April 14,1999 

The Honorable Raymie Kana 

Colorado County Auditor 

Courthouse, Third Floor 

Columbus, Texas 78934 

Opinion No. X-0034 

Re: Authority of county attorney to provide legal 

services to commissioners court, and related 

questions 014-1137) 

Dear Ms. Kana: 

You have asked this office whether a county attorney who is covered by the terms of the 

Professional Prosecutors Act, chapter 46 of the Government Code, may perform for the county 

ancillary legal services which do not form part of his duties “without charge to the county,” and 

whether such a county attorney “can legally enter into an agreement with a municipality to provide 

legal advice, opinion, and consultation services for a fee regarding the arrest, docketing, and 

disposition of city and State law offenders prosecuted through the municipal court.” 

We begin with a brief review of the statutes applicable to the Colorado County Attorney. 

Section 45.145 of the Government Code provides that the Colorado County Attorney “shall perform 

the duties imposed on and have the powers conferred on district attorneys by general law.” 

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 4 45.145(a) (Vernon Supp. 1999). As this office stated in Letter Opinion 

No. 98-26, 

Generally, the Colorado County Attorney, like a district attorney, is required 

to “represent the State in all criminal cases in the district courts of [the 

county] and in appeals therefrom. . .” The Colorado County Attorney also 

is required to represent the state in examining trials and habeas corpus 

proceedings. In addition, the Colorado County Attorney has various duties, 

found in scattered statutes, such as providing legal advice to appropriate 

officials; enforcing certain licensing acts; and challenging public nuisances. 

Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-98-26, at 2 (footnotes omitted). Finally, the Colorado County Attorney is one 

of the county attorneys made subject to the Professional Prosecutors Act by Government Code 

section 46.002(3). 

As to your first question, we conclude that while a county cannot contract for ancillary 

services with a county attorney covered by the Professional Prosecutors Act in his private capacity 

precisely because such a county attorney may not engage in private practice, we do not believe that 
The Honorable Raymie Kana - Page 2 (X-0034) 

the law would prevent him from providing such services gratis on a voluntary basis. The decision 

whether to offer to provide such services on that basis would, of course, belong to the county 

attorney. 

As to your second question, we know of no basis upon which the attorney would have the 

authority to enter into such a contract as you describe. If it be argued that he is entering into such 

contracts in his private capacity, then he is barred from doing so by chapter 46. If, on the contrary, 

the contracts are entered into in his official capacity, he has no authority to enter into them. The 

general authority of a county to enter into contracts is vested in the commissioners court. The county 

attorney is without authority to enter into such agreements. 

As we understand the background for your questions, the Colorado County Attorney has 

taken the view that he is debarred from performing legal services to the county beyond those which 

are made his duty by statute. Apparently he reads a letter opinion issued by this office, Letter 

Opinion No. 98-26, as mandating this result. In that opinion, we concluded that the county attorney 

could not contract with the commissioners court to provide courthouse security. 

We do not agree with the rather expansive reading which the County Attorney gives Letter 

Opinion No. 98-26. In our view, the provision of security services, which the opinion declared 

beyond the authority of the county attorney and outside the province of his investigator, is 

distinguishable from the ancillary legal services which the County Attorney asserts he may not now 

perform. 

However, we do note that a particular problem arises with respect to the provision of 

ancillary legal services by a county attorney when, as in this case, the attorney is covered by the 

Professional Prosecutors Act. The standard treatise on county law, as well as certain attorney 

general opinions of this office, have generally asserted that, while the provision of some legal 

services to the county was beyond the duty of the county attorney, the commissioners court could 

retain the county attorney for such services as a private practitioner: 

[A]s to the county as a legal entity, it is not the duty or responsibility of a 

local prosecutor to “represent the county in its general legal business or the 

conduct of ordinary civil actions.” The exception to this rule is the 

responsibility . to render upon request legal advice and opinions to county 

officials. Numerous authorities have stated that a county commissioners 

court may employ in a private capacity the county or district attorney to 

represent the county in matters for which he is not required by law to provide 

representation. 

36 DAVID B. BROOKS, COUNTY AND SPECIAL DISTRICT LAW 9 21.14 (citing Hill Farm, Inc. v. Hill 

County, 425 S.W.2d 414,419 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968), affd, 436 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1969)); 

seealso Guynes v. Galveston County, 861 S.W.2d 861,864 (Tex. 1993) (BecauseGalvestonCounty 

Criminal District Attorney did not have exclusive duty of civil representation for county, 
The Honorable Raymie Kana - Page 3 (JC-0034) 

commissioners court could establish legal department for “wide-range of duties related to the 

county’scivilbusiness.“);Tex. Att’y Gen. Gp.Nos. JM-198 (1984),0-4301(1942), O-3656(1941), 

O-864 (1939), O-198 (1939). 

As Attorney General Opinion JM-198 noted in passing, however, this traditional argument 

does not fit well with the provisions of the Professional Prosecutors Act. In that opinion, after 

affirming that the Victoria County Commissioners Court had the authority to contract with the 

Criminal District Attorney in his private capacity to represent the county in condemnation 

proceedings which were outside the scope of his official duties, this office noted “that effective 

September 1, 1983, the criminal district attorney in Victoria County became a “district attorney” 

within the meaning of the Professional Prosecutors Act, which provides that a district attorney 

governed by the act may not engage in the private practice oflaw.” Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JM-198 

at 3 (1984). 

The situation alluded to in Attorney General Opinion JM- 198 is squarely presented here. The 

Colorado County Attorney is covered by the Professional Prosecutors Act. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. 

