 

Moreover, POGO is aware of a GAO study that is underway that is reviewing public and private 

sector pay comparability. However, it is our understanding that GAO will not address whether or 

how such comparisons inform the cost effectiveness of contracting for government services.!7 

Additionally, last year, the House Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service, and 

Labor Policy held a hearing titled "Are Federal Workers Underpaid?,,!8 The hearing discussed 

the findings of a study funded by the Heritage Foundation comparing public and private sector 

pay.!9 The Heritage study suffered from a number of methodological problems that call into 

question the validity of its findings and recommendations, including its recommendation that the 

government hire more contractors?O Despite Heritage's claim that federal employees are 

compensated at higher rates than private sector employees, Heritage did not empirically 

determine whether or not those savings would, in fact, be realized were the government to 

transfer its services to the contractor sector. 

A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), "Comparing the Compensation of 

Federal and Private-Sector Employees,,,2! also compared public and private sector pay. CBO 

found that, overall, "federal workers tend to be older, more educated, and more concentrated in 

professional occupations than private-sector workers," and, on average, are paid 16 percent more 

than similar employees in the private sector. However, that trend occurs mostly in the lower 

education levels. Public servants with advanced degrees were paid 18 percent less in total 

compensation than the private sector.22 POGO found a very similar disparity in our Bad Business 

report. However, our report also found that contractors cost, on average, 83 percent more than 

federal employees and over 100 percent more than their peers in the private sector for 35 

comparable occupations. 

17 POGO staffers have met on two occasions with GAO personnel who are conducting a congressionally requested 

srudy of public and private sector pay. "Comparability" offederal employee compensation with private sector 

compensation is legislatively mandated. Officc of Personnel Management, "Federal Employecs Pay Comparability 

Act of 1990". http://www.opm.gov/fcddatalhtml/paystrucrure/2004/fepcaI990.asp (Downloaded March 26, 2012) 

"Hearing of House Oversight and Government Reform Subcomminee on Fcderal Workforce, u.s. Postal Service, 

and Labor Policy, "Are Federal Workers Underpaid?", March 9, 2011. http://oversight.housc.gov/hearing/arefederal-workers-underpaidl 

19 James Sherk, A Report of the Heritage Center for Data Analysis: Inflated Federal Pay: How Americans Are 

Overtaxed to Overpay the Civil Service (Report # 10-05), July 7, 2010, p. 1. 

hnp:llthC media.s3.amazonaws.coml20 I O/pdf/CDA I 0-05 .pdf (Downloaded September 27, 20 I 0) (hereinafter 

Heritage Srudy). The Heritagc Foundation "is a research and educational institution-a think tank--whose mission 

is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited 

government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense:' 

hnp:llwww.heritage.org/About 

20 Heritage Srudy, p. 16. 

21 Congressional Budget Office, Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Employees, January 

20 12. http://www.cbo.gov/sites/defaultifileslcbofilcslattachmentslO 1-30-FedPay.pdf (Downloaded March 26, 2012) 

(hereinafter CBO Pay Srudy) 

12 CBO Pay Srudy, p. vii-ix. 

5 
98 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.076

We should also consider the data that has been analyzed by the Office of Personnel Management 

(OPM). OPM data compares various occupations, including those set and adjusted in the General 

Schedule (GS) rates of pay, documenting that compensation for many white collar jobs is lower 

in the federal government than in the private sector. One example provided by OPM clearly 

shows that federal pay for a government engineer is lower than private sector pay.23 

Studies comparing public and private sector pay are only useful for limited purposes, but they 

will continue to drive policy decisions until Congress mandates that cost comparisons include the 

aforementioned third market: contractor costs. This includes salary, full fringe benefits, all 

overhead to house federal and contractor employees, accurate data on contractor personnel, and 

fully loaded costs. Without taking the full universe of costs into account, the government risks 

wasting billions of dollars and jeopardizing the quality of government services.24 

POGO's Study Proves a More Complete Picture is Needed 

For the first time, POGO's study introduced into discussions concerning public-private 

compensation the issue of costs associated with transferring government jobs to contractors. 

POGO compared total annual compensation for federal and private sector employees with 

federal contractor billing rates in order to determine whether the current costs of federal service 

contracting serve the public interest. POGO found that the government pays service contractors 

at rates exceeding the cost of employing federal employees to perform comparable functions and 

far exceeding (more than double) the cost of employing private sector workers. 

POGO's study analyzed the total compensation paid to federal and private sector employees, and 

annual billing rates for contractor employees across 35 occupational classifications covering over 

550 service activities.25 (See Table I) Our findings were shocking-POGO determined the 

government pays billions more to hire contractors than it would spend to hire federal employees 

to perform the same service. Specifically, POGO's study shows that the federal government 

approves service contract billing rates--deemed fair and reasonable-that pay contractors 1.83 

times more than the government pays federal employees in total compensation, and more than 2 

times the total compensation paid in the private sector for comparable services. 

We also found: 

Federal government employees were less expensive than contractors in 33 ofthe 

35 occupational classifications POGO reviewed. 

In one instance, contractor billing rates were nearly 5 times more than the full 

compensation paid to federal employees performing comparable services. 

23 Office of Personnel Management, "Use of Bureau of Labor Statistics Data for Setting General Schedule Pay." 

http://www.opm.gov/ocaipay/htmVUsingBLSData.asp (Downloaded March 27, 2012) 

24 Howard Risher, "Analysis: Politics of federal pay obscures the facts," Government Executive, May 25,201 I. 

http://www.govexec.com!storyyage.cfm?articleid=47870&oref.=todaysnews (Downloaded May 26, 2011) 

25 The complete methodology is included in POGO's Bad Business report. http://www.pogo.org/pogofiles/rcportslcontract-oversightlbad-business/co-gp-20 1 1091 3-I.html 

6 
99 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.077

Private sector compensation was lower than contractor billing rates in all 35 

occupational classifications we reviewed. 

Most importantly, the federal government has failed to determine how much 

money it saves or wastes by outsourcing or insourcing/retaining services, and has no 

methodology for doing so. 

POGO's investigation highlights two basic facts about outsourcing government work to 

contractors. First, comparing federal to private sector compensation reveals nothing about what it 

actually costs the government to outsource services. Second, the federal government is not doing 

a good job of obtaining genuine market prices26 and is therefore not realizing the savings often 

promised in connection with outsourcing services. The argument for outsourcing serviccs states 

that free market competition will result in efficiencies and save taxpayer dollars, but our study 

showed that using contractors to perform services may actually waste taxpayers dollars. 

POGO's report has not escapcd criticism?7 We acknowledge that we were very limited in conducting 

our survey bas cd on thc lack of contracting cost data, comparable occupational data, and government 

overhead rates for work performcd by governrncnt and contractor employees. However, since the 

release of our report, our fmdings have been validated by several federal agencies. Additionally, 

POGO has submitted numerous Freedom Of information Act requests for additional data about service 

contract rates and labor hours, the contractor workforce, and the implementation of Circular A-76 or 

other cost comparison procedures. (Appendix B) 

Because the POGO study is based upon data reflecting only a subset of government contracts, we 

do not contend that our findings can, or should, be projected across the entire federal 

government. That is why we strongly advocate that Congress direct GAO to conduct a similar 

analysis of government-wide contracting that would provide a valid basis for estimating 

precisely how many billions of dollars the government is wasting each year by relying so heavily 

upon service contractors. 

Before directing GAO conduct such a study, however, it would be imperative for Congress to 

legislate critical changes in government data systems. Failures in government procurement 

practices and employment data systems limit the government's and the public's ability to assess 

costs. Failures include the lack of standards for producing cost estimates; the lack of data related 

to negotiated service contract billing rates; the lack of data about the actual number of contractor 

26 Steve Kelman, "How agencies can cut contracting costs," Federal Computer Week, August 9, 20t L 

http://fcw.comiarticles/2011l08/08/comment-kelman-save-money-for-govemment.aspx (Downloaded August II, 

2011); Steve Kelman, "GSA schedules: Are agencies paying too much?," Federal Computer Week, July 29,2010. 

http://few.comIBlogs/Lecternl20 I 0107/Steve-Kelman-GSA-schedules-pricing-July-2 9 .aspx (Downloaded June 23, 

2011); Steve Kelman, "Are agencies paying too much through the GSA schedule? Readers respond," Federal 

Computer Week, August 3, 2010. http://fcw.comIBlogs/Lecteml2010/08/Steve-Kelman-GSA-schedule-pricingreaction.aspx (Downloaded June 23. 201]); One recent story indicated that cost is emerging as major factor in 

federal contracting. Sarah Chacko, "Feds driving harder bargain at procurement table," Federal Times, July 25, 

2011, p. I. http://www.federaltimes.comlarticle/20110724/ ACQUlSITlON0311 0724030211 0091 ACQUISITION 

(Downloaded July 26, 2011) 

"Scott Arney, "Outsourcing Savings - Myth BUSTED!," POGO Blog, September 16,2011. 

http://pogoblog.typepad.comlpogoI2011/09/0utsourcing-savingsmyth-busted.html 

7 
100 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.078

employees holding a specific occupational position under any given contract; and the lack of a 

universal job classification system. 

The expanding "shadow government" wastes billions of dollars annually. The focus on 

comparing federal and private sector salaries is a distraction from determining what the 

government actually pays for services. Instead, the focus should be on the full costs of paying 

service contractors, which accounts for approximately one-quarter of all discrctionary 

spending.28 

Agencies' Service Contracts are Costly29 

Instead of a comprehensive cost comparison that analyzes the life-cycle costs of hiring or 

retaining federal employees as compared to contractors, government comparisons have been 

limited to isolatcd cases, which POGO discussed in its Bad Business report. Since that report was 

released, a few additional cost comparison audits have been made public. 

For example, in 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) reported that in fiscal ycar 2010 it had 

established (insourced) nearly 17,000 new govcrnment civilian positions to perform services that 

had been performed by contractors.3D Of the reasons citcd by the Pentagon for insourcing thosc 

services, cost savings was cited 50 percent of the time.]1 However, DoD did not report thc 

number of contractor employees whose functions wcre in sourced because, as was later notcd by 

the GAO, the Department does not have access to this data.J2 "[DoD) contracts for services to be 

performed, so the number of employees used to perform these services is not a decision of thc 

dcpartment but is at the discretion ofthc contractor," the GAO reported.]] The GAO warns that 

more comprehensive and reliable contracting data is needed to ensure that DoD officials are able 

to manage and oversee insourcing and meet Department workforce goals. 34 

Despite growing evidence of the excessive costs associated with service contracts, DoD has 

proposed cuts to its civilian workforce. According to media reports, the Army and Air Force are 

28 In 2010, service contracts accounted for $320 billion oflhe nearly $1.26 trillion discretionary spending total. 

According to data compiled by POGO from the Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG), 

the federal government awarded $320 billion in service contracts in fiscal year 2010. 

https:llwww.tpds.gov/tpdsnlLcmsl; Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, 

Fiscal Year 2012, p. 200. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/omblbudgetlfy2012/assets/budget.pdf 

(Downloaded August 18, 2011) 

29 Additional examples of cost comparisons are found in POGO's Bad Business report, some of which show that inhouse workers are more cost efficient while others show that service contractors are cheaper. POGO Bad Business 

report. http://www.pogo.orgipogo-files/reports/contract-oversightlbad-business/co-gp201 10913.html#Government%20Cost%20Studies 

30 Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, "Report to the 

Congressional Defense Committees on the Department of Defense's FY 2010 In-sourcing Actions," September 

20 II. http://www.pogo.orgiresources/contract-oversight/co-gp-20110913.html(Downloaded March 26, 2012) 

Jl Id. at5. 

32 Government Accountability Office, DOD Needs to Better Oversee In-sourcing Data and Align In-sourcing Efforts 

with Strategic Workforce Plans, (GAO-12-319), February 2012. http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588425.pdf 

(Downloaded March 26, 2012) 

JJ Id., at 14. 

)4 Id., at l. 

8 
101 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.079

cutting thousands of civilian jobs35 Internal DoD documents, however, reveal that the civilian 

workforce is less costly when compared to military and contractor personnel. As the following 

chart indicates, civilian personnel cost DoD 572 hillion in FY 20 I 0 as compared to $150 billion 

for military personnel and nearly 5250 billion for contractors36 

N.1JOnallJef"nse Sudgetestlmales lor ,YlOll (MCurrenIQQllars'l - BASe and 0<:0 $$ 

OUSD(P&Rj-· Requirements and Program and 8udget COordjf'H!tlon mrectorate 
102 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.080

In another example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has awarded millions of 

dollars to federal contractor Booz Allen Hamilton for management support services. J7 According 

to Reuters, some lawmakers and SEC insiders are questioning the fiscal wisdom of the SEC's 

decision. Booz Allen consultants are costing the SEC anywhere from $100 an hour to over $300 

an hour and are being paid an average of$140 per hour as compared to $93 per hour for SEC 

stafe8 That's a differential of over 50 percent, which over a year is a cost premium of nearly 

$100,000 per employee.39 

Congressional Involvement is Needed 

Not many people can grasp the big picture-fully understanding how the total workforce has 

dramatically increased with the increased hiring of contractors; how service contracts operate; 

and how limitations have reduced flexibility in government hiring, all of which have resulted in 

increased government spending. Accordingly, there have been many missed opportunities to 

realize savings that would result from cost analyses matching specific federal occupations to 

comparable contractor occupations. Government reports or policies are published each year 

promoting competition,40 cost realism,41 and partnering with cost-conscious contractors.42 

Unfortunately, those reports or policies fail to include a comprehensive cost comparison as 

proposed by POGO prior the awarding renewal, or extension of federal service contracts. 

Oversight agencies like the GAO occasionally examine the cost aspects of service contracts, but 

largely squander the opportunity to conduct meaningful comparative cost analyses of service 

contracts. For instance, the GAO now publishes an annual report providing examples where 

federal programs may be able to achieve greater efficiencies or become more effective in 

providing services by eliminating duplication, overlap, and fragmentation.43 The most recent 

report identified 51 such examples, but only three directly address service contract eosts.44 

Furthermore, the report only recommended ways to streamline, reevaluate or renegotiate these 

J7 Sarah N. Lynch, "Critics question cost as consultants nip and ruck SEC," Reuters, March 1,2012. 

http://www.reuters.comlarticle/20 12/0310 I/sec-consultants-idUSL2E8E 12Y 120 120301 (Downloaded March 27, 

2012); Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. received $1.6 billion in FY 2010. USAspending.gov. 

http://www.usaspcnding.gov/cxplore?&tab=By+Prime+Awardee&overridecook=yes&&carryfillers=on&fromflscal 

=yes&contracts= Y &fiscal year=20 1 O&val=&contraclorid= 14806 

38 Sarah N. Lynch, "Critics question cost as consultants nip and tuck SEC," Reuters, March I! 2012. 

http://www.reuters.comlarticle/20 12/03/0 I/sec-consultants-idUSL2E8E 12Y120 12030 I (Downloaded March 27, 

2012) 

39 To calculate the cost premium, POGO multiplied the hourly rales by 2080. 

40 Government Accountability Office, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs. 

Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue (GAO-II-318SP), March 2011, p. 21 1. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsidl1318sp.pdf(DownloadedMarch 27, 2012) 

41 Defense Contract Audit Agency, "Master Documcnt - Audit Program," Version No. 1.6, updated January 2012, 

http://www.dcaa.miVsap/27010 AP NApdf(Downloaded March 27, 2012) 

42 Sarah Chacko, "DoD looking-for \:ost-conscious' contractors, Assad says," Federal Times, March 23, 2012. 

http://www.federaltimes.comlarticle/20 120323/ ACQUISITION03/20323030 111001 (Downloaded March 27, 2012) 

4) Government Accountability Office, "Improving Efficiency & Effectiveness: GAO's body of work on duplication, 

overlap, and fragmentation across the federal government." http://www.gao.gov/duplication (Downloaded March 

27,2012) 

44 Government Accountability Office, 20 I2 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentalion, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue (GAO-12-342SP), February 2012. 

http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588818.pdf (Downloaded March 26, 2012) 

10 
103 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.081

contracts in order to save money. It did not conduct a comprehensive cost analysis in order to 

answer the most basic of procurement questions: whether contractors cost less than government 

employees. 

Senators Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) and Susan Collins (R-ME) have examined service contracts, 

but that has not resulted in government-wide policy change. On February 23, 2010, Senators 

Lieberman and Collins sent a letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet 

Napolitano expressing concerns about the number of DHS contractors, the costs, and whether 

contractors were performing inherently governmental functions. 45 Specially, the letter stated: 

We also note that DHS's FY 2011 budget request reflects several instances of 

cost savings resulting from the conversion of contractor positions to federal 

employees. While the fundamental question in deciding whether a federal 

employee should perform a task, or whether the task may appropriately be 

assigned to a contractor, should not simply be which option is cheapest but rather 

whether or not the government's interests are best served by having the work 

performed by federal employees, nonetheless it is notable that the shift to a 

more appropriate employee-to-contractor ratio may well also save the 

Department and the taxpayers money. (Emphasis added) 

On October 14,2011, the Senators sent a letter to the Joint Select Committee on Deficit 

Reduction, proposing many cost savings reforms.46 The letter included the following 

proposal: 

As with decisions about the number of federal employees, we believe that the best 

way to achieve desired cost savings in contracting is through the statutory limits 

on spending that were put in place under the Budget Control Act. Such an 

approach to reducing spending will ensure, for example, that any reductions in 

the number of federal employees will not merely be offset by increases in the 

number of contractor employees, who may, depending on the services 

procured, be more expensive than federal employees. However, control of 

contractor costs, as well as federal employee costs, must be a key component of 

deficit reduction. We therefore recommend that the Joint Committee consider 

requiring that agencies reduce their reliance on management support services 

contracts by 15 percent in Fiscal Year 2012 (as OMB has proposed), for a 

savings of $6 billion. (Emphasis added) 

Regrettably, Congress has not meaningfully helped federal agencies save money with regard to 

service contracts. Congress has all too frequently legislated without having the empirical data 

necded to makc informed decisions about whether it would be more cost effective to increase the 

45 Letter from Senators Lieberman and Collins to Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Janet 

Napolitano, February 23, 2010. http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/mediaiminority-mediaJsenators-lieberman-collinsastounded.dhs.contract-workers-exceed-number-ot~civilian-employees 

46 Letter from Senators Lieberman and Collins to Secretary of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, 

October 14,201 I, p. 4. http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/downloadllieberman-collins-Ietter-to-super-committee 

II 
104 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.082

number of federal employees in order to implement programs.47 Unfortunately, in many cases, 

agencies were left no recourse but to hire contractors as permanent- or semi-permanent staff, 

largely because of congressionally imposed federal pcrsonnel ceilings,48 consequcntly increasing 

spending on wasteful service contracts. 

Recommendations 

POGO's Bad Business report included numerous recommendations that would permit the 

government to compare fulllife-cyele costs of comparable occupations, ensure promised cost 

savings are realized, remove federal full-time equivalents ceilings, improve the ~uality of service 

contractor data, and increase the practice of using short-term federal employees. 9 

There are two recommendations in particular which deserve heightened attcntion by this 

Subcommittee-comparative cost modeling and improved service contract inventories. 

Current government cost modeling systems are insufficient. They are not comprehensive because 

they do not take into considcration all relevant cost data. There is an urgent need for specificity 

and comparability of all government and contractor costs. For example, such criteria as types of 

services/occupations, standardized government administrative and overhead costs, including 

those for awarding, administering, and overseeing service contractors (especially those 

contractors working in government facilities), administrative costs, revenues (tax consequences), 

and intangibles (flexibility, quality of performance, cducation, and service experience) need to be 

considered. Therc is also a need for government-wide standards for comparative cost analyses 

and an independent comparative cost review. Finally, the government needs a comparative tax 

revenue paradigm that reflects contractor tax obligations/deductions. Somc of these criteria are 

included in Circular A-76 and the Defense Department's cost modeling system, but thosc 

systems must be revisited to ensure that all life-cycle costs are included. 

The current structure of service contract inventories is insufficient in providing the government 

and public with comprehensive data about the use of service contractors.50 POGO recommends 

47 Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994 (p.L. 103-226); Government Accountability Office, Statement of 

Timothy P. Bowling, Associate Director, Federal Management and Workforce, Federal Downsizing: The Status of 

Agencies' Workforce Reduction Efforts (GAO!T-GGD-96-124), May 23,1996. 

http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96124t.pdf (Downloaded March 27, 2012) 

48 Congressional Research Service, Inherently Governmental Functions and Department o/Defense Operations: 

Background. Issues. and Options for Congress (R40641), June 22, 2009, p. 34. 

http://prhome.defense.gov!RSlIREQUIREMENTS/docs/CRS _ DoDIGCA.pdf (Downloaded September 27, 2010) 

(hereinafter Inherently Governmental Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues. and 

Options for Congress (R40641)) 

"POGO Bad Business report, p. 35. http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files!reportslcontract-oversightlbad-businesslco-gp20110913.html#Recommendations 

50 In December 2011, POGO published a blog critiquing current service contract inventories entitled "Federal 

Service Contract Inventories: A Failure to Address Which Contracts Are Cost Justified." It details all the flaws that 

exist in how these inventories are currently identifying the data upon which Congress intended agencies to 

rationalize their human resources and cost cutting decisions. http://pogoblog.typepad.comipogo/201O!l2/federalservice-eontract-inventories-a-failure-to-address-which-contracts-are-cost-justified.html; Earlier in June 2011, 

POGO submitted a public comment concerning a proposed amendment to the Federal Acquisition Regulation 

concerning service contracts reporting requirements, stressing the need to utilize valid data sources and service 

cataloging systems and 10 incorporate meaningful cost information; unfortunately, the government determincd they 

12 
105 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.083

that the government uses a coding/identification system that is comparable to OPM's personnel 

system, and take into consideration the duration of the contract; the number of all prime and 

subcontractor personnel (by service/occupation and total); the hours worked; the hourly/annual 

billing rates for such personnel; the costs that must be incurred to maintain that workforce; and 

the justification for contracting those services (e.g., cost efficiency, the lack oflegislative 

authority for hiring government personnel, the lack of government expertise, short-term needs, 

flexibility hours, etc.). 

If the government collects enhanced data about the number and cost of service contractors, it will 

be in a position to ensure that there is a proper balance of the total government workforce and 

that all potential savings are realized. 

Thank you for inviting me to submit written testimony for this very important hearing. I look 

forward to working with the Subcommittee to further explore how service contracting can be 

improved and how costs can be appropriately factored into any government human capital 

planning. 

lacked legislative authority to make such improvements. http://www.pogo.orgfpogo-filcs/lettcrs/contractoversightlco-t-20110620.html, 

13 
106 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.084

Table 1: Cost Analyses 

POGO's study evaluated whether the current practice of outsourcing federal services to 

contractors is actually cost beneficial. To do this, POGO compared the average of the General 

Services Administration's listed annual contractor billing rates (which we referred to throughout 

the Bad Business report as "average annual contractor billing rates") with the full costs of federal 

employee annual compensation for comparable services. POGO also compared federal employee 

full annual compensation with private sector employee full annual compensation, as well as 

average annual contractor billing rates with private sector employee full annual compensation, in 

order to evaluate the validity of the current private sector versus federal employee debate. These 

three comparisons are set forth below in Table 1. 51 

Federal Full Federal Full Private Contractor 

OPM Series to Contractor Contractor Annual Sector Annual 

Description Private* to Federalt to Private:): Compensation Annual Billing 

Compensation Ratestt 

Accounting 1.50 2.40 3.60 $124,851 $83,132 $299,374 

Auditing 1.47 2.31 3.40 $122,373 $83,132 5283,005 

Budget Analysis .89 2.75 2.43 $110,229 $124,501 S302,661 

Building 

Management .62 2.38 1.48 S111,564 $179,740 $265,242 

Cartography 1.47** 1.46 2.14** $116,481 S79,219 $169,520 

Cemetery 

Administration 1.12 2.83 3.17 $106,124 $94,485 $299,832 

Services 

Claims 

Assistance and .76 4.83 3.66 $57,292 $75,637 $276,598 

Examining 

Computer 1.04 1.97 2.04 $136,456 $131,415 $268,653 Engineering 

Contracting .98 2.29 2.24 $1l3,319 S115,596 $259,106 

51 Table], along with its accompanying "sources" and "notes" descriptions, were pulled directly from POGO's 

study. Project On Government Oversight, Bad Business: Billions a/Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring 

Contractors, September ]3, 20 12. htlp:llwww.pogo.orglpogo-files/reports/contract-oversightlbad-business/co-gp20 II 091 3.htmJ#Government%20Cost%20Studies 

14 
107 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.085

Correctional 

Officer 

2.17 1.15 2.49 $72,977 $33,598 $83,803 

Environmental 

Protection 1.20 1.40 1.68 $127,247 $105,964 $177,570 

Specialist 

Equal 

Opportunity 1.40 2.05 2.87 $125,368 $89,394 $256,381 

Compliance 

Facility 

Operations .90 1.66 1.50 $108,060 $119,449 $179,254 

Services 

Financial 

Analysis 

1.24 1.30 1.61 $132,262 $106,679 SI7I,288 

Financial 

Management 

1.13 2.05 2.32 $164,218 $145,486 $337,002 

Fire Protection 

and Prevention 

1.04-- 1.25 1.29-- $65,452 $63,105 $81,702 

Food Inspection 1.04" 1.29 1.34'- $58,090 $55,883 $74,963 

General 

Attorney 

.79 3.17 2.5\ $175,081 $220,924 $554,923 

General 

Inspection, 

Investigation, 1.17 1.62 1.90 $104,712 $89,394 $169,666 

Enrorcement, 

and Compliance 

Groundskeeper 2.00 .80 1.60 $64,896 $32,396 $51,709 

Human 

Resources 1.11 2.05 2.27 $111,711 $100,465 $228,488 

Management 

Information 

Technology 1.09 1.59 1.73 $124,663 $1l4,818 $198,411 

Management 

Language 1.80" 1.92 3.46'- $110,014 $61,010 $211,2:J Specialist 

15 
108 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.086

Logistics 

Management .94 1.76 1.66 $116,047 $123,349 $204,443 

[Deployment) 

Logistics 

Management 1.19 1.46 1.74 $116,047 597,269 $168,938 

(Planning) 

Management 

and Program 1.15 2.15 2.48 $124,602 $108,132 $268,258 

Analysis 

Mechanical 

Engineering 

1.15 1.50 1.72 5126,177 $109,961 $189,197 

Medical Records 

Technician 

1.26 .99 1.24 $58,641 $46,705 $57,782 

Nurse 1.16 1.65 1.92 $105,714 $91,042 $174,803 

Police 1.24 1.34 1.66 $71,256 $57,533 $95,659 

Program 

Management 

.97 1.56 1.50 $173,551 $179,740 $269,901 

Quality .94 1.09 1.03 $98,939 $104,891 $107,786 Assurance 

Security Guard 1.53 1.36 2.08 $50,257 532,953 $68,515 

Statistics 1.15 1.66 1.91 $125,192 $108,586 $207,563 

Technical 

Writing and 1.25 1.08 1.35 $103,801 $82,873 $112,091 

Editing 

\\ ,"'I,I!!l' (0" 

PI l'lll III 111'" 

1.211 I.Xl 2.11'1 

Sources: 

The full methodology, data descriptions, and complete data tables for how the figures in this table were obtained are 

provided in the Bad Business repon at Appendices A, B, C, and D. Appendix B contains a table of the 35 occupational 

classifications (including OPM, BLS, and GSA identification codes) with the base salaries and full compensation paid to 

federal employees and private sector employees (according to two BLS surveys), as well as the GSA billing rates for 

specified contracts. Appendix C contains the job titles and descriptions provided by OPM, BLS, and GSA for the 35 

matching GS occupational series, SOC codes, and GSA SINs. Appendix D contains a table ofthe GSA contracts and the 

35 occupational classifications covering over 550 service activities selected for calculating the average hourly and annual 

contractor billing rates for the various SINs used for comparing costs, along with the listed hourly billing rates. Annual 

16 
109 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.087

dollar figures arc rounded to the nearest dollar. For the contractor rates, while POGO used an average annual billing rate, 

agencies do not necessarily purchase services over a full year's period of time. 

Noles: 

The comparisons in this table are expressed as ratios in accordance with the following calculations: 

• The federal to private comparisons are calculated by dividing the average annual full compensation paid to federal 

employees by the average annual full compensation paid to private sector employees perfonning similar services. 

t The contractor to federal comparisons are calculated by dividing the average annual contractor billing rate for 

performing these services by the average annual full compensation paid to federal employees performing similar services 

t The contractor to private sector comparisons are calculated by dividing the average annual contractor bHling rate by the 

average annual full compensation paid to private sector employees performing similar services. 

tt Average annual contractor billing rates are typically based on a 2,087-hour conversion method, but for the sake of 

comparison to total government compensation, POGO used a 2,080-hour conversion. As a result, POGO multiplied the 

average hourly contractor billing rate by 2,080 to calculate the average annual contractor billing rate. 

** No National Compensation Survey data were available for comparison; therefore Occupational Employment Statistics 

data were used. 

