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NORTH AMERICAN OFFSHORE 

ENERGY: MEXICO AND CANADA 

BOUNDARY TREATIES AND NEW 

DRILLING BY CUBA AND BAHAMAS 

OVERSIGHT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

MINERAL RESOURCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

Wednesday, November 2, 2011 

Serial No. 112-78 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

or 

Committee address: http://naturalresources.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

DOC HASTINGS, WA, Chairman 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, MA, Ranking Democrat Member 

Don Young, AK 

John J. Duncan, Jr., TN 

Louie Gohmert, TX 

Rob Bishop, UT 

Doug Lamborn, CO 

Robert J. Wittman, VA 

Paul C. Broun, GA 

John Fleming, LA 

Mike Coffman, CO 

Tom McClintock, CA 

Glenn Thompson, PA 

Jeff Denham, CA 

Dan Benishek, MI 

David Rivera, FL 

Jeff Duncan, SC 

Scott R. Tipton, CO 

Paul A. Gosar, AZ 

Rau ́l R. Labrador, ID 

Kristi L. Noem, SD 

Steve Southerland II, FL 

Bill Flores, TX 

Andy Harris, MD 

Jeffrey M. Landry, LA 

Jon Runyan, NJ 

Bill Johnson, OH 

Mark Amodei, NV 

Dale E. Kildee, MI 

Peter A. DeFazio, OR 

Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, AS 

Frank Pallone, Jr., NJ 

Grace F. Napolitano, CA 

Rush D. Holt, NJ 

Rau ́l M. Grijalva, AZ 

Madeleine Z. Bordallo, GU 

Jim Costa, CA 

Dan Boren, OK 

Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, CNMI 

Martin Heinrich, NM 

Ben Ray Luja ́n, NM 

John P. Sarbanes, MD 

Betty Sutton, OH 

Niki Tsongas, MA 

Pedro R. Pierluisi, PR 

John Garamendi, CA 

Colleen W. Hanabusa, HI 

Vacancy 

Todd Young, Chief of Staff 

Lisa Pittman, Chief Counsel 

Jeffrey Duncan, Democrat Staff Director 

David Watkins, Democrat Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES 

DOUG LAMBORN, CO, Chairman 

RUSH D. HOLT, NJ, Ranking Democrat Member 

Louie Gohmert, TX 

Paul C. Broun, GA 

John Fleming, LA 

Mike Coffman, CO 

Glenn Thompson, PA 

Dan Benishek, MI 

David Rivera, FL 

Jeff Duncan, SC 

Paul A. Gosar, AZ 

Bill Flores, TX 

Jeffrey M. Landry, LA 

Bill Johnson, OH 

Doc Hastings, WA, ex officio 

Peter A. DeFazio, OR 

Madeleine Z. Bordallo, GU 

Jim Costa, CA 

Dan Boren, OK 

Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, CNMI 

Martin Heinrich, NM 

John P. Sarbanes, MD 

Betty Sutton, OH 

Niki Tsongas, MA 

Vacancy 

Edward J. Markey, MA, ex officio 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Hearing held on Wednesday, November 2, 2011 .................................................. 1 

Statement of Members: 

Holt, Hon. Rush D., a Representative in Congress from the State of 

New Jersey ................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 5 

Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Colorado ......................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3 

Markey, Hon. Edward J., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Massachusetts ........................................................................................... 16 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 17 

Statement of Witnesses: 

Antrim, Caitlyn, Executive Director, Rule of Law Committee for the 

Oceans ............................................................................................................ 42 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 44 

Bromwich, Hon. Michael R., Director, Bureau of Safety and 

Environmental Enforcement, U.S. Department of the Interior ................ 6 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 8 

Claver-Carone, Mauricio, Executive Director, Cuba Democracy Advocates 26 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 29 

Pin ̃ on, Jorge R., Visiting Research Fellow, Florida International 

University Latin American and Caribbean Center, Cuban Research 

Institute ......................................................................................................... 31 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 33 

Salerno, Vice Admiral Brian, Deputy Commandant for Operations, U.S. 

Coast Guard .................................................................................................. 12 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 13 

Statement before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources 

Committee dated October 18, 2011, submitted for the record .......... 15 

Whittle, Daniel J., Senior Attorney and Cuba Program Director, 

Environmental Defense Fund ...................................................................... 37 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 38 

Additional materials supplied: 

Council of the Americas, Washington, D.C., Statement submitted for the 

record ............................................................................................................. 62 

Rivera, Hon. David, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Florida, Statement by Jorge Pin ̃ on before the House Oversight and 

Government Reform Committee’s Subcommittee on National Security 

and Foreign Affairs dated April 29, 2009 ................................................... 53 

Ros-Lehtinen, Hon. Ileana, Hon. Albio Sires, Hon. Mario Diaz-Balart, 

and Hon. David Rivera, Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, 

Letter to President Barack Obama submitted for the record ................... 24 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON ‘‘NORTH AMERICAN 

OFFSHORE ENERGY: MEXICO AND CANADA 

BOUNDARY TREATIES AND NEW DRILLING 

BY CUBA AND BAHAMAS.’’ 

Wednesday, November 2, 2011 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources 

Committee on Natural Resources 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m. in Room 

1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Doug Lamborn 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Lamborn, Broun, Rivera, Duncan of 

South Carolina, Holt, and Markey [ex officio]. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The Committee will come to order. The Chairman 

notes the presence of a quorum, which under Committee Rule 3[e] 

is two Members. 

The Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources is meeting 

today to hear testimony on an oversight hearing on the North 

American Offshore Energy: Mexico and Canada Boundary Treaties 

and New Drilling by Cuba and Bahamas. 

Under Committee Rule 4[f], opening statements are limited to 

the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee. However, I ask unanimous consent to include any other Members’ opening statements in the hearing record if submitted to the clerk by 

close of business today. Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

I recognize myself for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO 

Mr. LAMBORN. At a time when world demand for energy is increasing, businesses that provide us with the oil and electricity 

that we use every day will continue to seek out new places around 

the world to develop these resources. We want to be attracting this 

energy development to our shores here in the United States. That 

way, the American people can compete for the jobs that come from 

energy development and our nation can reap the economic and national security benefits of increased U.S. energy development. 

Unfortunately, as previous hearings we have conducted this year 

have so clearly pointed out, uncertainty is forcing companies to 

look elsewhere in globally competitive markets. As you can see 

from today’s hearing, you don’t have to venture too far to find new 

areas for oil and natural gas development. Cuba’s lease blocks are 

only miles from our shores. 

This is the subject of today’s hearing. We will cover two boundary disputes that are hindering U.S. energy development, one with 

Mexico and one with Canada. It is my hope that an expeditious 

2 

and fair agreement between the U.S. and the other countries will 

give the certainty necessary to move forward with energy development along the U.S.-Mexico boundary and open the western gap in 

the Gulf of Mexico and in the disputed areas of the Beaufort Sea 

in Alaska. 

Additionally, we will be discussing Cuba and the Bahamas’ new 

pursuit of offshore resources development and what that development means to the United States. It is my hope that we can hear 

from BSEE and the U.S. Coast Guard today on the implications of 

this drilling in waters adjacent to the U.S. and how the inspection 

of Cuba’s drilling rig announced at the Senate hearing on this issue 

will be conducted and what will happen afterwards. 

It was my hope that the Committee would hear from all U.S. 

Government entities involved in issuing licenses and engaged in 

U.S.-Cuba drilling issues. However, the Departments of State, 

Treasury and Commerce all declined to participate in today’s hearing. 

There has been growing concern that companies will be allowed 

to expand their engagement with Cuba and that this Administration is weakening the U.S. embargo on Cuba, a state sponsor of terrorism. A recent trip to Cuba by the President’s own chairman of 

the Oil Spill Commission and licenses and waivers for companies 

to sell technology to Cuba raise many concerns about this Administration’s willingness to support the drilling efforts of the Cuban regime. 

Companies that are interested in engaging in support of Cuba’s 

efforts should be aware that they are under the greatest of scrutiny, and efforts to circumvent U.S. law will be closely monitored 

and appropriate actions taken. Like dealings with Iran, engagement with a Cuban dictatorship that sponsors terrorism is a road 

fraught with danger. 

Our second panel will answer more philosophical questions about 

the laws of our nation and how we can work within the legality of 

these laws as we look toward the implications of Cuba’s desire to 

pursue offshore drilling. 

Offshore energy development in the U.S. is conducted with great 

transparency and extensive regulatory oversight. There is an entirely different story in Cuba where very little is considered transparent, especially with a brutal regime that has a huge list of 

human rights violations. A public hearing such as we are conducting today would not be allowed to occur under the Castro regime. 

It is in the interest of this Committee to find out exactly how our 

nation is preparing to mitigate any problems that may occur as a 

result of Cuba’s untested pursuit of offshore drilling. The Bahamas, 

Mexico and Canada are completely different examples of those nations pursuing offshore drilling in waters adjacent to the United 

States in a transparent and open manner that shows how our nations can work together to ensure the utmost safety. 

Given the importance of these issues, I greatly look forward to 

the testimony we will hear today, and I thank all our witnesses 

today for answering questions on these diverse issues, all of which 

significantly impact our nation. 

3 

Now I would like to recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Representative Holt of New Jersey, for five minutes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lamborn follows:] 

Statement of The Honorable Doug Lamborn, Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources 

At a time when world demand for energy is increasing, businesses that provide 

us with the oil and electricity that we use every day will continue to seek out new 

places around the world to develop these resources. We want to be attracting this 

energy development to OUR SHORES here in the United States. That way, the 

American people can compete for the jobs that come from energy development—and 

our nation can reap the economic and national security benefits of increased U.S. 

energy development. 

Unfortunately, as previous hearings we have conducted this year have so clearly 

pointed out: UNCERTAINTY is forcing companies to look elsewhere in a globally 

competitive market. As you can see from today’s hearing—you don’t have to venture 

too far to find new areas for oil and natural gas development. Cuba’s lease blocks 

are only miles from our shores. 

This is the subject of today’s hearing—we will cover two boundary disputes that 

are hindering U.S. energy development, one with Mexico and one with Canada. It 

is the hope that an expeditious and fair agreement between the US and the other 

countries will give the certainty necessary to move forward with energy development along the U.S.—Mexico boundary and open the ‘‘western gap’’ in the Gulf of 

Mexico and in the disputed areas of the Beaufort Sea in Alaska. 

Additionally, we will be discussing Cuba and the Bahamas’ new pursuit of offshore resources and development– and what that development means to the United 

States. It is my hope that we can hear from BSEE and the U.S. Coast Guard today 

on the implications of this drilling in waters adjacent to the U.S. and how the inspection of Cuba’s drilling rig announced at the Senate hearing on this issue will 

be conducted and what will happen afterwards. 

It was my hope that the Committee would hear from all US government entities 

involved in issuing licenses and engaged in U.S.—Cuba drilling issues. However, the 

Departments of State, Treasury and Commerce all declined to participate in today’s 

hearing. There has been growing concern that companies will be allowed to expand 

their engagement with Cuba and that this administration will weaken the U.S. embargo on Cuba, a state sponsor of terrorism. A recent trip to Cuba by the President’s 

own Chairman of the Oil Spill Commission and licenses and waivers for companies 

to sell technology to Cuba raise many concerns about this Administration’s willingness to support the drilling efforts of the Cuban regime. Companies that are interested in engaging in support of Cuba’s efforts should be aware that they are under 

the greatest of scrutiny and efforts to circumvent US law will be closely monitored 

and appropriate actions taken. Like dealings with Iran, engagement with a Cuban 

dictatorship that sponsors terrorism is a dangerous road. 

Our second panel will answer more philosophical questions about the laws of our 

nation—and how we can work within the legality of these laws as we look towards 

the implications of Cuba’s desire to pursue offshore drilling. 

Offshore energy development in the U.S. is conducted with great transparency 

and extensive regulatory oversight. This is an entirely different story in Cuba where 

very little is considered ‘‘transparent’’—especially with a brutal regime that has a 

laundry list of human rights violations. A public hearing such as we are conducting 

today on this subject would not be allowed to occur under the Castro regime. It is 

in the interest of this Committee to find out exactly how our nation is preparing 

to mitigate any problems that may occur as a result of Cuba’s untested pursuit in 

offshore drilling. The Bahamas, Mexico and Canada are completely different examples of a nation’s pursuing offshore drilling in waters adjacent to the United States 

in a transparent open manner that shows our nation’s can work together to ensure 

the utmost safety. 

Given the importance of these issues, I greatly look forward to the testimony we 

will hear today and I thank all of our witnesses today for answering questions on 

these diverse issues—all of which significantly impact our nation. 

4 

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSH D. HOLT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Mr. HOLT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses 

for coming. 

In 2008, Vice President Dick Cheney asserted that China was 

drilling off Cuba. He said that with words dripping with import— 

as close as 60 miles to the Florida Keys—as a way to push for expanded drilling off of U.S. beaches on the East Coast and the eastern Gulf of Mexico. However, China was not actually drilling off 

Cuba, and Mr. Cheney’s claims were unfounded. 

Now a Spanish company, along with Norwegian and Indian partners, has announced plans to begin exploratory drilling off Cuba, 

roughly 80 miles from Florida, next January. Because of the embargo on Cuba, the Chinese-built drill rig will be used to conduct 

the exploration. However, I feel that rather than having a real discussion today about the ways we should engage Cuba to ensure 

that drilling takes place safely, we will be hearing about, well, the 

case for expanded drilling in the United States. 

The independent blue ribbon BP Oil Spill Commission concluded 

that it is in our country’s national interest to negotiate now with 

these near neighbor—meaning Mexico and Cuba—to agree on a 

common, rigorous set of standards and a system for regulatory 

oversight. The same operator adherence to effective safety culture 

called for in this report, along with protocols to cooperate on containment and response strategies and preparedness in case of a 

spill. 

We should develop the strongest possible safety standards for offshore drilling here in the United States and work with countries 

with whom we share a maritime boundary to see that they adhere 

to such standards. Oil spills don’t recognize international boundaries. In fact, the Obama Administration is already working to develop a protocol to establish a common set of safety and environmental standards with Mexico for the Gulf of Mexico. These negotiations are ongoing I believe. 

In addition, the Administration is working with Repsol to ensure 

that the United States Coast Guard and Interior Departments can 

inspect any rig, such as the Chinese rig, prior to entering Cuban 

waters. The Administration should also consider issuing a general 

license to allow U.S. companies and personnel to provide assistance 

in the event of a spill. 

In addition, the United States is working to negotiate maritime 

boundaries with countries like Canada in the Arctic Ocean, and I 

am sorry to say Republicans in the Senate are weakening our negotiating position. Republican Senators have blocked the ratification 

of the Law of the Sea Treaty, which would improve our ability to 

submit international claims to the Continental Shelf beyond 200 

miles in places like the Arctic. 

As a result, we are at a disadvantage in working to ensure that 

the United States and U.S. companies can claim those resources 

that are rightfully ours. In fact, what we are seeing in the Arctic 

Ocean as countries move to claim the seabed and the minerals 

below it could only be described as a black gold rush, and the 

United States is sitting on the sidelines because Senate Republicans refuse to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty. 

5 

I expect today that people, some here, will be expressing their 

fears rather than expressing facts and rather than looking to solve 

actual problems. We will hear that Cuba is drilling and we are not. 

We will likely hear these claims despite the fact that U.S. oil production is at its highest level in nearly a decade and oil production 

from the Gulf of Mexico is higher than it was during the final year 

of the previous Administration. 

In a symbolic move, Russia placed a flag on the sea floor at the 

North Pole in 2007, and both Russia and Canada intend to submit 

claims to the United Nations to extend their Continental Shelf in 

the coming years. If Republicans were serious about ensuring that 

U.S. interests and resources were protected in the Arctic, then they 

would end their opposition to ratification of the Law of the Sea 

Treaty. 

I hope we will be dealing with the facts today. This is really not 

the Committee to be discussing embargoes. It is the Committee to 

discuss the environment and the protection of our environment, 

jobs, and resources. I yield back my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Holt follows:] 

Statement of The Honorable Rush D. Holt, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, 

In 2008, Vice President Dick Cheney asserted that China was drilling off of Cuba, 

as close as 60 miles from the Florida Keys, as a way to push for expanded drilling 

off U.S. beaches on the East Coast and in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico. However, 

China was not actually drilling off of Cuba and Mr. Cheney’s claims were unfounded. 

Now, a Spanish company, Repsol, has announced plans to begin exploratory drilling off of Cuba roughly 80 miles from Florida in January of next year. Because of 

the embargo on Cuba, a Chinese-built drill rig will be used to conduct the exploration. However, I fear that rather than having a real discussion today about the 

ways that we should engage Cuba to ensure that this drilling takes place safely, 

the majority will use this pending action to once again try to make the case for expanded drilling off the United States. 

The independent, blue-ribbon BP Oil Spill Commission concluded that ‘‘it is in our 

country’s national interest to negotiate now with these near neighbors [Mexico and 

Cuba] to agree on a common, rigorous set of standards, a system for regulatory oversight, and the same operator adherence to the effective safety culture called for in 

this report, along with protocols to cooperate on containment and response strategies and preparedness in case of a spill.’’ We should develop the strongest possible 

safety standards for offshore drilling here in the United States and work with countries with whom we share a maritime boundary to see that they adhere to these 

standards. Oil spills don’t recognize international boundaries. 

In fact, the Obama Administration is already working to develop a protocol to establish a common set of safety and environmental standards with Mexico for the 

Gulf. Those negotiations are ongoing. 

In addition, the Administration is working with Repsol to ensure that the U.S. 

Coast Guard and Interior Department inspectors can inspect the Chinese rig prior 

to it entering Cuban waters. The Administration should also consider issuing a general license to allow U.S. companies and personnel to swiftly provide assistance in 

the event of a spill. 

In addition, as we are working to negotiate maritime boundaries with countries 

like Canada in the Arctic Ocean, Republicans in the Senate are weakening our negotiating position. 

Republican Senators have blocked ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty, which 

would improve our ability to submit international claims to our continental shelf beyond 200 miles in places like the Arctic. As a result, we are at a disadvantage in 

working to ensure that the United States and U.S. companies can claim those resources that are rightfully ours. In fact, what we are seeing in the Arctic Ocean, 

as countries move to claim the seabed and the minerals below it, could only be deVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\71116.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
6 

scribed as a black gold rush. And the United States is sitting on the sidelines because Senate Republicans refuse to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty. 

I expect that we are likely going to hear a lot of the same fear mongering today 

that we heard in 2008. That Cuba is drilling and we are not. We will likely hear 

these claims despite the fact that U.S. oil production is at its highest level in nearly 

a decade and oil production from the Gulf of Mexico is higher than it was during 

the final year of the Bush Administration. 

In a symbolic move, Russia placed a flag on the sea floor at the North Pole in 

2007. And both Russia and Canada intend to submit claims to the United Nations 

to extend their continental shelf in the coming years. 

If Republicans were serious about ensuring that U.S. interests and resources were 

protected in the Arctic, they would end their opposition to ratification of the Law 

of the Sea Treaty. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. Thank you. Before I invite the witnesses forward, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Florida, 

Mr. Bilirakis, and the gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Amodei, who 

is a member of the Committee but not this Subcommittee, be allowed to join the Members of this Subcommittee on the dais and 

participate in the hearing. These Members do not count for a 

quorum and cannot vote. Without objection, so ordered. 

I now invite forward The Honorable Michael Bromwich, Director 

of Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, BSEE, and 

Vice Admiral Brian Salerno, Deputy Commandant for Operations, 

U.S. Coast Guard. 

Like all our witnesses, your written testimony will appear in full 

in the hearing record, so I ask that you keep your oral statements 

to five minutes as outlined in the invitation letter to you and under 

Committee Rule 4[a]. Our microphones are not automatic, so you 

need to turn them on when you are ready to begin. 

I will also explain how our timing lights work. When you begin 

to speak, our clerk will start the timer and a green light will appear. After four minutes a yellow light appears, and at that time 

you should begin to conclude your statement. At five minutes the 

red light will come on. 

Director Bromwich, thank you for being here, and you may begin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL BROMWICH, DIRECTOR, 

BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 

Mr. BROMWICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Holt 

and Members of the Committee. I am happy to be here today to 

discuss issues relating to oil and gas exploration in waters that 

border the United States Outer Continental Shelf. 

As you know, the blowout and oil spill from the Macondo well 

last year prompted the most aggressive and comprehensive reforms 

to U.S. offshore oil and gas regulation in our history. Our reforms 

are designed to ensure that the exploration and development of oil 

and gas resources in U.S. waters proceed safely and with appropriate protection for ocean environments and our coastlines. 

But the risks to U.S. waters and shores posed by offshore drilling 

are not limited to activities on the U.S. OCS. As a result, we have 

taken steps to try to improve drilling standards and practices as 

well as oil spill response preparedness for operations in foreign 

waters that could have an impact on our coastline. 

7 

We are working with key agencies across the Federal government, including the State Department, Coast Guard, EPA, NOAA 

and others, as well as with industry, oil spill response and blowout 

containment companies and our international counterparts in the 

Gulf of Mexico, in the Arctic and along our maritime boundaries 

with Canada. 

More specifically, we are working closely with other Federal 

agencies to address the threat posed by offshore drilling and a potential oil spill in neighboring parts of the Gulf of Mexico that 

could affect U.S. waters, shores and interests. Several other countries on or near the Gulf of Mexico are expected to move forward 

with offshore drilling in their exclusive economic zones in the near 

future. 

The Spanish oil company, Repsol, as has been mentioned, has 

announced its intention to drill offshore wells in Cuba’s waters 

using a newly constructed mobile offshore drilling unit. In the near 

future, there also will likely be offshore drilling activity in the 

EEZs of the Bahamas and Jamaica and continuing offshore activity 

in Mexico’s EEZ. 

The U.S. Government is taking steps to protect our waters and 

coastal resources by promoting safety through prevention and by 

preparing response contingencies in the event of a spill. These activities include communicating with Repsol to encourage its compliance with U.S. safety and environmental standards, cooperating 

with our regulatory agency counterparts in the region, including 

Mexico, through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to develop 

common safety standards and taking steps to ensure that U.S. resources are available to respond to a spill. 

The simple fact is we do not have regulatory authority over 

Repsol’s activities in Cuba, but beginning in February of this year 

Repsol has voluntarily provided us information regarding its drilling and oil spill response plans. We have had numerous contacts 

with the company, and we have made it clear that we expect it to 

adhere to the highest environmental health and safety standards 

and to have adequate prevention, mitigation and remediation systems in place in the event of an incident. 

