18850 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 70 / Tuesday, April 13, 2010 / Notices 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for 

electronic access to the SECG. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Nancy S. Bufano, Center for Food Safety 

and Applied Nutrition (HFS–315), Food 

and Drug Administration, 5100 Paint 

Branch Pkwy., College Park, MD 20740, 

301–436–1493. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

In the Federal Register of July 9, 2009 

(74 FR 33030), FDA issued a final rule 

requiring shell egg producers to 

implement measures to prevent 

Salmonella Enteritidis (SE) from 

contaminating eggs on the farm and 

from further growth during storage and 

transportation, and requiring these 

producers to maintain records 

concerning their compliance with the 

rule and to register with FDA. The final 

rule became effective September 8, 

2009. 

FDA examined the economic 

implications of the final rule as required 

by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 

U.S.C. 601–612) and determined that 

the final rule will have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. In compliance 

with section 212 of the Small Business 

Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 

(Public Law 104–121), FDA is making 

available this SECG stating in plain 

language the requirements of the 

regulation. 

FDA is issuing this SECG as level 2 

guidance consistent with FDA’s good 

guidance practices regulation (21 CFR 

10.115(c)(2)). The SECG represents 

FDA’s current thinking on the 

prevention of SE in shell eggs. It does 

not create or confer any rights for or on 

any person and does not operate to bind 

FDA or the public. An alternative 

approach may be used if such approach 

satisfies the requirements of the 

applicable statutes and regulations. 

II. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

This SECG refers to collections of 

information described in FDA’s final 

rule that published in the Federal 

Register of July 9, 2009 (74 FR 33030 at 

33089), and that became effective on 

September 8, 2009. As stated in the final 

rule, these collections of information are 

subject to review by the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) under 

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(the PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501–3520). In 

compliance with the PRA (44 U.S.C. 

3507(d)), the agency has submitted the 

information collection provisions of the 

final rule to OMB for review. FDA will 

publish a notice in the Federal Register 

announcing OMB’s decision to approve, 

modify, or disapprove the information 

collection provisions in this final rule. 

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, 

and a person is not required to respond 

to, a collection of information unless it 

displays a currently valid OMB control 

number. 

III. Comments 

Interested persons may submit to the 

Division of Dockets Management (see 

ADDRESSES) electronic or written 

comments regarding this SECG. Submit 

a single copy of electronic comments or 

two paper copies of any mailed 

comments, except that individuals may 

submit one paper copy. Comments are 

to be identified with the docket number 

found in brackets in the heading of this 

document. The SECG and received 

comments may be seen in the Division 

of Dockets Management between 9 a.m. 

and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday. 

IV. Electronic Access 

Persons with access to the Internet 

may obtain the document at http:// 

www.fda.gov/FoodGuidances or http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

Dated: April 7, 2010. 

Leslie Kux, 

Acting Assistant Commissioner for Policy. 

[FR Doc. 2010–8359 Filed 4–12–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4160–01–S 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

[Docket No. DHS–2009–0026] 

National Protection and Programs 

Directorate; Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards Personnel Surety 

Program 

AGENCY: National Protection and 

Programs Directorate, DHS. 

ACTION: 30-day notice and request for 

comments: New information collection 

request 1670–NEW. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), National Protection and 

Programs Directorate (NPPD), Office of 

Infrastructure Protection (IP), 

Infrastructure Security Compliance 

Division (ISCD) will be submitting the 

following information collection request 

(ICR) to the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) for review and clearance 

in accordance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA). The 

information collection is a new 

information collection. A 60-day public 

notice for comments was previously 

published in the Federal Register on 

June 10, 2009, at 74 FR 27555. 

Comments were received and responses 

are in this notice. The purpose of this 

notice is to solicit additional comments 

during a 30-day public comment period 

prior to the submission of this collection 

to OMB. The submission describes the 

nature of the information collection, the 

categories of respondents, the estimated 

burden, and cost. 

DATES: Comments are encouraged and 

will be accepted until May 13, 2010. 

This process is conducted in accordance 

with 5 CFR 1320.8. 

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are 

invited to submit comments on the 

proposed information collection 

through the Federal Rulemaking Portal 

at http://www.regulations.gov. Follow 

the instructions for submitting 

comments. Comments must be 

identified by docket number DHS– 

2009–0026. 

Comments that include trade secrets, 

confidential commercial or financial 

information, Chemical-terrorism 

Vulnerability Information (CVI), 

Sensitive Security Information (SSI), or 

Protected Critical Infrastructure 

Information (PCII) should not be 

submitted to the public regulatory 

docket. Please submit such comments 

separately from other comments in 

response to this notice. Comments 

containing trade secrets, confidential 

commercial or financial information, 

CVI, SSI, or PCII should be 

appropriately marked and submitted by 

mail to the DHS/NPPD/IP/ISCD CFATS 

Program Manager at the Department of 

Homeland Security, 245 Murray Lane, 

SW., Mail Stop 0610, Arlington, VA 

20528–0610. Comments must be 

identified by docket number DHS– 

2009–0026. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A 

copy of this ICR, with applicable 

supporting documentation, may be 

obtained through the Federal 

Rulemaking Portal at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Program Description 

The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards (CFATS), 6 CFR part 27, 

require high-risk chemical facilities to 

submit information about facility 

personnel and, as appropriate, 

unescorted visitors with access to 

restricted areas or critical assets at those 

facilities. This information will be 

vetted by the Federal Government 

against the Terrorist Screening Database 

(TSDB), the consolidated and integrated 

terrorist watchlist maintained by the 

Federal Government, to identify known 

or suspected terrorists (i.e., individuals 

with terrorist ties). 


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High-risk chemical facilities must also 

perform other relevant background 

checks in compliance with CFATS 

Personnel Surety Risk-Based 

Performance Standard 12 (RBPS–12). 