17 
110 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.088

Appendix A 

Bad Business: Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Wasted 

on Hiring Contractors 

September 13,2011 
111 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.089

Project On Government Oversight 

Bad Business: 

Billions of Taxpayer Dollars 

Wasted on Hiring Contractors 

1100 G Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC 20005 

(202) 347-1122 • info@pogo.org • www.pogo.org 

POGO is a 501(c)3 organization 
112 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.090

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................................. 1 

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 3 

Background ............................................................................................................................................... 5 

Summary of Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 1 0 

POGO's Cost Analysis ........................................................................................................................... 12 

Table I: Cost Analyses ....................................................................................................................... 13 

Government Cost Studies ....................................................................................................................... 19 

Contingency Operations ..................................................................................................................... 19 

Domestic Security Work ..................................................................................................................... 20 

Security Work Abroad ........................................................................................................................ 21 

Contractors Overseeing Contracts ...................................................................................................... 23 

Air Force Logistics ............................................................................................................................. 23 

Anny Operations Research ................................................................................................................. 24 

Anny Corps of Engineers ................................................................................................................... 24 

Protesting West Point Outsourcing ..................................................................................................... 25 

IRS Contractors Tax Public ................................................................................................................ 26 

TSA's Screening Partnership Program ............................................................................................... 28 

Cautionary Notes Relating to Other Cost Analyses ........................................................................... 29 

Savings Risked by Long-Term Contracts and Federal Employment Restrictions ................................. 32 

Need for a Special Pool of Part-Time and Full-Time Federal Employees ......................................... 34 

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 34 

Recommendations ................................................................................................................................... 35 

Acronyms And Glossary ......................................................................................................................... 38 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Methodology 

Appendix B: Occupational Salaries and Compensation for Federal and Private Sector Employees. and 

Contractor Billing Rates 

Appendix C: Descriptions of OPM, SOC, and GSA Job and Service Titles and Codes 

Appendix D: GSA Contract Billing Rates 

Appendix E: Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Appendix F of Final 

Report to Congress, August 20 II 

ii 
113 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.091

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Based on the current public debate regarding the salary comparisons offederal and private sector 

employees, the Project On Government Oversight (POGO)i decided to take on the task of doing what 

others have not--comparing total annual compensation for federal and private sector employees with 

federal contractor billing rates in order to determine whether the current costs of federal service 

contracting serves the public interest. 

The current debate over pay differentials largely relies on the theory that the government pays private 

sector compensation rates when it outsources services. This report proves otherwise: in fact, it shows 

that the government actually pays service contractors at rates far exceeding the cost of employing 

federal employees to perform comparable functions. 

POGO's study analyzed the total compensation paid to federal and private sector employees, and 

annual billing rates for contractor employees across 35 occupational classifications covering over 550 

service activities. Our findings were shocking-POGO estimates the government pays billions more 

annually in taxpayer dollars to hire contractors than it would to hire federal employees to perform 

comparable services. Specifically, POGO's study shows that the federal government approves service 

contract billing rates-deemed fair and reasonable-that pay contractors 1.83 times more than the 

government pays federal employees in total compensation, and more than 2 times the total 

compensation paid in the private sector for comparable services. 

Additional key findings include: 

Federal government employees were less expensive than contractors in 33 of the 35 

occupational classifications POGO reviewed. 

In one instance, contractor billing rates were nearly 5 times more than the full compensation 

paid to federal employees performing comparable services. 

Private sector compensation was lower than contractor billing rates in all 35 occupational 

classifications we reviewed. 

The federal government has failed to determine how much money it saves or wastes by 

outsourcing, insourcing, or retaining services, and has no system for doing so. 

POGO's investigation highlights two basic facts about outsourcing government work to contractors. 

First, comparing federal to private sector compensation reveals nothing about what it actually costs the 

government to outsource services. The only analysis that will shed light on the true costs of 

government is that of contractor billing rates and the full cost of employing federal employees to 

perform comparable work. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan recently 

completed a fundamental study of costs, and found that, in certain contingency operations, although 

savings resulted from hiring local or third-country nationals, military and civilian employees can cost 

less than hiring American contractors. 

I For more information on POGO's contract investigations, please visit POGO's website, 

http://www.pogo.orglinvestigationslcontract-oversightl. POGO also maintains the Federal Contractor Misconduct Database 

containing instances of criminal. civil, and administrative misconduct invoJving the largest federa1 contractors. 

http://www.contractorm;sconduct.org! 
114 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.092

Second, the federal government is not doing a good job of obtaining genuine market prices, and 

therefore the savings often promised in connection with outsourcing services are not being realized. 

The argument for outsourcing services is that, by outsourcing services on which the government holds 

a monopoly, free market competition will result in efficiencies and save taxpayer dollars. But our study 

showed that using contractors to perform services may actually increase rather than decrease costs to 

the taxpayers. 

POGO found several failures in government procurement, employment, and data systems that limit the 

government's and the public's abilities to assess and correct excessive costs resulting from insourcing 

or outsourcing federal services. Failures included the lack of standards for calculating cost estimates 

and justifying insourcing or outsourcing decisions; the lack of data related to negotiated service 

contract billing rates; not publishing government information about the number of actual contractor 

employees holding a specific occupational position under any given contract; and that there is no 

universal job classification system. 

For decades there have been increasing political pressures to reduce the size of the federal government. 

In response the government has awarded service contracts, resulting in an expanding "shadow 

government" that costs hundreds of billions of dollars annually. The focus on comparing federal and 

private sector salaries needs to shift because they have nothing to do with what the government 

actually pays for services. Instead, the focus properly belongs on analyzing the full costs of paying 

contractors to perform federal services. Given the nation's ongoing economic problems, this analysis 

has become even more relevant-approximately one-quarter of all discretionary spending now goes to 

service contractors. 

POGO's recornmendations include: 

1. Congress should require all federal agencies, when awarding service contracts, to use service 

coding systems that are consistent with OPM's job classification system. Congress should also 

require the collection, reporting, and oversight of life-cycle costs associated with government 

services performed by federal employees or contractors. 

2. Congress should pass legislation requiring greater transparency and improved pricing on GSA 

Schedule service contracts. 

3. Congress should strengthen the FAIR Act to enhance service contract reporting. 

4. Congress should remove full-time equivalents ceilings, and decrease the maximum benchmark 

compensation amount applicable to contractor employees. 

5. Agencies should use their existing authorities to hire federal employees for short-term projects. 

2 
115 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.093

INTRODUCTION 

There is no doubt that contractors playa substantial role in supporting government operations, 

missions, programs, and projects domestically and abroad. For many years the federal government has 

increasingly relied on contractors to perform government functions. This shift to outsourcing! followed 

the call to reduce the size of the federal employee workforce, even as the U.S. population and demand 

for government services grew.] Now, in some federal offices contractor employees outnumber federal 

employees.4 Unfortunately, the government has turned to contractors without an eye toward cost 

savings.s 

Since 1999, the size of the federal employee workforce has remained relatively constant at about 

2 million, 6 while the contractor workforce has increased radically-from an estimated 4.4 million to 

7.6 million in 2005.7 In other words, the federal contractor workforce dwarfs the federal employee 

workforce nearly four-fold. 

2 UOutsourcing refers to the transfer of an existing federal business or administrative function to the commercial sector, with 

the government remaining responsible for the affected services. Privatization refers to the transfer of a federal business or 

administrative function, including the responsibility for the affected services, to the commercial sector." General 

Accounting Office, Outsourcing and Privatization: Pr;vate-Sector Assistancefor Federal Agency Studies (B-282180), 

March 26, 1999. http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf21161965.pdf(Downloaded June J 5,2011) 

, Acquisition Advisory Panel, Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and 

the United States Congress, January 2007, pp. 2-3. https:llwww.acquisition.gov/comp/aapI24102_GSA.pdf(Downloaded 

September 27, 2010) (hereinafter Acquisition Advisory Panel Report) 

, A specific example is the Department of Defense: "at IS of the 2 I [contracting] offices we reviewed, contractor 

employees outnumbered DOD employees and comprised as much as 88 percent ofthe workforce." Government 

Accountability Office, Defense Contracting: Additional Personal Conflict of Interest Safeguards Neededfor Certain DOD 

Contractor Employees (GAO-08-169), March 2008, p. 3. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08169.pdf(DownloadedApril 

28,2011) (hereinafter GAO-08-169); "DOD relies extensively upon contractors to support overseas contingency 

operations. As of March 201 I, DOD had more contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq (155,000) than unifonned 

personnel (145,000). Contractors made up 52% of DOD's workforce in Afghanistan and Iraq." Congressional Research 

Service, Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis (R40764), May 13,201 I, 

Summary. http://www.fas,org/sgp/crs/natsecIR40764.pdf(DownloadedJune 9, 2011) (hereinafter Department of Defense 

Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis (R40764)) Another example is Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS): "Because oftbe Department of Homeland Security's aggressive Secure Border Initiative program schedule 

coupJed with shortages of government program managers and acquisition specialists ... Customs and Border Protection 

relied on contractors to filJ the skills gap and get the program underway ... [CBP] continues to rely heavily on contract 

personnel, who comprise more than 50% of the Secure Border Initiative workforce." Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspector General, Better Oversight Needed of Support Services Contractors in Secure Border Initiatrve 

Programs (OIG-09-80), June 2009, p. I. http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OlG_09-80_Jun09.pdf(Downloaded 

April 28, 2011) 

.5 In addition to cost savingsl outsourcing services was premised on the idea that contractors provide a level of flexibility 

that federal employees do not. FlexibiIities include the ability to meet short-tenn needs, to fire poorly perfonning 

contractors~ and terminate or not renew a contract. 

6 Office of Personnel Management, "Historical Federal Workforce Tables ~ Executive Branch Civilian Employment Since 

1940," September 30, 20 I O. http://www.opm.gov/feddatalHistoricalTableslExecutiveBranchSince 1 940.asp (Downloaded 

March 29, 201 1); Office of Personnel Management, "Fed Scope Employment Trend," 

http://www.fedseope.opm.gov/cognos/cgi-binlppdscgi.exe?DC=Q&E=/FSe%20-%20LongitudinaVEmployment"1o 

20Trend%20(Year-to-Year)&LA=en&LO=en-us&BACK=%2Fcognos%2Fcgi-bino/02Fppdscgi.exe%3Ftoc%3D% 

252FFSe%2520-%2520Longitudinal%26LA%3Deno/026LO%3Den-us (Downloaded March 29, 2011); Paul C. Light, The 

New True Size of Government, New York University, August 2006, p. I I. 

http://wagner.nyu.eduiperfonnance/filesffrue_Size.pdf(Downloaded March 16,2011) (hereinafter The New True Size of 

Government); l'In 1953, there was one Federal worker for every 78 residents. In 2009, it was one for every 147." 

Hearing Statement ofthe Honorable John Berry, Director of the U.s. Office of Personnel Management, before the U.S. 

House Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, U,S. Postal Service, and Labor Policy, Committee on Oversight and 

Government Refonn, "Are Federal Workers Underpaid?" March 9,201 J, p. 2. 

3 
116 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.094

There is currently no way to quantify the actual number of contractor employees who perform 

government functions at a particular department or agency at any given time.8 Because the federal 

government does not keep timely and accurate statistics of the actual size of its contractor workforce, 

Congress mandated that civilian agencies and the Department of Defense (DoD) keep such records. 9 

However, as there is no consistency in the methodologies employed by the various agencies, data from 

these inventories are unreliable and do not provide a complete picture of jobs, functions, or activities 

being provided by service contractors. In addition, even with the changes, the inventories still fail to 

provide timely and accurate data on contractor emplo,res or cost information that would be helpful 

when comparing federal with contractor employees.! Improvements are forthcoming-a proposed 

regulation will require annual disclosures of inventories for service contracts that will include a 

description of the services, how those services will achieve agency objectives, the total dollar amount 

obligated and invoiced for services under the contract, and additional contract-related information.!! 

This is important because the federal government currently spends over $320 billion on service 

contracts each year.!2 Often, those expenditures rest on the claim that the private sector can provide 

services at substantial cost savings to the government and taxpayers 13 because of the free market's 

ability to conduct business more cost-effectively than the government. 14 

http://oversight.house.gov/images/storiesrrestimonylBerry_ Testimony.pdf (Downloaded March 17,2011) (hereinafier 

Berry 2011 Testimony) 

7 When the contractor workforce is combined with civilians, mHital)' personnel, U.S. Postal Service employees, and 

grantees, the size of the blended federal workforce was estimated at 14.6 million people in 2005. The New True Size of 

Government, p. II; Paul C. Lighi, "The Real Crisis in Government," The Washington Post, January 12,2010, p. A17. 

http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlcontentlarticleI2010/01I11lAR2010011103255.html(Downloaded March 29, 

2011); Hearing Statement of Paul C. Light, New York UniversityiThe Brookings Institution, before the U.S. Senate 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Govemment Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia, "An Update 

on the Bush Administration's Competitive Sourcing Initiative," July 24, 2003. 

http://wagner.nyu.edu//faculty/publications/filesllightCompetitiveSourcing.pdf (Downloaded September 27, 20 I 0) 

• Acquisition Advisory Panel Report, p. 416. 

'National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (pub. Law 110-181), § 807(a), January 28,2008. (hereinafier 

NDAA FY 2008); Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2010 (Pub. Law 111-117), Sec. 743, December 16, 2009. 

Ie Letter from John P. Hutton, Government Accountability Office, to Congressional Committees, "Defense Acquisitions: 

Observations on the Department of Defense Service Contract Inventories for Fiscal Year 2008," January 29, 2010, 

Enclosure I, p. 42. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dI0350r.pdf(Downloaded September 27, 2010); The DHS has begun to 

keep statistics on the size of its shadow government workforce of contractor employees. It had estimated that the size of its 

contractor employee workforce was 200,000, as compared with 188,000 DHS employees, but recently changed the estimate 

to 110,000 contractor employees. Ed O'Keefe, "Eye Opener: Homeland Security Has More Contractors Than Feds," The 

Washington Post, February 24, 2010. http://voices.washingtonpost.comlfederaleyeI2010102/eye_opener_homeland_security_h.html (Downloaded September 27, 2010); Sean Reilly, "Whoops: Estimate 

on number ofDHS contract employees off by 100,000 or so," Federal Times, April II, 2011. 

http://blogs.federaltimes.comlfederal-times-blogf20 I J 104111Iwhoops-estimated-number-of-dhs-contract-employees-off-byat-Ieast-J 000001 (Downloaded April 12, 2011) 

II Federal Register, Vol. 76, No. 76, April 20, 2011, p. 22070. 

11 According to data compiled by POGO from the Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG), the 

federal government awarded $336 billion and $320 billion in service contracts in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, respectively. 

https:/lwww.fpds.govlfpdsnlLcmsl;"Civilian agencies obligated over $135 billion in fiscal year 2010 for services--80 

percent of total civilian spending on contracts." Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Planning: Opportunities to 

Build Strong Foundationsfor Better Services Contracts (GAO-11-672), August 2011, p. 1. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsldI1672.pdf(Downloaded August 11,2011) 

\3 Statement by Jacques S. Gansler, Ph.D., Before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

"Implementing Improvements to Defense Wartime Contracting," April 25, 20 II, pp. 12-13. 

http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/hearing20 11-04-25 _testimony-Gan.ler.pdf (Downloaded April 28, 20 II) Dr. 

Gansler is the Chairman of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in ExpeditionsI)' Operations, 

Chairman of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Improvements to Services Contracting. and a professor at the 

4 
117 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.095

POGO's study tested the accuracy of the cost-savings claim. A few other studies have compared 

specific jobs and the associated costs, but POGO has gone one step further by looking at a larger 

sampling of comparable jobs and their costs when they are performed by government, private sector, 

and contractor employees.!S . 

POGO's investigation into the costs of outsourcing seems particularly timely in light of recent efforts 

to reduce government spending and considering that government spending on services now eclipses its 

spending on goods.!6 If POGO's recommendations are implemented, government officials, both 

legislative and executive, will be better informed in deciding when insourcing or outsourcing services 

is cost-justified. They also will be better informed when debating what legislative or regulatory 

reforms to institute to eliminate billions of dollars in waste each year.!7 

BACKGROUND 

Reducing the size of the federal emplore workforce and increasing budgetary savings have been pet 

projects of policymakers for decades.! Yet it wasn't until the 1950s during the Eisenhower 

administration that there emerged a formalized policy favoring the outsourcing of federal services if it 

could be shown that those services were commercially available at a cost savings to the taxpayer.!9 

In 1966, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) incorporated this policy in its Circular 

University of Maryland. He served as Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) from 1997 to 

2001. 

14 Reliance on service contractors is sometimes justified by the claim that they provide enhanced performance and 

innovation. This report does not address the validity of that claim. 

15 See Table 1. There have been a few limited government studies, which we examine later in this report, that have 

compared contractor costs to federal employee compensation, 

" According to data compiled by POGO from the Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation and 

USAspending.gov, service contract award dollars accounted for 62 percent and 60 percent of an contract spending in fiscal 

years 2009 and 2010 respectively; Acquisition Advisory Panel Report, pp. 2-3. "Almost BO percent of contract obligations 

made by civilian agencies in fiscal year 2010 were for service contracts," Government Accountability Office, OMB Service 

Contracts Inventory Guidance and Implementation (GAO-II-538R), May 27, 20 [ I, p. I. 

http://www.g.o.gov/new.items/dI1538r.pdf(DownloadedMay 27,201 I) (hereinafter GAO-II-53BR) 

17 For example, "The [FY 20 lOJ Budget proposes reducing spending on contractor services in the Department of Defense 

(DOD) in 2010 to achieve net savings of $0.9 billion by bringing some contracted services in house." Office of 

Management and Budget, Terminations, Reductions, and Savings: Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2010, p. 78. 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudgetffylO/pdfftrs.pdf(Downloaded April 12,201 I) 

18 According to the organization In the Public Interes.t. states are facing budget constraints similar to those of the federal 

government, and are outsourcing work Bnd privatizing public assets. including education systems, toll roads, road and 

bridge construction and maintenance, prisons, parking meters, libraries, and trash collection/recycling. Those efforts have at 

times seen higher costs Bnd a decline in mission perfonnance. In the Public Interest, "What's at stake." 

http://inthepublicJnterest.org!whats-al-stake (Downloaded June 17,20 II); Craig Gustafson, "Ambulance deal shorted city, 

whistle-blower says: Fonner head of San Diego operation says $12 mimon could be at stake," San Diego Union-Tribune, 

April 25, 20 II. http://www.signonsandiego.cominews/20l I/aprf25/ambulance-service-contract-questionedf (Downloaded 

April 26, 2011) 

"Bulletin from Rowland R. Hughes, Executive Office of the President, Bureau oflhe Budget, to the Heads of Executive 

Departments and Establishments. ~<CommercialMindustrial activities ofthe Government providing products or services for 

governmental use," Bulletin 55-4, January 15, 1955, pp. 1,3. 

http://www.govemmentcompetition.org!uploadsfBureau_otthe _ Budget_Bulletin _55-4 _January _15_1955. pdf 

(Downloaded May 5, 2011); GAO-I1-538R, p. I. 
118 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.096

A-76, an administrative vehicle for handling personnel needs by competing agency work between 

government offices and contractors.20 OMB has supplemented the A-76 Circular with a handbook that 

includes procedures for detennining which government jobs should remain in-house, and which could 

be transferred to contractors by either cost comparison21 generally depending on which bid was more 

cost-efficient22 or by direct conversion.23 As part of the pUblic-private competition process, the 

government identifies the work, prepares an in-house cost estimate (which can include a mix offederal 

and contractor employees), and compares the agency's bid to the best offer from contractors.24 

Both political parties have taken issue with the proper size of the federal civilian workforce and the 

proper balance between government employees and contractor employees.25 In the 1980s, the Reagan 

administration was a strong advocate for a smaller government. In its attempt to shrink the size of 

government, the administration frequently clashed with Congress over whether the government or 

private industry should perfonn certain functions?6 When President Reagan was sworn into office in 

1981, he declared, "In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is 

the problem,,,27 and his administration began pushing agencies to outsource commercial functions.2B 

When President Clinton took office in 1993, he also took up the mantle of "small government," 

promising to reduce the federal workforce by 300,000 employees?9 The Clinton administration 

instituted the "reinventing government" initiative and oversaw the implementation of the Federal 

Activities Inventory Refonn (FAIR) Acfo with the goal of increasing the outsourcing of commercial 

functions. The FAIR Act was originally introduced as the Freedom from Government Competition 

Act, which would have prohibited agencies from engaging in any activity producing goods or services 

that could be provided by the private sector.31 

20 0MB issues instructions and infonnation to federal agencies about various policy issues. Office of Management and 

Budget, "OMB Circular A-76." http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_default (Downloaded June J 7, 20J I) 

(Hereinafter OMB Circular A-76); Government Accountability Office, Commercial Activities Panel: Improving the 

Sourcing Decisions of the Federal Government (GAO-02-847D, September 27, 2002, p. 2. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02847t.pdf(Downloaded September 27, 20ID) (hereinafter GAO-02-847T) 

,\ The A-76 competition process (also known as public-private competition) allows government employees to bid for the 

work against contractors. POGO avoids the use of the term "public-private" competitions through most of this report so that 

there is no confusion between the contractor and private sector data that is presented. 

"GAO-02-847T, p. 2. 

2J Under a process called "direct conversion," the federal government can outsource government jobs without competition 

and cost comparisons. GAO-02-S47T, pp. 2-3. 

24 GAO-02-847T, p. 3. 

"Ed O'Keefe, "Eye Opener: Homeland Security Has More Contractors Than Feds," The Washington Post, February 24, 

2010. http://voices.washinglonposl.comlfederal-eyel20 I 0/02/eye _opener_homeland _security _ h.html (Downloaded 

September 27, 2010) 

26 Congressional Research Service, Inherently Governmental Functions and Deportment of Defense Operations: 

Background, Issues, and Option<for Congress (R40641), June 22, 2009, p. 5. 

http://prhome.defense.govIRSIIREQUIREMBNTS/docs/CRS _DoDIGCA.pdf (Downloaded September 27, 20 I D) 

(hereinafter Inherently Governmental Functions and Deportment of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Options 

far Congress (R40641)) 

27 Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address, January 20,1981. 

http://www.reaganfoundation.orglpdf/lnaugural_Address_ 01208 I .pdf (Downloaded June 17, 2011) 

" Acquisition Advisory Panel Report, p. 399, n. 18. 

20 Testimony of Dan Guttman, Fellow at the Johns Hopkins' Washington Center for the Study of American Government, 

before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, "Who's Doing Work for Government? Monitoring, Accountability 

and Competition in the Federal and Service Contract Workforce," March 6, 2002. 

http://hsgac.senate.gov/030602guttman.htm (Downloaded September 27, 2010) 

"Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (Pub. Law 105-270), § 2(d) and (e), October 19,1998. 

11 Inherently Governmental Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Optionsfor 

Congress (R4064 1), pp. 5, 8 n. 37. 

6 
119 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.097

The George W. Bush administration continued the Clinton administration's pro-outsourcing agenda. In 

his President's Management Agenda, President Bush announced early in his first term his intention of 

making the federal government more "market-based. ,,32 The Bush administration also "proposed 

amending OMB Circular A-76 so that all functions were presumed to be commercial unless agencies 

justified why they were inherently governmental."l3 The Bush administration employed contractors in 

the military and reconstruction operations in Ira~]4 and Afghanistan,3S and in the cleanup efforts after 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the Gulfregion.] In May 2003, the Bush administration revised OMB 

Circular A-76 to emphasize competition of services with "streamlined cost comparisons."l7 

In 2002, the Commercial Activities Panees concluded that A-76 competitions had achieved significant 

savings and efficiencies for the government.39 The panel "strongly supported a continued emphasis on 

competition as a means to improve economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the government.,,4D 

Six years later in May 2008, OMB reported that from FY 2003 through FY 2007 the federal 

government conducted 1,375 A-76 competitions, which, at the tinJe of the report, resulted in accrued 

actual savings of$I.88 billion.41 OMB projected that, over the long run, there would be $7.2 billion in 

total savings.42 In the majority of cases, the savings did not result from outsourcing to contractors, but 

" Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, The President's Management Agenda: Fiscal Year 

2002, p. 4. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-biniGetTRDoc? AD= ADA39442I &Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (Downloaded 

September 27, 201 0) 

33 inherently Governmental Functions and Department of Defense Operations:. Background, lssues. and Options for 

Congress (R40641), p. 6. 

" "DOD obligated approximately $15.4 billion on contracts in the Iraq theater of operations in FY201 0, representing 20% 

oftotal spending in those regions. From FY2005 to FY2010, DOD obligated approximately $112.8 billion on contracts 

primarily in the Iraq theater of operations, representing 19% of total obligations for operations in Iraq." Department of 

Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis (R40764), p. 19. 

)S "DOD relies extensively upon contractors to support overseas contingency operations. As of March 2011, DOD had more 

contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq (155,000) than uniformed personnel (145,000). Contractors made up 52% of 

DOD's workforce in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since December 2009, the number of DOD contractors in Afghanistan has 

exceeded the number in lraq .... According to FPDS, DOD obligated approximately $J 1.8 billion on contracts in the 

Afghanistan theater of operations in FY2010, representing 15% of total obligations ... in the area. From FY2005-FY2010, 

DOD obligated approximately $33.9 billion on contracts primarily in the Afghanistan theater, representing 16% of total 

DOD obligations for operations in that area." Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background 

and Analysis (R40764), pp. Summary, 13. 

36 Hearing Statement of David E. Cooper, Government Accountability Office, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing 

Management, Before the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. I'Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: 

Preliminary Observations on Contracting for Response and Recovery Efforts," GAO-06-246T, November 8, 2005, pp. 2-3. 

http://www.gao.gov/new-itemsld06246t.pdf(Downloaded April 27, 2011) 

31 The revised circular in 2003 stated: "The longstanding policy ofthe federal government has been to rely on the private 

sector for needed commercial services. To ensure that the American people receive maximum value for their tax dollars. 

commercial activities should be subject to the forces of competition." OMS Circular A-76, Revised May 2003. 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a076 _a76JncUech_ correction (Downloaded September 27, 20 I 0). 

" Commercial Activities Panel was chaired by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, to study the 

P90Hcies and procedures governing the transfer of commercia1 activities from federal employees to contractors. 

GAO-02-847T, p. 8. 

"GAO-02-847T, p. 9. 

41 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Report on Competitive Sourcing Results: Fiscal 

Year 2007, May 2008, pp. 4, 13-14. 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultifiles/omb/assets/procurementicomp_sourc_fy2007.pdf(Downloaded April 5, 

2011) (hereinafter Report on CompetiiNe Sourcing Results) 

41 Report on Competitive Sourcing Results, pp. 2. 4, llwl2. The project savings require independent validation to detennine 

ifthe benefits and cost savings promised during the A-76 competition process were or will be realized. Report on 

Competitive Sourcing Results, pp. 14-15; Memorandum from Clay 10hnson Ill, Deputy Director for Management, 

Executive Office of the Presiden~ Office of Management and Budge~ to the President's Management Council, "Validating 

7 
120 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.098

rather from keeping the work in-house. In fact, 83 percent of the competitions were won by federal 

employees (as a percentage oHotal FTEs competed).43 Consequently, the vast majority of projected 

savings might not be a function of private sector efficiencies, but may instead have been due to the 

government's structural reengineering of the federal employee workforce.44 In many instances, 

government agencies cut their workforces through measures "including buyouts, early retirements, 

[and 1 reassignment to priority pro grams within the agency or at another agency. ,,45 

Despite the cost savings associated with the A-76 process, it has been criticized by both government 

officials and contractor trade groups for a number of reasons. For instance, both sides claim the process 

favors the other side.46 Additionally, some agencies have been criticized for their inability to 

effectively administer the competitions and document the actual savings achieved.47 Other criticisms 

include the fact that, generally speaking, the A-76 process only provides a small look into overall 

outsourcing activities and that it is a political vehicle to place government services in the hands of 

contractors.48 

The Obama administration's policy on the issue of outsourcing has fluctuated. President Obama issued 

a March 4, 2009, memo on government contracting that expressed concerns about federal contract 

spending, including the level of competition, the use of risky contracts, and the need to protect 

functions that should be performed by federal employees.49 The President directed OMB to develop 

and issue government-wide guidance to assist agencies in reviewing "existing contracts in order to 

identify contracts that are wasteful, inefficient, or not otherwise likely to meet the agency's needs, and 

the Results of Public-Private Competition," Aprill3, 2007. 

http://www.faLgov/pdfsiMemonValidatingResultsCompetitions.pdf(Downloaded May 24, 2011) 

4J Report on Competitive Sourcing Results, p. 2. nAs part of this process, the government identifies the work to 

be perfonned (described in the perfonnance work statement), prepares an in-house cost estimate on the basis of its most 

efficient organization, Bnd compares it with the winning offer from the private sector," A footnote related to this text stated, 

"The most efficient organization is the government's in-house plan to perfonn a commercial activity. It may include a mix 

offederal employees and contract support." GAO-02-847T, p. 3. 