Repsol officials have stated publicly that in carrying out its exploratory drilling plans in Cuban waters it will adhere to U.S. regulations and the highest industry standards. Repsol has also offered U.S. agencies an opportunity to board the mobile offshore 

drilling unit that it intends to use in Cuban waters to inspect the 

vessel and drilling equipment and to review relevant documentation. 

To protect U.S. interests, we have sought to gather information 

on the unit’s operation, technology and safety equipment. BSEE 

and the Coast Guard are planning to coordinate a joint visit to the 

unit that would occur shortly before the rig is scheduled to enter 

Cuban waters. 

In addition to keeping BSEE regularly informed of its plans, 

Repsol has expressed a desire to keep U.S. regulators and spill response planners apprised of its oil spill preparedness activities offshore Cuba. Along with other U.S. representatives, BSEE has already witnessed a tabletop spill response exercise. During the exerVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\71116.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
8 

cise, Repsol’s spill management team mobilized to respond to a hypothetical spill. 

Beyond our specific engagement with Repsol, BSEE has been engaged with our regulatory counterparts in the Gulf of Mexico in an 

effort to harmonize drilling safety standards in the region. BSEE 

and its predecessor agencies have been collaborating with officials 

from all levels of the Mexican Government since the late 1990s, 

and this cooperation has increased substantially since the creation 

of the new Mexican Regulatory Commission. 

The U.S. Government will immediately use all appropriate resources and authorities to conduct response operations in the event 

of an oil spill from activities in the region that threaten U.S. 

waters or its coastline. The Administration has engaged state and 

local governments and private parties that might be affected by 

such a spill. We will continue with active support of these efforts 

to ensure that appropriate plans and resources are in place to respond promptly and effectively to an oil spill that reaches U.S. 

waters. 

The Gulf of Mexico is not the only area in which we are 

proactively working on issues related to a potential oil spill, and 

my prepared testimony discusses the ways in which DOI and BSEE 

specifically are engaged in a number of multilateral and bilateral 

initiatives for oil spill preparedness and response in the Arctic and 

with Canada. 

We view engagement with our foreign counterparts in the areas 

of shared interest as a central part of our efforts to protect U.S. environmental and economic interests. Thank you very much, and I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bromwich follows:] 

Statement of Michael R. Bromwich, Director, Bureau of Safety and 

Environmental Enforcement, United States Department of the Interior 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss oil and gas exploration in North American waters that border the United States Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). As Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, the agency in charge 

of enforcing safety and environmental regulations on the U.S. OCS, I would like to 

share with you information on the actions we have taken to ensure that oil and gas 

operations in neighboring waters are done in as safe and environmentally responsible manner as possible, and to ensure that the U.S. responds appropriately to protect U.S. interests in the event of a spill originating in foreign waters that may affect adjacent U.S. waters and shorelines. 

As you know, the blowout and oil spill from the Macondo well last year prompted 

the most aggressive and comprehensive reforms to offshore oil and gas regulation 

and oversight in U.S. history. Our new standards and other reforms are designed 

to ensure that the exploration and development of oil and gas resources in U.S. 

waters proceeds safely and with appropriate protections for ocean environments and 

our coastlines. 

Because the risks to U.S. waters and shores posed by offshore drilling are not limited to the activities on the U.S. OCS, the Department of the Interior (DOI) and 

my agency have taken steps to improve drilling standards and practices, as well as 

oil spill response preparedness, for operations in foreign waters that could have an 

impact our coastline. DOI and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) are engaged with the key agencies across the federal government— 

including the State Department, United States Coast Guard (USCG), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) and others—as well as with industry, oil spill response and blowout containment companies, and our international counterparts in the Gulf of Mexico, in 

the Arctic and along our maritime boundaries with Canada. 

9 

Status of Response Capability and Readiness in the Gulf of Mexico 

DOI and BSEE are working closely with other federal agencies to address the 

threat of an oil spill in neighboring parts of the Gulf of Mexico that could affect U.S. 

waters, shores and interests. Several other countries on or near the Gulf of Mexico 

are expected to proceed with offshore drilling in their exclusive economic zones 

(EEZ) in the near future. As you know, the Spanish oil company Repsol has announced its intent to drill offshore wells in Cuba’s waters using a newly constructed 

mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU), the Scarabeo 9. In the near future, there also 

likely will be offshore drilling activity in the EEZs of the Bahamas and Jamaica and 

continuing offshore activity in Mexico’s EEZ, including possible activity along the 

U.S.-Mexico maritime boundary pursuant to a transboundary agreement between 

the two countries, which is currently under negotiation. Formal negotiations of the 

agreement, which would advance the shared commitment of Presidents Obama and 

Calderon to promote the safe, efficient and equitable development of transboundary 

hydrocarbon reservoirs, began in August 2011. Multiple rounds of negotiations have 

followed, and the parties hope to have a final agreement by the end of the year. 

The U.S. government is taking steps to protect U.S. waters and environmental 

and economic resources by promoting drilling safety to prevent spills in the first 

place and by preparing response contingencies in the event of a spill. These activities include: (1) communicating with Repsol to encourage its compliance with U.S. 

safety and environmental standards; (2) cooperating with our regulatory agency 

counterparts in the region, including Mexico, through bilateral and multilateral 

mechanisms to develop common safety standards; and (3) taking steps to ensure 

that U.S. resources are available to respond to a spill. 

1. Engagement with Repsol 

While BSEE does not have regulatory authority over Repsol’s activities in Cuba, 

beginning in February of this year, Repsol has voluntarily provided us information 

regarding its plans related to drilling and oil spill response. In our numerous communications with Repsol, we have made clear that we expect it to adhere to industry and international environmental, health, and safety standards and to have adequate prevention, mitigation, and remediation systems in place in the event of an 

incident. Repsol officials have stated publicly that in carrying out its exploratory 

drilling plans in Cuban waters, it will adhere to U.S. regulations and the highest 

industry standards. Repsol has offered U.S. agencies an opportunity to board the 

Scarabeo 9 rig that Repsol intends to use in Cuban waters to inspect the vessel and 

drilling equipment and to review relevant documentation. Given the proximity of 

drilling to U.S. waters, and considering the serious consequences a major oil spill 

would have on our economic and environmental interests, we have welcomed the opportunity to gather information on the rig’s operation, technology, and safety equipment. BSEE and the Coast Guard are coordinating a joint visit to the Scarabeo 9 

that will occur shortly before the rig is scheduled to enter Cuban waters. 

In addition to keeping BSEE regularly informed of its plans, Repsol has expressed 

a desire to keep U.S. regulators and spill response planners appraised of its oil spill 

preparedness activities offshore Cuba. Along with other U.S. representatives, BSEE 

has already witnessed a table-top spill response exercise held at the Repsol office 

in Trinidad. 

During the exercise, Repsol’s spill management team mobilized to respond to a 

hypothetical spill and demonstrated response equipment deployment capabilities. 

Repsol has subsequently invited BSEE and Coast Guard officials to observe another 

emergency drill to be conducted in Trinidad related to contingency planning for the 

drilling. 

2. Regional Drilling Safety Initiatives in the Gulf of Mexico 

In addition to our communications with Repsol and in parallel with the negotiations of a transboundary agreement, BSEE has been engaged with our regulatory 

counterparts in the Gulf of Mexico in an effort to harmonize drilling safety standards in the region. BSEE and its predecessor agencies have been collaborating with 

officials from all levels of the Mexican government since the late 1990s on issues 

related to the safe and responsible development of oil and gas resources in the Gulf 

of Mexico. This cooperation has increased substantially in the aftermath of Deepwater Horizon and after the creation of the National Hydrocarbons Commission 

(CNH), the Mexican agency responsible for regulating offshore drilling safety on 

Mexico’s continental shelf. 

BSEE and CNH are working towards a set of common safety and environmental 

standards through a series of technical workshops. Following a workshop held this 

summer in BSEE’s Gulf of Mexico regional office, the U.S. and Mexico developed 

an action plan to define subject areas where the creation of common standards 

10 

would be appropriate. CNH officials will be returning to BSEE’s offices in the near 

future for a technical exchange about BSEE’s Worst Case Discharge analysis. 

In addition to this ongoing cooperation, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar and 

I traveled to Mexico for a series of meetings with Mexican officials to discuss the 

development of common safety and environmental standards for offshore oil and gas 

exploration and development in the Gulf of Mexico. 

3. Spill Response and Preparedness 

The U.S. government will immediately use all appropriate resources and authorities to conduct response operations in the event an oil spill from activities in Cuban 

waters or from activities in other states in the region that threaten U.S. waters or 

its coastline. The Administration has engaged state and local governments and private parties that might be affected by such a spill to ensure awareness and mutual 

cooperation and the adequacy of five different existing Area Contingency Plans covering Florida where models predict varying probabilities of U.S. shoreline impacts 

should a spill occur at the planned exploratory drilling locations in Cuban waters. 

BSEE staff is also engaged with District Seven USCG staff out of Miami in the development of an International Offshore Drilling Response Plan and will be participating in an upcoming workshop to validate the plan. We will continue with active 

support of these efforts to ensure that appropriate plans and resources are in place 

to respond in a rapid and effective manner to an oil spill that reaches U.S. waters. 

As part of this planning for possible oil spills from deepwater drilling off of Cuba, 

NOAA, in cooperation with the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), has 

run sophisticated trajectory models to identify potential landfall areas along the 

U.S. coasts. 

Using worst case discharge data provided by Repsol, coupled with computer model 

results, the USCG is working with Area Committees in the areas that potentially 

could be affected by such a spill to enhance Area Contingency Plans—an effort that 

requires local and state participation in the development of protection strategies and 

establishing priorities for threatened resources. 

The U.S. is also taking measures to ensure that the appropriate private industry 

parties are able to respond quickly in the event of an oil spill in Cuban waters. The 

Department of Commerce and the Treasury Department have a long-standing practice of providing licenses to address environmental contingencies in Cuban waters. 

The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued 

a number of licenses for post-incident oil spill containment and cleanup items for 

use by U.S. companies in Cuban waters. These items include booms, skimmers, 

dispersants, pumps and other equipment and supplies necessary to minimize environmental damage in the event of a spill. Several such applications are currently 

under review by BIS, including applications for a subsea well containment system 

and related equipment, such as remotely operated submersible vehicles and subsea 

construction, dive support, and well intervention vessels. 

In consultation with the Department of State, the Treasury Department can issue 

licenses to U.S. entities to prepare for and to operate in the event of an oil spill. 

The Treasury Department has been issuing such licenses for over a decade, including licenses for environmental response, maritime salvage, and spill prevention activities. 

Finally, BSEE is working closely with other federal agencies on a number of regional initiatives with countries in the region, including Mexico, Cuba, the Bahamas 

and Jamaica. For example, planning is underway for a Regional Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation Seminar to Focus on Developing National 

Plans for Marine Pollution Preparedness and Response Related to Offshore Units 

and Regional Cooperation. This seminar, which is sponsored and conducted by the 

International Maritime Organization, will take place in the Bahamas later this year 

and officials from the Bahamas, Cuba, Mexico, Jamaica and the United States have 

been invited to participate. The seminar will provide a valuable opportunity for participating countries to learn about other nations’ plans for emergency well control 

and oil spill response, which will help us improve our own response planning for 

upcoming offshore drilling expected in the EEZs of participating states. We believe 

a multilateral approach that involves all parties in the region contemplating drilling 

activities that could affect the United States is the most effective means of safeguarding our interests. We therefore intend to continue to vigorously pursue continued multilateral engagements in the Gulf of Mexico. 

11 

Status of Response Capability and Readiness in the Arctic and with 

Canada 

In addition to our activities in the Gulf of Mexico, DOI and BSEE are also engaged in a number of multilateral and bilateral initiatives for oil spill preparedness 

and response in the Arctic and with Canada. 

1. Arctic Council 

The U.S. is a member of the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, which is a highlevel forum of eight nations—Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, the 

United States, Sweden and Finland—and their indigenous peoples. 

The Arctic Council’s meeting in Nuuk, Greenland this past May led to the creation of two important initiatives to address oil spill prevention, preparedness and 

response in the Arctic. The first of these is the Oil Spill Preparedness and Response 

Task Force, of which BSEE is a member and which intends to develop an international instrument on oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic. The 

Task Force met in Oslo, Norway last week. In addition, BSEE is participating in 

the Arctic Council Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working 

group, which is developing recommendations on best practices in oil spill prevention. 

The results of both initiatives will be presented at the next Ministerial Meeting of 

the Arctic Council in the spring of 2013. 

2. Bilateral Cooperation with Canada 

BSEE also participates in a number of bilateral initiatives with Canada related 

to oil spill preparedness and response. BSEE’s Technology Assessment and Research 

Program has collaborated with Canada in over 35 joint research and development 

projects, many of which relate to improving oil spill response and preparedness. For 

example, the Bureau is collaborating with Canada’s Department of the Environment 

on a number of joint oil spill response research projects focusing on remote sensing 

and measurement of spilled oil; chemical treating agents; the properties and behavior of spilled oil; testing and evaluation of oil spill absorbents; cleaning up oil from 

shorelines; mechanical containment and cleanup of spilled oil; and examining matters relating to dispersant use. Another project has involved collaboration with 

Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans on a study of dispersants. 

BSEE’s predecessor agencies also initiated and conducted two meetings of the 

US–Canada Northern Oil and Gas Research Forum (Forum). The first Forum took 

place in October 2008 in Anchorage, followed by a second Forum in December 2010 

in Calgary. The forums focused on technical, engineering, and scientific research 

concerning offshore drilling safety, oil spill prevention and management, ice engineering and transportation issues, as well as the environmental effects of oil and 

gas exploration and development in the Arctic. These multidisciplinary conferences 

brought together participants from government, industry, academia, indigenous 

groups, and non-governmental organizations to discuss research issues of relevance 

to the management of oil and gas activities. 

BSEE has also cooperated in joint projects with the Canadian Coast Guard at the 

Oil and Hazardous Materials Simulated Environmental Test Tank (OHMSETT), 

which is the U.S. oil spill response and renewable energy test facility located in New 

Jersey. One project evaluated remote sensing equipment to detect spilled oil; another evaluated the oil containment performance of five different types of fire-resistant booms. We will continue this engagement under the leadership of BSEE’s Oil 

Spill Response Division. 

Finally, BSEE will participate in the annual Arctic and Marine Oil Spill Program 

(AMOP) Technical Seminar with Canada.The Seminar was created in 1978 by 

Canada’s environmental ministry to improve the knowledge base and technology for 

combating Arctic and marine oil spills. Since then, it has been a useful forum for 

cooperation and information exchange, providing BSEE with the opportunity to engage researchers from other countries who have similar Arctic response interests, 

learn about emerging technologies and scientific discoveries, inform attendees of 

findings from BSEE-funded research, and identify research gaps and needs. In the 

last AMOP seminar conducted in October 2011, the program included discussions 

on the use of Ohmsett for research related to biofuel spill response and dispersant 

operational research conducted at Ohmsett over the last ten years, evidencing the 

contributions that BSEE has and will continue to make to improving oil spill response. 

BSEE is also on the Executive and Planning Committees of the International Oil 

Spill Conference, which is held every three years—the most recent Conference was 

held in mid-2011. The conference focuses on new technologies and hosts exhibitors 

and participants from around the globe. 

12 

As you can tell from this description of the activities of DOI and BSEE, we view 

engagement with our foreign counterparts in areas of shared interest and concern 

as a central part of protecting U.S. environmental and economic interests. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. Perfect timing. You have had a little practice 

here. 

Mr. BROMWICH. A little bit. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you for your statement and for being here. 

And, Vice Admiral Salerno, thank you for being here, and please 

begin your statement. 

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL BRIAN SALERNO, 

DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD 

Admiral SALERNO. Good morning, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking 

Member Holt, Ranking Member Markey from the full Committee 

and distinguished Members of the Committee and full Committee. 

I am very pleased to be here this morning to answer your questions 

on the Coast Guard’s response capability and readiness for oil spills 

originating in foreign waters adjacent to the United States which 

may affect or threaten our nation and our natural resources. 

Protecting the marine environment from oil spills is an important Coast Guard mission. Contingency planning, training and exercises are fundamental to our readiness to respond to oil spills. 

These in turn have their foundation in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan or NCP for short. 

Contingency planning under the NCP occurs at several levels. 

Local level planning is conducted by an area committee under the 

guidance of the Coast Guard captain of the port, who is also 

predesignated as the Federal on-scene coordinator in coastal areas. 

The area committee brings together Federal, state, local and tribal 

officials and commercial responders to identify risks, sensitive 

areas to be protected and protection strategies. 

At the regional level, Coast Guard districts participate with other 

Federal agencies and state officials through regional response 

teams on such issues as dispersant use and in situ burning 

preauthorizations. And finally, at the national level, the Coast 

Guard serves as the vice chair of the national response team, which 

is comprised of 16 Federal agencies with environmental response 

responsibilities and ensures national level capabilities are available 

as needed to support response efforts. 

Each of these organizational levels also has a role to play in developing strategies and cooperative relationships with our foreign 

neighbors to enhance preparedness and response to transboundary 

environmental threats. In particular, we have well-established relationships with Canada, Russia and Mexico to achieve cooperation 

on potential pollution threats, the identification of equipment and 

personnel resources available to respond to incidents and procedures for notification and incident management in the event of an 

actual response. 

In each of these cases, cooperation in controlling the source of the 

pollution is paramount in addressing the transnational nature of 

the threat. Facilitating movement of people and equipment to the 

source is an essential component of the aforementioned agreeVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\71116.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
13 

ments. Additionally, these agreements include regular planning 

sessions, exercises and support mutual cooperation in oil spill research and development. 

Under these agreements, we have concluded a bilateral response 

exercise with Mexico in San Diego just this past August. We also 

successfully completed a joint Coast Guard/Canadian Coast Guard 

environmental response summit last month. Just yesterday, I 

hosted a Russian delegation here in Washington and signed a bilateral memorandum of understanding that will expand our current 

cooperative response agreements to cover boundary waters between 

the United States and Russia. 

While we can point to successes and healthy relationships in the 

areas already mentioned, we do not have the same bilateral ability 

to engage with all countries which are potential sources of transboundary pollution threats. This is particularly true in the northern Caribbean and the anticipated deepwater drilling in the Cuban 

EEZ as a primary example. 

However, we are taking steps to engage multilaterally in the 

Caribbean. By working through the International Maritime Organization we have garnered support to convene a multilateral seminar 

this December in the Bahamas that will invite Caribbean nations 

to discuss oil spill prevention and response issues. 

At the same time, we are working extensively with our domestic 

response partners to update our contingency plans. We are also directly engaged with Repsol related to their response strategies, resources and capabilities in support of their drilling operations. 

In the event that an oil spill does occur within the Cuban EEZ, 

the Coast Guard would mount an immediate response under the 

national contingency plan in partnership with other Federal, state 

and local agencies. We would focus on combating the spill as far 

offshore and as close to the source as possible using all viable response tactics. 

In preparation for such an eventuality, our Seventh District in 

Miami has been working closely with the state and local response 

organizations in southern Florida since March. Our district office 

will conduct a response exercise later this month. 

As was highlighted by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, any spill 

of national significance, regardless of its source, will require unity 

of effort across all levels of government, industry and the private 

sector. Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Salerno follows:] 

Statement of Vice Admiral Brian Salerno, 

Deputy Commandant for Operations, United States Coast Guard 

Good Morning Chairman LAMBORN, Ranking Member HOLT, and distinguished 

Members of the Committee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to answer any 

questions you may have on the U.S. Coast Guard’s response capability and readiness for oil spills originating in foreign waters adjacent to the United State that 

may affect or threaten our Nation and our natural resources. 

SUMMARY 

Protecting the marine environment from oil spills is an important Coast Guard 

mission. Contingency planning, training, and exercises are fundamental to our readiness to respond to oil spills. These in turn have their foundation in the National 

Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). 

Contingency planning under the NCP occurs at several levels: 

14 

• Local level planning is conducted by an Area Committee, under the guidance 

of the Coast Guard captain of the port, who is also pre-designated as the Federal On Scene Coordinator for the coastal zone. The area committee brings 

together federal, state, local, and Tribal officials and responders to identify 

risks, sensitive areas to be protected, and protection strategies. 

• At the regional level, Coast Guard Districts participate with other federal 

agencies and state officials, through Regional Response Team, on such issues 

as dispersant use and in-situ burning pre-authorizations; 

• And finally at the national level, the Coast Guard serves as the vice chair 

of the National Response Team, which is comprised of 16 federal agencies 

with environmental response functions, and ensures national level capabilities are available as needed to support response efforts. 

International Partnerships 

Each of these organizational levels also has a role to play in developing strategies 

and cooperative relationships with foreign neighbors to enhance preparedness and 

response to transboundary environmental threats. In particular, we have well established relationships with Canada, Russia and Mexico to achieve cooperation on: 

• potential pollution threats, 

• identification of equipment and personnel resources available to respond to 

incidents, and 

• procedures and protocols for notification, incident management, and coordinating a spill response. 

In each of these cases, cooperation in controlling the source of the pollution is 

paramount in addressing the transnational nature of the threat. Facilitating movement of essential people and equipment to the source is an essential component of 

these agreements. 

Additionally, these agreements include regular joint planning sessions and exercises; they also help sponsor and support bi-lateral cooperation in oil spill research 

and development. 

For example, we conducted 

• a major bi-lateral response exercise with Mexico in San Diego this past August; and 

• we successfully completed a joint U.S. Coast Guard/Canadian Coast Guard 

Environmental Response Summit last month. 

Just yesterday I hosted a Russian delegation here in Washington, and signed a 

Bi-lateral Memorandum of Understanding that will expand our current cooperative 

response agreements to cover the entire U.S./Russian boundary waters. 

Preparedness in the Northern Caribbean 

While we can point to successes and healthy relationships in the areas already 

mentioned, we do not have the same bi-lateral ability to engage with all countries 

which are potential sources of transboundary pollution threats. This is particularly 

true in the northern Caribbean, and the anticipated deepwater drilling in the Cuban 

EEZ is the salient example. However, we are taking steps to engage multi-laterally 

in the Caribbean. By working through the IMO we have garnered support to convene a multilateral seminar this December in the Bahamas that will invite Caribbean nations to discuss oil spill prevention and response issues. 

Consequently, we are working extensively with our domestic response partners to 

update our contingency plans. We are also engaged directly with REPSOL, the 

Spanish-owned company which plans to drill the first well in the Cuban offshore 

starting in January 2012, related to their response strategies, resources, and capabilities in support of their drilling operations. 

