STATE DEPARTMENT

Diplomatic Security 

Challenges

Statement of Michael J. Courts, Acting Director 

International Affairs and Trade

Testimony 

Before the House Committee on 

Foreign Affairs

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST

Thursday, November 15, 2012

GAO-13-191T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
Page 1 GAO-13-191T Diplomatic Security

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Berman, and Members of the 

Committee:

I am pleased to be here to discuss diplomatic security challenges at U.S. 

embassies and consulates overseas. The U.S. government maintains 

more than 270 diplomatic posts, including embassies, consulates, and 

other diplomatic offices, in about 180 countries worldwide. More than 

80,000 U.S. government employees work overseas under Chief of 

Mission authority, representing more than 30 agencies and government 

entities.1

My testimony today is primarily based on a GAO report that was issued in 

November 2009, examining the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security).

Since the 1998 embassy attacks in East Africa, U.S. civilian 

officials posted overseas have faced increasing threats to their safety and 

security, and facilities in high threat locations have faced numerous 

attacks. In September, the U.S. consulate compound in Benghazi, Libya, 

was breached and sustained mortar fire. Tragically, the U.S. Ambassador 

and three other U.S. officials were killed.

2

Detailed information on our scope and methodology can be found in the 

reports cited in appendix I. We conducted the underlying performance 

audits in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits 

The Bureau’s mission, to 

ensure a safe environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, involves 

activities such as the protection of people, information, and property 

overseas, and dignitary protection and passport and visa fraud 

investigations domestically. My testimony also includes work we have 

subsequently performed to follow up on the implementation of the report’s 

recommendations. I will discuss (1) the growth of Diplomatic Security’s 

missions and resources, (2) the challenges Diplomatic Security faces in 

conducting its work, and (3) the status of GAO’s recommendation 

concerning Diplomatic Security. 

 

1

Agencies represented overseas include the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, 

Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development.

2

GAO, State Department: Diplomatic Security’s Recent Growth Warrants Strategic 

Review, GAO-10-156 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2009).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-191T Diplomatic Security

to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Diplomatic Security’s mission and the resources needed to carry it out 

have grown substantially since 1998. Following the 1998 embassy 

bombings in Africa, Diplomatic Security determined that many U.S. 

diplomatic facilities did not meet its security standards and were 

vulnerable to terrorist attack. Diplomatic Security added many of the 

physical security measures currently in place at most U.S. missions 

worldwide, such as additional barriers, alarms, public address systems, 

and enhanced access procedures. From 1998 to 2009, there were 39 

attacks aimed at U.S. Embassies, Consulates, or Chief of Mission 

personnel (not including regular attacks against the U.S. Embassy in 

Baghdad since 2004). The nature of some of these attacks led Diplomatic 

Security to further adapt its security measures. Moreover, the attacks of 

September 11, 2001, underscored the importance of upgrading 

Diplomatic Security’s domestic security programs and enhancing its 

investigative capacity. Furthermore, following the onset of U.S. operations 

in Iraq in 2003, Diplomatic Security has had to provide security in the Iraq 

and other hostile environments such as Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Diplomatic Security funding and personnel increased considerably in 

conjunction with its expanding mission. Diplomatic Security reports that its 

budget increased from about $200 million in 1998 to $1.8 billion in 2008. 

In addition, the size of Diplomatic Security’s workforce doubled between 

1998 and 2009. For example, the number of security specialists (special 

agents, engineers, technicians, and couriers) increased from under 1,000 

in 1998 to over 2,000 in 2009, (see fig. 1). At the same time, Diplomatic 

Security has increased its use of contractors to support its security 

operations worldwide, specifically through increases in the Diplomatic 

Security guard force (with over 35,000 guards in Fiscal Year 2011) and 

the use of contractors to provide protective details for American diplomats 

in high-threat environments.

Diplomatic Security’s 

Mission and 

Resources Have 

Grown Considerably 

Since 1998
 

Page 3 GAO-13-191T Diplomatic Security

Figure 1: Growth of Security Specialist Workforce: 1998-2009

Diplomatic Security faces several policy and operational challenges. First, 

State is maintaining missions in increasingly dangerous locations, 

necessitating the use of more security resources and making it more 

difficult to provide security in these locations. Second, although 

Diplomatic Security has grown considerably in staff, staffing shortages, as 

well as other operational challenges, further tax Diplomatic Security’s 

ability to implement its mission. Finally, State has expanded Diplomatic 

Security without the benefit of adequate strategic planning.

Dangerous 

Environments, 

Staffing Shortages, 

Other Operational 

Limitations, and 

Reactive Planning 

Challenge Diplomatic 

Security 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-191T Diplomatic Security

Keeping staff secure, yet productive, in Iraq has been one of Diplomatic 

Security’s greatest challenges in recent years. The U.S. mission in 

Baghdad is the largest in the world. As of May 2012, the United States 

was planning for a presence of 11,500 personnel at 11 diplomatic sites. 