44 Report on Competitive Sourcing Results, p. 10, 

45 Report on Competitive Sourcing Results, p. 10. 

"Congressional Research Service, Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy (RL30392), June 30, 2005, pp. 4-

6. http://www.fas.org/sgpicrs/natsecIRL30392.pdf(Downloaded April 20, 2011); In addition, a Center for Strategic and 

International Studies (CSIS) report highlights the inherent problems with government lifecycle cost comparison models and 

appropriate overhead rates, and proposed a cost-estimating methodology. Although the report discusses a comprehensive 

cost estimation methodology that should be used to create a baseline for making more accurate cost comparisons, it is silent 

on all the costs the government incurs~ above and beyond fixed biHing rates, associated with the award, administration. and 

oversight of service contracts. Center for Strategic and International Studies, DoD Workforce Cost Realism Assessment, 

May 2011, pp. 11-19. http://csis.org/filesipublicationlll0517 _Berteau_DoDWorkforceCost_ Web.pdf(Downloaded May 

18,2011) (hereinafter DoD Workforce Cost Realism Assessment) 

47 For instance, GAO found that in one competition, DOL reported projected savings to Congress tha.t overestimated its 

actual savings due to the fact that its costs were underreported by 100 percent. Government Accountability Office, 

Department of Labor: Belter Cost Assessments and DepartmenIWide Performance Tracking Are Needed to Effecttvely 

Manage Competittve Sourcing Program (GAO-09-14), November 21, 2008, pp. 4-5. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsid0914.pdf(Downloaded September 27, 2010). 

48 American Federation ofGovemment Employees, "Public Comments on the Presidential Memorandum on Government 

Contracting," July 15, 2009. http://www.afge.org/index.cfm?page...Privatization&Fuse~Content&ContentID=1953 

(Downloaded July 12,2011) 

49 Memorandum from President Barack Obama, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, "Government 

Contracting," March 4, 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/theJ>ress _ officelMemorandum-for-the-Heads-of-ExecutiveDepartments-and-Agencies-Subject-Govemmentl (Downloaded May 1 I, 2011) (hereinafter Obama Contracting Memo) 

8 
121 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.099

to formulate appropriate corrective action in a timely manner."so As a result, agencies received 

guidance to improve the insourcing process and better manage the multi-sector workforce.sl 

The insourcing effort was short-lived and, despite the concerns about government contracting 

President Obama expressed in his March 2009 memo, the administration appears to have backed away 

from that pOlicy.52 Specifically, President Obama signed into law a two-year freeze on federal 

employee salaries, 53 which could have the effect of harming the government's ability to hire and retain 

federal employees and thus increase the need for contractors. 54 In addition, the government has 

temporarily banned new A-76 competitions at 000,55 and has made little effort to identify and 

eliminate any excessive costs of outsourcing the over $320 billion in services contracts awarded each 

year while this ban is in effect. S6 In fact, only one federal agency has taken any meaningful steps to 

rein in contractors during this period of time. The Department of Energy (which is uniquely positioned 

because of its significant contractor workforce) has taken the unprecedented move of freezing 

so Obama Contracting Memo. 

" Memorandum from Director Peter R. Orszag, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 

"Managing the Multi-Sector Workforce," OMB Memo M-09-26, July 29,2009, pp. 1-2. 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sitesidefaultlfileslomb/assetslmemorandajy2009/m-09-26.pdf(Downloaded September 27, 

2010); Stephen Losey, "Huge Federal Staffing Planned in 2010," Federal Times, May 12,2009. 

http://www.federaltimes.com/articleI20090512/PERSONNEL02l90512030 111 050IPERSONNEL04 (Downloaded 

September 27, 2010); Ashton Carter, "A Message from the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics." https:llacc.dau.milladllen-US/365272lfile/5029512%20-

%20ActionMemo%20TABo/020A%20Carter%20Memo%20vI7o/020Publish%20D.pdf(Downloaded April 11, 2011); Alice 

Lipowicz, "DHS draws flak for review of services contracts," Federal Computer Week, June 5, 2009. 

http://fcw.com/Articles!2009/06/08INEWS-DHS-conlracts.aspx (Downloaded April II, 2011) 

"Memorandum from Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh to Principal Officials of Headquarters-Department ofthe 

Army, and others, "Reservation ofIn-Sourcing Approval Authority," February 1,2011. 

http://www .pscouncil.org! AM/Template.cfrn?Section=Home I &TEMPLA TE=/CM/ContentDisplay .cfrn&CONTENTlD=6 

796 (Downloaded May 18,2011); Marjorie Censer, "The Pentagon relraats on insourcing as spending slows," The 

Washington Post, April 3, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.comlbusinessicapitalbusinesslthe-pentagon-retreats-aninsourcing-as-spending-slows/2011/03128/AFsJJxWC_story.htrnl (Downloaded on April II, 2011) 

" Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011 (Pub. Law 111-322), § I (b) and (c), 

December 22, 2010; Memorandum for President Barack Obama, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 

"Freezing Federal Employee Pay Schedules and Rates That Are Set By Administrative Discretion," December 22. 2010. 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-officel20 1 0/12122/memorandum-adjustrnents-<:ertain-rates-pay (Downloaded April 3, 

20 II). The Republicans' FY 2012 budget resolution seeks to extend the pay freeze through 2015. Emily Long and Kellie 

Lunney, "GOP budget resolution calls for pay freeze through 2015," Government &ecutive, April 5, 2011. 

http://www.govexec.comistoryyage.cfrn?articleid=47515&dcn=todaysnews (Downloaded on April 11,2011) 

54 There are differing viewpoints on the result of freezing federal employees salaries. Howard Risher, 'The true cost of a 

5-year pay freeze," Federal Times, May I, 2011. http://www.federaltimes.comiarticleI20110501/ADOP061105010306/ 

(Downloaded May 3, 20 II); "News Digest: May 9-Pay freeze unlikely to hurt retention, official says," Federal Times, 

May 9, 2011, p. 4. http://www.federaltimes.comiarticleI20110508IDEPARTMENTS0511050BO3011 (Downloaded June I, 

2011) 

" Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 (Pub. Law 111-llB), § 8117 (hereinafter Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2010); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (pub. Law 111-84), § 325; Omnibus 

Appropriations Act, 2009 (Pub. Law III-B), § 737. DoD is seeking to have it's A-76 authority restored. Sarah Chacko, 

"DoD report seeks return to A-76 job competitions," Federal Times, July 19,2011. 

http://www.federaltimes.com/articleI20 II 0719IDEP AR TMENTSO III 07190307/1 023IDEP AR TMENTSO 1 (Downloaded 

July 22, 2011). DoD is prohibited from undertaking direct conversions "unless the conversion is based on the result of a 

public-private competition ...... 10 U.S.c. § 2461; Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 

2011 (Pub. Law 112-10), § 8015. 

""Since fiscal year 2006, civilian agencies have obligated over $100 billion annually to obtain a range of services from 

contractors." GAO-II-53BR, p. 1. 

9 
122 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.100

'contractor employees' salaries.57 Although this is a good move, other agencies may be less effective in 

controlling excessive contract prices.58 Generally, most contracts include annual escalation clauses or 

increased rates for each option l,ear of the contract-and, in some instances, those contracts include 

options for nine years or more. 9 

The 112'h Congress is even taking steps to promote the government's hiring of contractors, no matter 

the cost. The House version of the FY 2012 Defense Authorization bill includes a "sense of Congress" 

provision that states that insourcing should only occur when it involves inherently governmental 

functions.6o 

No matter the reasons for shifts in policies, the fact remains that the overall size of the blended federal 

workforce and the dollars spent on service contracts have dramatically increased. As budgets decrease, 

federal employee total compensation will receive increased scrutiny despite policymakers not having 

all the facts. 61 

SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGy62 

POGO reviewed 35 occupational classifications for this study. We employed two critical selection 

criteria: (1) whether the occupational classifIcations involved a "special interest function,,,63 and (2) 

whether the occupational classification had been converted to a "commercial" function for the 

purposes of a FAIR Act inventory or subject to outsourcing pursuant to Circular A_76.64 POGO 

analyzed classification systems from the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) General Schedule 

(GS) and Job Grading Standards for Trades, Craft, and Labor Positions (WG) series (which we refer to 

throughout the report as GS series),65 Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) Standard Occupational 

" Alyah Khan, "DOE holds unique power to freeze contractor pay," Washington Techn%gy, December 22, 2010. 

http://washingtontechnology.comJarticlesI20 I 0/12122/unique-arrangement-allows-doe-to-freeze-contractor-pay.aspx 

~Downloaded April 3, 2011) 

• Congress has made an control contract costs with 000. The Senate's National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Vear 

2012 (S. 981) includes Section 807 applying allowable senior executive benchmark compensation limits to all contractor 

employees, and Section 30 I freezes DoD's operation and maintenance funding at 2010 levels. Emily Long, "Pain of 

Defense service contractor cuts might not be felt evenly," Government Executive, June 20, 2011. 

http://www.govexec.comJstoryyage.cfrn?articleid=48047&sid=60 (Downloaded June 23, 2011) 

59 For instance, the Amly logistics support LOGCAP IV contract award to three different contractors has one base year and 

nine option years. U.S. Anny Sustainment Command Public Affairs, "ASC selects LOGCAP IV contractors," June 28, 

2007. http://www.army.miVarticlel3 836/asc-selects-Iogcap-iv-contractorsl (Downloaded May 31, 2011) (hereinafter ASC 

selects LOG CAP IV contractors) 

'" Sarah Chacko, "House bill urges 000 to halt insourting," Federal Times, May 27,2011. 

http://www.federaltimes.comJarticleI20110527/ACQUISITION03/10527030211001 (Downloaded May 31, 2011) 

61 Howard Risher, "Analysis: Politics of federal pay obscures the facts," Government Executive, May 25, 201 1. 

http://www.govexec.com/story Jlage.cfrn?articleid=47870&orer-todaysnews (Downloaded May 26, 2011) 

.2 The complete methodology can be found in Appendix A. 

6) "Special interest functions are functions that require increased management attention due to heightened risk of workforce 

imbalance." Memorandum from Daniell. Gordon, Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, to Chief 

Acquisition Officers, uService Contract Inventories," November 5, 20 I 0, Attachment, pp. 3-4. 

http://www. whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultifilesiomb/procurementimemo/service-contract-inventories-guidanceII052010.pdf(Downloaded July 13, 2011) 

64 The occupational classifications selected by POGO would pass the "Vellow Book Test," indicating that they are services 

easily found in a phone book. Those types of services have been targeted by Members of Congress for outsourcing. 

Matthew Weigelt, "Lawmakers want competitive sourcing on the table," Federal Computer Week, July 19, 20 II. 

http://fcw.comJarticlesi2011l07/19/competitive-sourcing-appropriations-committee-Ietter.aspx (Downloaded July 22, 2011) 

65 The GSA Schedule program provides agencies with a "simplified process for obtaining commercial supplies and services 

at prices associated with volume buying." Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 8.402. Service contracts ofte!) are 

10 
123 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.101

Classification (SOC) system, and General Services Administration's (GSA) service activities as 

classified in its Special Item Number (SIN) system to establish comparable occupational services. 

(Appendix C) POGO then identified appropriate data tables published by each agency that allowed 

POGO to determine and compare the average rate of full annual compensation paid to federal and 

private sector employees with the average annual billing rates for contractor employees performing 

comparable services at government sites. (Appendices B and D) Because the contractor billing rates 

published by GSA include not only salaries but also other costs including benefits contractors provide 

their employees,66 POGO added OPM's 36.25 percent benefit rate to federal employee salaries67 and 

BLS's 33.5 percent loading to private sector employee salaries to reflect the full fringe benefit package 

paid to full-time employees in service-providing organizations that employ 500 or more workers.68 All 

supporting data for this study are found in Table J and Appendices B through D.69 

POGO is aware that its methodology does not incorporate some governmental cost factors: Le., nondirectly associated overhead (e.g., executive management and administration, information technology, 

and legal support), material and supplies (e.g., insurance and maintenance), or facilities 

(e.g., depreciation, rent, insurance, maintenance and repair, utilities, capital improvements).7o 

However, given the fact that POGO relied exclusively on GSA's listed contractor billing rates for 

performance at government sites, many of those cost factors would essentially be canceled out.71 In 

fact, when contractors perform work at contractor sites, POGO found that contractor billing rates were, 

on average, 15 percent higher than rates for work performed at government sites. In addition, POGO 

did not include in its comparative analysis additional costs that the government incurs as a result of 

awarded through high-risk labor-hour contracts, a type oftime and material contract, that is considered a las! resort. FAR 

Subpart I6.601(d); Sarah Chacko, "White House orders agencies to cut spending on services contracts," Federal Times, 

July 11,2011, p. 3. htrp:l!www.federaItimes.comiarticlel20I 10707/ACQUISITION03/1070703081 (Downloaded July 12, 

2011) Labor-hour contracts are generally mOre susceptible to waste, fraud, and abuse than fixed price or cost-type 

contracts, and therefore the rates provided in GSA Schedu1e contracts tend to be higher than the equivalent amounts that 

would otherwise be paid by the government under fixed price and cost-type contracts. 

66 GSA contracts supply hourly hilling rates, Those rates are not just the salaries contractor employees are paid, but include 

benefits, overhead, administrative costs, and profit. There is no way to determine the portion of those rates that are 

designated as salary. 

61 Memorandum from Jim NU5slet Director. Office of Management and Budget, to the Heads of Executive Departments and 

Agencies, "Update to Civilian Position Full Fringe Benefit Cost Factor, Federal Pay Raise Assumptions, and Inflation 

Factors used in OMB Circular No. A-76, 'Performance of Commercial Activities, '" M-08-13, March I I, 2008, p. 2. 

htrp:llwww.whitehouse.gov/sitesl 

default!filesiomb/memorandalty2008/m08-13.pdf(Downloaded September 27,2010) (hereinafter Update to Civilian 

Position Full Fringe Benefit Cost Factor) 

61 Because the vast majority of contract service providers are large corporate entities, POGO thought it appropriate to 

calculate benefits based on this workforce classification. Bureau of Labor Statistics) "Table 14. Private industry workers, by 

establishment employment size: employer costs per hours worked for employee compensation and cosu as a percentage of 

total compensation, 2004-2010,500 workers or more," March 9, 2011, pp. 187-189. 

ftp:l/ftp.bls.gov/pub/speciaLrequests/ocwc/ectiececqrtn.pdf (Downloaded March 28, 201 I) 

69ln preparing this study, POGO utilized certain data modeling of Avue Technologies Corporation, a provider of automated 

management platform solutions, However, POGO remains soleJy responsible for the ultimate analysis and conclusions 

~esented. 

OMS Circular A-76 outlines numerous costs, including a 12 percent overhead rate, that must be added to full 

compensation labor costs in order to accurately compare the total cost to the government when making public~private cost 

comparisons. OMB Circular A-76, Revised May 2003, B-I7. 

htrp:/lwww. whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a076_a76_incUech_correction (Downloaded September 27, 2010); DoD 

Workforce Cost Realism Assessmen~ pp. 16-19. 

11 For instance, within the Defense Finance and Accounting Service the DoD Inspector General stated that it "found no 

relationship or any instances where genera} and administrative costs would be reduced by the conversion of work from in~house 

to contract perfonnance," Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General. Infrastructure and Environment: 

Public/PrNate Competition/or the De/ense Finance and Accounting Service Military Refired and Annuitant Pay Funcr;ons (D· 

2003·056), March 2 1,2003, pp. 19, 22. htrp:/fwww.dodig.miUauditireports/ty03/03.056.pdf(Downloaded May 19, 2011) 

11 
124 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.102

outsourcing services to contractors. Those costs would only add to the costs associated with 

outsourcing documented in this report. 

POGO made every effort to ensure that its study is as accurate as possible. However, there are a 

number offactors that potentially limit the accuracy of POGO's [mdings. For instance, over the course 

of our investigation, we discovered some disturbing limitations to the federal databases available to us. 

The most critical limitations are that: I) the government's coding, classification, and data collection 

systems are inconsistent and do not allow for reliable cost analyses 72; 2) government websites do not 

provide access to agency documents that detail cost estimates and the justifications for outsourcing 

decisions; 3) the government does not publish information on the number of actual contractor 

employees holding a specific occupational position under any given contract; 4) the government only 

lists the ceiling prices that it can be billed by contractors for the specific occupational positions--the 

government is at liberty to negotiate prices that are lower than those listed, but it does not publish those 

negotiated rates (however, based on POGO's review of GSA contracts, and anecdotal evidence, the 

government tends to pay the listed billing rates rather than negotiating lower rates73); and 5) 

government websites do not disclose what the expected cost savings for service contracts are, nor the 

actual savings (or lack of savings) that result from those contracts. These shortcomings prevent 

government officials, as well as the public, from accurately assessing outsourcing costs. There are 

other factors that may limit the accuracy of POGO's findings, and we detail those in the full 

methodology in Appendix A. 

POGO's COST ANALYSIS 

POGO's study evaluates whether the current practice of outsourcing federal services to contractors is 

actually cost beneficial.74 To do this, POGO compared the average of GSA's listed annual contractor 

billing rates (which we refer to throughout the report as "average annual contractor billing rates,,)75 

with the full costs of federal employee annual compensation for comparable services. POGO also 

compared federal employee full annual compensation with private sector employee full annual 

compensation, as well as average annual contractor billing rates with private sector employee full 

annual compensation, in order to evaluate the validity of the current private-sector versus federalemployee debate. These three comparisons are set forth below in Table I. 

n For example, two OPM documents provide inconsistent data for matching its GS Series of job classifications with the 

BLS's SOC job classification codes; specifically, in more than a third of the occupations POGO compared, OPM's GSjob 

classification codes conflicted with the data utilized in the annual U.S. Pay Agent reports (located in Appendix VII of the 

2002 report) to establish comparable compensation for federal civilian employees and private sector employees. 

n Steve Kelman, "How agencies can cut contracting costs," Federal Computer Week, August 9) 2011. 

http://fcw.comiarticIesI20 11l08/08/comment-kelman-save-money-for-govemment.aspx (Downloaded August II, 2011); 

Steve Kelman, "GSA schedules: Are agencies paying too much?," Federal Computer Week; July 29, 2010. 

http://fcw.comlBlogslLecteml2010/07/Steve-Kelman-GSA-schedules-pricing-July-29.aspx (Downloaded June 23, 2011); 

Steve Kelman, "Are agencies paying too much through the GSA schedule? Readers respond," Federal Computer Week, 

August 3, 20 I O. http://fcw.comIBlogsiLecteml20 I 0/08/Steve-Kelman-GSA-schedule-pricing-reaction.aspx (Downloaded 

June 23, 2011); One recent story indicated that cost is emerging as major factor in federal contracting. Sarah Chacko, "Feds 

driving harder bargain at procurement table," Federal Times, July 25, 201 I, p. I. 

http://www.federaltimes.comlarticle/201 10724IACQUISITION03/107240302/1009IACQUISITJON (Downloaded July 26, 

2011) 

74 This study was a quantitative rather than qualitative study, and did not look at outcomes of contractor or federal 

employee performance. In general, cost comparisons should be a factor-but not the only factor-when assigning service 

tasks to either federal or contractor employees. 

7S In some instances, the listed hilling rates can be negotiated down to a lower rate. POGO has no access to how many rates 

are negotiated or for how much. 

12 
125 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.103

Table 1: Cost Analyses 

'--"-------1:-- ------

Full Federal Full Private Contractor ! OPM Series Federal Contractor Contractor Sector Annual 

Description to to Federalt to Private:!: Annual Annual BIlling , Private- Compensation Compensation Ratestt I 

I 

i Accounting L50 1,40 3.60 $124,851 $83,132 $299,374 i 1 Auditing IA7 231 JAO $122,373 $83,132 $283,005 i 

I Budget Analysis , ,89 ~ 2A3 $110,229 $124,501 $302,661 I 

---~- $111,564 I I 

i Building .62 238 IA8 $179,740 $265,242 : ! Manaaement 

, Cartography IA7-- 1.46 2,14-- $116,481 $79,219 $169,520 I 

i Cemetery 

( Administration 1.12 2.83 3.17 $106,124 $94,485 $299,832 

I Services i 

I Claims Assistance I and Examinina .76 4,83 3.66 $57,292 $75,637 $276,598 1 

! Computer 1.04 1.97 2,04 $136,456 $131,415 $268,653 ; I Enfrineerin& 

! Contracting .98 2.29 2.24 $113,319 $115,596 $259,106! 

I Correctional Officer 2.17 1.15 2A9 $72,977 $33,598 $83,803 ! 

: Environmental 1.20 lAO 1.68 $127,247 $105,964 $177,570 : i Protection SPllcialist , 

! Equal Opportunity lAO 2.05 2.87 $125,368 $89,394 I 

i Compliance $256,381 I 

i Facility Operations .90 1.66 1.50 $108,060 $119,449 $179,254 I I Services I 

i Financial Analysis 1.24 1.30 1.61 $132,262 $106,679 $171,288 : 

I Financia-I-----t-' 

1.13 2.05 232 $164,218 $145,486 $337,002 i : Management 

i Fire Protection and 1.04-- 1.25 1.29'- $65,452 $63,105 $81,702 : ! Prevention 

I Food Inspection 1.04-' 1.29 L34'- $58,090 I $55,883 $74,963 ; - i General Attorney .79 3.17 2,51 $175,081 $220,924 $554,923 • 

! General Inspection, ! Investigation, 1.17 1.62 1.90 $104,712 $89,394 $169,666 I Enforcement, and 

I Compliance ! : Groundskeeper 2.00 .80 1.60 $64,896 $32,396 $51,709 

I.Human Resourees 1.11 2.05 2.27 $111,711 $100,465 $228,488 I i Management 

I Information 

I Technology 1.09 1.59 1.73 $124,663 $114,818 $198,411 i I Management I 

I Language Specialist 1.80" 1.92 3A6-- $110,014 $61,010 $211,203 i 

I Logistics 

I Management .94 1.76 1.66 $116,047 $123,349 $204,443 I 

!J!>eploynt""tL ~,---

---"-""--'---~--- --------"-- _.-"-- _._- ---

13 
126 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.104

I Logistics ~ .. ~f;=~ , 

Management U9 1.46 1.74 $116,047 $97,269 $168,938 i , [Planning] 

\ Management and l.I5 2.15 2.48 $124,602 $108,132 $268,258 i i Program Anal~sis 

Mechanical l.I5 LSO 1.72 $126,177 $109,961 $189,197 : ! Engineering 

I Medical Records 

I Technician 1.26 .99 1.24 $58,641 $46,705 $57,782 l 

l Nurse 1.I6 1.65 1.92 $105,714 t- $91,042 $174,803 ! 

LPolice 1.24 1.34 1.66 $71,256 $57,533 $95,659 I 

I Program .97 LS6 l.50 $173,551 $179,740 $269,901 i i ManaKement , i 

I Quality Assurance .94 1.09 1.03 $98,939 $104,891 $107,786 t 

i Secnri!): Guard 1.53 1.36 2.08 $50,257 $32,953 $68,515 I 

i Statistics l.I5 1.66 1.91 $125,192 $108,586 $207,563 i ; Tecbnical Writing .. US 1.08 J.35 $103801 $82,873 $112,091 i d Ed tiD : 

\\ l'r.lg.t.: ( H~( 

PIClillUIJIS I Uti I 1.83 2.U9 I 

Sources: 

The full methodology, data descriptions. and complete data tables for how the figures in this table were obtained are provided in 

Appendices A. B. C. and D. Appendix B contains a table of the 35 occupational classifications (including OPM, BLS, and GSA 

identification codes) with the base salaries and full compensation paid to federal employees and private sector employees 

(according to two BLS surveys), as well as the GSA billing rates for specified contracts. Appendix C contains the job titles and 

descriptions provided by OPM, BLS, and GSA for the 35 matching GS occupational series, SOC codes, and GSA SINs. Appendix 

D contains a table afthe GSA contracts and the 35 occupational classifications covering over 550 service activities selected for 

calculating the average hourly Bnd annual contractor billing fates for the various SINs used for comparing costs, along with the 

listed hourly hlHing rates, Annual dollar figures are rounded to the nearest doHar. For the contractor rates, while POGO used an 

average annual billing rate, agencies do not necessarily purchase services over a full year's period oftime. 

Notes: 

The comparisons in tbis table are expressed as ratios in accordance with the following calculations: 

.. The federal to priVate comparisons are calculated by dividing the average annual full compensation paid to federal 

employees by the average annual fuB compensation paid to private sector employees perfonning similar services. 

t The contractor to federal comparisons are calculated by dividing the average annual contractor billing rate for 

perfonning these services by the average annual full compensation paid to federal employees perfonning similar services. 

t The contractor to private sector comparisons are calculated by dividing the average annual contractor billing rate by 

the average annual fun compensation paid to private sector employees performing similar services, 

tt Average annual contractor billing rates are typically based on a 2.087-hour conversion method, but for the sake of comparison 

to total government compensation, POGO used a 2,080-hour conversion. As a result, POGO multiplied the average hourly 

contractor billing rate by 2,080 to calculate the average annual contractor billing rate . 

•• No National Compensation Survey data were available for comparison; therefore Occupational Employment Statistics data 

were used. 

14 
127 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.105

The result of POGO's analysis was shocking. In 94 percent (33 of the 35) of the occupational series 

POGO analyzed, the average annual contractor billing rate was much more than the average annual full 

compensation for federal employees: on average, contractors may be billing the government 

approximately 1.83 times what the government pays federal employees to perform similar work.76 

When the average annual contractor billing rates were compared with the average annual full 

compensation paid to private sector employees in the open market, POGO found that in all 

occupational classifications studied, the contractor billing rates were, on average, more tban twice 

tbe costs incurred by private sector employers for tbe same services. 

The most egregious example of an outsourced occupational classification that resulted in excessive 

costs rather than cost savings is claims assistance and examining-administrative support positions 

that involve examining, reviewing, developing, adjusting, reconsidering, or recommending 

authorization of claims by or against the federal government. To provide these services, on average, 

federal employees are fully compensated at $57,292 per year, private sector employees are fully 

compensated at $75,637 per year, and the average annual contractor billing rate is $276,598 per year. 

POGO found the government may therefore be paying contractors, on average, nearly 5 times what it 

pays government employees to perform the same services. 77 Put another way, the government may be 

paying the contractor providing support services for claims assistance and examining more than it does 

federal judges or administrative law judges, who earn less than $200,000 per year. 78 Contractors may 

be billing the government, on average, approximately 3.66 times what private sector employees are 

compensated for performing similar services. 

General attorney services often involve the resolution, management, or disposition of assets held by the 

federal government. To provide these services, a federal government attorney is paid on average 

. $175,081 per year/9 a private sector attorney is paid on average $220,924 per year, and a contractor 

attorney may be billing the government on average $554,923 per year. In other words, contractors may 

be billing the federal government up to 3.17 times more, on average, what the government pays a 

federal attorney, and up to 2.51 times what private sector employees are compensated. It is hard to 

discern how the government canjustify these excessive costs. In fact, contractor legal assistants or law 

clerks who lack the advanced education and skills of an attorney cost more than federal attorneys.80 

When POGO analyzed accounting, auditing, and budget analysis occupational positions (some of 

which fallon the line between inherently governmental and closely associated with inherently 

" While the policy of downsizing the federal government by outsourcing services failed to generate the cost savings 

advocates of outsourcing have promised, POGO acknowledges that not all federal service contracts impose unreasonable 

costs; indeed, some as yet indetenninable percentage of these contracts may result in cost savings to the government. 

11 Throughout this report, whenever we refer to "pay" or "is paid," we are referring to the fully loaded compensations (base 

salary plus benefits), which are listed in detail in Appendix B. 

78 U.S. Courts, "Federal Judicial Pay Increase Fact Sheet." 

http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeshipsiJudiciaICompensation/JudicialPayincreaseFact.aspx (Downloaded April 

12,2011) 

" A recent media report detailed that numerous government lawyers earned more than $180,000 per year, which is similar 

to the average government attorney salary found in this study. Kevin McCoy, "Doctors, lawyers, dentists tops in fed jobs 

that pay $180K-plus," USA Today, May 3, 2011. http://www.usatoday.com!money/economyI201l-05-02-highest-paidfederal-workers_n.htm (Downloaded May 3, 201l) 

80 The legal assistant or law clerk rate was $89 per hour in 2009, which is an annual rate of$185,120. General Services 

Administration, eLibrary, "Sullivan Cove Consultants, LLC, Contract Number GS-23F-0 181 S SIN 520-6 Professional 

Legal Services," May 17,2006 -May 16,2011, p. 3. 

http://www.gsaelibrary.gsa.govlElibMainicontractorlnfo.do?contractNumber=GS-23 F-O 181 S&contractorName~ 

SULLIV AN+COVE+CONSUL TANTS+LLC&executeQuery=YES (Downloaded April 13, 20 11) 

15 
128 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.106

governmental functions),81 we found that federal employees are paid on average $119,000 per year, 

private sector employees are paid less than $100,000 a year, and contractors may be billing the 

government nearly $300,000 per employee per year, on average. This means that, on average, it can 

cost the government approximately 2.5 times more to use contractor employees for these services than 

federal employees, and that contractors may be billing the government 3 times on average what private 

sector employees are compensated. 

Information technology work is widely outsourced throughout the federal government because of the 

assumption that IT companies provide vastly superior skills and cost savings.82 But the cost savings are 

not being realized. POGO found that the federal government may be paying contractors to provide 

computer engineers, on average, $268,653 per year, nearly twice what it costs to use federal employees 

at $136,456 per year. For information technology management services, on average, the government 

may be paying annual rates of $198,411 for contractor employees, which is 1.59 times what the 

government pays federal employees at $124,663,83 and 1.73 times what private sector companies 

compensate their employees at $114,818 to perform comparable services. 

