The starting points for the study of relations between 

presidents and their intelligence communities since the 

Second World War are the briefings they receive from 

the CIA before their inauguration. John L. Helgerson is 

well equipped to write this study of these briefings. He 

served as the Agency's Deputy Director for Intelligence 

during the George H. W. Bush administration and was 

head of the team that briefed Bill Clinton in Little Rock 

after the 1992 election.

 — Christopher Andrew
This book has been prepared primarily for the use of US government officials. The format, coverage, and content are designed to meet their requirements. Publications are not generally available to the public directly from the

Central Intelligence Agency. Requesters outside the US government can purchase copies from:

Government Printing Office (GPO)

Publications and Information Sales

at

www.gpo.gov

This book is also available on the Internet at:

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/index.html.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis in this work are those of the

author. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US government entity, past or present.

Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.

ISBN 978-1-929667-19-2

Originally published in 1996 and reprinted in its entirety in 2001.

Cover image @ CORBIS
GETTING TO KNOW THE PRESIDENT

Second Edition

INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS OF

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES,

1952–2004

John L. Helgerson

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

May 2012
The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was established as an organization within CIA to “think through the functions of intelligence and bring the 

best intellects available to bear on intelligence problems.” The center, comprising professional historians and experienced practitioners from throughout 

the Intelligence Community, attempts to document lessons learned from past 

activities, to explore the needs and expectations of intelligence consumers, 

and to stimulate serious debate about current and future intelligence challenges.

To carry out this mission, CSI publishes books and monographs addressing 

historical, operational, doctrinal and theoretical aspects of the intelligence 

profession. It also administers the CIA Museum and maintains the CIA’s Historical Intelligence Collection of published literature on intelligence. The center also houses the Emerging Trends Program, which seeks to identify the 

impact of future trends on the work of US intelligence.

The center also manages the quarterly journal Studies in Intelligence.

Past unclassified publications produced by CSI include:

ARCHANGEL: CIA’s Supersonic A-12 Reconnaissance Aircraft (Second 

Edition, 2011), by David Robarge, CIA Historian

The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004, by 

L. Britt Snider (2008)

Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, by Douglas F. Garthoff (2005)

Psychology of Intelligence Analysis by Richards J. Heuer, Jr. (1999)

Other publications may be found at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-forthe-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/index.html.

Questions and comments may be addressed to: 

The Center for the Study of Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, DC, 20505
To Martha, 

Katherine, and Paul

v

JOHN L. HELGERSON

Mr. Helgerson was the Central Intelligence Agency’s inspector general

from 2002 until his retirement in 2009. Previously, he served as chairman of

the Intelligence Community’s National Intelligence Council and deputy director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. 

Mr. Helgerson began his career in government as an analyst of African politics at the CIA. At varying ponts he headed units responsible for coverage of

Africa, Latin America, and Europe. He served in a number of senior management posts, including deputy director for intelligence and director of congressional affairs. 

Prior to his government service, Mr. Helgerson was an assistant professor

of political science at the University of Cincinnati and a research affiliate of

the University of Zambia in Lusaka. He specialized in international relations

and African politics. 

A native of South Dakota, Mr Helgerson graduated from Saint Olaf College

in Northfield, Minnesota, and received M.A. and Ph.D degrees from Duke

University in Durham, North Carolina.

He is the author of Getting To Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952–1992.

Mr. Helgerson has received a number of awards and commendations,

including the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, CIA’s Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, and NIMA’s Distinguished Civilian

Service Award.

vii

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Foreword to First Edition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

CHAPTER 1: Truman and Eisenhower: Launching the Process . . . . . . . . . . 7

Strained Relations Complicate the Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Preelection Briefings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Support to the President-Elect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

The New President as an Intelligence Consumer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Briefing Governor Stevenson in 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

The Challenger Briefed Again in 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

CHAPTER 2: Into Politics with Kennedy and Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

The Presidential Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Preelection Briefings: What Really Was Discussed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

The Missile Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Postelection Briefing on Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Other Covert Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

The Mystery Briefing of Late November . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Kennedy Visits the CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Origins of the President’s Intelligence Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

The Transition to President Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Evolution to the President’s Daily Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

CHAPTER 3: Nixon and Ford - Uneven Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Supporting Nixon’s Team in New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

The Key Player: Henry Kissinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Nixon Remains Aloof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

A Closer Relationship With Ford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Discussing Operations and Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Political Problems Undermine the Briefing Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

CONTENTS
viii

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 4: In-Depth Discussions with Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Extended Preelection Briefings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Operational and Political Issues Arise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Carter’s Use of the President’s Daily Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

CHAPTER 5: Reagan and Bush - A Study in Contrasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Postelection Briefings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

A Higher Level of Daily Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

After the Inauguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

The Transition to President Bush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

CHAPTER 6: Briefing Governor Clinton in Little Rock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

The DCI Visits Little Rock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Establishing a “Permanent” Presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Substance of Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Other Opportunities To Help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Great Support Made It Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

What Was Accomplished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

CHAPTER 7: George W. Bush: Demanding Consumer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

The Presidential Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Postelection Briefings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

Vice President-elect Cheney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Covert Action Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Strong Supporting Cast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Impact of Austin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

President Bush as a Customer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Intelligence and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Kerry and Edwards Briefed in 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

CHAPTER 8: Concluding Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Patterns of Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

What the Presidents Recommend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

Keeping Out of Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

The Arrangements Make a Difference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

 Material That Was Welcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
ix

FOREWORD

The Central Intelligence Agency is more of a presidential service organization than perhaps any other component of the US government. Since 1952,

CIA, and now the Intelligence Community, have provided presidential candidates and presidents-elect with intelligence briefings during their campaigns

and transitions. These briefings have helped presidents be as well informed as

possible on international developments from the day they take office.

In addition to their central, substantive purpose, these briefings usually

have also served as the IC’s introduction to the “First Customer,” the individual who, more than any other, determines what place intelligence will have in

the national security hierarchy. They have been crucial in giving an early

sense of the personalities of the candidates and presidents-elect, their knowledge of world affairs, and their views of how intelligence and the IC can best

support national security decisionmaking.

Getting To Know the President by John Helgerson makes a singular contribution to the literature of intelligence by describing this important process of

information sharing between the IC and the chief executive. First published in

1996 and now revised and updated to include accounts of intelligence support

to candidates and presidents-elect in the three elections between then and

2004, Helgerson’s study provides unique insights into the mechanics and content of the briefings, the interaction of the participants, and the briefings’

effect on the relationships presidents have had with their intelligence services.

His observations on how and what to brief during the campaign and transition

periods are essential reading for members of the community charged with that

responsibility in the future and seeking to learn from the best practices of their

predecessors.

In his 1996 foreword to the first edition of this book, Christopher Andrew

took note of the “simple but important fact that each president is different.”

From that point flows another explanation for this second edition. Prepared

then, as now, under the sponsorship of the Center for the Study of Intelligence,

this work reflects CSI’s and the CIA’s commitment to the examination, and

continual reexamination, of the profession of intelligence in the United States.

This effort has been manifest in products of many kinds, unclassified and clas-
x

FOREWORD

sified, with many of the latter eventually released wholly or in part to the public. As with other dimensions of the IC’s and CIA’s work, service to

policymakers and presidents demands both the scrutiny of today’s practitioners of intelligence and the perspective of historians to follow. While this

book is primarily intended to serve those who must consider the IC’s role in a

presidential election year, it is also hoped that it will help illuminate as much

as possible for others the nature of CIA and IC service to past presidents,

while at the same time keeping faith with the essential confidentiality to which

sitting presidents are entitled.

David Robarge

 Chief Historian

 Central Intelligence Agency
xi

FOREWORD

TO FIRST EDITION

GETTING TO KNOW THE PRESIDENT

This is an important and original book. How world leaders understand or

misunderstand, use or fail to use, the intelligence available to them is an

essential but still under-researched aspect both of modern government and of

international relations. The making of the American intelligence community

has transformed the presidency of the United States. Before the First World

War, the idea that the United States might need a foreign intelligence service

simply did not occur to most Americans or to their presidents. After the war,

Woodrow Wilson publicly poked fun at his own pre-war innocence: “Let me

testify to this, my fellow citizens, I not only did not know it until we got into

this war, but I did not believe it when I was told that it was true, that Germany

was not the only country that maintained a secret service!” Wilson could

scarcely have imagined that, less than half a century later, the United States

would be an intelligence superpower. Though the intelligence nowadays available to the president is, like all human knowledge, incomplete and fallible, it

probably exceeds—at least in quantity—that available to any other world

leader past or present.

The starting point for the study of relations between presidents and their

intelligence communities since the Second World War are the briefings they

receive from the CIA before their inauguration. John L. Helgerson is well

equipped to write this path-breaking study of these briefings. A political scientist before joining the CIA, he served as the Agency’s deputy director for

intelligence during the Bush administration and was head of the team that

briefed Bill Clinton in Little Rock after the 1992 election. In addition to having access to classified files, Mr. Helgerson has interviewed previous Agency

briefers and all surviving former presidents.

Both briefers and former presidents are agreed on the simple but important

fact that each president is different. Presidents differ more widely in their previous knowledge and experience of intelligence than in their grasp of most

other areas of government. Harry Truman entered the Oval Office in April

1945 almost wholly ignorant of intelligence matters. His determination that no

future president should take office as uninformed as he had been is partly

responsible for the intelligence briefing offered to all presidential candidates
xii

FOREWORD TO FIRST EDITION

since 1952. Unlike Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower did not need to be persuaded of the importance of intelligence. Ike was the first president since

George Washington already experienced in the use of intelligence when he

took the oath of office. He wrote after the Second World War that ‘intelligence

had been of priceless value to me...and, in no small way, contributed to the

speed with which the enemy was routed and eventually forced to surrender.”

Recent presidents have varied almost as greatly in their experience of intelligence as Truman and Eisenhower. Agency briefers found Presidents Reagan

and Bush, in Mr. Helgerson’s words, “virtual polar opposites.” Despite Ronald

Reagan’s membership in 1975 of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA activities within the United States, he had no previous experience as an intelligence

consumer and felt the need for generality. Bush, by contrast, was the first former director of central intelligence, with the arguable exception of George

Washington, to be elected president. He had a closer working relationship than

any previous president with the CIA. Like Reagan, President Clinton had no

previous experience as an intelligence consumer.

Mr. Helgerson provides the first detailed account of the way in which

Agency briefers have attempted, with varying success, to adapt briefings to

the differing experience, priorities, and working patterns of successive presidents. One of the earliest changes in the new administration is usually the format of the President’s Daily Brief, probably the world’s smallest circulation,

most highly classified, and—in some respects—best informed daily newspaper. Some presidents, it appears, like it to include more humor than others. On

average, about 60 percent of the items covered in the President’s Daily Brief

do not appear in the press at all, even in unclassified form.

The most important lesson of this book is that, if the CIA is to provide

effective intelligence support to policymakers, there is no substitute for direct

access to the president. There is the implied lesson also that, if presidents are

to make the best use of the CIA, they need to make clear to the Agency at regular intervals what intelligence they do and do not want. As a result of his own

experience as DCI, Bush plainly took this lesson to heart. Some presidents,

however, have provided little feedback.

Most good books leave the reader wanting more. Getting To Know the President is no exception. As well as holding the interest of his readers, Mr. Helgerson will also increase their curiosity. What, for example, were the exotic and

closely-held methods or the sensitive human-source and technical collection

programs on which DCI George Bush briefed President-elect Jimmy Carter?

Just as it is reasonable for readers to ask questions such as these, so it is also

reasonable on some occasions for intelligence agencies to avoid precise

replies in order to protect their sources and methods.
xiii

GETTING TO KNOW THE PRESIDENT

There is an inevitable tension between the curiosity of readers and scholars

on the one hand and the security-consciousness of intelligence agencies on the

other. Historians and intelligence officers are unlikely ever to reach complete

agreement on how much of the past record can be declassified without compromising current operations. In recent years, however, the CIA Center for the

Study of Intelligence has gone further than most of the world’s major intelligence agencies in opening up some of its records to historical research, publishing important volumes of documents on subjects such as the Truman

administration, the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet estimates, and spy satellites.

All historians will hope that these documents will be followed by many more.

It is also to be hoped that Getting To Know the President will set a precedent for intelligence agencies in other countries. Until similar volumes are

available on the briefing of, among others, British prime ministers, German

chancellors, French and Russian presidents, and leading Asian statesmen, the

use made of intelligence by world leaders will continue to be a major gap in

our understanding of both modern government and international relations.

Christopher Andrew

Corpus Christi College

Cambridge

xv

PREFACE

The first edition of this book, Getting To Know the President: CIA Briefings

of Presidential Candidates, 1952–1992, was produced while I served a oneyear assignment with the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence in the

mid-1990s. This updated and expanded second edition was made possible

through a contract with the Center in 2011. I am grateful for these opportunities. The resulting study is my work alone; the opinions offered are not those

of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of the Director of National

Intelligence (ODNI), or the US government.

To the maximum extent feasible, contemporaneous written records have

been used to construct the account of developments presented. For the earlier

presidential transitions, it has proved possible to declassify all relevant documents. Among the numerous individuals who helped search for source materials, a few were especially helpful and deserve special thanks: ODNI officers

John Moseman and Richard Fravel; CIA officers David Robarge, Peter Clement, Janet Platt, Becky Rant, Emma Sullivan, and Michael Warner; Andrea

Mehrer at the Library of Congress; and Dwight D. Eisenhower Library archivist David Haight.

Interviews with former presidents, CIA directors, and numerous others

involved in the 10 presidential transitions provided invaluable additional

material with which to flesh out the sometimes sparse written record. I deeply

appreciate the honor and time granted me by Presidents George H. W. Bush,

Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, and Gerald Ford in agreeing to be interviewed.

Similarly, I am grateful to the DCIs and DNIs who were most involved in the

transitions—Richard Helms, William Colby, Stansfield Turner, Robert Gates,

Michael Hayden, and Michael McConnell—for sharing their recollections.

Former Agency officer Meredith Davidson provided invaluable assistance in

reconstructing the events of the early 1950s.

The Intelligence Community (IC) protects carefully the confidentiality of

comments made to its officers by serving presidents, and I have continued that

tradition in this account. Readers will find neither exposés of our presidents’

private moments nor specific descriptions of what they said during briefing

sessions, especially regarding sensitive policy issues of continuing relevance
xvi

PREFACE

and importance. Similarly, it would not be appropriate to use this volume to

offer judgments about how well the various presidents used the intelligence

they were provided. Nevertheless, I have been able to recount in unclassified

form the circumstances under which the Community established its relationships with successive presidents and to discuss, in general terms, the subjects

about which they were briefed. 

I thank David Robarge, Andres Vaart, Bruce Wells, David Peterson, Richard Kovar, Judith Van Roy, and Harriet Malone for their assistance in editing

and producing the original study and this updated version.

John L. Helgerson
3

INTRODUCTION

It was President Harry Truman, in whose administration the Central Intelligence Agency and the postwar Intelligence Community (IC) were created,

who instituted the custom of providing candidates for the presidency classified briefings on foreign developments. In 1952 he authorized the CIA to brief

Gen. Dwight Eisenhower and Governor Adlai Stevenson so that the successful

candidate would be as well informed as possible on the world situation when

he took office. The briefings would also position the CIA to develop a close

working relationship with the new president and his advisers. These two

objectives have guided the efforts of the Agency and the IC during presidential transition periods ever since.

Thus it was, after Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton won the 1992 election,

that CIA moved quickly to establish a presence in Little Rock to provide intelligence support to the new president-elect. As CIA’s deputy director for intelligence, I was sent to meet with the governor and his staff to describe the

materials the Agency proposed to make available and to elicit the governor’s

agreement to receive regular briefings from the CIA. Events unfolded in such

a way that I became the head of a team that spent most of the period from

November 1992 through January 1993 in Little Rock providing daily intelligence updates to the president-elect.

In keeping with President Truman’s initiative, the Agency wanted to help

the new president-elect prepare for his foreign policy responsibilities and

acquaint him and his staff with IC’s capabilities for collecting, analyzing, and

delivering intelligence that would be vital to them when they took office. As

we made arrangements for briefing Governor Clinton, we attempted to learn

as much as possible from the Agency’s experience in previous transition periods. What we discovered was that the CIA had provided pre-inaugural intelligence support to all eight presidents elected since the Agency was founded,

but had no systematic records of those efforts. There was no body of organized information to indicate what had worked before and what had not. Such

records and memories as we did have, however, made clear that we needed to

make decisions quickly on how to proceed in a number of areas that would

have an important bearing on whether we met our two primary goals.
4

 INTRODUCTION

The key variables that seem to determine whether the IC is successful in

serving a new president fall into four general categories. The first of these

relates to the level and type of person or persons the Community puts forward

to represent it. In some transitions the director of central intelligence (DCI),

and now the director of national intelligence (DNI), has been personally and

extensively involved; in others the DCI took no active role. Sometimes the IC

has fielded very senior officers as its briefers but in other instances relied on

much more junior representatives. When senior officers do the briefings they

generally give the Community’s product and approach greater credibility and

access, but their selection also increases the likelihood that the exercise will

be seen as political.

A second category of key variables concerns other political considerations

to which the Intelligence Community must be sensitive to ensure that it and a

new president come to work together well. Foremost among these is the background of the president-elect himself, particularly as it relates to his familiarAuthor John Helgerson reviews materials for his briefing of Governor 

Bill Clinton at the Arkansas governor’s mansion. Helgerson was CIA’s

deputy director for intelligence at the time.
5

ity with the IC and its products. It is quite a different matter, for example, to

establish a relationship with an individual who has moved up from the vice

presidency in the way that Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush did,

as contrasted with individuals who have come to the position with no Washington experience in the manner of Presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton,

and George W. Bush. Similarly, the IC’s experience has varied significantly

depending on whether or not the new president has come from the same political party as his predecessor.

The DCI’s or DNI’s own political or career ambitions have sometimes

raised delicate political problems. It is not unlikely, for example, that during a

transition period the interests of the leader of the IC as an individual would not

correspond with those of the IC itself. A most important political variable is

the attitudes of the outgoing president and the national security advisor. Their

support for the Community’s efforts to establish an early and effective relationship with a new administration facilitates matters immensely.

The third group of key variables concerns logistic arrangements for the

briefings. Should briefings be given prior to the election to both, or even multiple, candidates? Alternatively, should they be postponed until after the vote

and provided exclusively to the single president-elect during the transition?

How many briefings should be given and with what frequency? Experience

shows that it matters, too, where the briefings are given and whether only the

candidate is briefed or staff assistants are included as well.

Finally, concerning the substance of the information provided, there have

been considerable variations in the amount and the type of material made

available. All presidents-elect in recent years have valued receiving the President’s Daily Brief (PDB), the intelligence summary created exclusively for the

president. Some have wanted to receive additional, supplementary intelligence publications during the transition period. A few have wanted oral briefings by a number of substantive experts as opposed to hearing from a single

Agency briefer each day; others have found multiple briefers confusing or

overwhelming.

An important issue to be faced by the IC during each transition concerns

how much information derived from sensitive human sources and technical

collection efforts and regarding covert action programs should be included in

the material given a president-elect, and when. Presidents in office are always

informed of such programs, and careful attention is given to the timing, level

of detail, and content of the presentation. And finally, concerning the substance of the support provided, there have been dramatic variations in the

amount of tailored assistance the IC has provided presidents-elect and their

national security teams to prepare them for pre-inaugural planning and policy
6

 INTRODUCTION

deliberations, speeches and press conferences, and, in particular, their meetings and communications with foreign statesmen.

Given the importance of these variables in determining whether the IC will

come to work well with a new president during the transition period and

beyond, it seemed desirable for the Community’s own purposes to create a

record of what we have done in the past, noting what has worked and what has

not. Even a cursory examination of the IC’s experience over the past half century reveals that it is often not intuitively obvious or self-evident what

approaches will translate into success. In preparing this study I have been

pleased to discover, or confirm, that certain of the intelligence briefings provided to incoming presidents have turned out to be of genuine and lasting historical importance in their own right. To use one example, the DCI and the

CIA’s deputy director for plans (operations) provided President-elect Kennedy

information on the Agency’s plans for what would become the Bay of Pigs

operation in Cuba. This occurred at a meeting with only the three of them

present. A great deal of what has subsequently been written by others about

what Kennedy was told, when he was told it, and what he said in response, is

substantially wrong. I hope this account can clarify the circumstances of this

and other important briefings provided to presidents over the years.

Finally, because the IC’s role during transitions is unique, the Community

seems to me to have an obligation to record what it has done and to make its

account as widely available as possible. Perhaps this material will be of use

not only to intelligence officers charged with meeting the Community’s briefing responsibilities in the future, but also to others interested in IC contributions during these important chapters of our national history.

John L. Helgerson
7

CHAPTER 1

TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER: LAUNCHING THE PROCESS

On 22 November 1952, the newspapers reported that President Harry Truman, shortly after noon the previous day, had stolen away from the White

House to give an “impromptu” speech at the Central Intelligence Agency. Truman had come to CIA at the invitation of the fourth director of central intelligence, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, to address a training course of government

officials. In that speech—delivered on a Friday afternoon almost two weeks

after the national election—Truman revealed a great deal about his motives in

founding the CIA and his aims in having the Agency provide intelligence

briefings to the new president-elect, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower.

The president reminisced with his audience about how there had been no

CIA when he had succeeded to the presidency in 1945. At that time, by many

accounts, he had been surprised to discover how much information relating to

intelligence and national security matters had been withheld from him. The

most dramatic evidence of how ill-informed he was came on his 12th day in

office when Secretary of War Henry Stimson briefed him for the first time on

the Manhattan (atomic bomb) Project, about which Truman had heard only

hints while serving as vice president and on key Senate committees.1

Truman also recalled how difficult it had been for him to obtain information

from the various government departments, each of which seemed “walled off”

from the others. On various occasions Truman had lamented to Smith that he

“used to do all this myself.” The president noted that this situation had been

corrected over the intervening years, saying that the CIA’s global intelligence

operations and procedures for forwarding information had made it possible to

“keep the President informed better than ever before.” In a rather backhanded

compliment, Truman said he believed that “we have an intelligence information service now that I think is not inferior to any in the world.”2

Truman was responsible for the very existence of that intelligence service.

Within a year of his becoming president, in January 1946, he formed the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). In the president’s mind, its key responsibility

1 David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1992), 376–78. 2 New York Times, 22 November 1952, 1,10.
8

CHAPTER 1

was to ensure that he personally received intelligence reports on a timely

basis. On 15 February 1946 the CIG launched the Daily Summary, and in June

a counterpart Weekly Summary was produced for the first time. Both these

publications were sent to the White House for the president. Both the daily

Gen. Walter Bedell Smith (left) relieves RAdm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter as

Director of Central Intelligence in 1950.
9

TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER: LAUNCHING THE PROCESS

and weekly publications continued to be published after CIG became the Central Intelligence Agency in September 1947.

There was much bureaucratic wrangling throughout the early years of the

CIG and CIA about their proper role in the production of current intelligence.

Virtually all key players involved with intelligence—in the military services,

the War (later Defense) Department, and the State Department—had serious

reservations about the new intelligence agency duplicating their work in current

intelligence. The president was virtually alone in expecting to receive a daily,

comprehensive current intelligence product, whatever the formal charters of the

CIG and CIA might say. Needless to say, his expectations carried the day.

To consolidate the production of current intelligence, CIA in January 1951

formed the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), which existed until the late

1970s when its functions were assumed by other offices. The CIA officers

who formed OCI were already preparing a closely held, all-source weekly

intelligence publication, the first of its kind, called the Situation Summary.

This was a global review, built around the Korean situation and its worldwide

implications that formed the basis for General Smith’s weekly briefings of the

president. Shortly after the establishment of OCI, two new publications were

inaugurated for wider distribution. The daily publication became the Current

Intelligence Bulletin, first issued on 28 February 1951; in August a companion

weekly publication, the Current Intelligence Weekly Review, was begun.

Managers of OCI felt their early efforts had been rewarded when Truman,

vacationing in Key West, Florida, wrote of the new publication, “Dear Bedel

[sic], I have been reading the intelligence bulletin and I am highly impressed

with it. I believe you have hit the jackpot with this one. Sincerely, Harry Truman.”3 The Current Intelligence Bulletin continued largely unchanged for the

next 25 years.

While Truman received, read, and expressed his appreciation for the

Agency’s daily and weekly publications, it had become clear over the years

that he especially valued the oral briefings delivered by the directors of CIA.

The president experimented with various procedures for these briefings, and

in the early years there were periods when he received them on a daily basis.

What finally proved most satisfactory, however, were weekly worldwide intelligence updates.

The weekly briefings worked best during the extended period when “Beedle” Smith served as DCI. Smith briefed Truman each Friday, accompanied at

the White House by a CIA officer, Meredith Davidson. Davidson would assist

the director in the preparation of his material (a notebook was left behind with

3 Harry Truman, letter to Bedell Smith, 8 March 1951.
10

CHAPTER 1

the president each week), but he did not normally go into the Oval Office. The

briefing was based primarily on the Situation Summary, which was prepared

with the president’s needs in mind. Davidson’s reward was to join the DCI and

the president’s special consultant for national security Affairs, Sidney Souers

(who had served as the first DCI for a five-month period in 1946), for coffee

and a postmortem on the president’s reactions and follow-up requests.4

Mindful of how useful the weekly briefings were to him, Truman determined that intelligence information should be provided to the candidates in

the 1952 election as soon as they were selected. In the summer of 1952, the

president raised this idea with Smith. He indicated he wanted the Agency to

brief Gen. Dwight Eisenhower and Governor Adlai Stevenson, remarking at

the time, “There were so many things I did not know when I became President.” Smith suggested to Truman that Davidson might be the proper individual to brief both Eisenhower and Stevenson to ensure they were receiving the

same information.

Later, during his speech at the Agency on 21 November, Truman explained

his rationale in providing briefings to the president-elect. The office of the

president of the United States, he told his audience, “now carries power

beyond parallel in history...that is the principal reason why I am so anxious

that it be a continuing proposition and that the successor to me and the successor to him can carry on as if no election had ever taken place. I am giving this

president—this new president—more information than any other president

had when he went into office.”

Referring to a widely publicized meeting he had held with Eisenhower at the

White House to discuss foreign policy issues earlier that same week, Truman

said, “It was my privilege a few days ago...to brief the General who is going to

take over the office on the 20th of January.” Truman did not mention in his

address that on that occasion he had given Eisenhower a comprehensive

National Intelligence Digest prepared by the CIA. Keyed to an NSC policy

outline, the Digest summarized, in Smith’s words, “the most important national

intelligence on a worldwide basis.”5

Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs more than a decade later that his meeting

with Truman “added little to my knowledge.” He recalled that Truman

“received me cordially; however...the conversations...were necessarily general and official in nature. So far as defense affairs were concerned, under the

instructions of the President, I had been briefed periodically by Gen. Walter

4 Meredith Davidson, interviews by the author in Frederick, Maryland, 26 March and 25 October 

1993. Unless otherwise indicated, the numerous references that follow concerning Davidson's 

briefings of Stevenson and Eisenhower come from these interviews.

5 Walter Bedell Smith, memorandum for the president, 9 January 1953.
11

TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER: LAUNCHING THE PROCESS

Bedell Smith and his assistants in the Central Intelligence Agency on developments in the Korean war and on national security.”6 According to Davidson,

Truman told Smith he “had kept it general on purpose, for political reasons.”

Strained Relations Complicate the Arrangements

In his remarks at the Agency, Truman could not bring himself to be completely deferential to his successor. In a mild dig, he observed that Eisenhower

had been “rather appalled at all that the President needs to know in order to

reach decisions.” In private, Truman was bitingly critical of his elected successor. The press, for its part, was reporting that the meeting of the two men at

the White House had been “coolly formal.” The New York Times, for example,

noted “there was some evidence of tension between Mr. Truman and his successor,” observing also that “the President-elect looked serious and was somewhat brusque when he left the President’s office.”7

While Truman’s motives appear to have been straightforward in providing

information to enable Eisenhower to assume the presidency fully informed, the

implementation left something to be desired and prompted suspicions on the

part of Eisenhower and his staff. Indeed, tensions between the two came close

to undermining the planned briefing process and with it the Agency’s access to

the president-elect during the important transition period. Ironically, the ultimate result was to elicit from Eisenhower a statement making clear he saw the

CIA as a relatively apolitical provider of information. In the end he was willing

to hear from the CIA things he was unwilling to hear from others.

A difficult private exchange between the president and his eventual successor had begun shortly after the Republican convention, when Truman sent

telegrams to Eisenhower and Stevenson inviting them to lunch with his cabinet on Tuesday, 19 August. Truman proposed that he ask Smith and other CIA

officers to brief “on the foreign situation” and have the White House staff

report on other issues as well. In his telegram, Truman also extended an offer

of weekly intelligence briefings for both candidates.8

Eisenhower declined the invitation. In reply, he told Truman he thought he

should receive “only those communications from the outgoing Administration

that could be known to all the American people.” He added, “The problems

which you suggest for discussion are those with which I have lived for many

6 Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1963), 

85.

7 New York Times, 19 November 1952, 1, 18.

8 Harry Truman, telegram to Dwight Eisenhower, 14 August 1952. A similar telegram was sent to 

Adlai Stevenson. 
12

CHAPTER 1

years.” The general concluded with a paragraph indicating he would welcome

weekly reports from the CIA, but he wanted it understood that his possession

of those reports “would not limit his freedom to discuss or analyze foreign

programs as he wanted.”9

The White House, obviously irritated that Eisenhower had declined Truman’s personal invitation, released the texts of the telegrams from both men.

What was not released to the public—nor, so far as I can tell, known to senior

CIA managers at the time—was a very direct note that Truman had written by

hand and sent to Eisenhower at his campaign headquarters in Denver on 16

August. In that note Truman indicated he was sorry if he had caused Eisenhower embarrassment with the luncheon invitation, but he underscored that

his intention was to provide information that would permit a continuous, uninterrupted foreign policy despite the change of administrations.

In language only Truman would use, he wrote, “Partisan politics should

stop at the boundaries of the United States. I am extremely sorry that you have

allowed a bunch of screwballs to come between us.” Truman added, “You

have made a bad mistake, and I’m hoping it won’t injure this great Republic.

There has never been one like it and I want to see it continues regardless of the

man who occupies the most important position in the history of the world.

May God guide you and give you light.”10

After reading Truman’s note, Eisenhower obviously decided there was no

point in responding in kind and sent back to Truman, on 19 August, a relatively conciliatory reply, also handwritten. Eisenhower reiterated the thought

that, for political reasons and in the absence of any national emergency, he

should not meet with the outgoing president and cabinet and thus had declined

the invitation. He repeated his appreciation for the offer to send him weekly

CIA reports, opined that those would be sufficient to keep him up-to-date on

developments abroad, and assured Truman of his support for a bipartisan foreign policy.11

Although Eisenhower had taken a relatively moderate tone in his reply to

Truman’s outburst, he clearly was bothered by the overall exchange and indicated as much in separate correspondence with Smith. The general felt free to

be open with Smith; they had worked closely together during the war in

Europe when Smith served for an extended period as his chief of staff.

9 Dwight Eisenhower, telegram to Harry Truman, 14 August 1952

10 Harry Truman, letter to Dwight Eisenhower, 16 August 1952. Maintained in the holdings of the 

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

11 Dwight Eisenhower, letter to Harry Truman, 19 August 1952. Eisenhower Library.
13

TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER: LAUNCHING THE PROCESS

Following Eisenhower’s nomination, Smith had sent a note of congratulations that Eisenhower had not acknowledged before the exchange with Truman over the briefings in mid-August. In a letter stamped “Personal and

Confidential” dated 14 August, Eisenhower thanked Smith for his note of congratulations the previous month, but then launched immediately into some

observations on his exchange with Truman. “The past two days my whole

headquarters has been in a little bit of a steaming stew over an incident in

which, according to the papers, you were at least briefly involved. It was the

meeting that Governor Stevenson had with the president and the cabinet.

According to the reports reaching here, you were brought in to help brief the

Governor on the world situation.”12 Eisenhower expressed his understanding

that the briefing of Stevenson had taken only a very few minutes but added,

“To the political mind it looked like the outgoing administration was canvassing all its resources in order to support Stevenson’s election.” The general

went on to stress the importance of doing what is right, recalling the challenges he and Smith had faced together in Europe during the war.

The lecture from Eisenhower caused great pain to his longtime friend and

admirer (one former Agency officer recalls that “it upset the hell out of Beedle”). Nevertheless, in a reply to Eisenhower dated 18 August, Smith made no

mention of the critical note. Rather, he offered in rather formal language the

briefings that Smith had discussed with the president and which the president,

in turn, had offered to Eisenhower. Smith proposed that he provide Eisenhower information on the world situation like that the president received each

Friday morning, and that this information should be delivered by an officer of

the CIA. Smith’s letter was delivered to Eisenhower in Denver.13 Fortunately

for the Agency, in light of the tension that had developed, Eisenhower

accepted the invitation to receive CIA briefings.

Eisenhower’s “turning over of command” ceremony had been held at

SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in Paris on 30 May

1952. The following day the general, Mrs. Eisenhower, and Eisenhower’s personal staff departed Europe for Washington. Although he had been on leave

without pay from his post as president of Columbia University since early

1951, Eisenhower had continued to use the university home at 60 Morningside Drive in Manhattan when he was in the city. This residence became his

headquarters for the next several months, and it was here that the first briefing

by the CIA occurred.

12 Dwight Eisenhower, letter to Walter Bedell Smith, 14 August 1952. Eisenhower Library.

13 Walter Bedell Smith, letter to Dwight Eisenhower, 18 August 1952.
14

CHAPTER 1

Preelection Briefings

The first briefing was on Saturday morning, 30 August, by Melvin Hendrickson, then head of the military branch in OCI’s “Indications Staff.” Like

many Agency officers at the time, Hendrickson had several years of Army

experience; his last post had been assistant military attaché in Oslo.14 With

military precision, Eisenhower entered the library of his residence exactly at

7:45 to receive Hendrickson and an accompanying security officer, the two

being introduced as “the gentlemen from CIA.” Eisenhower suggested that

they move to an adjoining smaller room.

The general took about 20 minutes to read carefully through the briefing

material but paid scant attention to the information on the disposition of

Soviet and satellite armed forces after confirming with Hendrickson that there

had been no significant changes in their deployment since his briefings by the

US Army in Europe some months earlier. There was more extended discussion of the situation in Iran, of France’s growing difficulties in North Africa,

and regarding trade between Japan and China. The latter subject was discussed in the context of the war in Korea and the ongoing armistice talks.

Eisenhower commented specifically, “Since trade is one of our most powerful

weapons, it seems to me that we should employ it to its maximum. Where are

the Japanese going to get their materials if they can’t get them from China?”

Concerning the North African situation, the general’s bottom line was a cryptic, “If the French don’t do something fairly soon, they will have another IndoChina on their hands.” At the conclusion of this first substantive discussion,

Eisenhower indicated that he would like to receive future similar briefings.15

During the remaining weeks before the election on 4 November, Eisenhower received three additional briefings from CIA. The second in the series

took place on 25 September when the general was in the midst of an extended

14 Melvin Hendrickson, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 23 March 1993. Unless otherwise indicated, the references to his briefings of Eisenhower come from this interview. In discussing that first briefing, Hendrickson said his most vivid memory was of Eisenhower’s powerful 

welcoming handshake, saying, “You had to be careful or he would squeeze your fingers off.”

15 Melvin Hendrickson, “Briefing of General Eisenhower—30 August 1952,” memorandum for the 

record, 5 September 1952. As a reminder of how things change in 40 years, one cannot help noting 

that the Agency’s New York office provided the visiting CIA team a chauffeur-driven Cadillac for 

their 20-minute trip from midtown to Columbia University on the upper west side. Conversely, 

some things never change. The team reported in their memorandum for the record that, when they 

returned later that day to New York’s LaGuardia Airport for their flight to Washington, they discovered their reservations were for a flight departing from Idlewild (now JFK) Airport. They 

changed their reservation and arrived back at CIA’s “Que” building in Washington by midafternoon. Among the stories Hendrickson told his colleagues was an account of his pleasure at having 

met not only General Eisenhower but also Mrs. Eisenhower and their grandchildren.
15

TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER: LAUNCHING THE PROCESS

whistle-stop campaign tour. He had flown from New York to Moline, Illinois,

and from there had traveled virtually nonstop through numerous small towns

in Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, West Virginia, and finally Maryland.

CIA’s Hendrickson boarded the train in Silver Spring, Maryland, and briefed

Eisenhower during the short trip into Baltimore.

During a subsequent period of almost nonstop campaigning, Eisenhower

blocked out two weekends for rest. One was when the Eisenhowers were staying at the Brown Palace Hotel in Denver, Mrs. Eisenhower’s hometown. Hendrickson provided the third preelection briefing at the couple’s Brown Palace

suite on 11 October, again a Saturday morning. On this occasion, Eisenhower,

in turn, provided Hendrickson one of the more unusual experiences intelligence officers have had. Hendrickson recalls being invited to join the general

and Mrs. Eisenhower at a rodeo in Denver that weekend. The Eisenhowers

were driven around the rodeo grounds in a stagecoach. Hendrickson rode shotgun, up top with the driver.

The fourth and final preelection briefing was on 25 October, 10 days before

the election. Eisenhower had been campaigning in Detroit and had taken an

overnight train to New York. This time Hendrickson boarded the campaign

train in the early morning at Harmon Station, New York, and briefed Eisenhower as they traveled to Grand Central in New York City.

During each of the briefings during the preelection period, Eisenhower spent

15–20 minutes studying the written material and, typically, another 10–15 minutes discussing that material and other items on his mind. He asked few specific factual questions but did make comments on a wide spectrum of issues,

primarily the Soviet, Korean, and Iranian situations, which were at the forefront of US government attention in 1952. Eisenhower also read carefully and

commented on Agency materials relating to security arrangements for the prospective Middle East collective security alliance then under consideration.16

The package of written briefing materials presented to Eisenhower (and

Stevenson) at each meeting typically included 20 or more short items—one or

two paragraphs in length—summarizing the current situation in a specific

country of interest. Events in the USSR, Iran, Korea, Egypt, Yugoslavia, and

Japan were included in almost all sessions, but in the course of the briefings

more than 50 countries were addressed. In addition, there was normally one

longer article on a priority country, Iran being the most common. Each package also contained the “Conclusions” of one or two recently published

16 Hendrickson prepared very brief memorandums for the record concerning the second and 

fourth briefings, dated 29 September and 28 October, respectively; no written record has been 

found of the third briefing, held in Denver.
16

CHAPTER 1

national intelligence estimates. The latter typically assessed the prospects for

communist expansionism in different regions of the world.

The general, while a candidate, was appreciative of the preelection briefings, commenting that they had been very helpful. At the conclusion of the

fourth session, however, he added—clearly referring to the Soviet Union and

Korea—that he “missed the G-3 information” (US military plans and operations) that he observed “was essential for a complete understanding of those

situations.” Eisenhower also commented that “if he got the job, some other

arrangement would have to be made for the briefings.” He mentioned specifically securing clearances for some of his staff so that they, too, could benefit

from the information being provided.

In an intriguing parting comment, Eisenhower mentioned to Hendrickson,

“When you get back to Bedell Smith, tell him if I get elected I’ve got a job for

him.” Decades after the fact, it has proved impossible to establish whether this

comment was passed to the DCI personally. In an interesting coincidence of

timing, however, Smith, less than a week later on 1 November, forwarded to

President Truman a written request to resign his post as DCI and to retire from

active military service.17

Support to the President-Elect 18

One day after he was elected president, Eisenhower on 5 November 1952

traveled to Augusta, Georgia, for two weeks’ vacation. When the CIA briefings resumed late in the month, the most significant thing that had changed

was that they were no longer given by Hendrickson but by General Smith,

accompanied by Davidson. The first session following the election was held

on 21 November, this time again on the train as the president-elect traveled

from New York to Washington for a reunion dinner of his US Military Academy classmates at the Army-Navy Club. The train stopped at Baltimore to

permit Smith and Davidson to board and talk with the president-elect on the

remaining leg into Washington.

By coincidence, Davidson, while still working in Army Intelligence, had

briefed Eisenhower on a couple of occasions at the Pentagon just after the war.

17 Walter Bedell Smith, letter to Harry Truman, 1 November 1952. Eisenhower Library.

18 Memorandums for the record have not been found in CIA files regarding the postelection briefings of Eisenhower, and there is reason to doubt that any exist. Davidson, who accompanied 

Smith to the first two sessions, remembers asking the DCI after the first meeting “whether there 

was anything he wanted me to write. He said no. Beedle would have been happy if nothing had 

been written.” This attitude of the DCI also explains why the memorandums written by Davidson 

and Hendrickson, even about briefings in which Smith did not participate, were so cryptic. 
17

TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER: LAUNCHING THE PROCESS

To Davidson’s astonishment, when he was escorted into the president-elect’s

car, Eisenhower immediately brightened as he recognized him and extended a

warm greeting. In a jocular exchange, Davidson explained that he had not

served in Europe as Eisenhower had, rather he had been fighting “the big war

in the Pacific.”

Smith cautioned Eisenhower that “you had better watch out, he has been

briefing the opposition,” referring to Davidson’s sessions with Stevenson in

Springfield, Illinois. This joking remark caused Eisenhower to turn deadly

serious. Davidson was impressed that Eisenhower wanted to hear no jokes

about Stevenson and was very positive about the Agency’s briefings of the

governor. Eisenhower observed that he thought very highly of Stevenson

because he had kept the campaign on a high plane and demonstrated mastery

of foreign affairs.

The relaxed social exchange with the Eisenhowers (both General and Mrs.

Eisenhower were in dressing gowns) continued almost until the train had completed its late-evening run to Washington. The substantive part of the briefing,

therefore, continued while they were parked at Union Station. Subjects of particular interest again included events in Korea and the negotiations under way

to bring the conflict to an end. But Smith also provided an overview of the

general world situation.

Because the DCI himself was now conducting the briefings, and because of

the preexisting relationship between Eisenhower and Smith, the session

involved substantially more give-and-take than had been the case before the

election. A more serious analysis of the issues was also to be expected because

Eisenhower, like all presidents-elect, realized he would have to grapple with the

world’s problems within a matter of weeks. Eisenhower asked a number of

questions, particularly about the political aspects of the Korean quagmire. He

especially wanted to clarify in his own mind what China was up to and to understand better that country’s role and motivations in the conflict. Eisenhower

asked, for example, “I never did know why we let the Chinese call themselves

volunteers?” In reply, Smith explained the nuances of the situation, concluding

by saying, “We didn’t have to bomb Peking—that’s why we acquiesced.”

Well after midnight, Smith and Davidson took their leave of the presidentelect at Union Station. General and Mrs. Eisenhower spent the night in their

Pullman car on the train. Mrs. Eisenhower had been an active participant

throughout the discussions. Davidson recalls that “she gave me the impression

of being much more political than Ike.”

In his memoirs Eisenhower recalled, “In a Detroit speech on October 24, I

announced my intention, if elected, to go to Korea before the following January and to determine for myself what the conditions were in that unhappy
18

CHAPTER 1

country.” For some days Eisenhower and his closest advisers had been discussing the wisdom of making this dramatic proposal public.19 Once it was

announced, the idea was very well received and, in fact, has been cited by

many observers as having clinched the Eisenhower victory 10 days later.

After the election, while preparing for his trip to Korea, Eisenhower telephoned Smith to inform him that he was not comfortable relying exclusively

on US Army information regarding what was going on in Korea; he wanted

the DCI to come to New York to give him the Agency’s independent assessment. The president-elect called at virtually the last moment and emphasized

that their visit should be given no publicity.

In keeping with their interpretation of Eisenhower’s instructions, Army security officers took Smith and Davidson to the briefing location in New York via

a circuitous route. The two were led in the front door of a drugstore and out the

back, for example, in a counterintelligence maneuver that served only to enrage

the always-impatient Smith. Ironically, they reached Eisenhower’s office in the

Commodore Hotel for an afternoon appointment that had been wedged into a

day filled with a dozen other well-publicized visitors. Smith and Davidson

were waiting in an outer office as a luncheon group hosted by Eisenhower

broke up. Smith was surprised to see Gen. William Donovan, the founder of the

Office of Strategic Services, among those leaving the general’s office.

Because the president-elect had requested Smith’s frank and personal

assessment of the situation in Korea, the two generals were alone for most of

the briefing session. Near the end of the session, Davidson was called in to

answer two or three factual questions. Eisenhower departed secretly for Korea

early the following day, 29 November.

Smith took very seriously his responsibility to provide an independent

assessment. He had insisted that his CIA staff derive facts about military developments from the US Army and Navy but jealously guarded his prerogatives

as DCI to make assessments and estimates based on those facts. By chance,

Smith and Davidson ran into John Foster Dulles in the lobby of the Waldorf

Astoria Hotel shortly after they had seen Eisenhower at the Commodore.

Dulles elicited confirmation that they had seen Eisenhower and asked what

they told him. Smith responded with a curt, “That’s between him and me.”

The late-November visit to the president-elect’s office also created a bit of

momentary tension with the Secret Service. Smith was sometimes reluctant to

have a protective officer from the Agency’s Office of Security accompany him

and would override vigorous recommendations to the contrary by CIA’s director of security, Sheffield Edwards. In this case, the DCI adamantly opposed

19 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 72.
19

TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER: LAUNCHING THE PROCESS

having additional people accompany him to New York given the ground rules

Eisenhower had set regarding secrecy. Edwards earlier had approached Davidson, insisting that he become weapons-qualified so he could protect the DCI.

On the train from Washington to New York, the DCI learned that Davidson

was carrying a weapon and challenged, “Edwards got to you, didn’t he?” The

DCI’s reaction was mild, however, compared with that of Secret Service officers when they discovered that Davidson was carrying a weapon during incidental conversation in the president-elect’s outer office.

The private meeting between Eisenhower and Smith on 28 November went

on for more than an hour and allowed the two to conduct some intelligence

business beyond their discussion of Korea. During that session Smith secured

Eisenhower’s approval of a proposal that CIA should establish a briefing

facility in New York City to provide continuous support to Eisenhower and his

staff. The facility was subsequently set up, but not as close to Eisenhower’s as

Smith would have liked. Agency officers recall that Sherman Adams, who

was to become Eisenhower’s chief of staff, intervened to ensure that the CIA

office was “a broom closet some distance from the President’s office.” Adams

obviously did not want Smith to have the same access to the new president

that he enjoyed with Truman.

The Agency maintained its office in the Commodore from 28 November

through the end of the transition period in January 1953. A CIA briefing officer

representing the DCI was present at all times. For most of the period the officer

was Ed Beatty, a former newsman who was editor of CIA’s Current Intelligence Bulletin. Each day a courier from Washington would bring to the New

York office the latest current intelligence products for use by the presidentelect and his staff. Eisenhower’s staff did utilize this facility, and Adams himself came by seeking information on at least one occasion. Eisenhower, however, relied exclusively on the briefings provided by the DCI.

During the transition period in late 1952 the press occasionally wrote of the

DCI’s “weekly” briefings of the president-elect. But, in fact, the general’s

schedule did not permit briefings on any regular schedule. His trip to Korea

and the Pacific took more than two weeks, with the result that the next CIA

briefing did not occur until 19 December. Eisenhower was accompanied at

that meeting by Adams and Smith by Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert

Amory. Specifically labeled “off the record” on Eisenhower’s calendar, it was

a session Smith would rather not have attended. He entered Eisenhower’s

office in high spirits but came out crushed. Sitting in morose silence all the

way back to Washington, he finally muttered, “And I thought that it was going

to be great.” Smith never explained what had happened.
20

CHAPTER 1

He had offered his resignation in writing to President Truman some six

weeks before, obviously hoping for a challenging appointment from his old

friend and colleague. It was widely known at the time that Smith aspired, perhaps unrealistically, to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Agency historians have surmised that Eisenhower informed Smith he would not be appointed

chairman of the Joint Staff, asking him instead to serve as under secretary of

state.

Smith did, in fact, serve in the number-two job at the Department of State

during the first year and a half of Eisenhower’s first term. But it was no secret

that he did not enjoy being the under secretary. He felt uncomfortable with the

nonmilitary way the Department functioned, he did not like John Foster

Dulles, and he was uneasy about Allen Dulles’s appointment as DCI.

The last occasion on which Smith is known to have met with Eisenhower

while serving as DCI was on 14 January 1953 in New York City. There Smith

joined John Foster Dulles and other Eisenhower advisers and appointees for

an extended foreign policy conference with the president-elect. Less than a

week later, on 20 January, Eisenhower was inaugurated. 

The New President as an Intelligence Consumer

To no one’s surprise, Eisenhower’s preferences on how he should receive

intelligence support did not change once he became president. CIA histories

indicate that the day after his inauguration in 1953 the Agency’s director of

current intelligence, Huntington Sheldon, sent to James Lay Jr., the executive

secretary of the National Security Council, a list of publications the Agency

could furnish the White House. It quickly became apparent, however, that the

president did not want to receive written intelligence materials on a regular

basis and had no interest in frequent briefings by CIA experts. As had been his

preference during the transition period, the president relied instead on periodic

high-level briefings.

The practice that developed and continued throughout the eight years of the

Eisenhower presidency involved the DCI, Allen Dulles, providing weekly

briefings to the National Security Council. Eisenhower chaired these NSC

meetings, and under his leadership they were more regular and more formal

than under any president before or since. He told President-elect Kennedy in

1960 that the NSC “had become the most important weekly meeting of the

government.”20

20 Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1965), 712.
21

TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER: LAUNCHING THE PROCESS

The NSC met every Thursday morning at 9:00 a.m. and with rare exceptions

opened its meetings with an intelligence briefing by the DCI. The briefing

addressed subjects mutually agreed with Lay of the NSC staff, representing the

interests of the president’s special assistant for national security affairs, Gen.

Robert Cutler. If the president, Cutler, or Lay did not have specific subjects

they wanted addressed, the CIA was free to propose its own agenda, although

the Agency’s ideas were always vetted with Lay before the briefing.