In the event that an oil spill does occur within the Cuban EEZ, the Coast Guard 

would mount an immediate response under the NCP, in partnership with other Federal, State and local agencies. And we would focus on combating the spill as far offshore and as close to the source as possible, using all viable response tactics. In 

preparation for such an eventuality, our Seventh District in Miami has been working closely with state, local and response organizations in Southern Florida since 

March. Our District Office will conduct a response exercise this month. 

Conclusion 

As was highlighted by the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, any spill of national significance, regardless of its source, will require unity of effort across all levels of government, industry, and the private sector. 

Thank you and I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

15 

Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Hearing on Outer 

Continental Shelf Oil Spill Response Capabilities, Panel 1, October 18, 2011 

SALERNO: 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Murkowski, distinguished members of the committee. I’m pleased to have this opportunity to answer any questions 

you may have on response capability and readiness for oil spills originating in foreign waters adjacent to the United States that may affect or threaten our nation 

or our natural resources. 

Protecting the marine environment from oil spills is an important Coast Guard 

mission. Contingency planning, training and exercises are fundamental to our readiness to respond to oil spills. These, in turn, have their foundation in the National 

Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, now simply as the NCP. 

That’s a long title. 

Contingency planning under the NCP occurs at several levels. Local level planning is conducted by an area committee, under the guidance of a Coast Guard captain of the port, who is also pre-designated as the federal on-scene coordinator for 

the coastal zone. 

The area committee brings together federal, state, local and tribal officials and responders to identify risks, sensitive areas to be protected and protection strategies. 

At the regional level, Coast Guard districts participate with other federal agencies 

and state officials through the regional response team. And they consider such 

issues as dispersant use and in-situ burning pre-authorizations. 

And finally at the national level, the Coast Guard serves as the vice chair of the 

National Response Team, which is comprised of 16 federal agencies with environmental response functions, and ensures national level capabilities are available, as 

needed, to support response efforts. 

Each of these organizational levels also has a role to play in developing strategies 

and cooperative relationships with foreign neighbors to enhance preparedness and 

response to trans-boundary environmental threats. 

In particular, we have well established relationships with Canada, Russia and 

Mexico to achieve cooperation on potential pollution threats, the identification of 

equipment and personnel needed to respond to actual incidents, and procedures and 

protocols for notification, incident management and coordinated spill response. 

Each of these cases involves cooperation in controlling the source of the pollution 

as—as paramount in addressing the trans-national nature of the threat. Without 

controlling the source, you cannot get ahead of the problem. So the facilitated movement of people and equipment to the source is an essential component of these 

agreements. 

Additionally, these agreements include regular joint planning sessions and exercises. They also help sponsor bilateral cooperation in oil spill research and development. Under these agreements, we’ve recently completed a major bilateral exercise 

with Mexico, held in San Diego this past August. 

We also held a joint U.S. Coast Guard/Canadian Coast Guard environmental summit this past month. And next month, I plan to meet with the Russian delegation 

here in Washington to sign a bilateral memorandum of understanding that will expand our parent cooperative agreements to cover the entire U.S./Russian boundary 

waters. 

We are also working with Russia, Canada and the six other Arctic nations 

through the Arctic Council, to produce an arctic-wide pollution preparedness and response instrument that will build on our existing bilateral agreements to enhance 

preparedness throughout the Arctic region. 

In light of the growing interest in oil exploration in the northern Caribbean, we 

are also working hard to improve regional cooperation there. The anticipated drilling in—off Cuban waters is a salient example, but others, like the Bahamas, are 

also considering deepwater drilling operations. 

By working through the International Maritime Organization, we’ve garnered 

support for a regional, multilateral seminar to be held, to which other Caribbean 

nations will be invited, including the Bahamas, Jamaica, Cuba and Mexico, for the 

purpose of discussing oil spill prevention and response issues. 

Meanwhile, we’re working extensively with all of our domestic response partners 

to update our contingency plans. We’re also engaged directly with Repsol, the Spanish company which plans to drill the first well off Cuba, starting in January of 2012, 

to better understand their response strategies, their resources and their capabilities. 

In the event an oil spill does occur within Cuban waters, the Coast Guard would 

mount an immediate response under the NCP and partnership with other federal, 

state and local agencies. We would focus on combating the spill offshore, using all 

available response tactics. 

16 

As was highlighted by the Deepwater Horizon spill, any spill of national significance, regardless of its source, will require a unity of effort across all levels of government, industry and the private sector. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Vice Admiral, for your statement and 

for being here today. 

Before we begin our questions, I would like to recognize as a 

courtesy to the Minority the Ranking Member of the full Committee, Representative Markey, for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Mr. MARKEY. I thank you. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, very 

much, and I thank our witnesses for being here. 

A few months from now the Spanish oil company, Repsol, will 

begin the first exploratory deepwater drilling in the waters off of 

Cuba, and other companies are now also lining up to drill off of 

Cuba. 

When you think of the oil companies that would be the logical 

candidates to do the first drilling in a new area, most people would 

think of companies like Exxon Mobil, Chevron and ConocoPhillips, 

but which are the companies that are planning to drill in the 

waters off of Cuba a mere 80 miles from Florida? They are the 

state-owned oil companies of Malaysia, Vietnam, Venezuela and 

China. 

Because of a relic of the Cold War, the Cuban embargo, American oil companies cannot drill in this area that could contain as 

much as five billion barrels of oil. The Majority has been so focused 

on a make believe moratorium on drilling in the Gulf that they 

have apparently missed the actual decades long moratorium on 

American companies drilling off of Cuba that is the result of the 

embargo. 

Republicans like to claim that U.S. rigs are disappearing from 

the Gulf. Well, there are rigs that are going to be flocking to the 

waters off of Cuba, but they are going to be drilling for China and 

Venezuela because of the embargo. I would think that my Republican colleagues would rather have this drilling done by Chevron 

than by Chavez. 

We are fortunate that the Administration has persuaded Repsol 

to agree to allow a single inspection of their drilling rig by Coast 

Guard and Interior Department inspectors before it enters Cuban 

waters. But once the rig crosses the maritime boundary with Cuba, 

our inspectors will not be permitted to ever review it again. Once 

it crosses that line, it will be as if it has crossed into a Bermuda 

Triangle of safety, forever disappearing from the site of our inspectors and our regulators. 

We should be able to work with Cuba as the independent BP 

Spill Commission has recommended to create the strongest possible 

safety standards and ensure that there can be cooperation in the 

event of a spill. We shouldn’t be forced to hope that oil spills so 

close to our shores can be prevented by a Cuban Government that 

has no experience, no experience, in regulating the oil industry. 

17 

We should end the Cuban embargo so that American companies 

and American workers can reap the benefits of drilling so near to 

our own shores. I would hope that the Majority’s opposition to lifting the embargo against Fidel does not outweigh their fidelity to 

creating more jobs for American businesses and American workers 

in our own country. 

I would urge my Republican colleagues to drop their opposition 

to all of the mythical moratoriums and all pretend permitoriums 

and instead join with Mr. Holt and I in supporting the repeal of 

an actual embargo that prevents our American oil companies from 

even competing for these Cuban leases. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Markey follows:] 

Statement of The Honorable Edward J. Markey, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Natural Resources 

Thank you. 

A few months from now, the Spanish oil company Repsol will begin the first exploratory deep-water drilling in the waters off of Cuba. And other companies are 

now also lining up to drill off of Cuba. 

When you think of the oil companies that would be the logical candidates to do 

the first drilling in a new area, most people would think of companies like 

ExxonMobil, Chevron and ConocoPhillips. 

But who are the companies that are planning to drill in the waters off of Cuba, 

a mere 80 miles from Florida? They are the state-owned oil companies of Malaysia, 

Vietnam, Venezuela, and China. 

Because of a relic of the cold war, the Cuban embargo, American oil companies 

cannot drill in this area that could contain as much as 5 billion barrels of oil. 

The Majority has been so focused on a make-believe moratorium on drilling in the 

Gulf, that they’ve apparently missed the actual decades-long moratorium on American companies drilling off of Cuba that is the result of the embargo. 

Republicans like to claim that U.S. rigs are disappearing from the Gulf. Well, 

there are rigs that are going to be flocking to the waters off Cuba but they are going 

to be drilling for China and Venezuela because of the embargo. 

I would think that my Republican colleagues would rather have this drilling done 

by Chevron than by Chavez. 

We are fortunate that the Administration has persuaded Repsol to agree to allow 

a single inspection of their drilling rig by Coast Guard and Interior Department inspectors before it enters Cuban waters. But once the rig crosses the maritime 

boundary with Cuba our inspectors will not be permitted to review it again. Once 

it crosses that line, it will be as if it has crossed into a Bermuda Triangle of safety, 

forever disappearing from the sight of our inspectors and regulators. 

We should be able to work with Cuba, as the independent BP Spill Commission 

has recommended, to create the strongest possible safety standards and ensure that 

there can be cooperation in the event of a spill. We shouldn’t be forced to hope that 

oil spills so close to our shores can be prevented by a Cuban government that has 

no experience in regulating this industry. 

We should end the Cuban embargo so that American companies and American 

workers can reap the benefits of drilling so near our shores. I would hope that the 

Majority’s opposition to lifting the embargo against Fidel does not outweigh their 

‘‘fidel-ity’’ to creating more jobs for American businesses and workers. 

I would urge my Republican colleagues to drop their opposition to all mythical 

moratoriums and all pretend permit-oriums and instead join me in supporting the 

repeal of an actual embargo that prevents our American oil companies from even 

competing for these Cuban leases. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. We will now begin our questioning. 

Members are limited to five minutes for their questions, but we 

may have additional rounds. I now recognize myself for five minutes. 

Director Bromwich, I think one of the predominant questions 

that we need to address today is about Cuba moving forward with 

offshore drilling. I know that your agency has been engaging diVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\71116.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
18 

rectly with Repsol, as you referred to, but from what I understand 

you do not have in your possession their detailed exploration plan. 

Is that true? Have you seen with your own eyes Repsol’s drilling 

plans for drilling in Cuban waters? 

Mr. BROMWICH. Mr. Chairman, no, we don’t have Repsol’s exploration plan. There are confidentiality agreements that we have 

been advised they have with the Cuban Government. 

We are in the process of discussions with Repsol, and I am hopeful that in the near future we will be able to surmount their concerns and be able to obtain those materials. So right now we don’t 

have it, but we are hopeful we will get it and related materials. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. If you haven’t seen their plans for how they 

are going to conduct drilling, how can you say that you expect 

Repsol and the other involved parties to adhere to our nation’s 

standards? 

Mr. BROMWICH. Well, we have met, as I mentioned in my opening statement, we have met with Repsol on a number of occasions 

and have had a number of telephone discussions with them in 

which we have discussed these issues. 

They have pledged to us repeatedly that they will in fact adhere 

to and observe all of the U.S. standards that apply both to the submission of exploration plans as well as to the submission of permits. They have an interest in backing up that pledge with actually 

doing it because they have interests in U.S. waters. 

I think that is certainly one of the reasons that they approached 

us. We didn’t approach them. They approached us last February 

telling us of their plans to drill in Cuba, and they have been quite 

cooperative at every stage of the process. 

Mr. LAMBORN. But it remains true that we are going strictly by 

their good faith, which I hope is unimpeached. But we have absolutely no enforcement capability whatsoever? 

Mr. BROMWICH. We will have no enforcement capability no matter what, whether we get the exploration plans or other geological 

and geophysical material. That will help us to provide feedback to 

Repsol, which I think they are genuinely eager to have, but we 

have no enforcement authority in Cuban waters. No. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. Just to clarify, and also, Vice Admiral 

Salerno, I would like to ask you a question. I have read a lot of 

press accounts of plans by BSEE and the U.S. Coast Guard to inspect Repsol’s drilling rig before it enters Cuban waters. 

What happens if you go onto the rig and there are areas where 

your inspectors are not allowed to go? Or what happens if you inspect the rig and have serious concerns about what you find? It 

seems to me that with no enforcement capability we won’t be able 

to do anything. 

Admiral SALERNO. Well, you are correct about the lack of enforcement capability. The visit will be consensual on the part of the 

owner of the rig and Repsol. However, Repsol has indicated to us 

that they have every intention of complying with U.S. standards. 

So essentially we have their word that they would match our 

standards as if they were operating in the Gulf of Mexico, but 

again this is consensual. We do not have any way to compel them 

to make changes on that rig. It was strictly their goodwill. 

19 

Mr. LAMBORN. So what do we do if you are not allowed to go into 

certain areas or you have major concerns? 

Admiral SALERNO. Well, again we would communicate that with 

Repsol. We would also communicate that with the flag authority of 

the rig, which has the legal oversight of the rig, as well as with 

the owner and the Classification Society. The Classification Society 

is the recognized organization that performs inspection services on 

behalf of the government, the flag under which the vessel is registered. 

Mr. BROMWICH. Mr. Lamborn, if I may add I completely agree 

with everything that Admiral Salerno has said, but if Repsol was 

to declare certain parts of the rig off limits, I would view that as 

a breach of what they pledged to us to do. So again, we don’t have 

enforcement authority over them, but that would be contrary to everything that they have told us. They have not attempted to cordon 

off any aspect of the rig from the inspection that the Coast Guard 

and BSEE will be doing, and a last-minute attempt to do that 

would not be received well. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. Thank you. Vice Admiral, for clarification, 

who is the flag authority again? 

Admiral SALERNO. The flag authority is Bahamas. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Thank you. 

I would now like to recognize the Ranking Member for five minutes of questions. 

Mr. HOLT. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is worrisome, of real concern to some of us that we have in 

place a system to get blowout containment systems, other containment and cleanup systems to any Gulf disaster. Help me understand how much confidence we have that we could or that Repsol 

would get to their site whatever they need. 

And then let me also ask how much time do we have to get in 

place whatever agreements would be necessary to give us the confidence that those would get there? And this is really a question 

for both the Admiral and the Director. 

Mr. BROMWICH. Mr. Holt, I have a high level of confidence that 

the necessary licenses will be in place. That is an ongoing process 

that involves Treasury Department and the Commerce Department, and both as a result of historical licenses as well as some recently granted licenses, there is a range of both equipment and 

services that right now could be provided, and those include vessels, other kinds of equipment, the capping stack and containment 

system, which, as you know, is an extremely important element of 

a response. 

One of the things that the Coast Guard and we and the rest of 

the Administration have been involved in over the last several 

months is trying to work to make sure that all of the relevant preparations are made and so this has had high-level attention for 

many months, and I think we are in a pretty good place right now 

in terms of getting everything that is needed in place. 

Mr. HOLT. And before I let the Admiral give his part of the answer to this, let me understand clearly. This is because of our 

agreement with Repsol, not because of any agreement with Cuba? 

Mr. BROMWICH. There is no agreement with Cuba, so these are 

understandings that we have with Repsol, but the licenses are realVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\71116.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
20 

ly separate and are sought after by other companies that are in a 

position to provide such services. 

Mr. HOLT. But is it not true that Repsol’s rig will be flagged in 

the Bahamas just like Deepwater Horizon and that all safety inspections will be conducted by a third party, so the same applies 

for cleanup? I mean for containment and disaster response. Isn’t 

that true? The rig would be inspected by the Norwegian company, 

the same company that BP used in the Deepwater case? 

Mr. BROMWICH. Yes. 

Mr. HOLT. OK. Admiral? 

Admiral SALERNO. The only thing I would add, sir, is Repsol does 

have agreements, preexisting agreements, with spill response organizations that do have the capabilities that Mr. Bromwich mentioned. 

From a Coast Guard perspective, we would mount a response as 

aggressively as possible as close to the source as possible. There is 

really no prohibition for the Coast Guard moving into the Cuban 

EEZ, but there is a problem with commercial pollution responders 

operating in the Cuban EEZ. That is the reason why the issue of 

licenses is so critical and why we are working so closely with State 

Department, Treasury and Commerce on that issue. So that is actively being managed. 

So the Coast Guard would not have enough pollution response 

capability in its own inventory to mount a large-scale response. We 

rely very heavily on commercial capabilities to work with us in a 

response. 

Mr. HOLT. Admiral, you spoke about a recently signed bilateral 

agreement with Russia. Does that provide for oil disaster response? 

Admiral SALERNO. Yes, sir, it does. Actually we have a longstanding joint contingency plan with the Russian Federation for oil 

spill response in the Bering Sea and in the Chukchi Sea. We updated that based on some lessons learned from Deepwater Horizon. 

Plus we just signed yesterday a memorandum of understanding 

which expands our levels of cooperation in oil spill R&D, mutual 

cooperation as additional drilling takes place in the Arctic and the 

rest. 

Mr. HOLT. And you felt that agreement was useful or necessary 

beyond any licensing agreements, isn’t that right, and so wouldn’t 

we want an agreement like that with Cuba if we could get it? 

Admiral SALERNO. Sir, the way we are approaching that is multilaterally under the auspices of the Cartagena Convention, which 

covers most of the Caribbean, including Cuba, but also the Bahamas, Jamaica, Mexico, the other countries that are planning to engage in drilling activity. 

That is the forum for coming to some agreement on mutual cooperation, sharing of resources, notifications and joint response activity. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. I now recognize the gentleman from 

Florida for five minutes. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My question is for Mr. 

Bromwich to start off. 

Regarding the inspection that is going to take place on the 

Repsol rig, do we have a more exact timetable of when that is going 

to occur? 

21 

Mr. BROMWICH. We don’t have an exact timetable because it depends on the speed of the vessel coming from foreign waters. Our 

best estimate is sometime in the first half of December, but that 

could slide. 

Mr. RIVERA. First half of December? 

Mr. BROMWICH. Correct. 

Mr. RIVERA. And tell me a little bit about how that inspection 

will take place and how we will know or become aware of the results of that inspection. 

Mr. BROMWICH. We will have a small team of inspectors, together 

with Coast Guard inspectors, that will actually board the vessel 

and go through the full set of the inspection regime that it would 

conduct on a rig in U.S. waters and go through all of that. We will 

receive the information from that inspection. We will also provide 

feedback to Repsol, pointing out any deficiencies that we have observed. 

Mr. RIVERA. And when you point out, hypothetically speaking, 

any deficiencies there will be time to address deficiencies before it 

actually enters Cuban waters? 

Mr. BROMWICH. Well, it depends on the deficiencies. I think for 

most the answer is yes, but for some, depending on what we find, 

that may take more time. We won’t know until we actually identify 

deficiencies if there are any. 

Mr. RIVERA. Now we mentioned earlier about enforcement capabilities. Going past the inspections, let us say we have given them 

our concerns as to their deficiencies and it enters Cuban waters. 

In terms of enforcement capabilities in national waters of other nations, does the United States have any enforcement capabilities on 

rigs in the waters of other nations right now: Mexico, Canada, 

other nations? 

Mr. BROMWICH. No. 

Mr. RIVERA. So even if Cuba were our best neighbor and Cuba 

was not a state sponsor of terrorism and Cuba was not a nation 

that holds American citizens hostage, as is occurring right now, 

even if all that were not to be true, the United States would still 

not have enforcement capabilities. Is that correct? 

Mr. BROMWICH. That is correct. And let me follow up a little bit 

about the inspection. I want to make clear that the completeness 

and the thoroughness of the inspection will not match what we are 

able to do in U.S. waters. 

There are certain aspects of the inspection that you do, including, 

for example, what is called an on-bottom test of the blowout preventer that can only be done at the site where the rig will actually 

be doing its work. And since our inspection will be many, many 

miles from where the rig will be drilling there are certain things, 

about a dozen things, that we will not be able to do because we are 

not doing the inspection where the drilling will already take place. 

Mr. RIVERA. No, I understand. 

Mr. BROMWICH. So I want to be clear that in our judgment it is 

a lot better than nothing, but I don’t want you or anyone else to 

think it is equivalent to—— 

Mr. RIVERA. No, I understand that. I am only making the point 

once it enters Cuban waters, because I know some have tried to 

make the argument that if you lift the embargo, for example, that 

22 

somehow that is a panacea in terms of enforcing what could happen in Cuban waters. 

And that is just not the case because we do not have enforcement 

capabilities, as you have said, in other nations’ waters, correct? 

Mr. BROMWICH. That is correct, yes. 

Mr. RIVERA. Yes? Did you want to add something? 

Admiral SALERNO. If I could offer just one caveat to that? 

Mr. RIVERA. Yes. 

Admiral SALERNO. I agree with everything Mr. Bromwich said. 

However, there is one distinction. If U.S. flag drilling rigs are operating in foreign waters, the U.S. does have jurisdiction over the rig 

itself. 

Mr. RIVERA. And the flag on this particular rig? 

Admiral SALERNO. The flag on this rig is Bahamas. 

Mr. RIVERA. OK. 

Admiral SALERNO. But if a U.S. flag—— 

Mr. RIVERA. So we would not have enforcement capabilities? 

Admiral SALERNO. Not on this one, no. 

Mr. RIVERA.—on this rig irrespective of the current relations? 

Admiral SALERNO. Correct. That is correct. 

Mr. RIVERA. Mr. Bromwich, let me ask you, any assurances from 

Repsol as to this rig’s compliance with existing economic sanctions 

against the Castro dictatorship? 

Mr. BROMWICH. Yes. My understanding is that they have complied with the rules that govern—— 

Mr. RIVERA. How did you reach that understanding? 

Mr. BROMWICH. Based on information supplied by Repsol. 

Mr. RIVERA. Repsol has given information regarding the rig not 

being in violation of any U.S. law in terms of the parts on the rig? 

Mr. BROMWICH. Correct. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. And with the indulgence of the witnesses, let 

us have a second round, but a truncated second round, two and a 

half minutes per Member. And if the clerk could keep track of that? 

I will begin. 

Mr. Bromwich or I guess Mr. Salerno also, will any other agencies be assisting with the inspection that we have been talking 

about? For example, will you be using Commerce or Treasury 

agents to review the equipment and parts of the rig? 

Admiral SALERNO. Not to my knowledge, sir. This would be a 

technical exam, and we have the technical expertise within our 

cadre to perform that inspection, as does BSEE from their aspect. 

Mr. BROMWICH. I agree with that. We have had no conversations 

that I am aware of that Treasury and Commerce personnel would 

be boarding the rig. I am not sure any of them has ever done an 

inspection. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. Just wanted to clarify that. That is all that 

I have for this hearing, and I would like to now recognize the 

Ranking Member. 

Mr. HOLT. Director Bromwich, you said earlier you wouldn’t be 

able to conduct an inspection of the rig, so what sorts of things 

would not be covered, and have you been able to talk with your 

counterparts in Cuba say to get some assurance that those inspections that you would have conducted perhaps would be conducted? 