With regard to human resources management, POGO found that the government may be paying 

contractors, on average, annual rates of $228,488, more than twice what the government compensates 

federal employees ($111,711). Contractors' average annual billing rates are 2.27 times what private 

sector companies compensate their employees ($100,465). 

Contracting functions, which are closely associated with inherently governmental functions,B4 are 

critical to maintaining a balanced and effective federal acquisition workforce that helps agencies meet 

their missions. Federal agencies are becoming increasingly dependent on contractors to provide those 

services.BS POGO found that the federal government may be paying contractors, on average, $259,106 

per year, 2.29 times what it pays federal employees at an average of $113,319, to perform comparable 

81 FAR Subpan 7.503(c) and (d). https:l/www.acquisition.gov/far/currentihtmVSubpan% 

207 _5.html#wp I 078196 (hereinafter FAR Subpan 7.5); POGO will be releasing a repon that focuses on the questionable 

use of contractors to perfonn inherently governmental functions, which are functions that must be perfonned by 

~overnment employees. 

IT contracts have been the subject of allegations of overbilling, improper payments, and kickbacks which have surfaced 

in federal and state IT contract'i. Project On Government Oversight, "Federal Contractor Misconduct Database," 

http://www.contractonnisconduct.org/index.cfmll, 73,222,htm17CaselIF 1233, 

http://www.contractonnisconduct.org/index.cfm/l,73 ,222,htmI7CaseID= I 085, 

http://www.contractonnisconduct.org/index.cfm/I, 73 ,222,html?CaseID=73 8; and 

Chad Vander Veen, "Is IT Outsourcing Still In?" Governing Magazine, June 2010. 

http://www.governing.comltopicsitechnology/ls-IT-Outsourcing-StiIl-ln.html(Downloaded September 27, 20 I 0) 

8J Recent commentary by Howard Risher, "a managing consultant for the studies that led to pay refonn in the Federal 

Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990," offered some thoughts on comparing salaries, stating that "Federal technology 

specialists would benefit most from a market-sensitive salary system .... The comparisons are striking. The 10west pay 

among selected federal technology jobs is 20 percent below market, while the highest is 27 percent above the market level. 

The comparisons are all over the place, which is not surprising because federal salaries have never been aligned with 

market levels." Howard Risher, "The barriers to market pay for the federal IT workforce," Federal Computer Week., May 3, 

20 II. http://fcw.com/aniclesl20 11l05109/comment-howard-risher-it-job-cIassifications.aspx (Downloaded May 4, 20 II) 

.. FAR Subpan 7.503(d). 

"For example, "at 15 ofthe 21 [contracting] offices we reviewed, contractor employees outnumbered DOD employees and 

comprised as much as 88 percent of the workforce." GAO-08-169, p. 3; Government Accountability Office, Defense 

Contracting: Army Case Study Delineates Concerns With Use of Contractors as Contract Specialists (GAO-08-360), 

March 2008, p. 3. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08360.pdf(Downloaded April 28, 2011); Government Accountability 

Office, Department of Homeland Security: Improved Assessment and Oversight Needed 10 Manage Risk of Contracting for 

Selected Services (GAO-07-990), September 2007, pp. 1,8. http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsld07990.pdf(DownloadedAprii 

28,2011) 

16 
129 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.107

services. We found that contractors may be billing the federal government 2.24 times on average what 

private sector employers are compensating their workers to perform similar services, at $115,596 per 

year on average. 

Safety and security services are another area in which the federal government has a substantial 

commitment to awarding service contracts. For instance, the Department of Justice relies on 

contractors to provide correctional officers.86 Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security's 

Federal Protective Service (FPS), which is responsible for providin~ security for government 

buildings, outsources over 90 percent of its security guard services. 7 POGO found that the federal 

government may be billed by contractors on average 1.15 times and 1.36 times, respectively, more 

than what it pays federal correctional officers ($72,977) and security guards ($50,257).88 Similarly, the 

federal government may be billed on average 1.25 times and 1.34 times, respectively, more than what 

it compensates federal employees for fire protection ($65,452) and police services ($71,256).89 

Contractors may be billing the federal government on average 1.29 to 2.49 times the full compensation 

costs associated with private sector employees performing similar services on the open market. 

Many of the job classifications POGO analyzed are typically characterized as "commercial" in 

nature-services that can be found in the phone book. The federal government also outsources 

functions and activities that are critical to our nation's security. For example, the Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence has reported that the government has 'outsourced 28 percent of its intelligence 

workforce90 and is paying contractors 1.66 times what it costs to have this work performed by federal 

employees ($207,000 annually for a contractor employee versus $125,000 for a federal employee).91 

POGO's analysis supports this. POGO analyzed the costs associated with outsourcing language 

specialists, who are frequently used to perform intelligence functions, and found that contractors may 

be billing the government, on average, $211,203 per year, more than 1.9 times the $110,014 per year 

the government compensates a federal employee. And contractors may be billing the federal 

government nearly 3.5 times, on average, the $61,010 per year private sector language specialists are 

compensated on the open market. 

While nearly all of the occupations POGO analyzed revealed excessive outsourcing costs, POGO did 

find two where utilizing contractors was more cost-effective. POGO found that the government incurs 

excessive costs by keeping groundskeeper services in-house. Specifically, federal groundskeeper 

16 Government Accountability Office. Cost of Prisons: Bureau of Prisons Needs Better Data to Assess Alternatives for 

Acquiring Low and Minimum Security Facilities (GAO-08-6), October 2007, p. 1. http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsld086.pdf 

(Downloaded April 28, 2011) 

87 Department of Homeland Security, "About the Federal Protective Service." http://www.dbs.gov/xaboutlstructurel 

gc_1253889058003.shtm (Downloaded April 11,2011). "In recent years, [GAO's] work has identified significant 

weaknesses in FPS's oversight and management of its security workforce, including the failures to ensure that its contract 

security guards maintain required training and certifications and to annually evaluate security guard performance. Such 

oversight gaps have rais.ed questions about FPS's reliance on a contract workforce. Footnote omitted. Government 

Accountability Office, Federal Facility Security: Staffing Approaches Used by Selected Agencies (GAO. I 1·60 I), June 

2011, p. 1. http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsldI160I.pdf(Downloaded August 16, 20 II) (hereinafter G AO-II-60 I) 

.. The GAO found that base pay for in-house security is $36,822. GAO-I 1-601, p. 14. 

"The GAO found that base pay for in-house police positions is $48,737. GAO-I 1-601, p. 14. 

" Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Key Facts About Contractors," p. 2. 

http://www.dnLgov/contentiTruth_About_ Contractors.pdf (Downloaded April 11, 2011) 

" Conference Call with Dr. Ronald Sanders, Associate Director of National Intelligence for Human Capital, "Results of the 

Fiscal Year 2007 U.S. Intelligence Community Inventory of Core Contractor Personnel," August 27, 2008, p. 8. 

http://www.asisonline.org/secmanI20080827 _interview.pdf (Downloaded April 28, 2011) 

17 
130 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.108

employees are compensated,92 on average, $13,187 per year more than what contractors may be billing 

the government. POGO estimates that a 20 percent savings results when the government outsources 

groundskeeper services, which closely matches government estimates.93 Average annual contractor 

billing rates are 1.6 times what private sector groundskeepers are compensated. In addition, POGO 

found that the government pays federal employees operating as medical record technicians .01 times 

more than the average annual contractor billing rates ($58,641 and $57,782, respectively). 

By shifting the focus from comparing federal with private sector employee compensation to comparing 

contractor billing rates with fedeml employee full compensation, POGO was able to examine the 

comparable costs of hiring federal and contractor employees. POGO's findings confmn the basic 

premise that government employees are generally compensated at a higher mte than private sector 

employees.94 However, in the 35 occupational classifications and 550 specific jobs POGO analyzed, 

reliance on contractor employees costs significantly more than having federal employees provide 

similar services. As a result, taxpayers are left paying the additional costs associated with corporate 

management, overhead, and profits that the government has no need to incur. 

Contractors make profits by providing services,95 and that is a sound business practice. The federal 

government also provides services, but does so without making any profit. The critical question is not 

whether contractors are entitled to earn profits but whether the government is paying higher costs to 

contractors for comparable services that could be provided by federal employees. 

Because POGO's cost analyses were limited to contracts for services entered into under GSA's 

Schedule program, we did not address the issue of contractors' executive compensation.96 Federal law 

currently permits a contractor to bill the federal government a portion of executive compensation. For 

example during FY 2010, contractors were allowed to bill the government up to $693,951 97 ofa 

" The full federal annual compensation for Groundskeeper is listed in FedScope pursuant to OPM's Job Grading Standards 

for Trades, Craft, and Labor Position, (WG) serie, under the occupation of "Gardening." Office of Federal Personnel 

Management, "Federal Wage System Job Grading Standard for Gardening," WG Series 5003. 

http://www.opm.gov/fedclasslfws5003.pdf(Downloaded August II, 20 II) 

93 "Apparently. DOD saves 20 percent by priva.tizing food service, grass cutting. civilian personnel administration, and 

similar functions." Captain John R. Withers. UContracting for DepotwLevel Maintenance," Army Logistician, Vol. 32, Issue 

I, January-February 2000. http://www.almc.arrny.millalogiissueslJanFebOOIMS453.htrn (Downloaded April 20, 2011) 

94 There may be a number of reasons federal employees generally receive higher rates of compensation than do employees 

in the private sector, including that federal employees are, on average, older, in management and professional positions, 

more experienced, more tenured. and more educated than the private sector workforce. Congressional Research Service, 

Selected Characteristics ofPrivale and Public Sector Workers (R41897), July 1,2011, pp. 7-15. 

http://www.govexec.comlpdfs/07191Ikll.pdf(DownloadedJuly 22, 2011); Office of Management and Budget, Blog 

Posted by Peter Orszag, "Salary Statistics," March 10,2010. http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblblogllO/03110/salarystatisticsl (Downloaded September 27,2010) (hereinafter Peter Orszag Blog) 

" According to an industry survey, 40 percent of survey participants reported profit rates before interest and taxes of 1-5% 

as a percentage of revenue; 35 percent reported profit rates of6-IO%; 9 percent reported profit rates of 11-15%; and 

6 percent reported profit rates above 15%. The remaining 10 percent reported profit rates o[zero or experienced a loss. 

Grant Thornton LLP, 16th Annual Government Contractor Industry Survey Highlights Book: Industry survey highlights 

2010, January 17,2011, pp. 6-7. 

http://www.grantthornton.comistaticfileslGTCorniGovernment%20contractorsiGovernment''1020 

contractor%20fileslI6th_HighlightsBook.pdf(Downloaded April 6, 2011) 

" POGO addressed the issue of excessive compensation for contractor executives in an April 22, 20 10, letter to OMB 

Director Peter Orszag. http://www .pogo.orglpogo-liles!letters!contract-oversightlco-cas-201 00422.html 

" Federal Register Office of Management and Budget, "Office of Federal Procurement Policy Cost Accounting Standards 

Board Executive Compensation, Benchmark Maximum Allowable Amoun!." 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procuremenUndex_exec_compJ (Downloaded May 25, 2011) (hereinafter Office of 

Federal Procurement Policy Cost Accounting Standards Board Executive Compensation) This is the amount of executive 

18 
131 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.109

contractor's executive compensation.98 While that rate may reflect only a partial level of an executive's 

corporate compensation, it constitutes approximately three times the level of actual salary the federal 

government pays its top executives. For example, in 2010, the President was paid $400,000 per annum, 

the Speaker of the House was paid $223,500 per annum, the Senate Majority Party Leader and the 

Senate Minority Party Leader, as well as the House Majority and Minority Leaders, were each paid 

$193,400 per annum, and Cabinet Members were paid $199,700 per annum.99 The fact that high-level 

executives in the private sector often receive seven-figure salaries and benefit packages should not 

have any bearing on how much those executives should bill federal taxpayers, which should not exceed 

the salary paid to senior federal employees performing comparable work. 

GOVERNMENT CO'sT STUDIES 

Despite numerous reports highlighting the government's lack ofin-house capabilitiesloo and studies 

mandated by law comparing federal and private sector compensation,IOI reviews of federal and 

contractor employee compensation and costs are not as abundant as the public might think. 

Contingency Operations 

The most recent comparison was conducted by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 

Afghanistan (CWC). (Appendix E) In its final report released on August 31,2011, the CWC stated: 

For lower- and mid-level-worker skills, contractors employing local or third-country nationals 

are less costly than military or federal civilian employees. However, when contractors employ 

U.S. citizens in higher-skill positions (as may be the case with communications support and 

professional services), their costs are roughly equivalent to military and federal civilians in 

comparable grade levels. The military is substantially more expensive when the contingency 

extends beyond rotation cycles and dwell costs are recognized. Commission on Wartime 

Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Final Report to Congress, August 2011, p. 226. 

The CWC's cost study is timely based on the dramatic increase in the use of contractors supporting the 

troops in the battlefield and conducting reconstruction operations. There is no denying that the use of 

local and third-country nationals saves the government money. However, despite a methodology 

closely mirroring POGO's, the CWC's study misses ¢e mark on a few vital points. First, the CWC 

saJary that may be priced into, or reimbursed under, government contracts. The contractor typically pays executives much 

higher salaries and other compensation in the fonn of benefits. 

" 75 Federal Register, 19661, Determination oJBenchmark Compensation AmountJor Certain Executives, April 15,2010. 

http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdfI2010-864J.pdf(Downloaded August 11,2011) 

.. The payments listed are salaries and do not include additional compensation in the fonn of benefits. TheCapitol.Net, Inc., 

"Pay and Perquisites of Members of Congress, Including A History of House and Senate Salaries," 

http://www.thecapitol.netiFAQ/payandperqs.htm (Downlo.ded July 22, 201 J); Office of Personnel Management, "Salary 

Table No. 20 I O-EX: Rates of Basic Pay for the Executive Schedule." http://www.opm.gov/ocaiIOtableslpdflex.pdf 

(Downloaded June 17, 2011) 

100 Department of De fens. Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis (R40764), p. I; Office ofthe 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, .nd Logistics, Report oJthe Defense Science Board Task Force 

on Improvements 10 Services Contracting, March 2011, p. 23. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsblreports!20IJ.05-Services.pdf 

(Downloaded June 17,2011); Government Accountability Office, Contingency Contracting: lmprovements Needed in 

Management oJContraclors Supporting Contract and Grant Administration in lraq and Afghanistan (GAO-1O-357), April 

2010, p. I!. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0357.pdf(Downloaded June 17,2011); Government Accountability Office, 

Department oj Homeland Security: Risk Assessment and Enhanced Oversight Needed to Manage Reliance on Contractors 

(GAO-OS-142T), October 17,2007, p. 4. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08142t.pdf(Downloaded June 17,2011) 101 5 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq.; Federal Employees' Pay Comparability Act of 1990 (Pub. Law 101-509), § 101. 

19 
132 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.110

described the costs of prolonged operations as being "roughly equivalent," but in fact, its own table 

showed that hiring "higher-skill" American contractor employees costs up to 30 percent more than 

DoD civilian employees. Second, the ewe did not include the cost to the government for the u.s. 

citizens in middle-skill positions, including plumbers and electricians, which were' hired by Kellogg 

Brown and Root and Services Employees International, Inc.-the primary employers of workers on the 

Army's LOGCAP III contract. The inclusion of only local and third-county nationals for the middle 

tier ignores the fact that the government was paying a premium that might exceed the cost of using 

military or DoD civilian workers for those jobs. 

In 2008, GAO reported that over the past 20 years DoD had increasingly relied on contractors for 

maintenance and logistics support of weapons systems. 102 This move was driven in large part by a 

change in DoD "guidance and plans" in the mid-I 990s that placed greater emphasis on outsourcing 

logistics functions. 103 DoD's new policy "assumed large cost savings would result from increased 

privatization.,,104 (Emphasis added) DoD was projecting cost savings of $20 billion to $30 billion per 

year, despite SUbjecting only 9 percent of these contracts to a competitive bidding process. lOS Although 

increased reliance on contractors for these activities was based on the assumption that there would be 

significant cost savings, GAO was "uncertain to what extent cost savings have occurred or will 

occur.,,106 (Emphasis added) 

DoD is one of the leading agencies that rely on contractor sUpport,107 but other agencies are also facing 

similar problems. lOS To assess the cost consequences of outsourcing, it is essential to compare the total 

compensation paid federal employees in a specific occupation with the rates contractors actually bill 

the federal government for comparable occupations. Only then is it possible to detennine if savings are 

being realized, and if the current level of service contracting is in the public interest. What follows is a 

survey of government reports that review the costs of federal and contractor employees. 

Domestic Security Work 

In June 2011, the GAO released its review of the government's use of in-house and contract security 

employees. GAO found both benefits and challenges when it came to cost, personnel flexibility, staff 

selections, and staff development and retention for in-house and contractor staffing decisions. As with 

many cost issues, the GAO found wide ranging opinions: 

Smithsonian officials reported it uses contract security guards at lower-risk areas of its 

facilities which has enabled it to staff five posts with contract security guards for the 

same cost as three posts staffed with federal security guards. In addition, the use of an 

in-house security workforce increases the number ofFTEs an agency must recruit, train, 

schedule, and manage, and adds to the in-house administrative responsibilities and 

associated costs that could otherwise be handled by a contractor. However, Army 

102 Government Accountability Office, Defense Management: DoD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on 

Contractors and Continue 10 Improve Management and Oversight (GAO-08-572T), March 11,2008, pp. Summary, 1,21. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08572T.pdf(Downloaded September 27, 2010) (hereinafter GAO-08-572n 

10' GAO-08-572T, pp. 22-23. 

104 GAO-08-572T, pp. 22-23. 

105 GAO-08-572T, pp. 27-28. 

106 GAO-08-572T, p. 4. 

107 Congressional Budget Office, Conlractors' Supporl a/US. Operatiorr.r in Iraq (pub. No. 3053), August 2008, p. 13. 

http://www .cbo.gav/ftpdoc,/96xx1doc9688/08-12-lraqContractors.pdf (Downloaded September 27, 20 I 0) (hereinafter CBO 

Iraq Report) 

108 Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, "Tap Secret America," The Washington Past, 2010. 

http://projects.washingtanpost.comltap-secret-america/ (Downloaded June 17,2011) 

20 
133 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.111

officials reported that an Anny analysis for fiscal year 2009 showed that while contract 

security guards would have offered savings over in-house security guards in the first 2 

years of an insourcing decision, in-house security guards would be more cost effective 

over time as start-up costs for training, equipment, and uniforms are reduced. They 

noted it had sufficient administrative capacity to absorb the increased workload without 

additional administrative staff.109 

Federal and contractor representatives raised additional issues with GAO about federal employee 

health and retirement benefits, as well as overtime, flexibility and budgetary concerns, and the low pay 

in the private sector that can "wesent challenges in assembling a qualified security workforce, which 

could present security risks."] 0 GAO did not look at specific contracts to compare actual cost of hiring 

security contractors to the cost of hiring federal employees, but the report certainly highlights pros and 

cons of each workforce and the need to look at case-by-case costs when considering insourcing and 

outsourcing decisions. 

Security Work Abroad 

On point with POGO's investigative approach are reports issued by the Congressional Budget Office 

(CBO)III and the Government Accountability Office (GAO)1I2 analyzing the cost of outsourcing 

services related to work in Iraq. 

The CBO examined contract expenditures in Iraq between 2003 and 2007. They estimated that the 

government awarded $85 billion in contracts during that period, of which between $6 billion and 

$10 billion went to private security contractors (PSCs).1I The only occupation CBO reported was for 

PSCs, and it found that "the costs of a private security contract are comparable with those of a U.S. 

military unit performing similar functions.,,114 

The CBO analyzed available information on a $332 million security contract between Blackwater and 

the Department of State for the one-year period beginning in June 2004.]]5 The contract award total for 

that one-year period was $98.5 million. CBO estimated the government's cost for military security to 

be $88.2 million (pOGO assumes for the same one-year period, although CBO did not specify). The 

analysis attributed 37 percent of those estimated military costs, or $32.8 million, 1 16 to placing a certain 

number of military personnel stateside to rotate into action should hostilities extend beyond a set 

period of time. Given that the period of time for which the comparison was made was limited to one 

year, POGO finds no logical basis for including the cost of maintaining a rotational military force. The 

appropriate cost estimate for using military personnel for that one-year period would therefore have 

been the $55.4 million CBO estimated for deployed units.1I7 

I09GAO-II-601,p.16. 

110 GAO-I 1-601, pp. 16-23. 

III CBO Iraq Report 

112 Government Accountability Office, Warjighter Support: A Cost Comparison 0/ Using State Department Employees 

Versus Contractors/or Security Purposes in Iraq (GAO-I0-266R), March 4, 2010. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsldl0266r.pdf(Downloaded September 27, 2010) (hereinafter GAO-IO-266R) 

113 CBO Iraq Report, p. 2. 

,,. CBO Iraq Report, p. 2. 

'15 CBO Iraq Report, p. 16. According to POGO's review, the Blackwater PSC contract (S-AQMPD-04-D-0061) was active 

from June 2004 to January 2010, and totaled over $332 million. 

'" CBO Iraq Report, p. 17. CBO ran costs for two cases which provided a deployed unit and a rotational force of 1.2 and 

2.0 soldiers at home for each soldier deployed. POGO's analysis focused on the 1.2 rotational force because that was the 

estimated ratio from 2004 to 2007. The cost ofthe 2.0 unit case was $110.1 million. 

117 CBO lraq Report, p. 17. 

21 
134 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.112

Comparing the government's $55.4 million cost for deployed units with the $98.5 million for the 

Blackwater contract shows the government had to pay 1.78 times more for outsourcing these security 

guard functions, rather than the parity finding asserted in the CBO report. 118 Even when the 

$32.8 million cost for stateside rotational military personnel is included, CBO cost estimates support 

POGO's findings oflost savings when outsourcing services: military plus rotational costs were 

$88.2 million, and Blackwater's costs were $98.5 million.ll9 

For another study, the GAO was charged with conducting a cost analysis of security services provided 

by contractors and government employees for both the Defense and State Departments during 

contingency operations in Iraq, and in 2010 released its findings. 120 GAO's analysis was limited to 

State Department contracts because DoD was unable to provide data. 121 The analysis was further 

limited by the fact that State could not provide data on the administrative costs associated with 

procuring and managing security contracts.122 GAO studied one contract for Baghdad embassy security 

and four distinct task orders under the Worldwide Personal Protective Services II contract. The 

obligations under the Baghdad Embassy contract and the Worldwide task orders totaled $643.6 million 

annually.123 The cost analysis focused on the major quantifiable cost components such as salary, 

benefits, overseas costs, training, recruitment, background screenings, and support. 124 

GAO's cost analysis showed that contractors performed for less cost on the Baghdad Embassy contract 

as well as on three of the four task orders, saving an estimated $872 million for taxpayers. 121 The 

fourth task order showed that the use of federal rather than contractor employees would have saved the 

government nearly $141 million.126 The results of this study highlight the importance of conducting 

cost analyses on a contract-by-contract basis prior to award in order to create a realistic baseline for 

either awarding a service contract or performing the work in-house to achieve cost savings. 

In addition to these studies, warnings conceming the blanket claim of outsourcing savings have come 

from a senior government official. Based on his role and experience on the ground as commander of 

NATO's International Security Assistance Force and of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley 

McChrystai stated that "the use of contractors was done with good intentions ... we thought we could 

save money ... .I think it doesn't save money. I actually think it would be better to reduce the number of 

contractors involved, increase the number of military if necessary, and where we have contractors, in 

lIB The CBO analysis did not evaluate the price the military must pay for breakdowns in communications between 

contractors and military command personnel) or the costs associated with contract administration and compliance. 

119 CBO Iraq Report, p. 17. The CBO study reviewed the use of military personnel only. The hiring offederal employees to 

p,erform private security functions should also have been included, which might provide cost savings. 

20 GAO-IO-266R, p. 2. GAO selected data for the year 2005 to conduct this cost analysis. 

III GAO-IO-266R, p. 2. 

122 GAO-IO-266R, p. 3. 

12' GAO-l 0-266R, p. 6. 

124 GAO-l 0-266R, p. 7. When estimating the cost to deploy a State Department employee to Iraq, GAO determined that 

only 26 percent of the cost could be attributed to salary and benefits, the remainder being attributed to costs associated with 

overseas deployment. GAO made no attempt to segregate out comparable cost factors for contractor employees, as the vast 

majority of contractor employees are foreign nationals (65%). GAO-l 0-266R, p. 10. 

12' GAO-l 0-266R, p. 6. The Baghdad Embassy contract saved the government $785.1 million, one Worldwide task order 

saved $43.7 million, a second Worldwide task order saved $40.3 million, and a third Worldwide task order saved 

$3.3 million. 

126 GAO-I 0-266R, p. 6. 

22 
135 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.113

many cases, I believe we could stop using foreign contractors and use a greater number of Afghan 

contractors.,,127 

Contractors Overseeing Contracts 

According to a March 2008 GAO study of contractor contract specialists, the Army Contracting 

Agency's Contracting Center of Excellence (CCE) paid contractors more than federal employees 

would have been compensated. The Army paid 

more on average for contractor-provided contract specialists than for its government 

contract specialists who are doing equivalent work. [GAO] found that on average and 

taking into account benefits and overhead rates, the cost of a GS-12 CCE contract 

specialist is $59.21 per hour, as compared to the contractors' average loaded hourly 

labor rate of $74.99, or about 17 percent more. The average cost of CCE's GS-13 

specialists is $72.15 per hour, while it is paying the contractor specialists $84.38 per 

hour, or about 27 percent more. [GAO] also reviewed available resumes of six contract 

employees supporting CCE for at least 6 months and found that they had from 5 to 32 

years, or an average of 18 years, of contracting-related experience. In comparison, the 

five CCE government contract specialists hired in fiscal year 2007 had from 6 to 17 

years, or an average of about 12 years, of contracting-related experience. All six 

contract employees had previously worked for, and were trained by, the federal 

government before being hired by the contractor. 128 

The cost differential arguably might have been explained by the fact that the contractor employees 

were more experienced, but the GAO study was silent on whether additional experience was required 

or necessary to effectively perform the contracted services. 

Air Force Logistics 

An example of how DoD's historical propensity for outsourcing services has resulted in excessive 

costs rather than cost savings was recently revealed. In 2009, the Air Force began implementing a DoD 

policy in support of insourcing services, including services that contractors were not performing at a 

cost savings to the federal government. 129 In one such case, Santa Barbara Applied Research, Inc. 

(SBAR) sued the government, challenging an Air Force decision to insource work that SBAR had 

performed under a 2007 logistics support contract. IlO The court decided the case in the government's 

favor and highlighted the complexity of government-to-contractor cost analyses. 

J27 Pierre Tran, ''NATO Commander: Too Many Contractors in Afghanistan," Federal Times, Apri120, 2010. 

http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20100420IDEPARTMENTSOI/4200307/1009/ACQUISITION (Downloaded 

September 27, 2010) 

'" Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting: Army Case Study Delineates Concerns with Use oj 

Contractors as Contracl Specialists (GAO-08-360), March 26, 2008, p. 5. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08360.pdf 

(Downloaded September 27, 20 I 0) 

'" Santa Barbara Applied Research, Inc. v. United States, Court of Fed. Claims, No. 11-86C, May 4, 2011, p. 5. 

http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/defau]tlfileslFlRESTONE.SANTAO50411.pdf (Downloaded May 6, 20 II) (hereinafter 

SBAR); Memorandum from William Lynn, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, 

"ln~soUIcing Contracting Services - Implementation Guidance," May 28, 2009. 

http://www ... amra.anny.miVscraidocumentslDepSecDef% 

20Memo%2028MA Y09%20ln-sourcing%20Implementation%20Guidance.pdf (Downloaded May 10, 20 II) (hereinafter 

In-sourcing Contracting Services -Implementation Guidance) 

130 SBAR, pp. 1-2. 

23 
136 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.114

The Air Force contract required SBAR to perform mana~ement, operations, and maintenance services 

at nine locations within the Air Force Space Command. I I Subsequently, new laws and regulations 

required DoD to better estimate and compare full costs of keeping work in-house or outsourcing it. 132 

Following that requirement, the Air Force identified contracts that were viable for insourcing by using 

the COMPARE cost-calculating tool. 133 ln 2010, after analyzing costs and determining that hiring 

civilian federal employees would be less expensive than hiring contractors, the Air Force notified 

SBAR that it was insourcing a portion of the contract.J34 The Air Force originally calculated cost 

savings of more than $31 million, but after SBAR's challenge, the Air Force conducted a new cost 

analysis based on the most recent data and found savings of approximately $8.8 million when the work 

was performed in-house. 135 

Army Operations Research 

The guidance DoD issued to better determine whether civilian federal employees or contractor 

employees can perform functions at a lower cost136 included an example in which DoD examined the 

relative costs to the Department of the Army of hiring an operations research analyst or contracting for 

an analyst to perform at a comparable level. 137 DoD found that the full cost to the government of hiring 

a civilian federal employee was $168,349, and that the cost of outsourcing the position to a contractor 

was $218,592. 138 This example demonstrates that outsourcing resulted in excessive costs of $50,243, 

or 30 percent. 