Agency veterans remember a wide variety of subjects being addressed at

the NSC meetings, reflecting the president’s broad interests. He was intrigued

with matters ranging from Italian elections, to the battle of Dien Bien Phu, to

periodic updates on Agency covert action operations. Eisenhower would interrupt periodically with questions and, within limits, permit questions from others as well. When his patience ran out, however, he was not at all reluctant to

cut off discussion, saying “OK Allen, let’s go ahead.”

According to Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, who served as secretary of the

White House Staff, Eisenhower expected Dulles to provide the latest intelligence on the crisis of the moment but, more important, to concentrate primarily on providing the intelligence background to whatever larger or longer term

planning issue was on the agenda. Because of this long-term focus, most of

the briefing materials used by the DCI were prepared by CIA’s Office of

National Estimates. Goodpaster recalls that Eisenhower frequently would ask,

“How solid is that information—where does it come from?” Dulles was reluctant to answer “with fourteen people in the room.” Eisenhower, Dulles, and

one staff aide (sometimes Goodpaster and sometimes Senior Staff Assistant

Gordon Gray) would then hold a smaller, follow-on meeting after the regular

NSC to answer the president’s more probing questions.21

The briefing process during the 1950s had several important advantages

from the Agency’s point of view. Among these was the fact that the DCI was

able to provide intelligence on important matters on a predictable schedule in

a forum that included not only the president, but also the chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the secretaries of state and defense, and other key players in

the foreign policy decision making process. The single-most-important advantage of the system, however, was that it was unambiguously obvious each

week whether the president was interested in, and well served by, the intelligence he was receiving. With this feedback, CIA was able to be responsive to

his needs and those of the NSC. Senior Agency officers believed the system

worked well. Sheldon summed it up by saying, “The Director got used to the

21 Andrew Goodpaster, interview by the author in Washington, DC, 26 September 1993. Unless 

otherwise indicated, all references to Goodpaster’s observations come from this interview.
22

CHAPTER 1

procedure and was happy with it, and everybody was happy with it; it simply

remained that way until the next administration.”

The DCI himself provided the vast majority of the briefings of the NSC. It

was clear to all involved, however, that Dulles was much more comfortable

with political and economic subjects than with scientific and military issues.

Quite often the director would permit a specialist to brief on such subjects,

always designating personally the individual he wanted to do the job. Herbert

Scoville Jr., the assistant director for scientific intelligence, gave many of the

briefings on scientific subjects, and the Agency’s nuclear specialist, Herbert

Miller, distinguished himself with briefings in that specialized field. Amory,

the Agency’s DDI, from time to time would brief on military matters.

White House records make clear that attendees at the NSC meetings noticed

the difference between briefings delivered by the DCI and those delivered by

the substantive experts. Gray addressed this subject in a meeting on 11 January 1961 when he discussed transition matters with McGeorge Bundy, representative of President-elect John Kennedy. Responding to questions by Bundy

about whether the president should have daily briefings and, if so, who should

deliver them, Gray wrote in his memorandum for the record, “I had made a

note several months ago to discuss with my successor intelligence briefings in

the Council. I believe that these should be crisper and should be conducted by

more junior officers with a special briefing competence.... I acknowledged to

Mr. Bundy that this would cause serious personal problems and I was not sure

I would advise him to tackle it. It was simply a question I left with him.” In

that same conversation, however, Gray asserted that the practice of having the

DCI brief the NSC every week was “a very useful device.”22

Goodpaster recalls that Eisenhower “had a lot of respect for Allen Dulles

growing out of Dulles’s work during the war. The president thought he was

very skilled at top-level intelligence—collecting it and analyzing it.” Eisenhower would read enough of the Intelligence Community’s estimates to get the

point and the highlights and, according to Goodpaster, “felt the formal estimates and papers were the genuine view,” meaning they were not politicized.

But there were some problems. Eisenhower had been struck, for example, at

how the “bomber gap” of the mid-1950s turned out to be a false alarm. When

the Intelligence Community and the US military began writing of the Soviets’

great progress in missile production during the late 1950s, “Eisenhower was

more than skeptical; he was unconvinced, challenging repeatedly, ‘what do

they base this on?’”

22 Gordon Gray, memorandum for the record, 17 January 1961. Eisenhower Library.
23

TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER: LAUNCHING THE PROCESS

According to Goodpaster, Eisenhower believed there were at least two reasons why the bomber and missile issues turned into serious political problems.

One difficulty was that there was a lot of contact between elements of the

Intelligence Community, particularly the Air Force, and Capitol Hill, in which

Congress “heard this continual drumbeat about how we were falling behind.”

The other problem, in Eisenhower’s view, was that “there was a lot of selfinterest in the intelligence assessments of the military services—they were out

to promote their own programs.”

Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower avoided reading daily intelligence

reports from any one agency. In fact, he normally read no daily reports.

Instead, Goodpaster, with the help of the president’s son, Lt. Col. John Eisenhower, each morning would review the separate reports from CIA, State,

Defense, and the Joint Chiefs. They would meld this material into one early

morning oral briefing. In those sessions, Eisenhower occasionally would ask

to see a specific raw report or analytic paper, or task additional work.

Agency veterans recall that Sheldon and Deputy Director for Intelligence

Loftus Becker in early March 1953 did discuss the idea of producing a brief,

all-source, daily current intelligence publication exclusively for the president.

As the Agency came to understand Eisenhower’s preferences, however, this

idea was never followed up. In any event, no such publication was actually

produced until the Kennedy administration. One innovation that was begun in

the early Eisenhower years and continued throughout his administration was

the practice of cabling a daily intelligence report to the president while he was

traveling abroad. That practice has continued to the present. 

Briefing Governor Stevenson in 1952

During the 1952 presidential campaign, it proved considerably easier to

arrange briefings of Governor Adlai Stevenson than it was to arrange the

briefings of Eisenhower. For a start, the governor accepted President Truman’s

invitation to lunch and an initial round of discussions on 19 August at the

White House. Thereafter, he was briefed every two to three weeks by the CIA

at the Governor’s Mansion in Springfield, Illinois. Those sessions took place

on 30 August, 15 September, and 1 and 20 October.

In the initial division of labor, it was decided that Davidson would travel to

Springfield to brief Stevenson. The plan had been for him to brief both candidates, but as luck would have it they requested their first briefing on the same

day. The material Davidson took to Illinois was almost exactly the same as

that provided Eisenhower. The exception—a distinction not observed in subsequent years—was that Eisenhower received material that included informa-
24

CHAPTER 1

tion derived from communications intelligence. Stevenson lacked experience

with this sensitive material and did not receive it.

Stevenson was an even more gracious host and careful reader than Eisenhower. During their Saturday afternoon sessions, he invariably offered his

CIA visitor refreshments and had numerous questions and comments about

the material he read. It was clear from the outset that Stevenson had the background and the intellect to take full advantage of the intelligence the Agency

was providing. Thinking back on the briefings more than four decades later,

Davidson still commented with awe, “I was impressed with the questions he

asked. He was well ahead of all of us.”

Of the many substantive issues that arose during the intelligence briefings

in 1952, the single one in which Stevenson was most interested was Iran.

Mohammed Mossadeq had become prime minister in April 1951, and shortly

thereafter he had secured passage of a law nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil

Company. In the succeeding months, relations between Iran and the United

Kingdom steadily worsened and approached the crisis point during the fall of

1952. Diplomatic relations were severed in October.

The United Kingdom was concerned about oil, prestige, and compensation,

and the United States was worried that Mossadeq might be deposed by the

Tudeh (Communist) Party. Stevenson, like Eisenhower, wanted to follow the

situation very carefully. Fortunately for the Agency, it was not until after the

election that serious discussions began between the United States and the

United Kingdom about a covert action program to remove Mossadeq.

Whether to brief a presidential candidate on a covert action program as important as the one that was implemented in Iran the following year was a question

that did not arise.

Supplementing the briefings he received during the 1952 campaign, Stevenson asked a number of questions to which the Agency responded with written

memorandums. In one case, for example, DCI Smith personally sent a memorandum to the governor analyzing Josef Stalin’s address to the 19th Communist Party Congress, held on 15 October. In addition to a factual account of the

points Stalin had made, Smith included an analysis that comes across in retrospect as a policy lecture to the candidate. The memorandum concluded with

the observation, “It is extremely unwise to underestimate the importance of

any of Stalin’s statements, although sometimes it is not as easy as in the present instance to highlight their actual meaning. The significance of the above is

unmistakable.”23

23 Walter Bedell Smith, memorandum for Governor Stevenson, 16 October 1952.
25

TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER: LAUNCHING THE PROCESS

The Challenger Briefed Again in 1956

During the 1956 presidential campaign, President Eisenhower continued to

receive routine intelligence briefings at NSC meetings just as he had for the

previous four years. Without hesitation, Eisenhower authorized the resumption of support to Stevenson during the 1956 campaign along the lines of the

briefings he and the governor had received four years earlier.

The responsibility for keeping Stevenson informed in 1956 fell primarily to

the Agency’s deputy director of current intelligence, Knight McMahan. This

time the logistics of the briefings were not as simple as they had been in 1952

when the candidate worked out of one location in Springfield. McMahan

briefed Stevenson on 10 September at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City,

on 17 September and 1 October at the Sheraton Park Hotel in Washington, and

on 29 October in Boston. McMahan conducted these briefings alone, except

that on 17 September in Washington he was joined by the deputy director of

central intelligence, Gen. Charles Cabell.

Like his predecessor four years earlier, McMahan observed, “One could not

help being impressed with Stevenson; he was a very informed man, but what

he read brought him up to date and included things he didn’t know anything

about.”24 Much of the information provided Stevenson in 1956 addressed the

crisis in Hungary. Beyond that issue, the governor studied very carefully

material presented to him on Soviet disarmament policy. He was also interested in developments in India and in the warming relationship between India

and China. He had questions on the Sino-Burmese relationship, developments

in Malaysia and Singapore, the disputed islands off the China coast, and Russia’s threatening activities in the vicinity of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

Stevenson’s interests in Hungary and the Asian issues, however, were secondary to his primary concern, which was the developing Suez Crisis, caused

by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s refusal to allow Israeli shipping

access to the Canal, in violation of longstanding agreements. Agency memorandums for the record show that during the first three briefings Stevenson asked a

number of questions about the Suez situation.25 He cross-examined McMahan

closely on such details as the convention of 1888 that governed Canal operations, Israeli shipping, developments in the UN, the attitudes of the nonpermanent members of the Security Council, possible solutions to the controversy, the

status of international funding for Nasser’s Aswan Dam project, and the failure

24 Knight McMahan, interview by the author in Hanover, New Hampshire, 18 April 1993. Unless 

otherwise indicated, all references to McMahan’s briefings of Stevenson come from this interview.

25 McMahan drafted memorandums for the record following his first three sessions with Stevenson, dated 12 September, 18 September, and 2 October 1956. No record is available of his fourth 

session, held on 29 October in Boston.
26

CHAPTER 1

of Britain’s blue-ribbon negotiating mission. As the crisis continued to build,

Stevenson probed the legal aspects of Nasser’s position and the Egyptian

leader’s ability to maintain his government against expected economic sanctions. And he was interested in regional aspects of the problem, including tensions between Israel and Jordan and the buildup of British forces on Cyprus.

On 29 October, McMahan was, in his own words, “caught in the worst situation possible for an intelligence briefer: briefing Stevenson in Boston on the

day Israel attacked Egypt.” McMahan had taken the train from Washington to

Boston the previous day while the interagency “Watch Committee” was

reviewing newly available intelligence confirming that Israel, with British and

French support, was completing its mobilization and would attack Egypt.

Because the evidence came from intercepted communications, this sensitive

material was not included in the written briefing materials prepared for Stevenson. Instead, McMahan intended to handle this breaking story orally.

To McMahan’s chagrin and embarrassment, he had no more than settled into

a chair to begin his briefing of Stevenson when one of the governor’s aides

burst in to inform him that the press was reporting that Israel had attacked.

McMahan had not yet said anything. In 1993, McMahan still remembered this

encounter clearly, recalling, “Stevenson took the news in stride, surprised that

he had heard it first from the media rather than from us. But he reacted with

consternation and concern.” Stevenson was more gracious than his running

mate, Senator Estes Kefauver. According to McMahan, “Kefauver [who was

briefed separately] gave me a very hard time—he couldn’t believe that the

French and the British had shut us out of the planning process.”26

Looking back on the Agency’s exchanges with Stevenson in 1956, it is clear

that he asked the right probing questions concerning the Suez Crisis as it

unfolded. He wanted to know not only about the situation in Egypt but also

about developments in Israel, Jordan, and Cyprus that were key to understanding the intentions of the parties involved. McMahan discussed with Stevenson

all aspects of the intelligence reporting but was not at liberty to review with

Stevenson the politics of intelligence collection and policy support that had

been unfolding as well. Agency officers had noted, for example, that Secretary

of State Dulles gave the impression that he did not want to receive detailed

information regarding the UK buildup on Cyprus lest the knowledge of the US

government, accompanied by its silence, represent approval. Particularly in

the early stages of the crisis, there had been a clear assumption by key policymakers that Israel and its backers, knowing of Eisenhower’s opposition to a

military move, would somehow hold back.

26 Memorandums for the record, dated 1 and 8 October 1956, are available for only two early 

briefings of Kefauver.
27

TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER: LAUNCHING THE PROCESS

Although the US Intelligence Community was, in fact, not aware of all of

the details of the Israeli, French, and British cooperation, it did not report

some of the details it did have. The increase in tensions had been well documented in the intelligence reporting but clear warnings of coming hostilities

were issued only a week ahead. When the attack occurred, the president and

the Democratic candidates were furious with the European allies and less than

proud of their own handling of the crisis.

From the Agency’s point of view, thanks to the problems with the Suez Crisis, the briefings for Stevenson in 1956 ended on an awkward note. In all other

respects, however, the sessions with Stevenson and Kefauver were a great success. Stevenson personally wrote Acting DCI Cabell to thank him for the

briefings provided by McMahan, observing that they were “excellent and I

found him very well informed.”27

Agency officers who met with Stevenson during his two campaigns came

away deeply impressed with his knowledge of foreign affairs and his interest

in and appreciation of the intelligence product. More than that, it had been a

great personal pleasure to deal with him. McMahan recalls, “He was a very

courteous, polite man. I remember thinking it was a blessing he was not

elected, in light of the public and personal attacks to which our presidents are

subjected.”



27 Adlai Stevenson, letter to C. P. Cabell, 11 September 1956
29

CHAPTER 2

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

The CIA’s early relationship with presidential candidate John Kennedy

could hardly have been more different from the one it had established eight

years earlier with General Eisenhower. In 1952, the Agency’s briefings in the

preelection period had been undertaken by working-level officers who, for the

most part, delivered current intelligence summaries in written form. With few

exceptions, the reports and analyses offered by the briefers steered clear of

policy issues. In 1960, by contrast, the briefings were handled personally by

DCI Allen Dulles and included extended discussions of sensitive matters.

In 1960, the CIA and its programs for the first time became involved in the

political campaign, sometimes within public view and sometimes behind the

scenes. Issues arose relating to the need for, and the protection of, US intelligence capabilities, specific intelligence collection programs such as the U-2

aircraft overflights, and substantive analytic findings related to Soviet economic and strategic capabilities. Charges were made regarding the allegedly

selective use of intelligence information by the White House and the Agency.

And, for the first time, CIA faced the question of what obligation it might have

to brief a presidential candidate on a major covert action program. 

The Presidential Debates

Many of these issues were on display during the presidential debates, held

for the first time in 1960. The first debate, in Chicago on 26 September,

focused exclusively on domestic issues, but in the second debate, on 7 October

in Washington, Republican candidate Richard Nixon attacked Senator Kennedy’s earlier statement that the United States should have apologized to the

Soviets for the incident in which Francis Gary Powers’s U-2 aircraft was

downed over the USSR during a CIA reconnaissance mission. “We all remember Pearl Harbor,” the vice president began. “We lost 3,000 American lives. We

cannot afford an intelligence gap. And I just want to make my position absolutely clear with regard to getting intelligence information. I don’t intend to see

to it that the United States is ever in a position where, while we are negotiating

with the Soviet Union, that we discontinue our intelligence effort, and I don’t

intend ever to express regrets to Mr. Khrushchev or anybody else.”1
30

CHAPTER 2

In the third debate on 13 October, featuring Kennedy from New York and

Nixon from Los Angeles, Kennedy cited the DCI as his authority for an invidious comparison of US and Soviet achievements: “The economic growth of

the Soviet Union is greater than ours. Mr. Dulles has suggested it is from two

to three times as great as ours.”2 In that debate and in the fourth and final

encounter in New York on 21 October, Kennedy pursued the theme that the

Soviets were surpassing the United States economically and militarily, a topic

that headed the list of CIA intelligence production priorities.

Perhaps the most crucial foreign policy issue raised in the 1960 debates,

which derived directly from US intelligence analyses, was the alleged gap

between US and Soviet intercontinental missile production. Kennedy charged

that the Soviets had “made a breakthrough in missiles, and by ‘61-2-3 they

will be outnumbering us in missiles. I’m not as confident as he [Nixon] is that

we will be the strongest military power by 1963.” Kennedy added, “I believe

the Soviet Union is first in outer space. We have made more shots but the size

of their rocket thrust and all the rest. You yourself said to Khrushchev, you

may be ahead of us in rocket thrust but we’re ahead of you in color television,

in your famous discussion in the kitchen. I think that color television is not as

important as rocket thrust.”3

During three of the debates, Nixon attacked Kennedy for his lack of willingness to defend Quemoy and Matsu, the small Nationalist-held islands off

the coast of Communist China. The extensive discussion of the QuemoyMatsu issue did not create any direct problem for the CIA, but it led directly to

a controversial dispute between the candidates over policy toward Cuba,

where a popular revolution had established a Soviet-supported communist

government. The politically charged clash had a number of repercussions in

the White House and at the CIA.

Kennedy adviser Arthur Schlesinger Jr. later described the relationship of

these China and Cuba issues and the sequence of events in his memoir of the

Kennedy administration, A Thousand Days: “The Kennedy staff, seeking to

take the offensive after his supposed soft position on Quemoy and Matsu, put

out the provocative statement about strengthening the Cuban fighters for freedom.”4 The controversial press release, crafted late one evening in the Biltmore Hotel in New York City by speechwriter Richard Goodwin, said, “We

must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista, democratic, anti-Castro forces in

exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro.”

1 New York Times, 8 October 1960, 10.

2 New York Times, 14 October 1960, 21.

3 New York Times, 22 October 1960, 8, 9. 4 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 225.
31

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

According to Goodwin, the policy statement was not shown to the sleeping

Kennedy because of the late hour; it was the only public statement of the campaign not approved by the candidate.5

The ill-considered statement on Cuba received wide press play and was

immediately attacked. The New York Times the next day ran the story as the

lead item on the front page with the headline: “Kennedy Asks Aid for Cuban

Rebels to Defeat Castro, Urges Support of Exiles and Fighters for Freedom.”

James Reston wrote in the Times that Kennedy had made “what is probably

his worst blunder of the campaign.”6

Coming the day before the fourth presidential debate, the statement from

the Kennedy camp put Nixon in what he found to be an extraordinarily awkward position. Many years later Nixon wrote in his memoirs, “I knew that

Kennedy had received a CIA briefing on the administration’s Cuba policy and

assumed that he knew, as I did, that a plan to aid the Cuban exiles was already

under way on a top secret basis. His statement jeopardized the project, which

could succeed only if it were supported and implemented secretly.”7

Throughout the campaign the two candidates had engaged in a spirited

exchange about whether the Eisenhower administration had “lost” Cuba, and

Nixon knew that the issue would be revived in the final debate, which was to

be devoted solely to foreign affairs. Nixon has written that to protect the

security of the planned operation he “had no choice but to take a completely

opposite stand and attack Kennedy’s advocacy of open intervention.” And he

did attack, saying, “I think that Senator Kennedy’s policies and recommendations for the handling of the Castro regime are probably the most dangerously

irresponsible recommendations that he has made during the course of this

campaign.”8

Former Kennedy advisers have underscored over the years that the statement on Cuba was released without Kennedy’s knowledge by staffers ignorant

of the covert action planning under way at the time and was crafted solely to

ensure that Kennedy would not again be put on the defensive about communist expansionism. These same advisers differ among themselves, however, on

the key question of whether Kennedy himself knew of the covert action plans.

Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen said in 1993, “I am certain that at

the time of the debates Kennedy had no knowledge of the planned operation.

His reference to more assertive action regarding Cuba was put in by one of my

assistants to give him something to say.”9

5 Richard Goodwin, Remembering America (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1988), 125. 

6 New York Times, 23 October 1960, E10.

7 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 220. 8 New York Times, 22 October 1960, 9.
32

CHAPTER 2

The assistant was Richard Goodwin, whose memory is quite different. He

asserts that as a presidential candidate, Kennedy “had received secret briefings

by the CIA, some of which revealed that we were training a force of Cuban

exiles for a possible invasion of the Cuban mainland.”10 Goodwin and

Sorensen have both made clear that they were not in attendance at any CIA

briefings.

The US government’s planning for a covert action program intended to

undermine Castro had been approved by President Eisenhower in March 1960

and was in progress throughout the period of the presidential campaign. The

question of when and to what extent Kennedy—or any presidential candidate—would be informed of the covert action deliberations was important to

CIA because it raised the delicate question of informing individuals outside

the normally restricted circle in CIA, the Congress, and the executive branch.

In 1960 this was uncharted territory. In subsequent presidential campaign

years, the Agency’s practice came to be one of delaying briefings even on

established covert action programs, as well as on sensitive technical and

human-source collection programs, until after the election had determined who

would be president. This meant denying such briefings to presidential candidates, creating the risk that they would inadvertently make statements during

the campaign that might embarrass themselves and the Agency, or—more

important—complicate the future execution of US foreign policy.

Well before the Cuba liberation issue came to a head in October, the outgoing Eisenhower administration had realized that covert action planning on

Cuba could be a political bombshell. Following one of Allen Dulles’s briefings of the National Security Council in early August, for example, the vice

president pulled the DCI aside to ask him whether Kennedy and his running

mate, Senator Lyndon Johnson, were being provided information on covert

action projects, specifically those related to Cuba. Dulles gave a carefully

crafted answer to the effect that Kennedy was being told a little but not too

much. According to former Agency officials familiar with the exchange,

Nixon reacted strongly to Dulles’s reply, saying, “Don’t tell him anything.

That could be dangerous.”11

In his own account of these events, published in 1962, Nixon charged that

Kennedy, before the election of 1960, had knowledge of covert action planning

“for the eventual purpose of supporting an invasion of Cuba itself.”12 This

9 Theodore Sorensen, telephone interview with the author, 19 May 1993. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Sorensen’s comments come from this interview.

10 Goodwin, Remembering America, 125.

11 Knight McMahan, interview with the author in Hanover, New Hampshire, 18 April 1993.

12 Richard Nixon, Six Crises (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1962), 354.
33

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

charge prompted a formal press release from the White House on 20 March

1962 denying that Kennedy had been told of any plans for “supporting an invasion of Cuba” before the election. The White House denial was backed up by

Dulles, by then a former DCI, who explained that Nixon’s comments were

apparently based on a misunderstanding of what was included in the briefings

he had given Kennedy.

Senator John F. Kennedy and DCI Allen Dulles prepare to meet the press.
34

CHAPTER 2

Preelection Briefings: What Really Was Discussed?

As early as 30 March 1960, Edward P. Morgan of the American Broadcasting Company used the occasion of a presidential press conference to ask

Eisenhower if the presidential nominees to be selected in the summer would

be given high-level intelligence briefings. At that early date the DCI had not

yet raised the subject with the president, but Eisenhower did not hesitate, saying “We always do that. They did it for me in 1952 and I did it in ‘56, as quick

as the nominees are named they begin to get it.”13 Indeed, on 18 July, Eisenhower sent telegrams to the Democratic nominees offering them briefings by

the CIA. Undoubtedly recalling his own difficult exchange with President

Truman eight years earlier, Eisenhower included in his telegram a paragraph

saying, “Because of the secret character of the information that would be furnished you, it would be exclusively for your personal knowledge. Otherwise,

however, the receipt of such information would impose no restriction on full

and free discussion.”14

Senator John F. Kennedy, the Democratic presidential nominee, immediately accepted the offer, and the first intelligence briefing was held five days

later, on Saturday, 23 July. The briefing was conducted at Kennedy’s vacation

home in Hyannisport, Massachusetts, by the DCI alone in a session that lasted

approximately two and a quarter hours. Dulles then briefed Senator Lyndon

Johnson, the vice-presidential nominee, at his ranch in Texas on 28 July.

In that first round of briefings, the DCI put heavy emphasis on Soviet

issues, including Soviet progress in strategic delivery capabilities, missiles,

and bombers, and discussed the nuclear testing issue. He also reviewed Soviet

statements on Berlin and Sino-Soviet cooperation. Dulles went over the latest

intelligence on the Taiwan Straits situation; Middle East politics, particularly

events in Iran; France’s anticolonial problems in Algeria and Belgium’s in the

Congo; and Cuba. The Johnson briefing differed from that of Kennedy only

because the Texas senator was also interested in discussing Mexico.15

Dulles recorded that both wanted to know what developments might arise

during the campaign, especially in Berlin, Cuba, and the Congo. Kennedy

asked Dulles’s opinion about the likelihood of an early Chinese attack on the

offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits and inquired about the status of the conference on limiting nuclear testing. Johnson, in addition to his interest in Mex13 Dwight Eisenhower, in comments recorded by Allen Dulles, memorandum for the president, 

9 July 1960.

14 Dwight Eisenhower telegrams to John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, Public Papers of the 

Presidents, 1960, 582. 15 Allen Dulles, memorandum for the president, 3 August 1960.
35

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

ican and Caribbean matters, asked about Soviet missile developments,

reflecting his position as chairman of the Senate Preparedness Committee.

At the conclusion of the first briefing, Kennedy stated that in future briefings

he wanted the DCI to cover potential trouble spots all around the world, but

subsequent scheduling difficulties delayed the next (and, as it turned out, the

last) preelection briefing session almost two months. On 17 September, a Saturday night, Dulles was dining with friends in Georgetown when he was surprised by a telephone call from a member of the Kennedy staff at about 9 p.m.

Could the DCI meet with the senator on Monday morning, 19 September, at the

Kennedy home in Georgetown?16

When the DCI arrived with his hastily prepared briefing package, he found

Kennedy engaged in discussion with Senator Albert Gore Sr. while various

other people, including Prince Sadruddin Khan, uncle of the Aga Khan,

waited their turns. When the other visitors had departed, the DCI had approximately 30 minutes with Kennedy to give him an update on world trouble

spots. Dulles’s memorandum for the record notes that he discussed Cuba, the

Congo, Berlin, Laos, Jordan, Syria, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Soviet

space program.

During this second briefing Kennedy was interested in learning what

Khrushchev’s objectives would be in his coming visit to the UN and what the

Agency believed the Soviet leader was likely to say or do. The senator said he

wanted to be alerted to any critical areas that CIA thought might blow up over

the next six or seven weeks before the election, but Dulles apparently took no

specific action at the time to meet this request.

More than a month later, with the election looming, Robert Kennedy contacted Acting DCI Gen. Charles Cabell to repeat the request for information on

possible trouble spots. This brought a response within 24 hours. On 2 November, Cabell traveled to California, where Kennedy was campaigning, to deliver

a memorandum that discussed a number of potentially troublesome developments. These included the Soviets’ October Revolution anniversary, SinoSoviet developments, tensions in Berlin and the Taiwan Straits, possible Chinese nuclear tests, a Soviet space spectacular, the French-Algerian impasse,

events in Southeast Asia, King Hussein’s delicate position in the Middle East,

the unsettled situation in the Congo, and possible action by Cuba against Guantanamo Naval Base. In this review of explosive international situations, the

Agency cautioned that, in fact, “we do not estimate any of them are likely to

occur prior to 8 November.”17

16 Allen Dulles, memorandum for the record, 21 September 1960. 

17 CIA, untitled list of significant developments in response to Kennedy’s request; no date.
36

CHAPTER 2

A search of CIA records has failed to confirm that Dulles briefed Kennedy

on the status of Cuban covert action planning in either of their two sessions

held before the election in 1960. The DCI’s memorandums recording the sessions in July and September mention Cuba only as one of many trouble spots

around the world. Taken alone, this would suggest that their discussion concerned what was going on in Cuba rather than what the United States might be

planning to do about it.

An internal CIA memorandum of 15 November 1960 discussing an anticipated postelection briefing mentions that “the following draft material is much

more detailed and operational than that prepared for the candidates in July.”18

This formulation suggests that the message on Cuba Dulles conveyed in July

was at least a bit “operational,” even if not detailed. Such an inference would

be consistent with Dulles’s answer to Nixon’s question in early August that he

had told Kennedy, in effect, a little but not too much.

When Dulles met with Kennedy in July (their only meeting before the

exchange between Dulles and Nixon in early August), the planning on Cuba

and the limited operational activities already launched related almost entirely

to propaganda and political action. Paramilitary planning at that point envisaged the deployment of extremely small (two or three men) guerrilla units.

Contingency planning within the Agency for more forceful action intensified

over the next several months, but the idea of a conventional assault by Cuban

exile forces was not put before the interagency Special Group until 3 November and was rejected. 

The Missile Gap

In the two preelection briefings in 1960, the most challenging issue the DCI

is known to have discussed at length was that of Soviet strategic capabilities.

Without intending to do so, Dulles had created a considerable political problem

for himself by giving a number of public speeches in which he asserted that

Soviet capabilities were growing and raised the question of what the US

response ought to be. He had highlighted the USSR’s progress in basic science,

in training large numbers of scientists, and its research and development efforts

as well as its demonstrated achievements in building spacecraft and missiles.

In early 1960 the United States was aware of the Soviet missile flights from

the Tyuratam test site, but did not know with certainty if any operational

Soviet missiles had been deployed. In the search for deployed missiles, among

other priority missions, U-2 aircraft had been flown over the Soviet Union

18 CIA, “Draft Cuban Operational Briefing: President-Elect,” 15 November 1960.
37

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

since July 1956. On 1 May 1960, Gary Powers was shot down. In the United

States, the West Virginia primary election campaign was at its peak; there was

no doubt that the U-2 incident would figure in the impending general election

campaign.

In his formal memorandums for the record, Dulles did not provide much

detail regarding exchanges he may have had with Kennedy about the U-2

shootdown. He did note that the senator, in the September briefing, had asked

him about a book by Maj. Gen. John Medaris, entitled Countdown for Decision. The Medaris book had criticized the US government for its failure to

replace the U-2 with a more sophisticated aircraft or an invulnerable satellite

reconnaissance system.

In a memorandum sent to Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, the staff secretary of

the White House, on 25 September, Dulles recorded that Kennedy and Johnson had separately inquired about intelligence techniques or capabilities to

replace the U-2.19 Dulles was clearly uneasy about the security hazards in

these questions and noted that he had replied only in a general way, indicating

that research and development work on advanced aircraft and satellites were

progressing “with reasonably satisfactory prospects.” Dulles added, “Unless I

hear from you to the contrary, I shall not give any more detailed briefings on

this subject.” In fact, the first US satellite reconnaissance system was being

used in an experimental way in the late summer of 1960; it was launched in

August. Significant amounts of analytically useful imagery did not become

available from the new system until December 1960, after the election.

During the preelection period, Dulles was also in an awkward position

owing to a minor dispute or misunderstanding between the White House and

the Kennedy team about whether the senator should receive a briefing from

Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates. During the preelection period, in the

interest of fairness to each candidate, Eisenhower wanted Kennedy to receive

general overview briefings on the world situation from the CIA, and these

were being provided. On the other hand, the president initially declined the

Kennedy team’s request that he receive a briefing from the secretary of

defense. By the end of August, however, the White House had changed its

mind and approved a briefing by Gates.

Dulles had weighed in with the White House on at least two occasions,

including once with Eisenhower personally, to urge that Gates brief Kennedy.

The DCI knew that he would be courting political trouble if he answered what

had been Kennedy’s first question: “Where do we ourselves stand in the missile race?” As he had done on innumerable occasions in congressional appear19 Allen Dulles, memorandum for Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, 25 September 1960.
38

CHAPTER 2

ances, Dulles insisted that the Defense Department “was the competent

authority on this question.”

The White House was obviously uneasy that Kennedy would hear several

versions of the story concerning Soviet strategic capabilities. Democrats on

the Preparedness Committee, led by the uniquely well-informed Senator Stuart Symington, were attacking the White House with claims that the Soviets

were outdistancing the United States. Gates had been trying to play down the

importance of the issue, but the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Air Force Gen.

Nathan Twining, was emphasizing the more alarmist views of the Air Force.

As DCI, Dulles had been charged with pulling together a collective view of

this intractable problem of collection and analysis, but everyone, including

Eisenhower, knew the Agency did not have the detailed technical intelligence

or the bureaucratic clout to referee the contentious issue.20

In responding to Kennedy’s questions about Soviet strategic capabilities,

Dulles did not improvise. On this critical and technical subject he stuck very

closely to the findings laid out in numerous national intelligence estimates.

During the period from 1957 to 1960, the Intelligence Community published

from two to four NIEs annually evaluating Soviet progress on space and ballistic missile programs. In December 1957, the Community had published one

of its most ominous NIEs, referring to the Soviets’ “crash program.” That estimate had projected that the USSR sometime during calendar year 1959 would

probably have its first operational capability with 10 prototype ICBMs.21 The

same estimate projected that the Soviet Union probably would have “an operational capability with 100 ICBMs about one year after its first operational

capability date, and with 500 ICBMs two, or at most, three years [that is,

1963] after first operational capability date.”

By early 1960, the Community as a whole was using somewhat more moderate language to discuss probable Soviet missile capabilities, but, nevertheless, early that year three separate NIEs were published whose findings were

sufficiently alarmist to fuel the missile gap debate. The bottom line of an estimate published in February was especially important because it came as close

as the US Intelligence Community ever did to a net assessment. It stated: “Our

analysis leads us to believe that if the US military posture develops as presently planned, the USSR will in 1961 have its most favorable opportunity to

gain a decided military, political, and psychological advantage over the United

States by the rapid deployment of operational ICBMs.”22 The February esti20 Andrew Goodpaster, interview by the author in Washington, DC, 26 September 1993. Unless 

otherwise indicated, all references to Goodpaster’s observations come from this interview.

21 Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-10-57, The Soviet ICBM Program - Conclusions,

10 December 1957, 1, 2.
39

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

mate went on to observe that the Soviet ICBM program did not appear to be a

crash program but was designed to provide a substantial ICBM capability at

an early date. A separate NIE, also published in February, stated flatly: “The

single-most-important development affecting the structure of Soviet military

power during the period of this estimate will be the buildup of an ICBM force.

Long-range missiles will enable the USSR to overcome its inferiority to the

United States in nuclear strategic attack capability, as it was unable to do with

bomber aircraft.”23

In terms of the political debate on the issue, an even larger problem was

posed by the Air Force conclusion that leaders of the Soviet Union were

endeavoring to attain a decisive military superiority over the United States.

This superiority, the Air Force assessed, would enable the USSR “to launch

such devastating attacks against the United States that at the cost of acceptable

levels of damage to themselves, the United States as a world power would

cease to exist.” This extremely ominous Air Force view was repeated in several NIEs—often referred to inaccurately as CIA products—published during

the period. It was shared widely with the Congress and leaked to the press.

The findings of these Intelligence Community estimates were having a significant impact on the White House, the Congress, and the voters. In the

words of Howard Stoertz, a senior CIA officer who often accompanied Dulles

to his briefings of the Congress and the NSC, “Our findings were sufficiently

scary that those who wanted a new administration to be elected were finding

support in our Estimates.”24

One interesting index of the impact of this intelligence was provided by former President (and Congressman) Gerald Ford in September 1993. Responding to an open-ended question about whether he remembered occasions when

intelligence findings had created particular policy dilemmas, Ford volunteered, “Mostly I remember the period from 1953 to 1964 when I was on the

Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that provided the CIA’s budget. Allen

Dulles and others from the CIA would come in and paint the most scary picture possible about what the Soviet Union would do to us. We were going to

be second rate; the Soviets were going to be Number One. I didn’t believe all

that propaganda.”25

22 National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-8-59, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack through 

Mid-1964, 9 February 1960, 2. 23 National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-4-59, Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 

1959-1964, 9 February 1960, 4. 24 Howard Stoertz, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 27 September 1993.

25 Gerald Ford, interview by the author in Beaver Creek, Colorado, 8 September 1993.
40

CHAPTER 2

The same material that was briefed to the House had been provided to the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee and, therefore, to one of its most prominent junior members, John Kennedy. Kennedy made effective use of this intelligence in his presidential campaign, to the discomfort of the CIA, the White

House, and Vice President Nixon—the Republican candidate. Goodpaster

remembers that the politics of the issue became sufficiently awkward that

Eisenhower sent him to the Agency to meet personally with Dulles and Symington to get to the bottom of the problem. Howard Stoertz remembers well

that “Allen Dulles had us prepare a chart to prove we had not cooked the

books for the election.” 

Postelection Briefing on Cuba

Once Kennedy had won the election, the CIA felt free to provide him a systematic briefing on the Agency’s covert action programs worldwide,

and—most important—to inform him in detail about the deliberations under

way on Cuba. This took place at the Kennedy residence in Palm Beach, Florida, on 18 November, some 10 days after the vote. Reflecting the importance

and sensitivity of the subject, there were two high-level briefers: Dulles,

whom Kennedy had announced he would keep on as DCI the day following

the election (along with FBI Director Hoover, his first appointments); and

Richard Bissell, the Agency’s deputy director for plans (operations). Like

Dulles, Bissell knew Kennedy from the Washington social scene and, in his

own case, from a shared New England background.

In discussing the briefing more than 30 years later, Bissell recalled that

“Allen and I felt great pressure to inform the new president. The [Cuban]

operation had acquired a considerable momentum and could not just be turned

off and on. We settled outside on the terrace at a table and I gave him an

abbreviated but fairly complete briefing on the state of the operation. I went

on at least 30 minutes, maybe 45. I was fairly detailed in outlining the plan of

what we hoped would happen.”26

A review of the briefing papers used by Dulles and Bissell suggests that

they gave Kennedy a careful overview of the Cuba plans as they existed in

mid-November 1960. Their review included an explanation of the presidential

authorization, signed by Eisenhower on 17 March, for the Agency to undertake planning. The briefing described the political action initiatives already

under way in which the Agency was providing support to various anti-Castro

groups and individuals inside and outside Cuba. They described the propa26 Richard Bissell, interview by the author in Farmington, Connecticut, 17 April 1993.
41

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

ganda operation in place at the time, including the preparation of publications

and radiobroadcasts aimed at weakening Castro’s rule. These included broadcasts from Swan Island, which years later came to play a prominent role in the

Agency’s activities against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

The briefing of 18 November occurred in the midst of a fundamental review,

back in Washington, of the scope of the paramilitary aspects of the anti-Castro

program. At that time, everything was in flux. Nothing had been decided, let

alone finally approved. In these circumstances, Dulles and Bissell planned to

brief Kennedy carefully on a range of possible paramilitary operations.

The first option envisaged the development and support of dissident groups

by the Agency’s Cuban assets to undertake antiregime guerrilla action inside

Cuba. A group of instructors had been trained who would, in time, oversee the

instruction of up to 500 additional men, and radio and flight training were

being provided Cuban pilots. The two briefers were to describe all these preparations, as well as the role of a few small groups already placed inside Cuba

and the airdrops of supplies and equipment that were sustaining them.

The potential second phase of the paramilitary plan to be covered by the

briefers was a combined sea-air assault by trained Cuban exiles coordinated

with the guerrilla activity generated on the island. This undertaking would

attempt to establish a close-in staging base for future anti-Castro military

operations. A last phase, should it be needed, would be an air assault on the

Havana area in support of guerrilla forces in Cuba moving on the ground into

the capital. Mention was to be made of a contingency plan for overt US military intervention that would include the use of Agency assets.

Bissell remembers emphasizing particularly the plans for the possible

movement of exile ground and air forces to Cuba both by sea and by air. He

recalls that he “put a lot of emphasis on the timing aspects, and the numbers

[of men and equipment] involved.” Dulles and Bissell intended to inform

Kennedy that it did not appear that in-country guerrilla actions alone would be

successful in sparking a successful revolt against the regime. It is unclear

whether they intended to brief the president-elect on the even more pessimistic assessment expressed by some in the Agency that even an invading force

of exile Cubans would be unsuccessful without direct US involvement.

Press accounts of the briefing of Kennedy in Palm Beach indicate that it

went on for two hours and 40 minutes. Bissell remembers that throughout the

extended session the president-elect “was almost entirely a listener—although

a very good listener. Kennedy had a number of questions that grew out of the

briefing, but he had no prepared list of questions ahead of time.”

Available CIA records do not suggest that Kennedy volunteered any opinion regarding the wisdom, or lack thereof, of the plans presented to him. Noth-
42

CHAPTER 2

ing in the documentation suggests that he either authorized the operation or

urged restraint. To the contrary, Dulles stated in a memorandum sent to Gen.

Maxwell Taylor, the president’s special adviser on military affairs, on 1 June

1961 that “the purpose of the briefing was not to solicit the president-elect’s

approval or disapproval of the program but merely to acquaint him of its existence.”27 This implies, obviously, that Dulles had not previously informed

Kennedy of the plans.

As Bissell put it, “We were in an absolutely untenable position until the new

president knew what was going on, but we avoided seeking a yea or nay.” He

added that “Kennedy was favorably interested, but extremely careful to avoid

a commitment, express or implied. We didn’t get any negative reaction—I was

interested above all in his studious neutrality. Allen Dulles and I talked about

the Kennedy reaction after the fact. We had the same impression—on the

whole Kennedy’s attitude was favorable.” This shared impression obviously

cleared the way for continued Agency planning for what ultimately became

the Bay of Pigs operation. 

Other Covert Programs

Dulles intended to have the briefing of the president-elect in Palm Beach

cover worldwide intelligence operations, of which Cuba was only one. His

records indicate he wanted to establish that the Agency was fully supportive of

the new president. “We made it clear to him that from this time on any information he desired was at his immediate disposal and would be willingly given.”28

In fact, Dulles was also working hard to solidify his personal standing with

Kennedy. Senior Agency officers undoubtedly had mixed feelings when Dulles

announced at a special staff meeting on 10 November that “all liaison with the

new Administration by CIA would be conducted by the Director.”29

According to handwritten notes prepared by Bissell, he and Dulles also

were prepared to brief Kennedy on a variety of issues, large and small.30 For

example, one planned topic was the question of clearances. Although the president would be told that he possessed all clearances automatically, he should

be advised of what was involved in providing special compartmented clearances that would enable his staff to receive intercepted communications and

other sensitive material. Dulles also intended to discuss with Kennedy the

legal basis for CIA’s worldwide special operations. On the substantive side, in

27 Allen Dulles, memorandum for Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 1 June 1961.

28 Allen Dulles, My Answer on the Bay of Pigs, unpublished draft, October 1965. 

29 Lyman Kirkpatrick, Diary, 10 November 1960.

30 Richard Bissell, untitled and undated notes for briefing President-elect Kennedy.
43

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

addition to Cuba, Dulles was prepared to brief Kennedy on operations in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere in Central America. Agency

activities in Tibet were also a discrete item.

The majority of the items to be raised did not address specific countries or

regions. Rather, Dulles planned a thematic discussion of Agency propaganda

and political action programs, with illustrative successes from around the

world. Dulles was primed to provide examples of where the Agency had succeeded in reducing the power of communist parties abroad and in supporting

the growth of constructive opposition parties. In a review of what was, at that

time, still recent history, Dulles intended to inform Kennedy of CIA actions

related to coups in Guatemala, Laos, and South Vietnam.

Regarding technical collection, Dulles was undoubtedly relieved to be able

to discuss with Kennedy more fully the progress that had been made with aircraft and satellite systems to replace the U-2. The DCI’s notes suggest he

intended to discuss the existing U-2 program and two follow-on programs.

One was the SR-71 aircraft, then under development, and the other the first

imaging satellite, a film-return system.

Thirty years after the fact, there is no way to know with certainty how much

of the material Dulles and Bissell prepared was actually discussed with Kennedy. Bissell remembers that the bulk of the time he and Dulles spent with

Kennedy in Palm Beach was used to discuss Cuba. After that discussion, Bissell remembers that “Allen Dulles and John Kennedy drifted off to the end of

the terrace and talked for some time about matters having nothing to do with

Cuba.” Bissell recalls that their conversation lasted at least 15 but certainly no

more than 30 minutes. When shown several pages of his own handwritten

notes concerning the issues the two had intended to raise, Bissell laughed and

asserted that “nobody had time to cover everything that is on this list at any

time prior to inauguration.”

Records of the Eisenhower White House suggest that Dulles discussed, or

at least was authorized to discuss, only a narrow agenda with the presidentelect at the Palm Beach meeting. On 17 November, the day before Dulles traveled to Florida, Goodpaster recorded that he had informed the president that

he had discussed the agenda with the CIA director and with Gen. Wilton Persons, the White House chief of staff. Goodpaster had informed Dulles that

CIA operations were to be disclosed to Kennedy only as specifically approved

on a case-by-case basis by President Eisenhower. Goodpaster’s memorandum

confirms Eisenhower had approved Dulles’s plan to inform Kennedy of operations relating to Cuba as well as to “certain reconnaissance satellite operations

of a covert nature.” No other subjects were specifically approved.31
44

CHAPTER 2

Dulles’s notes state not only that Eisenhower authorized the Palm Beach

briefing but also that the briefing was given at his suggestion and that it covered “worldwide intelligence operations.” Bissell recalls that the scheduling of

the briefing came up rather quickly. To his knowledge, Dulles received no

guidance or suggestion from the White House on what the subject matter

should be.

In discussing the politics of these briefings in 1993, Goodpaster remembered clearly the conflicting views the president and others in the White

House had about them. On the one hand, some of Eisenhower’s preelection

reservations had evaporated by mid-November. He had issued a directive that,

because Kennedy was to be the next president, “We must help him in any way

we can.” On the other hand, Goodpaster also remembers that Eisenhower had

some uneasiness about how far Dulles should and would go in his discussions.

The president believed ongoing deliberations by him and his advisers should

remain confidential, and he worried about the inherent problems of protecting

that confidentiality while at the same time briefing Kennedy fully.

Goodpaster’s records indicate he discussed with the president and Senior

Staff Assistant Gordon Gray the “special problem” of Dulles’s continued

attendance at NSC meetings once he had been designated by Kennedy to serve

in the next administration. Goodpaster informed Dulles that while the president wanted him to continue to attend NSC meetings, the proceedings of those

sessions were not to be disclosed outside the NSC room. According to the

records, he had the impression that “Mr. Dulles had not understood that this

matter was a delicate one.” In 1993, Goodpaster reiterated that “there was a

feeling that all this had to be explained pretty carefully to Allen Dulles.”

The Mystery Briefing of Late November

A number of books and articles written about the Bay of Pigs contain the

assertion that Kennedy was informed in detail of the planned operation and

gave his approval in a briefing by Dulles in late November 1960. A review of

the chronology of these publications suggests that most authors picked up this

piece of information from the widely read account of events contained in

Schlesinger’s A Thousand Days. Schlesinger opened chapter 10, entitled “The

Bay of Pigs,” with the statement: “On November 29, 1960, 12 days after he

had heard about the Cuban project, the president-elect received from Allen

Dulles a detailed briefing on CIA’s new military conception. Kennedy listened

with attention, then told Dulles to carry the work forward.”32

31 Andrew Goodpaster, memorandum for the record, 17 November 1960.
45

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

If this briefing occurred, it would be by far the most important in the series

Kennedy received. This would place on the president-elect an earlier and more

direct responsibility for the development of the operation than would otherwise be justified. In fact, however, the Dulles-Kennedy meeting of 29 November cited by Schlesinger appears not to have occurred at all. Available CIA

records contain no mention of such a briefing. Dulles’s personal desk calendar

shows that he had a very full day, with 10 different appointments running from

9:00 a.m. to 5:45 p.m., none of which was with the president-elect. It would be

most extraordinary if the director’s calendar or other CIA records failed to

note a meeting of the DCI with the president-elect. Similarly, there is nothing

in information available about Kennedy’s activities to indicate that he met

with Dulles that day. The New York Times of 30 November reported, “The

Senator worked at home throughout the day [of 29 November] leaving only to

visit his wife Jacqueline and son John F. Jr. in Georgetown University Hospital.” The newspapers also reported that Kennedy had met at home that day

with prospective cabinet appointee Chester Bowles, and with Terry Sanford,

the latter visiting to recommend Luther Hodges for a cabinet position. Other

visitors to the Kennedy home in Georgetown included his father, Joseph P.

Kennedy, Edward Foley of the Inaugural Committee, and Senator Dennis

Chavez of New Mexico.33

In thinking back on the briefings Kennedy received on the controversial

Cuban operation, Ted Sorensen, his speechwriter and confidant, recalls, “President Kennedy did tell me, much later, that he had been briefed on the operation

by the CIA while he was president-elect. CIA told him what they had in mind

and why in some detail. That was the Palm Beach briefing.” Sorensen doubted

that Kennedy received a more detailed briefing by Dulles on 29 November,

adding, “I saw him every single day and we discussed the whole range of policy matters—the foreign issues as well as 500 domestic ones.”

Schlesinger was amused that he may have described a critical briefing that

appears not to have occurred. In a letter to the author in 1993, he recommended that the original draft manuscript of his A Thousand Days be

reviewed to ascertain whether the controversial assertion was footnoted. “If

nothing turns up I must take Rick’s way out,” he wrote, referring to the character in Casablanca played by Humphrey Bogart. “Bogart: ‘I came to Casablanca for the waters.’ Claude Raines: ‘What waters? We’re in the desert.’

