Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-315 | September 25, 2019 Page 1 of 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kay A. Beehler

Terre Haute, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Benjamin J. Shoptaw

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Amanda Schmidtz,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 25, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-315

Appeal from the Sullivan Superior 

Court

The Honorable Hugh R. Hunt, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

77D01-1709-F4-671

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-315 | September 25, 2019 Page 2 of 16

Case Summary and Issues

[1] Following a jury trial, Amanda L. Schmidtz was convicted of dealing in a 

schedule II controlled substance, a Level 4 felony, and found to be an habitual 

offender. The trial court sentenced Schmidtz to twelve years in the Indiana 

Department of Correction for the conviction, enhanced by fifteen years for the 

habitual offender finding. Schmidtz appeals, raising the following issues for our 

review: 1) whether the State adequately proved her identify as the person who 

committed the prior felony offenses on which the habitual offender finding was 

based, 2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her, and 3) 

whether her twenty-seven year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

her offenses and her character. Concluding the evidence was sufficient to 

connect Schmidtz to the three prior felonies alleged in the habitual offender 

information, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Schmidtz, 

and Schmidtz’s sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May 2017, a confidential informant working for the Sullivan County 

Sheriff’s Office purchased thirteen tablets of hydrocodone acetaminophen from 

Schmidtz, who had a valid prescription for the pills. The State charged 

Schmidtz with one count of dealing in a schedule II controlled substance, a 

Level 4 felony, and alleged that she was an habitual offender. The habitual 

offender count alleged Schmidtz had been previously convicted of three prior 

Class D felonies: 1) operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person
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on February 20, 2008, in Vigo Superior Court cause number 84D05-1610-FD3298 (“Cause 3298”); 2) operating a vehicle as an habitual traffic violator on 

June 17, 2011, in Sullivan Superior Court cause number 77D01-1007-FD-85 

(“Cause 85”); and 3) escape on April 27, 2012, in Sullivan Superior Court cause 

number 77D01-1108-FD-77 (“Cause 77”). 

[3] At trial, Schmidtz did not dispute that she sold the pills. See Transcript, 

Volume 3 at 5-6. She did, however, claim that she sold the pills under duress. 

Beginning in 2013, Schmidtz was involved in an abusive relationship with 

Jason Donovan. At some point, Donovan began living intermittently in 

Schmidtz’s home. He was physically and verbally abusive to Schmidtz and 

destructive to her property. Donovan would often steal Schmidtz’s prescription 

drugs and Schmidtz felt there was “was [not] any way to get around it, to get 

away from it” because if she did not give Donovan “whatever he wanted,

which was mainly [her] medicine, then he didn’t have any problem with 

whatever he had to do to get them.” Tr., Vol. 2 at 245-46.

[4] In early 2017, Donovan moved out of Schmidtz’s home and began residing 

with a friend, Steve Myers. On May 23, 2017, Myers called Schmidtz and said, 

“I got you[r] phone number from [Donovan], can I get some pills?” Id. at 249. 

When Schmidtz told him no, Myers said, “[W]e know you have your 

prescription, we know you got your script filled.” Id. Schmidtz believed that 

“[m]entioning [Donovan’s] name and leading me to believe that [the pills] were 

for [Donovan] was a threat to me.” Tr., Vol. 3 at 29. Schmidtz quoted Myers a 

price per pill that was so inflated she thought “maybe they’ll go somewhere else 
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and leave me alone.” Tr., Vol. 2 at 250. Instead, Myers said he would come by 

the next day. Schmidtz felt like “a sitting duck, more or less, [because] they 

were coming to get ‘em and that was that.” Id. When Myers arrived on May 

24, Schmidtz thought Donovan might be waiting in the car and if she did not 

sell Myers the pills, Myers would “go out and say ‘she won’t give ‘em to me’ 

and [Donovan] would come in and take ‘em and beat me up.” Tr., Vol. 3 at 3.

Schmidtz sold Myers thirteen pills. Unbeknownst to Schmidtz, Myers was 

acting as a confidential informant for the police and when he visited Schmidtz 

that day, he was wearing a recording device that captured audio and video of 

the transaction.

