### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs May 5, 2015

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LOUIS STILL

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 14

- 01374 Glenn Wright

, Judge

No. W2014

- 0158 4

- CCA

- R3

- CD

- Filed September 9, 2015

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Louis Still, of operating a motor vehicle after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, a Class E felony, and the trial court sentenced him to four years to be served as one month in

confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction because the State‟s key witness, the arresting officer, was not credible. Based upon the record and t he parties‟ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right ; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.

N ORMA M C G EE O GLE

, J. , delivered the opinion of the court, in which R OBERT W.

W EDEMEYER and R OGER A. P AGE

, JJ.

, joined.

Brett B. Stein

, Memphis , Tennessee, for the a ppellant, Louis Still

.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Caitlin Smith

, Assistant Attorney

General ; Amy P. Weirich , District Attorney General; and Carla Taylor , Assistant Dist rict Attorney General, for the a ppellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

The appellant‟s trial was held on May 12 and 13, 2014. Officer Ryan Orr of the Memphis Police Department testified that on the evening of December 9, 2013, he was on routine patrol in the area of Shelby Drive and Tulane Road and saw a white Ford

Escort we stbound on Shelby. The car turned into a BP gas station parking lot and pulled- 2

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into a handicap parking space, the only one in the lot, in front of the store. Officer Orr

said that he saw the driver, who was the appellant, get out of the Escort and go int o the

store. Officer Orr stated that he was about one hundred feet away from the Escort and that he did not see anyone else get out of the car.

Officer Orr testified that he pulled into the parking lot, got out of his patrol car,

and walk ed to the front of the Escort. The car‟s windows were not tinted, and Officer Orr

could see into the car clearly. A handicap placard was not in the Escort, and n o one was inside the vehicle . Officer Orr said the appellant was in the store for a couple of minutes.

When the appellant came outside, the officer confronted him and asked if he was handicapped and knew he was parked in a handicap space. The appellant answered both questions in the negative, so Officer Orr asked him for his driver‟s license and insurance

info rmation, which was normal procedure. The appellant could not provide insurance information and did not have his driver‟s license “on him.” He gave Officer Orr his social security number, and Officer Orr used the number to run a computer check of the

appe llant‟s license. The check revealed that the appell ant‟s license had been revoked. Officer Orr said that he arrested the appellant and that the appellant asked if the officer could give him a citation instead of making the arrest. Officer Orr refused to issue a citation, had the Escort towed to the Traffic Bureau, and had another officer transport the appellant to the Traffic Bureau.

On cross

- examination, Officer Orr testified that the incident occurred about 7:00 p.m., and he acknowledged that it was d ark outside. Officer Orr said that prior to seeing the Escort, he had been traveling south on Tulane Road . As he approached the intersection with Shelby Drive, he saw the Escort traveling west on Shelby. The Escort was “coming toward” Officer Orr but di d not pass in front of him and turned left into the BP parking lot. No one was in the car with the appellant. Officer Orr acknowledged that when he confronted the appellant, the appellant was walking toward the driver‟s side of

the Escort . Officer Orr patted down the appellant but did not remember if the appellant

had the Escort‟s keys on his person. Officer Orr said that he called for “backup,” that his partner arrived less than one minute later, and that his partner also spoke with the appellant. Officer Orr acknowledged that a bus stop was nearby but said that he did not see anyone at the stop.

Officer Orr testified that he was alone when he saw the Escort and that he filled out the appellant‟s “arrest ticket” about thirty minutes l ater . He also acknowledged that he wrote the following on the ticket:

While on routine patrol officers R. Orr, 12497 and B. Huff, 12578, observed vehicle Ford Escort traveling westbound on Shelby Drive. Officers observed the vehicle turn south into- 3

- the parking lot at 639 East Shelby Drive at the BP Gas Station. Officers observed the vehicle p ull into a handicap parking spo t. And the officers observed [that the Escort] did not have a handicap placard hanging from the rearview mirror or a handicap emblem on the license plate. [O]fficers stopped

the vehicle and confronted the driver defendant Still. Officers asked the defendant if he was handicap ped and he stated no, I

am not. Officers checked the defendant‟s information with

Station B and [were] advise d that he is a revoked habitual for having been an habitual issued on 10/4/2005. Officers asked

the defendant for his insurance and [he] stated that he could not provide officers with insurance. Officers placed defendant into custody.