23 

Mr. BROMWICH. There is a list of 12 or 13 items that I got from 

our personnel. 

Mr. HOLT. Give us a sense. Do you have a sense? 

Mr. BROMWICH. One is the on-bottom test that I mentioned before, which is actually an important test. One is we generally inspect how the well has been secured. We obviously can’t do that. 

There are specific diverter system requirements we are not going 

to be able to check, specific well control drill requirements we are 

not going to be able to check, specific drilling fluid program requirements we are not going to be able to check and specific casing 

program requirements that relate to the implementation of the 

drilling program that we are not going to be able to check. 

Mr. HOLT. And have you been able to talk with counterparts in 

Cuba to see that those are being done? 

Mr. BROMWICH. No, we have not. 

Mr. HOLT. If there were a bilateral agreement, would you expect 

to have those conversations or even that inspection authority? 

Mr. BROMWICH. Well, I think it would be likely we would have 

such instructions. I am not sure if we had those kinds of discussions around and available and we had confidence in the Cuban 

regulatory regime, I am not sure that we would even be doing this 

inspection. 

Mr. HOLT. Director Bromwich, one last thing. This Committee 

has invited the CEOs of BP and other companies involved in the 

Deepwater Horizon disaster to testify this afternoon. The CEOs 

from these four companies have all refused to appear. 

Do you believe that these CEOs should testify before Congress on 

the government’s joint investigation report on the spill so that the 

American people can hear from them what actions the companies 

are taking to improve the safety of their drilling operations? 

Mr. BROMWICH. Well, with the litigation and enforcement proceedings going on, I understand their decision, but I am quite disappointed by their decision. It is obviously an issue of great public 

importance. I know that Members on both sides would like to hear 

from the CEOs of those companies. 

Mr. HOLT. We are disappointed in those decisions too and feel 

the public deserve and really need to hear. Thank you. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. And I am also disappointed that the 

Departments of State, Commerce and Treasury refused to be here 

this morning. I am very disappointed in them. 

I would now like to recognize the gentleman from Florida if he 

has any followup questions. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much. First, before I proceed with 

my question, which will be for the Coast Guard, Mr. Chairman, I 

would like to ask unanimous consent that a letter which was sent 

to President Obama yesterday and signed by my colleagues, the 

Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, 

Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart, Congressman Albio Sires, regarding this very issue expressing our concerns as to the inspections of 

the rig and the lack of conformity with U.S. law, if that could be 

entered into the record with your permission. 

Mr. LAMBORN. If there is no objection, that will be entered into 

the record. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much. 

24 

[The letter submitted for the record by Mr. Rivera follows:] 


71116.005.eps

The Honorable Barack Obama 

President of the United States 

The White House 

Washington, D.C. 20500 

Dear Mr. President: 

([011 \Jtel5l5 of tlJI'. l!l1nitl'u s.tntl'l5 

Wo"billijtOIl, J'i)(!; 20515 

November 1,2011 

We are extremely concerned over what seems to be a lack ofa coordinated effOlt by the 

Administration to prevent a State Sponsor of Terrorism, just 90 miles from our shores, from engaging 

in risky deep sea oil drilling projects that wiIl harm U.S. interests as weIl as extend another economic 

lifeline to the Cuban regime. 

Spain's state-owned energy company, Repsol, has entered into an agreement with the Cuban 

regime to drill off Cuba's coast. A Chinese-built deep water oil rig will be used for this project - the 

Scarabeo 9. Despite the fact that the oil rig has not reached Cuban territorial waters, or the Western 

Hemisphere for that matter, the Department of Interior has been actively providing assistance, 

guidance, and technical advice to Repsol. This is inconsistent with numerous U.S. foreign policy and 

national security objectives with regards to Cuba. 

111e Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) as implemented by 3 I C.F.R. § 515.201, prohibits 

certain transactions involving propcl1y in which Cuba or a Cuban national has any inlerest whatsoever, 

directly or indirectly. The support that the Department of Interior is providing to Repsol appears \D be 

in contravention ofTWEA, as such assistance will result in a financial windfall to the Cuban regime. It 

may also facilitate processes (hat could lead to an environmental disaster off U.S. shores and the 

greater Caribbean. 

The Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement for the Department of 

Interior at a recent Senate Energy and Natural Resomces Committee hearing, indicated that Interior, in 

coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard, will conduct an examination of the rig just before it enters 

Cuban waters. However, in conjunction with this examination, we request that the Department of 

Commerce's Bmeau of Industry and Security (BIS) also be involved and conduct its own review and 

inspection to ensure that no U.S. laws or regulations are being violated, including the TWEA and the 

Export Administration Act (EAA). 

We are concerned by reports that the Scarabeo 9 may have been designed specifically to avoid 

U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba. While the EAA and the Export Administration Regulations 

(EAR) generally prohibit virtually all exports and reexports of U.S. - origin goods, software and 

technology to Cuba, we need clarity on how the Administration is applying the sanctions and EAR to 

foreign produced items incomorating 10 percent or less controlled U.S. content. 
25 

Mr. RIVERA. And my question for the Coast Guard. In the case 

of a foreign sourced spill, whether it comes from Mexico, the Bahamas or Cuba, and that oil reaches American waters and beaches, 

who would pay for that cleanup? 

Admiral SALERNO. Two answers on that, sir. One is we immediately would open the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, so we have 

a source of funding to manage the Coast Guard and private contractor response in our EEZ, in our waters and our coasts. We 

would also seek legal avenues to obtain compensation from the 

source. 

When it occurs in a foreign EEZ it becomes very complicated legally, very fact-dependent. However, I do know that Department of 

Justice as well as the legal branches of many of the involved agencies are working with those issues now and running through various scenarios as to how that would be applied. 

Mr. RIVERA. Now, in terms of the Oil Liability Trust Fund that 

you mentioned, there is a cap on that? 

Admiral SALERNO. That is correct. The fund is broken up into 

two parts. There is an emergency fund and a principal fund. 


71116.006.eps
26 

Mr. RIVERA. What are the caps? 

Admiral SALERNO. There is a $1 billion cap per incident. The ini- tial authorization is for $50 million. It can be advanced by $100 

million and then beyond that requires congressional approval, but 

the overall cap is $1 billion. 

Mr. RIVERA. And is there a cap within that $1 billion for response? 

Admiral SALERNO. That is the response portion of the fund. The overall fund is a $2 billion plus fund. 

Mr. RIVERA. So there is not a $125 million cap on response? 

Admiral SALERNO. Well, the initial authorization is $50 million. 

It can be enhanced by $100 million, so that is $150 million, and 

then beyond that requires congressional approval. 

Mr. RIVERA. I only have a few seconds left, but let me just ask 

you, what was the ultimate cost of the response on the Deepwater 

Horizon? 

Admiral SALERNO. The cost to the fund—sorry, I would have to 

get you an exact amount. I don’t believe we—we did not reach the 

$1 billion mark. 

BP of course paid about roughly $20 billion in response plus another $20 billion for the Gulf Coast restoration, so about $40 billion 

total paid. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. I want to thank the panel for their testimony, for each of them being here. Members of the Committee may 

have additional questions for the record, and I would ask that you 

respond to these in writing. We appreciate your attendance today. 

Mr. BROMWICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LAMBORN. You are welcome. 

Admiral SALERNO. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LAMBORN. You are welcome. 

I would now like to invite forward the second panel consisting of 

Mr. Mauricio Claver-Carone, Executive Director of the Cuba Democracy Advocates; Mr. Jorge Pin ̃ on, Visiting Research Fellow, 

Latin American and Caribbean Center of Cuban Research Institute; Mr. Daniel Whittle, Senior Attorney and Cuba Program Director, the Environmental Defense Fund; and Ms. Caitlyn Antrim, Executive Director of the Rule of Law Committee for the Oceans. 

[Pause.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. Thank you for being here today. Like all our 

witnesses, your written testimony will appear in full in the hearing 

record, so I ask that you keep your oral statements to five minutes 

as outlined in the invitation letter to you. 

Our microphones are not automatic. Like I was saying earlier, 

you have to turn them on to begin speaking. The way our timing 

lights work is that when you begin to speak the clerk will start the 

timer and a green light comes on. After four minutes a yellow light 

comes on, and after five minutes the red light comes on. 

Mr. Claver-Carone, you may begin. 

STATEMENT OF MAURICIO CLAVER-CARONE, 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CUBA DEMOCRACY ADVOCATES 

Mr. CLAVER-CARONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is truly a 

privilege to be here with all of you today. My name is Mauricio 

27 

Claver-Carone, and I am the Executive Director of Cuba Democracy Advocates, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to 

the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in 

Cuba. 

I have held this position for seven years, and throughout this 

time I have been closely monitoring the plans, developments and 

geopolitical motivations behind the Cuban regime’s efforts to pursue offshore oil exploration. 

However, it is important to note that despite the broad media attention given to the Cuban regime’s most recent plans, which we 

are discussing here today, its efforts to conduct offshore oil exploration date back almost 20 years now, and ultimately all of them 

have been unsuccessful. 

Please allow me to begin with some broader observations. Cuba 

is a totalitarian dictatorship. It is the sole remaining dictatorship 

in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, it should not be viewed 

through the same lens as its democratic neighbors, the Bahamas 

and Mexico, nor should it be treated in the same manner. 

The Bahamas and Mexico are allies of the United States. We 

share a relationship of trust and cooperation with these two friendly nations. Meanwhile, the Cuban regime remains under U.S. sanctions, which Congress codified into law under the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, due to three fundamental reasons: 1] The brutal violations of the Cuban people’s human, civil, 

political and economic rights; 2] Its hostile anti-American policies; 

and 3] The illegal expropriation of properties belonging to U.S. nationals. 

Moreover, Cuba remains one of four countries designated by the 

U.S. Government as a state sponsor of terrorism based on its harboring of fugitives, including the murderers of U.S. law enforcement officials, its unwillingness to cooperate with U.S. 

antiterrorism efforts, its intelligence gathering and sharing with 

other rogue regimes and its support for foreign terrorist organizations. The other three countries on the state sponsors of terrorism 

list are Iran, Sudan and Syria. 

Considering the background of Cuba’s regime, a strong case can 

be made that it is not in our national interest to lift sanctions and 

assist yet another anti-American dictatorship, particularly a state 

sponsor of terrorism, in its ambitions for oil exploration. To do so 

would not ease domestic fuel costs or enhance energy independence 

here at home, which should be the goal of U.S. energy policy. 

To the contrary, it would add to the extortionate practices that 

other oil-producing dictatorships have exploited for the last half a 

century. Furthermore, considering that the same Cuban regime has 

already expropriated U.S. oil assets in the past, it would send a 

dangerous message to other hostile governments that, in this region alone, would like to do the same. 

Now allow me to focus on some of the specifics of the Cuban regime’s offshore exploration plans, which unfortunately tend to get 

overlooked. Despite the Cuban regime’s highly publicized efforts 

over the last 20 years, there have been no commercially viable discoveries or extraction of oil in waters off Cuba’s shores. Moreover, 

there is currently no drilling taking place in waters off Cuba’s 

shores. 

28 

The Cuban regime first began using offshore drilling rights to extract political concessions from various nations of the world soon 

after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which ended that country’s hefty subsidies to Cuba. According to recently declassified documents by Brazilian Foreign Ministry, in 1993 the Cuban regime 

first offered the government of then-President Itamar Franco the 

most promising blocks for oil exploration to Brazil’s national oil 

company, Petrobras, in exchange for their shunning of Cuban dissidents on the island and canceling a meeting with Cuban exiles 

at the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, D.C. The Brazilian Government happily complied with both, only to exit from Cuba emptyhanded years later. 

The Cuban regime found a new partner when Hugo Chavez rose 

to the presidency of oil-rich Venezuela in 1998. With the backing 

of Chavez and Venezuela’s state oil company, the Cuban regime resumed its diplomatic offensive, signing highly publicized oil leases 

with Spain’s Repsol, Norway’s Statoil, Russia’s Gazprom, India’s 

ONGC, Malaysia’s Petronas, Canada’s Sherritt, Angola’s Sonangol, 

Vietnam’s PetroVietnam and China’s CNPC. 

However, only one company has actually conducted any exploratory drilling, Spain’s Repsol in 2004. It found some oil but not in 

any commercially viable quantities. It then pulled out of Cuba. 

Similarly, after much initial fanfare, Canada’s Sherritt and Brazil’s Petrobras, perhaps the most credible and respected of the region’s oil companies outside the United States, publicly abandoned 

their efforts in 2008 and 2011 respectively, stating that Cuba offshore drilling was not commercially viable and citing poor prospects. 

Much of this can be attributed to U.S. sanctions, which dramatically drive up cost of production. The Cuban regime has itself admitted that U.S. sanctions make it commercially impractical to 

produce oil in its territorial waters. As long as U.S. trade sanctions 

against Cuba remain in place, producing or refining any oil found 

in Cuban waters isn’t an option. 

That leads to the question, if offshore drilling in Cuban waters 

is not commercially viable for the most respectable regional oil 

companies which are located relatively close to Cuba and have the 

most experience in dealing with the Cubans, is such drilling really 

viable for the Angolans, the Malaysians or the Chinese? The answer is no. 

Initially, as the Ranking Member noted, we learned this in 2006 

when the Cuban regime had seemingly convinced public policymakers in Washington and many here in Congress that the Chinese were ready to drill off Cuba’s shores. That threat never materialized, but it served the Cuban regime’s political interests. 

Last year’s oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico by BP and the justifiable public outrage that ensued has given the regime a new and 

strategic opportunity to use the threat of offshore drilling as a 

means of forcing the U.S. to unilaterally ease sanctions. 

Despite the fact that Repsol still faces exploratory hurdles, the 

U.S. is erring on the side of caution. While such precautions are 

necessary, efforts should also be made to prevent the Cuban regime 

from engaging in offshore exploration altogether. Precaution might 

bring us temporary peace of mind, but prevention would better 

29 

serve our long-term national interest, and there is legislation filed 

in Congress to do so. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. Again, I truly appreciate the invitation and the opportunity to speak before you and 

the Committee. I will be pleased to respond to any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Claver-Carone follows:] 

Statement of Mauricio Claver-Carone, Executive Director, 

Cuba Democracy Advocates 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It’s truly a privilege to be here with all of you today. 

My name is Mauricio Claver-Carone and I’m the Executive Director of Cuba Democracy Advocates, a non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Cuba. 

I have held this position for seven years and throughout this time, I have been 

closely monitoring the plans, developments and geo-political motivations behind the 

Cuban regime’s efforts to pursue offshore oil exploration. 

However, it’s important to note that despite the broad media attention given to 

the Cuban regime’s most recent plans, which we are discussing here today, its efforts to conduct offshore oil exploration date back almost 20 years. And ultimately— 

all of them have been unsuccessful. 

Please allow me to begin with some broader observations. 

Cuba is a totalitarian dictatorship. It is the sole remaining dictatorship in the 

Western Hemisphere. Therefore, it should not be viewed through the same lens as 

its democratic neighbors, the Bahamas and Mexico—nor should it be treated in the 

same manner. The Bahamas and Mexico are allies of the United States. We share a relationship 

of trust and cooperation with these two friendly nations. Meanwhile, the Cuban regime remains under U.S. sanctions, which Congress codified into law under the 

1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, due to three fundamental reasons: 1. the brutal violations of the Cuban people’s human, civil, political and economic rights. 2. its hostile anti-American policies. 3. the illegal expropriation of 

properties belonging to U.S. nationals. 

Moreover, Cuba remains one of four countries designated by the U.S. Government 

as a state-sponsor of terrorism based on its harboring of fugitives (including the 

murderers of U.S. law enforcement officials); its unwillingness to cooperate with 

U.S. anti-terrorism efforts; its intelligence gathering and sharing with other rogue 

regimes; and its support for foreign terrorist organizations. The other three countries on the state-sponsors of terrorism list are Iran, Sudan and Syria. 

Considering the background of Cuba’s regime, a strong case can be made that it 

is not in our national interest to lift sanctions and assist yet another anti-American 

dictatorship—and state-sponsor of terrorism—in its ambitions for oil exploration. To 

do so would not ease domestic fuel costs or enhance energy independence here at 

home, which should be the goals of U.S. energy policy. To the contrary, it would add 

to the extortionate practices that other oil-producing dictatorships have exploited for 

the last half-a-century. 

Furthermore, considering that this same Cuban regime has already expropriated 

U.S. oil assets in the past (Esso and Texaco), it would send a dangerous message 

to other hostile governments that—in this region alone (e.g. Hugo Chavez in Venezuela)—would like to do the same. 

Now, allow me to focus on some of the specifics of the Cuban regime’s offshore 

exploration plans, which unfortunately tend to get overlooked. 

Despite the Cuban regime’s highly publicized efforts over the last 20 years, there 

have been no commercially viable discoveries or extraction of oil in waters off Cuba’s 

shores. Moreover, there is currently no drilling taking place in waters off Cuba’s 

shores. 

The Cuban regime first began using offshore-drilling rights to extract political 

concessions from various nations of the world soon after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which ended that country’s hefty subsidies to Cuba. 

According to recently declassified documents by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, 

in 1993 the Cuban regime first offered the government of then President Itamar 

Franco the ‘‘most promising’’ blocks for oil exploration to Brazil’s national oil company, Petrobras, in exchange for their shunning of Cuban dissidents on the island 

and cancelling a meeting with Cuban exiles at the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, D.C. The Brazilian government complied with both, only to exit from Cuba 

empty-handed years later. 

30 

The Cuban regime found a new ‘‘partner’’ when Hugo Chavez rose to the presidency of oil-rich Venezuela in 1998. With the backing of Chavez and Venezuela’s 

state-oil company PdVSA, the Cuban regime resumed its diplomatic offensive signing highly publicized oil-leases with Spain’s Repsol, Norway’s Statoil, Russia’s 

Gazprom, India’s ONGC Videsh, Malaysia’s Petronas, Canada’s Sherritt, Angola’s 

Sonangol, Vietnam’s PetroVietnam and China’s CNPC. 

Only one company, however, has actually conducted any exploratory drilling— 

Spain’s Repsol in 2004. It found some oil, but not in any commercially viable quantities. It then pulled out of Cuba. 

Similarly, after much initial fanfare, Canada’s Sherritt and Brazil’s Petrobras— 

perhaps the most credible and respected of the region’s oil companies outside the 

United States—publicly abandoned their efforts in 2008 and 2011, respectively, stating that Cuba offshore drilling was ‘‘not commercially viable’’ and citing ‘‘poor prospects.’’ 

Much of this can be attributed to U.S. sanctions, which dramatically drive up 

costs of production. The Cuban regime has itself admitted that U.S. sanctions make 

it commercially impractical to produce oil in its territorial waters. Keep in mind 

that even the largest neighboring foreign oil companies, Mexico’s Pemex and Venezuela’s PdVSA, refine the majority of their oil in the U.S. and then repatriate it, 

for they lack the domestic infrastructure to process their own heavy crude and the 

U.S.’s geographical proximity enhances profitability. As long as U.S. trade sanctions 

against Cuba’s regime are in place, producing and refining any oil found in Cuban 

waters in the United States isn’t an option. 

That leads to a question: If off-shore drilling in Cuban waters is not commercially 

viable for the most respectable regional oil companies, which are located relatively 

close to Cuba and have the most experience in dealing with Cubans, is such drilling 

really viable for the Angolans, Malaysians or the Chinese? The answer is no. 

Initially, we learned this in 2006, when the Cuban regime seemingly had convinced public policymakers in Washington—including many here in Congress—that 

the Chinese were ready to drill off Cuba’s shores. The threat never materialized, but 

it served the Cuban regime’s political interests. As Reuters reported from Cuba at 

the time: ‘‘Havana is eager to see American oil companies join forces with the antiembargo lobby led by U.S. farmers who have been selling food to Cuba for four 

years.’’ 

Last year’s oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico by BP and the justifiable public outrage 

that ensued has given the Cuban regime a new and strategic opportunity to use the 

threat of offshore drilling as a means of forcing the U.S. to unilaterally ease sanctions. Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez has confirmed this on various occasions and relayed as much to former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, who recently 

traveled to Havana in an unsuccessful effort to secure the release of American hostage Alan Gross; Gross has been held for nearly two years in a Cuban prison for 

helping the island’s Jewish community connect to the Internet. 

In a flashback to 2004, Spain’s Repsol is back in Cuba preparing to drill another 

exploratory well early next year. This time, the Cuban regime is ‘‘threatening’’ that 

if Repsol is pressured into abandoning drilling, India’s ONGC Videsh or Malaysia’s 

Petronas will step forward. 

Curiously, this peculiar corporate trio was granted extensive oil-rights last year 

by Hugo Chavez to develop a block with 235 billion barrels of reserves in Venezuela’s oil-rich Orinoco belt. Reserves in that one Venezuelan block alone are believed to be 50 times greater than the best estimates in all of Cuba’s territorial 

waters. Some geo-political foul play can surely be deduced from the particularity 

and timing of this arrangement. 

Despite the fact that Repsol still faces exploratory hurdles (and gargantuan production costs if oil is ever found), the United States is erring on the side of caution 

and licensing specialty oil spill mitigation firms to respond quickly in the case of 

an accident. This is also not a new phenomenon. The U.S. has been licensing such 

firms since at least 2001. Moreover, current U.S. law provides all of the necessary 

flexibility to do so. 

While such precautions are necessary, efforts should also be made to prevent the 

Cuban regime from engaging in offshore exploration altogether. The anti-American 

nature of the Cuban regime will simply not provide the necessary safeguards regardless of the level of U.S. engagement on this issue. Thus, there is currently legislation filed with this goal in mind, including H.R. 2047, the Caribbean Coral Reef 

Protection Act, which targets U.S. visas and loans to the Cuban regime’s foreign 

business partners, and H.R. 373, which amends the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 

Act to deny U.S. leases to foreign companies that engage in oil exploration with 

countries under U.S. sanctions, such as Iran and Cuba. Precaution might bring us 

31 

temporary peace of mind, but prevention would better serve our long-term national 

interests. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. Again, I truly appreciate the invitation and the opportunity to speak before you and the committee. I will be pleased 

to respond to any questions. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Pin ̃ on, you may begin. 

STATEMENT OF JORGE R. PIN ̃ ON, VISITING RESEARCH 

FELLOW, LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN CENTER, 

CUBAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. 

The 1982 Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the 

Sea defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use 

of the world’s oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment and the management of their marine natural resources. 

