PCN273891 GPO Stock Number: 008-020-01606-3

Library of Congress Control Number: 2011930973

I see powerful echoes of what I personally experienced as Director of NSA and 

CIA. I only wish I had access to this fully developed intellectual framework and 

the courses of action it suggests while still in government.

—General Michael V. Hayden (retired)

Former Director of the CIA

 Director of the NSA

 e problem of secrecy is double edged and places key institutions and values of 

our democracy into collision. On the one hand, our country operates under a broad 

consensus that secrecy is antithetical to democratic rule and can encourage a variety 

of political deformations. But the obvious pitfalls are not the end of the story. A long 

list of abuses notwithstanding, secrecy, like openness, remains an essential prerequisite 

of self-governance. Ross’s study is a welcome and timely addition to the small body of 

literature examining this important subject. 

 —Gabriel Schoenfeld

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute

Author of Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, 

and the Rule of Law (W.W. Norton, May 2010).

The topic of unauthorized disclosures continues to receive significant attention 

at the highest levels of government. In his book, Mr. Ross does an excellent 

job identifying the categories of harm to the intelligence community associated 

with these disclosures. A detailed framework for addressing the issue is also 

proposed. This book is a must read for those concerned about the implications 

of unauthorized disclosures to U.S. national security.

—William A. Parquette

Foreign Denial and Deception Committee

National Intelligence Council 

Gary Ross has pulled together in this splendid book all the raw material needed 

to spark a fresh discussion between the government and the media on how 

to function under our unique system of government in this ever-evolving 

information-rich environment.

—Benjamin Shore

Retired newspaper journalist and editor 
Who Watches the Watchmen?

The Conflict Between National Security 

and Freedom of the Press

Gary Ross

National Intelligence University

Washington, DC

July 2011

iii

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

Those who surrender true liberty to a false security defend nothing 

worth preserving, while those who abandon real security to an illusory 

liberty protect nothing worth safeguarding.

 - Ronald K. L. Collins,

Author and Law Professor
Gary Ross’ book, Who Watches the Watchmen?, argues that 

the tension between maintaining national security secrets and 

the public’s right to know cannot be “solved,” but can be better 

understood and more intelligently managed.

Watchmen is the inaugural book in a new series titled, The NI 

Press Series on Denial and Deception. The series will present 

original research by faculty and students in the university’s Denial and Deception 

Certificate Program, as well as writings sponsored by the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence Foreign Denial and Deception Committee. 

In August 2011, the National Defense Intelligence College was re-named the 

National Intelligence University. To reflect this change, the NDIC Press was 

re-named the National Intelligence Press. The goal of the NI Press is the same: 

to publish high quality, valuable, and timely books on topics of concern to the 

Intelligence Community and the U.S. government. Books published by the NI 

Press undergo peer review by senior officials in the U.S. government as well as 

outside experts. 

This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of 

Security Review, Department of Defense. The views expressed in this publication 

are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of 

the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, or the U.S. government. 

Authors of NI Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do 

not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers authors to offer new and 

sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key 

issues. This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 

105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.

How to order this book. Everyone may download a free electronic copy of this 

book from our website at http://www.NI-U.edu. U.S. government employees may 

request a complimentary copy of this book by contacting us at: press@NI-U.edu. 

The general public may purchase a copy from the Government Printing Office 

(GPO) at http://bookstore.gpo.gov.

Editor, NI Press

Center for Strategic Intelligence Research

National Intelligence University

Defense Intelligence Agency

Bolling Air Force Base

Washington, D.C. 20340-5100

ISBN 978-1-932946-29-1

GPO Sales Stock Number 008-020-01606-3

Library of Congress Control Number 2011930973

1962

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY

scientia est lux luci s
i

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COMMENTARIES ......................................................................................... ix

FOREWORD ............................................................................................... xxiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................... xxvii

AUTHOR’S PREFACE ............................................................................... xxix

CHAPTER 1 – Conflicting Principles ......................................................... 1

Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit ........................................ 4 

The Scope of Unauthorized Disclosures in the United States ............... 9

Researching the Topic ............................................................................... 12

Responding Through Law: The “Espionage Act” .................................. 15

Seeking an Alternative to a Legislative Solution ................................... 18 

The Difficulty Identifying Leakers: A Thousand Grains of Sand ........ 20

Statutory Abuses and Efforts to Prevent Unauthorized 

 Disclosures ............................................................................................... 25

Rational Choice Theory: An Alternative to a Legislative Approach ...26

CHAPTER 2 – Journalist Motivations and Justifications ...................... 29

Journalist Motivations for Disclosing Classified Information ............ 30

Altruistic Motivation – Promoting Informed Debate ...........................30

Pentagon Papers ................................................................................. 31

Bay of Pigs ....................................................................................................... 33

Altruistic Motivation – Exposing Government Misconduct................34
ii

GARY ROSS

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

The Family Jewels ............................................................................... 36

Colonel Alpirez ................................................................................... 37

Non-Altruistic Motivation – Advancing Corporate Interests ..............39

Pentagon Papers ................................................................................. 41

Non-Altruistic Motivation – Advancing Personal Interests..................43

Veil ................................................................................................................... 45

State of War ..................................................................................................... 45

Collateral Murder .............................................................................. 46 

Non-Altruistic Motivation – Advancing Foreign Interests...................47

Journalist Justifications for Disclosing Classified Information ........... 48

Justification – Government Overclassification .......................................49

Justification – Continued Toleration for Politically Advantageous 

 Disclosures ................................................................................................52

Pre-War Intelligence on Iraq ............................................................. 53

Stealth ............................................................................................................... 55

Justification – Inadequacy of Congressional Oversight ........................56

Justification – Legal Protection for the Press under the First 

 Amendment ..............................................................................................58

Justification – The Ability of the Media to Handle Classified 

 Information Responsibly .........................................................................61

U-2 ........................................................................................................ 64
iii

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

IVY BELLS ......................................................................................... 65

Project AZORIAN ............................................................................. 66

Hostage Crises .................................................................................... 67

Pentagon Papers ................................................................................. 67

CIA Detention Facilities .................................................................... 68

Terrorist Surveillance Program ......................................................... 68 

SWIFT Banking ................................................................................. 69

U.S. Troops in Afghanistan ................................................................ 70

Government Employees and Their Motivations: 

 The “Supply Side” ..................................................................................... 71

Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 77

CHAPTER 3 – The Cost of Disclosing Classified Information: 

Identifying Harm........................................................................................... 79

Categories of Harm.................................................................................... 81

Damage to Sources and Methods .............................................................82

Soviet ICBM Testing ........................................................................... 83

Operation BROADSIDE .................................................................... 84

Project AZORIAN .............................................................................. 84 

OBELISK ............................................................................................ 87 

SWIFT Banking ................................................................................. 87

Operation MERLIN ........................................................................... 88
iv

GARY ROSS

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

National Intelligence Estimate — Iran .............................................. 89

Potential Loss of Life ..................................................................................91

Counterspy and Covert Action Bulleting .......................................... 91

Mossad in Syria .................................................................................. 93

Beirut Barracks .................................................................................. 94

TWA Flight 847 ................................................................................. 95

PURPLE and MAGIC ....................................................................... 95

Disclosure of U.S. Military Field Report by WikiLeaks .................... 96

Koran Descration ............................................................................... 98

CIA Recruiting Iranians .....................................................................99

Soviet Mechanic ............................................................................... 100

Impact on the Development and Implementation of 

 Foreign Policy .........................................................................................100

Troop Levels in Afghanistan ............................................................ 101

National Intelligence Estimate — Iran ............................................ 102

Covert Action in Pakistan ................................................................ 103

Support to Egyptian Operation ....................................................... 104 

Non-Lethal Presidential Findings ................................................... 105

Effect on International Alliances ............................................................106

Net-Centric Diplomacy .................................................................... 107

Hadley Memo ................................................................................... 108
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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Stinger Missiles to Angola ................................................................ 108

Military Aircraft to Taiwan ............................................................. 109

Curveball .......................................................................................... 110

CIA Detention Facilities .................................................................. 111

Pakistani Collaboration with Afghan Insurgents ........................... 112

Financial Costs .........................................................................................113

Project AZORIAN ............................................................................ 115

Project GREEK ISLAND ................................................................. 115

Alaskan Airfield ............................................................................... 116

Decrease in Public Knowledge Resulting from Incomplete or 

 Inaccurate Information .........................................................................116

Baghdad Diarist ............................................................................... 118

Benefiting U.S. Adversaries While Harming U.S. Interests ............... 120

Confirmation Bias and the Media’s Ability to Identify Harm ........... 121

Conclusion ................................................................................................... 122

CHAPTER 4 – IVY BELLS – Inside the Journalist’s DecisionMaking Process ............................................................................................ 125

The Analysis Preceding Publication ..................................................... 125 

Conclusion ................................................................................................... 131 

CHAPTER 5 – A Proactive Application of Rational 

Choice Theory .............................................................................................. 135
vi

GARY ROSS

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

Applying Rational Choice Theory to the Dilemma of 

 Disclosures ............................................................................................. 136 

The Process .............................................................................................. 138 

Potential Motivations ...................................................................... 138

Potential Justifications ..................................................................... 138

Potential Harm ................................................................................ 139

Relevancy of Variables ..................................................................... 139

Relative Significance of Variables .................................................... 140

Government Ability and Desire to Effect Change ........................... 140

Appropriate Venues for Implementation ......................................... 141

Past Forums for Engaging with the Media: SIGINT 101 and 

 the Dialogue Group .............................................................................. 141

The British Model — Defence Advisory Commitee and the Official

 Secrets Act .............................................................................................. 143

The Road Ahead ...................................................................................... 145

APPENDIX – The Legal Framework Underlying Unauthorized 

 Disclosures .................................................................................................. 147

Legal Framework: Executive Branch .................................................... 147 

Legal Framework: Legislative Branch.................................................... 152 

Legal Framework: Judicial Branch......................................................... 158 

Conclusion ................................................................................................... 167 

ENDNOTES .................................................................................................. 169
vii

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................... 227

INDEX............................................................................................................ 253

ABOUT THE AUTHOR.............................................................................. 259

List of Figures

Figure 1 – Psychological Scale ....................................................................... 27

Figure 2 – Through the Eyes of the Enemy - Stanislav Lunev ................... 41

Figure 3 – Doonesbury................................................................................... 44

Figure 4 – February 5, 2003 Presentation to the UN.................................. 54

Figure 5 – October 14, 1962 U2 Images of Soviet Missiles in Cuba......... 65

Figure 6 – Glomar Explorer........................................................................... 85

Figure 7 – Unauthorized Disclosure Satire .................................................. 86

Figure 8 – Unauthorized Disclosure Satire .................................................. 90

Figure 9 – Mossad Agent Eli Cohen ............................................................. 93

Figure 10 – USMC Barracks - Beirut, 1983 ................................................. 94

Figure 11 – Unauthorized Disclosure Satire .............................................. 106

Figure 12 – Glomar Explorer....................................................................... 114

Figure 13 – Psychological Scale - Unauthorized Disclosures.................. 123

Figure 14 – Psychological Scale - Ivy Bells Disclosure ............................. 132

Figure 15 – Classified Document Cover Sheets - SF 703, 

 704, and 705 ................................................................................................ 148

Figure 16 – November 1979 Progressive Magazine.................................. 165

ix

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

COMMENTARY

Who Watches the Watchmen? could hardly be more 

timely as we debate the recent leaking of the largest trove of documents 

in American history. The “WikiLeaks” case drives home the need for what 

this book lays out: an approach to protecting classified information that 

goes beyond law enforcement. Gary Ross’ application of Rational Choice 

Theory codifies, organizes, and extends what many of us have been trying 

to do instinctively when dealing with unauthorized disclosures. In Ross’ 

discussions of “motivations” and “justifications,” I see powerful echoes of 

what I personally experienced as Director of NSA and CIA. I only wish 

I had had access to this fully developed intellectual framework and the 

courses of action it suggests while still in government. 

General Michael V. Hayden (U.S. Air Force, Retired)

Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Former Director, National Security Agency
x

GARY ROSS

COMMENTARY

In August 2000 the Hermes Society, a fellowship of dedicated government 

professionals committed to improving the Intelligence Community’s 

effectiveness in countering foreign denial and deception activities, met to 

discuss the need for a rigorous studies program on denial and deception. 

As a result of this meeting and others that followed, the Denial and 

Deception Advanced Studies Program (DDASP) was conceived. The early 

vision of the program articulated by R. Kent Tiernan, currently the Foreign 

Denial and Deception Committee (FDDC) Vice Chairman, included three 

components: formal instruction, a research paper, and a certification phase. 

The DDASP began in November 2002 at the Joint Military Intelligence 

College (JMIC), now the National Intelligence University (NIU). Twelve 

students graduated from the program in 2003. To date, the DDASP has 

seen more than 300 students graduate. The program has been able to 

flourish thanks to ongoing sponsorship by the FDDC, under the Office of 

the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and NIU. 

The goal of the DDASP is to enhance the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 

ability to identify, counter, and exploit foreign denial and deception 

(D&D) activities generally, and to create a cadre of certified counter-D&D 

specialists spread across the Intelligence Community’s sixteen elements. 

Gary Ross is one such cadre member and the author of Who Watches the 

Watchmen? The Conflict between National Security and Freedom of the 

Press. 

The DDASP teaches students to take into consideration the sources of 

foreign knowledge of U.S. intelligence capabilities, such as espionage and 

unauthorized disclosures in the media. The more an adversary understands 

how the Intelligence Community (IC) collects secrets the more effective 

and motivated it will be to engage in denial and deception. 

Over the last nine years, graduates of the DDASP have produced a 

veritable archive of master’s theses on many facets related to D&D. The 

NIU and FDDC intend to share these papers with the IC. Ross’ book on 

unauthorized disclosures is the first such publication to be offered as part 

of this new series of topics relating to the many dimensions of D&D. Future 
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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

publications will include such titles as Russian Strategic Political Deceptions 

and The Hidden Threat to National Security: Human Smuggling Networks. 

In addition to student theses, the DDASP faculty and FDDC staff, in 

conjunction with NIU, select and make available other outstanding 

publications to various audiences to raise the level of foreign deception 

awareness among analysts throughout the IC. To date, the FDDC has 

published ten research papers written by DDASP students as part of its 

Analysis Capabilities Enhancement Summary (ACES) series, which seeks 

to encourage diverse and independent analyses throughout the IC. 

Intelligence requires secrets. So says James B. Bruce in his article, “Laws and 

Leaks of Classified Intelligence: The Consequences of Permissive Neglect.” 

Ross’ work and those to follow are intended to educate the IC about the 

sources of foreign knowledge and the resulting advantage afforded to our 

adversaries. 

America’s intelligence advantage is critically dependent upon our ability 

to secretly collect secrets. Unauthorized disclosures degrade our ability to 

do so and thereby jeopardize our intelligence advantage. Gary Ross’ book 

is a must read for those concerned about the implications to U.S. national 

security.

William A. Parquette

Foreign Denial and Deception Committee

National Intelligence Council
xii

GARY ROSS

COMMENTARY

In his concurring opinion in the “Pentagon Papers” case,1 Justice Black—

always a First Amendment absolutist—expressed skepticism that claims of 

national security should ever overcome the First Amendment, especially 

the freedom of the press guaranteed therein. As he wrote: 

The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of 

informed representative government provides no real security for 

our Republic. The Framers of the First Amendment, fully aware of 

both the need to defend a new nation and the abuses of the English 

and Colonial Governments, sought to give this new society strength 

and security by providing that freedom of speech, press, religion, 

and assembly should not be abridged.2

Yet, for every Justice Black, there is a Justice Jackson, who observed 22 years 

earlier in another First Amendment case that “the choice is not between 

order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without 

either.” Thus, Jackson warned, “if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire 

logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of 

Rights into a suicide pact.”3

There is much to commend both viewpoints; popular government 

necessarily presupposes the ability of the people meaningfully to assess the 

full measure of their elected representatives’ conduct, ability that in turn 

depends largely upon a free and independent press. And yet, one hardly 

needs to strain to understand how the publication of certain national 

defense information could gravely jeopardize the security of the United 

States—and the freedoms that make the nation worth securing in the first 

place. To be sure, I am not one of those who believe that balancing liberty 

and security is a zero-sum game, but it is well past time to concede that 

there is such a thing as information that the government should be able to 

protect from public disclosure, even by members of the news media acting 

with the purest of motives. And once we agree on that point, the question 

becomes how we sort out that information—and who does the sorting.4

The problem, as Gary Ross documents in Chapter 1 of this careful and 

thorough monograph, is that legislative attempts to broker some middle 
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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

ground between these two principled guideposts have proven woefully 

ineffective—in both directions. The federal espionage statutes are antiquated 

in ways that undermine their practical utility and perhaps even their 

constitutionality.5 And federal whistleblower laws, which might otherwise 

be the place to distinguish between the right and wrong kinds of disclosures, 

are instead a hodgepodge of confusing—and at times conflicting—mandates 

to government employees.6 Thus, the law as it stands today serves neither 

the government’s nor the media’s best interests.

One possible response is to put the proverbial ball back in Congress’ court, 

and to encourage the legislature to approach the various federal laws 

concerning unauthorized disclosures of national security information from 

a comprehensive perspective, tying together classification schemes with 

criminal laws for disclosing validly classified information, creating defenses 

to prosecution in cases where the disclosure can be justified either on the 

ground that the information was wrongfully classified or that the value of 

public disclosure outweighed the threat to national security, and so on. Thus, 

a number of prominent scholars from across the spectrum have felled forests 

in the past several decades attempting to suggest how such comprehensive 

legislative reform could—and should—be pursued.7

Ross is a realist, however, and his analysis should convince even the skeptical 

reader that meaningful and sufficiently thorough legislative reform is highly 

improbable. Moreover, even the most careful, sweeping, and systematic new 

legislation will not solve the problem at the heart of Ross’ manuscript: how 

we account for the quite unrelated reasons why individual journalists might 

choose to disclose protected information, and how we assess the varying 

costs of disclosure across these different cases. Put another way, Ross’ work 

demonstrates quite forcefully that there are two independent variables in 

these cases—the journalist’s motives (which Ross exhaustively discusses in 

Chapter 2) and the government’s harm (the subject of Chapter 3). Legislative 

reforms, no matter how clever, could hardly make one dependent upon the 

other, as Ross demonstrates in his walk-through of a not-so-hypothetical 

journalist’s decision-making process in Chapter 4.

The solution Ross proposes is both intriguing and somewhat unorthodox. 

Although there has been an increasing amount of scholarship in recent 

years on the possibilities for self-control within the executive branch as an 
xiv

GARY ROSS

alternative to external oversight,8 what Ross suggests in Chapter 5—what 

he calls “the proactive application of rational choice theory”—may in fact 

satisfy the two constituencies that count here by encouraging them, simply 

enough, to communicate with each other. Of course, none of this will stop a 

journalist who, for whatever reason, is dead-set on disclosing the protected 

information. If the goal is to reduce unauthorized disclosures, however, 

rather than eliminate them altogether, then it is hard to see any downside 

to the steps for which Ross so convincingly advocates. Indeed, on this topic 

in particular, it is no indictment of a proposal that it must necessarily be 

incomplete.

Nevertheless, I would be remiss if I did not mention the one other nonpunitive way to convince journalists not to disseminate protected 

information: restore their confidence that only properly classified 

information is being protected. We live in an age of “unlawful secrets”—

information that is either wrongly classified, or classified information about 

unlawful governmental programs. As a result, for all the good that it will 

do to assess the cost-benefit analysis of unauthorized disclosures from the 

perspective of the journalist as well as the government, it can only help if the 

well-documented upsurge in over-classification were also addressed from 

within. The New York Times and Washington Post waited over a year before 

publishing details on the government’s warrantless wiretapping program.9

Imagine how much longer they might have held off if that program was the 

only legally controversial Bush administration counterterrorism initiative 

that had been kept from the public. Indeed, I doubt I am exaggerating in 

suggesting that the government’s credibility—or lack thereof—had as much 

to do with the upsurge in unauthorized disclosures in the latter years of the 

Bush administration as the collective media itself.

In the end, then, faith on the part of the media that protected information is 

being kept secret for the right reasons may be as powerful a weapon against 

unauthorized disclosures as even the most systematic application of costbenefit analysis.

Stephen I. Vladeck

Professor of Law

Washington School of Law

American University 
xv

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

COMMENTARY

The unauthorized disclosure of classified information—leaks in plain 

parlance—is emerging as one of the more important security challenges 

of the post-9/11 era. Although the phenomenon of leaking, as Gary Ross 

reminds us in this comprehensive study, has been with us throughout 

our history, in the midst of the Global War on Terrorism it has become 

particularly acute.

Careless handling of information was to cost both the Confederacy and 

the Union untold lives during the Civil War. During World War I the 

dangers posed by leaks were one factor that prompted Congress to enact 

the Espionage Act of 1917, which stands today as our fundamental law 

governing secrets. On the eve of and during World War II, leaks were 

dearly paid for in treasure and blood. In the Cold War we responded to 

the experience of World War II—and to the new existential danger posed 

by nuclear weapons—by initiating unprecedentedly tight controls on 

information. It was only as the Cold War waned that we began to unwind 

from that crisis-driven approach and embrace maximum transparency, at 

least in our rhetoric if not always in reality. Then came September 11, 2001, 

and the default position of openness had to be flipped once again to its 

reverse. Yet, counter to what one might have expected, it is this era, when 

the imperative of secrecy is particularly important for success in the War 

on Terror, that leaking has intensified.

The problem of secrecy is double-edged and places key institutions and 

values of our democracy into collision. On the one hand, our country 

operates under a broad consensus that secrecy is antithetical to democratic 

rule and can encourage a variety of political deformations. The potential 

for excessive concealment has grown more acute as the American national 

security apparatus expanded massively in the decades since World War II, 

bringing with it a commensurately large extension of secrecy. With huge 

volumes of information pertaining to national defense walled off from 

the public, secrecy almost inevitably has become haphazard. Secrecy can 

facilitate renegade governmental activity, as we saw in the Watergate and 

the Iran-Contra affairs. It can also be a breeding ground for corruption.
xvi

GARY ROSS

Nevertheless, the obvious pitfalls are not the end of the story. A long list 

of abuses notwithstanding, secrecy, like openness, remains an essential 

prerequisite of self-governance. To be effective, even many of the most 

mundane aspects of democratic rule, from the development of policy 

alternatives to the selection of personnel, must often take place behind 

closed doors. To proceed always under the glare of the public would cripple 

deliberation and render government impotent. And when one turns to 

the most fundamental business of democratic governance, namely, selfpreservation—carried out through the conduct of foreign policy and the 

waging of war—the imperative of secrecy becomes critical, often a matter 

of survival.

Even in times of peace, the formulation of foreign and defense policies is 

necessarily conducted in secret. However, this is not a time of peace; ever 

since September 11, 2001, the country has been at war. And we are not 

only at war; we are engaged in a particular kind of war—an intelligence war 

against a shadowy and determined adversary. The effectiveness of the tools 

of intelligence—from the recruitment of agents to the operation of satellite 

reconnaissance systems—remains overwhelmingly dependent on their 

clandestine nature. It is not an overstatement to say that secrecy today, as 

we engage in a struggle without a discernible end point, is one of the most 

critical tools of national defense.

Leaks of secret information to the press thus present a direct and serious 

challenge to our conduct of national security in an age of global terrorism. 

Here it is necessary to draw a crucial distinction. As any American government 

official or journalist will readily attest, leaking is part and parcel of our system 

of rule. Not a day goes by in Washington without government officials sharing 

inside information with journalists and lobbyists in off-the-record briefings 

and in private discussions over lunch. Some of the material changing hands 

in this fashion winds up getting published. A study by the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence counted 147 separate disclosures of classified 

information that made their way into the nation’s eight leading newspapers in 

a 6-month period alone. As these startlingly high numbers indicate, leaks to 

the press are a well-established informal practice. They enable policymakers 

to carry out any one of a number of objectives: to get out a message to 

domestic and foreign audiences, to gauge public reaction in advance of some 
xvii

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

contemplated policy initiative, to curry favor with journalists, and to wage 

inter- or intra-bureaucratic warfare. For better or for worse, leaking has 

become part of the normal functioning of the U.S. government.

Yet, there are leaks of an entirely different and far more serious character: 

those which telegraph to our adversaries our methods and capabilities 

and compromise our ability to protect ourselves. Ironically, the years after 

September 11, 2001, when the imperative of national security secrecy has 

been particularly acute, have also been the years in which this kind of reckless 

leaking has proliferated. Among other things, major American newspapers 

have dropped into the public domain the means by which our intelligence 

agencies eavesdrop on al Qaeda terrorists and the methods by which we 

track the movements of their funds.

One of the virtues of Ross’ study of leaking is the taxonomy it offers of both 

the causes and the effects of leaking. Having assembled a large catalog of leaks 

from the second half of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st, he 

shows the great variety of motives that propel journalists to publish classified 

information. These range from, at one end of the spectrum, the promotion 

of informed public debate to, at the other end, advancing corporate interests 

in the competitive struggles of contemporary journalism. Ross also offers a 

taxonomy of the harm caused by leaks. Here, too, there is a wide range of 

outcomes. At one end of the spectrum there is the potential for loss of life 

and damage to sensitive intelligence sources and methods. At the other end 

of the spectrum, there are the modest—but still serious—consequences like 

a breakdown in intelligence sharing with allied powers.

Striking the right balance between security and liberty is a perpetual challenge 

in a democracy. With the two imperatives in constant tension, inquiry into 

the costs and consequences of disclosure of secrets is an essential task. 

Ross’ study is a welcome and timely addition to the small body of literature 

examining this important subject.

Gabriel Schoenfeld

Senior Fellow

Hudson Institute

Author of Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, and the Rule of 

Law (W.W. Norton, May 2010)
xviii

GARY ROSS

COMMENTARY

There is probably no issue more vexing, more troublesome, and more 

irritating to intelligence agencies around the world than the legal and moral 

question of America’s news media publishing and broadcasting classified 

information about intelligence matters. While U.S. news organizations are 

basically protected by the Constitution’s provision for freedom of the press, 

and by the reluctance of the government to prosecute under a number of 

laws, their foreign counterparts have no such seeming immunity. Even in 

the United Kingdom, a nation whose concept of jurisprudence most closely 

parallels America’s, the media are well aware that the Official Secrets Act 

is not to be ignored. Over the years, there have been times when foreign 

intelligence agencies have hesitated to share fully with their American 

counterparts for fear of leaks to the U.S. media.

Gary Ross has produced a scholarly work that looks fairly and comprehensively 

at the major aspects of this issue. While he proposes no legislative solution 

for this clash of principles, he offers some positive recommendations at the 

end that, to me, hold promise.

Ross describes an innovative but short-lived program at the National 

Security Agency to reach out to journalists writing about its activities. 

“SIGINT 101” explains what the NSA does and how it does it. The agency 

looked at published and broadcast stories, noted the harmful effects, and 

discussed how the stories could have been edited to remove the harm while 

retaining their purpose. However, NSA’s program, which started in 2002, 

was discontinued two years later, apparently because of staffing changes in 

the agency’s press office. Yet, this proactive effort had to have been effective 

in reducing the incidents of classified information being made public.

Ross also describes a parallel effort, initiated by a former CIA general 

counsel and former Washington Post reporter, to bring together major 

news organizations, intelligence agencies, and the Defense Department to 

engage in an ongoing dialogue. Representatives met at a private Washington 

club. One media participant credited the sessions with dissuading the Bush 

administration from proposing broader anti-leak legislation.

American journalists do not have the intent to harm the United States. They 

intend to tell a compelling story of something the government is doing in 
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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

the public’s name that may or may not be legal, that may not have received 

approval from legislative bodies tasked with authorizing certain actions, and 

that may run counter to government policies.

Furthermore, journalists do not obtain classified information by breaking 

and entering. Journalists obtain secrets because the classified information 

is given to them. A reporter’s tradecraft, minus black bag jobs, wiretapping, 

and other techniques, is quite similar to an intelligence agent’s: cultivating 

sources and asking informed questions.

A journalist who participated in SIGINT 101 would be more sensitive to the 

issue of harm and likely would take the extra steps needed to reduce harm. In 

my 40 years of journalistic experience—nearly 30 of them in Washington—I 

never met, nor heard of, a reporter who turned his back on a government 

agency willing to work with a news organization that had obtained classified 

information. For example, the Washington Post, no stranger to conflicts with 

the government over publishing secrets, deleted the identification of specific 

countries in its revelation that the CIA maintained secret detention facilities 

in Eastern Europe where suspected terrorists could be interrogated and held. 

The Post had responded to a government request in an attempt to limit what 

the administration viewed as damaging information—beyond the fact that 

the facilities’ existence would be made public. 

The government’s challenge is to figure out how to reduce leaks. A number 

of government employees have lost their jobs for unauthorized disclosures 

and that punishment remains available to the government. It will not 

stop leaks, however. Ross quotes former Director of Central Intelligence 

Robert Gates: “The answer, if there is one, is the slower, more mundane 

and frustrating process of again instilling discipline through education and 

developing broad support.”

Beyond losing their job, I can only assume that the prospect of criminal 

prosecution, however slight, may also deter some potential leakers. The fact 

that an FBI linguist was sentenced to 20 months in prison in May 2010 for 

charges related to leaks to a blogger should be sobering for others thinking of 

leaking. A former NSA official has also been indicted for activities associated 

with leaking secrets to a newspaper reporter. It is not known how the leaker 

was unmasked. However, a recently released FBI file shows that the agency 

used a wide variety of investigative tools, including polygraphs, to try to 
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GARY ROSS

find a leaker in the mid-1980s. Reporters involved with published leaks 

have been subjected to wiretaps and other investigative methods over the 

years. The government is not completely incapable of identifying leakers, but 

prosecution is usually a political decision.

In the end, it is the media, in all their forms, that should be the focus of 

government agencies. Every intelligence and defense agency should have 

a “SIGINT 101” program. Journalists, by their nature, are interested in 

learning more; they would not resist hearing an agency’s point of view and 

engaging in dialogue with the government. It is the vacuum of silence that 

the government should fill with proactive measures, as suggested by Ross.

One aspect of this dilemma that Ross might have addressed in greater detail 

is the historical development of media suspicion of government actions 

and support for leakers. It was not always thus. In World War II, reporters 

accompanying combat units wore uniforms and willingly subjected their 

stories to censors. Government employees heard constantly that “loose lips 

sink ships.” There was a tendency to keep most secrets, even on the home front.

Nevertheless, that all changed for the media, in my view, during the 

Vietnam War. Reporters on the ground and in Washington came to realize 

that they were being lied to about the war, and very quickly trust was lost. 

The media were blamed by many in the government for “losing the war” 

by eroding public support. Publication of the leaked classified “Pentagon 

Papers” by the New York Times and the Washington Post revealed the 

government’s willful deception of the American people about the war. It 

has been downhill ever since, and most of today’s journalists have lived and 

worked in no other environment.

President George W. Bush’s administration further fanned the media’s 

mistrust of government information by falsely asserting, in an effort to 

build public support for invading Iraq after the attacks of 9/11, that Iraq was 

behind the attacks, that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction, 

and that Iraq’s oil revenue would pay for the war. Yet, in the 2003 invasion 

of Iraq, reporters were embedded with combat units and kept operational 

secrets. Even though their communication with their home offices was not 

censored—satellite telephones assured that—there were no harmful leaks 

of classified information. (Note: TV correspondent Geraldo Rivera was 
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removed from the battlefield for drawing the next day’s plan of attack in the 

sand for his viewers, but I have never heard that the attack was compromised.) 

Embedded reporters responded to what SIGINT 101 sought to accomplish: 

reporters can keep secrets if they understand the big picture.

In addition to the major print and broadcast media, however, the government 

now must deal with blogs, electronic publications, and other channels for 

putting information “out there.” For the last three years, an Internet site called 

WikiLeaks has invited anonymous individuals to share classified documents 

with the world. These posters are not likely candidates for SIGINT 101. Their 

contributions to WikiLeaks are made without any prior consultation with 

affected agencies, nothing like pre-publication meetings of, say, high-ranking 

CIA officials and a newspaper’s editors.

Finally, I would like to take issue with one observation that Ross makes 

early in his book—that reporters who write major stories based on leaked 

classified information may be motivated by the possibility of winning the 

prestigious Pulitzer Prize, which is given annually for the best American 

news stories. Despite the deep satisfaction that comes with winning this 

career-enhancing prize, that is not the motivation behind an investigation 

that begins a year or two earlier. My former employer, the Copley News 

Service, in conjunction with the San Diego Union-Tribune, won a Pulitzer 

Prize in 2006 for stories that resulted in a corrupt Congressman going to 

prison. I know that exposing the politician as a crook, not winning the 

Pulitzer Prize, was the motivation. In short, it was what good journalism 

should be. The prize is just the cherry on top.

All in all, Gary Ross has pulled together in this splendid book all the raw 

material needed to spark a fresh discussion between the government and the 

media on how to function under our unique system of government in this 

ever-evolving information-rich environment.

Benjamin Shore

Retired Journalist and Editor

Washington Bureau 

Copley News Service

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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

FOREWORD

The “Democratic Dilemma”

From George Washington and the War for Independence to George Bush 

and the War on Terror, the conflict between the principle of maintaining 

a free press and the necessity for secrecy (the protection of intelligence 

sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure) has defied resolution. 

Retired CIA senior executive James Bruce, former Vice Chairman of the 

U.S. Intelligence Community’s Foreign Denial and Deception Committee 

and Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology, 

characterized this fundamental conflict as a “democratic dilemma”

...that characterizes the relationship between secrecy and democracy. 

Unquestionably, democracies require openness to establish and 

sustain accountability. Anyone seriously interested in government 

accountability understands the democratic risks inherent in secrecy. 

Yet the greater openness that can facilitate U.S. democracy also 

serves its foreign adversaries.10

Attempts to reconcile this conflict between a journalist’s motivations for 

publishing classified information and the perceived harm resulting from 

the loss of intelligence sources and methods is one of the primary themes 

explored in Gary Ross’ book, Who Watches the Watchmen? The Conflict 

between National Security and Freedom of the Press.

Throughout Who Watches the Watchmen? Ross explores the history of this 

conflict. He explains that the topic of unauthorized disclosures has been 

a frequent subject for research in the government, academic, and legal 

communities. The issue has also been debated at Congressional hearings 

before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Judiciary Committee and the 

Senate Armed Services Committee.

Beyond the government’s recognition of a necessity to protect information 

in the interest of national security, the responsibility to maintain an 

enlightened citizenry in a democracy is documented and acknowledged 
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GARY ROSS

in Ross’ publication. The foundation for maintaining these democratic 

principles is found in the U.S. Bill of Rights, which contains the first 

ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Though not as prominent 

in the public consciousness as the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, 

the Preamble to the Bill of Rights similarly captures the sentiments and 

aspirations of the Founding Fathers. The Preamble declares that the Bill 

of Rights was established “in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of 

its [U.S. Constitution] powers . . . And as extending the ground of public 

confidence in the Government.”

In Chapter One of Who Watches the Watchmen? Ross conducts an in-depth 

exploration of the history of the conflict between the principle of a free 

press and the necessity to protect intelligence sources and methods. Past 

government efforts to respond to the issue, primarily involving a legislative 

solution, are also examined. A potential framework for understanding a 

journalist’s thought process when electing to publish classified information, 

Rational Choice Theory, is also presented. Chapter Two examines the 

motivations and justifications for members of the media to obtain and 

publish classified information. Historical examples are used to assist 

in identifying and analyzing individual motivations and justifications. 

Motivations for government employees to disclose classified information 

are also presented and analyzed, based on a book written by a former dean 

of the Columbia School of Journalism. Chapter Three identifies precise 

categories of harm attributed to unauthorized disclosures. Historic events 

are again used to differentiate and explore each category of harm. 

Based on detailed information contained in Bob Woodward’s 1987 book Veil: 

The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987, Chapter Four examines the process 

whereby members of the media rationally deliberated the publication of an 

actual unauthorized disclosure. This case study offers unique and valuable 

insights into a journalist’s thought processes. Conclusions regarding 

Rational Choice Theory and its application to the democratic dilemma of 

unauthorized disclosures are presented in Chapter Five. Ross’ book concludes 

by examining the legal foundations underlying the conflict, including the 

U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights, enacted and proposed legislation, 

Executive Orders, and case law. 
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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

Who Watches the Watchmen? The Conflict between National Security 

and Freedom of the Press offers an excellent examination of the ongoing 

conflict between a free press and the need to protect intelligence sources 

and methods. Its publication will promote an improved understanding 

of the “democratic dilemma” both for members of the U.S. Intelligence 

Community and for the public. 

Warren E. Snyder, Ph.D.

Denial and Deception Advanced Studies Program

National Intelligence University

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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My first Special-Agent-in-Charge once compared a successfully resolved 

criminal investigation to a wonderfully cooked jambalaya. In many ways, 

this book reminds me of that occasionally frustrating, yet ultimately 

rewarding, case. Though I may be the one serving the final dish, the flavor 

is a result of the ingredients brought together by the many individuals who 

assisted me throughout this process. 

My sincere thanks to the members of the National Intelligence Council, 

Foreign Denial and Deception Committee, and the staff at the National 

Intelligence University for recognizing the significance of the issue and 

providing a forum to engage in this dialogue. Special thanks to William 

Parquette, Warren Snyder, George Mitroka, Cathryn Thurston, and William 

Spracher for their guidance and advocacy. I would also like to recognize 

journalists Siobhan Gorman of the Wall Street Journal, Pamela Hess of the 

Associated Press and Ben Shore, formerly of Copley News Service, for their 

willingness to lecture at the University, providing a voice to the media’s 

viewpoint.

To Naval Criminal Investigative Service managers Steven Corbett and Barry 

Marushi, and to Office of the Director of National Intelligence managers 

Glenn Stampler and Raymond Wiggins: Thank you for supporting my 

efforts to complete both the Strategic Intelligence Master’s Program and 

the research for this book. Barry, I’m grateful to you for giving me the 

opportunity to begin this process. Our time together was too short.

There are several friends and colleagues to whom I’m also indebted. To 

colleagues Dan Altman and Greg Lynch: Everyone should be fortunate 

enough to work with individuals “of your ilk” during their career. I think 

it’s time to fire up the hookah. My gratitude to “devil’s advocates” William 

Marotti and Kelly Logan for our many online discussions: They allowed me 

to hear what it was I was trying to say and shined the light of perspective 

(actually, the glow of my computer monitor) on my premise.
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GARY ROSS

Above all, this book is dedicated to my lovely wife Tammy and our beautiful 

daughters Emma, Audrey, and Sophie. This book would never have been 

possible without their love and support (and patience). 

And finally to the readers, for allowing me to offer up this bowl of jambalaya. 

My hope is that it will inspire additional dialogue among the government, 

the media, and the public. 

Gershon (Gary) Ross

May 2011
xxix

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

AUTHOR’S PREFACE

The only way we can know whether information is legitimately kept 

secret is when it is revealed.11 

 - WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange

On October 22, 2010, the Internet-based organization WikiLeaks released 

what is being referred to as the largest unauthorized disclosure of classified 

information in U.S. history. Over the vigorous objections of the U.S. 

Department of Defense, WikiLeaks disclosed over 390,000 classified 

reports concerning U.S. military operations in Iraq. Prior to posting the 

documents on its website, WikiLeaks provided the material to several 

media outlets, including the New York Times, the British newspaper The 

Guardian, the German magazine Der Spiegel, and the Qatar-based news 

organization Al Jazeera. These outlets each published independent articles 

based on their analysis of the reports.

This was not the first time WikiLeaks defied the U.S. government by 

disclosing classified information. In April 2010, WikiLeaks posted a video 

on its website documenting an airstrike by two U.S. Apache helicopters in 

Baghdad, Iraq. Three months later, WikiLeaks disclosed 77,000 additional 

classified reports detailing U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. 

In November 2010, WikiLeaks began releasing classified U.S. State 

Department cables from a reported cache of more than 250,000 documents 

it had obtained. Similar to the military reports, WikiLeaks provided media 

outlets in England, Germany, Spain, and France with advance access to the 

diplomatic cables.12 In April 2011, WikiLeaks and multiple media outlets 

also published information derived from over 700 classified “Detainee 

Assessment Briefs” for individuals held at the U.S. military prison in 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.13

Attempting to put the scope of the disclosures in context, the German 

magazine Der Spiegel wrote:14
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GARY ROSS

Never before in history has a superpower lost control of such vast 

amounts of such sensitive information – data that can help paint 

a picture of the foundation upon which US foreign policy is built. 

Never before has the trust America’s partners have in the country 

been as badly shaken. 

WikiLeaks’ founder Julian Assange offered the following explanation for 

his decision to disclose the military reports involving U.S. operations in 

Afghanistan:15

These files are the most comprehensive description of a war to be 

published during the course of a war – in other words, at a time when 

they still have a chance of doing some good. They cover the small and 

the large. A single body of information, they eclipse all that has been 

previously said about Afghanistan. They will change our perspective 

on not only the war in Afghanistan, but on all modern wars.

This material shines light on the everyday brutality and squalor of 

war. The archive will change public opinion and it will change the 

opinion of people in positions of political and diplomatic influence. 

There is a mood to end the war in Afghanistan. This information 

won’t do it alone, but it will shift political will in a significant manner.

During a subsequent interview, Assange discussed his rationale for 

releasing the classified diplomatic cables:16

If there are people in the State Department who say that there is some 

abuse going on, and there’s not a proper mechanism for internal 

accountability and external accountability, they must have a conduit 

to get that out to the public; and we are that conduit.

When questioned whether he recognized the legitimacy of any state secrets, 

Assange responded:17 

There is a legitimate role for secrecy, and there is a legitimate role for 

openness. Unfortunately, those who commit abuses against humanity 

or against the law find abusing legitimate secrecy to conceal their 

abuse all too easy. People of good conscience have always revealed 

abuses by ignoring abusive strictures. It is not WikiLeaks that 
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decides to reveal something. It is a whistleblower or a dissident who 

decides to reveal it. Our job is to make sure that these individuals 

are protected, the public is informed and the historical record is not 

denied.

The New York Times reported that the compromised military reports 

offered no “earthshaking revelations,” but did offer additional context and 

insight into what was already known by the American public.18 For the 

Iraq-related documents, these insights reportedly included the deaths 

of Iraqi civilians during military operations, Iranian military support to 

Iraqi insurgents, and the reliance on public contractors to augment U.S. 

forces. The Afghan-related documents are reported to document expanded 

CIA paramilitary operations in the region, a relationship between 

Afghan insurgents and Pakistan’s intelligence service, and CIA support 

to Afghanistan’s intelligence agency. The Guantanamo Bay Detainee 

Assessment Briefs reportedly identify concerns that detainees were either 

being wrongfully held though they were not a threat, or wrongly released 

though they actually were.19

On the same day the Times published its first article containing information 

derived from the compromised State Department cables, it also published 

a “Note to Readers.” The note explains the Times’ motivation for disclosing 

classified information, as well as the deliberative process that preceded 

publication. The note read, in part:20

The Times believes that the documents (United States embassy 

cables) serve an important public interest, illuminating the goals, 

successes, compromises and frustrations of American diplomacy in 

a way that other accounts cannot match. 

The Times has taken care to exclude, in its articles and in 

supplementary material, in print and online, information that would 

endanger confidential informants or compromise national security. 

The Times’s redactions were shared with other news organizations 

and communicated to WikiLeaks, in the hope that they would 

similarly edit the documents they planned to post online.
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GARY ROSS

After its own redactions, the Times sent Obama administration 

officials the cables it planned to post and invited them to challenge 

publication of any information that, in the official view, would harm 

the national interest. After reviewing the cables, the officials – while 

making clear they condemn the publication of secret material – 

suggested additional redactions. The Times agreed to some, but not 

all.

The question of dealing with classified information is rarely easy, 

and never to be taken lightly. Editors try to balance the value of the 

material to public understanding against potential dangers to the 

national interest. 

Of course, most of these documents will be made public regardless 

of what the Times decides. WikiLeaks has shared the entire archive of 

secret cables with at least four European publications, has promised 

country-specific documents to many other news outlets, and has said 

it plans to ultimately post its trove online. For the Times to ignore 

this material would be to deny its own readers the careful reporting 

and thoughtful analysis they expect when this kind of information 

becomes public.

The U.S. government strongly condemned the disclosures and related 

media reporting. Administration officials, including President Obama, 

characterized the compromise as potentially harmful to U.S. and coalition 

personnel and operations. In response to the disclosures involving military 

operations in Iraq, the Department of Defense issued the following 

statement:21

We deplore WikiLeaks for inducing individuals to break the law, 

leak classified documents and then cavalierly share that secret 

information with the world, including our enemies. We know terrorist 

organizations have been mining the leaked Afghan documents for 

information to use against us, and this Iraq leak is more than four 

times as large. By disclosing such sensitive information, WikiLeaks 

continues to put at risk the lives of our troops, their coalition partners 

and those Iraqis and Afghans working with us. The only responsible 

course of action for WikiLeaks at this point is to return the stolen 

material and expunge it from their Web sites as soon as possible. 
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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

We strongly condemn the unauthorized disclosure of classified 

information and will not comment on these leaked documents 

other than to note that “significant activities” reports are initial, raw 

observations by tactical units. They are essentially snapshots of events, 

both tragic and mundane, and do not tell the whole story. That said, 

the period covered by these reports has been well chronicled in news 

stories, books and films, and the release of these field reports does not 

bring new understanding to Iraq’s past.

However, it does expose secret information that could make our 

troops even more vulnerable to attack in the future. Just as with 

the leaked Afghan documents, we know our enemies will mine this 

information, looking for insights into how we operate, cultivate 

sources and react in combat situations, even the capability of our 

equipment. This security breach could very well get our troops and 

those they are fighting with killed. 

U.S. public opinion appears divided over the actions taken by both 

WikiLeaks and the media. In a survey conducted by the Pew Research 

Center, 47 percent of respondents believed the public interest was 

harmed by the disclosure of Afghan-related military reports.22 Fourtytwo percent felt the disclosures served the public interest. The difference 

in public opinion over the compromise of U.S. State Department cables 

was more pronounced. Sixty percent of survey participants identified this 

disclosure as harmful while 31 percent believed the disclosures served the 

public interest. When questioned regarding the media’s handling of the 

disclosures, 38 percent responded that news organizations had gone too far 

in reporting classified material. An almost identical 39 percent indicated 

that news organizations had struck a proper balance. Fourteen percent felt 

that the media had withheld too much classified material.

Beyond the U.S. government and public, allied governments also voiced 

their concern over the disclosures. U.K. Defence Secretary Liam Fox issued a 

statement which read, “We condemn any un-authorised release of classified 

material. This can put the lives of UK service personnel and those of our allies 

at risk and make the job of Armed Forces in all theatres of operation more 

difficult and more dangerous.”23 Afghan President Hamid Karzai described 
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GARY ROSS

the WikiLeaks disclosures as “shocking and extremely irresponsible,” adding 

that it placed the lives of Afghan informants working with allied forces at 

risk.24

Pakistani officials indicated that the allegations of cooperation between 

Pakistan’s intelligence service and Afghan insurgents could harm relations 

with the United States.25 The officials also questioned whether the United 

States could be trusted with sensitive information in the future. A senior 

official from Pakistan’s intelligence service suggested that the agency might 

need to reexamine its cooperation with the United States if the CIA did not 

denounce the allegations. 

Mexican President Felipe Calderon described the harm to U.S. relations 

from the disclosure of diplomatic cables as “severe.”26 Calderon also 

personally called for the removal of the U.S. ambassador to Mexico. The 

ambassador, who had been critical of the Calderon administration in 

several of the compromised cables, ultimately resigned his position and 

returned to the United States.27 

U.S. adversaries have also commented on the disclosures. In a video 

released by Al Qaeda cleric and spokesperson Anwar Al-Awlaki, Assange’s 

actions were praised and the U.S. response sharply criticized:

[T]he war against the publication of truth [goes on], and, what is 

more, the U.S. is fighting to shut down websites like WikiLeaks, 

just because it reported facts about the American war in Iraq and 

about the conversations of American diplomats with their agents 

worldwide.

The U.S. [accuses] anyone who censures its corruption of being a 

terrorist, and dumps a sack full of [other] readymade accusations 

over him in order to designate him as one of its Muslim and other 

opponents. [The U.S.] has leveled a similar accusation at the owner 

of WikiLeaks, in order to keep [his site] busy and neutralize its 

work in disseminating the domestic secrets of the musty American 

[White] House.28

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed that the Taliban was 

reviewing the documents disclosed by WikiLeaks.29 He explained, “We will 
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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

investigate through our own secret service whether the people mentioned 

are really spies working for the U.S. If they are U.S. spies, then we know 

how to punish them.” Mujahid added that the Taliban had become aware 

of the disclosures through media reporting. 

Though Assange asserts that WikiLeaks followed a “harm minimization” 

process, it was widely reported that non-redacted documents disclosed by 

WikiLeaks identified hundreds of foreign nationals cooperating with U.S. 

forces. Representatives from five human rights organizations—Amnesty 

International, Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), 

Open Society Institute (OSI), Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 

Commission, and the Kabul office of International Crisis Group (ICG)—

contacted WikiLeaks to voice their concerns.30 The representatives urged 

WikiLeaks to remove or redact the documents containing identifying 

information. 

During an August 2010 interview, Assange discussed WikiLeaks’ disclosure 

of the identities of individuals cooperating with U.S. forces:31

We’re faced with no easy choices. We are faced with economic 

constraints. We are faced with the reality that publication often 

brings justice and justice delayed is justice denied. We can’t sit on 

material like this for 3 years, with one person to go through the 

whole lot line by line to redact. We have to take the best road that 

we can, and in this case that was listening to what the other press 

organizations were saying about the material. 

Now, it is regrettable that some number, and although the number is 

being inflated by some organizations, that some number of innocent 

people is named in that and they face some threat as a result. But 

that is the constraints that we are under. For other material that we 

are dealing with, we are now faced with this terrible conundrum. Do 

we go through it line by line? It will cost us approximately sevenhundred and fifty thousand dollars to do that, and there will be a 

delay in doing that.

Where will the money come from? Because all those people who are 

so ready to pass blame and pretend that they are concerned about 
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GARY ROSS

the lives of Afghan civilians are not actually willing to step up to the 

plate to actually put the bat in to history. What do we do about that? 

It’s not fair. It’s a difficult thing. There are no easy choices for this 

organization. 

Assange is reported to have given a different response during a private 

meeting with several journalists. In the book WikiLeaks: Julian Assange’s 

War on Secrecy, a journalist from The Guardian documents a conversation 

with Assange concerning the identification of foreign nationals in the 

compromised documents. During the discussion, Assange reportedly 

remarked: “Well, they’re informants. So, if they get killed, they’ve got it 

coming to them. They deserve it.”32 Assange has denied making this 

statement, adding that he intends to sue The Guardian for libel.33

In October 2010 a Pentagon spokesman commented on efforts to protect 

Iraqis identified in the compromised military reports:34

There are 300 names of Iraqis in here that we think would be 

particularly endangered by their exposure. We have passed that 

information on to U.S. Forces Iraq. They are in the process right now 

of contacting those Iraqis to try to safeguard them.

The State Department also initiated a process to warn hundreds of 

human rights activists, foreign government officials, and businesspeople 

of the potential threat resulting from the disclosure of their identities. A 

“handful” of these individuals was reportedly relocated to safer locations, 

either within their home countries or abroad.35 It was also reported that 

Afghan and Pakistani citizens had become more reluctant to speak with 

human rights investigators and that contact between human rights activists 

and diplomats had been negatively impacted. 

In addition to the resignation of the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, the 

ambassador to Ecuador was also expelled from the country and the U.S. 

ambassador to Libya recalled to the United States.36 The Ecuadorian 

government expelled the U.S. ambassador in response to a compromised 

cable reporting high-level corruption in the police force and possible 

knowledge by Ecuador’s President.
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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton denounced WikiLeaks’ disclosure of 

the classified diplomatic cables.37 Clinton stated that the compromise 

undermined efforts to work with other countries and tore “at the fabric of 

the proper function of responsible government.” She added that individuals 

who dedicated their lives to protecting others faced serious repercussions, 

including imprisonment, torture, and death. Clinton was confident, 

though, that U.S. relationships with foreign governments would endure 

despite the more immediate harm. 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates also offered his perspective on the 

impact of the compromised State Department cables:38

Now, I’ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy 

described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think 

those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, 

governments deal with the United States because it’s in their interest, 

not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because 

they believe we can keep secrets.

During a subsequent briefing before Congress, State Department officials 

reportedly assessed the disclosure of diplomatic cables to be “embarrassing” 

but “containable.”39 It was reported that one of the Congressional officials 

briefed believed the administration felt compelled to depict the harm as 

serious in order to support efforts to pursue criminal charges. 

Multiple media outlets reported that the Defense Department established 

a 120-member task force to assess the impact of the disclosures. In August 

2010 Secretary Gates presented preliminary findings for the Afghanrelated military documents to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The 

initial conclusion was that no specific intelligence sources or methods were 

compromised but that the identification of cooperative Afghan nationals 

was likely to cause significant harm to national security.40 Secretary Gates 

also informed the Committee that the military was working with coalition 

partners to assess the additional risk and consider mitigation options. 

Beyond questions concerning the disclosures’ perceived benefits or harm, 

the status of WikiLeaks as a media organization and Assange as a journalist 

has also been the subject of considerable debate. Assange identifies himself 
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GARY ROSS

as “a publisher and editor-in-chief who organizes and directs other 

journalists.”41 Judith Miller, former New York Times reporter and Pulitzer 

Prize winner, remarked that Assange “may be a bad journalist, but he is a 

journalist.”42 Washington Post reporter and fellow Pulitzer Prize winner, 

Dana Priest, does not share Miller’s opinion. At a 2011 American Bar 

Association event, Priest remarked, “I don’t think of him as a journalist at 

all. I think of him as a source.”43 Executive editor of the New York Times

Bill Keller wrote that the Times also regarded Assange as “a source, not 

as a partner or collaborator.”44 A statement released by the Society of 

Professional Journalists reported a lack of consensus among its members 

on whether WikiLeaks’ actions could be considered “journalism.”45

One other significant point of contention appears to be the ownership of 

the classified material. The U.S. government maintains its ownership of the 

material, asserting that WikiLeaks’ only responsible course of action is to 

return the stolen documents and remove the information from its Web 

sites.46 Assange contends that he is the owner of the information obtained 

by WikiLeaks. When The Guardian acquired a portion of the compromised 

diplomatic cables from a source other than WikiLeaks, Assange threatened 

to sue the newspaper.47 Assange asserted that he had a financial interest in 

the information’s disclosure and would take legal action if The Guardian

failed to honor its prior agreement to coordinate publication. 