Officer Orr main tained that despite his repeated use of the word “officers ,” Officer Huff

was not present . However, Officer Huff was present when Officer Orr filled out the

arrest ticket.

On redirect examination, Officer Orr testified that he had written hundreds of

ar r est tickets during his career. He said his use of “officers” was “habit” because other officers commonly arrived at crime scenes for backup.

At the conclusion of Officer Orr‟s testimony, the parties stipulated that the appellant had been declared a m otor vehicle habitual offender on October 4, 2005. The

State rested its case.

Constance Townes testified for the appellant that he was a good friend of her family and lived in her neighborhood. On December 9, 2013, the appellant‟s wife, Rita, telephone d Townes and asked Townes to drive Rita‟s Escort “around the corner” to have the Escort “checked out” by a mechanic. Townes walked down the street to the appellant‟s house. Townes got into the driver‟s seat of the Escort, and the appellant got into the p assenger side. Townes said that she drove the car to the mechanic and that she and the appellant were there about one hour. Townes then drove to the BP on Shelby Drive and pulled into a handicap space because “the car had quit.” Townes got out of the

dr iver‟s seat and was going to walk to get the mechanic while the appellant stayed with the car. Townes saw some friends, and they drove her to the mechanic. When Townes later returned to the BP station, the appellant and the car were gone. She said the

a ppellant did not drive the car on December 9.

On cross

- examination, Townes testified that she did not know what time Rita telephoned her. She said that when she and the appellant got to the BP station, it was still- 4

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light outside. Upon being questioned by the trial court, Townes acknowledged that the Escort‟s keys were in her pocket when she left the BP station.

Joseph Lockhart testified that he and the appellant were “old acquaintance[s].” On December 9, 2013, Lockhart was standing at the bus stop ne ar the BP station and saw

“s ome young lady” driving a car. Lockhart did not know the woman. He said that “they [were] having a problem with the car” and that the woman pulled up to the area where Lockhart was standing. The woman got out of the car and l eft. Lockhart spoke with the appellant, and the appellant went into the store. When the appellant came out of the store, Lockhart was on the bus. Upon being questioned by the trial court, Lockhart testified that he did not see a police car pull into the parking lot. He said it was still daylight outside when the incident occurred

.

The jury convicted the appellant as charged of operating a motor vehicle after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to four years to be served as one month

in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation.

II. Analysis

The appellant contends that the evidence is insuffic ient to support his conviction because Officer Orr was not credible. In support of his argument, he notes that Officer Orr‟s testimony was inconsistent with the officer‟s n arrative on the arrest ticket and that the State did not have Officer Huff testify. The State argues th at the evidence is

sufficient. We agree with the State.

When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the standard for review by an appellate court is “ whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ” Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). The State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable or legitimate inferences which may be

drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and t he weight and value to be afforded the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence, are resolved by the trier of

fact. State v. Bland , 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). This court will not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence, nor will t his court substitute its inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence for those inferences drawn by the jury. Id. Because a jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant is initially cloaked at trial and replaces it on appeal with one of guilt, a convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating to this court that the evidence is insufficient. State v. Tuggle

,- 5

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639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

A guilty verdict can be based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidenc e, or a combination of direc t and circumstantial evidence. State v. Hall , 976 S.W.2d 121, 140 (Tenn. 1998). “ The jury decides the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, and

„ [t]he inferences to be drawn from such evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the jury. ‟” State v. Rice , 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting

Marable v. State , 313 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tenn. 1958)). “ The standard of review „ i s the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence. ‟” State v.

Dorantes , 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson , 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)).

T aken in the light most favorable to the State, the evid enc e shows that on the evening of December 9, 2013, Officer Orr saw the appellant drive the Escort, park the car in a handicap space at the BP station, and go into the store. When Officer Orr checked the appellant‟s driver‟s license, he learned that the a ppellant had been declared a motor
vehicle habitual offender. Defense counsel thoroughly cross

- examined Officer Or r, and the officer acknowledged that his testimony contradicted the information on the appellant‟s arrest ticket. Specifically, Officer Orr wrote on the ticket that another officer was with him when he first saw the appellant driving the Escort and when he confronted the appellant. However, Officer Orr explained that he commonly wrote “officers” on arrest tickets out of habit and that another officer was not present. The jury, as was its prerogative, chose to accredit the officer‟s testimony that he saw the appellant driving the Escort. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the record and the parties‟ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

_________________________________ NORMA MCGEE OGLE , JUDGE