5 46.002(3) (Vernon Supp. 1999). As such he “may not engage in the private practice of law. .” 

Id. $ 46.005(a). Accordingly, since he cannot engage in private practice, he cannot receive 

compensation from the county for providing legal services which do not form part of his statutory 

duties. 

We do not, however, agree wholly with the County Attorney’s view that he is “now 

mandated to discontinue any extra work I have been doing, as I cannot contract with the County.” 

Letter from John Julian Moore, Colorado County Attorney, to Colorado County Commissioners 

Court 3 (Apr. 6, 1998) (on file with Opinion Committee). As we have already pointed out, Letter 

Opinion No. 98-26 contains no such mandate. Nor, in our view, does the Professional Prosecutors 

Act necessarily forbid the County Attorney to provide such services. It does bar the county from 

contracting with him in his private capacity to perform them for remuneration. But it does not 

appear to us that the Act prevents him from voluntarily and gratuitously providing such services. 

In the words ofthe standard treatise, “The legislature passed the Professional Prosecutors Act 

in 1974 for the purpose of improving prosecution in the state by guaranteeing a higher state salary 

to local prosecutors and imposing a duty on the commissioners court to provide necessary funds for 

the operation of the various local prosecuting offices. In return, the prosecutors subject to the Act 

are prohibited from engaging in any form of private practice, or accepting referral fees.” BROOKS, 

sup-a, 9 21.44 (footnotes omitted). The principal concern of the prohibition on private practice is 

that the prosecutor not be spending his time attending to the business of private clients rather than 

public business. Accordingly, we interpret “the private practice of law,” for the purposes of 

Government Code section 46.005(a) to mean the sale of legal services. In our view, the free and 

voluntary performance of legal services for the county not required of the county attorney by statute 

would in no way frustrate the purpose of the Act. While a hypertechnical reading of section 

46.005(a) in conjunction with the older attorney general opinions of this office on contracts between 

the commissioners court and the attorney in his private capacity might lead one to the rather severe 
The Honorable Raymie Kana - Page 4 (X-0034) 

conclusion that the attorney could under no circumstances provide services beyond his statutory 

duties, absent binding court precedent or the clear direction of the legislature we reject such a 

conclusion. 

Of course the County Attorney is not obliged to perform such services, and the 

commissioners court would have to depend upon his good graces in this regard. But the provisions 

of section 46.005(a) do not prevent the County Attorney from offering and providing such services 

on a voluntary basis. 

While the Act does not prevent the County Attorney from offering ancillary legal services 

to the county gratis, it does prevent him from entering in his private capacity into the sort of 

consultation agreements with cities to which your second question refers. As we have pointed out, 

a county attorney covered by the Professional Prosecutors Act in effect gives up his private capacity 

and for that reason cannot contract with cities to represent them as a private lawyer.’ 

One of the consultation agreements with which you have furnished us a copy appears to be 

executed by the County Attorney as a private lawyer. However, under the terms of section 

46.005(a), the County Attorney has no capacity to practice law privately. 

The other contract with which we have been furnished appears to have been executed by 

the County Attorney in his official capacity. However, the only general ability to contract for 

the county resides in the commissioners court. This principle has repeatedly been asserted by this 

office, generally in questions dealing with the ability of the sheriff to contract for jail operations. 

See, e.g., Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. DM-111 (1992); Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-98-072. As Letter Opinion 

No. 98-072 put it, “Contracts binding on the county must in general be made by the 

commissioners court unless a sheriff or other county official has specific authority to make them.” 

Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-98-072, at 2. 

We find no specific authority for the County Attorney to enter into consultation agreements 

with municipalities to provide legal advice to the municipal court either in the Colorado County 

Attorney’s statute, section 45.145 of the Government Code, the general provisions concerning 

county attorneys in chapter 45 of the Government Code, the general provisions concerning district 

attorneys in chapter 43 of the code, those concerning prosecuting attorneys in chapter 41, or in the 

provisions of the Professional Prosecutors Act. Absent such specific contractual authority, the 

County Attorney may not enter in his official capacity into such consultation agreements as are at 

issue here.* 

‘We emphasize that this conclusion is limited to attorneys covered by the Professional Prosecutors Act, and 

therefore by section 46.005(a). This discussion does not implicate constitutional questions concerning dual offkeholding, or the common-law doctrine of incompatibility. 

‘We do not address the authority of a county to enter into a contract for the provision of legal services with a 

municipality. 
The Honorable Raymie Kana - Page 5 (X-0034) 

SUMMARY 

While the Professional Prosecutors Act, chapter 46 of the Government 

Code, prevents a county attorney covered by it from entering into a contract 

with the county to provide it, for remuneration, with ancillary legal services 

not included among his statutory duties, it does not prevent the county 

attorney from voluntarily and gratuitously providing such services should he 

so choose. 

Because prosecutors covered by the Act give up their capacity to practice 

law privately, the Act does prevent a county attorney covered by it from 

entering in his private capacity into a consultation agreement with a 

municipality to provide the municipal court with legal advice. Nor, absent 

specific statutory authority to do so, may the county attorney enter into such 

a contract in his official capacity. 

Yo very truly 4 c cm-... CL ‘-“‘--I-- 

JOiiN CORNYN 

Attorney General of Texas 

ANDY TAYLOR 

First Assistant Attorney General 

CLARK KENT ERVIN 

Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel 

ELIZABETH ROBINSON 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by James E. Tourtelott 

Assistant Attorney General