See 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(i–iii): High-risk 

chemical facilities must ‘‘perform 

appropriate background checks * * * 

including (i) Measures designed to 

verify and validate identity; (ii) 

Measures designed to check criminal 

history; [and] (iii) Measures designed to 

verify and validate legal authorization to 

work.’’ The CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program is not intended to halt, hinder, 

or replace high-risk chemical facilities’ 

performance of background checks 

which are currently required for 

employment or access to secure areas of 

those facilities. 

Background 

On October 4, 2006, the President 

signed the Department of Homeland 

Security Appropriations Act of 2007 

(the Act), Public Law 109–295. Section 

550 of the Act provides DHS with the 

authority to regulate the security of 

high-risk chemical facilities. 

Section 550 requires that DHS 

regulations establish CFATS RBPS. 

RBPS–12 (6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv)) 

requires that regulated chemical 

facilities implement ‘‘measures designed 

to identify people with terrorist ties.’’ 

The ability to identify individuals with 

terrorist ties requires the use of 

information held in Governmentmaintained databases, which are 

unavailable to high-risk chemical 

facilities. Therefore, DHS is 

implementing the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program, which will allow 

chemical facilities to comply with 

RBPS–12 by implementing ‘‘measures 

designed to identify people with 

terrorist ties.’’ 

Overview of CFATS Personnel Surety 

Process 

The CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

will work with the DHS Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) to 

identify individuals who have terrorist 

ties by comparing information 

submitted by each high-risk chemical 

facility to the information of known or 

suspected terrorists who are listed in the 

TSDB. 

Information will be submitted to DHS 

through the Chemical Security 

Assessment Tool (CSAT), the online 

data collection portal for CFATS. The 

representative(s) of each high-risk 

chemical facility will submit the 

information of affected individuals to 

DHS through CSAT. The 

representative(s) of each high-risk 

chemical facility will also certify that 

the information is (1) true, correct, and 

complete, and (2) collected and 

submitted in compliance with the 

facility’s Site Security Plan (SSP). The 

representative(s) of each high-risk 

chemical facility will also affirm that 

notice required by the Privacy Act of 

1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, has been given to 

affected individuals before their 

information is submitted to DHS. 

DHS will send a verification of 

submission to the representative(s) of 

each high-risk chemical facility when a 

high-risk chemical facility (1) Submits 

information about an affected individual 

for the first time, (2) submits updated or 

corrected information about an affected 

individual, and/or (3) notifies DHS that 

an affected individual no longer has 

access to that facility’s restricted areas 

or critical assets. 

Upon receipt of each affected 

individual’s information in CSAT, DHS 

will send a copy of the information to 

TSA. Within TSA, the Office of 

Transportation Threat Assessment and 

Credentialing (TTAC) conducts 

screening and vetting of information 

against the TSDB for many DHS 

programs. On behalf of DHS, TTAC will 

compare the information of affected 

individuals collected by DHS to the 

information of known or suspected 

terrorists on the TSDB. TTAC will 

forward the results from potential 

matches to the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Terrorist Screening 

Center (TSC), which will make a final 

determination of whether an individual 

is a match to a known or suspected 

terrorist listed in the TSDB. 

In the event that there is a positive 

match to an identity in the TSDB, the 

TSC will notify the appropriate Federal 

law enforcement agency for 

coordination, investigative action, and/ 

or response, as appropriate. DHS will 

neither routinely provide vetting results 

to high-risk chemical facilities, nor will 

it provide results to an affected 

individual whose information was 

submitted by a high-risk chemical 

facility. As warranted, high-risk 

chemical facilities may be contacted by 

the Department or Federal law 

enforcement as a part of appropriate law 

enforcement investigation activity. (See 

the amendment to the FBI’s Terrorist 

Screening Records System, published in 

the Federal Register on August 22, 

2007, at 72 FR 47073.) 

Information Collected 

DHS may collect the following 

information from individuals: 

• Full name 

• Date of birth 

• Place of birth 

• Gender 

• Citizenship 

• Passport information 

• Visa information 

• Alien registration number 

• DHS Redress Number (if available) 

• Work phone number(s) 

• Work e-mail address(es) 

DHS will collect information that 

identifies the high-risk chemical facility 

or facilities, to which the affected 

individual has access to restricted areas 

or critical assets. As applicable, DHS 

will also collect information to verify 

that an affected individual is currently 

enrolled in a DHS program which relies 

on DHS-performed TSDB checks, in 

addition to other program-specific 

requirements. 

DHS may request additional 

information on an affected individual to 

confirm that the individual is or is not 

a match to a known or suspected 

terrorist in the TSDB. DHS may 

randomly select a small percentage of 

affected individuals for further 

verification as part of data accuracy 

review and auditing processes. In order 

to assist with this confirmation and 

verification, DHS may request 

additional information on affected 

individuals from the high-risk chemical 

facilities which have submitted their 

information to the Department. DHS 

may also collect information about 

points of contact at each high-risk 

chemical facility, and which points of 

contact the Department or Federal law 

enforcement personnel may contact 

with follow-up questions. However, a 

request for additional information from 

DHS does not imply, and should not be 

construed to indicate, that an individual 

is known or suspected to be associated 

with terrorism. 

DHS may collect information on 

affected individuals as necessary to 

enable it to provide redress for 

individuals who believe that they have 

been improperly impacted by the 

Personnel Surety Program. The 

information collected may include 

information necessary to conduct 

adjudications under subpart C of 

CFATS, 6 CFR 27.300–27.345. 

DHS will also collect administrative 

or programmatic information (e.g., 

affirmations or certifications of 

compliance, extension requests, brief 

surveys for process improvement, etc.) 

necessary to manage the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program. 

Affected Population 

6 CFR 27.230(a)(12) requires facility 

personnel and, as appropriate, 

unescorted visitors who have access to 

restricted areas or critical assets to 

undergo background checks. This 

affected population will include (1) 


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facility personnel (e.g., employees and 

contractors) who have access, either 

unescorted or otherwise, to restricted 

areas or critical assets, and (2) 

unescorted visitors who have access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

These background checks do not 

affect facility personnel who do not 

have access to facilities’ restricted areas 

or critical assets, nor do they affect 

escorted visitors. 