Bogart: ‘I was misinformed.’”34

32 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 233. 

33 New York Times, 30 November 1960, 1,30. 34 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., letter to the author, 23 June 1993.
46

CHAPTER 2

An important meeting concerning the Cuba operation, in fact, was held on

29 November at the White House at 11:00 a.m. with the president (Eisenhower) in the chair. The president-elect was not included. Schlesinger and

other authors, writing a few years after the fact, had obviously learned that on

that date “the president” was briefed on Cuba and, being oriented to president

Kennedy, assumed that it was he who was involved. Indeed, the meeting of 29

November was an important one. On that date, Eisenhower underscored that

he wanted to continue active planning for the project. Eisenhower was pushing ahead vigorously; Kennedy was not yet responsible in any degree.

Soon after his inauguration on 28 January 1961, Kennedy did receive a full

briefing on the planned Cuban operation. At that meeting the new president

authorized the Agency to continue its preparations and asked that the paramilitary aspects of the plan be provided to the Joint Chiefs for their analysis.

Even in late January, however, Kennedy withheld specific approval for an

invasion, with or without direct US involvement. 

Kennedy Visits the CIA

One unique aspect of Kennedy’s familiarization with the CIA was the president-elect’s decision to visit CIA Headquarters during the transition period. He

was initially scheduled to visit the Agency’s South Building, at 2430 E Street in

downtown Washington, on 16 December. In preparation for the visit, Dulles

asked Huntington Sheldon, the director of current intelligence, to prepare a

book for the DCI containing material he and senior Agency officials should use

in discussions with Kennedy.

The ambitious agenda that was prepared for the visit envisaged presentations by the DCI and eight other senior officers.35 Briefings were prepared on

the Agency’s mission, organization, and budget, and on the legal basis for its

activities. Dulles and others would describe the Agency’s relationship with the

Congress; the functions of such organizations as the Watch Committee and the

President’s Board of Consultants; and the functions of the several agencies

that made up the Intelligence Community. The assistant director for national

estimates would describe the estimates process and brief one specific paper, a

recently published estimate of the world situation.

The chiefs of the Agency’s key directorates were primed to explain their

roles and activities. The clandestine services portion of the briefing included a

description of clandestine intelligence collection and the covert action func35 CIA, “Agenda for President-elect,” 16 December 1960.
47

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

tions. In the latter discussion, the chief of operations was to update “Cuban

operations since the Palm Beach briefing.”

Owing to scheduling difficulties, Kennedy was unable to visit the Agency

on 16 December. The visit was delayed until after the inauguration and finally

occurred on Thursday, 26 January 1961. Dulles’s desk calendar notes that the

briefings were to run from 2:40 until 4:10 p.m. In reality, they had to be abbreviated considerably, much to the consternation of the participants, because an

unintended opportunity came to the president’s attention.

For reasons having nothing to do with Kennedy’s visit, the Agency, a few

weeks before, had put together an attractive exhibit of materials relating to the

history of intelligence that was located just inside the entrance of South Building. A number of exhibits were displayed under a sign that read, “These letters

loaned courtesy of the Houghton Library of Harvard University.” The newly

elected Harvard man immediately noticed the reference to his alma mater. He

stopped and read thoroughly the entire case of historical materials, much to

the chagrin of Dulles and other waiting CIA executives.

Kennedy was already frustrated at press leaks from his new administration

and, therefore, was especially taken with one of the letters in the display case.

Written by General Washington to Col. Elias Dayton in July 1777, that letter

included the observation that “The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is

apparent and need not be further urged—All that remains for me to add is, that

you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success

depends in Most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally

defeated.” Kennedy asked Dulles if he could have a copy of the letter, which,

of course, was sent promptly. The president wrote the CIA director thanking

him and the creator of the exhibit, Walter Pforzheimer, saying, “The letter is

both a fine memento of my visit with you and a continuing reminder of the

role of intelligence in national policy.”36 

Origins of the President’s Intelligence Checklist

Within days of his election, President Kennedy sent word to the White

House that he would like to receive daily briefings on the same material that

was being furnished to President Eisenhower.37 The request from Kennedy

came by way of one of his assistants for transition matters, Washington attorney Clark Clifford. Eisenhower approved the passage of this material to Kennedy on 17 November, the eve of Dulles’s trip to Florida. There is no record

36 John Kennedy letter to Allen Dulles, 10 February 1961.

37 Goodpaster, memorandum for record, 17 November 1960. 
48

CHAPTER 2

that Dulles discussed this matter with Kennedy the next day, however, and

some weeks were to go by before there was any organized follow-up.

When Kennedy visited CIA Headquarters after his inauguration, Sheldon

described the current intelligence products that were available to him. Kennedy reiterated that he wanted to read the publications and designated his military aide, Brig. Gen. Chester Clifton, who was present at the meeting, to

receive the material. Clifton had taken over Goodpaster’s role of providing

daily briefings to the new president, although Goodpaster continued to serve

in the White House for a few weeks to help with the transition.

For the first few months of the Kennedy administration, Agency couriers

each morning would deliver CIA’s Current Intelligence Bulletin to Clifton.

Clifton or MacGeorge Bundy would then take the material to the president,

reporting back his questions or comments if there were any. Unfortunately, the

intelligence report was part of a large package of material Kennedy received

each day and was often not read. This left the new president less well

informed than he thought he was, a situation that was soon driven home to

him during his unfortunate encounter with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev

in Vienna, when he found himself unprepared to respond to his adversary’s

boasting and bullying.

From the start of the Kennedy administration, Dulles had few opportunities

to present intelligence directly to the president. In large part, this was because

Kennedy did not hold regularly scheduled NSC meetings as Eisenhower and

Truman had done. In addition, however, there was a problem of personal

chemistry and a generational gap between the new president and the CIA

director. Agency veterans at the time had the feeling that Dulles may have

been patronizing to Kennedy in his early briefings and, thus, was not warmly

welcomed to the White House.38 Along the same lines, Sorensen remembers

Kennedy “was not very impressed with Dulles’s briefings. He did not think

they were in much depth or told him anything he could not read in the newspapers.” In these awkward circumstances, Dulles’s practice was to prepare written memorandums for the president on items that he deemed to be of

particular significance, delivering them personally when possible. He also

made personal deliveries when he wanted to bring certain important national

estimates to the president’s attention.

The fiasco at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, reinforced by Kennedy’s frustration at the meeting with Khrushchev in early June, changed everything. General Clifton informed current intelligence director Sheldon that the president

was reluctant to continue receiving intelligence in the normal way. Clifton sug38 Richard Lehman, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 10 March 1993.
49

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

gested the Agency would have to come up with some entirely different way of

presenting its information if it were to regain the president’s confidence. He

volunteered that there was no point in the DCI discussing the matter directly

with the president as that would be counterproductive. Dulles took this implicit

criticism calmly, possibly foreseeing that the president’s disappointment with

the Agency on this and other scores would lead, as it did in November 1961, to

his own removal.

Dulles gamely soldiered on in his attempts to bring the new president the

fruits of the Agency’s collection and analysis in the traditional manner, but it

was largely the unauthorized efforts of his subordinates that opened a new and

less formal channel to the White House that would satisfy Kennedy and most

of his successors. In mid-1961 Huntington Sheldon and other managers of the

Office of Current Intelligence—working with Clifton but without the knowledge of their superiors either at the White House or the Agency—came up with

a new intelligence briefing publication designed exclusively for the president.

Longtime current intelligence specialist Richard Lehman worked up a dry run

of the proposed President’s Intelligence Checklist and Sheldon took it to Clifton for his approval. Clifton was pleased with the trial document, which eliminated the bewildering array of source classifications and restrictions common

to intelligence publications and presented facts and analysis in short, vernacular paragraphs.

The first issue of the new publication was delivered to Clifton on Saturday,

17 June, and carried by him to the president at his country home near Middleburg, Virginia. The first Checklist was a small book of seven pages, measuring

8-1/2 by 8 inches, that contained 14 items of two sentences each with a halfdozen longer notes and a few maps. Agency managers spent a nervous weekend; they were immensely relieved the following Monday morning to hear

Clifton’s “go ahead—so far, so good.”

Quickly it became clear the president was reading the Checklist regularly

and issuing instructions based on its contents. Not infrequently he asked to see

source materials, estimates of developing situations highlighted for his attention, texts of speeches by foreign leaders, and occasional full-length Agency

publications that provided more depth, details, and explanations. Within a few

months, the secretaries of state and defense asked to see what the president

was reading. In December, six months after publication had begun, Clifton

passed the word to the Agency that those two cabinet members should be

added to the subscriber list.

No Agency officer sat with the president while he read the Checklist, but

Clifton was careful to pass back to the Agency the president’s reactions and

questions. CIA officials regarded the new system as the best possible daily
50

CHAPTER 2

channel to a president. The relationship with Kennedy was not only a distinct

improvement over the more formal relationship with Eisenhower, but would

only rarely be matched in future administrations.

Meanwhile, in November 1961, Allen Dulles had been replaced by John

McCone, who served Kennedy as DCI for almost two years. In the early part

of this period, McCone succeeded in rebuilding the Agency’s relationship

with Kennedy. McCone saw Kennedy frequently, and the president—more

than any other before or since—would telephone even lower level Agency

officers for information or assistance. Interestingly, McCone’s prescience in

alerting the president to the possibility that the Soviets would place missiles in

Cuba backfired for him personally. Although McCone was right when most

others were wrong, the president did not like the DCI’s public references to

this fact, and their relationship cooled noticeably.

Editors of the Checklist were especially heartened in September 1963 when

Clifton passed back the president’s personal expression of delight with “the

book.” A month later, on a morning when Clifton, McGeorge Bundy, and the

Agency’s briefing officer were huddled in the basement of the West Wing

going over the Checklist, President Kennedy called down asking where they

were and when they were going to bring it to him. Clifton and his Agency

contacts were also heartened by Secretary Rusk’s comment that the Checklist

was “a damned useful document.”

President Kennedy’s Checklist was published daily for two and a half years,

capturing the regular attention of the president and serving his needs. Created

out of an almost desperate desire to please a president who had found the

Agency wanting, it proved to be the forerunner of the President’s Daily Brief,

the publication that was to serve all presidents from 1964 to the present. 

The Transition to President Johnson

The transition to President Johnson was as abrupt for the US Intelligence

Community as it was for the rest of the country. In some respects, it was also

as uncertain. Johnson had received a number of intelligence briefings as chairman of the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee and later as

Senate majority leader. He had met on one occasion with Allen Dulles in July

1960 while a vice-presidential candidate, but neither Dulles nor his successor,

John McCone, had paid much attention to keeping Johnson informed during

the intervening years.

Johnson, in turn, had paid relatively little attention to the products of the

Intelligence Community while he was vice president. Each day his office

received the Agency’s Current Intelligence Bulletin, a widely distributed
51

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

product that contained less sensitive and less highly classified information

than was included in the Checklist. Although the Checklist at the end of the

Kennedy presidency was being sent also to the secretaries of defense and state

and to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Johnson was unaware of its

existence. For reasons undoubtedly growing out of the earlier political rivalry

between Kennedy and Johnson, Kennedy’s intelligence assistant, Bromley

Smith, early in the administration had ordered that “under no circumstances

should the Checklist be given to Johnson.”39

On Saturday morning, 23 November 1963, the day following Kennedy’s

assassination, McCone instructed his executive assistant, Walter Elder, to telephone the new president’s secretary and inform her that the DCI would, as

39 Lehman interview, 10 March 1993. 

Attorney General Robert Kennedy and new DCI John McCone.
52

CHAPTER 2

usual, be at the White House at 9:00 a.m. to give the president the regular

morning intelligence briefing.40 In reality, there was nothing usual or regular

about the DCI’s involvement in a morning briefing, but McCone obviously

believed he needed to take an extraordinary initiative to establish a relationship with the new president.

McCone was waiting in Bundy’s office in the basement of the West Wing

when Johnson entered at approximately 9:15. Johnson had been an infrequent

visitor to those quarters, which also included the White House Situation Room,

but he was forced to come there for the meeting because Kennedy’s office had

not yet been cleared out. R. Jack Smith, CIA’s director of current intelligence,

was present and talked briefly with Johnson in Bundy’s outer office, writing

later that the president looked “massive, rumpled and worried.”41

Despite the irregular and strained nature of the circumstances, McCone

accomplished his mission during that first meeting with President Johnson.

The president expressed his confidence in McCone, who, in turn, reassured

the new president that he and the Agency stood ready to support him in every

way. McCone introduced the president to the Checklist and reviewed with him

the unspectacular substantive items in the publication that day. Johnson had

few questions during their 15-minute session, but he did agree that McCone

should brief him personally each morning at least for the next several days. He

asked that the director bring any urgent matters to his attention at any time,

day or night.

The Checklist shown to Johnson on that first occasion was a bulky publication containing five unusually long items and six additional notes. R. Jack

Smith explained to Bromley Smith that the Agency had tried to provide, as

unobtrusively as possible, a bit of extra background for Johnson. Bromley

Smith approved the strategy but added that he hoped the Agency would not be

too obvious in its tutorials. In his memoirs, Johnson wrote of his relief to discover “on that sad November morning” that the international front was relatively peaceful and that there was nothing in the material McCone brought to

him that required an immediate decision.42

McCone met with Johnson almost every day for the next two or three

weeks, briefing him on virtually all the world’s trouble spots and providing

information from CIA files and collection efforts on President Kennedy’s

assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. The president told the director to make sure that

40 Walter Elder, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 21 April 1993. 

41 R. Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency (Washington: 

Pergamon-Brassy’s, 1989), 163. 

42 Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 22.
53

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

CIA gave the FBI all information and support necessary to its investigation of

Oswald’s background.

McCone also used these opportunities to inform the president of a variety of

CIA covert action and technical collection programs, including the successful

effort to build what became known as the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft to

augment the U-2. McCone brought the president up to date on the status of the

program (by that time a number of aircraft had been built) and to brief him on

McCone’s discussions with President Kennedy about the advisability of making the program public. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara had urged Kennedy

to announce the aircraft’s existence and Kennedy was inclined to do so. But a

discussion of the political and security issues involved prompted Johnson to

postpone any public announcement of the program. He ordered McCone to

get as many aircraft produced and deployed to the operating site as possible

and eventually revealed the existence of the aircraft at a press conference in

February 1964.

Vietnam

The most significant issue Johnson and McCone discussed during this

period undoubtedly was Vietnam. McCone was straightforward in providing

the Agency’s analysis of the course of the war there. Initially, this won him

favor with the new president, who had not favored certain of the steps taken in

Vietnam by his predecessor, but it was to lead ultimately to a falling out

between McCone and Johnson.

On 24 November, a mere two days after Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson

met at 3:00 p.m. in the Executive Office Building with Rusk, McNamara,

George Ball, Bundy, McCone, and Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry

Cabot Lodge. According to McCone, Lodge informed the group that the

United States had not been involved in the recent coup against President Ngo

Dinh Diem.43 In fact, Lodge had instructed a CIA liaison officer to tell the

South Vietnamese generals that the US government had lost confidence in

President Diem, and he was kept aware of events before and during the coup

on 1 November. During the course of the military takeover, Diem was captured and then killed.

Lodge maintained that the population of South Vietnam was very happy as

a result of the coup, showing the group assembled at the Executive Office

Building some pictures of crowds in Saigon. Lodge argued that the change in

government in South Vietnam had been an improvement and that he was

43 John McCone, “South Vietnam Situation,” memorandum for the record, 25 November 1961. 
54

CHAPTER 2

hopeful about the course of the war, expecting “marked progress” by February

or March 1964. He also stated, without elaboration, that there were indications

that North Vietnam might be interested in reaching mutually satisfactory

arrangements with the United States. McCone wrote in his memorandum for

the record that Lodge’s statements were “optimistic, hopeful and left the president with the impression that we were on the road to victory.”

McCone presented the group with a much more pessimistic CIA assessment. He cited the continuing increase in Viet Cong activity over the previous

month, predicting more and sustained pressures from the guerrillas. The director pointed out that the South Vietnamese military was having considerable

trouble organizing the government and was receiving little help from civilian

leaders, who seemed to be staying on the sidelines. McCone said the Intelligence Community could not give an optimistic appraisal of the future.

Johnson stated that he approached the situation in Vietnam with misgivings

and was anxious about calls in the Congress for a US withdrawal. While recognizing he would have to live with the results of the coup, he was particularly doubtful the United States had taken the right course in upsetting the

Diem regime. He was critical, even harsh, about the divisions within the ranks

of US advisers about the conduct of the war. He made clear his desire to

replace several key figures in the US country team in Saigon and dictated that

he “wanted no more divisions of opinion, no more bickering, and any person

that did not conform to policy should be removed.”

During McCone’s daily discussions of the Checklist, the president regularly

raised the question of Vietnam. Despite his strictures against differences of

opinion, he appeared to appreciate the fact that McCone’s assessments did not

correspond to what he was hearing from others. The president repeatedly

asked for the director’s appraisal of the situation, but the continuing exchange

between the two ultimately proved troublesome for the director. In large part

this was because Johnson sought McCone’s advice on the sensitive issue of

who should “run the show” in South Vietnam and discussed his thoughts on

possible personnel changes among his advisers and ambassadors.

Johnson remarked to McCone that, although he appreciated the work the

DCI was doing in intelligence, he did not want him to confine himself to that

role. The president invited the director to come to him personally with suggestions for courses of action on policy that McCone thought wise, even if his

ideas were not consistent with the advice others were providing. Johnson

mentioned specifically that he was not satisfied with the advice he was receiving on nuclear testing, Cuba, and particularly South Vietnam. The president

questioned McCone closely about the prospects in South Vietnam, underscor-
55

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

ing his desire for an “objective appraisal.” Johnson specifically asked for any

recommendations McCone might have for modifying his Vietnam policy.

Johnson’s confiding in McCone during the first two weeks of his presidency

clearly flattered the CIA director but also put him in an awkward position with

other key players in the government, as well as with regard to his obligation

provide objective intelligence assessments. Within months, events were to

reveal that McCone probably took the president more literally than he should

have. The DCI’s candor in providing advice to the president eventually strained

their relationship.

The president was not so completely preoccupied with Vietnam that he did

not remember to focus on another enduring problem—the Castro regime in

Cuba. Within a week of becoming president, he asked McCone how effective

US policy was regarding Cuba and what the CIA projected to be the future of

that country. Johnson was especially interested in the effectiveness of the economic embargo of Cuba and wanted to know what the Agency planned to do

to dispose of Castro. The president said he did not want any repetition of “the

fiasco of 1961,” the CIA-planned rebel invasion, but he felt the United States

could not abide the existing Cuban situation and wanted the CIA to propose a

more aggressive strategy. Johnson informed McCone that he looked to the

CIA for firm recommendations.

Initially, it was unclear whether Johnson would return to a system of regular

NSC meetings or continue the more casual Kennedy approach. There was,

therefore, much interest in the NSC meeting the president called for 5 December 1963. At that meeting, McCone was to brief the group on the Soviet military and economic situation. He prepared thoroughly for this first NSC meeting

with the new president, bringing one assistant, Clinton Conger, and a number

of large briefing charts to the meeting.

To McCone’s surprise, Johnson had invited to the meeting the chairmen and

ranking minority members of the leading congressional committees. The

director accommodated this novel approach by quickly briefing the congressional leaders on the fact of, and restrictions related to, communications intercepts, which were to be mentioned during the briefing. Just as the meeting

began, however, there was another surprise when the president gave a nod and

in came his White House photographer. McCone was aghast as the photographer began shooting pictures left and right. He turned around with a start to

confirm that Conger had managed to turn over a map of Soviet ICBM sites

before the first pictures were taken of that end of the room. In the subsequent

months, it was to become clear that Johnson was no more enamored of weekly

NSC meetings than Kennedy had been. When a rare meeting was held, however, it normally began with an intelligence briefing by McCone.
56

CHAPTER 2

With few formal NSC meetings, much of the Agency’s relationship with the

new president came to rest on the briefings McCone was providing Johnson

privately. Unfortunately, these soon became a casualty of the differences

emerging between the two men regarding Vietnam. The momentum of

McCone’s contacts with Johnson was interrupted by a trip the director took in

December 1963 to review the Vietnamese situation. It was his second trip to

Saigon since becoming DCI, and McCone was discouraged by what he found.

His pessimism made him skeptical of proposals Defense Secretary McNamara

made for an extended program of clandestine raids against North Vietnam in

early 1964. During a subsequent trip to Vietnam in March 1964, McCone’s reservations deepened, and he concluded that the war effort, even with McNamara’s enhancements, was not succeeding.

McCone recommended to the president a six-point program to reverse the

deteriorating situation that would involve an escalation of US military actions

significantly beyond anything McNamara and Johnson had considered. Johnson

refused to accept the DCI’s recommendations. As the president came to side

with McNamara’s approach to the conduct of the war, he became increasingly

impatient with McCone and with the continuing differences between the DCI

and the secretary of defense. By the end of March 1964, Johnson clearly had

lost confidence in McCone and interest in his regular intelligence updates. In

the succeeding months McCone attempted periodically to restart his briefings

of the president, at least on an occasional basis, but Johnson turned him aside.

In June 1964 the director informed the president for the first time that he

would like to resign as soon as Johnson had decided on a successor.44 Despite

his growing disenchantment with McCone, Johnson insisted that he remain in

his post until after the presidential election in November 1964. 

Evolution to the President’s Daily Brief

Providing the Checklist to President Kennedy had worked so well that CIA

naturally hoped the arrangement would continue with Johnson, but this was

not to be. In his first weeks as president, Johnson read the Checklist and

seemed interested in discussing its contents during his meetings with

McCone. After those meetings stopped, however, Johnson tended not to read

the daily publication.

Observing that Johnson was no longer reading the Checklist, General Clifton (who had stayed on from the Kennedy administration as military aide to

the president) proposed the idea of a twice-weekly intelligence report. CIA

44 Elder interview, 21 April 1993. 
57

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

managers thought this strategy was worth a try. In truth, they thought that anything that would catch the president’s eye was worth a try; several formats

were offered during this period. They had been dismayed by Bromley Smith’s

assessment that Johnson was probably disinclined to read the Kennedytailored Checklist that had been denied him as vice president.

On 9 January the first issue of the semiweekly was taken to Clifton at the

White House. The next morning Clifton called Lehman at CIA to report that

he had shown the new publication to the president at breakfast and it had

“worked like a charm.” At the end of January, Clifton again made a point of

seeking Johnson’s reaction to the Intelligence Review. The president observed

at that point that he found it a valuable supplement to the intelligence briefings

he received and wanted the publication continued without change.

Although the president read primarily the semiweekly review, his staff

requested that the Checklist continue to be published daily to enable them to

answer the president’s frequent spur-of-the-moment questions. With the president not reading the Checklist most days, McCone decided he would expand

its readership; he obtained permission to send it to four additional officials in

the State Department, two more in Defense and in the Joint Chiefs, and to the

offices of the secretary of the treasury and the attorney general.

The practice of producing two presidential intelligence publications worked

well through the election year of 1964. The president typically read the

Review on the return leg of campaign trips, and his staff felt well supported

with the daily Checklist. As the election neared, however, Secretary of State

Rusk expressed to McCone his concern about the security of the Checklist as a

result of its expanded dissemination. Rusk was worried about possible leaks

regarding sensitive policy issues during the campaign. The DCI was more

concerned about the basic question of whether it made any sense to publish a

“presidential” Checklist when the president himself almost never read it, but

agreed something should be done.

Meanwhile, during the 1964 electoral campaign, Johnson’s opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater, set a precedent by declining to receive intelligence briefings. In July, after consulting with the president, McCone had telephoned

Goldwater to offer the customary briefings. According to his assistant, Walter

Elder, Goldwater replied only that he would consider it. Within hours, an

assistant called to decline, explaining that the senator appreciated the offer but

felt he had all the information he needed to conduct his campaign. McCone,

reflecting a frustration he and Johnson shared, mused, “He probably does; the

Air Force tells him everything he wants to know.”

Responding to the concerns of the secretary of state and the DCI about the

circulation of the Checklist, R. Jack Smith proposed that the most graceful
58

CHAPTER 2

way for the Agency to drop a number of the readers of the Checklist would be

to discontinue the publication and produce a new one. Smith observed that the

Agency would maximize the likelihood that Johnson would accept a new publication and read it regularly if it were produced to conform as much as possible to his work habits. Because Johnson did much of his reading at night, in

bed, Smith recommended that the publication be published and delivered in

the late afternoon as the Review had been, rather than in the morning like the

Checklist.

Smith’s proposal was accepted, and after the election both the Checklist and

the Review were dropped. The new President’s Daily Brief, designed specifically for President Johnson, was delivered to the White House on 1 December

1964. Its fresh appearance obviously appealed to the president. His assistant,

Jack Valenti, sent the first issue back to Bundy with word that the president

read it, liked it, and wanted it continued. Quite apart from the packaging of the

current intelligence, President Johnson—like other presidents—was becoming

a closer reader of the daily products as he became increasingly enmeshed in

foreign policy matters. By mid-February 1965, for example, he was reading not

only the PDB but also CIA’s daily Vietnam situation report, which Bromley

President and Mrs. Lyndon Johnson pose with their grandchild and a copy

of the President’s Daily Brief.
59

INTO POLITICS WITH KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

Smith insisted be delivered at 8:00 a.m. each day so that it could be sent to the

president early.

In early 1965, Johnson agreed that the time had come for McCone to return

to the private sector. That understanding undoubtedly was furthered by a letter

the director delivered to Johnson on 2 April in which he argued against an

expanded land war in Vietnam and concluded that US bombing was ineffective.45 By coincidence, the day that McCone passed the directorship of CIA to

his successor, VAdm. William Raborn—28 April—was also the day US

Marines landed in the Dominican Republic to deal with the crisis there. It was

during the Dominican crisis that word was received that the PDB had taken

firm root in the White House. Presidential spokesman Bill Moyers said on 21

May, approximately six months after the PDB had been launched, that the president read it “avidly.”

The PDB process that was in place in early 1965 continued more or less

unchanged throughout the Johnson administration. CIA did not receive from

Johnson the steady presidential feedback that it had received from Kennedy.

The Agency knew, however, that the president was reading the PDB regularly,

and Johnson’s aides, usually Bromley Smith, were consistently helpful in

passing back the president’s reactions, criticisms, and requests. The only significant change made in the PDB process came when the president again

reversed himself and indicated he wanted to receive the PDB early in the

morning rather than in the evening. He had decided that he wanted to see the

PDB at 6:30 a.m., before he began reading the morning newspapers.

Those newspapers later provided conclusive evidence that the publication

was reaching the president. Agency personnel were surprised one morning to

see a photograph in the papers showing President and Mrs. Johnson sitting in

the White House in dressing gowns. Mrs. Johnson was holding their first grandson while the president was reading a copy of the President’s Daily Brief. 



45 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 3

NIXON AND FORD - UNEVEN ACCESS

During his eight years as vice president in the 1950s, Richard Nixon had had

broad exposure to the activities of the civilian US Intelligence Community. He

was aware CIA had briefed the presidential candidates in every election since

1952 and undoubtedly harbored mixed feelings about the way the process had

worked in 1960, when his narrow defeat by John Kennedy might well have

hinged on the candidates’ different perceptions of the intelligence process.

This familiarity with the IC’s capabilities and practices made him willing, at

the outset of his new campaign for the presidency in 1968, to accept briefings

from CIA Director Richard Helms. It also led him to decline to receive routine

briefings from lower level officers, opening the way for Henry Kissinger, his

national security advisor, to play a central and expanding role.

Nixon won the Republican Party nomination on 8 August 1968. Two days

later the nominee and his running mate, Governor Spiro Agnew of Maryland,

flew to Texas to hear a “general review of the international situation” from

President Johnson and his key foreign policy advisers. In addition to the president, the group included Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Cyrus Vance (the

number-two negotiator in the Vietnam peace talks in Paris), and DCI Helms.

The president welcomed the Republican candidates with a tour of his ranch in

an open convertible, but when the time came for the substantive briefing, he

made only a few introductory remarks and then gave the floor to Helms.

Helms’s memorandum for the record indicates that he focused on the handful of international developments that were at a critical stage during the late

summer of 1968, including the confrontation between Czechoslovakia and the

Soviet Union, events in the Middle East, and the military situation in Vietnam.1 The director also discussed Cuba, including Castro’s support for revolutionary efforts in Latin America, and events in the Dominican Republic and

Haiti. Following Helms’s briefing, Vance continued with a review of developments in the Paris peace negotiations that included details of the private talks

under way between the United States and North Vietnam.

1 Richard Helms, “Briefing of Former Vice President Nixon and Governor Agnew,” memorandum for the record, 12 August 1968.
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CHAPTER 3

Helms recorded that Nixon and Agnew were interested, in particular, in the

effects of the Soviet-Czechoslovak confrontation on Poland and Yugoslavia.

He also noted that they were surprised to hear the North Vietnamese were

demanding that the Saigon government negotiate directly with the communist

shadow administration in South Vietnam, the National Liberation Front. During the course of the briefing, Nixon directed a number of policy questions to

Rusk. The Republican candidate made clear he had no intention of saying or

doing anything that would complicate the job of the US negotiators in Paris.

Looking back on his first briefing of candidate Nixon 25 years after the

fact, Helms recalled that, in his view, it was not a particularly well-organized

or useful session.2 After his own 15-minute overview of key worldwide

developments, he recalled, the politicians’ instincts took over for the balance

President Richard Nixon greets CIA employees as DCI Richard Helms 

looks on.
63

NIXON AND FORD - UNEVEN ACCESS

of the discussion in the sitting room at the LBJ ranch and during the one-hour

lunch that followed. Johnson was on a liquid diet, recovering from a bout of

diverticulitis, so he was free to do all the talking while the others enjoyed a

meal of steak and corn on the cob. Helms recalled with some amusement that

the president of five years and the candidate, with his eight years of vicepresidential experience, each wanted to demonstrate to the other his mastery

of foreign affairs.

Nixon appears to have been pleased with the session; he later wrote positively in his memoirs about the “full-scale intelligence briefings ordered by

Johnson for each of the nominees.”3 The session concluded with the president’s assurance to Nixon that he could call on Rusk or Helms for any additional information he might require.

As it happened, the discussion in Texas on 10 August was the only briefing

Nixon was to receive in the preelection period. That session had focused

entirely on the facts of developments abroad and the status of negotiations in

which the United States was involved. Unlike the situation that had developed

in 1960, there was in the August briefing—and in the whole campaign in

1968—no effort by anyone to make a political issue of the Intelligence Community’s programs or analysis. A key factor that helped ensure that did not

happen was Helms’s strict constructionist view of the CIA director’s job. He

was determined to stick to the facts and avoid involvement in policy discussions, unlike his predecessors Allen Dulles and John McCone.

Helms was aided in his determination to avoid any politicization of intelligence in 1968 by the fact that there were no presidential debates that year.

Although there had been one debate during the primaries (between Robert

Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy), once the nominations were final Nixon concluded that he could avoid debating his opponent, Vice President Hubert

Humphrey, just as Johnson had declined to debate Goldwater in 1964. Nixon’s

judgment was buttressed by the results of polls showing, as early as the first

week in September, that he was leading Humphrey by a substantial margin,

which he was able to retain throughout the campaign.

2 Richard Helms, interview by the author in Washington, DC, 16 March 1993. Subsequent comments of Helms come also from this interview.

3 Nixon, Memoirs, 316. Nixon’s Democratic opponent in 1968, Hubert Humphrey, routinely 

received intelligence reports by virtue of being the incumbent vice president. Two other candidates also received intelligence briefings in that unusual year: former Alabama Governor George 

Wallace on 26 July and Georgia Governor Lester Maddox on 21 August. Helms and others briefed 

each of these candidates in Rusk’s office, generally on the same array of subjects they had covered with Nixon. Very brief accounts of these sessions can be found in Helms’s memorandums for 

the record, “Briefing of Former Governor George C. Wallace,” 26 July 1968, and “Briefing of 

Governor Lester Maddox,” 22 August 1968.
64

CHAPTER 3

After a postelection vacation in Key Biscayne, Florida, President-elect

Nixon and his wife returned to New York City on Monday, 11 November,

stopping en route in Washington for lunch with the president and an

impromptu afternoon of discussions with the president and his foreign affairs

aides. In addition to the president, Rusk, and Helms, this time the group also

included Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, JCS Chairman Gen. Earl

Wheeler, and National Security Advisor Walt Rostow. Helms remembers that

the afternoon meeting in the cabinet room suffered from the short notice and

complete lack of preparation given the participants. There was only a desultory exchange on substantive issues, inasmuch as “nobody knew what was

wanted or expected.”

Invigorated by his election and vacation, the president-elect was struck by

the very different mood of the other participants as they concentrated on Vietnam.4 He recalled that those assembled seemed very nearly worn out from

dealing with the prolonged crisis and “had no new approaches to recommend

to me.” Nixon said he saw the war etched on the faces around him and found

them relieved to be able to turn the morass over to someone else. He recorded

that they emphasized to him that the United States must see the war through to

a successful conclusion and that a negotiated settlement that looked like a

defeat would have a devastating impact on US allies and friends in Asia and

around the world.

From Helms’s point of view, the meeting on 11 November was of significance for a reason unrelated to the discussion of Vietnam. Helms remembers

that Johnson asked him to stay on for a private talk after the session

adjourned. At that time, Johnson told Helms that Nixon had twice asked about

him (Helms). Johnson said he told Nixon that he “had no idea how Helms had

voted, but that his was a merit appointment.”

Johnson’s kindness in recommending Helms to the Nixon administration

may have resulted from a lingering embarrassment over the way he had

treated Helms at an earlier point. In 1965, Johnson had passed over Helms to

appoint VAdm. William Raborn Jr. as DCI. At the time, Johnson informed

Helms that, although he had heard good things about him, he was “not well

enough known in this town,” meaning on Capitol Hill. But Johnson went on to

tell Helms that he “should attend every meeting Raborn did.”

The director’s only other meeting with Nixon during the transition period

occurred later the same week when he was summoned to New York City on

Friday, 15 November. Helms entered the Nixon suite on the 39th floor of the

Pierre Hotel at 1:30 p.m. to find the president-elect conversing with adviser

4 Ibid., 336.
65

NIXON AND FORD - UNEVEN ACCESS

John Mitchell, who was to become attorney general. With virtually no preliminaries, Nixon indicated that he would like Helms to stay on as DCI. The public announcement would come some time later. 

Supporting Nixon’s Team in New York City 5

Discussions between Johnson and Helms resulted in a decision that CIA

should make available to the president-elect in New York City the same daily

intelligence information being provided to the outgoing president in Washington. Helms assigned the task of providing this assistance to the Agency’s deputy director for intelligence, R. Jack Smith. As a first step, he asked Smith to

confer with Nixon’s chief aide, former advertising executive Robert Haldeman.

Joined by Howard Osborn (CIA’s director of security) and Richard Lehman

(deputy chief of the Office of Current Intelligence [OCI]), Smith went to New

York on the morning of 12 November.6 Smith showed Haldeman a sample of

the intelligence publications the Agency proposed to make available to

Nixon—the President’s Daily Brief (PDB), the Central Intelligence Bulletin

(CIB), the daily Situation in Vietnam, the Weekly Review, and selected memorandums. In turn, Haldeman asked that the Agency initiate special intelligence

security clearances for a number of staff members, including Richard Allen and

Martin Anderson. They had been the president-elect’s advisers on foreign

affairs during the campaign and were to advise him during the transition period.

It was agreed that CIA should establish a reading room in a secure area to

which members of the Nixon staff could come for security indoctrination and

to read classified documents. Space was not available in the Pierre, so it was

decided to locate the Agency’s outpost, dubbed “DDI-New York,” in the basement of the Nixon campaign headquarters at 450 Park Avenue, six blocks

from the president-elect’s office. This site, formerly the world headquarters of

the North American Missionary Alliance and soon to be demolished, was chosen because it seemed unlikely to attract attention from the press and the public. Allen’s office was also in the building.

Paul Corscadden, an 11-year veteran of OCI, was designated officer in

charge. Kenneth Rosen, an intelligence officer who had served in the White

House Situation Room under President Johnson and worked a year as a spe5 The material that follows regarding the Agency’s activities in New York City draws very heavily 

on the classified writings of the late Paul H. Corscadden; he is, in effect, the author of this section.

6 They had planned to fly, but a heavy snowfall intervened, and the three men traveled by train 

instead, arriving at Pennsylvania Station in the storm-struck metropolis at the onset of the evening 

rush hour. They were provided a police escort to take them through the badly snarled traffic to the 

Central Park area and the Pierre Hotel.
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CHAPTER 3

cial assistant to McGeorge Bundy, was second in command. Corscadden and

Rosen moved into the Statler-Hilton Hotel at 7th Avenue and 33rd Street for

the duration of the transition period. Because of the expense of living in New

York City and the representational nature of the assignment, the executive

director of CIA waived the standard per diem limitation and allowed each of

them up to $30 per day.

The area selected to house the Agency’s facility required extensive renovation, which, magically, the CIA’s Office of Logistics accomplished in 72 hours,

including one weekend. The construction activity did not go unnoticed by

other occupants of the building. Reports soon circulated that the Secret Service, the FBI, or some other sensitive, top secret government agency had

moved in and would, among other things, assume responsibility for the physical security of all the president-elect’s staff offices and the protection of his

family. The CIA’s Office of Security had decided not to identify the operation

as Agency sponsored but, rather, to allow those who learned of its existence to

draw whatever conclusions they chose. This decision, reasonable on the face

of things, led to unexpected consequences. Before long, Nixon staff secretaries

were calling to ask that someone “behind the Black Door” investigate the disappearance of office supplies or solve the mystery of a purloined television set.

On another occasion, the supervisor of the staff mailroom demanded that one

of the Agency communicators “taste” and immediately remove from the mailroom a crate of canned hams sent to the president-elect as a Christmas gift.

Those who were curious about what was housed behind that Black Door

enjoyed the unwitting support of the municipal health authorities. Occupants

of nearby buildings along Park Avenue had complained of an infestation of

black rats that had established colonies in the ground around the brightly

lighted Christmas trees festooning the avenue from 59th Street to Grand Central Station. Within hours, health inspectors poured through all the nearby

buildings. A team came to the door of the Agency facility, demanding admission. They were turned away with the assurance that there were no rats inside.

Beginning on 19 November, intelligence publications were wired to New

York on a daily basis. The Situation in Vietnam report arrived the evening of

its publication in Washington; the PDB came soon after 5 a.m. each morning.

Nixon staff members who had access to the intelligence publications came to

the facility at their convenience. A reading table contained all of each day’s

publications, along with appropriate national intelligence estimates, special

memorandums, intelligence handbooks, and various graphic aids. Of the key

staffers, Allen and Anderson visited most often.

Corscadden and Rosen delivered a complete set of publications each day in

a sealed envelope marked “Eyes Only—The President-elect” to Rose Mary
67

NIXON AND FORD - UNEVEN ACCESS

Woods in Nixon’s office. Woods had been granted the proper clearances, and

the Agency had installed a safe in her office for the secure storage of classified

materials. Initially, it was thought that she probably would return the publications after two or three days, during which time the president-elect would

have had the opportunity to read at least a current issue of the PDB.

For the first 10 days of the operation, only intelligence analyses prepared

for the outgoing administration were made available to the president-elect’s

staff. It soon became apparent, however, that the needs of the incoming

administration did not coincide in every detail with those of the Johnson

administration. To meet the emerging special needs of the new team, OCI on

29 November compiled the first “Nixon Special,” an “Eyes Only” intelligence

memorandum based on sensitive intelligence information that the Agency

knew would be of interest to Nixon. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) soon afterward provided an additional service by transmitting

directly to New York from its field bureaus foreign press and radio articles

pertaining to the incoming administration.

 The Key Player: Henry Kissinger

The appointment of Harvard Professor Henry Kissinger as assistant for

national security affairs was announced by the president-elect at a news conference on 2 December. By prior arrangement with DDI Smith, who had telephoned him from Washington the morning of Nixon’s announcement, Kissinger

came to the Agency facility on Park Avenue for a briefing that same afternoon.7

He was shown current issues of all the intelligence publications available in the

facility and was told what had been delivered to the Pierre for the presidentelect since the Agency support operation began. Kissinger was assured that the

CIA was prepared to provide full support to him and the rest of the incoming

administration.

During that first session, Kissinger expressed appreciation for the Agency’s

willingness to assist him and for the support it had so far provided the incoming administration. He promised to arrange his schedule to allow 15 minutes

per day to read the intelligence publications. He also accepted a proposal that

Corscadden and Rosen undertake during off-duty hours to advise him of any

critical world developments requiring the attention of the president-elect. This

precautionary arrangement had earlier been accepted by Allen and Anderson

as well as Haldeman.

7 A more detailed discussion of Smith’s exchange with Kissinger can be found in his memoirs, 

The Unknown CIA, 201–203.
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CHAPTER 3

Kissinger asked for time to become familiar with Nixon’s reading habits and

daily routine before advising the Agency of any recommendations he might

have for changes. He did say—in what foreshadowed Nixon’s style and his

own, in the White House—that it had been made clear to him that the presidentelect had no intention of reading anything that had not first been perused and

perhaps summarized by one of his senior staff. Kissinger said he did not know

what had happened to issues of the PDB already entrusted to Rose Mary Woods

but that, without his prior approval, future deliveries would not reach the president-elect. Two days later, Kissinger underscored that the Agency should not

provide intelligence support to anyone at the Pierre other than the presidentelect and himself; Mr. Haldeman and others from the campaign might have

access to classified publications after they had arrived in Washington, but they

would have no need for them before that time.

Kissinger reacted none too favorably to the first few issues of the PDB that

he read. At one time he expressed a preference for the CIB with its more complete text and greater detail. He complained that the prose in the PDB was too

often elliptical and that the selection of topics was too random and lacked the

continuity necessary for the uninitiated reader. Kissinger’s points were well

taken. The PDB was uniquely tailored to the needs of the outgoing administration—just as its predecessor had been shaped to the reading preferences of

President Kennedy. Moreover, its authors could assume that President Johnson and his advisers were familiar with the background of the subjects covered each day. Nixon and Kissinger, however deep their background and

however well read, lacked detailed familiarity with many of the ongoing, current issues addressed in the PDB.

The Agency had anticipated this situation, because it had come up in all

prior transitions. OCI had already begun to devise a new version of the PDB

for Nixon and his aides. Considerably expanded in length, the new brief had

been circulated for comment to the DCI, DDI, and others of the Agency’s

principal officers. With their concurrence, it was decided to send the new PDB

to New York. Kissinger approved its format and style at a meeting on the evening of 6 December. Thus, the Agency began to publish, in effect, two PDBs.

The substance was the same, but the publication given to Johnson was significantly more concise than that given to Nixon.

To no one’s surprise, it proved impossible to schedule daily briefings with

Kissinger; he was seen frequently but unpredictably. His assistant, Lawrence

Eagleburger of the Department of State, was seen every day and was notably

more appreciative of the assistance he was provided.

On 9 December, Kissinger told Corscadden that he had been asked to brief

the president-elect’s “senior staff” and would need inputs for a 30-minute ses-
69

NIXON AND FORD - UNEVEN ACCESS

sion on the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, the state of US-Chinese

relations, the US-USSR strategic arms balance, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

He asked especially for “tidbits, local color...things which will make these

people think they’re getting the inside story but which, if leaked, will not compromise or embarrass me or the president-elect or the United States Government.” He promised to come to Park Avenue soon to review the drafts.

On the afternoon of 11 December, Kissinger paid his second visit to the

basement suite on Park Avenue, arriving with Eagleburger. It was evident the

two had discussed the format Kissinger preferred even before he had seen the

materials prepared by the Agency. Eagleburger’s assignment was to redraft

CIA’s contribution. After scanning the briefing book and posing one or two

questions about France’s nuclear program, Kissinger asked for still more material on Berlin, the problem of Nigeria’s breakaway state of Biafra, the strategic

arms balance, NATO, the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia, and the

prospects for a meeting in Warsaw of Chinese and American representatives.

Kissinger delegated to Eagleburger responsibility for preparing “drafts” for his

consideration the next evening in Washington, when the president-elect proposed to unveil his cabinet during a nationwide television broadcast from the

Shoreham Hotel in Washington. Eagleburger worked in the basement at Park

Avenue until three o’clock in the morning, returned to the Pierre for a few

hours’ rest, and then resumed the job of redrafting and editing the briefing

Kissinger was to give.

Eagleburger’s task was complicated by the fact that, except for Woods,

none of the Nixon clerical staff, including Kissinger’s secretary, had yet been

granted special intelligence security clearances. Corscadden arranged to have

Eagleburger’s preliminary text typed by the Agency secretary assigned to

DDI-NY and to have it taken to the Pierre. Eagleburger was then driven to

LaGuardia Airport for his flight to Washington. CIA officers met Eagleburger

at National Airport and took him to an improvised two-room office at the

Shoreham Hotel. They remained with Eagleburger for much of the night of 12

December, calling on the Agency’s analytical resources to provide substantive

backup through the duty officer in the Operations Center.8

During his late-evening television appearance, the president-elect disclosed

that he and his cabinet-to-be and top advisers would spend the following day,

Friday, 13 December, in conference. One of the highlights of their all-day session would be an intelligence briefing by Kissinger. Agency officers received

no direct feedback on the substantive discussions held on 13 December. They

were interested that Kissinger, in their next meeting, directed that Attorney

8 The CIA officers involved in this exercise were delighted later in the month when Kissinger sent 

Helms a letter of thanks for their extraordinary efforts.
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CHAPTER 3

General-designate Mitchell receive the PDB and all other reports in which he

expressed any interest. Before long, Mitchell was being briefed on a daily

basis and proved to be “very helpful as a window into what Nixon wanted.”9

In mid-December, Kissinger also directed that no national intelligence estimates were to go to the president-elect. Somewhat sharply, he explained that no

one department or agency of the government would be permitted to present its

views directly to Nixon to the disadvantage of any other. Corscadden pointed

out that an NIE was the product of the Intelligence Community as a whole, that

it was issued in the name of the United States Intelligence Board, and could not

be considered “parochial.” This rejoinder had no appreciable effect.

Toward the end of December, Kissinger began to meet more regularly with

Corscadden and Rosen. By then Kissinger was able to read only the PDB with

any regularity; DDI-NY was responsible for calling to his attention “critical

items” in other publications. The balance of the 15-minute “daily” session was

devoted to a capsule review of crucial international situations the new administration was likely to face during its first few months in office—“stressing the

significance, not the facts”—and to discussion of whatever papers Kissinger

had requested of the Agency. He directed that memorandums prepared for

Nixon should contain a “statement of the problem and an assessment of its

significance,” as well as a summary.

Kissinger’s reading of an estimate on Soviet strategic attack forces led him

to ask for an oral briefing on the US-Soviet strategic balance. After consulting

with his military aide, Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, and with Eagleburger,

Kissinger decided that the J-3 section of the Joint Chiefs should take the lead.

CIA’s deputy director for science and technology and director of strategic

research were also invited to participate in the briefing, which was held on Saturday, 21 December 1968. In addition to Kissinger, Mitchell, Eagleburger, and

Goodpaster were present.

This was the most formal briefing Kissinger received during the transition;

unfortunately, it did not go well. The J-3 team that had traveled from Washington to conduct the briefing used only the “high side” numbers regarding Soviet

capabilities in their text and graphics. This prompted the CIA experts present

to try to supplement the briefing and question some of its conclusions. In the

discussion that followed, Kissinger, Goodpaster, and finally Mitchell asked

ever-more probing questions, to the obvious chagrin of the briefers. Kissinger

and Mitchell both made clear after the fact that they were not satisfied.

The issue of possible direct State Department involvement in the support

process in New York arose as a result of a PDB item on coup reports in a cer9 Richard Lehman, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 10 March 1993.
71

NIXON AND FORD - UNEVEN ACCESS

tain country. Kissinger asked about US contingency plans if a coup occurred.

When the Agency officers replied that they were not normally privy to such

contingency planning, Kissinger turned to Eagleburger and insisted that a representative of the State Department attend the morning briefing sessions.

Eagleburger discussed the idea with CIA, but nothing came of it. Years later,

describing how the system worked, Eagleburger recalled that he “occasionally

called on the State Department to send specific written materials—I was from

State, after all—but the Agency team was all we needed right there.”10

As Kissinger became more and more active toward the end of December,

his probing questions and his insatiable demands for assessments of the significance of isolated developments—even those in the low order of probability—meant that far more speculative, estimative analysis was required. This

led CIA to the strategy of having its substantive officers prepare detailed

backup pieces to complement the topics covered each day in the PDB. These

reports provided the generalists who briefed Kissinger with additional information with which to field his queries.

Mindful of Kissinger’s repeated requests for “problem papers,” special

briefings on emergent crises likely to confront the new administration during

its first months in office, and “must reading” before Inauguration Day, the

Agency in late December began appending to the PDB a series of special

papers focused on critical issues. For more than 18 months, the PDB, at President Johnson’s request, had carried special annexes on Vietnam and on North

Vietnamese reflections on the US political scene. Kissinger decided that the

annexes need not be sent to the president-elect and should not be published

after Inauguration Day. The new “problem papers” were designed in part,

therefore, to replace the Vietnam annexes in the New York edition of the PDB,

which was by now being tailored for the incoming administration.

In the remaining days of the operation, Kissinger read the “problem papers”

on such subjects as access to Berlin, the communist troop buildup in South

Vietnam, the military balance between the two Koreas, and the French economic situation. For each of these subjects, CIA analysts with the appropriate

expertise traveled to New York to accompany the regular briefers. Especially

in the cases of Vietnam and Korea, Kissinger had numerous questions. He

wanted to know the Agency’s past track record in estimates on the subject at

hand and pressed the analysts for “your personal opinion.”