The United States has signed maritime boundary agreements 

with most of its neighbors—Russia [Alaska], Canada [ex Arctic 

Ocean], Cuba and Mexico—delineating an economic exclusive zone 

under which each state has sovereign rights on the exploration and 

exploitation of its water, seabed and subsurface marine resources. 

As the United States, Mexico, Cuba and the Bahamas embark in 

developing their respective deepwater hydrocarbon resources within their EEZs and after the catastrophic experience of the Ixtoc and 

Macondo well blowouts, the establishment of a working relation between all four countries and marine environmental protection 

would assist in the contingency planning and cooperation necessary 

to an early and truly effective response to an accidental oil spill. 

The United States has already in place agreements of cooperation with Mexico and Canada that set protocols to follow in case 

of an oil spill which would pose a threat to their shared marine environment. A similar bilateral agreement is urgently needed with 

Cuba and the Bahamas. 

The Bahamas, Cuba and the United States are signatories of 

multilateral agreements that commit the parties to prepare for and 

cooperate on potential oil spills. As was mentioned here, this includes the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness 

Response and Cooperation, which was adopted in 1990 under the 

auspices of the International Maritime Organization. Under the 

Convention, parties are required to establish measures for dealing 

with pollution incidents either nationally or in cooperation with 

other countries. 

To respond effectively to an oil-related marine accident, all four 

countries would also require immediate access to each other’s oil 

services and equipment resources that can provide the needed instant technology and know-how that will be needed to prevent, 

limit and hold the damage of their shared marine environment. 

We are very naive to think that in the case of Cuba a handful 

of licenses would prevent and contain a deepwater oil exploratory 

well blowout. A general license to export and supply equipment, 

personnel and services to international oil companies operating in 

Cuba in the case of an emergency is urgently needed. 

32 

Deepwater Horizon response resources needed to assist in containment and cleanup efforts were unprecedented: over 48,000 responders, more than 5,050 vessels, over 10 billion feet of containment boom, two million gallons of dispersant and also two ultra 

deepwater semi-submersibles that were needed to drill relief wells 

to permanently seal the reservoir. 

Over the last few months we have seen a number of congressional concerns questioning the experience in deepwater drilling of 

the international oil companies, the standards and regulations 

under which they will operate, the technology and quality of the 

drilling equipment and the lack of a multilateral disaster preparedness and coordination agreement in the event of an oil spill. 

Most noticeable, Mr. Chairman, throughout this debate, it has 

been singularly focused on Spain’s publicly held oil company, 

Repsol, while ignoring all other exploratory oil drilling activities in 

Cuba, Mexico and the Bahamas by a number of state-owned national oil companies, such as Malaysia’s Petronas, Russia’s 

Gazprom and Mexico’s Pemex, among others. 

Mexico, Cuba and the Bahamas are in the process of implementing the most up-to-date drilling regulations and standards, 

but do they have the resources, capabilities, assets, personnel and 

experience to enforce them? Can these countries’ regulatory agencies appropriately police the operators? 

The United States not only needs to reach out and share lessons 

learned and best practices with all companies operating in the region for the benefit and protection of our common economic and environmental interests but most importantly with the regulatory 

agencies such as Mexico’s Comisio ́n Nacional de Hidrocarburos, 

Cuba’s Oficina de Regulacio ́n Ambiental y Seguridad Nuclear and 

the Bahamas’ Ministry on the Environment. 

Having said this, the recent unprecedented international role 

played by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and 

Environmental Enforcement appears to me, Mr. Chairman, to be 

outside of its constitutional mandate to take charge of the nation’s 

internal affairs and therefore merits further review and consideration as it establishes precedents which are not in the best interests of the United States’ national security and could impact negatively in your efforts of hydrocarbon development in the Perdido 

Fault of Mexico and in the Chukchi Sea. 

The economic and environmental consequences from an accidental oil spill for all 19 million Florida residents demands 

proactive joint planning by Cuba, Mexico and the Bahamas and the 

United States. In order to prevent such a disaster, this planning 

should be done in the spirit of cooperation and not confrontation. 

The editorial position of Florida’s three largest newspapers, Mr. 

Chairman, underscores this view. The St. Petersburg Times, and I 

quote, ‘‘Florida lawmakers’ hope of thwarting Cuba’s offshore drilling ambitions by isolating it from oil companies that do business 

in the United States is shortsighted political posturing that won’t 

work.’’ 

The Fort Lauderdale Sun Sentinel, ‘‘Cuba’s oil drilling ought to 

be put above the diplomatic and political fray.’’ 

33 

And The Orlando Sentinel, ‘‘Politics instead of wise policy continues to undermine the U.S. approach to oil drilling in Cuban 

waters.’’ 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pin ̃ on follows:] 

Statement of Jorge R. Pin ̃ on, Visiting Research Fellow, Florida 

International University Latin American and Caribbean Center, Cuban 

Research Institute 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for the privilege and 

honor to be here today testifying and sharing with you what I consider to be an 

issue of national security. 

My name is Jorge Pin ̃ on, I am a Visiting Research Fellow with Florida International University, Latin American and Caribbean Center’s Cuban Research Institute. I am also the former president of Amoco Oil de Mexico and president of Amoco 

Oil Latin America. 

The 1982 Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) 

defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world’s oceans, 

establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of the 

marine natural resources. 

The United States has signed maritime boundary agreements with most of its 

neighbors; Russia (Alaska), Canada (ex Arctic Ocean), Cuba, and Mexico; delineating an economic exclusive zone—EEZ—over which each state has sovereign 

rights on the exploration and exploitation of its water, seabed, and subsurface marine resources. 

As The United States, Mexico, Cuba and The Bahamas embark in developing 

their respective deepwater hydrocarbon resources within their EEZs, and after the 

catastrophic experience of the Ixtoc and Macundo wells blowouts, the establishment 

of working relations between all four countries in marine environmental protection 

would assist in the contingency planning and cooperation necessary to an early and 

truly effective response to an accidental oil spill. 

The United States have already in place agreements of cooperation with Mexico 

and Canada which set protocols to follow in case of an oil spill which would pose 

a threat to their shared marine environment. A similar bilateral agreement is urgently needed with Cuba and The Bahamas. 

Cuba, The Bahamas and the United States are signatories of multilateral agreements that commit the parties to prepare for and cooperate on potential oil spills. 

This includes the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation (OPRC), which was adopted in 1990 under the auspices of 

the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Under the convention, parties are 

required to establish measures for dealing with pollution incidents, either nationally 

or in cooperation with other countries. 

To respond effectively to an oil-related marine accident, all four countries would 

also require immediate access to each others’ oil services and equipment resources 

that can provide the near-instant technology and know-how that will be needed to 

prevent, limit, and halt damage to their shared marine environment. 

We are very naı ̈ve to think that in the case of Cuba, a handful of individual export 

licenses could prevent and contain a deepwater oil exploratory well blowout. A general license to export and supply equipment, personnel and services to international 

oil companies operating in Cuba in the case of an emergency is urgently needed. 

The Deepwater Horizon response resources needed to assist in containment and 

cleanup efforts were unprecedented; over 48,000 responders, more than 5,050 vessels including skimmers, tugs, barges, tankers, and recovery vessels; hundreds of 

aircrafts, remotely operated vehicles, and multiple mobile offshore drilling units and 

support equipment, 2.93 million feet of containment boom, 8.35 million feet of sorbent boom and nearly 2 million gallons of dispersant. Also, 2 ultra-deepwater semisubmersibles were needed to drill relief wells to permanently seal the reservoir. 

Over the last few months, we have seen a number of congressional concerns questioning the experience in deepwater drilling of the international oil companies, the 

standards and regulations under which they will operate, the technology and quality 

of the drilling equipment, and the lack of a multi-lateral disaster preparedness and 

coordination agreement in the event of an oil spill. 

Most noticeable throughout this debate has been the singularly focus on Spain’s 

publicly held oil company Repsol, while ignoring all other exploratory oil drilling activities in Cuba, Mexico and The Bahamas by a number of state-owned national oil 

34 

companies such as; Malaysia’s Petronas, Russia’s Gazprom, India’s ONGC, Angola’s 

Sonangol, and Mexico’s Pemex among others. 

Mexico, Cuba and The Bahamas are in the process of implementing the most up 

to date drilling regulations and standards; but do they have the resources, capabilities, assets, personnel, and experience to enforce them? Can these countries’ regulatory agencies appropriately police the operators? 

The United States not only needs to reach out and shared lessons learned and 

best practices with all companies operating in the region for the benefit and protection of our common economic and environmental interests; but most importantly 

with the regulatory agencies such as Mexico’s Comision Nacional de Hidrocarburos, 

Cuba’s Oficina de Regulacio ́n Ambiental y Seguridad Nuclear, and The Bahamas 

Ministry of the Environment. 

Having said this, the recent unprecedented international role played by the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement appears to 

be outside of its constitutional mandate to ‘‘take charge of the Nation’s internal affairs’’ and therefore, merits further review and consideration as it establishes precedents which are not in the best interest of the United States national security; and 

could impact negatively in our efforts of hydrocarbon development in the Perdido 

Fault (Mexico) and in the Chukchi Sea (Russia). 

The economic and environmental consequences from an accidental oil spill for all 

19 million Florida residents, demands proactive joint planning by Mexico, Cuba, The 

Bahamas and the United States in order to prevent such a disaster. This planning 

should be done in a spirit of cooperation, and not confrontation. 

The editorial position of Florida’s three largest newspapers Mr. Chairman underscores this view: 

The St Petersburg Times; ‘‘Florida lawmakers’ hopes of thwarting Cuba’s 

offshore drilling ambitions by isolating it from oil companies that do business in the United States is shortsighted political posturing that won’t 

work.’’ (February 7, 2011) 

The Fort Lauderdale Sun Sentinel; ‘‘Cuba’s oil drilling ought to be put 

above the diplomatic and political fray.’’ (October 23, 2011) 

And the Orlando Sentinel; ‘‘Politics instead of wise policy continues to undermine the U.S. approach to oil drilling in Cuba’s waters.’’ (October 19, 

2011) 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Jorge R. Pin ̃ o ́n began his thirty year career in the energy sector when he joined 

Shell Oil Company. He was president and CEO of Transworld Oil USA prior to joining Amoco Corporation in 1991 as president of Amoco Corporate Development Company Latin America. In this position Mr. Pin ̃ on represented the business development and joint venture efforts in the region between Amoco Corporation and state 

oil companies. 

In 1994 he was transferred to the downstream oil sector to serve as president of 

Amoco Oil de Me ́xico and president of Amoco Oil Latin America, based in Mexico 

City. After the 1999 merger between Amoco and BP, Mr. Pin ̃ on was transferred to 

Madrid, Spain, to manage BP Europe’s western Mediterranean petroleum supply 

and logistics operations. He retired from BP in 2003. 

In 1997, when vice-president and member of the board of directors of the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico—AMCHAM—Mr. Pin ̃ on received the 

‘‘Yiacatecutli’’ award for distinguished service in the promotion of U.S.-Mexico business relations. 

Mr. Pin ̃ on is today an international energy consultant, as well as a visiting research fellow with Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean 

Center—Cuban Research Institute. With international experience in emerging markets and a network of senior energy contacts in Latin America, he is an independent 

analyst of regional energy issues, as well as the politics of oil and natural gas in 

Latin America. 

He is also recognized as an expert on Cuba’s energy sector, as well as on the island’s future economic transition challenges and opportunities. He is an advisor and 

a member of the Cuba task forces at The Brookings Institution and The Council of 

the Americas, and a member of the board of directors of the Association for the 

Study of the Cuban Economy—ASCE—; and a co-author of Cuba’s Energy Future: 

Strategic Approaches to Cooperation (Brookings, 2010), a monograph addressing the 

major challenges facing Cuba’s access to energy resources that are environmentally 

sustainable and sufficient to meet the nation’s revitalization and development goals. 

Mr. Pin ̃ on holds a degree in Economics and a certificate in Latin American Studies from the University of Florida. 

35 


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Mr. Whittle? 


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37 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL WHITTLE, SENIOR ATTORNEY/ 

CUBA PROGRAM DIRECTOR, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE 

FUND 

Mr. WHITTLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Committee. It is an honor to be here today. 

The Environmental Defense Fund has been working for years to 

rebuild fisheries and conserve coastal ecosystems in the Gulf of 

Mexico and along the Atlantic coast. We started working in Cuba 

in the year 2000 because the health of marine life, coral reefs and 

fisheries in the U.S. depends in part upon how well these resources 

are managed in Cuba. 

The BP disaster was a wakeup call and a costly reminder that 

deepwater drilling is inherently risky. Lessons from the massive 

spill are still being learned, and it falls to Congress, the Administration and industry to adopt reforms to ensure that nothing like 

it ever happens again in U.S. waters. Congress, the Administration 

and industry must also take steps now to ensure that nothing like 

it happens again in Mexican, Cuban or Bahamian waters. 

Following the Ixtoc spill in 1979, Mexico and the United States 

entered into an agreement called MEXUS to ensure close coordination and cooperation on planning and responding to future transboundary spills. As Vice Admiral Salerno indicated this morning, 

we also have similar agreements in place with Canada and Russia. 

Just months after the Deepwater Horizon blowout, the Administration initiated a new round of talks with all levels of Mexican 

Government designed to strengthen MEXUS. U.S. and Mexico are 

also talking and meeting on the need for common environmental 

and safety standards, which were not part of the original agreement 31 years ago. The Administration does not have a MEXUSlike agreement with Cuba, and discussions, as we know, between 

the two governments are extremely limited because of U.S. law and 

policy. 

A major spill in Cuban waters would have devastating environmental and economic impacts in both Cuba and the United States. 

In the U.S., marine life, coastal communities and livelihoods from 

Florida to North Carolina would be at risk. Florida’s multibillion 

dollar a year tourism and fishing industries, especially in the Keys 

and along the state’s East Coast, would take a direct and costly hit. 

With the prospect of oil drilling in Cuba as early as December, the 

Administration should act now to minimize the possibility of oil 

spills in Cuba altogether and to ensure that our national interests 

are fully protected. 

Dialogue and cooperation between the U.S. and Cuba on environmental protection and safety standards is not without precedent. 

Since 1963, the National Hurricane Center in Miami has worked 

directly with its Cuban counterparts to track and monitor tropical 

storms and hurricanes. The U.S. has provided training to Cuban 

forecasters, and in turn Cuba has allowed the U.S. Air Force C-130 

hurricane hunters into its airspace. This cooperation has saved 

lives and property. 

In its report earlier this year, which was already quoted, the 

President’s Oil Spill Commission called upon the U.S. Government 

to engage with both Cuba and Mexico to agree upon a common set 

of standards. The Administration has done this with Mexico, CanVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\71116.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
38 

ada and Russia but has not yet initiated such negotiations with 

Cuba. 

In September, I led a nine-member delegation to Havana with 

William Riley, the former EPA Administrator and Co-Chair of the 

Commission, and Richard Sears, the Commission’s chief scientist. 

Our delegation also included the International Association of Drilling Contractors president, Lee Hunt. Though Cuban environmental 

agencies have developed a strong set of regulations, best practices 

and standards, our visit confirmed that more needs to be done to 

ensure that Cuba is adequately prepared to regulate and oversee 

offshore oil exploration. 

In my written testimony, I outline some of the constructive steps 

that the Department of the Interior and Coast Guard have taken 

to date on this issue. Negotiations with Repsol are good, but they 

are no substitute for direct negotiations with Cuban government 

agencies. As a result, I believe the U.S. remains unprepared to 

minimize the environmental and economic damage that could occur 

from a spill in Cuban waters. 

My testimony also outlines a number of specific actions the Administration can take now. I believe the Administration should 

preauthorize companies through a general license to assist in preventing and responding to major oil spills in Cuban waters. Most 

importantly, the Administration should initiate a dialogue with 

Cuba, much like we have with Mexico and Canada, to ensure that 

future drilling is conducted safely. Also, dialogue is the best way 

to enhance transparency. It is in fact the only way in this case to 

have transparency. Third, the Administration should develop a 

joint contingency plan with Cuba. 

Ultimately our countries should work together much more broadly on environmental cooperation to protect the many shared resources, migratory fish populations, coral reefs, wetland systems, et 

cetera, that we share with our neighboring country. Thank you 

very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Whittle follows:] 

Statement of Daniel J. Whittle, Senior Attorney 

and Cuba Program Director, Environmental Defense Fund 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to join 

you in a discussion of the potential environmental implications of new offshore energy development and what measures can to be taken to protect marine ecosystems, 

coastal communities, and livelihoods against future oil spills in ocean waters we 

share with Cuba, Mexico and the Bahamas. 

My name is Daniel Whittle and I work for the Oceans Program at Environmental 

Defense Fund (EDF) where I am the director of the Cuba Program. EDF is a national environmental organization that searches for solutions that maximize economic incentives for solving environmental problems. 

EDF has been working in the Gulf of Mexico for 35 years to protect and restore 

coastal ecosystems and to rebuild troubled multi-billion dollar fisheries. EDF is 

working now to address the economic and environmental devastation of the BP oil 

disaster and to ensure that Congress sends money where it is needed most: projects 

to repair Gulf Coast communities, wildlife and the environment, including the restoration of the delta of the Mississippi River. We support passage of The Resources 

and Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist Opportunity, and Revived Economies of the 

Gulf States Act of 2011 (RESTORE Act) that would to ensure that 80 percent of 

the Clean Water Act (CWA) penalties to be paid by BP and other responsible parties 

will be used to restore the communities, economies and ecosystems of the Gulf region directly. 

For the past 11 years, under a specific license from the US Department of Treasury, EDF has worked with marine biologists and other scientists in Cuba to protect 

39 

coral reefs and other important ocean and coastal ecosystems, and to identify strategies for restoring declining fish populations. Cuba’s coral reefs remain of high quality and are vital habitats for many fish species of importance to the United States. 

The particular emphasis of our Cuba Program has been on waters of the Atlantic 

Ocean, the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico that the United States shares 

with and Cuba. Therefore, over the last several years we have closely monitored 

Cuba’s plans to develop offshore oil and gas resources in the Gulf of Mexico; since 

2009 we have been particularly focused on promoting bi-lateral and/or multi-lateral 

dialogue and cooperation to ensure that any oil exploration and production that does 

take place, proceeds in an environmentally sound and safe manner. 

Finally, my colleagues and I are also closely following Cuba’s progress in implementing country-wide energy efficiency programs and in its investment into renewable energy, including wind, solar, biomass, and clean ocean energy. 

Current US Policy on Cuba Impedes Cooperation on Environmental 

Protection 

Current US policy on Cuba permits EDF and other scientific, academic, and conservation organizations to conduct on-the-ground research and conservation projects 

with Cuban partners and institutions. Scientific and professional exchange is generally limited, however, to non-governmental groups and academic institutions. 

Most private companies are prohibited from doing business in Cuba because of the 

embargo. There is a narrow exception for some private entities, such as oil services 

companies, but they must first apply for specific approval from the US Treasury and 

Commerce Departments to provide services and export equipment to Cuba. This 

process is complicated and time-consuming and apparently few companies in the oil 

services sector have asked for or received specific licenses so far. In the event of an 

oil spill in Cuban waters, this licensing process would cost precious time. 

US government agencies such as the Coast Guard, the Department of Interior, the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) are extremely limited in their ability to communicate or 

coordinate with their Cuban government counterparts on environmental protection 

or natural resources management. This compromises each country’s ability to ensure 

that shared waters and natural resources are properly managed and adequately protected. 

This lack of dialogue, cooperation, and joint planning between government agencies leaves the United States especially vulnerable to future oil spills in Cuban 

waters. Florida and other states along the east coast as far as North Carolina would 

be threatened by a major oil spill in Cuba. Therefore, as outlined below, the Administration should take immediate steps to initiate negotiations with the Cuban government to ensure that sufficient environmental and safety safeguards are in place 

before drilling begins later this year. In addition, the Administration should pre-approve categories of private companies to send personnel and equipment to Cuba in 

the event of an oil spill that threatens US waters. 

Shared Ecosystems and Shared Resources 

Because of the prevailing currents and Cuba’s close proximity to the United 

States, Mexico and the Bahamas, marine and terrestrial ecosystems in all countries 

are tightly linked. For example, Cuba provides important spawning grounds for 

snappers, groupers and other reef fishes that are crucial to commercial and recreational fisheries along the southeast United States and in the Gulf of Mexico. 

Cuba, the Bahamas, and the United States also share a recently discovered deepwater coral ecosystem that covers more than 25,000 square miles and extends as 

far north as North Carolina. Cuba provides essential habitats that sustain an amazing array of birds and the area around Havana is a major launching point for most 

of the familiar songbirds that nest along the east coast of the United States. 

The health of the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem is inordinately important to the ecological systems of the Gulf and the people who depend upon it for their livelihoods 

and culture, but also to the ecosystems and fishing communities of the broader 

western Atlantic. The coastal wetlands and beaches of the Gulf provide essential 

habitats for the vast preponderance of economically important species harvested in 

the Gulf, one of America’s great fishing grounds. The coral reefs, eelgrass beds and 

mangrove swamps of the southern and eastern Gulf are key habitats for a wide 

array of marine organisms, and are especially vulnerable to oil pollution. 

The northern Gulf also functions as a key spawning and nursery ground for many 

highly migratory species from tunas to billfishes to sharks. In fact, whale sharks 

from a large portion of the North Atlantic congregate in the Gulf to feed. A large 

population of sperm whales lives in the northern Gulf, feeding on abundant midwater biota. In addition, the Gulf plays a key role for passage of larvae from upVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\71116.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
40 

current spawning grounds in the western Caribbean to and through the Florida 

Straits into the broader Atlantic beyond. 

Oil pollution in the Gulf threatens a wide array of essential habitats and important fishery species, and many protected species. 

Offshore Oil and Gas Development Demands Region-wide Planning and 

Cooperation 

As evidenced by the BP oil disaster in 2010 and the Ixtoc spill in the Bay of 

Campeche, Mexico in 1979, deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico is inherently 

risky and can result in severe and long lasting impacts to marine life, coastal ecosystems, and communities. These disasters underscore that oil spills do not observe 

political boundaries and that cross-border cooperation on spill prevention and response is in the best interests of each country. 

In 1980—prompted by the Ixtoc spill—Mexico and the United States entered into 

an agreement (known as the MEXUS agreement) for planning and responding to future spills that might threaten the waters of both countries. MEXUS includes a 

number of mandatory provisions designed to ensure the two countries have the 

readiness and capacity to prepare for and respond to trans-boundary oil spills. 

Among other things, the agreement provides for rapid incident notification, a joint 

response team, on-site coordinators, communication protocols, and expedited customs and immigration procedures to ensure that equipment and personnel can be 

deployed efficiently and in a timely manner. 