In July 2010 U.S. Army Private First Class Bradley Manning was detained 

and charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for disclosing 

national defense information to an unauthorized person.48 The information 

alleged to have been disclosed by Manning includes a video of U.S. military 

operations in Iraq and more than 50 classified State Department cables. 

Though not charged for disclosing the Iraq- and Afghanistan-related 

documents to WikiLeaks, Manning has been identified as a person of 

interest.49 In March 2011, twenty-two additional charges were preferred 

against Manning, including the theft of public records, unauthorized 

transmittal of defense information, computer fraud, violation of Army 

regulations, and aiding the enemy. Though aiding the enemy may be 

considered a capital offense, military prosecutors indicated that they do 
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not plan on pursuing the death penalty.50 As of May 2011, Manning was 

being held in pre-trial confinement at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Manning is reported to have been brought to the attention of law enforcement 

by Adrian Lamo, an individual with whom he had corresponded over 

the Internet. An online magazine published alleged chat-logs between 

Manning and Lamo.51 In the logs, it appears Manning discusses how he 

was able to remove classified material from a military system and transfer 

the information to WikiLeaks:

(01:54:42 PM) Manning: i would come in with music on a CD-RW

(01:55:21 PM) Manning: labelled with something like “Lady 

Gaga”... erase the music... then write a compressed split file

(01:55:46 PM) Manning: no-one suspected a thing

(01:55:48 PM) Manning: =L kind of sad

(01:56:04 PM) Lamo: and odds are, they never will

(01:56:07 PM) Manning: i didnt even have to hide anything

(01:56:36 PM) Lamo: from a professional perspective, i’m curious 

how the server they were on was insecure

(01:57:19 PM) Manning: you had people working 14 hours a day... 

every single day... no weekends... no recreation...

(01:57:27 PM) Manning: people stopped caring after 3 weeks

(01:57:44 PM) Lamo: i mean, technically speaking

(01:57:51 PM) Lamo: or was it physical

(01:57:52 PM) Manning: >nod<

(01:58:16 PM) Manning: there was no physical security

(01:58:18 PM) Lamo: it was physical access, wasn’t it

(01:58:20 PM) Lamo: hah

(01:58:33 PM) Manning: it was there, but not really
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(01:58:51 PM) Manning: 5 digit cipher lock... but you could knock 

and the door...

(01:58:55 PM) Manning: *on

(01:59:15 PM) Manning: weapons, but everyone has weapons

(02:00:12 PM) Manning: everyone just sat at their workstations... 

watching music videos / car chases / buildings exploding... and 

writing more stuff to CD/DVD... the culture fed opportunities

(02:01:44 PM) Manning: hardest part is arguably internet access... 

uploading any sensitive data over the open internet is a bad idea... 

since networks are monitored for any insurgent/terrorist/militia/

criminal types

(02:01:52 PM) Lamo: tor?

(02:02:13 PM) Manning: tor + ssl + sftp

(02:02:33 PM) Lamo: *nod*

(02:03:05 PM) Lamo: not quite how i might do it, but good

(02:03:22 PM) Manning: i even asked the NSA guy if he could find 

any suspicious activity coming out of local networks... he shrugged 

and said... “its not a priority”

(02:03:53 PM) Manning: went back to watching “Eagle’s Eye”

(02:12:23 PM) Manning: so... it was a massive data spillage... 

facilitated by numerous factors... both physically, technically, and 

culturally

(02:13:02 PM) Manning: perfect example of how not to do 

INFOSEC

(02:14:21 PM) Manning: listened and lip-synced to Lady Gaga’s 

Telephone while exfiltratrating possibly the largest data spillage in 

american history

(02:15:03 PM) Manning: pretty simple, and unglamorous
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(02:16:37 PM) Manning: *exfiltrating

(02:17:56 PM) Manning: weak servers, weak logging, weak 

physical security, weak counter-intelligence, inattentive signal 

analysis... a perfect storm

(02:19:03 PM) Manning: >sigh<

(02:19:19 PM) Manning: sounds pretty bad huh?

(02:20:06 PM) Lamo: kinda 

(02:20:25 PM) Manning: :L

(02:20:52 PM) Lamo: i mean, for the .mil

(02:21:08 PM) Manning: well, it SHOULD be better

(02:21:32 PM) Manning: its sad

(02:22:47 PM) Manning: i mean what if i were someone more 

malicious

(02:23:25 PM) Manning: i could’ve sold to russia or china, and 

made bank?

Five months after the initial charges were preferred against Manning, a 

bill was introduced in the Senate to amend Section 798 of the Espionage 

Act (Title 18, U.S. Code §§ 793-798). The proposed legislation is 

referred to as the “Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful 

Dissemination (SHIELD) Act.” The amendment identifies additional 

categories of information illegal to disclose without authorization. This 

includes the identity of a classified informant or source associated with 

the U.S. Intelligence Community and information concerning the human 

intelligence activities of the United States or a foreign government. A 

similar bill was introduced in the House of Representatives. Neither bill 

was enacted prior to the adjournment of the 111th Congress.

In December 2010 the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing entitled 

“WikiLeaks, the Espionage Act and the Constitution.” The hearing 

examined the potential for imposing criminal sanctions, the relevance of 
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the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the difficulties 

associated with defining the term “journalist.” Witnesses included 

American University law professor Stephen Vladeck and author Gabriel 

Schoenfeld (both of whom provided Commentaries for this book). The 

Senate Homeland Security Committee also held a hearing in March 2011, 

“Information Sharing in the Era of Wikileaks: Balancing Security and 

Collaboration.” 

In the aftermath of WikiLeaks’ disclosure of hundreds of thousands 

of classified U.S. documents, the New York Times has reportedly been 

examining whether the model could be replicated. One system being 

considered by the Times, an “EZ Pass lane for leakers,” would provide 

government employees with the ability to anonymously submit large 

volumes of information to the newspaper electronically.52 Al Jazeera is 

reported to have already established a “Transparency Unit,” offering this 

capability. 

Beyond the implications for the U.S. government and media, this incident 

has also reinvigorated a long-standing debate over the media’s publication of 

classified information and government efforts to protect this information. 

Several difficult questions have been raised during the debate, such as: 

● What entities constitute “the media” and what legal protections are 

afforded to them, particularly under the First Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution?

● What role do media outlets play in promoting informed debate and 

exposing government misconduct?

● Can media outlets accurately assess the impact an unauthorized 

disclosure will have on national security? 

● To what extent does the government overclassify some information while 

tolerating or even condoning the disclosure of other information?

● How does the motivation of advancing personal or corporate interests 

affect the decision to publish classified information?

● What impact do unauthorized disclosures have on alliances with foreign 

governments and allied intelligence services?

● What harm, including the loss of sources and methods, financial costs, 

and threat to life can be attributed to unauthorized disclosures?
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● How effective is Congressional oversight of military and intelligence 

activities?

As the title of this book suggests, the issue of accountability extends beyond 

government self-oversight and external oversight by the media. The issue 

also encompasses accountability for the media and for organizations 

such as WikiLeaks. This topic was addressed at a conference attended by 

Assange and author Douglas Murray. During his presentation, Murray 

commented, “Governments are elected. You, Mr. Assange are not. Who 

guards the guardians?”53

The subject of oversight was also addressed during an interview with 

Assange on the CBS television news program “60 Minutes.” During the 

interview, the correspondent remarked:54

You [Julian Assange] see yourself as a check on the power of the 

United States and other big countries in the world and in the process 

of doing that you have now become powerful yourself. Who is the 

check on you?

Assange responded:

It is our sources who choose to provide us with information, or not, 

depending on how they see our actions. It is our donors who choose 

to give us money, or not. This organization cannot survive for more 

than a few months without the ongoing support of the public.

The ability of sources and donors to provide adequate oversight for 

organizations such as WikiLeaks and the corresponding ability, or necessity, 

for oversight of the U.S. media are among the most complex issues related 

to the topic of unauthorized disclosures. 

This book will examine each of the above issues. Historical events, including 

the WikiLeaks incident, will be explored in an effort to better understand 

the ongoing conflict between national security and freedom of the press. 

Ultimately, the topic of what approach, if any, the government should 

pursue to reduce the perceived harm from unauthorized disclosures will be 

addressed. Because this is a dynamic topic, with leaks occurring practically 

every day, an arbitrary cutoff date of May 1, 2011, has been established for 

inclusion of new information. 

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CHAPTER 1

Conflicting Principles

Whoever . . . publishes . . . classified information . . . concerning the 

communication intelligence activities of the United States . . . shall be 

fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.55

 -18 USC § 798

Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press . . . 56

 First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

Since the founding of this nation, the U.S. press has been committed to 

promoting democracy through an informed citizenry. From the “lone 

pamphleteers” of 1776 to major metropolitan newspaper editors of 2011, 

each has recognized the significance of disseminating essential information 

to the public. This includes publishing information concerning government 

actions conducted on behalf of its citizens as well as exposing corrupt or 

illegal activity committed by its elected representatives. This free flow of 

information allows individuals to remain engaged with their government.

The Founding Fathers understood that an ability to participate in informed 

debate was crucial to the success of the newly formed republic. In 1822, 

James Madison famously wrote, “A popular government without popular 

information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or 

a tragedy or perhaps both.”57 Madison established this principle as a 

cornerstone of U.S. jurisprudence in the Bill of Rights, which contains the 

first ten Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Ratified in 1791, the First 

Amendment reads: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 

of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble 

. . .”58 The prominence given to the concept of a free and independent 

press distinguishes the United States for its dedication to both a robust 

marketplace of ideas and a government accountable to the people.

Following the ratification of the First Amendment, however, the concept 

of a press free from government constraint has conflicted with the 
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principle that information could be withheld from the public in the 

interest of national security. While there is seldom disagreement over 

the need to maintain both a strong national defense and an autonomous 

press, differences in opinion occur when the two are perceived to overlap. 

At no time is this conflict more evident than when media outlets elect to 

publish classified information—information identified by the government 

as necessary to withhold in the interest of national security. Concern over 

the impact of these “unauthorized disclosures”59 can be traced back to the 

Revolutionary War. 

In November 1775, eight months prior to the adoption of the Declaration 

of Independence, the Second Continental Congress passed a resolution 

concerning the necessity for secrecy. The resolution read, in part:

[E]very member of this Congress considers himself under the ties 

of virtue, honor and love of his country not to divulge directly or 

indirectly any matter . . . which a majority of the Congress shall order 

to be kept secret and that if any member shall violate this agreement 

he shall be expelled from this Congress and deemed an enemy to the 

liberties of America and liable to be treated as such.60

Less than a year after formally declaring independence, a fledgling U.S. 

government faced its first scandal involving an unauthorized disclosure by 

the media. 

In April 1777, the Second Continental Congress appointed Thomas Paine, 

the influential author of Common Sense and The Rights of Man, to a position 

with the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Upon taking office, Paine was 

administered an oath “to disclose no matter, the knowledge of which shall 

be acquired in consequence of his office, that he shall be directed to keep 

secret.”61 On January 2 and January 5, 1779, Paine published two articles 

in the Pennsylvania Packet, under the pseudonym “Common Sense.” The 

articles disclosed that King Louis XVI of France had covertly provided 

military supplies to the Continental Army prior to the French government 

publicly acknowledging its alliance with the colonies.62

To avoid jeopardizing relations with France, the Continental Congress 

passed a resolution denying the allegation. Paine was called before 
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Congress, where he confirmed being both the source of the leak and the 

author of the articles. He ultimately resigned his position with the Foreign 

Affairs Committee. 

The conflict between the principle of a free press and the necessity 

for national security continued to defy resolution following Paine’s 

resignation. This conflict became manifest in Thomas Jefferson’s attitude 

toward the press before and after being elected the nation’s third President. 

Jefferson’s writings prior to and immediately following the ratification of 

the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights describe an idealistic vision for an 

independent press:63

Our liberty cannot be guarded but by the freedom of the press, nor 

that be limited without danger of losing it.

No government ought to be without censors, and where the press is 

free, no one ever will.

Printing presses shall be subject to no other restraint than liableness 

to legal prosecution for false facts printed and published.

And, perhaps most notably, he stated:

Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government 

without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should 

not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.

However, after his inauguration in 1801, Jefferson’s faith in the press appears 

to have been severely tested. His statements reflect resentment toward the 

media for his perception of how they had evolved:64

[I have seen] repeated instances of the publication of what has not 

been intended for the public eye, and the malignity with which 

political enemies torture every sentence from me into meanings 

imagined by their own wickedness only. . .

These people [printers] think they have a right to everything, 

however secret or sacred. 

Indeed, the abuses of the freedom of the press here have been carried 

to a length never before known or borne by any civilized nation.
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In 1807, in stark contrast to his earlier statement regarding his preference 

for newspapers above government, Jefferson lamented:

The man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than 

he who reads them, inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer to 

truth . . . 

In his second inaugural address of March 4, 1805, Jefferson condemned the 

U.S. press for abusing the freedoms it was granted. Three of the address’ 

fifteen paragraphs were devoted to this admonishment, including the 

following excerpt: 

During this course of administration, and in order to disturb it, 

the artillery of the press has been leveled against us, charged with 

whatsoever its licentiousness could devise or dare. These abuses of 

an institution so important to freedom and science are deeply to 

be regretted . . . but public duties more urgent press on the time of 

public servants, and the offenders have therefore been left to find 

their punishment in the public indignation.65

When considering Jefferson’s sentiments, two important distinctions 

must be made: First, his dissatisfaction with the media appears to have 

focused primarily, though not exclusively, on the publication of falsehoods 

as opposed to classified information. Also, regardless of his degree of 

frustration, Jefferson maintained his belief in the underlying principle of 

an autonomous press. Jefferson concluded the portion of his inaugural 

address concerning the press as follows:

[T]he press, confined to truth, needs no other legal restraint . . . If 

there be still improprieties . . . its supplement must be sought in the 

censorship of public opinion.66

Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit

It is much to be wished that our printers were more discreet in many 

of their publications.67

- George Washington

Over the past 200 years, the clause “or of the press” has been the subject 

of considerable debate. Though secrecy may be considered both necessary 
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and proper, it can still be perceived as inconsistent with the principles of 

self-government. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart referred to the 

“dilemma” which occurs when information is withheld from the public in 

a democracy.68

Achieving consensus on the proper balance between openness and 

secrecy has remained elusive. Debate over this dichotomy between the 

perceived need to both disclose and withhold information has persisted 

among academic and legal scholars, government officials, and the public. 

The intensity and longevity of this debate can be attributed to the deep 

convictions held by advocates on both sides of the issue. Both groups are 

convinced that their position is in the best interest of the American public. 

A letter published by New York Times Executive Editor Bill Keller in 

2006 illustrates this dilemma. In the letter, Keller responds to criticism 

surrounding the Times’ publication of an article containing classified 

information. He acknowledges the government’s intent to withhold 

certain information from the public while at the same time asserting the 

importance of an independent press:

It’s an unusual and powerful thing, this freedom that our founders gave 

to the press. Who are the editors of The New York Times . . . to disregard 

the wishes of the President and his appointees? And yet the people 

who invented this country saw an aggressive, independent press as a 

protective measure against the abuse of power in a democracy, and an 

essential ingredient for self-government. They rejected the idea that it is 

wise, or patriotic, to always take the President at his word, or to surrender 

to the government important decisions about what to publish.69

Former Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair presents an 

alternative viewpoint. In a 2009 memorandum disseminated to the 

directors of the sixteen U.S. Intelligence Community agencies, Blair 

identifies the severe consequences posed by the unauthorized disclosure of 

classified information:70

In accordance with my responsibility to protect sources and 

methods, I am committed to preventing unauthorized disclosures of 

classified information. I take this responsibility extremely seriously, 

recognizing that disclosures of classified information, including 
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GARY ROSS

“leaks” to the media can compromise sensitive sources and methods. 

These disclosures may allow our adversaries to learn about, deny, 

counteract, and deceive our intelligence collection methods, leading 

to the loss of critical capabilities, resources, and even lives. In 

recent years, unauthorized disclosures have severely diminished 

the capability of the Intelligence Community (IC) to perform its 

mission and support national security objectives. Furthermore, 

these disclosures greatly impact our relationships with our foreign 

partners, who become reluctant to share sensitive intelligence, 

fearing this information might appear in the media.71

Blair’s assertions mirror the 2005 findings of the WMD Commission 

(Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding 

Weapons of Mass Destruction). In its final report to the President, the 

Commission concluded that unauthorized disclosures by the media 

“significantly impaired U.S. capabilities against our hardest targets,” caused 

“grave harm” to national security, and “collectively cost the American 

people hundreds of millions of dollars.”72

Though these viewpoints may appear incompatible, the divide is not 

absolute. Former heads of the U.S. Intelligence Community have 

recognized and commended the press for their role in preserving and 

promoting democracy. In a 1986 speech presented to members of the 

Society of Professional Journalists, former Director of Central Intelligence 

(DCI) William Casey expressed his admiration for the press:

I cherish the first amendment and admire the diligence and ingenuity 

of the working press. I applaud your exposure of waste, inefficiency, 

and corruption. I salute and support your obligation to ferret out and 

publish the information the people need to be well informed about 

events around the world as well as the activities of their democratic 

government.73

Former DCI William Colby, a predecessor of Casey, acknowledged that 

the disclosure of classified information may be appropriate under certain 

circumstances:

There have been some “bad secrets” concerning intelligence; their 

exposure by our academic, journalist, and political critics certainly 
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is an essential part of the workings of our Constitution. There have 

been some “non-secrets” which did not need to be secret; I have 

undertaken a program of bringing these into the open. But I think 

that responsible Americans realize that our country must protect 

“good secrets.”74

Respected members of the media have also recognized that information 

may be classified based on legitimate national security concerns. Katharine 

Graham, former publisher and chairman of the board of the Washington 

Post, conceded that national security had been harmed and the lives of U.S. 

servicemen endangered by the publication of classified information:

You may recall that in April 1983, some sixty people were killed in 

a bomb attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut. At the time, there was 

coded radio traffic between Syria, where the operation was being 

run, and Iran, which was supporting it. Alas, one television network 

and a newspaper columnist reported that the U.S. government had 

intercepted the traffic. Shortly thereafter the traffic ceased. This 

undermined efforts to capture the terrorist leaders and eliminated 

a source of information about future attacks. Five months later, 

apparently the same terrorists struck again at the Marine barracks in 

Beirut; 241 servicemen were killed.75

Other prominent members of the media, including Walter Cronkite, Tom 

Brokaw, and Ted Koppel, understood the potential threat to national 

security posed by unauthorized disclosures. In a joint letter to the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in 2006, Cronkite, Brokaw, and 

Koppel emphasized the obligation of their colleagues to seriously consider 

possible consequences before publishing classified information. They 

wrote:

Leaks of classified information are a serious matter because 

some leaks can endanger national security. We recognize that the 

government has a legitimate interest in protecting our national 

security secrets, and the media have a responsibility to carefully 

consider the impact of its reporting . . . Investigating and prosecuting 

those who leak information that causes serious harm to national 

security is understandable.76
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Polling data suggest public sentiment is closely divided over the perceived 

benefit or harm resulting from unauthorized disclosures. A 2007 survey 

conducted by the Pew Research Center illustrates this rift in public opinion. 

Fourty-four percent of respondents believed that unauthorized disclosures 

“hurt the public interest by revealing information that people should not 

have.”77 The percentage of those who believed that disclosures serve the 

public by “providing Americans with information they should have” was 

only a marginally less 42 percent. These findings were almost identical 

to the results of a Pew study conducted twenty years earlier. In the 1986 

study, 43 percent of respondents believed that unauthorized disclosures 

served the public interest, while 42 percent held that the disclosures were 

harmful.78

A survey conducted in 2006 by the First Amendment Center identified 

a similar divide in public opinion.79 Fifty-one percent of the survey’s 

participants believed that “sensitive and classified government information” 

should only be published when exposing government wrong doing. Thirtyfive percent responded that, regardless of its intended purpose, the media 

should not publish such information. Twelve percent believed newspapers 

should have the ability to publish information without restriction. 

Considering the above polling data, the one indisputable finding appears 

to be that the issue of unauthorized disclosures is disputable. 

Questions regarding the role of the media in a democratic society are 

certainly not new. Concern over the ability to regulate the actions of those 

performing an oversight function can be traced back to Plato’s Republic. 

Published in 360 B.C., the narrator, Socrates, describes a “Guardian Class” 

and its role in society. In a Latin translation of the dialogue, Socrates is asked, 

“Quis custodiet ipso custodes?” (Who will guard the guardians?)80 Socrates’ 

response, whether applied to government oversight of its citizens or media 

oversight of the government, does little to aid in resolving the dilemma of 

unauthorized disclosures: 

They will guard themselves against themselves. We must tell the 

guardians a noble lie. The noble lie will inform them that they are 

better than those they serve and it is therefore their responsibility to 

guard and protect those lesser than themselves.81 
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The Scope of Unauthorized Disclosures in the United 

States

I’ve been told that The New York Times has so much classified material, 

they don’t know where to store it.82

- President Gerald Ford

In the 232 years following the publication of Paine’s “Common Sense” 

articles, and the 206 years since Jefferson’s second inaugural address, 

unauthorized disclosures by the U.S. media have persisted. Former 

Presidents, from Harry S. Truman through George W. Bush, have voiced 

their frustration over the practice.83 In 2009, President Barack Obama 

joined his predecessors in expressing his displeasure.84

Quantifying precise figures for unauthorized disclosures in a historical 

context is difficult. Former Presidents have provided some insight, if 

only through hyperbole. In 1951, President Truman remarked “ninetyfive percent of our secret information has been revealed in newspapers 

and slick magazines.”85 Twenty years later, President Nixon discussed 

administration efforts to respond to “massive leaks of vital diplomatic and 

military secrets.”86 In declassified minutes from a 1974 National Security 

Council meeting, President Ford noted: “I’ve been told that The New York 

Times has so much classified material, they don’t know where to store 

it.”87 When asked in 1981 to identify the biggest disappointment of his 

presidency, President Reagan cited “the inability to control the leaks.”88 In 

1985, President Reagan famously complained of being “up to my keister 

in leaks.”89

Publicly available information concerning the actual number of 

unauthorized disclosures during a given period is rare. In 1988 former 

DCI Robert Gates wrote that there had been approximately five hundred 

documented disclosures between 1979 and 1988, 50 a year during a tenyear period.90 In November 2000, an NSA official testified before the House 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) that the NSA had 

identified 40 instances in 1998 where signals intelligence capabilities were 

disclosed for the first time in the media and an additional 34 instances in 

1999.91
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During testimony before the SSCI in June 2000, Attorney General 

Janet Reno stated that the Justice Department had been notified of an 

unauthorized disclosure approximately fifty times a year over “the last 

several years.”92 This is equivalent to the level identified by DCI Gates, 

approximately one unauthorized disclosure per week. Reno added that 

virtually all agencies within the Intelligence Community and the Defense 

Department had suffered “severe losses of sources, methods, and important 

liaison relationships” as the result of unauthorized disclosures.93

The most recent publicly available statistics were provided to the Senate 

Judiciary Committee by the Department of Justice in 2010.94 The Justice 

Department reported receiving an average of thirty-seven notifications of 

unauthorized disclosures annually between 2005 and 2009. The relative 

consistency in the number of unauthorized disclosures over the past 30 

years demonstrates their persistent nature, independent of which political 

party controls the White House or Congress. 

Information regarding the number of criminal investigations initiated 

by the Justice Department in response to an unauthorized disclosure is 

also seldom released. In 1980, it was reported that the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) had conducted 25 criminal investigations involving 

disclosures over the prior two years, approximately 12 per year.95 A 1985 

article revealed that there had been an average of 20-30 active unauthorized 

disclosure investigations between 1981 and 1985.96 In response to a query 

from the SSCI, the Department of Justice reported that the FBI had 

completed 85 investigations predicated on an unauthorized disclosure 

between September 2001 and February 2008, approximately thirteen per 

year.97

Several factors may contribute to the persistent supply and demand for 

disclosures. Continued partisanship between political parties seeking to 

gain an advantage in a narrowly divided Congress, or a similarly divided 

public, is one possible factor. The increased quantity of information 

required to support U.S. interests worldwide and improvements in the 

quality of U.S. collection capabilities might be another. The abundance of 

print, broadcast, and electronic media outlets scrutinizing government 

activity is likely to play a role. A desire by the public to remain informed of 
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government activity during a time of war may also help sustain this “leak 

economy.” The consistent rate of disclosures over the past three decades, 

however, demonstrates that this economy is not entirely dependent on 

ongoing military hostilities. 

History has also shown that unauthorized disclosures can sometimes take 

on an eerily repetitive quality. Other than a change in adversary and a 50-

year improvement in technology, a striking similarity exists between a 

1958 disclosure concerning the ability of military aircraft to monitor Soviet 

missile tests98 and a 2007 article disclosing the monitoring of Chinese 

missile tests by satellite.99

History also appears to have repeated itself in 2005 when the New York 

Times published an article disclosing the existence of a National Security 

Agency (NSA) program to monitor specific domestic communications 

without a warrant. Thirty years earlier, in 1975, the Times exposed 

Operation SHAMROCK, a decades-long classified program that allowed 

the NSA and its predecessors to duplicate and analyze magnetic tapes of 

international telegrams.100 Continuing the parallel, the 1975 article resulted 

in Congressional hearings to determine whether adequate oversight was 

performed. The hearings also examined the legality and propriety of the 

program. 

Three recent unauthorized disclosures, each involving a classified 

counterterrorism program, have reinvigorated debate among members of 

the government, media, and public. 

On November 2, 2005, the Washington Post published an article by 

Dana Priest reporting the existence of a system of covert CIA detention 

facilities in Eastern Europe.101 On December 16, 2005, a New York Times

article by James Risen and Eric Lichtblau disclosed that the President had 

authorized the NSA to monitor certain domestic communications without 

a warrant.102 Lastly, on June 23, 2006, the New York Times published a 

second article by Risen and Lichtblau. The article revealed the existence 

of a classified CIA and Treasury Department program to analyze financial 

records from a foreign database named SWIFT (Society for Worldwide 

Interbank Financial Telecommunication).103
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It was reported that the SWIFT database contained transactions involving 

U.S. citizens. 

In recognition of the CIA detention facility and NSA surveillance articles, 

Priest, Risen, and Lichtblau were awarded Pulitzer Prizes for Journalistic 

Excellence. Alternatively, in response to the SWIFT database article, the 

House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning the media for 

their disclosure of classified information. These responses underscore the 

acute difference in opinion over the impact of unauthorized disclosures.

Considering the issue from an alternative perspective, the U.S. Intelligence 

Community has recognized the value of information published in the 

foreign media. In 2005, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

(ODNI) and CIA established the Open Source Center. The mission of 

the Open Source Center is to “advance the Intelligence Community’s 

exploitation of openly available information.”104

Other Intelligence Community agencies, including the Defense Intelligence 

Agency (DIA) and the FBI, have also reportedly tasked analysts to collect 

and assess information from publicly available sources.105 This would 

include the analysis of foreign media to identify information concerning 

an adversary’s capabilities and intentions. In 2008 Frances Townsend, 

former Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism, 

commented that it had become routine for the President’s Daily Brief to 

contain intelligence collected from open source material.106

Researching the Topic

Unauthorized disclosures remain a frequent subject for research in the 

government and academic/legal communities. The issue has been examined 

at academic symposia and in the law journals of prominent universities 

throughout the country, including Columbia, Stanford, and Harvard. 

Professional associations, including the American Society of Newspaper 

Editors, Brookings Institution, and the American Bar Association, have 

discussed the topic at national conferences and seminars. 

The issue has been debated at Congressional hearings before the House 

Armed Services Committee (1980), the Senate Select Committee on 
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Intelligence (1978, 1998, 2000, and 2009), the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence (1979, 2005, and 2006), the Senate Judiciary 

Committee (2006 and 2010), and the Senate Homeland Security Committee 

(2011). Titles for these hearings include “The Effects of Unauthorized 

Disclosures of Classified Information,” “Espionage Laws and Leaks,” 

“Roles and Responsibilities of the Media with Respect to Unauthorized 

Disclosures of Classified Information,” and “Leaks of Classified National 

Defense Information.” Specific issues examined during these hearings 

include government efforts to safeguard classified information, the impact 

of unauthorized disclosures on national security, the role of the U.S. media, 

the applicability of criminal statutes, and the potential for enacting new 

legislation.

Research published in the previously cited law journals focus primarily on 

the applicability of existing legal statutes. These articles include “National 

Security Secrets vs. Free Speech,” published in the Stanford Law Review

in 1974; “Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press,” published in the 

Harvard Law & Policy Review in 2007, and one of the most often referenced 

articles in this debate, “The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense 

Information,” published in the Columbia Law Review in 1973. As their 

titles suggest, these studies examine ambiguities in U.S. law related to free 

speech and national security. 

In “Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press,” University of Chicago 

Law Professor Geoffrey Stone provides an apt description of the current 

“awkward, even incoherent, state of affairs.”107 Professor Stone contends 

that this dilemma is a consequence of apparent legal inconsistencies 

between the U.S. Constitution and its First Amendment:

Although elected officials have broad authority to keep classified 

information secret, once that information gets into the hands of the 

press, the government has only very limited authority to prevent its 

further dissemination. This may seem an awkward, even incoherent, 

state of affairs. If the government can constitutionally prohibit public 

employees from disclosing classified information to the press in 

the first place, why can it not enjoin the press from publishing that 

information if a government employee unlawfully discloses it?
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GARY ROSS

But one could just as easily flip the question. If the press has a 

First Amendment right to publish classified information unless 

publication will “surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable 

damage to our Nation or its people,” why should the government be 

allowed to prohibit its employees from revealing such information to 

the press merely because it poses a potential danger to the national 

security?

Federal judges, from the Circuit Court and Court of Appeals to the Supreme 

Court, have also published relevant opinions. A 1971 opinion, authored by 

Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, offers an eloquent summary of this 

controversial issue:

[T]he only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in 

the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an 

enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion 

which alone can here protect the values of democratic government. 

For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and 

free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment. For 

without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened 

people. 

Yet it is elementary that the successful conduct of international diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national defense require both confidentiality and secrecy. Other nations can hardly 

deal with this Nation in an atmosphere of mutual trust unless they 

can be assured that their confidences will be kept. And within our 

own executive departments, the development of considered and intelligent international policies would be impossible if those charged 

with their formulation could not communicate with each other freely, frankly, and in confidence. In the area of basic national defense 

the frequent need for absolute secrecy is, of course, self-evident.108

The number of related articles published in newspapers, magazines and 

on the Internet is also remarkable. The positions expressed in these 

articles span the entire spectrum of the debate, from “Indict the New 

York Times” and “Stop the Leaks” to “A Leaky Bureaucracy is Good for 

Democracy” and “No More Secrecy Bills.” The cover of the March 2006 
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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

edition of Commentary magazine asked the question, “Has the New York 

Times Violated the Espionage Act?” Though there may be several areas 

of disagreement, no one could contend that the issue of unauthorized 

disclosures has been overlooked. 

Responding Through Law: The “Espionage Act”

It would be frivolous to assert . . . that the First Amendment, in the 

interest of securing news or otherwise, confers a license on either 

the reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws. [N]

either reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such conduct, 

whatever the impact on the flow of news.109

- Supreme Court Justice Byron White 

In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the free press the 

protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy . . . 

The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government 

and inform the people.110

- Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black

Based on the harm attributed to unauthorized disclosures, the government 

has moved beyond debating the issue and has undertaken efforts to prevent 

the compromise of classified information. To date, the effort has largely 

focused on a legislative solution and criminal sanctions. 

When a violation of federal law occurs involving the unauthorized 

disclosure of classified information, Intelligence Community agencies are 

required to notify the Department of Justice.111 In consultation between 

the Department’s National Security Division and the affected agency, 

primary consideration is given to initiating a criminal investigation. 

This decision is based on several factors, including the assessed harm to 

national security, the extent of official dissemination of the compromised 

information, and the willingness of the agency to support an investigation 

and potential prosecution. Administrative actions, such as the revocation 

of a security clearance or termination of employment, are only considered 

in cases “when a prosecution cannot be undertaken or is not successful.”
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GARY ROSS

The principal legal statutes related to unauthorized disclosures are Title 

18 of the U.S. Code, Sections 793-798, more commonly referred to as 

the “Espionage Act.” Proposed and enacted within two months of the 

United States’ entrance into World War I in 1917, the Act criminalizes the 

disclosure of information “relating to the national defense.”112 Section 793 

prohibits disclosures to “any person not entitled to receive it,” while Section 

794 specifically proscribes disclosures to “any foreign government.” 

Section 798, a 1950 amendment to the Act, contains several key distinctions 

from its predecessors. Section 798 criminalizes the disclosure of “classified 

information,” specifically involving cryptographic or communications 

intelligence. Section 798 is the only section that expressly proscribes the 

publication of classified information. The American Society of Newspaper 

Editors is reported to have endorsed the passage of Section 798 in 1950.113

Violations of Sections 793 and 798 are punishable by incarceration for up to 

ten years. A conviction under Section 794, specifically involving a foreign 

government, is punishable by incarceration for a term up to life. The death 

penalty may also be sought in certain cases, including a disclosure directly 

resulting in the death of a U.S. agent, or a disclosure of a “major element of 

defense strategy.” 

Separate legislation, enacted in 1933, 1954, and 1982, identifies additional 

categories of intelligence illegal to disclose without authorization. These 

include diplomatic codes, nuclear weapons intelligence, and the identities 

of covert U.S. agents. The statutes concerning diplomatic codes and covert 

agents were both predicated by the publication of classified information. In 

1931 former intelligence officer Herbert Yardley published Inside the Black 

Chamber, detailing U.S. code breaking in the early 20th century. In 1978 

former CIA case officer Philip Agee published the identities of CIA officers 

in the magazine Covert Action Quarterly.

Between 1946 and 2010, there were no less than 18 proposals to amend 

existing statutes related to unauthorized disclosures that were never 

enacted. A comprehensive analysis of the U.S. legal system, including the 

Constitution and Bill of Rights, proposed and enacted legislation, and case 

law is included in the Appendix. 
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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

In the United States, no member of the media has been indicted or convicted 

for the unauthorized publication of classified information. The government 

has considered the option on at least four occasions—in 1942, 1971, 1975, 

and 1986. In the 94 years following the passage of the Espionage Act, there 

have been only four criminal indictments specifically for the unauthorized 

disclosure of classified information to a member of the media. 

The first, a 1973 indictment of RAND analysts Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony 

Russo, was dismissed due to prosecutorial misconduct.114 Ellsberg had 

provided portions of a TOP SECRET Defense Department study concerning 

Vietnam to both the New York Times and Washington Post. The second 

indictment, in 1985, resulted in a successful conviction.115 In this case, Navy 

analyst Samuel Morison was convicted under Sections 793 of the Espionage 

Act for providing classified satellite imagery to the magazine Jane’s Defence 

Weekly. In August 2010, State Department contract analyst Stephen Jin-Woo 

Kim was indicted for disclosing the contents of a TOP SECRET intelligence 

report to a journalist.116 Former CIA operations officer Jeffrey Sterling 

was indicted in December 2010 for disclosing classified information to a 

member of the media.117 The information reportedly concerned a covert 

CIA operation involving Iran. 

Each of the incidents identified above, as well as other relevant legal 

actions, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 2-4 and the 

Appendix. This includes four indictments for unauthorized disclosures to 

entities other than traditional media outlets, including a legal advocacy 

group, a political action committee, an Internet “blogger,” and an Internetbased organization. One other indictment, for activity associated with an 

unauthorized disclosure though not specifically for the disclosure itself, 

will also be examined. 

Of the approximately 1,500 unauthorized disclosures and 200 criminal 

investigations over the past three decades, an indictment rate of .3% (4 

out of 1,500) and a conviction rate of .07% (1 out of 1,500) are clearly 

ineffective for an approach focused on criminal enforcement. Whether 

the four indictments or single conviction are considered appropriate, 

they have not created a significant deterrent for government employees to 

discontinue disclosing classified information to the media. 
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GARY ROSS

Seeking an Alternative to a Legislative Solution

Criminal prosecution is not the most effective way to address the leak 

problem.118

- Attorney General Janet Reno

Beyond the attention unauthorized disclosures have received in the 

academic, professional, and legal communities, at least ten government 

commissions, committees, and task forces have examined the issue over 

the past 50 years. Unauthorized disclosures by the media were the primary 

topic in three of the ten studies and part of the larger subject of government 

secrecy and security in the others. Titles for these reports include:

The Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Committee on Classified 

Information (The Coolidge Report), 1956

The Report of the Commission on Government Security (The Wright 

Commission), 1957

The Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by the 

Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure, 1978

The Report of the Interdepartmental Group on Unauthorized 

Disclosures of Classified Information (The Willard Report), 1982

The Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Commission to Review 

DoD Security Policies and Practices (The Stilwell Commission), 1985

Report to the National Security Council on Unauthorized Media Leak 

Disclosures by the National Counterintelligence Policy Board, 1996

Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government 

Secrecy (The Moynihan Commission), 1997

Report of the National Commission on Terrorism (The Bremer 

Commission), 2000

Report to the Attorney General by the Interagency Task Force 

Concerning Protections against Unauthorized Disclosures of 

Classified Information, 2002
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Report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the 

United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (SilbermanRobb Commission), 2004

Several of the reports conclude that a legislative approach to reduce 

unauthorized disclosures is both inadequate and impractical. The reports 

acknowledge numerous limitations preventing the effectiveness of such a 

strategy.

The drafters of the 1956 Coolidge Report wrote: “No change in the 

statutes or Executive Orders has been suggested to us which would in our 

judgment contribute significantly to improving the situation.”119 Future 

Vice President Joseph Biden noted in his Preface to the 1978 Report of 

the Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure: “[E]ven the most radical 

revision of the espionage statutes . . . may not resolve this dilemma.”120 The 

Committee’s final report concluded that there had been a “major failure on 

the part of the Government to take action in leak cases.” The Report added 

that “no present statute can be effectively enforced against leaks” and that 

it would be “a difficult task to draft a constitutional criminal statute which 

would solve the enforcement problems.”

Members of the Willard Group reached a similar conclusion. The Group 

described the government approach, focused on criminal enforcement, 

as an “ineffectual system,” “frustrating to all concerned,” and “almost 

totally unsuccessful.”121 The report concluded that the threat of criminal 

prosecution had become “so illusory as to constitute no real deterrent to the 

prospective leaker.” Former Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary 

of Defense Robert Gates concurred with this opinion. In 1988, while 

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Gates wrote: “I personally believe 

that new laws, even if they could be enacted, would not stop leaks.”122

The 1996 report to the National Security Council noted that the lack 

of criminal prosecutions failed to create an adequate deterrent for the 

“seemingly risk-free enterprise” of disclosing classified information. Board 

members examined prior administrations’ efforts to prevent unauthorized 

disclosures and found them to be largely unsuccessful. This ineffectiveness 

was attributed to several factors, including a lack of political will to deal 

firmly and consistently with the “leakers,” as well as disagreements over 
20

GARY ROSS

the need for additional legislation. Former Attorney General Janet Reno 

similarly recognized the limitations of pursuing criminal sanctions. During 

testimony before the SSCI in 2000, Reno stated definitively that the Justice 

Department believed criminal prosecution was “not the most effective way 

to address the leak problem.” 

Almost five decades after the Coolidge Report, the Interagency Task Force 

Concerning Protections Against Unauthorized Disclosures examined the 

issue. In its 2002 report to Attorney General John Ashcroft, the Task Force 

reported that attempting to resolve the issue by amending existing statutes 

was likely not the proper approach: 

The extent to which such a provision (legislation specifically tailored 

to unauthorized disclosures of classified information) would yield 

any practical additional benefits to the government is unclear . . .123

Ashcroft expanded on this finding in his letter to Congress accompanying 

the Task Force report. He wrote that the government “must entertain new 

approaches to deter, identify, and punish those who engage in the practice 

of unauthorized disclosures of classified information.”124 Ashcroft added 

that legislation specifically focused on unauthorized disclosures “would be 

insufficient in my view to meet the problem . . .”

In an article published on September 5, 2001, less than a week before the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, former Secretary of Defense William 

Cohen expressed his doubts regarding the effectiveness of a legislative 

solution: “Legislation (to create a new criminal offense applying to any 

government official who intentionally discloses classified information to 

a person not authorized to receive it) would probably do little to prevent 

damaging leaks.”125

The Difficulty Identifying Leakers: A Thousand Grains of 

Sand

Even if there had been consensus that an approach focused on criminal 

enforcement was practical, and the enactment of meaningful legislation 

possible, the most significant obstacle would still remain. This difficulty 
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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

lies in the fundamental ability to identify the government employee 

responsible for disclosing classified information to the media. 

After examining this issue, the 2002 Interagency Task Force concluded that 

identifying individuals responsible for disclosing classified information to 

the media was “difficult at best.”126 One of the Task Force working groups 

noted that, even in cases involving the compromise of highly sensitive 

information, it was typical for “literally hundreds, if not thousands of 

individuals” to have had access to the information. In the 1996 report to 

the National Security Council, “the challenge in identifying the leaker” 

was recognized as a primary factor contributing to the U.S. government’s 

inability to control disclosures.127

The Willard Group documented a similar problem identifying the 

responsible government employee(s) in 1982. It acknowledged that “in 

most situations, hundreds or thousands of employees have had access to 

information (that is leaked) and there is no practical way to narrow the 

focus of the inquiry.”128 The 1978 Report of the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence noted that criminal investigations were often unsuccessful 

“because the leaked information has been disseminated broadly in such 

interagency classified materials . . . some of which have circulation in 

the thousands.”129 The last two statements are particularly noteworthy, 

considering that access to classified information through secure computer 

networks, such as SIPRNet (Secure Internet Protocol Router Network) 

and JWICS (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System), was 

significantly less common in 1978 and 1982 than in 1996 or 2002. 

Looking back to a period when the number of government employees, the 

volume of classified information, and the technical capability to share that 

information were even further reduced, the difficulty in identifying the 

“leaker” was still understood. In the 1956 Coolidge Report, the Committee 

reported: 

Due to the difficulties in identifying the sources of these leaks 

because of the large number of persons who have had access to the 

information in question, it is impossible to describe with certainty 

the individuals who are responsible and the reasons which motivated 

them.130
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Recent policy changes within the Intelligence Community are likely to 

exacerbate this problem. 

One of the principal findings of the 9/11 Commission (National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States) was that a lack 

of information sharing contributed to the intelligence failures associated 

with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In response to this finding, 

new policies were implemented to increase collaboration and reduce 

stove-piping, the tendency to report information vertically within a closed 

channel rather than horizontally across related communities of interest.131

In February 2008, Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell 

published the “Information Sharing Strategy for the Intelligence 

Community.” This strategy established a new standard for handling 

and disseminating classified information. Rather than considering an 

individual’s “need to know” specific intelligence, the DNI revised the 

standard to a more proactive “responsibility to provide.”132

Combined with improvements in technology and the additional requirement 

to collect intelligence during periods of international conflict, this new 

focus on a responsibility to provide has resulted in wider dissemination and 

increased access to classified information. These factors further complicate 

the already daunting task of successfully identifying and prosecuting 

government employees who disclose classified information to the media. 

Ironically, another unauthorized disclosure may result in the pendulum 

swinging away from a standard of increased information sharing. In 

the wake of the 2010 disclosure of hundreds of thousands of classified 

documents by the Internet-based organization WikiLeaks, the Intelligence 

Community has begun to reexamine this policy. Director of National 

Intelligence James Clapper commented: “WikiLeaks and the continued 

hemorrhaging of leaks in the media don’t do much to support the notion 

of integration and collaboration.”133 Clapper spoke of identifying a “sweet 

spot” between the need to share and the need to protect information. It 

remains to be seen whether such a “sweet spot” can be achieved, and the 

effect it will have on the flow of information to the media.

Beyond the primary difficulty of identifying a suspect, additional legal 

barriers exist. Former Assistant Attorney General for National Security 
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Kenneth Wainstein identified several of these obstacles to pursuing 

criminal prosecutions:

Finding the leaker in the first place is hard . . . Producing incriminating 

evidence is also difficult, since in most cases prosecutors are reluctant 

to subpoena the receivers of leaks – members of the press. Agencies 

from which the information was leaked are often not eager to 

prosecute, on the theory that open court proceedings might simply 

reveal more classified information. Plus, leak cases are often marked 

by zealous and novel legal defenses.134

Current Justice Department policy requires that all other methods for 

acquiring desired information be exhausted before the Department will 

consider issuing a subpoena to a journalist.135 Subpoenaing a journalist 

also requires direct approval from the Attorney General. These difficulties 

were discussed in a 2010 Justice Department memorandum to the Senate 

Judiciary Committee.136 The memorandum notes that, even in those 

infrequent cases when a member of the media is subpoenaed, there are 

often prolonged legal challenges and the journalist will likely elect to serve 

jail time rather than identify his or her source. 

Both the 1978 SSCI Report and 1982 Willard Group Report recommend 

that an increased emphasis be placed on deterring unauthorized 

disclosures through the use of agencies’ administrative authorities. Former 

Attorney General John Ashcroft similarly advocated an approach focused 

on administrative authorities. In a 2002 letter to Congress accompanying 

the findings of the Interagency Task Force on Unauthorized Disclosures, 

Ashcroft wrote:

A comprehensive, coordinated, Government-wide, aggressive, properly 

resourced, and sustained effort to address administratively the problem of 

unauthorized disclosures is a necessity. Departments and agencies should 

use all appropriate investigative tools and techniques at their disposal 

to identify those who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified 

information. Immediate and consequential administrative investigations 

that are coordinated across agencies responsible for handling classified 

information would provide a large measure of deterrence.137
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GARY ROSS

This sentiment was echoed in the Justice Department’s 2010 memorandum 

to the Senate Judiciary Committee: “Because indictments in media leak cases 

are so difficult to obtain, administrative action may be more suitable and 

may provide a better deterrent to leaks of classified information.”138 These 

administrative sanctions would include the revocation of a security clearance 

or termination of employment. Title 5 of the U.S. Code, Section 7532, grants 

an agency head broad discretion to terminate an employee when such action 

is considered necessary “in the interests of national security.”139

Emphasizing administrative authorities does offer several advantages over 

pursuing criminal prosecutions. These include avoiding legal issues over 

the applicability of the Espionage Act and the First Amendment, political 

issues related to a decision to prosecute, and concerns that classified 

information would be disclosed during a trial. Additional administrative 

authorities, such as the use of polygraph examinations and compelled 

interviews, would also appear to favor a strategy that relied more heavily 

on administrative sanctions.140 Considering the scarcity of criminal 

indictments, even a modest increase in the number of administrative 

sanctions would represent an improvement.

Beyond any potential benefits, though, the single largest obstacle 

of identifying a suspect still remains. Unless there was a significant 

improvement in the ability to identify one government employee among 

thousands in a “need to know” environment, this approach is unlikely to 

have the desired effect. An individual undeterred by the remote possibility 

of a criminal indictment would be similarly unswayed by the perceived 

unlikelihood of administrative sanctions. Whether the recommendation 

to focus on administrative authorities was implemented, the rate of 

unauthorized disclosures does not appear to have diminished. 

It is unlikely that the value the U.S. public places on information-sharing 

and collaboration within the government, or a free press outside the 

government, will diminish. Consequently, efforts to address the issue 

of unauthorized disclosures primarily through legal or administrative 

authorities will continue to be ineffective. In order to reduce the perceived 

harm from unauthorized disclosures, an alternative approach must be 

identified. 
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Over the past four decades, some unconventional approaches to respond to 

the threat of unauthorized disclosures have been employed. Unfortunately, 

some of these efforts included activities that exceeded legal authorities. 

Statutory Abuses and Efforts to Prevent Unauthorized 

Disclosures 

I don’t give a damn how it is done, do whatever has to be done to stop 

these leaks and prevent further unauthorized disclosures.141

- President Richard Nixon

At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was conducted of Jack 

Anderson . . . to attempt to determine Anderson’s sources for highly 

classified Agency information appearing in his syndicated columns.142

- CIA “Family Jewels” Memorandum

In June 2007, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Michael 

Hayden, declassified a 1973 CIA report. The report documented activities 

conducted by the CIA that may have been “in conflict with the provisions 

of the National Security Act of 1947.”143 DCI James Schlesinger directed 

that the study be completed shortly after succeeding Richard Helms. The 

“Family Jewels” report documents three cases in which the CIA conducted 

surveillance of members of the U.S. media.144

At the direction of former DCI Helms, the CIA surveilled Washington Post

reporter Michael Getler on three separate occasions in 1971 and 1972. 

This operation was code-named CELOTEX I. DCI Helms also directed the 

surveillance of columnist Jack Anderson under Operation CELOTEX II in 

1972. Anderson’s associates, Brit Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear, 

were also surveilled as part of CELOTEX II. The “Family Jewels” report 

also documents the 1972 surveillance of author Victor Marchetti as part 

of Operation BUTANE. In all three cases, the purpose for the surveillance 

was to uncover the journalists’ government source.

In 1973 Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo’s indictments for the 

unauthorized disclosure of portions of a TOP SECRET government study, 

the “Pentagon Papers,” was dismissed due to prosecutorial misconduct. 
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GARY ROSS

This misconduct included the wiretapping of Ellsberg’s telephone and the 

burglary of his psychiatrist’s office by a White House “Special Investigations 

Unit.” This group, specifically created in response to the disclosure of the 

Pentagon Papers, would later gain infamy as the “Plumbers” implicated in 

the 1972 burglary of the Democratic National Committee headquarters at 

the Watergate Hotel.145

Rather than respond to unauthorized disclosures through legislation, or 

seek a solution outside the law, the government would be better served 

by improving its understanding of why members of the U.S. press elect 

to disclose classified information. Increased awareness of a journalist’s 

rationale for publishing this information might provide the foundation 

for an approach to reduce its perceived harm.146 Achieving an improved 

understanding of a journalist’s decision-making process can be achieved 

through a field of study known as Rational Choice Theory. 

Rational Choice Theory: An Alternative to a Legislative 

Approach

Only a fundamental change in prevailing attitudes will alleviate the 

problem of unauthorized disclosures . . . Without a change in attitudes, 

no program to deal with unauthorized disclosures can possibly be 

effective.147 (Emphasis added)

- Report of the Interdepartmental Group

on Unauthorized Disclosures

The best approach is to work cooperatively with journalists to persuade

them not to publish classified information that can damage national 

security.148 (Emphasis added)

- Matthew Friedrich, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Until those who, without authority, reveal classified information are 

deterred . . . they will have no reason to stop their harmful actions.149

(Emphasis added)

- Attorney General John Ashcroft
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Rational Choice Theory focuses on the internal decision-making process 

an individual performs prior to electing a course of action. Rational Choice 

Theory contends that individuals who choose to engage in a behavior often 

do so only after rationally assessing the perceived costs and benefits related 

to the behavior. 

This process can be envisioned as a “psychological scale,” allowing 

individuals to balance relevant factors in order to reach a conclusion.

FIGURE 1- PSYCHOLOGICAL SCALE

Source: Author

As a result of this rational weighing of options, Rational Choice Theory 

contends that an undesirable behavior can be discouraged by modifying an 

individual’s evaluation of either the identified costs or benefits. By altering 

the individual’s assessment, which previously resulted in the commission of 

an undesirable act, it would be possible to successfully reduce or eliminate 

the perceived harm associated with the behavior. 

In the book Choosing White-Collar Crime,

150 Neal Shover and Andy 

Hochstetler explore the application of Rational Choice Theory to criminal 

behaviors involving non-violent, white collar offenses. The authors 

explain that Rational Choice Theory can also be applied to a wide range of 

behaviors, beyond white collar offenses:

It [Rational Choice Theory] has been applied to a host of problems 

and processes, including managerial decisions, interpersonal 

exchange, consumer purchasing, and the dynamics of economic 

markets. Arguably, it is the dominant theoretical paradigm in 

political science.151
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Among the behaviors that can be applied to Rational Choice Theory is the 

publication of classified information. In accordance with Rational Choice 

Theory, members of the media would only elect to perform this action after 

rationally assessing that the apparent benefits outweighed the perceived 

costs. If a journalist’s cost-benefit analysis was altered to the point in 

which the alternative conclusion, not to publish classified information, 

was reached, the frequency of unauthorized disclosures and, consequently, 

their potential harm would decline. 

Relying on criminal or administrative sanctions to deter individuals from 

disclosing classified information has proven to be an ineffective approach. 

Applying the principles of Rational Choice Theory by proactively engaging 

members of the media to examine their decision-making process offers an 

alternative that can ultimately prove more effective. 

Before a conclusion can be reached regarding the feasibility or desirability of 

an approach incorporating Rational Choice Theory, the individual elements 

that comprise a journalist’s cost-benefit analysis must be understood. This 

book identifies and examines the motivations and justifications considered 

by members of the media prior to disclosing classified information, as 

well as the categories of harm these motivations and justifications are 

weighed against. Chapter Two examines the motivations and justifications 

for members of the media to obtain and publish classified information. 

Historical examples are used to assist in identifying and analyzing specific 

motivations and justifications. Motivations for a government employee to 

disclose classified information are also discussed. 