[5] A jury found Schmidtz guilty of dealing as charged in the first phase of the trial. 

Thereafter, the State presented evidence in the habitual offender phase, calling 

the Chief Probation Officer for Sullivan County and introducing through her 

certified records from three previous felony cases and one probation revocation 

proceeding against “Amanda L. Schmidtz.” On the basis of this evidence, the 

jury found the State had proved Schmidt to be an habitual offender.

[6] At Schmidtz’s sentencing hearing, her children testified about the hardship that 

a lengthy sentence would be to their family and in particular, to Schmidtz’s 

grandchildren. They also testified about Schmidtz’s troubled relationship with 

Donovan. Schmidtz again testified about her relationship with Donovan and 

how she felt Myers’s call was an implicit threat against her from Donovan. She 

also testified that after her arrest, she worked as a confidential informant for the 

police for several months and participated in several controlled buys. Schmidtz 
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acknowledged that her criminal record “is not that good, I know that[, but] 

when I actually did [those] offenses it was much farther in the past.” Tr., Vol. 3 

at 153. Finally, Schmidtz testified that although she had trouble with alcohol 

and drugs in the past, there was a lengthy period during which she had been 

clean and sober until becoming involved with Donovan. 

[7] The trial court acknowledged that Schmidtz did not have any convictions in the 

four or five years preceding this case but noted that this case was Schmidtz’s 

seventh felony conviction overall and “the Court has a real hard time getting 

past that. To me that shows a disdain for the law, an inability or unwillingness 

to abide by our laws here in this state.” Id. at 157. The trial court identified 

Schmidtz’s criminal history as an aggravating factor and found no mitigating 

factors. The trial court sentenced Schmidtz to twelve years in the Department 

of Correction for the dealing conviction, enhanced by fifteen years for the 

habitual offender finding, for a total sentence of twenty-seven years. Schmidtz 

now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Standard of Review

[8] We consider a claim of insufficient evidence to support an habitual offender 

finding the same as any sufficiency claim. See Woods v. State, 939 N.E.2d 676, 

677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Therefore, we consider only the 
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probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. 

State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not reweigh the evidence or 

judge witness credibility, as that is the factfinder’s role, and we will affirm the 

adjudication unless no reasonable fact finder could find the elements of the 

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Evidence is sufficient if an 

inference may be reasonably drawn from it to support the judgment. Id. at 147.

B. Habitual Offender Status

[9] To establish that Schmidtz was an habitual offender, the State was required to 

show that she had accumulated three prior unrelated felony convictions and, 

because all the alleged predicate offenses were Class D felonies, that “not more 

than ten (10) years have elapsed between the time [she] was released from 

imprisonment, probation, or parole (whichever is latest) and the time [she] 

committed the current offense.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(d) (2015). Schmidtz 

claims the evidence during the habitual offender phase of her trial was 

insufficient to establish her identity as the person who committed the predicate 

convictions alleged in the habitual offender count.

[10] Here, the State offered the following certified documents to prove that Schmidtz 

was the same person convicted of the current offense as that convicted of the 

alleged predicate offenses:

• As to Cause 3298: the information charging “Amanda L. Schmidtz”

with Class D felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a 

person, the order accepting her plea of guilty and deferring the entry of 
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judgment and sentencing while she participates in Drug Court, and the 

sentencing order dated February 20, 2008, Tr., Vol. 1, Exhibit P at 25-32;

documents showing Cause 3298 prompted a revocation of her probation 

in Sullivan County cause number 77D01-0309-FD-81 (“Cause 81”) after 

Schmidtz appeared in Sullivan Superior Court and admitted to violating 

the terms of her probation by being arrested and entering a Drug Court 

agreement in Cause 3298, id., Exhibit Q at 33-41; 

• As to Cause 85: the information charging “Amanda L. Schmidtz” with 

Class D felony operating a vehicle as an habitual traffic violator, and the 

sentencing order from June 17, 2011, that includes a probation 

component, id., Exhibit R at 42-44;

• As to Cause 77: the information charging “Amanda L. Schmidtz” with 

Class D felony escape, and the change of plea and sentencing order from 

April 27, 2012, that includes a probation component, id., Exhibit S at 45-

47; and 

• The testimony of Barbara Lance, chief probation officer in Sullivan 

County, who testified that she knew Schmidtz even before she became a 

probation officer, positively identified Schmidtz in court as the person 

against whom she filed a revocation probation in Cause 81 for her 

actions in Cause 3298, and positively identified her as “one and the 

same” person referenced in Causes 85 and 77, Tr., Vol. 3 at 72.