Between fiscal years 2004 and 2008, Diplomatic Security operations in 

Iraq required approximately 36 percent of Diplomatic Security’s entire 

budget. To support security operations in Iraq, Diplomatic Security had to 

draw staff and resources away from other programs. In 2009, we reported 

that Diplomatic Security’s workload—and thus its resource 

requirements—would likely increase as the U.S. military transitioned out 

of Iraq.3

U.S. policymakers’ focus on Afghanistan poses another significant 

challenge for Diplomatic Security. The security situation in Afghanistan 

deteriorated between 2005 and 2010 and has remained relatively 

dangerous since.

In addition to operating in the Iraq and Afghanistan, State is maintaining 

missions in an increasing number of other dangerous posts—such as 

Peshawar, Pakistan, and Sana’a, Yemen—some of which State would 

have previously evacuated. The policy to maintain a presence in 

dangerous areas began with State’s 2006 transformational diplomacy 

initiative, which required a shift of human resources to increasingly critical 

regions such as Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East. According to 

Diplomatic Security officials, maintaining missions in these dangerous 

environments requires more resources.

Despite Diplomatic Security’s staff growth since 1998, some offices were 

operating with severe staffing shortages. In 2008, approximately one-third 

of Diplomatic Security’s domestic suboffices operated with a vacancy rate 

of 25 percent or higher. Several offices reported that this shortage of staff 

affected their ability to conduct their work, leading to backlogged cases 

and training gaps.

 

3

GAO, Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-09-294SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 24, 2009). Further in June 2012, we reported that Iraq continued to require 

extraordinary funding to provide additional security capabilities. See GAO, Mission Iraq: 

State and DOD Face Challenges in Finalizing Support and Security Capabilities, 

GAO-12-856T (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 28, 2012).

Maintaining Missions in 

Dangerous Environments 

Significantly Affects 

Diplomatic Security’s Work

Some Diplomatic Security 

Offices Operated with 

Severe Staff Shortages
 

Page 5 GAO-13-191T Diplomatic Security

State officials attributed these shortages to three factors:

• Staffing the Iraq mission: In order to provide enough Diplomatic 

Security special agents in Iraq, we reported that Diplomatic Security 

had to move agents from other programs, and those moves affected 

the agency’s ability to perform other missions, including providing 

security for visiting dignitaries and visa, passport, and identity fraud 

investigations.

• Protection details: Diplomatic Security draws agents from field offices, 

headquarters, and overseas posts to participate in protective details 

and special events, such as the Olympics. Diplomatic Security’s role 

in providing protection at such major events has grown and will 

require more staff.

• Normal rotations: Staff take home leave between overseas postings 

and are sometimes required to take training before starting their next 

assignment. This rotation process regularly creates periodic staffing 

gaps, which affects Diplomatic Security’s ability to meet its increased 

security demands.

Diplomatic Security faced a number of other operational challenges that 

impeded it from fully implementing its mission and activities, including:

• Inadequate buildings: State is in the process of updating and building 

many new facilities. However, we have previously identified many 

posts that did not meet all security standards delineated by the 

Overseas Security Policy Board and the Secure Embassy 

Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999.

• Foreign language deficiencies: In 2009, we found that 53 percent of 

Regional Security Officers do not speak and read foreign languages 

at the level required by their positions, and we concluded that these 

language shortfalls could be negatively affecting several aspects of 

U.S. diplomacy, including security operations.4

 

4

For GAO’s review of language training at State, see GAO, Department of State: 

Comprehensive Plan Needed to Address Persistent Foreign Language Shortfalls, 

GAO-09-955 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009). 

Other Operational 

Challenges Impeded 

Diplomatic Security’s 

Ability to Fully Implement 

Its Mission and Activities
 

Page 6 GAO-13-191T Diplomatic Security

• Experience gaps: Thirty-four percent of Diplomatic Security’s positions 

(not including those in Baghdad) were filled with officers below the 

position’s grade. For example, several Assistant Regional Security 

Officers with whom we met were in their first overseas positions and 

stated that they did not feel adequately prepared for their job, 

particularly their responsibility to manage large security contracts.

• Host country laws: At times, host country laws prohibit Diplomatic 

Security from taking all the security precautions it would like outside 

an embassy. For example, Diplomatic Security officials said that they 

prefer to arm their local guard forces and their special agents; 

however, several countries prohibit this. In cases of attack, this 

prohibition limits Diplomatic Security’s ability to protect an embassy or 

consulate.

• Balancing security with the diplomatic mission: Diplomatic Security’s 

desire to provide the best security possible for State’s diplomatic 

corps has, at times, been in tension with State’s diplomatic mission. 

For example, Diplomatic Security has established strict policies 

concerning access to U.S. facilities that usually include both personal 

and vehicle screening. Some public affairs officials—whose job it is to 

foster relations with host country nationals—have expressed concerns 

that these security measures discourage visitors from attending U.S. 

Embassy events or exhibits. In addition, the new embassies and 

consulates, with their high walls, deep setbacks, and strict screening 

procedures, have evoked the nickname “Fortress America.” 