Chapter Three identifies precise categories of harm attributed to 

unauthorized disclosures. Historic events are again used to distinguish 

each category of harm. Chapter Four presents a case study to examine the 

actual process whereby members of the media deliberated the publication 

of classified information involving a clandestine operation code-named 

IVY BELLS. This case study provides unique and valuable insight into a 

journalist’s thought processes. Conclusions regarding Rational Choice 

Theory and its application to the issue of unauthorized disclosures are 

discussed in Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER 2

Journalist Motivations and Justifications

I have never seen any trace of a threat to the national security from 

the Publication. Indeed, I have never seen it even suggested that there 

was such an actual threat. It quickly becomes apparent to any person 

who has considerable experience with classified material that there 

is massive overclassification and that the principal concern of the 

classifiers is not with national security, but rather with governmental 

embarrassment of one sort or another.152

- Former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold discussing 

the Pentagon Papers

For advocates of the expansive rights of a free press, unauthorized 

disclosures are viewed not only as justified, but as essential, for preserving 

democracy. They contend that any potential harm to national security is 

outweighed by the benefits of an independent press. Jerry Berman, former 

chief legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, wrote:

Although I would not question the fact that some leaks may 

endanger national security, I would argue that they are necessary in 

this country, because in a democratic society the national security 

interest must be balanced against the public’s right to know.153

As evidenced by the quotes of former DCIs William Casey and William 

Colby in Chapter 1, recognition of the benefits of a robust press extend 

beyond the news media. In 2007 former CIA Director Michael Hayden 

joined his predecessors in recognizing the media for the vital function they 

perform:

I have a very deep respect for journalists and for their profession. 

Many of them—especially in the years since 9/11—have given their 

lives in the act of keeping our citizens informed. They are smart, 

dedicated, and courageous men and women. I count many of them 

as colleagues. We each have an important role to play in the defense 

of the Republic.154
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GARY ROSS

The degree of support for the press may vary, though, as well as the belief in 

the propriety of publishing appropriately classified information. 

In accordance with the principles of Rational Choice Theory, individuals 

who recognize the legitimacy of publishing classified information 

have concluded that the benefits can outweigh potential costs. In these 

circumstances, they would be motivated to publish classified information 

to achieve these benefits. 

Journalist Motivations for Disclosing Classified 

Information

There are two general categories of motivations: altruistic and nonaltruistic. The term “motivation” in this case is defined as “a desire which 

gives purpose and direction to behavior.”155 The primary focus for altruistic 

motivations is the welfare of others, while non-altruistic motivations are 

concerned with benefits to the individual.

Two altruistic motivations for members of the media to disclose classified 

information can be identified. As their name implies, their focus is on 

promoting societal rather than individual interests. Though closely related, 

they are distinct and will be examined separately. 

Altruistic Motivation – Promoting Informed Debate

Enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon 

which an open society is premised, and a free press is thus indispensable 

to a free society.156

- Justice Potter Stewart

Being a democracy, the government cannot cloak its operations in secrecy. 

Adequate information as to its activities must be given to its citizens or 

the foundations of its democracy will be eaten away.157

- Coolidge Report

The motivation cited most frequently by proponents of the media’s right to 

publish classified information is the desire to increase public knowledge and 

promote informed debate. The press embraces its role as a “Fourth Estate,” 
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publishing information regarding actions taken by the government on the 

public’s behalf. In these cases, the publication of classified information is viewed 

as enhancing the American public’s knowledge. The public can then use this 

information to debate the propriety and desirability of government actions.158

As described in the preamble to the Society of Professional Journalists’ 

(SPJ) Code of Ethics, “Public enlightenment is the forerunner of justice 

and the foundation of democracy.”159 The body of the SPJ Code identifies 

four basic principles, the first of which is “Seek Truth and Report It.” By 

placing such a high value on the dissemination of truth, the SPJ effectively 

increases the perceived benefit of publishing classified information. This, 

in turn, impacts the journalist’s internal cost-benefit analysis, increasing 

the likelihood that he or she will conclude that these benefits outweigh any 

identified costs.

The Newspaper Association of America and the National Newspaper 

Association also recognize the significance of the media’s role in informing 

the public. Prior to May 2006 Congressional hearings concerning 

unauthorized disclosures, the associations submitted a joint letter to the 

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The letter reads, in 

part: “The immediate effect of publication may arguably be harmful or 

beneficial. But the overall effect of public disclosures concerning the affairs 

of government is to enhance the people’s ability to understand what the 

government is doing and to hold the government accountable.”160

Members of the news media, as well as other advocates of the propriety of 

publishing classified information, identify several historical examples in 

which the value of an enlightened citizenry was perceived to overcome the 

potential harm to national security. The incident cited most frequently is 

the Pentagon Papers case.

Pentagon Papers

In June 1971, the Nixon administration obtained court orders enjoining 

both the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing articles 

containing information from a TOP SECRET study of the Vietnam War. 

Both papers had published articles containing classified information 

prior to the injunction. The Times and Post appealed the orders and the 
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Supreme Court ultimately agreed to hear the case. Arguing before the 

court, attorneys for both newspapers asserted that the public’s right to be 

informed of decisions and actions taken by the government outweighed 

potential national security concerns. 

In this case, the controversial government actions included the expansion 

of air strikes and ground operations in Laos, Cambodia, and North 

Vietnam and the alleged politicization of the timing of military operations. 

The Times specifically identified the motivation of informing the public in 

the opening paragraph of its first published article. The paragraph referred 

to the commitment of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon 

administrations to a non-communist South Vietnam “to a much greater 

extent than their public statements acknowledged at the time.”161

On June 30, 1971, in a 6-to-3 decision, the Court ruled that the government 

had not overcome the heavy presumption against prior restraint and that 

the Times and Post could resume publication. In a rare occurrence, all 

nine justices published either a concurring or dissenting opinion. Three 

frequently cited excerpts, all from concurring opinions, specifically discuss 

the media’s motivation to maintain an enlightened citizenry.162

In his concurring opinion, Justice William Douglas wrote: “Secrecy in 

government is fundamentally anti-democratic . . . Open debate and 

discussion of public issues are vital to our national health. On public 

questions, there should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate.” 

Justice Hugo Black wrote: “The press was protected so that it could bare the 

secrets of government and inform the people.” He added, “The guarding of 

military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative 

government provides no real security for our Republic.” 

Justice Potter Stewart also recognized the benefits of an unrestrained 

press and an informed citizenry. Justice Stewart wrote: “The only effective 

restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense 

and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in an 

informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the 

values of democratic government . . . For, without an informed and free 

press, there cannot be an enlightened people.” Twenty-six years after the 

Supreme Court ruling, Katharine Graham, former chairman of the board 
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of the Washington Post, published her memoirs. Graham had ultimately 

made the decision to publish the Pentagon Papers articles in the Post. In 

her memoirs, Graham explained her rationale for disclosing information 

from the classified government study: “[T]he material in the Pentagon 

Papers was just the kind of information the public needed in order to form 

its opinions and make its choices more wisely.”163 Graham believed that 

the publication was not a breach of national security, but the “obligation of 

a responsible newspaper.”

Members of the media also routinely cite the failed CIA-supported coup 

in Cuba in 1961, the “Bay of Pigs” incident, as an example in which the 

nation was harmed by information being inappropriately withheld from 

the public. They conclude that preventing informed debate is contrary 

to the interests of the American public, and actually represents a greater 

threat to national security than the disclosure of classified information. 

Bay of Pigs

In April 1961, the New York Times informed the Kennedy administration 

that it intended to publish an article regarding the CIA’s training of antiCastro guerrillas in Florida and Guatemala.164 In response to an appeal 

from the administration, which focused on the potential harm to national 

security, the Times withheld much of the information and published a 

condensed article on April 7, 1961. One week later, the guerrilla forces 

landed in Cuba and were defeated. The defeat embarrassed the United 

States and solidified Castro’s hold on Cuba. President Kennedy publicly 

condemned the media for “indiscriminate and premature reporting.”165

Privately, though, Kennedy is reported to have told the New York Times

managing editor, “Maybe if you had printed more about the operation, you 

would have saved us from a colossal mistake.”166

Forty-five years later, when defending their decisions to publish 

information related to the SWIFT financial database, editors from both 

the New York Times and Los Angeles Times referenced the Bay of Pigs 

incident. In an article published in the Los Angeles Times, Editor Dean 

Baquet wrote that the press had “an obligation to cover the government” 

and “offer information about its activities so citizens can make their own 
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decisions.”167 Rather than citing an example in which the public benefited 

from the disclosure of information by the media, Baquet referenced the 

Bay of Pigs incident. Baquet wrote that Kennedy regretted persuading the 

press to withhold information on the invasion and might have terminated 

the operation had it been exposed. 

In a similar editorial, New York Times Senior Editor Bill Keller also wrote of 

his paper’s withholding of information related to the Bay of Pigs invasion. 

Keller added that the Times’ “biggest failures have generally been when we 

failed to dig deep enough or to report fully enough.”168 Keller concluded 

that if the Times had not played down its advanced knowledge of the Bay 

of Pigs invasion, it might have “prevented a fiasco.”169

Altruistic Motivation – Exposing Government Misconduct

There is a tradition of ferreting out governmental wrongdoing – waste, 

corruption, inefficiency – by disclosures to the press, which function as 

the guardians of the public in many, many cases.170

- Senator Arlen Specter

In addition to promoting informed debate, advocates of the legitimacy 

of disclosing classified information characterize the disclosures as an 

essential tool for exposing government abuse or illegal activity. Though 

federal whistleblower protections do not apply to disclosures of classified 

information to the media, many consider the press to be a legitimate 

forum for government employees to report misconduct, regardless of 

classification.

Reporting on the activities of the U.S. government has been a hallmark 

of the American media as far back as the country’s first newspapers, such 

as Benjamin Franklin’s Pennsylvania Gazette. The tradition of the media 

uncovering political (and corporate) corruption continued with the 

investigative reporting of the “muckrakers” of the late nineteenth and early 

twentieth centuries. These journalists published historically significant 

articles documenting illicit activity, including public corruption, abusive 

treatment in mental institutions, and objectionable conditions in the 

garment and meat-packing industries. On several occasions, the exposure 
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of improprieties led to the enactment of legislation to address identified 

concerns.

In the early and mid-twentieth century, the U.S. media continued 

publishing information to keep the public informed of government 

activities. Throughout both World War I and World War II, media outlets 

were the primary means for the public to follow the progress of the war. 

War correspondents, such as Ernie Pyle and Edward R. Murrow, provided 

information to supplement information released by military press offices. 

Though the correspondents represented a source outside the military, 

journalists working in combat zones voluntarily agreed to government 

constraints, including allowing the military to review and censor their 

reporting. This trust between the government and media changed 

drastically in the latter half of the twentieth century.

The change can be traced to the late 1960’s and early 1970’s and the Vietnam 

War. Unprecedented political and public opposition to the war led to a desire 

for information outside official government channels. For many, Daniel 

Ellsberg’s disclosure of the “Pentagon Papers” in 1971 signifies a turning 

point in the public’s confidence and trust in government. Revelations from 

the Pentagon Papers included contradictions between public statements 

made by government officials and actual facts, as well as a confirmation of 

the politicization of both military operations and intelligence. 

The disclosure of the Pentagon Papers validated an increasingly held belief 

that a robust oversight mechanism outside the government was necessary. 

It was during this period that the term “credibility gap” became widely used 

to describe the skepticism felt toward government officials. White House 

Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman specifically discussed the impact of the 

Pentagon Papers’ disclosure on the relationship between the government 

and the public:

But out of the gobbledygook, comes a very clear thing: you can’t trust 

the government; you can’t believe what they say; and you can’t rely 

on their judgment; and the – the implicit infallibility of presidents, 

which has been an accepted thing in America, is badly hurt by this, 

because it shows that people do things the President wants to do 

even though it’s wrong, and the President can be wrong. 171
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If the existence of a credibility gap was validated by the Pentagon Papers, 

the Nixon administration’s response to the disclosure only widened the 

chasm. 

As noted above, after the initial disclosures in the New York Times and

Washington Post, the administration attempted to enjoin the newspapers 

from publishing additional articles. The Times and Post appealed the 

government injunction and the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the 

government had not met the high standard necessary to invoke prior 

restraint against the media. After losing its case in the Supreme Court, 

the administration indicted Ellsberg and Anthony Russo for disclosing 

classified information to the media. The government’s waning credibility 

was further damaged when charges against Ellsberg and Russo were 

dismissed due to prosecutorial misconduct. This misconduct included the 

wiretapping of Ellsberg’s telephone and the burglary of his psychiatrist’s 

office by a White House “Special Investigations Unit,” more infamously 

known as the “Plumbers.”172

Beyond the Vietnam War and the Pentagon Papers, there are several 

additional examples in which unauthorized disclosures by the media 

are believed to have played an essential role in informing the public of 

government misconduct. These include:

The Family Jewels

On December 22, 1974, the front page of the New York Times read, “Huge 

CIA Operation Reported in U.S. against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents 

in Nixon Years.”173 The accompanying article detailed several incidents 

of CIA misconduct. Beyond the previously discussed surveillance of 

American journalists, the article identified additional abuses, including 

domestic CIA operations targeting anti-war organizations. The article’s 

assertions were based on information contained in a classified 1973 CIA 

study known as the “Family Jewels.” 

The New York Times’ disclosure of portions of this study is reported to have 

directly contributed to the establishment of three government commissions 

to examine Intelligence Community activities.174 In 1975, President Ford 
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established the President’s Commission on CIA Activities within the 

United States, also known as the “Rockefeller Commission.” The Senate 

and House of Representatives each established their own committees: the 

United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 

with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee) and the House 

Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee). In addition to abuses 

committed by the CIA, the committees also identified misconduct by 

the National Security Agency, including the monitoring of international 

telegrams and communications of U.S. citizens involved in the anti-war 

movement.175

As a direct result of the committees’ findings, several changes to the Intelligence 

Community were implemented, including enhanced Congressional and 

executive oversight. In 1978 the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act 

(FISA) was enacted, and the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) 

was established to oversee requests for surveillance of suspected foreign 

agents inside the United States. Permanent committees for intelligence 

oversight were also established in the House (HPSCI) and Senate (SSCI). 

Based on findings concerning CIA involvement in plots to assassinate 

foreign leaders, including Fidel Castro, President Ford issued Executive 

Order 11905.176 The Executive Order specifically prohibits governmentsanctioned assassinations. 

In 2007, Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Hayden declassified 

greater portions of the Family Jewels report. The National Security Archive 

released these newly declassified portions in June 2007.177

Colonel Alpirez

In March 1995, the New York Times published an article identifying 

Guatemalan Colonel Julio Alpirez as a paid CIA informant.178 The article 

alleged that, while working with the CIA, Alpirez was involved in the 

deaths of Michael Devine, a U.S. citizen living in Guatemala, and Efrain 

Bamaca, the spouse of a U.S. citizen. CIA officials were reportedly aware 

of the allegations but concealed their knowledge of Alpirez’s involvement. 

The Times article cited a letter from Congressman Robert Torricelli of New 

Jersey to President Clinton. 
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After the allegations concerning Alpirez were published, the CIA’s inspector 

general conducted an internal investigation. In response to the 700-page 

IG report, DCI John Deutch enacted several procedural changes within the 

agency.179 These included the establishment of new standards for recruiting 

foreign sources and selecting managers for overseas offices. Deutch also 

made a commitment to report all human rights abuses by paid informants 

and to sever relations with these informants, if necessary. Deutch added that 

the CIA would ensure that Congress and relevant ambassadors were kept 

more informed of overseas CIA activity. In addition to the CIA’s internal 

investigation, the Departments of Justice and State, and the President’s 

Intelligence Oversight Board, conducted independent investigations.

The CIA IG report identified 26 officials culpable for maintaining the 

relationship with Alpirez and for withholding information.180 At least 

two CIA officials, the chief of station in Guatemala and the chief of Latin 

America operations, were dismissed. Congressman Torricelli, identified 

as the source for the New York Times article, was not punished due to 

“ambiguity” in Congressional procedural rules.181 Rules in the House of 

Representatives were subsequently modified to include a secrecy oath both 

for Congressmen and staffers. Torricelli was later elected to the U.S. Senate. 

State Department employee Richard Nuccio, identified as having provided 

the original information to Torricelli, lost his security clearance and 

resigned. A State Department investigation determined he had prepared 

classified documents on his home computer and may have disclosed 

classified information to members of the media.182 After his resignation, 

Nuccio was hired by Torricelli as his senior foreign policy advisor. 

In 1997, two years after the original article concerning Alpirez was 

published, the New York Times reported that the CIA had severed ties 

with approximately 100 foreign agents. The agents, almost half from Latin 

America, were reportedly terminated because their value as informants 

was outweighed by their human rights abuses.183

Beyond the altruistic motivations identified by members of the media—

informing the citizenry and exposing misconduct—several non-altruistic 

motivations can also impact a journalist’s decision whether to publish 

classified information. These motivations, acknowledged by the media less 
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frequently, if at all, include: (1) advancing corporate interests; (2) advancing 

personal interests; and (3) advancing foreign interests. 

When defending the decision to publish classified information, members 

of the media, including Katharine Graham, Bill Keller, Dean Baquet, Dana 

Priest, and Eric Lichtblau, have each referred to the desire to inform the 

public and/or the responsibility to expose government misconduct. The 

desire to advance corporate interests (increase circulation and profits), 

personal interests (advance a career or personal agenda), or foreign 

interests (co-opted by a foreign government) were not cited. Though not 

identified in this context, members of the media, as well as U.S. and foreign 

government officials, have discussed these motivations. 

Non-Altruistic Motivation – Advancing Corporate 

Interests

News organizations are highly competitive and sometimes their drive 

to be first to disclose major news can outweigh concern for disclosing 

sensitive secrets.184

- Jack Nelson, former Los Angeles Times Washington bureau chief

Members of the media recognize that a media outlet must be profitable 

to survive. Journalists’ salaries must be paid, and the owners of television 

networks and newspapers, whether private or public, expect to earn a profit. 

Because the American public has several options for obtaining information, 

these outlets must compete to increase or maintain their market share. 

As the number of media outlets expands with the advent of new sources 

and media, such as cable television and the Internet, competition has only 

become more intense. 

Former Baltimore Sun and Boston Globe reporter Lyle Denniston provided 

one of the most candid portrayals of this profit motive. At a 1984 panel 

sponsored by Columbia University, Denniston described a journalist’s 

responsibility as it relates to the publication of classified information:

As a journalist, I have only one responsibility and that is to get a story 

and print it. It isn’t a question of justification in terms of the law; it’s a 

question of justifying it in terms of the commercial sale of information 
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to interested customers. That’s my only business. The only thing I do in 

life is to sell information, hopefully for a profit.185

One method for a news organization to increase public interest is to be 

the first, or only source, to provide information to the public, to “scoop” 

the competition. Beyond Denniston, other members of the media have 

discussed the competitive nature of the news industry and the desire to 

be the first to “break the story.” In 1986 former Washington Post CEO 

Katharine Graham wrote: “The electronic media in the United States 

live or die by their ratings, the number of viewers they attract,” adding, 

“As a result, each network wants to be the first with the most on any big 

story. It’s hard to stay cool in the face of this pressure.”186 New York Times

journalist Eric Lichtblau echoed this sentiment two decades later. During 

a radio interview regarding his articles on the SWIFT database and NSA 

Terrorist Surveillance Program, Lichtblau stated, “Journalism for better or 

worse is a very competitive business and there’s a high premium on having 

something exclusively.”187

Government officials also recognize the impact of this motivation among 

members of the media. During debate on a House Resolution condemning 

the New York Times for publishing an article related to the SWIFT database, 

Congressman Michael Oxley expressed his belief that the editors of the 

Times are “more concerned about their sagging circulation rates and about 

damaging the Bush administration than they are about disrupting terrorist 

financing.”188 Recognition of this profit motive extends beyond U.S. borders. 

In 1992 Stanislav Lunev, former intelligence officer for Russia’s military 

intelligence organization, Glavnoye Razvedovatel’noye Upravlenie (GRU), 

defected to the United States. Prior to his defection, Lunev collected 

intelligence in the United States under non-official cover. After defecting, 

Lunev published his biography, Through the Eyes of the Enemy. In it, Lunev 

discusses this non-altruistic motivation, writing: “In my view, Americans 

tend to care more about scooping their competition than about national 

security, which made my job easier.”189

One example in which the desire to advance corporate interests was 

identified as a contributing factor in the publication of classified information 

is the aforementioned Pentagon Papers case. Though it may not have been 
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the primary motivation for the New York Times or the Washington Post, it 

appears to have played a role in their decision-making process.

FIGURE 2 – THROUGH THE EYES OF THE ENEMY – 

STANISLAV LUNEV 190

Source: Regnery Publishing. Used with permission.

Pentagon Papers

When the New York Times began publishing articles containing excerpts 

from the “Pentagon Papers,” Washington Post Executive Editor Ben Bradlee did not applaud the Times’ ability to increase public knowledge or 

expose government misconduct. In his memoirs, Bradlee wrote, “[W]e 

found ourselves in the humiliating position of having to rewrite the competition.”191 In her memoirs, Katharine Graham, former CEO of the Post 

wrote that Bradlee “anguished over being scooped.”192 When the Nixon 

administration obtained an injunction to prevent the Times from publishing additional articles, rather than denouncing the government’s attempt 

to suppress the free flow of information Bradlee wrote, “At least the New 

York Times had been silenced, never mind how.” 

When detailing the Washington Post’s acquisition of portions of the 

Pentagon Papers and the decision to publish its own articles, Bradlee 

discussed the benefits, not only for the public, but also for the Washington 

Post Corporation. Bradlee wrote, “I knew exactly how important it was 

to publish, if we were to have any chance of pulling the Post up – once 
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and for all – into the front ranks.” After the Supreme Court ruled that 

the government could not impose prior restraint to prevent publication, 

Graham wrote that publishing the Pentagon Paper articles “went a long 

way toward advancing the interests of the Post.”

The motivation of advancing corporate interests was apparently not 

confined to the Washington Post. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren 

Burger recognized that the New York Times also shared this motivation. In 

his concurring opinion, Burger discussed how the motivation of advancing 

corporate interests might have surpassed the motivation to enlighten the 

citizenry. Burger points out that the Times elected to copyright material it 

had published from the Pentagon Papers and had also considered enjoining 

the use of the material by other publishers.193 These actions would have 

diminished the public’s ability to obtain this information. 

The aversion to being “scooped” and the connotation of its harm to 

corporate interests is often discussed in relation to the disclosure of classified 

information. During a 2006 interview, Ben Bradlee discussed NBC’s 

decision to broadcast a news report related to the classified operation IVY 

BELLS while his paper was still considering government objections. Rather than 

blaming NBC for acting irresponsibly, Bradlee referred to “an excess of caution 

on our part, which cost us the story.”194 Robert Kaiser, former managing editor 

of the Post, also identified how delaying publication to consider government 

concerns ultimately harmed the newspaper: 

We equivocated for weeks. Finally, NBC News scooped us on our 

own story, then we published our version. As the editor supervising 

preparation of the story, I was humiliated; I also learned a good 

lesson.195

There are additional historical examples in which a media outlet was 

“scooped” after taking the time to consider government objections. Rather 

than faulting the other media outlet for acting irresponsibly, members of the 

media have expressed regret for withholding the information. Discussing 

the Los Angeles Times’ decision to publish its article related to the SWIFT 

database, after previously withholding publication, Editor Dean Baquet 

stated: “I wish I’d gotten my story up before the New York Times did.”196 

After the Los Angeles Times published a 1975 article regarding the classified 
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operation AZORIAN, Seymour Hersh, who had agreed to withhold 

publication a year earlier, stated, “I hit my head and said ‘Dumbbell’.”197

After it was determined that a 2004 CBS broadcast that raised questions 

about President Bush’s service in the Air National Guard had relied on 

forged documents, the network established an independent panel to 

examine the incident. The panel faulted CBS executives for their “myopic 

zeal” to be the first to broadcast the information.198

Non-Altruistic Motivation – Advancing Personal Interests 

The authority and responsibility to determine what information to 

protect in the national interest is given to the President; it is not for 

private individuals to decide to disclose information in their own self 

interest.199

- Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R-NY)

Beyond any benefit to a corporation, such as the New York Times or the 

Washington Post, the potential for personal advancement can similarly 

impact the decision to disclose classified information. This personal 

benefit can come in many forms, from an increased salary or promotion, 

to more prominent placement of articles in a newspaper or magazine, 

to professional and public recognition. Unauthorized disclosures can 

also advance personal interests through the promotion of an individual’s 

political ideology or other agenda.

Both the journalism community and the public recognize the prestige 

associated with being awarded a Pulitzer Prize. In addition to the $10,000 

cash award, recipients are often referred to as “Pulitzer Prize- winning 

author/journalist . . .” Acknowledgment for excellence in any field also 

normally corresponds directly to career advancement. 

Journalists recently awarded a Pulitzer Prize for articles that disclosed 

classified information include Washington Post journalist Dana Priest 

and New York Times journalists James Risen and Eric Lichtblau. Priest 

was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for Beat Reporting in 2006 for her article 

concerning overseas CIA detention facilities. Risen and Lichtblau were 

awarded Pulitzer Prizes for National Reporting, also in 2006, for their 
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article related to the NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program. Though the 

authors of the New York Times’ Pentagon Papers articles did not receive 

an individual award, the New York Times was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for 

Public Service in 1972. 

FIGURE 3 – DOONESBURY, DECEMBER 22, 1986

Source: DOONESBURY@1986, G.B. Trudeau. Reprinted with permission of 

UNIVERSAL UCLICK.

Members of the media have cited the awards as an affirmation of the 

propriety of disclosing classified information. Speaking about the 2006 

prizes, Bill Keller stated: “The Pulitzer judges have put a premium . . . 

on journalism that demonstrated the press standing up to power, often 

with substantial consequences,” adding “Prizes don’t always say anything 

terribly important about the state of our business, but this year’s Pulitzers 

do, and what they say is: The country has never needed us more than it 

does today.”200 In a joint column, ABC correspondent Cokie Roberts and 

her husband, former New York Times reporter Steve Roberts, wrote that the 

2006 Pulitzer Prizes “recognize the sort of journalism—courageous, costly 

and comprehensive—that only papers can provide.”201

In addition to the prospective career benefits of a Pulitzer Prize, the 

disclosure of classified information has also been used in a more direct 

manner to promote a journalist’s personal interests. This includes the 

publication of classified information in a book rather than in a newspaper. 

If the assumption is made that it takes longer to publish a book than a 

newspaper article, then the decision must have been made by the author to 

withhold information from the public until the book could be published. 
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This decision to withhold classified information for inclusion in a book has 

been a source of controversy on at least two occasions. 

Veil

In 1987, Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward published the 

book Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987. The book contained 

information obtained from interviews with former DCI William Casey. 

This information reportedly could have had an impact on the prior year’s 

Tower Commission, which investigated the sale of arms to Iran and the 

diversion of funds to support Contra rebels in Nicaragua.202 Rather than 

publishing the information in the Washington Post prior to or during 

hearings, Woodward withheld the information until after the Commission 

had published its final report. 

As described by journalist Tim Hackler, “In this case, the ‘public’s right to 

know’ seems to have been superseded by Woodward’s right to high royalty 

payments.”203 New York Times columnist Flora Lewis wrote: “There is a 

risk of undermining the important constitutional guarantee on which we 

all rely if the judgment on when to publish and how is seen to turn on sheer 

commercial impact.”204

State of War

Similar questions regarding the timing of publication and withholding of 

information were raised in 2006 when reporter James Risen’s book State of 

War was published. It was less than a month before the book’s publication 

that the Times published Risen and Lichtblau’s article regarding the NSA 

Terrorist Surveillance Program. In a separate article, published by the 

Times’ Public Editor, it was reported that the Times had been aware that 

State of War was scheduled to be published in the near future.205 The 

article speculates that the decision to disclose classified information the 

Times had previously withheld may have been affected by the motivation 

of advancing corporate interests: “the paper was quite aware that it faced 

the possibility of being scooped by its own reporter’s book in about four 

weeks.” In a published statement, New York Times Executive Editor Bill 

Keller denied that the decision to publish the article was related to the 

publication of Risen’s book.206
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After Risen was reportedly subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury about 

information appearing in the book, the Times published another article. 

This article emphasized that the paper had not published the information 

appearing in the chapter in question.207 What was unclear was whether 

the Times had been aware of the information and chose not to publish, or 

if Risen had withheld the information from the newspaper. 

The authors of Choosing White-Collar Crime specifically discuss the 

motivation of advancing personal interests in reference to Rational Choice 

Theory. They describe how additional variables, such as the pressure to 

succeed, can impact the ability to rationally weigh costs and benefits. This 

may be particularly relevant in the intensely competitive news business:

Performance pressure . . . (has) been linked repeatedly to increased 

likelihood that criminal choices will be made. Performance pressure 

is anxiety or fear induced in individuals or organizational units by 

the perceived need to maintain or improve performance standards. 

This can be the need to increase profit margins . . . but in all cases 

it stems from belief that performance has not measured up in the 

eyes of peers of superiors. Performance pressure is communicated 

in countless ways, and it can cause employees to be less concerned 

with legalities.208

Collateral Murder

Personal interests can be advanced, not only through professional 

recognition or financial gain but also by promoting a personal agenda. 

In April 2010, the Internet-based organization WikiLeaks posted a video 

on its website documenting an airstrike by two U.S. Apache helicopters 

in Baghdad, Iraq. Of the 11 reported casualties, two were employees of 

the news agency Reuters. One of the Reuters employees had been carrying 

a camera with a telephoto lens, mistaken for a weapon by an Apache 

crewman. Two children seated inside a van were also injured during the 

attack. 

WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange edited the original 39-minute video to a 

17-minute video he titled “Collateral Murder.”209 Both videos were posted 

on the WikiLeaks website, though Assange confirmed that 90 percent of 
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the viewers accessed only the edited video. The 17-minute video makes no 

mention of prior gunfire in the area and focuses attention on the Reuters 

reporters and not on the Iraqis, who were later confirmed to have been 

armed with an AK-47 and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. Assange 

confirmed editing the original video and adding the title for “maximum 

possible political impact.” Assange added that he believed the attack was 

equivalent to murder. During a subsequent interview, Assange identified 

his desire for WikiLeaks disclosures to change the opinions of policymakers 

and the public, and to end the war in Afghanistan.210

Whether the motivations of advancing corporate or personal interests are 

discussed less often than their more altruistic counterparts, journalists 

would certainly not volunteer information concerning the third nonaltruistic motivation, advancing foreign interests.

Non-Altruistic Motivation – Advancing Foreign Interests

It is no secret that foreign intelligence agencies use reporters as agents. 

During the Cold War, KGB agents routinely used reporters’ credentials 

as cover for their activities.211

- Rep. Benjamin Gilman, Chairman, House International 

Relations Committee

During testimony before the House International Relations Committee 

in 2000, an FBI official verified that the Bureau was aware of foreign 

intelligence officers assuming notional positions as journalists.212 Prior to 

his defection to the United States in 1992, former Russian GRU intelligence 

officer Stanislav Lunev worked in the United States under journalistic cover. 

Lunev worked as a correspondent for the Russian news organization TASS. 

In a 2000 article Lunev wrote that, in addition to posing as journalists, 

Russian intelligence officers actively recruited members of the American 

media due to their access to political, military, and intelligence officials.213 

Lunev confirmed that he had personally recruited American journalists 

to collect information and described the number of American journalists 

working on Russia’s behalf as “very big.” Lunev believed that Russia had 

successfully penetrated all major press outlets in the United States. 
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A second Russian intelligence officer, KGB Colonel Vitaly Yurchenko, also 

discussed Russia’s recruitment of a member of the American media. After 

defecting to the United States in August 1985, Yurchenko identified NSA 

analyst Ronald Pelton and former CIA case officer Edward Lee Howard as 

Soviet spies. Pelton was convicted of espionage and Howard defected to the 

Soviet Union prior to being arrested. In addition to Pelton and Howard, 

Yurchenko reportedly informed the CIA that Washington Post Moscow 

Bureau Chief Dusko Doder had accepted money from a KGB officer.214

After the FBI was unable to corroborate Yurchenko’s information 

regarding Doder, FBI Director William Webster discussed the issue with 

Washington Post Executive Editor Ben Bradlee. Doder was scheduled to 

return to Washington to cover the Intelligence Community for the Post. 

When confronted, Doder denied the allegations and agreed to submit to 

a polygraph examination. In his autobiography, Ben Bradlee wrote that 

the examination was never conducted because Ed Williams, an attorney 

for the Post, opposed the idea.215 Before the matter was resolved, Doder 

resigned from the Post and accepted an assignment in China with the U.S. 

News and World Report. In November 1985, three months after defecting, 

Yurchenko redefected to the Soviet Union.

Journalist Justifications for Disclosing Classified 

Information

In addition to the five identified motivations, advocates of the media’s 

ability to publish classified information cite several justifications for this 

action. The term “justification” is defined as a fact or circumstance that 

shows an action to be reasonable or necessary.216 Beyond Rational Choice 

Theory’s balance of risk and reward, an individual must conclude that his/

her action will be considered reasonable or necessary by peers and the 

general public (as well as internally). This ability to justify an action, once 

completed, must be considered along with the motivations that initially 

directed the behavior. If an individual cannot conclude that a combination 

of perceived motivations and justifications outweigh the identified costs, 

he/she will discontinue the activity.

The five identified justifications for a member of the media to publish 

classified information include: (1) government overclassification; (2) 
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the hypocrisy of the government condoning politically advantageous 

disclosures; (3) the inability or unwillingness of Congress to provide 

adequate oversight; (4) the perceived legal authority under the First 

Amendment; and (5) the ability to handle classified information in a 

responsible manner. 

Justification – Government Overclassification

A very first principle . . . would be an insistence upon avoiding secrecy 

for its own sake. For when everything is classified, then nothing is 

classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical 

or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection 

or self-promotion . . . [S]ecrecy can best be preserved only when 

credibility is truly maintained.217

- Justice Potter Stewart

I have revealed no secrets because I have told nothing that was, or I 

conceive, ought to be a secret.218

- Thomas Paine

The U.S. government classifies a vast amount of information. A 

study completed by the National Archives concluded that 8.7 million 

classification decisions were made in 2001.219 According to a 2002 report 

by the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), the 8.7 million 

classification decisions were the highest recorded level for classification 

actions and a 44 percent increase over the prior year.220 In 2005, after the 

commencement of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the number 

of classification decisions climbed from 8.7 million to 14 million.221 A 

2006 ISOO report indicated that the level had risen once more, to over 20 

million classification decisions.222 

Continued globalization will increase the number of world events 

impacting U.S. interests. This will require the U.S. Intelligence Community 

to collect and analyze greater amounts of information. As technology 

improves, IC collection capabilities will similarly progress. Taken together, 

globalization and enhanced collection capabilities will likely result in a 

continued increase in the quantity of classified intelligence maintained by 

the government. 
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In terms of personnel, a 2010 Washington Post article reported that 

over 850,000 civilian employees, military personnel, and government 

contractors held a TOP SECRET security clearance.223 The article also 

reported that there were more than 1,000 government organizations and 

almost 2,000 private companies in the United States conducting work on 

intelligence, counterterrorism, and homeland security programs. 

One of the most frequently cited justifications for the media’s publication 

of classified information is the perception that the U.S. government 

classifies information unnecessarily. This overclassification results in 

information being improperly withheld from the U.S. public. Examining 

the issue of overclassification in 1979, a Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) study concluded that 24 percent of documents classified by the 

Department of Defense contained instances of overclassification.224 As 

a consequence of the increased volume of classified information and the 

number of individuals authorized to make classification decisions, there 

is a legitimate concern that the level of improperly classified information 

will also have increased. If the percentage of overclassifications reported 

in the Defense Department in 1979 were extrapolated to the 20 million 

classification decisions made in 2006, it would equate to approximately five 

million instances of overclassification.

Recognition of the issue of overclassification extends throughout all levels 

of government as well as the private sector. Former DCI William Colby 

acknowledged that there were both “bad secrets” and “non-secrets” in 

addition to appropriately classified intelligence.225 Former DCI William 

Casey agreed that too much information was classified.226

Moving from the Executive Branch to the Legislative, several Congressmen 

have discussed the issue of overclassification. In June 2000, while chairman 

of the SSCI, Senator Richard Shelby stated: “There’s too much classified, and 

a lot of it is classified for the wrong reasons, to probably withhold things 

from the public that should never have been withheld.”227 Six months later, 

while condemning President Clinton’s veto of his proposed amendment 

to amend the Espionage Act, Senator Shelby conceded, “Critics also 

cite—correctly—the Government’s tendency to overclassify information, 

especially embarrassing information, the disclosure of which would not 

damage national security...”228
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During 2006 Senate hearings concerning unauthorized disclosures, 

Senator Patrick Leahy (nicknamed “Leaky Leahy” for his own alleged 

involvement in the disclosure of classified information) commented: “We 

know some . . . intelligence information was classified simply to cover up 

mistakes made by this administration. In fact, many, many, many times 

things were classified to cover up mistakes by the administration.”229

The Defense Department recognized the danger of overclassification as far 

back as the 1956 Coolidge Report:

[O]verclassification has reached serious proportions. The result is 

not only that the system fails to supply to the public information 

which its proper operation would supply, but the system has become 

so overloaded that proper protection of information which should be 

protected has suffered. The press regards the stamp of classification 

with feelings which vary from indifference to active contempt.230

In addition to government officials, several prominent members of 

the media have discussed overclassification as a justification for the 

publication of classified information. During a 1988 interview for the 

American Intelligence Journal, Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward 

remarked that he believed overclassification was “totally out of control.”231

In his 1995 autobiography, former Washington Post Executive Editor Ben 

Bradlee wrote, “Officials—more often than not, in my experience—use 

the claim of national security as a smoke screen to cover up their own 

embarrassment.”232

As the result of studies conducted by ISOO documenting increased 

levels of classified information in the executive branch, President Obama 

established the National Declassification Center in January 2010. The 

mission of the Center is to develop greater efficiencies and to expedite the 

declassification process.233 In October 2010, President Obama also signed 

into law P.L. 111-258, the “Reducing Over-Classification Act.”234 The 

law is intended to discourage overclassification by, among other things, 

requiring inspectors general to annually assess classification activities 

within executive branch agencies, and mandating regular training on 

proper classification procedures. J. William Leonard, director of ISOO, 

summarized the issue fittingly. Leonard remarked he had seen information 

classified that he had also seen published in third grade textbooks.235
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Justification – Continued Toleration for Politically 

Advantageous Disclosures

[T]he most damaging revelations of intelligence sources and methods 

are generated primarily by Executive Branch officials pushing a 

particular policy . . . Preventing damage to intelligence sources and 

methods from media leaks will not be possible until the highest level 

of the Administration ceases to disclose classified information on a 

classified basis for political purposes.236 

- Senator Jay Rockefeller

As opposed to withholding information that should not be classified, 

critics also identify the hypocrisy of government officials publicly decrying 

unauthorized disclosures as harmful, while simultaneously condoning 

or even encouraging politically advantageous disclosures. Allegations of 

this double standard do not appear to be a partisan issue. Both Democrat 

and Republican administrations have been accused of placing political 

considerations above national security concerns. 

The practice of disclosing classified information to the media to influence 

policy, and its associated harm, was recognized by the 1978 SSCI 

Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure. In a report to the full Committee, 

the Subcommittee noted: 

[T]his type of security leak (the disclosure of classified information 

to a journalist) has become part of a flourishing informal and quasilegal system . . . There are two major drawbacks to the sub rosa 

practice of providing selected intelligence information to the news 

media and other sources. First, the public does not necessarily receive 

a balanced view from the leaked information because the process is 

informal. Second, and more importantly, information whose secrecy 

is vital to our national security is sometimes disclosed.237

In the 1996, Report to the National Security Council on unauthorized 

disclosures, “selective leaking” was identified as one of the primary reasons 

why efforts to prevent disclosures were not successful. The report cited the 

following excerpt from the 1987 Tower Commission Iran-Contra report: “[S]
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elective leaking has evolved to the point that it is a principal means of waging 

bureaucratic warfare and a primary tool in the process of policy formulation 

and development in Washington.”238

In response to the 2006 New York Times disclosure related to the SWIFT 

database, the House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning 

the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. During deliberation, 

Representative Louise Slaughter, chairman of the House Rules Committee, 

stated that the Bush administration had “always been willing to leak 

even the most sensitive information if it thought it would benefit from it 

politically.”239 She added: “But if a leak contradicts their agenda, suddenly 

they call it treason. They suffer from a case of selective outrage.” The Bush 

administration was also perceived to have condoned the disclosure of 

classified information to garner public support prior to the 2003 invasion 

of Iraq. Opponents accused the Bush administration of “cherry-picking” 

intelligence reports and assessments that supported their position. 

Pre-War Intelligence on Iraq

Five months prior to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, Senator Bob Graham, 

chairman of the SSCI, accused the Bush administration of “selectively 

disclosing classified information that corresponds more closely to its 

political agenda than to national security concerns.”240 In a letter to the 

Director of National Intelligence regarding the Bush administration’s use of 

intelligence, Senator Jay Rockefeller also decried the abuse of intelligence for 

political purposes.241 Rockefeller specifically cited disclosures of classified 

information concerning Iraq’s acquisition of aluminum tubes, intelligence 

regarding Iraq’s attempts to purchase uranium, and the Iraqi government’s 

alleged connections with Al Qaeda. 

Critics of the politicization of prewar intelligence also cite the February 

5, 2003, briefing by General Colin Powell to the United Nations Security 

Council. During the UN briefing, Powell disclosed communications, 

imagery, and human intelligence.242

The debate over the Bush administration’s politicization of intelligence 

became even more divisive when Robert Novak published a column in 
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July 2003 identifying Valerie Plame as a covert CIA officer.244 A special 

prosecutor was appointed to investigate the disclosure, which ultimately 

led to the indictment of Vice President Dick Cheney’s Chief of Staff, 

Scooter Libby. Libby was indicted for perjury, obstruction of justice, and 

making false statements (Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage was 

identified as the individual who had initially disclosed Plame’s identity). 

During court proceedings, Libby testified that he had received approval 

from the President, through Vice President Cheney, to disclose portions 

of a classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) to defend the 

administration’s use of pre-war intelligence.245 During the same period 

Libby had reportedly received authority to disclose this information to the 

media, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and other administration 

officials were in the process of debating whether to declassify the 

information.246

Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald concluded that the intent of 

authorizing the disclosure of NIE material was to respond to criticism by 

Plame’s husband, former Ambassador Joe Wilson.247 Though not convicted 

for the disclosure of Plame’s identity, Libby was convicted for obstruction 

of justice. Before leaving office, President George W. Bush granted Libby 

clemency.

Democratic administrations have also been accused of condoning 

the selective disclosure of classified information. In 1980 the Carter 

FIGURE 4 – FEBRUARY 5, 2003, PRESENTATION TO THE UN 243

Source: Department of State.
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administration faced accusations regarding the politically motivated 

disclosure of intelligence concerning the development of Stealth 

technology.

Stealth

Three months prior to the November 1980 Presidential election, an ABC 

broadcast and articles published in the Washington Post and Aviation 

Weekly disclosed classified information regarding a program to develop 

military aircraft that could evade enemy radar.248 On August 22, 1980, 

in response to the disclosures, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown held 

a press conference confirming the existence of the “Stealth” program. The 

reason given for acknowledging the program was to create a firewall to 

prevent future disclosures.249

President Carter’s opponent in the upcoming election, Ronald Reagan, 

accused the Carter administration of deliberately leaking the information 

to make Carter appear stronger on defense issues. Prior events, including 

the cancellation of the B-1 bomber program and the failed attempt to rescue 

American hostages in Iran, may have led to a perception that President 

Carter had been weak on defense issues. It was reported that Secretary 

Brown’s press conference regarding the Stealth program was scheduled to 

precede the release of the government report concerning the failed hostage 

rescue attempt.250

General Richard Ellis, commander of Strategic Air Command, stated that 

the disclosures regarding the Stealth program gave the Soviets years of 

advance warning, increasing their ability to create countermeasures and 

reduce the effectiveness of Stealth technology.251 Ellis had requested that 

the administration disavow the information. The Carter administration 

concluded that leaks of the program were inevitable, as a consequence of 

the thousands of workers involved in the program. 

Between August and October 1980, the House Armed Services Committee 

held hearings regarding the impact of the disclosures. The committee had 

been briefed on the program two days prior to the media disclosures, but 

had reportedly received less information than had been disclosed by the 
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press.252 During the hearings, Benjamin Schemmer, editor of Armed Forces 

Journal, testified regarding an article he had published.253 Schemmer 

claimed that he had been contacted by the Pentagon and given approval to 

publish an article he had previously withheld at the administration’s request. 

He also testified that William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense and future 

Secretary of Defense, had provided additional information for the final 

article. Schemmer told the committee that he believed the information 

regarding Stealth technology was disclosed for political reasons. 

A former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, testified 

that President Carter had deliberately disclosed information on the 

Stealth program so that its existence could be officially announced and 

the administration could take credit for it.254 Admiral Zumwalt identified 

David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security 

Affairs, as the media’s source of information. Aaron denied disclosing 

classified information, but refused to testify before the committee based on 

a dispute over executive privilege. The final Congressional report, released 

in February 1981, concluded that official confirmation of the program had 

caused “serious damage . . . to the security of the United States and our 

ability to deter or to contain a potential Soviet threat.”255

As long as the appearance persists that senior government officials are 

willing to disclose classified information for political gain, attempts to 

persuade the media to reduce other “non-sanctioned” disclosures will be 

difficult. 

Justification – Inadequacy of Congressional Oversight

Congressional oversight of the Executive branch is anemic. [I]f we fail to 

conduct serious oversight, then we are inviting the problem.256

- Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA)

Closely tied to a journalist’s motivation of maintaining an informed 

citizenry is the belief that the press is the entity most capable of providing 

oversight of government activity. Congressional oversight is often portrayed 

as inadequate, either due to a lack of will or a lack of ability, particularly 

when a single political party controls both the White House and Congress. 
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In this case Congress is depicted simply as a “rubber-stamp” rather than 

a true oversight body. Alternatively, if the opposition party controls a 

narrowly divided Congress, the ability to perform oversight is perceived to 

be impaired by political partisanship.

Members of both the media and the Intelligence Community have 

expressed concern over the effectiveness of Congressional oversight. 

Washington Post reporter Dana Priest described Congressional oversight 

as “dysfunctional”257 and New York Times reporter James Risen depicted 

Republican oversight of the Bush administration as “docile.”258 Senator 

Lee Hamilton, former Chairman of the HPSCI and Vice Chairman of the 

9/11 Commission, concluded that Congressional oversight was broken due 

to partisanship, a lack of far-sightedness, and the infrequency of oversight 

meetings.259 In 1986 Senator Patrick Leahy, former Vice Chairman of the 

SSCI, made the remarkable assertion that members of both the HPSCI and 

SSCI often learned of IC activities through unauthorized disclosures in the 

media.260

In 2006, the minority (Democratic) staff for the House Committee on 

Government Reform prepared a report regarding Congressional oversight 

during the Bush administration. Fifteen instances were identified in which 

proper oversight was believed not to have occurred.261 Of these fifteen 

identified instances, four were specifically related to Intelligence Community 

activities. During opening remarks for a 2006 Senate Judiciary Committee 

hearing, Committee Chairman Arlen Specter stated that one purpose of the 

hearing was to examine “growing concern that the Congress of the United 

States has not exercised its constitutional responsibilities on oversight.”262

Intertwined with the perceived lack of intelligence oversight is the alleged 

inadequacy of current federal whistleblower statutes. The 1998 Intelligence 

Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) specifically addresses 

procedures for reporting fraud, abuse, or illegal activity involving classified 

programs through appropriate channels. Similar to the concerns raised over 

Congressional oversight, media and government officials have expressed 

their apprehension over the effectiveness of the whistleblower process. In 

2006 New York Times reporter Eric Lichtblau offered his perspective on 

this issue:
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There are whistleblowers who will tell you that they have done just 

that (gone to the Intelligence Committee in the House or the Senate) 

and have found that they’ve been retaliated against or could not find 

a venue, even in Congress. So whether or not that process works is 

debatable.263

During 2006 HPSCI hearings regarding the publication of classified 

information, HPSCI chairman, Rep. Peter Hoekstra remarked, “We need 

to make sure the whistleblower process is working so people don’t feel their 

only alternative is going to the press.”264

Former NSA senior executive Thomas Drake, indicted in 2010 for activities 

related to the disclosure of classified information to the media, is reported 

to have attempted to pursue internal whistleblower processes prior to his 

alleged disclosures to the media.265 According to media reporting, Drake 

was a source for a 2001 complaint filed with the Defense Department 

inspector general’s office. The complaint alleged mismanagement of a 

program named Trailblazer, intended to analyze digital data collected by 

NSA. Drake was a proponent of an earlier program, Thin Thread, which 

Trailblazer had replaced. In addition to the inspector general, Drake 

reportedly notified his superiors and members of Congress before allegedly 

providing classified information to the media.

The Baltimore Sun published articles concerning Trailblazer in 2006 and 

2007. At the time the articles were published, NSA’s inspector general is 

reported to have already concluded that Trailblazer had been mismanaged. 

The NSA Director, General Michael Hayden, also reportedly acknowledged 

that Trailblazer was ineffective and had run millions of dollars over its 

intended budget. 

Additional details regarding federal whistleblower statutes and the 

indictment of Thomas Drake are included in the Appendix.

Justification – Legal Protection for the Press under the 

First Amendment

We have a first amendment right to publish things, even irresponsibly.266

- Bob Woodward
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Members of the media contend that the Founding Fathers specifically 

provided protections under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 

for the press to collect and publish classified information. They reference 

this justification frequently when discussing the issue of unauthorized 

disclosures, asserting that this protection is based on a recognition of the 

benefits to the American public.

Journalists Dana Priest from the Washington Post and Eric Lichtblau from 

the New York Times, each awarded a Pulitzer Prize for articles containing 

classified information, have acknowledged the critical role of the First 

Amendment in American journalism. At a 2006 American Bar Association 

Conference, Priest remarked: “Most of the protections in the Bill of Rights 

are for individuals, but the free press clause protects an institution, the 

publishing business.”267 In response to a question concerning journalists 

acquiring classified information, Lichtblau stated: “Most lawyers will 

tell you that it is not a crime for any news organization in this country 

to disseminate information that could arguably be considered classified. 

That’s why we have the First Amendment . . .”268

Support for Priest’s and Lichtblau’s position can be found within the Judicial 

Branch. In a 1974 speech, Justice Potter Stewart remarked that the primary 

purpose of the First Amendment was to create “a fourth institution outside 

the government as an additional check on the three official branches.”269 

Several judges have held that national security concerns cannot easily, or 

perhaps ever, override First Amendment protections. Though Fourth Circuit 

Court of Appeals Judge Harvie Wilkinson upheld the conviction of Samuel 

Morison for disclosing classified information to the media, he wrote: “The First 

Amendment interest in informed popular debate does not simply vanish at the 

invocation of the words ‘national security.’ National security is public security, 

not government security from informed criticism.”270 In a concurring opinion 

in the Pentagon Papers case, Justice Hugo Black wrote:

“The term ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours 

should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied 

in the First Amendment. The guarding of military and diplomatic 

secrets at the expense of informed representative government 

provides no real security for our Republic.”271
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One other significant legal issue concerns the applicability of the 1917 

Espionage Act to members of the media. Individuals who recognize the 

collective benefits of unauthorized disclosures contend that the provisions 

of the Act do not, and were never intended to, apply to journalists and 

are overridden by First Amendment protections. Though the Espionage 

Act originally included a provision which would have made it unlawful 

to publish certain information during a time of war, the provision was 

ultimately rejected.272 Jack Nelson, former Los Angeles Times Washington 

bureau chief, wrote: “The legislative history of the Espionage Act clearly 

shows that Congress’ original intent was to punish spies, not those who 

disclose information to inform the public.”273 New York Times reporter 

James Risen justified the legality of unauthorized disclosures, including his 

own, by observing, “I think the First Amendment came first, before the 

Espionage Act.”274

Whether intentional or not, Risen’s comment appears to be a reference to 

the historic Supreme Court case Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 

In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court ruled that if a law enacted 

by Congress conflicts with the Constitution, the law would be invalid. At 

least one federal judge appears to share Risen’s sentiments regarding the 

applicability of the Espionage Act to members of the press. In the 1988 

Fourth Circuit ruling denying Samuel Morison’s appeal of his conviction, 

Judge Harvie Wilkinson wrote: “[P]ress organizations . . . probably could 

not be prosecuted under the espionage statute.”275 Capturing the essence 

of this justification, Judge Wilkinson added: “Criminal restraints on the 

disclosure of information threaten the ability of the press to scrutinize and 

report on government activity.”276

The contention that the media should be considered a legitimate entity 

to provide oversight, particularly for Intelligence Community programs, 

requires one additional justification. In order to respond to allegations 

that unauthorized disclosures harm national security, advocates of the 

propriety of these disclosures assert that members of the media have the 

ability to handle classified information responsibly. 
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Justification – The Ability of the Media to Handle 

Classified Information Responsibly

I have been gratified by the readiness of many of you (members of the 

Society of Professional Journalists) to carefully consider on occasion 

withholding publication of information which could jeopardize 

national interests or to present a story in a way that meets the public 

need yet minimized potential damage to intelligence sources.277

- DCI William Casey

When the media obtains especially sensitive information, we are willing to 

tell the authorities what we have learned and what we plan to report. (The 

media) want to do nothing that would endanger human life or national 

security. We are willing to cooperate with the authorities in withholding 

information that could have those consequences.278

- Katharine Graham

The justification cited most frequently by advocates of the media’s right to 

publish classified information is that journalists are capable of balancing 

the responsibility to inform the public with the necessity to protect 

national security. When discussing this justification, the media often refer 

to their willingness to speak with government officials prior to publication 

and seriously consider any concerns they might have. As described by 

the Newspaper Association of America and the National Newspaper 

Association, this dialogue helps protects against the publication of 

information that could truly harm national security.279

Both the journalists who compose articles containing classified information 

and the senior editors who authorize their publication have identified the 

desire to make informed decisions. In a joint letter to the HPSCI, Tom 

Brokaw, Walter Cronkite, and Ted Koppel wrote that deliberations regarding 

the publication of classified information almost always involve discussions 

with government officials.280 Editors from the Wall Street Journal, New 

York Times, and Los Angeles Times have each discussed their willingness to 

inform government officials when considering the publication of classified 

information. 
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In a joint 2006 article entitled “When Do We Publish a Secret,” Bill Keller, 

executive editor of the New York Times, and Dean Baquet, editor of the Los 

Angeles Times, wrote”

No article on a classified program gets published until the responsible 

officials have been given a fair opportunity to comment. And if 

they want to argue that publication represents a danger to national 

security, we put things on hold and give them a respectful hearing. 