On 6 January, Kissinger, who initially became Nixon’s national security

advisor, turned to the question of intelligence support on Inauguration Day and

10 Lawrence Eagleburger, telephone interview by the author, 1 November 1993. Other comments 

by Eagleburger also come from this interview.
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CHAPTER 3

thereafter. By this time, Nixon had expressed his intention to hold regular staff

meetings with his key advisers at 9:00 a.m. or 9:30 a.m. each morning.

Kissinger surmised that he would brief the president for 30 minutes each morning, immediately following these staff conferences. He did not want to give

Nixon anything he and his National Security Council staff had not had time to

mull over and was anxious to “preview” intelligence reporting each evening,

with an eye to meeting the chief executive early the next day.

Kissinger proposed that the DCI change the PDB’s publication time for the

PDB from early morning to late afternoon, releasing the publication to him in

the evening and to the president the following morning. This would, Kissinger

admitted, introduce a lag of 12 hours in the reporting time, but he was not disturbed that the PDB would be less current; he was more concerned that he have

time to prepare his own comments on anything the president would see.

With Inauguration Day less than a week away, the Agency proposed to introduce to the president-elect and Kissinger an entirely new PDB—redesigned to

meet Kissinger’s specifications for a briefing paper tailored to Nixon’s preferences. The new publication was to consist of three sections—“Major Developments,” “Other Important Developments,” and occasional annexes—all double

spaced and printed on legal-size paper bound at the top.

The first section, “Major Developments,” was to be subdivided into sections

on Vietnam, the Middle East, Soviet Affairs, and Europe. This was not a static

listing. As developments warranted, some areas could be dropped, others

added. The second section, “Other Important Developments,” was intended to

highlight problems which—though not yet critical—could in time engage US

policy interests. The annexes were to fulfill the same role as the “problem

papers” that were appended to the PDB sent to New York during the early part

of January. Kissinger approved the new format on 15 January 1969.

 Nixon Remains Aloof

The support operation mounted in New York constituted the most elaborate

system yet designed to provide intelligence to a president-elect. Ironically,

Nixon’s aloof style resulted in a situation in which the Agency had no direct

contact with him. Until mid-December, for example, Agency officers were

uncertain whether he had been reading the PDB or the other publications

deposited each morning with his secretary. On 18 December, Eagleburger

confided that Nixon had informed Kissinger that Woods had been “stockpiling” the unopened envelopes containing the PDB, CIB, and memorandums on

Vietnam. Nixon had asked Kissinger to send someone upstairs to retrieve

these envelopes so that Kissinger could review the collection and decide
73

NIXON AND FORD - UNEVEN ACCESS

whether there was anything in it that the president-elect should read. The

question had been answered: Mr. Nixon had read no Agency publications during the first month of the New York operation.

Eagleburger observes that Nixon’s handling of the intelligence material was

a result of his management style rather than any disinterest in foreign developments. In fact, he says, “Nixon was very interested—but it was just him and

Henry. That’s why you didn’t brief him directly.” Eagleburger did not see

Nixon either—briefings of the president-elect were the prerogative of

Kissinger alone.

Other accounts, however, confirm more directly that Nixon’s refusal to

receive intelligence briefings personally stemmed from negative attitudes

about the CIA that went well beyond an aloof and formal management style.

Goodpaster, who worked with the transition staff to help organize the national

security apparatus, remembers discussing with Nixon how the Eisenhower

team had handled intelligence support. Goodpaster says Nixon “acknowledged the importance of intelligence, but also commented that when you

needed it, it often wasn’t there.”11

Discouraging as it was to CIA officers not to have personal contact with

Nixon, a great deal of Agency material did reach the president-elect through

Kissinger’s daily briefings. According to Eagleburger, “Henry made heavy

use of the CIA material. I remember especially Korea and other Asian issues.

Henry would go in and go over the material with Nixon; documents would be

left behind that Nixon would read.” Rosen remembers how pleased the

Agency team was when it would occasionally receive back from Kissinger

copies of the PDB initialed by Nixon, confirming that at least some of the

material was being read.12

Throughout the two months of the operation in New York, there was some

uneasiness among Agency managers because Kissinger levied heavy demands

for analytic work in the president’s name, and Eagleburger levied similarly

heavy demands in Kissinger’s name. Without direct access to the principal

consumer, it was always unclear how much of this material was really wanted

or read by Nixon himself. For the most part, however, it did not matter. CIA

took pride in serving those who clearly would be the key foreign policy aides

to the new president.

On one occasion the ambiguity about who was really speaking for whom

was especially worrisome. A few days before the inauguration, Kissinger

called Helms in Washington with a discouraging message. He said that the CIA

11 Andrew Goodpaster, telephone interview by the author, 17 November 1993.

12 Kenneth Rosen, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 22 March 1993.
74

CHAPTER 3

director, following the inauguration, should brief the National Security Council

on intelligence matters at the opening of its meetings but should then leave the

meetings before the policy discussions. This scenario was represented by

Kissinger as Nixon’s idea, but Helms knew it was a ridiculous idea. Long experience had shown him that policymakers, during the course of their deliberations, frequently needed to turn to the representative of the Intelligence

Community for factual updates.

Two days following the inauguration, the first NSC meeting was held. At

the outset, Nixon invited the attendees to stay for lunch following the meeting.

With this encouragement, Helms stayed through the meeting and lunch. And

with the precedent established, he simply stayed throughout all subsequent

NSC meetings. The scenario earlier raised by Kissinger never surfaced again.

CIA’s direct access to Nixon was limited to the briefings by the Agency’s

directors—Richard Helms, James Schlesinger, and, finally, William Colby—at

meetings of the National Security Council. In an interview in 1982, Helms

offered a graphic account of how difficult those meetings could be, especially

during the early period of the Nixon presidency:

From the very beginning of the Nixon administration, Nixon was

criticizing Agency estimates, estimates done back when he was Vice

DCI Helms waits to deliver his intelligence briefing to the National

Security Council.
75

NIXON AND FORD - UNEVEN ACCESS

President. What he knew about estimates in the intervening years I

don't know. But he would constantly, in National Security Council

meetings, pick on the Agency for not having properly judged what

the Soviets were going to do with various kinds of weaponry. And

obviously, he was being selective, but he would make nasty remarks

about this and say this obviously had to be sharpened up. The

Agency had to understand it was to do a better job and so on. And I

haven’t the slightest doubt that Nixon’s carping affected Kissinger,

who after all was his national security advisor.

Despite this challenge to the estimates, the analysis and so forth of

the Agency, the fundamental fact remains that if the things had not

been read, if people were not paying attention to them there never

would have been the challenge. So I don’t think anybody needs to

feel bad about a rocky period in the Agency’s history. It was bound

to be a rocky period with Richard Nixon as President, given the fact

that he held the Agency responsible for his defeat in 1960. And he

never forgot that and he had a barb out for the Agency all the time

because he really believed, and I think he believes to this day, that

that “Missile Gap” question was the responsibility of the Agency

and that it did him in.13

 When he was elected president in 1968, Nixon could hardly have imagined

how US collection capabilities had improved since the end of his term as vice

president eight years before. At the time he had left that office, several years

of U-2 flights had given the United States an invaluable look at the Soviet

Union. But the flights had been intermittent and covered only a portion of

Soviet territory. As a result, the United States in 1960 was still dealing in conjecture, albeit informed conjecture, about possible deployed Soviet strategic

systems. In 1968 it was dealing in facts. It was never clear that the cynical

president appreciated what had changed. As the years passed, the NSC forum

was less and less fruitful. Colby remembers that “Nixon didn’t operate well in

meetings—he liked to make decisions on the basis of written material. When

you did brief him on something, he looked like his mind was on other

things—he may have been thinking about Watergate, I guess.”14 Colby wrote

in his memoirs that none of Nixon’s three DCI’s saw him outside formal or

ceremonial meetings. “I remember only one private conversation with him; it

occurred when he phoned to ask what was happening in China and I provided

a quick summary off the top of my head.”15

13 Richard Helms, interview by R. Jack Smith, Washington, DC, 21 April 1982. 

14 William Colby, interview by the author in Washington, DC, 7 April 1993. Unless otherwise 

noted, subsequent comments by Colby also come from this interview.
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Throughout the Nixon presidency, a courier delivered the PDB to Kissinger’s

office. Each day Kissinger delivered to the president a package of material that

included the PDB along with material from the State Department, the White

House Situation Room, the Joint Chiefs, and others. Nixon would keep the

material on his desk, reading it at his convenience throughout the day. Feedback

to the Agency typically was provided by Kissinger directly to the DCI. 

A Closer Relationship With Ford16

In the late spring of 1974, when it was becoming apparent that Nixon would

not survive the Watergate scandal, the DCI saw a responsibility and an opportunity.17 William Colby, who had been appointed director in September 1973,

decided that CIA should help the new vice president, Gerald Ford, prepare for

his probable elevation to the presidency. Colby’s initiative was to afford CIA

unprecedented direct and daily access to the resident when Ford moved into

the Oval Office.

Colby modestly recounts that his decision to provide full intelligence support to Ford “had as much to do with good preparation in case something happened to the president—any president—as it did with Nixon’s problems with

Watergate.” Colby remembers thinking at the time, “We should get the PDB to

the Vice President so that he would know everything the President knew. We

didn’t want another situation like when Truman was unaware of the Manhattan project.”

Whatever his mix of motives, Colby invited the vice president to visit CIA

Headquarters. Ford came, on 12 June 1974, and was given wide-ranging briefings on intelligence operations and assessments. In response to Ford’s request,

Colby agreed to send him the PDB, in addition to the National Intelligence

Daily (NID) he had been receiving. An Agency current intelligence specialist,

David Peterson, was assigned to provide continuing intelligence support to the

vice president.

15 William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and 

Schuster, 1978), 373.

16 The material that follows regarding the Agency’s support of President Ford was in large part 

drafted by David A. Peterson.

17 In the election campaign of 1972, there had been no special intelligence briefings. Nixon, as the 

incumbent president, continued to receive the PDB. His Democratic opponent, Senator George 

McGovern, at one point had agreed (against the counsel of his advisers) to receive an intelligence 

briefing from Kissinger. The CIA was to follow up with regular briefings. Unfortunately, the 

political crisis involving McGovern’s running mate, Senator Thomas Eagleton, forced the cancellation of the Kissinger briefing, and it proved impossible to reschedule either that briefing or the 

others that were to follow.
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NIXON AND FORD - UNEVEN ACCESS

Ford accepted a suggestion that the PDB be brought to him directly,

acknowledging that this would be the most secure way to receive the sensitive

document. He specified that he would like to see it early each morning, preferably as his first appointment. Beginning 1 July that became the regular routine, one that was altered only occasionally by such diversions as a vicepresidential breakfast with the president or a speaking engagement out of

town. On a few occasions Ford was seen at his Alexandria home before he

flew off to keep such an engagement. Always a gracious host, he brewed and

served instant coffee.

Ford came to the vice-presidency an informed consumer of the products of

the Intelligence Community. He notes that he “had become familiar with CIA

first as a member of the Intelligence subcommittee on Appropriations; later in

other roles, including Minority Leader. I knew Colby from my days in Congress.” This familiarity, particularly with Colby personally, was to provide the

Agency at least a temporary buffer in some difficult times to come.18

When Nixon resigned and Ford was sworn in as president on 9 August

1974, Agency officers were uncertain whether the briefings would continue. It

seemed probable that Kissinger would intervene and terminate the sessions,

substituting some other arrangement. (He was described later as “furious”

when he learned of the CIA briefing routine, of which he had not been

informed.) The uncertainty was short lived; that evening Ford passed the word

that he wanted his usual briefing the next morning at the White House.

On Saturday morning, 10 August, Ford seemed as awed as Peterson when

he entered the Oval Office to begin his first full day as chief executive. Gen.

Alexander Haig, who was to carry on as chief of the White House staff, was

also present. The walls and furniture in the Office were bare following the

removal of Nixon’s pictures and possessions. The famous desk had only a

telephone console on it, prompting the new president to tell Haig that he

would rely on him to help keep the desk uncluttered.

To Peterson’s surprise, in view of Haig’s presence, the president first asked

for his intelligence briefing. He was given a status report on a sensitive operation that interested him, after which he read the PDB, punctuating his perusal

with a couple of questions.

During that first session, Ford asked Haig for his views on how the intelligence briefing should fit into the daily presidential schedule. Haig replied that

Nixon had received the PDB along with several other reports, cables, and

overnight summaries to read as time permitted during the day. The general

18 Gerald Ford, interview by the author in Beaver Creek, Colorado, 8 September 1993. Unless 

otherwise indicated, all observations by Ford come from this interview.
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went on to say, however, that an early daily intelligence briefing was a better

idea. Ford agreed, expressing satisfaction with the routine that had been established and observing that such an arrangement would help prepare him for a

subsequent daily meeting with Kissinger. The new president evidently felt at

some disadvantage in discussing foreign affairs with his secretary of state and

wanted as much advance support as he could get. Accordingly, the CIA briefer

would continue to be the president’s first appointment each morning.

Peterson’s initial session in the Oval Office ended on a mildly embarrassing

note. He exited the room through the nearest door—only to find himself at a

dead end. A second door, which he later learned led to a smaller, more private

office for the president, was locked, trapping him in the passageway. The presidential lavatory was on one side opposite a Pullman kitchen where stewards

prepared refreshments. It was obvious that unless he was prepared to stay

indefinitely, he would have to reenter the Oval Office, where the president and

Haig were still conferring. Peterson knocked, opened the door with apologies

and sheepishly explained his predicament. The president laughed and professed that he didn’t yet know his way around the West Wing very well either.

He directed Peterson out another door to the hallway. The observant briefer

noticed that this door had no frame and was papered to blend with the wall.

For two days during the first week of the Ford presidency, Peterson met

alone with the president each morning. On the third morning, Gen. Brent

Scowcroft, then Kissinger’s assistant as national security advisor, indicated

that henceforth he would accompany Peterson. Although this arrangement

probably was prompted, in part, by Kissinger’s desire to know what CIA was

telling the president, Scowcroft’s presence undoubtedly enhanced the value of

the session for Mr. Ford. The president would raise questions about the policy

implications of the intelligence, and Scowcroft would either provide the

answers or undertake to obtain an early assessment. It soon became evident

that no previous president had derived such prompt benefit from the Agency’s

current intelligence reports.

The daily contact with Ford facilitated CIA’s ability to respond to his intelligence needs. Immediately after each briefing session, Peterson would report

via secure telephone to his immediate boss, the director of the Office of Current Intelligence, who would relay any presidential queries, messages, or comments to the DCI’s daily staff meeting at 9:00 a.m. With that kind of

communication, the director and his senior aides could get rapid feedback, and

the president’s needs could promptly be served.

A further advantage of the direct contact involved the security of the PDB.

By carrying it away after the president read it, CIA was able to maintain complete control of his copy of the publication. Coupled with the more stringent
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NIXON AND FORD - UNEVEN ACCESS

controls that were applied to a second copy provided Scowcroft, which he

later showed to Kissinger, CIA was able to terminate the wide exposure that

the PDB had had among members of the White House and National Security

Council staffs during the Nixon presidency.

Once it was clear that the Agency had established a secure and expeditious

channel for providing sensitive material directly to the president, the Agency’s

director and the deputy director for operations granted permission to publish

articles drawn from the Agency’s most protected sources. Occasionally operational activities also were reported. Highly sensitive intercepted messages

were included on a regular basis for the first time. To limit access to such compartmented material even within the Agency, it was typed on loose pages that

were stapled into the copies for the president and Kissinger. 

Discussing Operations and Intelligence

One tightly held operation was not covered in the PDB, but Ford was provided an oral account of its status each morning while it was in progress. That

operation, the Glomar Explorer project, was an intricate undertaking to raise a

Soviet ballistic missile submarine that had sunk in the Pacific. In his memoirs,

Ford wrote of the deliberations that occurred “on the second morning of my

Presidency, [when] Kissinger, Scowcroft, Schlesinger, and CIA Director William Colby came to the Oval Office to advise me that Glomar Explorer was on

station and ready to drop the claws.”19

Two decades after the event, the former president remembered well his

apprehensions about the operation: “I did feel the Glomar action was a gamble. We didn’t know what the Soviets would do. But I was convinced we had

to take the risk, in terms of what we stood to gain.”

Fortunately, Ford had been briefed on the Glomar project in detail during

his visit to CIA as vice president two months earlier. Like Kennedy on the Bay

of Pigs operation, Ford had less time than he would have liked to become

familiar with the plans. Unlike the Cuban undertaking, however, the operation

in the Pacific did not result in a challenge to a new president. The Soviets,

unaware of their lost vessel’s location, watched the “deep-sea mining” operation with interest, but did not attempt to thwart it.

There is no doubt that the drama associated with the Glomar endeavor and

Ford’s keen interest in it helped to certify for him the utility of the daily briefing sessions. Later, however, it was Peterson’s unhappy lot to inform the pres19 Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 135–36.
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ident that an accident during the lifting operation had caused the fragile hulk

to break apart, resulting in the loss of a critical portion of the submarine.

An ancillary benefit from these daily meetings with Ford was the closer

cooperation that developed between the PDB staff and the White House Situation Room, which provides round-the-clock support to the president on foreign developments and national security affairs. At Scowcroft’s request, after

each briefing session the Agency representative would give an account of the

meeting to Situation Room personnel so they could get a better insight on the

president’s interests and concerns. In addition, CIA’s PDB staff began to

inform them each evening of the topics to be covered in the PDB the following morning so they would not duplicate coverage of any current development

in their own morning summary for the president.20

The president soon became acutely conscious that CIA’s reporting was

problem oriented. Told on one occasion that the Agency did not have much to

tell him that day, he replied that he wasn’t disappointed: “When there is more

to report, that usually means you have more bad news.”

Sometimes the bad news was political and preceded the Agency’s briefer

into the Oval Office. One such occasion came in March 1975, the day after the

DCI had testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the situation in Cambodia, where the Lon Nol regime was under heavy attack by

Khmer Rouge forces. The president’s first words that morning were that he

was unhappy about “what your boss said on the Hill yesterday.” He had read

an account of the director’s testimony in the Washington Post, which quoted

Colby as saying the Lon Nol regime would have little chance to survive even

with the supplemental US aid the president had requested from Congress.

Scowcroft helpfully pointed out that the advance text of the director’s statement did not include any such remark. It turned out the DCI’s response to a

question from the committee had been quoted out of context.

The eventual success of the Khmer Rouge and the forced US withdrawal

from Vietnam soon led to the Mayaguez affair. The seizure of the US-owned

container ship by the communist forces occurred in the early hours (Washington time) of 12 May 1975. Before the CIA briefer left for the White House, the

Agency’s Operations Center armed him with a map and the latest information

on the incident, still in progress, including messages sent a short time earlier

by the ship’s radioman as Khmer Rouge troops were boarding the vessel.

20 One morning Ford’s dog, Liberty, was in the Oval Office. While the president read the PDB, the 

friendly and handsome golden retriever padded back and forth between Scowcroft and Peterson. 

All was well until her wagging tail struck the president’s nearby pipe rack. The clatter of pipes 

and other smoking paraphernalia brought swift presidential retribution; Liberty was banished, 

never again to appear during a PDB meeting.
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NIXON AND FORD - UNEVEN ACCESS

The president was distressed to receive this news, but by the time Kissinger

got to him on the telephone during the PDB session Ford had absorbed the

facts and had given some thought to the implications. Plans for the subsequent

rescue operation began to formulate during that conversation with Kissinger.

Ford recalls that, in the end, the Mayaguez incident “gave us a welcome

opportunity to show that we were not going to be nibbled at by our enemies.”

The morning briefing session was not confined solely to current intelligence. Selected national intelligence estimates and other memorandums occasionally were provided as well. The most timely and effective example of this

occurred shortly before Ford’s meeting with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November 1974. The day before the president’s departure, the PDB carried the key judgments of the annual estimate of Soviet

strategic forces, and the briefer emphasized the underlying rationale and principal conclusions of the study. A copy of the complete NIE with its voluminous annexes was given to him to take along on the trip. The Agency also had

put together a 10-minute film with color footage of Brezhnev in an informal

setting that was shown to Ford in the cabinet room before his departure.

Events had pressed Ford to decide very quickly in his presidency whether to

follow through with Nixon’s commitment to the Vladivostok meeting. As a

result, he probably studied the intelligence reporting on this issue as closely as

any. The president recalls, “[Although] I had only a few months, I felt fully

prepared to discuss the substantive issues as a result of the briefings I had

received in Congress, as Vice President, and then as President.”

In 1993, Ford remembered clearly the distrust of Agency analysis he had

felt during his early years in Congress, when Allen Dulles and others seemed

to be exaggerating the Soviet threat. He claimed to have had no similar reaction to the Agency’s work during his own brief presidency but offered the cautious assessment that “in part it may have been that by then I had a pretty good

understanding of my own of what the situation in the USSR was all about.”

Ford did not receive his intelligence material exclusively through the PDB.

He used NSC meetings much more effectively than his predecessor; indeed,

he probably used them more effectively than any president since Eisenhower.

The NSC sessions almost always began with an intelligence update. Colby

remembers that Ford, unlike Nixon, “always paid attention and was engaged.

He was well informed.”

Ford, too, remembers the formal NSC meetings as useful. In thinking back

on those sessions, he remarked, “On substantive performance, I thought very

highly of Bill Colby. I saw him primarily at the NSC. He always briefed, for

example on Vietnam as we were forced to withdraw, on the Mayaguez seizure

by the Cambodians, and on SALT.”
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Outside the formal NSC structure, however, Colby had few contacts with

Ford and, thus, little direct personal knowledge of the issues the president was

concentrating on at a given time and his intelligence needs. Colby described

the situation this way: “My own reluctance to push into the Oval Office unless

I was invited or had something that I thought demanded my personal presence, combined with a lively awareness of the probable reaction if I had tried

to elbow past Henry Kissinger, kept me from pressing for personal access to

either Nixon or Ford. In retrospect, I consider this one of the errors I made as

Director, although I am not sure how I could have done any differently.”21

Ford makes the same point: “The Sunday when Colby came to my office to

resign was probably the first time I met with him one-on-one. I don’t remember ever telephoning him directly for information.” 

Political Problems Undermine the Briefing Process

Regrettably, the domestic political problems the CIA created for Ford before

long began to outweigh the good will built up by the Agency’s substantive sup21 Colby, Honorable Men, 373–74.

President Gerald Ford, flanked by Secretary of State Kissinger and Defense

Secretary Schlesinger, presides over an NSC meeting. DCI Colby is seated 

at the far left.
83

NIXON AND FORD - UNEVEN ACCESS

port. Within months of Ford’s accession to the presidency, the Agency, and

then the White House, were buffeted by public accounts of CIA’s past involvement in domestic spying, feckless preparations for possible assassinations, and

covert action undertakings in Chile. As the Rockefeller Commission and the

Church and Pike Committees exposed more and more information about the

Agency’s real and imagined misdeeds, the director’s standing with Ford weakened. Colby was not responsible for the sins of the past and, in fact, had

ordered some controversial programs halted, but his handling of the issues—in

particular, his failure to forewarn the White House of breaking embarrassments—caused Ford and Kissinger to lose confidence in him.

Ford recalls that in 1975 he “talked with Colby, although not regularly,

about the difficulties the Agency was having with the Church and Pike Committees. In addition to the real problems, the committees were up to some

political mischiefmaking. We went through a terrible time. We just needed a

fresh start with the Congress.”

Intended or not, the system of PDB briefings of the president became a

casualty of the shakeup Ford instituted on 3 November 1975 among his senior

national security officers. Colby and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger

were replaced, respectively, by Ambassador George Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, until then the president’s White House chief of staff. Scowcroft was elevated to assistant to the president for national security affairs, the position

Kissinger had retained with Scowcroft as his deputy, after assuming stewardship of the Department of State.

Concerning the change in procedures that accompanied the personnel shifts,

Ford recalls:

The result was we set up a better system where I had an oral presentation [of information available from all agencies] by Brent [Scowcroft]. Dave Peterson had been very helpful, but his separate sessions

were no longer necessary. Scowcroft had more time for the daily

briefs than Henry had. Kissinger had been wearing two hats and

didn’t have time to handle the morning meetings properly. I took away

his second hat. Henry was not happy about that, but he understood.

Ford maintains that under the new procedures he “continued to be very conscientious about reading the PDB [and] interested in the information.” CIA,

no longer present, lost the benefit of the president’s immediate reaction to

each PDB. Scowcroft saw the president often, but he was not normally present

when the president read the PDB and, therefore, had little to pass on in the

way of the president’s views and questions relating to the intelligence he was

receiving. As a consequence, the PDB could no longer be tailored as well to

suit Ford’s personal needs.
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There was no indication that Ford felt deprived after the daily PDB sessions

ended. At the CIA, however, the experience of 14 months of daily meetings

with the president, contrasted with the succeeding months without those meetings, confirmed vividly the stark truth that there is no substitute for direct

access to the president.

George Bush returned from China to become DCI in January 1976. He had

been a colleague of Ford’s in Congress and was untainted by the Agency’s

image problems. Even in these improved circumstances, however, he found it

necessary to rely primarily on the written PDB and on briefing opportunities

at NSC meetings to keep the president informed. Even he had relatively few

one-on-one meetings with the president. For his part, Ford remembers that

Former Ambassador George H.W. Bush receives congratulations from 

out-going DCI Colby and President Ford after his swearing in at the CIA

Headquarters Auditorium.
85

NIXON AND FORD - UNEVEN ACCESS

there was “no material change” in his relationship with Bush (compared with

Colby) as far as the presentation of substantive intelligence was concerned.

Ironically, it would not be until Bush himself was in the Oval Office that

CIA would again establish with a president a working relationship as fruitful

as the one it had enjoyed during the first half of the Ford presidency.

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CHAPTER 4

IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CARTER

In late June 1976, Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter distinguished himself in

the eyes of CIA officials by becoming the first presidential hopeful to request

intelligence briefings even before receiving his party’s nomination. Carter’s

request, which was directed to President Ford, prompted discussions involving the president, CIA Director George Bush, and National Security Advisor

Brent Scowcroft about who should provide such briefings and when they

should be made available to the candidate. Bush recommended to Ford that as

a first step he, Bush, should meet with Carter to discuss the ground rules and

arrange for follow-on briefings, which would be delivered by intelligence professionals. The ever-cautious Scowcroft recommended instead that all briefings should be given by the DCI, accompanied and supported by the

appropriate national intelligence officers (NIOs), who were the Intelligence

Community’s senior substantive experts.

These deliberations resulted in a decision by Ford that Bush should meet

with Carter to discuss the parameters and arrangements for the provision of

intelligence support. Such a session could be arranged before the nomination.

Following the nomination, NIOs would provide Carter in-depth intelligence

briefings. The president insisted that the DCI chair the sessions even though

he would not necessarily be obliged to give the briefings himself.

Pursuant to the president’s instructions, Bush contacted Carter to arrange a

meeting. The two met on 5 July in Hershey, Pennsylvania, where Carter was

attending a meeting of Democratic governors. In the course of the meeting,

the director informed Carter that the president had asked him to preside over

the briefings that would follow. Bush introduced to Carter one senior Agency

officer, Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Richard Lehman, noting

that he would be the action officer in charge of preparing the briefings that

would follow in Plains, Georgia. They would begin after the Democratic convention the next week. Carter, in turn, indicated that he would welcome

detailed discussions of selected subjects such as Soviet strategic programs. He

designated his “issues man,” Stuart Eizenstat, to be his contact and proposed

to receive briefings every week to 10 days.
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Although the initial meeting was to have been limited to a discussion of the

arrangements for future briefings, Lehman’s account noted that the conversation “ranged over virtually the entire field of intelligence.”1 Carter was briefed

on a number of current developments abroad and was shown a variety of intelligence materials and publications, including satellite photographs. Lehman

reported that the governor asked a great many questions “ranging from the

future of Rhodesia to morale in the Agency.”

In thinking back to that pre-nomination meeting with the DCI in Pennsylvania, Carter remembered, “I was very honored to have President [then DCI]

Bush come to brief me. President Ford offered every assistance. I hardly knew

him and had never been in the Oval Office.”2

In soliciting the CIA briefings, Carter was already displaying the interest in

detail that was to be a mark of his presidency. The day following his meeting

with Bush in Pennsylvania, Carter told newsmen that he would receive “a sixhour briefing” shortly after the Democratic nomination. On several subsequent occasions during the campaign, the governor expressed the hope that by

being fully informed he could avoid committing himself to positions that

might later embarrass him as a candidate or as president. Asked in 1993 about

his motives in arranging what became a series of immensely time-consuming

sessions, Carter replied, “I wanted the long briefings in Plains. I wanted particularly not to make any inadvertent mistake that would complicate things for

President Ford on SALT or later for me.” Just prior to the presidential debates,

Carter remembers, “I wanted to know what was going on.”

 Extended Preelection Briefings

When the time came in late July to meet Carter in Plains, Agency officers

discovered that the first challenge was to get there. CIA’s director in 1976 normally used a Gulfstream aircraft for his travel within the United States. Plains

had a 4,400-foot sod airstrip that was not suitable for Gulfstream operations.

The manager of the airfield at Americus, Georgia, some 10 miles from Plains,

informed the Agency aircrew that Gulfstream aircraft had occasionally used

his 4,200-foot paved airstrip, but that they should be aware there was no kerosene fuel available at the facility. Moreover, the airfield at Americus had no

control tower and, thus, was suitable for operation only in daylight hours. On

discovering that the nearest all-weather facility with an instrument landing

1 Richard Lehman, “Meeting with Governor Carter,” memorandum for the record, 6 July 1976. 

2 Jimmy Carter, interview by the author in Atlanta, Georgia, 23 June 1993. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent quotations from Carter come from this interview. 
89

IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CARTER

system was at Albany, some 45 miles from Plains, Agency officials sought

help from the US military.

A few phone calls resulted in arrangements whereby Bush and his party

would travel from Washington, DC, directly to Lawson Army Airfield at Fort

Benning, Georgia. At Fort Benning, they were told, the director would be

transferred to a US Army Bell helicopter for a 30-minute flight to Peterson

Field at Plains. The Agency aircrew that normally flew the DCI was puzzled

that the manuals made no mention of Peterson Field. Another call revealed

that it was not exactly Peterson Field; rather, it was Peterson’s field, Peterson

being a farmer who owned land at the edge of Plains.

In the planning stages of the first visit, Lehman and Carter’s press secretary,

Jody Powell, agreed that they should minimize press attention to the director’s

visit. This was intended to reinforce the nonpolitical nature of the briefings,

Powell having assured CIA that the governor wanted to avoid any appearance

of taking political advantage of the Agency briefing. However, with the growing number of reporters in Plains desperate for news and with the expected

helicopter arrival, it became obvious that the visit would not go unnoticed.

The press was, therefore, informed of the time and place of the director’s

arrival. Bush talked briefly with reporters after disembarking from the helicopter, enabling the rest of the party to unload the briefing materials and travel

the short distance to Carter’s home. Despite the original intentions of the planners, Lehman remembers that the visit “could not possibly have been more

conspicuous.”3

The first CIA session was highly publicized for another reason as well—it

was sandwiched into a week filled with other high-level briefings of the nominee. The Agency’s presentation occurred on Wednesday, 28 July, preceded by

a discussion of defense issues that lasted most of the day Monday, and a session with leading economists on Tuesday. Thursday was dedicated to a foreign

policy presentation by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Commenting on

this series of briefings in 1993, Carter remembered especially “the value of

Secretary Kissinger’s whole day of briefings.”

Carter himself drew added press attention to the Agency briefing by discussing it at some length with reporters the day before. On Tuesday the governor

informed newsmen that he had asked the CIA “to brief him on confidential

information concerning Lebanon and the Middle East, Rhodesia, South Africa,

and South Korea, plus the interrelationships between the United States, the

Soviet Union, and China.”4 He piqued reporters’ interest by volunteering that

3 Richard Lehman, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 10 March 1993. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent comments are also from this interview.
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he had not decided whether, if he were elected president, he would replace

Bush as CIA director. The governor noted that Bush had previously been

involved in Republican politics but added that he had “brought the CIA a good

background as former UN ambassador and US representative to China.” Carter

added his choice for CIA head would be a person “with stature with the American people, whose integrity was beyond doubt and with some analytic ability.”

CIA’s session with Carter began about 1:00 p.m. and continued without

interruption for a full six hours, adjourning about 7:00 p.m.5 The session

included a current intelligence review of world trouble spots: Lebanon, IraqiSyrian relations, strains between Egypt and Libya, the Taiwan Straits, Rhodesia, the Cuban presence in Angola, and developments in Uganda. These subjects were covered in approximately 30 minutes. The bulk of the afternoon

was devoted to a discussion of Soviet strategic programs and the status of the

SALT talks.

Bush made some brief introductory comments, but most of the briefing was

delivered by two Agency experts in strategic systems, Howard Stoertz and

Ray McCrory. The two provided a detailed description of Soviet forces for

intercontinental nuclear attack and for nuclear attack on the Eurasian periphery. Their presentation focused also on Soviet strategic defense capabilities

and US estimates of long-term prospects for the strategic balance. An ensuing

discussion of SALT compliance issues was very detailed; it included a

description of how monitoring was carried out and how the process worked

within the US government for determining whether a violation had occurred.

Participants from the Agency were surprised that the discussion of strategic

issues went on so long that they were forced to jettison plans to discuss Soviet

political developments, foreign policy, and the state of the Soviet economy.

Carter was a very careful and interested listener and an active participant.

All who were present remember that he asked a great many questions, often in

minute detail. He was especially interested in the nature of the Intelligence

Community’s evidence, including satellite photography of deployed Soviet

weapons. The governor asked detailed questions about the obligations of the

USSR and the United States under the interim agreement and about the truth

of the charges being made in the press that the Soviets were violating SALT I

understandings.

Carter’s running mate, Senator Walter “Fritz” Mondale, also attended the

briefing. He was especially interested in the role and knowledge of the Con4 Associated Press, 28 July 1976.

5 Richard Lehman, “First Briefing of Governor Carter,” memorandum for the record, 29 July 

1976.
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IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CARTER

gress in arms control issues. He wanted to understand precisely whether the

Soviets were justified in any of their charges that the United States had violated the SALT I agreement. Mondale also was well informed about and sensitive to the specific issue of whether Minuteman missile shelters constituted a

violation of the interim agreement.

A different set of questions from Mondale caused the CIA director some

concern because they raised sensitive policy issues. In some cases his queries

related to ongoing CIA relationships with foreign liaison services or the

Agency’s operations. Lehman noted in a memorandum for the record some

days after the July briefing that he had informed Carter aide Eizenstat that the

DCI had been uncomfortable with some of Mondale’s questions, particularly

those concerning covert action.6 Lehman explained that the director felt that

answering these questions would go beyond the guidelines set by President

Ford. He underscored that the DCI hoped to avoid being put in the position of

having to refuse to answer certain questions.

Carter, Mondale, and Eizenstat left with Agency officers a number of factual questions that there had not been time to discuss during the briefing. Lehman provided Eizenstat answers to some of these questions by telephone;

others were simply lost in the press of business. One matter about which

Carter asked showed he had carefully studied the foreign policy issues in

which John Kennedy had become involved during his candidacy some 16

years earlier. That was Taiwan and the offshore islands. Lehman consulted in

Washington before articulating precisely for the governor what the US commitment was to defending Quemoy, Matsu, and certain other territories. In

fact, this issue, which had been so important in the 1960 campaign, did not

play a significant role in 1976.

Agency officers were pleased when Eizenstat informed Lehman on 29 July,

the day following the initial session, that Carter had been “extremely pleased

with the briefings.” In response to Lehman’s question, Eizenstat indicated the

governor had no suggestions for any changes in the format, the level of detail,

or the length of the briefings, having described them as just right. Senior

Agency officers had been anxious, unable to believe that Carter really wanted

to sit through six hours of nonstop briefings. The participants had been

impressed not only with the governor’s endurance and interest but with the

hospitality he and Mrs. Carter had shown them. They were particularly touched

that Mrs. Carter brought in a bowl of peaches in the late afternoon, a welcome

diversion after several hours of briefings.

6 Richard Lehman, “Conversation with Stuart Eizenstat,” memorandum for the record, 3 August 

1976.
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The second major preelection briefing of Carter took place in Plains two

weeks later on 12 August. At least in the memory of one working-level officer

who took part, the most dramatic and memorable moment occurred not during

the session with Carter himself but during the helicopter flight from Fort Benning to Plains. Asked if he had had a difficult flight, he remembered, “Not at

all. It was fine. The problem was that during the short flight I realized I had

left my briefing materials back in the Operations Center at Headquarters. It

was your worst nightmare, going with the director to brief the man who may

be the next president and forgetting your materials.”

The rattled briefers were further shaken when they arrived. With some time

to spare before they were due at Carter’s home, they visited the Carter campaign headquarters where they were introduced to the governor’s mother, Lillian Carter. Upon meeting the CIA officers, Mrs. Carter volunteered that she

understood that “Jimmy was going to clear the government of all vestiges of

Republicans, including CIA Director Bush.” Her plainspoken prediction

reflected progressively more pointed comments the candidate had been making to the press about the possibility of replacing key government officials,

including Bush.

Bush himself was realistic and outwardly relaxed about the likelihood that

he would be replaced, joking about it with his CIA colleagues. The latter were

more apprehensive about the prospect that, if their boss were replaced, the job

would be “politicized.” They were acutely aware that the four previous presidents had not appointed a new DCI when they came into office. The last such

occasion had been Eisenhower’s appointment of Allen Dulles 24 years earlier.

Having learned in the first session that Carter was likely to ask numerous

and detailed questions, Bush brought eight CIA officers with him to the second briefing to ensure that the team could handle any subject the governor

might raise. Carter again asked that Mondale be present and this time also

included Eizenstat and Mondale’s foreign policy aide, David Aaron. Aaron’s

inclusion, at Carter’s request, helped relieve an awkward situation. Aaron had

shown up at the first session but had not been permitted to attend, as his role

was unclear. In time, he was to become the deputy national security advisor.

Zbigniew Brzezinski had not yet been named national security advisor and did

not attend any of the briefing sessions.

The substantive issues discussed during the second session related primarily

to the status of Soviet conventional forces and to developments in China. In

addition, an overview of current developments was provided that focused on

Greek-Turkish tensions, strains between Egypt and Libya, a recent Rhodesian

raid into Mozambique, the problems of Somalia and Djibouti, a recent

exchange of fire across the Demilitarized Zone in Korea, and civil strife in Leb-
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IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CARTER

anon. There was also considerable discussion, as at the first briefing, of Soviet

strategic programs and arms control negotiating issues. The status of Soviet

Backfire bomber and SS-X-20 missile programs was carefully reviewed.7

Obviously feeling more relaxed than he had in the earlier session, Bush led

off this second exchange with some more expansive general comments and

introductions of the other participants. Throughout the discussions he made

occasional comments, using to advantage his experience as US representative

in Beijing. Carter was again a very active participant with so many questions

and comments that the briefers were unable to cover the requested topics,

even though the session lasted from 11:00 a.m. until almost 5:00 p.m.

One of the participants remembers, “I was impressed with Carter. He was a

very, very quick study, able to digest immediately everything we gave

him—fact after fact. He seemed to have a photographic memory and would

often repeat back to us the points we had made to be absolutely sure that he

understood. He used his very detailed questions to be certain he understood

the nuances, which he described with precision when he rephrased the points

we had made.”8 The CIA participants, arrayed in a circle in Carter’s family

room, watched with fascination as the governor, from his corner of the room,

would spin the globe next to his chair as if to allow it to determine the country

about which he would ask next. By the time the afternoon was over they felt

they had covered the world.

In addition to pleasing his visitors with his obvious interest in the substance

of their business, Carter was a more relaxed host during the second session.

He adjourned the proceedings for an hour or so while Mrs. Carter served

lunch. The participants, during the break, spelled one another playing with

Amy Carter and her cat on the couch.

Toward the end of the briefing, Mondale made an unsolicited contribution

that greatly pleased the Agency officers in attendance. In remarks seemingly

directed both to Carter and Bush, Mondale expressed his respect for the

Agency. He said CIA had reformed itself completely over the last two years,

underscoring that this was a remarkable achievement for any government organization. Mondale was referring, of course, to the efforts CIA Directors Colby

and Bush had undertaken in the wake of the revelations of CIA misdeeds that

had been so widely publicized in the early 1970s. The senator’s background

enabled him also to make some perceptive and useful comments about the

nature of congressional review of the Intelligence Community and its budget.

7 Richard Lehman, “Briefing of Governor Carter, 12 August 1976,” memorandum for the record, 

16 August 1976.

8 Wayne Wolfe, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 13 December 1993.
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CHAPTER 4

Like candidates before and after them, Carter and Mondale were shown and

took an interest in certain unique CIA products. They were each given copies

of an Agency compilation of foreign, particularly Soviet, press commentary

on their candidacies. Carter was interested in studying some sample satellite

photography showing much of southwest Georgia. The governor seemed to

find tracking the geography of his home region a useful technique for understanding the capabilities of the imaging system.

Reflecting the governor’s insatiable interests, the Carter team had provided

CIA in advance of the briefing a list of 44 specific questions that they hoped

could be answered. A few of the questions raised delicate policy and operational issues, just as Mondale’s questions had done two weeks earlier. Because

the president had not approved the Agency’s discussion of these matters

before the election, the director reiterated the ground rules at the outset of the

briefing.

In fact, by the time the group turned to the list of 44 questions late in the

afternoon, time was running out and the awkward issue of political delicacy

did not have to be faced directly. In his memorandum for the record, Lehman

recorded that he was “able to give very brief, often one-sentence

answers...this moved so fast that our listeners were unable to check our

replies against their list of questions, probably a highly desirable thing.” As

Lehman’s comment implied, at the time it seemed sensible simply to stick to

the essential facts and avoid addressing the complicated policy issues, but the

matter was not that simple and did not go away.

Not only did the problem persist, it returned within a week, precipitated by

events in Korea. On 18 August a donnybrook over the removal of a tree from

the Demilitarized Zone dramatically raised tensions on the Peninsula. In the

days following that incident, Carter received a number of questions from the

press regarding his position on Korea and asked Eizenstat to call Lehman and

request a briefing on the situation. The available facts were fairly straightforward, and it was decided that a formal briefing was unnecessary. A senior

Agency analyst, John Whitman, briefed Eizenstat by telephone regarding

developments in North Korea and the Chinese and Soviet reactions.

Understandably in the circumstances, Eizenstat was interested also in the

status of US forces and in the US reaction to the heightened tensions but was

reminded that the president’s guidelines provided that the Agency should brief

only on foreign developments and not on US policy or actions. Eizenstat was

asked if he had channels to the Departments of State and Defense that he

could use to acquire the information that Carter needed. On hearing that such

channels did not exist, Whitman suggested that he or Carter might wish to
95

IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CARTER

contact Scowcroft. Eizenstat responded that the governor did not want to

approach Scowcroft “lest he [Carter] become enmeshed.”

Whitman recorded in a memorandum for the record that Eizenstat appreciated the prompt telephone update on Korea and that their exchange on the

ground rules of CIA’s liaison with the Carter team was an amiable one.9 Whitman also recorded: “It is nevertheless clear that, since we are their only official channel to the Executive Branch, dicey moments may occur in the

future.” In many similar circumstances over the years, CIA was to be the only

authorized ongoing link between a sitting administration and a presidential

candidate or president-elect of the other party. Agency officers have cherished

such opportunities, in part, for their implicit acknowledgment that CIA can be

trusted to provide information in a nonpolitical manner. At the same time,

however, they have often had concerns about whether this exclusive system

might not unduly limit an incoming administration.

Before the end of August 1976, separate briefings were also given the two

vice-presidential candidates. On 23 August, Bush and seven senior Agency

experts briefed Ford’s running mate, Senator Robert Dole, in a comprehensive

session that covered Soviet strategic programs and conventional forces. The

group also informed Dole of current intelligence related to the Korea crisis,

tensions between Egypt and Libya, and developments in South Africa and

Rhodesia. The senator’s questions related primarily to the military strengths of

the two sides in Korea.10

On 24 August, Whitman provided a briefing to Mondale and Aaron that

focused primarily on Soviet ICBM dismantling and destruction. He also covered developments in Korea and answered a number of questions from the

senator related to US satellite reconnaissance capabilities. On this occasion,

Aaron raised with Whitman the possibility of the Agency providing another

briefing along the lines of those given in Plains, this time focusing on the Middle East and southern Africa. Given Carter’s heavy schedule, the two discussed the possibility of providing such a briefing in Washington to Mondale,

Aaron, and Eizenstat,11 but there was no time available in the campaign schedule and the Carter-Mondale team received no further intelligence briefings

until after the election on 3 November.

In the 1976 campaign there were three 90-minute debates between candidates Ford and Carter. The resumption of debates during a presidential cam9 John Whitman, “Inquiry from Governor Carter on Korea,” memorandum for the record, 20 

August 1976.

10 John Whitman, “Briefing of Senator Dole,” memorandum for the record, 24 August 1976.

11 John Whitman, “Conversation with Senator Mondale,” memorandum for the record, 24 August 

1976.
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CHAPTER 4

paign after a 16-year hiatus raised concerns in the minds of senior Agency

executives, who had an all-too-clear memory of how CIA had been caught up

in the controversial issues raised in the Kennedy-Nixon encounters in 1960. In

July and August 1976, Agency officers were heartened by Carter’s repeated

reassurances that he did not want to take political advantage of intelligence

briefings and statements and that he wanted only to understand the facts to

avoid making mistakes.

In fact, two of the three presidential debates included virtually no discussion of foreign policy issues. The debate on 23 September in Philadelphia

focused on domestic and economic policy matters. The debate on 22 October

in Williamsburg, Virginia, contained only a very brief exchange on Yugoslavia, including specifically the question of the appropriate US response to a

possible post-Tito Soviet invasion of that country. The remainder of that

debate addressed domestic issues.

The one debate dedicated to foreign and defense issues was held on 6 October in San Francisco. Agency officers were relieved that the CIA and its programs did not become a big part of any of the key subjects discussed. These

included US leadership abroad, the proper level for the US defense budget, the

US position for future SALT talks, cooperation with authoritarian regimes,

grain sales to the Soviet Union, arms sales and peace negotiations in the Middle East, energy policy, proliferation, and the future of the Panama Canal.

CIA was mentioned only twice during the debate, both times by Carter as

part of his comments on integrity and leadership in foreign affairs. Early in the

debate the governor said, “I’ve traveled the last 21 months among the people

of this country. I’ve talked to them and I’ve listened. And I’ve seen at first

hand in a very vivid way the deep hurt that has come to this country in the

aftermath of Vietnam and Cambodia, Chile and Pakistan, and Angola and

Watergate, the CIA revelations.” There could be no doubt that he had carefully

planned this formulation: he used almost exactly the same words more than an

hour later in his closing statement, saying, “And we’ve been hurt in recent

years in this country in the aftermath of Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, Pakistan,

Angola, Watergate, CIA.”12

From the Agency’s point of view, Carter’s formulation was unfortunate. At

the same time, there was relief that he had made only passing references, that

the Intelligence Community’s activities had not become a bigger issue in the

campaign, and that the Agency’s operations and analyses had not become

entwined in discussion of the substantive issues. Thinking back on this spe12 New York Times, 7 October 1976, 36.
97

IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CARTER

cific issue in 1993, Carter commented that, in his mind, “Politicization of

intelligence was not a problem in the debates or otherwise.”

 Operational and Political Issues Arise

Three days following the election on 2 November, Bush telephoned Carter

to offer his congratulations and tender his resignation as CIA director. He told

Carter frankly that he was unclear about the protocol in such a situation and

asked if the president-elect would like a letter of resignation. Carter graciously

said that was not necessary and thanked Bush for his call.13

In the telephone conversation, Bush proposed they get together soon so he

could inform Carter about certain “exotic and very closely held items relating

to sources and methods.” Bush informed Carter of the kinds of support CIA

had offered past presidents-elect during periods of transition, describing specifically the office that had been set up for Nixon in New York in 1968. In

reply, the new president-elect said that he would be very interested in having

such a session. The two resolved to leave the arrangements to Lehman and

Eizenstat, as they had done for the preelection briefings.

The one postelection session with Carter that Bush chaired took place on

19 November. This meeting was another multihour session in which Bush was

assisted by a half-dozen senior officers. The most significant discussions of

the day, however, were in the first 45 minutes, during which Bush met privately with Carter and Mondale, accompanied only by his personal assistant,

Jennifer Fitzgerald. This group of four assembled in the little-used small living room in the Carter home while the larger group of aides from both sides

waited in the larger and more informal study.

Bush informed Carter that he wanted to discuss a personal matter and

reopened the question of the CIA directorship. The DCI reminded Carter that

there had been charges of politics when Bush was nominated to head CIA and

that he, Bush, felt that if he were to leave at the end of the Ford presidency

there might well be another political outcry. He elaborated, stating that, if he

were seen to have done a reasonable job, the charge could be made that replacing him had politicized the Agency. Bush volunteered that he could be helpful

in muting such criticism. He added that any CIA director needed to have

direct access to the president and cited occasions when he had used such

access to President Ford. Later Bush recorded that, after “weighing both the

political problem and the confidence/direct access problem that I felt clearly

13 George [H. W.] Bush, “President-Elect Jimmy Carter,” memorandum of conversation, 

6 November 1976.
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that I should leave and the President-elect should put his own man in the organization in whom he had confidence.”14

Whatever Bush’s intent may have been, his reopening the question of his

own tenure clearly surprised Carter, who had thought the matter settled when

Bush had telephoned him two weeks earlier. In 1993, Carter volunteered that

his impression from that exchange in 1976 was that “Bush wanted to be kept

on as DCI.” Parenthetically and laughingly, he added, “If I had agreed to that

[Bush] never would have become president. His career would have gone off

on a whole different track!”

Carter explained, “It would be good in general to have some overlap [of a

DCI serving from one president to the next]. But the job of DCI must be depoliticized. Bush was too political. That is why I selected Stan Turner. He didn’t

want the job, he wanted to be CNO [Chief of Naval Operations].”