[11] The State must introduce into evidence proper certified and authenticated 

records of the defendant’s prior felony convictions in order to prove beyond a 
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reasonable doubt the fact of those prior convictions for purposes of adjudicating 

the defendant an habitual offender. Dexter v. State, 959 N.E.2d 235, 238 (Ind. 

2012). Although certified copies of judgments or commitments containing the 

same or similar name as the defendant may be introduced to prove the 

commission of prior felonies, there must be additional supporting evidence to 

identify the defendant as the same person named in the documents. Hernandez 

v. State, 716 N.E.2d 948, 953 (Ind. 1999). This proof of identity may be in the 

form of circumstantial evidence. Id. A sufficient connection between the 

documents and the defendant is made if the evidence yields logical and 

reasonable inferences from which the trier of fact may determine it was indeed 

the defendant who was convicted of the two felonies alleged. Id.

[12] Here, “Amanda L. Schmidtz,” date of birth March 27, 1969, was charged with 

dealing in a schedule II controlled substance and alleged to be an habitual 

offender. See Appendix, Volume 2 at 14, 71. The certified documents admitted 

at trial to show prior felony convictions each name “Amanda L. Schmidtz” as 

the defendant. The charging information in Cause 3298 shows the defendant’s 

date of birth as March 27, 1969. Tr., Vol. 1, Exhibit P at 26. The sentencing 

order in Cause 85 shows the defendant was forty-two years of age in June 2011. 

Id., Exhibit R at 43. The sentencing order in Cause 77 shows the defendant was 

forty-three years of age in April 2012. Id., Exhibit S at 46. Thus, the name and 

date of birth/age of the defendant in each of those three prior felony cases are 

consistent with Schmidtz. 
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[13] Moreover, Lance testified to her familiarity with Schmidtz. As the chief 

probation officer in Sullivan County, Lance handles “all the felon cases[.]” Tr., 

Vol. 3 at 64. Lance personally filed the petition to revoke in Cause 81 based on 

the Vigo County charges in Cause 3298 and appeared in court for the 

revocation hearing. Lance affirmed that “the Amanda Schmidtz that [was] on 

probation [in Cause 81] in 2007 and . . . [the] person who is referenced in 

[Cause 3298] is . . . in the courtroom today” and pointed her out. Id. at 68.1 

Lance also affirmed that the person convicted in Causes 85 and 77 was 

sentenced to probation in each case and that person and Schmidtz “are one and 

the same person[.]” Id. at 70, 72. Lance’s testimony shows a familiarity with 

Schmidtz and makes a sufficient connection between Schmidtz and the certified 

documents. See Oster v. State, 992 N.E.2d 871, 877-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) 

(where certified documents introduced in habitual offender proceeding 

contained “several different . . . names” that were “sufficiently similar to 

support an inference that they refer to the same person” and a parole officer 

testified that he had supervised the defendant and the defendant was the same 

person named in the certified documents, the State produced sufficient evidence 

to sustain finding that defendant was an habitual offender), trans. denied. 

1

Schmidtz contends the admission of Exhibit Q, referencing Cause 81 which was not one of the charged 

predicate offenses, was confusing and that the State attempted to use the probation revocation in Cause 81 as 

proof of Cause 3298. The State introduced Exhibit Q in order to show how Lance was aware of Cause 3298 

and able to identify Schmidtz as the perpetrator of that cause – the documents in Exhibit Q and Lance’s 

testimony show Lance and Schmidtz were both in court for the probation revocation hearing in Cause 81 

when Schmidtz admitted to the allegations of Cause 3298. This was necessary because Cause 3298 

originated out of a different county.
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[14] The State produced sufficient evidence to prove Schmidtz’s identity as the 

person convicted of three previous felonies and therefore, produced sufficient 

evidence from which the jury could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Schmidtz is an habitual offender.