Linking Affected Individuals to Specific 

CFATS Covered Facilities 

To comply with CFATS, high-risk 

chemical facilities are required to 

identify who is an affected individual, 

and at which high-risk chemical facility 

or facilities each affected individual has 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets. DHS intends to collect this 

information through CSAT. 

Personnel Surety Submission Schedule 

To Check for Terrorist Ties 

DHS will establish a CFATS 

Personnel Surety Submission schedule 

for high-risk chemical facilities when 

submitting information to DHS to check 

for terrorist ties under 6 CFR 

27.230(a)(12)(iv). The schedule will be 

published in the Federal Register. The 

schedule, when published, will require: 

(1) An initial submission of information 

either within a certain number of days 

after DHS issues a letter of authorization 

or within certain number of days after 

publication of the schedule, whichever 

is later; (2) additional submissions for 

individuals that become newly affected 

(e.g., new hires or other individuals 

given access to a restricted area or 

critical asset); (3) updates or corrections 

to information for affected individuals 

whose information has previously been 

submitted; and (4) notification when an 

affected individual no longer has access 

to a restricted area or critical asset. The 

schedule will likely vary by final tier. A 

proposed schedule is provided in 

subpart (B) of the ‘‘Response To 

Comments Received During The 60-Day 

Comment Period’’ section of this 30-Day 

notice. High-risk chemical facilities may 

request extensions or variances from 

this schedule based on unique or 

unusual circumstances. 

Request for Exception to the 

Requirement Under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) 

DHS is requesting from OMB an 

exception for the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program to the Paperwork 

Reduction Act (PRA) requirement, as 

contained in 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3), which 

requires Federal agencies to confirm 

that their information collections 

provide certain reasonable notices, 

under the Paperwork Reduction Act, to 

affected individuals. If this exception is 

granted, DHS will be relieved of the 

potential obligation to require high-risk 

chemical facilities to collect signatures 

or other positive affirmations of these 

notices from affected individuals. 

Whether or not this exception is 

granted, DHS will still require high-risk 

facilities to affirm that required Privacy 

Act notice has been provided to affected 

individuals before personal information 

is collected. See 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3). 

DHS’s request for an exception to the 

requirement under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) 

would not exempt high-risk chemical 

facilities from having to adhere to 

applicable Federal, State, local, or tribal 

laws, or to regulations or policies 

pertaining to the privacy of facility 

personnel and the privacy of unescorted 

visitors. 

Responses to Comments Received 

During the 60-Day Comment Period 

DHS received 17 comments in 

response to the 60-day notice for 

comment. Comments were received 

from three private citizens, four private 

sector companies, seven associations, 

one training council, and one 

professional society. One additional 

comment was a jointly submitted 

comment. Many of the comments were 

in response to the questions posed by 

DHS in the 60-day notice for comments. 

In this section of this notice, DHS first 

addresses specific questions that the 

Department solicited, then other 

comments related to the Personnel 

Surety Program, and finally unsolicited 

comments received in response to the 

60-day notice. 

(A) On behalf of OMB, DHS solicited 

comments that evaluate whether the 

proposed collection of information is 

necessary for the proper performance of 

the functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility. 

Comment: Commenters challenged 

the practical utility of requiring highrisk chemical facilities to update 

previously submitted information. 

Response: The information collected 

by DHS is generally static. However, 

DHS will require each high-risk 

chemical facility to update and correct 

information previously submitted about 

affected individuals. Updates and 

corrections do not necessarily need to 

be made immediately when submitted 

information changes; rather, DHS will 

require high-risk facilities to make 

updates and corrections in accordance 

with a DHS-approved schedule. 

For example, when a high-risk 

chemical facility becomes aware that an 

affected individual’s information has 

changed (e.g., when a high-risk 

chemical facility becomes aware that an 

affected individual has changed his/her 

name), the high-risk chemical facility 

must update the submitted information. 

DHS will also require a high-risk 

chemical facility to correct previously 

submitted information when the highrisk chemical facility becomes aware 

that an affected individual’s information 

is incorrect (e.g., an affected 

individual’s place or date of birth). 

Requiring high-risk chemical facilities 

to update and correct information about 

affected individuals will increase the 

accuracy of the data collected, and 

decrease the probability of incorrect 

matches to the information of known or 

suspected terrorists listed on the TSDB. 

One piece of information that may 

change is the list of high-risk chemical 

facilities within one company or 

organization to which an affected 

individual has access. When such a 

change occurs, updates are not required 

immediately but rather in accordance 

with a schedule to be published by 

DHS. 

Comment: Commenters challenged 

the practical utility of requiring highrisk chemical facilities to notify the 

Department when an affected individual 

no longer has access to a high-risk 

chemical facility’s restricted area(s) or 

critical asset(s). Commenters suggested 

that this notification by a high-risk 

chemical facility to DHS would provide 

no value in the context of terrorism 

screening. 

Response: DHS will not rely on a 

single, one-time check to determine that 

an affected individual has ties to 

terrorism. Instead, DHS will continue to 

vet an affected individual’s information 

against new and/or updated TSDB 

records as they become available, for as 

long as the affected individual has 

access to a high-risk chemical facility’s 

restricted area(s) or critical asset(s). This 

process is referred to as ‘‘recurrent 

vetting’’ and is a standard DHS vetting 

practice. DHS will require high-risk 

chemical facilities to notify the 

Department when an affected individual 

no longer has access to a high-risk 

chemical facility’s restricted areas or 

critical assets so that the Department 

can cease recurrent vetting of the 

affected individual. 

Comment: Many commenters 

suggested that the proposed collection 

of information is needless and 

duplicative. Specifically, commenters 

suggested that the proposed information 

collection will place an undue burden 

on industry—in regard to time, money 

and other resources—by creating a 

program which duplicates an existing 

DHS screening or vetting program, such 

as the Transportation Worker 


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Identification Credential (TWIC) 

program. 