Carter was unambiguous in his response after Bush finished his discussion

of the pros and cons of staying on as director. The DCI had finished with an

observation that—all things considered—he probably should be replaced. The

president-elect, according to Bush, “simply said ‘Okay,’ or something like

this, with no discussion, no questions about any of the points I had made....

As in the rest of the briefing, Carter was very cold or cool, no editorializing,

no niceties, very business-like.” Bush also noted that Mondale at this point

“spoke up and rather generously said that things had gotten better since I’d

been there.” The three concluded with a discussion of the timing of the

announcement of a new CIA director-designate.

Given Carter’s expressed views on the politicization issue, senior Agency

officers later found it ironic that his first choice for CIA Director was Theodore Sorensen, the former Kennedy political adviser and speechwriter.

Sorensen was nominated on 24 December but in mid-January withdrew his

name because of mounting criticism that he had played a very political role in

the Kennedy administration.

His private session with Carter gave Bush the opportunity to inform the

president-elect of a variety of sensitive human-source and technical collection

programs. In the first such session since Kennedy was briefed by Allen Dulles

on covert action activities in Cuba, the DCI took 30 minutes or more to inform

Carter of specific operational undertakings he needed to be aware of early in

his presidency. He also showed Carter and Mondale samples of reporting from

sensitive sources, underscoring that the lives of CIA assets were literally at

stake. Bush underscored that if the president-elect felt he needed additional

information he could, of course, contact CIA.

14 George [H. W.] Bush, memorandum of conversation, 22 November 1976.
99

IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CARTER

The DCI also used the occasion of the small group meeting to show the

president-elect a copy of the President’s Daily Brief. He described the distribution of the publication and informed Carter that President Ford had

approved providing it to him on a daily basis starting immediately. This subject was to be discussed further in the larger briefing session.

In all, Bush described to the president-elect more than a dozen sensitive

CIA programs and issues. At the time of the briefing, and when discussing it

President Jimmy Carter welcomes DCI-designate VAdm. Stansfield Turner.
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some 17 years after the fact, Bush was puzzled that Carter had virtually no

comment and asked no questions during the whole session. He had not indicated whether he thought the operations were good or bad, or that he was surprised or not surprised. He asked for no follow-up action or information. Bush

commented that Carter “seemed a little impatient; he didn’t say much but

seemed to be a little turned off. He tended to moralize.”15

In fact, Carter was “turned off” and uncomfortable with many of the

Agency’s sensitive collection programs. He ordered some discontinued during

the brief period when Henry Knoche served as acting director from late January to early March 1977. There was only one item raised in the discussion of

sensitive matters between Bush and Carter to which the president-elect

reacted positively. Somewhat incongruously, Bush had taken with him to

Plains a letter to the president-elect from John Harper, rector of St. John’s

Episcopal Church in Washington, DC, inviting President Carter to worship

there. Without a moment’s thought, the president-elect said that he felt sure he

would be able to do this.

Bush was obviously relieved when the smaller session was finished and he

and Carter joined the larger group for the substantive briefings. The DCI

recorded that Carter, in the larger session that followed, “was very attentive,

listening intently and showing much more warmth in the bigger meeting than

in the smaller.... He called the briefers by their first names. Actually, he

referred to me a little more in this briefing than he did in the earlier ones

where I had the distinct feeling he was somewhat uncomfortable with my

being there.”

During the larger group session on the afternoon of 19 November, Carter

and Mondale were briefed on the US Intelligence Community in more detail

than had been given any other president-elect before or since. Recalling the

session in 1993, Bush said, “I felt that a president-elect should get a formal

briefing early on how intelligence works—what the assets are, what’s available real time, methodology, sources and methods protection, etc.” If Bush

was the inspiration for the session, the bulk of the actual briefing was by Knoche, then deputy director of central intelligence, and Adm. Daniel Murphy,

director of the Intelligence Community Staff.

The two primary briefers discussed the priorities and budget of the Intelligence Community and the array of satellites and aircraft that comprised its

technical intelligence reconnaissance program. There was considerable discussion of the CIA’s management of its covert action programs. Knoche

ensured that the governor was aware of the procedures involved with authoriz15 George H. W. Bush, interview by the author in Kennebunkport, Maine, 6 May 1993.
101

IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CARTER

ing such programs, including the director’s authorities, the role of the Operations Advisory Group and the oversight responsibilities of the Congress. He

discussed CIA’s clandestine intelligence collection efforts and showed the

governor examples of some of the technical collection gear used by CIA

assets abroad. Knoche also spent some time discussing the Agency’s unique

contacts with foreign leaders and how CIA activities abroad are coordinated

with the US ambassador in the country concerned.

The group reviewed the history of the CIA from the time of the Office of

Strategic Services, emphasizing how intelligence priorities, programs, and

resource levels had evolved through the decades of the 1950s and 1960s and

until 1976. As a result of this extended discussion, Carter came to the presidency with a more detailed understanding of the capabilities and activities of

the US Intelligence Community than any previous president had possessed at

that early stage.

During the afternoon session there was also a discussion of selected substantive issues in which Carter had specifically indicated an interest. These

included the politics of OPEC and the international petroleum situation. As in

the preelection sessions, the Agency’s director of current intelligence provided

an update on crisis areas: Lebanon, the Arab-Israeli situation, the Horn of

Africa, Rhodesia, and Soviet-Polish tensions. The governor was also provided

an oral briefing and written information regarding Soviet views and statements on the incoming administration, specifically related to the politics of

arms control.16

Throughout the day, Carter continued to be an active participant in the discussions; he and Mondale both had numerous comments and questions about

the Soviet topics. They had received communications from Soviet General

Secretary Brezhnev and Ambassador Dobrynin and were interested in discussing the meaning and implications of those messages. The president- and vice

president-elect repeatedly sought to clarify whether one dared rely on Soviet

statements. Bush and Lehman, a long-time CIA Soviet expert, came away

from the session pleased at the depth of Carter’s interest in Soviet matters.

They appreciated the perceptive questions he asked but also thought he had

some decidedly naive and unrealistic ideas about the Soviet Union. Lehman

recalled in 1993 that, while Carter clearly understood the issues in an abstract

way, he “obviously had no comprehension of the Soviet system as it actually

worked. Later, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, it was as if the scales

had dropped from his eyes.”

16 Richard Lehman, “Briefing of the President-elect,” memorandum for the record, 19 November 

1976. 
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Lehman at one point offered to have Agency specialists prepare a paper for

Carter on the subject of how the Soviet system worked. Back in Washington,

with the paper in preparation, Lehman was discouraged when Mondale

adviser Aaron called “with glee” to report that the president-elect had declined

to have the paper prepared after all. Unintentionally, perhaps, senior Agency

officers had got themselves in the middle of some delicate maneuvering

among Carter’s advisers regarding who would have the new president’s ear

regarding how he should look at the Soviet Union and its leaders.

The last item of the day was to clarify with the governor whether he wished

to receive the PDB on a daily basis in Plains. Bush had extended President

Ford’s offer during their private session several hours earlier, and Carter

apparently had been pondering it throughout the afternoon briefings. When

Lehman raised the question again before their departure, Carter accepted

Ford’s offer and said the sample copy that had been shown him looked useful.

Lehman noted that, although Aaron objected—presumably because he would

not be present—the decision was made to station a CIA officer in Plains to

provide the PDB. This daily support began on 29 November.

Knoche, the most active player on the Agency’s side, came away from the

19 November session predicting that CIA would find “a good customer and

champion of intelligence during Carter’s incumbency in the White House.”

Lehman recorded that “the general tone of the entire session was extremely

friendly and as intense as the previous ones.” For his part, the president-elect,

during an unusual public session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said on 23 November: “President Ford has been very gracious to me in

letting me meet with his key leaders.... I have had a complete briefing from

the CIA which will be set up on a daily basis from now on.”17

With Carter having clarified his intention to replace Bush as DCI during the

19 November meeting, the director on 24 November publicly announced his

resignation. To no one’s surprise, the novelty of a newly elected president

promptly replacing the CIA director led the press to read the most ominous

possible interpretation into the announcement. Evans and Novak, for example,

opined that “the departure of George Bush from the CIA sooner than anybody

expected...stems from the nature of his encounter with President-elect Carter

during the transition.” The journalist team wrote that “Bush’s six-hour intelligence briefing of Carter at Plains on November 19 was called a ‘disaster’ by

one Carter insider.” They cited a “key Carterite” as telling them that “Jimmy

just wasn’t impressed with Bush.”18

17 Jimmy Carter, “President-elect Jimmy Carter’s Views Concerning Foreign Policy,” Briefing 

Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 23 November 1976.

18 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Washington Post, 27 November 1976.
103

IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CARTER

The Evans-Novak article appeared on a Saturday morning. By midafternoon, Jody Powell telephoned Bush to report that Carter had asked him to pass

along his feeling that the article was all nonsense (in fact using a more graphic

term to characterize the nonsense). Powell expressed Carter’s very high regard

for Bush and indicated the president-elect would be making a statement personally to set the record straight. At the same time, Aaron telephoned Knoche

to pass along much the same message and to underscore that Carter was very

high on CIA. Agency personnel were heartened on 29 November when Carter

released a statement describing as “completely untrue” reports that he was displeased with the caliber of the briefings he had received from the outgoing CIA

director. Powell added on that date that Carter had found the briefings “professional, competent, and most helpful.”19

In discussing the sessions during an interview in 1994, Ambassador Mondale recalled that Carter had been particularly fond of the briefings and

focused on the material “with extraordinary intensity.” He remembered with a

smile that “a fellow named George Bush came down” to Plains to guide them

through “stacks of maps and graphs and other data.” Mondale observed that

he and Carter found the sessions “extremely useful in helping to understand

the realities of foreign events at the time.”20

A final briefing session was held in Plains on 3 December, without the DCI

and the large contingent of experts. Lehman recalls, “I traveled to Plains

alone. It was pouring rain, there was a cordon of Secret Service at the governor’s home and he was in the house alone; no servants, no staff, nobody. For

two and a half hours we roamed over a wide range of intelligence business and

certain substantive issues.” Two additional sessions were held on 9 and 10

December at Blair House in Washington, DC. Lehman was also the briefer at

these sessions, which were abbreviated but included the usual mix of agenda

items touching on intelligence operations and developments abroad. Bush

stopped by the session on 9 December to give Carter a 20-minute update on a

half-dozen sensitive operational developments and to inquire how the briefings were going. Carter expressed his satisfaction with the support he was

receiving, including in Plains. He good-naturedly refused to be drawn out on

who would be appointed DCI.

19 United Press International, 29 November 1976.

20 Walter Mondale, interview by an Agency officer in Tokyo, Japan, 15 April 1994.
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Carter’s Use of the President’s Daily Brief

Immediately after the Thanksgiving holiday, the Agency began to send the

PDB to Carter in Plains on a daily basis. This established another precedent in

terms of the level of support provided a president-elect during the transition

period. Each morning at 6:30, a copy of exactly the same document that was

about to be shown President Ford was faxed to Plains by the White House

Communications Agency. At the Georgia end, CIA had stationed a midlevel

officer who was responsible for receiving the document and delivering it to

Carter personally at 8:00.

The CIA officer who met with Carter was John Biddiscomb, an imagery

specialist from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Biddiscomb was

selected because he would be adept at answering any questions Carter had on

the satellite photography that was sent to Plains along with the text of the daily

current intelligence items. It was not thought that the Agency should station a

more senior substantive expert in Plains, in part, because Carter’s foreign

affairs advisers were in Atlanta or Washington and were uneasy at the prospect that the daily sessions might turn into extended substantive discussions in

which they were not involved. Carter was a punctual and interested reader. He

would arrive at his office each morning at 8:00 to meet Biddiscomb and would

typically spend 30 to 45 minutes reading through the day’s current intelligence. Biddiscomb recalls that Carter always extended a warm welcome and

was appreciative of the material made available to him. He showed particular

interest in items on the Soviet Union and international petroleum matters.21

As the weeks went along, Carter was sent a considerable volume of supplementary material in addition to the PDB. This material included biographies

of key world leaders, more detailed information on crises abroad, and the

reactions of foreign governments to the new US administration. When Carter

had finished reading the PDB or other material, he would initial it with a “JC.”

At the conclusion of each day’s session, Biddiscomb would telephone Lehman at CIA with feedback on Carter’s interests and to pass along any questions that the governor may have had.

The Agency’s continuous presence in Plains gave it an unusual degree of

access to the president-elect. The ground rules in Plains were that only Biddiscomb and Carter’s own appointments secretary had the authority to call him

directly at any time. In fact, CIA did not exercise this prerogative of special

access with the exception of one occasion on which Biddiscomb contacted

Carter late one evening to pass along a message from Aaron in Washington.

While Biddiscomb appreciated Carter’s graciousness and the access he was

21 John Biddiscomb, telephone interview by the author, 28 April 1993.
105

IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CARTER

granted, there was throughout the period a continuing formality to the earlymorning sessions that did not really permit the establishment of a familiar

relationship with the president-elect.

The occasional light moments that occurred arose typically when Carter’s

brother, Billy, would put in an appearance at the president-elect’s office. On

one occasion Billy inquired of his brother whether he had permission to ask the

CIA to “take care of some of these reporters” who were becoming a bit oppressive. Ever cautious, the president-elect said, “You'll have to ask Mr. Biddiscomb about that.” Biddiscomb wisely replied that the Agency had its hands full

dealing with reporters itself and probably could not be much help. In reality,

Biddiscomb was relieved that the press contingent in Georgia showed very little interest in the CIA presence, once it had become clear that it was a routine

daily operation that would result in no announcements to the press. He had

made no particular efforts to avoid the press, which in any case would have

been impossible in the setting. Not infrequently, for example, he found himself

in a local restaurant surrounded by reporters and Secret Service officers. On

one occasion, the president-elect and his family were there as well.

When Lehman briefed Carter in Plains on 3 December and during his visit

to Washington on 9 December, the first item on his agenda was to elicit

Carter’s reaction to the PDB and the supplementary material he had been

receiving since Thanksgiving.22 Lehman’s memorandums for the record make

clear that Carter did not find the PDB satisfactory. The governor was aware

that no changes would be made until after his inauguration on 21 January, but

he underscored that he would expect changes, once that date arrived. Carter

stressed that he was “a voracious reader of the press” and would prefer a publication that contained only items not covered in the newspapers.

During their first discussion of the PDB format, Lehman left with Carter

samples of PDBs that had been prepared for the last four presidents to illustrate some of the different options available. As a first step, Carter asked Lehman to experiment with the supplemental material, adding longer pieces with

more background material. These were to include “insights into proposals that

might be coming from other countries,” for example those relating to Middle

East peace negotiations. Carter also asked on that date for additional biographical material on foreign leaders. Lehman left with him a collection of

biographies on key Chinese officials.

By the time Carter and Lehman met at Blair House on 10 December, it was

obvious the president-elect was a little impatient that he would have to wait

22 Richard Lehman, “Briefing of the President-elect,” memorandum for the record, 13 December 

1976.
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until January to receive the publications in the form he preferred. A big part of

the problem seemed to be that the PDB being prepared for the outgoing president appeared in a different format than the material prepared for the president-elect in the separate supplement. The governor was reading both but was

unhappy. Lehman’s reaction was to direct that for the next few weeks CIA

should print the supplement in the same format as the PDB and transmit both

to Plains at the same time and as one package so that they would look alike to

the governor. Following the inauguration, the supplement could be dropped

and all appropriate material published in the PDB in whatever format the governor preferred.

On 10 December, Lehman also took the opportunity to introduce David

Peterson, the CIA officer responsible for the production of the PDB. Lehman

indicated that Peterson would deliver the PDB to Governor Carter the next

time he came to Washington. In his memorandum for the record, Lehman,

obviously mindful of the Agency’s practice earlier in the Ford administration,

noted that he hoped to develop a situation in which Peterson would be briefing

the president every morning after the inauguration, adding that he had not yet

suggested this to the Carter entourage. During their first meeting, Carter

remarked to Peterson that he liked the PDB but would want to talk with him

further about its contents at a later time, probably after the inauguration.23

Carter seemed to enjoy and benefit from the substantive discussions held at

Blair House during his visits to Washington in the transition period. In the presence of more senior Agency officers in Washington, he was considerably more

expansive in his comments than he was during the daily current intelligence

sessions in Plains. In these relatively informal and relaxed sessions, the president-elect was even able occasionally to find some humor in the intelligence he

was provided, joking among other things about the positive statements Libyan

leader Qadhafi was making about the upcoming Democratic administration in

Washington. Carter commented in 1993 that he remembered the Blair House

sessions as being very useful to him—not only the briefings provided by CIA

but also one given him by representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The JCS briefers had met with Carter at Blair House to go over with him his

responsibilities in the event of nuclear attack. Carter recalls taking particular

pride in insisting that the vice president-elect also receive this briefing in order

to prepare for the eventuality that he might need to discharge those weighty

responsibilities. To Carter’s knowledge, vice presidents had not previously

been briefed in such a way.

23 David Peterson, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 4 March 1993.
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IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CARTER

During the last of the Blair House sessions, Carter settled on a version of

the PDB that he liked. The format he selected was notable primarily for the

large amount of white space on the page—space in which he could write

notes. On Inauguration Day, 20 January, Peterson met with Carter and presented him the first issue of the PDB printed in the new format.

With Bush having resigned effective 20 January, it fell to Acting DCI Knoche to meet with the new president and his national security advisor, Zbigniew

Brzezinski, the next day to brief them on a sensitive satellite collection capability that had not previously been discussed. On that occasion Carter affirmed

to Knoche personally that he wanted him to act as DCI until a successor was

confirmed (Sorensen by that time had withdrawn his name). Carter expressed

his pride in CIA and indicated that Knoche had his full confidence. A bit more

than two weeks later, on 5 February, Carter telephoned Knoche to inform him

that Adm. Stansfield Turner would be nominated to be the next director.

Carter used the occasion of the first meeting of the National Security Council on 22 January to underscore to all attendees the importance of the PDB,

which he thought had “sharpened in focus in recent days.”24 Confirming again

that he had been disappointed by earlier versions that he found wordy and “no

different from the New York Times,” he asked Knoche to ensure that the publication continued to be “sharp and focused, brief and clear as to what the intelligence is.” Carter directed that Knoche should disseminate the PDB only to

him, the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, and the national

security advisor, at the same time informing both secretaries that their deputies would not receive it.

Brzezinski and Aaron had not been seeing the PDB during the transition

period, so it fell to Peterson to talk with them following the inauguration to

familiarize them with the publication and procedures for distributing it. Carter

had obviously been discussing his preferences with Brzezinski, because the

latter reiterated Carter’s guidelines for the publication, underscoring that it

should not repeat material available in the newspapers.

The new president quickly put into place a system for keeping himself

informed of developments abroad on a day-to-day basis that was very similar

to the process Ford used. That is, he preferred to start each morning with a

one-on-one meeting with his national security advisor. Carter later wrote in

his memoirs:

The PDB Zbig brought to me each morning was a highly secret document, distributed to only five people...Zbig and I would discuss the

report and other developments relating to defense and foreign

24 Henry Knoche, Memorandum for the Record, “PDB,” 24 January 1977.
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CHAPTER 4

affairs. Often, while he was still present, I would call the Secretary

of State or the Secretary of Defense on a secure telephone to obtain

additional information or get their opinions. They, too, were early

risers, always at their desks by seven o'clock.25

The downside of this system from the CIA perspective was that the

Agency’s briefing officer was not present when the president read through the

day’s current intelligence. In discussing this set of procedures in 1993, Carter

evinced awareness that the system he adopted had the effect of denying CIA

immediate feedback on his reactions and questions, but made clear he thought

good management demanded that he work through the national security advisor. Carter remembered, “Zbig was enough day-to-day. I read the PDB and the

Secretary of State’s Morning Report. I wanted Brzezinski to draw to my attention things I needed to do something about. If [Secretary of Defense] Harold

Brown could handle a matter and I didn’t need to be aware of it that was fine.”

In fact, the CIA received considerably more feedback from Carter than it

had from Ford. Heartening evidence that this would be the case appeared

within days of the inauguration, because the president frequently wrote com25 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 55.

National Security Advisor Zbignew Brzezinski and President Carter confer

over the day’s edition of the President’s Daily Brief.
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IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH CARTER

ments on his copy of the PDB. But this practice was to create another minor

problem.

Peterson would deliver the PDB to Brzezinski each morning, retrieve the

previous day’s edition, and note down any reactions Carter may have

expressed to Brzezinski. On 31 January, Brzezinski informed Peterson that he

would no longer be able to return to the Agency the president’s copy of the

PDB.26 Brzezinski showed Peterson the issue for Saturday, 29 January, on

which the president had written several action directives and questions

addressed to Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Brzezinski

decreed that these presidential notations demanded that the original copies of

the PDBs should be securely stored at the White House. CIA had no problem

with this procedure because Brzezinski offered assurances that the Agency

would be informed of the president’s annotations whenever his comments

related to the substance of the intelligence.

Peterson recalls that the president often wrote on the PDB and that the copies were shown to him as promised. Carter’s notations usually were instructions to his senior policymakers. Such directives obviously were properly the

property of the president, the National Security Council staff, and the Departments of State and Defense. For planning purposes, however, it proved very

useful to the Agency to be informed of these directives in order that timely

and relevant intelligence could be provided to the president.

In the months that followed, Carter initiated one other practice that was

immensely valuable in keeping the CIA informed of his policy and intelligence interests and opened opportunities for the Intelligence Community to

provide useful service to the new president. When Turner took up the post of

DCI in mid-March, he began—at the president’s invitation—a practice of personally providing Carter in-depth weekly briefings on a subject of particular

interest. The Agency had not had such an opportunity since the period when

DCI “Beedle” Smith regularly briefed President Harry Truman. The five intervening presidents had been briefed in varying ways, sometimes frequently and

in depth, but never in the systematic way that the Agency was able to establish

with Carter.

In thinking back over the intelligence support he received, Carter in 1993

recalled that he valued Turner’s briefings highly, even though they were later

to slip from their regular weekly schedule. He noted, “From the daily material—the PDB—I selected the items I wanted discussed in more detail the next

week by the DCI. I particularly remember the briefings I received on confes26 David Peterson, “White House Copy of the PDB,” memorandum for the record, 31 January 

1977.
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sional and political groups in Lebanon, on a new imaging system, and on the

South African nuclear program.”

Carter began his presidency with a deep understanding of intelligence. He

had received in-depth briefings on developments abroad and on the most sensitive operations of the US Intelligence Community. He had received daily

current intelligence support—the PDB—during the transition period that continued once he was in office. Throughout his presidency he received weekly

substantive briefings. In the course of four years, Carter was to enjoy great

foreign policy successes, like the Camp David Accords, and to suffer great

disappointments, as with the Iranian seizure of US hostages. Throughout it all,

he received an unprecedented level of detailed intelligence information.

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CHAPTER 5

REAGAN AND BUSH - A STUDY IN CONTRASTS

The 12-year period from 1980 to 1992 presented CIA with two presidents

who were virtual polar opposites in terms of their familiarity with and use of

intelligence. Governor Ronald Reagan of California had the least experience

as a regular consumer of national-level intelligence of any president elected

since CIA was founded; Ambassador George H. W. Bush, on the other hand,

was completely familiar and comfortable with intelligence in a way that only a

former DCI could be. Reagan brought to the presidency deep convictions

about key national security issues and felt the need for only limited, very general intelligence information. Bush approached developments abroad as a

pragmatic activist and expected from the Intelligence Community an unprecedented level of day-to-day support and detail. Both, however, received

Agency officers warmly and were openly appreciative of their support.

Before the election, candidate Reagan received only one intelligence briefing. It was held on 4 October 1980 at Wexford, a borrowed country estate near

Middleburg, Virginia, where the governor was staying for a period during the

campaign. The DCI, Adm. Stansfield Turner, accompanied by three senior

Agency officers, represented CIA. Reagan was accompanied by vice-presidential candidate George Bush; his transition chief of staff Ed Meese; campaign director William Casey; and Richard Allen, his adviser on national

security matters.

Participants in that first briefing remember it as a “circus.” The living room

of the Middleburg home where the session was held was like a chaotic movie

set with chairs scattered more or less randomly about the room and people

constantly coming and going. The governor was an engaging host, but in the

impossible setting it was extraordinarily difficult to make effective use of the

briefing aids and other materials that Turner had brought with him. Throughout the meeting, which went on for approximately one hour, the CIA participants had the feeling that the Reagan camp had accepted the briefing simply

because it had been offered and they had to do it. There was no evidence that

anyone had the expectation that the governor would engage in an in-depth

review of the substantive issues.
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Even in these awkward circumstances there was some serious discussion of

developments in the Middle East, the agreed focus of the session. Turner discussed the petroleum aspects of the issue and the conflicts between Iran and

Iraq and in Afghanistan. National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East

Robert Ames briefed on the internal politics of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Richard

Lehman, from the National Intelligence Council, elaborated on the impact of

the Iran-Iraq war on the region and on the Soviet role.

Reagan posed a few questions to be sure that he understood the essential

points the Agency was trying to make. He asked straightforward, common

sense questions, primarily related to the oil situation. Agency participants

were interested to observe that there was absolutely nothing ideological in the

governor’s approach and that no policy issues arose.

Richard Allen asked the most questions, including some related to Afghanistan that put the DCI on the spot. In replying to a direct question from Allen

about whether the US government was engaged in supplying arms to the

insurgents in Afghanistan, Turner felt obliged to be more elliptical than he

would have preferred. The DCI left no doubt in the listeners’ minds that the

United States was supporting the insurgents through Pakistan, but he also tried

to make clear that this was a very sensitive covert action program that he was

not in a position to describe in detail, inasmuch as the governor was still a candidate for the presidency rather than president-elect.

In recalling his exchange with Reagan in 1993, Turner commented that his

reticence on the Afghan program had a serious substantive aspect as well. In

early October 1980, the “Afghan story had not yet leaked and we were scared

about Pakistan’s position.”1 Turner’s concerns reflected the fact that, particularly during the early years of the Afghan conflict, the US government was

concerned lest Pakistan become the ultimate casualty of a US program, undertaken with vital Pakistani cooperation, to expel Soviet forces from Afghanistan. This concern for security had to be weighed against Turner’s larger

motive in providing as much information as possible to Reagan “because we

didn’t want him saying something he would regret if he became president.”

The press had been informed in advance that Reagan would receive an intelligence briefing on the Middle East on 4 October. Reporters were eagerly

awaiting the candidate’s reaction, knowing the briefing was potentially politically significant inasmuch as Reagan had previously criticized the Carter

administration for its failure to have done more to support the late shah of Iran.

In fact, after the briefing, Reagan left it to Bush to discuss the session with the

1 Stansfield Turner, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 20 April 1993. Subsequent quotations from Turner also come from this interview.
113

REAGAN AND BUSH - A STUDY IN CONTRASTS

press. The latter called the discussion “pure intelligence and said that neither he

nor Mr. Reagan intended to use the information as ammunition to criticize

President Carter.”2 Bush added that he was “impressed” with the information.

“I feel better informed about the world,” he told reporters, “I can’t tell you I

feel more optimistic about it.” For his part, Reagan declined to discuss the

briefing with newsmen, although he did characterize it as “most interesting.”

The one presidential debate held during the 1980 campaign that involved

the candidates of the major parties was held in Cleveland, Ohio, on 28 October, some three weeks after Reagan’s intelligence briefing. At least half of the

90-minute debate was devoted to developments abroad and US national security policy. The international portion of the debate was largely a discussion of

Middle East issues: Arab-Israeli peace negotiations; Persian Gulf oil; the terrorist threat, specifically that from Iran related to the ongoing hostage crisis;

the Iran-Iraq war; and weapons proliferation. Agency officers were relieved

that during this extended discussion there was, unlike the situation four years

earlier in 1976, no mention whatever of CIA.

In response to a question from the moderator of the debate on what he

might do to deal with terrorism, Reagan made clear that he did not want to

“say anything that would inadvertently delay in any way the return of those

hostages” and that he was fearful he might “say something that was presently

under way or in negotiation and thus expose it and endanger the hostages.” He

also made clear that he did not have “access to the information in which I

would know all the options that are open.”3 Senior Agency officers were not

surprised that the governor would handle the hostage issue this way during the

debate; they had been struck—and remembered their reaction clearly in

1993—that there had been no discussion whatever of the hostage issue during

their briefing of the candidate two weeks earlier.

Ironically, in light of the highly charged politics of the hostage issue that

would ensue in succeeding years, the only discussion of the issue that

occurred during CIA’s formal briefings in the preelection period in 1980

occurred not with Reagan but with third-party candidate John Anderson. On

Sunday afternoon, 5 October, Turner and three senior Agency officers spent

two hours providing Anderson the same briefing on the Middle East that had

been given to Reagan the previous day. In 1993, Turner recounted that on that

occasion Anderson reported to him that he had been approached by an Iranian

intermediary who raised the possibility of an arms-for-hostages exchange with

Iran. The DCI promptly reported this approach to the State Department and

took no further action himself.

2 New York Times, 5 October 1980, 34. 3 Ibid., 29 October 1980, A27. 
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Those involved in the briefing of Anderson recall it as a deeply substantive

and intellectual discussion that went on without interruption for more than two

hours. Anderson impressed the Agency officers with a number of perceptive

and informed questions. Turner recalled vividly the contrast between the Reagan and Anderson briefings, saying that he received “more sensible questions

from Anderson than we got from the Reagan people.” 

Postelection Briefings

In response to the Agency’s standing invitation, Reagan aide Ed Meese

telephoned Turner some two weeks following the November election to

arrange for intelligence support for the new president-elect. Although Reagan

himself was to divide his time between Washington and California, his transition staff had set up offices in Washington, and it was decided that the director’s follow-on briefings should be given in the capital. As the scheduling

worked out, these sessions occurred on 19 and 20 November at the townhouse

Reagan used as his headquarters on Jackson Place, near the White House.

Briefings were also provided on 11 December and 15 January at Blair House,

the much larger and more elaborate presidential guest house across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House.

It was decided to devote the first of the postelection briefings to an update

on the Middle East, inasmuch as it had been more than six weeks since the last

meeting with Reagan in early October. In his opening remarks Turner

described the structure and functions of the various elements of the US Intelligence Community. He then turned the floor over to the Agency’s assistant

NIO for the Middle East, Martha Neff Kessler, who did the bulk of the substantive briefing.

Thinking back on the session in 1993, Kessler remembered primarily how

Turner, Lehman, and she were invited to join the president-elect and his staff

around the dining room table of the Jackson Place townhouse but that the

room was already so crowded with Reagan aides that it was all but impossible

to even sit down. The result was that while Kessler was able literally to rub

elbows with Reagan and Bush simultaneously, she was unable to open the

briefing book. She gave a more spontaneous and informal briefing than might

otherwise have been the case.

In contrast to the briefing provided six weeks earlier, Kessler recalled that, in

late November, Reagan was an active participant who posed a number of questions regarding Middle East peace issues. He focused on the Golan Heights,

Syrian and Palestinian politics, and relations among the various Middle East

countries. According to Kessler, Reagan’s questions “reflected considerable
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REAGAN AND BUSH - A STUDY IN CONTRASTS

knowledge. He was by no means a rightwing ideologue as the press charged.

He was very current and extremely alert.”4 Allen also asked a number of questions, and his often had an edge. Bush, who had been instrumental in setting up

these sessions, made a number of comments elaborating on CIA activities.

Participants in the briefing on 19 November remember it as one of the more

notable cases when an analytic prediction provided to a president came true. In

the course of her discussion of the high stakes of the ongoing Middle East

negotiations, Kessler remarked, “We could lose Sadat.” Reagan interrupted,

“What do you mean, lose Sadat?” to which Kessler replied that he could be

overthrown or killed. Her concerns were based on her assessment of the tensions in the region rather than on any specific intelligence reporting. Tragically,

this premonition was to come to pass less than a year later, in October 1981.

The session held the following day, 20 November, also took place in the

crowded Jackson Place townhouse. It was to have been a review of the USSoviet strategic force balance, the NATO–Warsaw Pact conventional force

4 Martha Neff Kessler, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 30 March 1993.

President Ronald Reagan talks with veteran CIA analyst Peter Dixon Davis.
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CHAPTER 5

balance, the Soviet threat to Poland, and developments in Central America. In

fact, no systematic briefing occurred at all. Instead, there was a general and

relatively brief discussion of the Soviet threat to Poland and the situation in

Central America.

Reagan's expressed interests during the session on 20 November included

the relationship between the Soviets’ involvement in Eastern Europe and their

ability to pursue their interests in other parts of the world. He was well

informed on Mexico’s role in Central America, Cuba, and the region, attributing this to his California background. Concerning both Central America and

Eastern Europe, the president-elect’s comments often addressed the policy

aspects of what the United States was doing and should do. Obliged to demur

on the policy questions, the CIA briefers came away concerned about whether

they had been very helpful.

By the time of the briefing on 11 December, the Reagan team had relocated

its operation to Blair House, which provided a much better setting for an organized presentation. The Agency’s primary briefer on that occasion was Douglas Diamond, a specialist on the Soviet economy who had been one of the

briefers of President Jimmy Carter in Plains four years earlier. Diamond later

recalled that the briefing covered not only the Soviet economy, but also the

implications of the economic situation for the USSR’s military programs, the

US-Soviet strategic balance, and the Sino-Soviet situation. He found Reagan a

friendly and interested recipient who raised a number of factual questions. On

the other hand, Diamond also remembered in 1993 that “the sun certainly

didn’t go down on this briefing like it had in Plains.”5 It was brief, reflecting

the dramatically contrasting styles of Reagan and Carter. Participants recall

that Turner was careful to provide “a Ronald Reagan-type briefing, not a Carter

briefing” in terms of the length and level of generality as well as its emphasis.

The CIA director’s briefings of the president-elect during November and

December were made somewhat awkward by the running speculation in the

media about whether Turner would be replaced and by whom. As the weeks

passed, the press more and more frequently suggested that campaign director

Casey would be appointed DCI. One attendee at the November briefings

recalled that, in these ambiguous circumstances, Turner simply “talked as

though he expected to be kept on as DCI.”6 Another remembered Casey saying to Turner, following one of the November briefings, “You are doing

exactly the right thing” in proceeding as if he would stay on as DCI.7

5 Douglas Diamond, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 28 April 1993.

6 Lehman interview, 10 March 1993.

7 Kessler interview, 30 March 1993. 
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REAGAN AND BUSH - A STUDY IN CONTRASTS

From the CIA perspective, it was never clear exactly when Reagan and

Casey finally decided on the CIA directorship. Within a three-week period in

November and December, Casey at first denied to Turner the press stories that

he would become DCI; later, before the briefing of 11 December, he telephoned Turner to confirm that indeed the press stories were true. At the conclusion of the session on 11 December, Reagan informed Turner that the

Casey nomination would be announced in a matter of hours.

Thinking back on the politics of the briefings and the CIA directorship in

1993, Reagan recalled, “My memory is of being completely satisfied with the

briefings I received during the transition.” But he also made clear that his satisfaction with the briefings had not for a moment led him to consider leaving

the incumbent CIA director in place. Reagan recalled emphatically, “I disagreed so completely with everything that President Carter was doing that we

thought a change was needed.”8

In discussing the more general question of how CIA had kept him aware of

Agency programs, Reagan noted that he had always thought he received sufficiently detailed information on CIA’s activities. Specifically, he expressed

appreciation for a briefing Turner provided the week before the inauguration on

the Agency’s sensitive technical and human-source collection efforts and on

some covert action programs. That briefing, conducted on 15 January, was a

particularly important one because it came at a time when the Reagan team had

been criticizing the outgoing Carter administration for its inaction in countering

the Soviet threat worldwide. Inevitably, much of this criticism was born of

ignorance, because Reagan and his advisers, before the DCI’s briefing, were

unaware of the array of covert action and sensitive collection programs in place.

Turner’s final briefing was provided only to Reagan, Bush, and Casey—by

then DCI-designate—unlike the previous sessions that were attended by a large

number of aides. The director described seven different covert action programs

and a dozen sensitive collection undertakings. One of Turner’s assistants later

recalled hearing at the time that the recipients on that occasion had no idea of

the number of programs that were in place and were extremely interested, especially in the Afghan program. Interestingly, in light of subsequent events, none

of the participants in any of the formal, high-level briefings of Reagan during

the transition remembers any discussion of the US hostages in Iran, nor do the

classified records of those briefings indicate the issue was raised.

As a result of the briefing on 15 January, Reagan—like Carter, but unlike all

other postwar presidents to that time—had a thorough understanding of CIA’s

8 Ronald Reagan, interview by the author in Los Angeles, California, 26 July 1993. Subsequent 

quotations from Reagan also come from this interview.
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CHAPTER 5

most sensitive activities at the time he became president. Ironically, Bush was

responsible in both cases: he had briefed Carter personally in 1976 and had

ensured that he and Reagan received such a briefing in 1981. Bush, with his

unique perspective, was struck by the differing reactions of the two presidents.

Bush had noticed in 1976 that Carter showed no reaction when he was

informed of the Agency’s sensitive programs; Reagan, on the other hand, supported them all enthusiastically.9

A Higher Level of Daily Support

Initially, it appeared doubtful that during the transition Reagan would accept

the Agency’s offer of daily intelligence briefings on current developments, as

distinct from the more informal and occasional background briefings. The

president-elect was known to be apprehensive that the outgoing president and

his national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, would use such briefings to

“put one over on him” and influence his future policies. In addition, several of

9 George H. W. Bush, interview by the author in Kennebunkport, Maine, 6 May 1993. Subsequent 

quotes from Bush also come from this interview. 

DCI William Casey’s close campaign relationship with Ronald Reagan won

him close and frequent access to the president.
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REAGAN AND BUSH - A STUDY IN CONTRASTS

Reagan’s key advisers doubted that he would learn anything from the briefings

that he could not learn just as easily from the newspapers. Fortunately, from

CIA’s point of view, the vice president-elect was aware of these feelings within

the Reagan camp and was determined to counter them. His view was that the

president-elect—indeed, any president-elect—badly needed the experience of

reading a daily intelligence report with an Agency officer in attendance to supplement and explain the material.

On Friday, 21 November, Reagan finished a week of briefings and meetings

in Washington and departed for his home in Pacific Palisades, California.

Bush rode with Reagan to the airport sendoff and used the occasion to urge the

president-elect to accept daily intelligence briefings during the several weeks

he would be in California. His appeal worked. A member of the Reagan staff

telephoned from the governor’s aircraft to ask that the Agency provide the

PDB, beginning the next morning in California. Richard Kerr, who was taking

over the transition team from CIA’s longtime current intelligence chief, Richard Lehman, boarded a commercial flight to Los Angeles that evening.

Kerr recalls a very warm welcome from Reagan when he appeared at midday on the 22nd to present the PDB and a short briefing. Kerr and a colleague,

Dixon Davis, shared the duty of providing such briefings from 22 November

through 14 January 1981. They were interested that Reagan was almost

always alone, or accompanied by a single staff assistant, during the period he

was in California. The Reagan transition team was at work in Washington, and

the candidate himself had a relatively relaxed and detached schedule. This was

in marked contrast to most other transitions before and since.

Reagan proved to be a thorough and very intent reader during the typically

20-minute sessions that he held with the CIA visitors. Always friendly and

respectful, he nevertheless displayed a certain wariness regarding the intelligence material that the briefers interpreted as reflecting his lack of familiarity

with it. Mrs. Reagan was almost always present in the home but normally did

not join the governor for the daily intelligence briefings. The first day was an

exception; on that occasion she hosted a lunch for Kerr. In the weeks that followed, she frequently would pass through the room during the briefing. Mrs.

Reagan seemed to have mixed feelings about the process, displaying some

uneasiness that she was not privy to what her husband was hearing. The staffers who sometimes sat in on the briefings took no interest in the substance;

their only interest was to ensure that the process did not take too much time.

During the last half of November 1980, the international situations that

received the most prominent coverage in the press included the hostage crisis

with Iran, the future of strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union, and domestic political developments in Israel and Poland—the latter including the ques-
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tion of possible Soviet meddling or intervention. The same issues were treated

at length in the PDB, and the president-elect was an avid reader on all subjects. He also read very carefully the background pieces the briefers provided

him. These supplementary papers, normally two pages long, were published

on a regular basis to bring him up to date on trouble spots around the world.

Within the first two weeks Reagan read backgrounders on the situations in

Pakistan, Lebanon, Kampuchea, Morocco, the Philippines, and Somalia.

Taking into account the PDB, the accompanying oral briefings and the supplementary material, the intelligence Reagan received each day was significantly greater in volume and detail than that received by Carter during his

transition four years earlier. At that time the practice had been simply to make

the written PDB available for his perusal.

From late November 1980 until early January 1981, Reagan read a number

of current intelligence items relating to the hostage crisis in Iran. These pieces

contained no sensitive US operational material. Rather, they kept the president-elect informed of the activities of various Iranian and third-country figures and provided such information as was available on the condition of the

hostages and on developments in Iran. Reagan asked many questions about

the hostage situation as well as about developments in the Soviet Union, Mexico, and Cuba—countries in which he clearly took a special interest.

In the course of their daily meetings with the president-elect, Kerr and Davis

provided considerable information about the US Intelligence Community and

its collection programs. This practice, encouraged by Bush, was designed in

part simply for the new president’s general background knowledge but also to

heighten his consciousness about what information should not be discussed

publicly lest it jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. In these sessions

there was no discussion whatever of CIA’s covert action programs. In contrast

with the daily briefings provided President-elect Clinton 12 years later, no support was provided directly to Reagan for use in telephone calls with foreign

leaders, meetings with his own staff or visitors, or press conferences.

Throughout the briefing process, Reagan displayed some of the understandable impatience that Agency briefers have seen with other presidents-elect

over the years. He commented on a number of occasions, for example, on the

awkwardness of reading the daily intelligence material, “even though I am not

in a position to affect US policy.” He clearly was most interested in the items

provided him on how foreign leaders and governments were reacting to his

election, including their analyses and speculation about policies he would follow. Reagan was entertained by accounts of foreign judgments on his probable

behavior and worried by misrepresentations of his positions.10
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REAGAN AND BUSH - A STUDY IN CONTRASTS

There was another side to the president-elect that the Agency briefers found

challenging and frustrating. According to Davis, “The problem with Ronald

Reagan was that his ideas were all fixed. He knew what he thought about

everything—he was an old dog.”11 This was particularly apparent regarding

issues involving the Palestinians. Reagan, by his own account, carried a decidedly pro-Israel attitude from his Hollywood associations over the years.

In response to comments and questions from Reagan, Agency analysts produced a three- or four-page memorandum on the subtleties of the Palestinian

movement. The memorandum discussed the complex array of backgrounds,

personalities, ideologies, tactics, and strategies that divided the Palestinian

people and characterized the many groups inside and outside the Palestine

Liberation Organization. Davis recalled that the president-elect read the memorandum “very slowly and thoughtfully—he must have taken 10 minutes. At

the end he said, ‘But they are all terrorists, aren’t they?’—My heart just

sank.”12

During the 1980 transition, Bush and Allen, who was to become national

security advisor, were also provided intelligence support on virtually a daily

basis. In addition to playing an immensely important role in establishing the

Agency’s relationship with Reagan, Bush was a key consumer in his own right.

He read the current intelligence publications every day and requested a great

deal of additional support for his meetings with foreign leaders. Reagan had

delegated to him the task of meeting with or taking most calls from numerous

heads of government and foreign ambassadors. In many cases the Agency’s

supporting material was provided to Bush in person in Washington or in California. In other instances it was provided in Houston, particularly over the

Christmas holiday. Bush’s substantive interests paralleled Reagan’s, with the

exception that the vice president-elect had an even deeper interest in the details

of any information relating to the hostages in Iran. His questions related primarily to information the Intelligence Community had on their health.

Beginning on 18 November, Allen was briefed daily through the remainder

of the transition. He initially attempted to interpose himself between the

Agency briefers and the president-elect, on the first occasion insisting that he

receive the PDB and take it to Reagan for his reading. Bush’s intervention

with Reagan ensured that Agency briefers subsequently saw him directly.

Allen then received the PDB separately. He also solicited significant additional support from the Agency for his own use and in support of Reagan. It

was Allen, for example, who determined the subjects to be addressed in the

10 Richard Kerr, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 9 March 1993.

11 Dixon Davis, interview by the author in Washington, DC, 26 April 1993.

12 Ibid.
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first 10 “backgrounders” that were provided to Reagan, and it was he who

requested information from the Agency to prepare the president-elect for a

meeting with Mexican President José Lopez-Portillo.

The other two key players who were to be on the Reagan national security

team, Secretary of State-designate Alexander Haig and Secretary of Defensedesignate Caspar Weinberger, did not receive the PDB during the transition.

Weinberger had requested PDB delivery as early as mid-December, but it was

determined instead that he should receive the less sensitive National Intelligence Daily until he was sworn in. In fact, his first briefing with the PDB

occurred within minutes of his swearing in as secretary of defense. Haig, too,

began receiving PDB briefings on inauguration day.

After the Inauguration

The inauguration of Reagan marked a watershed in the CIA’s relationship

with him just as the inauguration of Carter had done four years before. In fact, it

was even more decisive. During the transition, intelligence professionals had

seen Reagan on a daily basis and had a relatively full discussion of international

developments from which they could learn firsthand what his interests and

needs were. Following the inauguration, with his staff trying to guard his time,

this daily contact was cut off. Intelligence support was provided to the president

only indirectly through the national security advisor, except in those cases

where the CIA director himself had occasion to meet with the president.

In a meeting with Kerr on 2 January, shortly before inauguration, Allen had

reviewed a variety of styles in which the PDB had been published over the

years; he was not particularly taken with any of the previous formats. Agency

officers had learned by this time to expect such a reaction. With virtually

every administration, if the format had not been designed specifically for that

president, either the president or his national security advisor would ask that

the publication be altered substantially to make it their own.

In this case, change was minimized because Kerr had discussed on several

occasions during December and early January the format and composition of

the PDB directly with Reagan. On each occasion, he had expressed his complete satisfaction with the length of the PDB, the format in which it was presented, and the level of generality of the pieces included. He claimed to want

no changes at all. On 13 January it was agreed by all parties that the PDB

would be provided daily to Allen, who would forward it to the president.

Additional copies were provided by individual CIA briefers to the vice president, the national security advisor, and the secretaries of defense and state.
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REAGAN AND BUSH - A STUDY IN CONTRASTS

Agency officers who provided daily intelligence support to the White

House during the Reagan administration remember that his several national

security advisors varied markedly in the time and attention they devoted to the

PDB. In all cases, however, they received the Agency’s briefer every day, read

the PDB, and ensured that it was forwarded to the president. Of the group,

Adm. John Poindexter was perhaps the least interested in reading the intelligence product.

Thinking back over the eight years of the Reagan administration, the

Agency’s briefing officer remembered only one or two occasions when the

national security advisor took him into the Oval Office to brief the president

directly. Unlike Carter, Reagan almost never wrote comments or questions on

the PDB. On a day-to-day basis, therefore, the Agency’s knowledge of the

president’s intelligence needs was limited. Such knowledge came only indirectly when Reagan’s interests were passed on by the national security advisor

or conveyed by the president directly to the CIA director.

Although distribution of the PDB theoretically was strictly controlled, as a

practical matter the security of the document eroded during the Reagan years.

At various points, several presidential advisers were receiving copies of the

PDB. This situation unfortunately led the Agency to be circumspect in the

items it included in the publication. This turn of events distressed Reagan’s

second CIA director, Judge William Webster, and Vice President Bush. Ultimately, the latter would be in a position to solve this problem and did.

The fact that Reagan did not receive daily oral briefings from CIA officers

did not mean that he did not receive intelligence information. Indeed, throughout the first few years of his administration, Reagan talked often with CIA

Director Casey as well as with his other key national security aides. The president valued receiving information directly from individuals he knew personally and with whom he was comfortable; he preferred informal sessions to the

more formal NSC system, which was used only infrequently.

This practice created concern among senior intelligence professionals, who

worried that the president was receiving, at best, information that was anecdotal and not necessarily as complete, relevant, or objective as it might have

been. But it was a practice that clearly was in keeping with the president’s

management style and personal preferences. In discussing the way he handled

intelligence in 1993, Reagan summed it up by saying that throughout his presidency he thought that “we received all the intelligence we needed to make

decisions.”

Looking back on his presidency, Reagan acknowledged that he had been

aware of the widely publicized strains between Secretary of State George

Shultz and Casey but claimed to have had no feeling that whatever tensions
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existed between the two men had affected the intelligence he received. He said

he had not felt that the intelligence provided by the CIA was in any way politicized, volunteering that the Agency had given him the information he needed

and did not tell him what to think.

In discussing Reagan’s use of intelligence reporting, Bush noted that the

president did indeed receive and read the key analytic pieces, especially the

PDB. In Bush’s judgment, Reagan was seeing information that was timely and

relevant, but it had less impact because it was provided indirectly. Bush

observed, “It was too bad that Ronald Reagan only read the intelligence at his

leisure after he became president. The real benefit is having the briefer sit

there with you.”

The Transition to President Bush13

From the point of view of the US Intelligence Community, the transition to

the Bush presidency in 1988 was undoubtedly the easiest of the eight transitions in which the CIA had been involved. In only two previous cases during

the postwar period—Johnson in 1964 and Ford in 1974—had an incumbent

vice president moved up to the presidency. Each of those accessions occurred

amid unique and extraordinarily trying circumstances that made the intelligence transition difficult. The 1988 turnover, by comparison, was the smoothest in postwar history. It also happened to bring into office the only US

president to have served as CIA director.