In its report earlier this year, President Obama’s National Commission on the BP 

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling recommended that cooperation be 

extended to include Cuba as well. 

‘‘It is in our country’s national interest to negotiate now with these near 

neighbors [Cuba and Mexico] to agree on a common, rigorous set of standards, a system for regulatory oversight, and the same operator adherence 

to the effective safety culture called for in this report, along with protocols 

to cooperate on containment and response strategies and preparedness in 

case of a spill.’’ 

In his testimony before the Senate Energy Committee on October 18, 2011, Michael Bromwich, the Director of the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Safety and 

Environmental Enforcement, indicated that United States-Mexico cooperation ‘‘has 

increased substantially in the aftermath of Deepwater Horizon and after the creation of the National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH), the Mexican agency responsible for regulating offshore drilling safety on Mexico’s continental shelf.’’ To their 

credit, Director Bromwich and Department of Interior Secretary Ken Salazar have 

held a series of meetings with Mexican officials to discuss the need for common safety and environmental standards for future offshore oil and gas development in the 

Gulf of Mexico. 

In contrast, the US government’s engagement with Cuba on this issue has been, 

for the most part, limited to the exchange of information after Cuban officials raised 

concerns that Cuban waters were threatened by the BP blowout. At that time, the 

two governments (through the US State Department and the Cuban Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs) opened up limited lines of communication, and US officials shared 

information and data with Cuba on the movement and transport of the oil, potential 

environmental impacts, and on response efforts being carried out in US waters. The 

US government also sought and received permission from Cuba to send a NOAA research vessel into Cuban waters to test for oil. 

In the absence of meaningful government-to-government dialogue, the Administration has taken some positive steps to enable private companies and non-governmental organizations to interact with Cuban agencies directly on this issue. For example, in the wake of BP, the US Treasury Department authorized the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) to meet with Cuban energy officials to discuss safety and environmental issues associated with offshore oil and gas 

production in Cuban waters. The Treasury and Commerce Departments have also 

signaled that they are prepared to issue more specific licenses to private companies 

in the US with the capacity to respond to, contain, and clean up oil spills. At least 

one US company, Clean Caribbean and Americas, already has Treasury and Commerce approvals to provide oil spill response services in Cuba. 

The Department of Interior has also reportedly had productive discussions with 

the Spanish company Repsol over its future drilling in Cuban waters and has apparently secured the company’s pledge to adhere to US environmental and safety standards. 

These positive steps, however, fall far short of those needed and pale in comparison to those the Administration taken to strengthen and expand cooperation with 

41 

Mexico. As a result, the United States remains unprepared to effectively assist in 

the prevention, containment, or clean-up of a major oil spill in Cuban waters. 

EDF Fact Finding Delegation to Cuba in September 2011 

In September 2011, EDF organized and led a fact finding delegation to Cuba on 

the government’s plans to develop oil and gas resources in the Gulf of Mexico. Our 

delegation of nine experts included William Reilly, former Administrator of the US 

Environmental Protection Agency and the co-chair of the President’s National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Richard 

Sears, chief scientist of the commission, and Lee Hunt, President of the International Association of Drilling Contractors, who partnered with EDF in planning 

and carrying out the delegation’s activities in Cuba. 

Our delegation met with a wide-range of Cuban officials and experts involved in 

the operation and regulation of offshore oil and gas exploration and development. 

Our goal was to get a better understanding of Cuba’s plans for offshore drilling, 

their approach to regulation and oversight of offshore operations, and of their readiness and capacity to conduct offshore activities in a safe and environmentally sound 

manner. We also came prepared to make suggestions to Cuban officials on how lessons learned from the BP oil spill should be incorporated into their laws, regulations, oversight, and response planning. 

The Cuban government made clear its determination to begin exploratory activities this year. Cuban energy officials indicated to us that, in partnership with 

Repsol and other foreign oil companies, they expect to drill up to six exploratory 

wells between 2011 and 2013. In such a short period of time, it was not possible 

for us to conduct a comprehensive assessment of Cuba’s oil drilling plans or of the 

strength of its regulatory framework and capacity, and many questions remain. 

Nonetheless, we had frank and open discussions and Cuban officials acknowledged 

the challenges associated with building an offshore oil and gas industry from 

scratch. They repeated their pledge to follow the highest international environmental and safety standards and expressed a strong willingness to cooperate with 

the United States and other countries in the region on all aspects of environmental 

protection and safety matters. 

After all, adopting all possible measures to minimize the likelihood of an oil spill 

is very much in the interest of Cuba, not just the United States, because of the importance of its coastal-oriented economy. 

The Administration Should Take Specific Actions Now to Negotiate with 

Cuba and Other Countries in the Region 

First and foremost, the Administration should take steps now to ensure that USbased companies are pre-authorized to assist in preventing and containing major oil 

spills in Cuban waters. Specifically, the US Department of Treasury should adopt 

a new general license that provides authority to any qualified oil services company 

in the United States to send personnel to Cuba in response to a request from Cuba, 

Repsol or any other oil company conducting operations in Cuban waters; likewise, 

the US Department of Commerce should pre-approve the export of vessels, equipment, and supplies needed for containment and response. This would allow Repsol 

and other foreign oil companies to contract with US oil service companies in advance of drilling. This is particularly important because of the proximity to Cuba 

of US firms with the requisite deep water drilling and advanced response, technical, 

and planning capabilities, in contrast to the distance between Cuba and other countries, such as the UK, Norway or Brazil, with state-of-the-art deep water oil development experience. 

Second, it is in our national interest to negotiate now with Cuba, Mexico and the 

Bahamas to ensure that any future drilling in waters of the Gulf of Mexico, Atlantic, 

or Caribbean is conducted according to the highest possible environmental and safety standards. In addition, the Administration should develop a joint contingency 

plan with Cuba that ensures the full participation of key US government agencies 

in oil spill response, including the US Coast Guard, the Department of Interior, 

NOAA and others. The MEXUS agreement discussed above can serve as a potential 

model for a US–Cuba agreement or for a region-wide agreement that includes the 

United States, Cuba, Mexico and the Bahamas. We urge action on this score as soon 

as possible. 

But the MEXUS agreement, with its emphasis on oil spill response, should only 

be a first step. A comprehensive solution requires that negotiations between the 

countries go beyond spill response and include how the countries can work together 

on prevention and on improving baseline scientific knowledge of shared waters and 

resources. Ultimately, our two countries must collaborate on protecting resources, 

such as coral reefs and coastal wetland systems that ecologically we share, and on 

42 

advancing deep water oil and gas production and spill-prevention technologies that 

advance our common interests in the Gulf of Mexico, Atlantic, and northern Caribbean ecosystems. 

In conclusion, because of our shared interests in protection of Gulf of Mexico resources, the importance of coastal resources to the health of our citizens and visitors, and physical processes that can disperse spilled oil far and wide, we urge the 

United States to engage Cuba, as it has Mexico, to strengthen standards and areas 

of cooperation that will minimize the likelihood of significant damage from any deep 

water oil and gas operations. 

As Cuba progresses toward extraction of oil and gas from deep water sites, EDF 

looks forward to a continuing dialogue with members of Congress as to how the marine environment of the Gulf, Atlantic and Caribbean may be best protected in that 

process. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Thank you. 

Ms. Antrim, you may begin. 

STATEMENT OF CAITLYN ANTRIM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

RULE OF LAW COMMITTEE FOR THE OCEANS 

Ms. ANTRIM. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 

today. 

I serve as the Executive Director of the Rule of Law Committee 

for the Oceans, a bipartisan group of experts and educators in 

international ocean law. Over my career I have worked as an ocean 

engineer, mineral economist, industry analyst, Federal official and 

diplomat, all with a focus on the development of minerals of the 

ocean floor. I would like to draw from that experience today to expand on our offshore energy base for development by American industry. 

As U.S. industry moves further seaward in search of exploitable 

energy resources, we approach the limits of the exclusive economic 

zone. Wide recognition of the exclusive economic zone has assured 

the stable legal environment essential for billion dollar investments 

in offshore oil. 

Now a warming Arctic and advances in technology are drawing 

attention to areas of the Continental Shelf outside the EEZ. The 

seabed north of Alaska is the most promising of these areas. Recent 

studies indicate that due to its unique geology the continental margin north of Alaska may extend 600 nautical miles or more from 

shore. There are reports of natural gas releases from the seabed at 

nearly that distance. 

The Alaskan Arctic isn’t the only region with energy resources 

beyond the EEZ. The continental margins off of South Carolina and 

south of Alaska extend beyond the EEZ as well, and there are also 

large areas of the seabed around some U.S. Pacific Ocean island 

territories that may be claimed as our extended Continental Shelf 

as well. 

Lack of clarity of the legal status of the continental margin beyond the Continental Shelf was of serious concern to U.S. policymakers throughout the 1970s. In 1970, the Nixon Administration 

proposed a new intermediate region between the shelf and the 

abyssal plains in which the coastal state would manage exploitation and share royalties with the international community. 

43 

Over the course of the Law of the Sea negotiations, U.S. diplomats quietly negotiated the extension of U.S. sovereignty over 

seabed resources from the edge of the Continental Shelf to the full 

extent of a new 200-mile EEZ, securing vast areas of the seabed 

with potential for energy and hard mineral resources. But as U.S. 

companies look to the sea floor beyond the EEZ, investors must 

consider the international perspective of conducting operations beyond the uncontested region of the economic zone. 

The Law of the Sea negotiations designed a process by which a 

coastal state may submit the boundary of an extended Continental 

Shelf to an international body of experts for confirmation of conformity with the criteria of the Convention. With such confirmation, coastal state jurisdiction over resources of that region would 

be recognized by all parties of the Convention. This part of the 

Convention has been accepted by every U.S. President since Gerald 

Ford, Republican and Democrat alike. 

If the U.S. remains outside of the Convention, we will still lay 

claim to a full continental margin off our shores, explaining that 

it is a right inherent in our national sovereignty, but other nations 

are not forced to agree with us. Such disagreement could be a serious matter for multinational companies that seek foreign investment, conduct business in foreign nations and sell in foreign markets. 

In 1981, the Reagan Administration review of the draft Convention found that it would be possible for the United States to exploit 

mineral resources of the seabed outside of a convention, but only 

if all other significant producers of minerals remained outside the 

Convention as well. As the only major nonparty nation with significant energy resources beyond the EEZ, our firms must be concerned about possible foreign discrimination or even legal action in 

response to exploitation of these resources without international 

recognition and without sharing royalties as provided in the Convention. 

International recognition and clear title of recovered resources 

are essential to any energy firm that invests, operates or markets 

beyond our shores. The provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention related to the extended shelf and sharing of royalties within 

it were negotiated with the advice, participation and approval of 

American industry and continue to be supported by individual 

energy companies and by the American Petroleum Institute. 

I agree with them that the Convention’s provisions on the extended Continental Shelf are in the economic interest of the United 

States. I hope the consideration of U.S. policies for this new region, 

including the establishment of agreed maritime boundaries with 

Canada in the Beaufort Sea and with Mexico and Cuba in the eastern gap of the Gulf of Mexico, will be designed to conform with possible U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention and will utilize the Convention’s requirements for international sharing of information related to the impact of seabed development on the marine environment for our own benefit if and when the U.S. Senate 

gives its advice and consent. 

That concludes my statement. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Antrim follows:] 

44 

Statement of Caitlyn Antrim, Executive Director, 

Rule of Law Committee for the Oceans 

National authority over resources of the sea floor beyond the territorial sea rests 

on a combination of domestic and international law and regulation. This is particularly true with regard to the offshore oil and gas industry. Multinational corporations that develop resources beyond the territorial sea are funded by domestic and 

foreign investors and sell their products in international markets. The offshore oil 

and gas industry has been one of the strongest supporters of the development of 

international law regarding coastal state authority over the continental shelf, and 

of US accession to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, and it presents a 

pragmatic view of offshore oil and gas development as a domestic industry operating 

in an international environment. 

The United States needs to address international legal aspects of continental shelf 

development in all of its coastal waters. In the Arctic, the US has yet to establish 

an agreed maritime boundary with Canada in the Beaufort Sea or an outer boundary to the continental shelf beyond the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone. In the 

Gulf of Mexico, there is an unresolved area of the continental shelf beyond the EEZ 

that is bordered by the United States, Mexico and Cuba, and the maritime boundary 

with Cuba in the Florida Strait that was negotiated in 1977 has not been submitted 

to the Senate for advice and consent. It remains a functional boundary that is provisionally applied but not a durable, legally recognized agreement. Development of hydrocarbon resources of the ocean floor in the region of the state of Florida, Cuba 

and the Bahamas is guided by principles of international law, the domestic laws and 

regulations of the coastal states and the Cartagena Convention and its protocols. 

The areas around the Pacific Ocean Island Territories are largely unexplored so far 

but may have mineral resources for future development. 

The majority of U.S. offshore oil and gas resources are found in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

(LOS) defines the EEZ for states parties to the Convention. Although the U.S. is 

not yet a party to it, the Convention’s definition of the EEZ has been applied by 

the United States as proclaimed in the 1983 statement of ocean policy by President 

Ronald Reagan: 

Third, I am proclaiming today an Exclusive Economic Zone in which the 

United States will exercise sovereign rights in living and nonliving resources within 200 nautical miles of its coast. This will provide United 

States jurisdiction for mineral resources out to 200 nautical miles that are 

not on the continental shelf. Recently discovered deposits there could be an 

important future source of strategic minerals. 

The Law of the Sea Convention details the internationally negotiated statement 

of rights, authorities and obligations of states within its Exclusive Economic Zone. 

For its parties, the Convention also provides a mechanism through which parties 

may secure international recognition of claims to the continental margin beyond the 

EEZ, an area referred to as the ‘‘extended continental shelf.’’ The US, as a nonparty, does not have access to this mechanism for obtaining international recognition of rights beyond the EEZ. Without international recognition of US authority in 

the extended shelf, the oil and gas industry sees domestic development beyond the 

EEZ as adding increased significant political risk to their international financing 

and trade relationships. 

Initial Steps in Creating the Exclusive Economic Zone 

Prior to the end of World War II, international law recognized only two ocean 

zones: the territorial sea that was generally, but not always, limited to a breadth 

of 3 nautical miles, and the high seas, which encompassed all waters seaward of 

the territorial sea. In the territorial sea, the coastal state had sovereign rights subject only to the right of foreign ships to pass through the under the conditions of 

‘‘innocent passage.’’ On the high seas, ships were under the authority of the flag 

state, subject to foreign authority in only a few specified cases, such as suspicion 

of piracy and transport of slaves. 

Advances of technology and the improvement of the economics for offshore development of living and mineral resources in the post-WWII period led to expanding 

claims of jurisdiction by coastal states over widening areas of what had previously 

been the high seas. In 1945, President Truman proclaimed US authority over the 

resources of the continental shelf contiguous to the lands of the United States (approximated by the 200 meter isobath). The proclamation was limited to seabed resources and their development and did not extend sovereignty to other activities beyond the territorial sea. 

45 

Regardless of US intent, the Truman Proclamation opened the way for other nations to extend claims over the high seas and its resources. In 1958, Iceland extended its claim to a fisheries zone to 12 nautical miles (nm), out from a previous 

limit of 4 nm. This displaced British fishing fleets from fisheries they had been utilizing and initiated the first so-called ‘‘Cod War’’ with a confrontation between the 

Icelandic coast guard and the Royal Navy. A subsequent extension of Iceland’s fishing zone to 50 nm in 1972 resulted in a renewed maritime confrontation and a third 

confrontation came with an extension of the zone to 200nm in 1977. 

In the 1960s, Chile, Peru and Ecuador extended their territorial sea to 200 nm, 

a claim that included all of the sovereign rights associated with the territorial sea 

once limited to 3 nm. American flag tuna boats were regularly impounded by Chile 

for fishing within the 200 mile zone. US officials protested these actions, but the 

seizures continued. US flag boats were released on payment of fines and, with the 

encouragement of the US government, returned to continue to challenge the extensive Chilean claim. 

Seeking the Certainty of International Law for the Seabed and its 

Resources 

The sudden collapse of the centuries-old regime of a narrow territorial sea and 

a vast expanse of ocean subject to high seas freedoms led to an effort to define a 

new legal order for the seas that could establish clear agreement on the limits of 

coastal state authority over the seas and its resources and stem the enclosure of 

ocean space by coastal nations. 

This effort to accommodate changes of practice into a new legal order was undertaken in the 1950s by the International Law Commission. This culminated in the 

1958 Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva and the adoption of a set of conventions 

that addressed four issues: the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Fisheries, the 

Continental Shelf, and the High Seas. While the four conventions laid out important 

principles regarding activities within each of the four issue-areas, it failed to clearly 

specify the geographic limits to the regions. In particular, the territorial sea convention failed to reach agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea, the fisheries convention failed to recognize exclusive coastal state authority over fisheries beyond the 

territorial sea and the continental shelf convention produced a vague and self-contradictory definition of the extend of the continental shelf. The first article of the 

Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf has this definition: 

For the purpose of these articles, the term ‘‘continental shelf’’ is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the 

coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres 

or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits 

of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. 

By rejecting the more expansive phrase ‘‘continental margin’’ in order to retain 

the more limited reference to the ‘‘continental shelf’’ and replacing ‘‘contiguous,’’ 

which had been part of the Truman Proclamation, with ‘‘adjacent,’’ which added a 

vague criteria for nearness, the definition introduced a qualitative limit on the seaward extent of the legal continental shelf. In establishing a depth limit of at least 

200 meters but going as far as exploitation could be conducted, the outer limit was 

left open to debate and disagreement. The result was a definition that was sufficient 

for the near term, but in need of revisions in order to resolve legal and political impediments to development in the longer term. 

A second attempt to define the outer limit of the territorial sea was attempted 

at a second conference in 1960, but it was unsuccessful. Clarifying the outer limit 

of the continental shelf would have to wait for a more significant effort to update 

and clarify the law of the sea. 

The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea 

A decade after the completion of the four Geneva Conventions of 1958, preparations began on a new effort to define national rights, responsibilities and limits at 

sea. Instead of seeking separate agreements on different issues, it was decided to 

seek a comprehensive agreement in which all essential national security interests 

would be met, while creating a package deal in which nations could seek to maximize their economic, environmental and scientific interests as a whole with tradeoffs 

between issues in order to facilitate the creation of an overall agreement attractive 

to all states. 

The determination of the breadth of a coastal state resource zone and the jurisdiction a state would have within the zone became a major focus of negotiators at the 

Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in both the preparatory discussions and 

the formal negotiations that began in 1973. While the initial focus of coastal state 

46 

claims to resources in the area beyond the territorial sea had been on living resources, the zone came to include management of resources of the seabed within the 

zone regardless of whether the seabed was part of the geological shelf or part of the 

deep ocean floor. 

Recognizing the Continental Shelf beyond the EEZ 

In 1970, during the preparations for the Third UN Conference on the Law of the 

Sea, the United States introduced a draft convention that incorporated a three-part 

system for management of mineral resources of the seabed. It included a continental 

shelf extending to the 200 meter isobath where minerals were under the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the coastal state, the deep seabed beyond the continental margin and 

beyond the jurisdiction of the coastal state where minerals would be managed by 

an international authority and an intermediate area, described as a trusteeship, in 

which minerals would be managed by the coastal state for the mutual benefit of the 

coastal state and the international community. As the EEZ was hammered out during the negotiations, the seabed within 200 miles from shore was incorporated into 

the EEZ. The negotiation of the provisions for the continental shelf beyond the EEZ 

took on aspects of the original US proposal for the seabed trusteeship zone. 

Under the LOS Convention, coastal state may have jurisdiction over the continental margin beyond the EEZ if it meets the geologic criteria specified in Article 

76 of the Convention that establishes conditions and limits to the extent of coastal 

state jurisdiction. Just as originally proposed by the United States, excessive or frivolous claims are blocked by requiring that continental shelf claims that extend beyond the EEZ be reviewed by an international panel of experts. Under the LOS Convention, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf serves this role. The 

Commission is empowered to review claims submitted to it and make recommendations as to whether the claims are in compliance with Article 76 or to recommend 

how the submissions might be brought into compliance. If claims are found to be 

in compliance, they are to be recognized by all of the parties to the Convention. The 

Commission does not resolve disputes between adjacent or opposing states as to how 

overlapping claims are to be decided, but it may review a joint proposal for recognition of an outer limit to the extended shelf by two or more states, leaving the division of the areas for later resolution among the states that made the joint submission. 

Under the definition used by the Convention, the US continental shelf would extend beyond the EEZ in two parts of the Gulf of Mexico, off of the US coast along 

the Atlantic Ocean and around some of the Pacific Island territories and, most significantly, in the Arctic Ocean north of Alaska. If the US were party to the LOS 

Convention, the Convention’s definition of the continental shelf would allow international recognition of US claims in the Arctic Ocean that may extend as far as 600 

miles from shore. While potential claims in the Gulf of Mexico are much more limited, they are adjacent to regions of proven economic potential. 

Following the model of the 1970 US Draft Convention, the LOS Convention provides for sharing of revenues from oil and gas production in the extended continental shelf. Negotiations in which representatives of US oil companies played a 

central role produced a royalty system that provided for no royalties for the first 

five years of production, rising one percent per year from year six to 7% in year 12 

and remaining at 7% thereafter. 

Industry and the Extended Continental Shelf in the Law of the Sea 

Convention 

With regard to the continental shelf, the Law of the Sea Convention represents 

significant benefits for industry over the preceding Geneva Conventions. There benefits are: 

• establishment of a clear definition of the outer extent of the continental shelf, 

providing essential certainty for investment; 

• incorporation of the seabed beyond the continental margin when within the 

EEZ, an area excluded by the 1958 definition; 

• inclusion of the continental margin far beyond the old limits of depth and adjacency; 

International Recognition of Claims to the Extended Continental Shelf 

For countries whose continental shelf will be developed by private industry, the 

most important feature of the LOS Convention’s regime for the continental shelf is 

the clear recognition of the authority of the coastal state to license exploration and 

production, to make licenses exclusive to the developer and to grant clear title to 

the recovered products. Oil industry representatives on the US delegation to the 

LOS negotiations made clear that benefits of the Convention’s continental shelf proVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\71116.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
47 

visions greatly outweighed those of its predecessor, the 1958 Geneva Convention on 

the Continental Shelf. 