Often, we agree to participate in off-the-record conversations with 

officials, so they can make their case without fear of spilling more 

secrets onto our front pages.281

Four years later, in 2010, the New York Times published another article 

discussing its decision-making process.282 The article followed the 

publication of an article by the Times detailing the contents of thousands 

of classified military reports provided by the Internet-based organization 

WikiLeaks:

Deciding whether to publish secret information is always difficult, 

and after weighing the risks and public interest, we sometimes 

chose not to publish. But there are times when the information is 

of significant public interest, and this is one of those times. The 

documents illuminate the extraordinary difficulty of what the United 

States and its allies have undertaken in a way that other accounts 

have not. 

Most of the incident reports are marked “secret,” a relatively low level 

of classification. The Times has taken care not to publish information 

that would harm national security interests. The Times and the other 

news organizations agreed at the outset that we would not disclose—

either in our articles or any of our online supplementary material—

anything that was likely to put lives at risk or jeopardize military or 

antiterrorist operations. We have, for example, withheld any names 

of operatives in the field and informants cited in the reports. We 

have avoided anything that might compromise American or allied 

intelligence-gathering methods such as communications intercepts. 

We have not linked to the archives of raw material. At the request of 
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the White House, the Times also urged Wikileaks to withhold any 

harmful material from its Web site. 

In addition to DCI Casey, quoted at the beginning of this section, at least 

four other Directors of Central Intelligence have commended mainstream 

media outlets for their willingness to consider government objections. In 

1979 former DCI William Colby testified before the HPSCI that he had 

“successfully convinced members of the press that they should not publish 

some things out of a sense of patriotism and decency and judgment.”283 

In 1988 former DCI Robert Gates wrote, “There have been a number of 

instances in which the press has withheld stories or written them in a way 

that preserved the confidentiality of intelligence sources.”284

Eight years later, in 1996, it was reported that former DCI John Deutch 

spoke with newspaper editors on at least two occasions to request that 

classified information not be published.285 Deutch stated, “Each time 

the editor in less than 20 seconds said okay.” In 2006 former DCI James 

Woolsey reportedly approached senior members of the media on two 

occasions “because a particular fact that one of their reporters had been 

asking about, if revealed, would have seriously put at risk a source or a 

method.”286 Woolsey added, “In each case, they said the story doesn’t 

depend on this fact, and thanks for letting us know, and they ran the story 

without the fact.” 

Members of the media also identify several instances in which information 

regarding the existence of a classified program or operation was withheld 

until disclosed by an alternative source. These sources have included 

foreign governments, foreign media outlets, or even U.S. officials. Once 

the information was disclosed, members of the media concluded that the 

necessity to protect national security no longer overrode the responsibility 

to inform the public. One difficulty media organizations face when 

discussing this justification is only being able to reference information that 

was ultimately disclosed. Ironically, some of the best examples of the media 

agreeing to withhold classified information cannot be cited without the 

media acting irresponsibly. This is similar to government frustration over 

the inability to identify the extent of harm caused by a disclosure without 

the requirement to disclose additional classified information.
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Members of the media have spoken on numerous occasions about their 

ability to make responsible decisions regarding the publication of classified 

information. In his memoirs, former Washington Post editor Ben Bradlee 

wrote, “In my time as editor, I have kept many stories out of the paper 

because I felt that national security would be harmed by publication.”287

In 1988, Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward confirmed that he was 

frequently talked out of running stories.”288 In the joint 2006 New York 

Times article, Bill Keller and Dean Baquet wrote, “Each of us has, on a 

number of occasions, withheld information because we were convinced 

that publishing it would put lives at risk.”289

Beyond these generalities, several specific instances have been identified 

in which classified information obtained by the media was withheld from 

publication. Several examples of media restraint during both the Cold 

War and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been discussed publicly. 

Examples in which the media identified the responsible use of classified 

information during the Cold War include:

U-2

The Washington Post is reported to have been aware of U-2 surveillance 

missions over the Soviet Union at least a year prior to Francis Gary Powers 

being shot down in May 1960.290 The decision was made to withhold 

publication in the interests of national security, including the recognition 

of a need to collect intelligence regarding Soviet missile capabilities. The 

New York Times also reportedly had knowledge of the U-2 missions in 

Soviet air space. 291

Even after Powers was shot down, the media continued to show restraint 

in publication. During research for a book on the U-2 program in 1962, 

two authors discovered that the United States had also been flying U-2 

missions over Cuba.292 In response to a request from Attorney General 

Robert Kennedy, this information was withheld. One of the authors later 

stated that he believed he had made the correct decision, particularly after 

a U-2 identified the presence of Soviet missiles and missile bases in Cuba 

later that year, leading to the Cuban missile crisis.
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FIGURE 5 – OCTOBER 14, 1962, U2 IMAGES OF SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA 293

Source: Central Intelligence Agency.

IVY BELLS

In 1985 Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward reportedly obtained 

classified information concerning IVY BELLS, a clandestine operation to 

intercept Soviet communications transmitted across undersea cables.294 

The operation involved U.S. submarines entering Soviet territorial waters 

to attach and service the IVY BELLS device, which was secured to Soviet 

communication cables. After discussions with government officials, 

the Post agreed not to disclose the operation’s existence. During a 2006 

interview, Ben Bradlee stated, “there is no damned way we were going to 

run this if it was still operating. So, we didn’t run it.”295

One year later, Bob Woodward learned that the IVY BELLS device had 

been removed by the Soviets. It was subsequently determined that a former 
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NSA employee, Ronald Pelton, had disclosed the program’s existence to 

the KGB. After Pelton’s espionage was discovered, Bradlee notified the 

government of his intent to publish an article containing the previously 

withheld information, stating, “Once it was certain that the Russians knew 

everything about IVY BELLS, there was no issue of national security.”296 

He added, “[I]f the Soviets knew all about IVY BELLS, why shouldn’t the 

American public know about it?” 

In response to continued government concerns, Bradlee and Post CEO 

Katharine Graham discussed the article’s contents with government officials 

on approximately twenty occasions, including conversations with DCI 

William Casey and President Ronald Reagan.297 Drafts of the article were 

provided for review during these discussions. Ultimately, NBC broadcast 

its own version of the story while the Post was still considering government 

concerns. This incident will be examined in detail in Chapter 4.

Project AZORIAN

During a 1975 CIA operation to recover a sunken Soviet submarine, several 

media outlets obtained information regarding the project’s existence. One 

section of the submarine was reported to have been successfully recovered 

and attempts to salvage the remaining portion were planned.298 DCI 

William Colby personally met with several journalists, including New York 

Times reporter Seymour Hersh. Hersh agreed to Colby’s request to withhold 

the information while operations were ongoing.299 Though Los Angeles 

Times reporter Jack Nelson did not agree with Colby’s rationale, the editor 

for the Los Angeles Times also agreed not to publish the information.300

In addition to the New York Times and Los Angeles Times, Colby is reported 

to have convinced Time, Newsweek, the Washington Post, the Washington 

Star, and all three major television networks to withhold the story.301 

(Author’s note: Similar to IVY BELLS, the existence of the operation was 

eventually disclosed, in this instance by columnist Jack Anderson. As part 

of an arrangement with the other outlets, DCI Colby contacted them when 

it became apparent the program would be exposed.)302
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Media restraint during the Cold War was not limited solely to classified 

programs involving the Soviet Union. In at least two instances, the media 

reportedly withheld classified information related to terrorist acts. 

Hostage Crises

In November 1979, Iranian militants seized the American Embassy in 

Tehran. For over a year, 53 Americans were held hostage. At least five U.S. 

news organizations, including the New York Times, Newsweek, Time, NBC, 

and CBS learned that six Americans had not been taken hostage and had 

sought refuge in the Canadian Embassy.303 All five organizations agreed 

to withhold disclosure of the information until the other hostages were 

released. Six years later, when Lebanese terrorists hijacked TWA Flight 847, 

media outlets learned that one of the hostages was an NSA employee.304 

Again, the information was withheld from publication. Even in the 

Pentagon Papers case, the incident most commonly cited as confirming the 

media’s right to publish without government interference, members of the 

media identified steps taken in an effort to handle classified information 

responsibly. 

Pentagon Papers

While examining portions of a TOP SECRET study provided by Daniel 

Ellsberg, the Washington Post discovered that two CIA agents stationed in 

Saigon were identified. In a 2006 interview, Ben Bradlee stated: “[W]hen 

we noticed that, everybody said, ‘Well, God, we’re not going to name CIA 

agents.’ So we said, ‘No,’ and took that out.”305 In her memoirs, Katharine 

Graham, former CEO of the Post, also discussed the consideration given 

to government objections. Graham wrote: “[W]e had independently, and 

in an effort to act responsibly, decided we wouldn’t publish those items 

that had been specified in the Solicitor General’s secret brief as being those 

most threatening to the national interest.”306 Graham added: “[W]e would 

not publish information based on intercepted communications, signal 

intelligence, and cryptography in general, adhering to this policy as we 

had in the past.” Graham also wrote that Ellsberg had withheld portions 

of the Pentagon Papers from the Post and that the newspaper did not have 
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access to much of the material the government appeared to have been most 

concerned about.

In addition to Cold War examples, several contemporary examples of media 

restraint have been identified, particularly related to current antiterrorism 

efforts and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to the examples 

provided below, media outlets have suggested that there are several other 

unreported cases in which classified information was obtained but never 

disclosed. Cases cited by the media as evidence that issues of national 

security were handled responsibly include:

CIA Detention Facilities

Dana Priest, author of the 2006 Washington Post article concerning the 

existence of overseas CIA detention facilities, discussed the Post’s prepublication process at a 2006 American Bar Association conference. Priest 

stated that all elements of the article were provided to the CIA prior to 

publication and that issues regarding the content of the article were 

discussed with senior government officials, including President Bush.307

As a result of concerns regarding the negative repercussions of identifying 

the countries hosting CIA facilities, Washington Post Executive Editor Len 

Downie agreed not to disclose the countries’ identities. Downie stated that 

the purpose of the article was accomplished without having to name the 

countries.308

Downie also indicated that, during research for the article, Priest obtained 

information regarding additional classified counterterrorism programs 

that were never disclosed. Downie stated: “Right from the outset it was 

clear to us that details . . . would not be important to readers,” and would 

be “injurious to Americans potentially or could damage these programs 

potentially.”309

Terrorist Surveillance Program

In 2006 Bill Keller, executive editor for the New York Times, revealed that 

the Times had withheld publication of its article concerning the NSA 

Terrorist Surveillance Program for more than a year. During that period, 
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the Times discussed national security concerns with government officials. 

Keller stated that, when the decision was made to publish the article,310 

“We satisfied ourselves that we could write about this program . . . in a way 

that would not expose any intelligence-gathering methods or capabilities 

that are not already on the public record.”311 Keller added that technical 

details of the program were also withheld.

SWIFT Banking

Less than a week after his SWIFT database article was published in the 

New York Times, Eric Lichtblau discussed how the decision to disclose 

classified information was reached. In response to accusations of being 

unpatriotic and treasonous, Lichtblau stated, “We wrestled with this 

(the decision to publish the story) for many weeks and listened to the 

government’s arguments.”312 Lichtblau added that the government argued 

that the disclosure would weaken the program’s effectiveness and harm the 

relationship with the SWIFT organization but that “the paper and the top 

editors felt that this was an important issue in the current public policy 

debate about the war on terrorism and that the reasons for not publishing 

were outweighed by the public interest.” 

Bill Keller concurred with Lichtblau’s statements. Keller described that 

paper’s deliberative process as follows: 

Our decision to publish the story of the administration’s penetration of 

the international banking system followed weeks of discussion between 

administration officials and the Times, not only the reporters who wrote 

the story but senior editors, including me. We listened patiently and 

attentively. We discussed the matter extensively within the paper. We spoke 

to others—national security experts not serving in the Administration—

for their counsel . . . We believe the Times . . . served the public interest 

by accurately reporting on these programs so that the public can have an 

informed view of them.313

The assertion that the article did not disclose information that had not been 

previously discussed publicly was one of the most oft-cited justifications for 

publication of the SWIFT article. Lichtblau and Keller each asserted that 
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terrorists were already well aware that their finances were being tracked, 

based at least partially on information disclosed by U.S. government 

officials.314

U.S. Troops in Afghanistan

In the week following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 

Knight Ridder Washington Bureau obtained information that U.S. special 

operations forces had entered Afghanistan to locate Osama bin Laden. 

In response to a request from the Pentagon, the decision was made not 

to publish the information.315 Knight-Ridder’s Washington Bureau chief 

agreed with the Pentagon’s contention that disclosing the information 

could increase the risk to the troops, remarking “based on what we knew, 

we believed that making (the operation) public could have substantially 

increased the risk to the Americans involved and could even have been 

seen as contributing to a loss of life.” 

Though Knight-Ridder chose not to disclose the information it had obtained, 

USA Today reached a different conclusion, publishing a front-page article 

on September 28, 2001. USA Today also believed it was acting responsibly 

and in the public’s best interest. The author of the article justified the 

disclosure by contending that the information was already widely known 

within Afghanistan. The article stated, “Their (U.S. operatives) arrival here 

two weeks ago and subsequent movement into Afghanistan have been 

reported by English and Urdu language newspapers here, and would not 

come as a surprise to bin Laden or Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban.”316

In at least two identified instances, beyond simply electing not to publish 

classified information, a media outlet proactively contacted government 

officials to discuss what had been disclosed to them. In the first case, 

in 1981, the Washington Post obtained a manuscript written in Russian 

with mathematical computations and diagrams. Rather than attempt to 

translate or publish the information, Post Executive Editor Ben Bradlee 

provided the manuscript to the CIA.317 Bradlee was informed thirteen 

years later that the document contained information regarding the design 

and function of a new Soviet Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). 

In 1994 a CIA Soviet weapons expert reportedly stated that the manuscript 
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“gave us the best insights we had . . . on their (Soviet) IRBM engineering 

capabilities,318 on their propellant capabilities.” The Deputy Director of 

Central Intelligence, Bobby Ray Inman, reportedly described the document 

as “unique material . . . judged to be valuable.”319

The second incident, also involving Bradlee and the Washington Post, 

occurred in 1988. A source, described by Bradlee as a disgruntled lowlevel Navy analyst, provided reporter Bob Woodward with information 

regarding three classified U.S. operations to penetrate Soviet systems used 

to control their nuclear forces. Woodward later learned that the source had 

an East German girlfriend. After meeting the source, Bradlee stated, “We 

quickly agreed that there was no useful social purpose in publishing the 

story, and recognized a responsibility to alert the government to a potential 

disaster.”320 Though Woodward and Bradlee refused to testify against the 

source, they provided the information to DCI William Webster.

Government Employees and Their Motivations: The 

“Supply Side”

Members of the media represent only one half of the previously identified 

“leak economy.” This economy cannot endure simply because journalists, 

the “demand side” of the equation, recognize a need to disclose classified 

information. In order to thrive, a “supply side” is also required. The “supply 

side” of the relationship consists of government employees with security 

clearances willing to disclose classified information to members of the 

media. Just as members of the media are motivated to publish classified 

information under certain circumstances, government employees have 

distinct rationales for their actions. Though the primary focus for this book 

is an analysis of the journalist’s decision-making process, an examination 

of the “supply side” of this process will assist in illustrating the complexities 

of this issue. 

Government agencies are aware that unauthorized disclosures would 

not occur without government employees willing to provide classified 

information to members of the media. Beyond the threat of criminal 

prosecution or administrative sanctions, government agencies attempt 
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to deter these disclosures through training and education programs. 

The intent of these programs is to diminish the rationale for disclosing 

classified information and to dissuade the employees from engaging in this 

undesirable behavior.

In the book LEAKING: Who Does It? Who Benefits? At What Cost? Elie Abel 

offers an academic and professional perspective on the topic of government 

employees who disclose classified information. Abel, a former New York 

Times, Los Angeles Times and CBS reporter, also a Stanford professor and 

former Dean of the Columbia School of Journalism, examines who these 

government employees are, the types of information they disclose, and 

why they elect to provide classified information to the media.

According to Abel, the categories of information disclosed to the media 

most often involve foreign policy and defense issues. He recognizes that 

Intelligence Community activities, particularly those involving the CIA 

and NSA, are also the subject of unauthorized disclosures, but to a lesser 

extent. Because of the perceived focus on political issues, Abel believes 

that the primary government sources are senior political appointees, 

policymakers, and senior executives from Executive Branch agencies. He 

shares the sentiment of President John F. Kennedy, who remarked that “the 

Ship of State is the only ship that leaks at the top.”321 Abel also identifies 

members of Congress and their staffs as significant sources of classified 

information for the media. 

Abel contends that mid-level bureaucrats and civil servants are normally 

not involved in unauthorized disclosures. He writes that these individuals 

do not have access to information the media would have the greatest 

motivation to publish, the kind that “makes a front-page splash.”322 

Without offering additional detail, Abel asserts that low- and mid-level civil 

servants are also less likely to be the source of an unauthorized disclosure 

because “the risk of exposure outweighs the possible gain.” In order for 

this assertion to be valid, the civil servant’s perception of the likelihood of 

discovery would either have to be higher than research indicates or his/her 

perception of the possible benefit would need to be slight. 

Abel implies that another reason why senior officials are more often the 

source of unauthorized disclosures is that they either have an existing 
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relationship with journalists or are more likely to engage or be approached 

by members of the media. Abel adds that it is government officials who 

instigate contact with the media in the majority of cases. He believes that 

unauthorized disclosures are seldom the product of a reporter’s probing, 

though he recognizes that some unauthorized disclosures are also “the 

products of hard work by enterprising newsmen and newswomen.”

Before identifying the motivations for government employees to 

disclose classified information, Abel makes one additional distinction. 

He differentiates between classified information provided to the media 

that is sanctioned by an administration official, and information the 

administration does not condone. He refers to sanctioned disclosures as 

“plants” and non-approved disclosures as “leaks.” Abel does not identify 

which he considers more prevalent.

Abel recognizes six distinct motivations for a government employee to 

disclose classified information to members of the media. These categories 

are based on a book written by former White House staffer and Presidential 

advisor Stephen Hess. Though presented individually, the six motivations 

can be grouped into three general categories: disclosures meant to benefit 

an individual or a policy the individual supports, disclosures meant to 

harm an adversary or a policy the individual opposes, or an altruistic 

disclosure meant to bring attention to a perceived wrong.

Included in the category of disclosures meant to benefit an individual or 

policy are:

THE EGO LEAK: An unauthorized disclosure meant to “satisfy the leaker’s 

sense of his own importance.” Abel indicates that the intent of the disclosure 

is to gain a feeling of worth that the government employee may not receive 

in the workplace. Because the individual has an impression that he/she 

is not appropriately recognized for his/her accomplishments, he/she seeks 

validation from another source, a member of the media. 

THE POLICY LEAK: An unauthorized disclosure intended to increase the 

probability that a desired policy will be enacted. The expectation is that 

additional support will be garnered from the disclosure, both from the 

public and within the administration. 
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THE GOODWILL LEAK: The primary purpose for this type of disclosure is 

to “earn credit with a reporter, to be cashed in at a later date.” In this case, 

the government employee believes the journalist would be more likely to 

publish a future disclosure intended to satisfy a separate motivation. 

THE TRIAL BALLOON LEAK: The objective for this category is to test how 

a potential policy will be received by others, including both lawmakers and 

the public. The risk of being associated with an unfavorable policy can be 

decreased if its reception is gauged before an official position is taken.

The second category, unauthorized disclosures motivated by a desire to 

harm an adversary or a policy the government employee opposes, includes:

THE ANIMUS LEAK: The intent of the disclosure is to embarrass or 

otherwise injure another person or political faction. The disclosure is 

meant as a hostile attack directed toward an opponent to weaken his/her 

position.

THE POLICY LEAK: Abel recognizes that a disclosure to the media can be 

used not only to promote a desired policy but also to increase attention to 

negative aspects of a specific proposal or political agenda. Abel distinguishes 

between disclosures meant to injure an individual, the “Animus” leak, and 

disclosures that target a policy.

The final category identified by Abel includes unauthorized disclosures 

meant to correct a perceived wrong, which includes: 

THE WHISTLEBLOWER LEAK: These disclosures are characterized by 

Abel as an altruistic last resort for “frustrated civil servants who feel they 

cannot correct a perceived wrong through regular channels.”323 He does 

not make a distinction between those government employees who attempt 

to obtain a remedy through an officially sanctioned process and those who 

elect to eschew the process entirely by going directly to the media. 

Beyond the six motivations to disclose classified information acknowledged 

by Abel, there are at least two additional reasons why an unauthorized 

disclosure might occur—ignorance and accident. Government employees 

not accustomed to handling classified information, or those improperly 

trained, can disclose classified information without realizing or 
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understanding the consequences of their actions. Government employees 

aware of their obligation to protect classified information can also 

unintentionally disclose information. These accidental disclosures can 

result from a momentary lapse in judgment or from persistence on the 

part of a journalist intent on acquiring classified information. Though the 

disclosures resulting from ignorance or accident may not have been the 

product of a premeditated act, the outcome is the same.

Other than acknowledging Hess’ belief that the “Ego Leak” is the most 

common, Abel does not offer an opinion on the relative frequency of the 

six identified motivations. He does recognize that the motivations are not 

mutually exclusive. When providing an example of an “Ego Leak,” Abel 

indicates that the government source had not only been passed over for 

promotion but also disagreed personally with a policy decision. 

Near the end of his book, Abel presents the results from a study conducted 

by the Institute of Politics at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. 

Though the results of the study do not directly correlate with the six 

identified motivations, some parallels can be drawn. 

In the study, 42 percent of respondents, identified as “former federal 

officials in policymaking positions,” acknowledged disclosing classified 

information to the media. Rationales for disclosing classified information 

were ranked as follows:

90% – To counter false or misleading information

75% – To gain attention for a policy option or issue

64% – To consolidate support from the public of a constituency 

outside of government

53% – To force action on an issue

32% – To send a message to another part of the government

31.5% – To stop action on an issue

30% – To test reactions to a policy consideration

30% – To protect their own position
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29% – In response to a reporter’s skill and persistence in eliciting 

information

The majority of these categories relate to what Abel refers to as a Policy 

Leak. Four of Abel’s categories, Ego, Goodwill, Animus, and Whistleblower, 

do not appear to be represented. Though Abel does not discuss this 

apparent discrepancy, one possible explanation may be the reliance on the 

poll’s respondents to self-identify their motivations. Just as members of 

the media rarely discuss some motivations, the study’s respondents may 

have under-reported or non-report motivations, such as Ego, Goodwill, 

or Animus. 

In reference to the legalities surrounding unauthorized disclosures, Abel 

offers his opinion that it is not illegal for government officials to provide 

classified information to the media, or for members of the media to 

accept and publish this information. He does identify an exception in 

cases involving the disclosure or publication of information related to 

communications intelligence: “the government’s capacity to eavesdrop on 

the communications of foreign governments” and “intelligence gathered 

by those methods.”324 This would appear to be a reference to prohibitions 

specified under Section 798 of the Espionage Act.

In Leaking, Abel cites several reasons why unauthorized disclosures 

will continue for the foreseeable future. He refers to several of the 

justifications previously identified in this chapter, including government 

overclassification and the perceived hypocrisy of tolerating advantageous 

disclosures. Abel also recognizes that members of the media perpetuate the 

cycle based on motivations other than promoting an informed citizenry or 

exposing government misconduct. 

Abel acknowledges the impact of a journalist’s motivation to advance 

personal or corporate interests. He refers to the media’s risk of sacrificing 

independent judgment “pursuing its self-interest in leaks, which serves 

to advance the career aspirations of reporters and the prestige of their 

organizations.” Abel adds: “A reporter profits by appearing to be more 

enterprising and better-informed than his colleagues or competitors. 

That way lies professional recognition, salary increases, and the path to 

advancement.”325
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Abel ultimately agrees with one of the primary conclusions of this book, 

that it is unrealistic to believe that unauthorized disclosures can be reduced 

through new legislation or harsh administrative sanctions. He believes that 

a legal remedy cannot be instituted without “doing violence to the fabric 

of American freedoms.” Abel concludes that any attempt to reduce the 

perceived harm caused by unauthorized disclosures must come through 

voluntary reforms. 

Conclusion

This chapter examined the multiple motivations and justifications 

comprising the “benefit” side of the journalist’s cost-benefit analysis related 

to the publication of classified information. Before a conclusion can be 

reached regarding the applicability of an approach incorporating Rational 

Choice Theory, the “cost” side of the equation must also be examined. 

Understanding the media’s perception of the harm caused by these 

disclosures is as essential a component as recognizing their motivations 

and justifications. Chapter 3 identifies and examines the specific categories 

of harm associated with unauthorized disclosures of classified information 

by the media. 

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CHAPTER 3

The Cost of Disclosing 

Classified Information: Identifying Harm

There is no doubt and ample evidence that unauthorized disclosures 

of classified information cause enormous and irreparable harm to the 

Nation’s diplomatic, military, and intelligence capabilities.326

 - Attorney General John Ashcroft

Newspapers recognize that the government has a duty to preserve 

national security and that some leaks may cause damage.327

- Newspaper Association of America and 

National Newspaper Association

Government officials, particularly those affiliated with the Intelligence 

Community (IC), believe that incidents of unauthorized disclosures must 

be reduced due to their harm to national security. While these officials 

recognize that unauthorized disclosures may produce a more informed 

citizenry, they believe the overall public interest in preserving national 

security will outweigh any potential benefits in almost all instances. 

Individuals intent on reducing disclosures do not consider this conflict 

to be between a government interest in maintaining secrecy and a public 

interest in acquiring knowledge of government activity. They contend that 

maintaining legitimate secrets is as much a public interest as a government 

interest. As noted by University of Chicago Law Professor Gerhard Casper 

in 1986:

[G]overnment interests are also the interests of the American people. 

They have a need for secrecy in some circumstances as compelling 

as their need for information. Representative government to some 

extent substitutes deliberation by representatives for deliberation by 

the people. The Founders understood that unrestrained freedom of 

information may impose prohibitive social costs.328
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Numerous examples have been identified in which Intelligence Community 

capabilities have been damaged or lost as the result of an unauthorized 

disclosure by the media. This harm, in turn, decreases the ability of the 

IC to perform its mission and support U.S. interests. The recognition of 

harm is not limited solely to government officials. Members of the media 

renowned for their disclosure of classified information also realize the 

potential for harm. Jack Nelson, former Washington bureau chief for the 

Los Angeles Times, wrote in 2002, “There are instances where the media is 

irresponsible in using classified information that might endanger national 

security.”329 As seen by the quote at the beginning of this chapter, both the 

Newspaper Association of America and National Newspaper Association 

recognize that disclosures may harm national security.330

Former Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, from James Schlesinger 

(1973) to Michael Hayden (2008), have also addressed the issue. In 1988 

former DCI Robert Gates provided an overview of the breadth of harm 

attributed to unauthorized disclosures by the media:

In recent years, U.S. foreign policy has been undercut, and the 

ability of American intelligence to help protect the security 

of the nation against our adversaries has been weakened by 

unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Deliberate 

leaks of intelligence information have jeopardized American lives, 

hampered U.S. effectiveness in combating terrorism . . . and have 

required the expenditure of billions of dollars in order to revamp 

or replace sophisticated technical collection systems that have 

been compromised. Unauthorized disclosures have damaged U.S. 

relationships with other intelligence services and have dissuaded 

potential agents from accepting the risks of working on behalf of the 

United States.331

Though he vetoed the 2001 Intelligence Authorization Act because of a 

provision to expand coverage of the Espionage Act, President Bill Clinton 

acknowledged that unauthorized disclosures could be “extraordinarily 

harmful to United States national security interests”: 

I have been particularly concerned about their potential effects on 

the sometimes irreplaceable intelligence sources and methods on 
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which we rely to acquire accurate and timely information I need 

in order to make the most appropriate decisions on matters of 

national security. Unauthorized disclosures damage our intelligence 

relationships abroad, compromise intelligence gathering, jeopardize 

lives, and increase the threat of terrorism . . . Those who disclose 

classified information inappropriately thus commit a gross breach 

of the public trust and may recklessly put our national security at 

risk.332

In upholding the conviction of Samuel Morison for providing classified 

satellite imagery to the media, Circuit Court Judge Harvie Wilkinson also 

detailed several potential categories of harm:

When the identities of our intelligence agents are known, they may 

be killed. When our electronic surveillance capabilities are revealed, 

countermeasures can be taken to circumvent them. When other 

nations fear that confidences exchanged at the bargaining table will 

only become embarrassments in the press, our diplomats are left 

helpless. When terrorists are advised of our intelligence, they can 

avoid apprehension and escape retribution.333

Beyond the recognition of potential harm, concern over the impact of 

unauthorized disclosures has sometimes led to a more visceral response. In 

1971 President Gerald Ford exclaimed that he was “damned sick and tired 

of a ship that has such leaky seams” and that his administration was “being 

drowned by premature and obvious leaks.”334 DCI John Deutch remarked in 

1996, “There’s something sick about the kind of people (that leak details of 

ongoing CIA operations).” 335 At the 1999 dedication ceremony for the CIA’s 

George Bush Center for Intelligence, former President George H.W. Bush 

expressed “contempt and anger for those who betray the trust by exposing 

the names of our sources.” He added that these government employees are 

“the most insidious of traitors.”336

Categories of Harm

Unauthorized disclosures by the media are perceived to impact seriously 

the ability of IC agencies to provide senior officials with intelligence to 

support national security objectives. In addition to the recognized harm 
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to the United States, classified information disclosed by the media is also 

viewed as benefiting U.S. rivals. Adversaries provided access to intelligence 

concerning U.S. capabilities and intentions can exploit this information to 

further their own objectives. 

Six distinct categories of harm caused by unauthorized disclosures can 

be identified. They include: (1) damage to sources and methods; (2) 

potential loss of life; (3) impact to foreign policy; (4) effect on international 

alliances; (5) financial costs; and (6) the decrease in public knowledge 

resulting from disclosures of incomplete or inaccurate information. 

Critics of unauthorized disclosures maintain that, in almost all cases, 

these consequences outweigh any justification the media may have for 

publishing classified information.337 In order to more fully understand 

these categories of harm, each will be examined individually. 

Damage to Sources and Methods

In recent years, publication of classified information by the media 

has destroyed or seriously damaged intelligence sources of the highest 

value. Every method we have of acquiring intelligence . . . has been 

damaged by the publication of unauthorized disclosures.338

- DCI William Casey

Unauthorized disclosures of classified information threaten the 

survivability of the sources and methods that we depend on. We have 

lost opportunity, if not capability, because of irresponsible leaks and we 

have made it easier for our enemies.339

- DCI Porter Goss

When an unauthorized disclosure in the media occurs, the impact extends 

beyond the specific information compromised. Disclosures increase 

an adversary’s knowledge of U.S. collection capabilities and potentially 

allow an adversary to identify the manner in which the information was 

originally collected, such as a human source, satellite, or covert listening 

device. Adversaries can then employ countermeasures to decrease U.S. 

knowledge of their actual capabilities and intentions. 
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In July 2009, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair noted that 

unauthorized disclosures “allow our adversaries to learn about, deny, 

counteract, and deceive our intelligence collection methods, leading to the 

loss of critical capabilities . . .”340 The 2005 WMD Commission Report 

focused particular attention on the harm that disclosures have caused 

to intelligence sources and methods. The Commission concluded that 

“unauthorized disclosures of U.S. sources and methods have significantly 

impaired the effectiveness of our collection systems.”341 The Commission 

also reported that U.S. adversaries had “learned much about what we can 

see and hear, and have predictably taken steps to thwart our efforts.”

Members of the media have also recognized the potential impact of 

unauthorized disclosures on intelligence sources and methods. Speaking 

at a 2007 American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) conference, 

Washington Post Executive Editor Len Downie acknowledged that classified 

information disclosed by the media “increases knowledge of those who 

could harm national security.”342 Former Washington Post CEO Katharine 

Graham publicly discussed the damage caused by the loss of an intelligence 

source prior to the bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 

1983.343

Several examples of harm to U.S. Intelligence Community sources and 

methods have been identified over the past half century. Instances in which 

sensitive sources and methods were compromised during the Cold War 

include: 

Soviet ICBM Testing

On January 31, 1958, an article in the New York Times disclosed that the 

United States had the ability to monitor countdowns for Soviet missile 

launches.344 This ability allowed the U.S. to deploy aircraft to observe and 

collect data from the splashdown sites. After the article was published, the 

Soviets reduced the length of these countdowns from eight hours to four 

hours. The shorter countdown did not provide the lead-time necessary for 

U.S. aircraft to reach their landing areas. President Dwight Eisenhower was 

reportedly “livid” about the disclosure.345 To regain a portion of the lost 

collection capability, the United States had to rebuild and staff an airfield 

in Alaska. 
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Operation BROADSIDE

During the 1960s and 1970s, a clandestine listening post inside the U.S. 

embassy in Moscow intercepted calls made from the limousines of Soviet 

Politburo members. Intelligence obtained from these intercepts was 

classified with the code name GAMMA GUPPY.346 On September 16, 

1971, columnist Jack Anderson published an article in the Washington 

Post disclosing the capabilities of the program. Beyond making a veiled 

reference to the operation or implying a capability, Anderson entitled his 

article “CIA Eavesdrops on Kremlin Chiefs.”347 After the disclosure, the 

Soviets began encrypting these communications.

Project AZORIAN

In 1974 a company owned by Howard Hughes constructed a salvage vessel 

for the CIA. The ship, Glomar Explorer, was specifically built to attempt 

a recovery of a sunken Soviet submarine in the Pacific Ocean. Though 

accounts vary, it was reported that at least one section of the submarine was 

successfully recovered, along with several nuclear torpedoes.348 Before an 

attempt could be made to salvage the remainder of the submarine, media 

outlets obtained information concerning the operation’s existence. 

On February 8, 1975, the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times published 

articles related to the attempted salvage. The Los Angeles Times article was 

titled “U.S. Reported after Russ Sub.”349 The story did not identify Project 

AZORIAN by name and incorrectly reported that the sunken submarine 

was located in the Atlantic Ocean and not the Pacific. Though DCI William 

Colby successfully convinced several news organizations, including the Los 

Angeles Times, to withhold additional reporting, columnist Jack Anderson 

ultimately disclosed a detailed account of the project’s existence during a 

radio broadcast on March 18, 1975.350 Other news organizations, such as 

the New York Times, subsequently published their own articles.351 After the 

disclosure, and before an attempt could be made to recover the remaining 

portion of the submarine, the Soviet Union sent signal vessels to patrol the 

salvage site. 

DCI Colby stated, “There was not a chance we could send the Glomar out 

again on an intelligence project without risking the lives of the crew and 
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inciting a major international incident . . . The Glomar project stopped 

because it was exposed.”352 Colby believed the recovery of the submarine 

would have been the “biggest single intelligence coup in history.”353 Beyond 

attempts to continue salvaging the Soviet submarine, Time magazine later 

reported, “The Glomar Explorer sits idle . . . Had its cover not been blown, 

the ship would have been used for recovering other seabed prizes like 

missile re-entry vehicles and underwater listening devices. Instead, the 

Government has put the vessel up for sale.”354 

Beneficiaries of unauthorized disclosures are not confined to traditional Cold 

War adversaries, such as the Soviet Union. Critics also recognize the negative 

impact to ongoing counterterrorism efforts. In 2007 CIA Director Michael 

Hayden observed that the ongoing disclosure of Intelligence Community 

sources and methods could be “just as damaging as revelations of troop or ship 

movements were in the past.” 356 During his confirmation hearing, Hayden 

criticized the media for aiding terrorists in avoiding capture by disclosing 

information that improved their understanding of U.S. methodologies.357

Former DCI Porter Goss agreed that “terrorists gain an edge when they keep 

their secrets and we don’t keep ours.”358

A 2002 CIA memo appears to corroborate these observations. The 

memorandum concludes that information made available by the U.S. 

media had decreased the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to identify and capture 

members of Al Qaeda:

FIGURE 6 – GLOMAR EXPLORER 355

Source: U.S. Government photo provided by National Security Archive.
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Information obtained from captured detainees has revealed that alQa’ida operatives are extremely security conscious and have altered 

their practices in response to what they have learned from the press 

about our capabilities.359

A translated Al Qaeda training manual also confirms the group’s recognition 

that significant intelligence concerning U.S. capabilities and intentions can 

be collected through the exploitation of the U.S. media:

[W]ithout resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at 

least 80% of information about the enemy. The percentage varies 

depending on the government’s policy on freedom of the press and 

publication. It is possible to gather information through newspapers, 

magazines, books, periodicals, official publications, and enemy 

broadcasts.360

Since the inception of the War on Terror and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

there have been numerous reported instances of unauthorized disclosures 

by the media. Disclosures identified as having harmed Intelligence 

Community sources and methods include:

FIGURE 7 – UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE SATIRE 361

Source: Roger Harvell. Used with permission.
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OBELISK

On September 7, 2007, ABC News revealed that the U.S. government had 

obtained a video of Osama bin Laden four days before its public release 

by Al Qaeda.362 The disclosure reportedly resulted in an order from 

Al Qaeda’s internal security division to discontinue use of its Internet 

communications network, known as “Obelisk.”363 Obelisk, which had 

previously been penetrated, was described as a network of sites used for 

operational activities, such as internal communications, expense reporting, 

and the distribution of propaganda. 

An Associated Press article reported, “Sources that took years to develop 

are now ineffective” and “[A] rare window into the world of al-Qaeda has 

now been sealed shut.”364 Focusing on the disclosure of the video to the 

media, and not the media’s subsequent publication of the information, the 

New York Sun described the loss of access to Obelisk as an “intelligence 

blunder.”365

SWIFT Banking

On June 23, 2006, the New York Times published an article revealing the 

existence of a classified program for analyzing international financial 

records from the Brussels-based SWIFT database.366 The article stated 

that the program was implemented legally, that Congress had received 

multiple briefings, and that several safeguards were established to prevent 

abuse, including the use of an outside auditing firm. The article identified 

several of the program’s successes, including contributions to the capture of 

“Hambali,” the mastermind behind the 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia. 

Hambali was the operations chief of Jemaah Islamiyah, an Asian terrorist 

group and Al Qaeda affiliate. The article also reported that information 

from SWIFT was used to identify Uzair Paracha, a Brooklyn man convicted 

for agreeing to launder funds for Al Qaeda. Both President Bush and Vice 

President Cheney described the disclosure as “disgraceful.”367

On June 28, 2006, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution 

condemning the program’s disclosure.368 The resolution read in part: 

“The Administration, Members of Congress, and the bipartisan chairmen 
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of the 9/11 Commission requested that media organizations not disclose 

details of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program so that terrorists would 

not shift their financing to channels in the international financial system 

that are less easily observed by intelligence agencies.” The resolution also 

stated, “Unauthorized disclosures of sensitive intelligence information 

inflict significant damage to United States activities in the global war on 

terrorism by assisting terrorists in developing countermeasures to evade 

United States intelligence capabilities.” During Congressional debate 

over the resolution, it was also reported that a recovered Al Qaeda memo 

explicitly stated that the group’s efforts had been harmed by the tightening 

of financial outlets.369

Beyond the reported impact of unauthorized disclosures on past and 

present conflicts, critics also identify instances in which the media may 

have compromised sources and methods critical to defending against 

potential future adversaries, such as Iran. These disclosures include:

Operation MERLIN

In the book State of War, author James Risen detailed a CIA operation 

codenamed MERLIN, which allegedly involved attempts to provide 

counterfeit blueprints to Iran for a trigger to a nuclear device that 

contained subtle flaws.370 Risen wrote that President Clinton approved 

the operation and that the Bush administration had endorsed the plan. In 

addition to disclosing the existence and objectives of Operation MERLIN, 

Risen also revealed that the NSA allegedly had the capability to intercept 

communications from the Iranian mission in Vienna and decipher the 

codes of Iran’s intelligence ministry.371 The New York Times, which 

had previously published Risen’s article concerning the NSA Terrorist 

Surveillance Program, did not publish information related to Operation 

MERLIN prior to the publication of State of War. The Times did not 

confirm whether it was aware of the information, but chose not to publish, 

or if Risen had withheld the information. 

In April 2010, the Washington Post reported that a federal grand jury 

had subpoenaed Risen to testify concerning his sources for classified 

information contained in State of War.

372 The article reiterated that the New 
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York Times had not published the information appearing in Risen’s book 

related to attempts to infiltrate Iran’s nuclear program. A judge ultimately 

quashed the subpoena and Risen did not testify. Risen had previously been 

subpoenaed in 2008, but the grand jury had expired prior to the issue being 

resolved.373

In December 2010, former CIA Operations Officer Jeffrey Sterling was 

indicted for disclosing classified information to a member of the media.374

Although the indictment does not specify whether Sterling’s disclosure is 

related to State of War, multiple media outlets have reported the connection. 

As of May 2011, Sterling’s trial was pending in U.S. District Court for the 

Eastern District of Virginia.

National Intelligence Estimate – Iran

In December 2007 the Bush administration declassified findings from a 

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) related to Iran. The NIE concluded 

that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.375 Beyond the 

declassified finding, though, several unauthorized disclosures concerning 

the intelligence underlying the NIE conclusions were also disclosed. The 

Washington Post reported that the CIA had obtained a laptop computer 

from an Iranian who had contacted a German intelligence officer in 

Turkey.376 The laptop reportedly contained information related to Iran’s 

nuclear program. The article also reported that the NSA had intercepted 

a conversation between Iranian officials in 2007, including one military 

officer whose name had appeared on the laptop computer. 

A separate article published in the New York Times reported that notes 

from Iranian officials involved in its weapons development program had 

been obtained by the United States in 2006.377 The Times article also 

discussed the 2007 NSA intercept and laptop computer obtained by the 

CIA. The Times article added that the Iranian who had provided the laptop 

computer was an engineer.

In 1996 Secretary of Defense William Perry summarized the harm to 

sources and methods resulting from disclosures. In a memorandum aimed 

at strengthening controls over classified information, Perry stated that 

intelligence sources and methods were becoming less effective as the result 
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of the disclosure of information from classified intelligence reports. Perry 

requested that the Department of Defense and CIA review distribution 

procedures to “significantly reduce the access to information revealing 

intelligence sources and methods.”378

FIGURE 8 – UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE SATIRE 379 

Source: Harley Schwadron and www.CartoonStock.com. Used with permission.

If implemented, this tightening would have had the secondary effect of 

limiting legitimate access to intelligence by intelligence professionals 

and policymakers. This failure to share information was specifically 

cited as contributing to the intelligence failures identified by the WMD 

Commission nine years later. Ultimately, unauthorized disclosures of 

sources and methods may not only increase our adversaries’ knowledge of 

U.S. capabilities but also decrease critical information sharing within the 

U.S. Intelligence Community. 
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Potential Loss of Life

I can say as a matter of first principal that the unauthorized disclosure 

of classified information has actually led to the deaths of individuals 

who would not otherwise have been subjected to that, had this 

information not been inappropriately put into the public domain.380

- General Michael Hayden

If . . . these newspapers proceed to publish the critical documents and 

there results therefrom the death of soldiers . . . (the) prolongation of 

the war and further delay in the freeing of United States prisoners, 

then the Nation’s people will know where the responsibility for these 

sad consequences rests.381

- Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun

One particularly vulnerable source of intelligence is HUMINT, information 

derived from a human source. As opposed to imagery from a satellite or 

communications intercepted by a remote listening device, the compromise 

of a human source may result not only in loss of intelligence, but also 

loss of life. Advocates of reducing the level of unauthorized disclosures 

have focused attention on this intelligence source based on the increased 

sensitivities involved when lives are placed at risk. 

When discussing the potential threat to life from unauthorized disclosures, 

the primary focus has been on Intelligence Community employees, such 

as Case Officers for the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. These are the 

individuals who collect information concerning an adversary’s capabilities 

and intentions from recruited assets. Unfortunately, there have reportedly 

been instances in which an unauthorized disclosure by the media 

contributed to the death of members of the IC.

Counterspy and Covert Action Bulleting

In 1969 Philip Agee resigned from the CIA after a 12-year career as a case 

officer. Agee indicated that he had become disillusioned with the CIA’s 

overseas activities.382 After his resignation, Agee published three books, 

Inside the Company: CIA Diary (1975); Dirty Work: The CIA in Western 
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Europe (1978); and Dirty Work: The CIA in Africa (1979). The books are 

reported to contain the names of several thousand CIA employees and 

other individuals affiliated with the CIA. In response to the disclosure of 

their identities, the CIA was reportedly required to terminate several active 

assignments.383

In 1975 Counterspy, a magazine with which Agee was affiliated, identified 

Richard Welch as a covert CIA employee.384 The Athens Daily News 

republished Welch’s identity on November 25, 1975. Welch was assigned 

as the chief of station in Athens, Greece, at the time, the highest-ranking 

CIA officer in the country. On December 24, 1975, Welch was assassinated 

outside his home in Athens. Agee had previously been quoted in Counterspy

as saying, “The most effective and important systematic attempts to combat 

the CIA that can be undertaken right now are, I think, the identification, 

exposure, and neutralization of its people working abroad.”385 On December 

29, 1975, the Washington Post commented that the “public identification of 

Richard Welch was tantamount to an open invitation to kill him.”386 Though 

additional factors were identified, DCI William Colby believed that the 

naming of Welch in Counterspy had contributed to his death.387

In subsequent Congressional hearings, Agee was accused of revealing to the 

Soviet Union that Jerzy Pawloski, a Polish national, was working as a U.S. 

agent.388 Pawlowski had previously been arrested by the Soviets, convicted 

for spying on behalf of the CIA and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. 

MI6, England’s Secret Intelligence Service, also blamed Agee for the death 

of two of its agents in Poland. 

In 1979 Agee began publishing the magazine Covert Action Bulletin. On 

July 2, 1980, the magazine revealed the identities of 15 alleged CIA officials 

working in Jamaica. They included Richard Kinsman, identified as the 

chief of station in that country. Two days later, Kinsman and his family 

survived an attack on their home by men armed with machineguns and a 

small bomb.389 An attempt to assassinate another U.S. official in Jamaica 

occurred three days later. 

Agee’s exposure of individuals affiliated with the CIA was cited as one of the 

primary motivations for the enactment of the 1982 Intelligence Identities 
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Protection Act. The Act makes it a felony to disclose the identity of a covert 

U.S. agent. 

Mossad in Syria

At a 2006 conference, former DCI James Woolsey remarked, “Agents have 

been blown and people have been killed by press reports . . .”390 To support 

this assertion, he identified a second intelligence officer who was executed as 

the result of an unauthorized disclosure by the press. Woolsey stated that the 

Israeli press had published an article containing information obtained in Syria 

by an agent of the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service.391 Woolsey asserted 

that the Syrians were able to identify and capture the agent, Eli Cohen, based 

on the information contained in the article. Cohen was convicted of espionage 

and hanged on May 18, 1965. 

FIGURE 9 – MOSSAD AGENT ELI COHEN 392

Source of photo on left: CDI Systems. Used with permission. 

Source of photo on right: Public domain.

Intelligence officers are not the only individuals endangered by unauthorized 

disclosures. Disclosures by the media have also been associated with 

the death of military members off the battlefield. Former Secretaries of 

Defense, to include William Perry and Donald Rumsfeld, have discussed 
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the additional threat to military personnel posed by disclosures of classified 

information.393,394 Unauthorized disclosures linked to the deaths of 

members of the military include:

Beirut Barracks

As reported by the former CEO of the Washington Post, Katharine 

Graham, the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in 

Beirut potentially could have been averted if the media had not disclosed 

classified information. Graham wrote that, five months prior to the attack, 

a television network and a newspaper disclosed that the United States had 

been intercepting encrypted communications between a terrorist group in 

Syria and Iran.395 The disclosure was made after 60 people were killed by a 

bomb attack in April 1983 at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. 

Graham stated that the communications were discontinued shortly after 

the disclosure (an additional example of the loss of an intelligence source). 

She added that the same terrorist group apparently carried out the attack 

on the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, killing 241 servicemen. 

Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward also identified this incident as 

an example of a harmful disclosure. In 1988 Woodward wrote, “I think that 

was a genuine, serious mistake and intelligence was lost and I think you 

can argue that some of your colleagues may have died in ’84 because that 

intelligence was lost.”396

FIGURE 10 – USMC BARRACKS – BEIRUT, 1983 397

Source of photo on left: Long Commission Report, commissioned by 

U.S. Government.

Source of photo on right: U.S. Marine Corps.
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TWA Flight 847

On May 12, 1985, the Washington Post disclosed that President Reagan 

had approved a covert operation for the CIA to train and support 

counterterrorist units in the Middle East.398 The article reported that one 

of these units later killed 80 people during a March 1985 attack in Beirut. 

Three months later, on June 14, 1985, members of the terrorist group 

Hezbollah hijacked TWA Flight 847. The hijackers tortured and executed one 

of the passengers, U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem, shooting him in the back 

of the head and dropping his body onto a runway in Beirut.399 The hijackers 

reportedly cited the CIA’s involvement in the March attack as justification 

for Stethem’s murder.400 A subsequent investigation by the HPSCI found no 

evidence that the CIA had encouraged or participated in terrorist activity in 

Lebanon.

PURPLE and MAGIC

One of the most frequently cited examples of a harmful disclosure of 

classified information by the media occurred in 1942. While onboard 

a U.S. Navy ship returning from the Pacific, Chicago Tribune reporter 

Stanley Johnston discovered that the United States had intercepted the 

Japanese order of battle prior to the Battle of Midway.401 As a result of 

this intelligence, Admiral Nimitz was able to ignore a Japanese feint and 

concentrate the American fleet near Midway Island. The naval victory at 

Midway is considered one of the most significant of World War II. After 

learning of the intercepts, Johnston wrote, and the Tribune published, an 

article titled “Navy Had Word of Jap Plan to Strike at Sea.” The information 

in the article was attributed to “reliable sources in naval intelligence.”402

The inescapable conclusion of the article was that the United States had 

decrypted the Japanese military code, known as JN-25 or PURPLE. Soon 

after the article was published, syndicated columnist Walter Winchell 

asserted that the Tribune article was based on decoded Japanese messages.403

This capability had been one of the most closely guarded secrets of the 

war and was credited with shortening the war in the Pacific. Intelligence 

derived from decrypted Japanese communications was classified by the 

code name MAGIC.
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President Roosevelt reportedly had to be dissuaded from sending the 

Marines to shut down the newspaper and charging Chicago Tribune 

publisher Robert McCormick with treason.404 The Navy was concerned 

that a trial would draw additional attention to the article. McCormick, 

an isolationist and ardent critic of Roosevelt, had opposed U.S. entrance 

into World War II.405 A grand jury was empanelled, but the Navy refused 

to cooperate with the Justice Department. In addition, JN-25 had been 

decrypted. As described by former DCI James Woolsey in 2006, “That one 

story could have changed the outcome of World War II in the Pacific.”406 

Other lives may also be placed in jeopardy by unauthorized disclosures. This 

includes individuals not directly affiliated with the IC or the military, such 

as American and foreign civilians who voluntarily assist U.S. intelligence 

agencies. Speaking before the Society of Professional Journalists in 1986, 

DCI William Casey addressed the threat to foreign assets, stating that 

recruited sources “have not been heard from after their information has 

been published in the U.S. press.”407 Director of the CIA Michael Hayden 

commented in 2007: “[I]n one case, leaks provided ammunition for a 

government to prosecute and imprison one of our sources, whose family 

was also endangered. The revelations had an immediate, chilling effect on 

our ability to collect against a top-priority target.”408

Examples of the threat to civilians from unauthorized disclosures include:

Disclosure of U.S. Military Field Reports by WikiLeaks

In July 2010, the Internet-based organization WikiLeaks posted 

information on its website from over 75,000 classified U.S. military field 

reports concerning the war in Afghanistan. WikiLeaks did not identify 

its source for the reports. Prior to publishing the information, WikiLeaks 

allowed the New York Times, the British newspaper The Guardian, and the 

German magazine Der Spiegel to review the documents. All three media 

outlets published articles containing information from the classified 

reports. In October 2010, WikiLeaks posted almost 400,000 additional 

classified documents related to the war in Iraq. 

Soon after WikiLeaks posted information from the classified reports on 

its website, concerns were raised that the identities of Afghan citizens 
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cooperating with U.S. and NATO forces had been exposed. Though the 

New York Times did not identify any of these individuals in its articles, 

it reported that “names or other identifying features of dozens of Afghan 

informants, potential defectors and others who were cooperating with 

American and NATO troops” could be found on the WikiLeaks website.409

Afghan President Harmid Karzai called the disclosures “extremely 

irresponsible and shocking,” adding that the lives of any Afghans identified 

would be endangered.410 Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, also voiced his concerns that WikiLeaks “might 

already have on their hands the blood of some young soldier or that of 

an Afghan family.”411 In apparent confirmation of President Karzai’s and 

Admiral Mullen’s fears, a Taliban spokesman stated that the Taliban was 

studying the disclosed information and would “punish” anyone identified 

as collaborating with U.S. forces.412

Representatives from five human rights organizations—Amnesty 

International, Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), 

Open Society Institute (OSI), Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 

Commission, and the Kabul office of International Crisis Group (ICG)—

contacted WikiLeaks to voice their concerns.413 The representatives urged 

WikiLeaks to remove or redact the documents containing identifying 

information. 