II. Sentencing

[15] Schmidtz states her sentencing issue as whether “the sentence imposed is an 

abuse of the court’s discretion, and is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense, and the character of Appellant Schmidtz.” Amended Brief of 

Appellant at 13. Her single argument commingles language applicable to both 

abuse of discretion and inappropriate sentence analyses. The two are separate 

inquiries and should be analyzed as such. See King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We have therefore attempted to separate her arguments 

on each issue and will address them in turn.

A. Abuse of Discretion

[16] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are 

reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is 

“clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the 

court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom.” Id. The trial court can abuse its discretion by 1) issuing an 

inadequate sentencing statement, 2) finding aggravating or mitigating factors 

that are not supported by the record, 3) omitting factors that are clearly 
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supported by the record and advanced for consideration, 4) or by finding factors 

that are improper as a matter of law. Laster v. State, 956 N.E.2d 187, 193 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2011).

[17] Schmidtz identifies several mitigating factors she believes were overlooked: 1) 

her crime did not cause or threaten serious harm to other persons or property; 

2) there are substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify her crime; 3) she 

had led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before committing this 

crime; and 4) her imprisonment would result in undue hardship to her family. 

See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1.2 The finding of a mitigating factor is discretionary, 

and the trial court is neither obligated to accept the defendant’s argument as to 

what constitutes a mitigating factor nor required to give the same weight to 

mitigating evidence that the defendant would. Hunter v. State, 72 N.E.3d 928, 

935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Furthermore, if the trial court declines 

to find the existence of a mitigating factor, it is not obligated to explain why it 

has found that the factor does not exist. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. On 

2

Schmidtz generally notes “[t]wo separate aspects of the sentencing in this case [that] present troubling 

revelations.” Amended Br. of Appellant at 14. Schmidtz first alleges Lance “testified that her sentence 

recommendations in general are based in part on whether or not a defendant pleads guilty or goes to trial.” 

Id. In context, however, Lance simply indicated that taking responsibility is considered a mitigating factor 

that she takes into account when making a sentencing recommendation. See Tr., Vol. 3 at 145. We see 

nothing nefarious in this approach. Schmidtz next alleges the trial court’s remarks “indicate a philosophy 

that, because [Schmidtz] exercised her right to trial, there would be no leniency in the sentence.” Amended 

Br. of Appellant at 14. Again, in context, it appears the trial court was simply trying to clarify and 

understand Schmidtz’s point when she testified about her time as a confidential informant and how she 

believed the State “did [her] dirty[,]” and “gave [her] nothing for it.” Tr., Vol. 3 at 137-38. Moreover, the 

trial court’s remarks recognize that any leniency that might be extended to someone who pleaded guilty 

would not be applicable here. We do not believe the trial court’s remarks in context indicate a general 

sentencing philosophy of punishing those who exercise their right to trial.
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appeal, a defendant must show “that the mitigating evidence is both significant 

and clearly supported by the record.” Hunter, 72 N.E.3d at 935.

[18] Schmidtz has not shown that the proffered mitigating factors are significant or 

clearly supported by the record. The fact that her crime did not cause or 

threaten serious harm to other persons or property is not significant in light of 

the crime alleged. Her defense of duress was presented to and rejected by the 

jury and is therefore not supported by the record. The trial court acknowledged 

the length of time that had passed between Schmidtz’s last conviction and this 

crime, but also noted the number of convictions Schmidtz had accumulated 

weighed more heavily. And finally, every family suffers some hardship when a 

family member is incarcerated, but Schmidtz’s children and grandchildren do 

not rely on her for financial support and will suffer no hardship greater than 

that of any other convicted person’s family. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in failing to find any mitigating factors.

B. Inappropriate Sentence

[19] We may review and revise criminal sentences pursuant to the authority derived 

from Article 7, Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution. Indiana Appellate Rule 

7(B) empowers us to revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial 

court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Because a trial court’s 

judgment “should receive considerable deference[,]” Cardwell v. State, 895 

N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008), our principal role is to “leaven the outliers,” id.

at 1225. “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling 
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evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as 

accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s 

character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good 

character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The defendant 

bears the burden of persuading this court that his or her sentence is 

inappropriate, Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006), and we may 

look to any factors appearing in the record for such a determination, Stokes v. 