Army Corps of Engineers 

In addition to the publicly accessible cost reviews cited above, POOO obtained an Army Corps of 

Engineers (USACE) review139 that found contractor employees "consist of 15 percent of the [USACE 

Engineering and Support Center Huntsville (CEHNC)] workforce" and ''there could be an annual 

potential savings of$874,289 by competitively hiring government civil service employees (OS) versus 

contractor personnei.,,140 The report cited the following concerns: 

", SBAR challenged the insourcing decision at four of the nine locations. SBAR, pp. 2-3, 9. 

lJ2 NDAA FV 2008, § 324; Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Vear 2011 (pub. Law 111-383), 

§ 323(b), January 7, 2011; In-sourcing Contracting Services-Implementation Guidance; Memorandum from Christine H. 

Fox, Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, "Directive-Type 

Memorandum (DTM) 09-007, 'Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian and Military Manpower and Contract 

Support, '" January 29, 20 I 0, revised October 21, 2010. http://www.dtic.miVwhsJdirectives!corres!pdfIDTM-09-007.pdf 

(Downloaded May 10.2011) (hereinafter DTM-09-007) 

m COMPARE is a software program used to compare "the relative costs of operating commercial activities by in-house, 

other Government agency, or commercial entities for purposes of OMB Circular A-76." SBAR, pp. 5-6. DoD subsequently 

updated the COMPARE database with costing procedures outlined in DTM-09-007, which is set to expire on September I, 

2011. 

114 SBAR, p. 8. 

m SBAR, pp. 8, II. 

"6 DTM-09-007, p. 5. 

'" DTM-09-007, p. 23. Using a methodology similar to POGO's, DoD's example is based on base pay and benefits for 

military and civilian personnel, and the contractor hourly rates were from the GSA Federal Services Schedule, which were 

converted to an annual rate by multiplying the hourly rate by 2,087. 

13. DTM-09-007, pp. 23-25. The full cost to the government includes DoD costs as well as other agency costs. DoD 

calculated that its cost to hire a civilian federal employee was $157,239. The government's example provides costs for 

contractors working at a government ($218,592) and contractor ($268,555) site. pOGO referred to the government site 

contractor rate because it corresponded to the rates utilized in our study. The example also found that military personnel 

("Military 0-5, 20 Vears of Service") would cost DoD S21 0,968 and the government $264,548 (this includes costs that 

B~encies such as Veterans Affairs and the Department of Education incur related to military personnel). 

" U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineering and Support Center, Huntsville, "Consulting Review of Contractor (InHouse) Support Services Contracts," CEHNC-IR-2006-009, July 21, 2005. (hereinafier USACE Huntsville) 

140 USACE Huntsville, p. 1. 

24 
137 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.115

15 percent ofCEHNC workforce is composed of support contractors. 54 percent of the support 

contractors are located in-house and the other 46 percent are located at the contractor site or the 

assigned worksite. 

58 percent of the in-house contractors charge direct while 38 percent charge indirect 

(overhead). 

CEHNC provides 100 percent ofin-house contractor personnel with the tools and equipment 

needed to perfonn their tasks. 

Approximately 75 percent of in-house contractor' [sic] scope of work does not provide a clear 

and concise explanation of the services contracted. 

Several instances were noted where the contractor perfonned work that could highly be 

considered personal services. 

Distinguishing between civil servants and contractor personnel needs improvement. 

Approximately 95 percent of the contractor personnel work station or cubicle [sic] were not 

clearly distinguishable from Government personnel. 

Contractor personnel have filled the same positions at CEHNC for more than 3 years and some 

as much as 8 years. . 

In-house contractor personnel are located side-by-side with government civil service 

employees. 

Approximately 80 percent of the 42 contracts reviewed were extended beyond the original 

perfonnance period. 

13 (12%) of contractor support was identified as retired or previously employed by CEHNC. 

14 (13%) of contractors [sic] personnel held positions such as Project Control Specialist, 

Consultant, Project Manager, Senior Investment, etc. These contractor employees' salaries are 

comparable to GS 14 and 15 salaries. The cost to hire GS government employees in this 

contracted position would result in an annual savings of $537,573 (61 % of the total estimated 

cost savings).141 

Many of those concerns echo POGO's findings, including the long-tenn period of work for service 

contracts and the lack of cost savings. Additional concerns were raised in the USACE report relating to 

conflicts of interest and poor contract planning and administration that also place taxpayer funds at 

risk. If the government were to investigate whether these conditions penneate the USACE and other 

agencies, it would be in a position to determine if billions are being wasted. 

Protesting West Point Outsourcing 

The aforementioned studies actually test the belief that outsourcing results in cost savings, but more 

frequently the government acted on this belief without ever testing it, as documented by a variety of 

bid protests. For example, in 2006, the Anny began preliminary planning for an A-76 competition at 

West Point for public worksjobs. 142 In 2008, the Anny issued a request for proposal (RFP)14J that 

contemplated either the issuance of a perfonnance agreement with a "most efficient organization" 

(MEa) of federal employees or the award of a cost-plus fixed-fee contract to a contractor. 144 The RFP 

indicated a number of critical factors that would be considered, and that the "lowest-cost technically-

'" USACE Huntsville, pp. 1-2. 

'" Government Accountability Office, "Decision in the matter of Frank A. Bloomer - Agency Tender Official, B401482.2; B-401482.3," October 19,2009, p. 2. http://www.gao.gov/decisionsibidpro/4014822.pdf(Downloaded 

September 27,2010) (hereinafter Bloomer Bid Protest) 

14] Bloomer Bid Protest, p. 2. Federal Business Opportunities, "West Point A-76 Department of Public Works - Custodial 

Support Services Solicitation Number: W91IS0-08-R-0009,'' March 26, 2009. 

https:llwww .lbo.govl?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id-82c7 cdc05420770eb2a3cOc85d022dcf& _ cview=O 

(Downloaded April 5, 2011) 

144 Bloomer Bid Protest p. 2. 

25 
138 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.116

acceptable proposal" would prevaiJ. 14S It was expected that a significant portion of the work under this 

contract would be done by issuing about 20,000 standard operating orders and 340 individual job 

orders per year, involving 16 different trades. 146 

The RFP required the submission of a cost proposal and indicated that the Anny would conduct a "cost 

realism" analysis. 147 The cost proposals were required to provide detailed fringe benefit cost 

information,148 direct labor costs, overhead costs, administrative costs, subcontracts, and profit. 149 The 

Anny cost evaluator deemed both the agency and winning contractor prices to be "realistic, reasonable, 

and complete."lso 

The contractor claimed it would perform the work 1 0 percent more efficiently than the government. 

The contractor based this claim on similar projects and services it had performed in the past. The 

contractor's cost estimate was approximately $58 million. The federal employees' cost estimate was 

approximately $68 million. The award went to the contractor, and federal employees filed a bid protest 

with the GAO.1Sl 

In the end, GAO sustained the federal employees' protest on the basis that the Anny's cost realism 

analysis, on which the cost review relied, was "materially flawed."ls2 The GAO found that the record 

provided no reasonable basis for the Anny to accept the contractor's performance estimates, because 

the contractor did not provide "factual support for its increased efficiency assumption."IS3 

The Anny's decision to outsource work highlights the government's willingness to operate on the 

belief that outsourcing results in cost savings without any evidence to substantiate that belief. To 

ensure GAO's advisory decision was not circumvented, Congress mandated that no activities 

performed at West Point be outsourced to private contractors pursuant to an A-76 study.IS4 

IRS Contractors Tax Public 

Outsourcing work at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been a hotly debated issue for years. In 

1996, the IRS conducted a pilot private debt collection program to reduce the gross tax gap, ISS but 

canceled the program after one year. IS6 The cancellation occurred because both the IRS and the OMB 

considered tax collection to be inherently governmental work. IS7 Additionally, the program was not 

145 Bloomer Bid Protest, p. 2. 

'46 Bloomer Bid Protest, p. 3. 

147 Bloomer Bid Prote,t, pp. 1,4. 

'48 HeaUh-benefit and retirement-benefit costs were to be consistent with the costs in the agency tender. Bloomer Bid 

Protest, p. 4. 

'" Bloomer Bid Protest, p. 4. 

'so Bloomer Bid Protest, p. 7. 

U1 Bloomer Bid Protest, p. 9. 

'" Bloomer Bid Protest, pp. I, 10. 

m Bloomer Bid Protest, pp. 13-14. 

'>4 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010. 

'5$ "The gross tax gap is the amount of tax that is imposed by law for a given tax year but not paid voluntarily or timely." 

Internal Revenue Service, National Taxpayer Advocate: 2004 Annual Report to Congress, Vol. I, December 31,2004, 

p. 226. http://www.irs.ustreas.govlpublirs-utVntaty2004annualreport.pdf(Downloaded May 4, 2011) (hereinafter National 

Taxpayer Advocate 2004) 

,,. Government Accountability Office, Tax Debt Col/eetion: IRS 1, Addressing Critical Success Factors/or Contracting 

Out but Will Need to Study the Best Use 0/ Resources (GAO-04-492), May 2004, p. 6. 

http;l!www.gao.gov/new,itemsld04492.pdf(Downloaded April 28, 2011) (hereinafter GAO·04-492) 

'" General Accounting Office, Internal Revenue Service: Issues Affecting IRS' Private Debt Col/ection Pilot (GAO/GGD97-129R), July 18, 1997, p. 2. http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdfl/159007.pdf(Downloaded June 17,2011); United States 

26 
139 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.117

producing the desired results-the amount of revenue collected by the private collectors was offset by 

the costs of the program. ISS The IRS continued to ex~erience an expanded annual gross tax gap, which 

by 2001 reached over $300 billion in unpaid taxes. IS 

Collection staffing shortages in the early 2000s again compelled the IRS to seek help from contractors 

in recovering billions of dollars in delinquent federal taxes. 160 The IRS envisioned hiring contractors 

called private collection agencies (PCAs) to work on "simple" collection cases. 161 By 2004, in 

response to the degradation of IRS' debt collection efforts, Congress passed the American Jobs 

Creation Act of 2004, authorizing the IRS to proceed with its Private Debt Collection (PDC) initiative, 

a pilot program for outsourcing elements of its responsibili~ for collecting delinquent taxes. 162 PCAs 

would be given slightly more discretion in resolving cases 1 3 and would be paid ur to 2S percentl64 of 

the amount of taxes they recovered. 16S The new program was instituted in 2006. 16 

In 2008, the benefits of this cost savings initiative were called into question. The IRS's National 

Taxpayer Advocate reported that in FY 2007, the IRS collected $2.7 trillion in taxes, while the PDC 

initiative brought in only $37 million in FY 2008 (before subtracting the operating costs of the 

program, commissions paid to the contractor of up to 2S percent, and indirect payments).167 The 

National Taxpayer Advocate report concluded that the PDC program was "probably causing a net 

reduction in federal revenue, which obviously defeats the purpose ofthe program. IRS data now show 

that the IRS's Collection function outperforms the PCAs in almost every way.,,168 

In March 2009, the IRS published the results of its cost effectiveness study of the PDC. 169 In one 

sample, the study compared the cost effectiveness of contractors and the IRS's Automated Collection 

Constitution, Art. I, sec. S, cl. I ("The Congress shall have Power to Lay and Collect taxes .... ") 

http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html(Downloaded June 17,2011); In its hlndmark IS19 

decision in McCulloch v, Maryland, the U,S. Supreme Court ruled that the power to tax "is an incident of sovereignty, and 

is coextensive with thalto which it is an incident." 17 U.S. 316 (1S19), p. 429. 

http://www.law.comell.eduisupctihtmlihistoricslUSSC_CR_0017_0316_Z0.html(Downloaded June 17, 2011); OMB 

Circular A-76, as it existed in 1999, specifically listed the collection of taxes as an inherently governmental function. 

Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Circlliar No, A-76: Revised Supplemental 

Handbook: Performance o/Commercial Activities, March 1996, updated through transmittal memorandum 20, June 1999, 

p,60. 

http://www. whitehouse,gov/siteslde fault1fileslomb/assets/agencyinformation _circulars YTOcurementydfla076supp,pdf 

(Downl0.ded June 17,2011) 

". Government Accountability Office, Tax Debt Collection: IRS Is Addressing Critical Success Factors/or Contracting 

Qui bUI Will Need 10 Study the Best Use a/Resources (GAO-04-492), May 2004, p. 6, 

http://www,gao,gov/new,itemsld04492,pdf(Downloaded April2S, 2011) (herein.fter GAO-04-492) 

'" Nation.1 Taxpayer Advocate 2004, p. 22S, 

'60 GAO-04-492, pp. 5-6. 

'" GAO-04-492, p. 6, 

'" The American Jobs Creation Act of2004 (Pub. Law 10S-357), § SSl, October 22, 2004. 

'" GAO-04-492, p. 6. 

'64 Internal Revenue Service, National Taxpayer Advocate: 2008 Annual Report to Congress, VoL I, December 31, 200S, 

p, 32S, http://www,irs,gov/pub/irs-utl/OS_tas_8TC_intro_toc_msp,pdf(Downlo.ded June 1,2011) (hereinafter National 

Taxpayer Advocate 200S) 

'os GAO-04-492, p, 7 

,66 Internal Revenue Service, "IRS Outlines Taxpayer Protections in Private Debt Collection Program," August 23,2006. 

http://www.irs.gov/newsTOomiarticlelO .. id~161300.00.html(Downloaded May 4, 2011) 

'" National Taxpayer Advocate 200S, p, 32S, 

'68 National Taxpayer Advocate 200S, p, 32S. 

'" Internal Revenue Service, Private Debt Collection: Cost Effectiveness Study, March 2009, 

http://grassley .senate.gov/news/uploadlPDC-Cost-Effectiveness-Study-March-2009-2,pdf (Downloaded April 28, 2011) 

(hereinafter Private Debt Collection: Cost Effectiveness Study) 

27 
140 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.118

System for collecting delinquent taxes. The study found that the cost per delinquent dollar collected 

was more than three times greater for contractors than for IRS employees. Additionally, IRS 

employees collected nearly three times more in delinquent taxes and resolved more than twice the 

number of cases as PCAS.l70 That same month, the IRS announced it was not renewing the collections 

contracts, thereby ending the PDC program.17l 

TSA's Screening Partnership Program 

The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) airport screening program also provides cost 

reviews of federal and contractor employees. TSA created the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) to 

allow commercial airports an opportunity to use contractor screeners instead of federal employees. 172 

In 2009, GAO reported on a TSA contractor study that "concluded that passenger screening at [airports 

staffed by contractors] has historically cost from 9 to 17 percent more than at [airports staffed by 

federal employees], and [contractor] screeners perfonned at a level that was equal to or greater than 

that of federal [employees]."l73 GAO highlilWted limitations in TSA's methodology and made 

recommendations to correct future reviews. l 4 Two years later, GAO revisited TSA's cost and 

performance reviews and reported that TSA claimed that airports with contractor screeners "would 

cost 3 percent more to operate in 2011 than airports using federal screeners.,,!75 

Another comparative cost analysis, however, arrived at a different conclusion. The House Committee 

on Transportation and Infrastructure issued an analysis in June 2011 finding that: I) taxpayers would 

save $1 billion over five years if the nation's top 35 airports operated as efficiently as the San 

Francisco International airport under the SPP ~rogram, and 2) SPP screeners are 65 percent more 

efficient than their TSA federal counterparts. l 6 

All of these government study examples illustrate the difficulty in comparing costs, and the 

contradictory results that can result from disparate methodologies. Until the government creates a 

system to accurately estimate the cost of performing commercial services, the public will never know 

the actual savings that could have been realized. 

170 Private Debt Collection: Cost Effectiveness Study, p. 9. 

171 Internal Revenue Service, "IRS Conducts Extensive Review, Decides Not to Renew Private Debt Collection ContractsIRS Employees More Flexible, More Cost Effective," March 5, 2009. 

http://www.irs.gov/newsroomlarticle/0 .. id~20502I.OO.html(Downloaded April 28, 2011) 

172 Aviation and Tmnsportation Security Act (Pub. L. No. 107-71), § 108, November 19,2001. 

173 Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: TSA 's Cost and Performance Study o[Privale..secfor Airport 

Screening (GAO-09-27R), January 9, 2009, p. 5. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0927r.pdf(DownloadedJune 15,2011) 

(hereinafter GAO-09-27R) 

'" GAO-09-27R, pp. 24-30. 

m Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: TSA's RfNised Cost Comparison Provides a More Reasonable 

Eosisfor Comparing the Costs of Private-Sector and TSA Screeners (GAO-II-375R), March 4, 201 I, p. 4. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsldI1375r.pdf(DownloadedJune 15,201 I) 

'" House Committee on Tmnsportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations, Staff Report: TSA Ignores More 

Cost EjJectjye Screening Model, June 3, 2011, p. 2. 

http://republicans. transportation. house.govlMediaifile/I12th1 A viationl20 I 1-06-03-TSA _ SPP _ Report.pdf (Downloaded 

June 15,2011); The Committee report appears to be in response to a January decision by TSA Administmtor John Pistole 

that announced that TSA would not expand SPP beyond its current 16 airports "as I do not see any clear or substantial 

advantages to do so at this time." John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security Adminislmtion, "TSA Statement 

on Contractor Screening Progmm," January 28, 2011. 

bttp:llwww.ts •. gov/pressihappeningsl20111012811_ conlmctor _screeninlU'rogmm.shtm (Downloaded June 2 1,201 I); The 

House Committee on Homeland Security, "King, Rogers, McCaul Introduce Bill to Aid Airports Seeking to Replace TSA 

Screening with Private Screening Companies," April 15, 2011. http://homeland.house.gov/press-releaselking-rogersmccaul-introduce-bill-aid-airports-seeking-replace-tsa-screening-private (Downloaded June 15,201 I) 

28 
141 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.119

Cautionary Notes Relating to Other Cost Analyses 

As mentioned previously, POGO's investigation is unique in that we compared federal and private 

sector employees' full compensation with average annual contractor billing rates for a sampling of 

occupational classifications. As reflected in Table 1, with a few exceptions, POGO confirms the results 

of studies that compared the public with the private sector, fmding that federal employees generally 

make approximately 20 percent more in salary and full compensation than do their counterparts in the 

private sector. While POGO's investigation adds some credibility to the government and private sector 

comparison studies, POGO has some concerns about those other studies. 

For example, USA Today analyzed a sample of 40 occupations using BLS data for 2008 and found that 

the typical federal employee is paid 20 percent more than a private sector employee in the same 

occupation. 177 The study found that "federal employees earn higher average salaries than private-sector 

workers in more than eight out of 10 occupations." USA Today used median salaries and did not adjust 

for any other cost factors, including health care and pension benefits. That study was refuted by 

National Treasury Employees Union President Colleen Kelley, who stated it "compares apples and 

oranges" because certain government work "has more complexity and requires more skill than ... work 

in the private sector.,,178 

A similar opinion has been stated by foriner OMB director Peter Orszag: 

... the truth is that a comparison of federal and private-sector pay, even by occupation, is 

misleading because the employees hired by the federal government often have higher 

levels of education than their counterparts in the private sector-even within the same 

occupations. When you factor in the education and experience of the federal workforce, 

there is no statistically significant difference in average pay levels. 179 

OPM Director John Berry, when he testified before the Senate in March 2010, similarly stated that 

comparisons showing that federal employees make more than private sector employees are conveying 

"misinformation" because they are not comparing workers with comparable skills and work 

experience. ISO Three months later, Berry announced that OPM enlisted outside experts to work with 

government statisticians to help settle the debate over pay differences. lsl Although OPM has 

historically employed the methodology found in the annual Pay Agent's Report to make these 

177 Dennis Cauchon, "Federal pay ahead of private industry," USA Today, March 8,2010. 

http://www.usatoday.comlnewslnationl2010-0J-04-federal-pay_N.htm (Downloaded September 27, 2010) (hereinafter 

"Federal pay abead of private industry") 

!11 "Federal pay ahead of private industry" 

'79 Peter Orszag Blog. 

,"0 Testimony of the Honorable John Berry, Director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Managemen~ Before the U.S. Senate 

Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government, Committee on Appropriations, March 24, 2010. 

http://appropriations.senate.gov/webcasts.cfin?method=webcasts. view&id= II f73d73-2d3 7 -4d41-8128-4193 860fl e801 

(Downloaded April 3, 2011); Stephen Losey, "New OPM Taskforce to Study Pay Gap," Federal Times, March 24, 2010. 

htlp:llwww.federaltimes.comlarticleI20 I 00324IBENEFITS01l32403Q41l001 (Downloaded September 27, 2010) 

'" Stephen Losey, "OPM Enlists Outside Experts to Determine Federal-Private Pay Gap," Federal Times, June 17,2010. 

http://www.f~deraltimes.comiarticle/20100617IBENEFITSOI/6170302/1 00 I IAGENCY04 (Downloaded September 27, 

2010) 

29 
142 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.120

comparisons,182 it is not known what data and methodology the outside experts are using for their 

comparisons. 183 

Another study comparing federal employee wages to private sector employee wages for comparable 

services was published by the Heritage Foundation. The Heritage Foundation found that "[tJhe federal 

pay system gives the average federal employee hourly cash earnings 22 percent above the average 

private worker's, controlling for observable skills and characteristics .... Overall, controlling for other 

factors, federal employees eam approximately 30 percent to 40 r.ercent more in total compensation 

(wages and benefits) than comparable private-sector workers.,,1 4 In light of that finding, Heritage 

recommended hiring more contractors. 185 

However, the Heritage study presents a number of methodological problems that call into question the 

validity of its findings and recommendations. The most critical problem, as it relates to whether 

outsourcing promotes cost savings, is Heritage's recommendation that the government hire more 

contractors. Heritage bases this recommendation on its comparative analysis of private-public 

compensation, despite the fact that the study did not compare federal costs for comparable services 

performed by contractors. So, despite Heritage's claims that federal employees are costing taxpayers, it 

is impossible for Heritage to empirically determine whether or not those savings would, in fact, be 

realized based on its study. 

Another problem with the Heritage study is that it used another BLS survey, the Current Population 

Survey (CPS), to document wage comparisons. There are several concerns with the CPS. First, the 

. CPS is a household employment survey with a sample size significantly smaller in scale than the 

National Compensation Survey (NCS). The CPS sample constitutes approximately 60,000 

households,18 whereas the NCS sampling frame is made up of more than 5,400,000 business 

respondents. 18? The NCS's larger sampling frame provides for more valid and reliable results. 

l81 The annual Pay Agent's Report compares rates of federal and private sector pay, identifies areas in which a pay disparity 

exists and specifies the size of the disparity, and makes recommendations for locality rates. Office of Personnel 

Management, "President's Pay Agent." http://www.opm.gov/oca!payagentl(DownloadedJune 17,2011) 

III It is not known. for instance. whether the experts will take into consideration a June 2010 white paper issued by an 

American Bar Association task force that highlights a criticism of the methodology used in the cost studies addressed in the 

Office of Federal Procurement Policy's (OFPP) Proposed Policy Letter dated March 31, 2010: namely, "arbitrarily 

assigning overhead values ... across the board ... as well as imposing 'plug' numbers for personnel costs {Le., fringe benefits] 

as opposed to actual loaded labor costs." Task Force of the American Bar Association, Public Contract Law Section, 

Privatization, Outsourcing and Financing Transactions and Battlespace Committees, Work Reservedfor Petformance by 

Federal Gf7IIernmenl Employees: OFPP Draft Policy Letter dated March 31.10JO-Issues and Challenges, June 16, 2010, 

p. 9. http://meetings.abanet.orglwebuploadicommuploadlPC800 1 OO/otherlinks _ files/wp06161 O.pdf (Downloaded 

September 27,2010) 

184 James Sherk, A Report of the Heritage Center for Data Analysis: Inflated Federal Pay: How Americans Are Overtaxed 

to Overpay the Civil Service (Report # 10-05), July 7, 2010, p. 1. http://thCmedia.s3.amazonaws.coml201OIpdtYCDAI0-

05.pdf(Downloaded September 27, 2010) (hereinafter Heritage Study). The Heritage Foundation "is a research and 

educational institution--a think tank-whose mission is to fonnulate and promote conservative public policies based on the 

principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national 

defense." http://www.heritage.orgiAbout 

l8' Heritage Study, p. 16. 

186 Bureau of Labor Statistics, II.Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey: Overview - SOUTce of data." 

http://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_over.htrn#source (Downloaded June 17,2011) 

117 Bureau of Labor Statistics, "National Compensation Survey, December 2006 - January 2008," Appendix Table 2. 

http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ocs/sp/nctb0767.pdf(Downlo.ded September 27, 2010) 

30 
143 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.121

Second, CPS average hourly wage data for private sector employees markedly differs from the 

comparable NCS data due to CPS's insufficient sample sizes for specific occupations. 188 POGO 

analyzed a subset of eight occupations reported in the Heritage study and determined that the reliance 

on CPS data resulted in significant distortions. According to POGO's analysis, the distortions between 

the CPS and NCS data ranged from negative 19 percent in the case of security guards to 84 percent in 

the case of fmancial managers. 189 

Third, CPS average hourly wage data for federal employees differs markedly from the government's 

official statistics. The CPS data for federal employees results in distortions similar to that found in the 

private sector employees data because it relie~ on a less representative sample size when compared 

with the government's data, which is based on a total population analysis. When CPS data is compared 

with OPM's FedScope data, 190 POGO found that for the subset of eight occupations,I91 discrepancies 

ranged from negative 29 percent in the case of security guards to 67 percent in the case of financial 

managers. 192 

Fourth, when NCS wage data for private sector employees are compared with OPM wage data for 

federal employees (the proper data comparison for estimating the private-federal wage differential) the 

differentials for the eight occupations we compared are significantly different from the 30 to 

71 percent differentials found by The Heritage Foundation. 19J Indeed, for the eight private-to-federal 

comparisons we examined, POGO found The Heritage Foundation's claimed wage differentials were 

distorted anywhere from 21 to 146 percent. 194 

lB' The CPS data used for comparable occupations in the Heritage ,tudy is found in Table 6 of Heritage's report and is 

based on data from 2006 through 2009. Heritage Study, pp. 5, 7-8. The NCS data for comparison purposes is for December 

2007 to January 2009. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Table 4: Full-time private industry workers: Mean and median hourly, 

weekly, and annual earnings and mean weekly and annual hours," pp. 4-1 through 4-37. 

http://www.bls.gov/ncslocslsp/ncbl13ll.pdf (Downloaded September 27,2010) I" Specifically, the analy,is shows the following discrepancies: Electrical and electronics engineers: $28.50 (CPS) v. 

$40.51 (NCS), a 42% discrepancy; Statisticians: $25.47 (CPS) v. $37.92 (NCS), a 49% discrepancy; Financial managers: 

$24.59 (CPS) v. $45.22 (NCS), a 84% discrepancy; Budget analysts: $24.20 (CPS) v. $31.41 (NCS), a 30% discrepancy; 

Accountants and auditors: $22.60 (CPS) v. $29.55 (NCS), a 31% discrepancy; Human resources: $22.05 (CPS) v. $28.75 

(NCS), a 30% discrepancy; Purchasing agents: $21.69 (CPS) v. $28.71 (NCS), a 32% discrepancy; Security guards: $14.02 

(CPS) v. $11.37 (NCS), a -19% discrepancy. 

190 FedScope is an OPM dataset of federal salary infonnation for all federal employees. 

1'1 FedScope only provides data on annual salaries and does not include overtime payor awards. POGO used the average 

annual salaries for all federal employees in a specified occupation and divide by 2080, the number of official hours for 

which federal employees are paid. Appendix A includes directions on where to find the data upon which POGO's 

comparisons are based. 

191 Specifically, the analysis shows the following discrepancies: Electrical engineers: $37.04 (CPS) v. $47.82 (FedScope), a 

29% discrepancy; Statisticians: $33.55 (CPS) v. $42.76 (FedScope), a 27% discrepancy; Financial managers: $32.84 (CPS) 

v. $54.83 (FedScope), a 67% discrepancy; Budget analysts: $32.36 (CPS) v. $36.95 (FedScope), a 14% discrepancy; 

Accountants and auditors: $30.26 (CPS) v. $42.15 (FedScope), a 39% discrepancy; Human resources: $30.50 (CPS) v. 

$37.57 (FedScope), a 23% discrepancy; Purchasing agents: $31.88 (CPS) v. $38.44 (FedScope), a 21% discrepancy; 

Security guards: $24.03 (CPS) v. $17.04 (FedScope), a ·29% discrepancy. 

193 Heritage Study, p. 8 (''total differences" in Table 6). 

I ... The True Differential column compares NCS hourly rates with OPM hourly rates. Heritage compared CPS hourly rates. 