In the book WikiLeaks: Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy, a journalist from The 

Guardian documents a conversation with WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, 

concerning the identification of foreign nationals in the compromised 

documents. During the discussion, Assange reportedly remarked: “Well, 

they’re informants. So, if they get killed, they’ve got it coming to them. They 

deserve it.”414 Assange has denied making this statement and indicated that 

he intends to sue The Guardian for libel.415

In a commentary concerning the potential breadth of harm resulting from 

the disclosures, former Director of both the CIA and the NSA Michael 

Hayden remarked:

What potential sources in Afghanistan will now believe that America 

can protect them? Why would anyone in that troubled land bet 
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his family’s well-being and future on such a well-intentioned but 

obviously porous partner, whatever hope or vision for the future 

this potential source might harbor? And we will never know who 

will now not come forward, who will not provide us with life-saving 

information, who will decide he cannot opt for a common effort 

against a common enemy. But we can be certain that the cost will 

be great.416

U.S. Army Private First Class Bradley Manning has been identified as a 

person of interest in the disclosure of the Afghan-related military reports 

to WikiLeaks.417 As of May 2011, Manning was being held in pre-trial 

confinement at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on charges related to the 

disclosure of classified information to an unauthorized person.418

Koran Desecration

On May 9, 2005, Newsweek published an article by Michael Isikoff 

disclosing that military guards at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, had desecrated 

a copy of the Koran by flushing it down the toilet.419 Isikoff attributed the 

information to an anonymous senior government official. The desecration 

of the Koran is reportedly a death penalty offense in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. After the allegation was republished on the front page of several 

newspapers in Pakistan, the Pakistani Parliament passed a unanimous 

resolution condemning the desecration.420

According to National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, radical Islamic 

elements used the report as a justification to incite protests in both Pakistan 

and Afghanistan.421 These protests resulted in 17 deaths and numerous 

injuries.422 After the protests, Isikoff wrote that Newsweek was “caught off 

guard,” adding, “We obviously blame ourselves for not understanding the 

potential ramifications.”423

Controversy over the disclosure intensified when Newsweek retracted the 

story one week later. In a published statement, it was acknowledged that the 

single anonymous source had not directly observed the alleged desecration 

and had “expressed doubt about his own knowledge of the accusation 

against the guards.”424 A Pentagon investigation was unable to corroborate 

the desecration. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard 
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Myers, stated that Defense Department investigators identified only one 

uncorroborated incident with any similarities to the allegation.425 In that 

case, a detainee reportedly attempted to block a toilet pipe using pages 

from a Koran. In response to the incident, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Public Affairs Richard Boucher stated, “It’s appalling, really, that an article 

that was unfounded to begin with has caused so much harm, including loss 

of life.”426

Newsweek reportedly issued rigorous new rules for using material from 

unidentified sources as a result of the article.427

CIA Recruiting Iranians

In January 2002 the Los Angeles Times published an article by Greg Miller 

entitled “CIA Looks to Los Angeles for Would-Be Iranian Spies.”428 The article 

details CIA efforts to recruit U.S. citizens, particularly in the Los Angeles area, 

with family members still residing in Iran. The article alleges that the CIA had 

successfully recruited “foreign students and other visitors to America, who 

return to their home countries and provide valuable information for the 

United States.” Miller identified the potential for harm in the same article, 

reporting that individuals caught spying in Iran face severe punishment, 

including execution. Prior to publication, DCI George Tenet urged Los 

Angeles Times managing editor Dean Baquet to withhold the story.429 

Baquet withheld the story for one day but then published the article, stating 

“They were kidding themselves if they thought it wouldn’t get out.”430

After the story was published, a representative from the CIA Public Affairs 

Office noted, “The plan to use the Iranian Americans to bring back intelligence 

had worked quite well, but not since the Times story.”431 The officer added, 

“The press can’t have it both ways, criticizing us for not knowing things and 

then making it harder for us to find out things and do our job.” The officer also 

noted that Iranian expatriates traveling to Iran from the United States would 

find themselves under much greater scrutiny. Though no causal relationship can 

be concluded, a 2007 article in Commentary magazine reported that four U.S. 

citizens had been detained in Iran subsequent to the publication of the Times

article.432 At least one of the individuals was from Southern California.
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Soviet Mechanic

As previously identified, a 1971 article published in the Washington Post

disclosed the existence of the classified program BROADSIDE, which 

involved intercepting phone calls made from Soviet limousines. A 2003 

article reported that a Soviet mechanic hired by the CIA to install covert 

listening devices in the limousines had “disappeared” after the Post article 

was published.433

Though the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were enacted to safeguard 

individual liberties, including the First Amendment’s right to a free press, 

the courts and members of Congress have recognized that protecting 

life is of paramount importance. In ordering the preliminary injunction 

prohibiting Progressive magazine from publishing instructions for 

constructing a hydrogen bomb, District Judge Robert Warren wrote:

While it may be true . . . as Patrick Henry instructs us, that one would 

prefer death to life without liberty . . . one cannot enjoy freedom of 

speech, freedom to worship or freedom of the press unless one first 

enjoys the freedom to live.434

In the Supreme Court case Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 

(1963), Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote in his opinion, 

“[W]hile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, 

it is not a suicide pact.”435 In 2006 Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas remarked: “I am a strong supporter of the First Amendment, the Fourth 

Amendment and civil liberties, but you have no civil liberties if you are 

dead.”436 Unauthorized disclosures are also perceived to impact foreign 

policy negatively, including both the deliberation necessary to shape national policy as well as the implementation of approved policies. 

Impact on the Development and Implementation of 

Foreign Policy

[T]he development of considered and intelligent international policies 

would be impossible if those charged with their formulation could not 

communicate with each other freely, frankly, and in confidence.437

- Justice Potter Stewart, New York Times v. United States
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[W]e cannot invariably install, as the ultimate arbiter of disclosure, 

even the conscience of the well-meaning employee . . . Vital decisions . . 

. by elected representatives would be subject to summary derailment at 

the pleasure of one disgruntled employee.438

- Judge Harvie Wilkinson, US v. Morison

Foreign policy decisions are normally preceded by extensive debate. 

Several options may be proposed and rejected before a final decision is 

made. Reaching a consensus, particularly in the current climate of political 

partisanship, is uncommon. Though the deliberative process may not 

always be conclusive, or even civil, it is vital in the formation of U.S. policy. 

An unauthorized disclosure during this process damages the opportunity 

for meaningful dialogue. Potential alternatives may not be supported, or 

even considered, if officials are concerned about the repercussions of being 

associated with an unpopular or unsuccessful policy. 

This concern is particularly compelling when deliberations involve a 

covert operation or other IC activity. Policy decisions involving classified 

programs are controversial by their very nature because they involve 

concealing information from the public. If a government official has to 

consider the possibility that a classified operation will be exposed, not only 

by a foreign adversary but also by a political adversary, the potential to 

garner his/her support may be diminished. As recently as November 2009, 

President Barack Obama expressed his frustration over unauthorized 

disclosures related to ongoing administration deliberations. 

Troop Levels in Afghanistan

In mid-2009, the Obama administration was deliberating the deployment 

of additional troops to augment U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In September 

2009, Bob Woodward published an article in the Washington Post containing 

information from a “confidential assessment” prepared by General Stanley 

McChrystal, the U.S. Commander in Afghanistan.439 According to the 

article, McChrystal assessed that, if additional troops were not deployed, 

the administration risked “mission failure.” Three weeks later, the New York 

Times disclosed that Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan 
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and McChrystal’s predecessor, submitted a classified cable to the White 

House outlining his reservations about deploying additional U.S. troops, 

and his concerns regarding the Afghan government.440 On November 19, 

2009, President Obama specifically addressed his frustration over these 

disclosures: 

I think I am angrier than Bob Gates about it, partly because we have 

these deliberations in the Situation Room for a reason — because 

we are making decisions that are life-and-death, that affect how our 

troops will be able to operate in a theater of war. For people to be 

releasing information during the course of deliberation – where we 

haven’t made final decisions yet – I think is not appropriate.”441

In December 2009 the Obama administration elected to deploy 

approximately 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan. The disclosures 

did not end with this decision, however. On January 25, 2010, the New 

York Times published a copy of Ambassador Eikenberry’s entire classified 

cable.442 The article indicates that an American official had provided a 

copy of the cable to the New York Times “after a reporter requested them.”

Several other historical examples illustrate how concern over unauthorized 

disclosures influenced either the development of a policy or implementation 

of a policy decision:

National Intelligence Estimate – Iran

As previously discussed, the Bush administration made the decision to 

declassify findings from a December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate 

(NIE) related to Iran. Two months prior to the release, Director of National 

Intelligence Michael McConnell had published a statement which read, 

“It is the policy of the Director of National Intelligence that KJs [Key 

Judgments of an NIE] should not be declassified.”443 After the Iran NIE 

findings were published, the Washington Post reported that the decision 

had been made “out of fear of leaks and charges of a cover-up.”444

In this instance, it appears that a valid and legal policy decision, not to 

disclose classified information, had been altered because officials were 
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resigned that the information would eventually be compromised. After 

these Key Judgments were released, classified information concerning the 

intelligence underlying the findings was also disclosed by the Washington 

Post445 and the New York Times.

446 These disclosures involved intelligence 

from both human and technical collection sources. 

Covert Action in Pakistan

In January 2008 the New York Times reported that President Bush and 

senior national security advisors were considering expanding the authority 

of the military and the CIA to conduct covert operations inside Pakistan’s 

borders.447 The article speculated on the manner in which these “highly 

classified” covert actions could be carried out and reported that the United 

States already had approximately 50 members of the military operating 

inside Pakistan. The article specifically stated that the officials disclosing the 

information wished to remain anonymous “because of the highly delicate 

nature of the discussions.” The article added that American diplomats and 

military officials critical of the operations being deliberated believed their 

exposure could result in a tremendous backlash, including angering the 

Pakistani Army, increasing support for anti-government militants, and 

reducing support for Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. 

In response to the unauthorized disclosure, Pakistan’s chief military 

spokesman stated, “It is not up to the U.S. administration, it is Pakistan’s 

government which is responsible for this country.”448 He also rejected 

the idea that the United States should conduct covert operations inside 

Pakistan. 

Even in cases where an administration is able to conduct sensitive 

deliberations confidentially, the ability to implement a policy can still be 

impacted by an unauthorized disclosure. Almost all policy decisions will 

have detractors. As noted by Judge Wilkinson, unauthorized disclosures 

may permit the judgments of a single opponent to override the entire 

policy process. Based on the threat of an unauthorized disclosure, the 

implementation of complex covert actions can become dependent on the 

continued good grace of every government official with knowledge of the 

activity. 
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At a 1984 conference held at Columbia University, James Schlesinger, former 

DCI and Secretary of Defense, commented that unauthorized disclosures 

had become routine and that this breakdown in discipline had made it 

“virtually impossible” to conduct covert operations.449 Seventeen years 

later, Attorney General John Ashcroft confirmed that the unauthorized 

disclosure of classified government information had hampered legitimate 

government policies.450

Examples of the impact of unauthorized disclosures on the implementation 

of policies include:

Support to Egyptian Operation

In 1983 Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak requested support from the 

United States for a joint operation targeting Libya. U.S. support for the 

operation would include the use of AWACS aircraft to assist Egyptian pilots. 

Though the policy decision was not unanimous, the Reagan administration 

agreed to support the operation. As part of the agreement, President 

Mubarak required that U.S. involvement remain covert.451 Opponents 

of the policy reportedly included senators Joseph Biden, Patrick Leahy, 

and David Durenberger. ABC reporter Brit Hume later reported that 

Senator Biden threatened on two occasions to expose U.S. involvement 

in the operation.452 The Washington Times reported that senators Leahy 

and Durenberger wrote a letter to DCI William Casey, also threatening to 

expose the operation.453

During final preparations for the operation, which had taken over a year to 

plan, the administration learned that ABC was preparing a story detailing 

a portion of the operational plan, the movement of the USS Nimitz closer 

to the Libyan coast. National Security Advisor William Clark met with 

ABC executives and, without revealing the complete operation, requested 

that ABC withhold publication. ABC agreed to delay broadcast for 24 

hours but then released the story. Other media organizations, including 

the Washington Post, also published articles related to the operation. After 

the disclosures, the operation was aborted. The Washington Post later 

quoted administration officials who stated that the disclosure revealed 

U.S. intentions and broke Mubarak’s condition that U.S. support remain 

confidential.454
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Non-Lethal Presidential Findings

In May 2007 ABC News reported that President Bush had signed a nonlethal “Presidential finding” related to Iran.455 A Presidential finding is a 

directive approving the execution of a covert operation. The online article 

noted that Presidential findings are classified, adding that they are briefed 

to members of Congress, including the House and Senate Intelligence 

Committees. The addition of the term “non-lethal” indicates that the 

CIA was not authorized to use deadly force during the operation. The 

reported objective of this particular CIA operation was to pressure Iran 

to discontinue its nuclear program without resorting to military force. 

The article’s author recognized the sensitivity of the Presidential finding, 

noting that the covert action could lead to Iranian retaliation and a “cycle 

of escalation.”456

In a separate disclosure five months after the ABC News article, the British 

newspaper The Telegraph published an article revealing that President 

Bush had also signed a non-lethal Presidential finding concerning 

Hezbollah.457 The finding reportedly authorized the CIA to assist the 

Lebanese government in preventing increased Iranian influence in the 

region, including Iranian support for Hezbollah. The article stated that 

Saudi Arabian officials were included in deliberations and that the U.S. 

Congress had been briefed on the finding. As previously noted, U.S. and 

CIA involvement in the Middle East had been identified as a justification 

for Hezbollah hijackers to execute a member of the U.S. Navy in 1985.

Ironically, even policy decisions concerning unauthorized disclosures 

are susceptible to disclosure. In January 1982, after a series of disclosures 

by the media, the Reagan administration published National Security 

Decision Directive (NSDD) 19, “Protection of Classified National Security 

Council and Intelligence Information.”458 The directive enacted specific 

measures in an attempt to reduce disclosures. Disclosures that preceded 

the directive, and may have led to its creation, related to cost overruns in 

the Defense Department and a decision not to sell the current generation 

of jet fighters to Taiwan. 

Announcement of the NSDD-19 guidelines had to be rushed because news 

of its existence was beginning to leak.459 Whether coincidence or not, the 
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day after the directive was published another disclosure revealed that the 

United States had detected crates of Soviet aircraft near Havana.460

The impact unauthorized disclosures have on policy deliberations and 

their implementation appears to be among the most frustrating categories 

of harm for government officials. This is a result of the enormous impact a 

single discontented individual can have on a lengthy and complex policy 

process.

FIGURE 11 – UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE SATIRE 461

Source: Harley Schwadron and www.CartoonStock.com. Used with permission.

Effect on International Alliances

In at least two instances . . . the foreign liaison services refused to share 

crucial information with the United States because of fear of leaks.462

- WMD Commission Report
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The massive hemorrhage of state secrets was bound to raise doubts 

about our reliability and about the stability of our political system.463

- Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State and 

National Security Advisor

As complicated as the implementation of domestic policies can be, 

successfully conducting international diplomacy is almost assuredly 

more complex. Beyond balancing internal interests, diplomacy requires 

the ability to achieve consensus with foreign government(s), which have 

their own, potentially competing, motivations. Fragile negotiations and 

partnerships can collapse if one party believes their interests are not being 

served. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart believed it was “elementary” 

that diplomacy required secrecy, and that other nations could not deal with 

the United States “unless they can be assured that their confidences would 

be kept.”464

During June 2000 testimony before the SSCI, Attorney General Janet 

Reno specifically cited the damage unauthorized disclosures can cause to 

diplomatic efforts and liaison relationships.465 In an environment where 

an increased emphasis has been placed on responding to international 

incidents with a coalition, rather than through unilateral action, any harm 

to international relationships resulting from unauthorized disclosures will 

be magnified. 

Cases in which unauthorized disclosures are reported to have damaged 

relations with a foreign ally include:

Net-Centric Diplomacy

In November 2010, the Internet-based organization WikiLeaks began 

releasing classified U.S. State Department cables from a reported cache of 

more than 250,000 documents it had obtained from an unknown source. 

The diplomatic cables were part of an electronic database referred to as 

Net-Centric Diplomacy. The cables contained assessments of foreign 

governments and officials by U.S. embassy and consulate staff. 

Mexican President Felipe Calderon described the harm to U.S. relations 

resulting from the disclosures as “severe.”466 Calderon personally called 
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for the removal of U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Carlos Pascual. Pascual, 

who had been critical of the Calderon administration in several of the 

compromised cables, ultimately resigned his position and returned 

to the United States.467 In addition to Pascual, the U.S. Ambassador to 

Ecuador was also expelled from the country and the U.S. Ambassador 

to Libya recalled to the United States.468 The Ecuadorian government 

reportedly expelled the U.S. Ambassador in response to a compromised 

cable discussing high-level corruption in the police force and possible 

knowledge by Ecuador’s President.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton denounced WikiLeaks’ disclosure of 

the classified diplomatic cables.469 Clinton stated that the compromise 

undermined efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems 

and tore “at the fabric of the proper function of responsible government.” 

She added that individuals who dedicated their lives to protecting others 

faced serious repercussions, including imprisonment, torture, and death. 

Clinton was confident, though, that U.S. relationships with foreign 

governments would endure despite the more immediate harm. 

Hadley Memo

On November 29, 2006, the New York Times published the text of a 

memorandum prepared by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley.470

The article described the memo as a secret document prepared for Cabinetlevel officials. In the memo Hadley was critical of Iraqi Prime Minister 

Nuri al-Maliki, stating he was either unwilling or unable to control the 

violence in Iraq, or he was possibly ignorant of its true extent. 

A second New York Times article, published the same day, indicated that 

the Bush administration was specifically seeking to avoid public criticism 

of Maliki. The article also reported that a meeting between President Bush 

and Maliki, scheduled for the day the classified memo was published, had 

been cancelled at the last minute.471

Stinger Missiles to Angola

In 1986 the United States agreed to ship Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to 

Angola.472 As part of the operation, DCI William Casey flew to Africa 
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to arrange for the missiles to be shipped through Zaire. Zaire agreed to 

participate, on the condition that it not be linked to the transfer. Ultimately, 

information concerning these shipments was disclosed to the Washington 

Post, which published an article exposing the operation. In this case, the 

government is reported to have identified the U.S. official who provided the 

information to the Post, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning 

Michael Pillsbury. Pillsbury reportedly failed three polygraph tests and was 

fired from his position in April 1986.473

Military Aircraft to Taiwan

On January 11, 1982, the Washington Post disclosed that the Reagan 

administration had agreed to sell F5-E fighter jets to Taiwan, but had 

denied its request for more advanced fighters.474 On January 13, White 

House spokesman Larry Speakes condemned the disclosure because it 

“did not allow us to conduct foreign policy in an orderly manner.” Speakes 

added that the administration had not concluded consulting with allies or 

with members of Congress when the disclosure occurred. 

As mentioned above, National Security Decision Directive 19, outlining 

the administration’s intention to implement greater control over access to 

classified information, was published soon after the Taiwan disclosure.475 

When publication of the directive was announced, the Taiwan disclosure 

was specifically cited as a justification for the enhanced security measures. 

At a news conference held a week after the Taiwan disclosure, President 

Reagan complained that leaks “had reached a new high.”476

Unauthorized disclosures not only harm state-to-state relations, but 

also relationships between the U.S. Intelligence Community and allied 

intelligence services. Based on the increased requirement to collect 

information in support of U.S. interests worldwide, the ability to collaborate 

with foreign intelligence services continues to be crucial. Historically, many 

of the most successful intelligence operations have relied on cooperation 

among allied intelligence services. These include Operation FORTITUDE, 

a deception operation to conceal the Allies’ landing at Normandy in 1944, 

and ULTRA, the Allied program to decrypt German communications 

encoded by its Enigma machines. 
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If allied intelligence services are expected to continue working jointly with 

the United States, intelligence sources and methods must be protected. If 

an agency is concerned that its intelligence will be compromised, it may 

refuse to share valuable information. If the allied intelligence service fears 

participation in joint operations will be exposed, it may elect not to provide 

assistance. In 2005 Congressman Peter Hoekstra of New York noted, “The 

loss of foreign partners would undoubtedly create overwhelming gaps in 

our ability to collect good intelligence around the globe.”477

In 1979 DCI Stansfield Turner discussed the harm to relationships 

resulting from a perception that the U.S. was unable to protect classified 

information. During testimony in a case involving disclosures contained in 

a book written by former CIA employee Frank Snepp, Turner stated, “We 

have had very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence 

services with whom we conduct liaison, who have questioned whether 

they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not 

remain secret.”478 In 2007 CIA Director Michael Hayden confirmed that 

allied intelligence services withheld intelligence as a result of unauthorized 

disclosures by the U.S. media:

Several years before the 9/11 attacks, a press leak of liaison 

intelligence prompted one country’s service to stop cooperating with 

us on counterterrorism for two years. More recently, more than one 

foreign service has told us that, because of public disclosures, they 

had to withhold intelligence that they otherwise would have shared 

with us. That gap in information puts Americans at risk.479

Examples of unauthorized disclosures concerning collaboration with allied 

intelligence services, and the harm to continued relations, include: 

Curveball

Among the findings of the WMD Commission, it was reported that foreign 

intelligence services refused to share intelligence with the United States on 

at least two occasions because of concerns that their intelligence would be 

disclosed.480 One of these cases involved an asset recruited by a foreign 

intelligence service, codenamed “Curveball.” Curveball was reported to be 
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an Iraqi defector with information concerning the status of Iraq’s WMD 

program. 

The reliance on erroneous information obtained from Curveball was 

reported to be one of the causes of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 

inaccurate assessment of the status of Iraq’s weapons program.481 It was 

also reported that the foreign intelligence service had refused numerous 

requests by the CIA for direct access to Curveball.482 Direct access may 

have resulted in a better assessment of his credibility, allowing the CIA to 

conclude that he was unreliable. 

During 2006 Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, Gabriel Schoenfeld, 

senior editor for Commentary magazine, testified that the media should be 

held partially responsible for the flawed intelligence, based on the foreign 

(identified as German) intelligence service’s refusal to grant access to the 

informant. The refusal to allow access to Curveball was reportedly based 

on a fear that his identity would be exposed. 483 Validating these concerns, 

Curveball’s identity was later revealed by CBS.484

CIA Detention Facilities

On November 2, 2005, the Washington Post published an article reporting 

the existence of a system of covert CIA detention facilities in Eastern 

Europe,485 for which journalist Dana Priest was awarded a Pulitzer 

Prize. In announcing that the HPSCI would be investigating this and 

other disclosures, Chairman Peter Hoekstra stated that the greatest 

harm realized was to U.S. relations with countries that conducted joint 

intelligence operations with the United States.486 A separate article quoted 

a government official who stated that the disclosure by Priest caused an 

“international uproar” and “did significant damage to relationships between 

the U.S. and allied intelligence agencies.”487 In 2006 it was reported that a 

senior CIA official was fired as a consequence of her unlawful contact with 

Priest and the disclosure of classified information to her.488

Almost two years after the initial disclosure by the Washington Post, a 2007 

Council of Europe report disclosed that two of the detention facilities were 

located in Poland and Romania. The report stated that “sources in the CIA” 

had confirmed the locations.489 In this case, not only had information 
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concerning a classified program been disclosed to the American public, 

but CIA officials are also alleged to have disclosed classified information 

directly to a foreign government official. A former undersecretary of 

defense wrote that more than one of the foreign governments that had 

allowed the CIA facilities in their country had subsequently rescinded 

their approval.490

Pakistani Collaboration with Afghan Insurgents

In June 2010, the New York Times published an article alleged to contain 

information obtained from classified U.S. military field reports.491 Over 

70,000 classified reports relating to the war in Afghanistan had been made 

available to the Times, the British newspaper The Guardian, and the German 

magazine Der Spiegel by the Internet-based organization WikiLeaks. 

WikiLeaks subsequently posted the classified reports on its website. The 

identity of WikiLeaks’ original source for the reports was not identified. 

In October 2010 WikiLeaks published almost 400,000 additional classified 

military reports concerning the war in Iraq.

Information contained in the military documents report suspected 

collaboration between Pakistan’s intelligence service, Inter-Services 

Intelligence (ISI), and elements of the Afghan insurgency. The reports 

suggest that representatives from ISI met directly with Afghan insurgents, 

including the Taliban, to provide material support and to review strategies.

Pakistani officials are reported to have reacted angrily to the disclosures, 

stating that they could have “damaging consequences for Pakistan’s 

relations with the United States.”492 Pakistani officials also questioned 

whether the United States could be trusted with sensitive information. A 

senior ISI official suggested that his agency might need to “reexamine its 

cooperation” with the United States if the CIA did not denounce allegations 

involving the ISI. A former head of the ISI was also quoted as saying that 

Pakistan should end its alliance with the United States altogether.

Concern over the impact unauthorized disclosures can have on intelligence 

relationships is not a recent development. At least four former Directors of 

Central Intelligence recognized and commented on this threat. In 1979 

DCI William Colby confirmed that “Foreign intelligence services were 
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reluctant to share sensitive information with us because they thought it 

would not be protected.”493 In 1986 DCI Casey wrote:

Leaders and intelligence services of our closest allies have told us 

that if we can’t tighten up, they will have to pull back on cooperation 

with us because they have had enough of reading the information 

they provide in the U.S. media.494

DCI Robert Gates made a similar pronouncement two years later. In 1988 

he wrote: “Unauthorized disclosures have damaged U.S. relationships 

with other intelligence services and have dissuaded potential agents from 

accepting the risks of working on behalf of the United States.”495 DCI 

Porter Goss also discussed the threat to international alliances in 2006:

Because of the number of recent news reports discussing our 

relationships with other intelligence services, some of these 

partners have even informed the CIA that they are reconsidering 

their participation in some of our most important antiterrorism 

ventures.496

Because information sharing among governments and intelligence services 

is particularly crucial during wartime, the consequences of unauthorized 

disclosures can be all the more devastating. As evidenced by the intelligence 

successes of World War II, cooperation among intelligence services may 

ultimately play a decisive role in a U.S. victory, or defeat.

Though not as provocative as the threat to human life or harm to 

international alliances, the financial cost to the Intelligence Community is 

also reported to be significant. 

Financial Costs

In our classified report, we detail several leaks that have collectively 

cost the American people hundreds of millions of dollars, and have 

done grave harm to national security.497

- WMD Commission Report, 2005

The harm caused by unauthorized disclosures has been described both 

in terms of increasing financial costs for the United States and decreasing 
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costs for U.S. adversaries. In separate speeches in 1986, DCI William 

Casey described both sides of the issue. In an April 1986 speech before the 

American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE), Casey remarked:

Stories in both the print and electronic media have shown, sometimes 

in great detail, how to counter capabilities in which we have invested 

billions of dollars and many years of creative talent and effort.498

Five months later, in a September 1986 speech delivered to the Society of 

Professional Journalists, Casey noted:

The KGB and other hostile intelligence services each year spend 

billions of dollars trying to acquire this information (information 

concerning U.S. sources and methods). But the unauthorized 

publication of restricted information hands to our adversaries on a 

silver platter information that their spies, their researchers, and their 

satellites are working 24 hours a day to uncover and use against us.499

Though it is rare for the exact costs for IC programs and equipment to 

be reported, there have been instances in which the financial impact of 

unauthorized disclosures by the media has been discussed: 

FIGURE 12 – GLOMAR EXPLORER501

Source: Courtesy of Offshore magazine. Used with 

permission.
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Project AZORIAN

As previously identified, Howard Hughes’ company, Global Marine, 

constructed the ship Glomar Explorer in support of Project AZORIAN. 

The objective of AZORIAN was to salvage a sunken Soviet submarine in 

the Pacific. The cost to construct the 619-foot-long, 116-foot-wide, 36,000-

ton Glomar Explorer was reported to be in excess of $200 million.500 A 

submersible barge the size of a football field, HMB-1, was constructed 

along with the ship. 

The cost for the entire operation was estimated at $550 million.502 Though 

reports vary regarding the success in recovering the Soviet submarine, the 

operation was prematurely terminated in March 1975 after being exposed 

by several media outlets, including the Los Angeles Times and New York 

Times. According to DCI William Colby, “The Glomar project stopped 

because it was exposed.”503

In December 1976, Time magazine reported that the ship was idle and that 

the government had placed it up for sale.504 The government was never 

able to sell the ship. From 1978 to 1980 the Glomar Explorer was leased to 

a private company. For the next 16 years, from 1980 to 1996, it remained 

unused in the Navy’s mothball fleet. It was leased once again in 1996.505 In 

2006, the government published a notice offering the submersible mining 

barge, HMB-1, for donation.506

Project GREEK ISLAND

In May 1992, the Washington Post published the article “The Ultimate 

Congressional Hideaway.”507 The article disclosed that the government 

had constructed a bunker underneath the Greenbrier Hotel in White 

Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. The purpose of the bunker was to house 

members of Congress in the event of a nuclear war or other national crisis. 

The estimated cost to construct the bunker, in 1960, was $14 million.508

The government had kept the existence of the 100,000-square foot bunker 

secret for over 30 years. The article’s author, Ted Gup, believed the bunker 

had become obsolete.
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The day after the article was published, Speaker of the House Tom Foley 

sent a letter to Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, recommending that 

support for the compromised bunker be discontinued. The bunker was 

subsequently decommissioned. It is unknown whether another facility was 

constructed to replace the Greenbrier bunker. 

Alaskan Airfield

Also previously discussed was a 1958 disclosure by the New York Times, 

revealing that the United States had the ability to monitor the countdowns 

for Soviet missile launches.509 After the Soviets reduced the length of the 

countdowns by four hours, U.S. aircraft were no longer able to reach the 

landing area to monitor the splashdown. To regain a portion of the lost 

collection capability, the United States rebuilt and staffed an airfield in 

Alaska “at a cost of millions of dollars.”510

In addition to DCI William Casey’s 1986 remarks regarding the financial 

harm caused by unauthorized disclosures, DCIs Robert Gates and 

Porter Goss discussed the issue in general terms. In 1988 DCI Gates 

wrote, “Deliberate leaks of intelligence information have . . . required the 

expenditure of billions of dollars in order to revamp or replace sophisticated 

technical collection systems that have been compromised.”511 In a 2006 oped published in the New York Times, DCI Goss concurred with the findings 

of the WMD Commission regarding the “hundreds of millions of dollars” 

lost as the result of unauthorized disclosures.512 Whether measured in 

hundreds of millions or billions of dollars, the perceived financial cost of 

unauthorized disclosures has been considerable.

Decrease in Public Knowledge Resulting from Incomplete 

or Inaccurate Information

The man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than 

he who reads them, inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer the 

truth . . .513

- Thomas Jefferson
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Rather than creating a more knowledgeable citizenry and increasing 

informed public debate, unauthorized disclosures may have the opposite 

effect—decreasing or distorting public knowledge. Journalists who obtain 

classified information often receive only partial details concerning a 

particular program or operation. Government employees who disclose 

information often have motivations beyond the desire to increase public 

awareness. These motivations may include garnering public approval 

for a program they support or harming a policy sponsored by a political 

rival. Whether a government source elects only to divulge a specific piece 

of information or has access only to a portion of an entire program, a 

journalist is often left with incomplete facts. 

If the journalist is unable to obtain the remaining relevant information, he 

or she is only able to provide one piece of a larger mosaic to the public. The 

government is then put in an undesirable position of either allowing the 

public to consider inaccurate or incomplete, and potentially prejudicial, 

information or disclosing additional classified information to clarify what 

has already been improperly disclosed. 

In almost every instance, a journalist who discloses classified information 

elects not to identify his or her source. Consequently, the public is unable to 

judge the source’s credibility, which would assist in assessing the reliability 

of the information disclosed. Similar to the United States’ difficulty in 

assessing the credibility of the discredited foreign asset Curveball, the 

public has less knowledge with which to make an informed decision. 

The media may use this blanket of anonymity to purposefully mislead 

the public on the credibility of a source. Seymour Hersh, an investigative 

journalist for the New Yorker well-known for publishing articles containing 

classified information, characterized the use of anonymity to disguise a 

weak source as a “chronic problem.”514 Hersh added that he was aware 

of this “very troubling” practice being used at the New York Times, the 

Associated Press, and other media outlets where he had worked. Ironically, 

a Pentagon spokesman stated in 2006 that Hersh himself had “a solid and 

well-earned reputation for making dramatic assertions based on thinly 

sourced, unverifiable anonymous sources.”515
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On at least one occasion, a journalist agreed to misidentify a source. In 

an article identifying Valerie Plame as a CIA employee, New York Times

reporter Judith Miller agreed to identify a source, Scooter Libby, chief of 

staff for Vice President Dick Cheney, as a “former Hill staffer.”516 In this 

case, Miller reportedly elected to mislead the public in an effort to protect 

her source. 

Though not involving classified information, a 2004 report regarding former 

President Bush’s service in the Air National Guard provides an example 

of the harm caused by the use of anonymous sources. In this case, a CBS 

broadcast presented documents that appeared to identify discrepancies with 

President Bush’s service in the National Guard.517 The CBS report, televised 

two months prior to the 2004 Presidential election, verified the documents’ 

authenticity but did not identify their source. Shortly after the broadcast it 

was determined that the documents were almost certainly forgeries.

Because CBS chose not to disclose the identity of its source, the public 

did not know that the source, Bill Burkett, was a long-time opponent of 

President Bush, described as an “embittered former officer who will do 

anything to embarrass the president and retaliate against senior Texas 

Guard officers.”518

The alleged desecration of the Koran in 2005 is another example of a 

disclosure that decreased public knowledge. In this instance, the disclosure 

resulted not only in a misinformed American public, but also reportedly 

contributed to several deaths. In response to this article, USA Today

announced its intention to reduce the use of information from unnamed 

sources by 75 percent.519 Three additional articles, published in New 

Republic magazine in 2007, may have also led to a less, rather than more, 

informed citizenry. 

Baghdad Diarist

In 2007 New Republic magazine published three articles containing 

information obtained from an anonymous U.S. soldier. Each of the articles 

detailed incidents alleged to have occurred in Iraq, including U.S. soldiers 

desecrating a grave, running over dogs with military vehicles, and ridiculing 

a disfigured Iraqi woman.520 After the articles were published, the U.S. 
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soldier was identified as Private Scott Beauchamp. It was also reported that 

Beauchamp was romantically involved with a New Republic reporter. 

A subsequent article, published in another magazine, reported that 

Beauchamp signed a sworn statement admitting that the information 

he provided for the articles were “exaggerations and falsehoods.”521 A 

Pentagon spokesman stated that, after a military investigation, no member 

of Beauchamp’s troop or company was able to substantiate Beauchamp’s 

allegations.522

When the U.S. public is provided only with partial information and is unable 

to evaluate the credibility of a source, the consequence may be a public 

that is less knowledgeable about government activity. In the Beauchamp 

case, along with the Bush National Guard and Koran desecration articles, 

an anonymous source, providing incomplete or inaccurate information, 

may have led to the American public actually being misinformed rather 

than informed. In these cases, the benefits of disclosure are particularly 

questionable. 

Journalists contend that the practice of concealing a source’s identity is 

a crucial component of their government oversight function. Without a 

policy of offering anonymity to a source, members of the media contend 

that government employees would be more hesitant to provide the 

information necessary to expose misconduct or illegal activity. In a July 

2008 letter to Congress supporting the proposed “Free Flow of Information 

Act,” the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) emphasized the 

importance of confidential sources: “[H]istory is replete with examples of 

news articles critical to the national interest that would have never been 

written had it not been for the protection of confidential sources.”523

Because the use of anonymous sources has always been an accepted practice 

by the American media, any theory of the impact of its discontinuation is 

purely speculative. It is possible that government sources would still have the 

conviction to openly disclose classified information exposing illegal activity 

or abuse. It is also possible that sources might elect to avail themselves of 

other outlets, such as the procedures established by whistleblower statutes. 

Perhaps only the disclosures of greatest concern to the government would 
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be impacted, disclosures where the harm to national security is recognized 

as significant and the benefit to the public considered nominal. 

Benefiting U.S. Adversaries While Harming U.S. Interests

The primary beneficiaries of leaks of national security and intelligence 

secrets are the enemies and potential adversaries of the United States.524

- Attorney General John Ashcroft

The fact of the matter is, some of the worst damage done to our 

Intelligence Community has come not from penetration by spies, 

but from unauthorized leaks by those with access to classified 

information.525

- Representative Peter Hoekstra, Ranking Member, HPSCI

Each of the six identified categories of harm may not only damage U.S. 

capabilities or interests, but also directly benefit U.S. adversaries. Whether 

providing the Soviet Union with advanced knowledge of the development 

of Stealth technology, informing Iran of efforts to disrupt its nuclear 

weapons program, or revealing to Al Qaeda that its computer network had 

been infiltrated, U.S. adversaries have benefited from the unauthorized 

disclosure of classified information. Former Russian military intelligence 

officer Stanislav Lunev, confirmed that adversaries welcome the disclosures 

and that, in his case, the Soviet Union was “very appreciative” of the 

classified information disclosed in U.S. newspapers.526

Critics of these disclosures contend that the harm not only surpasses any 

benefit to the U.S. public but also potentially rivals the damage caused 

by traditional espionage. When classified information is disclosed in a 

public forum, such as a newspaper or on the Internet, countless foreign 

governments or other adversaries are provided insight into U.S. capabilities 

and intentions. In response to President Clinton’s 2000 veto of a bill to 

broaden the Espionage Act, Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama noted, 

“Where a spy generally serves one customer, media leaks are available to 

anyone with twenty-five cents to buy the Washington Post, or access to an 

Internet connection.”527
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In his 1985 denial of a motion to dismiss Samuel Morison’s indictment 

under the Espionage Act, Judge Joseph Young identified this concern:

The danger to the United States is just as great when this information 

is released to the press as when it is released to an agent of a foreign 

government. The fear in releasing this type of information is that 

it gives other nations information concerning the intelligence 

gathering capabilities of the United States. The fear is realized 

whether the information is released to the world at large or whether 

it is released only to specific spies.528

Even in cases where a disclosure by the media is perceived to have caused 

little or no direct harm to national security, critics still oppose the practice. 

Speaking of the potential harm from information believed “unimportant,” 

Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote:

Foreign intelligence services have both the capacity to gather 

and analyze any information that is in the public domain and the 

substantial expertise in deducing the identities of intelligence 

sources from seemingly unimportant details. ... [B]its and pieces of 

data may aid in piecing together bits of other information even when 

the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.529

In his opinion in Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), Supreme 

Court Justice John Paul Stevens noted that disclosures which do not directly 

damage national security can still be harmful. Justice Stevens recognized 

that all disclosures reinforce a perception that the government is unable to 

prevent the undesirable behavior.530 This perception, in turn, increases the 

likelihood that other government employees will elect to disclose classified 

information which does cause direct and identifiable harm to national 

security. 

Confirmation Bias and the Media’s Ability to Identify 

Harm

In order to reduce incidence of unauthorized disclosures, members of the 

media must not only recognize the harm caused by disclosures but also 

conclude more frequently that this harm outweighs perceived benefits. 
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Complicating what is already a difficult process, additional obstacles exist 

that may decrease the likelihood that a journalist will reach this conclusion. 

These include psychological limitations that affect an individual’s ability 

to perceive and process information. Chief among these limitations is the 

concept of “confirmation bias.”

Confirmation Bias is defined as “a phenomenon wherein decision makers 

have been shown to actively seek out and assign more weight to evidence 

that confirms their hypothesis, and ignore or underweigh evidence that 

could disconfirm their hypothesis.”531 Because government officials are 

normally unaware of an unauthorized disclosure until a media outlet 

notifies them of the intent to publish, confirmation bias would likely apply. Consequently, even if government officials offer evidence of harm to 

national security, the potential for altering the decision would be reduced.

Paul Steiger, Managing Editor of the Wall Street Journal, discussed this 

predisposition to publish: “The presumption is that we will publish what we 

have learned through our reporting, if we think a story is newsworthy.”532 

Washington Times reporter Bill Gertz shared Steiger’s sentiment: “As a 

reporter, I lean towards publication.”533 Once a journalist concludes that 

disclosing classified information is beneficial, any attempt to alter this 

conclusion is immediately disadvantaged by confirmation bias. 

It must also be understood that at the same time advocates of reducing the 

level of unauthorized disclosures are attempting to convince a journalist 

to alter his or her decision to publish, supporters of the legitimacy of these 

disclosures may be doing the opposite. Based on the effect of confirmation 

bias, it can be expected that a member of the media predisposed to 

publication would give greater credence to arguments favoring disclosure. 

As will be seen in the next chapter, members of the media may not only 

give greater credence to information that agrees with their preconceived 

notions; they may actively seek out this information.

Conclusion

The continued publication of classified information signifies that, at 

least in those cases, members of the media concluded that the identified 

motivations and justifications outweighed the recognized categories 
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of harm. In Chapter 1 this cost-benefit analysis was visualized as a 

“psychological scale.” Applying the concepts of Rational Choice Theory 

with the findings presented in Chapters 2 and 3, a journalist’s deliberative 

process can be visualized in the following manner:

FIGURE 13 – PSYCHOLOGY SCALE – UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES

Source: Author.

Though not all motivations, justifications, or categories of harm may be 

applicable in every circumstance, each has the potential to contribute to 

the cost-benefit analysis. An ability to recognize which is relevant in a 

specific situation is also essential for understanding a journalist’s thought 

process. This capability will be examined in the final chapter. 

If advocates of reducing the frequency of unauthorized disclosures 

are genuine in their desire to effect change, a successful approach 

that incorporates Rational Choice Theory must be considered. Before 

examining the potential for applying such an approach, one final historical 

case study will be presented. Based on information made available by 

journalist Bob Woodward in the 1987 book Veil, the thought processes 

of members of the media and their rational weighing of choices can be 

examined in remarkable detail. 

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CHAPTER 4

IVY BELLS – Inside the Journalist’s 

Decision-Making Process

We shouldn’t publish what others are prosecuted for treason for.

- Washington Post Executive Editor Ben Bradlee

The deliberation that preceded the Washington Post’s publication of 

classified information related to Operation IVY BELLS provides an 

excellent case study of how Rational Choice Theory can be applied to 

a journalist’s decision-making process. This study illustrates how the 

motivations, justifications, and categories of harm identified in Chapters 2 

and 3 are weighed by members of the media.

The case study is based on information made available by journalist Bob 

Woodward in Chapter 23 of his 1987 book, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 

1981-1987.

534 Woodward discusses, in considerable detail, the deliberative 

process performed by officials at the Post prior to electing to publish an 

article containing classified information. The process includes Woodward’s 

initial acquisition of the information, the drafting and editing of articles, and 

conversations with senior government officials, including President Ronald 

Reagan. Through Woodward’s description of events, it is possible to identify 

the motivations, justifications, and categories of harm that Woodward and 

other senior Post executives considered prior to reaching the decision to 

publish.535

The Analysis Preceding Publication

In November 1985, former NSA employee Ronald Pelton was arrested and 

charged with espionage for providing classified information to the Soviet 

Union. Pelton had worked for the NSA from 1965 to 1979. Among the 

information compromised by Pelton was a classified operation named IVY 

BELLS. As reported by Woodward, this operation involved tapping Soviet 

undersea communication cables in the Sea of Okhotsk. U.S. submarines 

were used to attach a bell-shaped device to the cables, which could capture 
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and record communications without damaging the outer shell of the cable. 

Submarines were also used to service the device and retrieve the recorded 

information. 

Operation IVY BELLS was reported to have been active from the late 

1970s through 1981 when the Soviets discovered and removed the 

device. Woodward states that KGB defector Vitaly Yurchenko assisted in 

identifying Pelton, adding that the United States had not known how the 

device was compromised prior to Pelton being identified. 

Woodward writes that he had been provided with information concerning 

IVY BELLS prior to Pelton’s arrest in 1985, but had withheld publishing 

the information because “we were not absolutely sure it had been 

compromised.” (Justification – Responsible Actors) Once it became 

apparent that the operation had been compromised, Washington Post 

Editor Ben Bradlee “felt it would be legitimate to explain the details to 

demonstrate what damage could be done by one of thousands of clerks, 

technicians, translators and information processors who operated the 

latest spy technologies.” (Motivation – Promote Informed Debate) 

On December 5, 1985, Bradlee and Washington Post Managing Editor Len 

Downie, Jr., met with the NSA Director, Army Lieutenant General William 

Odom, to discuss the operation and the Post’s intent to publish information 

concerning its existence. (Justification – Responsible Actors) Odom told 

Bradlee and Downie that the disclosure would “tell the Russians something 

they did not know” and that “great national-security issues were at stake.” 

(Harm – Damage to Sources and Methods) Woodward indicates that 

another official with whom he spoke was concerned that articles involving 

IVY BELLS would “launch a competitive feeding frenzy in the news media 

for more information” and that a “string of stories could follow, revealing a 

detail here and another there.” (Harm – Damage to Sources and Methods)

After Woodward located prior publications that referred to the use of 

submarines to intercept Soviet communications, the decision was made 

to draft an article for publication. These prior publications included a 1975 

article published in the New York Times and information contained in 

the 1975 Pike Committee Congressional Report on intelligence activities. 

On January 27, 1986, Bradlee and Woodward met with Odom again and 
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showed him a draft of the article they intended to publish. The purpose 

for the meeting was to have Odom and his aides “point out anything they 

felt might damage national security.” (Justification – Responsible Actors)

The next day, Odom informed Woodward that he would not assist them in 

editing the article, that publication “would generate attention, all destructive 

and unwanted,” and that “even if the Soviets knew (about IVY BELLS) they 

did not know precisely what the United States knew about what they (the 

Soviets) knew.” Woodward received a similar response from another former 

senior official with whom he spoke, one of “the elders of the CIA.” This 

official told Woodward that the discovery of the IVY BELLS device “might 

have been embarrassing to those in charge of the military or KGB” and that 

the KGB probably did not tell Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev because 

“they conceal fuck-ups in the Soviet system just like ours.” The CIA official 

explained that, in response to the additional attention the article would 

undoubtedly cause, “a general alarm would go off in the Soviet military or 

the KGB requiring a full investigative response.” The official explained that 

the resulting investigation “might lead to the compromise of other U.S. 

operations.” (Harm – Damage to Sources and Methods)

Woodward describes the meeting with the CIA elder as “sobering,” adding 

that it “served the purpose of reminding us that this story was not simple,” 

and could have “unintended consequences.” Bradlee advised Woodward 

that he “wanted to slow down to see clearly what might be coming.” 

(Justification – Responsible Actors)

After this meeting, Woodward indicated that they began “shopping the 

story around town to see whether we could get someone with impeccable 

authority to tell us it would be all right to publish.” (Confirmation Bias)

He took an updated draft of the story to the White House and gave it to 

a “well-placed official” to determine if there were still objections. Four 

details in the earlier draft had been removed because “further reporting 

by us suggested it was conceivable that the Soviets might not know them.” 

(Justification – Responsible Actors)

On February 26 the updated draft was discussed by several senior Reagan 

administration officials, including Secretary of State George Shultz, 

Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, National Security Advisor John 
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Poindexter, and Chief of Staff Donald Regan. Woodward writes that they 

concluded the article, if published, would damage national security by 

“harming the political relationship between the United States and Soviet 

Union.” (Harm – Effect on International Alliances) 

After the administration officials completed their review, Woodward 

and Bradlee met again to discuss the issue. Bradlee told Woodward that 

six drafts of the article had been written, each containing fewer details. 

Bradlee confirmed that “the first drafts could have caused trouble” and that 

they “shouldn’t publish what others are prosecuted for treason for.” Bradlee 

asked Woodward, “What social purpose is there in this story?” Woodward 

responded that his rationale was “to find out, and tell our readers, what he 

(Pelton) had sold” and “also show how easy it was to walk into the Soviet 

Embassy here and sell American secrets.” Woodward indicated that “Pelton 

was one of the biggest spies the Russians ever had” and that “he had given 

away crown-jewel intelligence-gathering operations, not just IVY BELLS.” 

(Motivation – Promote Informed Debate) Woodward wrote that “the 

editors remained uncertain.”

In mid-March a “senior FBI official” told Woodward that the administration 

had come close to declining to prosecute Pelton “because of fears that a trial 

would expose secrets.” The official explained that “any reporting on the 

nuts and bolts of how information is obtained raises consciousness” which 

“might uncork counterintelligence forces we want bottled up.” (Harm – 

Damage to Sources and Methods)

On March 21, Woodward spoke with Director of Central Intelligence 

William Casey at a reception hosted by the New York Times. Woodward 

asked Casey why the administration was opposed to publication of the IVY 

BELLS article. Casey responded that, if classified information related to 

IVY BELLS was disclosed, “public opinion will build, could build, so we 

can’t do it.” Woodward’s impression was that Casey was referring to the 

concern that the public might not support “cable-tapping or submarine 

operations close to the Soviet coast.” 

Woodward related the conversation to Bradlee, who “made it clear that, for 

the moment, he was unhappy we were still pursuing the story.” Woodward 

explained to Bradlee that he believed failing to pursue the story was a 
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“serious mistake.” Bradlee again asked Woodward, “What is the social 

purpose of reporting this?” In response, Woodward identified several 

concerns related to Intelligence Community activities. 

Woodward indicated that “many intelligence people and others who use 

it are uneasy” over “the possibility that the United States is pressing too 

much” and that the result may be “a declaration of a kind of intelligence 

war against the Soviets.” He also told Bradlee that “at some earlier point . 

. . the U.S. had plans to send a U.S. nuclear submarine not only into their 

(Soviets) territorial waters, but up one of their rivers.” Woodward said that 

there was “contradictory information whether it had happened” and that 

“maybe it never happened.” 

Bradlee asked Woodward if things in the Intelligence Community were 

“under control.” Woodward answered that the NSA was “getting into nonSoviet undersea cables worldwide” and that “serious people” were concerned 

that the U.S. allowed the Soviets to “vacuum up telephone conversations 

from microwave towers all over Washington,” a “massive invasion of the 

privacy of U.S. citizens.” (Motivation – Expose Government Misconduct)

Woodward added that “as well as I could piece it together there was a 

tacit understanding that, in return, the U.S. could operate electronic 

intelligence-gathering from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.” After discussing 

these issues, Woodward reported that Bradlee “wasn’t buying” it and was 

still concerned that they were going to “cross legitimate national security.” 

(Justification – Responsible Actors)

Bradlee and Woodward agreed that Bradlee should speak directly with one 

of Woodward’s original sources of information on IVY BELLS, a “former 

senior intelligence official.” Woodward felt the official was “someone who 

could say confidently that the IVY BELLS story would not tell the Russians 

anything they did not know.” Bradlee met with the “senior official” in 

late April 1986. The official convinced Bradlee that “the story as now 

drafted would not tell the Soviets anything they did not already know.” 

(Confirmation Bias)

On April 25, Bradlee instructed Woodward to contact the White House 

and inform officials there that the story would be running in two days. 

The next day, NSA Director Odom called Bradlee. Odom told Bradlee that 
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he was still opposed to the story being published because he “was really 

worried about other countries that didn’t know about the capability.” 

(Harm – Damage to Sources and Methods) Bradlee agreed to meet with 

Odom again. During this meeting, Odom told Bradlee that some in the 

administration were “looking into the possibility of using a 1950 law that 

provides criminal penalties for anyone who ‘publishes’ anything classified 

about communications intelligence.” 

Woodward wrote that William Casey met with the head of the Justice 

Department Criminal Division on May 2, and “proposed that the 

department consider bringing criminal charges.” Casey also wanted the 

Justice Department to consider “going to court to get an order to stop the 

Post from publishing the IVY BELLS story.” After meeting with the Justice 

Department, Casey met with Bradlee and Managing Editor Downie. Casey 

told Downie that if the IVY BELLS story was published Casey would 

“recommend that you be prosecuted.” Casey requested that Bradlee and 

Downie hold the story for another week and told them he would request 

that President Reagan talk with Bradlee. Bradlee asked if the story was “that 

important.” Casey responded that “lives could conceivably be in danger if 

that is published.” (Harm – Potential Loss of Life) 

Based on the meeting with Casey, Bradlee and Downie again agreed to 

postpone publication. (Justification – Responsible Actors) Though 

Bradlee and Downie agreed to withhold the IVY BELLS article, they 

did publish an article on May 7 reporting that the administration was 

considering prosecuting the Washington Post for disclosing classified 

information. The article stated that the Post was holding back on “another 

story it has prepared concerning U.S. intelligence capabilities.” 

On May 10, Katharine Graham, chairman of the board of the Washington 

Post, received a phone call from President Reagan. Reagan insisted to 

Graham that the story on Pelton would harm national security. Reagan 

reportedly told Graham that “good intelligence had prevented 125 terrorist 

incidents over the last year,” creating an impression that preventing 

these attacks was somehow tied to IVY BELLS. (Harm – Potential Loss 

of Life) Graham responded to the President that she would speak with 

Bradlee. She later told Bradlee that she “was impressed with the president’s 
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argument” and “wondered why we had to write this story.” (Justification – 

Responsible Actors)

Ultimately, on May 19, 1986, the day jury selection for Pelton’s trial 

was scheduled to begin, NBC reported on the Today show that “Pelton 

apparently gave away one of the NSA’s most sensitive secrets – a project 

with the code name ‘IVY BELLS,’ believed to be a top-secret underwater 

eavesdropping operation by American submarines inside Soviet harbors.” 

After being informed of the disclosure, Casey issued a statement saying 

he was referring NBC’s broadcast to the Justice Department for possible 

prosecution. 

On May 21, after the NBC story was broadcast, the Washington Post

published its article concerning IVY BELLS. The article was titled 

“Eavesdropping System Betrayed, High-Technology Device Disclosed by 

Pelton Was Lost to Soviets.” Casey issued another statement indicating that 

the Post story was also “being reviewed to see whether prosecution would 

be initiated.” The Post subsequently published articles with additional 

details, including the location of the operation in the Sea of Okhotsk. 

In response to the Washington Post articles, Casey and Odom issued a 

joint public statement. The statement “cautioned against speculation and 

reporting details beyond the information actually released at trial,” adding 

that “such speculations and additional facts are not authorized disclosures 

and may cause substantial harm to the national security.” 

Ultimately, no charges were brought against NBC or the Washington Post

for the disclosures. On May 29, 1986, Casey told the Associated Press, “I 

think that certainly the press has been very hysterical about the thing, 

saying we’re trying to tear up the First Amendment and scuttle the freedom 

of the press. We’re not trying to do that.” 

Conclusion

The IVY BELLS incident demonstrates how identified motivations, 

justifications, and categories of harm apply in a real-world scenario. The 

deliberations by the Post prior to its decision to publish, as revealed by Bob 
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Woodward, also illustrate how these variables are applied to the decisionmaking process, as described by Rational Choice Theory. 

FIGURE 14 – PSYCHOLOGICAL SCALE – IVY BELLS DISCLOSURE

Source: Author.

In this case, the assessment of cost and benefit changed several times before 

a final decision was reached. These changes were based on additional 

information the media obtained from government officials who expressed 

their concerns. This additional information increased the identified harm, 

which altered the media’s cost-benefit analysis, at least in the short term. 

In the end, conversations with other anonymous sources (and the possible 

impact of confirmation bias) led to the decision to publish. 