Revenue Sharing in the Extended Shelf 

The revenue sharing provisions for the extended continental shelf are consistent 

with the US proposal in 1970. The coastal state is authorized to collect royalties on 

behalf of both itself and the international community. Production is exempt from 

royalties during the first five years of production, allowing early recovery of investment during the most productive years of a well, rising over a seven year period 

to a maximum of only 7%, ensuring that coastal states will also be able to share 

in the revenues of production from the continental shelf. 

Industry Statement of the Convention’s Provisions on the Extended Shelf 

Writing at the conclusion of the LOS negotiations in 1982, John Norton Garrett, 

who represented the Gulf Oil Exploration and Production Company on the US delegation to the LOS Conference, said: 

In conclusion, I believe that the international petroleum industry can live 

with a law of the sea treaty incorporating those provisions of the Draft Convention that specifically apply to margin delimitation and revenue sharing 

seaward of the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone as well as navigation and 

pollution control. 

Marine Environmental Pollution, Regional Agreements and Dispute 

Resolution 

Responding to Pollution from Continental Shelf Development in the LOS Convention 

The Law of the Sea Convention was negotiated just as marine environmental 

issues were gaining attention in the international community. As such, they provide 

a framework for action but identify few specific activities. The provisions related to 

pollution from seabed activities, listed in Article 208 of the Convention, all fall into 

good-faith responsibilities of states parties that are not subject to binding dispute 

settlement: 

Article 208 

Pollution from seabed activities subject to national jurisdiction 

1. Coastal States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment arising from or in connection with 

seabed activities subject to their jurisdiction and from artificial islands, installations and structures under their jurisdiction, pursuant to articles 60 

and 80. 

2. States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and 

control such pollution. 

3. Such laws, regulations and measures shall be no less effective than international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures. 

4. States shall endeavour to harmonize their policies in this connection at the 

appropriate regional level. 

5. States, acting especially through competent international organizations or 

diplomatic conference, shall establish global and regional rules, standards 

and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control 

pollution of the marine environment referred to in paragraph l. Such rules, 

standards and recommended practices and procedures shall be re-examined 

from time to time as necessary. 

As a non-party that shares interests in preventing or reducing marine environmental pollution from seabed activities, the United States seeks strong environmental protection rules for seabed mineral development and works through the 

International Maritime Organization, the Arctic Council and other international 

bodies to ensure effective regulation for activities in the US EEZ and in the EEZs 

of other nations. Unfortunately, having not yet joined the Convention, US diplomats 

start from behind in assuring foreign states of commitment to the Convention’s principles and face difficulty in leading the development of provisions for marine environmental protection. 

The fifth paragraph of article 208 could provide the US with leverage to engage 

other nations in multilateral discussions of rules, standards and practices for continental shelf development. In the Caribbean Sea, the United States already works 

through the Cartagena Convention and its protocols to provide a regional approach 

to marine environmental protection in the Caribbean. 

48 

Regional Maritime Governance 

The Cartagena ‘‘Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region’’ is the umbrella agreement addressing 

the marine environment in the region of the Caribbean Sea. The Convention was 

adopted in conjunction with its protocol on oil spills in 1983. 

The oil spill protocol recognizes the responsibility of states parties to take preventative and remedial actions to avoid and respond to oil spills, to share information, 

to require their nationals to report oil spill incidents, notify other parties of spills, 

establish operational measures, create subregional arrangements, and establish institutional arrangements. 

A protocol to the Cartagena Convention addressing land-based sources of pollution 

came into force in 2010 and the United States, Cuba and the Bahamas are all parties to the agreement. 

Resolving International Disputes 

Dispute settlement processes always pose an issue of effectiveness versus freedom 

of action. The Cartagena Convention provides an arbitral process that parties may 

use if they agree to do so, but it is clearly not mandatory, though the commitment 

to resolve disputes peacefully is mandated. 

In the LOS Convention, marine environmental disputes related to the continental 

shelf may be referred to mandatory dispute settlement, but only as allowed by Article 297, Paragraph 1(c), which limits mandatory settlement to cases ‘‘when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of specified international rules 

and standards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment which 

are applicable to the coastal State and which have been established by this Convention or through a competent international organization or diplomatic conference in 

accordance with this Convention.’’ As such, a party to the Convention could only be 

bound to mandatory settlement when has agreed to ‘‘specified international rules’’ 

and may, as part of another agreement, establish dispute resolution procedures that 

supersede those of the LOS Convention, although the default arbitration processes 

of the convention may be agreeable to parties to the Convention. 

Conclusions 

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides the international legal framework for a strong US offshore industry to operate in the US extended continental 

shelf and for protection of US interests in the marine environment. The provisions 

of the Convention related to the EEZ have largely been accepted as customary international law unaffected by US non-party status other than lack of access to the dispute resolution provisions of the Convention. With regard to the continental shelf 

beyond the EEZ, however, the United States lacks access to the Commission on the 

Limits of the Continental Shelf for international recognition of claims beyond the 

EEZ and cannot expect recognition of claims to an extended shelf by other states 

as long as the US rejects the revenue sharing provisions of article 82 of the Convention and other provisions that form the package deal agreed to by all parties in return for coastal state authority over mineral resources of the continental shelf beyond the EEZ. 

Provisions of the Convention related to marine environmental pollution from activities on the continental shelf are relevant to the United States both as a developer of the continental shelf and as a neighbor of countries that develop their own 

shelves. If the US becomes a party to the Convention, it will have greater leverage 

to negotiate rules, standards and practices to protect its marine environment from 

activities in foreign EEZs. However, consideration must be given to the advantages 

and disadvantages of mandatory dispute settlement both under the Convention and 

under regional agreements and ensure that future agreements, treaties and conferences reflect US interests in the balance of mandatory settlement and national 

autonomy of action. Dispute resolution provisions of conventions and protocols can 

be negotiated to incorporate their own dispute settlement provisions that provide for 

negotiation of differences with binding arbitration as an option subject to mutual 

agreement of the parties, which would resolve any lingering US concerns over the 

LOS Convention’s dispute settlement provisions. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. I want to thank each of the witnesses 

for their testimony. Members of the Committee may have additional questions for the record, and I would ask that you respond 

to those in writing. 

49 

We will now begin questioning. Members are limited to five minutes for their questions, but we may have additional rounds. And 

I now recognize myself for five minutes. 

First of all, a general statement. I would like to thank you for 

being here and for the varying and diverse opinions that were expressed. Cuba’s interest in pursuing offshore oil and gas development certainly is a dangerous prospect to which we have almost no 

clear understanding of their plans, commitment or capability. 

As we hear more about Cuba, we see a multitude of U.S. agencies working to help Cuba’s drilling to go forward: the Bureau of 

Safety and Environmental Enforcement or BSEE, the State Department, the U.S. Coast Guard, NOAA, the Commerce Department and the Office of Foreign Assets Control through the Treasury Department. As Chairman of this Subcommittee, I would just 

like to say I wish there was equal effort to help our own oil and 

gas resources to be produced in the Outer Continental Shelf here 

in the United States. 

OK. First question. Mr. Claver-Carone, you mentioned that the 

Cuban Government has pushed offshore drilling for the past 20 

years. Have you noticed an increase in engagement by this particular Administration on this issue at such a level as we have seen 

recently? 

For instance, we know, as was stated in earlier testimony on this 

panel, Mr. Riley, the Chairman of President Obama’s hand-picked 

Oil Spill Commission, recently went down there to meet with 

Cuban officials. 

Mr. CLAVER-CARONE. Well, I think that they have been at it for 

20 years. Since 2001, frankly, there has been a licensing process in 

regards to oil spill mitigation firms in order to have some type of 

safety mechanism in place as there has been now. 

In regards to this particular Administration, my biggest fear, we 

have seen that sanctions have worked as a deterrent for the last 

20 years in keeping this offshore exploration from taking place. If 

the Administration would have taken a harder stance from day one 

toward Repsol—there was an opportunity earlier this year when 

actually Secretary Salazar was in Spain and he met with Repsol. 

Repsol came out of that meeting thinking that they had a green 

light as opposed to saying hey, don’t go there. 

I believe, as we have seen in the last 20 years, if the Administration would have taken a stronger stance, would have strongly tried 

to dissuade the Spaniards from proceeding that we really wouldn’t 

have been seeing this right now. Absolutely. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Thank you for that answer. 

Mr Whittle, as you mentioned, you were part of a recent group 

that traveled to Cuba to speak with Cuban officials. 

In the past, the Environmental Defense Fund has called offshore 

drilling in the U.S. a tragic sacrifice. However, after traveling to 

Cuba you seem to have a more optimistic view of drilling in Cuba 

waters. You were quoted as saying of Cuban officials that ‘‘they are 

taking the lessons of the BP spill very seriously.’’ 

Do you see any inconsistency in the more pessimistic view that 

your group has expressed about U.S. offshore drilling versus what 

seems to be a more optimistic view of Cubans drilling offshore? 

50 

Mr. WHITTLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me clarify our position on offshore drilling. We have consistently opposed offshore 

drilling off the coast of New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina and 

California. We have not opposed offshore drilling in the western or 

central Gulf, and in fact after the BP disaster we have worked to 

improve standards and have had some measure of success. 

In Cuba, we do not oppose or support offshore drilling. In fact, 

we have grave concerns with the drilling in the area that it is. It 

is in sensitive marine environments, and a spill could risk Cuban 

marine life and ecosystems and those in the U.S. 

As far as my state of North Carolina, the way we look at it is 

Cuba is determined to drill. I believe that it will begin drilling this 

year or early next year. The rig is on its way. I cannot comment 

on whether sanctions would work or not. We are extremely concerned that if drilling begins anytime soon that the U.S. simply 

isn’t prepared to protect our environment. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And that is what you meant when you said you 

came back and you thought that they needed to do more? I mean, 

you weren’t satisfied with the status of where they stood in their 

oversight capabilities? 

Mr. WHITTLE. Right. We were there for about five days, and we 

had maybe two and a half to three days of intense meetings with 

engineers, scientists, officials, et cetera, and so we got a first 

glimpse at what steps are being taken in terms of training, regulation, et cetera. A fair amount has been done. There are a couple 

gaps. 

One thing we pointed out, Cuba doesn’t have an oil spill prevention fund like we do in the United States. So if there is a spill, how 

do you pay for the cleanup? It was extremely important in responding to BP. Liability questions, capability, independence. 

Cuba is just now beginning to develop an offshore industry and, 

frankly, they don’t have the history of regulating. We found out the 

hard way that even in the U.S. we did not have the accountability 

we thought we had beforehand. So many questions that can only 

be answered through continued conversations like this. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. Thank you. I would now like to recognize the 

Ranking Member. 

Mr. HOLT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to continue 

that line of questioning, Mr. Whittle. 

We appreciate the efforts of groups like the Environmental Defense Fund to reach out to Cuba, and I think you have experience 

with let me call it the Riley delegation in the bilateral discussions. 

You have said a little bit about this, but I would like to give you 

more time to elaborate. 

Both on inspection to prevent spills and on response in the case 

of a spill, what more can we do and what more might we wish we 

could do to be assured that things would be handled well? 

I was struck by what I thought was a lack of alarm from the government witnesses a few minutes ago, and I would like to be assured. I would like to think that everything is fine. I wonder from 

your visits to Cuba whether you are comfortable with their safety 

standards and, if not, what you would wish that we as the United 

States could do about that. 

51 

Mr. WHITTLE. Thank you. I have been following Cuban environmental law and policy for about a decade and have been impressed 

how strong their basic framework, laws and policies are. In fact, 

many of them have been based upon U.S. environmental law and 

some are in fact a bit stronger. 

In terms of ensuring that inspections are comprehensively done 

and response is well done, I think the model is the relationship we 

have with Mexico. In fact, as Director Bromwich testified, following 

the BP spill, despite the fact that we had an agreement in place, 

he indicated that we have taken many steps to strengthen the 

agreement and understanding. So we have greater confidence that 

inspections in Mexican waters will be done adequately because of 

that agreement and that ongoing dialogue. 

In other words, there is much more transparency of what is 

going on in Mexico than in Cuba to U.S. Government agencies with 

the expertise. 

In terms of responsiveness, the Cubans do not have the capacity 

to respond to a major oil spill. They are relying upon Repsol and 

other foreign countries to contract out. I am encouraged that Treasury and Commerce have begun issuing licenses. I think bureaucratically that it is a slow process, and in the event of an emergency even best-case scenario it would take several days to get everything lined up, and because of the Florida currents that could 

be too late. 

Mr. HOLT. If the drilling is going to begin in a matter of months 

I believe, should we pursue the national hurricane agreement, a bilateral agreement, as a model for getting in place environmental 

cooperation? Does the hurricane agreement, with which I am not 

familiar with, provide exemptions to the embargo or is it just exchange of information? And I would like any of the witnesses who 

are prepared to talk about this to take that on. Is this a model that 

we should use for environmental protection? 

Mr. CLAVER-CARONE. If I may address that, Congressman? You 

know, first of all, in regards to the observation that Cuba’s environmental laws are very impressive and things of the sort, I would 

like to remind everyone Cuba is a totalitarian state. You know, basically rulemaking in Cuba is based on a dictator and his whim. 

So everything might look very pretty on paper. You know, actually 

Cubans have constitutional rights, but at the end of the day that 

doesn’t exist. 

In regards to the hurricane agreement, I actually think that is 

the case in point of the dangers of this. While it might be very pretty in theory and on paper, the reality of the hurricane agreement 

in practice, pursuant to Hurricane Michelle in 2001 and Hurricane 

Dennis in 2008, has been the high politicalization of this agreement by the Castro regime. 

The United States has even offered aid for hurricane relief to 

Cuba and the Castro regime. It hasn’t saved lives; it has actually 

cost lives. Cuba has refused to accept that aid unless the United 

States eases sanctions. So we see how the Cuban Government is 

almost masterful at manipulating the agreement. 

Mr. HOLT. In the short time remaining, do other witnesses have 

any comments on this matter? Thank you. 

52 

Mr. WHITTLE. I think in fact the hurricane cooperation does show 

that there are certain issues—narcotics, migration, hurricanes and 

I believe the environment—in which the two countries can have a 

dialogue independent of the more controversial issues that separate 

us. 

Mr. CLAVER-CARONE. May I answer that? 

Mr. HOLT. Well, I think my time is expired. 

Mr. CLAVER-CARONE. It will take two seconds. 

Mr. HOLT. Unless I get more time. Thank you. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. We will have a second round, and we could 

certainly pursue that at that time. 

The gentleman from Florida? 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My questions are to start 

off for Mr. Pin ̃ on. I know you have spoken extensively on this and 

have given the perception when you do speak that you try to be a 

neutral observer or analyst on this matter, and I appreciate that, 

but I need to ask you. You have often traveled to Cuba and met 

with officials from the Cuban Interest Section here in Washington 

regarding this matter. In your discussions and your travels with 

Cuban officials, do you ever discuss with them how to best approach the American Government in terms of easing sanctions? 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. No, sir, I have not. 

Mr. RIVERA. And when I talk about easing sanctions, I am including in there sanctions regarding the energy sector and oil exploration. Do you ever discuss those issues? 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. No, sir, I have not. 

Mr. RIVERA. And the reason I ask is much of your testimony 

today and previously and other remarks that you have made has 

been couched around the issue of the Deepwater Horizon accident 

and couched on issues related to preparing for a disaster. 

But even previous to the Deepwater Horizon, in comments and 

testimony that you have given, and I will point to one in particular 

back in 2009, April 2009, testimony that you gave before the House 

Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee, you spoke about 

the importance of Cuba achieving energy independence. You spoke 

about the importance of allowing U.S. companies to contribute in 

developing Cuba’s hydrocarbon reserves as well as renewable 

energy such as solar, wind, sugarcane, ethanol. So even much before—— 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. Yes. 

Mr. RIVERA.—the Deepwater Horizon crisis you had been advocating—— 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. Yes. 

Mr. RIVERA.—for increased engagement—— 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. Yes. 

Mr. RIVERA.—between U.S. companies in Cuba’s energy sector. 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. Yes. 

Mr. RIVERA. And in fact, you have advocated for the fact that 

U.S. companies should be allowed increased access to those energy 

sectors. 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. Yes. 

Mr. RIVERA. So, Mr. Chairman, with your permission and with 

unanimous consent, I would like to ask that that testimony from 

53 

April 29, 2009, by Mr. Pin ̃ on be entered into the record for this 

hearing as well. 

Mr. LAMBORN. If there are no objections, so ordered. 

[The testimony of Mr. Pin ̃ on submitted for the record by Mr. 

Rivera follows:] 

Oral Testimony of Mr. Jorge Pin ̃ on 

Energy Fellow, Center for Hemispheric Policy, The University of Miami 

Before the 

House Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

Hearing on ‘‘National Security Implications of U.S. Policy toward Cuba 

April 29, 2009 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Nearly two years ago, under the auspices of the Brookings Institution, I was invited to be part of a group of 19 distinguished academics, opinion leaders and international diplomats committed to (ph) seeking a strong and effective U.S. policy toward Cuba. Under the leadership of Ambassador Palos Pasquale (ph) and Ambassador Vicki Huddleston, a team of well-known experts in the field of U.S.—Cuba relations carried out a series of simulation exercises and discussions that have served 

to enhance our understanding of the complex political realities of Cuba and the 

United States. 

By testing the responses of several strategic actors and stakeholders a variety of 

scenarios, we have identified potential catalysts and constraints to political change 

on the island The end result of our effort was a road map report entitled, ‘‘Cuba: 

A New Policy of Critical And Constructive Engagement,’’ which I believe the committee has a copy of. 

Two-fourths Cuba’s petroleum (inaudible) currently relies on important, and Venezuela is the single source of this import under heavily subsidized (inaudible) returns. This petroleum dependency, valued at over $3 billion in 2008, could be used 

by Venezuela as a tool to influence a Cuban government in maintaining a political 

antagonistic and belligerent position toward the United States. 

Cuba has learned from past experiences and is very much aware of the political 

and economic risk and consequences of depending on a single source of imported oil. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and a 2003 Venezuelan oil strike taught 

Cuba very expensive lessons. 

Rau ́l Castro understands the risks. His recent visits to major oil exporters, such 

as Brazil, Russia, Angola and Algeria, underscore his concerns. 

A relationship with Brazil would provide a bonus to Cuba’s current dependency, 

while others could (inaudible) a corrupt and unsavory business practices. Only when 

Cuba diversifies suppliers and develop its own resources, estimated by the U.S. to 

be at 5.5 billion barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, would have 

the economic independence needed in order to consider the political and economic 

evolution. 

Although Cuban authorities have invited the United States oil companies to participate in developing their offshore oil and natural gas resources, U.S. law does not 

allow it. Today, international oll companies such as Staines-Wetzell (ph), (inaudible), and Brazil’s Petrobras are active in exploration activities in Cuba’s Gulf Mexico 

waters. 

American oil (ph) and oil and equipment service companies have the capital, technology and operational know-how to explore, produce and refine in a safe and responsible manner Cuba’s potential oil and natural gas reserves, with the remaining 

(inaudible) line, because our almost (inaudible) five (inaudible), international (ph), 

political and economic embargo. 

The president can end this impasse by licensing American companies to participate in developing Cuba’s offshore oil and natural gas. In the opinion of legal experts consulted, Mr. Chairman, no legislation prevents the president from authorizing U.S. oil companies from developing Cuba’s oil and natural gas reserves. 

A Cuban government influenced by its energy benefactors, would most likely result in a continuation of the current political and economic model. If Cuba’s future 

leaders are (inaudible) to fill the power vacuum left by the departure of the old 

cadre, they could become (inaudible) of illicit business activities, drug cartels, and 

the United States could face a mass illegal immigration by hundreds of thousands 

of Cubans. 

54 

The Brookings Report proposes, Mr. Chairman, as part of a full (ph) strategy, a 

policy that supports the allegiance (ph) of the Cuban state where the Cuban people 

(inaudible) in the political and economic future of their country to Democratic rules. 

And to achieve this goal, Mr. Chairman, Cuba must achieve energy independence. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, if U.S. companies were allowed to contribute in developing Cuba’s hydrocarbon reserves, well as renewable energy such as solar, wind, 

and sugar cane ethanol, it would reduce the influence of autocratic and corrupt government on the island’s road toward selfdetermination. Most importantly, it would 

provide the United States and other Democratic countries with a better chance of 

working with Cuba’s future leaders to carrying out reforms that will lead to a more 

open and representative society. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much. So I would think that in 

terms of your testimony today being couched around the Deepwater 

Horizon accident, that is really not the impetus for your advocacy 

in terms of engagement for the energy sector in Cuba. You have 

been for several years now advocating for that increased engagement. 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. Yes. 

Mr. RIVERA. Would that be accurate? 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. That is correct. That is correct. 

Mr. RIVERA. I believe to do so, as I discussed earlier, all those 

energy sectors that you mentioned in terms of increased engagement, whether it be hydrocarbon, solar, wind or sugarcane, ethanol, you would agree all those energy sectors in Cuba are not controlled by any private entities but are controlled by the Castro dictatorship? 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. That is correct. 

Mr. RIVERA. So, if we were to engage or to follow your line of reasoning and to allow more engagement by U.S. companies with the 

Cuban energy sector, the financial windfall would fall to the Cuban 

Government as well? 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. Yes, but there is an issue of—may I? 

Mr. RIVERA. Sure. 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. Yes. The testimony that you are referring to was testimony based on the Brookings reports of which I was a member, 

along with Pepe Hernandez from the Cuban National American 

Foundation and a group of another 19 people, including Ambassador Pascual and others. So my testimony that I gave to the 

House in 2009 was based on the new policy of critical and constructive engagement with Cuba out of the Brookings reports, of which 

I was a member. 

I would encourage the Members to read this report because what 

it encourages us to do is that for the economic and political transition of Cuba what we argued here was that we needed not a weak 

Cuba where a power vacuum would be left but a strong Cuba. We 

also studied in this report that the monetary impact, the monetization of any of Cuba’s resources, will take anywhere between five to 

10 years. 

Mr. RIVERA. I have run out of time. I have run out of time, but 

I will just state the fact that any—— 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. The answer is yes. 

Mr. RIVERA. I understand that. 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. Yes. 

55 

Mr. RIVERA. The fact that any report that would argue to make 

the Castro dictatorship stronger is flawed on its face. 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. Fine. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. Thank you. Mr. Duncan of South Carolina? 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. Having a 

markup in another committee sort of took my focus away from this 

hearing, and I hate that I missed Mr. Bromwich when he was here 

because we have had a lot of conversations this year on this Committee about the safety and the de facto moratorium, the actual 

moratorium and drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. The fact is that we 

are drilling off the coast of Brazil and supporting that. Our President is saying we will be your first and best customer. 