CIA officers had been pleased when Vice President Bush, even before the

Republican convention in August 1988, reassured them that he wanted to continue receiving daily intelligence briefings throughout the campaign and after

the election. Bush acknowledged that he would be forced to miss some of the

daily briefings but asked that they be provided without fail when he was in

Washington. An increased proportion of the meetings would have to be held at

his residence rather than at his office, which Bush often bypassed as he traveled in and out of Washington during the campaign. The vice president also

made clear to Agency officers that, if he won, he planned to alter the arrange13 In 1984, presidential candidate Walter Mondale did not receive briefings from the CIA. National 

Security Advisor Bud McFarlane provided him one overview of developments abroad in Minneapolis during the summer, but Mondale did not seek follow-up sessions with the Agency. Remembering the events of a decade earlier during a discussion in Tokyo in April 1994, Ambassador Mondale 

joked that he might have come off better in campaign debates and sound bites had he had “more 

ammunition to work with.” He observed that he should have asked for a series of CIA briefings but 

laughingly conceded that he “never really thought [he] stood much of a chance against Reagan, 

which probably kept [him] from even thinking about preparing seriously for the presidency!”
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REAGAN AND BUSH - A STUDY IN CONTRASTS

ments then in place to provide intelligence support to Reagan. Bush stressed

that he wanted to continue his daily sessions with CIA briefers not only during

the transition period but also after his inauguration because he considered the

personal dialogue was useful. The CIA briefer with whom Bush spoke

recalled in 1994 that he had suggested that, after the inauguration, the DCI, as

the president’s chief intelligence adviser, might wish to take over the daily

briefings. Bush killed the idea on the spot; he “wanted working-level officers”

to do the briefings.14

The Democratic candidate for president in 1988, Massachusetts Governor

Michael Dukakis, was offered intelligence support and agreed to receive one

briefing on worldwide developments at his home in Brookline, Massachusetts.

The briefing was delivered on 22 August by CIA Director William Webster

and his deputy, Robert Gates, whose most vivid memory of the occasion

involved the difficulty the two had in reaching the Dukakis home. Agency

security officers were apparently unaware that the route from the hotel where

the CIA officials were staying to the Dukakis residence passed through an

area near Fenway Park that was completely congested with vehicles and

pedestrians trying to force their way to a makeup baseball game. Gates later

remembered with some amusement one moment during which the two were

stranded in their car surrounded by the crowd. One irate woman peered into

their automobile and, on seeing the distinguished Judge Webster, called out to

her accompanying friend, “It’s that damn Lloyd Bentsen.”15

Senator Bentsen was not in the car but, as Dukakis’s running mate, did

attend the briefing. Dukakis had also invited Congressmen Louis Stokes and

Lee Hamilton, successive chairmen of the House Intelligence Committee, and

his adviser on security matters, Madeleine Albright. When the whole group

assembled, there was a peculiar feeling; all of them save one knew each other

well from their experience in working together on intelligence matters in the

Congress or on the NSC staff. Dukakis was the odd man out.

The governor was attentive as Webster and Gates talked, but he listened

with the detached air of someone who was doing it out of a sense of obligation

rather than out of any real interest in the substance. After Webster finished an

extended one-and-a-quarter-hour presentation on worldwide developments

and Gates followed with a 15-minute review of developments in the Soviet

Union, Dukakis thanked them but raised no questions. Hamilton and Bentsen

posed a few questions that were designed to illuminate matters for the governor but failed to spark his interest. Like the briefings given other presidential

candidates in preelection periods, the one for Dukakis was devoted entirely to

14 Charles Peters, telephone interview by the author, McLean, Virginia, 31 January 1994.

15 Robert Gates, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 12 April 1993.
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developments abroad. It did not include a discussion of CIA covert action or

sensitive collection programs.

In the presidential debates of 1988, CIA officials were expecting the worst

from the time the first question was answered. That question, raised during the

debate in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, on 25 September, related to narcotics use in the United States. In his answer, Dukakis charged that the administration of Reagan and Bush had been “dealing with a drug-running Panamanian

dictator,” Manuel Noriega. The governor did not specifically mention CIA, one

of several US government agencies that had dealt with Noriega, but Bush did.

The vice president replied to Dukakis’s charges by saying, “The other day

my opponent was given a briefing by the CIA. I asked for and received the

same briefing. I am very careful in public life about dealing with classified

information, and what I’m about to say is unclassified.” Bush then went on to

explain that seven administrations had dealt with Noriega and it was the Reagan-Bush administration that had “brought this man to justice.” CIA officers

worried not about the facts of their activities in Panama, which they believed

perfectly defensible, but were concerned that the Agency’s briefings and programs were about to become a political football once again.16

The Agency was still the focus of much media attention generated by the

activist policies of its late director, William Casey. Moreover, in the course of

the first debate, the candidates addressed such politically charged issues as

arms sales to Iran, policy toward Central America, US-Soviet arms control

negotiations, and the future of the Strategic Defense Initiative, “Star Wars.”

Bush attacked Dukakis for his alleged failure to support the US military strike

on Libya in 1986; Dukakis, in turn, criticized Bush for US policies on Angola.

Yet, despite these heated and potentially explosive exchanges, CIA did not

become a political issue in that debate or later in the campaign. The second and

only other debate between the presidential candidates was held on 13 October

in Los Angeles. On that occasion little attention was paid to foreign policy

issues, and there was no mention whatever of the Central Intelligence Agency.

In the postelection period, Bush quickly directed the Agency to provide

daily briefings to those who would make up his key national security team:

Vice President Dan Quayle, Chief of Staff John Sununu, and National Security

Advisor Brent Scowcroft. The president-elect also checked to make sure that

the Agency was making the PDB available to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Adm. William Crowe. Bush wanted all these recipients to be

reminded of what information came from sensitive sources and methods so

16 “Bush and Dukakis, Face to Face on Key Issues,” Congressional Quarterly, 1 October 1988, 

2743.
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REAGAN AND BUSH - A STUDY IN CONTRASTS

that they would not inadvertently disclose what was classified. He further

directed that he did not want the PDB “floating around”; CIA was to show the

PDB to authorized recipients and then take it back—it was to be left with no

one. His intent was to tighten control of the document “to ensure that the

Agency felt free to include more sensitive material.” Speaking for himself,

Bush underscored that he did not want to “get lazy.” The Agency briefer was

to appear at 8:15 on his first day in office.17

During his four years in office, Bush routinely received the Agency briefer

every working day, almost always as the first item of business in the morning.

Webster attended these sessions regularly while he was DCI; Gates did so less

frequently. The president read the PDB carefully and quite often examined

some of the raw intelligence reports that elaborated on an article he found

interesting in the PDB. Occasionally there would be an extended exchange

between the president and the Agency’s briefer; more often, the president or

the national security advisor would pose a few specific questions. The briefer

would answer these on the spot or take them back to the Agency to prepare a

more satisfactory oral or written answer the following morning.

17 Peters interview, 31 January 1994.

President George H.W. Bush meets with CIA briefer Charles Peters (standing)

and members of the president’ s national security team. DCI William Webster

is seated on Peters’s left. 
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This system provided the president direct and timely intelligence support

and the CIA intimate knowledge of his interests and needs. The fact that the

briefings were held in the early morning was especially helpful because that

was when he was most likely to be making and receiving telephone calls to

heads of state in Europe. Agency briefers were immediately at hand to

respond to any information needed to deal with these calls. Bush was much

quicker in his daily routine to use the telephone than his predecessors, not

only to contact foreign leaders but also to contact the CIA director for an

update on the latest developments.

In discussing the system of daily briefings, Bush observed, after his retirement in 1993, “The real payoff is having the Agency briefer there to follow up.

But having too many people around creates a problem—I held it to the national

security advisor and sometimes the chief of staff. If the group grows, pretty

soon word gets out that ‘He’s considering bombing Bosnia’ or whatever.”

Thinking back on the transition from his eight years as vice president to the

four years as president, Bush volunteered that there had been no real changes

in his intelligence requirements after he moved up to be chief executive: “The

big difference is that you have to make the decisions—that makes you read a

lot more carefully.”

On becoming president, Bush had sought no significant alterations in the

format or composition of the PDB. He had become comfortable with it over the

previous eight years. Looking retrospectively, he judged that the mix of items

addressed had been well suited to his needs. He attributed that suitability to the

presence of the briefer while he read the material, making the Agency aware

that he needed more or less on a given subject. Bush was sensitive to the fact

that his national security advisor and chief of staff would occasionally discuss

with senior Agency officers the purported need to include more items on a specific subject in the PDB. Referring to the efforts of his aides to determine what

was provided in the PDB, Bush offered this decisive judgment: “I felt well supported on the full range of issues. Don’t let anybody else tell you what the president wants or needs in the PDB—ask him.”

CIA’s relationship with Bush was undoubtedly the most productive it had

enjoyed with any of the nine presidents it served since the Agency’s founding

in 1947. Alone among postwar presidents, he had served as CIA director. Also

uniquely, he succeeded to the presidency by election after receiving full intelligence support as vice president. These circumstances were obviously not of

the CIA’s making and may never be repeated, but they made the Agency’s job

immeasurably easier at the time.

The good relationship was also a result of Bush’s deep personal interest in

developments abroad and his experience as a diplomat representing the United
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REAGAN AND BUSH - A STUDY IN CONTRASTS

States in Beijing and at the United Nations. More than any other president, he

was an experienced consumer of national-level intelligence. Also of critical

importance was the fact that he had a highly capable and experienced national

security advisor in Brent Scowcroft, who was determined to see that he

received good intelligence support.

Bush was candid in telling CIA officers when he thought their analysis

might be flawed and equally quick to commend them when they were helpful

or identified an approaching key development before he did. There were many

such developments because his presidency witnessed the most far-reaching

international changes of the postwar period: the collapse of European communism, the reunification of Germany, the disintegration of the USSR and the

rollback of Russian imperialism, and the full-scale involvement of the United

States in a ground war in the Middle East. On these, and on the lesser issues of

Tiananmen Square, Haiti, Bosnia, or Somalia, President Bush was uniquely

and extraordinarily well informed.

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BRIEFING GOVERNOR CLINTON IN LITTLE ROCK

During the presidential campaign of 1992, President Bush continued to

receive intelligence briefings on a regular basis just as he had for the previous

12 years. When he was on the road campaigning he was sent the PDB, which

informed him each morning of new developments warranting his attention and

provided him in-depth analysis of sensitive international situations. When he

was in Washington, he would read the PDB with the Agency’s briefing officer

present so that he could hear of any late updates, review and discuss supplementary materials, and ask for new or follow-up information.

Fortunately, in light of the election outcome, President Bush’s background

had made him uniquely mindful of the value of providing intelligence briefings to the challenger as well. He had been director of central intelligence in

1976, and in that capacity had personally provided briefings to Governor

Jimmy Carter at his home in Georgia. Bush played a major role in arranging

briefings for Governor Ronald Reagan in 1980, and as vice president he

received briefings during the transition to his own presidency in 1988. There

was no doubt that as president he would approve briefings for Governor Bill

Clinton, continuing uninterrupted the practice President Truman set in motion

40 years before.

 The DCI Visits Little Rock

Soon after the Democratic convention in 1992, National Security Advisor

Brent Scowcroft contacted Washington attorney Samuel Berger to offer intelligence briefings to Governor Clinton. At that time, Berger, who subsequently

became deputy national security advisor, was serving as a primary adviser to

Governor Clinton on foreign policy matters. Scowcroft and Berger agreed

that, as a first step, DCI Robert Gates would travel to Little Rock and provide

a worldwide intelligence briefing.

In preparation for his meeting with the DCI, the candidate’s staff had prepared extensive reading materials for his review. On the appointed day, the

governor met over lunch with his running mate, Senator Albert Gore, and with

the outgoing chairmen of the two congressional intelligence committees, Sen-
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ator David Boren and Representative David McCurdy, who were to participate

in the briefing session.

The DCI also had spent considerable time preparing, mindful of the governor’s lack of familiarity and experience with the Intelligence Community and

its products.1 Knowing that presidential campaigns often kept candidates too

busy for regular briefings, Gates also wanted to make the most of what might

be the only opportunity to deal directly with the candidate before the election.

Governor Clinton was a gracious host when the DCI began his briefing in

Little Rock on the afternoon of 4 September, and the session proceeded in a

relaxed atmosphere. The substantive issues on which the DCI focused

included the turmoil in Russia, conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and developments in Iraq, North Korea, China, and Iran. He stressed the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There was some discussion of foreign

economic espionage directed against the United States and relatively brief

treatment of a half-dozen Third World issues ranging from hunger in Africa to

prospects for Cambodia.

The governor listened attentively and asked probing questions, primarily on

proliferation, Iraq, and the situations in Bosnia and Russia. On nonsubstantive

matters, which were discussed only briefly, the DCI was heartened when Governor Clinton expressed his support for a strong and capable US intelligence

service. Responding to an allusion by the DCI to intelligence budget stringencies, Clinton turned to Boren and McCurdy and joked, “Is this your doing?”

The others were actively involved as well. Senator Gore, in particular, had a

number of questions, and Boren and McCurdy drew on their experiences to

highlight various aspects of the intelligence business.

Following that meeting, no further briefings were provided to Governor

Clinton until after the election on 3 November. This was not surprising; experience with other candidates in preceding years had shown that such briefings

have been difficult to arrange or politically awkward during the period of the

heaviest campaigning and presidential debates. 

Establishing a “Permanent” Presence

Like other Americans, Agency officials followed the campaign and

watched the polls carefully but took no steps to establish a CIA presence in

Little Rock until after the election had been decided. This left senior managers

1 Robert Gates, interview by the author, McLean, Virginia, 12 April 1993. Subsequent references 

to the Gates briefing come from this interview. 
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BRIEFING GOVERNOR CLINTON IN LITTLE ROCK

somewhat anxious about whether a field facility could be set up in time to provide the highest quality intelligence materials to the president-elect should he

want them immediately. As it turned out, this was not a problem; it was a full

week before the confusion of the postelection period dissipated and Agency

officers could discuss the practical aspects of intelligence briefings with the

president-elect’s team. In the interim, the DCI reconfirmed President Bush’s

approval for the establishment of an Agency outpost in Arkansas.

A team drawn from CIA’s Offices of Communications, Security, Current

Production and Analytic Support (CPAS), and Logistics discreetly established

an Agency office in Little Rock in the days following the election. The DCI

asked the author, as the Agency’s deputy director for intelligence, to head the

team and to elicit from Governor Clinton and his staff agreement that he

should receive daily intelligence briefings from CIA. Although this was

accomplished smoothly, at the time I had more than a few apprehensions. We

were aware that staff members in some previous transitions, including at least

a couple at very senior levels, had worked vigorously to thwart undertakings

such as we were about to propose.

On 11 November, I met with Berger and Nancy Soderberg of Governor

Clinton’s staff to make our pitch. The meeting was held in downtown Little

Rock in a hastily commandeered office in the building into which the transition team was moving that very day. Berger and Soderberg could not have

been more receptive. They were not familiar with the Intelligence Community

or its range of products but were interested in ascertaining what kinds of support could be provided Governor Clinton and key staffers in Little Rock and

Washington. 

The PDB Briefing Process

During the presidencies of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, the 

Agency’s practice was to print the PDB in the early morning hours and 

have briefers present it personally to presidentially designated recipients at 

the opening of business. Having the briefer present when the PDB was 

read allowed Agency officers to answer a large proportion of questions on 

the spot. More involved questions and requests for additional information 

were brought back to analysts at Headquarters, with written or oral 

answers provided the following day. This system provided the Agency a 

firsthand and timely method of keeping abreast of policymakers’ interests 

and a reliable means of protecting the security of the PDB.
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We described the functions of the various agencies and the products normally provided to the president. Our discussion naturally focused on the PDB,

including an explanation of how the president received it from an Agency

briefer each day and how the Agency responded to follow-up questions. We

recommended that the Agency also provide the governor a daily supplement

to the PDB, inasmuch as the regular publication would still reflect the interests of President Bush and its focus would not necessarily correspond with the

needs of Governor Clinton.

Berger and Soderberg were shown copies of that day’s PDB and a proposed

supplemental current intelligence publication. We also showed them the

National Intelligence Daily and other selected materials, noting that the publications they had before them had been printed earlier that morning in a hotel

room in Little Rock. They were clearly impressed with the quality of the

books; the installation in Little Rock of secure communications equipment for

receiving high-quality color computer graphics from CIA Headquarters proved

well worth the effort.

Berger undertook to discuss the issues related to intelligence briefings with

Governor Clinton and promised to get back to us promptly. In fact, the next

day Soderberg called our advance command post to indicate that Governor

Clinton did indeed want to receive the PDB and a briefer, at least for a trial

period, to see what kinds of information it contained and what his schedule

permitted.

On 13 November, 10 days following the election, we had our first session

with Governor Clinton in the book-lined study of the Governor’s Mansion.

Senator Gore was at the Mansion for other meetings and joined us. Our introductory exchange was a bit awkward as we all fumbled around deciding

where best to sit to go over the materials we had brought. We settled on a large

round table in the corner of the study. After offering a brief but friendly welcome, our two new customers immediately read every word of that day’s

PDB, obviously intrigued to see what it contained.

Much of the discussion concerned procedures related to the PDB. The president-elect wanted to be sure he could receive briefings whenever they could

be fitted into his schedule. We assured him that he could but suggested a fixed

time, preferably an early morning session, as the most likely to be satisfactory

on an ongoing basis. We informed the governor that the PDB in the recent past

had been provided also to the vice president, the national security advisor and

his deputy, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the White House chief of

staff, and the secretaries of state and defense, but that in the future the distribution list would be his to control. Governor Clinton replied that he wanted

Senator Gore to begin receiving the PDB immediately and asked that we pro-
135

BRIEFING GOVERNOR CLINTON IN LITTLE ROCK

vide it to other cabinet-level recipients once they were named, assuming this

was agreeable to President Bush. I took the opportunity to wonder aloud

whether it would not make sense to provide the PDB also to the secretary of

the treasury, given the steadily growing importance of economic issues. The

president-elect thought for only a moment, declared this to be a very good

idea and ordered that immediately after the inauguration we should begin regular briefings of the secretary of the treasury as well.

The governor was interested in our suggestion that he receive a personalized supplement. After some discussion, he indicated he would accept in it

some material chosen by us to elaborate items discussed in the main PDB.

However, he underscored that he wanted the supplement to focus primarily on

specific issues requiring early policy action. He opined off the cuff that his list

of topics would surely include proliferation issues, Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia. Senator Gore suggested we include items on global environmental issues.

Berger was charged with drawing up a list of topics to be covered in the

supplement. In fact, such a list proved unnecessary, because the staff quickly

observed that the issues the governor had identified received virtually daily

treatment in the regular PDB. Occasionally, in the weeks to come, the staff

was to request that a specific topic be treated in the supplement, and we readily complied.

The discussion of our preparing materials directly related to policy decisions prompted me to volunteer at the first meeting that CIA saw its proper

role as providing intelligence reports and analysis, including exploration of

the likely ramifications for the United States of pursuing given courses of

action. Experience had shown, however, that we should not be in the business

of formulating or advocating policy options. In the back of my mind were

memories of the policy buzz saws—particularly regarding Latin America and

the Persian Gulf—the Agency had walked into during the 1980s. To our relief,

Governor Clinton and Senator Gore both understood immediately and agreed

with our understanding of the proper role of intelligence. At no time were we

to have any problem avoiding policy entanglements.

On the substantive side, both Clinton and Gore had comments on many of

the items in the PDB that first day. Various pieces prompted stories of world

leaders they had met and countries they had visited. Like all of our readers,

they found the graphics—the maps, charts, and imagery—to be especially

useful. The fact that the session went on for approximately an hour was flattering but prompted well-founded fears on our side that our chief problem in

Little Rock would be scheduling our briefings. It was a continuing challenge

to fit the intelligence briefings into the governor’s always-hectic schedule.
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At this session Governor Clinton was again a gracious host, as he had been

when the DCI visited, welcoming us and inquiring about our arrangements in

Little Rock. On learning the Agency had set up its operation in a modest motel

near the airport, the governor expressed surprise. I half-jokingly responded

that we thought it important to impress a new president with our frugality

given CIA’s limited budget. He took this in good humor, and after laughing

appreciatively sat back and said, “Well, I am impressed.”

Following the session with the governor, we had an opportunity to talk with

Mrs. Clinton as we were departing the Mansion. When she remarked that she

was aware of substantial adjustments being made at CIA to deal with the

changing international situation, we volunteered that the Agency occasionally

had provided support to her predecessors and would be pleased to provide her

also with written material and/or briefings to prepare for foreign trips or visitors. She expressed gratitude for the offer and indicated she would follow up

through the national security advisor. 

Substance of Discussions

The daily intelligence briefings continued almost without interruption from

13 November to 16 January 1993, when both the governor and the briefing

process relocated to Washington. Throughout that period, we made a point to

provide Governor Clinton exactly the same material that was being shown to

President Bush in Washington. This included, in addition to the PDB itself,

drafts of national intelligence estimates and selected raw intelligence traffic—including Directorate of Operations reports, State Department cables,

and NSA traffic. However, it quickly became apparent that the governor’s primary interest was in studying the PDB.

Three subjects were addressed with great frequency in the PDB. First

among these was Russia. At the time, the United States and Russia were still

putting the finishing touches on the START II agreement. Debate was under

way in the press and the Congress about how much additional aid the United

States should provide Russia, and there was much discussion of a possible

Russian-American summit, possibly one that would include president-elect

Clinton. As background to these issues, there were the worrisome daily developments in Moscow as President Yel’tsin and the Russian Congress fought

over their conflicting visions of Russia’s political and economic future. Coverage of these subjects resulted in the publication of more than 50 PDB articles on Russia that the governor studied during the transition period.

The other two topics that received extensive treatment were Somalia and

Yugoslavia. Our policy-level readers had a great appetite for understanding
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BRIEFING GOVERNOR CLINTON IN LITTLE ROCK

events on the ground in Somalia while discussions proceeded in the executive

branch, the press, and the Congress about whether and how the United States

should become involved. Clinton obviously knew that he would inherit the

Somalia problem whether or not President Bush introduced US forces. Similarly, there were numerous intelligence items reporting on the situation in the

former Yugoslavia, and here, too, the governor read with special care, aware

that he would be called on to make decisions concerning the level of any US

involvement in the conflict there. Clinton seemed throughout to value our

efforts to keep him abreast of these developments, and he came to them already

well informed. These were two foreign policy problems he had raised in the

campaign; he had obviously done his homework, particularly regarding the

policy aspects of each.

The next tier of items in terms of the frequency with which they were

addressed in the PDB included Iraq, GATT talks in Europe, Haiti, and the

Israel-Lebanon situation. During this period, Iraq was relatively calm,

although Washington and Baghdad were still jockeying over what was acceptable behavior in terms of the placement of Iraqi air-defense weapons and US

overflights. This testing continued throughout the period, and we all were

mindful that Iraq’s actions might be designed in part to elicit some statement

or sign of the attitudes of the incoming Clinton administration.

Concerning Europe, the United States was in the process of negotiating certain intractable agricultural issues with the European Community (EC)—particularly France. This discussion was all but certain to be incomplete at

inauguration time. In Haiti, a ragtag fleet of new boats was being built as Haitians prepared to flee their country in the belief the new US president would

be more welcoming than the outgoing Bush administration. And in the Middle

East, Israeli, Palestinian, and Lebanese leaders were conducting an angry war

of words over the fate of the Palestinian expellees then camped on the Lebanese border.

Of these second-tier problems, Governor Clinton clearly was most interested in Haiti. It, too, had been among the foreign policy issues he had highlighted during the campaign. The Iraqi, European, and Israeli issues all were

of interest but were fundamentally different in the sense that Governor Clinton

obviously did not believe they would require fundamental policy decisions

immediately.

A few items in the PDB led to interesting discussions about the relationship

between intelligence reporting and appropriate follow-up in the policymaking

and law enforcement communities. Sometimes this included discussion of

actions that might be taken by the president himself. When he read one piece

on the possible transfer of missiles between two countries, for example, the
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governor initiated a discussion about actions a president might take in

response to such a report. Such occasions permitted us to explain the mechanisms through which the acquisition of intelligence information results in concrete operational accomplishments in the areas of proliferation, narcotics, or

other sanctions enforcement.

Unlike the situation in some previous presidential transitions, there was in

1992 a very close congruence between the subject matter presented in the

intelligence reporting and the international developments receiving the most

attention in the US press. With minor variations, the same issues received the

most prominence during the campaign and, to a lesser extent, in the presidential debates.

In fact, during the presidential debates of 1992 there was very little focus on

international events. The first debate, held in St. Louis on 11 October, had

included some discussion of three high-priority issues: Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia. The governor’s interest obviously continued at a high level as these subjects were discussed subsequently in the intelligence reporting. There were,

however, certain other issues raised in the St. Louis debate that turned out to

receive almost no coverage and were of little day-to-day interest, including the

international politics surrounding the question of US defense commitments and

troop levels in Western Europe and the next steps in arms control.

The subsequent two presidential debates, held in Richmond on 15 October

and in East Lansing on 19 October, included almost no discussion of foreign

affairs. There were some exchanges on global economic issues and the new

world order, including the opening of foreign markets to US exports. In East

Lansing there was a brief exchange on Iraq. These discussions, however, concerned overall policy direction and did not translate into concrete interest on

the governor’s part in follow-up intelligence reporting.

To our pleasure, and occasionally to our embarrassment, Governor Clinton

read the PDB carefully no matter what might be next on his schedule. We frequently made suggestions that he might want to concentrate on certain items

and skip others if he was in a hurry, but he seldom accepted these invitations.

On one memorable day the hurried governor was busy putting on his necktie

and drinking a Diet Coke when we met for our session. He said he would not

have time to read the book and asked that I simply tell him what was important.

I gave him two-sentence summaries of a half-dozen items and one longer article in the PDB. When I finished this staccato account I expected him to depart,

but he said, “Well, that sounds interesting,” seized the book, and sat down and

read the whole thing. He had tied his necktie.

Certain aspects of the PDB grabbed the attention of Governor Clinton as

they had captured the attention of previous readers over the years. As men-
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BRIEFING GOVERNOR CLINTON IN LITTLE ROCK

tioned earlier, chief among these were the graphics, which he always looked at

first. Also, he was obviously interested in the “Weekly Leadership Notes,” a

feature of the PDB at that time that described briefly what the president’s

counterparts around the world would be doing during the coming week.

Finally, like his predecessors, Governor Clinton reacted well (charitably, actually) to our occasional attempts at humor; he, too, suggested that more humor

would be welcome.

Not everything worked. One item that President Bush had found useful, for

example, had been a looseleaf notebook the Agency had assembled containing

page-size maps of virtually every place of interest in the world. President

Bush would regularly open his desk drawer, pull out this collection of maps

and refer to it while reading or discussing the PDB. In one of our early sessions with Governor Clinton, we presented such a map notebook to him. He

received it with thanks, but that was the last we ever saw or heard of it.

Similarly, we were a bit discouraged, although not altogether surprised, to

find that the supplement was only a limited success. I thought analysts in the

Agency did a fine job of preparing perceptive background articles pegged to

issues treated briefly in the PDB and in providing in-depth material on issues

we knew to be high on the Clinton agenda. The first of the supplements, for

example, included articles on reform in Russia, the economic outlook for East

Asia, the crisis in Angola, and Bosnian Serb flight activity. The second supplement addressed the politically charged issue of detention camps in Bosnia,

included biographic material on the three presidential candidates in South

Korea, and discussed the background on the fighting in Lebanon. Such material was made available to the governor for a period of days, but it was clear

that, while he was interested in principle, he simply did not have time to go

through this material unless it was related to a high-priority issue that had to

be addressed immediately.

When it became clear that the supplement was not being read and we found

ourselves holding it over from one day to the next, we experimented with a

much reduced version in which we provided a single page of material on only

one or two background issues. These, too, proved of limited utility.

What did turn out to be of use was an art form created in Little Rock by John

McLaughlin, CIA’s director of Slavic and Eurasian analysis, who spelled me

for two-week periods in delivering the briefings. McLaughlin was in Little

Rock during a period when the governor’s schedule forced postponement of

several briefings until noon or even afternoon. By this time, the wheel of international events had turned enough that the morning PDB was lagging behind

press reports that were by then available to us and the governor. As a result,

McLaughlin began typing up one-page summaries of developments since the
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PDB was published, and we found that these were of interest to governor Clinton. His interest derived from the fact that he was using the briefing process as

a useful supplement in preparing for his frequent press conferences. Whenever

the PDB briefing was delayed well into the day, we prepared these updates and

used them instead of the formal supplement, which was gradually phased out.

Unlike some of his predecessors, Governor Clinton during the transition did

not receive any comprehensive briefings on the organization of the Intelligence Community or on sensitive collection programs involving human assets

or technical collection techniques. Neither did he receive a comprehensive

briefing on covert action programs before the inauguration. As a result, we

found ourselves during the PDB briefings occasionally providing explanations

of Intelligence Community programs that grew naturally out of the substantive issues discussed in the PDB. This gave us, for example, opportunities to

brief on US imaging systems and to describe NSA and its product. On a couple of occasions we provided brief accounts of specific covert action programs, an awareness of which was essential to make sense of the day’s PDB.

John McLaughlin and President-elect Clinton relax after one of the briefings 

during the pre-inaugural period.
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BRIEFING GOVERNOR CLINTON IN LITTLE ROCK

In retrospect, this probably was a good way to introduce a new president to

sensitive covert action and collection programs; that is, tying the fact of a program to its intelligence payoff. Earlier experience had shown that comprehensive briefings on these programs sometimes were overwhelming and did not

stick with the recipient. Obviously, after inauguration, any president should

still receive a general overview briefing from the DCI and/or the deputy director for operations. In expressing his views on this subject, former President

Bush was decidedly of the opinion that a president-elect needed to be briefed

on any sensitive programs that had the potential to blow up on him, but otherwise should be spared the details until in office.2 

Other Opportunities To Help

To underscore the unique relationship between the United States and Mexico, several presidents-elect have made a point of meeting with the president of

Mexico during the transition period before holding meetings with any other foreign leader. Governor Clinton was no exception and scheduled a meeting with

President Carlos Salinas in Austin, Texas, on 8 January 1993. We had assumed

such a session would occur and had prepared a fair amount of material on economic issues—especially the North American Free Trade Agreement—as well

as Mexico’s political situation and bilateral narcotics cooperation. As it turned

out, the governor’s own staff had prepared him extremely well on NAFTA, so

our material on that subject was largely unneeded.

The day or two before Governor Clinton’s departure for Texas to see President Salinas proved to be most hectic. Fearing this, we had worked with his

staff to prepare a package of one-page pieces that supplemented the briefing

books he had already received. In the discussion in the Mansion before departure on 8 January it was clear he had read the Agency’s material carefully.

This included specifically the material on the narcotics problem, which obviously was high on the governor’s agenda.

The biographies the Agency had prepared of Mexican leaders with whom

the governor would be meeting were also of high interest. CIA had found that

high-level policymakers welcomed short videos on foreign leaders. In addition to passing along factual information, the videos effectively showed

speaking style, body language, emotional intensity, and so on. The Agency

had produced a video on President Salinas, and the day before the departure

2 George H. W. Bush, interview by the author, Kennebunkport, Maine, 6 May 1993. Subsequent 

references to Bush’s comments come from this interview.
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for Texas we had an opportunity to show it to Senator Gore, who in turn recommended it enthusiastically to Governor Clinton.

Having no confidence we would find an opportunity for Governor Clinton

to watch this video in traditional VCR format, we had acquired a minivideo

machine, a Sony Watchman, and created a small tape version. Time ran out in

our briefing, so Governor Clinton and his traveling companions took the video

machine with them so that he could watch it en route to Austin. Berger jokingly remarked that he had heard each new administration receives a free

video machine from the CIA. It was returned the next day.

The meeting with President Salinas gave us a welcome opportunity to demonstrate how the Agency could be useful in preparing a president for meetings

with foreign leaders. To our satisfaction, when we saw Governor Clinton the

next day following his return from Texas, he volunteered that he had found

President Salinas and the Mexican approach at the meeting to be “exactly as

you had predicted.”

We also provided material for use during the many telephone calls the president-elect made to world leaders. The first such instance involved Korean President Roh Tae Woo whom, by coincidence, Governor Clinton was to telephone

the first day we saw him in Little Rock. Agency officers provided similar information to assist the governor in making contact with perhaps a dozen other

world leaders as well.

The most interesting conversation for which we were able to support Governor Clinton was the one he had with President Boris Yel’tsin on 4 January

1993. Before the call, the governor’s aides and we had discussed with him

what Yel’tsin presumably wanted from him and the points he was likely to

raise during the call. In fact, there were no surprises. The items discussed, as

were later reported to the press, included START II and its ratification, Ukrainian support for the treaty, issues of economic reform in Russia, cooperation

between the United States and Russia on Bosnia, and the timing of a future

meeting between Presidents Yel’tsin and Clinton.

Although it is hardly satisfying to hear only one side of a conversation, particularly one that is conducted through an interpreter, it appeared to be helpful

that we were able to sit in the room with the president-elect during his discussion with Yel’tsin. Following that fairly lengthy conversation we were able

immediately to go over some of the points Yel’tsin had made. Our discussion

served, I believe, to clarify certain of the inherently ambiguous points that had

come up. In fact, during that immediate follow-on session and over the next

two days, we continued to furnish Agency materials that provided context to

the points Yel’tsin had made, especially those related to arms control issues.
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McLaughlin had the sad task of helping Governor Clinton with some other

telephone calls as well. These were the ones he made to the families of US

personnel who were casualties in Somalia. McLaughlin acquired the facts

needed to place the calls and, at the governor’s request, coordinated with the

White House to be sure that calls from the president-elect did not interfere in

any way with calls being made by President Bush.

We had been asked to provide substantive and logistic support of a different

nature at an earlier point when the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

had visited Little Rock. On 4 December, Adm. David Jeremiah, accompanied

by Assistant Secretary of State for Political/Military Affairs Robert Gallucci,

visited Little Rock to explain the plan for US involvement in Somalia. This

visit had been expected but was firmly scheduled only at the last minute. The

afternoon before, the White House, through the DCI, had contacted us requesting that the CIA team in Little Rock make the supporting arrangements for

Admiral Jeremiah’s visit.

The visit went very well, although with much less elaborate logistic support

than is usually provided for a flag-rank officer. Agency personnel from the

Office of Communications and the Office of Security handled all the arrangements and served as escort officers. They rented a van to transport the

expected large number of briefing boards, cleared the military team with the

Secret Service, and transferred the admiral and his supporting staff to the Governor’s Mansion and back to the airport. Once at the Mansion, they introduced

Admiral Jeremiah and his team to the Clinton staff.

The briefing itself was attended not only by Governor Clinton but also by

Senator Gore and by Warren Christopher, who had not yet been designated

secretary of state. Other Clinton aides were also present. Inasmuch as we had

spent almost a month at that point briefing Clinton daily on the situation on

the ground in Somalia—and as I had just finished the morning PDB

update—Dave Jeremiah devoted relatively little time to describing the current

situation and turned instead to a discussion of planned US actions.

As always, Jeremiah provided an informal and to-the-point briefing, which

Governor Clinton and the others obviously appreciated. I was relieved to have

it occur, because a certain amount of frustration was building among the Clinton staff, who sensibly wanted to know what Somalia operation they would

inherit. Gallucci clarified issues related to the policy side of the US involvement. Knowing he would assume responsibility for an ongoing project, Governor Clinton asked about the expected duration of the operation, the conditions

under which US forces would be withdrawn, and where things stood regarding

the formation of a UN-controlled follow-on force that would relieve the US
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units. Governor Clinton’s own predictions about how long US forces would be

required to stay in Somalia ultimately proved to be right on the mark.

Later in December, McLaughlin and the rest of the group then in Little Rock

had a full and exciting day when Governor Clinton named his national security

team. While McLaughlin was waiting for his late-morning appointment on 22

December, the national security appointees entered the Mansion’s reception

area. This gave him and the governor’s aides an opportunity to caucus with the

appointees in an informal roundtable discussion of the latest events in Serbia,

Russia, and the Middle East in preparation for the day’s press conference.

During the press conference, the appointments of Warren Christopher, Les

Aspin, Tony Lake, Madeleine Albright, Jim Woolsey, and Sandy Berger were

announced. Following the press conference, Agency officers had a welcome

opportunity to meet the DCI-designate, brief him on the international situation, and show him quickly around the facility that had been established in

Little Rock.

As luck would have it, about the time the personnel announcements were

made, Little Rock Airport became completely fogged in and none of the

appointees was able to depart the city as anticipated. The stranded group all

assembled for dinner that evening with one exception—the DCI-designate.

Christopher indicated the next day that the group had been curious about

Woolsey’s whereabouts, joking that “those CIA folks” must have spirited him

away. We dispelled the mystery surrounding the DCI-designate’s disappearance. It had been important for him to get to California the next day, so one of

our communications officers had rented a car—at Woolsey’s expense—and

driven him to Dallas so he could catch an early morning flight to California. 

Great Support Made It Work

Immediately after the election, two representatives of the Office of Communications had been sent to Little Rock to find office space for our support operation. They quickly located what turned out to be a perfect setup in the Comfort

Inn, a modest motel approximately a mile from Little Rock Airport. There was

an even more modest restaurant, a Waffle House, adjacent. The location facilitated the regular turnover of personnel and provided convenient access to the

Governor’s Mansion, which was a five- to ten-minute drive from there.

From a security point of view it was an ideal arrangement; we were able to

rent a group of rooms that allowed us to control the space above, below and on

each side of our command post. The center of our operation was an apartment

formerly used by the motel manager, who had earlier installed a “panic alarm”

hooked directly into police headquarters. The apartment contained a large liv-
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BRIEFING GOVERNOR CLINTON IN LITTLE ROCK

ing/dining room, which we converted into office space, and two bedrooms,

one of which was used as an office for the senior briefer and the other as a refuge for the person who caught the overnight shift. Finally, the facility had a

kitchenette that made it much more habitable for all concerned. Coming from

Washington, we were impressed that the cost of our individual rooms was

$38.50 per night. We paid twice that for the apartment. The motel staff could

not have been more supportive or discreet. Initially, they presumed that we

were with the Secret Service, an impression we soon corrected.

Our security officers took pains to get to know the Secret Service detail in

Little Rock. This was time well spent; its members were eager to give us any

backup security assistance we might need at the command post and were most

helpful in facilitating our access to the Governor’s Mansion. Their help was

all the more necessary when we accompanied the Clintons to California and

South Carolina.

At the time we established our operation, the press in Little Rock was eager

for news of the president-elect’s every activity. This made us apprehensive

that press attention to our presence could force our relocation to secure quarters. As a result, we investigated the possibility of operating from Little Rock

Air Force Base. The commanding officer was eager to have us locate there

and was prepared to offer every assistance. Our security and communications

officers visited the base and were given a tour of the proposed facilities.

Secure storage, office space, and communications were available to us.

The problem was that the air base was several miles beyond the city of North

Little Rock on the other side of the Arkansas River; the drive to the Governor’s

Mansion would have been considerably longer. Moreover, although some quarters might have been available, we would not have been able to stay nearly as

close to our command center. In the motel we could simply walk out of one

room and into another to receive secure calls, faxes, and so forth. With this

convenience in mind, we kept the air base as a fallback possibility, but we were

never forced to use it.

It was three weeks before the press became aware of, or at least paid any

attention to, the fact that the CIA was present in Little Rock and was providing intelligence briefings to the president-elect. In the early days of our operation the governor’s staff had been happy to follow our suggestion that we

simply make no public announcement about our operation. At a later stage,

however, there was discussion in the press about how Governor Clinton was

preparing to take on the international responsibilities of the presidency. At that

point, the governor’s team confirmed publicly that he was receiving regular

briefings from the Agency and was seeing all intelligence material available to

President Bush.
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It took a few days for the press to get the story straight. Initial inquiries came

from the Los Angeles Times on the first of December. On the second, the Arkansas Democrat Gazette made reference to “daily written briefings from the

Administration and briefings by telephone.” A day later, the New York Times

came closer, reporting that “the Central Intelligence Agency has set up an office

in Little Rock from which to deliver a copy of the National Intelligence Daily

to Mr. Clinton. Mr. Clinton also receives a fifteen-minute oral briefing on security matters every day that aides say is the same one that Mr. Bush gets at the

White House.” Later, on NBC’s morning news program, the governor’s spokesman, George Stephanopoulos, explained that the president-elect was fully

informed about foreign policy issues because the “CIA briefs him daily.”

The press kept a vigil on the side street from which all traffic entered and

exited the Governor’s Mansion and on many occasions filmed our comings

and goings. Nevertheless, we were not pursued or otherwise bothered and

were successful throughout in protecting our identities and location. Keeping

a low profile, however, meant we made little use of the bar in the Capital

Hotel downtown; it was the gathering place for visiting politicos, but was also

the hangout for all the reporters.

If the Office of Communications had found it easy to acquire a secure and

inexpensive location from which to operate, they were challenged a good deal

more in establishing the communications links to Washington. The problem

came from the fact that we needed to install in Little Rock an unusually capable system that allowed us to transmit a quantity and quality of material significantly greater than anything we had previously done for VIP support on the

road. In normal circumstances, traveling PDB recipients in 1992 received a

black and white document transmitted via a rather basic secure fax system. As

a result of work that was already under way in Washington, it was clear that

we had the hardware and software capability to deliver a very high quality

version of the PDB to Governor Clinton in Little Rock. The system had never

been field-tested, however, so we needed to be sure we had a reliable and

redundant capability. The equipment that was installed allowed us to input text

at Headquarters and immediately receive and edit it at the other end. It also

allowed us to transmit very high quality color graphics, maps, and imagery.

Over and above the PDB operation, we were able with this capable communications system to send large numbers of documents in both directions to support the briefing operation on a real-time basis. This capability was invaluable

in enabling us to answer questions and provide background material to Governor Clinton and his aides. Over time the Agency team became sufficiently

adept at using the new equipment that it could replicate the process in California when Governor Clinton traveled there over the Thanksgiving holiday and at

Hilton Head, South Carolina, where he spent several days after Christmas.
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In large part because of the hard work of our people at Headquarters, we

were able to publish a book indistinguishable from the one published by the

Agency’s printing plant. Personnel in Washington put in countless hours of

overtime to provide 24-hour support of all kinds. Their mastery of the digitized color graphics process was but one critical contribution. All who participated in this operation thought it set a standard for future VIP on-the-road

support.

Looking back, we flinched to discover that our undertaking in Little Rock

was by no means inexpensive, even though the cost of hotel rooms was a

modest $38.50 per night. Substantial expenditures were made for personnel

rotation and accommodations, computer equipment and communications

lines, and per diem expenses. By inauguration day, we had incurred expenses

in excess of a quarter million dollars. 

What Was Accomplished

By any quantitative measure, the Agency succeeded in the primary purpose

of providing intelligence briefings to help the president-elect become well

informed about international developments. President-elect Clinton read hundreds of intelligence reports on current developments relating to US interests.

A large proportion of these reports addressed subjects that were of high priority to him personally, including Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. One cannot know

precisely how valuable this intelligence reporting may have been, but we did

observe with satisfaction that he read the material daily and carefully.

Beyond the PDB briefings, the Agency provided a great deal of ad hoc support. This material was used to prepare for meetings and telephone calls to

foreign leaders and in other policy deliberations. On a more pedestrian level,

the Clinton team turned to the CIA for help with such things as acquiring safes

for secure storage and arranging for the establishment of secure communications between Little Rock and Washington. At varying times we functioned

not only as representatives of the Intelligence Community but as surrogates

for the State Department, the Joint Chiefs, the Department of Defense, and the

General Services Administration.

At no time did we seek or receive any systematic feedback from Governor

Clinton on the assistance we were providing, but he was appreciative throughout the transition period. And we have some independent accounts of his reactions. Former President Bush recalls, for example, that when the Clintons

visited the White House after the election, the governor “went out of his way

to tell me the briefings were useful and he planned to continue them.” Bush

added that Governor Clinton “told me the CIA information made a big differ-
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ence on Haiti. He said that the Agency’s intelligence made an impact on him

and was influential in the decisions he subsequently took.”

Immediately after the election, Bush had delegated to Scowcroft the job of

dealing with the Clinton team regarding the intelligence briefings. During the

Clintons’ visit to the White House, however, Bush underscored how useful

CIA’s daily briefings had been to him and urged the president-elect to continue to receive them when in office. Bush says he also stressed the need to

limit the distribution of the PDB. “I told him you had to control and limit

access so that the Agency could put everything in the book.”

From the Agency’s institutional point of view, establishing the practice of

regular briefings of the president and senior national security officials met an

important goal of the Little Rock operation. However, once he was in office,

President Clinton after a few months discontinued the practice of receiving

daily PDB briefings. After US forces were killed in Somalia in the Black

Hawk Down incident, the briefings were restored and over the years were

often attended by the DCI. Throughout Clinton’s two-term presidency, intelligence reports regularly reached National Security Advisors Tony Lake and

Sandy Berger, and the president. The products of the Intelligence Community

may have had more impact than the briefers themselves. 

CIA employees felt their efforts rewarded when President Clinton spoke of

this briefing process during a visit to the Agency’s Headquarters in Virginia

on 4 January 1994, after almost a full year in office. The president observed:

Intelligence is a unique mission. Nobody knows that better than

those of us who have the honor to serve in the Oval Office. When

President Truman autographed the photo of himself that hangs in

this building, he wrote, “To the CIA, a necessity to the president of

the United States, from one who knows.” Every morning, the president begins the day asking what happened overnight. What do we

know? How do we know it? Like my predecessors, I have to look to

the intelligence community for those answers to those questions. I

look to you to warn me and, through me, our nation of the threats, to

spotlight the important trends in the world, to describe dynamics

that could affect our interests around the world.

The Little Rock undertaking also enabled Agency personnel to meet a large

proportion of the people who were to become prominent in the Clinton administration. Senior Agency briefers established at least some relationship with all

those who later became key White House figures. We had an opportunity to

meet all of those appointed to the top national security posts and the majority of

other cabinet-level appointees. Each of the new appointees was exposed to the

Agency’s role in supporting the president-elect. On one occasion a new cabinet
appointee was clearly surprised to see Agency briefers waiting to see the governor and inquired about the frequency with which such briefings were given,

asking if they occurred weekly or on some other basis. The questioner was

obviously surprised and impressed when told that the Agency briefed each day.

All Agency personnel involved in the Little Rock operation—in Arkansas

and at Headquarters—came to have a sense of satisfaction and pride in what

they were able to accomplish. Each was also aware, however, of the unique

opportunity they had been given and of their good luck that the operation

worked out as well as it did.3



3 Senator Robert Dole, Clinton’s challenger in the 1996 election, was not provided a worldwide 

intelligence briefing. Following the Republican convention, CIA’s deputy director for intelligence 

at the time, John Gannon, proposed in writing to Director John Deutch that Dole should be offered 

the customary overview briefing. The author contacted Deutch and his chief of staff, Michael 

O’Neil, both of whom presume the Agency surely would have offered a briefing, but neither of 

whom remembers having taken any action to arrange it. Deutch and O’Neil both said they had a 

vague memory that Dole declined a briefing. Senator Dole has no recollection of having been 

offered an intelligence briefing. 

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9
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GEORGE W. BUSH: DEMANDING CONSUMER

 Governor Bush was “the most interactive ‘briefee’ I’ve ever dealt with,”

wrote CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin after a four-hour session at

Crawford, Texas, in September 2000.1 Recalling the experience years later,

McLaughlin said, “I remember thinking that whoever would be briefing this

president better be ready for a ride.”2 Bush had little experience with international affairs but, even as a candidate, was a rigorous questioner who expected

a great deal of those dispatched to provide him intelligence assessments of the

world situation.

McLaughlin had become responsible for this first intelligence briefing of

candidate Bush through a scheduling conflict. The standard practice over the

years had been for the DCI personally to brief presidential candidates from each

party shortly after their nomination. In mid-2000, the DCI was George Tenet, a

charismatic leader who had held the position three years and was conversant

with all substantive issues. In any normal circumstances, he would have followed the usual practice and traveled to Texas to deliver a comprehensive,

worldwide intelligence overview to the recently selected Republican candidate.

As it happened, the briefing of the governor was scheduled for 2 September.

Tenet, however, was centrally involved in extended diplomatic negotiations

related to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and was traveling in the Middle

East in early September.3 As a result, it fell to Tenet’s deputy, McLaughlin, to

prepare the briefing and deliver it in Texas.

Although Tenet stayed completely out of the process of assembling the briefing team and materials, McLaughlin did receive some guidance. Clinton

administration National Security Advisor Sandy Berger counseled, “Don’t tell

him [Bush] anything sensitive,” to which McLaughlin good naturedly replied

that he “would use [his] own judgment.” Berger understood such briefings had

been standard practice since the candidacies of Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai

Stevenson and had personally helped make arrangements for President-elect

1 John McLaughlin, “Governor Bush Briefing,” 2 September 2000.

2 John McLaughlin, interview with the author, Washington, DC, 28 September 2011.

3 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 73.
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Clinton to receive his briefings. At the same time, he was known in 2000 to

have limited enthusiasm for the process and came across as wanting to keep the

Bush briefing low-key. This understandable dilemma—and exchanges similar

to this one—had occurred in a great many transitions, with the outgoing administration not sure which candidate would accede to office and thus very protective of sensitive and classified information, but with its intelligence officers on

the hook to provide the best and most useful available information to candidates who might soon be in the White House.

The briefing was held in a casual setting on a Saturday morning in the living room of the modest, original Prairie View home on Bush’s ranch at Crawford. In addition to the governor, campaign advisers Condi Rice, Paul

Wolfowitz, and Josh Bolton attended. Rice and Wolfowitz asked a number of

substantive questions and requested occasional clarifications to highlight a

particular point or ensure an area they were interested in was sufficiently covered. All the briefers observed and later remarked, however, that the governor

was clearly in charge “from moment one.”

From the Intelligence Community side, the team included, in addition to

McLaughlin, three senior analysts and managers with expertise in Latin

America, East Asia, and the Middle East. McLaughlin himself was a longtime

expert in European and Russian issues. The plan was for McLaughlin to

deliver a comprehensive overview of the international situation using a series

of desktop tent graphics that he would display and flip over as he progressed.