In addition to supporting the applicability of Rational Choice Theory, the 

IVY BELLS incident demonstrates how legal authorities are ineffective in 

preventing disclosures. Not only was the threat of criminal prosecution 

unsuccessful in deterring the media, it appears to have been detrimental to 

government efforts. By publishing the government’s threat of prosecution, 

the media effectively placed the government on the defensive. Rather than 

focusing on the message that disclosures “may cause substantial harm to 

the national security,” officials were placed in the undesirable position 

of having to respond to the perception that the First Amendment and 

freedom of the press were being attacked. 
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Though preventing an unauthorized disclosure by altering a journalist’s costbenefit analysis was not completely successful, Woodward confirmed that 

the Post did elect to withhold facts that would otherwise have been disclosed. 

Publication of the remaining classified information was also delayed for 

several months. 

Considering the “psychological scale” one final time, this case study allows 

for the most detailed depiction of a journalist’s rational weighing of choices. 

Actual events surrounding the IVY BELLS disclosure can be applied to the 

identified elements of a journalist’s cost-benefit analysis. It is important to 

note that, because this case study is presented from the media’s point of 

view, only those elements Woodward elected to discuss can be identified. 

There may be other elements that Woodward either did not recognize, or 

recognized but consciously withheld from his narrative, such as advancing 

corporate or personal interests.

After considering the information contained in Chapters 1-4, one final 

question remains: whether the perceived harm from unauthorized 

disclosures can be effectively reduced through an approach that proactively 

applies the principles of Rational Choice Theory. 

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CHAPTER 5

A Proactive Application of Rational Choice 

Theory

Leaks are like prostitution and gambling. You can control them and 

contain them a bit – but you’re not going to eliminate them.536

 - Patrick Buchanan

Unauthorized disclosures of classified information by the U.S. media 

continue to occur. Completely eliminating these disclosures is not a 

realistic goal for the U.S. government. A more reasonable objective is to 

reduce disclosures perceived to cause the greatest harm to national security. 

Past efforts to prevent unauthorized disclosures, focused primarily on a 

legislative solution, have proven ineffective. Other approaches involved 

activities which exceeded statutory authorities. Considering these past 

failures, a more innovative approach is required, an approach that 

recognizes the value of a free press outside the government, information 

sharing within the government, and secrecy in the interest of national 

security.

One potential resolution to this conflict was described by University of 

Chicago Law Professor Cass Sunstein in 1986. Sunstein referred to this 

solution as an “Equilibrium Model” of disclosures:

[T]he absence of a right of access to information held by the 

government is balanced by the power to publish almost all 

information that has been lawfully obtained. The self-interested 

behavior of countervailing forces, it is thought, will produce an 

equilibrium that benefits the citizenry as a whole.537

Sunstein’s colleague, Professor Geoffrey Stone, described this laissez-faire 

approach as follows: 

The solution, which has stood us in good stead for more than 

two centuries, is to reconcile the conflicting values of secrecy 

and accountability by guaranteeing both a strong authority of the 
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government to prohibit leaks and an expansive right of the press to 

publish them.538

Unfortunately, several concerns have been identified that prevent the 

Equilibrium Model from being widely accepted as a solution. 

Professor Sunstein notes that the Equilibrium Model allows the government 

potentially to suppress information in response to concerns other than 

national security (perhaps to conceal politically harmful or illegal activity), 

and for the press to publish information in which a substantial national 

security interest actually exists (possibly to advance corporate or personal 

interests).539 The model also assumes, perhaps incorrectly, that either 

side has the ability to overcome the other’s less desirable motivations. 

The government’s ability to prevent or respond to past disclosures 

has reportedly been affected by a reluctance to disclose the additional 

information necessary to demonstrate the true extent of harm. This issue 

was specifically cited in the 1942 Chicago Tribune disclosure involving 

Japanese naval codes and the 1975 New York Times disclosures related 

to Operation HOLYSTONE. Furthermore, Sunstein points out that no 

empirical evidence exists to justify the validity of the Equilibrium Model. 

While the Equilibrium Model may initially appear to be an aesthetic and 

logical approach, it fails to offer an acceptable solution. 

If the desire to reduce the perceived harm from unauthorized disclosures 

is genuine and a legislative or administrative solution is ineffective, illegal 

activity unacceptable, and the “Equilibrium Model” inadequate, an 

alternative approach must be considered. Rational Choice Theory offers 

one such alternative. 

Applying Rational Choice Theory to the Dilemma of 

Disclosures

Attorney General John Ashcroft recognized the need to “deter” those 

who reveal classified information while Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General Matthew Friedrich spoke of working cooperatively with 

journalists to “persuade” them not to publish classified information. The 

1982 Willard Group wrote that changing the status quo would require “a 
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sense of discipline and self-restraint by those who work with or obtain 

classified information.” The use of terms such as “deter,” “persuade,” and 

“self-restraint” denotes an appreciation for the significance psychological 

processes play in the disclosure of classified information.

Developing an effective approach that incorporates Rational Choice Theory 

requires an improved understanding of the thought process of members 

of the media. The findings presented in Chapters 2 and 3 confirm that it is 

possible to identify the underlying motivations, justifications, and categories 

of harm that comprise a journalist’s cost-benefit analysis. The events 

described in Chapter 4 demonstrate that Rational Choice Theory’s rational 

weighing of alternatives can be applied to the behavior of publishing classified 

information. Collectively, these facts support the premise that a “Rational 

Choice” model would be a valid approach to the dilemma of unauthorized 

disclosures, one which may ultimately succeed in reducing its perceived 

harm. Unfortunately, recognizing that an approach has the potential to 

be effective and achieving the desired results are not the same. Applying 

Rational Choice Theory would be neither a simple nor swift solution.

Complicating what would already be a complex approach are the internal 

and external obstacles previously identified. Internal barriers include the 

psychological limitation of “confirmation bias” (discussed in Chapter 3) 

and anxiety caused by “performance pressure” (discussed in Chapter 2). 

These factors affect a journalist’s ability to perform the cost-benefit analysis 

in a rational manner. External barriers to success involve those factors 

that may actually create an atmosphere more conducive to an increase 

rather than a decrease in disclosures. These include the increased number 

of world events that impact U.S. interests (globalization), increased 

Intelligence Community collection capabilities and requirements, the 

increased number of media outlets (along with the advent of the 24-hour 

news cycle), the politicization of intelligence by government officials, and 

an increased desire by the public to remain aware of government activity 

during a time of war. 

Considering just one of these factors, it was reported in 1987 that there had 

been a 400 percent increase in the number of radio and television reporters 

operating in Washington, DC, over the prior two decades.540 This equates to 
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approximately 10,000 journalists representing over 3,000 news organizations. 

Because the Internet did not become widely available until the following 

decade, these levels are also likely to have increased. 

As long as journalists continue to provide the demand for classified 

information and government employees remain willing to supply this 

information, successfully impacting the “leak economy” will remain difficult. 

No significant change can occur however, unless proactive action is taken to 

alter this status quo. 

The Process

For a proactive application of a Rational Choice model to be effective, 

journalists would have to conclude more frequently that the costs 

associated with the perceived harm outweigh the identified motivations 

and justifications for publishing classified information. If journalists were 

persuaded to reevaluate their cost-benefit analysis in cases that would 

have otherwise resulted in an unauthorized disclosure, incidents could be 

decreased, along with the associated harm. 

As presented, the motivations and justifications that comprise the benefit 

side of the cost-benefit analysis are:

Potential Motivations

1. Promote informed debate

2. Expose government misconduct

3. Advance corporate interests

4. Advance personal interests

5. Advance foreign interests 

Potential Justifications

1. Government overclassification

2. Government toleration for advantageous disclosures

3. Legal protection under the First Amendment
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4. Inadequacy of Congressional oversight

5. Media’s ability to handle classified information responsibly

The six categories of harm that make up the cost side of the cost-benefit 

analysis are:

Potential Harm

1. Damage to sources and methods

2. Potential loss of life

3. Impact to the development and implementation of foreign policy

4. Effect on international alliances

5. Financial costs 

6. Decrease in public knowledge from disclosures of incomplete or 

inaccurate information

Once the relevance of Rational Choice Theory is recognized, the additional 

barriers to success understood, and the components of a journalist’s costbenefit analysis identified, four additional steps remain. These steps involve 

identifying: 

● which of the motivations, justifications, and categories of harm are 

applicable to a specific disclosure or category of disclosures 

● the relative significance of the applicable variables for members of the 

media

● whether the government has both the ability and desire to impact the 

identified variables

● appropriate venues for implementing this approach

Relevancy of Variables

If an attempt is made to prevent publication involving a specific classified 

operation/program, or an entire category of classified information 

(e.g., intelligence derived from a human source), the motivations and 

justifications the media would consider applicable in those instances 

must be identified. Not all motivations and justifications would apply to 
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every operation or program. Similarly, it is unlikely that the media would 

perceive all six categories of harm to be relevant. 

Relative Significance of Variables

Once the applicable motivations, justifications, and categories of harm 

are identified, the relative weight members of the media attribute to each 

must be considered. Altering the cost-benefit analysis, to a point where the 

decision to perform an undesirable action is no longer reached, requires 

an understanding of the significance of each variable on both sides of the 

equation. 

Decreasing the value of a specific motivation or increasing the recognition 

of a particular category of harm would be irrelevant if the variable selected 

represented only a fraction of a journalist’s overall estimation. For example, 

convincing the media that Congressional oversight was robust for a 

particular program may be pointless if other motivations or justifications 

were perceived to hold significantly more value. The same issue would 

apply if members of the media were persuaded that a disclosure would 

almost certainly have a negative impact on foreign policy, but this single 

category of harm was not considered significant enough to overcome the 

multiple recognized benefits.

Government Ability and Desire to Effect Change

Consideration must also be given to the Executive Branch’s willingness 

and ability to impact a perceived motivation, justification, or category of 

harm. Even if the proper variables were identified which, if successfully 

modified, could alter the balance of journalists’ cost-benefit analyses, it 

must be determined whether the government was capable of affecting 

these variables. Beyond this ability, the government must also have both 

the desire and political will to perform the necessary actions. 

For example, if reducing disclosures perceived to be condoned for political 

reasons would result in a similar decrease in all disclosures, politicians and 

other senior government officials would have to be willing to discontinue 

disclosing information to influence policy. Similarly, if a media outlet was 

willing to withhold classified information that potentially threatened the 
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life of a government employee or source, it would have to be determined 

if the government could make such an assertion (and if it was willing to 

provide that information to the media). This difficulty was discussed by 

former CIA Director Michael Hayden:

[T]here is sometimes an instinct on the part of the media to take 

a story into the darkest corner of the room. ... And here we are 

fill in the blank, NSA, CIA – in a very real sense unable to defend 

ourselves publicly, because we can’t enter into the debate about the 

story, because to enter into the debate would actually reveal even 

more information that would be helpful to those who would do the 

republic harm.541

Appropriate Venues for Implementation

Finally, once the above three steps are completed, a forum conducive to 

applying this approach must be identified. Ultimately, success or failure 

may depend on the government’s ability to engage members of the media. 

Possible venues include one-on-one discussions between a senior agency 

official and a senior editor, meetings between a group of senior agency 

and media officials, working groups comprised of mid-level intelligence 

officers and journalists, and indirect engagement through the public. Some 

of these venues have been utilized in the past, though not as part of a 

unified approach.

Past Forums for Engaging with the Media: SIGINT 101 

and the Dialogue Group

The most commonly used method for engaging with the media has been 

direct one-on-one discussions between high-ranking government officials 

and senior members of the media. Several examples were previously cited 

in which CIA Directors spoke directly with senior editors and journalists 

to attempt to prevent the publication of classified information. This 

interaction represents the least strategic and most reactive option. 

Considering a more strategic approach, there have been past attempts to 

engage members of the media proactively. Between 2002 and 2004, the 
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National Security Agency held several half-day, off-the-record seminars 

labeled “SIGINT 101.” The stated purpose of these seminars was to “talk 

to journalists regarding our mission and the sensitivities of our mission in 

an unclassified way.”542 The belief was that, through education, journalists 

could be discouraged from publishing classified information harmful to 

NSA programs. The course outline included sessions with high-ranking 

NSA officials, including then-Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, NSA 

Director during this period. The intent of these sessions was to discuss 

how past articles could have been edited to remove the most objectionable 

portions without significantly altering the intent of the articles. This 

program appears to have been discontinued in 2004 due to staffing changes 

in NSA’s Public Affairs Office. 

SIGINT 101 represents one example of a venue in which a journalist’s 

decision-making process was discussed in a group setting. One other 

group forum used by government officials to discuss a journalist’s costbenefit analysis was the “Dialogue Group.” 

In early 2001, after President Clinton vetoed the Shelby Amendment to 

the 2001 Intelligence Authorization Act, there were discussions regarding 

the possible reintroduction of the legislation. Ultimately, the bill was not 

reintroduced. As an alternative, an interagency task force (Interagency 

Task Force Concerning Protections against Unauthorized Disclosures) 

was established and an informal dialogue between government and media 

officials was initiated. Former CIA General Counsel Jeffrey Smith and 

former Washington Post reporter Scott Armstrong are credited with the 

group’s formation.543

In a Los Angeles Times article, journalist Jack Nelson described this “Dialogue 

Group” as a forum to discuss “ways to protect the most sensitive national 

security secrets without abridging the public’s right to know.”544 Meetings, 

held every few weeks at the Metropolitan Club in Washington, DC, were 

attended by senior government officials from the CIA, NSA, Department of 

Justice, Department of Defense, and National Security Council.545 Media 

representatives included senior officials from the Los Angeles Times and the 

Washington Post. The group was cited as a contributing factor in the Bush 

administration’s decision not to pursue broader anti-leak legislation.546
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Specific elements of the journalist’s cost-benefit analysis described as being 

discussed during the meetings include the justification of government 

overclassification and the harm resulting from the loss of sources and 

methods.547 During meetings, government officials identified specific 

articles that had been published and discussed the harm each had caused. 

Similar to the SIGINT 101 seminars, alternatives were suggested that 

would have diminished the harm to national security interests without 

compromising the overall intent for publication. The most recent reporting 

regarding the Dialogue Group was published in May 2006.548

As opposed to reactive meetings precipitated by the media informing the 

government of its intent to publish classified information, the Dialogue 

Group and SIGINT 101 represent a more proactive approach. Forums such 

as these offer an opportunity for members of the government and the media 

to discuss government concerns informally and examine the journalist’s 

decision-making process in a constructive, less adversarial manner.

Proactive discussions between the government and media, similar to 

the Dialogue Group, have been successfully utilized outside the United 

States. For the past 99 years, the Defence Press and Broadcasting Advisory 

Committee (DPBAC) has provided a mechanism for the UK government 

to engage formally with British media organizations. The DPBAC, whose 

membership includes senior government and media officials, issues 

guidance on the publication of classified information. The goal of the 

Committee is to prevent harm to national security resulting from the 

disclosure of sensitive information. 

The British Model – Defence Advisory Committee and 

the Official Secrets Act

Formed in 1912, the Defence Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee 

provides a forum for the government of the United Kingdom to work 

jointly with media organizations on matters involving national security. 

The Committee is comprised of five government employees, representing 

four government agencies, and sixteen representatives from the British 

media. The Committee is chaired by the Under-Secretary of State for 

Defence.
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The DPBAC was established one year after the passage of the Official Secrets 

Act of 1911, which broadly proscribed the disclosure of “official government 

information” without authorization. Unlike the 1917 U.S. Espionage Act, 

the Official Secrets Act was not constrained by the provisions of the First 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In 1989, the Official Secrets Act was 

amended to significantly narrow its scope. The amended Act identifies six 

specific categories of government information illegal to disclose without 

authorization.549 It also designates an intra-government review board for 

government employees to report unlawful, abusive, or fraudulent activity. 

Guidance issued by the DPBAC to the media is referred to as Defence 

Advisory (DA) Notices. There are currently five standing DA Notices, 

which identify categories of information that the Committee recommends 

the media not disclose in the interest of national security. These categories 

are:

DA Notice 01: Military Operations, Plans, and Capabilities 

DA Notice 02: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapons and 

 Equipment 

DA Notice 03: Ciphers and Secure Communications 

DA Notice 04: Sensitive Installations and Home Addresses 

DA Notice 05: United Kingdom Security and Intelligence 

Special Services 

In addition to the standing notices, the DPBAC also issues letters to provide 

guidance in response to specific incidents. These letters are issued when the 

Committee is notified or has reason to believe a media organization may 

publish information involving national security. The most recent “Letter 

of Advice” from the DPBAC was issued on November 26, 2010.550 The 

letter concerned British media reporting on the disclosure of classified U.S. 

State Department cables by the website WikiLeaks. DA Notices, such as the 

November 2010 letter, are advisory in nature and are not legally binding. 

Media organizations ultimately retain the right to publish and are under no 

legal obligation to participate in the DA Notice system. 
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In addition to the UK, Israel also reportedly maintains an “Honest Broker” 

system similar to the DA Notice process.551 In 1952 Australia also formed an 

Advisory Committee to provide guidance to the media.552 This Committee 

was active for 30 years before the discontinuation of meetings in 1982. In 

November 2010, Australian Attorney General Robert McClelland proposed 

the reestablishment of a “formal mutually agreed arrangement with the 

media on the handling of sensitive national security information.” The 

intent of the agreement was to “facilitate reporting in a manner that avoids 

risk . . . or compromises important investigations or operations,” as well 

as to “strike a balance between national security and the public’s right to 

know.”553

Because the United Kingdom and Australia have no direct equivalent to the 

U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment, a more formal “Advisory Committee” 

model may be both more feasible and publicly accepted. In the political, 

legal, and social climate of the United States, where freedoms such as those 

guaranteed in the First Amendment are jealously guarded and the seed 

of a “credibility gap” has been cultivated, a less formal “Dialogue Group” 

concept is more likely to succeed. 

The Road Ahead

Proactively engaging with the media to examine the costs and benefits 

associated with unauthorized disclosures represents the greatest potential 

for reducing the perceived harm to national security. Maintaining the 

status quo or attempting to legislate a solution both have proven to be 

ineffective methods for resolving the dilemma. True change can only 

occur if the Executive Branch is willing to invest the time and resources 

necessary to implement an approach focused on engagement with the 

media. Past efforts, including the informal Dialogue Group, and current 

systems, such as the formal British Advisory Committee, offer a roadmap 

for the implementation of such an approach.

After expressing his belief that leaks could not be prevented through 

legislation, former DCI Robert Gates spoke of this more appropriate, yet 

difficult, approach. Gates wrote: “The answer, if there is one, is the slower, 

more mundane and frustrating process of again instilling discipline 
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through education and developing broad support . . .”554 The 1982 House 

Judiciary Committee Report on Unauthorized Disclosures (Willard Group) 

similarly concluded that a “fundamental change in prevailing attitudes . 

. . will not be achieved easily or quickly” but that “without a change in 

attitudes, no program to deal with unauthorized disclosures can possibly 

be effective.”555 Regardless of the difficulties in persuading journalists that 

the benefits of an unauthorized disclosure may not outweigh its harm, 

advocates of reducing the frequency of unauthorized disclosures will likely 

continue their efforts. 

General Michael Hayden, former director of the CIA and NSA, understands 

the crucial role of a proactive and sustained dialogue with the media. He 

offered the following advice to his former colleagues in the Intelligence 

Community:

I’m telling people to talk to the press when the press is accusing us 

of something. An additional lesson I would draw for my friends in 

the Intelligence Community, especially talk to the press when they 

aren’t accusing you of something. Go out of your way to establish 

communication and openness with all sorts of media. 

Talk to the press when you’re not being accused. There’s a lot more 

that can be done, not when you’re fighting a fire but in more peaceful 

times, to have open dialog with members of the press.556

Reducing the perceived harm of unauthorized disclosures can be 

achieved through a proactive approach that incorporates the principles of 

Rational Choice Theory. Ultimately, success or failure will depend on the 

government’s willingness to pursue this “frustrating” process and effect a 

“fundamental change in prevailing attitudes.”
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APPENDIX

The Legal Framework Underlying 

Unauthorized Disclosures

Because freedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom of 

reporters to investigate and report the news, the prosecutorial power 

of the government should not be used in such a way that it impairs 

a reporter’s responsibility to cover as broadly as possible controversial 

public issues.557

- Section 50.10 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulation

A comprehensive understanding of the conflict between freedom of the 

press and national security would not be complete without an analysis of 

the legal foundations underlying the issue. This appendix examines the 

framework, including the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights, enacted 

and proposed legislation, Executive Orders, and case law. 

Legal Framework: Executive Branch

The basis for Executive Branch authority to withhold information from 

public dissemination has been interpreted through case law related to 

Article II of the U.S. Constitution. In the 1988 Supreme Court ruling in 

Department of Navy v. Egan 484 U.S. 518 (1988) Justice Harry Blackmun 

wrote: “His (the President’s) authority to classify and control access to 

information bearing on national security . . . flows primarily from this 

constitutional investment of power in the President (Article II).”558 In an 

earlier ruling in the “Pentagon Papers” case, New York Times v. United 

States 403 U.S. 713 (1971), Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart wrote: 

“Under the Constitution, the Executive must have the largely unshared 

duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to 

exercise that power (the conduct of foreign affairs and the maintenance of 

our national defense) successfully.”559
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CONFIDENTIAL

THIS IS A COVER SHEET

FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

ALL INDIVIDUALS HANDLING THIS INFORMATION ARE REQUIRED TO PROTECT

IT FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL

SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE ATTACHED

DOCUMENT MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE

ORDER(S), STATUTE(S) AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.

(This cover sheet is unclassified.)

32 CFR 2003

Prescribed by GSA/ISOO STANDARD FORM 704 (8-85) 704-101

NSN 7540-01-213-7902

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS IS A COVER SHEET

FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

ALL INDIVIDUALS HANDLING THIS INFORMATION ARE REQUIRED TO PROTECT

IT FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL

SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE ATTACHED

DOCUMENT MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE

ORDER(S), STATUTE(S) AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.

(This cover sheet is unclassified.)

32 CFR 2003 Prescribed by GSA/ISOO STANDARD FORM 703 (8-85) 703-101

NSN 7540-01-213-7901

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

THIS IS A COVER SHEET

FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

ALL INDIVIDUALS HANDLING THIS INFORMATION ARE REQUIRED TO PROTECT

IT FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL

SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE ATTACHED

DOCUMENT MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE

ORDER(S), STATUTE(S) AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.

(This cover sheet is unclassified.)

32 CFR 2003

Prescribed by GSA/ISOO STANDARD FORM 704 (8-85) 704-101

NSN 7540-01-213-7902

FIGURE 15 – CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT COVER SHEETS – SF 703, 704 and 705

Source: U.S. Government.

Beyond the interpreted authority of Article II, the responsibility to protect 

classified information within the Intelligence Community (IC) has been 

delegated by legislation on two occasions. In the National Security Act 

of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence, the designated head of the 

IC, was charged with protecting intelligence sources and methods from 

unauthorized disclosure.560 This duty was transferred to the Director of 

National Intelligence (DNI) in 2004 through the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act, codified under Title 50, Section 403. As the head 

of a reorganized IC, the DNI was similarly tasked to protect intelligence 

sources and methods.561

Federal regulations governing the procedures for safeguarding intelligence 

sources and methods are contained in Executive Order (EO) 13526, signed 

by President Barack Obama on December 29, 2009. EO 13526 replaced EO 

12958, which was enacted in 1995. EO 12958 was preceded by EO 12356 

(1982), EO 12065 (1979), and EO 10501 (1953). 

EO 13526 establishes three classification levels for information. These 

levels are specifically defined based on the harm that would result if the 

information were disclosed without authorization. Information classified 

“Confidential” would “cause damage” to national security, while the 

disclosure of “Secret” information would cause “serious damage.” The 

disclosure of information classified “Top Secret” would, by definition, 
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result in “exceptionally grave” damage to national security.562 Documents 

classified in accordance with EO 13526 require additional safeguards to 

prevent unauthorized disclosure. These safeguards include specific storage 

requirements and the use of cover sheets and classification markings to 

identify the classification level of a document.

Beyond these collateral classification levels, there are additional instructions 

and procedures for handling information related to particularly sensitive 

programs, which are categorized by “compartments.” These include Special 

Access Programs (SAP) and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). 

SAP and SCI information requires additional safeguards that exceed 

protections for information with a collateral classification. 

Executive Order 13526 identifies eight specific categories of information 

eligible for classification. In addition to an expectation that national 

security would be harmed if the information were disclosed, the 

information must also relate to one of the following eight categories to be 

considered suitable for classification:

1. Military plans, weapons systems, or operations;

2. Foreign government information;

3. Intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence 

sources or methods, or cryptology;

4. Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, 

including confidential sources;

5. Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the 

national security;

6. United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear

 materials or facilities;

7. Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, 

infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to 

the national security; or

8. The development, production, or use of weapons of mass 

destruction.
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Executive Order 13526 defines the term “Unauthorized Disclosure” as 

“a communication or physical transfer of classified information to an 

unauthorized recipient.”563 In recognition of the conflicting issues raised 

by withholding information in a democracy, the following statement is 

included in the Executive Order:

Our democratic principles require that the American people be 

informed of the activities of their Government. Also, our Nation’s 

progress depends on the free flow of information both within the 

Government and to the American people. Nevertheless, throughout 

our history, the national defense has required that certain information 

be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our 

democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our interactions 

with foreign nations.564

EO 12065, the 1979 predecessor to EO 13526, similarly identified the need 

to “balance the public’s interests in access to Government information 

with the need to protect certain national security information from 

disclosure.”565

EO 13526 identifies three prerequisites for an individual to be granted 

access to classified information. They include a favorable determination 

of eligibility, the completion of an approved non-disclosure agreement, 

and a “need to know” the classified information.566 Sanctions for the 

knowing, willful, or negligent disclosure of properly classified information 

to unauthorized persons are also prescribed in the Executive Order. These 

penalties include the loss of access to classified information, the termination 

of employment, and “other sanctions in accordance with applicable law 

and agency regulation.”567

The authority for an agency to take administrative action against an 

employee, such as the removal of access to classified information or 

termination of employment, is codified under Title 5 of the U.S. Code, 

Section 7532. Section 7532 grants the head of an agency broad discretion 

to terminate an employee when he considers that action necessary in the 

interests of national security.568
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Though the “applicable” criminal laws are not specifically identified in EO 

13526, they are enumerated in the non-disclosure agreement required 

by the Executive Order. Standard Form 312, the “Classified Information 

Nondisclosure Agreement,” identifies eight criminal statutes under which 

an individual could potentially be prosecuted for the unauthorized 

disclosure of classified information.569 These statutes will be discussed in 

the next section.

Executive Orders have not been used solely to limit the dissemination 

of information. In addition to establishing procedures for protecting 

information, Executive Order 13526 also expressly prohibits the 

classification of information “to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or 

administrative error,” “prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, 

or agency,” “restrain competition,” or “prevent or delay the release of 

information that does not require protection in the interests of national 

security.”570 The penalties identified in the Executive Order for the 

unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including the loss of 

access to classified information, termination of employment, or “other 

sanctions” also apply to the improper classification of information. 

Current Executive Branch policy shows great deference for the role of the 

press in the United States. Section 50.10 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal 

Regulation (CFR) governs the Department of Justice’s policy regarding the 

issuance of subpoenas to members of the news media. Section 50.10 states:

Because freedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom of 

reporters to investigate and report the news, the prosecutorial power 

of the government should not be used in such a way that it impairs a 

reporter’s responsibility to cover as broadly as possible controversial 

public issues.571

The guidelines, first proposed by Attorney General William French Smith 

in 1980, were established in an attempt to strike a balance between “the 

public’s interest in the free dissemination of ideas and information and the 

public’s interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration 

of justice.”572 In accordance with this policy, the Department of Justice 

will not issue a subpoena to a member of the media unless all reasonable 
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attempts are made to obtain the desired information from alternative 

sources. The policy further states that negotiations with the media should 

be pursued when the Department is considering subpoenaing a journalist. 

The Attorney General must also directly authorize the issuance of a 

subpoena for a member of the media.

Legal Framework: Legislative Branch

The criminal statutes identified by the non-disclosure agreement include 

the following sections of Titles 18 and 50 of the U.S. Code:

18 USC 641 - Prohibits the theft or conversion of government 

property for personal use.

18 USC 952 - Prohibits the unauthorized publication or disclosure 

of a diplomatic code or coded correspondence.

18 USC 1924 - Prohibits the unauthorized removal, retention, or 

storage of classified information.

50 USC 421 - Prohibits the disclosure of the identity of a covert U.S. 

agent to unauthorized persons.

50 USC 783 - Prohibits the communication of classified information 

to the agent of a foreign government by a government employee or 

employee of a corporation in which the government is a majority 

owner.

The remaining three statutes, 18 USC 793, 794, and 798 are part of the 

Espionage Act, the most comprehensive statute relating to unauthorized 

disclosures. Section 793 prohibits the disclosure of “national defense 

information” to “any person not entitled to receive it,”573 while Section 794 

specifically proscribes disclosures to “any foreign government.”574 Sections 

793 and 794 both include a requirement that the disclosure be committed 

“with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the 

injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.” 

Section 798, a 1950 amendment to the Act, contains several key distinctions 

from its predecessors. Section 798 criminalizes the disclosure of “classified 

information,” specifically involving cryptographic or communications 
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intelligence.575 Section 798 does not include an “intent” provision, only a 

requirement that the disclosure be performed “knowingly” and “willfully.” 

Section 798 is also the only section that expressly prohibits the publication 

of classified information. 

The severity of the penalties for violating Sections 793, 794, and 798 

vary widely. The sentence for a conviction under Section 793 or 798 

includes a fine and imprisonment for up to ten years, while a violation 

of Section 794 is punishable by imprisonment for up to life. Section 794 

also includes provisions for seeking the death penalty under certain 

circumstances, including the disclosure of information resulting in the 

death of an individual, the disclosure of military plans during time of war, 

or a disclosure concerning nuclear weaponry or early warning systems. In 

accordance with the 1954 Hiss Act, codified under Title 5 of the U.S. Code, 

Section 8312, an individual convicted under Sections 793, 794, or 798 

of the Espionage Act (or comparable provisions of the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice) forfeit any federal annuity or other retirement benefits.576

When initially proposed, the Espionage Act included a provision 

which would have made it unlawful, during time of war, to publish any 

information determined to be “of such character that it is or might be 

useful to the enemy.”577 Congress debated whether the provision would 

do more to protect national security (potentially preventing the enemy 

from sinking a U.S. vessel as the result of published information) or stifle 

legitimate criticism (possibly concealing an epidemic among U.S. troops).

In response to opposition, the provision was amended to specify “nothing 

in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict any discussion, 

comment, or criticism of the acts or policies of the Government.”578 

President Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, addressed Congress directly, 

arguing that the provision was necessary for public safety. Despite both 

the amendment and President Wilson’s personal appeal, the provision was 

defeated on May 31, 1917, by a vote of 184 to 144. Of the 184 votes against 

the provision, 148 were cast by Republicans.579

There is one additional legal prohibition related to unauthorized disclosures 

not identified in the non-disclosure agreement. Section 224 of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954 criminalizes the communication, transmission, or 
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disclosure of “Restricted Data” to any person “with intent to injure the 

United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation.”580

The term “Restricted Data” is defined as information related to the design, 

manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons or the production or use of 

special nuclear material. The relevant portion of the Atomic Energy Act is 

codified under Title 42 of the U.S. Code, Section 2274. 

Between 1946 and 2010, there have been at least 18 unsuccessful proposals 

to amend existing statutes related to unauthorized disclosures. In 1946 

the Joint Congressional Committee for Investigation of the Attack 

on Pearl Harbor recommended legislation akin to the British Official 

Secrets Act, broadly prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of classified 

information.581 The Secretary of War submitted a comparable proposal 

to the Attorney General, also in 1946. The Secretary of War’s proposal 

was based on the results of a joint study conducted by Army and Navy 

Intelligence and the FBI. Neither proposal became law. Secretary of 

Defense Robert Lovett again proposed the enactment of broad legislation 

in 1952. The Justice Department drafted legislation, though it was never 

voted on by Congress. 

The 1957 Wright Commission on Government Security recommended 

enacting legislation that would have made it a crime for “any person 

willfully to disclose without proper authorization, for any purpose whatever, 

information classified ‘secret’ or ‘top secret,’ knowing, or having reasonable 

grounds to believe, such information to have been so classified.”582 The 

proposal was ultimately rejected by the Senate. Similar initiatives during 

the Eisenhower administration in 1958 and the Johnson administration in 

1966 were also unsuccessful.583

The next proposal, Senate Bill S.1400, was introduced in March 1973. 

Section 1124 of the bill criminalized the communication of “classified 

information” by individuals who were authorized to have possession of 

the information to “a person not authorized to receive it.”584 This proposal 

focused solely on the individual with authorized access, indicating that the 

recipient of the classified information would not be subject to prosecution 

under the provision. No action was taken on the bill. Section 1124 was 

eventually reintroduced as part of Senate Bill S.1 in 1975. Though additional 
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procedural safeguards were added, controversy over the section led to its 

withdrawal. In 1976 legislation drafted by the CIA was proposed by the 

Ford administration. The legislation was strongly criticized by the media 

and civil liberties organizations and never enacted. 

The next four proposals were included in draft intelligence authorization 

bills for fiscal years 1984, 1986, 1987, and 1993.585 Both expansive and 

narrowly written proposals were considered. Two proposals broadly 

proscribed the unauthorized disclosure of all classified information. 

Another provided for civil remedies in cases involving the disclosure of 

signals intelligence, while one other allowed for an affirmative defense and 

an ex parte determination by a judge whether the relevant information 

was classified appropriately. The 1993 proposal only related to disclosures 

of TOP SECRET information involving technical collection systems or 

capabilities. Ultimately, all were removed from the final bill submitted to 

Congress due to legal and/or political concerns and a perceived lack of 

support.

In 2000, a provision to amend Section 798(a) of the Espionage Act was 

included in the final version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 

2001. Section 304 of the Act, introduced by Senator Richard Shelby of 

Alabama, broadly criminalized the disclosure of classified information to 

unauthorized persons. After Congress approved a final version of the Act 

containing the “Shelby Amendment,” President Bill Clinton vetoed the bill. 

The veto occurred four days before the November 8, 2000, Presidential 

election. In a published statement, President Clinton identified the Shelby 

Amendment as the sole reason for the veto, citing both a lack of public 

hearings as well as its potentially chilling effect on legitimate activities.586 

Six years later, in August 2006, Senator Kit Bond introduced Senate Bill 

S.3774, which duplicated the provisions of the Shelby Amendment. It was 

heavily criticized and never enacted. 

The next two attempts to enact legislation were proposed in 2007 by Senator 

Jon Kyl of Arizona. In February 2007, Senator Kyl attached an amendment 

to the “Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act,” S.236. The amendment 

prohibited the communication, transmission, or publication of classified 

information “concerning efforts by the United States to identify, investigate, 
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or prevent terrorist activity.”587 Violations of this provision were punishable 

by imprisonment for up to 20 years. As the result of strong opposition, 

Senator Kyl removed the amendment, modified the text, and reintroduced 

it as an amendment to Senate Bill S.4, “Improving America’s Security Act 

of 2007.”588 The new amendment criminalized the unauthorized disclosure 

of classified information contained in reports submitted to Congress. The 

amendment specified that the statute would apply to members and employees 

of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. This provision also 

faced significant opposition and was never enacted. 

The most recent attempt to amend existing legislation, the “Securing 

Human Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination (SHIELD) Act,” 

was introduced in the Senate in December 2010. The proposal amended 

Section 798 of the Espionage Act, adding two additional categories of 

information illegal to disclose without authorization. This information 

includes the identity of a classified informant or source associated with 

the U.S. Intelligence Community, and information concerning the human 

intelligence activities of the United States or a foreign government. A 

similar bill was also introduced in the House of Representatives. Neither 

bill was approved prior to the conclusion of the 111th Congress.

Beyond the government’s recognition of a necessity to protect information 

in the interest of national security, the responsibility to maintain an 

enlightened citizenry in a democracy is also acknowledged. The foundation 

for this principle is found in the U.S. Bill of Rights, which contains the first 

ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Though not as prominent in the 

public consciousness as the preamble to the U.S. Constitution, the preamble 

to the Bill of Rights similarly captures the Founding Fathers’ sentiments. 

The preamble declares that the Bill of Rights was established “in order to 

prevent misconstruction or abuse of its [U.S. Constitution] powers . . . And 

as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government.”589

This desire to instill confidence in the government and prevent abuse 

is further reinforced by the protections guaranteed under the First 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In order to ensure the public 

remain free to, among other things, openly debate the propriety of 

government activity, the First Amendment declares that the government 
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will “make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . of the press 

. . .”590 Two documents that precede the Bill of Rights, the Virginia 

Declaration of Rights (1776) and the Constitution of the Commonwealth 

of Massachusetts (1780), appear to have influenced the author of the Bill 

of Rights, James Madison. 

Article 12 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights states: “The freedom 

of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty and can never be 

restrained but by despotic governments.”591 Article 16 of the Constitution 

of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts reads: “The liberty of the press is 

essential to the security of freedom in a state; it ought not, therefore, to be 

restrained in this commonwealth.”592 In an early draft of the Bill of Rights, 

Madison wrote: “The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right 

to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments, and the freedom of the 

press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”593

Beyond the ability of the press to provide oversight from a position outside 

of the government, legislation has also been enacted to allow those inside 

a government “of the people” to report items of concern. This authority is 

codified in two “Whistleblower” acts. The Whistleblower Protection Act 

(WPA) of 1989 establishes provisions for government employees to report 

activity they believe violates a law, rule, or regulation; evidences an abuse 

of authority or a waste of funds; or creates a substantial danger to health 

or safety.594 The legislation also provides protection for the government 

employee against retaliation by his or her employing agency. 

Four venues for a government employee to report undesirable activities 

are identified in the WPA: the Office of Special Counsel, U.S. Congress, 

an agency’s Inspector General Office, or an employee designated by the 

head of the agency. The WPA is codified under Title 5 of the U.S. Code, 

Section 2302. It was amended in 1994 to provide additional protections for 

government employees against adverse actions.

In 1998 a provision of the proposed Intelligence Authorization Act of 

1999 expanded the coverage of the WPA to employees and contractors 

of Intelligence Community agencies. These individuals were previously 

precluded from protection under the WPA. The WPA had also specifically 

prohibited the disclosures of information “required by Executive Order to 
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be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign 

affairs.”595 The 1998 provision was enacted as the Intelligence Community 

Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) of 1998. In accordance with the 

ICWPA, IC employees can report prohibited actions, including allegations 

containing classified information, to their agency’s Inspector General, an 

authorized official of the covered agency, or members of Congressional 

intelligence committees (HPSCI or SSCI).596

The provisions of the WPA and ICWPA do not apply to disclosures to 

the media. The processes and protections enumerated in the Acts relate 

specifically to reports made through approved government channels.

A proposal introduced in Congress in 2007, but never enacted, would have 

had a considerable impact on the oversight role of the press. The “Free 

Flow of Information Act” would have provided journalists with a federal 

privilege protecting them from being compelled to disclose the identity 

of a confidential source.597 The proposal did contain a possible exception 

in cases involving national security. Advocates continue to support the 

reintroduction and passage of the Act. One particular point of contention 

in the 2007 proposal appears to have been the definition of a “journalist.” 

As of 2011, 36 states offered at least some level of privilege for journalists to 

protect the identity of a source. Questions regarding an individual’s status 

as a journalist also appear to be present at the state level. In April 2010, the 

New Jersey Court of Appeals ruled that an online blogger was not eligible 

for journalist protections available at the state level.598

Legal Framework: Judicial Branch

The Supreme Court has recognized a compelling government interest to 

protect information related to national security. Consequently, the Court 

has found that restricting provisions of the First Amendment in certain 

circumstances may be justified. In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 

U.S. 563 (1968) and National Federation of Federal Employees v. United 

States, 695 F. Supp. 1196 (1988), the courts ruled that First Amendment 

restrictions of government employees are permissible when there is 

a substantial government interest and the restrictions are narrowly 

drawn.599, 600
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In the 1980 case Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), the Supreme 

Court affirmed the authority of the CIA to require current and former 

employees to submit articles and books for pre-publication review in the 

interests of national security.601 One year later, in Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 

280 (1981), the court ruled that the Executive Branch could decline to issue 

a passport to an individual in response to national security concerns.602 In 

Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), the Supreme Court also 

ruled that Executive Branch agencies had the discretion to deny a security 

clearance based on a compelling need to protect classified information.603 

In each of these cases the defense argued, unsuccessfully, that the 

government’s actions infringed on its client’s First Amendment rights. 

University of Chicago law professor Geoffrey Stone provides an excellent 

overview of permissible limitations to First Amendment protections in the 

article “Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press.”604 Stone identifies 

three instances in which a law may limit speech: content restrictions, 

restrictions other than content (time and location), and restrictions of 

conduct incidental to speech. 

Professor Stone wrote that restrictions related to content are presumptively 

unconstitutional and “held to the highest degree of First Amendment 

scrutiny” as a result of the potential negative impact to public debate. The 

courts analyze non-content legal restrictions, such as time or location 

prohibitions, by weighing the government interest against the impact to 

speech. Restrictions of “non-communicative” activities incidental to speech, 

such as wiretapping, breaking and entering, or bribery, are presumptively 

constitutional because they do not expressly restrict speech. 

Stone indicates that a court will only invalidate incidental restrictions 

if the impact on speech is substantial and significantly outweighs the 

government’s interest in enforcing the law.605 An example of a noncommunicative restriction with only incidental impact to speech would 

include the enforcement of traffic laws. Though it could be argued that citing 

an individual for speeding to a protest rally restricts his or her speech, the 

incidental impact to speech does not outweigh the government’s interest in 

enforcing traffic laws to prevent injury.
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When these criteria are applied to a law that prohibits the publication of 

classified information, two standards would appear to apply. Stone writes 

that, because such a law regulates content, it would require the highest 

level of scrutiny for validity. However, because publication by the media 

is necessarily preceded by the non-communicative removal of classified 

information by a government employee, and possibly the solicitation of the 

government employee to disclose classified information, Stone asserts that 

the latter criteria may also be applicable. A prohibition against unlawful 

acts, such as the removal of classified information by a government 

employee or the solicitation of a government employee for classified 

information, would be presumptively constitutional. This presumption 

would only be invalidated if it was determined that the government’s 

interest was significantly outweighed by the impact to speech. 

In two 1974 Supreme Court cases related to access to government 

information, Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. 417 U.S. 843 (1974)606 and 

Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974),607 the court ruled that the First 

Amendment does not provide the media with an absolute right to access 

government information. In these decisions, the Court found that the 

media’s ability to access information is no greater than that of the general 

public. 

In the 1972 Supreme Court case Branzburg v. Hayes (408 U.S. 665), the 

Court ruled that journalists did not have a federal privilege to refuse to 

identify a source during grand jury proceedings. The case combined three 

incidents in which journalists were subpoenaed to testify before the grand 

jury regarding criminal activity they had witnessed. The first case involved 

a journalist’s knowledge of the manufacture and use of hashish while the 

other two involved knowledge of the activities of the Black Panther Party, 

an African American organization founded to promote civil rights. In a 

five-to-four decision, the Court ruled that the First Amendment did not 

provide authority for a journalist to refuse to comply with a valid grand 

jury subpoena.

Between 1991 and June 2007, the Department of Justice reported 

subpoenaing journalists on 19 occasions.608 This equates to approximately 

one subpoena per year over a 16-year period. Of the 19 subpoenaed 
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journalists, at least three were imprisoned for refusing to comply with the 

subpoena. In 2001 freelance reporter Vanessa Leggett was jailed for 168 

days for refusing to reveal unpublished information relevant to a murder 

trial.609 In 2005 New York Times reporter Judith Miller was sentenced to 

18 months incarceration, serving 85 days before agreeing to identify her 

source of information concerning the identity of a CIA employee.610 Most 

recently, in 2006, freelance videographer Joshua Wolf was imprisoned for 

226 days. Wolf refused to provide authorities with video footage from a 

street protest related to the July 2005 G-8 economic summit.611

As previously discussed, there have been four attempted prosecutions 

specifically for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the 

media. In 1971 Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, employees of the Rand 

Corporation, were indicted for providing portions of a TOP SECRET 

Defense Department study to the New York Times and the Washington Post. 

The indictment included eight counts under the Espionage Act, six counts 

of theft, and one count of conspiracy. On May 11, 1973, the cases against 

Ellsberg and Russo were dismissed due to government misconduct.612

In the second case involving an unauthorized disclosure to the media, 

Navy analyst Samuel Morison was indicted and successfully convicted in 

1985 under section 793 of the Espionage Act.613 Morison, with the Navy’s 

approval, was a part-time contributor to the British magazine Jane’s Defence 

Weekly. In an apparent attempt to garner favor with Jane’s and obtain a 

full-time position, Morison provided three classified satellite images to an 

editor at the magazine. The imagery, from the U.S. KH-11 reconnaissance 

satellite, showed the first Soviet Kiev-class nuclear powered aircraft carrier 

still under construction. Jane’s subsequently published one of the images 

on the cover of its August 11, 1984, edition. 

During the trial, Morison’s attorneys argued that the Espionage Act did 

not apply to unauthorized disclosures to the media, that provisions of the 

Act were vague and overbroad, and that Morison’s motivation was actually 

patriotic. The judge and jury rejected these arguments. Morison was 

found guilty on all counts and was sentenced to two years’ incarceration. 

The conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme 

Court declined to hear the appeal. After serving his sentence, Morison 
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was pardoned by President Bill Clinton in January 2001, his final day in 

office.614

In August 2010, Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, a State Department contractor, 

was indicted under Section 793 of the Espionage Act for disclosing the 

contents of a TOP SECRET intelligence report to a journalist working for 

a national news organization.615 As of May 2010, the case was pending 

in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The most recent 

criminal indictment for an unauthorized disclosure to the media occurred 

in December 2010. Former CIA Operations Officer Jeffrey Sterling was 

indicted, also under Section 793, for disclosing classified information to a 

member of the media.616 The information reportedly concerned a covert 

CIA operation involving Iran. As of May 2010, the case was pending in U.S. 

District Court, Eastern District of Virginia. 

Though not specifically charged for disclosing classified information to 

the media, former NSA employee Thomas Drake was indicted in April 

2010 for activities related to unauthorized disclosures to a member of the 

media.617According to the indictment, multiple articles published between 

February 2006 and November 2007 contained classified information 

provided by Drake. Drake was indicted under Section 793 of the Espionage 

Act for the unlawful possession and retention of classified information. He 

was also charged with obstruction of justice (18 USC 1519) and making 

a false statement to a special agent of the FBI (18 USC 1001(a)). Drake’s 

trial was scheduled to begin in June 2011 in U.S. District Court, Maryland 

District.

There are four additional notable instances in which portions of the 

Espionage Act were used to prosecute individuals for unauthorized 

disclosures to recipients other than a foreign government. In 2006, Larry 

Franklin, a Defense Department analyst, pled guilty under Section 793 of 

the Espionage Act for disclosing classified information to U.S. employees of 

the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).618 The classified 

information concerned U.S. policies toward Iran. Based on the terms of 

the plea agreement, Franklin was sentenced to 121⁄2 years imprisonment. 

Franklin cooperated with prosecutors and the FBI and his sentence was 

later reduced to 10 months house arrest, community service, and probation. 
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The guilty plea included one count for the conspiracy to communicate 

national defense information to persons not entitled to receive it. Included 

in the overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were disclosures made to 

members of the media.619

In December 2009, former FBI linguist Samuel Leibowitz pled guilty under 

Section 798 of the Espionage Act for providing five classified FBI documents 

to the owner of an Internet blog site. The unidentified documents “contained 

classified information concerning the communication intelligence 

activities of the United States.”620 Information from the documents was 

subsequently posted to the blog site. In May 2010, in accordance with 

the terms of the plea agreement, Leibowitz was sentenced to 20 months 

incarceration.

One other conviction not involving a disclosure to a foreign government 

resulted from charges brought by the Navy under the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice (UCMJ). In 2007, Lieutenant Commander Matthew 

Diaz was found guilty during a general court-martial for the disclosure 

of classified information to an individual not authorized to receive it.621 

While assigned to the U.S. detention camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Diaz 

mailed a classified list of detainees to the Center for Constitutional Rights, 

a legal advocacy group. Criminal charges were preferred under Article 134 

of the UCMJ, which provides for the application of federal criminal statutes 

to members of the military. Diaz was sentenced to six months confinement 

and was discharged from the Navy. Diaz had served in the military for over 

20 years. 

In July 2010, charges for an unauthorized disclosure were also preferred 

under the UCMJ against Private First Class Bradley Manning.622 Manning 

was charged with communicating national defense information to an 

unauthorized recipient, exceeding his authorized access on a classified 

computer network, and improperly storing classified information on his 

personal computer. Information alleged to have been disclosed by Manning 

includes a video of a military operation in Iraq and more than 50 classified 

State Department cables. The unauthorized recipient of the information is 

reported to be the Internet-based organization WikiLeaks, an international 

organization reportedly dedicated to publishing documents revealing 
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misconduct by governments or corporations. Similar to the case involving 

LCDR Diaz, violations of Section 793 of the Espionage Act were brought 

under Article 134 of the UCMJ. As of May 2011 Manning remained in pretrial confinement at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Beyond criminal prosecution, the most significant case involving the 

conflict between the government’s authority to withhold information and 

the ability of the press to publish this information is the previously discussed 

Supreme Court case New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), 

better known as the “Pentagon Papers” case.623 The principal issue in this 

case involved “prior restraint,” the government’s ability to prevent the 

publication of information it believes will harm national security. 

On June 13, 1971, the New York Times published a front-page article 

containing classified information from a TOP SECRET Department of 

Defense study concerning Vietnam. Daniel Ellsberg, an employee of 

the RAND Corporation, had provided the study to Times reporter Neil 

Sheehan without authorization. After refusing a request from the Nixon 

administration to discontinue the disclosures, the New York Times

published articles on each of the next two days. 

In response to the Times’ refusal to cooperate, the government obtained 

a federal injunction to prevent further disclosures. After the injunction 

was issued, Ellsberg provided portions of the study to the Washington Post, 

which began publishing its own articles. The government subsequently 

enjoined the Washington Post from publishing additional articles. Both 

newspapers appealed the injunctions, the appeals were combined, and the 

Supreme Court agreed to hear the joint case.

On June 30, 1971, the Supreme Court ruled, six to three, that the government 

had not overcome the “heavy presumption” against prior restraint.624 In 

his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart wrote that prior restraint could 

only be justified when a disclosure “will surely result in direct, immediate, 

and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.”625 The Court relied 

partially on the precedent established in the 1931 Supreme Court case Near 

v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In the Near case, the Court determined 

that prior restraint was unconstitutional except for extremely limited 

circumstances.626
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Though the Supreme Court ruled that prior restraint was not warranted 

in this instance, subsequent courts have identified at least two instances in 

which they believed prior restraint was justified. In the 1979 case United 

States v. Progressive Inc., 467 F Supp 990 (1979), the District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin issued an injunction to prevent the magazine 

The Progressive from publishing an article detailing the instructions for 

constructing a hydrogen bomb.627 The Court found that prior restraint 

was necessary in this case to prevent “irreparable harm to the national 

security of the United States.” The government ultimately dropped the case 

when the information was disclosed in another publication.

FIGURE 16 – NOVEMBER 1979 PROGRESSIVE 

MAGAZINE 628

Source: The Progressive, November 1979. Used with 

permission.

In the second case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida 

issued an injunction in 1990 to prevent CNN from broadcasting recorded 

conversations between former Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega and his 

attorneys.629 CNN defied the court order, broadcasting excerpts from the 

conversations 11 times while appealing the injunction. CNN reported that 

it chose to defy the court order because it believed that the injunction was 

an invalid prior restraint.630 The Supreme Court denied CNN’s appeal of 

the injunction, even though the information had already been broadcast.631

CNN was convicted of contempt of court in 1994 and ordered to broadcast 

an apology for defying the court. CNN was also ordered to reimburse the 
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government $85,000 in attorney fees. CNN’s apology read, in part, “On 

further consideration . . . CNN realizes that it was in error in defying the 

order of the court . . . while appealing the court’s order.”632

In the 2001 Supreme Court case Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 

(2001), the Court ruled that a member of the media could not be held 

liable for broadcasting information he or she had obtained lawfully, even 

if the information was provided by an individual who had acquired the 

information through a violation of federal law.633 In this case, a radio 

station had broadcast excerpts from a phone conversation that a private 

citizen had unlawfully recorded. The Court found that the media outlet 

could not be held liable because it had not performed an illegal act to 

obtain the recording. This decision did not discuss the additional legal 

issues raised when the media obtain and publish classified information. 

The government has considered criminal prosecution for a journalist or 

media outlet on at least four occasions. In August 1942, a grand jury was 

empanelled after a June 7, 1942, Chicago Tribune article disclosed that the 

U.S. Navy had access to Japanese operational plans prior to the Battle of 

Midway. No indictment was returned, largely because the Navy refused 

to cooperate with the investigation. The Navy’s decision was reportedly 

based on concern over the additional attention the disclosed information 

would receive during criminal proceedings.634 The government was also 

reportedly concerned that additional classified information would be 

disclosed during a trial.

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision to allow the continued 

publication of the “Pentagon Papers” articles, the U.S. Attorney for 

New York reportedly rejected a request by the Nixon administration 

to convene a grand jury to indict the New York Times.

635 In 1975, the 

Ford administration considered filing criminal charges against the New 

York Times for its disclosure of a classified program to intercept Soviet 

communications.636 The operation, code-named HOLYSTONE, utilized 

specially equipped submarines to enter the territorial waters of the Soviet 

Union. Dick Cheney, then a White House aide, prepared a memorandum 

for White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld after the disclosure. 

The memorandum outlined potential courses of action, including the 
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prosecution of the New York Times and/or Seymour Hersh, the author of 

the article.637

The Attorney General also prepared a “Memorandum for the President,” 

outlining the Justice Department’s position regarding legal action. The 

memorandum discussed all potential legal options, concluding that “the 

most promising course of action, for the moment, would be to discuss the 

problem of publication of material detrimental to the national security 

with leading publishers.”638 Ultimately, neither the New York Times nor 

Hersh was indicted and no further legal action was pursued. Similar to the 

1942 Tribune disclosure, the decision was also partially based on concerns 

that criminal proceedings would draw additional attention to the classified 

program.639

Most recently, in May 1986, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey 

reportedly requested that the Justice Department consider prosecuting 

NBC for broadcasting a news report containing classified information.640 

The request was in response to a broadcast detailing the NSA operation 

IVY BELLS, in which the United States is reported to have intercepted 

Soviet communications by tapping undersea cables. Similar to the prior 

two cases, no legal action against NBC was taken. 