Response: TWIC’s authorizing statute, 

the Maritime Transportation Security 

Act of 2002 (MTSA), as amended, 46 

U.S.C. 70101 et seq., explicitly applies 

‘‘transportation security card’’ 

requirements only to: ‘‘individual[s] 

allowed unescorted access to secure 

area[s] designated in * * * [maritime] 

vessel or [maritime] facility security 

plan[s]’’ (§ 70105(b)(2)(A)); certain 

MTSA license and permit holders 

(§ 70105(b)(2)(B)); maritime vessel pilots 

(§ 70105(b)(2)(C)); maritime towing 

vessel personnel (§ 70105(b)(2)(D)); 

individuals with access to certain 

protected maritime security information 

(§ 70105(b)(2)(E)); and ‘‘other 

individuals engaged in port security 

activities’’ (§ 70105(b)(2)(F)). 

Furthermore, individuals are only 

eligible to receive TWICs if they have 

not committed certain ‘‘disqualifying 

criminal offense[s],’’ or if they do not 

meet certain ‘‘immigration status 

requirements’’ 49 CFR 1572.5(a)(1)–(2). 

However, the CFATS authorizing statute 

applies to ‘‘chemical facilities that * * * 

present high levels of security risk’’ 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act of 2007, Public Law 

109–295, section 550 (Oct. 4, 2006), as 

amended. CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program requirements apply only to 

high-risk chemical facilities’ ‘‘personnel, 

and as appropriate * * * unescorted 

visitors with access to restricted areas or 

critical assets’’ 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12). 

Moreover, facilities regulated under 

MTSA are exempt from CFATS. 

Accordingly, the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program is not duplicative of the 

TWIC program. 

DHS recognizes that some affected 

individuals under CFATS possess 

TWICs or other credentials that rely on 

DHS-conducted TSDB vetting (e.g., an 

individual vetted under the TWIC 

program). DHS intends to reduce the 

burden of this collection by recognizing 

previous TSDB vetting results 

conducted by DHS. Therefore, an 

affected individual who possesses a 

current and valid TWIC will likely 

require less information to be submitted 

than an affected individual who does 

not have a TWIC. Some additional 

personal information will be required in 

order to verify that the affected 

individual has a previous TSDB vetting 

result upon which the TWIC was issued. 

Comment: One comment suggested 

that the vetting of affected individuals 

against the TSDB has little practical 

utility in identifying terrorists due to the 

large number of individuals whose 

names appear on the TSDB, even though 

they are not actually threats to national 

security. 

Response: As indicated in the CFATS 

interim final rule, the Department has 

determined that a TSDB check is 

necessary for the purpose of protecting 

restricted areas and critical assets of 

high-risk chemical facilities from 

persons who may have ties to terrorism. 

See 72 FR 17708. The TSDB is the 

Federal Government’s integrated and 

consolidated terrorist watchlist and is 

the appropriate database to identify 

individuals with terrorist ties. 

(B) On behalf of OMB, DHS solicited 

comments which evaluate the accuracy 

of the Department’s estimate of the 

burden of the proposed collection of 

information, including the validity of 

the methodology and assumptions used. 

Comment: Commenters suggested that 

DHS did not provide sufficient detail 

about the proposed information 

collection to adequately evaluate the 

estimated burden. 

Response: In order to provide the 

public with more information to 

evaluate the estimated burden, the 

Department has established the 

information submission schedule 

outlined below. The Department will 

review comments received in response 

to this 30-day notice when finalizing the 

DHS schedule for submitting 

information. High-risk chemical 

facilities will be notified of the final 

DHS schedule prior to its 

implementation. The final DHS 

schedule will also be published in the 

Federal Register. 

Final tier 1 Final tier 2 Final tier 3 Final tier 4 

Initial Submission of Affected Individual’s Information.60 days after DHS issues 

a letter of authorization.

60 days after DHS issues 

a letter of authorization.

90 days after DHS issues 

a letter of authorization.

90 days after DHS issues 

a letter of authorization. 

Submission of a New Affected Individual’s Information.Within 30 days of being 

granted access.

Within 30 days of being 

granted access.

Within 60 days of being 

granted access.

Within 60 days of being 

granted access. 

Submission of Updates 

and Corrections to an 

Affected Individual’s Information.

Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need 

for an update or correction.

Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need 

for an update or correction.

Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need 

for an update or correction.

Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need 

for an update or correction. 

Submission of notification 

that an affected individual no longer has access.

Within 90 days of access 

being removed.

Within 90 days of access 

being removed.

Within 90 days of access 

being removed.

Within 90 days of access 

being removed. 

Comment: Commenters generally 

believed the mechanics of the 

information submission and update 

process could place a heavy burden on 

high-risk facilities. One commenter 

indicated that DHS could expect 

submissions to be in the tens of 

thousands per month. Commenters 

suggested that the proposed 35-minute 

burden for the information collection 

was based on an incomplete estimate, 

and did not account for the duplicative 

submission of affected individuals’ 

information by multiple high-risk 

chemical facilities in the cases of 

individuals who have access to 

restricted areas or critical assets at 

multiple facilities. 

Response: The estimated burden 

relied on the regulatory evaluation 

published for CFATS on April 1, 2007. 

In the regulatory evaluation, the 

Department estimated that 1,063,200 

affected individuals would be vetted 

against the TSDB (i.e., 29,533 per 

month) over a three-year period. This 

estimate allows for the possibility that a 

specific individual could have access at 

multiple high-risk chemical facilities. 

The Department’s population estimate 

also aligns with the commenters’ 

expectations that DHS should expect 

tens of thousands of submissions during 

each month. 

The estimated time for a responsible 

entity to submit the information of each 

affected individual through the CSAT 

portal is 0.59 hours per individual. This 

estimate is based upon the CFATS 

regulatory evaluation. The estimated 

time per affected individual was derived 

by assuming that (1) 30 minutes is 


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required to type in the required 

information for every affected 

individual once; (2) 5 percent of affected 

individuals will have some element of 

their information change annually, 

requiring 10 additional minutes of 

effort; and (3) 20 percent of affected 

individuals will lose access to restricted 

areas or critical assets annually, which 

will require 10 additional minutes of 

effort to remove each affected 

individual’s information from CSAT. 