The three experts would then join him in fielding questions during a discussion period. Governor Bush listened politely to the first few sentences, then

made clear with his preemptive questioning that he was not taken with this

painfully systematic approach.

Similarly, the governor was not intrigued by a briefcase the Middle East

expert had brought along—one modified to show how easily terrorists could

conceal and disperse biological or chemical agents. Such show-and-tell devices

usually intrigued individuals and groups being briefed, but the governor gestured to the effect of “get that out of here” and wanted to settle down to serious

discussion. He did focus carefully on various satellite images and charts that

helped illuminate threats such as worldwide missile proliferation.

There was ample time in this extended session with Governor Bush to discuss all principal threats to the United States and key international players,

both states and personalities. Not surprisingly, in 2000 these subjects included

countries of perennial interest to the Intelligence Community such as China,

Russia, and North Korea; the range of active and potential trouble spots in the

Middle East and South Asia, notably Iraq, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute; the Balkans, especially Kosovo and Serbia; and a number of Latin
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American countries where US interests might be compromised by foreseeable

possible developments.

The terrorist threat to the United States was an important element of the

briefing. At this time, more than a full year before 9/11, the discussion had a

worldwide focus. The Middle East specialist explained his assessment that the

next president would face a terrorist attack on US soil, and there was discussion of what certain scenarios could look like. In his memoir, President Bush

recalled that he “had received my first briefing on the [al-Qa‘ida] terrorist network as a presidential candidate.”4 Much of the discussion addressed a particularly high-stakes variant of terrorism—the possible proliferation to terrorists

of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states. 

During the briefing Bush took care to explore information about world leaders with whom he anticipated he would be meeting as president. One briefer

recalled that this discussion involved “much granularity,” with the governor in

several instances offering his views of a given leader. He was interested in standard biographical details, but also in gaining less tangible insight into key leaders. The governor’s focus on personalities made an strong impression with a

second briefer—“That’s when he lit up,” the briefer recalled. President Bush

was very much a people person, and while working knotty issues throughout

his time in office, always maintained personal contact with counterparts abroad.

Interactive and sure of himself, Bush was an active questioner and participant throughout the morning, to put it conservatively. In addition to exchanges

on key countries, regions, and leaders, he entered into discussion on a variety

of military, proliferation, weapons, and big-picture economic issues. Intentionally or not, on some issues he helped the briefers calibrate their presentations

by sharing information on countries he had or had not visited and explicitly

indicating when information was new to him. 

CIA briefers in Crawford were frank to acknowledge areas of importance in

which reliable intelligence information was insufficient to draw definitive conclusions. On a couple of occasions during the extended discussion, they could

see that Bush was surprised the Intelligence Community did not know more on

a given issue. One briefer was concerned the governor might wonder if the

briefers were “pulling their punches,” adding they certainly did not hold back. It

was clear Bush would want “fine-grained human intelligence” when in office.

 During the briefing, the issue of intelligence entanglement with policy matters did not arise in any significant way. The governor expressed his views and

noted areas where he anticipated policy decisions would be needed. But even

on one or two issues where his questions could have been construed as asking

4 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 134.
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for policy advice, he readily settled for relevant intelligence information devoid

of any recommendations on actions that might be taken. He did ask specifically

about the role of DCI Tenet in the ongoing Middle East peace process. This

was, indeed, an almost unique situation in Agency history, one that Tenet has

termed a “semidiplomatic function.” His very close involvement with the

Israelis and Palestinians at the end of the Clinton presidency was understood at

the time as building capabilities and trust to facilitate negotiations rather than

as a policymaking role in the negotiations themselves.

At the outset of the session, Governor Bush had asked the team about their

areas of expertise and how their jobs and challenges had changed since the end

of the Cold War. At the end, he discussed his expectations of intelligence should

he be elected and the importance of deploying intelligence capabilities to identify opportunities, prevent conflict, and protect the United States. Overall, the

briefers felt satisfied they had been able to cover most of the considerable

ground they had come prepared to discuss. In keeping with the Agency’s preference to keep its officers out of the limelight, McLaughlin declined Bush’s invitation to join him when he met with reporters immediately after the briefing. 

During the preelection period in which Governor Bush received his one

worldwide briefing, a similar briefing was offered to the Democratic presidential candidate, Al Gore. Not surprisingly, he declined. As sitting vice president,

Gore for eight years had been receiving daily intelligence updates in the form

of the PDB, as well as more in-depth briefings at meetings of the NSC and otherwise, as requested. At the time President Clinton approved the plan to offer a

worldwide briefing to Governor Bush, however, he requested that a similar

briefing be offered also to Joe Lieberman, the Democratic candidate for vice

president. Senator Lieberman accepted the offer, and was briefed by Martin

Petersen, CIA’s associate deputy director for intelligence for strategic plans.

Petersen found Lieberman to be most gracious and appreciative.

Senior officers of the Intelligence Community have always been eager to

brief candidates of both parties, with the same material, to make clear the process is completely nonpolitical. Despite such efforts, however, the IC and its

assessments have sometimes become political footballs in presidential campaigns. In the historic debate on international affairs between Vice President

Nixon and Senator John Kennedy in 1960, for example, the candidates

engaged in testy exchanges on the so-called missile gap between the United

States and the USSR, and on Soviet economic strength. On both of these

issues, the candidates cited intelligence assessments and public statements of

DCI Allen Dulles to buttress their positions. From the point of view of the IC,

no good can come of such a development.
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GEORGE W. BUSH: DEMANDING CONSUMER

In 2000, the international situation was generally calmer than it had been in

many earlier transitions and was destined to be in the next one. On the hopeful

side, reformers that year had won control of the Iranian parliament for the first

time since the Islamic revolution; North and South Korea signed a peace

accord; Serbian President Milosevic was voted out of office; and democracy

seemed to have matured in Mexico, as Vicente Fox’s election as president

ended decades of one-party rule. The immutable problem areas of the Middle

East endured, notably renewed, serious clashes between Israelis and Palestinians and the need to contain Saddam Hussein. But in a reflection of the times,

as the campaign went on, leaders of IC agencies were deliberating how to

scale back their budgets and manpower to meet the stringencies of the postCold War “peace dividend” period.

The Presidential Debates

The first of three presidential debates between Al Gore and George Bush

was held on 3 October at the University of Massachusetts in Boston. The second was at Wake Forest University in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, on 11

October, and the last at Washington University in St. Louis on 17 October.

There was one vice-presidential debate between Joe Lieberman and Dick

Cheney, held 5 October at Centre College in Danville, Kentucky. Domestic

issues dominated all the debates, but the moderators ensured there were some

exchanges related to international affairs. Intelligence issues arose only indirectly or by implication.

The first foreign affairs question posed in the debate in Boston was how to

deal with President Milosevic of Serbia, who was clinging to power despite

having lost the election. Gore and Bush sought to distinguish their positions

from one another, including on the matter of whether Russia could help solve

the problem, and whether it would be appropriate to use force in such a situation. Fortunately for the IC, the two candidates agreed more than they disagreed, and the substantive intelligence record on the Balkans was a very

strong one, so there seemed to be no temptation on anyone’s part to bring

intelligence issues into the exchange. 

Bush and Cheney offered forceful critiques of US actions and the situation

in Iraq. On October 5 in Danville, Cheney charged that the US government

“no longer knew what was happening in Iraq, in particular, whether that government was reconstituting its programs for building weapons of mass

destruction.” Cheney at this time offered no explicit criticism of intelligence

related to Iraq, but the implication was clear, especially in light of extensive

reviews of intelligence performance on Iraqi WMD programs before and after
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the first war with Iraq in 1990–91, when the US-led coalition drove Iraqi

forces out of Kuwait and destroyed them. 

In his second debate, Governor Bush echoed Cheney’s points, saying, “We

don’t know whether he [Saddam Hussein] is developing weapons of mass

destruction.” And in the third debate in St. Louis: “The man may be developing weapons of mass destruction, we don’t know.” Again, these were not

explicit criticisms of the IC, but they drew attention to a key area where available intelligence did not meet the needs of policymakers.

Senators Gore and Lieberman defended the defense policies of the Clinton

administration on Iraq and a range of other issues, such as troop strength,

combat readiness, and weapons acquisition practices. Gore during the debates

twice referred to his service on the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence as well as his experience on the Senate Armed Services Committee and on the NSC.

By virtue of not having been mentioned by name even once, the IC and the

CIA emerged almost unscathed from the presidential debates of 2000,

although the several references to the inadequacy of information on Iraq were

embarrassing.

Postelection Briefings

Within a few days of the election, presidents-elect customarily have chosen

to begin receiving daily intelligence briefings, in which they receive exactly

the same publication—the President’s Daily Brief—that is prepared for the

incumbent president right up to Inauguration Day. Every president since Harry

Truman has recognized the need for his successor to be up to speed on international developments from the moment he takes the oath of office, so these

briefings have been approved in all cases. The president-elect may also task

the briefers for additional information, in the form of answers to specific questions or additional supplementary papers. 

CIA was in position immediately to provide briefings to the president-elect,

whichever candidate that might be. If Gore was elected, he would continue to

be briefed in Washington. If Bush was elected, he would be briefed in Austin

by the Agency’s most senior analyst, Winston Wiley, the deputy director for

intelligence, or one of his two deputies, Jami Miscik or Marty Petersen. These

briefers were supported in Austin by a four-person team that included a midlevel analyst, communications officer, graphics expert, and information technology specialist. Such a team was in place in Austin on Election Day, with

equipment and real-time connectivity that gave them access to the full range

of intelligence information they would have had at their desks in Washington.
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GEORGE W. BUSH: DEMANDING CONSUMER

Everyone was surprised when 7 November 2000 came and went with no

president-elect. The uncertain outcome of the election in Florida, owing to the

“hanging chads,” resulted in a month’s delay before briefings could begin. Ever

resourceful, the support teams—which rotated through Austin roughly every

10 days—used this period to practice the process of receiving the electronic

PDB from Washington and sorting through voluminous raw reports and finished intelligence products from several intelligence agencies to assemble the

morning package that would be briefed to Bush should he become presidentelect. The teams found this to be time well spent. As one of the “Austin analysts” put it, “We were trying to get smart on the whole world.”

 In fact, presumably anxious about the impact of the extended delay or foreseeing the legal outcome, President Clinton ultimately approved briefings for

Bush even before the Supreme Court resolved the election. The CIA was surprised to get the word indirectly, when White House Chief of Staff John

Podesta on 30 November announced the president’s decision on the Today

show. The following day, Miscik met with the Secret Service to coordinate

President-elect George W. Bush and Associate Deputy Director for 

Intelligence Marty Petersen before a briefing in Austin, Texas.
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access to Governor Bush, and on Sunday, 3 December, with the governor’s

future chief of staff, Andy Card. Miscik recalls that the latter made clear the

Agency, in its briefings, would need to prove its worth and could take nothing

for granted simply because Bush’s “Dad had been DCI.”5

Wiley provided the first briefing, on 5 December at the Governor’s Mansion. Governor Bush greeted him with an unexpected question, “Are you a

direct report to George Tenet?” Wiley was able to answer that he was. He and

others felt reinforced in their judgment that it was best to have the briefings of

a newly elected president conducted by a very senior manager and analyst

who has worldwide expertise and experience supporting the policy process,

but is not himself or herself a political appointee identified with the outgoing

administration.

The briefings of the governor almost always began exactly at 8:00 a.m., or a

few minutes early, and lasted 45 minutes to an hour. Andy Card met the briefers downstairs at the Governor’s Mansion and escorted them to the governor’s

office. Often, the future national security advisor, Condi Rice, or her deputy,

Steve Hadley, would attend also. Wiley found that Bush was an attentive, curious listener and an active questioner. Wiley conducted the first several briefings in December, then turned the process over to his deputies, returning for

the last few briefings in Texas before President-elect Bush and his team

moved to Washington at the end of the first week in January.

Even senior officials encounter unexpected problems. The first day Wiley

was to brief Bush, he and the support team at 3:00 a.m. were printing the PDB

with a fancy, massive color printer, installed for the occasion, when the ceiling

collapsed. Water was everywhere; apparently condensate from the air conditioning system that had accumulated and then leaked through the flat roof

above them. Fortunately, the deluge just missed the printing and other communications gear. Cleaning up the mess in the middle of the night distracted

everyone and dispelled some of the anxiety of preparing to brief the man who

looked likely to become the next president. 

Marty Petersen was the senior briefer in Austin on the day the Supreme

Court decided the outcome of the election. The next morning, he greeted Bush

with, “Good morning, Mr. President-elect.” Bush beamed. Petersen found that

Bush read the PDB carefully and that he sought supplementary material,

including raw intelligence reports, international press reports, and the publications of several intelligence agencies. The president-elect regularly received

and studied imagery and other graphics. As he had with other briefers, Bush

asked Petersen a lot of questions.6

5 Jami Miscik, telephone interview with the author, 8 December 2011.
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GEORGE W. BUSH: DEMANDING CONSUMER

The briefers soon found that the president-elect had an excellent memory

and it was important to build continuity into the material they were presenting.

Miscik recalls Bush, seeking clarification on one matter, saying, “A week ago

you told me X....” She also remembers telling Bush on one occasion that she

needed to correct the record regarding what she had told him two days earlier.

She was pleased that the president-elect commented approvingly on the

Agency’s determination to keep the record straight. 

Anticipating the transition briefings, CIA prepared a book that contained

contributions from leadership analysts in all Agency geographic analytical

components. Provided to both candidates, it provided biographical and other

information on foreign leaders, including their past experience traveling to the

United States. The book included a list of points the foreign leaders could be

expected to raise in their calls of congratulations to the president-elect. Bush

put this book to use on a number of occasions when he received calls following his election. He was, moreover, a heavy user of the Agency’s standard

leadership profiles of foreign counterparts, reading more than 30 of them during the transition.

A review of PDB items delivered to the president-elect during a random 30

days of the transition period reveals a wide geographic distribution of subjects

addressed. The greatest proportion of pieces devoted to a single region, 25

percent, related to the Middle East. Most of these analyzed developments in

the Israel-Palestinian peace process and Iraq. 

 East Asia and Latin America were also followed closely, each comprising

17 percent of total items. Of the East Asian pieces, two-thirds focused on

China and most of the remainder on North and South Korea. The Latin American pieces assessed developments in several countries across the region. Thirteen percent of PDB items related to Russia, which, along with China, was the

single country with the most coverage. Europe, other than Russia, accounted

for another 13 percent, with most of these focusing on the Balkans.

Fewer pieces concentrated on international economic and energy issues,

and fewer still, in this pre-9/11 period, on South Asian countries and international terrorism.

From the start, President-elect Bush seemed to have confidence in his briefers and the CIA. Petersen observed that while he was in Bush’s office, for

example, the president-elect would often take phone calls regarding obviously

sensitive matters. Petersen would offer to leave the room, but Bush invariably

signaled him to stay seated, explaining on one occasion, “I can trust you

guys.” While the relationship of briefer to a president-elect is always a formal

6 Martin Petersen, interview with the author, Reston, Virginia, 21 September 2011.
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one, Bush was “warm, friendly, and engaged,” according to Petersen. The latter reported that one of his most unexpected opportunities arose suddenly one

morning when it fell to him to help the president-elect extract the family cat

from the Christmas tree.

Vice President-elect Cheney 

During the transition, the vice president-elect was based in Washington. He

received his first briefing on 5 December, just as Bush did. CIA adopted the

practice of having Cheney briefed by one of the rotating senior briefers who

was not that week in Austin. This helped provide continuity and exposed the

briefers to the interests and requirements of both officials. Cheney was often

briefed in the car during his morning drive from home to the transition office.

As both his home and this office were in McLean, Virginia, the short drive put

a premium on thinking through how best to use the limited available time.

The vice president-elect had long experience in government and an equally

long memory. It was not uncommon for him to request of the briefers that he

be provided national intelligence estimates or other materials that he remembered from his time as secretary of defense as addressing a particular subject.

Cheney wrote in his memoir: 

I had spent time on intelligence issues throughout my career, beginning when I was Ford’s chief of staff, then when I served on the

House Intelligence Committee, and, of course, as secretary of

defense. But when I became vice president, I had been away from it

for eight years, and I felt it was important to get up to speed.7

When in office, Vice President Cheney was a regular reader of the PDB and

other materials. His briefer met with him early every morning, normally at the

vice president’s home. Briefers found him to be a most careful reader, but

more contained and reserved than Bush. In his morning PDB sessions, he generally asked fewer questions and engaged in less discussion than the president.

On other occasions, however, the vice president was among the most forceful

questioners of intelligence analysts.

The vice president’s copy of the PDB normally included the entire package

the president received, but also additional material. As Cheney has written,

“The second section—‘behind the tab,’ we called it—contained responses to

questions I’d asked or items my briefers knew I was interested in.” The vice

president usually attended the president’s PDB sessions and would sometimes

7 Dick Cheney, In My Time (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2011), 315.
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GEORGE W. BUSH: DEMANDING CONSUMER

draw on his supplementary material in Oval Office discussions or ask the

briefers to share the material with the president. Concerning the makeup of the

briefing book generally, the former vice president wrote, “In my experience,

intelligence was an absolutely crucial element for those in policymaking positions, and if the briefers thought it should be in the PDB, it should go in.”8

Covert Action Briefing

Senior intelligence officials have never been of one mind regarding the best

time to brief incoming presidents and other senior executive branch officials

on covert action programs and other very sensitive operations. One line of reasoning is that it is best to hold off on such briefings until the new president and

administration have their feet on the ground, unless urgent developments dictate otherwise. The alternative perspective is that it is impossible to foresee

what might happen on a president’s first day in office and that they should at

least have been alerted to the existence of all such programs in case sudden

developments force them to make policy or military decisions involving those

programs.

In recent transitions, it has been done both ways. Clinton, for example, did

not receive such a briefing during his transition. Carter did. With George H.W.

Bush the issue did not arise, as he came to the presidency directly from the

vice presidency, where he had been aware of all such programs for eight years,

and before that in other capacities, including DCI. 

In this case, a decision was made to brief President-elect George W. Bush

on a broad range of CIA foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert

action activities shortly before inauguration. On 11 January 2001, Director

Tenet and Deputy Director for Operations Jim Pavitt provided the presidentelect, the vice president-elect, Andy Card, and Steve Hadley an extended

overview of these programs at Blair House. As he was the Agency officer with

primary responsibility for operational activities, Pavitt did most of the talking.

Pavitt recalls, “The briefing was a tour d’horizon of what we were doing...all

of it. President-elect was engaged, listened carefully, and asked good questions.”9 Tenet has written, “We told them our biggest concerns were terrorism,

proliferation, and China. I don’t recall Iraq coming up at all.”10

8 Ibid., 314–15.

9 James Pavitt, communication with the author, McLean, Virginia, 6 October 2011.

10 Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, 136.
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Strong Supporting Cast

The substantive briefings and related materials provided to President-elect

Bush during the transition were made possible by the support of a great many

Agency officers behind the scenes. CIA’s analytical arm, the Directorate of

Intelligence (DI), had begun planning the process almost a year ahead. The

deputy director for intelligence at that time was John McLaughlin, who had

been one of two senior officers providing briefings to President-elect Clinton in

Little Rock during his transition. McLaughlin was, thus, particularly mindful

and well informed about the logistical, communications, and security issues

that needed to be resolved well in advance if the briefings were to succeed.

In December 1999, the DI Corporate Board approved an ambitious initiative

to create a system that could provide electronic, online dissemination of the

PDB and other materials to the Agency’s most senior consumers at any location. Such a system was needed to meet the Agency’s responsibility to provide

all its consumers real-time intelligence, but the urgency was reinforced by

knowledge that a transition would be occurring in less than a year’s time. In the

early months of 2000, concern also mounted that the DI needed to determine

what real estate would be required if the Republican candidate would be supported from a remote location (the assumption was that Vice President Gore

would be the Democratic candidate, briefed in Washington). Any such location

would present issues involving physical security, communications bandwidth,

and coordination with the Secret Service. Mid-level DI officers were identified

and assigned responsibility for beginning work in all these areas.

In February 2000, McLaughlin named a coordinator of preliminary work on

transition planning, and in May he asked Marty Petersen, the third-ranking

officer in the DI, to assume overall responsibility for transition activities.

McLaughlin formalized the roles of other officers already working on IT system development, operational and security issues, coordination, and the preparation of substantive material. Petersen held weekly meetings of these officers

to ensure corporate awareness and proper coordination as they worked to

implement their goals. He included representatives of the Agency’s administration and operations directorates in these sessions. Looking back on that

period, Petersen stressed that the keys to success were to start early; get the

support piece right, as “that can kill you”; and pave the way for timely assistance from relevant nonanalytical components, for example, needed approvals

from the operations directorate related to the sourcing of raw intelligence

reports to be shown to the president-elect.

As early as late May, when it had become clear Governor Bush was very

likely to become the Republican nominee, DI officers visited Austin to look

into real estate options and travel routes for the briefers. The team arranged
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GEORGE W. BUSH: DEMANDING CONSUMER

for secure office space within a reasonable driving distance of the Governor’s

Mansion. The DI’s senior officer responsible for security matters contacted

and consulted with the Secret Service well in advance of the election in order

to pave the way for seamless cooperation immediately after Election Day. At

the appropriate time he also made contact and contingency arrangements with

the governor’s own staff. By the time briefings began in December, this officer had made multiple trips to Austin, and he stayed in the city for the first

week of briefings to ensure everything worked as planned.

The most suspenseful part of the preparations was the challenging IT effort

to provide the PDB online and ensure that the analysts and briefers in Austin

would have all the capabilities they had on their desktops in Washington. In

January 2000, the DI named a program manager for the new presidential intelligence dissemination system.11 That officer was charged with creating a modernized system second to none, yet cautioned that the effort in Austin “will be

the briefing of your lifetime.... We want to impress him as best we can...the

briefing cannot fail.” From the outset, all involved were concerned these considerations might prove mutually exclusive.

The program manager worked closely with In-Q-Tel to provide managers

with options on how to proceed. Founded in the late 1990s, In-Q-Tel was a

unique innovation for CIA. Although funded by the Agency, it is an independent, nonprofit, private corporation that undertakes to harness the best of private sector technology to meet Agency operational and programmatic needs.

Inevitably, there have been some successes and some failures. This time had

to be a success.

In-Q-Tel in 2000 provided some dramatic possibilities for technologically

enhanced briefings. The most memorable, in the judgment of the program

manager, was an iPad-like system in which the briefer could immediately

bring up virtually any relevant intelligence information (albeit with a click

rather than a touch of the screen). In-Q-Tel’s proposed options were carefully

considered by officers representing analysts and briefers who would be using

the new system. Not surprisingly, given the very high stakes involved, the prospective users “were very uncomfortable with the most far-reaching and

untested approaches.”

The dissemination system delivered by this program was a substantial

improvement over existing capabilities for briefing senior consumers while

they were traveling and proved reliable when deployed. It included some

powerful web-based tools developed by In-Q-Tel. In the end, however, the

11 The quotes in the following paragraphs concerning the IT initiative come from an interview with 

the program manager, an Agency officer under cover, in Herndon, Virginia, 27 September 2011.
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technology used was, in the view of the program manager, “far more limited

and fundamental than many of the options—it was not all that avant garde or

different.” While many of the capabilities developed were not used in 2000,

they were, for the most part, introduced into Agency IT services over the next

10 years. “Our ideas got leveraged.”

From the point of view of Agency analysts working in Austin, the important thing was that—for the first time in a transition briefing effort—they had

computer workstations with full Headquarters capability and adequate bandwidth to meet their needs, including instant messaging. They could receive the

PDB electronically (rather than by fax), and they had full access to all Agency

databases. Their other equipment included secure telephones and cell phones,

secure and nonsecure fax machines, and a desktop publishing capability with

a “big, fancy” printer. IT professionals rotated through Austin throughout the

period of the briefings to ensure everything functioned properly.

The DI selected four experienced analysts to serve in Austin, helping the

briefer prepare for the morning sessions with the governor. The analysts typically were in Austin for 10-day, solo tours of duty, overlapping a day or two

with the colleague who would relieve them. The analysts were chosen for

their versatility and initiative rather than their areas of expertise, which varied

widely. Although the days in Austin were demanding, the analysts reported

that they enjoyed and were challenged by the work, which forced them to

become knowledgeable about developments worldwide. Looking back on the

experience, one of them commented that after the job in Austin was finished,

“it was very hard to go back to our narrow accounts.”

The analyst reported for work sometime between midnight and 3 a.m. each

day to begin sorting through the large volume of intelligence reporting. The

basic PDB was the centerpiece of the presentation to the president-elect. There

were also press reports from around the world, individual reports from

human assets, satellite imagery, communications intercepts, and a wealth of

publications from all US intelligence agencies, ranging from leadership profiles on foreign leaders to multiagency NIEs. The governor obviously would

not have time to read great quantities of such material, so the task was to identify specific items that related directly to that day’s PDB, were otherwise

responsive to a particular request or need, or enabled the briefer to make helpful, supplementary oral comments. 

A big part of the analyst’s work throughout the day was to follow up on

questions the governor or his aides raised in the morning briefing. The briefer

could answer some on the spot, but often the answer would be provided the

following morning in the form of written material prepared by analysts in

Washington, or with an oral answer made possible by information acquired
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GEORGE W. BUSH: DEMANDING CONSUMER

from intelligence databases in the 24 hours since the last briefing. The analyst,

graphics specialist, and communications officer were all involved in sorting

and researching information and preparing responsive material for presentation at the next session. The daily deadline was to get the briefer on the road in

time to arrive at the Mansion well before the 8:00 a.m. scheduled start time, as

the governor was often ready to begin a few minutes early.

CIA officers at Headquarters were eager to assist the team in Austin—sometimes too eager, in fact. The virtually limitless communications

capability presented the analyst and briefer in Austin with a challenge. They

were sent a great deal of material and were tempted or needed to access a huge

amount themselves. Some material, including many of the most sensitive,

“raw” reports from the Directorate of Operations, came to the Agency’s Operations Center only in paper form, rather than electronically. The Operations

Center therefore tended to use the secure fax to forward various materials to

Austin, to the point that the fax pipeline and the analysts were both overwhelmed. When interviewed about their experience and recommendations,

the analysts, while grateful, diplomatically noted that Headquarters, and the

Operations Center in particular, might have exercised more selectivity and

discretion in what was sent to the Agency’s support operation in Austin or

wherever it might be the next time around. 

The president-elect was briefed almost exclusively in Texas during the transition period. There was one important exception, however, when he asked

that he continue to receive briefings while visiting Boca Grande Island, Florida for a two-day family gathering Christmas week. The Agency learned of

this requirement at the last minute, with the result that briefer Jami Miscik and

her supporting colleagues had to stay in a hotel that was a 45-minute drive

from the briefing site. On Christmas Day, Miscik and an analyst conducted a

trial run, both to familiarize themselves with the route and to try out a portable

suite of communications equipment that was much less capable than the

sophisticated system they had been using in Austin.

The briefing team was in suspense the early morning hours of 26 December. The download time for the PDB and associated background material was

greater than they had anticipated, and they learned by telephone that the president-elect wanted to receive his briefing earlier than even he usually required.

In the end, the PDB was received less than an hour before Miscik needed to

depart the hotel for the briefing site. The package was assembled, and she

reached the president-elect’s hotel in time to hear him ask, as he arrived, “Is

the CIA here yet?”

One unique aspect to the Florida trip was that Miscik on 26 and 27 December briefed President-elect Bush and former President Bush at the same time.
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She recalled thinking that the last person in that situation would have been

President John Quincy Adams’s intelligence briefer.

Bush’s two briefings in Florida and one in Washington during a stopover on

his indirect return to Texas were a harbinger of things to come, as the briefer

during the Bush presidency would accompany him wherever he traveled. The

requirement for briefings while on the road, especially during a family holiday

at Christmas, also seemed to signal that the president-elect had come to value

and rely on the briefings. 

When Governor Bush relocated to Washington at the end of the first week

of January, analysts who had served in Austin continued to support the briefer

who met with the president-elect. From the beginning of the transition, analysts who were back in Washington (rather than serving in Austin that week)

would support the briefer who was meeting each morning with the vice president-elect. Ironically, the analysts found it was harder to do their job in Washington than in Austin. While in Washington, they were “super executive

assistants” with a variety of tasks that diluted their efforts to support the briefers. They also observed tension between the long-established PDB staff working with the incumbent administration and themselves. Preparing the range of

materials necessary to support properly both the outgoing and incoming

administrations created a lot of work for everyone. 

All the supporting cast in Austin found they became caught up in “duties as

assigned” that were largely unpredictable. It fell to them, for example, to

install a secure telephone in the Governor’s Mansion, a secure phone and fax

in the president-elect’s home in Crawford, and safes for secure storage in the

mansion and in a second building on the ranch. When the transition briefings

in Texas were completed, Agency officers recruited a Secret Service counterpart to help them remove one of the safes to an Agency location. 

Impact of Austin

President-elect Bush was provided transition briefings in Austin until 6 January 2001 and was then briefed in Washington right up to Inauguration Day.

Deputy Director for Intelligence Wiley used the occasion of the last briefing in

Texas to introduce Michael Morell, a senior DI officer who would be taking

over briefing responsibilities in Washington and would continue as briefer to

President Bush after inauguration. The pre-inauguration briefings in Washington were usually at the Madison Hotel, a setting that Wiley recalled as vastly

different from Austin, primarily because of enhanced security—the corridor

of the hotel through which the briefers accessed the office of the presidentelect was “full of security forces in combat gear.” 12
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GEORGE W. BUSH: DEMANDING CONSUMER

In their final session in Austin, Governor Bush expressed to Wiley his

appreciation for the briefings he had been provided, pronouncing them “great,

and helpful.” It was what he said next, however, that really stuck in Wiley’s

mind. The president-elect said, “When I am sworn in, I expect I will be getting

the good stuff.” CIA knew it had work to do, believing it had been giving him

“the good stuff” all along.

Within a week of his return to Washington from Texas, Wiley sent a message to all hands in the Directorate of Intelligence. He reported President-elect

Bush had very high expectations regarding the intelligence support he would

be receiving from CIA as president and had indicated he would be approving

distribution of the PDB only to a few senior cabinet members and White

House advisers. Wiley informed his workforce that he would be making a

number of fundamental changes to the PDB.

Immediately after Inauguration Day, Director Tenet announced to the

Agency workforce that changes would be made to presidential support. “I

know that we are off to a strong start with President Bush,” he wrote, continuing with an admonition that the Agency should “step up the quality of our support.” The director noted that the DI would be taking the lead in implementing

improvements to the PDB process, but would rely more than ever before on

input from the other directorates. Jim Pavitt added that the DO saw the PDB as

a key way it supported the president and his advisers, and that the directorate

was prepared to shed more light on the sourcing of intelligence reports because

it would increase confidence in the reliability of the information.13

In fact, senior CIA officers understood well that the “good stuff” the new

president really wanted was what one of them called the “blood and guts” of

operations. Historically, CIA had run very sensitive pieces in the PDB, but

these almost always were analytical items that did not include operational or

programmatic details. Clearly, with the new president wanting such information and willing to limit sharply the distribution of the publication, more such

explicit information would need to be included. Wiley also made a number of

other changes, the thrust of which, as he put it, was to “break the binding on

the book” and make the PDB briefing “an event rather than a book.”

12 Winston Wiley, interview with the author, McLean, Virginia, 5 October 2011.

13 “Agency Announces Changes to Presidential Support,” What’s News at CIA, No. 829, 23 January 2001.
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President Bush as a Customer

During his eight years in office, President Bush continued to be actively

engaged in the PDB process—his briefings really were events. In the week

following his inauguration, Director Tenet and the president’s briefer, Michael

Morell, met every day with the president, vice president, chief of staff, and

national security advisor in what were described at the time as “highly interactive sessions.” Initially, in addition to the White House team, PDBs were

delivered only to the secretaries of defense and state and to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. This limited dissemination enabled to Agency to include very sensitive

operational information as the new president wanted. By the end of Bush’s

tenure, however, the list of PDB recipients had grown to 20. 

After the initial launch, there was a brief time when Tenet did not attend

every PDB session. Tenet had confidence Morell would handle the job well,

and he did not want it to appear, as a result of his daily appearances at the

White House, like he was lobbying to keep his job as DCI on a permanent

basis in the new administration.14 However, the president soon informed

Morell that he wanted the director there every day. The briefer was highly

knowledgeable about the contents of the PDB, as well as the raw intelligence

and analytical considerations that undergirded the day’s pieces. He normally

introduced the pieces and answered questions. Tenet’s contribution, as he has

described in his memoir, was “to provide color commentary and the larger

context.” The director would also “pull back the curtain” and explain to the

president how CIA and the Intelligence Community had acquired the intelligence. President Bush undoubtedly became significantly more knowledgeable

about the sources and methods of the IC than any previous president, with the

exception of his father, George H. W. Bush, who carried into his presidency

such knowledge gained during his time as DCI. 

To facilitate this free flowing discussion and meet the president’s needs, the

Agency each day provided Bush with intelligence tailored to his schedule right

up to the last minute. This included late-breaking intelligence reports, numerous maps and charts, imagery, and information on operational developments

interspersed among the more traditional analytical pieces. The compilation of

material was put together with a greater flexibility of format and writing style,

clearly leading with the most important items, of whatever length, and greater

transparency regarding the source of the material, whether human or technical.

Even during the Bush presidency, however, CIA protected absolutely the true

names of human sources—those were never included in the PDB.

14 Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, 137.
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GEORGE W. BUSH: DEMANDING CONSUMER

President Bush received an intelligence update every day. As he put it, “Six

mornings a week, George Tenet and the CIA briefed me.... On Sundays, I

received a written intelligence briefing.”15 His Agency briefer traveled with him

wherever he was, which was unprecedented. This daily contact and close relationship enabled the briefer immediately to refer any questions the president

might have to Agency colleagues for quick follow-up. It also ensured the contents of the book, and the supporting material, would be as relevant and timely

as possible. Periodically throughout his eight years, Bush’s chief of staff or

national security advisor would work with the DNI or CIA to focus the PDB

even more closely on what one of them called the “president’s rhythms.”

In these efforts to focus the PDB, no one attempted to tell the IC what to say

substantively; rather, it was guidance to ensure certain high-priority subjects

would be addressed in the PDB at a time when the information would be most

useful to the president. For example, for a period the president held twice

weekly video conferences with the US commanding general and ambassador

in Iraq. It was requested that on those mornings the PDB should include the

latest intelligence on Iraq. On the off days, the proportion of the book devoted

to other areas and issues would expand, along with the time to discuss them. 

In addition to his daily PDB sessions, or as an extension of them, President

Bush in early 2007 began a practice of receiving more in-depth briefings

directly from CIA and IC experts in selected countries, regions, or functional

areas. These sessions, which came to be known as deep dives, were nominally

bounded by a specific, planned length of time, but if the president was interested, they would go on longer. The president would often begin by questioning the briefer or briefers about their backgrounds, including the time they had

worked on their account, their language expertise, residence in their area of

responsibility, and the like. He did this so consistently that before long the

Agency started giving him prepared biographies of the briefers for upcoming

deep dives. The president obviously wanted to confirm that he was hearing

from individuals who really knew their subject. Usefully, he would often characterize his own experience or inexperience with a given subject, which would

help the analysts calibrate their presentations.

The vice president, senior White House and NSC aides, and sometimes the

secretaries of state and defense would sit in on the deep dive briefings, either

in person or via video conference. Generally, the White House aides liked the

briefings because they were of interest to the president and were useful to him.

Others had reservations, because the president took seriously what he heard in

these sessions and would sometimes make what turned out to be quite firm

15 Bush, Decision Points, 153.
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decisions about courses of action based on the briefings but before the normal

interagency policy process had a chance to run its course. 

On one early occasion the president was briefed by two analysts in a session

at Camp David that was planned for 30 minutes, but which as a result of his

extended questioning lasted 90 minutes. Not long after this briefing, the president, according to DNI Michael McConnell, said, “As long as I am president,

we will keep doing these.”16

Intelligence and Politics

In his memoir, President Bush explained he had initially intended to nominate Donald Rumsfeld, veteran of previous Republican administrations, to be

DCI. As events unfolded, however, Rumsfeld was selected to be secretary of

defense. With no obvious alternative candidate for CIA, Bush decided to postpone resolving the matter definitively, and instead leave George Tenet in the

job for an indefinite period. President Bush, in his memoir, explained his

thought process: 

I had great respect for the Agency as a result of Dad’s time there.

Retaining Bill Clinton’s CIA director would send a message of continuity and show that I considered the Agency beyond the reach of

politics. I had been receiving intelligence briefings as presidentelect for a few weeks when I met the sitting director, George Tenet.

Tenet...obviously cared deeply about the Agency. As George and I

got to know each other, I decided to stop looking for a replacement.

The cigar-chomping, Greek-to-the-core director agreed to stay.17

In his memoir, Tenet wrote, “In my heart I wanted to stay because I felt the

job was unfinished.” He recounts it was at the conclusion of the briefing of

Bush on Agency operations (on 11 January) when the president-elect asked

him to stay behind to discuss the matter of his continued service. “Why don’t

we just let things go along for a while and we’ll see how things work out?” he

remembers Bush saying. “I gathered from that I was neither on the team nor

off it. I was on probation.” Tenet explained also that while he would not be a

member of the cabinet in the Bush administration, he would soon find he had

extraordinary access to the president. “Being in regular, direct contact with the

president is an incredible boon to a CIA director’s ability to do his job.”18

16 VADM Michael McConnell, interview with the author, Herndon, Virginia, 26 October 2011.

17 Bush, Decision Points, 84. 18 Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, 136–37.
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GEORGE W. BUSH: DEMANDING CONSUMER

The president and the DCI were alike in many respects and bonded closely.

Their daily contact during the PDB briefings—and shared burden to protect

the country from additional terrorist attacks in the wake of 9/11—ensured the

director’s relationship with the president and senior White House staff was

initially strong despite their different party backgrounds. Unfortunately, however, events unfolded in such a way that Tenet’s relationship with the White

House deteriorated seriously before the end of Bush’s first term.

Several intelligence-related issues—including public statements by the

administration and the IC about Iraqi WMD, the reported acquisition from

Niger of raw materials for Iraq’s nuclear program, and alleged cooperation

between Iraq and al-Qa‘ida—became highly charged politically and caused

growing disaffection with the Agency on the part of some senior officials. In

such circumstances, the nuances or even essential facts of the issues become

irrelevant. When any intelligence matter seriously embarrasses the administration, the head of the CIA, as captain of that ship, is held responsible. By July

2004, Tenet had concluded that trust had been broken between him and the

White House. He informed the president’s chief of staff, “It’s time to go,” and,

after seven years in the job, resigned.19

Porter Goss succeeded Tenet as DCI and assumed responsibility for the

daily intelligence briefings. Goss was to be the last DCI. As a result of perceived weaknesses in the structure and functioning of the IC related to the

events of 9/11, Congress and the Bush administration created the cabinet-level

post of director of national intelligence. In April 2005, John Negroponte was

appointed the first DNI and responsibility for the daily briefings thus fell to

him. Goss continued as director of the CIA and, like his successors, attended

Oval Office sessions, albeit less frequently, to discuss Agency operational

matters. Negroponte, in turn, was replaced in February 2007 by Michael

McConnell, who carried on the briefings until the end of Bush’s second term. 

Kerry and Edwards Briefed in 2004

President Eisenhower, running for reelection in 1956, established the practice of approving intelligence briefings for his challenger. Most challengers

have accepted. Stevenson (1956), Carter (1976), Reagan (1980), and Clinton

(1992) were briefed. McGovern (1972) accepted a briefing offered by Henry

Kissinger, which was to be followed by CIA briefings, but Kissinger’s briefing and thus the series were cancelled as McGovern dealt with the political

fallout from the withdrawal from the race of his running mate, Senator Eagle19 Ibid., 486.
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ton. Senator Mondale (1984) declined to be briefed. Senator Dole (1996)

apparently was not offered a briefing. 

CIA has always taken seriously the opportunity and obligation to brief challengers, knowing the process is a nonpartisan one that should favor neither

side and that an incumbent president has access to the full range of intelligence information. Beyond that, almost half of those who have challenged an

incumbent president in the period the Agency has existed have been successful, making it all the more important for them to receive the government’s best

information about developments abroad as soon as practicable. 

In 2004, the George W. Bush administration followed the well-established

tradition and approved briefings for Senators John Kerry and John Edwards.

Each candidate received two briefings. Presidential candidate Kerry was

briefed on 1 September in Nashville and on 25 September in Boston. Vice

presidential candidate Edwards was briefed on 31 August in Wilkes-Barre,

and on a second occasion at his home in Washington, DC.

Acting Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin conducted both of

Kerry’s briefings and Edwards’s first. McLaughlin had been serving as acting

director since Tenet’s resignation in July. In addition to having just served four

years as DDCI, McLaughlin had been centrally involved in the briefings of

President-elect Bill Clinton and candidate George W. Bush and was ideally

suited for the task. Deputy Director for Intelligence Jami Miscik conducted

the second briefing of Edwards; earlier she had been heavily involved with

briefing President-elect George W. Bush.

Agency components provided inputs to an inch-thick package of written

material that McLaughlin studied to formulate his briefing for Kerry and

Edwards. From that, McLaughlin distilled a briefing that was literally worldwide. His approach, he stressed, was to construct a briefing “that would

answer the question, what does he really need to know to be president?”20 It

was also intended to respond to seven pages of questions that had been

received from the Kerry/Edwards campaign. 

Not surprisingly, three years after 9/11, the briefing highlighted the global

war on terrorism, with a focus on al-Qa‘ida and other groups, political Islam,

and terrorism-related developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It also

focused on the political situation and insurgency in Iraq, and on states of proliferation concern such as North Korea, Iran, and Libya.

The briefing provided the IC’s assessment of developments in countries and

regions of longstanding high intelligence interest—Russia, China, and the

20 McLaughlin interview, 28 September 2011. 
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GEORGE W. BUSH: DEMANDING CONSUMER

Middle East—and trouble spots in a half dozen selected states in Africa, Latin

America, and East Asia. Finally, it addressed a few transnational issues,

including energy security. Even the distilled version of the briefing was substantial—it lasted two hours.

Referring to the subject of Iraq, Senator Kerry informed McLaughlin and

the analysts who accompanied him that he wanted the briefing “with the bark

off.” He asked to hear “exactly what you would tell President Bush.”

McLaughlin felt he provided the same objective assessment of developments

that the Agency had been providing the administration, recalling, “At that

time, we [CIA] were not all that popular in the White House [concerning

CIA’s assessment of Iraq].” 

Overall, the briefers found Senator Kerry in both sessions to be “more

inclined to be briefed than Edwards or Bush,” meaning Kerry would hear them

out while they made their points rather than moving immediately to discussion

or questions. At the same time, while the senator was very friendly, even gracious, he asked well-informed, probing questions. One of the experts accompanying McLaughlin recalled Kerry asked very specific, hard questions, almost

like an interrogation. He felt the session was challenging and rewarding, but

intense, saying there “was not a 10-second period that was wasted time.”

Kerry’s highly professional and systematic method of questioning obviously

reflected his years of service on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The briefings of Senator Edwards were considerably more relaxed than

those of Kerry, and did not run as long. CIA briefers were pleased the first session occurred at all, as they heard Edwards tell his staff as he approached the

briefing room at the hotel, “I know I have to do this, but I will get it over with

quick and we can go for pizza.” In the event, Edwards gave the briefing team

a generous amount of time, and the session, although conversational, was

interactive and substantive. Edwards’s staff participated more fully in the back

and forth than did Kerry’s, where one accompanying staff member limited his

role to asking a few questions to clarify particular points. 

Looking back on the briefings of the challengers in 2004, McLaughlin

remarked that he “felt very good about the briefing of Kerry in terms of the

substance and our relationship with him.” He felt the briefing of Edwards was

“less thorough” than he wanted it to be. 

The presidential debates leading up to the election of 2004 began only days

after the second intelligence briefings of Kerry and Edwards. Debates between

President Bush and Democratic challenger Kerry were held on 30 September

at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, Florida; on 8 October at Washington University in St. Louis; and on 13 October at Arizona State University in
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Tempe. There was one debate between Vice President Dick Cheney and John

Edwards, held 5 October at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland. 

 Inevitably, in light of the intervening events of 9/11, intelligence issues featured more prominently in the debates of 2004 than they had in 2000. The

umbrella topic of the first debate was foreign policy and homeland security.

Bush referred to the intelligence on Iraq that had contributed to his decision to

go to war to remove Saddam Hussein. Kerry said he had accepted the intelligence reporting on the threat from Iraq and supported the president’s authority, and displayed an awareness of what had been reported in more recent

Intelligence estimates on Iraq.

In the second debate, Bush was more pointed in saying, “We all thought there

were weapons there [in Iraq]. I wasn’t happy when we found out there were no

weapons, and we’ve got an intelligence group together to figure out why.” The

president in the first debate underscored his intention to “reform our intelligence services to make sure that we get the best intelligence possible,” and,

later in the debate, his plan to “strengthen our intelligence gathering services.” 

In their one debate, the vice president and Edwards had a direct exchange

on another controversial issue related to Iraq. In answer to the first question

asked in the debate, Cheney charged that Saddam Hussein “had an established

relationship with al-Qa‘ida. Specifically, look at George Tenet, the CIA director’s testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations two years ago

when he talked about a 10-year relationship.”

Edwards countered, “Mr. Vice President, there is no connection between the

attacks of September 11th and Saddam Hussein. The 9/11 Commission has

said it. Your own secretary of state has said it. And you’ve gone around the

country suggesting that there is some connection. There is not. And in fact the

CIA is now about to report that the connection between al-Qa‘ida and Saddam

Hussein is tenuous at best.” Later in the debate, Edwards cited his service on

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the travel to the Middle East

he had undertaken while on the committee as a reason he had “a very clear

idea of what has to be done to keep this country safe.”

These exchanges regarding the CIA, its director, and specific intelligence

issues were the most explicit such references in a presidential debate since the

debates between Nixon and Kennedy in 1960. In general, they reflected the

dissatisfaction with the IC that was felt by many in Congress and the administration as a result of the events of 9/11 and the WMD issues associated with

the start of the war with Iraq. Within six months of the presidential debates of

2004, the White House and Congress disestablished the position of DCI and

created the post of director of national intelligence. 
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GEORGE W. BUSH: DEMANDING CONSUMER

George W. Bush restructured the Intelligence Community more fundamentally than any president since Truman in 1948. By a significant margin, he also

made more use of the IC to provide information on international developments than any previous president. He almost never missed his daily PDB

briefing, acquired unprecedented knowledge about IC sources and methods,

devoted a great deal of time to focused, in-depth briefings, and became

uniquely informed about intelligence operations. 

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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Through 10 transitions from 1952 to 2000, the Intelligence Community has

provided intelligence support to the presidents-elect. This support, endorsed by

each of the sitting presidents, has been designed primarily to acquaint the

incoming president with developments abroad that will require his decisions

and actions as president. A second goal has been to establish a solid working

relationship with each new president and his advisers so the IC could serve him

well, once in office.

The IC has been generally, but not uniformly, successful in accomplishing

these goals. Overall, it has proved easier to help the new president become

well informed than to establish an enduring relationship. Both aims have been

met better in recent transitions than during some of the earlier ones. One key

variable is that the IC in recent years has made a much more organized and

concerted effort to provide intelligence support to the president-elect and the

national security team.

The background and attitudes the president-elect brings with him obviously

are powerful variables in determining the extent to which the IC’s effort will

succeed. Ironically, prior familiarity with the Intelligence Community and

experience with foreign developments—or lack thereof—do not by themselves

predict much of anything. In the period under review, Presidents Reagan, Clinton, and George W. Bush, for example, were by any objective measure the least

experienced in foreign affairs at the time of their election, yet by Inauguration

Day each had absorbed an immense amount of information. Once in office,

their dramatically different operating styles dictated the nature of their equally

different relationships with the CIA and the IC.

At the other extreme, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Eisenhower provide clear cases of individuals who had had long experience with intelligence

and foreign affairs before their election. Here too, however, their management

styles, personal interests, and backgrounds determined their different relationships with IC after inauguration—informal and close in one case, formal and

aloof in the other. The Agency had provided good substantive support to each

during the transition.
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In the three cases where the CIA’s relationship with the White House was to

prove the least satisfactory—or the most volatile, a different but equally challenging matter—the president either brought a grudge with him or quickly

became disillusioned with intelligence. President Nixon felt the CIA had cost

him the 1960 election; President Kennedy was immediately undercut and disillusioned by the Bay of Pigs misadventure; and President Johnson was alienated by the Agency’s negative assessments on Vietnam. In each of these cases

the relationship was not helped by the fact that CIA had not succeeded in providing good intelligence support to, and establishing ties with, any of the three

before their inauguration.

The obvious but sometimes elusive key for the IC, and particularly its

director, is to grasp each new president’s needs and operating style and

accommodate them during the transition and beyond. Individual proclivities

aside, however, some generalizations can be offered about how the IC can best

approach its unique mission of providing substantive support during presidential transitions. Most of the evidence suggests that the Community has learned

from its past experiences and built on them.

 Patterns of Support

In looking at the intelligence support provided the early postwar presidents

before their inauguration, it is necessary to set aside President Truman, who

came to office before the creation of the modern IC, and Johnson, whose elevation to the presidency came suddenly amid extraordinary circumstances that one

hopes will never be repeated. Concerning the others, it is notable that each of

them—Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nixon—received intelligence briefings both

in the preelection period and during the postelection transition. Kennedy and

Nixon received few briefings; Eisenhower was given somewhat more, including

several presented by the DCI. However, not one of the presidents-elect during

the 1950s and 1960s read the Agency’s daily publications or met with a CIA

officer for daily updates during the transition. Only Kennedy received a briefing

on covert activities and sensitive collection programs before being sworn in.