The Heritage Distortion column compares the True Differential with Heritage's CPS Differential. The specific distortions 

are set forth below: 

Electrical engineers 

Stati,ticians 

Financial managers 

Budget analysts 

Accountants and auditors 

NCS 

Private 

$40.51 

$37.92 

$45.22 

$31.41 

$29.55 

OPM True CPS Heritage 

~ ~ Differential Distortion 

$47.82 18% 30% 67% 

$42.76 13% 32% 146% 

$54.83 2 J % 34% 62% 

$36.95 18% 34% 89% 

$42.15 43% 34% -21 % 

31 
144 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.122

Fil181ly, The Heritage Foundation claims that federal employees get an average annual benefits 

package worth $32,115, while private sector employees get an average annual benefits package worth 

only $9,882. In fact, OMB calculates that federal employees receive an estimated annual benefits 

package that is 36.25 percent of their annual salaries.195 In comparison, based on NCS data, the BLS 

calculates that private sector employees who work for large companies receive an estimated annual 

benefits packages worth 33.5 percent of their annual salaries. 196 The differential in benefits 

compensation is therefore only approximately 8 percent, not the 325 percent claimed by The Heritage 

Foundation. 

And in yet another study, in a congressional effort to determine whether reducing federal employee 

compensation is appropriate and an effective way to save taxpayer money, the Congressional Research 

Service (CRS) was directed to conduct a study comparing the salaries of the 50 state governors with 

federal employees working in their states. 197 The CRS study documented that 77,057 federal 

employees earned more in total annual pay than their respective state governors.198 Although the 

results of this study are alarming, policymakers should not rush to judgment that federal employees are 

overpaid. Similar to salary comparisons involving federal and private sector employees, CRS ignores 

what is most telling-the total cost to the federal government, no matter if the work is performed by 

federal or contractor employees. 

When policymakers use these or similar studies to justify outsourcing, they will miss the mark. 

Because the major source of excessive costs results from government's reliance on contractors, any 

such study, without a review of the rates contractors will bill the government, will most likely provide 

little, if any, useful information about how to achieve cost savings. 

SAVINGS RISKED BY LONG-TERM CONTRACTS AND FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS 

POGO is also concerned with the number of long-term service contracts, which removes government 

flexibility and can result in cost increases rather than savings. The federal government regularly enters 

into contracts that extend over long periods of time--sometimes 10 years or more. 199 

One reason for such long-term contracts is Congress's failure to remove the ceiling on federal 

employee full-time equivalents (FTEioO under the guise of reducing the size of government. But with 

this freeze, agencies are forced to bring in contractors for support in order to meet their missions and 

provide flexibility to meet changing government financial situations and demands. POGO agrees that 

Human resources $28.75 $37.57 31% 38% 23% 

Purchasing agents $28.71 $38.44 34% 47% 38% 

Security guards $11.37 $17.04 50% 71% 42% 

'" Update to Civilian Position Full Fringe Benefit Cost Factor, pp. 1,2. 

,96 Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employer Costs for Employee Compensation: Historical Listing: March 2004 - March 

2011," Table 14,500 workers or more. ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ocwc/ectlececqrtn.txt (Downloaded June 21, 

2011) 

197 Memorandum from Wendy Ginsberg, Analyst in American National Government, Congressional Research Service, to 

Senator Tom Coburn, "Federal Employee Salaries and Gubernatorial Salaries," May 6, 20 II. 

http://coburn.senate.gov/publiC!index.cfm?a~Files.SeTVe&File _id~8718cd7d-b24 3-49bf-8805-e7ebOfdc7709 (Down loaded 

June 10,2011) (hereinafter Federal Employee Salaries and Gubernatorial Salaries) 

'98 Federal Employee Salaries and Gubernatorial Salaries, p. 3. 

'99 "ASC selects LOGCAP IV contractors." 

200 Inherently Governmental Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background. Issues, and Options/or 

Congress (R4064 I), pp. 33-34. 

32 
145 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.123

contractors can provide flexibility, especially in the case of short-term projects. However, if federal 

hiring restrictions are in place, the government's overall flexibility is undermined while the size of 

government still increases in the form of a shadow government contractor workforce. 

For instance, the Coast Guard's Deepwater program became one of the most egregious examples of 

excessive costs associated with outsourcing government work. The program was designed to upgrade 

the Coast Guard's fleet, including efforts to build or modernize five classes of ships and aircraft. In 

2002, the Coast Guard contracted with Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS), ajoint venture formed 

by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, to manage the entire operation. After years of cost 

overruns, design flaws, and ships and technology that failed to meet contract requirements, the Coast 

Guard assumed the position as program manager in 20 I 0.2Q1 As seen in this example, transferring skills 

and experience from the federal government to contractors is not always in the government's and 

taxpayers' interest. 

According a 2009 Federal Times article, 16 intelligence agencies urged Congress to remove caps on 

staffing at intelligence agencies.202 Agencies were left no recourse but to hire contractors as semipermanent staff, largely because of imposed staff ceilings,203 increasing spending on service contracts. 

Unfortunately, Congress has all too frequently legislated without empirical data to make informed 

decisions about whether it would be more cost effective to authorize sufficient numbers offederal 

FTEs in order to implement government programs, or to authorize agencies to contract out the work. 

As noted before, recent efforts by policymakers to freeze federal employee compensation without 

mandating a freeze on service contract awards or on service contractor billing rates (which often 

increase annually) will impose additional risks of greater taxpayer costs by limiting the government's 

ability to hire and retain federal employees. Hiring ceilings and salary freezes might actually widen the 

existing gap between federal and contractor employee costs, thereby increasing the cost to the 

government and taxpayers. 

In addition to freezing federal employee compensation, Congress is now exploring whether to reduce 

federal employee compensation in an effort to further reduce costs to the federal government and 

taxpayers. In 2011, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform conducted hearings to 

determine if federal employee compensation was comparable to private sector compensation and 

whether reductions ofthe federal workforce are necessary.204 Testimony focused on recent studies 

201 Congressional Research Service. Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background, Oversight Issues. and Options/or 

Congress, June 22, 2007, p. I. http://www.au.af.miVaulawclawcgate/crslr133753.pdf(Downloaded April 6, 20] I) 

(hereinafter Coast Guard Deepwater Program); Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard: Update on Deepwater 

Program Management, Cost, and Acquisition Wor/iforce (GAO-09-620T), April 22, 2009, p. 2. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09620t.pdf(Downloaded September 27, 20] 0); Testimony of Jane Hall Lute, Deputy 

Secretary Department of Homeland Security, before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on 

Appropriations, "Homeland Security Major Systems Acquisition," CQ Transcriptions, March 2, 2010, p. I I; Chris Strohm, 

"Coast Guard takes control from Deepwater's integrators," CongressDaily, March 3, 2010. 

http://www.govexec.com!story...page.cfm?articleid=44706&sid=61 (Downloaded May 11,2011) 

20, Stephen Losey and Elise Castelli, "Thousands of intel jobs being insourced," Federal Times, July 27, 2009. 

http://www.federaltimes.comlarticleI20090728/ACQUISITION02/907280301/-IIRSS (Downloaded June 14,2011) 

,OJ CRS IGF and DoD report, p. 34 

2" House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service and 

Labor Policy, "Are Federal Workers Underpaid?" March 9, 2011. 

http;/Iover.ight.hou.e.gov/index.php?option=com _ content&view=article&id= I I 75%3A3 -9-ll-qare-federal.workersunderpaidq&catid=15<emid=2 (Downloaded June 17,201 J); House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 

Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service and Labor Policy, "Rightsizing the Federal Workforce," May 26, 

33 
146 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.124

claiming federal employees were compensated at higher rates than private sector employees, and 

should be in line wi!b private sector compensation for comparable work. Unfortunately, with the lone 

exception of one ranldng Congressman, the Committee did not focus on latent costs that could exceed 

the expected savings that would result from reducing the size of and compensation paid to the federal 

employee workforce. As testimony by the federal employee union representatives made c1ear,205 

reducing federal employee compensation would impact the government's ability to retain highly 

skilled and experienced workers, which in tum would necessitate outsourcing those jobs to contractors. 

Simply stated, the consequence of reducing federal employee compensation in the service occupations 

documented in POGO's study would be an increase in govemment spending on those services. 

Need for a Special Pool of Part-Time and FuU-Time Federal Employees 

The federal government is the country's largest employer-when the contractor workforce is combined 

with civilians, military personnel, U.S. Postal Service employees, and grantees, the size of the blended 

federal workforce was estimated at 14.6 million people in 2005.206 To avoid the dilemma of having to 

hire contractors for short-term projects, federal agencies must utilize existing authorization to hire 

short-term at-will federal employees.2o, The government should generate pools offederal employees 

who would be able to move from program to program, agency to agency, on a temporary basis to meet 

the multitude of short-term needs of the federal government. In addition, there is a constant need for 

workers who have prior government experience and institutional knowledge to provide services over a 

short period of time, but existing regulations impose impediments and disincentives to exploiting these 

resources, resulting in myriad service contracts that pay hi~-Ievel retirees at far higher rates than if 

they were allowed to be rehired back into the government. 08 

CONCLUSION 

Contrary to popular belief, many government services are not performed by federal employees, but by 

contractors. The government spends hundreds of billions of dollars annually on services-in fact, 

2011. http://oversight.house.gov/index.pbp?option=com _ content&view=artic1e&id= 1300%3A5-26-II-qrightsizing-thefederal-workforceq&catid=15&Itemid=26 (Downloaded June 17,2011) 

205 Testimony of Colleen M. Kelley, National President, National Treasury Employees Union, before the Subcommittee on 

Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service and Labor Policy, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, "Are 

Federal Workers Underpaid?" March 9, 2011, pp. 6-8. 

http://oveTsight.house.gov/imagesistoTieslTestimonylKelley _ Testimony.pdf (Downloaded June 10, 20 II); Statement of 

William R. Dougan, National President, National Federation of FedeTal Employees, and Chairman, Federal WOTkers 

Alliance, befoTe the House Subcommittee on Federal WorlcfoTce, U.S. Postal Service and LaboT Policy, "Rightsizing the 

Federal Workforce," May 26, 2011, pp. 6-8. http://oversight.house.gov/images/storiesITestimony/5-26-

II_Dougan]edWorkfoTce_Testimony.pdf(Downloaded June 10,2011) 

106 The New True Size of Government, p. Ii; "With about 2.0 million civilian employees, the Federal Government, 

excluding the Postal Service, is the Nation's largest employer,n Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Career 

Guide to Industries, 2010-11 Edition." http://www.bls.gov/oco/cglcgs041.httn(DownloadedApriI26,2011) 

201 Authority for temporary and term appointtnents resides at 5 CFR Part 316 fOT competitive service and at 5 CFR part 213 

for excepted service appointments. 

'OB Reemployment by the federal government can cause an employee's salary to be offset by the amount of his or her 

annuity or, depending on the type ofretiTement, theiT annuity will stop. Agency heads have the discretion to rehiTe federal 

retirees on a limited, part-time basis without offset of annuity. Generally, annuitants may not work mOTe than 520 hours for 

the first six months and no more than 1040 hours during any 12-month period, and are limited to 3,120 hours total. The 

total number of annuitants that can be rehired this way may not exceed 2.5 percent of the total number ofPTEs ofthe 

agency. National Defense Authorization Act fOT Fiscal Year 2010 (Pub. Law 111-84), § 1122, October 28, 2009; National 

Defense Authorization Act fOT Fiscal Year 2004 (pub. Law 108-136), § 1101, November 24, 2003; There are a few limited 

circumstances when retired federal employees can be reemployed by the government without discontinuing their annuity. 

General Services Administration Modernization Act, Pub. Law 109-313, § 4; 5 C.F.R. §§ 553.201 and 553.202. 

34 
147 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.125

approximately one-quarter of all discretionary spending now goes to service contractors209 -and 

POGO's analysis found these contracts may be costing taxpayers, on average, 1.83 times more than if 

federal employees had done the work. In order to reduce those excessive costs, a government-wide 

system to conduct federal employee versus service contract cost analyses needs to be created. Instead 

of directly hiring service contractors without considering hiring federal employees-perhaps from a 

newly created pool of part-time or temporary federal employees--conducting cost reviews at the start 

of the process would allow the government to save billions of dollars annually. 

Federal agencies should move aggressively to limit or curtail service contracting, unless contractors 

can show that they both save taxpayer dollars and enhance performance as compared to when the work 

is performed by federal employees. In no event should agencies contract for work that is inherently 

governmental work, or closely associated with inherently governmental work, and agencies should 

curtail or eliminate the outsourcing of services that have been poorly performed by contractorswhether due to quality of the work or cost issues, including cost overruns. 

Based on POGO's findings, we believe awarding government service contracts is nearly always more 

expensive than having such work performed by federal employees, even after accounting for the total 

cost to the government of federal employee fringe benefits and associated overhead costs. 

Under the current federal personnel and service contracting systems, waste to the tune billions of 

dollars a year will continue for the foreseeable future. The government's failure to ameliorate its 

reliance on service contractors, its failure to base outsourcing actions on cost analyses, and its failure to 

review existing contracts for potential cost savings have serious budget consequences. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

I. Congress should pass legislation requiring: 

a) All federal agencies awarding service contracts to use service coding systems that are 

consistent with OPM's job classification system. Use of systems consistent with OPM's 

will help ensure that cost analyses matching specific federal positions to comparable 

contractor and private sector positions is valid. These systems should be required for all 

Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act inventories to allow a comprehensive 

understanding of the services being performed by federal employees and contractors; 

b) The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to promulgate guidance establishing a 

uniform set of standards and guidelines for comparing the fuillifecycle costs (including 

contract modifications, amendments, and options) of outsourcing federal services with the 

costs of having those services performed by federal employees; 

c) Inspectors General of agencies awarding $5 billion or more annually in total contracts to 

file an annual report detailing amounts awarded in service contracts, and including 

competition information, a cost analysis of savings resulting from hiring contractors rather 

than federal employees, and whether insourcing those services would result in cost savings; 

'09 In 2010, service contracts accounted for $320 billion of the nearly $1.26 mllion discretionw;' spending total. According 

to data compiled by POGO from the Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG), the federal 

government awarded $320 billion in service contracts in fiscal year 2010. https:llwww.fpds.gov/fpdsniLcms!; Office of 

Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2012, p. 200. 

http://www. whitehouse.gov/sites!defaultlfiles!omblbudgetlry20 12/assetslbudget.pdf (Downloaded August 18, 2011) 

35 
148 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.126

d) Federal agencies to conduct pre-award contract cost analyses to determine whether the use 

of contractors is less costly and provides enhanced performance over the use of federal 

employees. These analyses should be conducted by an entity independent of the office 

responsible for the contracting decision; 

e) Federal service contracts be subjected to periodic post-award reviews by the agency's 

Office ofInspector General (OIG) to certify that the costs of contractor performance is less 

than if the work were performed by federal employees. If the OIG determines that this is 

not the case, the contract should be terminated (if practical), and the work should be 

performed by federal employees; 

f) The removal of federal full-time equivalents (FTE) ceilings, and requiring agencies to 

manage personnel costs (whether incurred by civil servants, the military, or contractors) by 

budget function or category, rather than by artificially relying on contractors or the military 

in order to meet civil service personnel ceilings; 

g) GSA's Inspector General to annually audit all the agency's Schedule contracts for services 

to determine whether the billing rates reflect fair and reasonable market prices, and to 

require the agency to renegotiate any rates the IG certifies fail that standard; and 

h) GSA to continuously update its Schedule Sales Query data system to identify for each 

Schedule service contract the following information: the occupational classification al1d 

Special Item Number for each job position offered, the number of contractor employees 

hired under each occupational classification, the real-time billing rates for each 

occupational classification under each contract, and the total government expenditures. 

2. Congress should amend the FAIR Act's service contracts reporting requirements to include: 

a) The occupational classification(s) of the person(s) performing the service; 

b) The actual number of all contractor and all subcontractor employees performing the service 

by occupational classification; and 

c) The actual billing rate(s) for each occupational classification of persons performing the 

service. 

3. Congress should pass legislation requiring OMB to submit to Congress and make publicly 

available an annual report on federal service contracts providing the following information and 

analysis: 

a) How much money the federal government spent outsourcing services, broken down by 

agency and legislative program; 

b) How many contractor and subcontractor employees provided services to the federal 

government, broken down by agency, legislative program, and occupational category; 

c) How much money the federal government actually saved by outsourcing services, broken 

down by agency, legislative program, and occupational category; 

d) Which inherently governmental or closely associated to inherently governmental functions 

the agencies insourced (this is especially important as insourcing is about ensuring 

appropriate federal control of government policies, programs, and missions); 

e) How much money the federal government actually saved by insourcing services, broken 

down by agency, legislative program, and occupational category; and 

f) Recommendations for legislative reforms for saving more money and for achieving an 

effective balance in the federal workforce between federal and contractor employees. 

4. Congress should amend the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. § 1127) to ensure 

that the maximum benchmark compensation amount applicable to contractor employees shall not 

36 
149 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.127

exceed the compensation paid to Levell positions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5312 and the Office of 

Personnel Management's rates of basic pay for the Executive Schedule. 

5. Agencies should: 

a) Periodically consider hiring federal employees for short-term projects--existing personnel 

authorities are very flexible and more than adequate for this purpose; and 

b) Place much more emphasis on cost analyses in their decisions to utilize contractors. Cost 

analyses will provide significantly greater insight into how much contractors should charge 

for the work to be performed and will serve as a benchmark for project costing, whether 

performed by contractors or federal employees. 

37 
150 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.128

ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY 

A-76 

BLS 

CBO 

CCE 

CEHNC 

CPS 

CRS 

CSIS 

cwe 

DHS 

DOE 

DoD 

DOL 

FAIR 

FAR 

FTE 

FY 

GAO 

GS 

GSA 

IG 

IGF 

IRS 

IT 

LOGCAP 

MEO 

NCS 

NATO 

OES 

OFPP 

OMB 

OPM 

PCA 

PDC 

PSC 

RFP 

SBAR 

SIN 

SOC 

USACE 

Acquisition workforce 

Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-76 

Bureau of Labor Statistics 

Congressional Budget Office 

Army Contracting Agency's Contracting Center of Excellence 

Corps of Engineers Huntsville Center 

Current Population Survey 

Congressional Research Service 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 

Department of Homeland Security 

Department of Energy 

Department of Defense 

Department of Labor 

Federal Activities Inventory Reform 

Federal Acquisition Regulation 

Full-Time Equivalent 

Fiscal Year 

Government Accountability Office 

General Schedule 

General Services Administration 

Inspector General 

Inherently governmental function 

Internal Revenue Service 

Information technology 

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 

Most efficient organization 

National Compensation Survey 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Occupational Employment Statistics 

Office of Federal Procurement Policy 

Office of Management and Budget 

Office of Personnel Management 

Private Collection Agency 

Private Debt Collection Initiative 

Private Security Contractor 

Request for proposal 

Santa Barbara Applied Research, Inc. 

Special Item Number 

Standard Occupational Classification system 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Federal contracting officers (COs), contracting officer representatives/contracting officer technical 

representatives (COTRs), contract specialists (GS-II02 series), purchasing agents (GS-IIOS series), 

procurement assistants (GS-II 06 series), auditors, engineers, logistics specialists, and program 

managers or specialists with responsibilities for planning, defining the requirements of, purchasing, 

monitoring, and/or evaluating federal contracts and/or contractors. 

38 
151 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.129

Bid protest 

An actual or prospective bidder's challenge to a contract that has been, or is about to be, awarded 

alleging a violation of law or regulation that governs the contracting process. Generally, bid protests 

can be filed with the GAO and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 

Circular A-76 

The OMB policy for the competition of commercial activities between federal employees and 

contractors. 

Closely associated with inherently governmental functions 

An activity so integrally related to an inherently governmental function that it may be in the public 

interest for the activity to be performed by a federal employee. FAR Subpart 7.S03(d). 

Commercial function 

A recurring federal service that could be performed by a contractor employee because it is not so 

intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by a federal employee. One of the 

designations used in FAIR Act inventories. 

Commission on Wartime Contracting 

An independent, bipartisan legislative commission established to study wartime contracting in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. The CWC's final report was issued in August 2011. 

COMPARE 

The A-76 costing software that allows a comparison offederal employee and contractor bids. 

Contractor 

An entity that provides goods to or performs services for a federal agency in accordance with a 

contract. 

Cost estimating 

Use of various analytical teclmiques to estimate the prospective cost or price of goods or services. 

Cost overrun 

Funds expended by an agency for goods or services in excess of the cost or price stated in the 

originally executed contract, task order, or delivery order. 

Cost-plus contract 

A contract under which the government reimburses the contractor for allowable costs incurred in 

providing goods or services. These contracts generally include a fee paid to the contractor in addition 

to reimbursement of costs. FAR Subpart 16.3. 

Current Population Survey 

A monthly survey of households conducted by the Bureau of Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 

It provides data on the labor force, employment, unemployment, persons not in the labor force, hours 

of work, earnings, and other demographic and labor force characteristics. 

Direct conversion 

When the federal government outsources government jobs without competition and cost comparisons. 

000 is currently prohibited from making such conversions. 

39 
152 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.130

Estimated or projected cost savings 

The amount of money the government expects to save when comparing government employee full 

compensation with contractor billing rates for the performance of services. 

FedScope 

An OPM dataset offederal salary information for all federal employees. 

Federal Acquisition Regulation 

The government-wide regulation governing federal contracts. The FARis codified at 48 CFR 

Chapter 1, which sets forth the policies and procedures used in awarding and administering federal 

government contracts. 

Federal agency 

A department ofthe executive branch of the U.S. government, a sub-unit of a federal department, or an 

independent entity created by Congress. 

Federalvvorkforce 

As used in this report, the totality of federal civilian and contractor employees who perform federal 

government functions. It does not include military persOIUlel, Postal Service employees, or government 

grantees who also provide services for the government. 

FuU compensation 

Compensation paid to government or private sector employees that includes salary plus a full fringe 

benefit package, based upon OPM and BLS data respectively. 

Full-Time Equivalent 

The standard for measuring the time a full time employee is required to be employed during one 

calendar year. As defined by the federal government, one FTE equals 40 hours per week at 52 weeks 

per year, or 2080 hours. 

Inherently governmental function 

A function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by federal 

employees. It includes activities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying government 

authority, or the making of value judgments in making decisions for the government. FAR Subparts 

2.1 01 and 7.503(c). See also OMB Circular A-76, Attachment A, which defines inherently 

governmental functions as, "activities require the exercise of substantial discretion in applying 

government authority and/or in making decisions for the government." 

Insourcing 

Transferring performance of government service functions from the contractor workforce to the federal 

employee workforce. 

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 

LOGCAP is an Army Materiel Command program providing support from civilian contractors for 

military troops operating in wartime and in other contingency situations. Contractors provide laundry, 

food, maintenance, engineering, construction, medical, and management services. LOGCAP III was 

competitively awarded in 2001 to Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR). LOGCAP IV was awarded in 2007 

to KBR, DynCorp International LLC, and Fluor Intercontinental Inc. 

40 
153 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.131

National Compensation Survey 

A comprehensive survey of businesses, conducted and analyzed by the Department of Labor's Bureau 

of Labor Statistics, that generates data on private sector occupational wages, employment cost trends, 

and employee benefits. 

Occupational Employment Statistics 

A program of the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics that produces employment and 

wage estimates for job occupations. These estimates include the number of people employed in certain 

occupations by federal, state, and local government agencies and in the private sector, as well as 

estimates of the wages and benefits paid to them. 

Outsourcing 

Transferring performance of government service functions from the federal employee workforce to the 

contractor workforce (also known as "competitive sourcing" or "conversion"), or hiring contractors to 

perform work not already performed by federal employees (also known as "direct conversion"). 

Overhead costs 

All costs of doing business except for direct labor, direct materials, and other direct expenses. As used 

in this report, given that work is performed on government sites, some examples of pertinent expenses 

might include accounting fees, advertising, insurance, legal fees, and taxes. O:MB Circular A-76 

outlines numerous costs, including a 12 percent overhead rate, that must be added to federal 

employees' full compensation labor costs in order to accurately compare the total cost to the 

government when making public/private cost comparisons. 

Public-private competition 

The process where federal employees and contractors submit competing bids to perform government 

service functions. This competition is also known as an A-76 competition or the competitive sourcing 

initiative. 

Privatization 

The total transfer of a federal business or administrative function, including the responsibility for the 

affected services, to the private sector. 

Shadow government 

The workforce of contractor employees who perform federal government services. 

Special interest functions 

Functions that require increased management attention due to heightened risk of workforce imbalance. 

Special Item Number 

The General Services Administration's categorization method that groups together similar goods and 

services to aid in the acquisition process. 

Standard Occupational Classification system 

A federal job coding and classification system created by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor 

Statistics to classify workers into occupational categories for the purpose of collecting, calculating, or 

disseminating data All workers are classified into one of 840 detailed occupations according to their 

occupational definition. 

Task order 

An order for services placed against an established contract or with government sources. FAR 

Subpart 16.5. 
154 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.132

Appendix B 

POGO FOIA Request 
155 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.133

to 

by 
156 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.134

9. All records that address whether andlor how to calculate the total number of full-time 

equivalent workers employed by contractors and all tiers of subcontractors that perform work 

on service contracts for the agcncy. 

10. All records for each year showing the total number of full-time equivalent workers 

employed by contractors and all tiers of subcontractors that perform the work on service 

contracts and how these contractor employees are stratified by occupation andlor public 

service code. 

II. All records showing for each service contract and task order executed by the agency 

during the past fiscal year the following information 

a. what the agency was billed, andl or 

b. what were the total number of hours worked on government premises, 

andlor 

c. what were the total number of hours worked on contractor premises, 

andlor 

d. what costs were incurred by the contractor, segregated by salaries, 

employee benefits, overhead (direct and indirect), general administrative 

expenses, andlor 

e. what costs were incurred by the agency, segregated by salaries, employee 

benefits, overhead (direct and indirect), general administrative expenses. 

12. All records relating to the agency's implementation of and compliance with OMB's 

Policy Letter 93-1 (Reissued) on May 16, 1994, as authorized pursuant to section 6(a) of 

the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, as amended, codified at 41 U.S.C. § 405. 

13. All records relating to whether andlor how: 

a. service contracts were accomplishing what was intended, andlor 

b. service contracts were cost effective, andlor 

c. inherently governmental functions were being performed by service contractors, 

andlor 

d. service contracts were andlor should be subject to full and open competition, 

andlor 

e. sufficient trained and experienced officials are available within the agency to 

manage and oversee the procurement and administration of service contracts, 

andlor 

f. effective management practices arc used to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in 

services contracting, andlor 

g. certain service contracts require greater oversight and the nature ofthat oversight, 

andlor 

h. agency officials ensure that their acquisition strategy for procuring services will 

result in the acquisition of services from a quality vendor that constitute the best 

value considering costs and other relevant factors, and yield the greatest benefit to 

the agency. 

14. All records relating to "best practices" the agency has considered, adopted, andlor 

implemented for the procurement and administration of service contracts. 
157 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.135

I request a waiver of all costs associated with fulfilling this submission pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 

552(a)(4)(A)(iii). Disclosure of the requested information will further the "public interest 

because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or 

activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest" of the requester, the 

Project On Government Oversight (POGO). Specifically, POGO will use the information 

requested to inform the public about whether and how the federal government is saving 

taxpayers money by contracting for services. See fee waiver supplement. 

Founded in 1981, POGO is a nonpartisan independent watchdog that champions good 

government reforms. POGO's investigations into corruption, misconduct, and conflicts of 

interest achieve a more effective, accountable, open, and ethical federal government. POGO 

disseminates information about its activities to thousands of concerned citizens, policymakers, 

and the media via email, direct mail, and its web site http://www.pogo.org, which receives 

approximately 140,000 page views monthly. The information provided by the agency will be 

used for the following activities: publication by email and on our website; publication in reports 

and newsletters issued by POGO; publication in the newsletters of affiliated nonprofit 

organizations; efforts to educate Congress, the Executive Branch, and other policymakers in 

Washington, D.C.; or investigational projects conducted in conjunction with the news media. 

POGO's use of all of those actions ensures that the public is well informed about the actions and 

operations ofthe federal government. 

If this request is denied in full or in part, please cite the exemptions pursuant t05 U.S.c. § 

552(b) that justify the denial. If an exemption applies, however, please consider exercising the 

agency's discretionary release powers to disclose the information. Additionally, please release 

all reasonably segregable portions of that information that do not meet an exemption. 

I look forward to your response within 20 days of the receipt of this request, unless, in the case 

of "unusual circumstances," the time limitation is "extended by written notice." I am aware that I 

have a right to appeal this request if it is wholly or partially denied or if the agency fails to 

respond within 20 days. I am aware that, if successful, a federal district court may assess 

"reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs" per 5 U.S.C. § 5S2(a)(4)(E). 

Please contact me or Scott Arney if this request requires further clarification. We can be reached 

at 202-347-1122, or via e-mail at pchassy@pogo.org or scott(tilpogo.org . Thank you for your 

prompt attention to this matter. 

Sincerely, 

r2/&¥ftf 

Paul Chassy, Ph.D., J.D. 

Investigator 

~~.~ 

Scott H. Arney 

General Counsel 
158 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.136

of the 

Government Services industry 
159 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.137

The Professional Services Council IPSe) appreciates your invitation to submit our views on the question 

of how much contractors are costing the government and the degree to which the government is 

assessing and using accurate and complete data to make appropriate cost-comparison determinations 

when such comparisons are relevant. Accurate cost comparisons between the public and private sectors 

have been a contentious issue for many years and we commend the subcommittee for holding this 

hearing to explore it in detail. 