Conclusion

Though he recognized that the law failed to offer an adequate resolution, 

Justice Potter Stewart identified the role of the law in establishing a 

foundation for the “contest” between a free press and national security. In a 

1974 speech delivered at Yale Law School, Justice Stewart remarked:

So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press may publish 

what it knows, and may seek to learn what it can.

But this autonomy cuts both ways. The press is free to do battle 

against secrecy and deception in government. But the press cannot 

expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed. There 

is no constitutional right to have access to particular government 

information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy. The 
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public’s interest in knowing about its government is protected by 

the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The 

Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an 

Official Secrets Act. 

The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its 

resolution. Congress may provide a resolution, at least in some 

instances, through carefully drawn legislation. For the rest, we must 

rely, as so often in our system we must, on the tug and pull of the 

political forces in American society.641

Stewart’s sentiments are reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson’s second inaugural 

address. Jefferson also asserted that recourse for undesirable behavior by 

the media “must be sought in the censorship of public opinion” and not in 

the law.642 Alexander Hamilton, one of Jefferson’s greatest political rivals, 

shared his belief. In 1788 Hamilton wrote that the “liberty of the press” 

was dependent on “public opinion and on the general spirit of the people 

. . .”643 Though an examination of the legal system can aid in framing the 

debate over the impact of unauthorized disclosures, it ultimately fails to 

offer an adequate solution to the dilemma. 
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Endnotes

1 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).

2 Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).

3 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., 

dissenting). In a book that borrows Jackson’s phraseology, Judge Richard 

Posner offered an analysis of the risks posed by transnational terrorism 

quite analogous to that offered by Ross. See RICHARD A. POSNER, 

NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN TIMES OF 

EMERGENCY (2006).

4 For a thoughtful framing of the problem, see Note, Mechanisms of 

Secrecy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1556 (2008).

5 See Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and 

Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973); see 

also Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: 

Executive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 

349 (1986) (updating their earlier analysis). For a more recent analysis, see 

Stephen I. Vladeck, Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory 

Framework and the Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 219 

(2007).

6 See, for example, Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National 

Security Whistleblowing After Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1531 (2008).

7 See, for example, Geoffrey R. Stone, Top Secret: When Our Government 

Keeps Us In The Dark (2007).

8 See, for example, Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: 

Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 

(2006).

9 See, for example, Eric Lichtblau, The Education of a 9/11 Reporter: The 

Inside Drama Behind the Times’ Warrantless Wiretapping Story, SLATE.COM, 

Mar. 26, 2008, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2187498.
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10 Bruce, James, How Foreign Adversaries Learn to Degrade U.S. Intelligence, 

and the Steps that Can be Take to Counter It. Based on a shorter article 

appearing in Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century 

Challenge, Roy Godson and James Wirtz, eds. (New Brunswick, NJ: 

Transaction Books, 2002).

11 Esther Addley, “Assange claims WikiLeaks is more accountable than 

governments,” The Guardian, April 9, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/

media/2011/apr/09/julian-assange-wikileaks-public-debate (accessed 

April 11, 2011). 

12 Though the New York Times had been given access to the U.S. military 

reports prior to their release, WikiLeaks did not offer The Times advanced 

access the to U.S. State Department cables. The refusal was reportedly in 

retaliation for The Times’ decision not to include a link to the WikiLeaks 

website in its earlier articles discussing U.S. military reports, as well as its 

publication of an article critical of Julian Assange. The Times ultimately 

obtained a copy of the cables from a separate source prior to their release by 

WikiLeaks.

13 Anne Kornblut, “Guantanamo documents revive debate,” Washington 

Post, April 25, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/guantanamo_documents_revive_debate/2011/04/25/AF15ySlE_story.

html?wprss=rss_homepage (accessed April 26, 2011). 

14 “A Superpower’s View of the World,” Spiegel Online International, 

November 28, 2010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/

world/0,1518,731580,00.html (accessed February 21, 2011).

15 “I Enjoy Crushing Bastards,” Spiegel Online International, July 26, 2010. 

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,708518,00.html (accessed 

November 2, 2010).

16 “WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange, Pt. 2,” 60 Minutes, January 30, 2011. http://

www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7300036n&tag=contentBody;housing

(accessed February 21, 2011).

17 “I Enjoy Crushing Bastards,” Spiegel Online International, 

July 26, 2010. 
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18 “The Iraq Archive: The Strands of War,” New York Times, October 22, 

2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/middleeast/23intro.html

(accessed October 29, 2010).

19 Anne Kornblut, “Guantanamo documents revive debate,” Washington 

Post, April 25, 2011.

20 “A Note to Readers: The Decision to Publish Diplomatic Documents,” 

New York Times, November 28, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/

world/29editornote.html (accessed February 21, 2011).

21 “The Defense Department’s Response,” New York Times, October 22, 

2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/middleeast/23response.html

(accessed October 29, 2010).

22 “Public Sees WikiLeaks as Harmful,” Pew Research Center, December 

8, 2010. http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1823/poll-wikileaks-harm-serve-publicinterest-press-handling (accessed March 29, 2011). 

23 Richard Spencer, “Wikileaks: Nick Clegg backs calls for investigation,” 

The Telegraph, October 24, 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/

middleeast/iraq/8084116/Wikileaks-Nick-Clegg-backs-calls-for-investigation.

html (accessed October 29, 2010).

24 Joshua Partlow and Greg Jaffe, “Karzai calls WikiLeaks disclosures 

‘shocking’ and dangerous to Afghan informants,” The Washington Post, 

July 29, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2010/07/29/AR2010072901762.html (accessed October 29, 2010).

25 Joshua Partlow and Karin Brulliard, “Pakistan decries WikiLeaks release 

of U.S. military documents on Afghan war,” The Washington Post, July 27, 

2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/26/

AR2010072602393_pf.html (accessed July 27, 2010).

26 Mary Beth Sheridan, “Calderon: WikiLeaks caused severe damage to 

U.S-Mexican relations,” Washington Post, March 3, 2011. http://www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/03/AR2011030302853.

html?referrer=emailarticle (accessed March 7, 2011).
172

GARY ROSS

27 Adam Thomson, “WikiLeaks spat leads to US diplomat resigning,” 

Financial Times, March 20, 2011. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/00911f6e530b-11e0-86e6-00144feab49a.html#axzz1HF2PtLkD (accessed

March 21, 2011).

28 Steven Stalinsky, “American-Yemeni Al-Qaeda Cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki 

Highlights the Role and Importance of Media Jihad, Praises Al-Jazeera TV 

Journalists and WikiLeaks,” The Middle East Media Research Institute, 

March 15, 2011. http://www.thememriblog.org/blog_personal/en/35529.htm 

(accessed March 18, 2011).

29 Robert Mackey, “Taliban Study Wikileaks to Hunt Informants,” New 

York Times, July 30, 2010. http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/

taliban-study-wikileaks-to-hunt-informants (accessed October 29, 2010).

30 Jeanne Whalen, “Rights Groups Join Criticism of WikiLeaks,” The Wall 

Street Journal, August 9, 2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052

748703428604575419580947722558.html (accessed February 21, 2011).

31 “The Data Revolution: How WikiLeaks is changing journalism,” 

Frontline Club, August 12, 2010. http://frontlineclub.com/

events/2010/08/the-data-revolution-how-wikileaks-is-changing-journalism.

html (accessed February 23, 2011).

32 Luke Harding and David Leigh, “WikiLeaks: How US political invective 

turned on ‘anti-American’ Julian Assange,” The Guardian, February 3, 2011. 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/03/wikileaks-julian-assange-usreaction (accessed February 23, 2011).

33 “Julian Assange extended interview,” Australian Broadcasting 

Corporation, November 4, 2011. http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2011/

s3188451.htm (accessed April 11, 2011).

34 “WikiLeaks website publishes classified military documents from Iraq,” 

CNN, October 22, 2010. http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-22/us/wikileaks.

iraq_1_wikileaks-website-classified-documents-iraq-wiki-leaks-iraqis?_

s=PM:US (accessed February 22, 2011).
173

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

35 Mark Landler and Scott Shane, “U.S. Sends Warning to People Named 

in Cable Leaks,” New York Times, January 6, 2011. http://www.nytimes.

com/2011/01/07/world/07wiki.html (accessed February 22, 2011).

36 Simon Romero, “Ecuador Expels U.S. Ambassador over WikiLeaks 

Cable,” New York Times, April 5, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/

world/americas/06ecuador.html (accessed April 9, 2011).

37 “Secretary Clinton’s remarks on WikiLeaks documents,” The Hill, 

November 29, 2010. http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/lawmakernews/130973-secretary-clintons-remarks-on-wikileak-documents (accessed 

April 9, 2011).

38 “DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the 

Pentagon,” November 30, 2010. http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2010/11/

dod113010.html (accessed February 26, 2011).

39 Mark Hosenball, “US officials privately say WikiLeaks damage limited,” 

Reuters, January 18, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/18/

wikileaks-damage-idUSN1816319120110118 (accessed February 26, 2011). 

40 Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense to Carl Levin, Chairman, Senate 

Armed Services Committee, August 16, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/

othergov/dod/gates-wikileaks.pdf (accessed October 29, 2010).

41 “Julian Assange answers your questions,” The Guardian, December 3, 

2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2010/dec/03/julian-assangewikileaks (accessed February 26, 2011). 

42 “Judith Miller: Julian Assange is a ‘bad journalist’,” Fox News, January 

3, 2011. http://www.politico.com/blogs/onmedia/0111/Judith_Miller_Julian_

Assange_is_a_bad_journalist.html (accessed February 26, 2011). 

43 Dana Priest, “The Evolving Nature of the Relationship Between The 

Media and National Security,” Standing Committee on Law and National 

Security Breakfast Program, American Bar Association, March 3, 2011.
174

GARY ROSS

44 Bill Keller, “Dealing With Assange and the WikiLeaks Secrets,” New 

York Times, January 26, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/

magazine/30Wikileaks-t.html (accessed February 26, 2011).

45 Hagit Limor, “The consensus on WikiLeaks: there is no consensus,” 

Society of Professional Journalists, December 2, 2010. http://blogs.

spjnetwork.org/president/?p=370 (accessed February 26, 2011).

46 “The Defense Department’s Response,” New York Times, 

October 22, 2010.

47 “The Man Who Spilled the Secrets,” Vanity Fair, February 2011. http://

www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/02/the-guardian-201102 (accessed 

February 26, 2011). 

48 “Bradley Manning Charge Sheet,” Cryptome, May 29, 2010. http://

cryptome.org/manning-charge.pdf (accessed October 29, 2010).

49 David S. Cloud, “Army private charged in earlier leak had access to 

latest WikiLeak papers,” The Los Angeles Times, July 28, 2010. http://articles.

latimes.com/2010/jul/28/world/la-fg-wikileaks-20100728 (accessed 

November 2, 2010).

50 Charlie Savage, “Soldier Faces 22 New WikiLeaks Charges,” New York 

Times, March 2, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/us/03manning.

html (accessed March 7, 2011).

51 Kevin Poulson and Kim Zetter, “‘I Can’t Believe What I’m Confessing 

to You’: The Wikileaks Chats,” Wired.com, June 10, 2010. http://www.wired.

com/threatlevel/2010/06/wikileaks-chat/ (accessed October 29, 2010).

52 Michael Calderone, “NY Times considers creating an ‘EZ Pass lane 

for leakers’,” The Cutline, January 25, 2011. http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_

thecutline/20110125/ts_yblog_thecutline/ny-times-considers-creating-an-ezpass-lane-for-leakers (accessed February 26, 2011).

53 “This house believes whistleblowers make the world a safer place: Part 

II,” New Statesman, April 10, 2011. http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/thestaggers/2011/04/assange-murray-speech (accessed April 11, 2011).
175

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

54 “WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange, Pt. 2,” 60 Minutes, January 30, 2011. http://

www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7300036n&tag=contentMaincontentBody

(accessed February 26, 2011).

55 18 U.S.C. 798 (1982).

56 U.S. Constitution, amend. 1. 

57 “The James Madison Center: Quotes on Various Issues,” James Madison 

University. http://www.jmu.edu/madison/center/main_pages/madison_archives/

quotes/great/issues.htm (accessed June 4, 2008).

58 U.S. Constitution, amend. 1. 

59 Executive Order 13526 defines an unauthorized disclosure as “a 

communication or physical transfer of classified information to an 

unauthorized recipient.”

60 J. William Leonard, “Managing Secrets in a Changing World,” First 

Amendment Center, March 16, 2004. http://www.firstamendmentcenter.

org/commentary.aspx?id=12878&printer-friendly=y (accessed June 4, 2008).

61 Moncure Daniel Conway, The Life of Thomas Paine (New York, NY: 

Knickerbocker Press, 1893), http://www.thomaspaine.org/bio/ConwayLife.

html (accessed June 4, 2008).

62 Moncure Daniel Conway, The Life of Thomas Paine.

63 “Thomas Jefferson on Politics and Government: Freedom of the Press,” 

University of Virginia Online Library. http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/

quotations/jeff1600.htm (accessed June 3, 2008).

64 “Thomas Jefferson on Politics and Government: Freedom of the Press.”

65 “Thomas Jefferson Second Inaugural Address,” The Avalon Project at Yale 

Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau2.asp (accessed 

June 3, 2008).

66 “Thomas Jefferson Second Inaugural Address.” 
176

GARY ROSS

67 Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits At What Cost? (New York, 

NY: Priority Press Publications, 1987).

68 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

69 Bill Keller, “Letter From Bill Keller on The Times’s Banking Records 

Report,” New York Times, June 25, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/25/

business/media/25keller-letter.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

70 The sixteen member agencies of the Intelligence Community include 

the four branches of the military; Defense Department organizations 

National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and Defense Intelligence 

Agency (DIA); and non-Defense Department agencies Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement 

Administration, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Coast Guard, 

Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Treasury, and Department 

of State.

71 Dennis Blair, “Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information,”

July 1, 2009.

72 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of the Commission on 

the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 

Destruction. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2005, http://

www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/index.html (accessed June 4, 2008).

73 William Casey, “Remarks Before the Society of Professional Journalists,” 

September 24, 1986.

74 Steven Aftergood, “Secrecy and Accountability in U.S. Intelligence,” 

Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/sgp/cipsecr.html 

(accessed June 8, 2008).

75 Katharine Graham, “Safeguarding Our Freedoms As We Cover Terrorist 

Acts,” Washington Post, April 20, 1986. http://www.washingtonpost.com/

ac2/wp-dyn/A4577-2001Jul16 (accessed June 3, 2008).
177

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

76 Tom Brokaw, Walter Cronkite, and Ted Koppel to SSCI, May 25, 2006. 

http://www.naa.org/~/media/3570430F97464C018CA4177BD022DBDD.

ashx (accessed June 4, 2008).

77 “Leaks Seen as Motivated More by Personal Than Political Reasons,” The 

Pew Research Center, April 5, 2007. http://pewresearch.org/pubs/446/newsleaks-remain-divisive-but-libby-case-has-little-impact (accessed June 4, 2008).

78 “Leaks Seen as Motivated More by Personal Than Political Reasons.”

79 “State of the First Amendment 2006,” First Amendment Center. http://

www.firstamendmentcenter.org/about.aspx?item=state_first_amendment_2006

(accessed June 4, 2008).

80 Plato, The Republic, trans. R.E. Allen (New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 2006).

81 Plato, The Republic.

82 U.S. National Security Council, National Security Council Meeting 

Minutes, October 7, 1974. http://fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/

nscmin/mscmin.html (accessed June 3, 2008).

83 Joel Garreau, “Up To Their Keisters in Leaks,” Washington Post, 

January 16, 1983.

84 Howard Kurtz, “President Wants a Plumber,” Washington Post, 

November 19, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2009/11/19/AR2009111901008.html (accessed November 20, 2009).

85 “Up To Their Keisters in Leaks.”

86 Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation About the Watergate 

Investigations,” August 15, 1973. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/

presidents/37_nixon/psources/ps_water2.html (accessed June 3, 2008).

87 U.S. National Security Council, National Security Council Meeting 

Minutes, October 7, 1974.
178

GARY ROSS

88 “Lid on Leaks,” Time Magazine, January, 25, 1982. http://www.time.com/

time/magazine/article/0,9171,925218,00.html (accessed June 3, 2008).

89 Daniel Schorr, “Whistle-blower’s intent is pure,” Christian Science 

Monitor, May 2, 2006. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/

is_20060502/ai_n16211140 (accessed June 3, 2008).

90 Robert Gates, “Unauthorized Disclosures: Risks, Costs, and 

Responsibilities,” in “Intelligence Leaks,” special issue, American Intelligence 

Journal (1988).

91 David Ignatius, “When Does Blowing Secrets Cross the Line?” 

Washington Post, July 2, 2000. http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/

access/55923003.html (accessed June 3, 2008).

92 Janet Reno, “Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence Concerning Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified 

Information,” Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/sgp.

othergov/renoleaks.html (accessed June 3, 2008).

93 Janet Reno, “Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence Concerning Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified 

Information.”

94 Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, 

Senate Judiciary Committee, April 8, 2010. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/

doj/intel-leak.pdf (accessed June 22, 2010).

95 “Button Your Lip,” Time Magazine, July 28, 1980. http://www.time.

com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,922071,00.html (accessed 

June 3, 2008).

96 George Church, “Plugging the Leak of Secrets,” Time Magazine, January 

28, 1985. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,959281,00.html 

(accessed June 3, 2008).

97 Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General to 

John D. Rockefeller, Chairman, SSCI, February 4, 2008. http://www.fas.org/

irp/congress/2007_hr/threat.pdf (accessed July 30, 2009).
179

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

98 James Bruce, “The Consequences of Permissive Neglect: Laws and Leaks 

of Classified Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 1 (2003) https://

www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csistudies/studies/vol47no1/article04.html (accessed June 4, 2008).

99 Michael Gordon and David Cloue, “U.S. Knew of China’s Missile Test, 

but Kept Silent,” New York Times, April 23, 2007. http://www.nytimes.

com/2007/04/23/washington/23satellite.html (accessed June 3, 2008).

100 L. Britt Snider, “Recollections from the Church Commission,” Studies 

in Intelligence (Winter 1999-2000). https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-thestudy-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art4.html

(accessed June 8, 2008).

101 Dana Priest, “CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons,” Washington 

Post, November 2, 2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content 

article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html (accessed June 3, 2008).

102 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers 

Without Courts,” New York Times, December 16, 2005. http://www.nytimes.

com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html (accessed June 3, 2008).

103 Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Bank Data is Sifted by U.S. in Secret 

to Block Terror,” New York Times, January 23, 2006. http://www.nytimes.

com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

104 “ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center,” Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence. http://www.dni.gov/press_

releases/20051108_release.htm (accessed June 3, 2008).

105 “Today’s spies find secrets in plain sight,” USA Today, April 1, 2008. 

http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/surveillance/2008-03-31-internet-spies_N.

htm (accessed June 3, 2008).

106 Today’s spies find secrets in plain sight.

107 Geoffrey Stone, “Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press.” 

Harvard Law and Policy Review 1, no. 1 (Winter 2007).
180

GARY ROSS

108 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

109 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).

110 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

111 Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, 

Senate Judiciary Committee, April 8, 2010. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/

intel-leak.pdf (accessed June 22, 2010).

112 18 U.S.C. 793 (1982).

113 Gabriel Schoenfeld, “Has the ‘New York Times’ Violated the Espionage 

Act?” Commentary, March 2006. http://www.commentarymagazine.com/

viewarticle.cfm/has-the-new-york-times-violated-the-espionage-act-10036

(accessed June 4, 2008).

114 “Pentagon Papers Case Dismissed,” Time Magazine, May 21, 1973.

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,907273,00.html (accessed 

June 3, 2008).

115 “Supreme Court Denies Freedom in Spy Case,” New York Times, June 

12, 1988. http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/12/us/supreme-court-deniesfreedom-in-spy-case.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

116 Spencer Hsu, “State Dept. contractor charged in leak to news 

organizations,” Washington Post, August 28, 2010. http://www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/27/AR2010082704602.

html (accessed October 21, 2010). 

117 Charlie Savage, “Ex-C.I.A. Officer Named in Disclosure Indictment,” 

New York Times, January 6, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/

us/07indict.html (accessed March 30, 2011).

118 Janet Reno, “Statement Before the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence Concerning Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified 

Information.”
181

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

119 Committee on Classified Information, Report to the Secretary of 

Defense by the Committee on Classified Information, November 8, 1956. 

http://www.thememoryhole.org/foi/coolidge.html (accessed June 3, 2008).

120 Report of the Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure to the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence, 1978. http://intelligence.senate.gov/

pdfs/95national_security_secrets.pdf (accessed April 15, 2011). 

121 Report of the Interdepartmental Group on Unauthorized Disclosures 

of Classified Information, March 31, 1982. http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/

willard.pdf (accessed June 3, 2008).

122 Robert Gates, “Unauthorized Disclosures: Risks, Costs, and 

Responsibilities.”

123 Interagency Task Force Concerning Protections Against Unauthorized 

Disclosures of Classified Information, Report to the Attorney General of the 

United States, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2002.

124 John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the 

House, October 15, 2002. http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dojleaks.html

(accessed July 30, 2009).

125 William Cohen, “National Secrets, Too Frequently Told,” New York 

Times, September 5, 2001. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/05/opinion/

national-secrets-too-frequently-told.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

126 Interagency Task Force Concerning Protections Against 

Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information, Report to the 

Attorney General of the United States.

127 Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the 

United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.

128 Report of the Interdepartmental Group on Unauthorized Disclosures of 

Classified Information.

129 Report of the Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure to the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence, 1978.
182

GARY ROSS

130 Committee on Classified Information, Report to the Secretary of 

Defense by the Committee on Classified Information.

131 Daniel P. Altman, Special Agent in Charge, U.S. Agency for 

International Development, Office of Inspector General, interview by 

author, July 3, 2010, Bethany Beach, DE.

132 United States Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy, 

February 22, 2008. http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Information_Sharing_

Strategy.pdf (accessed June 3, 2008).

133 James Clapper, “Remarks and Q&A by Director of National Intelligence 

James Clapper,” November 2, 2010. http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2010/11/dnigeoint.pdf (accessed April 17, 2011).

134 Peter Grier, “Soldier arrested in WikiLeaks classified Iraq video case,” 

Christian Science Monitor, June 7, 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/

Military/2010/0607/Soldier-arrested-in-WikiLeaks-classified-Iraq-video-case 

(accessed June 7, 2010).

135 28 CFR 50.10, “Policy with regard to the issuance of subpoenas to 

member of the news media,” (1980). http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2003/

julqtr/pdf/28cfr50.10.pdf (accessed June 4, 2008).

136 Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, 

Senate Judiciary Committee.

137 John Ashcroft, Attorney General to Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the 

House, October 15, 2002.

138 Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, 

Senate Judiciary Committee.

139 5 U.S.C. 7532 (1966).

140 In accordance with the “Garrity Rule,” a government employee may 

be compelled to provide a statement or face disciplinary action, such as the 

termination of employment. Any information obtained as the result of a 
183

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

compelled interview cannot be used against the employee during criminal 

proceedings.

141 “Up To Their Keisters in Leaks.”

142 Central Intelligence Agency, “Family Jewels Memorandum,” May 16, 

1973. http://www.gwu.edu/...nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm

(accessed June 3, 2008).

143 Central Intelligence Agency, “Family Jewels Memorandum,” 

May 16, 1973. 

144 Central Intelligence Agency, “Family Jewels Memorandum,” 

May 16, 1973. 

145 “Pentagon Papers Case Dismissed,” Time Magazine, May 21, 1973. 

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,907273,00.html

(accessed June 3, 2008).

146 For the purposes of this book, the term “journalist” refers to an 

individual who gathers information concerning matters of public interest for 

dissemination to the public for a substantial portion of his or her livelihood. 

The term “press” includes the local and national organizations that employ 

journalists and are primarily responsible for the dissemination of matters of 

public interest.

147 Report of the Interdepartmental Group on Unauthorized Disclosures 

of Classified Information, March 31, 1982. http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/

willard.pdf (accessed June 3, 2008).

148 Richard Hertling to Patrick Leahy, March 1, 2007. http://www.scribd.

com/doc/334133/Letter-from-Hertling-to-Senator-Leahy?ga_related_doc=1

(accessed June 3, 2008).

149 John Ashcroft, “Statement Before the United States Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence Concerning Unauthorized Disclosure of 

Classified Information.”
184

GARY ROSS

150 Neal Shover and Andy Hochstetler, Choosing White Collar Crime (New 

York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006 

151 Neal Shover and Andy Hochstetler, Choosing White Collar Crime.

152 Senate, Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing 

Government Secrecy, 103rd Cong., 1997, S. Doc. 105-2: Government 

Printing Office, 1997. http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/

secrecy/index.html (accessed June 3, 2008).

153 Edward Xanders, “A Handyman’s Guide to Fixing National Security 

Leaks: An Analytical Framework for Evaluating Proposals to Curb 

Unauthorized Publication of Classified Information.”

154 Michael Hayden, “Remarks of Central Intelligence Agency Director at 

the Council on Foreign Relations,” September 7, 2007. http://www.fas.org/

irp/cia/product/dcia090707.html (accessed December 9, 2009).

155 “Motivation,” Word Reference. http://www.wordreference.com/

definition/motivation (accessed June 8, 2008).

156 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).

157 Committee on Classified Information, Report to the Secretary of 

Defense by the Committee on Classified Information.

158 Committee on Classified Information, Report to the Secretary of 

Defense by the Committee on Classified Information.

159 “Code of Ethics,” Society of Professional Journalists. http://www.spj.org/

ethicscode.asp (accessed June 8, 2008).

160 Newspaper Association of America and National Newspaper 

Association to HPSCI, May 23, 2006.

161 Neil Sheehan, “Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of 

Growing U. S. Involvement,” New York Times, June 13, 1971. http://select.

nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10B1FFD3D5813748DDDAA0994DE40

5B818BF1D3 (accessed June 8, 2008).
185

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

162 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

163 Katharine Graham, Personal History (New York, NY: Random House, 

1997).

164 Rachel Patron, “Does the media have freedom of speech,” Florida SunSentinel, March 28, 2008. http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sun_sentinel/results.ht

ml?st=advanced&QryTxt=%22here%27s+an+example+of+how+one+of+the+g

reat+political+scoops%22&type=current&sortby=REVERSE_CHRON&datety

pe=0&frommonth=01&fromday=01&fromyear=1985&tomonth=06&today=0

8&toyear=2008& (accessed June 8, 2008).

165 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information.”

166 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information.”

167 Dean Baquet, “Why We Ran the Bank Story,” Los Angeles Times, 

June 27, 2006. http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.

php?az=view_all&address=364x1514165 (accessed June 8, 2008).

168 Bill Keller, “Letter From Bill Keller on The Times’s Banking Records 

Report,” New York Times, June 25, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com

/2006/06/25/business/media/25keller-letter.html (accessed June 8, 2008).

169 Bill Keller, “Letter From Bill Keller on The Times’s Banking Records 

Report.”

170 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Examining DOJ’s Investigation 

of Journalists Who Publish Classified Information: Lessons from the Jack 

Anderson Case, 109th Congress, 2nd sess., June 6, 2006. http://www.fas.

org/irp/congress/2006_hr/journalists.html (accessed June 8, 2008).

171 “The Pentagon Papers: Secrets, Lies and Audiotapes,” The National 

Security Archive, George Washington University. http://www.gwu.

edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB48/ (accessed July 27, 2010).
186

GARY ROSS

172 Pentagon Papers Case Dismissed, Time Magazine, May 21, 1973. 

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,907273,00.html (accessed 

June 3, 2008).

173 “The CIA’s Family Jewels,” George Washington University, The 

National Security Archive. http://www.gwu.edu/...nsarchiv/NSAEBB/

NSAEBB222/ (accessed June 8, 2008).

174 Scott Shane, “There are Leaks. And Then There are Leaks,” New 

York Times, April 30, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/30/

weekinreview/30shane.html?ex=1304049600&en=68008f1a247c9b9c&ei=50

88&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (accessed June 8, 2008).

175 L. Britt Snider, “Recollections from the Church Commission.” 

176 Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report 

for Congress: Assassination Ban and E.O. 12333: A Brief Summary 

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 4, 2002). http://

www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21037.pdf (accessed June 8, 2008).

177 Central Intelligence Agency, “Family Jewels Memorandum,” 

May 16, 1973.

178 Tim Weiner, “Guatemalan Agent of C.I.A. Tied to Killing of 

American,” New York Times, March 23, 1995. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/

fullpage.html?res=990CE4D7173EF930A15750C0A963958260 (accessed 

June 9, 2008).

179 Tim Weiner, “C.I.A. Agent’s Tie to Deaths In Guatemala Is Still Hazy,” 

New York Times, July 27, 1995. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=

990CEED8113AF934A15754C0A963958260 (accessed June 9, 2008).

180 Thomas Powers, “Computer Security: The Whiz Kid vs. the Old Boys,” 

New York Times, December 3, 2000. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.htm

l?res=9E0CEFDA163DF930A35751C1A9669C8B63 (accessed 

June 9, 2008).
187

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

181 Tim Geraghty, “A Brief History of Classified Leaks,” National 

Review Online, October 1, 2003. http://www.nationalreview.com/geraghty/

geraghty200310010843.asp (accessed June 9, 2008).

182 Tim Geraghty, “A Brief History of Classified Leaks.”

183 Tim Weiner, “CIA Severs Ties to 100 Foreign Agents,” New York Times, 

March 3, 1997. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9406E2D71F3

1F930A35750C0A961958260&scp=59&sq=%22Tim+Weiner%22+and+%

22guatemala%22&st=nyt (accessed June 9, 2008).

184 Jack Nelson, “U.S. Government Secrecy and the Current Crackdown 

on Leaks.” 

185 Lyle Denniston, “The Constitution That Delicate Balance: National 

Security and Freedom of the Press” (panel interview conducted at Columbia 

University Seminar on Media and Society, New York, New York, 1984). 

http://www.learner.org/resources/series72.html (accessed June 4, 2008).

186 Katharine Graham, “Safeguarding Our Freedoms As We Cover 

Terrorist Acts.”

187 “‘New York Times’ Stirs Controversy in Exposing Government 

Secrets,” National Public Radio. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.

php?storyId=5515699 (accessed June 10, 2008).

188 Congress, House of Representatives, Rep. Dennis Oxley of Indiana 

speaking for the Resolution Supporting Intelligence and Law Enforcement 

Programs to Track Terrorists and Terrorist Financing, H.Res. 895, 109th 

Cong., 2nd sess. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/h062906.html

(accessed June 8, 2008).

189 James Bruce, “The Consequences of Permissive Neglect: Laws and 

Leaks of Classified Intelligence.”

190 “Internet Security Advisory Group Publications,” Internet Security 

Advisory Group. http://www.isag.com/library/index.html (accessed

June 5, 2008).
188

GARY ROSS

191 Ben Bradlee, A Good Life: Newspapering and Other Adventures. 

192 Katharine Graham, Personal History.

193 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

194 “Free Speech, Reporting on National Security,” PBS Online News 

Hour.

195 Robert Kaiser, “Public Secrets.”

196 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information.”

197 Kathryn Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The postWatergate investigations of the CIA and FBI.

198 “CBS Ousts 4 for Bush Guard Story,” CBS.

199 Congress, House of Representatives, Rep. Pete Hoekstra, “Opening 

Statement Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: 

Hearing on the Role and Responsibilities of the Media in National 

Security,” May 26, 2006. http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/

congress/2006_hr/060526-hoekstra.pdf (accessed June 8, 2008).

200 “Two Gulf Coast newspapers win Pulitzer Prize,” [USA Today], April 

17, 2006. http://www.usatoday.com/life/2006-04-17-katrina-pulitzers_x.

htm?POE=LIFISVA (accessed June 10, 2008).

201 Brent Baker, “Cokie and Steve Roberts Hail Pulitzer Prize Winning 

Stories on Bush’s ‘Abuse of Power’,” Newsbusters. http://newsbusters.org/

node/5071 (accessed June 10, 2008).

202 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”

203 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”

204 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”
189

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

205 Byron Calame, “Behind the Eavesdropping Story, a Loud Silence,” 

New York Times, January 1, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/01/

opinion/01publiceditor.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

206 Thomas Joscelyn, “Source Code,” The Daily Standard. http://www.

weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/541acool.asp 

(accessed June 10, 2008).

207 Philip Shenon, “Times Reporter Subpoenaed Over Source for Book,” 

New York Times, February 1, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/01/

washington/01inquire.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

208 Neal Shover and Andy Hochstetler, Choosing White-Collar Crime.

209 “Secretive website WiliLeaks may be posting more U.S. military video,” 

CNN.com, June 21, 2010. http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-21/tech/wikileaks.

assange_1_wikileaks-documents-video?_s=PM:TECH (accessed 

April 25, 2011). 

210 “WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange on the ‘War Logs’,” Der 

Spiegel Online, July 26, 2010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/

world/0,1518,708518,00.html (accessed April 25, 2011). 

211 FBI says spies working in State Department media, Reuters, May 13, 

2000. http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/archives.php?id=17331 (accessed 

June 10, 2008).

212 FBI says spies working in State Department media, Reuters.

213 Christopher Ruddy, “Russia Defector: Large Number of Spies

Act as Journalists,” Newsmax. http://archive.newsmax.com/articles/?a

=2000/5/14/143832 (accessed June 10, 2008).

214 Pat Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy: A Dilemma of Democracy.

215 Ben Bradlee, A Good Life: Newspapering and Other Adventures.

216 “Justification,” Dictionary.com. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/

justification (accessed June 9, 2008).
190

GARY ROSS

217 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

218 Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits At What Cost?

219 Congress, House of Representatives, Rep. Jane Harman, “Opening 

Statement Before the House Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence: Hearing on the Role and Responsibilities of the Media in 

National Security,” May 26, 2006. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_

hr/052606harman.pdf (accessed June 8, 2008).

220 Jack Nelson, “U.S. Government Secrecy and the Current Crackdown 

on Leaks.” 

221 Congress, House of Representatives, Rep. Jane Harman, “Opening 

Statement Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: 

Hearing on the Role and Responsibilities of the Media in National Security.”

222 Information Security Oversight Office, Report to the President, May 

31, 2007. http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/2006rpt.pdf (accessed June 8, 2008).

223 Dana Priest and William Arkin, “A hidden world, growing beyond 

control,” Washington Post, July 19, 2010. http://projects.washingtonpost.com/

top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/ (accessed 

July 23, 2010).

224 Edward Xanders, “A Handyman’s Guide to Fixing National Security 

Leaks: An Analytical Framework for Evaluating Proposals to Curb 

Unauthorized Publication of Classified Information.”

225 Steven Aftergood, “Secrecy and Accountability in U.S. Intelligence.” 

226 William Casey, “Remarks Before the Society of Professional 

Journalists,” September 24, 1986.

227 “Plugging Media Leaks,” News Hour with Jim Lehrer. http://www.pbs.

org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june00/leaks_6-29.html (accessed June 9, 2008).

228 Congress, Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama speaking for the 

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.
191

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

229 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Examining DOJ’s Investigation of 

Journalists Who Publish Classified Information: Lessons from the Jack Anderson 

Case.

230 Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Committee on Classified 

Information, 1956. 

231 Bob Woodward, “A Journalist’s Perspective on Public Disclosures.” 

232 Ben Bradlee, A Good Life: Newspapering and Other Adventures (New 

York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

233 “National Declassification Center,” Society for History in the Federal 

Government. http://shfg.org/shfg/federal-history-work/declassification (accessed 

April 25, 2011).

234 Kevin Kosar, “The Reducing Over-Classification Act Becomes Law,” 

Society for History in the Federal Government. http://shfg.org/shfg/federalhistory-work/declassification (accessed April 25, 2011).

235 Scott Shane, “Increase in the Number of Documents Classified by 

the Government,” New York Times, July 3, 2005. http://www.nytimes.

com/2005/07/03/politics/03secrecy.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

236 Murray Waas, “Is There a Double Standard On Leak Probes?

237 Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee 

on Secrecy and Disclosure, 1978. 

238 Report to the National Security Council on Unauthorized Media Leak 

Disclosures by the National Counterintelligence Policy Board, 1996. 

239 Congress, House of Representatives, Rep. Louis Slaughter of New York 

speaking for the Resolution Supporting Intelligence and Law Enforcement 

Programs to Track Terrorists and Terrorist Financing, H.Res. 895, 109th 

Cong., 2nd sess. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/h062906.html 

(accessed June 8, 2008).
192

GARY ROSS

240 Jack Nelson, “U.S. Government Secrecy and the Current Crackdown 

on Leaks.” 

241 Murray Waas, “Is There a Double Standard On Leak Probes?”

242 Colin Powell, “A Policy of Evasion and Deception,” Washington Post, 

February 5, 2003. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/transcripts/

powelltext_020503.html (accessed June 9, 2008).

243 “Weapons of Mass Destruction.” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/

library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030205-powell-un-17300pf.html

(accessed April 7, 2010). 

244 Robert Novak, “Mission to Niger,” Washington Post, July 14, 2003. 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/20/

AR2005102000874.html (accessed March 14, 2010).

245 Murray Waas, “Is There a Double Standard On Leak Probes?”

246 David Sanger and David Barstow, “Iraq Findings Leaked by Cheney’s 

Aide Were Disputed,” New York Times, April 9, 2006. http://www.nytimes.

com/2006/04/09/washington/09leak.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

247 David Sanger and David Barstow, “Iraq Findings Leaked by Cheney’s 

Aide Were Disputed.”

248 Jim Cunningham, “Cracks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, the Media and 

the F-117A,” Airpower Journal (Fall, 1991). http://www.airpower.maxwell.

af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj91/fal91/cunn.htm (accessed June 9, 2008).

249 Jim Cunningham, “Cracks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, the Media and 

the F-117A.”

250 George Church, “Chronicle of a Security Leak,” Time, September 29, 

1980. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,952775-2,00.html

(accessed June 9, 2008).

251 Jim Cunningham, “Cracks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, the Media and 

the F-117A.”
193

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

252 Jim Cunningham, “Cracks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, the Media and 

the F-117A.”

253 George Church, “Chronicle of a Security Leak.”

254 Jim Cunningham, “Cracks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, the Media and 

the F-117A.”

255 Jim Cunningham, “Cracks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, the Media and 

the F-117A.”

256 Congress, House of Representatives, Rep. Jane Harman, “Opening 

Statement Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: 

Hearing on the Role and Responsibilities of the Media in National 

Security.” 

257 “Frontline: Newswar - Interview, James Risen,” PBS. http://www.pbs.org/

wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/interviews/risen.html (accessed June 8, 2008).

258 Lee Hamilton, “Being a Partner and Critic to the Congress,” 

CongressLink. http://www.congresslink.org/print_expert_hamilton.htm

(accessed June 10, 2008).

259 Edward Xanders, “A Handyman’s Guide to Fixing National Security 

Leaks: An Analytical Framework for Evaluating Proposals to Curb 

Unauthorized Publication of Classified Information.”

260 Committee on Government Reform, Minority Staff, Special 

Investigations Division, “Congressional Oversight of the Bush 

Administration,” January 17, 2006. http://oversight.house.gov/

Documents/20060117103554-62297.pdf (accessed June 8, 2008).

261 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Examining DOJ’s Investigation 

of Journalists Who Publish Classified Information: Lessons from the Jack 

Anderson Case. 

262 “Frontline: Newswar - Interview, Eric Lichtblau,” PBS.

263 “Frontline: Newswar - Interview, Eric Lichtblau,” PBS.
194

GARY ROSS

264 “House committee weighs press’ role in intelligence leaks,” Reporters 

Committee for Freedom of the Press. http://www.rcfp.org/news/2006/0530-

prr-housec.html (accessed June 10, 2008).

265 Ellen Nakashima, “Former NSA executive Thomas A. Drake may pay 

high price for media leak,” Washington Post, July 14, 2010. http://www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/13/AR2010071305992_

pf.html (accessed July 23, 2010).

266 Bob Woodward, “A Journalist’s Perspective on Public Disclosures.” 

267 Dana Priest, “National Security Secrets and Democracy: Leaks, 

Whistleblowers and the Press” (panel interview at 2006 American Bar 

Association 16th Annual Review of the Field of National Security Law, 

Washington, DC December 1, 2006). http://38.105.88.161/Search/basic.asp?

BasicQueryText=security+whistleblowers&SortBy=bestmatch (accessed 

June 10, 2008).

268 “Frontline: Newswar - Interview, Eric Lichtblau,” PBS. http://www.pbs.

org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/interviews/lichtblau.html (accessed 

June 10, 2008).

269 James Goodale, “The First Amendment and Freedom of the Press,” U.S. 

Department of State, Bureau of International Information Programs. http://

usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/0297/ijde/goodale.htm (accessed June 10, 2008).

270 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. April 1, 1988).

271 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

272 Huffington Post, May 21, 2006. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-rstone/freedom-of-the-press-v-n_b_21382.html (accessed June 4, 2008).

273 Jack Nelson, “U.S. Government Secrecy and the Current Crackdown 

on Leaks.” 

274 James Risen, “Reporting National Security under Threat of 

Indictment” (panel interview at 2006 Media Law Resource Center Annual 

Dinner, Washington, DC, November 9, 2006). http://www.medialaw.org/
195

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

Template.cfm?Section=Archive_by_Date1&Template=/ContentManagement/

ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4730 (accessed June 8, 2008). 

275 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. April 1, 1988).

276 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. April 1, 1988).

277 William Casey, “Remarks Before the Society of Professional 

Journalists.” 

278 Katharine Graham, “Safeguarding Our Freedoms as We Cover Terrorist 

Acts.”

279 Newspaper Association of America and National Newspaper 

Association to HPSCI, May 23, 2006.

280 Tom Brokaw, Walter Cronkite, Ted Koppel to SSCI, May 25, 2006.

281 Dean Baquet and Bill Keller, “When Do We Publish a Secret,” 

New York Times, July 1, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/01/

opinion/01keller.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

282 “Piecing Together the Reports, and Deciding What to Publish,” 

New York Times, July 25, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/

world/26editors-note.html?pagewanted=all (accessed July 26, 2010).

283 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Espionage Laws 

and Leaks, 96th Cong., 1st sess., January 24, 25, and 31, 1979.

284 Robert Gates, “Unauthorized Disclosures: Risks, Costs, and 

Responsibilities.”

285 R. Jeffrey Smite, “Having Lifted CIA’s Veil, Deutch Sums Up: I Told 

You So.”

286 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information.”

287 Ben Bradlee, A Good Life: Newspapering and Other Adventures.
196

GARY ROSS

288 Bob Woodward, “A Journalist’s Perspective on Public Disclosures.” 

289 Dean Baquet and Bill Keller, “When Do We Publish a Secret.”

290 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”

291 Pat Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy: A Dilemma of Democracy.

292 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information.”

293 James Hansen, “Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” CIA, 

Center for the Study of Intelligence. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-forthe-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no1/article06.

html (accessed June 10, 2008).

294 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information.”241 “Free 

Speech, Reporting on National Security,” PBS Online News Hour. http://

www.pbs.org/newshour/bradlee/transcript_security.html (accessed 

June 10, 2008).

295 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information.”

296 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information.”

297 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information.”

298 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”

299 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”

300 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information.”

301 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”
197

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

302 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”

303 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”

304 Katharine Graham, “Safeguarding Our Freedoms As We Cover 

Terrorist Acts.”

305 “Frontline: Newswar - Interview, Ben Bradlee,” PBS. http://www.pbs.

org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/interviews/bradlee.html (accessed 

June 8, 2008).

306 Katharine Graham, Personal History.

307 Dana Priest, “National Security Secrets and Democracy: Leaks, 

Whistleblowers and the Press.”

308 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information.”

309 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information.”

310 Dean Baquet and Bill Keller, “When Do We Publish a Secret.”

311 Gabriel Schoenfeld, “Has the ‘New York Times’ Violated the Espionage 

Act?”

312 “‘New York Times’ Stirs Controversy in Exposing Government Secrets,” 

National Public Radio.

313 Bill Keller, “Letter From Bill Keller on The Times’s Banking Records 

Report,” New York Times, June 25, 2006. 

314 Bill Keller, “Making Tough Calls on National Security” (panel interview 

at 2007 American Society of Newspaper Editors, First Amendment Summit, 

Washington DC, January 18, 2007). http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?id=6420 

(accessed June 5, 2008).

315 “U.S. ‘Making Matters Worse?’ U.S. Supports Terrorism; Americans 

First and Reporters Second; Limbaugh’s ‘Cheerfully Right-Wing Views’.” 
198

GARY ROSS

Media Research Center, http://www.mediaresearch.org/cyberalerts/2001/

cyb20011010.asp (accessed June 10, 2008).

316 “U.S. ‘Making Matters Worse?’; U.S. Supports Terrorism; Americans 

First and Reporters Second; Limbaugh’s ‘Cheerfully Right-Wing Views’.” 

317 Ben Bradlee, A Good Life: Newspapering and Other Adventures.

318 Ben Bradlee, A Good Life: Newspapering and Other Adventures.

319 Ben Bradlee, A Good Life: Newspapering and Other Adventures.

320 Ben Bradlee, A Good Life: Newspapering and Other Adventures.

321 Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits At What Cost?

322 Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits At What Cost?

323 Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits At What Cost?

324 Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits At What Cost?

325Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits At What Cost?

326 John Ashcroft to Dennis Hastert, October 15, 2002, www.fas.org/sgp/

othergov/dojleaks.html (accessed June 4, 2008).

327 Newspaper Association of America and National Newspaper 

Association to HPSCI, May 23, 2006, http://www.naa.org/~/media/0CB927

2EDCA64213A4991CD8DA066D3A.ashx (accessed June 4, 2008).

328 Gerhard Casper, “Comment - Government Secrecy and the 

Constitution,” California Law Review 74, no. 3 (1986).

329 Jack Nelson, “U.S. Government Secrecy and the Current Crackdown 

on Leaks,” The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public 

Policy (Fall 2002), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/research_publications/

papers/working_papers/2003_1.pdf (accessed June 8, 2008).

330 Newspaper Association of America and National Newspaper 

Association to HPSCI, May 23, 2006.
199

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

331 Robert Gates, “Unauthorized Disclosures: Risks, Costs, and 

Responsibilities.”

332 Bill Clinton, “Statement by the President to the House of 

Representatives,” November 4, 2000. 

333 United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir., April 1, 1988).

334 “Up to Their Keisters in Leaks.”

335 R. Jeffrey Smith, “Having Lifted CIA’s Veil, Deutch Sums Up: I Told 

You So,” Washington Post, December 26, 1996, http://www.csun.edu/coms/

ben/news/cia/961226.wp.html (accessed June 4, 2008).

336 George H.W. Bush, “Remarks by George Bush at the Dedication 

Ceremony for the George Bush Center for Intelligence,” April 26, 1999, 

https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/bush_

speech_042699.html (accessed June 4, 2008).

337 Several historical examples of the perceived harm caused by unauthorized disclosures will be presented in this chapter. Though it can be assumed 

that the media outlets considered the disclosures to be appropriate, based on 

some combination of the motivations and justifications presented in the previous chapter, the intent of this chapter is to discuss the recognized harm. 

338 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets,” Association 

of Former Intelligence Officers, The Intelligence Professional Series, no. 8 

(1992).

339 Porter Goss, “Testimony of DCI Goss Before Senate Armed Services 

Committee,” March 17, 2005, http://www.cia.gov/news-information/speechestestimony/2005/Goss_testimony_03172005.html (accessed June 3, 2008).

340 Dennis Blair, “Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information,” 

July 1, 2009.

341 Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the 

United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
200

GARY ROSS

342 Len Downie, “Making Tough Calls on National Security” (panel 

interview at 2007 American Society of Newspaper Editors, First 

Amendment Summit, Washington, DC, January 18, 2007), http://www.

asne.org/index.cfm?id=6420 (accessed June 5, 2008).

343 Katharine Graham, “Safeguarding Our Freedoms as We Cover Terrorist 

Acts.” 

344 James Bruce, “The Consequences of Permissive Neglect: Laws and 

Leaks of Classified Intelligence.”

345 James Bruce, “The Consequences of Permissive Neglect: Laws and 

Leaks of Classified Intelligence.”

346 Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Boulder, CO: 

Westview Press, 1999).

347 “Plugging the Leak: The Case for a Legislative Resolution of the 

Conflict Between the Demands of Secrecy and the Need for an Open 

Government,” Virginia Law Review 71, no. 5 (June 1985).

348 “Plugging the Leak: The Case for a Legislative Resolution of the 

Conflict Between the Demands of Secrecy and the Need for an Open 

Government.”

349 Kathryn Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The PostWatergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 

North Carolina Press, 1996).

350 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”

351 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”

352 Katharine Graham, “Safeguarding Our Freedoms as We Cover Terrorist 

Acts.” 

353 James Bruce, “The Consequences of Permissive Neglect: Laws and 

Leaks of Classified Intelligence.”
201

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

354 James Bruce, “The Consequences of Permissive Neglect: Laws and 

Leaks of Classified Intelligence.”

355 Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Boulder, CO: 

Westview Press, 1999).

356 “Plugging the Leak: The Case for a Legislative Resolution of the 

Conflict Between the Demands of Secrecy and the Need for an Open 

Government,” Virginia Law Review 71, no. 5 (June 1985).

357 “Plugging the Leak: The Case for a Legislative Resolution of the 

Conflict Between the Demands of Secrecy and the Need for an Open 

Government.”

358 Porter Goss, “Loose Lips Sink Spies,” New York Times, February 10, 

2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/10/opinion/10goss.html (accessed June 

5, 2008).

359 Donald Rumsfeld, “The Impact of Leaking Classified Information,” 

July 12, 2002, http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/dod071202.pdf (accessed 

June 5, 2008).

360 “Al Qaeda Manual Eleventh Lesson,” The Disaster Center, http://www.

disastercenter.com/terror/Al_Qaeda_Manual_ELEVENTH_LESSON.htm

(accessed July 28, 2010).

361 “MSM Leaks,” Never Yet Melted, http://neveryetmelted.com/2006/07/11/

msm-leaks/ (accessed April 7, 2010).

362 Brian Ross, “New Videotape from Bin Laden; Al Qaeda’s No. 1 

Still Alive,” ABC News, September 7, 2007, http://blogs.abcnews.com/

theblotter/2007/09/new-videotape-f.html (accessed June 5, 2008).

363 Eli Lake, “Qaeda Goes Dark After a U.S. Slip,” New York Sun, October 

9, 2007, http://www.nysun.com/foreign/qaeda-goes-dark-after-a-us-slip/64163/

(accessed June 5, 2008).

364 Sarah Dilorenzio, “Group: U.S. officials leaked secret info on al-Qaeda 

video, putting intelligence methods at risk,” Associated Press. 
202

GARY ROSS

October 9, 2007, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/20071009-

1257-us-al-qaidatapeleak.html (accessed June 5, 2008).

365 Eli Lake, “Qaeda Goes Dark After a U.S. Slip.”

366 Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Bank Data is Sifted by U.S. in Secret 

to Block Terror.”

367 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information,” American 

Journalism Review (October/November 2006), http://www.ajr.org/Article.

asp?id=4185 (accessed June 5, 2008).

368 Supporting Intelligence and Law Enforcement Programs to Track 

Terrorists and Terrorist Finances, H.Res.895, 109th Cong, 1st sess, (June 

2006), http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/hr/hr895.pdf (accessed 

June 5, 2008).

369 Supporting Intelligence and Law Enforcement Programs to Track 

Terrorists and Terrorist Finances, H.Res.895, 109th Cong, 1st sess, 

(June 2006).

370 Gabriel Schoenfeld, “Not Every Leak Is Fit to Print,” Weekly Standard, 

February 18, 2008, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/

Articles/000/000/014/714othkb.asp?pg=2 (accessed June 5, 2008).

371 Gabriel Schoenfeld, “Not Every Leak Is Fit to Print.”

372 Howard Kurtz, “After reporter’s subpoena, critics call Obama’s leakplugging efforts Bush-like,”Washington Post, April 30, 2010, http://www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/29/AR2010042904656.

html (accessed May 5, 2010).

373 Phillip Shenon, “Times Reporter Subpoenaed Over Source for Book,” 

New York Times, February 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/01/

washington/01inquire.html (accessed June 5, 2008).
203

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

374 Charlie Savage, “Ex-C.I.A. Officer Named in Disclosure Indictment,” 

New York Times, January 6, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/

us/07indict.html (accessed March 30, 2011).

375 Peter Baker and Dafna Linzer, “Diving Deep, Unearthing a Surprise,” 

Washington Post, December 8, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/article/2007/12/07/AR2007120702418.html (accessed June 5, 2008).

376 Peter Baker and Dafna Linzer, “Diving Deep, Unearthing a Surprise.”

377 David Sanger and Steven Lee Myers, “Details in Military Notes Led to 

Shift on Iran, U.S. Says,” New York Times, December 6, 2007, http://www.

nytimes.com/2007/12/06/world/middleeast/06intel.html?hp (accessed 

June 5, 2008).

378 William Perry, “Unauthorized Disclosures of Intelligence,” July 31, 

1996, http://www.fas.org/sgp/clinton/perry.html (accessed June 5, 2008).

379 Harley Schwardon, “This one is for not leaking any military secrets,” 

Cartoonstock, http://www.cartoonstock.com/cartoonview.asp?catref=hsc1279

(accessed April 7, 2010).

380 “Transcript of General Hayden’s Interview with WTOP’s J.J. Green,” 

Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/pressreleases-statements/press-release-archive-2007/transcript-of-general-haydensinterview-with-wtop.html (accessed June 5, 2008).

381 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 

382 Phillip Agee, London Times, January 9, 2008, http://www.timesonline.

co.uk/tol/comment/obituaries/article3162281.ece (accessed June 5, 2008).

383 Phillip Agee, London Times, January 9, 2008.

384 Samuel Francis, “The Intelligence Identities Protection Act,” The 

Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/

IB70.cfm (accessed June 5, 2008).