DHS believes that the information 

contained in this notice, in the 

Personnel Surety Program’s 60-day PRA 

notice preceding this notice (74 FR 

27555 (June 10, 2009)), and in the 

CFATS regulatory evaluation provides 

sufficient detail about the proposed 

Personnel Surety Program’s information 

collection process. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the Department’s estimate of the 

burden may not have accounted for the 

burden an affected individual incurs 

from investigations and adverse 

employment decisions that may result 

from the individual’s possibly 

unjustified presence on the TSDB. 

Response: The burden outlined in this 

30-day notice is limited in scope to 

those activities listed in 5 CFR 

1320.3(b)(1). Specifically, 5 CFR 

1320.3(b)(1) requires the Department to 

estimate the total time, effort, or 

financial resources expended by persons 

to generate, maintain, retain, or disclose 

or provide information to or for a 

Federal agency. 

The Department is also seeking to 

collect five core data elements about 

each individual to be vetted under the 

Personnel Surety Program: Full name, 

date of birth, place of birth, gender, and 

citizenship. When taken together, these 

identifiers will minimize false positive 

matches to the TSDB. Furthermore, each 

potential match will be manually 

reviewed by Department adjudicators 

who have expertise in evaluating 

matches prior to confirmation that an 

individual’s information matches the 

information of a known or suspected 

terrorist. 

(C) On behalf of OMB, DHS solicited 

comments to enhance the quality, 

utility, and clarity of the information to 

be collected. 

Comment: Most of the commenters 

requested additional clarity about what 

information DHS will routinely collect 

and update. Several commenters 

suggested that the information collected 

should be limited to information which 

is necessary to conduct an inquiry 

against the TSDB. One commenter also 

suggested that the information should 

be limited to personal information that 

is unlikely to change. 

Response: As outlined earlier in this 

30-day notice, DHS will routinely 

collect an affected individual’s full 

name, date of birth, place of birth, 

gender, and citizenship. DHS will also 

collect information that identifies the 

high-risk chemical facility or facilities to 

which the affected individual has 

access. DHS has limited the information 

routinely collected to include only that 

which is (1) Necessary to conduct a 

TSDB check and adjudicate potential 

matches, (2) unlikely to change, and (3) 

is essential for quickly understanding 

the risk a known or suspected terrorist 

poses to high-risk chemical facilities. 

DHS will not require immediate 

reporting of updates to previously 

submitted information. As previously 

discussed in this notice, DHS will 

permit high-risk chemical facilities to 

update information on a periodic basis 

in compliance with a DHS-approved 

schedule. 

Comment: Most commenters 

commended DHS for intending to 

recognize the previous TSDB vetting 

results completed by other DHS 

programs, such as the TWIC program. 

Several commenters, however, 

suggested that DHS should not collect 

information from high-risk chemical 

facilities for the purpose of verifying the 

validity of credentials issued as part of 

other DHS programs (which conduct 

TSDB vetting) because the burden of 

data collection necessary to verify such 

credentials could be burdensome. 

Response: In lieu of conducting new 

TSDB vetting on all affected 

individuals, DHS intends to recognize 

the results of previous TSDB vetting 

conducted on individuals enrolled in 

certain other DHS programs. 

Specifically, DHS is considering 

recognizing the previous TSDB vetting 

results completed by other DHS 

programs, such as TWIC, and the 

Trusted Traveler Programs (Secure 

Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid 

Inspection (SENTRI), Free and Secure 

Trade (FAST), and NEXUS). Further, 

DHS is also considering recognizing the 

results of TSDB vetting (conducted by 

DHS) upon which each State relies 

when issuing a Commercial Driver’s 

License with a Hazardous Materials 

Endorsement (HME). 

This will likely require fewer pieces 

of information than are required to vet 

an individual who is not enrolled in 

another vetting program. DHS believes 

the burden of collecting those fewer 

pieces of information is accounted for in 

the estimated burden. 

This approach will also limit the 

number of instances in which different 

DHS programs may vet the same 

affected individual against the TSDB. If 

other programs’ vetting results cannot 

be verified without substantial effort, 

DHS may initiate new vetting of an 

affected individual’s information against 

the TSDB. 

Comment: Several commenters 

recommended that the Department 

recognize and offer reciprocity to the 

background checks, which include 

vetting against the TSDB, as conducted 

by the Department of Justice Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (ATF). Commenters 

suggested that without this 

accommodation, the regulatory overlap 

between the two agencies will impose 

unreasonable burdens. 

Response: ATF does not conduct 

recurrent vetting against the TSDB, and 

thus is not appropriate as a reciprocal 

program to meet the requirements of 

CFATS. 

(D) On behalf of OMB, DHS solicited 

comments regarding the minimization 

of the burden of information collection 

on those who are to respond, including 

through the use of appropriate 

automated, electronic, mechanical, or 

other technological collection 

techniques or other forms of information 

technology (e.g., permitting electronic 

submissions of responses). 

Comment: Commenters encouraged 

DHS to consider the procedural and 

logistical challenges of large-scale data 

collection and transmission when 

developing the Personnel Surety portal 

component of CSAT. Specifically, 

commenters suggested that DHS permit 

each high-risk chemical facility to 

transmit data collectively (e.g., via a 

spreadsheet or other readily available 

electronic means). In other words, a 

high-risk chemical facility would collect 

the required information in a single file 

(or series of files) and upload it to DHS. 

Anything to the contrary—such as 

manual entry of discrete information 

into data fields—would result in an 

undue burden to the regulated 

community, increase human error, and 

raise information security concerns. 

Response: DHS will enable high-risk 

chemical facilities to upload 

information electronically about 

multiple affected individuals 

collectively. DHS would welcome 

suggestions about what technical 

standards, formats, or export/import 

capabilities are in use by high-risk 

chemical facilities to facilitate such data 

submission. 