Understanding the cost implications associated with agency sourcing decisions is always important, 

particularly in today's fiscal environment. While we recognize that there are clear limits to the scope of 

work that is appropriate for the private sector to perform for the government, it is also true that the 

innovation, skills, agility, and competitive spirit ofthe private sector are the engine that drives our 

economy. Thus, any decision to perform work inside the government that is, under current law and 

policy, appropriate for performance in the private sector must be accompanied by real analytical rigor. 

To do otherwise is contrary to both the government's and taxpayers' interests and the broader health of 

our economy. 

PSC is the voice of the government professional and technical services industry. PSC's nearly 350 

member companies represent small, medium, and large businesses that provide federal agencies with 

services of all kinds, including information technology, engineering, logistics, facilities management, 

operations and maintenance, consulting, international development, scientific, social, environmental 

services, and more. Together, the trade association's members employ hundreds ofthousands of 

Americans in all 50 states. 

In conducting your review and if Congress were to fashion any legislative proposal as a result, we would 

recommend that you focus on five key points: 

I. While cost is a critical factor in most sourcing decisions, in others it is not relevant. The first 

question that must be asked is not which sector or provider is more cost effective but what is the nature 

of the work itself? For example, as the Obama administration has made clear, when work is deemed to 

be "inherently governmental" in nature, it should always be performed by government employees, 

regardless of cost. The same is generally true for a small subset of work that is sometimes referred to as 

"closely associated with inherently governmental" or "critical" functions. By the same token, when work 

is commercial in nature (Le., engineering, software development, management consulting, etc.); 

involves skills the government is not generally able to internally hire, retain, or provide essential training 

capabilities for; or is work for which there may only be a limited need, then cost comparisons may be of 

less significance in the decision process. In these latter cases, understanding the associated cost 

comparison is important but the realities of the human capital market or the government's temporal 

mission means that cost alone should not be the basis for a sourcing decision. 

II. The key to getting the "right" answer for the American taxpayer in cases where cost is a factor 

lies in ensuring that the government is using the best and most complete taxonomy for conducting its 

cost comparisons. To date, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that this objective is not being 

achieved. For work that is contracted, the costs to the government are clear and are detailed in 

proposals received and in the resulting contract(s). Regrettably, the same is far from true for 

government cost estimates. Although absolute "apples-to-apples" comparisons of the cost of 

government versus private-sector performance are elusive, significant improvements to the current 

process are achievable and much needed. 

III. Government in-house cost estimates fail to account for the full cost impacts incurred by other 

than the requiring agency or true "Iifecycle" costs associated with the hiring of federal personnel 
160 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.138

(including the full range of post-retirement costs that are not and cannot be "front loaded"). These 

substantial, often deferred, liabilities must be accounted for in all cost comparison analyses, much as 

they are accounted for in the balance sheets of any private entity, and must be included in proposals 

submitted on government solicitations. 

IV. Attempts to answer in general the perennial question "who is more expensive?" are off track. 

Instead, the question should be "who is more cost efficient in this circumstance?" Determining sourcing 

policy, or preemptively determining the source of performance, on the basis of "averages" or estimates 

is simply not sound management as it detracts from the specifics and realities of each individual 

situation and fails to account for the effects of market competition or the dynamics ofthe competition 

for talent. The government would never award a contract on the basis of a company's "average" costs 

on other related work. Federal sourcing actions should not be based on such limited and often 

misleading analyses, either. 

V. The process for making sourcing decisions should be subjected to transparency and 

accountability. The current moratorium on competitions conducted under OMB Circular A-76 has not 

only enabled the government to make sole-source, non-competitive, insourcing decisions but also has 

enabled the government to do so without transparency or accountability. As a matter of practice and 

policy, government components refuse to share the analytical bases for their decisions, if any, even 

when requested by members of Congress or through the Freedom of Information Act. Furthermore, 

while more competition is being required for contracted work, government activities alone are exempt 

from the rigors of competition and continue to operate in a monopoly environment. While cost analyses 

are helpful and important, they cannot replace the benefits of competition. 

Focus on the Taxonomy 

In asking the question of whether the government is effectively using cost data to make its sourcing 

decisions, it is essential to first start with a focus on the quality of that data and the taxonomy through 

which it is being analyzed. 

Adequate data is available to enable far more analytically sound cost comparisons than are generally 

being applied by federal departments and agencies today. In some recent cases of government 

"insourcing" work, the problems have not been with the availability of data but with the data the 

government chose to use in its assessment. In assessing contractor costs, the task is relatively easy. 

Contractors submit a proposal or, where insourcing is being considered, contractors are operating 

pursuant to a contract where all of the contractor's costs are clearly documented. However, the same is 

not true for government in-house cost estimates. 

For example: 

In 2010, a government component insourced more than 200 jobs on the basis of a "cost 

comparison" which purported to show that the government would save approximately $400,000 

on a contract with a value in excess of $225 million. leaving aside the question of whether it is 

wise or cost efficient to insource (or outsource) work for such negligible savings, there has long 

been agreement (and also statutory and regulatory requirements) that insourcing or 

outsourcing should generate a minimum 10 percent or $10 million in personnel savings to justify 

the transition and organizational churn involved. Of particular note in this case are the 

additional facts that emerged upon a review of the cost comparison itself (one of the very few 

for which information was made available after a Freedom of Information Act request): 

--In its estimate of contractor costs, the government included contract items that the 

contractor had not been required to execute. Had those elements been excluded from the cost 
161 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.139

comparison, as they should have been, any potential savings estimated by the analysis would 

have been more than wiped out; 

--The government assumed that its workforce would be 15 percent smaller than the 

contractor workforce-the size of which was dictated by the government itself. In addition to 

this change demonstrating that in-house performance was substantially higher in cost on a per 

person basis cost, no effort was made to assess the costs of contract performance with a smaller 

workforce; 

--The analysis did not include any assessment of costs that would not be incurred 

against the agency's own budget. In other words, all post-retirement costs that are assumed by 

the Office of Personnel Management were excluded. Including just one-identifiable and 

marginal post-retirement cost (monthly premiums for health insurance)-would have resulted 

in tens of millions of dollars being added to the government cost estimate. In fact, those costs 

alone would likely have amounted to nearly 25 percent of the total cost of continued contract 

performance. Instead, the component claimed a "$400,000 savings." 

• In 2012, a government component informed a contractor that it was insourcing more than 70 

positions on the basis of significant estimated cost savings. However, in reviewing the cost 

comparison summary documents (made available only after a direct congressional request), it 

became evident that the cost comparison was based on faulty data. 

--The analysis substantially altered the workforce requirements associated with the 

work and based the government cost estimate on a workforce with significantly less expertise 

and experience than the government was requiring the contractor to provide. 

--The analysis assigned substantial cost to the contractor to account for government 

contract administration and management requirements. However, because the insourcing 

involves less than half of the contractor's workforce under the relevant contract, the bulk of 

current contract administration costs will continue to be incurred whether or not the work was 

insourced. Moreover, the analysis did not provide for any costs to account for the government's 

very real and unavoidable management, supervisory or other related costs associated with 

performance by government personnel. 

--The analysis was conducted under outdated cost comparison gUidelines that had been 

more recently updated to better capture the complete costs to the government. 

Many external "analyses" have inappropriately compared fully burdened contractor costs with 

only direct government personnel costs. 

--One good example of this misleading trend is evident in the suggestion that private 

security contractors in Iraq were substantially more expensive than equivalent military capacity. 

Such "analyses" compare the reported daily "rate" for some private security personnel with the 

Army's pay rate. However, as the CongreSSional Budget Office' and CongreSSional Research 

Service' both concluded, such comparisons ignore the fact that the contractor rate includes a 

wide range of non-pay overhead, benefits, training, equipment and other costs that were not 

included in the base pay rate of the uniformed military. Under those circumstances, both CBO 

and CRS concluded that there is very little, if any, difference in the total immediate costs of 

using private security contractors versus Army personnel. Both also noted, however, that in 

peacetime the bulk of the Army personnel would remain in the Army (accruing all costs 

'''Contractors' Support of u.S. Operations in Iraq," Congressional Budget Office, August 2008. Available at: 

http://www .cbo.gov /sites/ default/files/ cbofiles/ftpd ocs/96xx/ do c9688/08-12 -iraq contracto rs. pdf 

, "Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues," Congressional Research 

Service, August 25, 2008. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf 
162 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.140

associated with their continued service plus their retirement and benefits) while the contractor 

workforce would be released as contracts were terminated. 

--Similarly, the Government Accountability Office3 and U.S. Department of State 

assessed the relative costs of using private security forces versus using State Department 

Diplomatic Security Service personnel. Their conclusion was that the use of private security was 

an order of magnitude less expensive than using DSS personnel. In short, while there is general 

agreement today that cost alone should not determine the circumstances under which the 

government should use private security, these studies are especially instructive in that they are 

among the few that sought to assess totallifecycle costs of government performance. 

As Congress weighs the question of contractor costs it is also important that members not rely on faulty 

studies conducted to date. One such study is the Project on Government Oversight's (POGO) September 

2011 report titled "Bad Business: Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring Contractors." The POGO 

report purports to prove that contractors are more expensive than federal employees. However, PSC's 

analysis of the report finds that it contains principal weaknesses and by POGO's own admission, the 

report is not without gaps. 

First, POGO relied on contractor rates included in the GSA's Multiple Award Schedules. However, those 

rates rarely end up being the final rates that agencies pay and in most cases the costs are substantially 

lowered through competition. Furthermore, those rates include the fully burdened contractor costs, 

including overhead, supplies, equipment and rent, whereas POGO ignored the full range of overhead 

and other non-personnel costs that drive up the cost of federal employee performance. The report also 

failed to recognize long-term costs associated with pUblic-sector performance, such as post-retirement 

costs and other expenses naturally associated with creating a permanent infrastructure that do not exist 

when relying on contractors. Lastly, the POGO report relies on "averages," which provide little basis for 

making sourcing decisions on a case-by-case basis. 

There are many more cost comparison examples that point to the same challenge. All show the 

government MUST have a clear, complete and consistent taxonomy for assessing the relative costs of 

performance. Indeed, despite whatever differences might exist between various stakeholders in this 

debate, we trust that all agree that getting the taxonomy and cost elements right is both the fairest way 

to move forward and the way in which the interests of the American taxpayer will best be served. 

A More Accurate and Balanced Taxonomy 

Today, there is a lack of clarity about the extent to which federal civilian agencies are undertaking 

rigorous cost analyses. Historically, federal agencies had been able to rely on the OMB Circular A-76 cost 

comparison methodology to conduct public-private competitions. Despite a current moratorium on 

OMB Circular A-76 public-private competitions, the cost comparison methodology still exists, yet it is 

unclear if, or how, it is being used by the agencies. 

The National Defense Authorization Acts of 2010 and 2011 direct the Defense Department to use the 

Directive Type Memorandum (09-007), (the "DTM") as the basis for its cost comparisons. While there 

are many similarities between the DTM and A-76, each has significant weaknesses that bias the outcome 

3 "Warfighter Support: A Cost Comparison of Using State Department Employees versus Contractors for Security 

Services in Iraq," Government Accountability Office, March 4, 2010. Available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/965 71.pdf 
163 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.141

in favor of the public sector. In fact, the DTM does not serve as a viable methodology, it is merely a list 

of factors that should be considered in a cost comparison. Moreover, as explained in the seminal 2011 

report by the non-partisan Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the DTM is a less 

complete and less analytically rigorous model than that contained in the longstanding OMB-Circular A76. 

Key Analytical Weaknesses of the DTM 

The independent CSIS analysis is the most comprehensive review of the quality and accuracy of 

government cost-comparison models. It identified numerous, substantial gaps in the DTM which, in 

CSIS's words, "overlook[sl many cost aspects for the government." 

According to CSIS, the DTM specifically: 

• Fails to address government-wide costs and, as a result, likely does not account for costs (or 

even savings) that might be incurred by agencies other than the immediate agency or 

component. 

• Does not take into account the full cost of DoD-owned capital (although such costs are included 

for contractors) thus ignoring foregone interest, risk premiums and depreciation. These costs 

are the same or similar for both the public and private sectors and can be calculated for 

government purposes. Instructively, OMB Circular A-76 does require consideration of these 

costs on the government side. 

Ignores tax collections foregone by the federal, state or local governments, elements which are 

incurred by contractors and considered under OMB Circular A-76. 

• Assumes cost growth for work that is contracted out but makes no similar assumptions for work 

performed by the government. As CSIS reported, the evidence is clear that cost growth is not a 

function of which sector performs the work but of changes in the scope of work, the presence of 

competition (which is the best guarantor of containing cost growth) and other factors. 

Does not require any assessment of the imputed cost of insuring and indemnifying in-house 

operations, although it does require such costs be assessed with regard to contractor 

performance. Here too, OMB Circular A-76 requires such costs to be assessed since it recognizes 

that while the government self-insures, there are costs associated with its practice of self 

insurance, and using a market-based model to assess those costs is the most logical means by 

which to do so. 

• Does not take into account the often wide variances in workload requirements and in so doing 

ignores the tremendous flexibility contractors can provide. The failure to account for this cost 

element ignores the substantial immediate and lifecycle costs associated with maintaining a 

workforce "bench" for those periods when workloads are reduced. In a contract environment, 

the workforce and, thus, the costs are continually adjusted based on immediate workload 

requirements. 

• Does not require the use, for government costing purposes, of a detailed statement of work, 

which serves as the foundation of any contract, thus making it "impossible to ensure that the 

full costs of performance are captured in any cost estimate." Once again, the creation of such a 

detailed statement of work is required under OMB Circular A-76. 
164 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.142

Cost Analyses Under OMB Circular A- 76 

While OMB Circular A-76 has a number of advantages over the less rigorous process required under the 

DTM, it is not without its flaws. As CSIS correctly notes, much of the debate over A-76 has traditionally 

focused on the process itself ratherthan the costing methodology. Yet key weaknesses remain in the A76 cost methodology, including: 

The A-76 methodology includes a standard 12 percent overhead rate for all government 

activities. Simply put, and as articulated by C5IS, the figure is "methodologically unsupportable." 

Although better than the DTM in its coverage of the cost of capital to the government, it 

remains more notional than analytical and well below all generally accepted norms for 

uoverhead." 

Other problems arise when the government creates the notional "most efficient organization" 

(MEO) using the A-76 costing model for cost comparison analyses only because there is no 

requirement that the MEO reflect the actual workforce design or the actual grade levels of the 

federal employees that will do the work. Finally, once the cost comparison is completed, there is 

no requirement that the MEO execute the work according to the MEO design that served as the 

basis for the cost comparison. 

As a result of these evident gaps, prior to the imposition of the current moratorium, the private 

sector had largely turned away from bidding on competitions conducted under A-76. In fact, 

during the last few years prior to the moratorium, the vast majority of A-76 competitions had 

fewer than two bidders and a significant percentage had no private sector bidders at all, thus 

depriving the government of the benefits of real competition. 

Misaligned Inputs 

Regardless of whether A-76 or the DTM is used, it is essential that all workforce and workload 

requirements for both the public and private sector be properly aligned. No comparison can overcome 

the analytical problems created by shortcomings in these areas. As noted in the examples provided 

earlier, cost comparisons that fail to align and equalize workforce numbers or skill sets inevitably lead to 

skewed results. Likewise, as has routinely been seen in competitions conducted under OMB Circular A76, the notional composition ofthe government's proposed "Most Efficient Organization"(MEO) may 

not align with the skills and grades of the government's current workforce. If the foundational data used 

as the basis for the cost comparison does not reflect the actual workforce involved, the results will be 

Similarly skewed. 

Addressing the Gaps; Improving the Taxonomy 

The C515 report is agnostic on the question of which sector should perform any given work. Rather, it 

provides an objective and improved taxonomy that is likely to result in more accurate cost analyses to 

be used to guide government sourcing decisions. The detailed explanations for each of its proposals, and 

the associated cost comparison tools, can be found in the May 2011 report "DoD Workforce Cost 

Realism Assessment.,,4 

4 "DoD Workforce Cost Realism Assessment," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), May 17, 2011. 

Available at: https:!lcsis.org!publication!dod-workforce-cost-realism-assessment 
165 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.143

The CSIS recommended taxonomy can be summarized as follows: 

Require a detailed statement of work for both public and private performance; 

• Include all, fully burdened costs to the federal government rather than just those that favor the 

requiring agency or component; 

Recognize and account forthe inherent risk of cost growth for both sectors; 

Account for transition costs in both directions: public to private and vice versa; 

Account for oversight and management costs for both sectors; 

Regularly update dynamic personnel cost elements (health, retirement, etc.); 

Account for the full cost of government-owned capital; 

Include tax (revenue) implications; 

Include in the costing model costs associated with varying workload levels; 

Account for costs of insurance/self insurance and indemnity for both sectors; and 

Recognize and account for cost impacts of cumulative sourcing decisions. 

A Simple, But Focused, Legislative Response 

Finally, Congress must take major steps toward addressing the evident and well documented 

weaknesses in the government's collection and use of data for sourcing decisions. In order to be 

successful, the federal government must be able to rely on and access the latest innovation, expertise, 

and flexibility of the public and private sectors. When determining which sector delivers capabilities in 

the most cost-effective and efficient manner, it is vital that the government have adequate, reliable 

tools for assessing the total, respective costs when cost is a factor in the decision-making process. To 

date, nothing truly approaching an "apples-to-apples" comparison of costs has existed. Hence, federal 

agencies, and DoD specifically, have continued to rely on faulty cost comparisons to justify sourcing 

decisions. Given the fiscal challenges faced by our nation, it is critically important that the federal 

government is able to accurately calculate and comprehend its total workforce costs. 

Therefore, PSC recommends that Congress: 

1. Rescind the moratorium on public-private competitions under OMB Circular A-76 to enable 

agencies to gain the full benefit of competition-the engine that drives performance and efficiency. 

2. Require OMB to update the current OMB Circular A-76 cost comparison taxonomy to address 

the shortcomings and process improvements identified in the CSIS report. 

3. Require 000 to develop a new methodology, if necessary using its existing Directive-Type 

Memorandum (DTM) 09-007, to compare costs of in-house with private-sector performance, correct 

identified shortcomings in the DTM and incorporate the process improvements highlighted by the CSIS 

report. 

4. Require that, in cases where agencies make a decision to insource contracted work, the analysis 

used in making that decision be shared at a minimum with the affected contractor and that a process for 

appeal by the contractor be provided. The fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act requires 

DoD to develop guidance on providing that notification to affected contractors, but as of March 15 that 

guidance was not yet developed and no information is being provided except in rare circumstances 

when requested by a member of Congress. 

5. Require that any decision to insource contracted work be accompanied by a government 

analysis of the impact of its decision on small business. In too many cases, small businesses have been 

impacted greatly-and some have even gone out of business-as the result of a government insourcing 
166 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.144

decision. Legislation favorably reported by the House Small Business Committee in March 2012 would 

impose this requirement on federal agencies. 

CONCLUSION 

The debate over whether contractors or federal employees are more expensive is not new and it flares 

up on the release of reports that claim that one side costs less than the other. While each ofthese 

reports needs to be assessed based on its merits and thoroughness, Congress should refrain from 

focusing on the less relevant and discernible global question and instead focus on the taxonomy that will 

get the right answer for the government in specific circumstances. Without question, getting to an 

accurate cost comparison model will be difficult. However, the shortcomings ofthe current comparison 

tools must not be overlooked and additional steps must be taken to improve them to help avoid the 

government making decisions that lead to higher costs to the taxpayer. Additionally, Congress must 

continue to recognize that cost is not the only factor in determining who is best suited to perform 

certain functions. 

PSC thanks the subcommittee for holding this important hearing, and we look forward to continuing 

working with the subcommittee and other members of Congress on this issue. 
167 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.145

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to 

Jay Aronowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Force Management, Manpower and Resources 

U.S. Department of Army 

From Senator McCaskill 

"Contractors: How Much Are They Costing tbe Government?" 

Tuesday, March 29,2012, 10:00 A.M. 

United States Senate, Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Question: To what extent is the Army sharing any lessons learned on the development of its 

contractor inventory with the Office of Management and Budget, civilian agencies or other 

military departments and defense components? 

Answer: The Army has shared lessons learned on the development of its contractor inventory 

extensively with other military departments. Numerous meetings have taken place between the 

Anny and its relevant counterparts in other military departments in order to share the Army's 

experiences with them. The Army also had the opportunity to meet with representatives from the 

Office of Management and Budget in January 20 I 0 to discuss lessons learned with them, though 

it has not otherwise had the opportunity to meet with agencies and components outside the 

Department of Defense. 

Question: To what degree is the contractor inventory data informing or improving the process 

by which Anny personnel are making acquisition decisions? 

Answer: To date, contractor inventory data has been primarily used by the Manpower 

community in its Total Force Management reviews. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2012, however, 

the Army Acquisition Executive is obtaining Army-wide semi-annual service requirements 

forecasts and quarterly cost reports for service acquisitions valued at $1 OM or more to provide 

program management and funding visibility for services acquisitions. Additionally, the Panel for 

Documentation of Contractors has, since 2009, performed a contractor inventory review to 

identity inherently governmental, closely associated with inherently governmental, critical, and 

authorized and unauthorized personal services functions. 

Question: When the analysis shows that using a federal employee is the best route, is the Anny 

actually able to do this? If not, why? Please provide examples. 

Answer: When the analysis shows that using a federal employee is the best route, the Army is 

able to do this, subject to certain constraints. The Resource Management Decision 703A2 issued 

by the Secretary of Defense directed the Components to freeze their civilian full-time equivalents 

(FTE) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 through FY 2013 (and later extended through FY 2018) to the 

levels budgeted inFY 2010. This "civilian cap" has reduced the flexibility of the Army to utilize 

the types of manpower it sees as most beneficial to the performance of its missions. 
168 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.146

Additionally, since the implementation of the Secretary of the Army's in-sourcing policy dated I 

February 2011, individual Cornmands within the Army have functioned with de facto civilian 

hiring ceilings in order to keep the Army compliant with the civilian FTE freeze. Since that time, 

the Secretary of the Army has given permission for the hiring against 640 positions and the 

creation of 79 new authorizations due to in-sourcing. 

Question: Have the current caps on federal employees hiring hampered agencies from actually 

making cost-analysis based decisions when contracting? 

Answer: The current caps on federal employees hiring have hampered agencies from actually 

making cost-analysis based decisions when contracting. The civilian full time equivalent cap 

instituted by the Secretary of Defense in Resource Management Decision 703A2 has had the side 

effect of removing some of the flexibility that the Army and its attendant Commands previously 

had to manage its workforce to the appropriate manpower mix. In practical terms, ifthe Army 

cannot hire civilians, then it must tum to other sources ofJabor-like contracting-when it needs 

to execute missions, provided the work is not inherently governmental. 

Question: How many exemptions from the civilian caps have been requested? How many have 

been granted? Please provide a short explanation of the functions at issue and the Department's 

reasons for granting or denying the exemptions. 

Answer: The only Army request to OSD for relief from the civilian cap was made by the 

Secretary of the Army on 5 April 2012. This exemption was a request regarding 857 positions at 

the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC). The DLIFLC trains 

military personnel and civilian employees from across the Department of Defense, and supports 

the Department's intelligence missions. 

The Army is the Executive Agent for the DLIFLC and made this request in order to continue 

offering instruction and support for students in 23 different languages and two dialects, including 

strategically vital languages like Arabic and Farsi. OSD has not yet responded to this request for 

an exemption, so a discussion of the Department's reasons for granting or denying the exemption 

is not possible at this time. 

Question: What further analysis will need be done to fully understand the information collected 

by the Army regarding overhead costs? When will that work be completed? 

Answer: The deadline for the collection of Fiscal Year 20 II data in the Contractor Manpower 

Reporting Application (CMRA) was May 1,2012. As such, we are now concluding the closeout 

for the data collection itself and can proceed to analysis. 

Analysis of the collected data has not yet been conducted, as the collection was not, as 

mentioned, complete. Now that the collection has been finished, analysis on a number of 

different factors can be initiated on a collaborative basis between the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Financial Management and Comptroller, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower 

and Reserve Affairs. Analysis will include, among other things, the examination of the effect 

levels of subcontracting have on overall and overhead costs, as well as the effect that the type of 

contract vehicle and type of contract service has on overall and overhead costs. 
169 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.147

Given the recent completion ofthe data collection and the need to now begin analysis, it is 

expected that data examination and synthesis by the aforementioned offices will require around 

six months to complete. 

Question: Please estimate the savings to the Anny in the event that the contractor compensation 

cap is lowered to $400,000 per year. 

Answer: If a $400KlFull Time Equivalent (FTE) Rate Cap was applied to the Fiscal Year (FY) 

2011 Anny Inventory of Contract Services, labor costs reported in the Contractor Manpower 

Reporting Application (CMRA) for FY 2011 would be reduced by $6B (approximately 15% of 

the $41 B in invoices reported in FY 2011 for contract services). 

This estimate was reached utilizing the following methodology: 

1. Using the data reported in CMRA for the FY 2011 Inventory of Contract Services, Labor 

Costs and Labor Rates were computed for the individual services listed within each Contract 

Task Order, where: 

a. Labor Cost = Total Amount Invoiced minus Direct Non-Labor Cost; and 

b. Labor Rate = Labor Cost divided by Number of Contractor FTEs. 

2. For labor rates greater than $400KlFTE, the associated labor costs were recomputed using the 

$400K maximum. Reductions in labor costs using this method totaled $6B. 

3. Total costs reported for contract services in CMRA for FY 201 1 amounted to $4IB. The 

application of the $6B reduction from the utilization ofthe $400,000IFTE cap represents a drop 

to $35B, a reduction of approximately 15%. 

Question: You stated that contractor costs are not accounted for in the budget process 

prospectively. What are the challenges with projecting contractor costs forward? 

Answer: There are two main challenges associated with projecting contractor costs forward. The 

first challenge is that many of the services and skills provided by contractors are not necessarily 

full-time, enduring requirements, but rather provide Anny with various services and skills to 

complete a variety of functional requirements. Although some of the requirements for which 

Anny contracts for services are enduring, using task-based contracts provides Anny the 

flexibility to execute funding on a variety of functional requirements throughout the year of 

execution whereas programming an enduring requirement for a civilian billet for a specific 

requirement limits the Army's flexibility to adjust to emerging requirements. 

The second main challenge arises from the fact that the budget is built from Object Classes. 

Contract services, however, are managed and grouped into "portfolios," as directed by 

USD(ATL) in response to statutory mandate. These budget objects and portfolios are not 

interchangeable: there is no clear cross-walk between them. Acquisition support managers are 

supposed to be controlling contract services spending based on these portfolios, but because 

these portfolios are not interchangeable with the object classes used in the budget and financial 

accounting systems, this cannot be done effectively. Object Class data itself is also not without 
170 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.148

its own flaws; the "Other services" object class includes a disparate variety of functions, like data 

digitization, chaplain services, intelligence services, and auditing. This kind of problem in 

budget object classifications only serves to further exacerbate the problem of lack of 

interchangeability with portfolios, and makes it even more difficult to project contracts costs 

forward. 

Question: In testimony you stated that from FY08 to FY I 0 the Army was able to reduce 

expenditures on non-OCO service contracts from $51B to $368. You stated that this reduction 

stemmed from an insourcing program combined with the contractor inventory review process. In 

FYII that amount increased to $408. 

Answer: The facts presented above are correct and consistent with our written testimony. From 

Fiscal Years 2008 to 20 I 0, there was indeed a decrease in expenditures on non-Overseas 

Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for contract services, as a result of the Department of 

Defense's institution of an active in-sourcing program, as well its service contract pre-award 

approval process and contractor inventory review process. 

Question: Why was there an increase in FYII service contract expenditures? 

Answer: There was an increase in service contract expenditures in Fiscal Year (FY) 20 II due to 

the confluence of various factors. The voluntary in-sourcing program, as well as the use of preaward analysis via the Panel for Documentation of Contractors, both contributed to the decline in 

service contract expenditures. In FY 2010, in-sourcing was no longer voluntary and was 

mandated by budgetary targets. Some viewed these targets as upward limits on in-sourcing, even 

for inherently governmental functions. In FY 2011, the institution of the civilian full time 

equivalent cap removed a great deal of the Army's flexibility in determining its manpower mix, 

but this flexibility was not accompanied by an attendant reduction in mission. 

Question: Have you continued to subject contracts for services to the same pre-award analysis? 

Answer: Yes, the Army has continued to subject contracts for services to the same pre-award 

analysis. However, the effect of mandated in-sourcing targets through the budget process 

starting in Fiscal Year 20 I 0, combined with the subsequent full time equivalent cap, can often 

override the results of such pre-award analysis, as funding drives behavior. 

Question: What impact did this have on Army spending for federal civilians or was there any 

correlation at all? 

Answer: Total pay for Army civilians in Fiscal Years (FY) 2009-2011 is as follows: 

FY 2009: $20,257,579,000 

FY 20 I 0: $21,820,440,000 

FY 2011: $24,154,232,000 

The Army's in-sourcing brought 921 civilians onboard in FY 2009, 6039 civilians in FY 2010, 

and 1126 civilians in FY 20 II. The increase in total pay for Army civilians in FY 2009-20 II 
171 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.149

seen above cannot be solely explained by this in-sourcing. The addition of 921 civilians through 

in-sourcing in FY 2009 increased Anny spending on civilian pay by about $96.SM; the addition 

of6039 in FY 2010 increased spending by about $636.SM; and the addition of 1126 in FY 2011 

increased spending by about $125.2M. These three years combined amount to about $8S8M, but 

even the combined amount is not enough to account for the spending increase outlined above. 