We found in 2009 that neither State’s departmental strategic plan nor 

Diplomatic Security’s bureau strategic plan specifically addresses its 

resource needs or its management challenges. Diplomatic Security’s 

substantial growth since 1998 has been reactive and has not benefited 

from adequate strategic guidance. For example, State’s strategic plan 

does not specifically address Diplomatic Security’s resource needs or 

management challenges. While State’s strategic plan for 2007-2012 has 

a section identifying security priorities and goals, we found it did not 

identify the resources needed to meet these goals or address all of the 

management challenges we identified in this report. Diplomatic Security 

had undertaken some planning efforts at the bureau and office level, but 

we found that these efforts also had limitations.

Several senior Diplomatic Security officials noted that Diplomatic Security 

was reactive in nature, stating a number of reasons for its lack of longAlthough Some Planning 

Initiatives Have Been 

Undertaken, Diplomatic 

Security’s Growth Has 

Been More Reactive than 

Strategic
 

Page 7 GAO-13-191T Diplomatic Security

term strategic planning. For example, Diplomatic Security provides a 

support function and must react to the needs of State; therefore, it cannot 

plan its own resources until State determines overall policy direction. 

Also, while State has a 5-year workforce plan that addresses all bureaus, 

officials stated that Diplomatic Security did not use this plan to determine 

its staffing needs.

In our 2009 report, we recommended that the Secretary of State—as 

either part of a State management initiative, the Quadrennial Diplomatic 

and Development Review (QDDR) or as a separate initiative—conduct a 

strategic review of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to ensure that its 

mission and activities address State’s priority needs. We stated that this 

review should also address key human capital and operational challenges 

faced by Diplomatic Security. At the time, State agreed with our 

recommendation and noted that, although it was not planning to perform 

a strategic review of the full Diplomatic Security mission and capabilities 

in the QDDR, the Department was committed to ensuring that Diplomatic 

Security’s mission would benefit from this initiative.

We have subsequently learned that State has not yet conducted the 

strategic review as recommended. Specifically, Diplomatic Security 

officials told GAO that the QDDR was not used to conduct such a review.

However, Diplomatic Security officials did point to several steps they had 

taken, including the creation of a Strategic Planning Unit and other efforts 

to enhance performance management. Diplomatic Security officials also 

noted that they have undertaken a new effort in response to the rapidly 

changing security environment encountered over the past year by 

bringing together subject matter experts from across Diplomatic Security 

to support scenario planning for future security requirements. We 

appreciate the steps that the Bureau has taken on its own initiative; 

however we continue to believe that the Department, and not the Bureau, 

needs to take action in order to strategically assess the competing 

demands on Diplomatic Security and the resulting mission implications.

Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions you or other Members of the 

Committee may have at this time.

Status of GAO’s 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action
 

Page 8 GAO-13-191T Diplomatic Security

For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Michael Courts at 

(202) 512-8980 or courtsm@gao.gov. Individuals making key 

contributions to this testimony include Anthony Moran, Miriam Carroll 

Fenton, Thomas Costa, Karen Deans, Jon C. Fremont, Valérie Nowak, 

Kira Self, and Christina Werth.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgement 
Related GAO Reports

Page 9 GAO-13-191T Diplomatic Security

Overseas Rightsizing: State Has Improved the Consistency of Its 

Approach, but Does Not Follow Up on Its Recommendations. 

GAO-12-799. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2012.

Department of State: Foreign Service Midlevel Staffing Gaps Persist 

Despite Significant Increases in Hiring. GAO-12-721. Washington, D.C.: 

June 14, 2012.

Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose 

Critical Challenges to Training Effort. GAO-11-780T. Washington, D.C.: 

June 29, 2011.

Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose 

Critical Challenges to Training Efforts. GAO-11-460. Washington, D.C.: 

June 1, 2011.

New Embassy Compounds: State Faces Challenges in Sizing Facilities 

and Providing for Operations and Maintenance Requirements. 

GAO-10-689. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2010.

State Department: Challenges Facing the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 

GAO-10-290T. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 2009.

State Department: Diplomatic Security’s Recent Growth Warrants 

Strategic Review. GAO-10-156. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 2009.

Department of State: Additional Steps Needed to Address Continuing 

Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts. GAO-09-874. 

Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2009.

Department of State: Comprehensive Plan Needed to Address Persistent 

Foreign Language Shortfalls. GAO-09-955. Washington, D.C.: September 

17, 2009.

Combating Terrorism: State Department’s Antiterrorism Program Needs 

Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes. 

GAO-08-336. Washington, D.C.: February 29, 2008.

Diplomatic Security: Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site 

Conditions Prevent Full Adherence to Standards. GAO-08-162. 

Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008.

Related GAO Reports
Related GAO Reports

Page 10 GAO-13-191T Diplomatic Security

State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas 

Posts Can Be Improved. GAO-08-23. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 

2007.

Overseas Security: State Department has Not Fully Implemented Key 

Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of 

Embassies. GAO-05-642. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005.

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