Comment: Many commenters 

suggested that third parties be 

authorized to support data submission 

to the Department. Specifically, many 

commenters suggested that DHS should 

permit third party vendors to enter 

information into CSAT on a facility’s 


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behalf. One commenter suggested that 

(1) Background check providers 

understand the information security and 

privacy protections that apply to 

information; (2) a web of Federal, State, 

and local laws protect information 

(many corporations outsource personnel 

surety needs for this reason); and (3) 

experienced background check 

providers will help high-risk chemical 

facilities ensure that compliance with 

CFATS does not cause noncompliance 

with other laws which govern the 

collection, use, storage, or destruction of 

information. 

Response: To support the submission 

of information by high-risk chemical 

facilities, DHS has historically 

allowed—and will continue to allow— 

authorized third-party access to CSAT 

as a Preparer. Information about the 

CSAT Preparer user role can be found 

at http://www.dhs.gov/chemicalsecurity. 

Comment: A few commenters 

suggested that high-risk chemical 

facilities receive an electronic 

acknowledgement that the submitted 

information has been received. Such an 

acknowledgement would aid in 

demonstrating a high-risk chemical 

facility’s compliance with 6 CFR 

27.230(a)(12)(iv). 

Response: DHS will send an 

electronic verification of submission to 

high-risk chemical facilities when a 

high-risk chemical facility (1) Submits 

information about an affected individual 

for the first time, (2) submits updated or 

corrected information about an affected 

individual, and/or (3) notifies DHS that 

an affected individual no longer has 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets. 

(E) DHS solicited comments that 

respond to the Department’s 

interpretation of the population affected 

by RBPS–12’s background check 

requirement. 

Comment: Many commenters 

provided extensive responses to the 

Department’s interpretation of the 

population which is affected by RBPS– 

12. The comments suggested that the 

Department’s interpretation expanded 

the definition beyond the scope of 

CFATS. The comments referenced the 

preamble to the CFATS Interim Final 

Rule, in which DHS stated that each 

facility ‘‘shall identify critical assets and 

restricted areas and establish which 

employees and contractors may need 

unescorted access to those areas or 

assets, and thus must undergo a 

background check’’ 72 FR 17708 (Apr. 7, 

2007). Commenters also suggested that 

vetting escorted facility personnel is 

inconsistent with other regulatory 

schemes (e.g., TWIC). 

Response: The regulatory text makes 

no distinction between facility 

personnel who are escorted and facility 

personnel who are unescorted. The 

actual text of CFATS, at 6 CFR 

27.230(a)(12), uses the term 

‘‘unescorted’’ to modify only the noun 

‘‘visitors.’’ As such, if facility personnel 

have access, either unescorted or 

otherwise (e.g., escorted), to restricted 

areas or critical assets, then they are 

affected individuals who must be 

screened for the purposes of the 

Personnel Surety Program. 

However, the preamble to the CFATS 

Interim Final Rule could be read to 

imply that a different population would 

undergo vetting rather than the 

population suggested in the regulatory 

text of CFATS. To the extent that there 

is a potential conflict, the regulatory text 

of CFATS takes precedence. As such, 

the populations of individuals who 

must be vetted under 6 CFR 

27.230(a)(12) are the same as those 

described in the 60-day notice 

preceding this 30-day notice: (1) Facility 

personnel (e.g., employees and 

contractors) with access (unescorted or 

otherwise) to restricted areas or critical 

assets, and (2) unescorted visitors with 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets. 

DHS would like to underscore that a 

high-risk chemical facility has wide 

latitude in its unique and tailored SSP 

regarding the terms under which facility 

personnel will be granted access, either 

unescorted or otherwise, to restricted 

areas and critical assets. Each high-risk 

chemical facility will need to consider 

its unique security concerns when 

determining which individuals will be 

afforded access to restricted areas or 

critical assets. 

Additionally, DHS will expect that 

each facility be able to explain why an 

individual is an affected individual. 

Specifically, an affected individual must 

meet one and only one of the following 

three criteria: (1) The individual is 

facility personnel with unescorted 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets; (2) the individual is facility 

personnel with access, but not 

unescorted access, to restricted areas or 

critical assets; or (3) the individual is an 

unescorted visitor with access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

(F) DHS solicited comments which 

respond to the statement that a Federal 

law enforcement agency may, if 

appropriate, contact the high-risk 

chemical facility as a part of a law 

enforcement investigation into terrorist 

ties of facility personnel. 

Comment: One commenter expressed 

concern that contact from a Federal law 

enforcement agency about an individual 

who is properly on the watchlist but is 

innocent nevertheless may result in 

adverse employment decisions. 

Response: Contact by a Federal law 

enforcement organization does not 

necessarily indicate that any affected 

person is a known or suspected terrorist. 

Further, employment decisions made by 

a high-risk chemical facility in response 

to contact by a Federal law enforcement 

agency are not regulated by CFATS. A 

corporation or facility should ensure 

that it is complying with all applicable 

laws, including applicable state 

regulations, when considering 

employment decisions. 

It should also be noted that DHS will 

randomly audit its vetting processes in 

an effort to maximize vetting accuracy 

and Personnel Surety Program 

efficiency. As part of this auditing, DHS 

may request information on a small 

percentage of affected individuals after 

those individuals have been initially 

vetted against the TSDB. A request for 

additional information does not imply, 

and should not be construed to indicate, 

that an individual is known or 

suspected to be associated with 

terrorism. 

(G) DHS solicited comments which 

respond to the Department’s intention to 

seek an exception to the notice 

requirement under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3). 

Comment: DHS received several 

comments in response to the 

Department’s intention to seek an 

exception to the PRA’s notice 

requirement. Every comment expressed 

concern about the impact to an affected 

individual’s right to be granted notice 

under the Privacy Act. See 5 U.S.C. 

552a(e)(3). 