385 Phillip Agee, London Times, January 9, 2008.
204

GARY ROSS

386 Samuel Francis, “The Intelligence Identities Protection Act.” 

387 Frederick W. Whatley, “Reagan, National Security, and the First 

Amendment: Plugging Leaks by Shutting Off the Main,” The CATO 

Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa037.html (accessed June 5, 2008).

388 Phillip Agee, London Times, January 9, 2008.

389 Samuel Francis, “The Intelligence Identities Protection Act.”

390 R. James Woolsey, “National Security and Freedom of the Press” (panel 

interview at 2006 American Enterprise Institute Conference, Washington, 

DC, September 7, 2006), http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventID.1383/

transcript.asp (accessed June 5, 2008).

391 R. James Woolsey, “National Security and Freedom of the Press” 

(panel interview at 2006 American Enterprise Institute Conference, 

Washington, DC, September 7, 2006).

392 “Eli Cohen,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eli_Cohen

(accessed June 5, 2008).

393 William Perry, “Unauthorized Disclosures of Intelligence,”

July 31, 1996.

394 Donald Rumsfeld, “U.S. Department of Defense News Briefing,” 

September 12, 2001, http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2001/09/dod091201.html

(accessed June 5, 2008).

395 Katharine Graham, “Safeguarding Our Freedoms as We Cover Terrorist 

Acts.”

396 Bob Woodward, “A Journalist’s Perspective on Public Disclosures,” in 

“Intelligence Leaks,” Special Issue, American Intelligence Journal (1988).

397 “1983 Beirut Barracks Bombing,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/1983_Beirut_barracks_bombing (accessed June 5, 2008).

398 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”
205

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

399 “The Long Arm of the Law,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://

www.fbi.gov/page2/jan06/longarm010506.htm (accessed June 5, 2008).

400 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”

401 “Reporting in the Time of Conflict: Secrecy vs. the Story,” Newseum, 

http://www.newseum.org/warstories/essay/secrecy.htm (accessed June 5, 2008).

402 “Reporting in the Time of Conflict: Secrecy vs. the Story.” 

403 “Reporting in the Time of Conflict: Secrecy vs. the Story.”

404 “Reporting in the Time of Conflict: Secrecy vs. the Story.” 

405 “Robert McCormick,” New World Encyclopedia, http://www.

newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Robert_McCormick (accessed June 5, 2008).

406 R. James Woolsey, “National Security and Freedom of the Press” (panel 

interview at 2006 American Enterprise Institute Conference, Washington, 

DC, September 7, 2006).

407 William Casey, “Remarks Before the Society of Professional 

Journalists,” September 24, 1986.

408 Michael Hayden, “Remarks of Central Intelligence Agency Director at 

the Council on Foreign Relations,” September 7, 2007. 

409 Eric Schmitt and Charlie Savage, “U.S. Military Scrutinizes Leaks 

for Risks to Afghans,” New York Times, July 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.

com/2010/07/29/world/asia/29wikileaks.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (accessed 

July 30, 2010).

410 Eric Schmitt and Charlie Savage, “U.S. Military Scrutinizes Leaks for 

Risks to Afghans.”

411 Adam Levine, “Top U.S. military official: WikiLeaks founder may have 

‘blood’ on his hands,” CNN, July 30, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/

US/07/29/wikileaks.mullen.gates/index.html#fbid=1wi0HJ6QJqN (accessed 

July 31, 2010).
206

GARY ROSS

412 Robert Mackey, “Taliban Study WikiLeaks to Hunt Informants,” New 

York Times, July 30, 2010, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/

taliban-study-wikileaks-to-hunt-informants/ (accessed July 30, 2010).

413 Jeanne Whalen, “Rights Groups Join Criticism of WikiLeaks,” Wall 

Street Journal, August 9, 2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052

748703428604575419580947722558.html (accessed February 21, 2011).

414 Luke Harding and David Leigh, “WikiLeaks: How US political 

invective turned on ‘anti-American’ Julian Assange,” The Guardian, February 

3, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/03/wikileaks-julianassange-us-reaction (accessed February 23, 2011).

415 “Julian Assange extended interview,” Australian Broadcasting 

Corporation, November 4, 2011. http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2011/

s3188451.htm (accessed April 11, 2011).

416 Michael Hayden, “WikiLeaks disclosures are a ‘tragedy’,” CNN, July 

30, 2010., http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/07/30/hayden.wikileaks.

secrets/index.html?hpt=T2 (accessed July 30, 2010).

417 David S. Cloud, “Army private charged in earlier leak had access to 

latest WikiLeak papers,” Los Angeles Times, July 28, 2010, http://articles.

latimes.com/2010/jul/28/world/la-fg-wikileaks-20100728 (accessed 

November 2, 2010).

418 “Charge Sheet, Bradley Manning,” Cryptome, May 29, 2010, http://

cryptome.org/manning-charge.pdf (accessed July 30, 2010).

419 “Newsweek retracts Quran story,” CNN, May 16, 2005, http://www.

cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/05/16/newsweek.quran/ (accessed 

June 5, 2008).

420 Katharine Seelye and Neil Lewis, “Newsweek backs off Quran 

desecration story,” New York Times, May 17, 2005. http://www.nytimes.

com/2005/05/17/politics/17koran.html?pagewanted=print (accessed June 5, 

2008).
207

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

421 Katharine Seelye and Neil Lewis, “Newsweek Retracts Account of 

Koran Abuse by U.S. Military,” New York Times, May 17, 2005, http://www.

nytimes.com/2005/05/17/politics/17koran.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (accessed 

June 5, 2008).

422 Katharine Skelve and Neil Lewis, “Newsweek Retracts Account of 

Koran Abuse by U.S. Military.”

423 Charles McGrath, “Reporter on Retracted Newsweek Article Put 

Monica on the Map,” New York Times, May 17, 2005, http://www.nytimes.

com/2005/05/17/politics/17isikoff.html (accessed June 5, 2008).

424 Christine Hauser and Katharine Seelye, “Newsweek Retracts Account 

of Koran Abuse by U.S. Military,” New York Times, May 16, 2005, http://

www.nytimes.com/2005/05/16/international/16cnd-koran.html (accessed June 

5, 2008).

425 “Newsweek retracts Quran story,” CNN, May 16, 2005.

426 Katharine Seelye and Neil Lewis, “Newsweek Retracts Account of 

Koran Abuse by U.S. Military,” New York Times, May 17, 2005.

427 Daniel Schorr, “Standing up for news leaks,” Christian Science 

Monitor, May 27, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0527/p09s02-cods.

html (accessed June 5, 2008).

428 Greg Miller, “CIA Looks to Los Angeles for Would-Be Iranian Spies,” 

Los Angeles Times, January 15, 2002, http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jan/15/

news/mn-22685 (accessed June 5, 2008).

429 Jack Nelson, “U.S. Government Secrecy and the Current Crackdown 

on Leaks.”

430 Jack Nelson, “U.S. Government Secrecy and the Current Crackdown 

on Leaks.”

431 Jack Nelson, “U.S. Government Secrecy and the Current Crackdown 

on Leaks.”
208

GARY ROSS

432 Gabriel Schoenfeld, “The Price of One Leak,” Commentary magazine 

(June 11, 2007), http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/

schoenfeld/523 (accessed June 5, 2008).

433 Fred Kaplan, “The Goods on Saddam,” Slate (January 31, 2003), http://

www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action-print&id=2077961 (accessed June 5, 

2008).

434 United States v. Progressive Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (1979).

435 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).

436 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing of the Committee 

on the Nomination of General Michael Hayden to be the Director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency.

437 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

438 United States v. Samuel Loring Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (1985).

439 United States v. Samuel Loring Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (1985).

440 Bob Woodward, “McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure’,” 

Washington Post, September 21, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002920.html (accessed

January 29, 2010).

441 Elisabeth Bumiller and Mark Landler, “U.S. Envoy Urges Caution on 

Forces for Afghanistan,” New York Times, November 11, 2009, http://www.

nytimes.com/2009/11/12/us/politics/12policy.html (accessed 

January 29, 2010).

442 Howard Kurtz, “President Wants a Plumber,” Washington Post, 

November 19, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2009/11/19/AR2009111901008.html (accessed November 20, 2009).

443 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Envoy’s Cables Show Worries on Afghan Plans,” 

New York Times, January 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/

world/asia/26strategy.html (accessed January 29, 2010).
209

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

444 Michael McConnell, “Guidance on the Declassification of National 

Intelligence Estimate Key Judgments,” October 24, 2007, http://www.fas.

org/irp/dni/nie-declass.pdf (accessed June 4, 2008).

445 Peter Baker and Dafna Linzer, “Diving Deep, Unearthing a Surprise.” 

446 Peter Baker and Dafna Linzer, “Diving Deep, Unearthing a Surprise.” 

447 “Details in Military Notes Led to Shift on Iran, U.S. Says,” New York 

Times, December 6, 2007. 

448 Steven Lee Myers, David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Considers 

New Covert Push Within Pakistan,” New York Times, January 6, 2008, http://

www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/washington/06terror.html?ex=1357275600&en

=d2b610da0c92dd8d&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (accessed 

June 5, 2008).

449 Isambard Wilkinson, “Pakistan rejects ‘covert action plans by 

US’,” London Times, January 15, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/

worldnews/1574844/Pakistan-rejects-’covert-action-plans-by-US’.html

(accessed June 5, 2008).

450 James Schlesinger, “The Constitution That Delicate Balance: National 

Security and Freedom of the Press” (panel interview conducted at Columbia 

University Seminar on Media and Society, New York, New York, 1984), 

http://www.learner.org/resources/series72.html (accessed June 4, 2008).

451 John Ashcroft, “Statement Before the United States Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence Concerning Unauthorized Disclosure of 

Classified Information.”

452 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”

453 “Purposeful Leaks,” National Review (September 11, 1987),

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Purposeful+leaks.+(Congressional

+leaks+to+press)-a05169250 (accessed June 4, 2008).

454 “Purposeful Leaks,” National Review.
210

GARY ROSS

455 Brian Ross, “Bush Authorizes New Covert Action Against Iran,” ABC 

News, May 22, 2007, http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/05/bush_

authorizes.html (accessed June 5, 2008).

456 Brian Ross, “Bush Authorizes New Covert Action Against Iran.”

457 Toby Harnden, “CIA gets the go-ahead to take on Hizbollah,” 

Daily Telegraph, January 10, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/

worldnews/1539095/CIA-gets-the-go-ahead-to-take-on-Hizbollah.html 

(accessed June 5, 2008).

458 “Protection of Classified National Security Council and Intelligence 

Information (NSDD 19),” January 12, 1982, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/

nsdd019.htm (accessed June 5, 2008).

459 Lid on Leaks, Time Magazine Online. 

460 Stephen Hess, The Government/Press Connection: Press Officers and 

Their Offices (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984).

461 Harley Schwardon, “Someone today leaked information to the media 

about the government’s new ‘no leak’ policy,” Cartoonstock, http://www.

cartoonstock.com/cartoonview.asp?catref=hsc3221 (accessed April 7, 2010).

462 Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the 

United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

463 Henry Kissinger, “The China Connection,” Time, October 1, 1979, 

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,947490,00.html (accessed 

June 6, 2008).

464 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

465 Janet Reno, “Statement Before the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence Concerning Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified 

Information.”

466 Mary Beth Sheridan, “Calderon: WikiLeaks caused severe damage 

to U.S-Mexican relations,” Washington Post, March 3, 2011. http://www.
211

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/03/AR2011030302853.

html?referrer=emailarticle (accessed March 7, 2011).

467 Adam Thomson, “WikiLeaks spat leads to US diplomat resigning,” 

Financial Times, March 20, 2011. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/00911f6e-530b11e0-86e6-00144feab49a.html#axzz1HF2PtLkD (accessed 

March 21, 2011).

468 Simon Romero, “Ecuador Expels U.S. Ambassador over WikiLeaks 

Cable,” New York Times, April 5, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/

world/americas/06ecuador.html (accessed April 9, 2011).

469 “Secretary Clinton’s remarks on WikiLeaks documents,” The Hill, 

November 29, 2010. http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/lawmakernews/130973-secretary-clintons-remarks-on-wikileak-documents (accessed 

April 9, 2011).

470 Michael Gordon, “Bush Aide’s Memo Doubts Iraqi Leaker,” New York 

Times, November 29, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/

middleeast/29cnd-military.html?ex=1322456400&en=688e0331df987eec&ei

=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (accessed June 6, 2008).

471 Michael Gordon, “Bush Aide’s Memo Doubts Iraqi Leaker.”

472 Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits At What Cost?

473 Laurence Zuckerman, “Washington’s Master Leakers,” Time, May 23, 

1988. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,967475,00.html

(accessed June 6, 2008).

474 Stephen Hess, The Government/Press Connection: Press Officers and Their 

Offices.

475 Lid on Leaks, Time.

476 Stephen Hess, The Government/Press Connection: Press Officers and Their 

Offices.
212

GARY ROSS

477 Peter Hoekstra, “Secrets and Leaks: The Costs and Consequences for 

National Security.”

478 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).

479 Michael Hayden, “Remarks of Central Intelligence Agency Director at 

the Council on Foreign Relations.” 

480 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of the Commission on the 

Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 

Destruction.

481 Peter Hoekstra, “Secrets and Leaks: The Costs and Consequences for 

National Security.”

482 Peter Hoekstra, “Secrets and Leaks: The Costs and Consequences for 

National Security.”

483 Gabriel Schoenfeld, “Statement Before the Senate Judiciary 

Committee,” June 6, 2006, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_

hr/060606schoenfeld.pdf (accessed June 3, 2008).

484 “Faulty Intel Source ‘Curveball’ Revealed,” CBS News, November 4, 

2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/01/60minutes/main3440577.

shtml (accessed June 3, 2008).

485 Dana Priest, “CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons.”

486 David Morgan, “House Panel to Probe Post Story,” Washington Post, 

November 10, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2005/11/10/AR2005111001628_pf.html (accessed June 6, 2005).

487 CIA Fires Source of Leaks for Prize Winning Journalist, 

Seattle Times, April 22, 2006, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/

nationworld/2002946196_cia22.html (accessed June 6, 2008).

488 Jed Babbin, “Don’t Shield the Media: Prosecute the Leakers,” Human 

Events, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=26414 (accessed June 6, 

2008).
213

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

489 Mark Mazzetti, “Pakistan Aids Insurgency in Afghanistan, Reports 

Assert,” New York Times, July 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/

world/asia/26isi.html (accessed July 27, 2010).

490 Joshua Partlow and Karin Brulliard, “Pakistan decries WikiLeaks 

release of U.S. military documents on Afghan war,” Washington Post, July 

27, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/26/

AR2010072602393_pf.html (accessed July 27, 2010).

491 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Espionage Laws 

and Leaks, 96th Cong., 1st sess., January 24, 25, and 31, 1979.

492 William Casey, “Remarks Before the Society of Professional 

Journalists,” September 24, 1986.

493 Robert Gates, “Unauthorized Disclosures: Risks, Costs, and 

Responsibilities,” in “Intelligence Leaks.”

494 Murray Waas, “Is There a Double Standard on Leak Probes?” National 

Journal, April 25, 2006, http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/0425nj1.htm

(accessed June 6, 2008).

495 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of the Commission on the 

Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 

Destruction.

496 Murray Waas, “Is There a Double Standard on Leak Probes?” National 

Journal, April 25, 2006, http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/0425nj1.htm

(accessed June 6, 2008).

497 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of the Commission on the 

Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 

Destruction.

498 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets.”
214

GARY ROSS

499 William Casey, “Remarks Before the Society of Professional 

Journalists,” September 24, 1986.

500 “Project Jennifer: Hughes Glomar Explorer,” Global Security, http://

www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/jennifer.htm (accessed June 8, 2008).

501 “Hughes Glomar Explorer,” Dante’s Page, http://w3.the-kgb.com/dante/

military/explpic2.html (accessed June 8, 2008).

502 Behind the Great Submarine Snatch, Time, December 6, 1976.

503 James Bruce, “The Consequences of Permissive Neglect: Laws and 

Leaks of Classified Intelligence.”

504 Behind the Great Submarine Snatch, Time, December 6, 1976.

505 “Submarines,” Haze Gray and Underway, http://www.hazegray.org/faq/

smn7.htm#G12 (accessed June 8, 2008).

506 “Notice of Availability for Donation of Test Craft Ex SEA SHADOW,” 

Federal Register 71, no. 178 (September 14, 2006), http://edocket.access.gpo.

gov/2006/pdf/E6-15266.pdf (accessed June 8, 2008).

507 Ted Gup, “The Ultimate Congressional Hideaway,” Washington Post, 

May 31, 1992, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/daily/july/25/

brier1.htm (accessed June 6, 2008).

508 Thomas Mallon, “Mr. Smith Goes Underground,” American 

Heritage Magazine, Volume 51, Issue 5, September 2000, http://www.

americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/2000/5/2000_5_60.shtml

(accessed March 10, 2010).

509 James Bruce, “The Consequences of Permissive Neglect: Laws and 

Leaks of Classified Intelligence.”

510 James Bruce, “The Consequences of Permissive Neglect: Laws and 

Leaks of Classified Intelligence.”

511 Robert Gates, “Unauthorized Disclosures: Risks, Costs, and 

Responsibilities,” in “Intelligence Leaks.”
215

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

512 Porter Goss, “Loose Lips Sink Spies.”

513 “Thomas Jefferson on Politics and Government: Freedom of the Press.”

514 “Frontline: Newswar - Interview, Seymour Hersh,” PBS, http://www.

pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/interviews/hersh.html (accessed June 8, 

2008).

515 “Hersh: U.S. mulls nuclear option for Iran,” CNN, http://www.cnn.

com/2006/POLITICS/04/10/hersh.access/index.html (accessed June 8, 2008).

516 Judith Miller, “A Personal Account; My Four Hours Testifying in the 

Federal Grand Jury Room,” New York Times, October 16, 2005, http://query.

nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F05E1D7143FF935A25753C1A9639C

8B63 (accessed June 8, 2008).

517 “CBS Ousts 4 for Bush Guard Story,” CBS, http://www.cbsnews.com/

stories/2005/01/10/national/main665727.shtml (accessed June 8, 2008).

518 Dave Moniz, Jim Drinkard, and Kevin Johnson, “Texan has made 

allegations for years,” USA Today, September 21, 2004, http://www.usatoday.

com/news/politicselections/nation/president/2004-09-21-burkett-side_x.htm

(accessed June 8, 2008).

519 Daniel Schorr, “Standing Up for News Leaks,” Christian Science 

Monitor, May 27, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0527/p09s02-cods.

html (accessed June 8, 2008).

520 Marcus Baram, “Baghdad Diarist Writes Fiction,” ABC News, http://

abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=3455826&page=1 (accessed June 8, 2008).

521 Marcus Baram, “Baghdad Diarist Writes Fiction.”

522 Marcus Baram, “Baghdad Diarist Writes Fiction.”

523 ASNE to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, July 21, 2008, http://asne.

org/portals/0/Publications/Public/CoalitionLetter.pdf (accessed 

November 30, 2009).
216

GARY ROSS

524 John Ashcroft, “Statement Before the United States Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence Concerning Unauthorized Disclosure of 

Classified Information.”

525 Peter Hoekstra, “Secrets and Leaks: The Costs and Consequences 

for National Security,” July 25, 2005, http://www.heritage.org/Research/

HomelandSecurity/wm809.cfm (accessed June 4, 2008).

526 James Bruce, “The Consequences of Permissive Neglect: Laws and 

Leaks of Classified Intelligence.”

527 Congress, Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama speaking for the 

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S.2507, 106th Cong., 

2nd sess., Congressional Record (6 December 2000): 11649-51, http://www.

fas.org/irp/congress/2000_cr/s120600.html (accessed June 8, 2008).

528 United States v. Samuel Loring Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (1985).

529 CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).

530 “Confirmation Bias,” Science Daily, http://www.sciencedaily.com/

articles/c/confirmation_bias.htm (accessed June 11, 2008).

531 Rachel Smolkin, “Judgment Calls: How top editors decide whether to 

publish national security stories based on classified information.”

532 “Quotes: Leaking Classified Information,” CI Centre, http://cicentre.

com/Documents/DOC_Quotes_Leaks.htm (accessed June 11, 2008).

533 Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York, 

NY: Simon and Schuster, 1987).

534 Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987, Chapter 

23, pp. 447-463.

535 The information contained in this chapter is derived from Chapter 23, 

pp. 447-463, of Woodward’s book. The accuracy of this information is not 

being confirmed. The purpose for including the details surrounding this disclosure of classified information is to examine the internal cost-benefit anal-
217

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

ysis performed by members of the media. Readers should remain cognizant 

that the information provided is written from a journalist’s point of view.

536 Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits At What Cost?

537 Cass Sunstein, “Government Control of Information.” 

538 Geoffrey Stone, “Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press.”

539 Cass Sunstein, “Government Control of Information.”

540 Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who Benefits At What Cost?

541 “Q & A - Gen. Michael Hayden,” C-SPAN.

542 Josh Gerstein, “Spies Prep Reporters on Protecting Secrets,” New York 

Sun, September 27, 2007. http://www.nysun.com/national/spies-prep-reporterson-protecting-secrets/63465/ (accessed June 11, 2008).

543 Jack Nelson, “What Leaks Are Good Leaks?” Los Angeles Times, January 

5, 2003. http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jan/05/opinion/op-nelson5 (accessed 

June 11, 2008).

544 Jack Nelson, “What Leaks Are Good Leaks?”

545 Jennifer LaFleur, “Federal officials and media have Dialogue over 

secrecy,” The News Media and the Law, Vol. 27, No. 1, Winter 2003. http://

www.rcfp.org/news/mag/27-1/cov-federalo.html (accessed June 11, 2008).

546 Jack Nelson, “What Leaks Are Good Leaks?”

547 LaFleur, “Federal officials and media have Dialogue over secrecy.”

548 Newspaper Association of America and National Newspaper 

Association to HPSCI, May 23, 2006.

549 The six specific categories of information prohibited from being 

disclosed without official authorization include security and intelligence, 

defence, international relations, foreign confidences, information which 

might lead to the commission of crime, and the special investigation powers 
218

GARY ROSS

under the Interception of Communications Act of 1985 or the Security 

Service Act of 1989. In addition to the requirement that information 

disclosed relates to one of these six categories, it must also be shown that the 

unauthorized disclosure is damaging to the national interest. 

550 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Will Wikileaks kill the Official Secrets Act?” 

Guardian Online, November 29, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/

nov/29/will-wikileaks-kill-official-secrets-act (accessed February 8, 2011).

551 “The DA-Notice System, Summary of Questions,” Defence Press and 

Broadcasting Advisory Committee. http://www.dnotice.org.uk/faqs.htm

(accessed February 9, 2011).

552 Pauline Sadler, “The D-Notice System,” Australian Press Council, 

May 2000. http://www.presscouncil.org.au/pcsite/apcnews/may00/dnote.html 

(accessed February 8, 2011).

553 Cameron Stewart, “Attorney General Robert McClelland urges media 

to accept security curbs,” The Australian, November 26, 2010. http://www.

theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/attorney-general-robert-mcclelland-urgesmedia-to-accept-security-curbs/story-fn59niix-1225961188070 (accessed 

February 8, 2011).

554 Robert Gates, “Unauthorized Disclosures: Risks, Costs, and 

Responsibilities.”

555 Report of the Interdepartmental Group on Unauthorized Disclosures of 

Classified Information.

556 “Michael Hayden Remarks,” First Amendment Center, October 29, 

2010. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/HaydenR (accessed 

April 26, 2011).

557 28 CFR 50.10, “Policy with regard to the issuance of subpoenas to 

member of the news media” (1980). http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2003/

julqtr/pdf/28cfr50.10.pdf (accessed June 4, 2008). 
219

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

558 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 

559 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

560 National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. 403 (1947). http://www.

intelligence.gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml (accessed June 4, 2008).

561 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 50 U.S.C. 

401 (2004). http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_

cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ458.108.pdf (accessed June 4, 2008).

562 Executive Order no. 13,526 (2009).

563 Executive Order no. 13,526 (2009). http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/executive-order-classified-national-security-information (accessed January 

12, 2010).

564 Executive Order no. 13,526 (2009).

565 Executive Order no. 12,065, Code of Federal Regulations, title 3, 

volume 43 (1978). http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12065.htm (accessed 

June 4, 2008).

566 Executive Order no. 13,526 (2009).

567 Executive Order no. 13,526 (2009).

568 5 U.S.C. 7532 (1966).

569 Office of Personnel Management, Standard Form 312, “Classified 

Information Nondisclosure Agreement” (2000). http://contacts.gsa.gov/

webforms.nsf/0/03A78F16A522716785256A69004E23F6/$file/SF312.pdf

(accessed June 4, 2008).

570 Executive Order no. 13,526 (2009).

571 28 CFR 50.10, “Policy with regard to the issuance of subpoenas to 

member of the news media” (1980).
220

GARY ROSS

572 28 CFR 50.10, “Policy with regard to the issuance of subpoenas to 

member of the news media” (1980).

573 18 U.S.C. 793 (1982).

574 18 U.S.C. 794 (1982).

575 52118 U.S.C. 798 (1982).

576 5 U.S.C. 8312 (1994).

577 Geoffrey Stone, “Freedom of the Press v. National Security,” The 

Huffington Post, May 21, 2006. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-rstone/freedom-of-the-press-v-n_b_21382.html (accessed June 4, 2008).

578 Geoffrey Stone, “Freedom of the Press v. National Security.” 

579 Geoffrey Stone, “Freedom of the Press v. National Security.”

580 Atomic Energy Act, Pub. L. 83-703 (1954). 

581 Report of the Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure to the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence, 1978. http://intelligence.senate.gov/

pdfs/95national_security_secrets.pdf (accessed April 15, 2011).

582 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

583 Report of the Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure to the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence, 1978.

584 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Espionage Laws 

and Leaks, 96th Cong., 1st sess., January 24, 25, and 31, 1979.

585 Report to the National Security Council on Unauthorized Media Leak 

Disclosures, March 1996.

586 Bill Clinton, “Statement by the President to the House of 

Representatives,” November 4, 2000. http://www.fas.org/sjp/news/2000/11/

wh110400.html (accessed June 4, 2008). 
221

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

587 Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007, S.236, 110th 

Cong., 1st sess., (June 2007). http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/110/s/

s236.pdf (accessed June 4, 2008).

588 Improving America’s Security Act of 2007, S.4, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 

(March 2007), http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/110/s/s4.pdf (accessed 

June 4, 2008).

589 U.S. Bill of Rights.

590 U.S. Constitution, amend. 1. 

591 George Mason, “Virginia Declaration of Rights,” June 12, 1776. http://

www.constitution.org/bcp/virg_dor.htm (accessed June 4, 2008).

592 John Adams and Samuel Adams, “Constitution for the Commonwealth 

of Massachusetts,” June 15, 1780. http://www.lexrex.com/enlightened/laws/

mass1780/mass_main.html (accessed June 4, 2008).

593 Robert Kaiser, “Public Secrets,” Washington Post, June 11, 2006. 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/

AR2006060901976.html (accessed June 4, 2008).

594 Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for 

Congress: The Whistleblower Protection Act: An Overview (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, March 12, 2007). http://www.fas.org/sgp/

crs/natsec/RL33918.pdf (accessed June 8, 2008).

595 Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report 

for Congress: National Security Whistleblowers (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, December 30, 2005). http://www.nswbc.org/

Reports%20-%20Documents/NationalSecurityWhistleblowers(CRSReport).pdf

(accessed June 8, 2008).

596 Library of Congress, Bill Text 105th Congress (1997-1998) 

H.R.3694.ENR. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c105:6:./

temp/~c105KzoGY0:e55303: (accessed July 28, 2010).
222

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597 Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R.2102, 110th Cong., 1st 

sess., (October 2007). http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/110/h/h2102.

pdf (accessed June 4, 2008).

598 MaryAnn Spoto, “N.J. court rules blogger is not protected under shield 

law in porn company defamation case,” The Star-Ledger, April 22, 2010, 

http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/04/nj_court_rules_blogger_not 

_pro.html (accessed May 9, 2010).

599 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

600 National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States, 695 F. 

Supp. 1196 (1988).

601 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).

602 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 380 (1981).

603 Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).

604 Geoffrey Stone, “Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press.” 

605 Geoffrey Stone, “Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press.” 

606 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).

607 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).

608 Rachel Brand, “Statement Before the House Committee on the 

Judiciary Concerning H.R. 2102,” June 14, 2007, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/

mediashield/rlb-testimony061407.pdf (accessed June 4, 2008).

609 David Kravets, “Journalist Free After 226 Days in Prison,” San 

Diego Union Tribune, April 4, 2007, http://www.signonsandiego.com/

uniontrib/20070404/news_1n4jailed.html (accessed June 4, 2008).

610 Times Reporter Testifies On Leak, CBS News Online, September 30, 

2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/30/national/main892127.shtml

(accessed January 2, 2010).
223

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

611 David Kravets, “Journalist Free After 226 Days in Prison,” San Diego 

Union Tribune, April 4, 2007.

612 Pentagon Papers Case Dismissed, Time, May 21, 1973.

613 United States v. Samuel Loring Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (1985).

614 Vernon Loeb, “Clinton Ignored CIA in Pardoning Intelligence 

Analyst,” Washington Post, February 17, 2001, http://www.fas.org/sgp/

news/2001/02/wp021701.html (accessed June 4, 2008).

615 Spencer Hsu, “State Dept. contractor charged in leak to news 

organizations,” Washington Post, August 28, 2010, http://www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/27/AR2010082704602.

html (accessed October 21, 2010). 

616 Charlie Savage, “Ex-C.I.A. Officer Named in Disclosure Indictment,” 

New York Times, January 6, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/

us/07indict.html (accessed March 30, 2011).

617 U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Northern Division, 

“United States of America v. Thomas Andrews Drake,” April 14, 2010, 

http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2010/04/drake-indict.pdf (accessed May 9, 2010).

618 U.S. Department of Justice, Eastern District of Virginia, “News 

Release,” January 20, 2006, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/01-Jan

uaryPDFArchive/06/20060120franklinnr.pdf (accessed June 4, 2008).

619 United States v. Lawrence Anthony Franklin, Eastern District of 

Virginia, Criminal No. 1:05CR225, May 26, 2005. 

620 “Former FBI Contract Linguist Pleads Guilty to Leaking Classified 

Information to Blogger,” FBI, Baltimore Division, December 17, 2009, 

http://baltimore.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/ba121709.htm (accessed 

December 18, 2009).

621 Virginia: Navy Lawyer Is Guilty of Communicating Secret Information, 

New York Times, May 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/

washington/18brfs-navy.html (accessed June 4, 2008).
224

GARY ROSS

622 David S. Cloud, “U.S. Soldier charged with leaking Iraq war video,” 

Los Angeles Times, July 7, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/07/nation/

la-na-iraq-WikiLeaks-20100707 (accessed July 26, 2010). 

623 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

624 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

625 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

626 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

627 United States v. Progressive Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (1979).

628 “The Progressive H-Bomb Cover,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/File:The_Progressive_H-bomb_cover.jpg (accessed November 20, 2009).

629 Cable News Network, Inc. v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990).

630 CNN Found in Contempt for Use of Noriega Tapes, New York Times, 

November 2, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/02/us/cnn-found-incontempt-for-use-of-noriega-tapes.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

631 Cable News Network, Inc. v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990).

632 CNN Is Sentenced for Tapes And Makes Public Apology, New York 

Times, December 20, 1994, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C

0CE4DA1338F933A15751C1A962958260 (accessed June 4, 2008).

633 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 

634 Gabriel Schoenfeld, “Has the ‘New York Times’ Violated the Espionage 

Act?” 

635 Tim Hackler, “The Press and National Security Secrets: When Is 

It Right to Withhold the News?” Periscope, Summer 2006, http://www.

timhackler.com/press_national_security_secrets.html (accessed June 4, 2008).
225

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

636 Seymour Hersh, “Submarines of U.S. Stage Spy Missions Inside 

Soviet Waters,” New York Times, May 25, 1975, http://graphics.nytimes.com/

packages/pdf/weekinreview/19750525_HershNYT_Holystone.pdf (accessed 

June 4, 2008).

637 Edward Levi, “Memorandum for the President,” March 29, 1975, 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/preview/levi.html (accessed 

June 4, 2008).

638 Adam Liptak, “Cheney’s To-Do Lists, Then and Now,” New York Times, 

February 11, 2007.

639 Stephen Engelberg, “C.I.A. Director Requests Inquiry on NBC 

Report,” New York Times, May 20, 1986, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.

html?res=F50710FE385F0C738EDDAC0894DE484D81 (accessed June 4, 

2008).

640 Potter Stewart, “Or of the Pres,” Hastings Law Journal 26, no. 631 

(1975).

641 Potter Stewart, “Or of the Pres,” Hastings Law Journal 26, no. 631 

(1975).

642“Thomas Jefferson Second Inaugural Address,” The Avalon Project at 

Yale Law School.

643 Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist No. 84,” Constitution Society, 

http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa84.htm (accessed June 4, 2008)

227

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

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freedom-of-the-press-v-n_b_21382.html (accessed June 4, 2008).
248

GARY ROSS

__________. “Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press.” Harvard 

Law and Policy Review 1, no. 1 (Winter 2007). 

“Submarines,” Haze Gray and Underway. http://www.hazegray.org/faq/

smn7.htm#G12 (accessed June 8, 2008).

Sunstein, Cass. “Government Control of Information.” California Law 

Review 74, no. 889 (1986).

Supporting Intelligence and Law Enforcement Programs to Track 

Terrorists and Terrorist Finances, H.Res.895, 109th Cong, 1st sess, 

(June 2006). http://www.govtrack.us/ data/us/bills.text/109/hr/

hr895.pdf (accessed June 5, 2008).

“Supreme Court Denies Freedom in Spy Case,” New York Times, June 12, 

1988. http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/12/us/supreme-court-deniesfreedom-in-spy-case.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

“Thomas Jefferson on Politics and Government: Freedom of the Press.” 

University of Virginia Online Library. http://etext.virginia.edu/

jefferson/quotations/jeff1600.htm (accessed June 3, 2008).

“Thomas Jefferson Second Inaugural Address.” The Avalon Project at Yale 

Law School. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau2.asp

(accessed June 3, 2008).

“Times Reporter Testifies On Leak,” CBS News Online, September 

30, 2005. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/30/national/

main892127.shtml (accessed January 2, 2010).

“Top Secret The Battle for the Pentagon Papers.” USC Center on 

Communication Leadership. http://www.topsecretplay.org/index.

php/content/courts (accessed June 4, 2008).

“Transcript of General Hayden’s Interview with WTOP’s J.J. Green,” 

Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/

press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-2007/transcript-ofgeneral-haydens-interview-with-wtop.html (accessed June 5, 2008).
249

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

U.S. Air Force. January 11, 2005. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, 

Information Operations. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_

pubs/afdd2_5.pdf (accessed June 4, 2008).

U.S. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: 

Espionage Laws and Leaks. 96th Cong., 1st sess., January 24, 25, and 

31, 1979.

U.S. Congress. House. Rep. Dennie Oxley of Indiana speaking for the 

Resolution Supporting Intelligence and Law Enforcement Programs 

to Track Terrorists and Terrorist Financing, H.Res. 895, 109th 

Cong., 2nd sess.. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/ 2006_cr/h062906.

html (accessed June 8, 2008).

U.S. Congress. House. Rep. Louis Slaughter of New York speaking for the 

Resolution Supporting Intelligence and Law Enforcement Programs 

to Track Terrorists and Terrorist Financing, H.Res. 895, 109th 

Cong., 2nd sess. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/ 2006_cr/h062906.

html (accessed June 8, 2008).

U.S. Congress. House. Rep. Peter Hoekstra of Michigan speaking for the 

Resolution Supporting Intelligence and Law Enforcement Programs 

to Track Terrorists and Terrorist Financing, H.Res. 895, 109th 

Cong., 2nd sess. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/ 2006_cr/h062906.

html (accessed June 8, 2008).

U.S. Congress, Senate. Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act 

of 2007, S.236, 110th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 153 

(March 2007).

U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Examining DOJ’s 

Investigation of Journalists Who Publish Classified Information: 

Lessons from the Jack Anderson Case, 109th Congress, 2nd sess., 

June 6, 2006. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/ 2006_hr/journalists.

html (accessed June 8, 2008).

U.S. Congress, Senate. Report of the Commission on Protecting and 

Reducing Government Secrecy, 103rd Cong., 1997, S. Doc. 105-
250

GARY ROSS

2: Government Printing Office, 1997. http://www.access.gpo.gov/

congress/commissions/secrecy/index.html (accessed June 3, 2008).

U.S. Congress, Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing of the 

Committee on the Nomination of General Michael Hayden to be 

the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 110th Congress, 

1st sess., May 18, 2006. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/ 2006_

hr/051806transcript.pdf (accessed June 5, 2008).

U.S. Congress. Senate. Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama speaking for 

the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S.2507, 

106th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (6 December 2000): 

11649-51. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/ 2000_cr/s120600.html

(accessed June 8, 2008).

U.S. Department of Justice, Eastern District of Virginia, “News Release,” 

January 20, 2006. http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/01-

JanuaryPDFArchive/ 06/20060120franklinnr.pdf (accessed June 4, 

2008).

U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Northern Division, 

“United States of America v. Thomas Andrews Drake,” April 

14, 2010. http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2010/04/drake-indict.pdf

(accessed May 9, 2010).

U.S. Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy, February 22, 

2008. http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Information_Sharing_Strategy.

pdf (accessed June 3, 2008).

U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, 2005 Report on Cost 

Estimates for Security Classification Activities. http://www.archives.

gov/isoo/reports/2005-cost-report.html (accessed June 8, 2008).

U.S. National Security Council, National Security Council Meeting 

Minutes, October 7, 1974. http://fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/

document/nscmin/mscmin.html (accessed June 3, 2008).

Waas, Murray. “Is There a Double Standard On Leak Probes?” National 

Journal, April 25, 2006. http://news.nationaljournal.com/

articles/0425nj1.htm (accessed June 6, 2008).
251

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

Weiner, Tim. “CIA Severs Ties to 100 Foreign Agents,” New York Times, 

March 3, 1997. http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/03/us/cia-severs-tiesto-100-foreign-agents.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

Whatley, Frederick W. “Reagan, National Security, and the First 

Amendment: Plugging Leaks by Shutting Off the Main.” The CATO 

Institute. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa037.html (accessed June 5, 

2008).

Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R.985, 110th 

Cong., 1st sess. (March 2007). http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.

text/110/h/h985.pdf (accessed June 4, 2008).

Woodward, Bob. “A Journalist’s Perspective on Public Disclosures,” in 

“Intelligence ‘Leaks’,” Special issue, American Intelligence Journal

(1988).

__________. “McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure’.” Washington 

Post, September 21, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/article/2009/09/20/ AR2009092002920.html (accessed 

January 29, 2010).

__________. Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987. New York, NY: 

Simon and Schuster, 1987.

Woolsey, R. James. “National Security and Freedom of the Press” (panel 

interview at 2006 American Enterprise Institute Conference, 

Washington, DC, September 7, 2006). http://www.aei.org/events/

filter.,eventID.1383/transcript.asp (accessed June 5, 2008).

Xanders, Edward. “A Handyman’s Guide to Fixing National Security 

Leaks: An Analytical Framework for Evaluating Proposals to Curb 

Unauthorized Publication of Classified Information.” Virginia Law 

School, Journal of Law and Politics 5, no. 759 (1989). http://www.

gmsr.com/article/A%20Handyman’s%20Guide%20to%20Fixing%20

National%20Security%20Leaks.pdf (accessed June 5, 2008).
252

GARY ROSS

Zuckerman, Laurence. “Washington’s Master Leakers.” Time, May 23, 

1988. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,967475,00.

html (accessed June 6, 2008).
253

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

INDEX

A

ABC, 44, 55, 87, 104, 105, 172, 201, 206, 210, 215, 228

Agee, Philip, 16, 91, 92, 159, 203, 204, 222

American Society of Newspaper Editors, 12, 16, 83, 114, 119, 197, 200, 

231, 236

Anderson, Jack, 25, 66, 84, 185, 191, 193, 249

Ashcroft, John, 20, 23, 26, 79, 104, 120, 136, 181-183, 198, 209, 216, 227

B

Baquet, Dean, 33, 34, 39, 42, 62, 64, 99, 185, 195-197, 228

Bay of Pigs, 33, 34

Biden, Joseph, 19, 104

Bill of Rights, xii, xxiv, 1, 3, 16, 59, 100, 147, 156, 157, 221

Black, Hugo, 15, 32, 59 

Blackmun, Harry, 91, 147

Blair, Dennis, 5, 6, 83, 176, 199, 228

Bradlee, Ben, 41, 42, 48, 51, 64-67, 70, 71, 125-130, 188, 189, 191, 195, 

198, 228, 232

BROADSIDE, 84, 100

Brokaw, Tom, 7, 61, 177, 195, 228

Burger, Warren, 42, 121

Bush, George W., xiv, xviii, xx, 9, 40 43, 53, 54, 57, 68, 87-89, 102, 103, 

105, 108, 118, 142, 179, 188, 193, 210, 227, 244

Bush, George H.W., 81, 199, 229

BUTANE, 25

C

Carter, Jimmy, 54-56

Casey, William, 6, 29, 45, 50, 61, 63, 66, 82, 96, 104, 108, 113, 114, 116, 

128, 130, 131, 167, 176, 190, 195, 205, 213, 214, 229

CBS, xliii, 43, 67, 72, 111, 118, 170, 175, 188, 212, 215, 223, 229, 232, 248

CELOTEX, 25

Cheney, Dick, 54, 87, 116, 118, 166, 192, 225, 238, 245

Chicago Tribune, 95, 96, 136, 166

Choosing White-Collar Crime, 27, 46, 184, 189, 247
254

GARY ROSS

CIA detention facilities, 11, 43, 68, 111

Clinton, Bill, 37, 50, 80, 88, 120, 142, 155, 162, 199, 220, 223, 230

Cohen, William, 20, 181, 230

Colby, William, 6, 29, 50, 63, 66, 84, 85, 92, 112, 115 

Commentary, 15, 99, 111, 180, 208, 246

Confirmation Bias, 121, 122, 127, 129, 132, 137, 216, 230

Coolidge Report, 18-21, 30, 51

Cronkite, Walter, 7, 61, 177, 195, 228

Curveball, 110, 111, 117, 212, 232

D

Denniston, Lyle, 39, 40, 187, 231

Deutch, John, 38, 63, 81, 195, 199

Dialogue Group, 141-143, 145

Diaz, Matthew, 163, 164

Douglas, William, 32

Downie, Len, 68, 83, 126, 130, 200, 231

Drake, Thomas, 58, 162, 194, 223, 240, 250

Doder, Dusko, 48

E

Eisenhowser, Dwight D., 32, 83, 154

Ellsberg, Daniel, 17, 25, 26, 35, 36, 67, 161, 164

Equilibrium Model, 135, 136

Espionage Act, xv, xli, 15-17, 24, 50, 60, 76, 80, 120, 121, 144, 152, 153, 

155, 156, 161-164, 169, 180, 197, 224, 231, 246

F

Family Jewels, 25, 36, 37, 183, 186, 229

First Amendment, xii, xlii, 1, 6, 8, 13-15, 24, 49, 58-60, 100, 131, 132, 138, 

144, 145, 156, 158-160, 175, 177, 194, 197, 200, 204, 218, 231, 233, 

237, 247, 251

Ford, Gerald, 9, 36, 37, 81, 155, 166

Franklin, Larry, 162, 223

Free Flow of Information Act, 119, 158, 222, 232
255

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

G

GAMMA GUPPY, 84

Gates, Robert, xix, xxxii, 9, 10, 19, 63, 80, 102, 113, 116, 145, 173, 178, 

181, 195, 199, 205, 213, 215, 218, 231, 232

Glomar Explorer, 84, 85, 114, 115, 214, 243

Goss, Porter, 82, 85, 113, 116, 199, 201, 215, 233 

Graham, Katharine, 7, 32, 33, 39, 40, 41, 42, 61, 66, 67, 83, 94, 130, 176, 

185, 187, 188, 195, 197, 200, 204, 233

GREEK ISLAND, 115

H

Hayden, Michael, ix, 25, 29, 37, 58, 80, 85, 91, 96, 97, 110, 141, 142, 146, 

184, 203, 205, 206, 208, 212, 217, 218, 234, 244, 248, 250 

Hersh, Seymour, 43, 66, 117, 167, 215, 225, 232, 234

Hoekstra, Peter, 43, 58, 110, 111, 120, 188, 212, 216, 235, 249

HOLYSTONE, 136, 166, 225

HPSCI, 9, 37, 57, 58, 61, 63, 95, 111, 120, 158, 184, 195, 198, 217, 240

Hume, Brit, 25, 104

I

Isikoff, Michael, 98, 207

IVY BELLS, 28, 42, 65, 66, 125-133, 167

J

Jefferson, Thomas, 3, 4, 9, 116, 168, 175, 215, 225, 248

K

Kaiser, Robert, 42, 188, 221

Keller, Bill, xxxiv, 5, 34, 39, 44, 45, 62, 64, 68, 69, 174, 176, 185, 195-197, 

228, 235, 236

Kennedy, John F., 32-34, 72

Kim, Stephen, 17, 162

Koppel, Ted, 7, 61, 177, 195, 228

L

Leahy, Patrick, 51, 57, 104, 178, 180, 182, 183, 234

Leibowitz, Samuel, 163

Libby, Scooter, 54, 118, 177, 237
256

GARY ROSS

Lichtblau, Eric, 11, 12, 39, 40, 43, 45, 57, 59, 69, 169, 179, 193, 194, 202, 

238, 244

Los Angeles Times, 33, 39, 42, 60-62, 66, 72, 80, 84, 99, 115, 142, 174, 185, 

206, 207, 217, 224, 228, 240

Lunev, Stanislav, 40, 41, 47, 120

M

Madison, James, 1, 60, 157, 175, 236 

MAGIC, 95

Manning, Bradley, xxxviii-xli, 98, 163, 164, 174, 206

McConnell, Michael, 22, 102, 209, 239

MERLIN, 88

Miller, Judith, xxxviii, 118, 161, 173, 215

Morison, Samuel, 17, 59, 60, 81, 101, 121, 161, 194, 195, 199, 208, 216, 

223, 243

N

National Newspaper Association, 31, 61, 79, 80, 184, 195, 198, 217, 240

NBC, 42, 66, 67, 131, 167, 225

Nelson, Jack, 39, 60, 66, 80, 142, 187, 190, 192, 194, 198, 207, 217, 240

New York Times, xiv, xx, xxix, xxxi-xxxviii, xlii, 5, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 31, 33, 

34, 36-45, 53, 57, 59-64, 66-72, 83, 84, 87-89, 96, 97, 100-103, 108, 

112, 115-118, 126, 128, 136, 147, 161, 164, 166-176, 179-181, 184-

195, 197, 201-211, 213, 215, 219, 220, 223, 224, 225, 228, 229-230, 

233, 236, 238-240, 242, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 251

Newspaper Association of America, 31, 61, 79, 80, 184, 195, 198, 217, 240

Newsweek, 66, 67, 98, 99, 206, 207

Nixon, Richard, 9, 25, 31, 32, 36, 41, 164, 166, 177, 240

O

Obama, Barack, xxxii, 9, 51, 101, 102, 148, 202, 237

OBELISK, 87

Open Source Center, 12, 179, 241

P

Paine, Thomas, 2, 3, 9, 49, 175, 231

Pelton, Ronald, 48, 66, 125, 126, 128, 130, 131
257

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

Pentagon Papers, xii, xx, 25, 26, 29, 31, 33, 35, 36, 40-42, 44, 59, 67, 147, 

164, 166, 180, 183, 185, 186, 223, 242, 248

Perry, William, 56, 89, 90, 93, 203, 204, 242

Pike Committee, 37, 126

Plame, Valerie, 54, 118

Priest, Dana, xxxviii, 11, 12, 39, 43, 57, 59, 68, 111, 173, 179, 190, 194, 

197, 212, 243

Progressive, 100, 165, 208, 224, 243

PURPLE, 95

R

Reagan, Ronald, 9, 55, 66, 95, 104, 105, 109, 125, 127, 130, 204, 251

Reno, Janet, 10, 18, 20, 107, 178, 180, 210, 251

Risen, James, 11, 12, 43, 45, 46, 49, 57, 60, 88, 89, 179, 193, 194, 202, 238, 

244

Rockefeller, James, 37, 52, 53

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 96

Rumsfeld, Donald, 93, 166, 201, 204, 245

S

Schlesinger, James, 25, 80, 104, 209, 245

Schoenfeld, Gabriel, xvii, xlii, 111, 180, 197, 202, 208, 212, 224, 246

SHAMROCK, 11

Shelby, Richard, 50, 120, 142, 155, 190, 216, 250

SIGINT 101, xviii-xxi, 141-143

Society of Professional Journalists, xxxviii, 6, 31, 61, 96, 114, 174, 176, 

184, 190, 195, 205, 213, 214, 229, 230

Specter, Arlen, 34, 57

SSCI, 7, 10, 20, 23, 37, 50, 52, 53, 57, 107, 158, 177, 178, 195, 228

Stevens, John Paul, 121

Stewart, Potter, 5, 14, 30, 32, 49, 59, 100, 107, 147, 164, 167, 168, 225, 247

Stone, Geoffrey, 13, 135, 159, 160, 169, 179, 194, 217, 220, 222, 247

Sunstein, Cass, 135, 136, 217, 248

SWIFT, 11, 12, 33, 40, 42, 53, 69, 87

T

Tenet, George, 99

Terrorist Surveillance Program, 40, 44, 45, 68, 88
258

GARY ROSS

Time, 66, 67, 85, 115, 178, 180, 183, 186, 192, 205, 210, 211, 214, 223, 229, 

237, 252

Truman, Harry, 9

Turner, Stansfield, 110

U

U.S. Constitution, xviii, xxiv, xlil, 1, 3, 13, 59, 144, 145, 147, 156, 175, 221

USA Today, 70, 118, 179, 188, 215

W

Washington Post, xiv, xviii, xx, xxxviii, 7 11, 17, 25, 31, 33, 36, 40-43, 45, 

48, 50, 51, 55, 57, 59, 64,-68, 70, 71, 83, 84, 88, 89, 92, 94, 95, 100-

104, 109, 111, 115, 120, 125, 126, 130, 131, 142, 160, 161, 164, 170, 

171, 176-180, 190, 192, 194, 199, 202, 203, 208, 210, 212, 213, 214, 

221-223, 233, 235, 237, 240, 241, 242, 243, 251

Washington Times, 104, 122

Webster, William, 48, 71

Whistleblower Protection Act, 57, 157, 158, 221, 238

White, Byron, 15

WikiLeaks, v, xvii-xxxix, 22, 46, 47, 62, 63, 96-98, 107, 108, 112, 144, 163, 

170-175, 182, 189, 205, 206, 210, 211, 213, 218, 224, 233, 237, 238, 

241, 242, 246, 247

Wilkinson, Harvie, 59, 60, 81, 101, 103

Willard Group, 19, 21, 23, 136, 146

WMD Commission, 6, 83, 90, 106, 110, 113, 116

Woodward, Bob, xxiv, 45, 51, 58, 64, 65, 71, 94, 101, 123-130, 132, 133, 

191, 194, 196, 204, 208, 216, 217, 251

Woolsey, James, 63, 93, 96, 204, 205, 251

Wright Commission, 18, 154

Y

Yurchenko, Vitaly, 64, 166
259

WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN?

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Gary Ross is a Special Agent with the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security. His academic background includes a Master of Science of Strategic 

Intelligence (MSSI) degree from the National Intelligence University and a 

Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree from Michigan State University, with a dual 

major in Criminal Justice and Psychology. He has completed advanced 

training at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, the Joint 

Counterintelligence Training Academy, and the Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Center. 

During his 20-year career in federal law enforcement, Mr. Ross has conducted and supervised criminal, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism 

investigations and operations with the Department of Homeland Security, 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Department of Labor. He was a recipient of the 

Department of Defense Team Award for National Security Investigations 

in 2007 and the Director of Central Intelligence Team Award for Countering Foreign Denial and Deception in 2003.

Among the places Gary has called home are Chicago, IL; Poulsbo, WA; 

Yokosuka, Japan; and Springboro, OH. He currently resides in Montclair, 

VA, with his wife and three daughters. Looking at the stamps in his passport, 

work has taken him to Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Singapore, 

Indonesia, Bahrain, England, Italy, and Mexico. He has been afloat on an 

aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean and submersed in a Trident submarine 

in the Hood Canal. 

The author can be contacted by e-mail at gary.ross@ymail.com. He 

welcomes comments about his research from readers interested in the vital 

topic of national security and the media.

PCN273891 GPO Stock Number: 008-020-01606-3

Library of Congress Control Number: 2011930973

I see powerful echoes of what I personally experienced as Director of NSA and 

CIA. I only wish I had access to this fully developed intellectual framework and 

the courses of action it suggests while still in government.

—General Michael V. Hayden (retired)

Former Director of the CIA

 Director of the NSA

 e problem of secrecy is double edged and places key institutions and values of 

our democracy into collision. On the one hand, our country operates under a broad 

consensus that secrecy is antithetical to democratic rule and can encourage a variety 

of political deformations. But the obvious pitfalls are not the end of the story. A long 

list of abuses notwithstanding, secrecy, like openness, remains an essential prerequisite 

of self-governance. Ross’s study is a welcome and timely addition to the small body of 

literature examining this important subject. 

 —Gabriel Schoenfeld

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute

Author of Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, 

and the Rule of Law (W.W. Norton, May 2010).

The topic of unauthorized disclosures continues to receive significant attention 

at the highest levels of government. In his book, Mr. Ross does an excellent 

job identifying the categories of harm to the intelligence community associated 

with these disclosures. A detailed framework for addressing the issue is also 

proposed. This book is a must read for those concerned about the implications 

of unauthorized disclosures to U.S. national security.

—William A. Parquette

Foreign Denial and Deception Committee

National Intelligence Council 

Gary Ross has pulled together in this splendid book all the raw material needed 

to spark a fresh discussion between the government and the media on how 

to function under our unique system of government in this ever-evolving 

information-rich environment.

—Benjamin Shore

Retired newspaper journalist and editor