And I think about Deepwater Horizon. It was 50 miles off the 

coast of Louisiana, and we had a terrible accident there that impacted the environment. We had a hearing last week about the 

true impacts of that horrific event to the shrimpers and the oystermen and also the welders and pipefitters and other things and the 

money that might be available or not. 

And so I reflect back on my experience under MMS, under the 

Outer Continental Shelf Five Year Planning Subcommittee, which 

I was on for about 18 months in the waning years of the last Administration. I remember when we were talking about a five-year 

plan of where we were going to allow offshore drilling and lease 

sales. 

I think about the very limited area that we were able to even 

talk about on that committee was western Gulf of Mexico, no eastern GOM at all, a very small grid square in the Alaskan Sea, nothing on the Outer Continental Shelf on the Atlantic side and nothing around Florida. Yet here we are having a conversation today 

with these panelists about Cuba harvesting resources off their 

coast and allowing foreign companies to come in and help them, assist them with that. 

But the question I have is, OK, we are not allowing lease sales 

for American companies that would be under American laws and 

American regulations. The safety that we learned from Deepwater 

Horizon, those mechanisms would be put in place, are being put in 

place in the Western GOM and anywhere the United States allows 

deepwater drilling off our Outer Continental Shelf. Yet we have 

Cuba 90 miles off the coast of Florida. If you come north to the 

drilling waters where they are going to purport to be drilling, it is 

very, very close to, according to the environmentalists, the very 

fragile waters around the coast of Florida. 

And so my question would be, and it will be in panel two because 

I won’t have enough time to ask this question and get an answer 

and delve into it, but we will in a minute, is what kind of safety 

mechanisms are in place? What sort of power does the United 

States have toward a foreign government, especially one that we 

have no diplomatic ties with at all? 

How can we ensure that the Chinese companies that are doing 

the drilling off the coast of Florida and off the coast of Cuba are 

going to implement the safety requirements that our own drillers 

and our own producers have to put in place in order to get back 

to work? 

56 

The slow walking of the permits by this Administration of American companies that want to produce American resources, the slow 

walking of those permits to make sure, to ensure to Americans that 

we won’t have another Deepwater Horizon, we have no certainty 

that the Cuban companies and the Cuban drilling efforts are putting in place those safety requirements that we won’t have a Deepwater Horizon type accident off the coast of Cuba that will impact 

the waters of Florida, the Keys and even the Gulf Coast states. 

And so those are the kind of questions that I want to see answered. That is what I am interested in, and I appreciate you giving me the time. I look forward to the second round of questioning. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Did you want one of the witnesses to respond to 

what you just commented on? 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. If I could? 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. The gentleman has yielded back, so we are 

going to start our second round of questions. 

Mr. Whittle, let me follow through on one other thing that had 

to do with the trip we were talking about that you and others took 

to Cuba recently. Were you able to talk to or about the plight of 

environmental activists when you met with Cuban officials, some 

of whom have been oppressed and mistreated? 

Mr. WHITTLE. No, sir, we did not talk about that during this particular trip. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. Mr. Carone, you note that the Cuban Government in the past expropriated U.S. oil assets from Esso in Texas. 

Do you think there is any possibility that that could happen with 

their relationship with Repsol’s assets? 

Mr. CLAVER-CARONE. Perhaps, and we are seeing that actually it 

has happened now with a bunch of companies in other sectors in 

Cuba in other industries that have actually been long-term trade 

partners of the regime. You know, it is kind of always whimsical 

with them and when it meets their interest. 

In the case of Repsol, Petronas, and India’s ONGC, I think there 

is a peculiar situation there because those companies, there is a 

Chavez angle. The Chavez angle is that those companies have been 

given rights, extensive rights last year, to drill in an area in the 

Orinoco belt which has over 235 billion barrels of oil. That is over 

50 times what can be expected in all of Cuba’s offshore waters. 

Therefore, there is a lot of geopolitical profiling taking place 

there, and Chavez to a degree is protecting them and sort of pushing them in that realm in order to be in this situation, in order to 

be able to extract and push and have the fear factor like we saw 

in 2006 with the Chinese, to basically push the United States to 

unilaterally ease sanctions, which is something that they use with 

all of these issues. We have seen it. 

You know, when we talk about these cooperation agreements in 

regards to narcotics, yes, we cooperate with the Cuban regime in 

narcotics. Yet we still have open indictments for senior officials of 

the Cuban regime for narcotrafficking here in the United States. 

I mentioned the environmental. This is a long trend of using 

these issues to try to unilaterally extract political concessions from 

the United States, which is very worrisome. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. Thank you. I would now like to recognize the 

Ranking Member. 

57 

Mr. HOLT. Thanks. Ms. Antrim, a number of commercial organizations—the American Petroleum Institute, the International Association of Drilling Contractors, the National Ocean Industries Association and others have called for ratifying the Law of the Sea. It 

appears that industry is wary of making investments in waters— 

well, in many places around the world but also around the U.S. Do 

you think that ratification of the Law of the Sea would benefit 

these extraction industries? They seem to think so. 

Ms. ANTRIM. Thank you for the question. Yes, I do agree with 

that. When we were looking at this during the Reagan Administration and preparing to go back to the final negotiating session we 

had delegations go to major industries to talk about the importance 

of obtaining international recognition of mining rights, of title to 

secured minerals. We were mainly looking at deep seabed minerals, 

but oil and gas of the extended shelf fall into the same category. 

Mr. HOLT. Now would ratification or full participation in the Law 

of the Sea treaty allow resolution of the kinds of liability questions 

that were raised earlier about damage from oil spills? 

Ms. ANTRIM. It provides a channel to do that, but the Law of the 

Sea Convention is very much a framework convention. Some of 

that work would be pursued through regional organizations such as 

the Cartagena Convention process, but as we develop more guidelines and regulations through the International Maritime Organization those become the minimum standards that all nations are 

expected to apply to their activities. If we reach those through a 

multilateral process, they become something that we can actually 

use dispute resolution to enforce. So, yes, it does strengthen our 

hand with regard to protecting ourselves from activities in foreign 

zones. 

Mr. HOLT. Thanks. I would like to go back to pursue a question 

I asked a few minutes ago that I am still not clear on. I was asking 

about the hurricane agreement and whether that would serve as a 

model. 

We have heard that Cuba might not be well prepared to deal 

with a major oil spill. We have heard from our own Coast Guard 

that they/we are dependent on commercial organizations, commercial entities coming in to assist with the cleanup. I will sort of repeat the question I asked before. Could the hurricane agreement 

serve as a kind of model? 

Under that are there permitted general licenses? Are there permitted exemptions of the embargo? I am concerned about what is 

going to happen to the Gulf waters, to the environment, to the U.S. 

Gulf Coast if there is a major oil spill relatively close to the United 

States that the Cubans for whatever reason, whatever their internal politics, are unable to deal with and we are still confronted 

with an embargo. 

I am not here trying to say this—let us assume the embargo remains in place. Is there a way to deal with the environmental problem that looms? Yes? Yes, please. 

Mr. WHITTLE. I am happy to take that one on. The Executive 

Branch has Presidential prerogative with current laws in place to 

engage with the Cubans both through the licensing authority and 

through diplomatic discussions. 

58 

The hurricane example is a good model for U.S. Government dialogue and cooperation, not so much for licensing and sending personnel. We have sent hurricane hunters in Cuban airspace. We 

have trained Cubans. There is a pretty active exchange of nongovernmental experts on hurricanes that the Center on International Policy conducts, bringing officials from Galveston, from 

Louisiana and elsewhere to Cuba to look at how Cuba prepares, so 

there is some dialogue and discussion. 

But there is authority. The model that the hurricane example 

provides is just that. There are issues in our national interest that 

can be conducted independent of these more controversial issues, 

and I would just like to say that having a dialogue and some limited cooperation in oil and gas will not facilitate keeping the oil and 

gas production. I am convinced they are moving in that direction 

now and that they will begin drilling independent of whether we 

make that step or not. 

Mr. HOLT. Thank you. I guess the time has expired. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. Thank you. The gentleman from Florida? 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

For Mr. Whittle, a couple questions. Can you tell me a little bit 

about Cuba’s environmental record nonenergy sector? 

Mr. WHITTLE. Yes, sir. Since the mid 1990s, Cuba has at least 

on paper made the environment a policy priority. They established 

a cabinet level ministry for the environment, and they ushered in 

a new suite of environmental laws, everything from a NEPA law, 

environmental impact statements, to a Coastal Zone Management 

Act to protect the area law, et cetera. 

Cuba has a mixed record on the environment. They have a number of environmental problems and challenges from water pollution 

to air pollution, extensive soil erosion associated with intensive agriculture. They have also done a good job in certain areas in protecting natural areas. They have a system of national parks and 

refuges where they intend to protect up to 25 percent of the Cuban 

insular shelf and up to 20 percent, I believe, of Cuban territory. 

They have done a good job of protecting coral reefs, mangrove forests, sea grasses and other fish habitat. 

They have some problems in managing fisheries, commercial 

fisheries now, so it is a mixed bag like it is everywhere else, but 

I have seen good progress in conserving coastal areas and natural 

areas in the last 10 years as a direct result of the laws implemented since 1995. 

Mr. RIVERA. Well, let me ask Mr. Claver-Carone. Mr. Whittle 

says it is a mixed record, some problems. Would you agree with 

that? What would be your assessment of Cuba’s environmental 

record? 

Mr. CLAVER-CARONE. Cuba’s environmental record historically, 

particularly under this regime, has actually been quite disastrous. 

I mean, we have seen from 1969 when they grazed pretty much all 

of Cuba’s land in order to plant sugarcane throughout. I mean, if 

there were environmental crimes against humanity, that would be 

definitely on the top of the list because Cuba has pretty much 

lost—it used to be able to feed itself. Cuba has not been able to do 

so since then. So definitely I don’t think Cuba’s environmental 

record is one to be admired. 

59 

On this particular issue I think there is one big concern that I 

think no one has really talked about in regards to the general licenses and the hurricane cooperation. We have general licenses for 

government officials, and that is how it is really used in regards 

to the hurricane. I mean, NOAA officials go there, et cetera, the 

general licenses for the Coast Guard to be able to do the same and 

for other government officials in regards and Interior to be able to 

do the same in that regard. 

I really urge caution. I think since 2001 the Treasury Department has been licensing specific disaster oil mitigation relief efforts 

to the island and different specialty companies, but I urge great 

caution in regards to a general license for commercial basically response. That would create a scenario in which there would be no 

control whatsoever. 

And I think that the Coast Guard can tell you and I know Mr. 

Pin ̃ on painted one scenario in his testimony in which he had all the 

vessels that went down in regards to the Deepwater Horizon. That 

would be the Coast Guard’s security nightmare. To have 5,000 vessels pretty much going down to Cuba uncontrolled, unlicensed, et 

cetera, would be a security nightmare for the Coast Guard. That 

would be the largest maritime traffic since the Morielle, and we 

saw how the Cuban Government used that against us when that 

was supposed to be just about migration and they used that 

against us. 

So I really urge caution, and I am sure the Coast Guard speaks 

for itself in that regard, but general licensing would be probably 

one of the most dangerous things we can do for a mass commercial 

response and for individual response to this drilling. 

Mr. RIVERA. Let me ask you in the minute that I have left also 

for Mr. Claver-Carone. With respect to the comments made earlier 

as to energy independence on behalf of the Castro dictatorship or 

strengthening the dictatorship’s energy sector, what type of impact 

would that have on potential democratic reforms or changing the 

nature of the regime? 

Mr. CLAVER-CARONE. It would be devastating. I mean, energy 

has always been the Achilles heel of the regime. Therefore, we have 

seen this. We saw the Soviet subsidies through 1991. Then their 

new godfather, and that was pretty much as the Chairman’s question before had gone to, their new godfather is Chavez. So why is 

Repsol and Petronas and these companies protected? Because Chavez is their godfather. He is protecting them, and he is protecting 

them with these subsidies. That wouldn’t be the case for American 

companies of course. 

So that essentially is what has maintained the economic livelihood of this regime. Now, even if they discovered some offshore, 

which, like I said, they have been at it 20 years. In 2004, Repsol 

said nothing there. Petrobras said not worth it. Sherritt has said 

I am out of here. You know, would it be sufficient to maintain that 

regime? Maybe, maybe not. 

But the one beneficiary immediately would be Chavez. That 

would be less than the 100,000 barrels a day that he has to send 

to the regime, and that is something that Chavez is also looking 

forward to, and a strong Chavez is a strong Castro, and a strong 

Castro is a strong Chavez. 

60 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LAMBORN. OK. The last person asking questions is Representative Duncan of South Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. I would just follow back up with some 

of the comments I made earlier. 

Mr. Whittle, does your group, the Environmental Defense Fund, 

do you all advocate drilling off the coast of Cuba? 

Mr. WHITTLE. No, sir. As I explained maybe before you showed 

up, domestically we oppose oil and gas drilling offshore of sensitive 

areas off North Carolina, Virginia, New Jersey and California. We 

do not oppose offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, particularly 

in the western and central Gulf. We do think offshore is here to 

stay. We are strong advocates of an alternative energy future, but 

we recognize the place of offshore. 

In terms of Cuba, we don’t take a position on their drilling. We 

recognize that they will drill, so our posture has been if and when 

Cuba drills it is imperative that steps be taken, that we protect our 

environmental and economic interests. 

Mr. DUNCAN. OK. Mr. Pin ̃ on, you were going to comment on 

something I had said earlier. I will give you the opportunity now 

if you have a question or a comment. 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. Yes. I think your comment was about environmental 

regulations. One of the things, I am not an academic. I am retired 

after 32 years in the oil industry. I was president of Amoco OilLatin America. 

I can tell you that I have been to countries in which the environmental regulations, when you and I would pull them off the shelf, 

they are probably the best in the world and you and I will be surprised. They are meaningless unless the regulators have the resources, the expertise to enforce those regulations. 

I am the first to admit that in the case of the Bahamas and Cuba 

and even maybe Mexico the regulations on the shelf might be fantastic. In fact, they might very well just copy the U.S. regulations. 

But as far as the enforcement is concerned, it is certainly lacking. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right, sir. You are saying that it is safer? The 

practices they put in place are safer than what Americans are 

doing now in the Western Gulf? 

Mr. PIN ̃ ON. No. What I am trying to say is that even though 

Cuba might have the regulations in place, the Government of Cuba 

itself, the regulatory agencies, don’t have the set of skills and/or experience to enforce them. 

In this case, you do have something to protect you, and that is 

Repsol. Repsol just drilled about a year ago the prospect Buckskin, 

which was about 180 miles south of Houston. It was a record-setter 

at a 32,000 feet depth. So here is a company that has a U.S. interest. Here is a company that is very well versed in know-how, in experience, following U.S. regulations, and they are the first ones 

that are going to drill in Cuba. 

The second company, by the way, as soon as the excavator 09 finishes with Repsol, which will be sometime in April, it is going over 

to Petronas. No one in the first panel I assure you even has the 

telephone number of Petronas. They wouldn’t even know who 

Petronas is. So it is sad that all of the emphasis has been put on 

Repsol. If we are really concerned about safety, we should have 

61 

been engaging Petronas and Gazprom, who are taking over the excavator 09. 

You are right, Representative Rivera. As soon as that rig leaves 

Trinidad and Tobago, a lot of things can happen before she gets to 

Cuba. When that rig leaves the hands of Repsol in April and goes 

over to Petronas, we won’t even have a telephone number to call 

and talk to. That to me is really totally unacceptable. 

Mr. RIVERA. Mr. Claver-Carone, the resources that are being harvested, where are they going to be refined? Is Cuba building refineries? 

Mr. CLAVER-CARONE. And that is the million dollar question. I 

mean, they have talked about like the regime does a lot of propaganda that Chavez and the Chinese are building this huge facility 

for refining in Cuba, but that will take years and years. Even the 

Venezuelans refine their oil here in the United States. The Mexicans refine their oil here in the United States. 

What will they do with it? I think that part of their big strategic 

bet here is that with all this that we are hearing eventually they 

are going to start garnering support from different lobbies here in 

the United States that are going to push to lift sanctions, and 

therefore whatever we find in Cuba we will be able to refine here 

in the United States and then repatriate it back to Cuba. You 

know, that is one bet. 

Another bet is maybe with the expansion of the Panama Canal 

with tankers being able to go by will they be able to send it to 

China? It is still very expensive. So that is one of the huge impediments and has been one of the deterrents that for the last 20 years 

has prevented Cuba from doing. 

In regards to Petronas coming after, I guarantee you that if 

Repsol once again, as they did in 2004, comes out with a commercially unviable find that Petronas will not be following up in any 

way whatsoever. 

Mr. DUNCAN. My hope is that our refining capacity, which we 

have capacity now, will be filled up with the Keystone XL Pipeline 

and oil coming from Canada, a friendly country who we will have 

economic relations with. My fear is that the Cuban oil will go to 

Venezuela or Valero’s Refinery in Aruba, which is all part of the 

Venezuelan regime. So that is an interesting concept. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. That concludes our questioning. This 

has been a good hearing. 

As I said earlier, Members may have additional questions for the 

record, and I would ask that you respond to those in writing. 

Thank you for being here. 

If there is no further business, without objection the Committee 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Additional material submitted for the record follows:] 

62 

Council of the Americas 

NORTH AMERICAN OFFSHORE ENERGY: MEXICO AND CANADA 

BOUNDARY TREATIES AND NEW DRILLING BY CUBA AND BAHAMAS 

The Council of the Americas (‘‘Council’’) appreciates the opportunity to provide a 

statement for the record concerning North American offshore energy, particularly 

deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. The Council is a business organization representing some 190 member companies invested in and doing business throughout 

the Western Hemisphere. Since our founding in 1965, the Council has been dedicated to the promotion of open markets, social and economic development, democracy, and the rule of law, and we are widely recognized for our policy and commercial leadership throughout the Americas. 

The Council is deeply engaged in hemispheric energy issues as well as U.S.-Cuban 

relations through member working groups. The Energy Action Group brings together the public and private sectors to develop strategic energy policies for the 

Americas. The Energy Action Group hosts forums in cities across the Americas and 

publishes working papers and recommendations on key energy topics. The Cuba 

Working Group includes corporate leaders from the worlds of banking, financial 

services, energy, telecommunications, hospitality, pharmaceuticals, and law. This effort has produced a series of papers on regulations and laws affecting U.S. business 

activity under the U.S. embargo and in Cuba. 

Background 

Spanish oil company Repsol is preparing to drill in the deep waters of the Cuban 

portion of the Gulf of Mexico. While much attention has been focused on Repsol and 

the arrival of its Chinese-constructed rig, the Scarabeo 9, in Cuban waters at the 

end of 2011, more than a handful of other oil companies are also engaged in exploratory activities off the Cuban, Jamaican, and Bahamian coasts. Mexico, as well, has 

its sights set on extracting deepwater oil in its stretch of the Gulf. 

The Deepwater Horizon blowout in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico in 2010 was a terrible 

tragedy but also a wake-up call for companies and countries about the risks inherent in deepwater drilling and the need for a well-coordinated emergency response 

plan, with public and private actors ready to deploy at a moment’s notice. 

The Council Applauds Private Sector Action and US–Mexico and US– 

Canada Cooperation 

Since the Deepwater Horizon explosion, the U.S. government has overhauled its 

offshore oil and gas regulations. In February 2011, several oil companies launched 

a quick-response system in case of another spill in the U.S. Gulf. At the international level, the United States is working with Mexico to develop shared safety 

and environmental standards for the Gulf. Outside of the Gulf, the United States 

and Canada are collaborating bilaterally and as part of the Arctic Council (members 

also include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden) on oil spill 

prevention and response in the Arctic. 

While U.S.-Cuban communication on Gulf drilling issues has thus far been limited 

to updates on the Deepwater Horizon spill, U.S.-Repsol engagement has been more 

active. Repsol has pledged to comply with U.S. regulatory requirements and industry standards in the Cuban area of the Gulf of Mexico and has shared its drilling 

and oil spill response plans with the United States as well as promised to allow U.S. 

agencies to inspect the Scarabeo 9. 

Safety First 

Repsol’s transparency is to be commended, but it is no substitution for direct U.S.- 

Cuban interaction on Gulf safety issues at the technical level. An oil spill in the 

Cuban Gulf puts at risk the waters and coast of the Eastern half of the United 

States from Florida to as far north as North Carolina. Such a spill would require 

more than a good working relationship between Repsol and the U.S. government. 

Complete cooperation and open communication between the U.S. and Cuban governments is essential for effective response management. 

For its part, the United States has issued licenses that exempt U.S. companies 

from the embargo and allow them to assist in the case of a possible spill off the 

coast of Cuba. In addition to the licensing, the United States has facilitated contact 

between some U.S. companies and NGOs and Cuban officials on drilling safety and 

environmental topics. 

These measures are constructive, but the Council is concerned that the licensing 

application process is too complicated and that too few companies have applied for 

or received licenses. Communication between U.S. companies and NGOs and Cuban 

officials is extremely important but no substitute for direct government-to-governVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 25, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\71116.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
63 

ment contact. The Council urges the United States to grant relevant oil and oil service companies an embargo waiver that would allow them to provide equipment and 

share safety and prevention best practices now in order to avoid the need to provide 

emergency assistance in response to a spill in Cuban waters later. The Council further urges the United States to enter into direct discussions with Cuba at a technical level, as well as with Jamaica and the Bahamas, to ensure that safety and 

environmental standards for drilling in shared waters are at the highest level, and 

that communication and cooperation procedures are in place in case of a spill. 

Bottom Line: The United States Must Do Everything Possible to Protect Its 

Waters and Coasts 

Legitimate concerns about strengthening the Cuban regime in ways that allow it 

to continue its level of political repression cannot be overlooked but should nonetheless be considered as part of a larger picture. With only 90 miles between the tip 

of Florida and the north coast of Cuba, our aquatic ecosystems are inextricably 

linked. What damages marine life and fouls beaches in Cuban waters, if not promptly contained, will damage marine life and foul beaches in U.S. waters as well. To 

the extent drilling occurs off Cuba’s coast, the United States must do everything 

within reason to protect its people and its environment. We can do this by working 

with Cuba (as well as Jamaica and the Bahamas) at a technical level to ensure drilling safety, prevention, sound practices, and, in the unfortunate event of an oil spill, 

quickly mobilize all necessary resources to contain it. 

For further information, please contact: 

Council of the Americas 

1615 L Street NW, Suite 250 

Washington, DC 20036 

202.659.8989 

www.as-coa.org 

Æ