Response: The request for an 

exception to 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) is 

related to the PRA and unrelated to the 

Privacy Act; 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) requires 

that each collection of information shall 

inform and provide reasonable notice to 

the potential persons to whom the 

collection of information is addressed. 

The request by DHS for an exception to 

5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) from OMB will 

ensure that DHS will be relieved of the 

potential obligation to require high-risk 

chemical facilities to collect signatures 

or other positive affirmations of these 

notices from affected individuals 

(although high-risk chemical facilities 

would not be precluded from collecting 

signatures or other positive affirmations 

of notice if this exception is granted). 

This exception will then afford high-risk 

chemical facilities wide latitude in 

choosing how to collect, recollect, or 

leverage already collected data based 

upon their unique business operations 

and processes. 


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Because the information being 

collected under this information 

collection request is information that 

will be used to identify individuals with 

known or suspected terrorist ties, the 

Department believes that it is important 

for affected individuals to be informed 

of the Government’s intended use of 

their information. However, under 

CFATS the Department regulates highrisk chemical facilities and not affected 

individuals. Although the affected 

individual is ultimately the source of 

the collected information, the burden of 

submitting the collected data to DHS 

lies on the high-risk chemical facility. 

(For example, high-risk chemical 

facilities may collect affected 

individuals’ information by having 

affected individuals fill out forms, or 

high-risk chemical facilities may submit 

batch files extracted from databases 

which contain the necessary 

information previously collected from 

affected individuals.) An exception to 5 

CFR 1320.8(b)(3) will ensure that the 

Department does not need to inspect, 

audit, or receive confirmation (e.g., 

signatures of acknowledgement from 

affected individuals) from high-risk 

chemical facilities where every affected 

individual has received notice under the 

PRA of this information collection. 

The Department’s request for an 

exception to 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) of the 

PRA is not a request for an exception to 

provide notice to affected individuals 

under the Privacy Act. If this exception 

is granted, high-risk chemical facilities 

will be relieved of the potential 

obligation to collect signatures or other 

positive affirmations from affected 

individuals, but will still be obligated to 

affirm that required privacy notice has 

been provided to affected individuals 

before personal information is collected. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that affected individuals 

should be notified in writing that they 

must undergo background checks 

consistent with the requirements of 6 

CFR 27.230 as a condition of 

employment at any high-risk chemical 

facility. Commenters also suggested that 

affected individuals should be advised 

of their rights to contest the findings of 

background checks, and of how to 

contest those findings. 

Response: No affirmative written 

statements of this sort are required by 

CFATS. However, DHS has discussed 

Personnel Surety Program background 

check requirements in CFATS in the 

Advanced Notice of Rulemaking 

preceding CFATS (71 FR 78276 (Dec. 

28, 2006)), the CFATS Risk-Based 

Performance Standards Guidance 

Document (May 2009), and the 

Personnel Surety Program’s 60-day PRA 

notice (74 FR 27555 (June 10, 2009)). 

(H) DHS also received unsolicited 

comments in response to the 60-day 

notice related to the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program. 

Comment: One commenter expressed 

disappointment in the proposed 

information collection, because the 

commenter believed that the collection 

approach did not guarantee the 

availability of all due process 

protections under notice and comment 

rulemaking pursuant to the 

Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 

Response: Through this notice and 

through DHS’s June 10, 2009, 60-day 

PRA notice, 74 FR 27555 (June 10, 

2009), DHS is fulfilling its obligations to 

solicit and respond to public comment 

under the PRA. DHS’s PRA publications 

detail (1) which data points the 

Department will collect in order to 

conduct vetting against the TSDB; (2) 

how the Department will collect those 

data points; and (3) how the Department 

will perform vetting against the TSDB. 

This type of program description is the 

type of detail which is appropriate in a 

PRA notice, because it allows DHS to 

solicit comments on how to improve the 

proposed information collection and to 

consider ways to reduce the burden the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program will 

place on affected individuals and highrisk chemical facilities. 

Comment: Many commenters 

expressed concern that DHS would not 

notify high-risk chemical facilities when 

affected individuals are determined to 

be known or suspected terrorists. 

Commenters stated that as a result of 

such lack of notification, high-risk 

chemical facilities may unknowingly 

grant access to individuals who are 

known or suspected to have terrorist 

ties, thereby subjecting facility 

personnel and surrounding 

communities to unnecessary risk. Some 

of the commenters acknowledged that 

there may be circumstances when it is 

either appropriate or inappropriate to 

contact a facility in the context of a law 

enforcement investigation, but stated 

that DHS should not withhold TSDB 

vetting results as a general matter. Other 

commenters suggested that DHS should 

always notify facilities about known or 

suspected terrorists to enable 

appropriate facility action, such as 

potentially limiting or denying known 

or suspected terrorists’ access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

Response: DHS will not routinely 

notify high-risk chemical facilities of 

Personnel Surety Program vetting 

results. DHS will coordinate with 

Federal law enforcement entities to 

monitor and/or prevent situations in 

which known or suspected terrorists 

have access to high-risk chemical 

facilities. The precise manner in which 

DHS or Federal law enforcement entities 

could contact high-risk chemical 

facilities following vetting are beyond 

the scope of this PRA notice. 

Comment: Commenters also suggested 

that failure to notify an individual that 

he/she is a known or suspected terrorist 

would abrogate that individual’s right to 

request an administrative adjudication 

of a finding under RBPS–12 that he/she 

is a potential security threat. 

Response: Administrative 

adjudications which contest findings 

that affected individuals are potential 

security threats are provided by 6 CFR 

27.310(a)(1). The Department does not 

intend to limit affected individuals’ 

abilities to request administrative 

adjudications merely because it will not 

routinely notify them of TSDB vetting 

results. Individuals who believe they 

have been adversely affected by vetting 

may file Notices of Application for 

Review with the Department. 

