COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Overton 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

PIEDMONT MANUFACTURING COMPANY, ET AL. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1546-96-3 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 FEBRUARY 25, 1997 

LOIS P. EAST 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 S. Vernon Priddy, III (Mark M. Caldwell, III; 

Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, on briefs), 

for appellants. 

 P. Scott De Bruin (Joseph R. Johnson, Jr. & 

Associates, on brief), for appellee. 

 This appeal stems from a 1992 award of benefits by the 

Workers' Compensation Commission to Lois P. East for DeQuervain’s 

tenosynovitis, affirmed by this Court in Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. 

East, 17 Va. App. 499, 438 S.E.2d 769 (1993). After the Supreme 

Court's decision in The Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 

467 S.E.2d 795 (1996), Piedmont moved the commission to vacate 

the award, arguing that the commission had no subject matter 

jurisdiction over the claim. The commission refused, and 

Piedmont appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 In the case at bar we are constrained to observe the 

doctrine of res judicata, in which "a point once adjudicated by a 

court of competent jurisdiction may be relied upon as conclusive 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

upon the same matter as between the parties or their privies, in 

any subsequent suit, in the same court or any other court, at law 

or in chancery." Patterson v. Saunders, 194 Va. 607, 611, 74 

S.E.2d 204, 207 (1953). "A plea of res judicata will be 

sustained if the prior adjudication was between the same parties 

or their privies and a valid final judgment was entered which 

resolved the claim on its merits." Waterfront Marine Constr., 

Inc. v. North End 49ers, 251 Va. 417, 430, 468 S.E.2d 894, 902 

(1996); see Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 670-71, 202 S.E.2d 917, 

920-21 (1974). 

 Piedmont argues that res judicata does not apply because the 

commission never had subject matter jurisdiction and that the 

award was therefore void ab initio. This argument is 

disingenuous. When East brought her claim, the commission found 

that it had jurisdiction to award benefits. This Court, which 

Piedmont does not contend lacks competent jurisdiction, then 

affirmed the finding of the commission. Because Piedmont chose 

not to appeal further, our decision became a point "adjudicated 

by a court of competent jurisdiction [to be] relied upon as 

conclusive upon the same matter as between the parties." The 

case before us today is the same matter between the same parties, 

and our past ruling continues to bind the parties.1

 

1

We note that, were we to revisit East’s claim, we would not 

retroactively apply Jemmott to vacate her award. As Jemmott

overruled the past consistent decisions of both the commission 
 3 

 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the commission. 

 Affirmed.

 

and this Court, and as a retrospective application would result 

in substantial inequity to claimants whose claims in tort are now 

barred by the statute of limitations, Jemmott should be applied 

only prospectively. See City of Richmond v. Blaylock, 247 Va. 

250, 252, 440 S.E.2d 598, 599 (1994); Harper v. Virginia Dep't of 

Taxation, 241 Va. 232, 237-40, 401 S.E.2d 868, 871-73 (1991).