Question: Can the Anny distinguish between non-OCO and OCO related service contracting 

costs? 

Answer: Yes, as described in the testimony, the Army can distinguish between non-Overseas 

Contingency Operations (OCO) and OCO related service contracting costs. The accounting 

system itself can identify a substantial amount of OCO-funded contractor services, though the 

accounting is neither perfect nor complete. 

Question: Are there functions that could be classified as inherently governmental being 

performed by contractors at this time in the Army? Please explain why and what is being done to 

change that. 

Answer: Yes, there are functions that could be classified as inherently governmental being 

performed by contractors at this time in the Army. There are a number of possible reasons for 

this. When a function being performed by a contractor is identified as being inherently 

governmental, that function's performance must be divested, shifted to existing workforce if it 

cannot be divested, or in-sourced, if neither of the previous options is possible. In-sourcing of 

functions can, at times, be a lengthy process, not the least because of the need to identify offsets 

as a result ofthe civilian full time equivalent cap. 

Additionally, the realities of actual contract performance are such that inherently governmental 

functions may be performed by contractors, even if statements of work deliberately exclude such 

functions. The Army's review of contracted work, both by individual contract and by task order, 

is an ongoing process, performed at both the pre-award and post-award stages. In practical 

terms, this review and analysis is iterative, and the longer it goes on, the greater the likelihood 

that more inherently governmental functions will be identified and appropriately dealt with. 

Finally, the Secretary of the Anny recently issued guidance on 10 February, 2012, that will 

withdraw funds by May 2012 from organizations that continue to contract inherently 

governmental functions or unauthorized personal services contracts and have not submitted 

packages within 90 days to in-source those functions. 

Question: The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report (GAO-12-357) on 

April 6, 2012 that found that the Army inventory review identified 1,935 instances in which 

contractors were performing inherently governmental functions. According to GAO, in 8 of the 

12 Army and Air Force cases GAO reviewed, contractors continued to perform inherently 

governmental functions because of DOD's decision to cap the number of civilian federal 

employees at 20 I 0 levels. Is the Army continuing to review functions that are closely associated 

to inherently governmental or critical? 
172 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.150

Answer: Yes, the Army is continuing to review functions that are closely associated with 

inherently govenunental or critical. In a memo dated December 29,2011, the Acting Under 

Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and Personnel and Readiness 

directed the Department components to complete an Inventory of Contracts for Services for 

Fiscal Year 2011, a part of which is the "identification of contracts under which functions closely 

associated with inherently govenunental functions are being performed." The Army is currently 

engaged in this review process, and at the moment approximately 11,000 contracts (or, about 

10%) still need to be reviewed for closely associated with inherently governmental and critical 

functions. 
173 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.155

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Jay Aronowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary, 

Force Management, Manpower and Resources, U.S. Army 

From Senator Daniel K. Akaka 

"Contractors: How much are they costing the government?" 

March 29, 2012 

I. I am concerned by the 2011 cap on full time Department of Defense civilians mentioned 

in your testimony because I believe it prevents the insourcing of inherently governmental 

work and does not allow the Department to correctly balance its workforce. 

a. How has the civilian workforce cap impacted the Army? 

b. Do you believe the civilian workforce cap should be lifted? 

Answer: The civilian workforce cap has impacted the Army in a number of different ways. As a 

result of the civilian cap, individual Army Commands have a cap on their own manpower, in 

order to ensure the Army's ongoing compliance with policy. This cap limits the flexibility that 

the Army has, both as a whole and in individual components, when managing its manpower mix. 

If a civilian cannot be hired, then the only remaining options are to contract the function, or use 

borrowed military manpower. The use of military personnel is usually not an option, which 

leaves only contracting as a viable means of executing a mission. 

When faced with hiring decisions, people are therefore being placed in the unenviable position of 

having to decide whether to comply with the civilian cap, or to comply with the other statutes 

and policies governing the workforce (like the prohibition on the performance of inherently 

governmental functions by contractors). 

Although the goal of the civilian cap-the reduction in overall Department of Defense 

expenditures-is clearly a good one, the workforce cap has had the unintended consequence of 

limiting the flexibility of the Army in managing its workforce. Cost-effective workforce 

management decisions ought to be based on allowing for the hiring of civilians to perform 

missions, rather than contractors, if the civilians will be cheaper. The lifting of the civilian 

workforce cap would restore this flexibility, and in that sense it would seem to be a positive 

potential step forward. 

2. You testified that this is the first year the Army's contractor inventory has been fully 

populated with data, and that its primary purpose has been to identify outsourcing of 

inherently governmental work. Does the Army have a strategy for using the data as part 

of its budget and acquisition process? 

Answer: Contractor inventory data has not yet been used by the Army as part of its budget and 

acquisition process, but there is a strategy to utilize the data going forward. Beginning in Fiscal 

Year 2012, the Army Acquisition Executive is obtaining Army-wide semi-annual services 

requirements forecasts and quarterly cost reports for services acquisitions valued at $1 OM and 
174 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.156

above. This data will help to provide program management and funding visibility for services 

acquisitions. This initiative implements part of the Army's 2011 Services Optimization 

Implementation Plan, with an aim to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and promote costs 

savings as the Army acquires essential services to support our Soldiers and their families. The 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Civilian Personnel and Quality of Life has also 

assembled a working group with the Army Budget Office, Army Program Analysis & 

Evaluation, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to 

integrate the Contractor Manpower Reporting Application into the budget process. 

3. The Army relies on self-reported data from contractors to populate its Contractor 

Manpower Reporting Application. What sort of oversight is done to make sure labor 

hours and costs are accurately reported? 

Answer: There are a number of different kinds of oversight to make sure that labor hours and 

costs are accurately reported into the Army Contractor Manpower Reporting Application 

(CMRA), though there is no real alternative to self-reporting for fixed-price contracts, as only 

contractors have access to this information. CMRA alerts users when they are entering labor 

costs and hours that project an hourly rate that is extremely high or extremely low. An additional 

CMRA edit check alerts users when entering labor costs that exceed the total amount invoiced 

for the contract task order. These tools assist in preventing inaccuracy during the initial phase of 

data entry. 

Additionally, Resource Managers of the major Army Commands review the results of data 

reported by contractors to ensure the correct alignment between reported contract services and 

requiring activities, and to ensure that the level of contract services reported by contractors is 

commensurate with the resources allocated by the Command for contracts that involve services. 

In these ways, Resource Managers play an important role in ensuring that labor hours and costs 

are accurately reported. 

Finally, during compilation of the annual inventory, extreme outliers in labor hours and costs are 

identified, researched and resolved. In addition, invoices for contract services reported by 

contractors in CMRA are compared with obligations for contract services recorded in Army 

finance and accounting systems to ensure contractor manpower reporting is complete. These last 

oversights provide the final checks to ensure that issues are resolved, and that data reporting is 

both complete and accurate. 

4. In his Plan for Economic Growth and Deficit Reduction, the President proposed a cap on 

contractor pay equal to the top of the Federal Executive Schedule -approximately 

$200,000 per year. Under the current formula, taxpayers may have to pay up to $700,000 

for contractor employees. What are your thoughts on the President's proposal and should 

it be implemented? 

Answer: The President's proposal to cap contractor pay at a level equal to the top of the Federal 

Executive Schedule is worth considering as part of an holistic look at how spending on contract 

services can be reduced across the Department of Defense. This reduction is even larger than the 

reduction to $400,000 proposed by Senators Boxer and Grassley and referenced by Senator 
175 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.157

McCaskill at the hearing on March 29, 2012. Any significant reduction in the cap on contractor 

pay needs to take into account the possible second- and third-order effects of such a decision. 

For example, contractors are utilized in instances when the Army requires the services of highlyqualified specialists whose abilities may not be present in the current, available Army manpower 

pool. This kind of need is especially present in fields like Information Technology. These 

contractors, because of the relative scarcity of their skills, command a high price. This is not to 

say, of course, that the government should simply throw money at a problem, but rather to say 

that if a contractor pay cap were to be implemented, the effects such a cap might have on 

contractor willingness to work for the government at reduced prices would need to be 

considered. 
176 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.151

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to 

Debra Tomchek, Executive Director, Balanced Workforce Program Management, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

From Senator McCaskill 

"Contractors: How Much Are They Costing the Government?" 

Tuesday, March 29, 2012,10:00 A.M. 

United States Senate, Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Question: You described in your testimony that the Balanced Workforce Strategy (BWS) Tool 

was to assure control ofDHS's mission. It is obvious that this tool has been a success in 

detennining and evaluating critical areas of the DHS' mission that had been in the control of 

contractors. 

Are you able to collect data using the BWS Tool? If so, how is DHS using this data? 

Response: The Balanced Workforce Strategy (BWS) Tool collects a variety of data for each 

analysis, including identifYing infonnation for the function (or contract); the Component's 

responses to questions concerning the function; the suggested ratio of federal employees to 

contractors; and the Component's reaction to the recommendation. The Component is supplied 

with all ofthe data and summaries for each analysis to assist it in making final recommendations 

for how to best source a function. 

The current version of the BWS Tool was built quickly by DHS to ensure that all Components 

could analyze functions in an automated, systematic, and documented way. At the present time, 

data associated with specific analyses must be aggregated manually in order for trends across 

analyses to be examined. As part of a continual BWS process improvement effort, manual 

reviews of the aggregate data occur. An upgrade to the BWS Tool platfonn is slated for FY 

2013 that will include more robust data archive and reporting capabilities. 

Question: Are you reviewing any prior contracts under this tool or only new contracts? 

Response: When the BWS launched in 2010, DHS asked Components to analyze contracts 

already in place. In September 2011, DHS launched a pilot requiring BWS reviews for pending 

contract requirements from a limited number of special interest product service codes (PSCs). 

Question: To what extent is DHS sharing its work on the BWS with the Office of Management 

and Budget or other federal agencies? 

Response: Since the launch ofBWS in 2010, DHS has shared its work extensively with the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other federal agencies. In 2010, DHS met with 

the OMB Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Administrator to discuss the BWS 

process and demonstrate the BWS Tool. In 2011, the Associate Administrator ofOFPP attended 

the 2011 biannual Balanced Workforce Strategy event, delivering a keynote address to 
177 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.152

Component representatives responsible for implementing the BWS process. DHS continues to 

provide OMB staff with regular updates on our progress. 

In FY 2011, DHS conducted over 15 briefings with officials from federal agencies, including the 

Office of Personnel Management, the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional 

Research Service, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and Senate and House 

of Representatives committee staff. 

In FY 2012, DHS has already briefed the Department of the Interior and the Department of 

Defense. Additional briefings are pending with representatives from the Departments ofthe 

Treasury, Navy, Army, Justice, and Veterans Affairs. 

Question: In your testimony you described a data call regarding the cost savings from an 

in sourcing effort, converting contractor positions to federal civilians, implemented by DHS. 

Approximately how many contractor positions were converted in fiscal year 2010 and 2011, and 

what were the resulting savings? 

Response: Past estimates from Components indicate approximately $28 million in cost savings 

as a result ofthe 2009-2010 insourcing efforts. 

Currently, the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer is working closely with the Office of 

the Chief Financial Officer to source and validate updated insourcing-related cost savings from 

Components. DHS will provide the Committee with new data for the record as soon as this 

effort is complete. 

Question: Are there planned steps to use these analyses to inform workforce decisions? 

Response: DHS Components use the three-step Balanced Workforce Strategy (BWS) process to 

determine the proper balance of federal employees and contractor personnel for programs and 

functions. After Components "Identify the Work" and "Analyze the Work" (which may include 

Cost Comparison Analysis), they move on to the final step of the process, "Implement the 

Sourcing Decision." If the BWS analysis reveals that the workforce for a function requires 

rebalancing, numerous Component stakeholders from across lines of business must collaborate to 

implement the change. 

The BWS process is designed to analyze workforce balance on a function by function basis; no 

plans exist to use aggregate cost savings information to influence decisions concerning the 

workforce for specific functions. 

Question: How are potential cost savings considered relative to other concerns when deciding 

whether to contract for services? 

Response: The primary aims of the BWS process are ensuring adherence to the law and 

minimizing potential risk to the DHS mission. When analyzing a function using the BWS 

process, the Component first considers the issue of mission control, and if it is determined that 
178 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.153

either federal employees or contractors would be suitable to perform a function, the Component 

must then consider cost to DHS, as prescribed by section 736 of the FY 2009 Omnibus 

Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-8. In such cases, the DHS Balanced Workforce Strategy guidance 

mandates that Components perform Cost Comparison Analysis to determine the most efficient 

sourcing decision. 

Question: What methodology, including assumptions, does DHS use to determine such savings? 

Response: When performing a Cost Comparison Analysis for a function, the Component first 

calculates the cost of federal workers using the DHS Modular Cost ModeL This model 

incorporates a variety of factors to describe the fully-loaded cost for a federal employee. 

On the contract side, the cost ofthe current contract is used, including the cost of contract 

oversight. If a new requirement is being reviewed, an Independent Government Cost Estimate 

serves as the basis for comparison. 

Question: What data does DHS use to compare the costs of contractors to federal employees? 

Response: When performing a Cost Comparison Analysis for a function, the Component first 

calculates the cost of federal workers using the DHS Modular Cost ModeL This model 

incorporates a variety of factors to describe the fully-loaded cost for a federal employee. There 

are several key data elements used for the federal side, including items such as grade level and 

geographic location. 

On the contract side, the cost of the current contract is used, including the cost of contract 

oversight. For fixed price contracts, the total cost is used. For other contract types, invoices are 

reviewed. If a new requirement is being reviewed, an Independent Government Cost Estimate 

serves as the basis for comparison. 

Question: Does DHS have any plans to move forward to start collecting contractor data, similar 

to the Army's contractor inventory, and to start looking at costs? 

Response: By the end ofFY 2012, DHS will have the ability to more accurately collect cost data 

for service contracts consistent with the requirements of FAR Case 2010-010 Service Contract 

Reporting Requirements. The FAR change requires contractors to report the total dollar amount 

invoiced for services and the number of Contractor direct labor hours expended on the services 

performed during the previous Government fiscal year. This information will be used to analyze 

the cost of contractor support for services at the same time DHS prepares its annual service 

contract inventory. At this time, DHS does not intend to apply the Army methodology, but to 

adhere to guidance promulgated for use by domestic agencies. 

Question: Is a DHS agency permitted to rely on federal civilians over contractors for purely cost 

reasons? 

Response: Ifa DHS Component's responses to the Balanced Workforce Strategy CBWS) Tool 

questionnaire indicate that a function can be performed by either the public or private sector 

without risk to mission control, the Component must then consider cost to DHS. The DHS 
179 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.154

Balanced Workforce Strategy guidance mandates that Components perfonn Cost Comparison 

Analysis to detennine the most efficient sourcing decision. 

Question: Do you know of any DHS agencies comparing costs before awarding contracts for 

services? 

Response: As part of the ongoing pilot requiring BWS reviews for pending contract 

requirements from a limited number of special interest product service codes (PSCs), 

Components must consider cost if the either federal employees or contractors would be suitable 

to perfonn a function. 

In general, the DHS acquisition planning process requires that program officials and acquisition 

specialists regularly consider issues of cost, which can include perfonning thorough market 

research and creating Independent Government Cost Estimates. 

Question: During the hearing you stated that you would coordinate with your colleagues in the 

interdisciplinary group at DHS to detennine how much savings could be had from lowering the 

contractor reimbursement cap from the FYIO level of$693,951 to $400,000, or the same level as 

what the government pays the President of the United States. 

How much money would this lower cap save at DHS? 

Response: DHS is unable to provide a reasonable estimate of the savings that DHS would 

realize should the FY 2010 executive compensation be lowered from the current cap of $693,95 1 

to $400,000, because we have insufficient infonnation. A senior executive at a company may 

support multiple contracts that provide supplies and services to multiple customers. In 

accordance with FAR 52.204-10, prime contractors and first tier subcontractors must report the 

total compensation of their "five most highly compensated employees in management positions 

at each home office and each segment of the contractor." However, the infonnation reported 

does not include how much of the reported salary should be allocated to commercial customers, 

allocated to other federal customers or allocated to DHS contracts. Additionally, the cap on 

executive compensation limits the price of only some contracts types (generally, cost type and a 

small portion of fixed-price type contracts). Short ofperfonning extensive audits of each 

company with which DHS contracts, there is no way at this time to detennine what portion of the 

savings gained from reducing executive compensation would be allocated to contracts where 

there would be a price reduction or to detennine how much of the executive compensation 

should be allocated to DHS contracts. 
180 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.158

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Debra Tomchek, Executive Director, 

Balanced Workforce Program Management Office, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

From Senator Daniel K. Akaka 

"Contractors: How much are they costing the government?" 

March 29, 2012 

1. There is a Government-wide shortage of acquisition professionals with the proper 

training to clearly define contract requirements and oversee them. Additionally. the 

Balanced Workforce Strategy requires collaboration between acquisition and human 

resources professionals. How has the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) made 

sure that its acquisition and human resources workforces have the training and tools 

needed to properly implement the Balanced Workforce Strategy? 

Answer: Since the development of the Balanced Workforce Strategy (BWS) in mid-20IO, DHS 

has utilized a variety of approaches to ensure that employees receive the education and support 

required to successfully implement the BWS. The comprehensive BWS education strategy has 

included instructional events/summits, training classes, guidance documents, and regular 

dialogue with Component employees via meetings and desk officer support. 

Instructional Events 

DHS launched the BWS at a July 2010 educational event, which included statements from senior 

leadership and instruction on the BWS process for Component representatives from human 

capital, procurement, finance, legal, and program offices. The Department held two such 

"biannual" events in 2011, and each served as an opportunity to share guidance with Component 

employees and to field questions concerning the BWS. In 2011, the BWS Departmental 

Working Group (DWG) also hosted a costing forum, specifically designed to address 

Component challenges related to cost comparison analyses; subject matter experts from the 

Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) and the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer 

(OCPO) both spoke and fielded Component questions. 

Training Classes 

The Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer (OCHCO) has developed formal, in-person 

training classes on all three steps of the BWS process for reviewing existing service contracts: 

Identify the Work, Analyze the Work, and Implement the Sourcing Decision. Recently, 

additional content was added to the classes to address Component questions about the pilot 

requiring BWS analyses of new and re-competed functions. Between September 2010 and May 

2012, DHS has held over 25 in-person training sessions, with over 225 Component 

representatives trained from human capital, procurement, finance, legal, and program offices. In 

addition, e-Iearning options have been piloted and are being implemented. 

In collaboration with OCHO, OCPO updated its policies and procedures to implement the Office 

of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01, "Performance oflnherently 
181 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.159

Governmental and Critical Functions" and emphasize the importance of maintaining a balanced 

workforce. To ensure members of the acquisition workforce fully understand the BWS and 

related OCPO policies and procedures, OCPO has trained over 500 members of the acquisition 

workforce between December 2011 and May 2012. Training is on-going. 

Guidance Documents 

To support all Component employees as they learn and implement the BWS, DHS created a 

comprehensive BWS guidance document, which is periodically updated to improve clarity and 

describe any process improvements; Version 2.0 was released in November 2011. The BWS 

guidance describes how to assess and make decisions regarding the balance and effective use of 

the federal and contractor resources, and the guidance includes appendices with forms, tools, and 

instructional information aimed to support the management ofthe BWS process at the 

Component level. Supplementary "User's Guide" documents with step-by-step instructions were 

also published for each of the three steps in the BWS process. 

Meetings and Desk Officer Interactions 

Each DHS Operational and support Component has a BWS desk officer responsible for assisting 

its employees with BWS implementation. Desk officer support includes briefing Component 

staff on policies and procedures, supporting Component use of the BWS Tool, and fielding 

Component questions for resolution by DHS Headquarters. 

DHS also holds bi-monthly meetings ofthe Balanced Workforce Executive Steering Group 

(ESG), comprised of senior leaders from the Management Directorate and representatives from 

Components, to discuss challenges and allow Components to provide input on the BWS. 

2. You testified that the Balanced Workforce Strategy has been used to assess all contracts 

in place as of 20 10, but is used to review only a handful of new contracts. 

a. Why is there such limited use of the Balanced Workforce Strategy for new 

contracts? 

b. Does DHS have plans to expand its pilot program? 

Answer: In 2010, DHS launched the BWS with a pilot featuring a sample of65 existing service 

contracts from DHS Components. This pilot approach allowed the Department to test 

procedures, surface lessons learned, and improve the existing contract review process prior to 

full-scale implementation. 

The BWS process requiring review of new and re-competed functions will eventually be 

expanded to apply to all new service contracts. The decision was made to start requiring the 

BWS review of new and re-competed functions via a limited-scope pilot, during which 

Components could test procedures and identify process improvement opportunities. At the end 

of June 2012, the BWS Departmental Working Group will begin to conduct a thorough 

assessment of the pilot to determine lessons learned and consider broadening the scope to include 

additional functions. 
182 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.160

While the BWS pilot underway currently applies to a limited number of functions, updates to 

Office of the Chief Procurement Officer policies and procedures require a separate Component 

review of all service contracts to ensure full compliance with the Federal Acquisition 

Regulations and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Letter 11-01, "Performance of 

Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions." This parallel review process, which will be 

combined with the BWS process in the future, ensures that all new contracts are being 

appropriately assessed by the Department prior to procurement. 

3. In his Plan for Economic Growth and Deficit Reduction, the President proposed a cap on 

contractor pay equal to the top of the Federal Executive Schedule -approximately 

$200,000 per year. Under the current formula, taxpayers may have to pay up to $700,000 

for contractor employees. What are your thoughts on the President's proposal and should 

it be implemented? 

Answer: The Administration's efforts to decrease the amount the government reimburses 

contractors for their compensation costs is an important step in strengthening fiscal 

accountability and improving our ability to contain procurement costs. 
183 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.161

UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT Washjngton. JX' 20415 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Chuck Grimes, 

Chief Operating Officer, U.S. Office of Personnel Management 

From Senator Daniel K. Akaka 

"Contractors: How much are they costing the government?" 

March 29, 2012 

1. You testified that Strategic Alignment is an essential part of effective 

workforce planning. How can agencies make sure that insourcing evaluates 

human capital needs to fulfill an agency's mission and is not driven by 

quotas? 

The strategic alignment process initiates the crosswalk between an agency's mission to its 

strategic plan to help determine the human capital (quantity of staff, staffing requirements and/or 

competencies) required to ensure mission accomplishment. In conjunction, through a strategic 

workforce planning process, agencies assess the composition of their current workforce by an 

analysis of their current personnel in the context of agency mission and specific strategic goals to 

calculate staffing and/or competency gaps. 

In short, the strategic alignment and strategic workforce planning processes determine agencies' 

human capital needs enabling agencies to build their workforce to ensure mission fulfillment. 

2. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently issued a report comparing 

Federal and private sector compensation. However, it compared individual 

employee characteristics rather than occupations. Additionally, some of the 

data may have mistakenly come from contractors, possibly making Federal 

compensation appear higher. What impact does CBO's methodology have 

on the reliability of the study's results? 

The CBO study compared compensation (both pay and benefits) per hour worked of Federal 

employees with the compensation of private sector employees with similar characteristics in 

large establishments. The employee characteristics CBO considered included broad 

occupational group, estimated years in the labor market, education level, age, gender, race, 

whether the employee was in a metropolitan area, etc. The CBO study did not compare similar 

jobs at the same levels of work within each locality pay area as required by both the General 

Schedule locality pay system and the Federal Wage System. CBO used 24 very broad 

occupational groupings, and the distribution of Federal versus private sector employees across 

specific occupations within those groupings may be very different. However, CBO's findings did 

not change substantively when they used narrower occupational groups. CBO did not consider 

www.opm.gov Our mission is to ensure the Federal Government has an effective civilian workforce www.usajobs.gov 
184 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.162

Office ofCongressionaJ 

and Legislative Affairs 

UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 

Washington, LX' 20415 

the employee's tenure with the specific employer. CBO also included private sector workers in 

the Leisure and Hospitality industry which tends to provide fewer benefits to its employees. The 

Federal Government has few employees in many of the jobs found in the Leisure and Hospitality 

industry and including these employers likely understates the value of benefits provided to 

private sector employees injobs similar to Federal jobs. 

More generally, it is worth reiterating, as noted in OPM's written testimony, that a simple 

comparison of labor costs alone is not likely to answer the question of which sector would be 

more cost-effective and efficient in perfonning a given task in a specific circumstance. For 

example, a cost comparison to consider in-house perfonnance as an alternative to continued 

contract perfonnance might be beneficial if requirements tend to be managed best through an 

employer-employee relationship, the agency has experience perfonning the work in-house, the 

ability to recruit for the skill is high, and the government has historically had challenges with 

contractor perfonnance. By contrast, the benefit of a cost comparison may be lower if the agency 

is looking to meet a surge, short tenn, capacity that would be costly to address through a longtenn hiring, the agency currently lacks an in-house capability to perfonn the work, and the 

agency has had considerable success in getting good perfonnance at a reasonable cost from its 

contractors. All of these factors may have a role in detennining when a cost comparison is likely 

to be most effective in achieving best value for the taxpayer. 

3. In his Plan for Economic Growth and Deficit Reduction, the President 

proposed a cap on contractor pay equal to the top of the Federal Executive 

Schedule -approximately $200,000 per year. Under the current formula, 

taxpayers may have to pay up to $700,000 for contractor employees. What 

are your thoughts on the President's proposal and should it be implemented? 

The Administration's efforts to limit the amount reimbursed for contractor compensation will 

improve fiscal management and better contain procurement costs. 

Office of Congressional and Legislative Affairs 

Tel.: 202·606-1300 I Fax: 202-606·2526 
185 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.163

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 

" WASHINGTON, D,C. 20503 

The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Contracting Oversigbt 

Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affalrs 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Madam Chairman: 

May 25, 2012 

This lettcr is in response to questions posed to the Office of Management and Budgct 

(OMB) following a March 29, 2012, hearing to examine the cost of using contractors. You 

asked when OMB plans to release additional guidance to agencies on insourcing and cost 

analysis and what topics thc guidance will address. You also asked when OMB plans to issue a 

decision regarding a request by the Dep31tment of Defense for an exemption from the Paperwork 

Reduction Act (PRA) in connection with the planned collcction of information from contractors 

to support the development of its annual service contractor inventory. 

As part of President Obama's commitmcnt to changing the way Washington does 

business, the Administration has made major strides to reform contracting under this 

Administration. We are buying lcss and buying sm31ter. Agencies put an end to the 

unsustainable growth in contracting experienced between 2000 and 2008 and, for the first timc in 

nearly two decades, overall contract spending has declined or stayed flat two years in a row. By 

pooling our purchasing power and renegotiating contracts to secure deeper discounts, we are 

delivering better prices for taxpayers and reducing the wasteful proliferation of duplicative 

contracts for common needs. 

Part of our contracting reform effOits have focused on striking the right balance between 

Federal employees and contractors that best protects the public's interest and serves the 

American people in a cost-effective manner. To date, most of these effOits have focused on 

clarifying what functions are inherently governmental or otherwise must be performed by 

Federal employees. These clarifications have been achieved througb policy, including the 

issuance of a comprehensive policy letter by OMB's Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 

management guidance, and pilots. 

Wc are now focusing on the development of guidance and tools, including cost 

comparisons, to help agencies consider where rebalancing of work can save money. The 

guidance will build on impOitant cost principles OMB laid out in its 2009 memorandum on 

managing the multi-sector workforce - namely, that if either sector can perform the work and 

cost is the driver, agencies should ensure their comparisons (I) address the full cost of 
186 

Æ 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER


73681.164

government and private sector perfoffi\ance and (2) compare like costs. See OMB Memorandum 

M -09-26 available at http://www. whitehouse. gov/sites/defaultlfi lesl ombl assets/memoranda 

fy2009/m-09-26.pdf. 

The guidance will be further shaped by experiences gained by the Departments of 

Defense (DoD) and Homeland Security and include management practices for identifying where 

analyses are likely to be most effective. We expect to issue guidance by mid-July. 

Closely related to these efforts is our work with DoD and civilian agencies to strengthen 

the use of service contract inventories. Service contract inventories, which help agencies better 

understand how contracted services are being used to support mission and operations, are an 

important tool for achieving greater budgetary accountability and more fiscally responsible 

contracting, both of which ensure investments in contract services are affordable and costeffective. 

On May 22, 2012, OMB concluded review of DoD's most recently proposed 

implementation of its service contract inventory requirements -- which includes obtaining 

information from contractors on direct labor costs -- and concluded that this guidance constitutes 

a "collection of information" under the PRA, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3). Although DoD initially 

requested an "emergency" clearance ofits information collection request, see 44 U.S.C. § 

35070), DoD worked with OMB to process its request using the normal clearance process, 

similar to how OMB handled several related information collection requests in past years by the 

Department of the Army, on which much of the DoD-wide guidance is based. OMB has 

provided an approval number for the collection (OMB no. 0704-0491), which will allow DoD to 

begin implementing its collection process. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to address these issues. We look forward to working 

with you and your staff as we move forward on these important matters. 

2