Comment: One commenter 

recommended that DHS should not 

collect an acknowledgement of State 

and local privacy law compliance from 

high-risk chemical facilities. The 

commenter suggested that requiring a 

compliance certification would add 

unnecessary procedural burden to the 

Personnel Surety Program because DHS 

is not responsible for State or local 

privacy law compliance. 

Response: DHS agrees with the 

commenter and will not collect this 

acknowledgement as part of Personnel 

Surety Program information 

submissions. 

Solicitation of Comments 

The Office of Management and Budget 

is particularly interested in comments 

which: 

1. Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

2. Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

3. Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

4. Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of appropriate automated, 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology 


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(e.g., permitting electronic submissions 

of responses). 

The Department is particularly 

interested in comments which: 

1. Respond to the Department’s 

interpretation of the population affected 

by RBPS–12 background checks, as 

outlined in 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12); 

2. Respond to fact that the Department 

or a Federal law enforcement agency 

may, if appropriate, contact the highrisk chemical facility as a part of a law 

enforcement investigation into terrorist 

ties of facility personnel; 

3. Respond to the Department’s 

intention to collect information that 

identifies the high-risk chemical 

facilities, restricted areas and critical 

assets to which each affected individual 

has access; and 

4. Respond to the Department on its 

intention to seek an exception to the 

notice requirement under 5 CFR 

1320.8(b)(3). 

Analysis 

Agency: Department of Homeland 

Security, National Protection and 

Programs Directorate, Office of 

Infrastructure Protection, Infrastructure 

Security Compliance Division. 

Title: CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program. 

Form: Not Applicable. 

OMB Number: 1670–NEW. 

Frequency: As required by the DHSapproved schedule. 

Affected Public: High-risk chemical 

facilities as defined in 6 CFR part 27, 

high-risk chemical facility personnel, 

and as appropriate, unescorted visitors 

with access to restricted areas or critical 

assets. 

Number of Respondents: 354,400 

individuals. 

Estimated Time per Respondent: 0.59 

hours (35.4 minutes). 

Total Burden Hours: 210,351.7 annual 

burden hours. 

Total Burden Cost (capital/startup): 

$0.00. 

Total Burden Cost (operating/ 

maintaining): $17,669,543. 

Dated: March 6, 2010. 

Thomas Chase Garwood, III, 

Chief Information Officer, National Protection 

and Programs Directorate, Department of 

Homeland Security. 

[FR Doc. 2010–8312 Filed 4–12–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–9P–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Office of the Secretary 

[Docket No. DHS–2009–0146] 

Privacy Act of 1974; Department of 

Homeland Security Citizenship and 

Immigration Services Ombudsman– 

001 Virtual Ombudsman System of 

Records 

AGENCY: Privacy Office, DHS. 

ACTION: Notice of Privacy Act system of 

records. 

SUMMARY: In accordance with the 

Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of 

Homeland Security is giving notice that 

it proposes to establish a new 

Department of Homeland Security 

system of records notice titled, 

‘‘Department of Homeland Security 

Citizenship and Immigration Services 

Ombudsman–001 Virtual Ombudsman 

System of Records.’’ This system of 

records will ensure the efficient and 

secure processing of information to aid 

the Citizenship and Immigration 

Services Ombudsman in providing 

assistance to individuals, employers, 

and their representatives in resolving 

problems with U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services; identify areas in 

which individuals, employers, and their 

representatives have problems working 

with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services; and to the extent possible, 

propose changes to mitigate problems 

pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 272. This newly 

established system will be included in 

the Department of Homeland Security’s 

inventory of record systems. 

DATES: Submit comments on or before 

May 13, 2010. This new system will be 

effective May 13, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by docket number DHS– 

2009–0146 by one of the following 

methods: 

• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 703–483–2999. 

• Mail: Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief 

Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, 

Department of Homeland Security, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

• Instructions: All submissions 

received must include the agency name 

and docket number for this rulemaking. 

All comments received will be posted 

without change to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information provided. 

• Docket: For access to the docket to 

read background documents or 

comments received go to http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

general questions please contact: 

Raymond Mills (202–357–8100), Privacy 

Point of Contact, Office of the 

Citizenship and Immigration Services 

Ombudsman, Department of Homeland 

Security, Washington, DC 20528. For 

privacy issues please contact: Mary 

Ellen Callahan (703–235–0780), Chief 

Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, 

Department of Homeland Security, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

Pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974, 

(5 U.S.C. 552a), the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) Citizenship 

and Immigration Services Ombudsman 

(CISOMB) is giving notice that it 

proposes to establish a new DHS system 

of records notice titled, ‘‘DHS/CISOMB– 

001 Virtual Ombudsman System of 

Records.’’ This system of records will 

ensure the efficient and secure 

processing of information to aid the 

CISOMB in providing assistance to 

individuals, employers, and their 

representatives in resolving problems 

with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USCIS); identify areas in 

which individuals, employers, and their 

representatives have problems working 

with USCIS; and to the extent possible, 

propose changes to mitigate problems 

pursuant 6 U.S.C. 272. 

CISOMB has developed the DHS/ 

CISOMB–001 Virtual Ombudsman 

System of Records to ensure the 

efficient and secure processing of 

information and to aid the Ombudsman 

in assisting individuals and employers 

in making systemic recommendations to 

USCIS. The core of the DHS/CISOMB– 

001 Virtual Ombudsman System of 

Records is CISOMB’s Web form 7001 

which is a user interface Web-based 

form which will automatically convert 

information submitted by an individual 

or employer into a case within 

CISOMB’s account within Internet 

Quorum/Enterprise Correspondence 

Tracking (IQ/ECT) system. IQ/ECT is the 

Department’s enterprise-wide 

correspondence and case management 

tracking system. This system allows the 

Department’s headquarters and 

components to manage cases and 

resolve issues in a coordinated and 

timely manner. For more information on 

IQ/ECT, please view the Enterprise 

Correspondence Tracking System PIA at 

http://www.dhs.gov/privacy. The system 

also enables CISOMB to segregate data 

into several categories to generate 

internal reports, provide customized 

feedback to individuals and employers, 

and supply real-time aggregated 


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