State, 947 N.E.2d 1033, 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. The question 

under Appellate Rule 7(B) analysis is “not whether another sentence is more 

appropriate” but rather “whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” King, 

894 N.E.2d at 268. Whether a sentence is inappropriate “turns on our sense of 

the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to 

others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 

895 N.E.2d at 1224.

[20] The nature of the offense references a defendant’s actions in comparison with 

the elements of the offense. Cannon v. State, 99 N.E.3d 274, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2018), trans. denied. The nature of the offense can be analyzed by using the 

advisory sentence as a starting point. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494. The 

sentencing range for dealing in a schedule II controlled substance, a Level 4

felony, is two to twelve years, with an advisory sentence of six years. Ind. Code 

§ 35-50-2-5.5. 
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[21] Schmidtz does not dispute that she sold thirteen of her prescription Norco pills 

to Myers. Norco3is a basically an “opiate with Tylenol,” tr., vol. 2 at 144, that 

can be “very addictive[,]” id. at 142. Her offense was elevated from a Level 6 

felony to a Level 4 felony because she sold at least five grams but less than ten 

grams of the drug. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-2(a)(1)(C), (d)(1). The trial court noted 

that the video tape of the deal shows Schmidtz “laughing, . . . cackling, . . . 

someone selling drugs there because they wanted to and not because they were 

under duress.” Tr., Vol. 3 at 157. Indeed, Schmidtz was selling to someone she 

knew and alleged that if she did not sell the pills, she believed they would be 

stolen from her. But Schmidtz did not call the police to report the supposed 

threat or alert them to the coming transaction, and she willingly set an inflated 

price. Schmidtz has shown no compelling evidence portraying her offense in a 

positive light and therefore, we cannot say the nature of her offense warrants a 

different sentence.

[22] The character of the offender refers to “general sentencing considerations and 

the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Cannon, 99 N.E.3d at 

280. In conducting our review, we consider the aggravating and mitigating 

factors found by the trial court, but also any other factors appearing in the 

record. Walters v. State, 68 N.E.3d 1097, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. 

denied. One relevant factor in considering the character of the defendant is 

3 Norco and Vicodin are among the brand names for hydrocodone acetaminophen. Tr., Vol. 2 at 141, 143.
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criminal history. Wells v. State, 2 N.E.3d 123, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. 

denied.

[23] Schmidtz has a criminal record dating back to 1995. The majority of her 

criminal convictions – three misdemeanor and six felony convictions prior to 

this case – are substance abuse related. Lance testified at the sentencing hearing 

that Schmidtz was not a good candidate for a shorter sentence or a community 

corrections or probationary sentence because “[s]he does not do well on 

probation, she’s been revoked twice, she’s violated [her current] bond.” Tr., 

Vol. 3 at 143. Schmidtz violated her current bond by being charged in two 

additional cases after being charged in this case; the trial court dismissed those 

cases on the State’s motion when it sentenced Schmidtz in this case. See

Appealed Order at 2. Participating in additional criminal conduct even while in 

the midst of being prosecuted for this offense does not reflect well on 

Schmidtz’s character.

[24] Schmidtz does not offer clear examples of her good character. She mentions 

her good relationship with her grandchildren and references her work as a 

confidential informant. She argues that there were substantial grounds to 

excuse or justify her actions. None of these things amount to compelling 

evidence that her character is so virtuous or consistently positive as to overcome 

her criminal history and current actions. 
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[25] Schmidtz has not met her burden of persuading us that her sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of her offense and her character. Her 

twenty-seven-year aggregate sentence is therefore affirmed.

Conclusion

[26] The State presented sufficient evidence to show Schmidtz had committed three 

prior unrelated felonies and to prove that she was an habitual offender. The 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Schmidtz and her sentence 

is not inappropriate. We therefore affirm the habitual offender finding and 

Schmidtz’s sentence.

[27] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.