During the first 25 years of its existence, CIA enjoyed no significant success in its efforts to establish a close and supportive relationship with each

president. The reverse was true: these relationships went downhill after Truman. He had received intelligence information at the weekly meetings of the

National Security Council, read the Agency’s daily and weekly intelligence

publications, and received in-depth weekly briefings from the DCI. His successor, Eisenhower, was perhaps the best at using the NSC as a vehicle for

receiving intelligence, but he did not read the publications regularly and did

not routinely see the DCI for separate intelligence briefings. Kennedy, John-
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

son, and Nixon also received intelligence information at NSC meetings,

although they relied less on the formal NSC system. Once in office, these

three presidents did read a daily intelligence publication, which took a different form for each. However, no president through the early 1970s read the

daily publications with the assistance of a briefer, as has generally been the

custom in more recent years.

No DCI during the Agency’s early decades was able to replicate on a continuing basis the relationship that Bedell Smith had established with Truman.

During the early Johnson years, John McCone attempted to restart regular

briefings of the president, but Johnson became impatient and ended them

before long. The third DCI to serve under Johnson, Richard Helms, saw that

an alternative approach was needed and managed to establish an excellent

relationship with the president by providing him intelligence at the famous

Tuesday luncheons and via short, highly pertinent papers. But even Helms

could not sustain his access or influence with Nixon. During Nixon’s years in

office, the relationship between the president and the CIA reached the lowest

point in the Agency’s history.

The presidents who have come into office since the mid-1970s have, during

their transitions, received more intelligence information on developments

abroad and on the activities of the US Intelligence Community than their predecessors did. Like their predecessors, they all received worldwide overview

briefings from the DCI, DNI, or other senior officers. Unlike their predecessors, however, they also read the PDB throughout the transition. With some

variations in how it was done, each of them met daily during the transition

with an officer of the IC, who provided oral briefings to supplement the PDB.

Almost all of this group—Carter, Reagan, George H. W. and George W.

Bush—were given in-depth descriptions of covert action and sensitive collection programs during the transition. Clinton did not receive such a briefing;

outgoing DCI Robert Gates decided to use his one briefing opportunity with

Clinton to concentrate on substantive issues and to leave discussion of sensitive activities until after the inauguration. Ford was aware of such programs

from his service as vice president. 

Once in office, all recent presidents received intelligence at meetings of the

NSC and read the PDB regularly. Distinguishing them from their predecessors,

however, was the fact that most recent presidents, with the exception of Reagan, while in office have read the PDB with a briefer in attendance. Usually, a

briefer from the IC was involved, although for a portion of Ford’s presidency

and with Carter the national security advisor was with the president as he read

the book and IC officers were not present on a daily basis. For most of the Ford

and Clinton presidencies and during both Bush presidencies, IC briefers were
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in attendance when the president was in Washington. Briefers also accompanied George W. Bush when he traveled. 

The single most critical test of whether the IC is properly supporting the US

policymaking process is the effectiveness of the intelligence support provided

the president. Overall, the level of that support deteriorated somewhat during

the IC’s first 25 years but improved and strengthened during the period

between the early 1970s and 2008. To a substantial extent, this positive trend

resulted from the leadership of one man, George H. W. Bush. Bush ensured that

full intelligence support was given to Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan, and

his own presidency was a high point in terms of the CIA’s relationship with the

White House. He saw to it that President-elect Clinton and his national security

team received extensive intelligence support during the transition and encouraged his son, George W. Bush, to receive the PDB daily. The latter, in 2008,

directed that extensive support be provided his successor, Barack Obama. 

What the Presidents Recommend

Interviews with four former presidents eliciting their opinions on why the

system of intelligence support worked better during some transitions and

administrations than others unearthed one immediate, common, and obvious

reaction: each president is different. Ford, in particular, stressed that point,

asserting that “the backgrounds and circumstances of the various presidents

are so different that there can be no one formula for future support. Eisenhower or Ford or even Kennedy were so much more familiar with intelligence

than a Clinton or a Reagan.” Ford went on to underscore that “the Intelligence

Community has to be prepared to be flexible to accommodate the different

experiences.”1

Carter had some of the most concrete advice on how the CIA ought to go

about establishing its relationship with each president-elect. As a start, he

urged the Agency to “give a new president-elect a paper on what previous

presidents had done regarding intelligence support. Let the next incumbent

decide—show them the gamut of material.”2

In discussing how presidents and times change, Carter noted that, if he were

in the White House in later years, he would have welcomed computerized

intelligence support in the Oval Office. Pleased to hear that the Agency had

1 Ford interview, 8 September 1993. Subsequent observations by Ford also come from this interview.

2 Carter interview, 23 June 1993. Subsequent observations by Carter also come from this interview.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

been experimenting for some time with a system for making real-time intelligence available via a computer terminal on the desk of senior consumers,

Carter volunteered, “If I was in the White House now I would welcome it. I

feel comfortable with computers and would use it, not as a substitute for the

other support, the PDB and the briefings, but in addition to it.” He explained

that when a question arose about developments in a particular country he

would “like to have access to something where I could punch in a request for

the latest information.”

The IC’s experience indicates that a critically important variable in establishing a successful relationship is the approach taken by the DNI (formerly

DCI). Comments of the presidents who were interviewed reinforced that

impression. During every transition, the director has been involved personally

in providing at least one, and in some cases many, briefings. In those cases

where the relationship was established most effectively, the common factor

was that the director succeeded in bringing the institutions of the IC into the

process so that intelligence professionals could assist him and carry the process forward after his role diminished or was discontinued. In one form or

another, this has been accomplished with each of the presidents elected since

the mid-1970s.

When the institutional link between the IC and the president was not properly established, it was usually because the director attempted to handle the

relationship singlehandedly. Two cases show that this can happen in quite different ways. DCI Allen Dulles, for example, chose to support the incoming

Kennedy administration almost entirely on his own, giving three briefings to

Kennedy and involving only one other CIA person. Those briefings reportedly

did not impress Kennedy, and the relationship between the two men, complicated immensely by the Bay of Pigs fiasco, unraveled within months.

In the case of Nixon, Helms was involved in one briefing immediately after

Nixon’s selection as the Republican nominee and in a perfunctory discussion

at the White House after his election. Unfortunately, the handoff of responsibility from the DCI to the CIA career officers positioned in New York to provide support did not succeed in its fundamental purpose. Nixon was never

seen personally, and he read very little Agency material. Given his deep suspicions of the CIA and Henry Kissinger’s determination to monopolize all contact with the new president, it is doubtful that the relationship could have been

handled any better. The Agency’s inability to establish a satisfactory relationship at the outset continued throughout the Nixon presidency—arguably, to

the detriment of both the president and the Agency.

While vigorous and effective action by the head of the IC clearly is a determining factor in establishing the Community’s institutional relationship with a
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new president, it does not follow that such involvement solidifies the position

of the DCI or DNI himself with the new president or administration. Directors

who were the most involved in transition support activities included Smith with

Eisenhower, Dulles with Kennedy, George H. W. Bush with Carter, and Turner

with Reagan. Sadly, each was disappointed with the role he was given, or not

given, by the incoming president.

Generally, directors of the IC retained from one administration to the next

are not destined to succeed. All in this category were dismissed or resigned

prior to the end of the term of the president who kept them on. Dulles, for

example, was very successful serving under Eisenhower but lasted only a few

months with Kennedy. McCone served successfully under Kennedy but

quickly wore out his welcome with Johnson. Helms was among the Agency’s

most successful directors during the Johnson years but was later dismissed by

Nixon. Colby served in particularly difficult circumstances under Nixon, only

to be dismissed later by Ford.

The two most recent cases in which a director was held over, those of William Webster and George Tenet, illustrate a larger point as well. Webster was

appointed by Reagan and served successfully in a rather formal relationship

with him. Webster had a fairly extended period in the George H. W. Bush

administration as well, faring better than any predecessor to that time who had

been extended from one administration to the next. On the other hand, he

never established with Bush and his key White House aides the close relationship that his successor, Robert Gates, enjoyed as a result of his prior service as

deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs. Tenet, likewise,

had an excellent relationship with President Clinton, who appointed him as his

third DCI, and, initially, with George W. Bush and his staff as well. Politically

charged intelligence issues soured the relationship, however, and Tenet

resigned in frustration near the end of Bush’s first term.

It is often suggested that for each of the directors who was obliged to resign

there was a single explanatory cause. For Dulles, the argument goes, it was the

Bay of Pigs; for McCone, the Agency’s independent analysis of the war in

Vietnam; for Helms, the failure to cooperate on the Watergate coverup; for

Colby, his failure to alert the White House in advance of the public exposures

of the Agency’s misdeeds, and so on. A more careful analysis, however, indicates that every director encountered serious difficulties of one kind or

another, including some that were an embarrassment to the White House.

Most of these problems, however, did not lead to the DCI’s dismissal. 

Each of the former presidents interviewed underscored that it is of the highest importance for a president to have an intelligence director in whom he has

confidence and with whom he feels comfortable. Opinions were mixed regard-
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

ing the best background or qualifications, whether a nominee should be an

intelligence professional or an outsider, and concerning the importance of the

candidate’s political background. Recalling his nomination of Gates, George H.

W. Bush explained, “It helped that Gates had been a professional, but I picked

him because he did such a good job sitting right here [on the deck of the Bush

home at Kennebunkport, while serving as deputy national security advisor].

Actually, I had known Bill Webster better over the years socially, from tennis

and so on, than I had Bob Gates.”3 With the unique perspective that came from

having been CIA director as well as president, Bush refused to be pinned down

on the issues of whether a CIA professional should hold the director's job and

whether there should be a turnover of directors at the end of each administration. Rather, he suggested, “There should be no set rule. It would be good for

the Agency to know that one of their own could be [director]. We should never

feel like the torch has to pass [at the end of an administration].”

Like Bush, Ford had no strong feelings on the question of whether a director should continue in office from one administration to the next. He pointed

out that he “had inherited one and appointed one. You need the right person

that you are comfortable with. I worked well with both Colby and [George H.

W.] Bush.” Ford underscored repeatedly that he had the highest confidence in

Colby’s handling of the Agency’s intelligence collection and analytic activities, but he concluded midway through his term that he simply had to appoint

a different director to defuse tensions with Congress over the CIA’s past activities. Ford was most charitable in his characterizations of Colby, euphemistically referring to his “resignation” and noting, “I offered him the job of

ambassador to Norway, but he declined.”

All of the former presidents interviewed, with the exception of Reagan,

expressed the feeling that the individual selected to run the IC should be apolitical. Carter, for example, volunteered that, although Bush had proved to be a

very capable director of the Agency, his selection had been ill advised because

of his role as chairman of the Republican Party—“he was too political.” Without, ironically, discussing his own initial choice of Kennedy political adviser

Theodore Sorensen to serve as DCI, Carter stressed that the man who did

serve as CIA director in his administration, Stansfield Turner, had been a

career military officer without any political ties who was also experienced in

using intelligence.

More than one of those interviewed was critical of, and used as an example,

the selection of William Casey as CIA director. Bush, who like Helms was a

forceful advocate of the need to keep intelligence and policy separate, volun3 George H. W. Bush interview, 6 May 1993. Subsequent observations by Bush also come from 

this interview.
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CHAPTER 8

teered, “Casey was an inappropriate choice. We would be having a cabinet

discussion of agriculture and there would be Casey. That shouldn’t be—the

DCI should not enter into policy discussions.”

Kissinger wrote that Nixon also believed that the job of CIA director should

not be a political plum and that this led him to retain Helms rather than

appoint a new director. Nixon’s decision was made against a backdrop in

which his two predecessors, Johnson and Kennedy, had retained a CIA director from the previous administration. Kissinger records Nixon retained Helms

despite Nixon’s reservations about CIA as an institution and his lack of comfort with Helms personally. Nixon’s discomfort allegedly derived in part from

the fact that Helms moved in Ivy League and Georgetown social circles.4

On 15 November 1968, Nixon offered Helms the job of CIA director apparently in large part because outgoing President Johnson had twice recommended him to Nixon. The most recent occasion on which Johnson had

commended Helms had been four days earlier, on 11 November, when Johnson, Nixon, Helms, and others had met in Washington at the White House.

The inescapable lesson from the history of the IC—albeit a lesson that neither presidents, DCIs, or DNIs are eager to draw explicitly—is that it works

better when a new president appoints his own director. In the intelligence

business innumerable delicate actions are undertaken that have the potential to

embarrass the US government and the president personally if they are mishandled or if misfortune strikes. In these circumstances the president must be

comfortable with his director, trust him implicitly, be associated with him

politically, and, above all, give him routine access.

The alternative thesis argues that some things are more important than a

close relationship with the president. According to this view, appointing a

career intelligence officer as director and routinely carrying over a DCI or

DNI from one administration to the next is the best way to protect the IC’s

nonpolitical status and operational and analytical integrity. Appealing as this

notion is to professionals, history does not treat it kindly. The incidence of

occasions in which the IC has become embroiled in politically stupid or even

illegal actions does not correlate with whether its leader was a political

appointee or an intelligence professional.

The relationship of trust between president and director occasionally derives

from close personal or professional associations in the past, witness the cases

of Ford and Bush, Reagan and Casey, and Bush and Gates. Alternatively, there

have been several cases where the president did not personally know well the

individual he appointed as DCI, but was willing to accept the assurances of

4 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1979), 11, 36.
185

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

others that the nominee would serve with distinction. Such cases included

Kennedy and McCone, Johnson and Helms, Carter and Turner, Clinton and

Woolsey, and Bush and Tenet. Some of the cases where there had been no

close past association worked well, but several did not.

 Keeping Out of Politics

Perhaps the most challenging of the political issues with which the IC must

grapple in establishing and sustaining its relationship with a new administration is how to support the president without being drawn into policymaking. It

frequently takes some time for a new administration, and for a new director, to

understand that the IC’s proper, limited role is to provide policymakers relevant and timely raw intelligence and considered, objective analysis, including

analyses of the probable ramifications of different US courses of action. Experience has shown that the IC should not take the additional step and become

involved in recommending policy.

Not infrequently, IC directors during transition periods have been offered

tempting opportunities to go beyond the bounds of proper intelligence support

into policy deliberations. DCI Smith reportedly was highly alert to these

potential pitfalls and held to a “strict constructionist” view of his responsibilities. When Eisenhower, not wanting to rely solely on the US Army’s analysis

of how the war in Korea was going, called for a CIA briefing that virtually

invited a different interpretation and policy involvement, Smith—an experienced general officer and once Eisenhower’s chief of staff—was very careful

to stick to the facts and make no recommendations.

The line between intelligence and policy was not respected so carefully by

those providing support to the two following presidents. The written record

leaves little doubt that IC analysts’ independent assessment of developments

in Castro’s Cuba was not solicited by or offered to Kennedy when he began

his deliberations leading up to the Bay of Pigs operation. Not even the informal assessments of the working-level operations officers were included in the

presentations given the new president and his team. CIA’s senior managers,

including Allen Dulles and Deputy Director for Plans (Operations) Richard

Bissell, perceived an obligation to devise and execute a program that would

“do something” about Castro. Some consciously proceeded against their better

judgment of the probable outcome but, ironically, did not want to let down

either Eisenhower, who was pressing for action, or Kennedy, who had committed himself to their program.

Johnson presented a temptation of a different sort to the DCI he retained

from the Kennedy period. The president found that John McCone would give
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him independent assessments of the course of the war in Vietnam. McCone’s

candor and outspokenness led Johnson to solicit from him advice on what

should be done regarding the conflict and concerning the assignments of diplomatic personnel—matters that were not properly part of McCone’s responsibilities. Flattered by the new president, McCone offered advice going beyond

his brief in a manner that soon put him at odds with his counterparts in other

government departments and, before many months had passed, with the president himself.

The lesson that Dulles and McCone had been burned by their involvement

in policymaking was not lost on Helms, who served as DCI for the bulk of the

Johnson and Nixon presidencies. More than any previous director, Helms was

careful to limit his role to providing intelligence while staying out of policy

discussions. He also recognized and stressed the need to get intelligence facts

and analysis to the president at a length and in a form that was digestible.

Kissinger has written perceptively of the challenge an intelligence director

faces in walking the fine line between offering intelligence support and making

policy recommendations. Probably more than any other national security advisor, he was sensitive to the reality that an assessment of the probable implications of any US action can come across implicitly or explicitly, intended or not,

as a policy recommendation. He wrote in White House Years, “It is to the

Director that the assistant first turns to learn the facts in a crisis and for analysis

of events, and since decisions turn on the perception of the consequences of

actions the CIA assessment can almost amount to a policy recommendation.”

Of Helms, he said, “Disciplined, meticulously fair and discreet, Helms performed his duties with a total objectivity essential to an effective intelligence

service. I never knew him to misuse his intelligence or his power. He never forgot that his integrity guaranteed his effectiveness, that his best weapon with

presidents was a reputation for reliability.... The CIA input was an important

element of every policy deliberation.”5

The Arrangements Make a Difference

Through the Bush transition in 2000, CIA alone handled the briefings of

presidents-elect. The Agency made efforts to include analysis from the other

agencies, but success was limited and uneven, dependent wholly on the determination of the senior briefer on the scene. That briefer always received

unquestioning support from CIA but there was in place no institutional supporting framework to introduce information from the Community into the mix. 

5 Ibid., 37, 487.
187

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

From the earliest years, comments by the presidents-elect or their senior

staffs revealed that they were aware of this problem. Eisenhower, for example,

lamented that he was not receiving regularly both Army operational assessments and CIA information on the situation in Korea. Kissinger, speaking for

Nixon, at one point insisted—without result—that information and/or personnel from the State Department accompany the Agency’s daily support. In 1992

one of the first questions the Clinton staff raised with the Agency’s representative in Little Rock related to how the various agencies of the Intelligence

Community worked together and whether the CIA officer would be including

their information in his briefings.

The intelligence units of the policy agencies, notably the Departments of

State and Defense, during transitions historically had concentrated on helping

their departments prepare for their incoming secretaries, rather than focusing

specifically on the new president. It was not until the ODNI assumed responsibility for transition briefings in 2008 that the several agencies making up the

IC became meaningfully involved in the process. 

Concerning more basic logistics arrangements, CIA’s experience over the

years had indicated that the system works best if the briefing support team was

in place in the city where the president-elect had set up his offices. The CIA

attempted to do this from the outset but had mixed results. During the Eisenhower transition, for example, the support operation established in New York

City was never utilized by Eisenhower himself and provided relatively minimal support to his senior assistants, notably Sherman Adams. Because Kennedy spent much of the transition period in Washington, albeit with extended

stays at Hyannisport and Palm Beach, there was no separate team set up specifically to support him. Provision of daily intelligence had been approved by

outgoing President Eisenhower, but a satisfactory system to provide continuous support was never established with the incoming Democratic president.

This clearly was a missed opportunity to establish a good relationship with

Kennedy and his senior assistants, many of whom were unfamiliar with and

suspicious of the Agency.

In the cases of Nixon and Carter, support operations were established that

succeeded in making intelligence available on a daily basis. Retrospectively,

however, it may be that the officers who supported the Nixon transition in

New York were too junior to gain the necessary entree. Nixon never received

the Agency’s representatives, although Kissinger did so frequently. Carter personally received an Agency officer each day, but he was more a courier than a

substantive expert.

The system has worked best when the CIA and the IC have made available

to the incoming president—on a continuous basis and on the scene—an expe-
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CHAPTER 8

rienced senior officer who can engage in some substantive give and take on

the spot. The two contrasting cases where a vice president moved up to the

presidency in midterm provide an instructive example of the benefits of having established a familiar relationship for the discussion of substantive issues

one-on-one. Ford had been receiving daily briefings from a senior member of

the PDB staff for many months before his accession to the presidency. This

compared favorably to the difficult situation where Johnson, as vice president,

had been specifically denied the president’s daily intelligence publication and

had received no regular briefings. He had been sent a copy of a less sensitive

daily intelligence publication, to which he paid little attention.

In recent transitions—for Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George

W. Bush—the IC dispatched more senior officers who were experienced in

supporting policymakers and were familiar with the full range of substantive

issues about which the president-elect would be reading each day. In fact, in a

great many of the daily sessions, the president-elect would simply read

through the PDB with few if any questions. On other occasions, however, he

would ask follow-up questions about subjects treated in the written material

or, less frequently, ask for an update on issues not discussed at all in the publication. In each of these cases it proved valuable to have senior officers in

place who could elaborate on the material presented. Occasionally they

explained IC collection programs or the way the material related to covert

action efforts under way.

Fortunately, modern technology has provided a solution to what had been a

problem in several early transitions: communications links with bandwidth

sufficient to transmit securely the most timely and relevant intelligence information to the president-elect wherever he may be. Now it takes only the

installation of a portable computer and printer in a hotel room to provide

printed material on-site that is literally indistinguishable from that which the

president receives in Washington. This communications capability permits the

support team to draw on the full resources of the IC in Washington and around

the world to provide text, high-quality imagery, and graphics.

By the time anyone reaches the presidency, that individual has long-established work habits that are not going to change. The military approach of Eisenhower or the highly disciplined styles of Truman, Carter, or George W. Bush,

for example, were vastly different from the more relaxed and less predictable

approaches of Kennedy, Reagan, or Clinton. The job of the intelligence director

and his representative is to accommodate each person’s style. Flexibility is critical on matters ranging from the scheduling of appointments to the presentation

of the substantive material, where the length, level of generality, and subject

matter must be within parameters suitable to the incoming president.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The IC must provide support not only to the incoming president but also to

his senior assistants. This does not mean subordinates should be shown the

most sensitive material prior to inauguration, a practice successive outgoing

presidents have made clear is not acceptable. Nevertheless, designees to cabinet posts and other close aides to the president-elect have intelligence needs

and can be shown a full array of less sensitive materials. The IC in the past has

sometimes served these individuals well and on other occasions has ignored

them. Meeting this responsibility in a prompt and well-organized way helps

establish a better relationship with an incoming administration. Other things

being equal, it is obviously easier to accomplish this if the outgoing president

and national security advisor are sympathetic to the need for a smooth transition, as George W. Bush and Steve Hadley were in 2008. It is easier still if the

transition is between two presidents of the same political party.

In the preelection period, it has proved feasible and desirable to provide

intelligence briefings to candidates from both or even multiple political parties. For the most part, this has been done; it certainly should be continued.

For various reasons intelligence support was not provided to a few majorparty candidates over the years. For example, Barry Goldwater declined the

Agency’s offer. George McGovern and Walter Mondale displayed only limited interest and when scheduling difficulties arose, the prospective CIA briefings fell by the boards. Robert Dole apparently was not offered a briefing. All

of those who have been elected to date have accepted and benefited from the

proffered intelligence support.

 Material That Was Welcome

Whether in the preelection period, during the transition, or once in office,

presidents almost without exception have concentrated on the current intelligence that related directly to the policy issues with which they were grappling.

Similarly, they were also the most interested in oral briefings that related to

those same issues. Written items or briefings were welcome if they were concise, focused, and accompanied by graphics or imagery that helped get the

point across quickly. The best received briefings were those delivered by

experts who were obviously masters of their subject—in recent years, typically the NIOs. Worldwide overviews provided by intelligence directors were

politely received but on a few occasions were judged to have repeated material available in the newspapers.

The substantive topics addressed in the material presented to a given president-elect are obviously a function of contemporaneous international developments and, therefore, vary significantly with each incoming administration.

There have been some nearly constant themes, however, such as develop-
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ments in Russia, China, North Korea, and the Middle East that are subjects the

IC knows it will be called on to address during each transition. North Korea’s

Kim Il-song and his family were probably the only foreign leaders whose

activities were the subject of intelligence reporting over the whole period

under review.

IC officers are well advised to be acutely conscious of the issues debated in

the election campaign. Presidents-elect typically are well informed on such

high-profile issues; in those areas they require only continuing updates and

help in sorting the vital nuggets from the torrent of information they will

receive. The IC’s greater challenge with a new president is to provide useful

intelligence on important issues that have not been highlighted in the campaign. On a continuing basis, roughly 60 percent of the items covered in the

PDB are not addressed in the newspapers. This body of information, in particular, is likely to be unfamiliar to a prospective president.

With virtually every new president, the IC has experimented with offerings

of supplementary written intelligence to elaborate issues raised in the PDB.

Only two presidents-elect have clearly welcomed such supplementary material and read it thoroughly when it was offered. Those two were otherwise

quite different individuals: Eisenhower and Reagan. Other presidents who

were presented such background material, especially Nixon and Clinton,

showed no sustained interest. Supplementary material should be made available to, but not pushed on, a president-elect who is already overburdened with

reading material and short on time.

The staff aides who support the president on security issues showed a

deeper interest in the extra information. The best known of them, Kissinger,

once told Helms, “You know the most useful document you fellows turn out is

that Weekly Summary that you put together. That’s much more valuable than

the daily stuff. That I can sit down on a Saturday morning and read and bring

myself up to date and I think it’s a good publication.”6

As a result of the presidents’ preference for material that can be digested

quickly, it has always been a challenge to interest them in longer analytic studies and the Intelligence Community’s formal national intelligence estimates.

As a rule, presidents have read carefully only those studies or estimates specifically urged on them by the DCI or the national security advisor because

they related directly to a policy matter of high, ongoing interest. Otherwise,

the IC has found the most success when it has gisted the findings of longer

papers and integrated a summary into the PDB. Indeed, the Agency has been

told by national security advisors that the PDB was the only publication on

6 Helms interview, 21 April 1982.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

any subject that they could be absolutely confident their principal would read

on any given day.

From the IC’s perspective, there are clear advantages to having a new president come into office well informed not only about developments abroad but

also about covert action and sensitive collection programs. Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush all were well briefed on such

activities. Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Clinton entered office with limited

familiarity with the Agency’s sensitive activities. Two others, Johnson and

Nixon, had no up-to-date knowledge of those programs when they took office.

Familiarity with sensitive programs does not necessarily result in support for

them. Carter, for example, ordered a halt to some of the Agency’s sensitive

undertakings within weeks of taking office. A president’s early awareness of

such programs is, nevertheless, essential for him, the country, the IC, and the

CIA. He needs to be in an informed position to defend and support these often

politically charged activities or to change them if necessary to ensure their consistency with his overall foreign policy objectives. If the Bay of Pigs fiasco

taught nothing else, it was that administration policy should drive covert action;

covert action projects should not drive policy or color the intelligence provided.

There has been an almost unbroken pattern over the years in expanding the

support provided a new president and his team in areas beyond daily intelligence. Beginning with the Nixon transition, his key staff aides—Kissinger

and Eagleburger—were provided significant quantities of material for their

own policy-planning purposes. For Clinton, the Agency provided background

material for use by the president- and vice president-elect and their senior

staffs for telephone calls with foreign leaders, speeches and press conferences,

and internal policy deliberations. The key to success in these efforts, as with

intelligence generally, is to stick to the facts. The new team must know that

the IC is neither defending policy for the old administration nor creating it for

the new one.

There has never been any doubt that the PDB, right up to Inauguration Day,

is designed to address the interests of the president in office. Realistically,

however, as the time for the turnover draws closer and as the incoming president is reading the PDB with care, the inevitable and probably appropriate

tendency is to select and address substantive items in a way that meets the

needs of the new president as well as the outgoing one. Fortunately, in practice

this usually amounts only to adjustments on the margin.

The IC’s experience in providing intelligence to 11 presidents—through 10

quite different transitions—has led many of its officers to appreciate the wisdom President Truman displayed in a speech he gave on 21 November 1953: 
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The office of President of the United States now carries power

beyond parallel in history. That is the principal reason that I am so

anxious that it be a continuing proposition and the successor to me

and the successor to him can carry on as if no election had ever

taken place.... That is why I am giving this president—this new president—more information than any other president had when he went

into office.7

President Truman was the first and the most senior of the intelligence briefers to be involved in the more than half-century series of briefings from 1952

to 2004. Truman personally had provided an intelligence overview to General

Eisenhower on 18 November 1952. In his speech at CIA three days later he

said, “It was my privilege...to brief the man who is going to take over the

office of President of the United States.” It has been the IC’s privilege as well,

many times.



7 New York Times, 22 November 1952, 1, 10. 
193

A

Aaron, David, 92, 95, 102, 107

Adams, Sherman, 19, 187

Afghanistan, 101, 112, 117, 172

Africa, 132, 173

Agnew, Spiro, 61

Albright, Madeleine, 125, 144

Algeria, 34, 35

Allen, Richard, 65, 66, 67, 112, 121, 122

al-Qa‘ida, 153, 171, 172, 174

Ames, Robert, 112

Amory, Robert, 19, 22

Anderson, John, 113

Anderson, Martin, 65, 66, 67

Angola, 90, 96, 126, 139

Arab-Israeli conflict, 69, 101

Aspin, Les, 144

Attorney General, 57

B

Balkans, 152, 155, 159

Ball, George, 53

Bay of Pigs, 6, 40–42, 44–46, 48, 178, 181, 182, 185, 191

Beatty, Ed, 19

Becker, Loftus, 23

Belgium, 34

Bentsen, Lloyd, 125

Berger, Samuel (Sandy), 131, 133, 134, 142, 144, 148, 151

Berlin, 34, 35, 69, 71

Biddiscomb, John, 104–105

Bissell, Richard, 40–42, 185

Black Hawk Down incident, 148

Bolton, Josh, 152

bomber gap, 22

INDEX
194

INDEX

Boren, David, 132

Bosnia, 129, 132, 135, 139, 142, 147

Bowles, Chester, 45

Brezhnev, Leonid, 81, 101

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 107, 109, 118

Bundy, McGeorge, 22, 48, 50, 53, 58, 66

Bush, George H. W., 5, 123, 124–129, 135, 139, 141, 147, 165, 168, 177, 179, 

182, 183, 191

as DCI, 83–85, 87, 89, 90, 91

concerns about politicalization of intelligence, 97

resignation, 102

briefing preferences, 125

intelligence interests as vice president, 117, 121

operational, covert action briefing, 161

preelection briefings, 124, 131

promotion of presidential intelligence support, 97, 111, 115, 118, 119, 

120, 121, 124, 129, 180

Bush, George W., 155–156, 160, 175, 177, 179, 182, 189, 191

briefing preferences, 153, 168–169

intelligence support during presidential travel, 166, 169

operational, covert action briefing, 161

postelection briefings, 156–159, 162–166

preelection briefing, 151–154

C

Cabell, Charles, 25, 35

Cambodia, 80, 96, 120, 132

campaign politics, 13, 96, 113

intelligence as an issue, 29, 61, 63, 96

Card, Andy, 158, 161, 168

Carter, Billy, 105

Carter, Jimmy, 87–110, 113, 116, 118, 120, 131, 171, 179, 183, 191

briefing preferences, 91, 102, 107, 179

evaluation of PDB, 105, 107

interest in satellite photography, 94, 104

operational, covert action briefing, 98–100, 161

postelection briefings, 97–103

preelection briefings, 87–95

feedback and follow-up, 93
195

restrictions, 91, 94

recommendations on improving presidential briefings, 180–181

Casey, William, 116, 117, 126, 183

Central America, 116, 126

Central Intelligence Bulletin, 65

Central Intelligence Group (CIG), 7

Chavez, Dennis, 45

Cheney, Dick, 155, 160–161, 166, 168, 169, 174

Chile, 96

China, 14, 17, 25, 34, 35, 69, 75, 89, 92, 94, 105, 129, 132, 152, 159, 161, 172

Christopher, Warren, 143, 144

Church Committee, 83

CIA Operations Center, 69, 165

CIA print plant, 147

Clifford, Clark, 47, 64

Clifton, Chester, 48, 49, 56

Clinton, Bill, 3, 5, 120, 131–148, 152, 157, 162, 171, 177, 179, 182, 190, 191

briefing preferences, 148

intelligence and policymaking, 135

operational, covert action briefing, 140, 161

postelection briefings, 133–138

preelection briefings, 131–132

Clinton, Hillary, 135

Colby, William, 74, 75, 76–77, 79, 81, 83, 93, 182, 183

communications, see logistics and communications

Conger, Clifton, 55

Congo, 34, 35

Corscadden, Paul H., 65, 66, 67, 68, 70

Countdown for Decision, 37

covert action, 5, 21, 24, 29, 31–32, 43, 53, 91, 100, 112, 117, 120, 140, 161, 

188, 191

Crowe, William, 126

Cuba, 6, 30–32, 34, 35, 40–42, 43, 47, 55, 61, 90, 116, 120, 185

covert action, 31, 32, 36

also see Bay of Pigs

Cuban missile crisis, 50

Current Intelligence Bulletin, 9, 19, 48, 50

Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 9

Current Production and Analytic Support (CPAS), 133

Cutler, Robert, 21

Cyprus, 26

Czechoslovakia, 61, 69
196

INDEX

D

Daily Summary, 8

Davidson, Meredith, 9, 16–18, 23

Davis, Dixon, 119, 120, 121

DCI presidential briefings, 9, 29, 75, 148, 151, 178, 179, 181

Bush for Carter, 98–100, 103

Bush for Carter (preelection), 90–94

Colby for Ford, 82

Dulles for Eisenhower, 20–21

Dulles for Kennedy, 42–44

Gates for Cinton (preelection), 131–132

Gates for George H. W. Bush, 127

Helms for Nixon, 61–64

McCone for Johnson, 52, 54–55, 56

McCone for Kennedy, 50

Smith for Eisenhower, 16–19

Smith for Truman, 9

Tenet for Bush, 168–169

Turner for Carter, 109

Turner for Reagan, 114, 117–118

Turner for Reagan (preelection), 111–113

Webster for George H. W. Bush, 127

DDI-New York, 65–71, 97

deep dive briefings, 169–170

Department of Defense, 9, 23, 38, 57, 94, 109, 147, 168

Department of State, 9, 20, 23, 57, 70, 76, 94, 109, 113, 136, 147, 168

Department of Treasury, 57, 135

Deutch, John, 149

Diamond, Douglas, 116

Diem, Ngo Dinh, 53

Directorate of Intelligence, 167

efforts to upgrade intelligence support, 162–166

Directorate of Operations, 136, 165, 167

Directorate of Science and Technology, 104

Djibouti, 92

DNI presidential briefings, 179

Dobrynin, Anatoly, 101

Dole, Robert, 95, 149, 171

Dominican Republic, 43, 59, 61

Donovan, William, 18
197

Dukakis, Michael

preelection briefings, 125

Dulles, Allen, 20, 20–22, 29, 32, 36–38, 42–44, 46, 48, 50, 63, 154, 181, 182, 

185

and Kennedy preelection briefings, 34–36

relations with Kennedy, 48

Dulles, John Foster, 18, 20, 26

E

Eagleburger, Lawrence, 68–69, 70, 72, 73, 191

Eagleton, Tom, 171

East Asia, 159, 173

economic espionage, 132

Edwards, John, 173

Edwards, Sheffield, 18

Egypt, 15, 90, 92, 95

Eisenhower, Dwight, 3, 7–23, 32, 34, 37, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 73, 151, 177, 178, 

185, 187, 190, 191

briefing preferences, 20–23

intelligence support during presidential travel, 23

postelection briefings, 16–20

preelection briefings, 14–16

tensions with Truman during transition, 11–13

Eisenhower, John, 23

Eisenhower, Mamie

participation in intelligence briefings, 17

Eizenstat, Stuart, 87, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97

Elder, Walter, 51, 57

European Community (EC), 137

Evans, Rowland, 102

F

family jewels, 82

FBI, 66

Fitzgerald, Jennifer, 97

Foley, Edward, 45
198

INDEX

Ford, David, 87

Ford, Gerald, 5, 39, 76–84, 88, 99, 102, 107, 179, 183, 191

briefing preferences, 77–78

decision to stop PBD briefings by CIA, 83

operational briefings, 79

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 67

Fox, Vicente, 155

France, 14, 34, 35, 69

G

Gallucci, Robert, 143

Gates, Robert, 125, 127, 131–132, 179, 182

Gates, Thomas, 37

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 137

General Services Administration, 147

Germany, 129

global economy, 139, 159

global energy, 104, 112, 159, 173

global environment, 135

Glomar Explorer, 79–80

Goldwater, Barry, 63, 189

preelection briefings declined, 57

Goodpaster, Andrew, 21, 23, 37, 40, 43, 48, 70, 73

Goodwin, Richard, 30, 32

Gore, Albert, 131, 134, 142, 143, 154, 155, 162

Gore, Albert, Sr., 35

Goss, Porter, 171

Gray, Gordon, 21, 22, 44

Greece, 92

Guatemala, 43

H

Hadley, Steve, 158, 161, 189

Haig, Alexander, 77, 122

Haiti, 61, 129, 135, 137, 147, 148

Haldeman, Robert (H. R.), 65, 67
199

Hamilton, Lee, 125

Harper, John, 100

Helms, Richard, 61, 61–64, 73, 74, 179, 181, 182, 186

Hendrickson, Melvin, 14–16

Hodges, Luther, 45

Hoover, J. Edgar, 40

Horn of Africa, 101

Humphrey, Hubert, 63

Hungary, 25

King Hussein, 35

Hussein, Saddam, 155, 174

I

India, 25

In-Q-Tel, 163

intelligence and policymaking, 18, 37–40, 54–56, 94, 116, 135, 137, 153, 183, 

185–186

Intelligence Community

greater role in transition briefings, 186–189

Intelligence Review, 57, 58

intelligence sources, 117, 120, 191

gaps, 153

human, 5, 32, 79, 98, 101, 117, 127, 140, 164, 167, 168

technical, 5, 24, 32, 37, 43, 53, 55, 75, 79, 88, 94, 95, 98, 107, 117, 140, 

164

intelligence support for first ladies, 136

Iran, 14, 15, 24, 34, 112, 126, 132, 152, 155, 172

Iran hostage crisis, 110, 113, 117, 119, 120, 121

Iraq, 90, 112, 132, 137, 152, 155, 161, 171, 173, 174

Israel, 26, 114, 119, 137, 152, 154, 155

Italy, 21

J

Japan, 14, 15

Jeremiah, David, 143

Johnson, Lyndon, 32, 34, 50–59, 61, 63, 64, 68, 71, 178, 185, 191
200

INDEX

briefing preferences, 52, 55, 59

covert action briefing, 53

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20, 21, 23, 38, 46, 51, 57, 70, 76, 106, 147, 168

Jordan, 26, 35

K

Kampuchea, see Cambodia

Kefauver, Estes, 26

Kennedy, John, 6, 20, 68, 79, 154, 174, 178, 185, 187, 191

1960 presidential debates, 29–32

briefing preferences, 22, 47, 49

dissatisfaction with intelligence briefings, 48

postelection briefings

Cuban covert action, 40–42, 44–46

restrictions, 43, 44

worldwide intelligence operations, 42–44

preelection briefings, 34–36

Cuban covert action, 31–33, 36

feedback and follow-up, 35

intelligence systems, 37

missile gap, 36–40

restrictions, 32, 34, 37

Kennedy, Joseph P., 45

Kennedy, Robert, 35, 63

Kerr, Richard, 119, 120, 122

Kerry, John

preelection briefings, 172–173

Kessler, Martha Neff, 114–115

Khan, Aga, 35

Khan, Sadruddin, 35

Khrushchev, Nikita, 35, 48

Kissinger, Henry, 61, 67–72, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 89, 171, 181, 184, 186, 187, 

191

critique of PDB, 68

efforts to control flow of intelligence, 68, 70, 71, 73, 77

Knoche, Henry, 100, 102, 103, 107

Korea, 16, 71, 73, 92, 94, 95, 155, 159

Korean War, 11, 14, 15, 17–18

Kosovo, 152
201

Kuwait, 156

L

Lake, Tony, 144, 148

Laos, 35, 43

Latin America, 152, 159, 173

Lay, James, Jr., 20, 21

leaks, 47, 57

Lebanon, 89, 90, 92, 101, 120, 137, 139

Lehman, Richard, 49, 57, 65, 87–88, 89, 91, 94, 97, 101, 104, 105–106, 112, 

114, 119

Libya, 90, 92, 95, 126, 172

Lieberman, Joe, 154, 155

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 53–54

logistics and communications, 5, 14–15, 16, 19, 25, 65, 66, 88–89, 104, 134, 

142, 143, 144–147, 156, 158, 162–166, 187, 188

Lopez-Portillo, José, 122

M

Maddox, Lester, 63

Malaysia, 25

Manhattan Project, 7

Mayaguez seizure, 80, 81

McCarthy, Eugene, 63

McCone, John, 50, 50–53, 59, 63, 179, 182, 185

and Vietnam policy, 53–56

resigination, 56

McConnell, Michael, 170, 171

McCrory, Ray, 90

McCurdy, David, 132

McFarlane, Bud, 124

McGovern, George, 171, 189

McLaughlin, John, 139, 143, 144, 151, 154, 162, 172–173

McMahan, Knight, 25–27

McNamara, Robert, 51, 53, 56

Medaris, John, 37
202

INDEX

Meese, Ed, 111, 114

Mexico, 34, 116, 120, 141, 155

Middle East, 114, 173, 190

Miller, Herbert, 22

Miscik, Jami, 156, 157, 159, 165

missile gap, 30, 36–40, 154

Mitchell, John, 65, 70

Mondale, Walter, 90–91, 92, 93, 95, 97, 100, 103, 106, 107, 124, 171, 189

Morell, Michael, 166, 168

Morgan, Edward P., 34

Morocco, 120

Mossadeq, Mohammed, 24

Moyers, Bill, 59

Mozambique, 92

Murphy, Daniel, 100

N

9/11, 153, 174

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 25

National Intelligence Council, 112

National Intelligence Daily (NID), 76, 122, 134, 146

National Intelligence Digest, 10

national intelligence estimates (NIEs), 16, 38–39, 66, 70, 81, 136, 160, 164, 

190

national intelligence officers (NIOs), 87, 112, 114, 189

National Security Council, 22, 32, 39, 44, 48, 55, 72, 74, 79, 107, 109, 154, 

156, 169

venue for presidential briefings, 20–22, 55, 74, 81, 178

NATO, 69

Negroponte, John, 171

Nigeria, 69

Nixon, Richard, 29, 31, 32, 61–67, 73–76, 154, 174, 178, 179, 181, 184, 187, 

190, 191

1960 presidential debates, 29–32

briefing preferences, 68–72, 75

distrust of CIA, 73

postelection intelligence support, 65–67

security, 65

preelection briefings, 61–63
203

Noriega, Manuel, 126

North Africa, 14

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 141

North Korea, 132, 152, 172, 190

Novak, Robert, 102

NSA, 136, 140

nuclear proliferation, 172

nuclear testing, 34

O

O’Neil, Michael, 149

Obama, Barack, 180

Office of Communications, 133, 143, 144, 146

Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), 9, 49, 65, 68, 78

Office of Logistics, 133

Office of National Estimates, 21

Office of Security, 18, 66, 133, 143

OPEC, 101

Operations Advisory Group, 101

Osborn, Howard, 65

Oswald, Lee Harvey, 52

P

Pakistan, 96, 112, 120, 172

Palestinian issues, 114, 121, 137, 152, 154, 155

Panama, 126

partisan politics, impact of, 12–13, 172

Pavitt, Jim, 161, 167

PDB briefers, role of, 76–79, 84, 104–105, 106–109, 119, 120, 121, 122–123, 

124, 125, 127–128, 159, 160, 164–166, 168–169, 179, 186

Persons, Wilton, 43

Petersen, Martin (Marty), 154, 156, 158, 162

Peterson, David, 76, 79, 83, 106, 107, 109

Pforzheimer, Walter, 47

Philippines, 120

Pike Committee, 83
204

INDEX

Podesta, John, 157

Poindexter, John, 123

Poland, 62, 101, 116, 119

politicalization of intelligence, 22, 40, 63, 92, 97–98, 124

Powell, Jody, 89, 103

Powers, Francis Gary, 29, 37

President’s Daily Brief (PDB), 5, 50, 56–59, 65, 68, 83, 99, 104–110, 131, 135, 

138, 154, 156, 160, 188

and press reporting, 105, 107, 139

feedback and follow-up, 59, 76, 78, 104, 108–110, 123, 127, 128, 137, 164

graphics, 135, 139, 147

real-tim delivery, 181

real-time delivery, 162–166

recipients, 107, 122, 126, 134, 148, 167, 168

scheduling, 134, 135, 139, 164

security, 123, 127, 168

storage and handling, 67, 72, 78, 109, 127, 166

supplemental material, 5, 104, 105, 120, 134, 135, 139, 158, 161, 164, 190

tailoring content and format, 68, 72, 105–107, 122, 128, 139, 168, 169, 

190

Weekly Leadership Notes, 139

President’s Intelligence Checklist, 47–50, 54, 56–58

recipients, 49, 51, 57

tailoring content and format, 49

presidential debates, 29–31, 63, 88, 95–96, 113, 138, 154, 155–156, 173–174, 

190

intelligence as an issue, 126, 155, 174

intelligence issues, 155

presidential feedback and follow-up, 9, 10, 17, 21–22, 35, 48, 49, 57, 121, 129

also see under President’s Daily Brief

presidential visits to CIA Headquarters, 148

John Kennedy, 46–47

press coverage, 19, 41, 89, 112, 146

proliferation, 132, 135, 161

Q

Qadhafi, Muammar, 106

Quayle, Dan, 126

Quemoy and Matsu, 30, 91
205

also see Taiwan Straits

R

Raborn, William, Jr., 59, 64

Reagan, Nancy

interest in intelligence briefings, 119

Reagan, Ronald, 5, 111–124, 131, 171, 177, 179, 182, 190, 191

briefing preferences, 116, 119–121, 122–124

distrust of daily intelligence briefings, 118

operational, covert action briefing, 117–118

postelection briefings, 114–122

preelection briefing, 111–113

Rhodesia, 89, 90, 92, 95, 101

Rice, Condoleezza (Condi), 152, 158, 168

Rockefeller Commission, 83

Roh Tae Woo, 142

Rosen, Kenneth, 65, 67, 70, 73

Rostow, Walt, 64

Rumsfeld, Donald, 83, 170

Rusk, Dean, 50, 51, 53, 57, 61, 63

Russia, 15, 16, 25, 29, 34, 35, 61, 69, 81, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 101, 104, 112, 116, 

119, 120, 129, 132, 136, 139, 144, 152, 159, 172, 190

S

Sadat, Anwar, 115

Sakhalin and Kuril Islands, 25

Salinas, Carlos, 141, 142

Sanford, Terry, 45

Saudi Arabia, 112

Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 30, 45

Schlesinger, James, 74, 79, 83

Scoville, Herbert Jr., 22

Scowcroft, Brent, 78, 79, 80, 83, 87, 95, 126, 129, 131, 148

Secret Service, 18, 66, 103, 105, 143, 145, 157, 162, 166

security, 14, 18, 19, 55, 66, 144, 147, 162, 166

clearances for presidential staff, 16, 42, 65, 69
206

INDEX

Serbia, 144, 152, 155

Sheldon, Huntington, 20, 21, 23, 46, 48, 49

Shultz, George, 123

Singapore, 25

Situation in Vietnam, 65

Situation Summary, 9, 10

Smith, Bromley, 51, 52, 57, 59

Smith, R. Jack, 52, 57, 65, 67

Smith, Walter Bedell, 7, 11, 12, 16, 16–20, 24, 109, 179, 185

Soderberg, Nancy, 133, 134

Somalia, 92, 120, 129, 135, 136, 143, 143–144, 147, 148

Sorensen, Theodore (Ted), 31, 45, 48, 98, 107

Souers, Sidney, 10

South Africa, 89, 95, 110

South Asia, 159

South Korea, 89, 139

Soviet space program, 35

Special Group, 36

SR-71, 43, 53

START II, 136, 142

Stephanopoulos, George, 146

Stevenson, Adlai, 3, 10, 11, 17, 151, 171

preelection briefings, 23–27

feedback and follow-up, 24, 26

not shown communications intelligence, 24, 26

Stimson, Henry, 7

Stoertz, Howard, 39, 40, 90

Stokes, Louis, 125

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 81, 88, 90, 91

strategic weapons, 34, 36–39, 69, 70, 81, 87, 90, 93, 95, 115, 119, 126

Suez Crisis, 25–27

Sununu, John, 126

Symington, Stuart, 38, 40

Syria, 35, 90, 114

T

Taiwan, 34, 35, 91

Taiwan Straits, 34, 90

Taylor, Maxwell, 42
207

Tenet, George, 151, 154, 158, 161, 167, 168–169, 170–171, 172, 174, 182

terrorism, 153, 159, 161, 172

Tibet, 43

transition teams, 114, 133

relations with, 19, 37, 65–67, 95, 102, 121, 133–135, 147, 187–189

Truman, Harry, 3, 7–9, 23, 48, 109, 131, 156, 178, 191

briefing preferences, 9

tensions with Eisenhower during transition, 11–12

Turkey, 92

Turner, Stansfield, 107, 109, 111–112, 114, 116

Twining, Nathan, 38

U

U-2, 29, 36, 43

Uganda, 90

Ukraine, 142

United States Intelligence Board, 70

US Congress, 23, 39, 46, 54, 77, 83, 90, 93, 136

Armed Services Committee, 156

House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, 39

oversight committees, 125, 131, 156, 174

Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, 50

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 40, 80, 102, 173

Senate Preparedness Committee, 35, 38

USSR, see Russia

V

Valenti, Jack, 58

Vance, Cyrus, 61, 109

Venezuela, 43

Vietnam, 21, 43, 53–56, 62, 64, 71, 96, 182, 186

W

Wallace, George, 63
208

INDEX

Watergate, 75, 76

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 153, 155, 171, 174

Webster, William, 123, 125, 127, 182, 183

Weekly Review, 65

Weekly Summary, 8, 190

Weinberger, Caspar, 122

Wheeler, Earl, 64

White House Communications Agency, 104

White House Situation Room, 65, 76, 80

Whitman, John, 94, 95

Wiley, Winston, 156, 158, 166

Wolfowitz, Paul, 152

Woods, Rose Mary, 67, 68, 72

Woolsey, James, 144

Y

Yel’tsin, Boris, 136, 142

Yugoslavia, 15, 62, 96, 132, 136